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From: Daniel Fett <fett@danielfett.de>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/E30h-_-RvtMdeccWR54kExXkw20>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] High-quality OAuth client libraries
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Hi all,

I'd like to draw your attention to a discussion that came up in the
OpenID Foundation's FAPI working group.

As you know, FAPI mostly builds upon standardized OAuth and OIDC
features. Nonetheless, it is hard to find client libraries that can be
used "out of the box" with a FAPI. Many client libraries only support a
very limited subset of features, lacking support even, for example, for
PKCE. And for many common languages or frameworks, only one or two
maintained libraries exist at all.

This means that many client implementers still have to roll their own
code for OAuth and OIDC integrations, with the well-known consequences
for security and interoperability.

As Dave pointed out on today's FAPI call, high-quality libraries would
likely be a huge boost for security in the OAuth/OIDC space.

I'd like to invite you to join the discussion over at the FAPI working
group:
https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/issues/433/track-fapi-compliant-rp-libraries

-Daniel

-- 
https://danielfett.de


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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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  <body>
    <p>Hi all,</p>
    <p>I'd like to draw your attention to a discussion that came up in
      the OpenID Foundation's FAPI working group.</p>
    <p>As you know, FAPI mostly builds upon standardized OAuth and OIDC
      features. Nonetheless, it is hard to find client libraries that
      can be used "out of the box" with a FAPI. Many client libraries
      only support a very limited subset of features, lacking support
      even, for example, for PKCE. And for many common languages or
      frameworks, only one or two maintained libraries exist at all.<br>
    </p>
    <p>This means that many client implementers still have to roll their
      own code for OAuth and OIDC integrations, with the well-known
      consequences for security and interoperability. </p>
    <p>As Dave pointed out on today's FAPI call, high-quality libraries
      would likely be a huge boost for security in the OAuth/OIDC space.<br>
    </p>
    <p>I'd like to invite you to join the discussion over at the FAPI
      working group:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/issues/433/track-fapi-compliant-rp-libraries">https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/issues/433/track-fapi-compliant-rp-libraries</a></p>
    <p>-Daniel<br>
    </p>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://danielfett.de">https://danielfett.de</a></pre>
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--_000_SA1PR09MB8142EE930B12FEC13FE64150A7F19SA1PR09MB8142namp_
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All,

MITRE, in support of the U.S. Government, has developed tailored OAuth 2.0 =
Token Exchange profiles for use in an enterprise environment. These documen=
ts build on the OAuth 2.0 profile<https://www.mitre.org/publications/techni=
cal-papers/enterprise-mission-tailored-oauth-20-and-openid-connect-profiles=
> MITRE released whose requirements have been incorporated into OAuth 2.1. =
The documents enable =93identity chaining=94 by ensuring that the identitie=
s of the user, client, and protected resources are propagated in the issued=
 access tokens to make appropriate access decisions.

Token and Identity Chaining between Protected Resources in a Single ICAM Ec=
osytem using OAuth Token Exchange<https://www.mitre.org/publications/techni=
cal-papers/token-and-identity-chaining-between-protected-resources-in-a-sin=
gle-icam-ecosystem-using-oauth-token-exchange>
Token and Identity Chaining between Protected Resources in a Multiple ICAM =
Ecosytem using OAuth Token Exchange<https://www.mitre.org/publications/tech=
nical-papers/token-and-identity-chaining-between-protected-resources-in-a-m=
ultiple-icam-ecosystem-using-oauth-token-exchange>

Please note, we will be working with the standards bodies to move these con=
cepts forward. These current profiles and this email should be considered a=
s informational as we seek additional feedback from Subject Matter Experts =
throughout the Community. We welcome your comments and suggestions at OAuth=
OIDCProfiles@groups.mitre.org<mailto:OAuthOIDCProfiles@groups.mitre.org> .

Regards,
Kelley Burgin, Ph.D.
Cybersecurity Engineer
The MITRE Corporation
(571) 424 - 8642

--_000_SA1PR09MB8142EE930B12FEC13FE64150A7F19SA1PR09MB8142namp_
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<html xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:sc=
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<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72" style=3D"word-wrap:=
break-word">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">All,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">MITRE, in support of the U.S. Government, has develo=
ped tailored OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange profiles for use in an enterprise env=
ironment. These documents build on the
<a href=3D"https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/enterprise-m=
ission-tailored-oauth-20-and-openid-connect-profiles">
OAuth 2.0 profile</a> MITRE released whose requirements have been incorpora=
ted into OAuth 2.1. The documents enable =93identity chaining=94 by ensurin=
g that the identities of the user, client, and protected resources are prop=
agated in the issued access tokens to
 make appropriate access decisions. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black"><a href=
=3D"https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/token-and-identity-=
chaining-between-protected-resources-in-a-single-icam-ecosystem-using-oauth=
-token-exchange" title=3D"https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-pape=
rs/token-and-identity-chaining-between-protected-resources-in-a-single-icam=
-ecosystem-using-oauth-token-exchange"><span style=3D"color:#0563C1"><br>
Token and Identity Chaining between Protected Resources&nbsp;in&nbsp;a Sing=
le ICAM Ecosytem using OAuth Token Exchange</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:black"><a href=
=3D"https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/token-and-identity-=
chaining-between-protected-resources-in-a-multiple-icam-ecosystem-using-oau=
th-token-exchange" title=3D"https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-pa=
pers/token-and-identity-chaining-between-protected-resources-in-a-multiple-=
icam-ecosystem-using-oauth-token-exchange"><span style=3D"color:#0563C1">To=
ken
 and Identity Chaining between Protected Resources&nbsp;in&nbsp;a Multiple =
ICAM Ecosytem using OAuth Token Exchange</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Please note, we will be working with the standards b=
odies to move these concepts forward. These current profiles and this email=
 should be considered as informational as we seek additional feedback from =
Subject Matter Experts throughout
 the Community. We welcome your comments and suggestions at <a href=3D"mail=
to:OAuthOIDCProfiles@groups.mitre.org">
OAuthOIDCProfiles@groups.mitre.org</a> .<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Regards,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Kelley Burgin, Ph.D.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Cybersecurity Engineer<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The MITRE Corporation<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">(571) 424 - 8642<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_SA1PR09MB8142EE930B12FEC13FE64150A7F19SA1PR09MB8142namp_--


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From: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt@backbase.com>
Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 17:49:57 +0300
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs
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Hello,

When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound access
token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinction between
these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401 Unauthorized with
WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error="invalid_token"? or could we use
error="invalid_dpop_proof", similar to token request? or maybe even 400 Bad
Request?

Regards,
Dmitry

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hello,</div><div><br></div><div>When a protected reso=
urce is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound access token, either of thos=
e could be invalid. Should we make distinction between these two cases? I.e=
. should the response always be a 401 Unauthorized with WWW-Authenticate: D=
PoP ... error=3D&quot;invalid_token&quot;? or could we use error=3D&quot;in=
valid_dpop_proof&quot;, similar to token request? or maybe even 400 Bad Req=
uest?</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>Dmitry</div><div><br></di=
v></div>

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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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--00000000000008c12105c9123e8b
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I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity
Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.

To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
functionalities that IdPs provide such as:

- Email verification on registration
- Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
- Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users that
are logged in


These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an
industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The
purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and
implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.



Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
verify their email address

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
verification code to verify their email address

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
reset their password

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
verification code to reset their password

--00000000000008c12105c9123e8b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"auto">I propose that we expand upon specific =
functionality provided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by th=
em.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">To start with, there=
 should be clear specifications for various functionalities that IdPs provi=
de such as:</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">- Email veri=
fication on registration</div><div dir=3D"auto">- Specifications regarding =
&quot;forgot password&quot; functionality</div><div dir=3D"auto">- Specific=
ations regarding &quot;resest password&quot; functionality for users that a=
re logged in</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><=
div dir=3D"auto">These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, a=
nd allow an industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must fol=
low. The purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently use=
d and implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.</div><div dir=
=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div=
><div dir=3D"auto">Some problems that would be addressed by these specifica=
tions=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt;line-height:1.5">would be:</span><=
/div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">- How to securely implem=
ent functionality where a user is sent a link to verify their email address=
</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"b=
ackground-color:rgb(255,255,255)">How to securely implement functionality w=
here a user is sent a verification code to verify their email address</span=
></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"=
font-size:12pt;line-height:1.5">How to securely implement functionality whe=
re a user is sent a link to reset their password</span><div dir=3D"auto"><b=
r></div><div dir=3D"auto">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255)">How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a veri=
fication code to reset their password</span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></d=
iv></div><div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
"><br></span></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br style=3D"font-family:-apple-system=
,helveticaneue;font-size:16px"></div></div>

--00000000000008c12105c9123e8b--


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From: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
To: "kevatshah@gmail.com" <kevatshah@gmail.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/HhhJ5zerNxCUC5MnYj6ZAcwnJ1Q>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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--_000_SA2PR00MB1002CDBCD5BBA402BE398F4595F69SA2PR00MB1002namp_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.

tim
________________________________
From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gma=
il.com>
Sent: Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
To: oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

Some people who received this message don't often get email from kevatshah@=
gmail.com. Learn why this is important<http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdenti=
fication>
I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity P=
roviders (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.

To start with, there should be clear specifications for various functionali=
ties that IdPs provide such as:

- Email verification on registration
- Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
- Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users that a=
re logged in


These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an indus=
try-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The purpose =
of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and implemented=
 flows that are secure and widely reusable.



Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to ve=
rify their email address

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificati=
on code to verify their email address

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to re=
set their password

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificati=
on code to reset their password




--_000_SA2PR00MB1002CDBCD5BBA402BE398F4595F69SA2PR00MB1002namp_
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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
tim</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%" tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> OAuth &lt;oauth-bounc=
es@ietf.org&gt; on behalf of Kevat Shah &lt;kevatshah@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37<br>
<b>To:</b> oauth@ietf.org &lt;oauth@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div>
<table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" width=3D"100%" alig=
n=3D"left" style=3D"border:0; display:table; width:100%; table-layout:fixed=
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<td valign=3D"middle" width=3D"1px" bgcolor=3D"#A6A6A6" cellpadding=3D"7px =
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</td>
<td valign=3D"middle" width=3D"100%" bgcolor=3D"#EAEAEA" cellpadding=3D"7px=
 5px 7px 15px" color=3D"#212121" style=3D"width:100%; background-color:#EAE=
AEA; padding:7px 5px 7px 15px; font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal,Segoe UI,Sego=
e WP,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif; font-size:12px; font-weight:normal; color:#21=
2121; text-align:left; word-wrap:break-word">
<div>Some people who received this message don't often get email from kevat=
shah@gmail.com.
<a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification">Learn why this is =
important</a></div>
</td>
<td valign=3D"middle" align=3D"left" width=3D"75px" bgcolor=3D"#EAEAEA" cel=
lpadding=3D"7px 5px 7px 5px" color=3D"#212121" style=3D"width:75px; backgro=
und-color:#EAEAEA; padding:7px 5px 7px 5px; font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal,=
Segoe UI,Segoe WP,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif; font-size:12px; font-weight:norm=
al; color:#212121; text-align:left; word-wrap:break-word">
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<div>
<div dir=3D"auto">
<div dir=3D"auto">I propose that we expand upon specific functionality prov=
ided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">To start with, there should be clear specifications for v=
arious functionalities that IdPs provide such as:</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Email verification on registration</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Specifications regarding &quot;forgot password&quot; fu=
nctionality</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&quot; fu=
nctionality for users that are logged in</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, =
and allow an industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must fo=
llow. The purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently us=
ed and implemented flows that are
 secure and widely reusable.</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">Some problems that would be addressed by these specificat=
ions&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size:12pt; line-height:1.5">would be:</span><=
/div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- How to securely implement functionality where a user is=
 sent a link to verify their email address</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification=
 code to verify their email address</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size:12pt; line-height:1.5">Ho=
w to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to reset =
their password</span>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification=
 code to reset their password</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br>
</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br style=3D"font-size:16px">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_SA2PR00MB1002CDBCD5BBA402BE398F4595F69SA2PR00MB1002namp_--


From nobody Mon Aug  9 13:03:43 2021
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From: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 16:03:22 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMEL4ivHb8vsZz3TVSELsiFtPc=NZ0cmvwP7-gKg1=cOKUUrbg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/gTwt--_HAaBe4AUjIKyhTj5nTuQ>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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--0000000000004b1d1205c925e15a
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That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards for
most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it make
sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C
standards don't exist?

- Kevat

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.
>
> tim
> ------------------------------
> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Kevat Shah <
> kevatshah@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
> *To:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>
> Some people who received this message don't often get email from
> kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is important
> <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
> I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity
> Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.
>
> To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
> functionalities that IdPs provide such as:
>
> - Email verification on registration
> - Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
> - Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users that
> are logged in
>
>
> These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an
> industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The
> purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and
> implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.
>
>
>
> Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:
>
> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
> verify their email address
>
> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
> verification code to verify their email address
>
> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
> reset their password
>
> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
> verification code to reset their password
>
>
>
>

--0000000000004b1d1205c925e15a
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto"><div>That&#39;s a good point. Is it fair to assume that W=
3C owns the standards for most (if not all) standards related to Identity P=
roviders? Or does it make sense for IETF to start setting these standards i=
n cases where W3C standards don&#39;t exist?</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></d=
iv><div dir=3D"auto">- Kevat<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote" dir=3D"auto"=
><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cap=
palli &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com">Tim.Cappalli@micros=
oft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">




<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:r=
gb(0,0,0)">
I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:r=
gb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:12pt;color:r=
gb(0,0,0)">
tim</div>
<div id=3D"m_-6708358250069876788appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%">
<div id=3D"m_-6708358250069876788divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"C=
alibri, sans-serif" style=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b>=
 OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=
=3D"noreferrer">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Kevat Shah &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
>kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noref=
errer">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_=
blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</font>
<div>=C2=A0</div>
</div>
<div>
<table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" width=3D"100%" alig=
n=3D"left" style=3D"border:0;display:table;width:100%;table-layout:fixed;bo=
rder-collapse:seperate;float:none">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign=3D"middle" width=3D"1px" bgcolor=3D"#A6A6A6" cellpadding=3D"7px =
2px 7px 2px" style=3D"padding:7px 2px 7px 2px;background-color:#a6a6a6">
</td>
<td valign=3D"middle" width=3D"100%" bgcolor=3D"#EAEAEA" cellpadding=3D"7px=
 5px 7px 15px" color=3D"#212121" style=3D"width:100%;background-color:#eaea=
ea;padding:7px 5px 7px 15px;font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal,Segoe UI,Segoe W=
P,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:12px;font-weight:normal;color:#212121;t=
ext-align:left;word-wrap:break-word">
<div>Some people who received this message don&#39;t often get email from <=
a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">=
kevatshah@gmail.com</a>.
<a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" target=3D"_blank" =
rel=3D"noreferrer">Learn why this is important</a></div>
</td>
<td valign=3D"middle" align=3D"left" width=3D"75px" bgcolor=3D"#EAEAEA" cel=
lpadding=3D"7px 5px 7px 5px" color=3D"#212121" style=3D"width:75px;backgrou=
nd-color:#eaeaea;padding:7px 5px 7px 5px;font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal,Seg=
oe UI,Segoe WP,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:12px;font-weight:normal;co=
lor:#212121;text-align:left;word-wrap:break-word">
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<div>
<div dir=3D"auto">
<div dir=3D"auto">I propose that we expand upon specific functionality prov=
ided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">To start with, there should be clear specifications for v=
arious functionalities that IdPs provide such as:</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Email verification on registration</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Specifications regarding &quot;forgot password&quot; fu=
nctionality</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&quot; fu=
nctionality for users that are logged in</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, =
and allow an industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must fo=
llow. The purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently us=
ed and implemented flows that are
 secure and widely reusable.</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">Some problems that would be addressed by these specificat=
ions=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt;line-height:1.5">would be:</span></=
div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- How to securely implement functionality where a user is=
 sent a link to verify their email address</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification=
 code to verify their email address</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt;line-height:1.5">How=
 to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to reset t=
heir password</span>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification=
 code to reset their password</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br>
</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br style=3D"font-size:16px">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div></div></div>

--0000000000004b1d1205c925e15a--


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From: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
To: "kevatshah@gmail.com" <kevatshah@gmail.com>
CC: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/fs2lOMSp85cwd_ZrGgKVoBB_CX0>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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--_000_SA2PR00MB1002E3A84B7848E01676B3C295F69SA2PR00MB1002namp_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and magic=
 link type "stuff" happens in W3C.

There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset endpoin=
t discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.
________________________________
From: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
To: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is impor=
tant<http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards for m=
ost (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it make s=
ense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C standards=
 don't exist?

- Kevat

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com<mailt=
o:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>> wrote:
I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.

tim
________________________________
From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>> on beha=
lf of Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com<mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com>>
Sent: Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
To: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf=
.org>>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

Some people who received this message don't often get email from kevatshah@=
gmail.com<mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com>. Learn why this is important<http://a=
ka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity P=
roviders (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.

To start with, there should be clear specifications for various functionali=
ties that IdPs provide such as:

- Email verification on registration
- Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
- Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users that a=
re logged in


These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an indus=
try-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The purpose =
of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and implemented=
 flows that are secure and widely reusable.



Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to ve=
rify their email address

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificati=
on code to verify their email address

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to re=
set their password

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificati=
on code to reset their password




--_000_SA2PR00MB1002E3A84B7848E01676B3C295F69SA2PR00MB1002namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and magic=
 link type &quot;stuff&quot; happens in W3C.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset endpoin=
t discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%" tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Kevat Shah &lt;kevats=
hah@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03<br>
<b>To:</b> Tim Cappalli &lt;Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> oauth@ietf.org &lt;oauth@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div>
<table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" width=3D"100%" alig=
n=3D"left" style=3D"border:0; display:table; width:100%; table-layout:fixed=
; border-collapse:seperate; float:none">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign=3D"middle" width=3D"1px" bgcolor=3D"#A6A6A6" cellpadding=3D"7px =
2px 7px 2px" style=3D"padding:7px 2px 7px 2px; background-color:#A6A6A6">
</td>
<td valign=3D"middle" width=3D"100%" bgcolor=3D"#EAEAEA" cellpadding=3D"7px=
 5px 7px 15px" color=3D"#212121" style=3D"width:100%; background-color:#EAE=
AEA; padding:7px 5px 7px 15px; font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal,Segoe UI,Sego=
e WP,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif; font-size:12px; font-weight:normal; color:#21=
2121; text-align:left; word-wrap:break-word">
<div>You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com. <a href=3D"http://=
aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification">
Learn why this is important</a></div>
</td>
<td valign=3D"middle" align=3D"left" width=3D"75px" bgcolor=3D"#EAEAEA" cel=
lpadding=3D"7px 5px 7px 5px" color=3D"#212121" style=3D"width:75px; backgro=
und-color:#EAEAEA; padding:7px 5px 7px 5px; font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal,=
Segoe UI,Segoe WP,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif; font-size:12px; font-weight:norm=
al; color:#212121; text-align:left; word-wrap:break-word">
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<div>
<div dir=3D"auto">
<div>That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards =
for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it m=
ake sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C stan=
dards don't exist?</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Kevat<br>
<br>
<div class=3D"x_gmail_quote" dir=3D"auto">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"x_gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Ca=
ppalli &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com">Tim.Cappalli@micro=
soft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"x_gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex; border-left=
:1px #ccc solid; padding-left:1ex">
<div dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt; color=
:rgb(0,0,0)">
I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt; color=
:rgb(0,0,0)">
<br>
</div>
<div style=3D"font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:12pt; color=
:rgb(0,0,0)">
tim</div>
<div id=3D"x_m_-6708358250069876788appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id=3D"x_m_-6708358250069876788divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D=
"Calibri, sans-serif" color=3D"#000000" style=3D"font-size:11pt"><b>From:</=
b> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" re=
l=3D"noreferrer">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf
 of Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank"=
 rel=3D"noreferrer">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noref=
errer">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_=
blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div>
<table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" width=3D"100%" alig=
n=3D"left" style=3D"border:0; display:table; width:100%; table-layout:fixed=
; border-collapse:seperate; float:none">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign=3D"middle" width=3D"1px" bgcolor=3D"#A6A6A6" cellpadding=3D"7px =
2px 7px 2px" style=3D"padding:7px 2px 7px 2px; background-color:#a6a6a6">
</td>
<td valign=3D"middle" width=3D"100%" bgcolor=3D"#EAEAEA" cellpadding=3D"7px=
 5px 7px 15px" color=3D"#212121" style=3D"width:100%; background-color:#eae=
aea; padding:7px 5px 7px 15px; font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal,Segoe UI,Sego=
e WP,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif; font-size:12px; font-weight:normal; color:#21=
2121; text-align:left; word-wrap:break-word">
<div>Some people who received this message don't often get email from <a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">
kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentific=
ation" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">
Learn why this is important</a></div>
</td>
<td valign=3D"middle" align=3D"left" width=3D"75px" bgcolor=3D"#EAEAEA" cel=
lpadding=3D"7px 5px 7px 5px" color=3D"#212121" style=3D"width:75px; backgro=
und-color:#eaeaea; padding:7px 5px 7px 5px; font-family:wf_segoe-ui_normal,=
Segoe UI,Segoe WP,Tahoma,Arial,sans-serif; font-size:12px; font-weight:norm=
al; color:#212121; text-align:left; word-wrap:break-word">
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<div>
<div dir=3D"auto">
<div dir=3D"auto">I propose that we expand upon specific functionality prov=
ided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">To start with, there should be clear specifications for v=
arious functionalities that IdPs provide such as:</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Email verification on registration</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Specifications regarding &quot;forgot password&quot; fu=
nctionality</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&quot; fu=
nctionality for users that are logged in</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, =
and allow an industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must fo=
llow. The purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently us=
ed and implemented flows that are
 secure and widely reusable.</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">Some problems that would be addressed by these specificat=
ions&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size:12pt; line-height:1.5">would be:</span><=
/div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">- How to securely implement functionality where a user is=
 sent a link to verify their email address</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification=
 code to verify their email address</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size:12pt; line-height:1.5">Ho=
w to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to reset =
their password</span>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification=
 code to reset their password</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br>
</span></div>
<div dir=3D"auto"><br style=3D"font-size:16px">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_SA2PR00MB1002E3A84B7848E01676B3C295F69SA2PR00MB1002namp_--


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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) (see
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt )  which I think was the subject of
Kevat's original email. 

 

So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IETF and
W3C?

 

 

 

From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Tim Cappalli
Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM
To: kevatshah@gmail.com
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

 

I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and magic
link type "stuff" happens in W3C.

 

There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset endpoint
discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.

  _____  

From: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com <mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com> >
Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
To: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com
<mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com> >
Cc: oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>  <oauth@ietf.org
<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> >
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers 

 

	
You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com
<mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com> . Learn why this is important
<http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification> 

	

That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards for
most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it make
sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C standards
don't exist?

 

- Kevat

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com
<mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com> > wrote:

I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.

 

tim

  _____  

From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org> > on
behalf of Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com <mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com> >
Sent: Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
To: oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>  <oauth@ietf.org
<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> >
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers 

 

	
Some people who received this message don't often get email from
kevatshah@gmail.com <mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com> . Learn why this is
important <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification> 

	

I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity
Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.

 

To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
functionalities that IdPs provide such as:

 

- Email verification on registration

- Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality

- Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users that
are logged in

 

 

These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an
industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The
purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and
implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.

 

 

 

Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:

 

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
verify their email address

 

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
verification code to verify their email address

 

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
reset their password 

 

- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
verification code to reset their password

 

 

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap:break-word'><div =
class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Although the IETF has been =
involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) (see <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/=
bcp-index.txt</a> ) &nbsp;which I think was the subject of Kevat&#8217;s =
original email. <o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>So perhaps =
this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IETF and =
W3C?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> OAuth =
&lt;oauth-bounces@ietf.org&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b>Tim =
Cappalli<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM<br><b>To:</b> =
kevatshah@gmail.com<br><b>Cc:</b> oauth@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: =
[OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity =
Providers<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>I =
don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and =
magic link type &quot;stuff&quot; happens in =
W3C.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>The=
re are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset =
endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, =
etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter =
style=3D'text-align:center'><hr size=3D2 width=3D"98%" =
align=3Dcenter></div><div id=3DdivRplyFwdMsg><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'color:black'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'color:black'> Kevat Shah &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Sen=
t:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03<br><b>To:</b> Tim Cappalli &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>=
&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org">oauth@ietf.org</a> =
&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> =
Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</span> =
<o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><table =
class=3DMsoNormalTable border=3D0 cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 =
align=3Dleft width=3D"100%" =
style=3D'width:100.0%;display:table;border-collapse:seperate;float:none'>=
<tr><td style=3D'background:#A6A6A6;padding:5.25pt 1.5pt 5.25pt =
1.5pt'></td><td width=3D"100%" =
style=3D'width:100.0%;background:#EAEAEA;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt =
11.25pt'><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-frame-hspace:2.25pt;mso-element-wr=
ap:around;mso-element-anchor-vertical:paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizo=
ntal:column;mso-height-rule:exactly'><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Segoe =
UI",sans-serif;color:#212121'>You don't often get email from <a =
href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a =
href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification">Learn why this is =
important</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></td><td width=3D75 =
style=3D'width:56.25pt;background:#EAEAEA;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt =
3.75pt'></td></tr></table><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>That's a =
good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards for most =
(if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it make =
sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C =
standards don't exist?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>- Kevat<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>I =
believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not =
IETF.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black'>tim=
<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter =
style=3D'text-align:center'><hr size=3D2 width=3D"98%" =
align=3Dcenter></div><div =
id=3D"x_m_-6708358250069876788divRplyFwdMsg"><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><b><span style=3D'color:black'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'color:black'> OAuth &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Kevat Shah =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, =
August 8, 2021 16:37<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] =
Specifications for Identity Providers</span> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><table =
class=3DMsoNormalTable border=3D0 cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 =
align=3Dleft width=3D"100%" =
style=3D'width:100.0%;display:table;border-collapse:seperate;float:none'>=
<tr><td style=3D'background:#A6A6A6;padding:5.25pt 1.5pt 5.25pt =
1.5pt'></td><td width=3D"100%" =
style=3D'width:100.0%;background:#EAEAEA;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt =
11.25pt'><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-frame-hspace:2.25pt;mso-element-wr=
ap:around;mso-element-anchor-vertical:paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizo=
ntal:column;mso-height-rule:exactly'><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:"Segoe =
UI",sans-serif;color:#212121'>Some people who received this message =
don't often get email from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a =
href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" =
target=3D"_blank">Learn why this is =
important</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></td><td width=3D75 =
style=3D'width:56.25pt;background:#EAEAEA;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt =
3.75pt'></td></tr></table><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I propose =
that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity =
Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>To start with, there should be clear specifications =
for various functionalities that IdPs provide such =
as:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>- =
Email verification on registration<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>- Specifications regarding &quot;forgot password&quot; =
functionality<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>- =
Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&quot; functionality for =
users that are logged in<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>These specifications only pertain to Identity =
Providers, and allow an industry-wide set of rules that each Identity =
Provider must follow. The purpose of doing so would be to standardize =
various frequently used and implemented flows that are secure and widely =
reusable.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Some problems that would be addressed by these =
specifications&nbsp;<span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>would =
be:</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>- =
How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to =
verify their email address<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>-&nbsp;<span =
style=3D'color:black;background:white'>How to securely implement =
functionality where a user is sent a verification code to verify their =
email address</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>-&nbsp;<span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>How to =
securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to reset =
their password</span> <o:p></o:p></p><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>-&nbsp;<span =
style=3D'color:black;background:white'>How to securely implement =
functionality where a user is sent a verification code to reset their =
password</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></bl=
ockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>
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From: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 16:14:38 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMEL4iuEGJoO0qTJGEcEvkEYHvdaqt2xrcrisuzgw7PK0OQTAg@mail.gmail.com>
To: michael@palage.com
Cc: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth@ietf.org
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/sqzzA2ZRVKivPyoBsoOgCUOsk_w>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure conformity of
standards?

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM <michael@palage.com> wrote:

> Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP)
> (see https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt )  which I think was the
> subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email.
>
>
>
> So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IETF
> and W3C?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Tim Cappalli
> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM
> *To:* kevatshah@gmail.com
> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>
>
>
> I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and
> magic link type "stuff" happens in W3C.
>
>
>
> There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset
> endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
> *To:* Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>
>
>
> You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is
> important <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>
> That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards for
> most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it mak=
e
> sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C
> standards don't exist?
>
>
>
> - Kevat
>
> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
> wrote:
>
> I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.
>
>
>
> tim
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Kevat Shah <
> kevatshah@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
> *To:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>
>
>
> Some people who received this message don't often get email from
> kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is important
> <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>
> I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity
> Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.
>
>
>
> To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
> functionalities that IdPs provide such as:
>
>
>
> - Email verification on registration
>
> - Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
>
> - Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users that
> are logged in
>
>
>
>
>
> These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an
> industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The
> purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and
> implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:
>
>
>
> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
> verify their email address
>
>
>
> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
> verification code to verify their email address
>
>
>
> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
> reset their password
>
>
>
> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
> verification code to reset their password
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

--00000000000096252305c92609fe
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to en=
sure conformity of standards?</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM  &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:michael@palage.com">michael@palage.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #cc=
c solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple=
" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div class=3D"m_4500908371963244180WordSec=
tion1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Although the IETF has been involved in Best C=
ommercial Practices (BCP) (see <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-inde=
x.txt" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-in=
dex.txt</a> ) =C2=A0which I think was the subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s origin=
al email. <u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-ex=
ist in both the IETF and W3C?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><div style=3D"border:none;borde=
r-top:solid #e1e1e1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><b>From:</b> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D=
"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; <b>On Behalf Of =
</b>Tim Cappalli<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM<br><b>To:</=
b> <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferr=
er">kevatshah@gmail.com</a><br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org"=
 target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b>=
 Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers<u></u><u></u></p></di=
v></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-=
serif;color:black">I don&#39;t think there is explicit ownership, but gener=
ally password and magic link type &quot;stuff&quot; happens in W3C.<u></u><=
u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u>=C2=A0=
<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:black">There are ex=
isting work efforts around standardizing password reset endpoint discovery,=
 password complexity schemas, etc.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div class=
=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center"><hr size=3D"2" =
width=3D"98%" align=3D"center"></div><div id=3D"m_4500908371963244180divRpl=
yFwdMsg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D"color:black"> Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah=
@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt=
;<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03<br><b>To:</b> Tim Cappalli &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mail=
to:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a> =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">=
oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for=
 Identity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D=
"0" cellpadding=3D"0" align=3D"left" width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100.0%;d=
isplay:table;border-collapse:seperate;float:none"><tr><td style=3D"backgrou=
nd:#a6a6a6;padding:5.25pt 1.5pt 5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td width=3D"100%" style=
=3D"width:100.0%;background:#eaeaea;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt"><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot=
;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif;color:#212121">You don&#39;t often get email fro=
m <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferre=
r">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdenti=
fication" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">Learn why this is important<=
/a><u></u><u></u></span></p></div></td><td width=3D"75" style=3D"width:56.2=
5pt;background:#eaeaea;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 3.75pt"></td></tr></tab=
le><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">That&#39;s a good point. Is it fai=
r to assume that W3C owns the standards for most (if not all) standards rel=
ated to Identity Providers? Or does it make sense for IETF to start setting=
 these standards in cases where W3C standards don&#39;t exist?<u></u><u></u=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">- Kevat<u></u><u></u><=
/p><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappal=
li &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=
=3D"noreferrer">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>=
</div><blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padd=
ing:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quo=
t;,sans-serif;color:black">I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, no=
t IETF.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:black=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:12.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif;color:blac=
k">tim<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"cent=
er" style=3D"text-align:center"><hr size=3D"2" width=3D"98%" align=3D"cente=
r"></div><div id=3D"m_4500908371963244180x_m_-6708358250069876788divRplyFwd=
Msg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span></b>=
<span style=3D"color:black"> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf=
.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; o=
n behalf of Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D=
"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Sent:</b> Sun=
day, August 8, 2021 16:37<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a>&g=
t;<br><b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</spa=
n> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></=
div></div><div><table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" alig=
n=3D"left" width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100.0%;display:table;border-collap=
se:seperate;float:none"><tr><td style=3D"background:#a6a6a6;padding:5.25pt =
1.5pt 5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100.0%;backgroun=
d:#eaeaea;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif=
;color:#212121">Some people who received this message don&#39;t often get e=
mail from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSend=
erIdentification" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">Learn why this is im=
portant</a><u></u><u></u></span></p></div></td><td width=3D"75" style=3D"wi=
dth:56.25pt;background:#eaeaea;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 3.75pt"></td></=
tr></table><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I propose that we expand u=
pon specific functionality provided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks =
handled by them.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">To start with, there sho=
uld be clear specifications for various functionalities that IdPs provide s=
uch as:<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u>=
</u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Email verification on registrat=
ion<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifications reg=
arding &quot;forgot password&quot; functionality<u></u><u></u></p></div><di=
v><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&q=
uot; functionality for users that are logged in<u></u><u></u></p></div><div=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">These spec=
ifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an industry-wide s=
et of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The purpose of doing s=
o would be to standardize various frequently used and implemented flows tha=
t are secure and widely reusable.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Some problems that would be addressed by =
these specifications=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">would be:</span>=
<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p=
></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- How to securely implement functionalit=
y where a user is sent a link to verify their email address<u></u><u></u></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white">How =
to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification cod=
e to verify their email address</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=
=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">How to securely implement functional=
ity where a user is sent a link to reset their password</span> <u></u><u></=
u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white">How to=
 securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification code =
to reset their password</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u><=
/u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u><=
/p></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></div></div=
></div></div></blockquote></div>

--00000000000096252305c92609fe--


From nobody Mon Aug  9 13:17:54 2021
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From: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
To: "kevatshah@gmail.com" <kevatshah@gmail.com>, "michael@palage.com" <michael@palage.com>
CC: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/WSqmu4ZoHDp90pi0fyYjur-IwdQ>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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--_000_SA2PR00MB10021A191E8C6487ED39B99F95F69SA2PR00MB1002namp_
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I think the first step would be finding the appropriate IETF group. I don't=
 think this is in scope for OAuth-WG as this topic seems to be about accoun=
t management and user credentials.
________________________________
From: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 16:14
To: michael@palage.com <michael@palage.com>
Cc: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>; oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.o=
rg>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers

How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure conformity of=
 standards?

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM <michael@palage.com<mailto:michael@palage.com>=
> wrote:

Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) (see=
 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt<https://nam06.safelinks.protection.=
outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Frfc%2Fbcp-index.txt&data=3D=
04%7C01%7CTim.Cappalli%40microsoft.com%7C41ce5aec4d7a4cf7efef08d95b726f93%7=
C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637641369333693489%7CUnknown%7C=
TWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0=
%3D%7C1000&sdata=3DcDC15G1s1n4JCY%2Fk5vFDDyCj6WF%2Bhd8Pd4Fq0JNEIzQ%3D&reser=
ved=3D0> )  which I think was the subject of Kevat=92s original email.



So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IETF an=
d W3C?







From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>> On Beha=
lf Of Tim Cappalli
Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM
To: kevatshah@gmail.com<mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers



I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and magic=
 link type "stuff" happens in W3C.



There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset endpoin=
t discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.

________________________________

From: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com<mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com>>
Sent: Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
To: Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com<mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.=
com>>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf=
.org>>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers



You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com<mailto:kevatshah@gmail.c=
om>. Learn why this is important<http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentificati=
on>

That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards for m=
ost (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it make s=
ense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C standards=
 don't exist?



- Kevat

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com<mailt=
o:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>> wrote:

I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.



tim

________________________________

From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>> on beha=
lf of Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com<mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com>>
Sent: Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
To: oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org> <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf=
.org>>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers



Some people who received this message don't often get email from kevatshah@=
gmail.com<mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com>. Learn why this is important<http://a=
ka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>

I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity P=
roviders (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.



To start with, there should be clear specifications for various functionali=
ties that IdPs provide such as:



- Email verification on registration

- Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality

- Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users that a=
re logged in





These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an indus=
try-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The purpose =
of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and implemented=
 flows that are secure and widely reusable.







Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:



- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to ve=
rify their email address



- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificati=
on code to verify their email address



- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to re=
set their password



- How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificati=
on code to reset their password







--_000_SA2PR00MB10021A191E8C6487ED39B99F95F69SA2PR00MB1002namp_
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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div style=3D"font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; c=
olor: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
I think the first step would be finding the appropriate IETF group. I don't=
 think this is in scope for OAuth-WG as this topic seems to be about accoun=
t management and user credentials.</div>
<div id=3D"appendonsend"></div>
<hr style=3D"display:inline-block;width:98%" tabindex=3D"-1">
<div id=3D"divRplyFwdMsg" dir=3D"ltr"><font face=3D"Calibri, sans-serif" st=
yle=3D"font-size:11pt" color=3D"#000000"><b>From:</b> Kevat Shah &lt;kevats=
hah@gmail.com&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:14<br>
<b>To:</b> michael@palage.com &lt;michael@palage.com&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Tim Cappalli &lt;Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com&gt;; oauth@ietf.org =
&lt;oauth@ietf.org&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</font>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
</div>
<div>
<div dir=3D"auto">How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to en=
sure conformity of standards?</div>
<br>
<div class=3D"x_gmail_quote">
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"x_gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:michael@palage.com">michael@palage.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"x_gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex; border-left=
:1px #ccc solid; padding-left:1ex">
<div lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">
<div class=3D"x_m_4500908371963244180WordSection1">
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commer=
cial Practices (BCP) (see
<a href=3D"https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2=
F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Frfc%2Fbcp-index.txt&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7CTim.Cappalli%40=
microsoft.com%7C41ce5aec4d7a4cf7efef08d95b726f93%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7c=
d011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637641369333693489%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wL=
jAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=3DcD=
C15G1s1n4JCY%2Fk5vFDDyCj6WF%2Bhd8Pd4Fq0JNEIzQ%3D&amp;reserved=3D0" original=
src=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt" shash=3D"H/QYrAF8iDG53sOQRoP=
FqA5sAAyu9P2wBb0VOwOvBHNLXP5LYwYP8nDq4aHusab1XaIsuuKmdG4okzILYNaCtq/w2VV3W0=
31n0cSV5BUYxGadyxaGE3QaJjpWFMgLtnCHRSnYCMjcijbXoht7hcsoo1pgoiZDV1Ko1AXGSUbQ=
8U=3D" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt</a> ) &nbsp;which I think was the su=
bject of Kevat=92s original email.
<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-=
exist in both the IETF and W3C?<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none; border-top:solid #e1e1e1 1.0pt; padding:3.0pt 0i=
n 0in 0in">
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bou=
nces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth-bounces@ietf.org<=
/a>&gt;
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Tim Cappalli<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"=
noreferrer">
kevatshah@gmail.com</a><br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noref=
errer">oauth@ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers<u></u>=
<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Arial&quot;,sans-serif; color:black">I don't think there is explicit owner=
ship, but generally password and magic link type &quot;stuff&quot; happens =
in W3C.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Arial&quot;,sans-serif; color:black"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Arial&quot;,sans-serif; color:black">There are existing work efforts aroun=
d standardizing password reset endpoint discovery, password complexity sche=
mas, etc.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div class=3D"x_MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center">
<hr size=3D"2" width=3D"98%" align=3D"center">
</div>
<div id=3D"x_m_4500908371963244180divRplyFwdMsg">
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span></b><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"> Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.=
com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03<br>
<b>To:</b> Tim Cappalli &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noref=
errer">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_=
blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</span>=
 <u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">&nbsp;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" align=3D"left" widt=
h=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100.0%; display:table; border-collapse:seperate; =
float:none">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"background:#a6a6a6; padding:5.25pt 1.5pt 5.25pt 1.5pt"></td>
<td width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100.0%; background:#eaeaea; padding:5.25p=
t 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt; font-family:&quot;=
Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif; color:#212121">You don't often get email from
<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
>kevatshah@gmail.com</a>.
<a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" target=3D"_blank" =
rel=3D"noreferrer">
Learn why this is important</a><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width=3D"75" style=3D"width:56.25pt; background:#eaeaea; padding:5.25pt=
 3.75pt 5.25pt 3.75pt">
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C=
 owns the standards for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Pro=
viders? Or does it make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in =
cases where W3C standards don't exist?<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">- Kevat<u></u><u></=
u></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferr=
er">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none; border-left:solid #cccccc 1.0pt; padding:=
0in 0in 0in 6.0pt; margin-left:4.8pt; margin-right:0in">
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Arial&quot;,sans-serif; color:black">I believe this topic would be more W3=
C scope, not IETF.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Arial&quot;,sans-serif; color:black"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt; font-family:&quot=
;Arial&quot;,sans-serif; color:black">tim<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div class=3D"x_MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center">
<hr size=3D"2" width=3D"98%" align=3D"center">
</div>
<div id=3D"x_m_4500908371963244180x_m_-6708358250069876788divRplyFwdMsg">
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span></b><sp=
an style=3D"color:black"> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.or=
g" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on b=
ehalf of Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_b=
lank" rel=3D"noreferrer">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noref=
errer">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_=
blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</span> <u>=
</u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">&nbsp;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" align=3D"left" widt=
h=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100.0%; display:table; border-collapse:seperate; =
float:none">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style=3D"background:#a6a6a6; padding:5.25pt 1.5pt 5.25pt 1.5pt"></td>
<td width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100.0%; background:#eaeaea; padding:5.25p=
t 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9.0pt; font-family:&quot;=
Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif; color:#212121">Some people who received this mes=
sage don't often get email from
<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
>kevatshah@gmail.com</a>.
<a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" target=3D"_blank" =
rel=3D"noreferrer">
Learn why this is important</a><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</td>
<td width=3D"75" style=3D"width:56.25pt; background:#eaeaea; padding:5.25pt=
 3.75pt 5.25pt 3.75pt">
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">I propose that we expand upon specific functionali=
ty provided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.<u></u><=
u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">To start with, there should be clear specification=
s for various functionalities that IdPs provide such as:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">- Email verification on registration<u></u><u></u>=
</p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;forgot password&q=
uot; functionality<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&q=
uot; functionality for users that are logged in<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">These specifications only pertain to Identity Prov=
iders, and allow an industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider =
must follow. The purpose of doing so would be to standardize various freque=
ntly used and implemented flows that
 are secure and widely reusable.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">Some problems that would be addressed by these spe=
cifications&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">would be:</span><u></u><u=
></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">- How to securely implement functionality where a =
user is sent a link to verify their email address<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"color:black; background:whit=
e">How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificat=
ion code to verify their email address</span><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">How to sec=
urely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to reset their pa=
ssword</span>
<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal">-&nbsp;<span style=3D"color:black; background:whit=
e">How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificat=
ion code to reset their password</span><u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"x_MsoNormal"><u></u>&nbsp;<u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 22:17:48 +0200
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To: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
Cc: michael@palage.com,  Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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I think it would be prudent to potentially ask *why?* What problem is
necessary to be solved by discussing/standardizing these particular
features? There could be, but without understanding, knowing how best to
tackle it is a challenging conversation without the right context.

