
From wwwrun@core3.amsl.com  Mon Jan  4 10:01:17 2010
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Subject: [Simple] Posting of IPR Disclosure related to Nokia Corporation's Statement about IPR related to RFC 4976
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Dear Cullen Jennings:

An IPR disclosure that pertains to your RFC entitled "Relay Extensions for the
Message Sessions Relay Protocol (MSRP)" (RFC4976) was submitted to the IETF
Secretariat on 2010-01-03 and has been posted on the "IETF Page of Intellectual
Property Rights Disclosures" (https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/1250/). The title
of the IPR disclosure is "Nokia Corporation's Statement about IPR related to RFC
4976."

The IETF Secretariat



From ibc@aliax.net  Tue Jan  5 04:15:49 2010
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From: =?utf-8?q?I=C3=B1aki_Baz_Castillo?= <ibc@aliax.net>
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Subject: Re: [Simple] SUBSCRIBE for xcap-diff event sent by the presence server to the XCAP server
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El Lunes, 28 de Diciembre de 2009, I=C3=B1aki Baz Castillo escribi=C3=B3:
> I would like to understand how such SUBSCRIBE sent by the presence server=
=20
> looks. The above draft just shows examples when a SIP user send such
>  SUBSCRIBE  but no one example when the subscriber is the presence server.

Hi, it's strange for me not to see questions/responses in this maillist, so=
=20
perhaps I'm wrong and the purpose of this maillist is to announce drafs/RFC=
's=20
and OMA/IETF liaisons.

Please, could I know if this maillist is appropriate for asking SIMPLE rela=
ted=20
questions? or should I ask in sip-implementors?

Thanks a lot.


=2D-=20
I=C3=B1aki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>

From ben@nostrum.com  Tue Jan  5 06:23:31 2010
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Subject: Re: [Simple] SUBSCRIBE for xcap-diff event sent by the presence server to the XCAP server
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<as chair>

Actually, this list is for the purpose of discussing SIMPLE standards =
work--that is, drafts, RFCs, liaisons, etc. But since xcap-diff is =
relatively new, it does not hurt to ask clarification questions. It's up =
to individuals to decide how to respond. SIP-implementors may be another =
good place to ask.

Also, keep in mind that lots of people are just getting back from =
holiday, so responses may be slower than usual.

Thanks!

Ben.


On Jan 5, 2010, at 6:15 AM, I=F1aki Baz Castillo wrote:

> El Lunes, 28 de Diciembre de 2009, I=F1aki Baz Castillo escribi=F3:
>> I would like to understand how such SUBSCRIBE sent by the presence =
server=20
>> looks. The above draft just shows examples when a SIP user send such
>> SUBSCRIBE  but no one example when the subscriber is the presence =
server.
>=20
> Hi, it's strange for me not to see questions/responses in this =
maillist, so=20
> perhaps I'm wrong and the purpose of this maillist is to announce =
drafs/RFC's=20
> and OMA/IETF liaisons.
>=20
> Please, could I know if this maillist is appropriate for asking SIMPLE =
related=20
> questions? or should I ask in sip-implementors?
>=20
> Thanks a lot.
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> I=F1aki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>
> _______________________________________________
> Simple mailing list
> Simple@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple


From Jari.Urpalainen@nokia.com  Thu Jan  7 03:17:27 2010
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From: Jari Urpalainen <jari.urpalainen@nokia.com>
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Subject: Re: [Simple] SUBSCRIBE for xcap-diff event sent by the presence server to the XCAP server
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On Mon, 2009-12-28 at 00:36 +0100, ext Iñaki Baz Castillo wrote:
> Hi, the way a presence server receives notifications for changes in XCAP 
> documents (so it can notify the watchers) is by subscribing to the XCAP server 
> for the event "xcap-diff" as specified in:
>   http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcapevent
> 
> I would like to understand how such SUBSCRIBE sent by the presence server 
> looks. The above draft just shows examples when a SIP user send such SUBSCRIBE 
> but no one example when the subscriber is the presence server.
a presence server can be a "normal" xcap-diff client. Acls though would
be quite different than with the typical use-case.   

