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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Port Control Protocol Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : PCP Third Party ID Option
        Authors         : Andreas Ripke
                          Rolf Winter
                          Thomas Dietz
                          Juergen Quittek
                          Rafael Lopez da Silva
	Filename        : draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05.txt
	Pages           : 14
	Date            : 2016-01-17

Abstract:
   This document describes a new Port Control Protocol (PCP) option
   called THIRD_PARTY_ID option.  It is designed to be used together
   with the THIRD_PARTY option specified in RFC 6887.

   The THIRD_PARTY_ID option serves to identify a third party in
   situations where a third party's IP address contained in the
   THIRD_PARTY option does not provide sufficient information to create
   requested mappings in a PCP-controlled device.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Sun Jan 17 08:50:42 2016
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From: Rolf Winter <Rolf.Winter@neclab.eu>
To: "pcp@ietf.org" <pcp@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pcp] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05.txt
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Subject: Re: [pcp] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05.txt
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Hi everybody,

this version has a number of changes implemented to address the discusses i=
t received during the IESG review.=20

Best,

Rolf

NEC Europe Ltd | Registered Office: Athene, Odyssey Business Park, West End=
  Road, London, HA4 6QE, GB | Registered in England 2832014


> -----Original Message-----
> From: pcp [mailto:pcp-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of internet-
> drafts@ietf.org
> Sent: Sonntag, 17. Januar 2016 17:30
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Cc: pcp@ietf.org
> Subject: [pcp] I-D Action: draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05.txt
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
>  This draft is a work item of the Port Control Protocol Working Group
> of the IETF.
>=20
>         Title           : PCP Third Party ID Option
>         Authors         : Andreas Ripke
>                           Rolf Winter
>                           Thomas Dietz
>                           Juergen Quittek
>                           Rafael Lopez da Silva
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05.txt
> 	Pages           : 14
> 	Date            : 2016-01-17
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document describes a new Port Control Protocol (PCP) option
>    called THIRD_PARTY_ID option.  It is designed to be used together
>    with the THIRD_PARTY option specified in RFC 6887.
>=20
>    The THIRD_PARTY_ID option serves to identify a third party in
>    situations where a third party's IP address contained in the
>    THIRD_PARTY option does not provide sufficient information to create
>    requested mappings in a PCP-controlled device.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-
> 05
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at
> tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pcp mailing list
> pcp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pcp


From nobody Fri Jan 22 16:27:15 2016
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Subject: [pcp] RFC 7723 on Port Control Protocol (PCP) Anycast Addresses
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 7723

        Title:      Port Control Protocol (PCP) Anycast 
                    Addresses 
        Author:     S. Kiesel, R. Penno
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       January 2016 
        Mailbox:    ietf-pcp@skiesel.de, 
                    repenno@cisco.com
        Pages:      9
        Characters: 20663
        Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso:   None

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-pcp-anycast-08.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7723

        DOI:        http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7723

The Port Control Protocol (PCP) anycast addresses enable PCP clients
to transmit signaling messages to their closest PCP-aware on-path
NAT, firewall, or other middlebox without having to learn the IP
address of that middlebox via some external channel.  This document
establishes one well-known IPv4 address and one well-known IPv6
address to be used as PCP anycast addresses.

This document is a product of the Port Control Protocol Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official
Internet Protocol Standards (https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards) for the 
standardization state and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this 
memo is unlimited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF-Announce and rfc-dist lists.
To subscribe or unsubscribe, see
  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
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For searching the RFC series, see https://www.rfc-editor.org/search
For downloading RFCs, see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc.html

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the
author of the RFC in question, or to rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org.  Unless
specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.


The RFC Editor Team
Association Management Solutions, LLC



From nobody Sun Jan 24 04:20:46 2016
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From: Rolf Winter <Rolf.Winter@neclab.eu>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [pcp] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-04: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Subject: Re: [pcp] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-04: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi Stephen,

please see inline:

NEC Europe Ltd | Registered Office: Athene, Odyssey Business Park, West End=
  Road, London, HA4 6QE, GB | Registered in England 2832014

> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-04: Discuss
>=20
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
>=20
>=20
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-
> criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>=20
>=20
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option/
>=20
>=20
>=20
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>=20
>=20
> (1) The THIRD_PARTY stuff in PCP was always a bit concerning from a
> security point of view. RFC 6887 says that you MUST NOT implement or
> use that except in some specific environments. At the time we would
> have liked to say that you MUST use PCP authentication when using that
> but RFC 7652 wasn't done until some time later. My DISCUSS question
> though is: why can't you distinguish based on a Key ID used with PCP
> authentication?

Because you'll need a tunnel technology specific ID. The PCP-controlled dev=
ice needs to know to which tunnel this requested mapping (IP in the third p=
arty option) belongs.