Warren Parad

Founder, CTO
Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
Authress <https://authress.io/>.


On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com> wrote:

> How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure conformity
> of standards?
>
> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM <michael@palage.com> wrote:
>
>> Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP)
>> (see https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt )  which I think was the
>> subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email.
>>
>>
>>
>> So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IETF
>> and W3C?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Tim Cappalli
>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM
>> *To:* kevatshah@gmail.com
>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>
>>
>>
>> I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and
>> magic link type "stuff" happens in W3C.
>>
>>
>>
>> There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset
>> endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> *From:* Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
>> *To:* Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>
>>
>>
>> You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is
>> important <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>
>> That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards fo=
r
>> most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it ma=
ke
>> sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C
>> standards don't exist?
>>
>>
>>
>> - Kevat
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.
>>
>>
>>
>> tim
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Kevat Shah <
>> kevatshah@gmail.com>
>> *Sent:* Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
>> *To:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>
>>
>>
>> Some people who received this message don't often get email from
>> kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is important
>> <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>
>> I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by Identit=
y
>> Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.
>>
>>
>>
>> To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
>> functionalities that IdPs provide such as:
>>
>>
>>
>> - Email verification on registration
>>
>> - Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
>>
>> - Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users tha=
t
>> are logged in
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an
>> industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The
>> purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and
>> implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:
>>
>>
>>
>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
>> verify their email address
>>
>>
>>
>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>> verification code to verify their email address
>>
>>
>>
>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link to
>> reset their password
>>
>>
>>
>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>> verification code to reset their password
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000d46fab05c926149d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I think it would be prudent to potentially ask=C2=A0<b>why=
?</b>=C2=A0What problem is necessary to be solved by discussing/standardizi=
ng these particular features? There could be, but without understanding, kn=
owing how best to tackle it is a challenging conversation without the right=
 context.<div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signat=
ure" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"bo=
rder:none;border-collapse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"214"><col width=
=3D"110"></colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=3D"border-lef=
t:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #cccccc 1pt;border-bottom:solid #fff=
fff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;vertical-align:top;padding:5pt 5pt 5pt=
 5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:s=
olid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1p=
t;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:=
transparent;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"bo=
rder:none;display:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;height:34px"><im=
g src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqh=
XdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-n=
h6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" width=3D"199" height=3D"34" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0px;margin-top:0px"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D"border-left:sol=
id #cccccc 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1=
pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;vertical-align:top;padding:5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt;=
overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:solid =
#ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;mar=
gin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:La=
to,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;vertical-align:b=
aseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=
=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #fffff=
f 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><fo=
nt face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;white-space=
:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></td></tr></tbody></table><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a=
 service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://authress.io/" style=3D"f=
ont-size:x-small" target=3D"_blank">Authress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-=
small">.</span><br></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15=
 PM Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com">kevatshah@gmail.c=
om</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex=
"><div dir=3D"auto">How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to =
ensure conformity of standards?</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div di=
r=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM  &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:michael@palage.com" target=3D"_blank">michael@palage.com</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=
=3D"EN-US" style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
>Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) (se=
e <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer" tar=
get=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt</a> ) =C2=A0which I t=
hink was the subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email. <u></u><u></u></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">So per=
haps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IETF and W3C?=
<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0=
<u></u></p><div><div style=3D"border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-l=
eft:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf=
.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; <=
b>On Behalf Of </b>Tim Cappalli<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06=
 PM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a><br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:=
oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a><br>=
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers<u></u>=
<u></u></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans=
-serif;color:black">I don&#39;t think there is explicit ownership, but gene=
rally password and magic link type &quot;stuff&quot; happens in W3C.<u></u>=
<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-f=
amily:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">There are existing work efforts around =
standardizing password reset endpoint discovery, password complexity schema=
s, etc.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"cen=
ter" style=3D"text-align:center"><hr size=3D"2" width=3D"98%" align=3D"cent=
er"></div><div id=3D"gmail-m_3301473412489012094m_4500908371963244180divRpl=
yFwdMsg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D"color:black"> Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah=
@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt=
;<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03<br><b>To:</b> Tim Cappalli &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mai=
lto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"=
>oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications fo=
r Identity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D=
"0" cellpadding=3D"0" align=3D"left" width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100%;dis=
play:table;float:none"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"background:rgb(166,166,166);=
padding:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100%;backgroun=
d:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt"><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,san=
s-serif;color:rgb(33,33,33)">You don&#39;t often get email from <a href=3D"=
mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@=
gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Learn why this is important</a><u></u><u>=
</u></span></p></div></td><td width=3D"75" style=3D"width:56.25pt;backgroun=
d:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt"></td></tr></tbody></table><div><d=
iv><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">That&#39;s a good point. Is it fair to assum=
e that W3C owns the standards for most (if not all) standards related to Id=
entity Providers? Or does it make sense for IETF to start setting these sta=
ndards in cases where W3C standards don&#39;t exist?<u></u><u></u></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">- Kevat<u></u><u></u></p><div><div=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockq=
uote style=3D"border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-l=
eft:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;ma=
rgin-right:0in"><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
2pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">I believe this topic would be=
 more W3C scope, not IETF.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:=
black"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">tim<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p></div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=
=3D"text-align:center"><hr size=3D"2" width=3D"98%" align=3D"center"></div>=
<div id=3D"gmail-m_3301473412489012094m_4500908371963244180x_m_-67083582500=
69876788divRplyFwdMsg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black=
">From:</span></b><span style=3D"color:black"> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
oauth-bounces@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@=
ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gm=
ail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<b=
r><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto=
:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a> &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oa=
uth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Ident=
ity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u=
></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cell=
padding=3D"0" align=3D"left" width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100%;display:tab=
le;float:none"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"background:rgb(166,166,166);padding:=
5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100%;background:rgb(23=
4,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif;=
color:rgb(33,33,33)">Some people who received this message don&#39;t often =
get email from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAbou=
tSenderIdentification" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Learn why this =
is important</a><u></u><u></u></span></p></div></td><td width=3D"75" style=
=3D"width:56.25pt;background:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt"></td><=
/tr></tbody></table><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I propose that we=
 expand upon specific functionality provided by Identity Providers (IdPs) a=
nd tasks handled by them.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">To start with, =
there should be clear specifications for various functionalities that IdPs =
provide such as:<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Email verification on =
registration<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifica=
tions regarding &quot;forgot password&quot; functionality<u></u><u></u></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest p=
assword&quot; functionality for users that are logged in<u></u><u></u></p><=
/div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">T=
hese specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an indust=
ry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The purpose o=
f doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and implemented =
flows that are secure and widely reusable.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u=
></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Some problems that would be addr=
essed by these specifications=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt">would be:=
</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u>=
</u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- How to securely implement funct=
ionality where a user is sent a link to verify their email address<u></u><u=
></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:whit=
e">How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificat=
ion code to verify their email address</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt">How to securely implement functi=
onality where a user is sent a link to reset their password</span> <u></u><=
u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white">Ho=
w to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verification c=
ode to reset their password</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u><=
/u></p></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></div><=
/div></div></div></blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000d46fab05c926149d--


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From: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 16:43:53 -0400
Message-ID: <CAMEL4itYKqB2+NP_DmYGw_G+EYmPtWoh56LiGX22RPj=N7w=HQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Cc: michael@palage.com,  Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/eqDCUjQWwn7pIZvMUpV7BJ-Rm6U>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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@wparad@rhosys.ch - Using forgot password and registration verification
links or codes could be used as vectors of attack.

One possible point of insecurity that I have seen is this: after a user
verifies their code or link, they are often sent to another page where they
enter more information (such as additional user information or new
passwords). The user isn't supposed to be authenticated at this step, and
yet the application must know who the user is.

How do we confirm the user's identity without authenticating them for these
steps?

This is the driving factor (the "why") for this ask.

@Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com - I agree. Which channels should we use to
discuss this issue?

- Kevat

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:17 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> wrote:

> I think it would be prudent to potentially ask *why?* What problem is
> necessary to be solved by discussing/standardizing these particular
> features? There could be, but without understanding, knowing how best to
> tackle it is a challenging conversation without the right context.
>
> Warren Parad
>
> Founder, CTO
> Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
> Authress <https://authress.io/>.
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure conformity
>> of standards?
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM <michael@palage.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP)
>>> (see https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt )  which I think was the
>>> subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IET=
F
>>> and W3C?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Tim Cappalli
>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM
>>> *To:* kevatshah@gmail.com
>>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and
>>> magic link type "stuff" happens in W3C.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset
>>> endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> *From:* Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
>>> *To:* Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
>>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is
>>> important <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>>
>>> That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards
>>> for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does =
it
>>> make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3C
>>> standards don't exist?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - Kevat
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> tim
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Kevat Shah <
>>> kevatshah@gmail.com>
>>> *Sent:* Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
>>> *To:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>>> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Some people who received this message don't often get email from
>>> kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is important
>>> <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>>
>>> I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by
>>> Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
>>> functionalities that IdPs provide such as:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - Email verification on registration
>>>
>>> - Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
>>>
>>> - Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users
>>> that are logged in
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an
>>> industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The
>>> purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used and
>>> implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link t=
o
>>> verify their email address
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>> verification code to verify their email address
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link
>>> to reset their password
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>> verification code to reset their password
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px" di=
r=3D"auto">@<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch" style=3D"text-decoration-li=
ne:none;color:rgb(66,133,244)">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>=C2=A0- Using forgot pas=
sword and registration verification links or codes could be used as vectors=
 of attack.=C2=A0<div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">One possible=
 point of insecurity that I have seen is this: after a user verifies their =
code or link, they are often sent to another page where they enter more inf=
ormation (such as additional user information or new passwords). The user i=
sn&#39;t supposed to be authenticated at this step, and yet the application=
 must know who the user is.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"auto">How do we confirm the user&#39;s identity without authenticating =
them for these steps?</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Th=
is is the driving factor (the &quot;why&quot;) for this ask.</div><div dir=
=3D"auto"><br></div>@<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" style=3D=
"text-decoration-line:none;color:rgb(66,133,244)">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.co=
m</a>=C2=A0- I agree. Which channels should we use to discuss this issue?</=
div><div style=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px" dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div></div><div dir=3D"auto" sty=
le=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><div style=3D"color:rgb(136,=
136,136)">- Kevat</div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:17 PM Warren Parad &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I think it would be prud=
ent to potentially ask=C2=A0<b>why?</b>=C2=A0What problem is necessary to b=
e solved by discussing/standardizing these particular features? There could=
 be, but without understanding, knowing how best to tackle it is a challeng=
ing conversation without the right context.<div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table sty=
le=3D"border:none;border-collapse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"214"><c=
ol width=3D"110"></colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=3D"bo=
rder-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #cccccc 1pt;border-bottom:so=
lid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;vertical-align:top;padding:5pt=
 5pt 5pt 5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;borde=
r-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #f=
fffff 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"=
><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);backgroun=
d-color:transparent;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><span sty=
le=3D"border:none;display:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;height:3=
4px"><img src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxY=
uyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fY=
sNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" width=3D"199" height=3D"34" style=3D"=
margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D"border-=
left:solid #cccccc 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-bottom:solid #=
ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;vertical-align:top;padding:5pt 5pt =
5pt 5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-lef=
t:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff=
 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-f=
amily:Lato,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;vertical=
-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr"=
 style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid =
#ffffff 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0p=
t"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;white=
-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></td></tr></tbody></table><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user data with IAM authorizatio=
n as a service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://authress.io/" styl=
e=3D"font-size:x-small" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">Authress</a><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br></div></div></div><br></div></d=
iv><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On =
Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gma=
il.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D=
"auto">How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure confor=
mity of standards?</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cla=
ss=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM  &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:micha=
el@palage.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">michael@palage.com</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div =
lang=3D"EN-US"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Although the IETF has been invol=
ved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) (see <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org=
/rfc/bcp-index.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:/=
/www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt</a> ) =C2=A0which I think was the subject o=
f Kevat=E2=80=99s original email. <u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">So perhaps this is a subject=
 matter that could co-exist in both the IETF and W3C?<u></u><u></u></p><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><div s=
tyle=3D"border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:none;border-top:1p=
t solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>Fro=
m:</b> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferre=
r noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; <b>On Behalf=
 Of </b>Tim Cappalli<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM<br><b>T=
o:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a><br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:=
oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.=
org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Provi=
ders<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></=
u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family=
:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">I don&#39;t think there is explicit ownershi=
p, but generally password and magic link type &quot;stuff&quot; happens in =
W3C.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u>=C2=A0<=
u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">There are existing work eff=
orts around standardizing password reset endpoint discovery, password compl=
exity schemas, etc.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" =
align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center"><hr size=3D"2" width=3D"98%" a=
lign=3D"center"></div><div id=3D"m_-5674079125007162266gmail-m_330147341248=
9012094m_4500908371963244180divRplyFwdMsg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span =
style=3D"color:black">From:</span></b><span style=3D"color:black"> Kevat Sh=
ah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, Augu=
st 9, 2021 16:03<br><b>To:</b> Tim Cappalli &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappa=
lli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Tim.Capp=
alli@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" =
rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications =
for Identity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
>=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table border=3D"0" cellspacing=
=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" align=3D"left" width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100%;=
display:table;float:none"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"background:rgb(166,166,16=
6);padding:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100%;backgr=
ound:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt"><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot=
;,sans-serif;color:rgb(33,33,33)">You don&#39;t often get email from <a hre=
f=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_b=
lank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIde=
ntification" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Learn why this=
 is important</a><u></u><u></u></span></p></div></td><td width=3D"75" style=
=3D"width:56.25pt;background:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt"></td><=
/tr></tbody></table><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">That&#39;s a good=
 point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards for most (if not a=
ll) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does it make sense for IETF=
 to start setting these standards in cases where W3C standards don&#39;t ex=
ist?<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">- Kevat=
<u></u><u></u></p><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:5=
6 PM Tim Cappalli &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style=3D"border-top:none;border-=
right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;colo=
r:black">I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.<u></u><u><=
/u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12=
pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-famil=
y:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">tim<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center"><hr size=3D"2"=
 width=3D"98%" align=3D"center"></div><div id=3D"m_-5674079125007162266gmai=
l-m_3301473412489012094m_4500908371963244180x_m_-6708358250069876788divRply=
FwdMsg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span><=
/b><span style=3D"color:black"> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@i=
etf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf=
.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.=
com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a=
>&gt;<br><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D=
"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oau=
th@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer nor=
eferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH=
-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table border=
=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" align=3D"left" width=3D"100%" st=
yle=3D"width:100%;display:table;float:none"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"backgro=
und:rgb(166,166,166);padding:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td width=3D"100%" style=3D=
"width:100%;background:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25p=
t"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&qu=
ot;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(33,33,33)">Some people who received =
this message don&#39;t often get email from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gma=
il.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com=
</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" rel=3D"noref=
errer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Learn why this is important</a><u></u><=
u></u></span></p></div></td><td width=3D"75" style=3D"width:56.25pt;backgro=
und:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt"></td></tr></tbody></table><div>=
<div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I propose that we expand upon specific fun=
ctionality provided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.=
<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p=
></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">To start with, there should be clear spe=
cifications for various functionalities that IdPs provide such as:<u></u><u=
></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Email verification on registration<u></u><u></u=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;for=
got password&quot; functionality<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&quot; functionali=
ty for users that are logged in<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">These specifications onl=
y pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an industry-wide set of rules th=
at each Identity Provider must follow. The purpose of doing so would be to =
standardize various frequently used and implemented flows that are secure a=
nd widely reusable.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u><=
/u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal">Some problems that would be addressed by these specific=
ations=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt">would be:</span><u></u><u></u></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal">- How to securely implement functionality where a user i=
s sent a link to verify their email address<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white">How to securely impl=
ement functionality where a user is sent a verification code to verify thei=
r email address</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt">How to securely implement functionality where a user is=
 sent a link to reset their password</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=
=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white">How to securely implemen=
t functionality where a user is sent a verification code to reset their pas=
sword</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></p></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div></=
div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></bl=
ockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 22:55:26 +0200
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To: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
Cc: michael@palage.com,  Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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I definitely see that there is room for a potential attack depending on the
internal implementation. Wouldn't that be only relevant internally to the
auth server though? Would adding a feature flag to the discovery document
or visibility into configuration help reduce the attack surface? Perhaps, I
would need to see the explicit vulnerability and how it would be
potentially mitigated. From my uninformed perspective it seems like trying
to protect users against a phishing attack that uses a malicious auth
server to emulate an honest one, though I could be missing something
critical.

Any additional information would be appreciated.

- Warren

Warren Parad

Founder, CTO
Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
Authress <https://authress.io/>.


On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:44 PM Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com> wrote:

> @wparad@rhosys.ch - Using forgot password and registration verification
> links or codes could be used as vectors of attack.
>
> One possible point of insecurity that I have seen is this: after a user
> verifies their code or link, they are often sent to another page where th=
ey
> enter more information (such as additional user information or new
> passwords). The user isn't supposed to be authenticated at this step, and
> yet the application must know who the user is.
>
> How do we confirm the user's identity without authenticating them for
> these steps?
>
> This is the driving factor (the "why") for this ask.
>
> @Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com - I agree. Which channels should we use to
> discuss this issue?
>
> - Kevat
>
> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:17 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> wrote:
>
>> I think it would be prudent to potentially ask *why?* What problem is
>> necessary to be solved by discussing/standardizing these particular
>> features? There could be, but without understanding, knowing how best to
>> tackle it is a challenging conversation without the right context.
>>
>> Warren Parad
>>
>> Founder, CTO
>> Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
>> Authress <https://authress.io/>.
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure conformit=
y
>>> of standards?
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM <michael@palage.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP)
>>>> (see https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt )  which I think was the
>>>> subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the
>>>> IETF and W3C?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Tim Cappalli
>>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM
>>>> *To:* kevatshah@gmail.com
>>>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and
>>>> magic link type "stuff" happens in W3C.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset
>>>> endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> *From:* Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
>>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
>>>> *To:* Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
>>>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is
>>>> important <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>>>
>>>> That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards
>>>> for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or does=
 it
>>>> make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W3=
C
>>>> standards don't exist?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> - Kevat
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> tim
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Kevat Shah <
>>>> kevatshah@gmail.com>
>>>> *Sent:* Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
>>>> *To:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Some people who received this message don't often get email from
>>>> kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is important
>>>> <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>>>
>>>> I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by
>>>> Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
>>>> functionalities that IdPs provide such as:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> - Email verification on registration
>>>>
>>>> - Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
>>>>
>>>> - Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users
>>>> that are logged in
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an
>>>> industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. Th=
e
>>>> purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used an=
d
>>>> implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would be=
:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link
>>>> to verify their email address
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>>> verification code to verify their email address
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link
>>>> to reset their password
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>>> verification code to reset their password
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I definitely see that there is room for a potential attack=
 depending on the internal implementation. Wouldn&#39;t that be only releva=
nt internally to the auth server though? Would adding a feature flag to the=
 discovery document or visibility into configuration help reduce the attack=
 surface? Perhaps, I would need to see the explicit vulnerability and how i=
t would be potentially mitigated. From my uninformed perspective it seems l=
ike trying to protect users against a phishing attack that uses a malicious=
 auth server to emulate an honest one, though I could be missing something =
critical.<div><br></div><div>Any additional information would be appreciate=
d.</div><div><br></div><div>- Warren<br><div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div di=
r=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"border:none;border-collapse:collapse"><colgrou=
p><col width=3D"214"><col width=3D"110"></colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"heig=
ht:0pt"><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255) rgb(204,204,204) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255);vertical-ali=
gn:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2=
;border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255);margin-t=
op:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;c=
olor:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;vertical-align:baseline;white-=
space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"border:none;display:inline-block;overflow:hi=
dden;width:199px;height:34px"><img src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com=
/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYd=
BhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" width=3D"199=
" height=3D"34" style=3D"margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;"></span></span>=
</p></td><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(=
255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204);vertical-al=
ign:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.=
2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255=
,255);border-top:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0p=
t"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;background-col=
or:transparent;font-weight:700;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap=
">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-lef=
t:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border=
-bottom:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font =
face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;white-space:pr=
e-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></td></tr></tbody></table><span style=
=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a se=
rvice. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://authress.io/" style=3D"font=
-size:x-small" target=3D"_blank">Authress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-sma=
ll">.</span><br></div></div></div><br></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10=
:44 PM Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com">kevatshah@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8p=
x" dir=3D"auto">@<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch" style=3D"text-decorati=
on-line:none;color:rgb(66,133,244)" target=3D"_blank">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>=
=C2=A0- Using forgot password and registration verification links or codes =
could be used as vectors of attack.=C2=A0<div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div d=
ir=3D"auto">One possible point of insecurity that I have seen is this: afte=
r a user verifies their code or link, they are often sent to another page w=
here they enter more information (such as additional user information or ne=
w passwords). The user isn&#39;t supposed to be authenticated at this step,=
 and yet the application must know who the user is.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"=
auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">How do we confirm the user&#39;s identity=
 without authenticating them for these steps?</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></=
div><div dir=3D"auto">This is the driving factor (the &quot;why&quot;) for =
this ask.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div>@<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@=
microsoft.com" style=3D"text-decoration-line:none;color:rgb(66,133,244)" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>=C2=A0- I agree. Which channe=
ls should we use to discuss this issue?</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(136,13=
6,136);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px" dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"au=
to"><br></div></div><div dir=3D"auto" style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-=
size:12.8px"><div style=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136)">- Kevat</div></div></div=
><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mo=
n, Aug 9, 2021, 4:17 PM Warren Parad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch=
" target=3D"_blank">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I think it would be pr=
udent to potentially ask=C2=A0<b>why?</b>=C2=A0What problem is necessary to=
 be solved by discussing/standardizing these particular features? There cou=
ld be, but without understanding, knowing how best to tackle it is a challe=
nging conversation without the right context.<div><br clear=3D"all"><div><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"border:none;border-collapse=
:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"214"><col width=3D"110"></colgroup><tbod=
y><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:solid=
;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,25=
5,255);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=
=3D"line-height:1.2;border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(25=
5,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;=
font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;vertical-al=
ign:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"border:none;display:inlin=
e-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;height:34px"><img src=3D"https://lh6.go=
ogleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtr=
JSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcU=
SNtuA" width=3D"199" height=3D"34" style=3D"margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0=
px;"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:soli=
d;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,2=
04,204);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" styl=
e=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1p=
t solid rgb(255,255,255);border-top:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0=
pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Lato,sans-s=
erif;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;vertical-align:baseline;w=
hite-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-he=
ight:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(=
255,255,255);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin=
-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:13.33=
33px;white-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></td></tr></tbody>=
</table><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user data with IAM au=
thorization as a service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://authress=
.io/" style=3D"font-size:x-small" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Auth=
ress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br></div></div></div><br=
></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail=
_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kev=
atshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><=
div dir=3D"auto">How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ens=
ure conformity of standards?</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM  &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:michael@palage.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">michael@pal=
age.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Although the IETF ha=
s been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) (see <a href=3D"https://=
www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt</a> ) =C2=A0which I think was t=
he subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email. <u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">So perhaps this =
is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the IETF and W3C?<u></u><u>=
</u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><=
div><div style=3D"border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:none;bor=
der-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><b>From:</b> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" rel=3D=
"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; <b=
>On Behalf Of </b>Tim Cappalli<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 =
PM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a><br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=
=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">=
oauth@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Ide=
ntity Providers<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;=
font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">I don&#39;t think there is explic=
it ownership, but generally password and magic link type &quot;stuff&quot; =
happens in W3C.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u><=
/u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D=
"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">There are existin=
g work efforts around standardizing password reset endpoint discovery, pass=
word complexity schemas, etc.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div class=3D"M=
soNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"text-align:center"><hr size=3D"2" width=
=3D"98%" align=3D"center"></div><div id=3D"gmail-m_4633393743236340673m_-56=
74079125007162266gmail-m_3301473412489012094m_4500908371963244180divRplyFwd=
Msg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span></b>=
<span style=3D"color:black"> Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gma=
il.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com=
</a>&gt;<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03<br><b>To:</b> Tim Cap=
palli &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Cc:</=
b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D=
"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subj=
ect:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</span> <u></u=
><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div=
><div><table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" align=3D"left=
" width=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100%;display:table;float:none"><tbody><tr><=
td style=3D"background:rgb(166,166,166);padding:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td widt=
h=3D"100%" style=3D"width:100%;background:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3=
.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(33,33,33)">You do=
n&#39;t often get email from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=
=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" rel=3D"noreferrer norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">Learn why this is important</a><u></u><u></u></span>=
</p></div></td><td width=3D"75" style=3D"width:56.25pt;background:rgb(234,2=
34,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt"></td></tr></tbody></table><div><div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal">That&#39;s a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C =
owns the standards for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Prov=
iders? Or does it make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in c=
ases where W3C standards don&#39;t exist?<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
 style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">- Kevat<u></u><u></u></p><div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_bl=
ank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><bloc=
kquote style=3D"border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border=
-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;=
margin-right:0in"><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size=
:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">I believe this topic would =
be more W3C scope, not IETF.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;colo=
r:black"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">tim<=
u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" sty=
le=3D"text-align:center"><hr size=3D"2" width=3D"98%" align=3D"center"></di=
v><div id=3D"gmail-m_4633393743236340673m_-5674079125007162266gmail-m_33014=
73412489012094m_4500908371963244180x_m_-6708358250069876788divRplyFwdMsg"><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span></b><span =
style=3D"color:black"> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" =
rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&=
gt; on behalf of Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=
=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br=
><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:=
oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.=
org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] Spe=
cifications for Identity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table border=3D"0"=
 cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" align=3D"left" width=3D"100%" style=3D=
"width:100%;display:table;float:none"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"background:rg=
b(166,166,166);padding:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td width=3D"100%" style=3D"width=
:100%;background:rgb(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt"><di=
v><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&quot;Seg=
oe UI&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(33,33,33)">Some people who received this m=
essage don&#39;t often get email from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com=
" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. =
<a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" rel=3D"noreferrer =
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Learn why this is important</a><u></u><u></u>=
</span></p></div></td><td width=3D"75" style=3D"width:56.25pt;background:rg=
b(234,234,234);padding:5.25pt 3.75pt"></td></tr></tbody></table><div><div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I propose that we expand upon specific functiona=
lity provided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.<u></u=
><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">To start with, there should be clear specifica=
tions for various functionalities that IdPs provide such as:<u></u><u></u><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal">- Email verification on registration<u></u><u></u></p><=
/div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;forgot pa=
ssword&quot; functionality<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&quot; functionality for=
 users that are logged in<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u=
></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">These specifications only pertai=
n to Identity Providers, and allow an industry-wide set of rules that each =
Identity Provider must follow. The purpose of doing so would be to standard=
ize various frequently used and implemented flows that are secure and widel=
y reusable.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">Some problems that would be addressed by these specification=
s=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt">would be:</span><u></u><u></u></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">- How to securely implement functionality where a user is se=
nt a link to verify their email address<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=
=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white">How to securely implemen=
t functionality where a user is sent a verification code to verify their em=
ail address</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"=
font-size:12pt">How to securely implement functionality where a user is sen=
t a link to reset their password</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=
=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white">How to securely implement f=
unctionality where a user is sent a verification code to reset their passwo=
rd</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<=
u></u></p></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><=
/div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div>=
</div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockq=
uote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>

--0000000000007848a705c9269b1a--


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From: Domingos Creado <domingos.creado@authlete.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 18:13:58 -0300
Message-ID: <CAFtv1m7V-zDAkdb+e4+buRttiadAAvtXRffQ9yt7XyJ5F0bQfg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Warren Parad <wparad=40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>,  Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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Hi All,

I think those are valid points, but they can be better addressed on
identity management forums like idsa or idpro.

https://www.idsalliance.org/

https://idpro.org/

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 5:55 PM Warren Parad <wparad=3D
40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> I definitely see that there is room for a potential attack depending on
> the internal implementation. Wouldn't that be only relevant internally to
> the auth server though? Would adding a feature flag to the discovery
> document or visibility into configuration help reduce the attack surface?
> Perhaps, I would need to see the explicit vulnerability and how it would =
be
> potentially mitigated. From my uninformed perspective it seems like tryin=
g
> to protect users against a phishing attack that uses a malicious auth
> server to emulate an honest one, though I could be missing something
> critical.
>
> Any additional information would be appreciated.
>
> - Warren
>
> Warren Parad
>
> Founder, CTO
> Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
> Authress <https://authress.io/>.
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:44 PM Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> @wparad@rhosys.ch - Using forgot password and registration verification
>> links or codes could be used as vectors of attack.
>>
>> One possible point of insecurity that I have seen is this: after a user
>> verifies their code or link, they are often sent to another page where t=
hey
>> enter more information (such as additional user information or new
>> passwords). The user isn't supposed to be authenticated at this step, an=
d
>> yet the application must know who the user is.
>>
>> How do we confirm the user's identity without authenticating them for
>> these steps?
>>
>> This is the driving factor (the "why") for this ask.
>>
>> @Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com - I agree. Which channels should we use to
>> discuss this issue?
>>
>> - Kevat
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:17 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> wrote:
>>
>>> I think it would be prudent to potentially ask *why?* What problem is
>>> necessary to be solved by discussing/standardizing these particular
>>> features? There could be, but without understanding, knowing how best t=
o
>>> tackle it is a challenging conversation without the right context.
>>>
>>> Warren Parad
>>>
>>> Founder, CTO
>>> Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
>>> Authress <https://authress.io/>.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure
>>>> conformity of standards?
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM <michael@palage.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP=
)
>>>>> (see https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt )  which I think was the
>>>>> subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the
>>>>> IETF and W3C?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Tim Cappalli
>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM
>>>>> *To:* kevatshah@gmail.com
>>>>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password and
>>>>> magic link type "stuff" happens in W3C.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset
>>>>> endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.
>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
>>>>> *To:* Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
>>>>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is
>>>>> important <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>>>>
>>>>> That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standards
>>>>> for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or doe=
s it
>>>>> make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where W=
3C
>>>>> standards don't exist?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - Kevat
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com=
>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> tim
>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Kevat Shah <
>>>>> kevatshah@gmail.com>
>>>>> *Sent:* Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
>>>>> *To:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>>> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Some people who received this message don't often get email from
>>>>> kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is important
>>>>> <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>>>>
>>>>> I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by
>>>>> Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
>>>>> functionalities that IdPs provide such as:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - Email verification on registration
>>>>>
>>>>> - Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
>>>>>
>>>>> - Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users
>>>>> that are logged in
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an
>>>>> industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. T=
he
>>>>> purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used a=
nd
>>>>> implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would
>>>>> be:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link
>>>>> to verify their email address
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>>>> verification code to verify their email address
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a link
>>>>> to reset their password
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>>>> verification code to reset their password
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi All,</div><div><br></div><div>I think those are va=
lid points, but they can be better addressed on identity management forums =
like idsa or idpro.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.idsalli=
ance.org/">https://www.idsalliance.org/</a></div><div><br></div><div><a hre=
f=3D"https://idpro.org/">https://idpro.org/</a></div></div><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 =
at 5:55 PM Warren Parad &lt;wparad=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ie=
tf.org">40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I definitely see that th=
ere is room for a potential attack depending on the internal implementation=
. Wouldn&#39;t that be only relevant internally to the auth server though? =
Would adding a feature flag to the discovery document or visibility into co=
nfiguration help reduce the attack surface? Perhaps, I would need to see th=
e explicit vulnerability and how it would be potentially mitigated. From my=
 uninformed perspective it seems like trying to protect users against a phi=
shing attack that uses a malicious auth server to emulate an honest one, th=
ough I could be missing something critical.<div><br></div><div>Any addition=
al information would be appreciated.</div><div><br></div><div>- Warren<br><=
div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table style=
=3D"border:medium none;border-collapse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"21=
4"><col width=3D"110"></colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=
=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(2=
04,204,204) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255);vertical-align:top;padding:5p=
t;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-width:1pt=
;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bot=
tom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);b=
ackground-color:transparent;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><=
span style=3D"border:medium none;display:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width=
:199px;height:34px"><img src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGI=
rSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO4=
5YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" style=3D"margin-left: =
0px; margin-top: 0px;" width=3D"199" height=3D"34"></span></span></p></td><=
td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204);vertical-align:top;pa=
dding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-l=
eft:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);bord=
er-top:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;background-color:transpa=
rent;font-weight:700;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren P=
arad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt soli=
d rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom:1p=
t solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"La=
to, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;white-space:pre-wrap">Fo=
under, CTO</span></font></p></td></tr></tbody></table><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:x-small">Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Imp=
lement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://authress.io/" style=3D"font-size:x-sm=
all" target=3D"_blank">Authress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</spa=
n><br></div></div></div><br></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:44 PM Kev=
at Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">kevats=
hah@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddi=
ng-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-si=
ze:12.8px" dir=3D"auto">@<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch" style=3D"text-=
decoration-line:none;color:rgb(66,133,244)" target=3D"_blank">wparad@rhosys=
.ch</a>=C2=A0- Using forgot password and registration verification links or=
 codes could be used as vectors of attack.=C2=A0<div dir=3D"auto"><br></div=
><div dir=3D"auto">One possible point of insecurity that I have seen is thi=
s: after a user verifies their code or link, they are often sent to another=
 page where they enter more information (such as additional user informatio=
n or new passwords). The user isn&#39;t supposed to be authenticated at thi=
s step, and yet the application must know who the user is.=C2=A0</div><div =
dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">How do we confirm the user&#39;s i=
dentity without authenticating them for these steps?</div><div dir=3D"auto"=
><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">This is the driving factor (the &quot;why&quot=
;) for this ask.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div>@<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Ca=
ppalli@microsoft.com" style=3D"text-decoration-line:none;color:rgb(66,133,2=
44)" target=3D"_blank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>=C2=A0- I agree. Which=
 channels should we use to discuss this issue?</div><div style=3D"color:rgb=
(136,136,136);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px" dir=3D"auto"><div di=
r=3D"auto"><br></div></div><div dir=3D"auto" style=3D"font-family:sans-seri=
f;font-size:12.8px"><div style=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136)">- Kevat</div></di=
v></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr=
">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:17 PM Warren Parad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rh=
osys.ch" target=3D"_blank">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I think it woul=
d be prudent to potentially ask=C2=A0<b>why?</b>=C2=A0What problem is neces=
sary to be solved by discussing/standardizing these particular features? Th=
ere could be, but without understanding, knowing how best to tackle it is a=
 challenging conversation without the right context.<div><br clear=3D"all">=
<div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"border:medium none;b=
order-collapse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"214"><col width=3D"110"></=
colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;bord=
er-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204) rgb(255,255,2=
55) rgb(255,255,255);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;borde=
r-color:rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transpare=
nt;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"border:medi=
um none;display:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;height:34px"><img =
src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXd=
fZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6=
hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" style=3D"margin-left: 0px; margin-top: 0px;" wi=
dth=3D"199" height=3D"34"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D"border-width:=
1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(2=
55,255,255) rgb(204,204,204);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden=
"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255=
,255);border-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-top:1pt solid rgb(255,=
255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;fo=
nt-family:Lato,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;vert=
ical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"=
ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border=
-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);=
margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:13.3333px;white-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font><=
/p></td></tr></tbody></table><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your =
user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a hre=
f=3D"https://authress.io/" style=3D"font-size:x-small" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">Authress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br>=
</div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,2=
04);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">How would that work? Would we need =
to work with W3C to ensure conformity of standards?</div><br><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:1=
1 PM  &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:michael@palage.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">michael@palage.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l">Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices (BCP) (=
see <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt</a> ) =
=C2=A0which I think was the subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email. <u><=
/u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal">So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both th=
e IETF and W3C?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><div style=3D"border-color:rgb(225,225,225) cu=
rrentcolor currentcolor;border-style:solid none none;border-width:1pt mediu=
m medium;padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> OAuth &lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b>Tim Capp=
alli<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=
=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_bl=
ank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a><br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org=
" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a><br><b>=
Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers<u></u><u>=
</u></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-se=
rif;color:black">I don&#39;t think there is explicit ownership, but general=
ly password and magic link type &quot;stuff&quot; happens in W3C.<u></u><u>=
</u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
2pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-fami=
ly:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">There are existing work efforts around sta=
ndardizing password reset endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, =
etc.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"text-a=
lign:center" align=3D"center"><hr width=3D"98%" size=3D"2" align=3D"center"=
></div><div id=3D"gmail-m_-4294363346704878473gmail-m_4633393743236340673m_=
-5674079125007162266gmail-m_3301473412489012094m_4500908371963244180divRply=
FwdMsg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span><=
/b><span style=3D"color:black"> Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@=
gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.=
com</a>&gt;<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03<br><b>To:</b> Tim =
Cappalli &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"noreferre=
r noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Cc=
:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" targe=
t=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=
=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>S=
ubject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</span> <u>=
</u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></=
div><div><table style=3D"width:100%;display:table;float:none" width=3D"100%=
" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" border=3D"0" align=3D"left"><tbody><t=
r><td style=3D"background:rgb(166,166,166) none repeat scroll 0% 0%;padding=
:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td style=3D"width:100%;background:rgb(234,234,234) non=
e repeat scroll 0% 0%;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt" width=3D"100%">=
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&quot;=
Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif;color:rgb(33,33,33)">You don&#39;t often get emai=
l from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnA=
boutSenderIdentification" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">L=
earn why this is important</a><u></u><u></u></span></p></div></td><td style=
=3D"width:56.25pt;background:rgb(234,234,234) none repeat scroll 0% 0%;padd=
ing:5.25pt 3.75pt" width=3D"75"></td></tr></tbody></table><div><div><div><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal">That&#39;s a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C=
 owns the standards for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Pro=
viders? Or does it make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in =
cases where W3C standards don&#39;t exist?<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">- Kevat<u></u><u></u></p><div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_bl=
ank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><bloc=
kquote style=3D"border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentcolor rgb(204=
,204,204);border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium medium medi=
um 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><di=
v><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sa=
ns-serif;color:black">I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IET=
F.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D=
"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u>=C2=A0<u><=
/u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12=
pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">tim<u></u><u></u></span></p></=
div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"text-align:center" align=3D"center"><=
hr width=3D"98%" size=3D"2" align=3D"center"></div><div id=3D"gmail-m_-4294=
363346704878473gmail-m_4633393743236340673m_-5674079125007162266gmail-m_330=
1473412489012094m_4500908371963244180x_m_-6708358250069876788divRplyFwdMsg"=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:</span></b><spa=
n style=3D"color:black"> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org=
" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a=
>&gt; on behalf of Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" re=
l=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<b=
r><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto=
:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf=
.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG] Sp=
ecifications for Identity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table style=3D"wid=
th:100%;display:table;float:none" width=3D"100%" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadd=
ing=3D"0" border=3D"0" align=3D"left"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"background:rg=
b(166,166,166) none repeat scroll 0% 0%;padding:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td styl=
e=3D"width:100%;background:rgb(234,234,234) none repeat scroll 0% 0%;paddin=
g:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt" width=3D"100%"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif;co=
lor:rgb(33,33,33)">Some people who received this message don&#39;t often ge=
t email from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noref=
errer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/=
LearnAboutSenderIdentification" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_bl=
ank">Learn why this is important</a><u></u><u></u></span></p></div></td><td=
 style=3D"width:56.25pt;background:rgb(234,234,234) none repeat scroll 0% 0=
%;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt" width=3D"75"></td></tr></tbody></table><div><div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I propose that we expand upon specific functiona=
lity provided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.<u></u=
><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">To start with, there should be clear specifica=
tions for various functionalities that IdPs provide such as:<u></u><u></u><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal">- Email verification on registration<u></u><u></u></p><=
/div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;forgot pa=
ssword&quot; functionality<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password&quot; functionality for=
 users that are logged in<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u=
></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">These specifications only pertai=
n to Identity Providers, and allow an industry-wide set of rules that each =
Identity Provider must follow. The purpose of doing so would be to standard=
ize various frequently used and implemented flows that are secure and widel=
y reusable.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">Some problems that would be addressed by these specification=
s=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt">would be:</span><u></u><u></u></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">- How to securely implement functionality where a user is se=
nt a link to verify their email address<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=
=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white none repeat scroll 0% 0%"=
>How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a verificatio=
n code to verify their email address</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt">How to securely implement function=
ality where a user is sent a link to reset their password</span> <u></u><u>=
</u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white none =
repeat scroll 0% 0%">How to securely implement functionality where a user i=
s sent a verification code to reset their password</span><u></u><u></u></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></=
div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Aug 2021 15:58:22 -0600
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To: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs
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Hi Dmitry,

I think you are right that it's probably worthwhile to allow for a
distinction in a protected resource error response. I'm inclined to say
that a new error code such as "invalid_dpop_proof" to use with the 401
response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most
straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I'll look to add
that, probably somewhere in section 7
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-protect=
ed-resource-access>,
in the next draft revision.