> 
> For example, let's imagine a simplified case in which there are just two XCAP 
> applications ("pres-rules" and "resource-lists").
> 
> The presence server should subscribe to users documents. AFAIK the presence 
> server would send a SUBSCRIBE as follows:
> 
> 
>    SUBSCRIBE sip:xcap-server@domain.org SIP/2.0
>    From: sip:presence-server@domain.org
>    Accept: application/xcap-diff+xml
>    Event: xcap-diff; diff-processing=no-patching
>    Content-Type: application/resource-lists+xml
> 
>    <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
>    <resource-lists xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:resource-lists">
>      <list>
>        <entry uri="pres-users/users/" />
>        <entry uri="resource-lists/users/" />
>      </list>
>    </resource-lists>
> 
> 
> Then when any user creates or modifies a XCAP document for those auids, then 
> XCAP server would sent a NOTIFY to the presence-server telling the document 
> addition/modification.
> 
> 
> Doubts:
> 
> - Is the above correct? (is it defined somewhere?)
theoretically yes, if you really have a distributed system, and you
indeed must use a public interface (though acls are beyond the scope of
xcap-diffevent). But in practice however, i'd assume you'd use some
"internal" api for this, and you wouldn't need to have a duplicated xcap
database (or equivalent).

> 
> - Most probably the presence-server is just interested in "index" documents 
> for both XCAP applications. However it would receive notifications for every 
> document created by any user even if it's not called "index". Is it the 
> expected behavior? How to ask in the SUBSCRIBE that there is noly interest on 
> "index" called documents?
there's no such thing like reg-expressions (or some search) in
diff-event subscriptions, though i don't think it's a big problem in
reality as you can easily skip those docs that you aren't interested in.

> 
> - Could the notification from the XCAP server to the presence server work with 
> PUBLISH rather than SUBSCRIBE & NOTIFY? This is: when a XCAP document is 
> modified the XCAP server sends a PUBLISH to the presence server with xcap-diff 
> body. Does it make sense?
Sure, but i cannot see any actual benefit

> 
> - And last question. Are all my questions defined in IETF docs? or do they 
> require specifications on top of IETF docs as OMA specs?
> 
at least rfc's will give you some hints how to make a system what you
are probably aiming at, i don't know about other specs though.

br, jari


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Subject: Re: [Simple] SUBSCRIBE for xcap-diff event sent by the presence server to the XCAP server
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>>
>> - Could the notification from the XCAP server to the presence  
>> server work with
>> PUBLISH rather than SUBSCRIBE & NOTIFY? This is: when a XCAP  
>> document is
>> modified the XCAP server sends a PUBLISH to the presence server  
>> with xcap-diff
>> body. Does it make sense?
> Sure, but i cannot see any actual benefit
>

The benefit would be that you (as an XCAP server) can send a publish  
once to the Presence Agent when a document has changed rather than  
using Subscribe/Notify which requires maintaining a continuous  
subscription to get an update.

Adrian


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<html><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><font =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
color=3D"#000000"><br></font></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">- =
Could the notification from the XCAP server to the presence server work =
with <br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">PUBLISH rather than =
SUBSCRIBE &amp; NOTIFY? This is: when a XCAP document is =
<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">modified the XCAP server =
sends a PUBLISH to the presence server with xcap-diff =
<br></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite">body. Does it make =
sense?<br></blockquote>Sure, but i cannot see any actual =
benefit<br><br></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The benefit would =
be that you (as an XCAP server) can send a publish once to the Presence =
Agent when a document has changed rather than using Subscribe/Notify =
which requires maintaining a continuous subscription to get an =
update.</div><div><br></div><div>Adrian</div><div><br></div></div></body><=
/html>=

--Apple-Mail-25--1059318916--

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From: =?utf-8?q?I=C3=B1aki_Baz_Castillo?= <ibc@aliax.net>
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Subject: Re: [Simple] SUBSCRIBE for xcap-diff event sent by the presence server to the XCAP server
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El Jueves, 7 de Enero de 2010, Adrian Georgescu escribi=C3=B3:
> The benefit would be that you (as an XCAP server) can send a publish once
>  to the Presence Agent when a document has changed rather than using
>  Subscribe/Notify which requires maintaining a continuous subscription to
>  get an update.

Yes I agree. Sending a PUBLISH is more or less "easy" but building a comple=
te=20
presence server just to handle subscription for presence server(s) is more=
=20
complex.

The fact is that I don't want that my XCAP server becomes a SIP presence=20
server. Instead it could publish xca-diff status to the *real* SIP presence=
=20
server, and this last would also manage the xcap-diff subscriptions from re=
al=20
clients.

Is this design wrong for some reason?

Thanks a lot.=20


=2D-=20
I=C3=B1aki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>

From ag@ag-projects.com  Thu Jan  7 04:19:33 2010
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Subject: Re: [Simple] SUBSCRIBE for xcap-diff event sent by the presence server to the XCAP server
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For me this is the right design and this is how we are implementing it =20=

in OpenSIPS/OpenXCAP tandem.