We added some text to the document which hopefully makes this clearer:

The THIRD_PARTY option carries a value of an internal IP address of a
NAT map entry.  The THIRD_PARTY_ID carries a value of an internal
realm of a NAT map entry.

Upon receiving a valid request with a legal THIRD_PARTY_ID option
identifier, the message is processed as specified in [RFC6887],
except that the identifier contained in the THIRD_PARTY_ID is used in
addition when accessing a mapping table.  Instead of just using the
value contained in the THIRD_PARTY option when accessing the internal
Internet address of a mapping table, now the combination of the two
values contained in the THIRD_PARTY option and in the THIRD_PARTY_ID
option is used to access the combination of internal Internet address
and internal realm of a NAT map entry.



> Wouldn't that help with the privacy concerns (one can manage Key IDs
> well if one wants) and also with the secrity concerns, and I would
> guess it should solve the tunnel issues that this is intended to
> address as well? (There may be good reasons why that doesn't work of
> course, but I'd like to understand them.)

I am not sure how that would solve the overall problem. Say someone uses L2=
TPv3 or GRE (or any other protocol really) as the tunneling protocol, then =
you're bound to use IDs from those protocols. They are not linked to the PC=
P sessions (indeed the scenario in the draft shows that PCP messages are no=
t even delivered over the tunnel).

Regarding authentication, we added text to the security considerations sect=
ion and used normative language to mandate authenticated access to the PCP =
client function.

>=20
> (2) Section 7: The "must be fully trusted" phrase is not a good one to
> use - iirc that was a compromise figured out to allow PCP to proceed
> ahead of the PCP auth spec.  And of course, it's really a nonsense. I
> think you should properly characterise the issues or else delete the
> unfortunate phrase.=20

We added text to the security considerations section (incl. normative langu=
age).

> I also think you should not encourage the use of
> this for carrying location or profile information.  What "Means" exist
> that could be used to really protect this? And why do you want to
> "protect unauthorized access"? that's oddly phrased at best. All in all
> I think you need better text for section 7, and I'm happy to try help
> find that.

We now restrict the usage of the option as defined in this document to the =
exact use case as described. In particular, the document now clearly states=
:

However, the
use of the THIRD_PARTY_ID option as specified in this document is
restricted to scenarios where the option is needed for the purpose of
uniquely identifying an internal host in addition to the information
found in the THIRD_PARTY option.

>=20
>=20
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>=20
>=20
> I share the concerns relating to possible use of long term identifiers
> here and thus support the DISCUSSes from Alissa and Joel.

We have text that discusses this now in the security considerations section=
.

Best,

Rolf


>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> pcp mailing list
> pcp@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pcp


From nobody Tue Jan 26 17:43:24 2016
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To: Rolf Winter <Rolf.Winter@neclab.eu>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [pcp] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-04: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hiya,

On 24/01/16 12:20, Rolf Winter wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
> 
> please see inline:
> 
> NEC Europe Ltd | Registered Office: Athene, Odyssey Business Park,
> West End  Road, London, HA4 6QE, GB | Registered in England 2832014
> 
>> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for 
>> draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-04: Discuss
>> 
>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to
>> all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to
>> cut this introductory paragraph, however.)
>> 
>> 
>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss- 
>> criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT
>> positions.
>> 
>> 
>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found
>> here: 
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> DISCUSS: 
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>> 
(1) The THIRD_PARTY stuff in PCP was always a bit concerning from a
>> security point of view. RFC 6887 says that you MUST NOT implement
>> or use that except in some specific environments. At the time we
>> would have liked to say that you MUST use PCP authentication when
>> using that but RFC 7652 wasn't done until some time later. My
>> DISCUSS question though is: why can't you distinguish based on a
>> Key ID used with PCP authentication?
> 
> Because you'll need a tunnel technology specific ID. 

Yet the current draft says that the value used is just
agreed out of band between pcp client and server with
no typing. Seems the same to me.

> The
> PCP-controlled device needs to know to which tunnel this requested
> mapping (IP in the third party option) belongs.
> 
> We added some text to the document which hopefully makes this
> clearer:
> 
> The THIRD_PARTY option carries a value of an internal IP address of
> a NAT map entry.  The THIRD_PARTY_ID carries a value of an internal 
> realm of a NAT map entry.
> 
> Upon receiving a valid request with a legal THIRD_PARTY_ID option 
> identifier, the message is processed as specified in [RFC6887], 
> except that the identifier contained in the THIRD_PARTY_ID is used
> in addition when accessing a mapping table.  Instead of just using
> the value contained in the THIRD_PARTY option when accessing the
> internal Internet address of a mapping table, now the combination of
> the two values contained in the THIRD_PARTY option and in the
> THIRD_PARTY_ID option is used to access the combination of internal
> Internet address and internal realm of a NAT map entry.
> 

Yes, that's clear but doesn't answer the question about 7652.