On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=3D
40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound acces=
s
> token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinction betwe=
en
> these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401 Unauthorized wi=
th
> WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error=3D"invalid_token"? or could we use
> error=3D"invalid_dpop_proof", similar to token request? or maybe even 400=
 Bad
> Request?
>
> Regards,
> Dmitry
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Dmitry,</div><div><br></div><div>I think you are r=
ight that it&#39;s probably worthwhile to allow for a distinction in a prot=
ected resource error response. I&#39;m inclined to say that=C2=A0a new erro=
r code such as &quot;invalid_dpop_proof&quot; to use with the 401 response =
containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most straightforward way=
 to accommodate it in the document. I&#39;ll look to add that, probably <a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-=
protected-resource-access">somewhere in section 7</a>, in the next draft re=
vision. <br></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM=
 Dmitry Telegin &lt;dmitryt=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.o=
rg" target=3D"_blank">40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>He=
llo,</div><div><br></div><div>When a protected resource is accessed using D=
PoP proof + DPoP-bound access token, either of those could be invalid. Shou=
ld we make distinction between these two cases? I.e. should the response al=
ways be a 401 Unauthorized with WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error=3D&quot;in=
valid_token&quot;? or could we use error=3D&quot;invalid_dpop_proof&quot;, =
similar to token request? or maybe even 400 Bad Request?</div><div><br></di=
v><div>Regards,</div><div>Dmitry</div><div><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 14:53:06 -0400
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To: Domingos Creado <domingos.creado@authlete.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
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Agreed! Thank you all for the feedback!

On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 5:14 PM Domingos Creado <domingos.creado@authlete.com>
wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> I think those are valid points, but they can be better addressed on
> identity management forums like idsa or idpro.
>
> https://www.idsalliance.org/
>
> https://idpro.org/
>
> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 5:55 PM Warren Parad <wparad=3D
> 40rhosys.ch@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> I definitely see that there is room for a potential attack depending on
>> the internal implementation. Wouldn't that be only relevant internally t=
o
>> the auth server though? Would adding a feature flag to the discovery
>> document or visibility into configuration help reduce the attack surface=
?
>> Perhaps, I would need to see the explicit vulnerability and how it would=
 be
>> potentially mitigated. From my uninformed perspective it seems like tryi=
ng
>> to protect users against a phishing attack that uses a malicious auth
>> server to emulate an honest one, though I could be missing something
>> critical.
>>
>> Any additional information would be appreciated.
>>
>> - Warren
>>
>> Warren Parad
>>
>> Founder, CTO
>> Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
>> Authress <https://authress.io/>.
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:44 PM Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> @wparad@rhosys.ch - Using forgot password and registration verification
>>> links or codes could be used as vectors of attack.
>>>
>>> One possible point of insecurity that I have seen is this: after a user
>>> verifies their code or link, they are often sent to another page where =
they
>>> enter more information (such as additional user information or new
>>> passwords). The user isn't supposed to be authenticated at this step, a=
nd
>>> yet the application must know who the user is.
>>>
>>> How do we confirm the user's identity without authenticating them for
>>> these steps?
>>>
>>> This is the driving factor (the "why") for this ask.
>>>
>>> @Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com - I agree. Which channels should we use to
>>> discuss this issue?
>>>
>>> - Kevat
>>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:17 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think it would be prudent to potentially ask *why?* What problem is
>>>> necessary to be solved by discussing/standardizing these particular
>>>> features? There could be, but without understanding, knowing how best =
to
>>>> tackle it is a challenging conversation without the right context.
>>>>
>>>> Warren Parad
>>>>
>>>> Founder, CTO
>>>> Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
>>>> Authress <https://authress.io/>.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com> wrote=
:
>>>>
>>>>> How would that work? Would we need to work with W3C to ensure
>>>>> conformity of standards?
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:11 PM <michael@palage.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Practices
>>>>>> (BCP) (see https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt )  which I think
>>>>>> was the subject of Kevat=E2=80=99s original email.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So perhaps this is a subject matter that could co-exist in both the
>>>>>> IETF and W3C?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> *On Behalf Of *Tim Cappalli
>>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 4:06 PM
>>>>>> *To:* kevatshah@gmail.com
>>>>>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think there is explicit ownership, but generally password an=
d
>>>>>> magic link type "stuff" happens in W3C.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are existing work efforts around standardizing password reset
>>>>>> endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.
>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* Kevat Shah <kevatshah@gmail.com>
>>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03
>>>>>> *To:* Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com>
>>>>>> *Cc:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You don't often get email from kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this
>>>>>> is important <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3C owns the standard=
s
>>>>>> for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Providers? Or do=
es it
>>>>>> make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in cases where =
W3C
>>>>>> standards don't exist?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Kevat
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli <Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.co=
m>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I believe this topic would be more W3C scope, not IETF.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> tim
>>>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Kevat Shah <
>>>>>> kevatshah@gmail.com>
>>>>>> *Sent:* Sunday, August 8, 2021 16:37
>>>>>> *To:* oauth@ietf.org <oauth@ietf.org>
>>>>>> *Subject:* [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Some people who received this message don't often get email from
>>>>>> kevatshah@gmail.com. Learn why this is important
>>>>>> <http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I propose that we expand upon specific functionality provided by
>>>>>> Identity Providers (IdPs) and tasks handled by them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To start with, there should be clear specifications for various
>>>>>> functionalities that IdPs provide such as:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Email verification on registration
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Specifications regarding "forgot password" functionality
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - Specifications regarding "resest password" functionality for users
>>>>>> that are logged in
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> These specifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow a=
n
>>>>>> industry-wide set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. =
The
>>>>>> purpose of doing so would be to standardize various frequently used =
and
>>>>>> implemented flows that are secure and widely reusable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Some problems that would be addressed by these specifications would
>>>>>> be:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a lin=
k
>>>>>> to verify their email address
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>>>>> verification code to verify their email address
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>>>>> link to reset their password
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - How to securely implement functionality where a user is sent a
>>>>>> verification code to reset their password
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

--000000000000d1586605c93903cc
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto">Agreed! Thank you all for the feedback!</div><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 202=
1, 5:14 PM Domingos Creado &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:domingos.creado@authlete.c=
om">domingos.creado@authlete.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi All,</div><div><br></div><div>I thin=
k those are valid points, but they can be better addressed on identity mana=
gement forums like idsa or idpro.</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https=
://www.idsalliance.org/" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://www.i=
dsalliance.org/</a></div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://idpro.org/"=
 target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://idpro.org/</a></div></div><br=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, A=
ug 9, 2021 at 5:55 PM Warren Parad &lt;wparad=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40rhosys.=
ch@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">40rhosys.ch@dmarc.i=
etf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I definitely see that there is room for a potential=
 attack depending on the internal implementation. Wouldn&#39;t that be only=
 relevant internally to the auth server though? Would adding a feature flag=
 to the discovery document or visibility into configuration help reduce the=
 attack surface? Perhaps, I would need to see the explicit vulnerability an=
d how it would be potentially mitigated. From my uninformed perspective it =
seems like trying to protect users against a phishing attack that uses a ma=
licious auth server to emulate an honest one, though I could be missing som=
ething critical.<div><br></div><div>Any additional information would be app=
reciated.</div><div><br></div><div>- Warren<br><div><br clear=3D"all"><div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"border:medium none;border=
-collapse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"214"><col width=3D"110"></colgr=
oup><tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-st=
yle:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204) rgb(255,255,255) r=
gb(255,255,255);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"l=
tr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:11pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;ve=
rtical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"border:medium no=
ne;display:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;height:34px"><img src=
=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZO=
sW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hju=
Im9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" style=3D"margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px" width=3D"=
199" height=3D"34"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;bor=
der-style:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,=
255) rgb(204,204,204);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p di=
r=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);b=
order-right:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-top:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255=
);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-fami=
ly:Lato,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;vertical-al=
ign:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" st=
yle=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:=
1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-=
top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:13.3333px;white-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></td=
></tr></tbody></table><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user da=
ta with IAM authorization as a service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"ht=
tps://authress.io/" style=3D"font-size:x-small" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"no=
referrer">Authress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br></div><=
/div></div><br></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D=
"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:44 PM Kevat Shah &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">=
kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204)=
;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;f=
ont-size:12.8px" dir=3D"auto">@<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch" style=3D=
"text-decoration-line:none;color:rgb(66,133,244)" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"=
noreferrer">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>=C2=A0- Using forgot password and registrat=
ion verification links or codes could be used as vectors of attack.=C2=A0<d=
iv dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">One possible point of insecurit=
y that I have seen is this: after a user verifies their code or link, they =
are often sent to another page where they enter more information (such as a=
dditional user information or new passwords). The user isn&#39;t supposed t=
o be authenticated at this step, and yet the application must know who the =
user is.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">How do we=
 confirm the user&#39;s identity without authenticating them for these step=
s?</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">This is the driving f=
actor (the &quot;why&quot;) for this ask.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div>=
@<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" style=3D"text-decoration-lin=
e:none;color:rgb(66,133,244)" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">Tim.Capp=
alli@microsoft.com</a>=C2=A0- I agree. Which channels should we use to disc=
uss this issue?</div><div style=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136);font-family:sans-=
serif;font-size:12.8px" dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div></div><div=
 dir=3D"auto" style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px"><div style=
=3D"color:rgb(136,136,136)">- Kevat</div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 4:17 PM=
 Warren Parad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch" target=3D"_blank" rel=
=3D"noreferrer">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">I think it would be prude=
nt to potentially ask=C2=A0<b>why?</b>=C2=A0What problem is necessary to be=
 solved by discussing/standardizing these particular features? There could =
be, but without understanding, knowing how best to tackle it is a challengi=
ng conversation without the right context.<div><br clear=3D"all"><div><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"border:medium none;border-coll=
apse:collapse"><colgroup><col width=3D"214"><col width=3D"110"></colgroup><=
tbody><tr style=3D"height:0pt"><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-style:s=
olid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(204,204,204) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(25=
5,255,255);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" s=
tyle=3D"line-height:1.2;border-width:1pt;border-style:solid;border-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
1pt;font-family:Arial;color:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;vertica=
l-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"border:medium none;di=
splay:inline-block;overflow:hidden;width:199px;height:34px"><img src=3D"htt=
ps://lh6.googleusercontent.com/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2=
A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYdBhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeB=
RRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" style=3D"margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px" width=3D"199" he=
ight=3D"34"></span></span></p></td><td style=3D"border-width:1pt;border-sty=
le:solid;border-color:rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rgb(255,255,255) rg=
b(204,204,204);vertical-align:top;padding:5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"lt=
r" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-r=
ight:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-top:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margi=
n-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Lato=
,sans-serif;background-color:transparent;font-weight:700;vertical-align:bas=
eline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"=
line-height:1.2;border-left:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);border-right:1pt sol=
id rgb(255,255,255);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(255,255,255);margin-top:0pt=
;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:13.3333px;white-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></td></tr><=
/tbody></table><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user data with=
 IAM authorization as a service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://a=
uthress.io/" style=3D"font-size:x-small" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" targ=
et=3D"_blank">Authress</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br></d=
iv></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"l=
tr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021 at 10:15 PM Kevat Shah &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D=
"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">How would that work? Would we=
 need to work with W3C to ensure conformity of standards?</div><br><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 9, 202=
1, 4:11 PM  &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:michael@palage.com" rel=3D"noreferrer nor=
eferrer" target=3D"_blank">michael@palage.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:=
1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal">Although the IETF has been involved in Best Commercial Pr=
actices (BCP) (see <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfc/bcp-index.txt" rel=
=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.or=
g/rfc/bcp-index.txt</a> ) =C2=A0which I think was the subject of Kevat=E2=
=80=99s original email. <u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">So perhaps this is a subject matter th=
at could co-exist in both the IETF and W3C?<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><div style=3D"bord=
er-color:rgb(225,225,225) currentcolor currentcolor;border-style:solid none=
 none;border-width:1pt medium medium;padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><b>From:</b> OAuth &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" rel=
=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.=
org</a>&gt; <b>On Behalf Of </b>Tim Cappalli<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August=
 9, 2021 4:06 PM<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=
=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com=
</a><br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer nore=
ferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a><br><b>Subject:</b> =
Re: [OAUTH-WG] Specifications for Identity Providers<u></u><u></u></p></div=
></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:bla=
ck">I don&#39;t think there is explicit ownership, but generally password a=
nd magic link type &quot;stuff&quot; happens in W3C.<u></u><u></u></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-fami=
ly:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans=
-serif;color:black">There are existing work efforts around standardizing pa=
ssword reset endpoint discovery, password complexity schemas, etc.<u></u><u=
></u></span></p></div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"text-align:center" =
align=3D"center"><hr width=3D"98%" size=3D"2" align=3D"center"></div><div i=
d=3D"m_4812636836346493544gmail-m_-4294363346704878473gmail-m_4633393743236=
340673m_-5674079125007162266gmail-m_3301473412489012094m_450090837196324418=
0divRplyFwdMsg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black">From:=
</span></b><span style=3D"color:black"> Kevat Shah &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ke=
vatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blan=
k">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, August 9, 2021 16:03=
<br><b>To:</b> Tim Cappalli &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.co=
m" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Tim.Cappalli@=
microsoft.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=
=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a> =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [OAUTH-=
WG] Specifications for Identity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table style=
=3D"width:100%;display:table;float:none" width=3D"100%" cellspacing=3D"0" c=
ellpadding=3D"0" border=3D"0" align=3D"left"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"backgr=
ound:rgb(166,166,166) none repeat scroll 0% 0%;padding:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><=
td style=3D"width:100%;background:rgb(234,234,234) none repeat scroll 0% 0%=
;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt" width=3D"100%"><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-s=
erif;color:rgb(33,33,33)">You don&#39;t often get email from <a href=3D"mai=
lto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D=
"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSender=
Identification" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">=
Learn why this is important</a><u></u><u></u></span></p></div></td><td styl=
e=3D"width:56.25pt;background:rgb(234,234,234) none repeat scroll 0% 0%;pad=
ding:5.25pt 3.75pt" width=3D"75"></td></tr></tbody></table><div><div><div><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal">That&#39;s a good point. Is it fair to assume that W3=
C owns the standards for most (if not all) standards related to Identity Pr=
oviders? Or does it make sense for IETF to start setting these standards in=
 cases where W3C standards don&#39;t exist?<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l" style=3D"margin-bottom:12pt">- Kevat<u></u><u></u></p><div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal">On Mon, Aug 9, 2021, 2:56 PM Tim Cappalli &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">Tim.Cappalli@microsoft.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>=
</div><blockquote style=3D"border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentco=
lor rgb(204,204,204);border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium =
medium medium 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0i=
n"><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-fami=
ly:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">I believe this topic would be more W3C sco=
pe, not IETF.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u=
>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">tim<u></u><u></u></=
span></p></div><div class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"text-align:center" align=
=3D"center"><hr width=3D"98%" size=3D"2" align=3D"center"></div><div id=3D"=
m_4812636836346493544gmail-m_-4294363346704878473gmail-m_463339374323634067=
3m_-5674079125007162266gmail-m_3301473412489012094m_4500908371963244180x_m_=
-6708358250069876788divRplyFwdMsg"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D=
"color:black">From:</span></b><span style=3D"color:black"> OAuth &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; on behalf of Kevat Shah =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer nor=
eferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br><b>Sent:</b> Sund=
ay, August 8, 2021 16:37<br><b>To:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" re=
l=3D"noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br><b>Subject:</b> [OAUTH-WG]=
 Specifications for Identity Providers</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><table style=3D"w=
idth:100%;display:table;float:none" width=3D"100%" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpa=
dding=3D"0" border=3D"0" align=3D"left"><tbody><tr><td style=3D"background:=
rgb(166,166,166) none repeat scroll 0% 0%;padding:5.25pt 1.5pt"></td><td st=
yle=3D"width:100%;background:rgb(234,234,234) none repeat scroll 0% 0%;padd=
ing:5.25pt 3.75pt 5.25pt 11.25pt" width=3D"100%"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif;=
color:rgb(33,33,33)">Some people who received this message don&#39;t often =
get email from <a href=3D"mailto:kevatshah@gmail.com" rel=3D"noreferrer nor=
eferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">kevatshah@gmail.com</a>. <a href=3D"h=
ttp://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">Learn why this is important</a><u></u><u></u><=
/span></p></div></td><td style=3D"width:56.25pt;background:rgb(234,234,234)=
 none repeat scroll 0% 0%;padding:5.25pt 3.75pt" width=3D"75"></td></tr></t=
body></table><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I propose that we expand=
 upon specific functionality provided by Identity Providers (IdPs) and task=
s handled by them.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">To start with, there s=
hould be clear specifications for various functionalities that IdPs provide=
 such as:<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<=
u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Email verification on registr=
ation<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifications r=
egarding &quot;forgot password&quot; functionality<u></u><u></u></p></div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- Specifications regarding &quot;resest password=
&quot; functionality for users that are logged in<u></u><u></u></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">These sp=
ecifications only pertain to Identity Providers, and allow an industry-wide=
 set of rules that each Identity Provider must follow. The purpose of doing=
 so would be to standardize various frequently used and implemented flows t=
hat are secure and widely reusable.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Some problems that would be addressed b=
y these specifications=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt">would be:</span>=
<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p=
></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">- How to securely implement functionalit=
y where a user is sent a link to verify their email address<u></u><u></u></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;background:white none =
repeat scroll 0% 0%">How to securely implement functionality where a user i=
s sent a verification code to verify their email address</span><u></u><u></=
u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"font-size:12pt">How to securel=
y implement functionality where a user is sent a link to reset their passwo=
rd</span> <u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:black;ba=
ckground:white none repeat scroll 0% 0%">How to securely implement function=
ality where a user is sent a verification code to reset their password</spa=
n><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u><=
/p></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div></div><=
/div></blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></=
div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_=
blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listin=
fo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a=
><br>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000d1586605c93903cc--


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From: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt@backbase.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 00:02:54 +0300
Message-ID: <CAOtx8D=e=vC09tXV4nJKWrMpZ5mQnxp6jNxnKtbmm-Pu50RcNw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs
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Hi Brian, thanks for the response,

On a related note, chapter 7.2 allows for protected resources supporting
Bearer and DPoP schemes simultaneously. Is it implied that such resources
should advertise both schemes when challenging user agents with
WWW-Authenticate?

The HTTP 1.1 Authentication spec, section 4.1
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.1> does allow for
multiple challenges sent as a single WWW-Authenticate header, for example:

    WWW-Authenticate: Newauth realm="apps", type=1,
                       title="Login to \"apps\"", Basic realm="simple"

which in our case would look like this:

    WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm="WallyWorld", algs="ES256 PS256",
                       Basic realm="WallyWorld"

or, in the case of error,

    WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm="WallyWorld", error="invalid_token",
error_description="Invalid DPoP key binding", algs="ES256",
                       Basic realm="WallyWorld"


The HTTP 1.1 spec, section 4.2
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.html#section-4.2> also allows for
multiple headers with the same name, but only under very strict conditions;
I'm not yet sure if those apply to WWW-Authenticate.

Is this worth mentioning in the DPoP spec?

Regards,
Dmitry

On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 12:58 AM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=
40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hi Dmitry,
>
> I think you are right that it's probably worthwhile to allow for a
> distinction in a protected resource error response. I'm inclined to say
> that a new error code such as "invalid_dpop_proof" to use with the 401
> response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most
> straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I'll look to add
> that, probably somewhere in section 7
> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-protected-resource-access>,
> in the next draft revision.
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=
> 40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Hello,
>>
>> When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound
>> access token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinction
>> between these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401
>> Unauthorized with WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error="invalid_token"? or
>> could we use error="invalid_dpop_proof", similar to token request? or maybe
>> even 400 Bad Request?
>>
>> Regards,
>> Dmitry
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Brian, thanks for the response,</div><div><br></di=
v><div>On a related note, chapter 7.2 allows for protected resources suppor=
ting Bearer and DPoP schemes simultaneously. Is it implied that such resour=
ces should advertise both schemes when challenging user agents with WWW-Aut=
henticate?</div><div><br></div><div>The <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf=
.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.1">HTTP 1.1 Authentication spec, section 4.=
1</a> does allow for multiple challenges sent as a single WWW-Authenticate =
header, for example:</div><div><br></div><div><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage">=
    WWW-Authenticate: Newauth realm=3D&quot;apps&quot;, type=3D1,
                       title=3D&quot;Login to \&quot;apps\&quot;&quot;, Bas=
ic realm=3D&quot;simple&quot;<br><br></pre><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage"><sp=
an style=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif">which in our case would look like=
 this:<br><br><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">    WWW-Authenticate: D=
PoP realm=3D&quot;WallyWorld&quot;, algs=3D&quot;ES256 PS256&quot;,
                       Basic realm=3D&quot;<span style=3D"font-family:arial=
,sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">WallyWorld</span></span>=
&quot;<br></span><br></span></pre><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage"><span style=
=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif">or, in the case of error,<br><br><span st=
yle=3D"font-family:arial,sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">=
    WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm=3D&quot;WallyWorld&quot;, error=3D&quot;in=
valid_token&quot;, error_description=3D&quot;Invalid DPoP key binding&quot;=
, algs=3D&quot;ES256&quot;,
                       Basic realm=3D&quot;<span style=3D"font-family:arial=
,sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">WallyWorld</span></span>=
&quot;<br></span></span></span></pre></div><div><br></div><div>The <a href=
=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.html#section-4.2">HTTP 1.1 spec,=
 section 4.2</a> also allows for multiple headers with the same name, but o=
nly under very strict conditions; I&#39;m not yet sure if those apply to WW=
W-Authenticate.</div><div><br></div><div>Is this worth mentioning in the DP=
oP spec?</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>Dmitry<br></div><div><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">O=
n Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 12:58 AM Brian Campbell &lt;bcampbell=3D<a href=3D"m=
ailto:40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><=
div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Dmitry,</div><div><br></div><div>I think you are ri=
ght that it&#39;s probably worthwhile to allow for a distinction in a prote=
cted resource error response. I&#39;m inclined to say that=C2=A0a new error=
 code such as &quot;invalid_dpop_proof&quot; to use with the 401 response c=
ontaining the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most straightforward way =
to accommodate it in the document. I&#39;ll look to add that, probably <a h=
ref=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-p=
rotected-resource-access" target=3D"_blank">somewhere in section 7</a>, in =
the next draft revision. <br></div></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><di=
v class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 5=
, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin &lt;dmitryt=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40backbase=
.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div>Hello,</div><div><br></div><div>When a protected resource is=
 accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound access token, either of those could=
 be invalid. Should we make distinction between these two cases? I.e. shoul=
d the response always be a 401 Unauthorized with WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ...=
 error=3D&quot;invalid_token&quot;? or could we use error=3D&quot;invalid_d=
pop_proof&quot;, similar to token request? or maybe even 400 Bad Request?</=
div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>Dmitry</div><div><br></div></div=
>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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From: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt@backbase.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 00:05:46 +0300
Message-ID: <CAOtx8Dkz2woiFKgop4Cn_==moLfpcvwU92QZrJO8AgstPpsrHQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs
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Sorry, "Basic" should be "Bearer" obviously.
Dmitry

On Thu, Aug 12, 2021 at 12:02 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt@backbase.com>
wrote:

> Hi Brian, thanks for the response,
>
> On a related note, chapter 7.2 allows for protected resources supporting
> Bearer and DPoP schemes simultaneously. Is it implied that such resources
> should advertise both schemes when challenging user agents with
> WWW-Authenticate?
>
> The HTTP 1.1 Authentication spec, section 4.1
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.1> does allow
> for multiple challenges sent as a single WWW-Authenticate header, for
> example:
>
>     WWW-Authenticate: Newauth realm="apps", type=1,
>                        title="Login to \"apps\"", Basic realm="simple"
>
> which in our case would look like this:
>
>     WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm="WallyWorld", algs="ES256 PS256",
>                        Basic realm="WallyWorld"
>
> or, in the case of error,
>
>     WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm="WallyWorld", error="invalid_token", error_description="Invalid DPoP key binding", algs="ES256",
>                        Basic realm="WallyWorld"
>
>
> The HTTP 1.1 spec, section 4.2
> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.html#section-4.2> also allows for
> multiple headers with the same name, but only under very strict conditions;
> I'm not yet sure if those apply to WWW-Authenticate.
>
> Is this worth mentioning in the DPoP spec?
>
> Regards,
> Dmitry
>
> On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 12:58 AM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=
> 40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Dmitry,
>>
>> I think you are right that it's probably worthwhile to allow for a
>> distinction in a protected resource error response. I'm inclined to say
>> that a new error code such as "invalid_dpop_proof" to use with the 401
>> response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most
>> straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I'll look to add
>> that, probably somewhere in section 7
>> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-protected-resource-access>,
>> in the next draft revision.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=
>> 40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound
>>> access token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinction
>>> between these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401
>>> Unauthorized with WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error="invalid_token"? or
>>> could we use error="invalid_dpop_proof", similar to token request? or maybe
>>> even 400 Bad Request?
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Dmitry
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Sorry, &quot;Basic&quot; should be &quot;Bearer&quot;=
 obviously.</div><div>Dmitry</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 12, 2021 at 12:02 AM Dmitry T=
elegin &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dmitryt@backbase.com">dmitryt@backbase.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Brian, thanks for the response,</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>On a related note, chapter 7.2 allows for protected resources supporting=
 Bearer and DPoP schemes simultaneously. Is it implied that such resources =
should advertise both schemes when challenging user agents with WWW-Authent=
icate?</div><div><br></div><div>The <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org=
/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.1" target=3D"_blank">HTTP 1.1 Authentication sp=
ec, section 4.1</a> does allow for multiple challenges sent as a single WWW=
-Authenticate header, for example:</div><div><br></div><div><pre>    WWW-Au=
thenticate: Newauth realm=3D&quot;apps&quot;, type=3D1,
                       title=3D&quot;Login to \&quot;apps\&quot;&quot;, Bas=
ic realm=3D&quot;simple&quot;<br><br></pre><pre><span style=3D"font-family:=
arial,sans-serif">which in our case would look like this:<br><br><span styl=
e=3D"font-family:monospace">    WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm=3D&quot;WallyW=
orld&quot;, algs=3D&quot;ES256 PS256&quot;,
                       Basic realm=3D&quot;<span style=3D"font-family:arial=
,sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">WallyWorld</span></span>=
&quot;<br></span><br></span></pre><pre><span style=3D"font-family:arial,san=
s-serif">or, in the case of error,<br><br><span style=3D"font-family:arial,=
sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">    WWW-Authenticate: DPo=
P realm=3D&quot;WallyWorld&quot;, error=3D&quot;invalid_token&quot;, error_=
description=3D&quot;Invalid DPoP key binding&quot;, algs=3D&quot;ES256&quot=
;,
                       Basic realm=3D&quot;<span style=3D"font-family:arial=
,sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">WallyWorld</span></span>=
&quot;<br></span></span></span></pre></div><div><br></div><div>The <a href=
=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.html#section-4.2" target=3D"_bla=
nk">HTTP 1.1 spec, section 4.2</a> also allows for multiple headers with th=
e same name, but only under very strict conditions; I&#39;m not yet sure if=
 those apply to WWW-Authenticate.</div><div><br></div><div>Is this worth me=
ntioning in the DPoP spec?</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>Dmit=
ry<br></div><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 12:58 AM Brian Campbell &lt;bcampb=
ell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Dmitry,</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>I think you are right that it&#39;s probably worthwhile t=
o allow for a distinction in a protected resource error response. I&#39;m i=
nclined to say that=C2=A0a new error code such as &quot;invalid_dpop_proof&=
quot; to use with the 401 response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate hea=
der is the most straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I&#3=
9;ll look to add that, probably <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/=
draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-protected-resource-access" target=3D"_bl=
ank">somewhere in section 7</a>, in the next draft revision. <br></div></di=
v><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin &lt;dm=
itryt=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">=
40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hello,</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound=
 access token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinction=
 between these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401 Unauthor=
ized with WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error=3D&quot;invalid_token&quot;? or =
could we use error=3D&quot;invalid_dpop_proof&quot;, similar to token reque=
st? or maybe even 400 Bad Request?</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><=
div>Dmitry</div><div><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
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va-zendesk,system-ui,-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,=
Roboto,Oxygen-Sans,Ubuntu,Cantarell,&quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;,Arial,sans-s=
erif;font-weight:600"><font size=3D"2">CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email m=
ay contain confidential and privileged material for the sole use of the int=
ended recipient(s). Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others i=
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</blockquote></div>

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 14:17:24 -0600
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To: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs
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It might be worth a mention but I'm always a little hesitant about
potentially repeating content from other specs (and maybe even getting it
wrong!). Maybe a very brief mention along with a pointer to that section in
RFC 7235 would be appropriate? I'm curious what other WG folk think about
this though?

FWIW, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.1 does say
"the [WWW-Authenticate] header field itself can occur multiple times."


On Wed, Aug 11, 2021 at 3:03 PM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=3D
40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hi Brian, thanks for the response,
>
> On a related note, chapter 7.2 allows for protected resources supporting
> Bearer and DPoP schemes simultaneously. Is it implied that such resources
> should advertise both schemes when challenging user agents with
> WWW-Authenticate?
>
> The HTTP 1.1 Authentication spec, section 4.1
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.1> does allow
> for multiple challenges sent as a single WWW-Authenticate header, for
> example:
>
>     WWW-Authenticate: Newauth realm=3D"apps", type=3D1,
>                        title=3D"Login to \"apps\"", Basic realm=3D"simple=
"
>
> which in our case would look like this:
>
>     WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm=3D"WallyWorld", algs=3D"ES256 PS256",
>                        Basic realm=3D"WallyWorld"
>
> or, in the case of error,
>
>     WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm=3D"WallyWorld", error=3D"invalid_token",=
 error_description=3D"Invalid DPoP key binding", algs=3D"ES256",
>                        Basic realm=3D"WallyWorld"
>
>
> The HTTP 1.1 spec, section 4.2
> <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.html#section-4.2> also allows for
> multiple headers with the same name, but only under very strict condition=
s;
> I'm not yet sure if those apply to WWW-Authenticate.
>
> Is this worth mentioning in the DPoP spec?
>
> Regards,
> Dmitry
>
> On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 12:58 AM Brian Campbell <bcampbell=3D
> 40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Dmitry,
>>
>> I think you are right that it's probably worthwhile to allow for a
>> distinction in a protected resource error response. I'm inclined to say
>> that a new error code such as "invalid_dpop_proof" to use with the 401
>> response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most
>> straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I'll look to add
>> that, probably somewhere in section 7
>> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-prot=
ected-resource-access>,
>> in the next draft revision.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=3D
>> 40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound
>>> access token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinct=
ion
>>> between these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401
>>> Unauthorized with WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error=3D"invalid_token"? o=
r
>>> could we use error=3D"invalid_dpop_proof", similar to token request? or=
 maybe
>>> even 400 Bad Request?
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Dmitry
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>
>> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
>> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
>> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited=
.
>> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the send=
er
>> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fr=
om
>> your computer. Thank you.*
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">It might be worth a mention but I&#39;m always a little he=
sitant about potentially repeating content from other specs (and maybe even=
 getting it wrong!). Maybe a very brief mention along with a pointer to tha=
t section in RFC 7235 would be appropriate? I&#39;m curious what other WG f=
olk think about this though?=C2=A0 <br><br>FWIW, <a href=3D"https://datatra=
cker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.1">https://datatracker.ietf.org/do=
c/html/rfc7235#section-4.1</a> does say &quot;the [WWW-Authenticate] header=
 field itself can occur multiple times.&quot; <br><div><br></div><div><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On We=
d, Aug 11, 2021 at 3:03 PM Dmitry Telegin &lt;dmitryt=3D<a href=3D"mailto:4=
0backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><div>Hi Brian, thanks for the response,</div><div><br></div><div>On a rela=
ted note, chapter 7.2 allows for protected resources supporting Bearer and =
DPoP schemes simultaneously. Is it implied that such resources should adver=
tise both schemes when challenging user agents with WWW-Authenticate?</div>=
<div><br></div><div>The <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rf=
c7235#section-4.1" target=3D"_blank">HTTP 1.1 Authentication spec, section =
4.1</a> does allow for multiple challenges sent as a single WWW-Authenticat=
e header, for example:</div><div><br></div><div><pre>    WWW-Authenticate: =
Newauth realm=3D&quot;apps&quot;, type=3D1,
                       title=3D&quot;Login to \&quot;apps\&quot;&quot;, Bas=
ic realm=3D&quot;simple&quot;<br><br></pre><pre><span style=3D"font-family:=
arial,sans-serif">which in our case would look like this:<br><br><span styl=
e=3D"font-family:monospace">    WWW-Authenticate: DPoP realm=3D&quot;WallyW=
orld&quot;, algs=3D&quot;ES256 PS256&quot;,
                       Basic realm=3D&quot;<span style=3D"font-family:arial=
,sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">WallyWorld</span></span>=
&quot;<br></span><br></span></pre><pre><span style=3D"font-family:arial,san=
s-serif">or, in the case of error,<br><br><span style=3D"font-family:arial,=
sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">    WWW-Authenticate: DPo=
P realm=3D&quot;WallyWorld&quot;, error=3D&quot;invalid_token&quot;, error_=
description=3D&quot;Invalid DPoP key binding&quot;, algs=3D&quot;ES256&quot=
;,
                       Basic realm=3D&quot;<span style=3D"font-family:arial=
,sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-family:monospace">WallyWorld</span></span>=
&quot;<br></span></span></span></pre></div><div><br></div><div>The <a href=
=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616.html#section-4.2" target=3D"_bla=
nk">HTTP 1.1 spec, section 4.2</a> also allows for multiple headers with th=
e same name, but only under very strict conditions; I&#39;m not yet sure if=
 those apply to WWW-Authenticate.</div><div><br></div><div>Is this worth me=
ntioning in the DPoP spec?</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>Dmit=
ry<br></div><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Aug 10, 2021 at 12:58 AM Brian Campbell &lt;bcampb=
ell=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank=
">40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Dmitry,</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>I think you are right that it&#39;s probably worthwhile t=
o allow for a distinction in a protected resource error response. I&#39;m i=
nclined to say that=C2=A0a new error code such as &quot;invalid_dpop_proof&=
quot; to use with the 401 response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate hea=
der is the most straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I&#3=
9;ll look to add that, probably <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/=
draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-protected-resource-access" target=3D"_bl=
ank">somewhere in section 7</a>, in the next draft revision. <br></div></di=
v><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin &lt;dm=
itryt=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">=
40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(20=
4,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hello,</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound=
 access token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinction=
 between these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401 Unauthor=
ized with WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error=3D&quot;invalid_token&quot;? or =
could we use error=3D&quot;invalid_dpop_proof&quot;, similar to token reque=
st? or maybe even 400 Bad Request?</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><=
div>Dmitry</div><div><br></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
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Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 15:31:17 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs
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On Thu, Aug 12, 2021 at 02:17:24PM -0600, Brian Campbell wrote:
> It might be worth a mention but I'm always a little hesitant about
> potentially repeating content from other specs (and maybe even getting it
> wrong!). Maybe a very brief mention along with a pointer to that section in
> RFC 7235 would be appropriate? I'm curious what other WG folk think about
> this though?

Brief mention + reference seems good to me.

> FWIW, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7235#section-4.1 does say
> "the [WWW-Authenticate] header field itself can occur multiple times."

Yes, both this and the implication to offer both challenges should be
unsurprising to people fully steeped in the workings of HTTP (which one
assumes does not cover anywhere close to all people that will be looking at
DPoP).

-Ben

P.S. If you want to become a person steeped in the workings of HTTP,
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-semantics/ is a pretty
good place to start.


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Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 15:33:10 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell=40pingidentity.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs
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It's not immediately obvious to me that making the distinction is good (but
I'm also basically devoid of the context in which this exchange will
occur).

With security protocols there can be risks from overly descriptive errors,
which might (e.g.) leak information that "this is a valid token" vs "this
is a bogus token" that an attacker who came upon something token-shaped
might not otherwise be able to ascertain.

-Ben

On Mon, Aug 09, 2021 at 03:58:22PM -0600, Brian Campbell wrote:
> Hi Dmitry,
> 
> I think you are right that it's probably worthwhile to allow for a
> distinction in a protected resource error response. I'm inclined to say
> that a new error code such as "invalid_dpop_proof" to use with the 401
> response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most
> straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I'll look to add
> that, probably somewhere in section 7
> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-protected-resource-access>,
> in the next draft revision.
> 
> 
> On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=
> 40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> > Hello,
> >
> > When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound access
> > token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinction between
> > these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401 Unauthorized with
> > WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error="invalid_token"? or could we use
> > error="invalid_dpop_proof", similar to token request? or maybe even 400 Bad
> > Request?
> >
> > Regards,
> > Dmitry
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> >
> 
> -- 
> _CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged 
> material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use, 
> distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.  If you have 
> received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately 
> by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your 
> computer. Thank you._

> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
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> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 17:05:03 -0600
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Indeed but this case would be only distinguishing between which of the two
things (token & proof) the client sent was invalid. It seems like a
reasonable amount of information to disclose that might be helpful in
troubleshooting while not giving actionable info to would-be attackers.