Adrian

On Jan 7, 2010, at 1:17 PM, I=F1aki Baz Castillo wrote:

> El Jueves, 7 de Enero de 2010, Adrian Georgescu escribi=F3:
>> The benefit would be that you (as an XCAP server) can send a =20
>> publish once
>> to the Presence Agent when a document has changed rather than using
>> Subscribe/Notify which requires maintaining a continuous =20
>> subscription to
>> get an update.
>
> Yes I agree. Sending a PUBLISH is more or less "easy" but building a =20=

> complete
> presence server just to handle subscription for presence server(s) =20
> is more
> complex.
>
> The fact is that I don't want that my XCAP server becomes a SIP =20
> presence
> server. Instead it could publish xca-diff status to the *real* SIP =20
> presence
> server, and this last would also manage the xcap-diff subscriptions =20=

> from real
> clients.
>
> Is this design wrong for some reason?
>
> Thanks a lot.
>
>
> --=20
> I=F1aki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>
> _______________________________________________
> Simple mailing list
> Simple@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple


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El Jueves, 7 de Enero de 2010, Adrian Georgescu escribi=F3:
> For me this is the right design and this is how we are implementing it =20
> in OpenSIPS/OpenXCAP tandem.

Is there any limitation in this approach? This is:

Theorically the presence server subscribes to the XCAP server and receives=
=20
NOTIFY with xcap-diff.=20
Also the clients subscribe to the XCAP server for xcap-diff event (to know=
=20
changes in their documents).

Instead of that, the client would subscribe to the presence server for xcap-
diff event and the XCAP server would publish xcap-diff to the presence serv=
er,=20
so this last would notify the users.

IMHO there is no limitation and we avoid building a complex presence server=
 on=20
top of a XCAP server (HTTP server, not SIP!). :)

Thanks.



=2D-=20
I=F1aki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>

From ag@ag-projects.com  Thu Jan  7 04:35:25 2010
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Subject: Re: [Simple] SUBSCRIBE for xcap-diff event sent by the presence server to the XCAP server
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On Jan 7, 2010, at 1:33 PM, I=F1aki Baz Castillo wrote:

> El Jueves, 7 de Enero de 2010, Adrian Georgescu escribi=F3:
>> For me this is the right design and this is how we are implementing =20=

>> it
>> in OpenSIPS/OpenXCAP tandem.
>
> Is there any limitation in this approach? This is:
>
> Theorically the presence server subscribes to the XCAP server and =20
> receives
> NOTIFY with xcap-diff.
> Also the clients subscribe to the XCAP server for xcap-diff event =20
> (to know
> changes in their documents).
>
> Instead of that, the client would subscribe to the presence server =20
> for xcap-
> diff event and the XCAP server would publish xcap-diff to the =20
> presence server,
> so this last would notify the users.

This last paragraph is exactly what I meant.

Adrian


From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Mon Jan 11 03:59:35 2010
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Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch
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Hi Ben,

Sorry for the delay of my reply. I have been on xmas vacation for a few wee=
ks.

Comments inline.=20
=20

>-------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
>=20
>** Substantive:
>=20
>-- Section 3:
>=20
>I'd like to see something to the effect of "Support of this=20
>specification is optional for MSRP user agents in general.=20
>User Agents that are likely to be deployed without MSRP=20
>Relays SHOULD support this specification in order to improve=20
>the odds of being able to communicate across NATs."

I agree it would be good to add something like that.

But, I think it would be useful even for MSRP user agents WITH relays to im=
plement it, in case the terminating UA is behind a NAT, but does not use a =
relay and therefor needs to be active.

So, maybe something like:

"Support of this specification is optional for MSRP user agents in general.=
 User Agents that are likely to be deployed in networks where User Agents n=
eed to establish the TCP connections in order to traverse NATs SHOULD suppo=
rt this specification in order to improve the odds of being able to communi=
cate across NATs."

-------------

>-- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
>=20
>I'm not entirely sure it's safe to assume that the presence=20
>or absence of a NAT on the signaling path always indicates=20
>the same for the media path. For example, there could be a=20
>SIP proxy _inside_ the NAT.

It is true that media may not always be NATed (I personally think it mostly=
 is the case, though), but I still think it's good to make that assumption =
when setting the a=3Dsetup value.

Maybe the paragraph could be re-written to:

"The UA can determine whether SIP  whether the SIP signaling will be NATed =
by inspecting the SIP Via header in the
200 (OK) response if the initial REGISTER request, by comparing the IP addr=
esses in the Via sent-by and received parameters. =20
If these are not the same then the UA can determine that there is a NAT in =
the path. Eventhough the media transport might not
be NATed, it is safe to assume that it will, and set the a=3Dsetup attribut=
e accordingly."