> 
>> Wouldn't that help with the privacy concerns (one can manage Key
>> IDs well if one wants) and also with the secrity concerns, and I
>> would guess it should solve the tunnel issues that this is intended
>> to address as well? (There may be good reasons why that doesn't
>> work of course, but I'd like to understand them.)
> 
> I am not sure how that would solve the overall problem. Say someone
> uses L2TPv3 or GRE (or any other protocol really) as the tunneling
> protocol, then you're bound to use IDs from those protocols. They are
> not linked to the PCP sessions (indeed the scenario in the draft
> shows that PCP messages are not even delivered over the tunnel).

That's a fair point actually. Ok, I agree that PCP authentication
isn't designed for these use cases. (It could I guess be made to
work but yeah, that'd I agree be a pretty odd implementation.)

I'll clear this point.

> 
> Regarding authentication, we added text to the security
> considerations section and used normative language to mandate
> authenticated access to the PCP client function.
>

Yet with no reference to 7652? Pity.

> 
>> 
>> (2) Section 7: The "must be fully trusted" phrase is not a good one
>> to use - iirc that was a compromise figured out to allow PCP to
>> proceed ahead of the PCP auth spec.  And of course, it's really a
>> nonsense. I think you should properly characterise the issues or
>> else delete the unfortunate phrase.
> 
> We added text to the security considerations section (incl. normative
> language).
> 
>> I also think you should not encourage the use of this for carrying
>> location or profile information.  What "Means" exist that could be
>> used to really protect this? And why do you want to "protect
>> unauthorized access"? that's oddly phrased at best. All in all I
>> think you need better text for section 7, and I'm happy to try
>> help find that.
> 
> We now restrict the usage of the option as defined in this document
> to the exact use case as described. In particular, the document now
> clearly states:
> 
> However, the use of the THIRD_PARTY_ID option as specified in this
> document is restricted to scenarios where the option is needed for
> the purpose of uniquely identifying an internal host in addition to
> the information found in the THIRD_PARTY option.

Well, the current text has a bunch of SHOULD statements saying to
be good and not send this stuff out of the operator network. I
don't get why those aren't MUST NOT statements. Why is that?

Couldn't you just simplify and say that this option MUST NOT be
sent outside an operator network?

S

> 
>> 
>> 
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> 
COMMENT:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>> 
I share the concerns relating to possible use of long term identifiers
>> here and thus support the DISCUSSes from Alissa and Joel.
> 
> We have text that discusses this now in the security considerations
> section.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Rolf
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________ pcp mailing list 
>> pcp@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pcp
> 


From nobody Wed Jan 27 02:47:41 2016
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Subject: [pcp] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05: (with COMMENT)
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Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option-05: No Objection

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)


Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pcp-third-party-id-option/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------


I had a discuss ballot on this, now clearing, as per below...

(1) The THIRD_PARTY stuff in PCP was always a bit concerning
from a security point of view. RFC 6887 says that you MUST NOT
implement or use that except in some specific environments. At
the time we would have liked to say that you MUST use PCP
authentication when using that but RFC 7652 wasn't done until
some time later. My DISCUSS question though is: why can't you
distinguish based on a Key ID used with PCP authentication?
Wouldn't that help with the privacy concerns (one can manage
Key IDs well if one wants) and also with the secrity concerns,
and I would guess it should solve the tunnel issues that this
is intended to address as well? (There may be good reasons why
that doesn't work of course, but I'd like to understand them.)

Jan 27:
It turns out that using PCP authentication to do this is
not a good idea - the use-cases in question have the same
PCP client and server acting for many third parties, so it'd
not be a good plan to try handle the third party id via PCP
authentication keying.

However, the document probably still should at least say
when to use PCP authentication, at present it doesn't
refer to that RFC at all.

(2) Section 7: The "must be fully trusted" phrase is not a good
one to use - iirc that was a compromise figured out to allow
PCP to proceed ahead of the PCP auth spec.  And of course, it's
really a nonsense. I think you should properly characterise the
issues or else delete the unfortunate phrase. I also think you
should not encourage the use of this for carrying location or
profile information.  What "Means" exist that could be used to
really protect this? And why do you want to "protect
unauthorized access"? that's oddly phrased at best. All in all
I think you need better text for section 7, and I'm happy to
try help find that.

Jan 27:
The authors have changed the wording. I'm still not keen
that there are so many SHOULD statements, and would
argue that it'd be better saying that this option MUST NOT
be sent outside one operator network. I hope that'll be
resolved via Alissa's discuss point and others though.

I (still) share the concerns relating to possible use of long
term identifiers here and thus support the DISCUSSes from
Alissa and Joel.