On Thu, Aug 12, 2021 at 4:33 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> It's not immediately obvious to me that making the distinction is good (b=
ut
> I'm also basically devoid of the context in which this exchange will
> occur).
>
> With security protocols there can be risks from overly descriptive errors=
,
> which might (e.g.) leak information that "this is a valid token" vs "this
> is a bogus token" that an attacker who came upon something token-shaped
> might not otherwise be able to ascertain.
>
> -Ben
>
> On Mon, Aug 09, 2021 at 03:58:22PM -0600, Brian Campbell wrote:
> > Hi Dmitry,
> >
> > I think you are right that it's probably worthwhile to allow for a
> > distinction in a protected resource error response. I'm inclined to say
> > that a new error code such as "invalid_dpop_proof" to use with the 401
> > response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most
> > straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I'll look to add
> > that, probably somewhere in section 7
> > <
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-protec=
ted-resource-access
> >,
> > in the next draft revision.
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin <dmitryt=3D
> > 40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> >
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bound
> access
> > > token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distinction
> between
> > > these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401 Unauthorize=
d
> with
> > > WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error=3D"invalid_token"? or could we use
> > > error=3D"invalid_dpop_proof", similar to token request? or maybe even
> 400 Bad
> > > Request?
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Dmitry
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > OAuth mailing list
> > > OAuth@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> > >
> >
> > --
> > _CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
> privileged
> > material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use=
,
> > distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.  If you
> have
> > received this communication in error, please notify the sender
> immediately
> > by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your
> > computer. Thank you._
>
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Indeed but this case would be only distinguishing between =
which of the two things (token &amp; proof) the client sent was invalid. It=
 seems like a reasonable amount of information to disclose that might be he=
lpful in troubleshooting while not giving actionable info to would-be attac=
kers. <br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gm=
ail_attr">On Thu, Aug 12, 2021 at 4:33 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mai=
lto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">It&#39;s not immediately obvious to me tha=
t making the distinction is good (but<br>
I&#39;m also basically devoid of the context in which this exchange will<br=
>
occur).<br>
<br>
With security protocols there can be risks from overly descriptive errors,<=
br>
which might (e.g.) leak information that &quot;this is a valid token&quot; =
vs &quot;this<br>
is a bogus token&quot; that an attacker who came upon something token-shape=
d<br>
might not otherwise be able to ascertain.<br>
<br>
-Ben<br>
<br>
On Mon, Aug 09, 2021 at 03:58:22PM -0600, Brian Campbell wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi Dmitry,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I think you are right that it&#39;s probably worthwhile to allow for a=
<br>
&gt; distinction in a protected resource error response. I&#39;m inclined t=
o say<br>
&gt; that a new error code such as &quot;invalid_dpop_proof&quot; to use wi=
th the 401<br>
&gt; response containing the DPoP WWW-Authenticate header is the most<br>
&gt; straightforward way to accommodate it in the document. I&#39;ll look t=
o add<br>
&gt; that, probably somewhere in section 7<br>
&gt; &lt;<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-0=
3.html#name-protected-resource-access" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"=
>https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03.html#name-protect=
ed-resource-access</a>&gt;,<br>
&gt; in the next draft revision.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On Thu, Aug 5, 2021 at 8:50 AM Dmitry Telegin &lt;dmitryt=3D<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:40backbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40b=
ackbase.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; Hello,<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; When a protected resource is accessed using DPoP proof + DPoP-bou=
nd access<br>
&gt; &gt; token, either of those could be invalid. Should we make distincti=
on between<br>
&gt; &gt; these two cases? I.e. should the response always be a 401 Unautho=
rized with<br>
&gt; &gt; WWW-Authenticate: DPoP ... error=3D&quot;invalid_token&quot;? or =
could we use<br>
&gt; &gt; error=3D&quot;invalid_dpop_proof&quot;, similar to token request?=
 or maybe even 400 Bad<br>
&gt; &gt; Request?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; Regards,<br>
&gt; &gt; Dmitry<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.or=
g</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>=
<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; -- <br>
&gt; _CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privi=
leged <br>
&gt; material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, us=
e, <br>
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tely <br>
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r>
&gt; computer. Thank you._<br>
<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>=
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&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
<i style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:ba=
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [DPoP] Protected resource access and invalid DPoP proofs
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On Thu, Aug 12, 2021 at 05:05:03PM -0600, Brian Campbell wrote:
> Indeed but this case would be only distinguishing between which of the two
> things (token & proof) the client sent was invalid. It seems like a
> reasonable amount of information to disclose that might be helpful in
> troubleshooting while not giving actionable info to would-be attackers.

Agreed on what information is conveyed here.
My thinking may be shaped from work on 2FA for Kerberos, where we go to
great lengths to not reveal whether the password or second-factor code was
incorrect, to avoid a "divide-and-conquer" type attack on human-selected
passwords.  The situation is, admittedly, different here.

-Ben


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?
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The token introspection RFC defines the optional "token_type" member and =

I just noticed that draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03 doesn't mention it.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2

Would it be sensible to mention that if the "token_type" gets set in a=20
introspection response, it must be "DPoP"?

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#section-6.=
2

Vladimir

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Vladimir Dzhuvinov



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From: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
To: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?
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Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2021 11:45:52 +0000
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?
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Yes, it should be. Good catch.=20

-Justin
________________________________________
From: OAuth [oauth-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Vladimir Dzhuvinov [vladi=
mir@connect2id.com]
Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2021 12:02 PM
To: oauth@ietf.org
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?

The token introspection RFC defines the optional "token_type" member and
I just noticed that draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03 doesn't mention it.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2

Would it be sensible to mention that if the "token_type" gets set in a
introspection response, it must be "DPoP"?

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#section-6.2

Vladimir

--
Vladimir Dzhuvinov



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Yeah, I believe that logically follows from the definition of token_type in
introspection and RFC 6749.

Do y'all think it needs to be mentioned in DPoP though? I'm not sure, to be
honest.



On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 5:46 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> Yes, it should be. Good catch.
>
> -Justin
> ________________________________________
> From: OAuth [oauth-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Vladimir Dzhuvinov [
> vladimir@connect2id.com]
> Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2021 12:02 PM
> To: oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?
>
> The token introspection RFC defines the optional "token_type" member and
> I just noticed that draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03 doesn't mention it.
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2
>
> Would it be sensible to mention that if the "token_type" gets set in a
> introspection response, it must be "DPoP"?
>
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#section-6.=
2
>
> Vladimir
>
> --
> Vladimir Dzhuvinov
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Yeah, I believe that logically follows from the defin=
ition of token_type in introspection and RFC 6749. <br></div><div><br></div=
><div>Do y&#39;all think it needs to be mentioned in DPoP though? I&#39;m n=
ot sure, to be honest. <br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug =
16, 2021 at 5:46 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu">jr=
icher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddi=
ng-left:1ex">Yes, it should be. Good catch. <br>
<br>
-Justin<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: OAuth [<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">oa=
uth-bounces@ietf.org</a>] on behalf of Vladimir Dzhuvinov [<a href=3D"mailt=
o:vladimir@connect2id.com" target=3D"_blank">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>]<b=
r>
Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2021 12:02 PM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a><=
br>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?<br>
<br>
The token introspection RFC defines the optional &quot;token_type&quot; mem=
ber and<br>
I just noticed that draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03 doesn&#39;t mention it.<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc=
7662#section-2.2</a><br>
<br>
Would it be sensible to mention that if the &quot;token_type&quot; gets set=
 in a<br>
introspection response, it must be &quot;DPoP&quot;?<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#s=
ection-6.2" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#section-6.2</a><br>
<br>
Vladimir<br>
<br>
--<br>
Vladimir Dzhuvinov<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

<br>
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Cc: Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?
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I think it can be a really simple mention as suggested here. I put it in =
a pull request:

https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/72 =
<https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/72>

I was actually surprised to see that the `token_type` value wasn=E2=80=99t=
 already required to be DPoP (case insensitive) so I added that, too.

 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On Aug 16, 2021, at 6:20 PM, Brian Campbell =
<bcampbell@pingidentity.com> wrote:
>=20
> Yeah, I believe that logically follows from the definition of =
token_type in introspection and RFC 6749.=20
>=20
> Do y'all think it needs to be mentioned in DPoP though? I'm not sure, =
to be honest.=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 5:46 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu =
<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
> Yes, it should be. Good catch.=20
>=20
> -Justin
> ________________________________________
> From: OAuth [oauth-bounces@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org>] =
on behalf of Vladimir Dzhuvinov [vladimir@connect2id.com =
<mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com>]
> Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2021 12:02 PM
> To: oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?
>=20
> The token introspection RFC defines the optional "token_type" member =
and
> I just noticed that draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03 doesn't mention it.
>=20
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2 =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2>
>=20
> Would it be sensible to mention that if the "token_type" gets set in a
> introspection response, it must be "DPoP"?
>=20
> =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#section-6.2=
 =
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#section-6.=
2>
>=20
> Vladimir
>=20
> --
> Vladimir Dzhuvinov
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>=20
> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and =
privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any =
review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly =
prohibited.  If you have received this communication in error, please =
notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any =
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">I =
think it can be a really simple mention as suggested here. I put it in a =
pull request:<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/72" =
class=3D"">https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/72</a></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I was actually surprised =
to see that the `token_type` value wasn=E2=80=99t already required to be =
DPoP (case insensitive) so I added that, too.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;=E2=80=94 Justin<br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Aug 16, 2021, at 6:20 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com" =
class=3D"">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta =
http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">Yeah, I believe =
that logically follows from the definition of token_type in =
introspection and RFC 6749. <br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Do y'all think it needs to be mentioned =
in DPoP though? I'm not sure, to be honest. <br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 5:46 AM Justin =
Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" =
class=3D"">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Yes, it should be. Good catch. =
<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
-Justin<br class=3D"">
________________________________________<br class=3D"">
From: OAuth [<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">oauth-bounces@ietf.org</a>] on behalf of Vladimir Dzhuvinov =
[<a href=3D"mailto:vladimir@connect2id.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>]<br class=3D"">
Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2021 12:02 PM<br class=3D"">
To: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">oauth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
The token introspection RFC defines the optional "token_type" member =
and<br class=3D"">
I just noticed that draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03 doesn't mention it.<br =
class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2</a><b=
r class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Would it be sensible to mention that if the "token_type" gets set in =
a<br class=3D"">
introspection response, it must be "DPoP"?<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<a =
href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#sec=
tion-6.2" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#=
section-6.2</a><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Vladimir<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
--<br class=3D"">
Vladimir Dzhuvinov<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">
OAuth mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br class=3D"">
</blockquote></div>

<br class=3D"">
<i =
style=3D"margin:0px;padding:0px;border:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:base=
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Any review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly =
prohibited.&nbsp; If you have received this communication in error, =
please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the message =
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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 09:27:30 -0600
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?
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Thanks Justin.

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 8:58 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> I think it can be a really simple mention as suggested here. I put it in =
a
> pull request:
>
> https://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/72
>
> I was actually surprised to see that the `token_type` value wasn=E2=80=99=
t already
> required to be DPoP (case insensitive) so I added that, too.
>
>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>
> On Aug 16, 2021, at 6:20 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
>
> Yeah, I believe that logically follows from the definition of token_type
> in introspection and RFC 6749.
>
> Do y'all think it needs to be mentioned in DPoP though? I'm not sure, to
> be honest.
>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 5:46 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>
>> Yes, it should be. Good catch.
>>
>> -Justin
>> ________________________________________
>> From: OAuth [oauth-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of Vladimir Dzhuvinov [
>> vladimir@connect2id.com]
>> Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2021 12:02 PM
>> To: oauth@ietf.org
>> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?
>>
>> The token introspection RFC defines the optional "token_type" member and
>> I just noticed that draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03 doesn't mention it.
>>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2
>>
>> Would it be sensible to mention that if the "token_type" gets set in a
>> introspection response, it must be "DPoP"?
>>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#section-6=
.2
>>
>> Vladimir
>>
>> --
>> Vladimir Dzhuvinov
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> *CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and
> privileged material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any
> review, use, distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited.
> If you have received this communication in error, please notify the sende=
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> immediately by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments fro=
m
> your computer. Thank you.*
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks Justin. <br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 8:58 AM Justin =
Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"=
overflow-wrap: break-word;">I think it can be a really simple mention as su=
ggested here. I put it in a pull request:<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"htt=
ps://github.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/72" target=3D"_blank">https://gi=
thub.com/danielfett/draft-dpop/pull/72</a></div><div><br></div><div>I was a=
ctually surprised to see that the `token_type` value wasn=E2=80=99t already=
 required to be DPoP (case insensitive) so I added that, too.</div><div><br=
></div><div>=C2=A0=E2=80=94 Justin<br><div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><d=
iv>On Aug 16, 2021, at 6:20 PM, Brian Campbell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bcampb=
ell@pingidentity.com" target=3D"_blank">bcampbell@pingidentity.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Yeah, I believe that logically f=
ollows from the definition of token_type in introspection and RFC 6749. <br=
></div><div><br></div><div>Do y&#39;all think it needs to be mentioned in D=
PoP though? I&#39;m not sure, to be honest. <br></div><div><br></div><div><=
br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gma=
il_attr">On Mon, Aug 16, 2021 at 5:46 AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Yes, it should be. Good=
 catch. <br>
<br>
-Justin<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: OAuth [<a href=3D"mailto:oauth-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">oa=
uth-bounces@ietf.org</a>] on behalf of Vladimir Dzhuvinov [<a href=3D"mailt=
o:vladimir@connect2id.com" target=3D"_blank">vladimir@connect2id.com</a>]<b=
r>
Sent: Sunday, August 15, 2021 12:02 PM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:oauth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">oauth@ietf.org</a><=
br>
Subject: [OAUTH-WG] DPoP 03 - introspection - token_type?<br>
<br>
The token introspection RFC defines the optional &quot;token_type&quot; mem=
ber and<br>
I just noticed that draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03 doesn&#39;t mention it.<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662#section-2.2" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc=
7662#section-2.2</a><br>
<br>
Would it be sensible to mention that if the &quot;token_type&quot; gets set=
 in a<br>
introspection response, it must be &quot;DPoP&quot;?<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#s=
ection-6.2" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-03#section-6.2</a><br>
<br>
Vladimir<br>
<br>
--<br>
Vladimir Dzhuvinov<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
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</blockquote></div>

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From nobody Fri Aug 20 09:52:22 2021
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Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 09:52:07 -0700
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] [mglt.ietf@gmail.com: Re: [Ace] Missing Introspection parameter in draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
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Hi OAuth-ers,

Just a heads-up that ACE is doing a quick WGLC to confirm that we should
register a new "cti" introspection parameter in our core spec, to match up
with the CWT token identifier claim of that name.  The document is already
in the RFC Editor's queue, so I wanted to raise visibility of this
"last-minute" change.

Please send any comments to ace@ietf.org or me directly.

Thanks,

Ben

----- Forwarded message from Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com> -----

Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 11:25:10 -0400
From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@combitech.com>
Cc: "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Ace] Missing Introspection parameter in draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz

Thanks Ludwig for raising the question. If anyone has an objection, please
express your concern by August 24. Expressing support is also more than
welcome!

Yours,
Daniel

On Tue, Aug 17, 2021 at 10:24 AM Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@combitech.com>
wrote:

> Hello ACE,
>
> I want to raise one issue for group comments that has come up in
> conjunction with fixing the IANA nits for draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz:
> In figure 16 we define mappings from OAuth Token introspection parameters
> to CBOR abbreviations. These parameters (should) correspond to the claims
> that could be found in e.g., a CWT.
> CWT renamed one token claim, namely 'jti' (JWT ID) into 'cti' for CWT ID.
> However, this is not reflected in the registered Introspection parameters
> (
> https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-parameters.xhtml#token-introspection-response)
> where only 'jti' is registered. This was overlooked when we originally
> defined the mappings in figure 16.
>
> I would therefore put the following question to the group:
>
> Does anyone object to this draft adding 'cti' as an OAuth introspection
> parameter?
>
> The corresponding text would go into the list of additional parameters in
> section 5.9.2 and be something along the lines of:
> "cti  OPTIONAL.  The CWT ID parameter has the same meaning and processing
> rules as the "jti" parameter defined in section 3.1.2. of [RFC 7662] except
> that the value is a byte string. "
>
> Regards,
>
> Ludwig
>
> --
> Ludwig Seitz
> Infrastructure Security Analyst
> Combitech AB
> Djäknegatan 31 . SE-211 35 Malmö . Sweden
> Phone: +46 102 160 846
> ludwig.seitz@combitech.com . combitech.com This e-mail is private and
> confidential between the sender and the addressee. In the event of
> misdirection, the recipient is prohibited from using, copying or
> disseminating it or any information in it. Please notify the above of any
> such misdirection Please consider the environment before printing this
> e-mail!
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Ace mailing list
> Ace@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace
>


-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

_______________________________________________
Ace mailing list
Ace@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace


----- End forwarded message -----


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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 9101

        Title:      The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: 
                    JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR) 
        Author:     N. Sakimura,
                    J. Bradley,
                    M. Jones
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       August 2021
        Mailbox:    nat@nat.consulting,
                    rfc9101@ve7jtb.com,
                    mbj@microsoft.com
        Pages:      25
        Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso:   None

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-34.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9101

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC9101

The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
query parameter serialization, which means that authorization request
parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
user agents such as web browsers.  While it is easy to implement, it
means that a) the communication through the user agents is not
integrity protected and thus, the parameters can be tainted, b) the
source of the communication is not authenticated, and c) the
communication through the user agents can be monitored.  Because of
these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
forward.

This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed
with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and encrypted with JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication, and
confidentiality properties of the authorization request are attained.
 The request can be sent by value or by reference.

This document is a product of the Web Authorization Protocol Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official
Internet Protocol Standards (https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards) for the 
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7009 (6663)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
"OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>

Section: 2.1

Original Text
-------------
The client constructs the request by including the following
   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format in
   the HTTP request entity-body:

   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.

   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter in
           order to help the authorization server to optimize the token
           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
           such values:

           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
             Section 1.4

           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
             Section 1.5

           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.

   The client also includes its authentication credentials as described
   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].

   For example, a client may request the revocation of a refresh token
   with the following request:

     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW

     token=45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=refresh_token

   The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token
   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If this
   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed
   of the error by the authorization server as described below.

Corrected Text
--------------
The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:

   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.

   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter in
           order to help the authorization server to optimize the token
           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
           such values:

           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
             Section 1.4

           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
             Section 1.5

           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.

   The client MUST also include in the request, the access token it received 
   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way as it  would  
   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC6749], Section 7.

   The following is a non-normative example request in which the client uses 
   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:

     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW

     token=45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=refresh_token

   The following is a non-normative example request in which the client uses 
   its access token to revoke the same access token:

     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW

     token=czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=access_token

   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used by the        
   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, including 
   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked. 
   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate whether the
   access token used for authorization is part of the same grant  as the 
   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  refused and 
   the client is informed of the error by the authorization server. 
   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD respond  
   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage 
   [RFC6750], Section 3. 
   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of this 
   specification.
    

Notes
-----
It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type of client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0 specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which revocation is one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify authorization required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an issue for revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and counter measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the scope of this particular RFC. As per the original text itself, "This specification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures against token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an attacker is able to successfully guess a public client's client_id and one of their tok
 ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens, they could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lose its authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No further damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to begin with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not be seen as a security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced in a subsequent errata.

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
--------------------------------------
Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
Publication Date    : August 2013
Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Invitation: OAuth Security Workshop 2021
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Hi all,

I would like to invite you to the OAuth Security Workshop 2021, a
fully-virtual, two-day event on

Â *November 30 and December 1, 2021 (UTC).*

The OAuth Security Workshop (OSW) aims to improve the security of OAuth,
OpenID Connect, GNAP and related Internet protocols by facilitating
direct exchange among academic researchers, standardization group
members and industry experts.

For this edition of the OSW, we use a simplified submission process:
Session proposals will be collected online before the event. The
schedule will be assembled by the organziation committee from these
session proposals.

Please submit a session proposal if

Â * you want to give a talk or tutorial,
Â * you are interested in convening a working session on a topic,
Â * or if you want to discuss a topic or question, whether you are an
expert in that topic or not.

Every participant can propose and conduct a session. We explicitly
invite newcomers to submit a session proposal.

OSW welcomes all topics that roughly fit into the areas OAuth, OpenID
Connect, and GNAP, be it from a standardization, application, or
research perspective.

Thanks to our sponsor yes.com, the event will be free of charge. A prior
registration is required.

Please find more information at https://oauth.secworkshop.events.

-Daniel
mail@danielfett.de


-- 
https://danielfett.de


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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
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  <body>
    <p>Hi all,<br>
      <br>
      I would like to invite you to the OAuth Security Workshop 2021, a
      fully-virtual, two-day event on<br>
      <br>
      Â *November 30 and December 1, 2021 (UTC).*<br>
      <br>
      The OAuth Security Workshop (OSW) aims to improve the security of
      OAuth, OpenID Connect, GNAP and related Internet protocols by
      facilitating direct exchange among academic researchers,
      standardization group members and industry experts.<br>
      <br>
      For this edition of the OSW, we use a simplified submission
      process: Session proposals will be collected online before the
      event. The schedule will be assembled by the organziation
      committee from these session proposals.<br>
      <br>
      Please submit a session proposal if<br>
      <br>
      Â * you want to give a talk or tutorial,<br>
      Â * you are interested in convening a working session on a topic,<br>
      Â * or if you want to discuss a topic or question, whether you are
      an expert in that topic or not.<br>
      <br>
      Every participant can propose and conduct a session. We explicitly
      invite newcomers to submit a session proposal.<br>
      <br>
      OSW welcomes all topics that roughly fit into the areas OAuth,
      OpenID Connect, and GNAP, be it from a standardization,
      application, or research perspective. <br>
      <br>
      Thanks to our sponsor yes.com, the event will be free of charge. A
      prior registration is required.<br>
      <br>
      Please find more information at <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://oauth.secworkshop.events">https://oauth.secworkshop.events</a>.<br>
      <br>
      -Daniel<br>
      <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:mail@danielfett.de">mail@danielfett.de</a><br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </p>
    <pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">-- 
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://danielfett.de">https://danielfett.de</a></pre>
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From nobody Mon Aug 23 12:41:39 2021
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From: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2021 15:41:18 -0400
Cc: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>, sdronia@gmx.de, mscurtescu@google.com, "rdd@cert.org" <rdd@cert.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>, ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7009 (6663)
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I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation was =
never meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of =
the AS. The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected =
here.

 =E2=80=94 Justin

> On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System =
<rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>=20
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
> "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
>=20
> Section: 2.1
>=20
> Original Text
> -------------
> The client constructs the request by including the following
>   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format in
>   the HTTP request entity-body:
>=20
>   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
>=20
>   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter =
in
>           order to help the authorization server to optimize the token
>           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
>           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
>           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
>           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>           such values:
>=20
>           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>             Section 1.4
>=20
>           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>             Section 1.5
>=20
>           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
>           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>=20
>   The client also includes its authentication credentials as described
>   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].
>=20
>   For example, a client may request the revocation of a refresh token
>   with the following request:
>=20
>     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>     Host: server.example.com
>     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>=20
>     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>=20
>   The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
>   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token
>   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If this
>   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed
>   of the error by the authorization server as described below.
>=20
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
>   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
>   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:
>=20
>   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
>=20
>   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter =
in
>           order to help the authorization server to optimize the token
>           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
>           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
>           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
>           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>           such values:
>=20
>           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>             Section 1.4
>=20
>           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>             Section 1.5
>=20
>           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
>           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>=20
>   The client MUST also include in the request, the access token it =
received=20
>   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way as it  =
would =20
>   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC6749], =
Section 7.
>=20
>   The following is a non-normative example request in which the client =
uses=20
>   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:
>=20
>     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>     Host: server.example.com
>     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>=20
>     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>=20
>   The following is a non-normative example request in which the client =
uses=20
>   its access token to revoke the same access token:
>=20
>     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>     Host: server.example.com
>     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>=20
>     token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=3Daccess_token
>=20
>   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used by the  =
     =20
>   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, including=20=

>   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.=20
>   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate whether =
the
>   access token used for authorization is part of the same grant  as =
the=20
>   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  refused =
and=20
>   the client is informed of the error by the authorization server.=20
>   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD =
respond =20
>   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage=20=

>   [RFC6750], Section 3.=20
>   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of this=20=

>   specification.
>=20
>=20
> Notes
> -----
> It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider =
that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients =
and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type =
of client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0 =
specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token =
belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which revocation =
is one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify =
authorization required to make requests to protected resources. If this =
is an issue for revocation, then it is an issue for all protected =
resources and counter measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather =
than broadening the scope of this particular RFC. As per the original =
text itself, "This specification in general does not intend to provide =
countermeasures against token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an =
attacker is able to successfully guess a public client's client_id and =
one of their tok
> ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens, they =
could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking =
it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lose =
its authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No =
further damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
> Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to =
begin with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not be seen =
as a security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced =
in a subsequent errata.
>=20
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party =20
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.=20
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
> Publication Date    : August 2013
> Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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From: Emond Papegaaij <emond.papegaaij@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2021 09:43:23 +0200
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7009 (6663)
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On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:

> I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation was n=
ever
> meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of the AS.
> The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.
>

We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was a
command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on login. It
then fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client
credentials are not stored by default. The current spec required us to
request the client credentials to revoke the access token on logout.
Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to authenticate, it
already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it wants
to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence that the
client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be the least
harmful one can do with a token.

For more information see:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/

Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij



> > On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System <
> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
> >
> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
> > "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".
> >
> > --------------------------------------
> > You may review the report below and at:
> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663
> >
> > --------------------------------------
> > Type: Technical
> > Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
> >
> > Section: 2.1
> >
> > Original Text
> > -------------
> > The client constructs the request by including the following
> >   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format in
> >   the HTTP request entity-body:
> >
> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
> >
> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter in
> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the token
> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
> >           such values:
> >
> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
> >             Section 1.4
> >
> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
> >             Section 1.5
> >
> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
> >
> >   The client also includes its authentication credentials as described
> >   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].
> >
> >   For example, a client may request the revocation of a refresh token
> >   with the following request:
> >
> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >     Host: server.example.com
> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >
> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
> >
> >   The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
> >   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token
> >   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If this
> >   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed
> >   of the error by the authorization server as described below.
> >
> > Corrected Text
> > --------------
> > The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
> >   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
> >   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:
> >
> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
> >
> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter in
> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the token
> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
> >           such values:
> >
> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
> >             Section 1.4
> >
> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
> >             Section 1.5
> >
> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
> >
> >   The client MUST also include in the request, the access token it
> received
> >   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way as it
> would
> >   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC6749], Sectio=
n
> 7.
> >
> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the client
> uses
> >   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:
> >
> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >     Host: server.example.com
> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >
> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
> >
> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the client
> uses
> >   its access token to revoke the same access token:
> >
> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >     Host: server.example.com
> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >
> >     token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=3Daccess_token
> >
> >   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used by the
>
> >   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, including
> >   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.
> >   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate whether the
> >   access token used for authorization is part of the same grant  as the
> >   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  refused and
> >   the client is informed of the error by the authorization server.
> >   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD
> respond
> >   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
> >   [RFC6750], Section 3.
> >   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of this
> >   specification.
> >
> >
> > Notes
> > -----
> > It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider tha=
t
> requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients and
> such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type of
> client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0
> specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token
> belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which revocation =
is
> one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify authorization
> required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an issue for
> revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and counter
> measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the sco=
pe
> of this particular RFC. As per the original text itself, "This
> specification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures again=
st
> token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an attacker is able to
> successfully guess a public client's client_id and one of their tok
> > ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens, they
> could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking
> it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lose i=
ts
> authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No further
> damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
> > Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to begin
> with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not be seen as a
> security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced in a
> subsequent errata.
> >
> > Instructions:
> > -------------
> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
> >
> > --------------------------------------
> > RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
> > --------------------------------------
> > Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
> > Publication Date    : August 2013
> > Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu
> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> > Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
> > Area                : Security
> > Stream              : IETF
> > Verifying Party     : IESG
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > OAuth mailing list
> > OAuth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Ri=
cher &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocat=
ion was never meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a functio=
n of the AS. The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expecte=
d here.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We ran into this very issue som=
e time ago. Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only req=
uests the client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and =
stores this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default. The =
current spec required us to request the client credentials to revoke the ac=
cess token on logout. Personally, I see no point in requiring the the clien=
t to authenticate, it already possesses an access token, which it can use f=
or whatever it wants to and the possession of the token should be enough ev=
idence that the client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems t=
o be the least harmful one can do with a token.</div><div><br></div><div>Fo=
r more information see:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/m=
sg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/ms=
g/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/</a></div><div><br></div><div>Best rega=
rds,</div><div>Emond Papegaaij</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">&gt; On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM=
, RFC Errata System &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" target=
=3D"_blank">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,<br>
&gt; &quot;OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation&quot;.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; You may review the report below and at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; Type: Technical<br>
&gt; Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gm=
ail.com" target=3D"_blank">ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Section: 2.1<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Original Text<br>
&gt; -------------<br>
&gt; The client constructs the request by including the following<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0parameters using the &quot;application/x-www-form-urlencod=
ed&quot; format in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the HTTP request entity-body:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token=C2=A0 =C2=A0REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the clien=
t wants to get revoked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token_type_hint=C2=A0 OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the typ=
e of the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0submitted for revocation.=C2=
=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0order to help the authorizatio=
n server to optimize the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is=
 unable to locate the token using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the given hint, it MUST extend=
 its search across all of its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supported token types.=C2=A0 A=
n authorization server MAY ignore<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0this parameter, particularly i=
f it is able to detect the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0such values:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* access_token: An access toke=
n as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.4<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* refresh_token: A refresh tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.5<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific implementations, prof=
iles, and extensions of this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specification MAY define other=
 values for this parameter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using the registry defined in =
Section 4.1.2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The client also includes its authentication credentials as=
 described<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0For example, a client may request the revocation of a refr=
esh token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0with the following request:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3D=
refresh_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server first validates the client creden=
tials (in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether t=
he token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0was issued to the client making the revocation request.=C2=
=A0 If this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0validation fails, the request is refused and the client is=
 informed<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0of the error by the authorization server as described belo=
w.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Corrected Text<br>
&gt; --------------<br>
&gt; The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent =
as<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;application/x-www-form-urlencoded&quot; data in the =
request body:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token=C2=A0 =C2=A0REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the clien=
t wants to get revoked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token_type_hint=C2=A0 OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the typ=
e of the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0submitted for revocation.=C2=
=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0order to help the authorizatio=
n server to optimize the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is=
 unable to locate the token using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the given hint, it MUST extend=
 its search across all of its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supported token types.=C2=A0 A=
n authorization server MAY ignore<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0this parameter, particularly i=
f it is able to detect the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0such values:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* access_token: An access toke=
n as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.4<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* refresh_token: A refresh tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.5<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific implementations, prof=
iles, and extensions of this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specification MAY define other=
 values for this parameter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using the registry defined in =
Section 4.1.2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The client MUST also include in the request, the access to=
ken it received <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0from the authorization server. It must do so in the same w=
ay as it=C2=A0 would=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC67=
49], Section 7.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the client uses <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3D=
refresh_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the client uses <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0its access token to revoke the same access token:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&amp;token_type=
_hint=3Daccess_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server MUST validate the access token us=
ed by the=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, i=
ncluding <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0ensuring that it is not expired or revoked. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate =
whether the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0access token used for authorization is part of the same gr=
ant=C2=A0 as the <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is=
=C2=A0 refused and <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the client is informed of the error by the authorization s=
erver. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SH=
OULD respond=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tok=
en Usage <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC6750], Section 3. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope=
 of this <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0specification.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Notes<br>
&gt; -----<br>
&gt; It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider th=
at requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients and =
such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type of clie=
nt however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0 specificat=
ion (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token belongs to t=
he client accessing protected resources, of which revocation is one. It is =
the role of the access token alone to signify authorization required to mak=
e requests to protected resources. If this is an issue for revocation, then=
 it is an issue for all protected resources and counter measures may be pro=
posed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the scope of this particular=
 RFC. As per the original text itself, &quot;This specification in general =
does not intend to provide countermeasures against token theft and abuse.&q=
uot; Additionally, &quot;If an attacker is able to successfully guess a pub=
lic client&#39;s client_id and one of their tok<br>
&gt; ens, or a private client&#39;s credentials and one of their tokens, th=
ey could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking=
 it.=C2=A0 If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lo=
se its authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.=C2=A0 No=
 further damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless.&quot;<br>
&gt; Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to begi=
n with, so relying on an attacker &quot;guessing&quot; it should not be see=
n as a security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced =
in a subsequent errata.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Instructions:<br>
&gt; -------------<br>
&gt; This erratum is currently posted as &quot;Reported&quot;. If necessary=
, please<br>
&gt; use &quot;Reply All&quot; to discuss whether it should be verified or<=
br>
&gt; rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party=C2=A0 <br>
&gt; can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. <br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)<br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: OAuth 2.=
0 Token Revocation<br>
&gt; Publication Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 : August 2013<br>
&gt; Author(s)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: T. Lodderstedt, Ed=
., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu<br>
&gt; Category=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : PROPOSED STANDARD<=
br>
&gt; Source=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Web Authoriza=
tion Protocol<br>
&gt; Area=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Security=
<br>
&gt; Stream=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : IETF<br>
&gt; Verifying Party=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: IESG<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2021 12:14:17 +0200
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7009 (6663)
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I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree with the errata, that
this particular use case probably isn't relevant:

Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only requests the
> client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and stores
> this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default.


Unless I misunderstand, I'll take "client credentials" to mean client Id
and client credentials via a client credentials grant. And therefore, is
not the correct flow to be used in a command line tool. Client credentials
are used in private when there are many user agents that could connect
through it, I would not recommend this as the solution here, and even if it
were, you would indeed have access to the client id and secret, so it would
not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.

However, I believe there is something fundamentally broke here, because
there are two use cases which are in conflict with each other:

   - I as a user, at any time want to revoke one of, access token, refresh
   token, or granted scopes associated with my identity by directly
   communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request through a
   client, and more specifically, I never want a client to determine whethe=
r
   or not I'm allowed to revoke these.
   - I as a user, at no time want to allow a client, for whom I did not
   give permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke granted scopes. It
   should not be the case that one client sharing the token with another
   client (either intentionally or accidentally) would be allowed to change
   the requested scopes nor make decisions about the validity of my current
   access token or delegated refresh token.

Given the latter we see that it must be the case that refresh tokens,
access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be revoked
without client authentication. This means that the original RFC is indeed
correct, and that the errata is not. But, this does not enable the former
case nor encourage a solution that works in scope of retaining control over
resources that the user agent owns. However, it is worth mentioning that it
doesn't prevent, as it still allows an AS to implement additional
mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.

That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a *flow* to safely
instruct the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot be done by
amending the revocation endpoint.

Warren Parad

Founder, CTO
Secure your user data with IAM authorization as a service. Implement
Authress <https://authress.io/>.