-------------

>-- Section 4.3:
>=20
>Did we ever close on the COMEDIA-TLS fingerprint=20
>requirement, and how that could be a problem in the presence=20
>of relays?

I am not sure we wrote down anything.

However, my suggestion would be to describe the problem in section 4.3, ie =
that there is currently no mechanism to provide to/retreive from fingerprin=
ts to an MSRP relay, and that the usage of COMEDIA-TLS in networks with rel=
ays is outside the scope of the specification.

We can then see whether people have interest to create a separate milestone=
 to look into the issue, because I am sure it will require some work.


-------------


>-- Section 4.4, third paragraph (NOTE about ICE)
>=20
>Is the note really needed? This draft is not about using ICE per se.

I can remove it.


-------------


> -- Section 5:
>=20
>Does it make sense to use STUN for this in a TCP stream?

The idea is simply to not disallow something which is defined in ICE.
=20
>Do we need some statement about not sending a keepalive=20
>mid-chunk? (I'm not sure why one would need to, but doing so=20
>is likely to corrupt a message.)

I don't think the mid-chunk issue is specific to MSRP, so I don't think we =
need to say anything.

>Also, does the default Tr value in ICE apply to TCP?

I don't know, but I have made the assumption that we don't need to start de=
fining MSRP specific ICE stuff. If there is a need for that, I would sugges=
t we do it in a separate draft.


-------------


>-- Section 6:
>
>Have we thought through whether changing the active party has=20
>any impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key=20
>fingerprints in the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I=20
>know it does--I just want to make sure we've thought about it.)

I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will be alligne=
d with other comedia usages.


-------------
=20
>** Editorial and Nits:
>=20
>-- General:
>=20
>Please expand non-common-knowledge acronyms on first mention.=20

I'll look into that.


-------------

>-- section 1, first two paragraphs:
>=20
>These would be easier to read if the references were=20
>structured as truly parenthetical rather than as bona-fide=20
>parts of the sentence. For example, "The Message Session=20
>Relay Protocol (MSRP) [ref] defines that..." rather than "[ref]=20
>defines that..."

I'll look into that.

-------------

>-- section 1, paragraph 2:
>=20
>ben: s/"responsible to create"/"responsible for creating"

Fixed.


-------------

>-- section 1, paragraph 4 (OMA example)
>=20
>By "located in the network", do you mean carrier network?=20
>Publicly accessible network?

Carrier network.

Fixed.

-------------

>-- section 1, last paragraph:
>=20
>Am I correct in assuming this would not be limited to TCP?=20
>For example, if we define an SCTP binding in the future,=20
>COMEDIA could still apply? If so, perhaps it would be better=20
>to consistently refer to transport connections rather than=20
>TCP connections.

RFC 4145 talks about TCP, so I assume COMEDIA would have to be updated in o=
rder to support SCTP first. And, before that is done I don't think we can s=
ay anything about how it will be applied for MSRP.


-------------

>-- section 3, paragraph 1:
>=20
>s/interop/interoperate (or interwork).=20

I changed to "interoperate".

Fixed.


-------------

>Also, I tend to think of UAs conforming to this spec as=20
>(mostly) also conforming to RFC4975. So I'm not sure "[RFC=20
>4975] conformant" is the best way to refer to UAs that do not=20
>implement COMEDIA. Perhaps something along the lines of "...=20
>from a UA that follows the RFC 4975 connection model..."

I can re-write to:

	"An MSRP UA conformant to this document can interoperate with a UA that fo=
llows the connection model defined in=20
	[RFC4975]. However, if an MSRP UA conformant to this document is located b=
ehind NAT, and does not proxy its MSRP=20
	communication via an MSRP-Relay node, and the UA receives an SDP offer fro=
m a remote UA that follows the connection=20
	model defined in [RFC4975], NAT traversal can only be achieved if the MSRP=
 UA supports ICE and the network=20
	provides TURN servers, or if the network supports SBC assisted NAT travers=
al for TCP."

-------------

>-- section 4.2, paragraph 1:
>=20
>We still need to make it more clear that the normative=20
>language in this spec is scoped to UAs supporting COMEDIA,=20
>i.e. this MUST is not universal. That might be doable by=20
>being a little more precise in the applicability statement=20
>(see my comment on section 3). Otherwise, we need some=20
>concise term that means "MSRP UAs implementing COMEDIA"

I think the best thing is to make the applicability statement more clear, b=
ecause one should be able to assume that the procedures then apply to entit=
ies which implement the specification.


-------------

>-- section 4.2, paragraph 2:
>=20
>ben:s/"which is not..."/"that is not..."

Fixed.

-------------

>-- section 4.2, fifth paragraph from end (starting with - the=20
>UA has used STUN) s/signalling/signaling Can we have an=20
>informational reference for STUN?

I'll fix that.

-------------

>-- idnits returns some warnings that should be fixed prior to pubreq.

Yes.

>-------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01=
:
>=20
>=20
>*** Substantive:
>=20
>-- Section 5:
>=20
>I think we need another paragraph along the lines of:
>=20
>"An MSRP UA treats its session URI as a shared secret to=20
>determine that an incoming transport connection is indeed=20
>from the signaled peer device. An MSRP session URI therefore=20
>needs to be hard to guess. However, RFC 4975 already requires=20
>the session-id part of the URI to be sufficiently hard to=20
>guess. Furthermore, the addressing information in the domain=20
>part of the URI is relatively easy to guess. This makes the=20
>difficulty in guessing the session-id roughly equivalent to=20
>the difficulty of guessing the entire URI."

Looks good.

-------------
=20
>-- Section 5, last paragraph:
>=20
>Do we need to talk about the security issues created by the=20
>intermediaries themselves? We don't otherwise specify how=20
>intermediaries work in this draft.

I am not really sure what we could say, with a reasonalble amount of text. =
There is a separate draft about SBCs, so...

-------------
=20
>** Editorial and Nits:
>=20
>-- General:
>=20
>Please expand acronyms on first mention.

I'll fix that.

-------------
=20
>-- Section 1, paragraph 3:
>=20
>I'm not sure I follow the "- NAPT - " part of the last sentence.

The "- NAPT -" stuff shouldn't be there, so I'll remove it.

-------------
=20
>-- Section 4.1 and 4.2
>=20
>Either need to state that 4.2 replaces the first paragraph in=20
>section 7.3, or state that it replaces the entire section and=20
>include the (one sentence) second paragraph from that section.

I can do either (paragraph or section).

If nobody objects, I'll indicate that it replaces the first paragraph.

-------------
=20
>-- Section 8.1:
>=20
>I'm not sure the references are right here.=20

I'll double check.


-------------

> -- Section 8.2
>=20
>Can we have an nformative reference to TS23.228?

I'll fix that.

-------------

> -- idnits returns some warnings--please check them before pubreq.

Ok.

-------------=20

Regards,

Christer

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Mon Jan 11 05:48:42 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Adam Roach <adam@estacado.net>, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2010 14:48:34 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments
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=20
Hi Adam,

My appologies also to you for the delay of the reply, due to my xmas vacati=
on.

Comments inline.

>Just for clarification: the fact that we're last calling=20
>these at the same time doesn't mean that we intend them to=20
>progress as a cluster=20
>(http://www.rfc-editor.org/cluster_def.html), does it? There=20
>is no normative dependency between them, and I'd hate to see=20
>them both be delayed due to issues related to only one of=20
>them (e.g., in IETF last call, or IESG review).

See Ben's reply.

----------

> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm
>=20
>    1. NIT: The abstract contains several acronyms that need to be
>       expanded (MSRP, UA, COMEDIA) -- see section 3.6 of
>       http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc-style-guide/rfc-style

I'll fix that.

----------

>    2. NIT: In the introduction, the sentence "[RFC4975] also allows, but
>       does not define, MSRP UAs to use other mechanisms in order to
>       create the MSRP transport connection" lacks parallelism. Try
>       "[RFC4975] also allows, but does not define, alternate=20
>       mechanisms for MSRP UAs to create MSRP transport connections."

I'll fix that.

----------

>    3. NIT: Also in the introduction: "[RFC4145] defines a mechanism,
>       COMEDIA, which endpoints can use..." should read "[RFC4145]
>       defines a mechanism, COMEDIA, that endpoints can use..." (the
>       phrase at the end of the sentence isn't incidental to its meaning
>       -- it is the purpose of the sentence).

I'll fix that.
=20
----------

>    4. SUBSTANTIVE: I agree with earlier comments that the first
>       paragraph of section 3 is a bit confusing, as it appears to impose
>       a normative requirement on all MSRP UAs. Removal seems a bit of
>       overkill, though, as it leaves implementors no information about
>       when ACM should be employed.

I suggested the following text in my reply to Ben:

"Support of this specification is optional for MSRP user agents in general.=
 User Agents that are likely to be deployed in networks where User Agents n=
eed to establish the TCP connections in order to traverse NATs SHOULD suppo=
rt this specification in order to improve the odds of being able to communi=
cate across NATs."