On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij <emond.papegaaij@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>
>> I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation was =
never
>> meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of the AS=
.
>> The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.
>>
>
> We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was a
> command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on login. I=
t
> then fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client
> credentials are not stored by default. The current spec required us to
> request the client credentials to revoke the access token on logout.
> Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to authenticate, i=
t
> already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it wants
> to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence that the
> client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be the least
> harmful one can do with a token.
>
> For more information see:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/
>
> Best regards,
> Emond Papegaaij
>
>
>
>> > On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System <
>> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
>> > "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".
>> >
>> > --------------------------------------
>> > You may review the report below and at:
>> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663
>> >
>> > --------------------------------------
>> > Type: Technical
>> > Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
>> >
>> > Section: 2.1
>> >
>> > Original Text
>> > -------------
>> > The client constructs the request by including the following
>> >   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format in
>> >   the HTTP request entity-body:
>> >
>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
>> >
>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter i=
n
>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the token
>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>> >           such values:
>> >
>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>> >             Section 1.4
>> >
>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>> >             Section 1.5
>> >
>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
>> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>> >
>> >   The client also includes its authentication credentials as described
>> >   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].
>> >
>> >   For example, a client may request the revocation of a refresh token
>> >   with the following request:
>> >
>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>> >     Host: server.example.com
>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>> >     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>> >
>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>> >
>> >   The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
>> >   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token
>> >   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If this
>> >   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed
>> >   of the error by the authorization server as described below.
>> >
>> > Corrected Text
>> > --------------
>> > The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
>> >   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
>> >   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:
>> >
>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
>> >
>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter i=
n
>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the token
>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>> >           such values:
>> >
>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>> >             Section 1.4
>> >
>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>> >             Section 1.5
>> >
>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
>> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>> >
>> >   The client MUST also include in the request, the access token it
>> received
>> >   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way as it
>> would
>> >   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC6749],
>> Section 7.
>> >
>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the client
>> uses
>> >   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:
>> >
>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>> >     Host: server.example.com
>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>> >
>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>> >
>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the client
>> uses
>> >   its access token to revoke the same access token:
>> >
>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>> >     Host: server.example.com
>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>> >
>> >     token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=3Daccess_toke=
n
>> >
>> >   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used by the
>>
>> >   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, including
>> >   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.
>> >   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate whether th=
e
>> >   access token used for authorization is part of the same grant  as th=
e
>> >   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  refused an=
d
>> >   the client is informed of the error by the authorization server.
>> >   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD
>> respond
>> >   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
>> >   [RFC6750], Section 3.
>> >   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of this
>> >   specification.
>> >
>> >
>> > Notes
>> > -----
>> > It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider
>> that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients
>> and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type =
of
>> client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0
>> specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token
>> belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which revocation=
 is
>> one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify authorization
>> required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an issue fo=
r
>> revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and counter
>> measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the sc=
ope
>> of this particular RFC. As per the original text itself, "This
>> specification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures agai=
nst
>> token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an attacker is able to
>> successfully guess a public client's client_id and one of their tok
>> > ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens, they
>> could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking
>> it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lose =
its
>> authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No further
>> damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
>> > Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to begi=
n
>> with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not be seen as a
>> security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced in a
>> subsequent errata.
>> >
>> > Instructions:
>> > -------------
>> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
>> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>> >
>> > --------------------------------------
>> > RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
>> > --------------------------------------
>> > Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
>> > Publication Date    : August 2013
>> > Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu
>> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>> > Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
>> > Area                : Security
>> > Stream              : IETF
>> > Verifying Party     : IESG
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > OAuth mailing list
>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000259c8105ca4b6669
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree=
 with the errata, that this particular use case probably isn&#39;t relevant=
:</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Our=
 client in this case was a command line tool, which only requests the clien=
t credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and stores this loc=
ally. The client credentials are not stored by default.</blockquote><div>=
=C2=A0</div><div>Unless I misunderstand, I&#39;ll take &quot;client credent=
ials&quot; to mean client Id and client credentials via a client credential=
s grant. And therefore, is not the correct flow to be used in a command lin=
e tool. Client credentials are used in private when there are many user age=
nts that could connect through it, I would not recommend this as the soluti=
on here, and even if it were, you would indeed have access to the client id=
 and secret, so it would not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>However, I believe there is something fundamentall=
y broke here, because there are two use cases which are in conflict with ea=
ch other:</div><div><ul><li>I as a user, at any time want to revoke one of,=
 access token, refresh token, or granted scopes associated with my identity=
 by directly communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request th=
rough a client, and more specifically, I never want a client to determine w=
hether or not I&#39;m allowed to revoke these.</li><li>I as a user, at no t=
ime want to allow a client, for whom I did not give permission to revoke my=
 refresh token nor revoke granted scopes. It should not be the case that on=
e client sharing the token with another client (either intentionally or acc=
identally) would be allowed to change the requested scopes nor make decisio=
ns about the validity of my current access token or delegated refresh token=
.</li></ul><div>Given the latter we see that it must be the case that refre=
sh tokens, access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be r=
evoked without client authentication. This means that the original RFC is i=
ndeed correct, and that the=C2=A0errata is not. But, this does not enable t=
he former case nor=C2=A0encourage a solution that works in scope of retaini=
ng control over resources that the user agent owns. However, it is worth me=
ntioning that it doesn&#39;t prevent, as it still allows an AS to implement=
 additional mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a <i>flow</=
i> to safely instruct the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot =
be done by amending the revocation endpoint.</div><div><br></div><div><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><table style=3D"border:none;border-collapse:collapse"><colgr=
oup><col width=3D"214"><col width=3D"110"></colgroup><tbody><tr style=3D"he=
ight:0pt"><td style=3D"border-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #cc=
cccc 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;verti=
cal-align:top;padding:5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=
=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #fffff=
f 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin-t=
op:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Arial;c=
olor:rgb(0,0,0);background-color:transparent;vertical-align:baseline;white-=
space:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"border:none;display:inline-block;overflow:hi=
dden;width:199px;height:34px"><img src=3D"https://lh6.googleusercontent.com=
/DNiDx1QGIrSqMPKDN1oKevxYuyVRXsqhXdfZOsW56Rf2A74mUKbAPtrJSNw4qynkSjoltWkPYd=
BhaZJg1BO45YOc1xs6r9KJ1fYsNHogY-nh6hjuIm9GCeBRRzrSc8kWcUSNtuA" width=3D"199=
" height=3D"34" style=3D"margin-left:0px;margin-top:0px"></span></span></p>=
</td><td style=3D"border-left:solid #cccccc 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff =
1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;vertical-a=
lign:top;padding:5pt 5pt 5pt 5pt;overflow:hidden"><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"l=
ine-height:1.2;border-left:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt=
;border-top:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><span style=
=3D"font-size:11pt;font-family:Lato,sans-serif;background-color:transparent=
;font-weight:700;vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap">Warren Parad=
</span></p><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.2;border-left:solid #fffff=
f 1pt;border-right:solid #ffffff 1pt;border-bottom:solid #ffffff 1pt;margin=
-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Lato, sans-serif"><span style=3D"=
font-size:13.3333px;white-space:pre-wrap">Founder, CTO</span></font></p></t=
d></tr></tbody></table><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">Secure your user d=
ata with IAM authorization as a service. Implement=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"h=
ttps://authress.io/" style=3D"font-size:x-small" target=3D"_blank">Authress=
</a><span style=3D"font-size:x-small">.</span><br></div></div></div><br></d=
iv></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_att=
r">On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:em=
ond.papegaaij@gmail.com">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></di=
v><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1=
ex">I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation was=
 never meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of th=
e AS. The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.=
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We ran into this very issue some time =
ago. Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only requests t=
he client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and stores =
this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default. The current=
 spec required us to request the client credentials to revoke the access to=
ken on logout. Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to au=
thenticate, it already possesses an access token, which it can use for what=
ever it wants to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence =
that the client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be th=
e least harmful one can do with a token.</div><div><br></div><div>For more =
information see:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oaut=
h/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.=
org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/</a></div><div><br></div><di=
v>Best regards,</div><div>Emond Papegaaij</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</=
div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">&gt; On Aug 22, 2021,=
 at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.=
org" target=3D"_blank">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,<br>
&gt; &quot;OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation&quot;.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; You may review the report below and at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; Type: Technical<br>
&gt; Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gm=
ail.com" target=3D"_blank">ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Section: 2.1<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Original Text<br>
&gt; -------------<br>
&gt; The client constructs the request by including the following<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0parameters using the &quot;application/x-www-form-urlencod=
ed&quot; format in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the HTTP request entity-body:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token=C2=A0 =C2=A0REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the clien=
t wants to get revoked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token_type_hint=C2=A0 OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the typ=
e of the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0submitted for revocation.=C2=
=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0order to help the authorizatio=
n server to optimize the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is=
 unable to locate the token using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the given hint, it MUST extend=
 its search across all of its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supported token types.=C2=A0 A=
n authorization server MAY ignore<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0this parameter, particularly i=
f it is able to detect the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0such values:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* access_token: An access toke=
n as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.4<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* refresh_token: A refresh tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.5<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific implementations, prof=
iles, and extensions of this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specification MAY define other=
 values for this parameter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using the registry defined in =
Section 4.1.2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The client also includes its authentication credentials as=
 described<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0For example, a client may request the revocation of a refr=
esh token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0with the following request:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3D=
refresh_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server first validates the client creden=
tials (in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether t=
he token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0was issued to the client making the revocation request.=C2=
=A0 If this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0validation fails, the request is refused and the client is=
 informed<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0of the error by the authorization server as described belo=
w.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Corrected Text<br>
&gt; --------------<br>
&gt; The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent =
as<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;application/x-www-form-urlencoded&quot; data in the =
request body:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token=C2=A0 =C2=A0REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the clien=
t wants to get revoked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token_type_hint=C2=A0 OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the typ=
e of the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0submitted for revocation.=C2=
=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0order to help the authorizatio=
n server to optimize the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is=
 unable to locate the token using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the given hint, it MUST extend=
 its search across all of its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supported token types.=C2=A0 A=
n authorization server MAY ignore<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0this parameter, particularly i=
f it is able to detect the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0such values:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* access_token: An access toke=
n as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.4<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* refresh_token: A refresh tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.5<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific implementations, prof=
iles, and extensions of this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specification MAY define other=
 values for this parameter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using the registry defined in =
Section 4.1.2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The client MUST also include in the request, the access to=
ken it received <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0from the authorization server. It must do so in the same w=
ay as it=C2=A0 would=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC67=
49], Section 7.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the client uses <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3D=
refresh_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the client uses <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0its access token to revoke the same access token:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&amp;token_type=
_hint=3Daccess_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server MUST validate the access token us=
ed by the=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, i=
ncluding <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0ensuring that it is not expired or revoked. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate =
whether the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0access token used for authorization is part of the same gr=
ant=C2=A0 as the <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is=
=C2=A0 refused and <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the client is informed of the error by the authorization s=
erver. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SH=
OULD respond=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tok=
en Usage <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC6750], Section 3. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope=
 of this <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0specification.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Notes<br>
&gt; -----<br>
&gt; It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider th=
at requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients and =
such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type of clie=
nt however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0 specificat=
ion (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token belongs to t=
he client accessing protected resources, of which revocation is one. It is =
the role of the access token alone to signify authorization required to mak=
e requests to protected resources. If this is an issue for revocation, then=
 it is an issue for all protected resources and counter measures may be pro=
posed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the scope of this particular=
 RFC. As per the original text itself, &quot;This specification in general =
does not intend to provide countermeasures against token theft and abuse.&q=
uot; Additionally, &quot;If an attacker is able to successfully guess a pub=
lic client&#39;s client_id and one of their tok<br>
&gt; ens, or a private client&#39;s credentials and one of their tokens, th=
ey could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking=
 it.=C2=A0 If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lo=
se its authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.=C2=A0 No=
 further damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless.&quot;<br>
&gt; Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to begi=
n with, so relying on an attacker &quot;guessing&quot; it should not be see=
n as a security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced =
in a subsequent errata.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Instructions:<br>
&gt; -------------<br>
&gt; This erratum is currently posted as &quot;Reported&quot;. If necessary=
, please<br>
&gt; use &quot;Reply All&quot; to discuss whether it should be verified or<=
br>
&gt; rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party=C2=A0 <br>
&gt; can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. <br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)<br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: OAuth 2.=
0 Token Revocation<br>
&gt; Publication Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 : August 2013<br>
&gt; Author(s)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: T. Lodderstedt, Ed=
., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu<br>
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From: Emond Papegaaij <emond.papegaaij@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2021 17:09:56 +0200
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7009 (6663)
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On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> wrote:

> I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree with the errata,
> that this particular use case probably isn't relevant:
>
> Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only requests the
>> client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and stores
>> this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default.
>
>
> Unless I misunderstand, I'll take "client credentials" to mean client Id
> and client credentials via a client credentials grant. And therefore, is
> not the correct flow to be used in a command line tool. Client credential=
s
> are used in private when there are many user agents that could connect
> through it, I would not recommend this as the solution here, and even if =
it
> were, you would indeed have access to the client id and secret, so it wou=
ld
> not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.
>

The CLI-tool actually supports both a 3-legged (via the device
authorization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via the client credentials
grant). It depends on the use case which one is appropriate. In the case of
a user logging in to access the application via the CLI, it clearly is the
3-legged flow, however when the CLI is used in a script that runs without
user interaction, it's the 2-legged flow. In this later case, the script
often fetches the credentials from some store, uses them to acquire an
access token, does it job, and revokes the token. Naturally, it can fetch
the credentials a second time to revoke the token, but I really don't see
the point in this case. The client merely indicates it is done with the
token and it can now be revoked. It is good practice to discard any
credentials when you are done with them to minimize the chance of abuse.
However, requiring the client authentication to revoke the token, really
complicates this case and will probably lead to scripts not revoking the
token.


> However, I believe there is something fundamentally broke here, because
> there are two use cases which are in conflict with each other:
>
>    - I as a user, at any time want to revoke one of, access token,
>    refresh token, or granted scopes associated with my identity by direct=
ly
>    communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request through a
>    client, and more specifically, I never want a client to determine whet=
her
>    or not I'm allowed to revoke these.
>    - I as a user, at no time want to allow a client, for whom I did not
>    give permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke granted scopes. =
It
>    should not be the case that one client sharing the token with another
>    client (either intentionally or accidentally) would be allowed to chan=
ge
>    the requested scopes nor make decisions about the validity of my curre=
nt
>    access token or delegated refresh token.
>
> Given the latter we see that it must be the case that refresh tokens,
> access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be revoked
> without client authentication. This means that the original RFC is indeed
> correct, and that the errata is not. But, this does not enable the former
> case nor encourage a solution that works in scope of retaining control ov=
er
> resources that the user agent owns. However, it is worth mentioning that =
it
> doesn't prevent, as it still allows an AS to implement additional
> mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.
>
> That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a *flow* to safely
> instruct the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot be done by
> amending the revocation endpoint.
>

I don't fully understand your statement here. As far as I understand the
token revocation endpoint, it is an endpoint specifically for the client to
be used when it no longer needs the token. The client can simply discard
the tokens, but it is cleaner to inform the AS about this fact and allow
the AS to cleanup its resources as well. It is in no way an endpoint to be
used by the resource owner to revoke access for certain clients. I see it
like returning a key when you no longer need access to a building. The fact
that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to return it.

I do want to point out that the spec for bearer tokens states: "A security
token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a
"bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possession
of it can." Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with another party
unless they really trust this other party, in which case they should also
trust this party not to revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If any
malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only use
them to revoke them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway. One could
even argue that the grant for the original client should also be revoked in
this case as well, because it is clearly broken.

Best regards,
Emond Papegaaij



> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij <emond.papegaaij@gmail.co=
m>
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation was=
 never
>>> meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of the A=
S.
>>> The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.
>>>
>>
>> We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was a
>> command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on login. =
It
>> then fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client
>> credentials are not stored by default. The current spec required us to
>> request the client credentials to revoke the access token on logout.
>> Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to authenticate, =
it
>> already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it want=
s
>> to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence that the
>> client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be the leas=
t
>> harmful one can do with a token.
>>
>> For more information see:
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Emond Papegaaij
>>
>>
>>
>>> > On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System <
>>> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
>>> > "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".
>>> >
>>> > --------------------------------------
>>> > You may review the report below and at:
>>> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663
>>> >
>>> > --------------------------------------
>>> > Type: Technical
>>> > Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
>>> >
>>> > Section: 2.1
>>> >
>>> > Original Text
>>> > -------------
>>> > The client constructs the request by including the following
>>> >   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format in
>>> >   the HTTP request entity-body:
>>> >
>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
>>> >
>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter =
in
>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the toke=
n
>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>>> >           such values:
>>> >
>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>> >             Section 1.4
>>> >
>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>> >             Section 1.5
>>> >
>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>>> >
>>> >   The client also includes its authentication credentials as describe=
d
>>> >   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].
>>> >
>>> >   For example, a client may request the revocation of a refresh token
>>> >   with the following request:
>>> >
>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>> >     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>> >
>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>>> >
>>> >   The authorization server first validates the client credentials (in
>>> >   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token
>>> >   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If this
>>> >   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed
>>> >   of the error by the authorization server as described below.
>>> >
>>> > Corrected Text
>>> > --------------
>>> > The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
>>> >   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
>>> >   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:
>>> >
>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
>>> >
>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter =
in
>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the toke=
n
>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its
>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>>> >           such values:
>>> >
>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>> >             Section 1.4
>>> >
>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>> >             Section 1.5
>>> >
>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>>> >
>>> >   The client MUST also include in the request, the access token it
>>> received
>>> >   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way as it
>>> would
>>> >   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC6749],
>>> Section 7.
>>> >
>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the clien=
t
>>> uses
>>> >   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:
>>> >
>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>> >
>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>>> >
>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the clien=
t
>>> uses
>>> >   its access token to revoke the same access token:
>>> >
>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>> >
>>> >     token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=3Daccess_tok=
en
>>> >
>>> >   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used by the
>>>
>>> >   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, including
>>> >   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.
>>> >   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate whether t=
he
>>> >   access token used for authorization is part of the same grant  as
>>> the
>>> >   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  refused
>>> and
>>> >   the client is informed of the error by the authorization server.
>>> >   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD
>>> respond
>>> >   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
>>> >   [RFC6750], Section 3.
>>> >   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of this
>>> >   specification.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Notes
>>> > -----
>>> > It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider
>>> that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential client=
s
>>> and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type=
 of
>>> client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0
>>> specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access toke=
n
>>> belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which revocatio=
n is
>>> one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify authorization
>>> required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an issue f=
or
>>> revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and counter
>>> measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the s=
cope
>>> of this particular RFC. As per the original text itself, "This
>>> specification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures aga=
inst
>>> token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an attacker is able to
>>> successfully guess a public client's client_id and one of their tok
>>> > ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens, they
>>> could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revokin=
g
>>> it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lose=
 its
>>> authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No further
>>> damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
>>> > Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to
>>> begin with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not be seen =
as a
>>> security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced in =
a
>>> subsequent errata.
>>> >
>>> > Instructions:
>>> > -------------
>>> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>>> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>>> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
>>> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>>> >
>>> > --------------------------------------
>>> > RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
>>> > --------------------------------------
>>> > Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
>>> > Publication Date    : August 2013
>>> > Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu
>>> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>>> > Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
>>> > Area                : Security
>>> > Stream              : IETF
>>> > Verifying Party     : IESG
>>> >
>>> > _______________________________________________
>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren P=
arad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt; wrote=
:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddi=
ng-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>I think it is worth pointing out, if we =
were to agree with the errata, that this particular use case probably isn&#=
39;t relevant:</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only requ=
ests the client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and s=
tores this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default.</bloc=
kquote><div>=C2=A0</div><div>Unless I misunderstand, I&#39;ll take &quot;cl=
ient credentials&quot; to mean client Id and client credentials via a clien=
t credentials grant. And therefore, is not the correct flow to be used in a=
 command line tool. Client credentials are used in private when there are m=
any user agents that could connect through it, I would not recommend this a=
s the solution here, and even if it were, you would indeed have access to t=
he client id and secret, so it would not be a problem to use them to revoke=
 the token.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The CLI-tool actual=
ly supports both a 3-legged (via the device authorization grant) and a 2-le=
gged flow (via the client credentials grant). It depends on the use case wh=
ich one is appropriate. In the case of a user logging in to access the appl=
ication via the CLI, it clearly is the 3-legged flow, however when the CLI =
is used in a script that runs without user interaction, it&#39;s the 2-legg=
ed flow. In this later case, the script often fetches the credentials from =
some store, uses them to acquire an access token, does it job, and revokes =
the token. Naturally, it can fetch the credentials a second time to revoke =
the token, but I really don&#39;t see the point in this case. The client me=
rely indicates it is done with the token and it can now be revoked. It is g=
ood practice to discard any credentials when you are done with them to mini=
mize the chance of abuse. However, requiring the client authentication to r=
evoke the token, really complicates this case and will probably lead to scr=
ipts not revoking the token.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>However, I believe there is=
 something fundamentally broke here, because there are two use cases which =
are in conflict with each other:</div><div><ul><li>I as a user, at any time=
 want to revoke one of, access token, refresh token, or granted scopes asso=
ciated with my identity by directly communicating with an AS. I never want =
to make this request through a client, and more specifically, I never want =
a client to determine whether or not I&#39;m allowed to revoke these.</li><=
li>I as a user, at no time want to allow a client, for whom I did not give =
permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke granted scopes. It should =
not be the case that one client sharing the token with another client (eith=
er intentionally or accidentally) would be allowed to change the requested =
scopes nor make decisions about the validity of my current access token or =
delegated refresh token.</li></ul><div>Given the latter we see that it must=
 be the case that refresh tokens, access tokens, and associated grants MUST=
 NOT be allowed to be revoked without client authentication. This means tha=
t the original RFC is indeed correct, and that the=C2=A0errata is not. But,=
 this does not enable the former case nor=C2=A0encourage a solution that wo=
rks in scope of retaining control over resources that the user agent owns. =
However, it is worth mentioning that it doesn&#39;t prevent, as it still al=
lows an AS to implement additional mechanisms for direct user revocation, i=
f desired.</div><div><br></div><div>That being said I would be in favor of =
enumerating a <i>flow</i> to safely instruct the AS to revoke directly by t=
he user, but it cannot be done by amending the revocation endpoint.</div><d=
iv></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t fully und=
erstand your statement here. As far as I understand the token revocation en=
dpoint, it is an endpoint specifically for the client to be used when it no=
 longer needs the token. The client can simply discard the tokens, but it i=
s cleaner to inform the AS about this fact and allow the AS to cleanup its =
resources as well. It is in no way an endpoint to be used by the resource o=
wner to revoke access for certain clients. I see it like returning a key wh=
en you no longer need access to a building. The fact that you hold the key =
should be enough for you to be able to return it.</div><div><br></div><div>=
I do want to point out that the spec for bearer tokens states: &quot;A secu=
rity token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a &=
quot;bearer&quot;) can use the token in any way that any other party in pos=
session of it can.&quot; Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with =
another party unless they really trust this other party, in which case they=
 should also trust this party not to revoke the tokens when not agreed upon=
. If any malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would onl=
y use them to revoke them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway. One cou=
ld even argue that the grant for the original client should also be revoked=
 in this case as well, because it is clearly broken.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>Best regards,</div><div>Emond Papegaaij</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0<=
/div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bo=
rder-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><di=
v><div>On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:emond.papegaaij@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<br></div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mo=
n, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.=
edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I person=
ally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation was never meant=
 to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of the AS. The cl=
ient is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our cli=
ent in this case was a command line tool, which only requests the client cr=
edentials on login. It then fetches an access token and stores this locally=
. The client credentials are not stored by default. The current spec requir=
ed us to request the client credentials to revoke the access token on logou=
t. Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to authenticate, =
it already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it want=
s to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence that the cli=
ent previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be the least harm=
ful one can do with a token.</div><div><br></div><div>For more information =
see:=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-u=
zA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg=
/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/</a></div><div><br></div><div>Best regar=
ds,</div><div>Emond Papegaaij</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">&gt; On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM,=
 RFC Errata System &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" target=
=3D"_blank">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,<br>
&gt; &quot;OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation&quot;.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; You may review the report below and at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; Type: Technical<br>
&gt; Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gm=
ail.com" target=3D"_blank">ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Section: 2.1<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Original Text<br>
&gt; -------------<br>
&gt; The client constructs the request by including the following<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0parameters using the &quot;application/x-www-form-urlencod=
ed&quot; format in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the HTTP request entity-body:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token=C2=A0 =C2=A0REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the clien=
t wants to get revoked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token_type_hint=C2=A0 OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the typ=
e of the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0submitted for revocation.=C2=
=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0order to help the authorizatio=
n server to optimize the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is=
 unable to locate the token using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the given hint, it MUST extend=
 its search across all of its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supported token types.=C2=A0 A=
n authorization server MAY ignore<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0this parameter, particularly i=
f it is able to detect the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0such values:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* access_token: An access toke=
n as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.4<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* refresh_token: A refresh tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.5<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific implementations, prof=
iles, and extensions of this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specification MAY define other=
 values for this parameter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using the registry defined in =
Section 4.1.2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The client also includes its authentication credentials as=
 described<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0For example, a client may request the revocation of a refr=
esh token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0with the following request:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3D=
refresh_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server first validates the client creden=
tials (in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether t=
he token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0was issued to the client making the revocation request.=C2=
=A0 If this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0validation fails, the request is refused and the client is=
 informed<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0of the error by the authorization server as described belo=
w.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Corrected Text<br>
&gt; --------------<br>
&gt; The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent =
as<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;application/x-www-form-urlencoded&quot; data in the =
request body:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token=C2=A0 =C2=A0REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the clien=
t wants to get revoked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token_type_hint=C2=A0 OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the typ=
e of the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0submitted for revocation.=C2=
=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0order to help the authorizatio=
n server to optimize the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is=
 unable to locate the token using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the given hint, it MUST extend=
 its search across all of its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supported token types.=C2=A0 A=
n authorization server MAY ignore<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0this parameter, particularly i=
f it is able to detect the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0such values:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* access_token: An access toke=
n as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.4<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* refresh_token: A refresh tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.5<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific implementations, prof=
iles, and extensions of this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specification MAY define other=
 values for this parameter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using the registry defined in =
Section 4.1.2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The client MUST also include in the request, the access to=
ken it received <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0from the authorization server. It must do so in the same w=
ay as it=C2=A0 would=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC67=
49], Section 7.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the client uses <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3D=
refresh_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the client uses <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0its access token to revoke the same access token:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&amp;token_type=
_hint=3Daccess_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server MUST validate the access token us=
ed by the=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, i=
ncluding <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0ensuring that it is not expired or revoked. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate =
whether the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0access token used for authorization is part of the same gr=
ant=C2=A0 as the <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is=
=C2=A0 refused and <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the client is informed of the error by the authorization s=
erver. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SH=
OULD respond=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tok=
en Usage <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC6750], Section 3. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope=
 of this <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0specification.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Notes<br>
&gt; -----<br>
&gt; It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider th=
at requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients and =
such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type of clie=
nt however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0 specificat=
ion (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token belongs to t=
he client accessing protected resources, of which revocation is one. It is =
the role of the access token alone to signify authorization required to mak=
e requests to protected resources. If this is an issue for revocation, then=
 it is an issue for all protected resources and counter measures may be pro=
posed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the scope of this particular=
 RFC. As per the original text itself, &quot;This specification in general =
does not intend to provide countermeasures against token theft and abuse.&q=
uot; Additionally, &quot;If an attacker is able to successfully guess a pub=
lic client&#39;s client_id and one of their tok<br>
&gt; ens, or a private client&#39;s credentials and one of their tokens, th=
ey could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking=
 it.=C2=A0 If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lo=
se its authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.=C2=A0 No=
 further damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless.&quot;<br>
&gt; Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to begi=
n with, so relying on an attacker &quot;guessing&quot; it should not be see=
n as a security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced =
in a subsequent errata.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Instructions:<br>
&gt; -------------<br>
&gt; This erratum is currently posted as &quot;Reported&quot;. If necessary=
, please<br>
&gt; use &quot;Reply All&quot; to discuss whether it should be verified or<=
br>
&gt; rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party=C2=A0 <br>
&gt; can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. <br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)<br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: OAuth 2.=
0 Token Revocation<br>
&gt; Publication Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 : August 2013<br>
&gt; Author(s)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: T. Lodderstedt, Ed=
., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu<br>
&gt; Category=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : PROPOSED STANDARD<=
br>
&gt; Source=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Web Authoriza=
tion Protocol<br>
&gt; Area=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Security=
<br>
&gt; Stream=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : IETF<br>
&gt; Verifying Party=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: IESG<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>=
<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"norefer=
rer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2021 08:47:26 -0700
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To: Emond Papegaaij <emond.papegaaij@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7009 (6663)
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Hey Emond

The access token represents the authorization to access the resource(s) --
it does not represent the authorization to manipulate tokens. The client
credentials are used for token management. While your implementation may be
ok with using the access token to revoke itself, it is not the security
model represented by the specification. Changing the spec would change the
security assumptions that existing deployments have made.

As noted in your response, the CLI has access to the client credentials to
revoke. Besides convenience, it is not clear to me why you would not want
to require the client credentials -- but it is your implementation -- you
can make your own decisions where and if you want to be compliant.

Warren: an interesting idea to provide more context on this in OAuth 2.1.

/Dick
=E1=90=A7

On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 8:10 AM Emond Papegaaij <emond.papegaaij@gmail.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> wrote:
>
>> I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree with the errata,
>> that this particular use case probably isn't relevant:
>>
>> Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only requests the
>>> client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and stores
>>> this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default.
>>
>>
>> Unless I misunderstand, I'll take "client credentials" to mean client Id
>> and client credentials via a client credentials grant. And therefore, is
>> not the correct flow to be used in a command line tool. Client credentia=
ls
>> are used in private when there are many user agents that could connect
>> through it, I would not recommend this as the solution here, and even if=
 it
>> were, you would indeed have access to the client id and secret, so it wo=
uld
>> not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.
>>
>
> The CLI-tool actually supports both a 3-legged (via the device
> authorization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via the client credentials
> grant). It depends on the use case which one is appropriate. In the case =
of
> a user logging in to access the application via the CLI, it clearly is th=
e
> 3-legged flow, however when the CLI is used in a script that runs without
> user interaction, it's the 2-legged flow. In this later case, the script
> often fetches the credentials from some store, uses them to acquire an
> access token, does it job, and revokes the token. Naturally, it can fetch
> the credentials a second time to revoke the token, but I really don't see
> the point in this case. The client merely indicates it is done with the
> token and it can now be revoked. It is good practice to discard any
> credentials when you are done with them to minimize the chance of abuse.
> However, requiring the client authentication to revoke the token, really
> complicates this case and will probably lead to scripts not revoking the
> token.
>
>
>> However, I believe there is something fundamentally broke here, because
>> there are two use cases which are in conflict with each other:
>>
>>    - I as a user, at any time want to revoke one of, access token,
>>    refresh token, or granted scopes associated with my identity by direc=
tly
>>    communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request through a
>>    client, and more specifically, I never want a client to determine whe=
ther
>>    or not I'm allowed to revoke these.
>>    - I as a user, at no time want to allow a client, for whom I did not
>>    give permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke granted scopes.=
 It
>>    should not be the case that one client sharing the token with another
>>    client (either intentionally or accidentally) would be allowed to cha=
nge
>>    the requested scopes nor make decisions about the validity of my curr=
ent
>>    access token or delegated refresh token.
>>
>> Given the latter we see that it must be the case that refresh tokens,
>> access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be revoked
>> without client authentication. This means that the original RFC is indee=
d
>> correct, and that the errata is not. But, this does not enable the forme=
r
>> case nor encourage a solution that works in scope of retaining control o=
ver
>> resources that the user agent owns. However, it is worth mentioning that=
 it
>> doesn't prevent, as it still allows an AS to implement additional
>> mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.
>>
>> That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a *flow* to safely
>> instruct the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot be done by
>> amending the revocation endpoint.
>>
>
> I don't fully understand your statement here. As far as I understand the
> token revocation endpoint, it is an endpoint specifically for the client =
to
> be used when it no longer needs the token. The client can simply discard
> the tokens, but it is cleaner to inform the AS about this fact and allow
> the AS to cleanup its resources as well. It is in no way an endpoint to b=
e
> used by the resource owner to revoke access for certain clients. I see it
> like returning a key when you no longer need access to a building. The fa=
ct
> that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to return it.
>
> I do want to point out that the spec for bearer tokens states: "A securit=
y
> token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a
> "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possession
> of it can." Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with another par=
ty
> unless they really trust this other party, in which case they should also
> trust this party not to revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If any
> malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only use
> them to revoke them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway. One could
> even argue that the grant for the original client should also be revoked =
in
> this case as well, because it is clearly broken.
>
> Best regards,
> Emond Papegaaij
>
>
>
>> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij <
>> emond.papegaaij@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation wa=
s never
>>>> meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of the =
AS.
>>>> The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.
>>>>
>>>
>>> We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was =
a
>>> command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on login.=
 It
>>> then fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client
>>> credentials are not stored by default. The current spec required us to
>>> request the client credentials to revoke the access token on logout.
>>> Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to authenticate,=
 it
>>> already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it wan=
ts
>>> to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence that the
>>> client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be the lea=
st
>>> harmful one can do with a token.
>>>
>>> For more information see:
>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I=
/
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Emond Papegaaij
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> > On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System <
>>>> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
>>>> > "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".
>>>> >
>>>> > --------------------------------------
>>>> > You may review the report below and at:
>>>> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663
>>>> >
>>>> > --------------------------------------
>>>> > Type: Technical
>>>> > Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
>>>> >
>>>> > Section: 2.1
>>>> >
>>>> > Original Text
>>>> > -------------
>>>> > The client constructs the request by including the following
>>>> >   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format in
>>>> >   the HTTP request entity-body:
>>>> >
>>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
>>>> >
>>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter
>>>> in
>>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the tok=
en
>>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
>>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of it=
s
>>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
>>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>>>> >           such values:
>>>> >
>>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>>> >             Section 1.4
>>>> >
>>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>>> >             Section 1.5
>>>> >
>>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
>>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>>>> >
>>>> >   The client also includes its authentication credentials as describ=
ed
>>>> >   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].
>>>> >
>>>> >   For example, a client may request the revocation of a refresh toke=
n
>>>> >   with the following request:
>>>> >
>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>>> >     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>>> >
>>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>>>> >
>>>> >   The authorization server first validates the client credentials (i=
n
>>>> >   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the token
>>>> >   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If this
>>>> >   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informe=
d
>>>> >   of the error by the authorization server as described below.
>>>> >
>>>> > Corrected Text
>>>> > --------------
>>>> > The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
>>>> >   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
>>>> >   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:
>>>> >
>>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked.
>>>> >
>>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this parameter
>>>> in
>>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the tok=
en
>>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token using
>>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of it=
s
>>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignore
>>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>>>> >           such values:
>>>> >
>>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>>> >             Section 1.4
>>>> >
>>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>>> >             Section 1.5
>>>> >
>>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
>>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>>>> >
>>>> >   The client MUST also include in the request, the access token it
>>>> received
>>>> >   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way as it
>>>> would
>>>> >   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC6749],
>>>> Section 7.
>>>> >
>>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the
>>>> client uses
>>>> >   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:
>>>> >
>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>>> >
>>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>>>> >
>>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the
>>>> client uses
>>>> >   its access token to revoke the same access token:
>>>> >
>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>>> >
>>>> >     token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=3Daccess_to=
ken
>>>> >
>>>> >   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used by
>>>> the
>>>> >   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, including
>>>> >   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.
>>>> >   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate whether
>>>> the
>>>> >   access token used for authorization is part of the same grant  as
>>>> the
>>>> >   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  refused
>>>> and
>>>> >   the client is informed of the error by the authorization server.
>>>> >   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD
>>>> respond
>>>> >   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
>>>> >   [RFC6750], Section 3.
>>>> >   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of this
>>>> >   specification.
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > Notes
>>>> > -----
>>>> > It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider
>>>> that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clien=
ts
>>>> and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the typ=
e of
>>>> client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0
>>>> specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access tok=
en
>>>> belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which revocati=
on is
>>>> one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify authorization
>>>> required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an issue =
for
>>>> revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and counte=
r
>>>> measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the =
scope
>>>> of this particular RFC. As per the original text itself, "This
>>>> specification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures ag=
ainst
>>>> token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an attacker is able to
>>>> successfully guess a public client's client_id and one of their tok
>>>> > ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens, they
>>>> could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoki=
ng
>>>> it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will los=
e its
>>>> authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No furthe=
r
>>>> damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
>>>> > Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to
>>>> begin with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not be seen=
 as a
>>>> security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced in=
 a
>>>> subsequent errata.
>>>> >
>>>> > Instructions:
>>>> > -------------
>>>> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>>>> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>>>> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
>>>> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>>>> >
>>>> > --------------------------------------
>>>> > RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
>>>> > --------------------------------------
>>>> > Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
>>>> > Publication Date    : August 2013
>>>> > Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu
>>>> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>>>> > Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
>>>> > Area                : Security
>>>> > Stream              : IETF
>>>> > Verifying Party     : IESG
>>>> >
>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
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>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hey Emond<div><br></div><div>The access token represents t=
he authorization to access the resource(s) -- it does not represent the aut=
horization to manipulate tokens. The client credentials are used for token =
management. While your implementation may be ok with using the access token=
 to revoke itself, it is not the security model represented by the specific=
ation. Changing the spec would change the security assumptions that existin=
g deployments have made.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>As noted in your re=
sponse, the CLI has access to the client credentials to revoke. Besides con=
venience, it is not clear to me why you would not want to require the clien=
t credentials -- but it is your=C2=A0implementation -- you can make your ow=
n decisions where and if you want to be compliant.</div><div><br></div><div=
>Warren: an interesting idea to provide more context on this in OAuth 2.1.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>/Dick</div></div><div hspace=3D"streak-pt-mark" st=
yle=3D"max-height:1px"><img alt=3D"" style=3D"width:0px;max-height:0px;over=
flow:hidden" src=3D"https://mailfoogae.appspot.com/t?sender=3DaZGljay5oYXJk=
dEBnbWFpbC5jb20%3D&amp;type=3Dzerocontent&amp;guid=3Dcd3b71ce-d389-45e9-aab=
0-b7140f23818c"><font color=3D"#ffffff" size=3D"1">=E1=90=A7</font></div><b=
r><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, =
Aug 24, 2021 at 8:10 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:emond.papegaa=
ij@gmail.com">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px so=
lid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On=
 Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren Parad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rh=
osys.ch" target=3D"_blank">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div>I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree with=
 the errata, that this particular use case probably isn&#39;t relevant:</di=
v><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Our clie=
nt in this case was a command line tool, which only requests the client cre=
dentials on login. It then fetches an access token and stores this locally.=
 The client credentials are not stored by default.</blockquote><div>=C2=A0<=
/div><div>Unless I misunderstand, I&#39;ll take &quot;client credentials&qu=
ot; to mean client Id and client credentials via a client credentials grant=
. And therefore, is not the correct flow to be used in a command line tool.=
 Client credentials are used in private when there are many user agents tha=
t could connect through it, I would not recommend this as the solution here=
, and even if it were, you would indeed have access to the client id and se=
cret, so it would not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.</div></=
div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The CLI-tool actually supports both a =
3-legged (via the device authorization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via the =
client credentials grant). It depends on the use case which one is appropri=
ate. In the case of a user logging in to access the application via the CLI=
, it clearly is the 3-legged flow, however when the CLI is used in a script=
 that runs without user interaction, it&#39;s the 2-legged flow. In this la=
ter case, the script often fetches the credentials from some store, uses th=
em to acquire an access token, does it job, and revokes the token. Naturall=
y, it can fetch the credentials a second time to revoke the token, but I re=
ally don&#39;t see the point in this case. The client merely indicates it i=
s done with the token and it can now be revoked. It is good practice to dis=
card any credentials when you are done with them to minimize the chance of =
abuse. However, requiring the client authentication to revoke the token, re=
ally complicates this case and will probably lead to scripts not revoking t=
he token.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>However, I believe there is something fundamen=
tally broke here, because there are two use cases which are in conflict wit=
h each other:</div><div><ul><li>I as a user, at any time want to revoke one=
 of, access token, refresh token, or granted scopes associated with my iden=
tity by directly communicating with an AS. I never want to make this reques=
t through a client, and more specifically, I never want a client to determi=
ne whether or not I&#39;m allowed to revoke these.</li><li>I as a user, at =
no time want to allow a client, for whom I did not give permission to revok=
e my refresh token nor revoke granted scopes. It should not be the case tha=
t one client sharing the token with another client (either intentionally or=
 accidentally) would be allowed to change the requested scopes nor make dec=
isions about the validity of my current access token or delegated refresh t=
oken.</li></ul><div>Given the latter we see that it must be the case that r=
efresh tokens, access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to =
be revoked without client authentication. This means that the original RFC =
is indeed correct, and that the=C2=A0errata is not. But, this does not enab=
le the former case nor=C2=A0encourage a solution that works in scope of ret=
aining control over resources that the user agent owns. However, it is wort=
h mentioning that it doesn&#39;t prevent, as it still allows an AS to imple=
ment additional mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a <i>fl=
ow</i> to safely instruct the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it can=
not be done by amending the revocation endpoint.</div><div></div></div></di=
v></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t fully understand your statem=
ent here. As far as I understand the token revocation endpoint, it is an en=
dpoint specifically for the client to be used when it no longer needs the t=
oken. The client can simply discard the tokens, but it is cleaner to inform=
 the AS about this fact and allow the AS to cleanup its resources as well. =
It is in no way an endpoint to be used by the resource owner to revoke acce=
ss for certain clients. I see it like returning a key when you no longer ne=
ed access to a building. The fact that you hold the key should be enough fo=
r you to be able to return it.</div><div><br></div><div>I do want to point =
out that the spec for bearer tokens states: &quot;A security token with the=
 property that any party in possession of the token (a &quot;bearer&quot;) =
can use the token in any way that any other party in possession of it can.&=
quot; Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with another party unles=
s they really trust this other party, in which case they should also trust =
this party not to revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If any malicious =
party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only use them to revok=
e them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway. One could even argue that =
the grant for the original client should also be revoked in this case as we=
ll, because it is clearly broken.</div><div><br></div><div>Best regards,</d=
iv><div>Emond Papegaaij</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>On Tue, Aug =
24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:emond.papegaaij@g=
mail.com" target=3D"_blank">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);p=
adding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at =
9:42 PM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D"_bla=
nk">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">I personally don=E2=80=99t ag=
ree with this errata. Token Revocation was never meant to act as a protecte=
d resource, but rather as a function of the AS. The client is known to the =
AS and so authentication is expected here.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><=
div>We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was =
a command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on login. I=
t then fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client credenti=
als are not stored by default. The current spec required us to request the =
client credentials to revoke the access token on logout. Personally, I see =
no point in requiring the the client to authenticate, it already possesses =
an access token, which it can use for whatever it wants to and the possessi=
on of the token should be enough evidence that the client previously authen=
ticated. Revoking the token seems to be the least harmful one can do with a=
 token.</div><div><br></div><div>For more information see:=C2=A0<a href=3D"=
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5W=
QaxnzGMdSqb2I/</a></div><div><br></div><div>Best regards,</div><div>Emond P=
apegaaij</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex">&gt; On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" target=3D"_blank">rfc-editor=
@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,<br>
&gt; &quot;OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation&quot;.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; You may review the report below and at:<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663" rel=3D"noreferre=
r" target=3D"_blank">https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; Type: Technical<br>
&gt; Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gm=
ail.com" target=3D"_blank">ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Section: 2.1<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Original Text<br>
&gt; -------------<br>
&gt; The client constructs the request by including the following<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0parameters using the &quot;application/x-www-form-urlencod=
ed&quot; format in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the HTTP request entity-body:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token=C2=A0 =C2=A0REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the clien=
t wants to get revoked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token_type_hint=C2=A0 OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the typ=
e of the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0submitted for revocation.=C2=
=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0order to help the authorizatio=
n server to optimize the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is=
 unable to locate the token using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the given hint, it MUST extend=
 its search across all of its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supported token types.=C2=A0 A=
n authorization server MAY ignore<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0this parameter, particularly i=
f it is able to detect the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0such values:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* access_token: An access toke=
n as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.4<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* refresh_token: A refresh tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.5<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific implementations, prof=
iles, and extensions of this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specification MAY define other=
 values for this parameter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using the registry defined in =
Section 4.1.2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The client also includes its authentication credentials as=
 described<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0For example, a client may request the revocation of a refr=
esh token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0with the following request:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3D=
refresh_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server first validates the client creden=
tials (in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether t=
he token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0was issued to the client making the revocation request.=C2=
=A0 If this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0validation fails, the request is refused and the client is=
 informed<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0of the error by the authorization server as described belo=
w.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Corrected Text<br>
&gt; --------------<br>
&gt; The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent =
as<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;application/x-www-form-urlencoded&quot; data in the =
request body:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token=C2=A0 =C2=A0REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the clien=
t wants to get revoked.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token_type_hint=C2=A0 OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the typ=
e of the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0submitted for revocation.=C2=
=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter in<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0order to help the authorizatio=
n server to optimize the token<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is=
 unable to locate the token using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the given hint, it MUST extend=
 its search across all of its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0supported token types.=C2=A0 A=
n authorization server MAY ignore<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0this parameter, particularly i=
f it is able to detect the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0such values:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* access_token: An access toke=
n as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.4<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0* refresh_token: A refresh tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.5<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Specific implementations, prof=
iles, and extensions of this<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0specification MAY define other=
 values for this parameter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using the registry defined in =
Section 4.1.2.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The client MUST also include in the request, the access to=
ken it received <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0from the authorization server. It must do so in the same w=
ay as it=C2=A0 would=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC67=
49], Section 7.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the client uses <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:<b=
r>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3D=
refresh_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the client uses <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0its access token to revoke the same access token:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<=
br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&amp;token_type=
_hint=3Daccess_token<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0The authorization server MUST validate the access token us=
ed by the=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, i=
ncluding <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0ensuring that it is not expired or revoked. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate =
whether the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0access token used for authorization is part of the same gr=
ant=C2=A0 as the <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is=
=C2=A0 refused and <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0the client is informed of the error by the authorization s=
erver. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SH=
OULD respond=C2=A0 <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tok=
en Usage <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC6750], Section 3. <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope=
 of this <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0specification.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Notes<br>
&gt; -----<br>
&gt; It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider th=
at requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients and =
such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the type of clie=
nt however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0 specificat=
ion (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token belongs to t=
he client accessing protected resources, of which revocation is one. It is =
the role of the access token alone to signify authorization required to mak=
e requests to protected resources. If this is an issue for revocation, then=
 it is an issue for all protected resources and counter measures may be pro=
posed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the scope of this particular=
 RFC. As per the original text itself, &quot;This specification in general =
does not intend to provide countermeasures against token theft and abuse.&q=
uot; Additionally, &quot;If an attacker is able to successfully guess a pub=
lic client&#39;s client_id and one of their tok<br>
&gt; ens, or a private client&#39;s credentials and one of their tokens, th=
ey could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking=
 it.=C2=A0 If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will lo=
se its authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.=C2=A0 No=
 further damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless.&quot;<br>
&gt; Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to begi=
n with, so relying on an attacker &quot;guessing&quot; it should not be see=
n as a security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced =
in a subsequent errata.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Instructions:<br>
&gt; -------------<br>
&gt; This erratum is currently posted as &quot;Reported&quot;. If necessary=
, please<br>
&gt; use &quot;Reply All&quot; to discuss whether it should be verified or<=
br>
&gt; rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party=C2=A0 <br>
&gt; can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. <br=
>
&gt; <br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)<br>
&gt; --------------------------------------<br>
&gt; Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: OAuth 2.=
0 Token Revocation<br>
&gt; Publication Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 : August 2013<br>
&gt; Author(s)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: T. Lodderstedt, Ed=
., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu<br>
&gt; Category=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : PROPOSED STANDARD<=
br>
&gt; Source=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Web Authoriza=
tion Protocol<br>
&gt; Area=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Security=
<br>
&gt; Stream=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : IETF<br>
&gt; Verifying Party=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: IESG<br>
&gt; <br>
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From: STAS Thibault <Thibault.STAS@swift.com>
To: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Purpose of client authentication for "public" client types
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Dear,

 

I notice that many API Gateway providers are requiring the authentication of
the client, even for public client types.