----------

>       The second paragraph of section 3 talks about NAT traversal
>       failures under certain circumstances, but provides implementors no
>       guidance about how to avoid these failures. I think you need to
>       add text that basically recommends that UA implementations that
>       can be configured to use ACM as their NAT traversal strategy also
>       MUST have the ability to use MSRP relays. (In other words:
>       mandatory to implement, optional to use). Otherwise, you're
>       encouraging deployment of clients that can perform NAT traversal,
>       but only under fairly limited network circumstances.

Are you sure you mean section 3? There is only one paragraph.

I am not sure I understand the comment about MUST implement ability to use =
MSRP relays. I don't think we should mandate ACM clients to always implemen=
t support of MSRP relays. An ACM client may not even be located behind a NA=
T (they support ACM just in order to allow other clients behind NATs to be =
active), or they are only used in networks where MSRP relays are not used.

We could say that clients which can be located behind MSRP relays should su=
pport MSRP relays, but doesn't RFC 4976 already say that? It's true even if=
 the client doesn't support ACM.

I don't think I encourage deployment of clients that can perform NAT traver=
sal only in limited network circumstances. The draft is about how clients c=
an use COMEDIA, it is not a generic implementation guide or profile for MSR=
P clients behind NATs :)

Or, did I missunderstand your comment?

----------

>    5. NIT: in section 4.2, "holdcon" should be spelled "holdconn" (two
>       'n's).

I'll fix that.

----------
=20
>    6. SUBSTANTIVE: In section 4.2, I think we need an explanation in the
>       document regarding why "holdconn" is normatively prohibited. It's
>       not immediately clear to me why we prevent this, and I can't find
>       any discussion on the SIMPLE mailing list on the topic.

I suggest to reomve the sentence, and not say anything about holdconn.

I have some difficulties in understanding how holdconn is related to TCP se=
tup direction, but I don't think there is anything MSRP specific about it.


----------
=20
>    7. SUBSTANTIVE: A natural consequence of the rules in section 4.2 is
>       that an _offer_ for an MSRP session must never be "passive." To
>       avoid misinterpretation, this should be stated as a normative
>       requirement.

You are probably right.

----------

>    8. SUBSTANTIVE: Unlike SIP, I don't think MSRP has rules that require
>       recipients to ignore CRLF sequences in a TCP connection. I'm
>       pretty sure that the CRLF mechanism described in section 5 for
>       pinhole preservation is NOT backwards compatible. However, RFC
>       4975 does talk about NAT binding keepalives in RFC 4975, section
>       7.1: "Bodiless requests may also be used in certain applications
>       to keep Network Address Translation (NAT) bindings alive, etc."

Good point.

I can re-write to:

"If an MSRP UA is located behind a NAT the UA MUST keep the NAT binding ali=
ve, in accordance with section 10 of [I.D.ietf-mmusic-
ice]. The UA SHOULD use MSRP requests without bodies as NAT keepalive messa=
ges, as defined in section 7.1 of [ref to RFC4975]."

----------

>    9. SUBSTANTIVE: Also related to section 5: I'm certain that nothing
>       in draft-ietf-mmusic-ice provides guidance here: that document
>       deals with UDP, while MSRP is exclusively a TCP protocol. Perhaps
>       you intended to cite draft-ietf-mmusic-ice-tcp?

Yes. I can change the reference.

=20
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessmatch
>=20
>    1. NIT: The abstract contains several acronyms that need to be
>       expanded (MSRP, UA, ALG) -- see section 3.6 of
>       http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc-style-guide/rfc-style

I'll fix that.

----------

>    2. NIT: The unexpanded acronym issue continues through the
>       introduction: SLA, B2BUA, NAPT, ALG.

I'll fix that.

----------

>    3. SUBSTANTIVE: This document updates RFC 4975, section 7.1, which
>       talks about ongoing sessions. However, to succeed, we also need to
>       modify the matching procedure that takes place during session
>       establishment. This is described in RFC 4975, section 5.4.

Good point.

I guess the following text:

"When the first request arrives, its To-Path header field should contain a =
URI that the listening element provided in the SDP for a session. The eleme=
nt that accepted the connection looks up the URI in the received request, a=
nd determines which session it matches."

...should be modified to:

"When the first request arrives, its To-Path header field should contain a =
URI with a session-id part that the listening element provided in the SDP f=
or a session. The element that accepted the connection looks up the session=
-id part of the URI in the received request, and determines which session i=
t matches."

----------

>    4. SUBSTANTIVE: In the security section, we need to talk through the
>       implications of this mechanism on TLS connections. After some
>       cursory thought on the topic, I think it works correctly: outbound
>       connections to MSRP relays will be okay, since the cert presented
>       by the relay will match the hostname the client used to connect to
>       it; and, for peer-to-peer mode (as described in RFC 4975, section
>       14.4), the hostname isn't part of the information used to match
>       the certificate. However, just because I think it works doesn't
>       mean that it actually does. :) I'd be a lot more comfortable if we
>       have a brief treatment of this issue in the security section so
>       that it gets some explicit security review.

I suggest we try to get the rest of the stuff fixed first, and then we can =
concentrate on the security stuff.

----------

>    5. NIT: Somewhere in the document, it would probably be good to cite
>       the text from RFC 4975, section 14.1, regarding MSRP security
>       properties: "Most components of the URI, such as the scheme and
>       the authority components, are common knowledge.  The secrecy is
>       entirely provided by the session-id component." This goes a long
>       way towards allaying any concerns that the host portion was
>       intended to provide any kind of protection when matching sessions.

I think that could be added to the security considerations sections.


Regards,

Christer


From adam@nostrum.com  Mon Jan 11 11:20:15 2010
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments
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On 1/11/10 7:48 AM, Christer Holmberg wrote:
>
>>     4. SUBSTANTIVE: I agree with earlier comments that the first
>>        paragraph of section 3 is a bit confusing, as it appears to impose
>>        a normative requirement on all MSRP UAs. Removal seems a bit of
>>        overkill, though, as it leaves implementors no information about
>>        when ACM should be employed.
>>      
> I suggested the following text in my reply to Ben:
>
> "Support of this specification is optional for MSRP user agents in general. User Agents that are likely to be deployed in networks where User Agents need to establish the TCP connections in order to traverse NATs SHOULD support this specification in order to improve the odds of being able to communicate across NATs."
>    

That seems reasonable.

> ----------
>
>    
>>        The second paragraph of section 3 talks about NAT traversal
>>        failures under certain circumstances, but provides implementors no
>>        guidance about how to avoid these failures. I think you need to
>>        add text that basically recommends that UA implementations that
>>        can be configured to use ACM as their NAT traversal strategy also
>>        MUST have the ability to use MSRP relays. (In other words:
>>        mandatory to implement, optional to use). Otherwise, you're
>>        encouraging deployment of clients that can perform NAT traversal,
>>        but only under fairly limited network circumstances.
>>      
> Are you sure you mean section 3? There is only one paragraph.
>    

When I started my review (shortly after Ben called for reviewers on 
December 9th), msrp-acm was at version -02, not version -03. The "second 
paragraph" I mention is the single paragraph that survived into version -03.

> I am not sure I understand the comment about MUST implement ability to use MSRP relays. I don't think we should mandate ACM clients to always implement support of MSRP relays. An ACM client may not even be located behind a NAT (they support ACM just in order to allow other clients behind NATs to be active),

Okay, that use case seems to make sense -- I can see chat rooms making 
use of this kind of model to allow both dial-in and dial-out connection 
models.

> ----------
>
>    
>>     6. SUBSTANTIVE: In section 4.2, I think we need an explanation in the
>>        document regarding why "holdconn" is normatively prohibited. It's
>>        not immediately clear to me why we prevent this, and I can't find
>>        any discussion on the SIMPLE mailing list on the topic.
>>      
> I suggest to reomve the sentence, and not say anything about holdconn.
>    

That addresses my concern.

> ----------
>
>    
>>     8. SUBSTANTIVE: Unlike SIP, I don't think MSRP has rules that require
>>        recipients to ignore CRLF sequences in a TCP connection. I'm
>>        pretty sure that the CRLF mechanism described in section 5 for
>>        pinhole preservation is NOT backwards compatible. However, RFC
>>        4975 does talk about NAT binding keepalives in RFC 4975, section
>>        7.1: "Bodiless requests may also be used in certain applications
>>        to keep Network Address Translation (NAT) bindings alive, etc."
>>      
> Good point.
>
> I can re-write to:
>
> "If an MSRP UA is located behind a NAT the UA MUST keep the NAT binding alive, in accordance with section 10 of [I.D.ietf-mmusic-
> ice]. The UA SHOULD use MSRP requests without bodies as NAT keepalive messages, as defined in section 7.1 of [ref to RFC4975]."
>    

Sounds good to me, modulo the change from ice to ice-tcp.