 

e.g.

 
https://docs.apigee.com/api-platform/security/oauth/implementing-password-gr
ant-type

 
https://auth0.com/docs/flows/call-your-api-using-resource-owner-password-flo
w

 
https://tyk.io/docs/basic-config-and-security/security/authentication-author
ization/oauth2-0/username-password-grant/

 

Not many providers are make the use of the client authentication optional,
as the client_secret is always present in either the Authorization Basic
header or within the payload.

 

What is the added value to perform client application authentication in the
context of "public" client type, like a vendor application sold to many
customers.?

The client_secret would be shipped along with the application, putting at
risk the secrecy of the client_secret.

 

The oAuth standard does not seem to provide a lot of guidance with regards
to the use and need of the client authentication in such context.

 

Would it not be preferable to recommend client identification rather than
client authentication in combination with resource-owner authentication ?

The client_id could be provided as part of the selected grant type
parameters.

 

 

 

 

Kind regards,

 

Thibault STAS 

SWIFT | Enterprise Architect - Information Technology

Tel: + 32 2 655 4975


 <http://www.swift.com> www.swift.com

This e-mail and any attachments thereto may contain information which is
confidential and/or proprietary and intended for the sole use of the
recipient(s) named above. If you have received this e-mail in error, please
immediately notify the sender and delete the mail.  Thank you for your
co-operation.  SWIFT reserves the right to retain e-mail messages on its
systems and, under circumstances permitted by applicable law, to monitor and
intercept e-mail messages to and from its systems.

 


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<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
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link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72" style=3D'word-wrap:break-word'><div =
class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>Dear,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>I notice =
that many API Gateway providers are requiring the authentication of the =
client, even for public client types.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>e.g.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"https://docs.apigee.com/api-platform/security/oauth/implementing-=
password-grant-type">https://docs.apigee.com/api-platform/security/oauth/=
implementing-password-grant-type</a><o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"https://auth0.com/docs/flows/call-your-api-using-resource-owner-p=
assword-flow">https://auth0.com/docs/flows/call-your-api-using-resource-o=
wner-password-flow</a><o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <a =
href=3D"https://tyk.io/docs/basic-config-and-security/security/authentica=
tion-authorization/oauth2-0/username-password-grant/">https://tyk.io/docs=
/basic-config-and-security/security/authentication-authorization/oauth2-0=
/username-password-grant/</a><o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Not many =
providers are make the use of the client authentication optional, as the =
client_secret is always present in either the Authorization Basic header =
or within the payload.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>What is the =
added value to perform client application authentication in the context =
of &#8220;public&#8221; client type, like a vendor application sold to =
many customers&#8230;?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The =
client_secret would be shipped along with the application, putting at =
risk the secrecy of the client_secret.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The oAuth =
standard does not seem to provide a lot of guidance with regards to the =
use and need of the client authentication in such =
context.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Would it not be preferable to recommend client =
identification rather than client authentication in combination with =
resource-owner authentication ?<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>The =
client_id could be provided as part of the selected grant type =
parameters.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Kind =
regards,<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><b><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></b></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><b>Thibault STAS <o:p></o:p></b></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>SWIFT | Enterprise Architect &#8211; Information =
Technology<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Tel: + 32 2 655 =
4975<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><br><a =
href=3D"http://www.swift.com"><span =
style=3D'color:blue'>www.swift.com</span></a><br><br></span><span =
lang=3DEN-GB =
style=3D'font-size:8.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>This e-mail and =
any attachments thereto may contain information which is confidential =
and/or proprietary and&nbsp;intended for the sole use of the =
recipient(s) named above. If you have received this e-mail in error, =
please immediately notify the sender and delete the mail.&nbsp; Thank =
you for your co-operation.&nbsp; SWIFT reserves the right to retain =
e-mail messages on its systems and, under circumstances permitted by =
applicable law, to monitor and intercept e-mail messages to and from its =
systems.</span><span lang=3DEN-GB><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
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To: STAS Thibault <Thibault.STAS=40swift.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
References: <c78e2dd97bc74f22aa0b58282647b76b@swift.com>
From: George Fletcher <gffletch@aol.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Purpose of client authentication for "public" client types
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While not widely deployed, the OAuth2 solution to a deployment of 
"public clients" that need to be able to transition to "confidential 
clients" so that client authentication makes sense, is to use Dynamic 
Client Registration (RFC 7591).

Dynamic Client Registration allows the public client to register and 
obtain (or provide) a client secret that is unique to that instance of 
the app. At that point, the client can authenticate to the backend 
services as needed. This model increases the security of the solution 
and decreases the risk while also providing a stepping stone to moving 
away from Bearer tokens to proof-of-possession model for tokens.

General best practice is to have the public client create a 
public/private key pair and register the public key as part of the 
registration event. The client can then prove its authenticity by 
signing data with the private key and the backend can validate via the 
public key. In the case of many mobile platforms, the public/private key 
pair can be created in the secure enclave of the device adding 
additional security protection for the private key.

As for risk with the deployment mechanisms used by the API Gateways, 
there is really no additional risk and no additional security benefit 
for providing the secret in the public client. Both clients can be 
easily impersonated so the gateway MUST treat a client secret coming 
from a public client with the exact same risk measurement as a request 
coming from a public client without the client secret. Basically, the 
risk/security is the same. There may, however, be backend developer 
benefit by keeping the flows more similar.

Thanks,
George

On 8/25/21 9:59 AM, STAS Thibault wrote:
>
> Dear,
>
> I notice that many API Gateway providers are requiring the 
> authentication of the client, even for public client types.
>
> e.g.
>
> https://docs.apigee.com/api-platform/security/oauth/implementing-password-grant-type 
> <https://docs.apigee.com/api-platform/security/oauth/implementing-password-grant-type>
>
> https://auth0.com/docs/flows/call-your-api-using-resource-owner-password-flow 
> <https://auth0.com/docs/flows/call-your-api-using-resource-owner-password-flow>
>
> https://tyk.io/docs/basic-config-and-security/security/authentication-authorization/oauth2-0/username-password-grant/ 
> <https://tyk.io/docs/basic-config-and-security/security/authentication-authorization/oauth2-0/username-password-grant/>
>
> Not many providers are make the use of the client authentication 
> optional, as the client_secret is always present in either the 
> Authorization Basic header or within the payload.
>
> What is the added value to perform client application authentication 
> in the context of ï¿½publicï¿½ client type, like a vendor application sold 
> to many customersï¿½?
>
> The client_secret would be shipped along with the application, putting 
> at risk the secrecy of the client_secret.
>
> The oAuth standard does not seem to provide a lot of guidance with 
> regards to the use and need of the client authentication in such context.
>
> Would it not be preferable to recommend client identification rather 
> than client authentication in combination with resource-owner 
> authentication ?
>
> The client_id could be provided as part of the selected grant type 
> parameters.
>
> Kind regards,
>
> **
>
> *Thibault STAS *
>
> SWIFT | Enterprise Architect ï¿½ Information Technology
>
> Tel: + 32 2 655 4975
>
>
> www.swift.com <http://www.swift.com>
>
> This e-mail and any attachments thereto may contain information which 
> is confidential and/or proprietary andï¿½intended for the sole use of 
> the recipient(s) named above. If you have received this e-mail in 
> error, please immediately notify the sender and delete the mail.ï¿½ 
> Thank you for your co-operation.ï¿½ SWIFT reserves the right to retain 
> e-mail messages on its systems and, under circumstances permitted by 
> applicable law, to monitor and intercept e-mail messages to and from 
> its systems.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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    <font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">While not widely deployed,
      the OAuth2 solution to a deployment of "public clients" that need
      to be able to transition to "confidential clients" so that client
      authentication makes sense, is to use Dynamic Client Registration
      (RFC 7591).<br>
      <br>
      Dynamic Client Registration allows the public client to register
      and obtain (or provide) a client secret that is unique to that
      instance of the app. At that point, the client can authenticate to
      the backend services as needed. This model increases the security
      of the solution and decreases the risk while also providing a
      stepping stone to moving away from Bearer tokens to
      proof-of-possession model for tokens.<br>
      <br>
      General best practice is to have the public client create a
      public/private key pair and register the public key as part of the
      registration event. The client can then prove its authenticity by
      signing data with the private key and the backend can validate via
      the public key. In the case of many mobile platforms, the
      public/private key pair can be created in the secure enclave of
      the device adding additional security protection for the private
      key.<br>
      <br>
      As for risk with the deployment mechanisms used by the API
      Gateways, there is really no additional risk and no additional
      security benefit for providing the secret in the public client.
      Both clients can be easily impersonated so the gateway MUST treat
      a client secret coming from a public client with the exact same
      risk measurement as a request coming from a public client without
      the client secret. Basically, the risk/security is the same. There
      may, however, be backend developer benefit by keeping the flows
      more similar.<br>
      <br>
      Thanks,<br>
      George<br>
    </font><br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 8/25/21 9:59 AM, STAS Thibault
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:c78e2dd97bc74f22aa0b58282647b76b@swift.com">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <meta name="Generator" content="Microsoft Word 15 (filtered
        medium)">
      <style>@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}@font-face
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	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
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      <div class="WordSection1">
        <p class="MsoNormal">Dear,<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">I notice that many API Gateway providers
          are requiring the authentication of the client, even for
          public client types.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">e.g.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ <a
href="https://docs.apigee.com/api-platform/security/oauth/implementing-password-grant-type"
            moz-do-not-send="true">https://docs.apigee.com/api-platform/security/oauth/implementing-password-grant-type</a><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ <a
href="https://auth0.com/docs/flows/call-your-api-using-resource-owner-password-flow"
            moz-do-not-send="true">https://auth0.com/docs/flows/call-your-api-using-resource-owner-password-flow</a><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ <a
href="https://tyk.io/docs/basic-config-and-security/security/authentication-authorization/oauth2-0/username-password-grant/"
            moz-do-not-send="true">https://tyk.io/docs/basic-config-and-security/security/authentication-authorization/oauth2-0/username-password-grant/</a><o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Not many providers are make the use of the
          client authentication optional, as the client_secret is always
          present in either the Authorization Basic header or within the
          payload.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">What is the added value to perform client
          application authentication in the context of ï¿½publicï¿½ client
          type, like a vendor application sold to many customersï¿½?<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">The client_secret would be shipped along
          with the application, putting at risk the secrecy of the
          client_secret.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">The oAuth standard does not seem to provide
          a lot of guidance with regards to the use and need of the
          client authentication in such context.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Would it not be preferable to recommend
          client identification rather than client authentication in
          combination with resource-owner authentication ?<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">The client_id could be provided as part of
          the selected grant type parameters.<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Kind regards,<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></b></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><b>Thibault STAS <o:p></o:p></b></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">SWIFT | Enterprise Architect ï¿½ Information
          Technology<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal">Tel: + 32 2 655 4975<o:p></o:p></p>
        <p class="MsoNormal"><span
            style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"
            lang="EN-GB"><br>
            <a href="http://www.swift.com" moz-do-not-send="true"><span
                style="color:blue">www.swift.com</span></a><br>
            <br>
          </span><span
            style="font-size:8.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,sans-serif"
            lang="EN-GB">This e-mail and any attachments thereto may
            contain information which is confidential and/or proprietary
            andï¿½intended for the sole use of the recipient(s) named
            above. If you have received this e-mail in error, please
            immediately notify the sender and delete the mail.ï¿½ Thank
            you for your co-operation.ï¿½ SWIFT reserves the right to
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        <p class="MsoNormal"><o:p>ï¿½</o:p></p>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - OAuth Proof of Possession Tokens with HTTP Message Signatures
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Just curious where this landed? Was it adopted by the WG? I'm ok with 
adopting it. We will just need to be clear about the overlap with DPoP 
and determine if guidance is necessary for when to use which method.

Thanks,
George

On 7/30/21 3:26 PM, Aaron Parecki wrote:
> I support the adoption of this document, it seems like a good starting 
> point for defining the link between HTTP Signatures and OAuth.
>
> Aaron
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 19, 2021 at 7:18 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu 
> <mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
>
>     Needless to say, but as the author of both this draft and the
>     draft that it would replace, I am in favor of adoption of this
>     document. There are still a lot of open questions to answer â€” such
>     as key introduction and management practices â€” and I think there
>     is a lot of power in the intersection of the OAuth and HTTPSig
>     spaces.
>
>     Â â€” Justin
>
>>     On Jul 16, 2021, at 12:31 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
>>     <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     All,
>>
>>     This is a call for adoption for the *OAuth Proof of Possession
>>     Tokens with HTTP Message Signatures*Â draft as a WG document:
>>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richer-oauth-httpsig/
>>     <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richer-oauth-httpsig/>
>>
>>     Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list *by July 30th*.
>>
>>     Regards,
>>     Â Rifaat & Hannes
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     OAuth mailing list
>>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     OAuth mailing list
>     OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>     <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
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    <font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Just curious where this
      landed? Was it adopted by the WG? I'm ok with adopting it. We will
      just need to be clear about the overlap with DPoP and determine if
      guidance is necessary for when to use which method.<br>
      <br>
      Thanks,<br>
      George<br>
    </font><br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 7/30/21 3:26 PM, Aaron Parecki
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAGBSGjpgMzV9Ek==wjRcgNmGgE3CR6x+hPX1JNRiERFR=yDwqw@mail.gmail.com">
      <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <div dir="ltr">I support the adoption of this document, it seems
        like a good starting point for defining the link between HTTP
        Signatures and OAuth.
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Aaron</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Jul 19, 2021 at 7:18
          AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href="mailto:jricher@mit.edu"
            moz-do-not-send="true">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
          0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div style="overflow-wrap: break-word;">Needless to say, but
            as the author of both this draft and the draft that it would
            replace, I am in favor of adoption of this document. There
            are still a lot of open questions to answer â€” such as key
            introduction and management practices â€” and I think there is
            a lot of power in the intersection of the OAuth and HTTPSig
            spaces.
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>Â â€” Justin<br>
              <div><br>
                <blockquote type="cite">
                  <div>On Jul 16, 2021, at 12:31 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
                    &lt;<a href="mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com"
                      target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                    wrote:</div>
                  <br>
                  <div>
                    <div dir="ltr">All,<br>
                      <br>
                      This is a call for adoption for the <b>OAuth
                        Proof of Possession Tokens with HTTP Message
                        Signatures</b>Â draft as a WG document:<br>
                      <a
                        href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richer-oauth-httpsig/"
                        target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richer-oauth-httpsig/</a><br>
                      <br>
                      Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list
                      <b>by July 30th</b>.<br>
                      <br>
                      Regards,<br>
                      Â Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br>
                    </div>
                    _______________________________________________<br>
                    OAuth mailing list<br>
                    <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
                      moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
                    <a
                      href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
                      target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
              <br>
            </div>
          </div>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
          <a href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target="_blank"
            moz-do-not-send="true">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
          <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"
            rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Aug 2021 09:38:45 -0400
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for adoption - OAuth Proof of Possession Tokens with HTTP Message Signatures
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George,

No, it was not adopted as we did not get enough people to support it.

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 3:58 PM George Fletcher <gffletch=3D
40aol.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Just curious where this landed? Was it adopted by the WG? I'm ok with
> adopting it. We will just need to be clear about the overlap with DPoP an=
d
> determine if guidance is necessary for when to use which method.
>
> Thanks,
> George
>
> On 7/30/21 3:26 PM, Aaron Parecki wrote:
>
> I support the adoption of this document, it seems like a good starting
> point for defining the link between HTTP Signatures and OAuth.
>
> Aaron
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 19, 2021 at 7:18 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>
>> Needless to say, but as the author of both this draft and the draft that
>> it would replace, I am in favor of adoption of this document. There are
>> still a lot of open questions to answer =E2=80=94 such as key introducti=
on and
>> management practices =E2=80=94 and I think there is a lot of power in th=
e
>> intersection of the OAuth and HTTPSig spaces.
>>
>>  =E2=80=94 Justin
>>
>> On Jul 16, 2021, at 12:31 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.co=
m>
>> wrote:
>>
>> All,
>>
>> This is a call for adoption for the *OAuth Proof of Possession Tokens
>> with HTTP Message Signatures* draft as a WG document:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richer-oauth-httpsig/
>>
>> Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list *by July 30th*.
>>
>> Regards,
>>  Rifaat & Hannes
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

--000000000000c5ffd305ca9eb8ef
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<div dir=3D"ltr">George,=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>No, it was not adopted as=
 we did not get enough=C2=A0people to support it.</div><div><br></div><div>=
Regards,</div><div>=C2=A0Rifaat</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at=
 3:58 PM George Fletcher &lt;gffletch=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40aol.com@dmarc.i=
etf.org" target=3D"_blank">40aol.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <font face=3D"Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Just curious where this
      landed? Was it adopted by the WG? I&#39;m ok with adopting it. We wil=
l
      just need to be clear about the overlap with DPoP and determine if
      guidance is necessary for when to use which method.<br>
      <br>
      Thanks,<br>
      George<br>
    </font><br>
    <div>On 7/30/21 3:26 PM, Aaron Parecki
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type=3D"cite">
     =20
      <div dir=3D"ltr">I support the adoption of this document, it seems
        like a good starting point for defining the link between HTTP
        Signatures and OAuth.
        <div><br>
        </div>
        <div>Aaron</div>
        <div><br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class=3D"gmail_quote">
        <div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Jul 19, 2021 at 7:18
          AM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" target=3D=
"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
          <div>Needless to say, but
            as the author of both this draft and the draft that it would
            replace, I am in favor of adoption of this document. There
            are still a lot of open questions to answer =E2=80=94 such as k=
ey
            introduction and management practices =E2=80=94 and I think the=
re is
            a lot of power in the intersection of the OAuth and HTTPSig
            spaces.
            <div><br>
            </div>
            <div>=C2=A0=E2=80=94 Justin<br>
              <div><br>
                <blockquote type=3D"cite">
                  <div>On Jul 16, 2021, at 12:31 PM, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
                    &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com" target=
=3D"_blank">rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;
                    wrote:</div>
                  <br>
                  <div>
                    <div dir=3D"ltr">All,<br>
                      <br>
                      This is a call for adoption for the <b>OAuth
                        Proof of Possession Tokens with HTTP Message
                        Signatures</b>=C2=A0draft as a WG document:<br>
                      <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ric=
her-oauth-httpsig/" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draf=
t-richer-oauth-httpsig/</a><br>
                      <br>
                      Please, provide your feedback on the mailing list
                      <b>by July 30th</b>.<br>
                      <br>
                      Regards,<br>
                      =C2=A0Rifaat &amp; Hannes<br>
                    </div>
                    _______________________________________________<br>
                    OAuth mailing list<br>
                    <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAu=
th@ietf.org</a><br>
                    <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
              <br>
            </div>
          </div>
          _______________________________________________<br>
          OAuth mailing list<br>
          <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.or=
g</a><br>
          <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>=
<br>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset></fieldset>
      <pre>_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </div>

_______________________________________________<br>
OAuth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] How to report a possible security threat
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Hi all,

How can I report a possible security threat?

Thanks,
Rutger

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<div dir="ltr">Hi all,<div><br></div><div>How can I report a possible security threat?<br></div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Rutger</div></div>

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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Rutger Hertogh <rhertogh@gmail.com>
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On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 03:56:51PM +0200, Rutger Hertogh wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> How can I report a possible security threat?

The answer depends on whether it's believed to be an issue with the
protocol itself vs a specific implementation or implementations of it.

The IETF guidance on reporting protocol vunlerabilities (the former
category) is available at
https://www.ietf.org/standards/rfcs/vulnerabilities/

-Ben


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From: Rutger Hertogh <rhertogh@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 2021 12:52:18 +0200
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] How to report a possible security threat
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--00000000000012ae1605cab0838b
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Hi Benjamin,

Thanks, on https://oauth.net/security/ they referred to this mailing list
but it doesn't seem smart to just blast it around in a public mailing list.
I'll follow the description from your link.

Thanks & Regards,
Rutger

On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 8:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 03:56:51PM +0200, Rutger Hertogh wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > How can I report a possible security threat?
>
> The answer depends on whether it's believed to be an issue with the
> protocol itself vs a specific implementation or implementations of it.
>
> The IETF guidance on reporting protocol vunlerabilities (the former
> category) is available at
> https://www.ietf.org/standards/rfcs/vulnerabilities/
>
> -Ben


On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 8:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 03:56:51PM +0200, Rutger Hertogh wrote:
> > Hi all,
> >
> > How can I report a possible security threat?
>
> The answer depends on whether it's believed to be an issue with the
> protocol itself vs a specific implementation or implementations of it.
>
> The IETF guidance on reporting protocol vunlerabilities (the former
> category) is available at
> https://www.ietf.org/standards/rfcs/vulnerabilities/
>
> -Ben
>

--00000000000012ae1605cab0838b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi=C2=A0Benjamin,<div><br></div><div>Than=
ks, on=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://oauth.net/security/">https://oauth.net/secur=
ity/</a> they referred=C2=A0to this mailing list but it doesn&#39;t seem sm=
art to just blast it around in a public mailing list.</div><div>I&#39;ll fo=
llow=C2=A0the description from your=C2=A0link.</div><div><br></div><div>Tha=
nks &amp;=C2=A0Regards,</div><div>Rutger</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 8:22 =
PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Sat,=
 Aug 28, 2021 at 03:56:51PM +0200, Rutger Hertogh wrote:<br>&gt; Hi all,<br=
>&gt;<br>&gt; How can I report a possible security threat?<br><br>The answe=
r depends on whether it&#39;s believed to be an issue with the<br>protocol =
itself vs a specific implementation or implementations of it.<br><br>The IE=
TF guidance on reporting protocol vunlerabilities (the former<br>category) =
is available at<br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/standards/rfcs/vulnerabi=
lities/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/standard=
s/rfcs/vulnerabilities/</a><br><br>-Ben</blockquote></div></div><br><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sat, Aug 28, 2=
021 at 8:22 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mi=
t.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex">On Sat, Aug 28, 2021 at 03:56:51PM +0200, Rutger Hertogh wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi all,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; How can I report a possible security threat?<br>
<br>
The answer depends on whether it&#39;s believed to be an issue with the<br>
protocol itself vs a specific implementation or implementations of it.<br>
<br>
The IETF guidance on reporting protocol vunlerabilities (the former<br>
category) is available at<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/standards/rfcs/vulnerabilities/" rel=3D"nor=
eferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/standards/rfcs/vulnerabilit=
ies/</a><br>
<br>
-Ben<br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000012ae1605cab0838b--


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Fwd: NomCom 2021-2022 Call for Nominations
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All,

Please, consider participating in this important process.

Regards,
 Rifaat & Hannes


---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: NomCom Chair 2021 <nomcom-chair-2021@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 10:05 AM
Subject: NomCom 2021-2022 Call for Nominations
To: IETF Announcement List <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: <ietf@ietf.org>


Finally! The moment we've all been waiting for:

   C A L L       F O R       N O M I N A T I O N S  ! ! !

The 2021-22 IETF Nominating Committee (NomCom) is seeking nominations
from now until Monday, October 11, 2021.

The open positions and more information are found at the NomCom web site:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/

They are also included below for convenience.

Nominations may be made by selecting the Nominate link at the top of the
NomCom 2021 home page, or by visiting the following URL:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/nominate/

Self-nomination is welcome!

Note:  Nominations made using the web tool require an ietf.org datatracker
account. You can create a datatracker ietf.org account if you don't have
one
already by visiting the following URL:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/accounts/create/

If you are unable to use the web form, nominations may instead be made by
email
to nomcom-2021 at ietf dot org. If using email, please include the word
"Nominate"
in the Subject and indicate in the email who is being nominated, their
email
address (to confirm acceptance of the nomination), and the position for
which you
are making the nomination. If you are nominating someone other than
yourself,
please tell us if we may tell the nominee that you were the one who made
the
nomination. If you wish to nominate someone via email for more than one
position, please use separate emails to do so.

Willing nominees will be asked to fill out a questionnaire specific to the
position
for which they are nominated. The finalized questionnaires will be
available no
later than Monday, September 6, 2021 (preliminary versions are already
posted)
and have a submission deadline of Monday, October 18, 2021.

NomCom 2021-22 will follow the policy for "Open Disclosure of Willing
Nominees" described in BCP 10/RFC 8713: "The list of
nominees willing to be considered for positions under review in the current
NomCom cycle is not confidential". Willing nominees for each position will
be
listed in a publicly accessible way, e.g., anyone with a datatracker
account may
access the lists. Additionally, the nomination form asks if we may share
your own
name with the nominee. In all other ways, the confidentiality requirements
of BCP
10 remain in effect. All feedback and all NomCom deliberations will remain
confidential and will not be disclosed.

There is a field on the form you can mark in order to allow the NomCom to
tell
the nominee that you were the one who made the nomination. This defaults to
=E2=80=9Cno=E2=80=9D - so if you don't mark the field we won=E2=80=99t tell=
.

In order to ensure time to collect sufficient community feedback about each
of
the willing nominees, nominations must be received by the NomCom on or
before
Monday, October 11, 2021.

Please submit your nominations as early as possible for the sake of your
nominees. Note that nominations should not wait for nominee management
permission, as it is easier to decline the nomination than put one in late.

The NomCom appoints individuals to fill open slots on the IAB, IESG, the
IETF
Trust and the LLC Board:

        ART AD: 1 position
        INT AD: 1 position
        OPS AD: 1 position
        RTG AD: 1 position
        SEC AD: 1 position
        TSV AD: 1 position
        IETF Trust: 1 position
        IETF LLC: 1 position
        IAB: 6 positions

The list of people and posts whose terms end with the
March 2022 IETF meeting, and thus the positions for which this NomCom is
responsible, is:

[An asterisk (*) next to a person's name indicates they do not intend to
accept
renomination.]

        LLC Board (3-year term)
                Jason Livingood

        IETF Trust (3-year term)
                Kathleen Moriarty

        IAB (2-year term)
                Ben Campbell *
                Cullen Jennings
                Mirja K=C3=BChlewind
                Jared Mauch
                Tommy Pauly
                Jiankang Yao

        IESG (2-year term)
                Murray Kucherawy, ART AD
                Erik Kline, INT AD
                Robert Wilton, OPS AD
                Martin Vigoureux, RTG AD
                Benjamin Kaduk, SEC AD *
                Martin Duke, TSV AD

Please be resourceful in identifying possible candidates for these
positions, as
developing our talent is a very crucial requirement for the IETF, and also,
please
consider accepting a nomination. You'll find extensive information about
specific
positions, in individual tabs at:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/requirements/

In addition to nominations, the NomCom seeks community input on the
positions
themselves. We need and welcome the community's views and input on the jobs
within each organization. If you have ideas on the positions=E2=80=99
responsibilities
(more, less, different), please let us know.

Please send suggestions and feedback about this to nomcom-2021 at ietf dot
org.

Thank you for your help in identifying qualified nominees!

Thanks,

Gabriel Montenegro
IETF NomCom Chair 2021-22
nomcom-chair-2021 at ietf dot org

--000000000000abcde605cacbfb07
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<div dir=3D"ltr">All,<div><br></div><div>Please, consider participating in =
this important process.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=C2=A0R=
ifaat &amp; Hannes</div><div><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">---------- Forwarded message ---------<br>=
From: <strong class=3D"gmail_sendername" dir=3D"auto">NomCom Chair 2021</st=
rong> <span dir=3D"auto">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nomcom-chair-2021@ietf.org">=
nomcom-chair-2021@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span><br>Date: Mon, Aug 30, 2021 at 10:=
05 AM<br>Subject: NomCom 2021-2022 Call for Nominations<br>To: IETF Announc=
ement List &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-announce@ietf.org">ietf-announce@ietf=
.org</a>&gt;<br>Cc:  &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@ietf.org">ietf@ietf.org</a>=
&gt;<br></div><br><br>Finally! The moment we&#39;ve all been waiting for:<b=
r>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0C A L L=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0F O R=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0N O M I N A T I O N S=C2=A0 ! ! !<br>
<br>
The 2021-22 IETF Nominating Committee (NomCom) is seeking nominations <br>
from now until Monday, October 11, 2021. <br>
<br>
The open positions and more information are found at the NomCom web site:<b=
r>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/</a> <br>
<br>
They are also included below for convenience.<br>
<br>
Nominations may be made by selecting the Nominate link at the top of the<br=
>
NomCom 2021 home page, or by visiting the following URL: <br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/nominate/" rel=3D"noref=
errer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/nominate/=
</a><br>
<br>
Self-nomination is welcome! <br>
<br>
Note:=C2=A0 Nominations made using the web tool require an <a href=3D"http:=
//ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">ietf.org</a> datatracker <=
br>
account. You can create a datatracker <a href=3D"http://ietf.org" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">ietf.org</a> account if you don&#39;t have one =
<br>
already by visiting the following URL: <br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/accounts/create/" rel=3D"noreferrer=
" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/accounts/create/</a><br>
<br>
If you are unable to use the web form, nominations may instead be made by e=
mail <br>
to nomcom-2021 at ietf dot org. If using email, please include the word &qu=
ot;Nominate&quot; <br>
in the Subject and indicate in the email who is being nominated, their emai=
l <br>
address (to confirm acceptance of the nomination), and the position for whi=
ch you <br>
are making the nomination. If you are nominating someone other than yoursel=
f, <br>
please tell us if we may tell the nominee that you were the one who made th=
e <br>
nomination. If you wish to nominate someone via email for more than one <br=
>
position, please use separate emails to do so.<br>
<br>
Willing nominees will be asked to fill out a questionnaire specific to the =
position <br>
for which they are nominated. The finalized questionnaires will be availabl=
e no <br>
later than Monday, September 6, 2021 (preliminary versions are already post=
ed) <br>
and have a submission deadline of Monday, October 18, 2021. <br>
<br>
NomCom 2021-22 will follow the policy for &quot;Open Disclosure of Willing =
<br>
Nominees&quot; described in BCP 10/RFC 8713: &quot;The list of <br>
nominees willing to be considered for positions under review in the current=
 <br>
NomCom cycle is not confidential&quot;. Willing nominees for each position =
will be <br>
listed in a publicly accessible way, e.g., anyone with a datatracker accoun=
t may <br>
access the lists. Additionally, the nomination form asks if we may share yo=
ur own <br>
name with the nominee. In all other ways, the confidentiality requirements =
of BCP <br>
10 remain in effect. All feedback and all NomCom deliberations will remain =
<br>
confidential and will not be disclosed.<br>
<br>
There is a field on the form you can mark in order to allow the NomCom to t=
ell <br>
the nominee that you were the one who made the nomination. This defaults to=
 <br>
=E2=80=9Cno=E2=80=9D - so if you don&#39;t mark the field we won=E2=80=99t =
tell.<br>
<br>
In order to ensure time to collect sufficient community feedback about each=
 of <br>
the willing nominees, nominations must be received by the NomCom on or befo=
re <br>
Monday, October 11, 2021.<br>
<br>
Please submit your nominations as early as possible for the sake of your <b=
r>
nominees. Note that nominations should not wait for nominee management <br>
permission, as it is easier to decline the nomination than put one in late.=
<br>
<br>
The NomCom appoints individuals to fill open slots on the IAB, IESG, the IE=
TF <br>
Trust and the LLC Board:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ART AD: 1 position<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 INT AD: 1 position<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 OPS AD: 1 position<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RTG AD: 1 position<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 SEC AD: 1 position<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 TSV AD: 1 position<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 IETF Trust: 1 position<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 IETF LLC: 1 position<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 IAB: 6 positions<br>
<br>
The list of people and posts whose terms end with the <br>
March 2022 IETF meeting, and thus the positions for which this NomCom is <b=
r>
responsible, is:<br>
<br>
[An asterisk (*) next to a person&#39;s name indicates they do not intend t=
o accept <br>
renomination.]<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 LLC Board (3-year term)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Jason Livingood<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 IETF Trust (3-year term)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Kathleen Moriarty<b=
r>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 IAB (2-year term)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Ben Campbell *<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Cullen Jennings<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Mirja K=C3=BChlewin=
d<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Jared Mauch<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Tommy Pauly<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Jiankang Yao<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 IESG (2-year term)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Murray Kucherawy, A=
RT AD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Erik Kline, INT AD<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Robert Wilton, OPS =
AD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Martin Vigoureux, R=
TG AD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Benjamin Kaduk, SEC=
 AD *<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Martin Duke, TSV AD=
<br>
<br>
Please be resourceful in identifying possible candidates for these position=
s, as <br>
developing our talent is a very crucial requirement for the IETF, and also,=
 please <br>
consider accepting a nomination. You&#39;ll find extensive information abou=
t specific <br>
positions, in individual tabs at: <br>
<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/requirements/" rel=3D"n=
oreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2021/requi=
rements/</a> <br>
<br>
In addition to nominations, the NomCom seeks community input on the positio=
ns <br>
themselves. We need and welcome the community&#39;s views and input on the =
jobs <br>
within each organization. If you have ideas on the positions=E2=80=99 respo=
nsibilities <br>
(more, less, different), please let us know.<br>
<br>
Please send suggestions and feedback about this to nomcom-2021 at ietf dot =
org. <br>
<br>
Thank you for your help in identifying qualified nominees! <br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
Gabriel Montenegro<br>
IETF NomCom Chair 2021-22<br>
nomcom-chair-2021 at ietf dot org<br>
<br>
</div></div>

--000000000000abcde605cacbfb07--


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Hi Dick,

>The access token represents the authorization to access the resource(s) --
>it does not represent the authorization to manipulate tokens.

Anything for which the client must have an access token to access is a
protected resource. In order to revoke a token, the client must have the
associated access token to begin with, hence a protected resource. If not a
protected resource, it is implied anyone can access it, and the OAuth spec
makes no assertions about where a protected resource must be located so
there's no reason it can't be on the AS as well.

Emond describes it quite neatly:
>> I see it like returning a key when you no longer need access to a
building.
>> The fact that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to
return it.

So you shouldn't be returning a key you never had.

Anything for which you *may* use a client_secret if you have one or not if
you don't is generally a red flag. In RFC 7009 as I've pointed out, the
client_id is being used as a security measure as it's part of the
authentication header. Furthermore, it also mentions an attacker *guessing*
it (in addition to the token). The client_id is by no means a secure item
on a non-confidential client such as an SPA.

Also you say:
> Changing the spec would change the security assumptions that existing
deployments have made.

Isn't that the nature of the business? Or are you implying that no
deployment should ever change even if improvements are found?

Ash


>Hey Emond
>
>The access token represents the authorization to access the resource(s) --
>it does not represent the authorization to manipulate tokens. The client
>credentials are used for token management. While your implementation may b=
e
>ok with using the access token to revoke itself, it is not the security
>model represented by the specification. Changing the spec would change the
>security assumptions that existing deployments have made.
>
>As noted in your response, the CLI has access to the client credentials to
>revoke. Besides convenience, it is not clear to me why you would not want
>to require the client credentials -- but it is your implementation -- you
>can make your own decisions where and if you want to be compliant.
>
>Warren: an interesting idea to provide more context on this in OAuth 2.1.
>
>/Dick
>=E1=90=A7
>
>On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 8:10 AM Emond Papegaaij <emond.papegaaij@gmail.com=
>
>wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> wrote:
>>
>>> I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree with the errata,
>>> that this particular use case probably isn't relevant:
>>>
>>> Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only requests th=
e
>>>> client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and store=
s
>>>> this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default.
>>>
>>>
>>> Unless I misunderstand, I'll take "client credentials" to mean client I=
d
>>> and client credentials via a client credentials grant. And therefore, i=
s
>>> not the correct flow to be used in a command line tool. Client
credentials
>>> are used in private when there are many user agents that could connect
>>> through it, I would not recommend this as the solution here, and even
if it
>>> were, you would indeed have access to the client id and secret, so it
would
>>> not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.
>>>
>>
>> The CLI-tool actually supports both a 3-legged (via the device
>> authorization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via the client credentials
>> grant). It depends on the use case which one is appropriate. In the case
of
>> a user logging in to access the application via the CLI, it clearly is
the
>> 3-legged flow, however when the CLI is used in a script that runs withou=
t
>> user interaction, it's the 2-legged flow. In this later case, the script
>> often fetches the credentials from some store, uses them to acquire an
>> access token, does it job, and revokes the token. Naturally, it can fetc=
h
>> the credentials a second time to revoke the token, but I really don't se=
e
>> the point in this case. The client merely indicates it is done with the
>> token and it can now be revoked. It is good practice to discard any
>> credentials when you are done with them to minimize the chance of abuse.
>> However, requiring the client authentication to revoke the token, really
>> complicates this case and will probably lead to scripts not revoking the
>> token.
>>
>>
>>> However, I believe there is something fundamentally broke here, because
>>> there are two use cases which are in conflict with each other:
>>>
>>>    - I as a user, at any time want to revoke one of, access token,
>>>    refresh token, or granted scopes associated with my identity by
directly
>>>    communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request through =
a
>>>    client, and more specifically, I never want a client to determine
whether
>>>    or not I'm allowed to revoke these.
>>>    - I as a user, at no time want to allow a client, for whom I did not
>>>    give permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke granted
scopes. It
>>>    should not be the case that one client sharing the token with anothe=
r
>>>    client (either intentionally or accidentally) would be allowed to
change
>>>    the requested scopes nor make decisions about the validity of my
current
>>>    access token or delegated refresh token.
>>>
>>> Given the latter we see that it must be the case that refresh tokens,
>>> access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be revoked
>>> without client authentication. This means that the original RFC is
indeed
>>> correct, and that the errata is not. But, this does not enable the
former
>>> case nor encourage a solution that works in scope of retaining control
over
>>> resources that the user agent owns. However, it is worth mentioning
that it
>>> doesn't prevent, as it still allows an AS to implement additional
>>> mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.
>>>
>>> That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a *flow* to safely
>>> instruct the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot be done b=
y
>>> amending the revocation endpoint.
>>>
>>
>> I don't fully understand your statement here. As far as I understand the
>> token revocation endpoint, it is an endpoint specifically for the client
to
>> be used when it no longer needs the token. The client can simply discard
>> the tokens, but it is cleaner to inform the AS about this fact and allow
>> the AS to cleanup its resources as well. It is in no way an endpoint to
be
>> used by the resource owner to revoke access for certain clients. I see i=
t
>> like returning a key when you no longer need access to a building. The
fact
>> that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to return it.
>>
>> I do want to point out that the spec for bearer tokens states: "A
security
>> token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a
>> "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in possessio=
n
>> of it can." Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with another
party
>> unless they really trust this other party, in which case they should als=
o
>> trust this party not to revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If any
>> malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only use
>> them to revoke them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway. One could
>> even argue that the grant for the original client should also be revoked
in
>> this case as well, because it is clearly broken.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Emond Papegaaij
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij <
>>> emond.papegaaij@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation w=
as never
>>>>> meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of the
AS.
>>>>> The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was
a
>>>> command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on
login. It
>>>> then fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client
>>>> credentials are not stored by default. The current spec required us to
>>>> request the client credentials to revoke the access token on logout.
>>>> Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to
authenticate, it
>>>> already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it
wants
>>>> to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence that the
>>>> client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be the
least
>>>> harmful one can do with a token.
>>>>
>>>> For more information see:
>>>>
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/
>>>>
>>>> Best regards,
>>>> Emond Papegaaij
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> > On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System <
>>>>> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>>>>> >
>>>>> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
>>>>> > "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".
>>>>> >
>>>>> > --------------------------------------
>>>>> > You may review the report below and at:
>>>>> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663
>>>>> >
>>>>> > --------------------------------------
>>>>> > Type: Technical
>>>>> > Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Section: 2.1
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Original Text
>>>>> > -------------
>>>>> > The client constructs the request by including the following
>>>>> >   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format i=
n
>>>>> >   the HTTP request entity-body:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked=
.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>>>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this paramete=
r
>>>>> in
>>>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the
token
>>>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token usin=
g
>>>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of
its
>>>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignor=
e
>>>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>>>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>>>>> >           such values:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>>>> >             Section 1.4
>>>>> >
>>>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>>>> >             Section 1.5
>>>>> >
>>>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of thi=
s
>>>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>>>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   The client also includes its authentication credentials as
described
>>>>> >   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   For example, a client may request the revocation of a refresh
token
>>>>> >   with the following request:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>>>> >     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>>>> >
>>>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   The authorization server first validates the client credentials
(in
>>>>> >   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the toke=
n
>>>>> >   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If this
>>>>> >   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is
informed
>>>>> >   of the error by the authorization server as described below.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Corrected Text
>>>>> > --------------
>>>>> > The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
>>>>> >   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
>>>>> >   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get revoked=
.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
>>>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this paramete=
r
>>>>> in
>>>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the
token
>>>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token usin=
g
>>>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of
its
>>>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY ignor=
e
>>>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the
>>>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines two
>>>>> >           such values:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>>>> >             Section 1.4
>>>>> >
>>>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
>>>>> >             Section 1.5
>>>>> >
>>>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of thi=
s
>>>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this parameter
>>>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   The client MUST also include in the request, the access token it
>>>>> received
>>>>> >   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way as i=
t
>>>>> would
>>>>> >   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC6749],
>>>>> Section 7.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the
>>>>> client uses
>>>>> >   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>>>> >
>>>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the
>>>>> client uses
>>>>> >   its access token to revoke the same access token:
>>>>> >
>>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
>>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
>>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
>>>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
>>>>> >
>>>>> >     token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=3Daccess_t=
oken
>>>>> >
>>>>> >   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used by
>>>>> the
>>>>> >   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, includin=
g
>>>>> >   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.
>>>>> >   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate whether
>>>>> the
>>>>> >   access token used for authorization is part of the same grant  as
>>>>> the
>>>>> >   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  refused
>>>>> and
>>>>> >   the client is informed of the error by the authorization server.
>>>>> >   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD
>>>>> respond
>>>>> >   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usag=
e
>>>>> >   [RFC6750], Section 3.
>>>>> >   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of thi=
s
>>>>> >   specification.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Notes
>>>>> > -----
>>>>> > It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider
>>>>> that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential
clients
>>>>> and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the
type of
>>>>> client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0
>>>>> specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access
token
>>>>> belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which
revocation is
>>>>> one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify authorizatio=
n
>>>>> required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an issue
for
>>>>> revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and
counter
>>>>> measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the
scope
>>>>> of this particular RFC. As per the original text itself, "This
>>>>> specification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures
against
>>>>> token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an attacker is able to
>>>>> successfully guess a public client's client_id and one of their tok
>>>>> > ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens, the=
y
>>>>> could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by
revoking
>>>>> it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will
lose its
>>>>> authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No
further
>>>>> damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
>>>>> > Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to
>>>>> begin with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not be
seen as a
>>>>> security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced
in a
>>>>> subsequent errata.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Instructions:
>>>>> > -------------
>>>>> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, pleas=
e
>>>>> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>>>>> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
>>>>> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > --------------------------------------
>>>>> > RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
>>>>> > --------------------------------------
>>>>> > Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
>>>>> > Publication Date    : August 2013
>>>>> > Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu
>>>>> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>>>>> > Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
>>>>> > Area                : Security
>>>>> > Stream              : IETF
>>>>> > Verifying Party     : IESG
>>>>> >
>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>Hi Dick,<br><br>&gt;The access token represents =
the authorization to access the resource(s) --<br>&gt;it does not represent=
 the authorization to manipulate tokens.=C2=A0<br><br>Anything for which th=
e client must have an access token to access is a protected resource. In or=
der to revoke a token, the client must have the associated access token to =
begin with, hence a protected resource. If not a protected resource, it is =
implied anyone can access it, and the OAuth spec makes no assertions about =
where a protected resource must be located so there&#39;s no reason it can&=
#39;t be on the AS as well.</div><div><br>Emond describes it quite neatly:<=
br>&gt;&gt; I see it like returning a key when you no longer need access to=
 a building. <br>&gt;&gt; The fact that you hold the key should be enough f=
or you to be able to return it.<br><br>So you shouldn&#39;t be returning a =
key you never had.<br><br>Anything for which you=C2=A0<i>may</i>=C2=A0use a=
 client_secret if you have one or not if you don&#39;t is generally a red f=
lag. In RFC 7009 as I&#39;ve pointed out, the client_id is being used as a =
security measure as it&#39;s part of the authentication header. Furthermore=
, it also mentions an attacker <u>guessing</u> it (in addition to the token=
). The client_id is by no means a secure item on a non-confidential client =
such as an SPA.<br><br>Also you say:<br>&gt; Changing the spec would change=
 the=C2=A0security assumptions that existing deployments have made.<br><br>=
Isn&#39;t that the nature of the business? Or are you implying that no depl=
oyment should ever change even if improvements are found?<br><br>Ash<br><br=
><br>&gt;Hey Emond<br>&gt;<br>&gt;The access token represents the authoriza=
tion to access the resource(s) --<br>&gt;it does not represent the authoriz=
ation to manipulate tokens. The client<br>&gt;credentials are used for toke=
n management. While your implementation may be<br>&gt;ok with using the acc=
ess token to revoke itself, it is not the security<br>&gt;model represented=
 by the specification. Changing the spec would change the<br>&gt;security a=
ssumptions that existing deployments have made.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;As noted in =
your response, the CLI has access to the client credentials to<br>&gt;revok=
e. Besides convenience, it is not clear to me why you would not want<br>&gt=
;to require the client credentials -- but it is your implementation -- you<=
br>&gt;can make your own decisions where and if you want to be compliant.<b=
r>&gt;<br>&gt;Warren: an interesting idea to provide more context on this i=
n OAuth 2.1.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;/Dick<br>&gt;=E1=90=A7<br>&gt;<br>&gt;On Tue, A=
ug 24, 2021 at 8:10 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:emond.papegaai=
j@gmail.com">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt;wrote:<br>&gt;<br>&gt=
;&gt; On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren Parad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:w=
parad@rhosys.ch">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt=
; I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree with the errata,<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt; that this particular use case probably isn&#39;t relevant:<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Our client in this case was a command line to=
ol, which only requests the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client credentials on login=
. It then fetches an access token and stores<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; this local=
ly. The client credentials are not stored by default.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&g=
t;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Unless I misunderstand, I&#39;ll take &quot;clie=
nt credentials&quot; to mean client Id<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; and client credentia=
ls via a client credentials grant. And therefore, is<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; not th=
e correct flow to be used in a command line tool. Client credentials<br>&gt=
;&gt;&gt; are used in private when there are many user agents that could co=
nnect<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; through it, I would not recommend this as the solutio=
n here, and even if it<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; were, you would indeed have access t=
o the client id and secret, so it would<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; not be a problem to=
 use them to revoke the token.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; The =
CLI-tool actually supports both a 3-legged (via the device<br>&gt;&gt; auth=
orization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via the client credentials<br>&gt;&gt=
; grant). It depends on the use case which one is appropriate. In the case =
of<br>&gt;&gt; a user logging in to access the application via the CLI, it =
clearly is the<br>&gt;&gt; 3-legged flow, however when the CLI is used in a=
 script that runs without<br>&gt;&gt; user interaction, it&#39;s the 2-legg=
ed flow. In this later case, the script<br>&gt;&gt; often fetches the crede=
ntials from some store, uses them to acquire an<br>&gt;&gt; access token, d=
oes it job, and revokes the token. Naturally, it can fetch<br>&gt;&gt; the =
credentials a second time to revoke the token, but I really don&#39;t see<b=
r>&gt;&gt; the point in this case. The client merely indicates it is done w=
ith the<br>&gt;&gt; token and it can now be revoked. It is good practice to=
 discard any<br>&gt;&gt; credentials when you are done with them to minimiz=
e the chance of abuse.<br>&gt;&gt; However, requiring the client authentica=
tion to revoke the token, really<br>&gt;&gt; complicates this case and will=
 probably lead to scripts not revoking the<br>&gt;&gt; token.<br>&gt;&gt;<b=
r>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; However, I believe there is something fundamenta=
lly broke here, because<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; there are two use cases which are i=
n conflict with each other:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0- =
I as a user, at any time want to revoke one of, access token,<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t; =C2=A0 =C2=A0refresh token, or granted scopes associated with my identit=
y by directly<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0communicating with an AS. I neve=
r want to make this request through a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0client, =
and more specifically, I never want a client to determine whether<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0or not I&#39;m allowed to revoke these.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0- I as a user, at no time want to allow a client, for whom I =
did not<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0give permission to revoke my refresh t=
oken nor revoke granted scopes. It<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0should not =
be the case that one client sharing the token with another<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0client (either intentionally or accidentally) would be allowed=
 to change<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0the requested scopes nor make decis=
ions about the validity of my current<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0access t=
oken or delegated refresh token.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Given the =
latter we see that it must be the case that refresh tokens,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be revoked<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt; without client authentication. This means that the original RF=
C is indeed<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; correct, and that the errata is not. But, this =
does not enable the former<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; case nor encourage a solution th=
at works in scope of retaining control over<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; resources that =
the user agent owns. However, it is worth mentioning that it<br>&gt;&gt;&gt=
; doesn&#39;t prevent, as it still allows an AS to implement additional<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt; mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.<br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a *=
flow* to safely<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; instruct the AS to revoke directly by the u=
ser, but it cannot be done by<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; amending the revocation endpo=
int.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; I don&#39;t fully understand y=
our statement here. As far as I understand the<br>&gt;&gt; token revocation=
 endpoint, it is an endpoint specifically for the client to<br>&gt;&gt; be =
used when it no longer needs the token. The client can simply discard<br>&g=
t;&gt; the tokens, but it is cleaner to inform the AS about this fact and a=
llow<br>&gt;&gt; the AS to cleanup its resources as well. It is in no way a=
n endpoint to be<br>&gt;&gt; used by the resource owner to revoke access fo=
r certain clients. I see it<br>&gt;&gt; like returning a key when you no lo=
nger need access to a building. The fact<br>&gt;&gt; that you hold the key =
should be enough for you to be able to return it.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; I=
 do want to point out that the spec for bearer tokens states: &quot;A secur=
ity<br>&gt;&gt; token with the property that any party in possession of the=
 token (a<br>&gt;&gt; &quot;bearer&quot;) can use the token in any way that=
 any other party in possession<br>&gt;&gt; of it can.&quot; Clients should =
IMHO not be exchanging tokens with another party<br>&gt;&gt; unless they re=
ally trust this other party, in which case they should also<br>&gt;&gt; tru=
st this party not to revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If any<br>&gt;=
&gt; malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only us=
e<br>&gt;&gt; them to revoke them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway.=
 One could<br>&gt;&gt; even argue that the grant for the original client sh=
ould also be revoked in<br>&gt;&gt; this case as well, because it is clearl=
y broken.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; Best regards,<br>&gt;&gt; Emond Papegaaij=
<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 a=
t 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:emond.pape=
gaaij@gmail.com">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<b=
r>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this err=
ata. Token Revocation was never<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; meant to act as a p=
rotected resource, but rather as a function of the AS.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt; The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.<b=
r>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; We ran into =
this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on logi=
n. It<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; then fetches an access token and stores this loca=
lly. The client<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; credentials are not stored by default. =
The current spec required us to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; request the client cred=
entials to revoke the access token on logout.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Personall=
y, I see no point in requiring the the client to authenticate, it<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt; already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever=
 it wants<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; to and the possession of the token should be =
enough evidence that the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client previously authenticate=
d. Revoking the token seems to be the least<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; harmful one=
 can do with a token.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; For more info=
rmation see:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/ar=
ch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arc=
h/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt; Best regards,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Emond Papegaaij<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; O=
n Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System &lt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
<a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>&=
gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; The fo=
llowing errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t; &gt; &quot;OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation&quot;.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt=
;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; --------------------------------------<br>&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; You may review the report below and at:<br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663">htt=
ps://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; --------------------------------------<br>&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Type: Technical<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Reported by=
: Ashvin Narayanan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com">ashvinn=
arayanan@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; &gt; Section: 2.1<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 &gt; Original Text<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; -------------<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; The client constructs the request by including the followi=
ng<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 parameters using the &quot;applicati=
on/x-www-form-urlencoded&quot; format in<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=
=A0 the HTTP request entity-body:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token =C2=A0 REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that the cli=
ent wants to get revoked.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token_type_hint =C2=A0OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about the type=
 of the token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 submitted for revocation.=C2=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; in<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 order to help the authorization server to optimize the token<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 lookup.=C2=A0 =
If the server is unable to locate the token using<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &=
gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the given hint, it MUST extend its s=
earch across all of its<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 supported token types.=C2=A0 An authorization server MAY igno=
re<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 this par=
ameter, particularly if it is able to detect the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &g=
t; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 token type automatically.=C2=A0 This =
specification defines two<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 such values:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 * access_token: An access tok=
en as defined in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 1.4<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 * refresh_token: A r=
efresh token as defined in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 1.5<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;=
<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Specific i=
mplementations, profiles, and extensions of this<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &g=
t; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 specification MAY define other values=
 for this parameter<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The client also includes its =
authentication credentials as described<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0=
 in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 For example, a client may request the revocation of a =
refresh token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 with the following reques=
t:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Host: <a h=
ref=3D"http://server.example.com">server.example.com</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0M=
zpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3Drefresh_to=
ken<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The au=
thorization server first validates the client credentials (in<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 case of a confidential client) and then verifies whe=
ther the token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 was issued to the client=
 making the revocation request.=C2=A0 If this<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
=C2=A0 validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed<=
br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 of the error by the authorization serve=
r as described below.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; Corrected Text<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; --------------<br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 POST [RFC7231] request with the following=
 parameters sent as<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 &quot;application/x=
-www-form-urlencoded&quot; data in the request body:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token =C2=A0 REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The=
 token that the client wants to get revoked.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<b=
r>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token_type_hint =C2=A0OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A =
hint about the type of the token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 submitted for revocation.=C2=A0 Clients MAY pass this=
 parameter<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; in<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 order to help the authorization server to optim=
ize the token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is unable to locate the token using<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the given hint, it=
 MUST extend its search across all of its<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 supported token types.=C2=A0 An authorizati=
on server MAY ignore<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 token type automat=
ically.=C2=A0 This specification defines two<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 such values:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt=
;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 * access_=
token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt=
; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 1.4<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 *=
 refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 1.5<br>&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this<br>&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 specification MAY d=
efine other values for this parameter<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The client M=
UST also include in the request, the access token it<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; received<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 from the authorization serve=
r. It must do so in the same way as it<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would<br>&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 when accessing a protected resource, as descr=
ibe in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Section 7.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The following is a non-normative=
 example request in which the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client uses<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 its access token to revoke the associated refres=
h token:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Hos=
t: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com">server.example.com</a><br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlenc=
oded<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authorization: Bearer czZCa=
GRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3Dref=
resh_token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0=
 The following is a non-normative example request in which the<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt; client uses<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 its access toke=
n to revoke the same access token:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Host: <a href=3D"http://server.example.com">server.ex=
ample.com</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Content-Type: appl=
ication/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Au=
thorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &g=
t;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQ=
mF0M2JW&amp;token_type_hint=3Daccess_token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The authorization server MUST validate the=
 access token used by<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &=
gt; =C2=A0 client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, includi=
ng<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 ensuring that it is not expired or r=
evoked.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 Additionally, the authorization=
 server MUST also validate whether<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 access token used for authorization is part of the =
same grant =C2=A0as<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt=
; =C2=A0 token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is =C2=A0ref=
used<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 the cl=
ient is informed of the error by the authorization server.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server=
 SHOULD<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; respond<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0=
 with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 [RFC6750], Section 3.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; =C2=A0 Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of t=
his<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 specification.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Notes<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; -----<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; It appears as=
 though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consider<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt; that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential client=
s<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and such, would lack authentication credentials. =
Regardless of the type of<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client however, authentic=
ation should not be required. The OAuth 2.0<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; specifi=
cation (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access token<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt; belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of whic=
h revocation is<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; one. It is the role of the access t=
oken alone to signify authorization<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; required to mak=
e requests to protected resources. If this is an issue for<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt; revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and cou=
nter<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rat=
her than broadening the scope<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; of this particular RF=
C. As per the original text itself, &quot;This<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; spec=
ification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures against<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; token theft and abuse.&quot; Additionally, &quot;If an=
 attacker is able to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; successfully guess a public cl=
ient&#39;s client_id and one of their tok<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; ens,=
 or a private client&#39;s credentials and one of their tokens, they<br>&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere t=
han by revoking<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; it.=C2=A0 If they chose to revoke t=
he token, the legitimate client will lose its<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; autho=
rization grant and will need to prompt the user again.=C2=A0 No further<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless.=
&quot;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Note that the client_id is not meant to=
 be private information to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; begin with, so relying o=
n an attacker &quot;guessing&quot; it should not be seen as a<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt; security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referen=
ced in a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; subsequent errata.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Instructions:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &g=
t; -------------<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; This erratum is currently pos=
ted as &quot;Reported&quot;. If necessary, please<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &=
gt; use &quot;Reply All&quot; to discuss whether it should be verified or<b=
r>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; rejected. When a decision is reached, the verif=
ying party<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; can log in to change the status and=
 edit the report, if necessary.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt; &gt; --------------------------------------<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t; &gt; RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &g=
t; --------------------------------------<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Titl=
e =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : OAuth 2.0 Token Revoca=
tion<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Publication Date =C2=A0 =C2=A0: August 20=
13<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Author(s) =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; Category =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: PROPOSED STANDARD<=
br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Source =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0: Web Authorization Protocol<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Area =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Security<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Stream =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
: IETF<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Verifying Party =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : IESG<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; ___________________=
____________________________<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing lis=
t<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf=
.org</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailm=
an/listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; ___________________________________=
____________<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth">https://www.=
ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; OA=
uth mailing list<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">OAut=
h@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/=
listinfo/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br=
>&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org">=
OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/list=
info/oauth">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt;&gt;<br>=
</div></div></div>

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From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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To: Ash Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7009 (6663)
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Hi Ash,

> Am 31.08.2021 um 02:42 schrieb Ash Narayanan =
<ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>:
>=20
> Hi Dick,
>=20
> >The access token represents the authorization to access the =
resource(s) --
> >it does not represent the authorization to manipulate tokens.=20
>=20
> Anything for which the client must have an access token to access is a =
protected resource. In order to revoke a token, the client must have the =
associated access token to begin with, hence a protected resource. If =
not a protected resource, it is implied anyone can access it, and the =
OAuth spec makes no assertions about where a protected resource must be =
located so there's no reason it can't be on the AS as well.
>=20
> Emond describes it quite neatly:
> >> I see it like returning a key when you no longer need access to a =
building.=20
> >> The fact that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able =
to return it.
>=20
> So you shouldn't be returning a key you never had.
>=20
> Anything for which you may use a client_secret if you have one or not =
if you don't is generally a red flag. In RFC 7009 as I've pointed out, =
the client_id is being used as a security measure as it's part of the =
authentication header. Furthermore, it also mentions an attacker =
guessing it (in addition to the token). The client_id is by no means a =
secure item on a non-confidential client such as an SPA.
>=20
> Also you say:
> > Changing the spec would change the security assumptions that =
existing deployments have made.
>=20
> Isn't that the nature of the business? Or are you implying that no =
deployment should ever change even if improvements are found?

Certainly not. However, an errata is not supposed to change the security =
assumptions of a spec. It is supposed to fix typos and clarify =
ambiguities. Changing the security assumptions or applying other =
normative changes is subject to new RFCs replacing the older ones.=20

So from my perspective, your inquiry exceeds the scope of an errata.=20

best regards,
Torsten.=20

>=20
> Ash
>=20
>=20
> >Hey Emond
> >
> >The access token represents the authorization to access the =
resource(s) --
> >it does not represent the authorization to manipulate tokens. The =
client
> >credentials are used for token management. While your implementation =
may be
> >ok with using the access token to revoke itself, it is not the =
security
> >model represented by the specification. Changing the spec would =
change the
> >security assumptions that existing deployments have made.
> >
> >As noted in your response, the CLI has access to the client =
credentials to
> >revoke. Besides convenience, it is not clear to me why you would not =
want
> >to require the client credentials -- but it is your implementation -- =
you
> >can make your own decisions where and if you want to be compliant.
> >
> >Warren: an interesting idea to provide more context on this in OAuth =
2.1.
> >
> >/Dick
> >=E1=90=A7
> >
> >On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 8:10 AM Emond Papegaaij =
<emond.papegaaij@gmail.com <mailto:emond.papegaaij@gmail.com>>
> >wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch =
<mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch>> wrote:
> >>
> >>> I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree with the =
errata,
> >>> that this particular use case probably isn't relevant:
> >>>
> >>> Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only =
requests the
> >>>> client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and =
stores
> >>>> this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Unless I misunderstand, I'll take "client credentials" to mean =
client Id
> >>> and client credentials via a client credentials grant. And =
therefore, is
> >>> not the correct flow to be used in a command line tool. Client =
credentials
> >>> are used in private when there are many user agents that could =
connect
> >>> through it, I would not recommend this as the solution here, and =
even if it
> >>> were, you would indeed have access to the client id and secret, so =
it would
> >>> not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.
> >>>
> >>
> >> The CLI-tool actually supports both a 3-legged (via the device
> >> authorization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via the client =
credentials
> >> grant). It depends on the use case which one is appropriate. In the =
case of
> >> a user logging in to access the application via the CLI, it clearly =
is the
> >> 3-legged flow, however when the CLI is used in a script that runs =
without
> >> user interaction, it's the 2-legged flow. In this later case, the =
script
> >> often fetches the credentials from some store, uses them to acquire =
an
> >> access token, does it job, and revokes the token. Naturally, it can =
fetch
> >> the credentials a second time to revoke the token, but I really =
don't see
> >> the point in this case. The client merely indicates it is done with =
the
> >> token and it can now be revoked. It is good practice to discard any
> >> credentials when you are done with them to minimize the chance of =
abuse.
> >> However, requiring the client authentication to revoke the token, =
really
> >> complicates this case and will probably lead to scripts not =
revoking the
> >> token.
> >>
> >>
> >>> However, I believe there is something fundamentally broke here, =
because
> >>> there are two use cases which are in conflict with each other:
> >>>
> >>>    - I as a user, at any time want to revoke one of, access token,
> >>>    refresh token, or granted scopes associated with my identity by =
directly
> >>>    communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request =
through a
> >>>    client, and more specifically, I never want a client to =
determine whether
> >>>    or not I'm allowed to revoke these.
> >>>    - I as a user, at no time want to allow a client, for whom I =
did not
> >>>    give permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke granted =
scopes. It
> >>>    should not be the case that one client sharing the token with =
another
> >>>    client (either intentionally or accidentally) would be allowed =
to change
> >>>    the requested scopes nor make decisions about the validity of =
my current
> >>>    access token or delegated refresh token.
> >>>
> >>> Given the latter we see that it must be the case that refresh =
tokens,
> >>> access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be =
revoked
> >>> without client authentication. This means that the original RFC is =
indeed
> >>> correct, and that the errata is not. But, this does not enable the =
former
> >>> case nor encourage a solution that works in scope of retaining =
control over
> >>> resources that the user agent owns. However, it is worth =
mentioning that it
> >>> doesn't prevent, as it still allows an AS to implement additional
> >>> mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.
> >>>
> >>> That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a *flow* to =
safely
> >>> instruct the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot be =
done by
> >>> amending the revocation endpoint.
> >>>
> >>
> >> I don't fully understand your statement here. As far as I =
understand the
> >> token revocation endpoint, it is an endpoint specifically for the =
client to
> >> be used when it no longer needs the token. The client can simply =
discard
> >> the tokens, but it is cleaner to inform the AS about this fact and =
allow
> >> the AS to cleanup its resources as well. It is in no way an =
endpoint to be
> >> used by the resource owner to revoke access for certain clients. I =
see it
> >> like returning a key when you no longer need access to a building. =
The fact
> >> that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to return =
it.
> >>
> >> I do want to point out that the spec for bearer tokens states: "A =
security
> >> token with the property that any party in possession of the token =
(a
> >> "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in =
possession
> >> of it can." Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with =
another party
> >> unless they really trust this other party, in which case they =
should also
> >> trust this party not to revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If =
any
> >> malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only =
use
> >> them to revoke them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway. One =
could
> >> even argue that the grant for the original client should also be =
revoked in
> >> this case as well, because it is clearly broken.
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >> Emond Papegaaij
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij <
> >>> emond.papegaaij@gmail.com <mailto:emond.papegaaij@gmail.com>> =
wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu =
<mailto:jricher@mit.edu>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token =
Revocation was never
> >>>>> meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function =
of the AS.
> >>>>> The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected =
here.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our client in this =
case was a
> >>>> command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on =
login. It
> >>>> then fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client
> >>>> credentials are not stored by default. The current spec required =
us to
> >>>> request the client credentials to revoke the access token on =
logout.
> >>>> Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to =
authenticate, it
> >>>> already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever =
it wants
> >>>> to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence that =
the
> >>>> client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be =
the least
> >>>> harmful one can do with a token.
> >>>>
> >>>> For more information see:
> >>>> =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/ =
<https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oaut=
h/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&=
usg=3DAOvVaw16H5lxg6EQsUfPTAc_WbWD>
> >>>>
> >>>> Best regards,
> >>>> Emond Papegaaij
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> > On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System <
> >>>>> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org <mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>> =
wrote:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
> >>>>> > "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > --------------------------------------
> >>>>> > You may review the report below and at:
> >>>>> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663 =
<https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663&=
source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3k2vU0wQT8A7wxoLn6l=
N2Z>
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > --------------------------------------
> >>>>> > Type: Technical
> >>>>> > Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com =
<mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>>
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Section: 2.1
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Original Text
> >>>>> > -------------
> >>>>> > The client constructs the request by including the following
> >>>>> >   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" =
format in
> >>>>> >   the HTTP request entity-body:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get =
revoked.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the =
token
> >>>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this =
parameter
> >>>>> in
> >>>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize =
the token
> >>>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token =
using
> >>>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all =
of its
> >>>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY =
ignore
> >>>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect =
the
> >>>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification =
defines two
> >>>>> >           such values:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in =
[RFC6749],
> >>>>> >             Section 1.4
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in =
[RFC6749],
> >>>>> >             Section 1.5
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions =
of this
> >>>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this =
parameter
> >>>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The client also includes its authentication credentials as =
described
> >>>>> >   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   For example, a client may request the revocation of a =
refresh token
> >>>>> >   with the following request:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >>>>> >     Host: server.example.com =
<https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&source=3Dgmail-i=
map&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZmHIoYL>
> >>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >>>>> >     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token=

> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The authorization server first validates the client =
credentials (in
> >>>>> >   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the =
token
> >>>>> >   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If =
this
> >>>>> >   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is =
informed
> >>>>> >   of the error by the authorization server as described below.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Corrected Text
> >>>>> > --------------
> >>>>> > The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
> >>>>> >   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
> >>>>> >   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request =
body:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get =
revoked.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the =
token
> >>>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this =
parameter
> >>>>> in
> >>>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize =
the token
> >>>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token =
using
> >>>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all =
of its
> >>>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY =
ignore
> >>>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect =
the
> >>>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification =
defines two
> >>>>> >           such values:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in =
[RFC6749],
> >>>>> >             Section 1.4
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in =
[RFC6749],
> >>>>> >             Section 1.5
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions =
of this
> >>>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this =
parameter
> >>>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The client MUST also include in the request, the access =
token it
> >>>>> received
> >>>>> >   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way =
as it
> >>>>> would
> >>>>> >   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in =
[RFC6749],
> >>>>> Section 7.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the
> >>>>> client uses
> >>>>> >   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >>>>> >     Host: server.example.com =
<https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&source=3Dgmail-i=
map&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZmHIoYL>
> >>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >>>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token=

> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the
> >>>>> client uses
> >>>>> >   its access token to revoke the same access token:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >>>>> >     Host: server.example.com =
<https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&source=3Dgmail-i=
map&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZmHIoYL>
> >>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >>>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     =
token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=3Daccess_token
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used =
by
> >>>>> the
> >>>>> >   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, =
including
> >>>>> >   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.
> >>>>> >   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate =
whether
> >>>>> the
> >>>>> >   access token used for authorization is part of the same =
grant  as
> >>>>> the
> >>>>> >   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  =
refused
> >>>>> and
> >>>>> >   the client is informed of the error by the authorization =
server.
> >>>>> >   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server =
SHOULD
> >>>>> respond
> >>>>> >   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token =
Usage
> >>>>> >   [RFC6750], Section 3.
> >>>>> >   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope =
of this
> >>>>> >   specification.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Notes
> >>>>> > -----
> >>>>> > It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to =
consider
> >>>>> that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential =
clients
> >>>>> and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of =
the type of
> >>>>> client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth =
2.0
> >>>>> specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the =
access token
> >>>>> belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which =
revocation is
> >>>>> one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify =
authorization
> >>>>> required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an =
issue for
> >>>>> revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and =
counter
> >>>>> measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than =
broadening the scope
> >>>>> of this particular RFC. As per the original text itself, "This
> >>>>> specification in general does not intend to provide =
countermeasures against
> >>>>> token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an attacker is able to
> >>>>> successfully guess a public client's client_id and one of their =
tok
> >>>>> > ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their =
tokens, they
> >>>>> could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by =
revoking
> >>>>> it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client =
will lose its
> >>>>> authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No =
further
> >>>>> damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
> >>>>> > Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information =
to
> >>>>> begin with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not =
be seen as a
> >>>>> security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be =
referenced in a
> >>>>> subsequent errata.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Instructions:
> >>>>> > -------------
> >>>>> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, =
please
> >>>>> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> >>>>> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> >>>>> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if =
necessary.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > --------------------------------------
> >>>>> > RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
> >>>>> > --------------------------------------
> >>>>> > Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
> >>>>> > Publication Date    : August 2013
> >>>>> > Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. =
Scurtescu
> >>>>> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> >>>>> > Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
> >>>>> > Area                : Security
> >>>>> > Stream              : IETF
> >>>>> > Verifying Party     : IESG
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > _______________________________________________
> >>>>> > OAuth mailing list
> >>>>> > OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
<https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oaut=
h&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP=
0VRFL>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> OAuth mailing list
> >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
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h&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP=
0VRFL>
> >>>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> OAuth mailing list
> >>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
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> >>>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >> OAuth mailing list
> >> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth =
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> >>
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> =
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Hi =
Ash,<br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">Am 31.08.2021 um 02:42 schrieb Ash Narayanan =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com</a>&gt;:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">Hi Dick,<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">&gt;The access token represents the authorization to access =
the resource(s) --<br class=3D"">&gt;it does not represent the =
authorization to manipulate tokens.&nbsp;<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Anything for which the client must have an access token to =
access is a protected resource. In order to revoke a token, the client =
must have the associated access token to begin with, hence a protected =
resource. If not a protected resource, it is implied anyone can access =
it, and the OAuth spec makes no assertions about where a protected =
resource must be located so there's no reason it can't be on the AS as =
well.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">Emond describes it quite =
neatly:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; I see it like returning a key when you no =
longer need access to a building. <br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; The fact that =
you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to return it.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">So you shouldn't be returning a key you never =
had.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Anything for which you&nbsp;<i =
class=3D"">may</i>&nbsp;use a client_secret if you have one or not if =
you don't is generally a red flag. In RFC 7009 as I've pointed out, the =
client_id is being used as a security measure as it's part of the =
authentication header. Furthermore, it also mentions an attacker <u =
class=3D"">guessing</u> it (in addition to the token). The client_id is =
by no means a secure item on a non-confidential client such as an =
SPA.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Also you say:<br class=3D"">&gt; =
Changing the spec would change the&nbsp;security assumptions that =
existing deployments have made.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Isn't that =
the nature of the business? Or are you implying that no deployment =
should ever change even if improvements are found?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>Certainly not. However, an errata is not supposed to =
change the security assumptions of a spec. It is supposed to fix typos =
and clarify ambiguities. Changing the security assumptions or applying =
other normative changes is subject to new RFCs replacing the older =
ones.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>So from my perspective, =
your inquiry exceeds the scope of an errata.&nbsp;</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>best =
regards,</div><div>Torsten.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">Ash<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">&gt;Hey Emond<br class=3D"">&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;The access token represents the authorization to access =
the resource(s) --<br class=3D"">&gt;it does not represent the =
authorization to manipulate tokens. The client<br =
class=3D"">&gt;credentials are used for token management. While your =
implementation may be<br class=3D"">&gt;ok with using the access token =
to revoke itself, it is not the security<br class=3D"">&gt;model =
represented by the specification. Changing the spec would change the<br =
class=3D"">&gt;security assumptions that existing deployments have =
made.<br class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;As noted in your response, =
the CLI has access to the client credentials to<br class=3D"">&gt;revoke. =
Besides convenience, it is not clear to me why you would not want<br =
class=3D"">&gt;to require the client credentials -- but it is your =
implementation -- you<br class=3D"">&gt;can make your own decisions =
where and if you want to be compliant.<br class=3D"">&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;Warren: an interesting idea to provide more context on =
this in OAuth 2.1.<br class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;/Dick<br =
class=3D"">&gt;=E1=90=A7<br class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;On Tue, =
Aug 24, 2021 at 8:10 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:emond.papegaaij@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;wrote:<br =
class=3D"">&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM =
Warren Parad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch" =
class=3D"">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to =
agree with the errata,<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; that this particular =
use case probably isn't relevant:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; Our client in this case was a command line tool, =
which only requests the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client =
credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and stores<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; this locally. The client credentials are not =
stored by default.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; Unless I =
misunderstand, I'll take "client credentials" to mean client Id<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; and client credentials via a client credentials =
grant. And therefore, is<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; not the correct flow =
to be used in a command line tool. Client credentials<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; are used in private when there are many user =
agents that could connect<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; through it, I would =
not recommend this as the solution here, and even if it<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; were, you would indeed have access to the client =
id and secret, so it would<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; not be a problem =
to use them to revoke the token.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; The CLI-tool actually =
supports both a 3-legged (via the device<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
authorization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via the client credentials<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; grant). It depends on the use case which one is =
appropriate. In the case of<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; a user logging in to =
access the application via the CLI, it clearly is the<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; 3-legged flow, however when the CLI is used in a =
script that runs without<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; user interaction, it's =
the 2-legged flow. In this later case, the script<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
often fetches the credentials from some store, uses them to acquire =
an<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; access token, does it job, and revokes the =
token. Naturally, it can fetch<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; the credentials a =
second time to revoke the token, but I really don't see<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; the point in this case. The client merely indicates =
it is done with the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; token and it can now be =
revoked. It is good practice to discard any<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
credentials when you are done with them to minimize the chance of =
abuse.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; However, requiring the client =
authentication to revoke the token, really<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
complicates this case and will probably lead to scripts not revoking =
the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; token.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; However, I believe there =
is something fundamentally broke here, because<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; =
there are two use cases which are in conflict with each other:<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- I as a =
user, at any time want to revoke one of, access token,<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;refresh token, or granted scopes =
associated with my identity by directly<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&nbsp; &nbsp;communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request =
through a<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;client, and more =
specifically, I never want a client to determine whether<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;or not I'm allowed to revoke =
these.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;- I as a user, at no time =
want to allow a client, for whom I did not<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&nbsp; &nbsp;give permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke =
granted scopes. It<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;should not be =
the case that one client sharing the token with another<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;client (either intentionally or =
accidentally) would be allowed to change<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&nbsp; &nbsp;the requested scopes nor make decisions about the validity =
of my current<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp;access token or =
delegated refresh token.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; Given the latter we see that it must be the case =
that refresh tokens,<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; access tokens, and =
associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be revoked<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; without client authentication. This means that =
the original RFC is indeed<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; correct, and that =
the errata is not. But, this does not enable the former<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; case nor encourage a solution that works in =
scope of retaining control over<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; resources =
that the user agent owns. However, it is worth mentioning that it<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; doesn't prevent, as it still allows an AS to =
implement additional<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; mechanisms for direct =
user revocation, if desired.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; That being said I would be in favor of =
enumerating a *flow* to safely<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; instruct the =
AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot be done by<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; amending the revocation endpoint.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; I =
don't fully understand your statement here. As far as I understand =
the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; token revocation endpoint, it is an endpoint =
specifically for the client to<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; be used when it no =
longer needs the token. The client can simply discard<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; the tokens, but it is cleaner to inform the AS about =
this fact and allow<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; the AS to cleanup its =
resources as well. It is in no way an endpoint to be<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; used by the resource owner to revoke access for =
certain clients. I see it<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; like returning a key =
when you no longer need access to a building. The fact<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; that you hold the key should be enough for you to be =
able to return it.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; I do =
want to point out that the spec for bearer tokens states: "A security<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; token with the property that any party in possession =
of the token (a<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; "bearer") can use the token in =
any way that any other party in possession<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; of it =
can." Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with another party<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; unless they really trust this other party, in which =
case they should also<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; trust this party not to =
revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If any<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only =
use<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; them to revoke them. A leaked token should be =
revoked anyway. One could<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; even argue that the =
grant for the original client should also be revoked in<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; this case as well, because it is clearly broken.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; Best regards,<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; Emond Papegaaij<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; On =
Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:emond.papegaaij@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On Mon, Aug 23, =
2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mit.edu" =
class=3D"">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I =
personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation was =
never<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; meant to act as a protected =
resource, but rather as a function of the AS.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; The client is known to the AS and so =
authentication is expected here.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; We ran into =
this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was a<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; command line tool, which only requests the =
client credentials on login. It<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; then =
fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; credentials are not stored by default. The =
current spec required us to<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; request the =
client credentials to revoke the access token on logout.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Personally, I see no point in requiring the =
the client to authenticate, it<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; already =
possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it wants<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; to and the possession of the token should be =
enough evidence that the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client =
previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be the least<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; harmful one can do with a token.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; For more =
information see:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/m=
sg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D16=
30975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw16H5lxg6EQsUfPTAc_WbWD" =
class=3D"">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnz=
GMdSqb2I/</a><br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Best regards,<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
Emond Papegaaij<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC =
Errata System &lt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" =
class=3D"">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; --------------------------------------<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; You may review the report below and =
at:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/e=
id6663&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw=
3k2vU0wQT8A7wxoLn6lN2Z" =
class=3D"">https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; --------------------------------------<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Type: Technical<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; Section: 2.1<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Original Text<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; -------------<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; The client constructs the request =
by including the following<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
&nbsp; parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format =
in<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; the HTTP request =
entity-body:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; token &nbsp; REQUIRED.&nbsp; =
The token that the client wants to get revoked.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; token_type_hint &nbsp;OPTIONAL.&nbsp; A hint about the type =
of the token<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; submitted for revocation.&nbsp; Clients MAY pass =
this parameter<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; in<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
order to help the authorization server to optimize the token<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
lookup.&nbsp; If the server is unable to locate the token using<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of its<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
supported token types.&nbsp; An authorization server MAY ignore<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
token type automatically.&nbsp; This specification defines two<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
such values:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
* access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; Section 1.4<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
* refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; Section 1.5<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
specification MAY define other values for this parameter<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; The client also includes its authentication credentials as =
described<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; in Section 2.3. =
of [RFC6749].<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; For example, a client may =
request the revocation of a refresh token<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; with the following =
request:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; POST /revoke =
HTTP/1.1<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Host: <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&amp;sourc=
e=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZ=
mHIoYL" class=3D"">server.example.com</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Content-Type: =
application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; The authorization server first validates the client =
credentials (in<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; case of a =
confidential client) and then verifies whether the token<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; was issued to the client =
making the revocation request.&nbsp; If this<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; validation fails, the =
request is refused and the client is informed<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; of the error by the =
authorization server as described below.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; Corrected Text<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
--------------<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; The client calls =
the revocation endpoint using an HTTP<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent =
as<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; =
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; token &nbsp; REQUIRED.&nbsp; The token that the client wants =
to get revoked.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; token_type_hint =
&nbsp;OPTIONAL.&nbsp; A hint about the type of the token<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
submitted for revocation.&nbsp; Clients MAY pass this parameter<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; in<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; order to help the authorization =
server to optimize the token<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; lookup.&nbsp; If the server is unable =
to locate the token using<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; the given hint, it MUST extend its search =
across all of its<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; supported token types.&nbsp; An authorization =
server MAY ignore<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; this parameter, particularly if it is able to =
detect the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; token type automatically.&nbsp; This specification defines =
two<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; such values:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
* access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; Section 1.4<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
* refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; Section 1.5<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
specification MAY define other values for this parameter<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; The client MUST also include in the request, the access =
token it<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; received<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; from the authorization =
server. It must do so in the same way as it<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; when accessing a protected resource, as describe in =
[RFC6749],<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Section 7.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client uses<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; its access token to revoke =
the associated refresh token:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; POST /revoke =
HTTP/1.1<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Host: <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&amp;sourc=
e=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZ=
mHIoYL" class=3D"">server.example.com</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Content-Type: =
application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; The following is a non-normative example request in which =
the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client uses<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; its access token to revoke =
the same access token:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; POST /revoke =
HTTP/1.1<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Host: <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&amp;sourc=
e=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZ=
mHIoYL" class=3D"">server.example.com</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Content-Type: =
application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&amp;token_type_hint=3Daccess_token<br=
 class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; The authorization server MUST validate the access token used =
by<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; client to authorize its call =
to the revocation endpoint, including<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; Additionally, the =
authorization server MUST also validate whether<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; access token used for authorization is part of the same =
grant &nbsp;as<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; token being revoked. If =
validation fails, the request is &nbsp;refused<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; &nbsp; the client is informed of the error by the authorization =
server.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; In the case of a =
bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; respond<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 &gt; &nbsp; with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer =
Token Usage<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; [RFC6750], =
Section 3.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; Errors based =
on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of this<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; &nbsp; specification.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Notes<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; -----<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; It appears as though the authors of =
RFC7009 have failed to consider<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; that =
requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; and such, would lack authentication =
credentials. Regardless of the type of<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.0<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; specification (RFC6749) does not specify =
verifying that the access token<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which revocation =
is<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; one. It is the role of the access =
token alone to signify authorization<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an issue =
for<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; revocation, then it is an issue =
for all protected resources and counter<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broadening the =
scope<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; of this particular RFC. As per =
the original text itself, "This<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
specification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures =
against<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; token theft and abuse." =
Additionally, "If an attacker is able to<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; successfully guess a public client's =
client_id and one of their tok<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens, they<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; could do much worse damage by using the =
token elsewhere than by revoking<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
it.&nbsp; If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will =
lose its<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization grant and will =
need to prompt the user again.&nbsp; No further<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; damage is done and the guessed token is =
now worthless."<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Note that the =
client_id is not meant to be private information to<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; begin with, so relying on an attacker =
"guessing" it should not be seen as a<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced in =
a<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; subsequent errata.<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; Instructions:<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
-------------<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; This erratum is =
currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; use "Reply All" to discuss whether =
it should be verified or<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; can log in to change the status and =
edit the report, if necessary.<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
--------------------------------------<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
--------------------------------------<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; Title &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : OAuth 2.0 =
Token Revocation<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Publication =
Date &nbsp; &nbsp;: August 2013<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
Author(s) &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. =
Dronia, M. Scurtescu<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Category =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;: PROPOSED STANDARD<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Source &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;: Web Authorization Protocol<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Area &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;: Security<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; Stream &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;: IETF<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Verifying Party &nbsp; &nbsp; : =
IESG<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listin=
fo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvV=
aw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRFL" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listin=
fo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvV=
aw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRFL" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listin=
fo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvV=
aw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRFL" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt;&gt; =
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; =
OAuth mailing list<br class=3D"">&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt; <a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listin=
fo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvV=
aw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRFL" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br =
class=3D"">&gt;&gt;<br class=3D""></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">OAuth =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/lis=
tinfo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DA=
OvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRFL<br class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br =
class=3D""></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_6B813EE7-B7AD-4784-83C9-5E33BB2C39EA--


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In-Reply-To: <7F1D49D6-C39B-45AB-8AA0-D399802B882E@lodderstedt.net>
From: Ash Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2021 20:12:33 +1000
Message-ID: <CAFvbn=ZTL4MyTxCx51V795igTgrck0AG8f9O4g9YyM6oFo-0XQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
Cc: IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC7009 (6663)
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Hi Torsten,

Thanks for clarifying. The errata system allows for two types of errata,
editorial and technical. I selected technical when I submitted this
particular one. Things like typos and ambiguities sound like editorial to
me, unless I'm mistaken.

I'd be fine with submitting a new RFC so as to not change the security
assumptions of this spec, though I'm not sure what then would be the
purpose of a technical errata?

Cheers,
Ash

On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 5:29 PM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.ne=
t>
wrote:

> Hi Ash,
>
> Am 31.08.2021 um 02:42 schrieb Ash Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>:
>
> Hi Dick,
>
> >The access token represents the authorization to access the resource(s) =
--
> >it does not represent the authorization to manipulate tokens.
>
> Anything for which the client must have an access token to access is a
> protected resource. In order to revoke a token, the client must have the
> associated access token to begin with, hence a protected resource. If not=
 a
> protected resource, it is implied anyone can access it, and the OAuth spe=
c
> makes no assertions about where a protected resource must be located so
> there's no reason it can't be on the AS as well.
>
> Emond describes it quite neatly:
> >> I see it like returning a key when you no longer need access to a
> building.
> >> The fact that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to
> return it.
>
> So you shouldn't be returning a key you never had.
>
> Anything for which you *may* use a client_secret if you have one or not
> if you don't is generally a red flag. In RFC 7009 as I've pointed out, th=
e
> client_id is being used as a security measure as it's part of the
> authentication header. Furthermore, it also mentions an attacker
> *guessing* it (in addition to the token). The client_id is by no means a
> secure item on a non-confidential client such as an SPA.
>
> Also you say:
> > Changing the spec would change the security assumptions that existing
> deployments have made.
>
> Isn't that the nature of the business? Or are you implying that no
> deployment should ever change even if improvements are found?
>
>
> Certainly not. However, an errata is not supposed to change the security
> assumptions of a spec. It is supposed to fix typos and clarify ambiguitie=
s.
> Changing the security assumptions or applying other normative changes is
> subject to new RFCs replacing the older ones.
>
> So from my perspective, your inquiry exceeds the scope of an errata.
>
> best regards,
> Torsten.
>
>
> Ash
>
>
> >Hey Emond
> >
> >The access token represents the authorization to access the resource(s) =
--
> >it does not represent the authorization to manipulate tokens. The client
> >credentials are used for token management. While your implementation may
> be
> >ok with using the access token to revoke itself, it is not the security
> >model represented by the specification. Changing the spec would change t=
he
> >security assumptions that existing deployments have made.
> >
> >As noted in your response, the CLI has access to the client credentials =
to
> >revoke. Besides convenience, it is not clear to me why you would not wan=
t
> >to require the client credentials -- but it is your implementation -- yo=
u
> >can make your own decisions where and if you want to be compliant.
> >
> >Warren: an interesting idea to provide more context on this in OAuth 2.1=
.
> >
> >/Dick
> >=E1=90=A7
> >
> >On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 8:10 AM Emond Papegaaij <
> emond.papegaaij@gmail.com>
> >wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren Parad <wparad@rhosys.ch> wrote=
:
> >>
> >>> I think it is worth pointing out, if we were to agree with the errata=
,
> >>> that this particular use case probably isn't relevant:
> >>>
> >>> Our client in this case was a command line tool, which only requests
> the
> >>>> client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and
> stores
> >>>> this locally. The client credentials are not stored by default.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Unless I misunderstand, I'll take "client credentials" to mean client
> Id
> >>> and client credentials via a client credentials grant. And therefore,
> is
> >>> not the correct flow to be used in a command line tool. Client
> credentials
> >>> are used in private when there are many user agents that could connec=
t
> >>> through it, I would not recommend this as the solution here, and even
> if it
> >>> were, you would indeed have access to the client id and secret, so it
> would
> >>> not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.
> >>>
> >>
> >> The CLI-tool actually supports both a 3-legged (via the device
> >> authorization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via the client credentials
> >> grant). It depends on the use case which one is appropriate. In the
> case of
> >> a user logging in to access the application via the CLI, it clearly is
> the
> >> 3-legged flow, however when the CLI is used in a script that runs
> without
> >> user interaction, it's the 2-legged flow. In this later case, the scri=
pt
> >> often fetches the credentials from some store, uses them to acquire an
> >> access token, does it job, and revokes the token. Naturally, it can
> fetch
> >> the credentials a second time to revoke the token, but I really don't
> see
> >> the point in this case. The client merely indicates it is done with th=
e
> >> token and it can now be revoked. It is good practice to discard any
> >> credentials when you are done with them to minimize the chance of abus=
e.
> >> However, requiring the client authentication to revoke the token, real=
ly
> >> complicates this case and will probably lead to scripts not revoking t=
he
> >> token.
> >>
> >>
> >>> However, I believe there is something fundamentally broke here, becau=
se
> >>> there are two use cases which are in conflict with each other:
> >>>
> >>>    - I as a user, at any time want to revoke one of, access token,
> >>>    refresh token, or granted scopes associated with my identity by
> directly
> >>>    communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request throug=
h
> a
> >>>    client, and more specifically, I never want a client to determine
> whether
> >>>    or not I'm allowed to revoke these.
> >>>    - I as a user, at no time want to allow a client, for whom I did n=
ot
> >>>    give permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke granted
> scopes. It
> >>>    should not be the case that one client sharing the token with
> another
> >>>    client (either intentionally or accidentally) would be allowed to
> change
> >>>    the requested scopes nor make decisions about the validity of my
> current
> >>>    access token or delegated refresh token.
> >>>
> >>> Given the latter we see that it must be the case that refresh tokens,
> >>> access tokens, and associated grants MUST NOT be allowed to be revoke=
d
> >>> without client authentication. This means that the original RFC is
> indeed
> >>> correct, and that the errata is not. But, this does not enable the
> former
> >>> case nor encourage a solution that works in scope of retaining contro=
l
> over
> >>> resources that the user agent owns. However, it is worth mentioning
> that it
> >>> doesn't prevent, as it still allows an AS to implement additional
> >>> mechanisms for direct user revocation, if desired.
> >>>
> >>> That being said I would be in favor of enumerating a *flow* to safely
> >>> instruct the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot be done
> by
> >>> amending the revocation endpoint.
> >>>
> >>
> >> I don't fully understand your statement here. As far as I understand t=
he
> >> token revocation endpoint, it is an endpoint specifically for the
> client to
> >> be used when it no longer needs the token. The client can simply disca=
rd
> >> the tokens, but it is cleaner to inform the AS about this fact and all=
ow
> >> the AS to cleanup its resources as well. It is in no way an endpoint t=
o
> be
> >> used by the resource owner to revoke access for certain clients. I see
> it
> >> like returning a key when you no longer need access to a building. The
> fact
> >> that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to return it=
.
> >>
> >> I do want to point out that the spec for bearer tokens states: "A
> security
> >> token with the property that any party in possession of the token (a
> >> "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other party in
> possession
> >> of it can." Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with another
> party
> >> unless they really trust this other party, in which case they should
> also
> >> trust this party not to revoke the tokens when not agreed upon. If any
> >> malicious party would get hold of my tokens, I wish they would only us=
e
> >> them to revoke them. A leaked token should be revoked anyway. One coul=
d
> >> even argue that the grant for the original client should also be
> revoked in
> >> this case as well, because it is clearly broken.
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >> Emond Papegaaij
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij <
> >>> emond.papegaaij@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> On Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata. Token Revocation=
 was never
> >>>>> meant to act as a protected resource, but rather as a function of
> the AS.
> >>>>> The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected her=
e.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> We ran into this very issue some time ago. Our client in this case
> was a
> >>>> command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on
> login. It
> >>>> then fetches an access token and stores this locally. The client
> >>>> credentials are not stored by default. The current spec required us =
to
> >>>> request the client credentials to revoke the access token on logout.
> >>>> Personally, I see no point in requiring the the client to
> authenticate, it
> >>>> already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it
> wants
> >>>> to and the possession of the token should be enough evidence that th=
e
> >>>> client previously authenticated. Revoking the token seems to be the
> least
> >>>> harmful one can do with a token.
> >>>>
> >>>> For more information see:
> >>>>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oau=
th/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&=
usg=3DAOvVaw16H5lxg6EQsUfPTAc_WbWD>
> >>>>
> >>>> Best regards,
> >>>> Emond Papegaaij
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> > On Aug 22, 2021, at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System <
> >>>>> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,
> >>>>> > "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation".
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > --------------------------------------
> >>>>> > You may review the report below and at:
> >>>>> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663=
&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw3k2vU0wQT8A7wxoLn6l=
N2Z>
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > --------------------------------------
> >>>>> > Type: Technical
> >>>>> > Reported by: Ashvin Narayanan <ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com>
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Section: 2.1
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Original Text
> >>>>> > -------------
> >>>>> > The client constructs the request by including the following
> >>>>> >   parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format
> in
> >>>>> >   the HTTP request entity-body:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get
> revoked.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
> >>>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this
> parameter
> >>>>> in
> >>>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the
> token
> >>>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token
> using
> >>>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of
> its
> >>>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY
> ignore
> >>>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect th=
e
> >>>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines t=
wo
> >>>>> >           such values:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749]=
,
> >>>>> >             Section 1.4
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749=
],
> >>>>> >             Section 1.5
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of
> this
> >>>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this paramete=
r
> >>>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The client also includes its authentication credentials as
> described
> >>>>> >   in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   For example, a client may request the revocation of a refresh
> token
> >>>>> >   with the following request:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&source=3Dgmail-=
imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZmHIoYL>
> >>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >>>>> >     Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The authorization server first validates the client credentials
> (in
> >>>>> >   case of a confidential client) and then verifies whether the
> token
> >>>>> >   was issued to the client making the revocation request.  If thi=
s
> >>>>> >   validation fails, the request is refused and the client is
> informed
> >>>>> >   of the error by the authorization server as described below.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Corrected Text
> >>>>> > --------------
> >>>>> > The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP
> >>>>> >   POST [RFC7231] request with the following parameters sent as
> >>>>> >   "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" data in the request body:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   token   REQUIRED.  The token that the client wants to get
> revoked.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   token_type_hint  OPTIONAL.  A hint about the type of the token
> >>>>> >           submitted for revocation.  Clients MAY pass this
> parameter
> >>>>> in
> >>>>> >           order to help the authorization server to optimize the
> token
> >>>>> >           lookup.  If the server is unable to locate the token
> using
> >>>>> >           the given hint, it MUST extend its search across all of
> its
> >>>>> >           supported token types.  An authorization server MAY
> ignore
> >>>>> >           this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect th=
e
> >>>>> >           token type automatically.  This specification defines t=
wo
> >>>>> >           such values:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           * access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749]=
,
> >>>>> >             Section 1.4
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           * refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749=
],
> >>>>> >             Section 1.5
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >           Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of
> this
> >>>>> >           specification MAY define other values for this paramete=
r
> >>>>> >           using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The client MUST also include in the request, the access token i=
t
> >>>>> received
> >>>>> >   from the authorization server. It must do so in the same way as
> it
> >>>>> would
> >>>>> >   when accessing a protected resource, as describe in [RFC6749],
> >>>>> Section 7.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the
> >>>>> client uses
> >>>>> >   its access token to revoke the associated refresh token:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&source=3Dgmail-=
imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZmHIoYL>
> >>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >>>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The following is a non-normative example request in which the
> >>>>> client uses
> >>>>> >   its access token to revoke the same access token:
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
> >>>>> >     Host: server.example.com
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&source=3Dgmail-=
imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZmHIoYL>
> >>>>> >     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> >>>>> >     Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >     token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&token_type_hint=3Daccess=
_token
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >   The authorization server MUST validate the access token used by
> >>>>> the
> >>>>> >   client to authorize its call to the revocation endpoint,
> including
> >>>>> >   ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.
> >>>>> >   Additionally, the authorization server MUST also validate wheth=
er
> >>>>> the
> >>>>> >   access token used for authorization is part of the same grant  =
as
> >>>>> the
> >>>>> >   token being revoked. If validation fails, the request is  refus=
ed
> >>>>> and
> >>>>> >   the client is informed of the error by the authorization server=
.
> >>>>> >   In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD
> >>>>> respond
> >>>>> >   with an HTTP 401 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token
> Usage
> >>>>> >   [RFC6750], Section 3.
> >>>>> >   Errors based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of
> this
> >>>>> >   specification.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Notes
> >>>>> > -----
> >>>>> > It appears as though the authors of RFC7009 have failed to consid=
er
> >>>>> that requests to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential
> clients
> >>>>> and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of the
> type of
> >>>>> client however, authentication should not be required. The OAuth 2.=
0
> >>>>> specification (RFC6749) does not specify verifying that the access
> token
> >>>>> belongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which
> revocation is
> >>>>> one. It is the role of the access token alone to signify
> authorization
> >>>>> required to make requests to protected resources. If this is an
> issue for
> >>>>> revocation, then it is an issue for all protected resources and
> counter
> >>>>> measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broadening
> the scope
> >>>>> of this particular RFC. As per the original text itself, "This
> >>>>> specification in general does not intend to provide countermeasures
> against
> >>>>> token theft and abuse." Additionally, "If an attacker is able to
> >>>>> successfully guess a public client's client_id and one of their tok
> >>>>> > ens, or a private client's credentials and one of their tokens,
> they
> >>>>> could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by
> revoking
> >>>>> it.  If they chose to revoke the token, the legitimate client will
> lose its
> >>>>> authorization grant and will need to prompt the user again.  No
> further
> >>>>> damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless."
> >>>>> > Note that the client_id is not meant to be private information to
> >>>>> begin with, so relying on an attacker "guessing" it should not be
> seen as a
> >>>>> security countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced
> in a
> >>>>> subsequent errata.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > Instructions:
> >>>>> > -------------
> >>>>> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary,
> please
> >>>>> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> >>>>> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
> >>>>> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary=
.
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > --------------------------------------
> >>>>> > RFC7009 (draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)
> >>>>> > --------------------------------------
> >>>>> > Title               : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation
> >>>>> > Publication Date    : August 2013
> >>>>> > Author(s)           : T. Lodderstedt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtesc=
u
> >>>>> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> >>>>> > Source              : Web Authorization Protocol
> >>>>> > Area                : Security
> >>>>> > Stream              : IETF
> >>>>> > Verifying Party     : IESG
> >>>>> >
> >>>>> > _______________________________________________
> >>>>> > OAuth mailing list
> >>>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
> >>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oau=
th&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP=
0VRFL>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
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th&source=3Dgmail-imap&ust=3D1630975362000000&usg=3DAOvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP=
0VRFL>
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Torsten,</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks for clari=
fying. The errata system allows for two types of errata, editorial and tech=
nical. I selected technical when I submitted this particular one. Things li=
ke typos and ambiguities sound like editorial to me, unless I&#39;m mistake=
n.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;d be fine with submitting a new RFC=
 so as to not change the security assumptions of this spec, though I&#39;m =
not sure what then would be the purpose of a technical errata?</div><div><b=
r></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>Ash</div><div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Aug 31, 2021 at 5:29 P=
M Torsten Lodderstedt &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">torste=
n@lodderstedt.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote"=
 style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:=
solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"wo=
rd-wrap:break-word;line-break:after-white-space">Hi Ash,<br><div><br><block=
quote type=3D"cite"><div>Am 31.08.2021 um 02:42 schrieb Ash Narayanan &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ashvinnarayan=
an@gmail.com</a>&gt;:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>Hi Dick,<br>=
<br>&gt;The access token represents the authorization to access the resourc=
e(s) --<br>&gt;it does not represent the authorization to manipulate tokens=
.=C2=A0<br><br>Anything for which the client must have an access token to a=
ccess is a protected resource. In order to revoke a token, the client must =
have the associated access token to begin with, hence a protected resource.=
 If not a protected resource, it is implied anyone can access it, and the O=
Auth spec makes no assertions about where a protected resource must be loca=
ted so there&#39;s no reason it can&#39;t be on the AS as well.</div><div><=
br>Emond describes it quite neatly:<br>&gt;&gt; I see it like returning a k=
ey when you no longer need access to a building. <br>&gt;&gt; The fact that=
 you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to return it.<br><br>=
So you shouldn&#39;t be returning a key you never had.<br><br>Anything for =
which you=C2=A0<i>may</i>=C2=A0use a client_secret if you have one or not i=
f you don&#39;t is generally a red flag. In RFC 7009 as I&#39;ve pointed ou=
t, the client_id is being used as a security measure as it&#39;s part of th=
e authentication header. Furthermore, it also mentions an attacker <u>guess=
ing</u> it (in addition to the token). The client_id is by no means a secur=
e item on a non-confidential client such as an SPA.<br><br>Also you say:<br=
>&gt; Changing the spec would change the=C2=A0security assumptions that exi=
sting deployments have made.<br><br>Isn&#39;t that the nature of the busine=
ss? Or are you implying that no deployment should ever change even if impro=
vements are found?<br></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>C=
ertainly not. However, an errata is not supposed to change the security ass=
umptions of a spec. It is supposed to fix typos and clarify ambiguities. Ch=
anging the security assumptions or applying other normative changes is subj=
ect to new RFCs replacing the older ones.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>So=
 from my perspective, your inquiry exceeds the scope of an errata.=C2=A0</d=
iv><div><br></div><div>best regards,</div><div>Torsten.=C2=A0</div><div><br=
><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><br>Ash<br><br><=
br>&gt;Hey Emond<br>&gt;<br>&gt;The access token represents the authorizati=
on to access the resource(s) --<br>&gt;it does not represent the authorizat=
ion to manipulate tokens. The client<br>&gt;credentials are used for token =
management. While your implementation may be<br>&gt;ok with using the acces=
s token to revoke itself, it is not the security<br>&gt;model represented b=
y the specification. Changing the spec would change the<br>&gt;security ass=
umptions that existing deployments have made.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;As noted in yo=
ur response, the CLI has access to the client credentials to<br>&gt;revoke.=
 Besides convenience, it is not clear to me why you would not want<br>&gt;t=
o require the client credentials -- but it is your implementation -- you<br=
>&gt;can make your own decisions where and if you want to be compliant.<br>=
&gt;<br>&gt;Warren: an interesting idea to provide more context on this in =
OAuth 2.1.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;/Dick<br>&gt;=E1=90=A7<br>&gt;<br>&gt;On Tue, Aug=
 24, 2021 at 8:10 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:emond.papegaaij@=
gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">emond.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt;wrote=
:<br>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 12:14 PM Warren Parad &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:wparad@rhosys.ch" target=3D"_blank">wparad@rhosys.ch</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; I think it is worth pointing out, if we=
 were to agree with the errata,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; that this particular use ca=
se probably isn&#39;t relevant:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Our client =
in this case was a command line tool, which only requests the<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt; client credentials on login. It then fetches an access token and sto=
res<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; this locally. The client credentials are not stored=
 by default.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Unless I misun=
derstand, I&#39;ll take &quot;client credentials&quot; to mean client Id<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt; and client credentials via a client credentials grant. And th=
erefore, is<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; not the correct flow to be used in a command li=
ne tool. Client credentials<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; are used in private when there =
are many user agents that could connect<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; through it, I would=
 not recommend this as the solution here, and even if it<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; we=
re, you would indeed have access to the client id and secret, so it would<b=
r>&gt;&gt;&gt; not be a problem to use them to revoke the token.<br>&gt;&gt=
;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; The CLI-tool actually supports both a 3-legge=
d (via the device<br>&gt;&gt; authorization grant) and a 2-legged flow (via=
 the client credentials<br>&gt;&gt; grant). It depends on the use case whic=
h one is appropriate. In the case of<br>&gt;&gt; a user logging in to acces=
s the application via the CLI, it clearly is the<br>&gt;&gt; 3-legged flow,=
 however when the CLI is used in a script that runs without<br>&gt;&gt; use=
r interaction, it&#39;s the 2-legged flow. In this later case, the script<b=
r>&gt;&gt; often fetches the credentials from some store, uses them to acqu=
ire an<br>&gt;&gt; access token, does it job, and revokes the token. Natura=
lly, it can fetch<br>&gt;&gt; the credentials a second time to revoke the t=
oken, but I really don&#39;t see<br>&gt;&gt; the point in this case. The cl=
ient merely indicates it is done with the<br>&gt;&gt; token and it can now =
be revoked. It is good practice to discard any<br>&gt;&gt; credentials when=
 you are done with them to minimize the chance of abuse.<br>&gt;&gt; Howeve=
r, requiring the client authentication to revoke the token, really<br>&gt;&=
gt; complicates this case and will probably lead to scripts not revoking th=
e<br>&gt;&gt; token.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; However, I bel=
ieve there is something fundamentally broke here, because<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; t=
here are two use cases which are in conflict with each other:<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0- I as a user, at any time want to revoke o=
ne of, access token,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0refresh token, or granted=
 scopes associated with my identity by directly<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0communicating with an AS. I never want to make this request through a<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0client, and more specifically, I never want a cl=
ient to determine whether<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0or not I&#39;m allow=
ed to revoke these.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0- I as a user, at no time =
want to allow a client, for whom I did not<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0giv=
e permission to revoke my refresh token nor revoke granted scopes. It<br>&g=
t;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0should not be the case that one client sharing the =
token with another<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0client (either intentionall=
y or accidentally) would be allowed to change<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
the requested scopes nor make decisions about the validity of my current<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0access token or delegated refresh token.<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; Given the latter we see that it must be the case t=
hat refresh tokens,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; access tokens, and associated grants MU=
ST NOT be allowed to be revoked<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; without client authenticati=
on. This means that the original RFC is indeed<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; correct, and=
 that the errata is not. But, this does not enable the former<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t; case nor encourage a solution that works in scope of retaining control o=
ver<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; resources that the user agent owns. However, it is wort=
h mentioning that it<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; doesn&#39;t prevent, as it still allow=
s an AS to implement additional<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; mechanisms for direct user =
revocation, if desired.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; That being said I w=
ould be in favor of enumerating a *flow* to safely<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; instruct=
 the AS to revoke directly by the user, but it cannot be done by<br>&gt;&gt=
;&gt; amending the revocation endpoint.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;=
&gt; I don&#39;t fully understand your statement here. As far as I understa=
nd the<br>&gt;&gt; token revocation endpoint, it is an endpoint specificall=
y for the client to<br>&gt;&gt; be used when it no longer needs the token. =
The client can simply discard<br>&gt;&gt; the tokens, but it is cleaner to =
inform the AS about this fact and allow<br>&gt;&gt; the AS to cleanup its r=
esources as well. It is in no way an endpoint to be<br>&gt;&gt; used by the=
 resource owner to revoke access for certain clients. I see it<br>&gt;&gt; =
like returning a key when you no longer need access to a building. The fact=
<br>&gt;&gt; that you hold the key should be enough for you to be able to r=
eturn it.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; I do want to point out that the spec for =
bearer tokens states: &quot;A security<br>&gt;&gt; token with the property =
that any party in possession of the token (a<br>&gt;&gt; &quot;bearer&quot;=
) can use the token in any way that any other party in possession<br>&gt;&g=
t; of it can.&quot; Clients should IMHO not be exchanging tokens with anoth=
er party<br>&gt;&gt; unless they really trust this other party, in which ca=
se they should also<br>&gt;&gt; trust this party not to revoke the tokens w=
hen not agreed upon. If any<br>&gt;&gt; malicious party would get hold of m=
y tokens, I wish they would only use<br>&gt;&gt; them to revoke them. A lea=
ked token should be revoked anyway. One could<br>&gt;&gt; even argue that t=
he grant for the original client should also be revoked in<br>&gt;&gt; this=
 case as well, because it is clearly broken.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; Best r=
egards,<br>&gt;&gt; Emond Papegaaij<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt; On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 9:44 AM Emond Papegaaij &lt;<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:emond.papegaaij@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">emond=
.papegaaij@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; On =
Mon, Aug 23, 2021 at 9:42 PM Justin Richer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jricher@mi=
t.edu" target=3D"_blank">jricher@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; I personally don=E2=80=99t agree with this errata.=
 Token Revocation was never<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; meant to act as a prote=
cted resource, but rather as a function of the AS.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
The client is known to the AS and so authentication is expected here.<br>&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; We ran into this=
 very issue some time ago. Our client in this case was a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; command line tool, which only requests the client credentials on login. I=
t<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; then fetches an access token and stores this locally.=
 The client<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; credentials are not stored by default. The =
current spec required us to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; request the client credenti=
als to revoke the access token on logout.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Personally, I=
 see no point in requiring the the client to authenticate, it<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt; already possesses an access token, which it can use for whatever it =
wants<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; to and the possession of the token should be enou=
gh evidence that the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client previously authenticated. R=
evoking the token seems to be the least<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; harmful one can=
 do with a token.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; For more informat=
ion see:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp=
s://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qxGcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/&amp;so=
urce=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw16H5lxg6EQsUfP=
TAc_WbWD" target=3D"_blank">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/7qx=
GcptE-uzA5WQaxnzGMdSqb2I/</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Best =
regards,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Emond Papegaaij<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; On Aug 22, 2021,=
 at 5:14 AM, RFC Errata System &lt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mail=
to:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" target=3D"_blank">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</=
a>&gt; wrote:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; The=
 following errata report has been submitted for RFC7009,<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; &quot;OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation&quot;.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; --------------------------------------<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; You may review the report below and at:<br>&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.=
rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D16309753620=
00000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw3k2vU0wQT8A7wxoLn6lN2Z" target=3D"_blank">https://www=
.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6663</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; --------------------------------------<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; Type: Technical<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Reported by: Ashvin=
 Narayanan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">ashvinnarayanan@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Section: 2.1<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt; &gt; Original Text<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; -------------<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; The client constructs the request by including t=
he following<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 parameters using the &quot=
;application/x-www-form-urlencoded&quot; format in<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
&gt; =C2=A0 the HTTP request entity-body:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token =C2=A0 REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The token that=
 the client wants to get revoked.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token_type_hint =C2=A0OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hint about =
the type of the token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 submitted for revocation.=C2=A0 Clients MAY pass this parameter<=
br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; in<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 order to help the authorization server to optimize the to=
ken<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 lookup.=
=C2=A0 If the server is unable to locate the token using<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the given hint, it MUST exten=
d its search across all of its<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 supported token types.=C2=A0 An authorization server M=
AY ignore<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 t=
his parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 token type automatically.=C2=
=A0 This specification defines two<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 such values:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 * access_token: An =
access token as defined in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 1.4<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;=
<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 * refresh_=
token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt=
; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 1.5<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 S=
pecific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 specification MAY define oth=
er values for this parameter<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The client also includ=
es its authentication credentials as described<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;=
 =C2=A0 in Section 2.3. of [RFC6749].<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 For example, a client may request the revocatio=
n of a refresh token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 with the following=
 request:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Hos=
t: <a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&amp;=
source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1=
k5eZmHIoYL" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnW=
DFmQmF0M2JW<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token=
<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The autho=
rization server first validates the client credentials (in<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 case of a confidential client) and then verifies whethe=
r the token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 was issued to the client ma=
king the revocation request.=C2=A0 If this<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=
=A0 validation fails, the request is refused and the client is informed<br>=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 of the error by the authorization server a=
s described below.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt=
; Corrected Text<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; --------------<br>&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt; &gt; The client calls the revocation endpoint using an HTTP<br>&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 POST [RFC7231] request with the following pa=
rameters sent as<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 &quot;application/x-ww=
w-form-urlencoded&quot; data in the request body:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &=
gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token =C2=A0 REQUIRED.=C2=A0 The to=
ken that the client wants to get revoked.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token_type_hint =C2=A0OPTIONAL.=C2=A0 A hin=
t about the type of the token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 submitted for revocation.=C2=A0 Clients MAY pass this =
parameter<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; in<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 order to help the authorization server to optim=
ize the token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 lookup.=C2=A0 If the server is unable to locate the token using<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 the given hint, it=
 MUST extend its search across all of its<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 supported token types.=C2=A0 An authorizati=
on server MAY ignore<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect the<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 token type automat=
ically.=C2=A0 This specification defines two<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 such values:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt=
;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 * access_=
token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt=
; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 1.4<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 *=
 refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 1.5<br>&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this<br>&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 specification MAY d=
efine other values for this parameter<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 using the registry defined in Section 4.1.2.<br=
>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The client M=
UST also include in the request, the access token it<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; received<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 from the authorization serve=
r. It must do so in the same way as it<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; would<br>&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 when accessing a protected resource, as descr=
ibe in [RFC6749],<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; Section 7.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The following is a non-normative=
 example request in which the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client uses<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 its access token to revoke the associated refres=
h token:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Hos=
t: <a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server.example.com&amp;=
source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1=
k5eZmHIoYL" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded<br>&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authorization: Bearer czZCaGRSa3F0Mzpn=
WDFmQmF0M2JW<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 token=3D45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&amp;token_type_hint=3Drefresh_token=
<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 The follo=
wing is a non-normative example request in which the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; client uses<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 its access token to revok=
e the same access token:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 POST /revoke HTTP/1.1<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Host: <a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttp://server=
.example.com&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DA=
OvVaw0ZzTvU9XBQl1k5eZmHIoYL" target=3D"_blank">server.example.com</a><br>&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-=
urlencoded<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authorization: Bearer=
 czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 =C2=A0 token=3DczZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW&amp;token_t=
ype_hint=3Daccess_token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; &gt; =C2=A0 The authorization server MUST validate the access token used =
by<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 client t=
o authorize its call to the revocation endpoint, including<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 ensuring that it is not expired or revoked.<br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 Additionally, the authorization server MUST also v=
alidate whether<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
=C2=A0 access token used for authorization is part of the same grant =C2=A0=
as<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; the<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 token be=
ing revoked. If validation fails, the request is =C2=A0refused<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt; and<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 the client is informed =
of the error by the authorization server.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=
=A0 In the case of a bearer token, the authorization server SHOULD<br>&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; respond<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 with an HTTP 40=
1 code as described in OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
 &gt; =C2=A0 [RFC6750], Section 3.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 Erro=
rs based on other types of tokens are beyond the scope of this<br>&gt;&gt;&=
gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =C2=A0 specification.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Notes<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; -----<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; It appears as though the auth=
ors of RFC7009 have failed to consider<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; that request=
s to revoke are likely to come from non-confidential clients<br>&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt; and such, would lack authentication credentials. Regardless of th=
e type of<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; client however, authentication should not=
 be required. The OAuth 2.0<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; specification (RFC6749)=
 does not specify verifying that the access token<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; b=
elongs to the client accessing protected resources, of which revocation is<=
br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; one. It is the role of the access token alone to si=
gnify authorization<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; required to make requests to pr=
otected resources. If this is an issue for<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; revocati=
on, then it is an issue for all protected resources and counter<br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; measures may be proposed in a separate RFC rather than broaden=
ing the scope<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; of this particular RFC. As per the or=
iginal text itself, &quot;This<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; specification in gen=
eral does not intend to provide countermeasures against<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; token theft and abuse.&quot; Additionally, &quot;If an attacker is abl=
e to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; successfully guess a public client&#39;s clien=
t_id and one of their tok<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; ens, or a private cl=
ient&#39;s credentials and one of their tokens, they<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; could do much worse damage by using the token elsewhere than by revoking<=
br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; it.=C2=A0 If they chose to revoke the token, the le=
gitimate client will lose its<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; authorization grant a=
nd will need to prompt the user again.=C2=A0 No further<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;=
&gt; damage is done and the guessed token is now worthless.&quot;<br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Note that the client_id is not meant to be private info=
rmation to<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; begin with, so relying on an attacker &q=
uot;guessing&quot; it should not be seen as a<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; secur=
ity countermeasure. This section of RFC7009 will be referenced in a<br>&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; subsequent errata.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt=
;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Instructions:<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; -------------=
<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; This erratum is currently posted as &quot;Rep=
orted&quot;. If necessary, please<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; use &quot;Re=
ply All&quot; to discuss whether it should be verified or<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt; &gt; rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party<br>&g=
t;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; can log in to change the status and edit the report=
, if necessary.<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; -=
-------------------------------------<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; RFC7009 =
(draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11)<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; -------------=
-------------------------<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Title =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation<br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Publication Date =C2=A0 =C2=A0: August 2013<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt; &gt; Author(s) =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : T. Lodderste=
dt, Ed., S. Dronia, M. Scurtescu<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Category =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: PROPOSED STANDARD<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt; &gt; Source =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Web Au=
thorization Protocol<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; Area =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Security<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; =
Stream =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: IETF<br>&gt;&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt; &gt; Verifying Party =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : IESG<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; _______________________________________=
________<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt=
;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.o=
rg</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=
=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;=
ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRFL" target=3D"_b=
lank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&g=
t;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<=
br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=
=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt;=
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org=
/mailman/listinfo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&=
amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRFL" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.=
org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; =
_______________________________________________<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; OAuth m=
ailing list<br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D=
"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.goog=
le.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth&amp;source=3Dgma=
il-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRFL" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt;&g=
t;&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<=
br>&gt;&gt; OAuth mailing list<br>&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org=
" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.g=
oogle.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth&amp;source=3D=
gmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw0SBRIZ3JVu9V2FyhP0VRF=
L" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth</a><br>&gt=
;&gt;<br></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>OAuth mailing list<br><a=
 href=3D"mailto:OAuth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">OAuth@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.google.com/url?q=3Dhttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinf=
o/oauth&amp;source=3Dgmail-imap&amp;ust=3D1630975362000000&amp;usg=3DAOvVaw=
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lockquote></div><br></div></blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000d5397d05cad8308c--


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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Protocol Action: 'JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-13.txt)
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The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens'
  (draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt-13.txt) as Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Web Authorization Protocol Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Benjamin Kaduk and Roman Danyliw.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-access-token-jwt/





Technical Summary

   This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth 2.0 access
   tokens in JSON web token (JWT) format.  Authorization servers and
   resource servers from different vendors can leverage this profile to
   issue and consume access tokens in an interoperable manner.

Working Group Summary

   The OAuth working group has defined an encoding format for access 
   tokens in RFC 7519. This document takes deployment practice and 
   summarizes it in this document with regards to the content 
   in the JWT access token. 

  Based on SECDIR review, an MTI signature algorithms was added.

Document Quality

The JWT access token is widely used in industry. 

Here is a list of implementations based on feedback on the mailing list: 

Node.js project oidc-provider (https://github.com/panva/node-oidc-provider) has an 
option to issue Access Tokens conforming to this profile. 

IdentityServer implements this functionality:
https://github.com/IdentityServer

Connect2id server implements this specification:
https://connect2id.com/products/server/docs/datasheet#access-token-encoding-jwt

Glewlwyd's OIDC plugin implements an earlier version of the specification:
https://github.com/babelouest/glewlwyd/blob/master/docs/OIDC.md#access-token-format
https://github.com/babelouest/glewlwyd

The working group has received feedback from the deployment community
and there is consensus on the content of the document. 

Personnel

Hannes Tschofenig is the document shepherd

Roman Danyliw is the responsible area director 