>
>> ==========
>> draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessmatch
>>
>>     
> ----------
>
>    
>>     3. SUBSTANTIVE: This document updates RFC 4975, section 7.1, which
>>        talks about ongoing sessions. However, to succeed, we also need to
>>        modify the matching procedure that takes place during session
>>        establishment. This is described in RFC 4975, section 5.4.
>>      
> Good point.
>
> I guess the following text:
>
> "When the first request arrives, its To-Path header field should contain a URI that the listening element provided in the SDP for a session. The element that accepted the connection looks up the URI in the received request, and determines which session it matches."
>
> ...should be modified to:
>
> "When the first request arrives, its To-Path header field should contain a URI with a session-id part that the listening element provided in the SDP for a session. The element that accepted the connection looks up the session-id part of the URI in the received request, and determines which session it matches."
>    

Yes, that's the change that needs to be made. I think that's everything 
we need to change, but you might do a quick re-read of 4975 to make sure 
we didn't miss a similar needed change elsewhere.


> ----------
>
>    
>>     4. SUBSTANTIVE: In the security section, we need to talk through the
>>        implications of this mechanism on TLS connections. After some
>>        cursory thought on the topic, I think it works correctly: outbound
>>        connections to MSRP relays will be okay, since the cert presented
>>        by the relay will match the hostname the client used to connect to
>>        it; and, for peer-to-peer mode (as described in RFC 4975, section
>>        14.4), the hostname isn't part of the information used to match
>>        the certificate. However, just because I think it works doesn't
>>        mean that it actually does. :) I'd be a lot more comfortable if we
>>        have a brief treatment of this issue in the security section so
>>        that it gets some explicit security review.
>>      
> I suggest we try to get the rest of the stuff fixed first, and then we can concentrate on the security stuff.
>    

"Dealing with security" is not something you do post-WGLC. This document 
is ostensibly moments away from being pushed into the publication 
process. If the document is really so immature that we can't form a 
reasonable security section yet, then the WGLC was premature. Apparently 
we need to withdraw it from last call and do a bit more work.

/a

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Mon Jan 11 14:32:21 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2010 23:32:15 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments
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Cc: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments
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Hi,

>>>     4. SUBSTANTIVE: In the security section, we need to talk through th=
e
>>>        implications of this mechanism on TLS connections. After some
>>>        cursory thought on the topic, I think it works correctly: outbou=
nd
>>>        connections to MSRP relays will be okay, since the cert presente=
d
>>>        by the relay will match the hostname the client used to connect =
to
>>>        it; and, for peer-to-peer mode (as described in RFC 4975, sectio=
n
>>>        14.4), the hostname isn't part of the information used to match
>>>        the certificate. However, just because I think it works doesn't
>>>        mean that it actually does. :) I'd be a lot more comfortable if =
we
>>>        have a brief treatment of this issue in the security section so
>>>        that it gets some explicit security review.
>>>
>>I suggest we try to get the rest of the stuff fixed first, and then we ca=
n concentrate on the security stuff.
>
>
>"Dealing with security" is not something you do post-WGLC. This document
>is ostensibly moments away from being pushed into the publication
>process. If the document is really so immature that we can't form a
>reasonable security section yet, then the WGLC was premature. Apparently
>we need to withdraw it from last call and do a bit more work.

I didn't mean we deal with it post-WGLC. I simply wanted to solve your othe=
r comments first. However, you seem ok with my proposals, so we can deal wi=
th the security thing.

We have discussed the sertificate impacts on the list, and I think Hadriel =
has had lots of input on that.

So, I don't think we should withdraw it from last call unless we find an is=
sue, but we can of course ask some security expert about this.

Regards,

Christer=

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Tue Jan 12 00:19:23 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 09:19:16 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments
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Cc: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments
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Hi,

A little related to this, in a reply to Ben's comments I suggested that we =
indicate that the usage of COMEDIA-TLS in networks with MSRP relays is outs=
ide the scope of the document. There is currently no mechanism for a MSRP U=
A to exchange the fingerprint information with a relay, and my suggestion w=
as that defining such mechanism should be done as a separate milestone (if =
people have interest in doing such work).

Regards,

Christer


=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: simple-bounces@ietf.org=20
> [mailto:simple-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Christer Holmberg
> Sent: 12. tammikuuta 2010 0:32
> To: Adam Roach
> Cc: Simple WG; draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm@tools.ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch=20
> - Adam's comments
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> >>>     4. SUBSTANTIVE: In the security section, we need to=20
> talk through the
> >>>        implications of this mechanism on TLS connections.=20
> After some
> >>>        cursory thought on the topic, I think it works=20
> correctly: outbound
> >>>        connections to MSRP relays will be okay, since the=20
> cert presented
> >>>        by the relay will match the hostname the client=20
> used to connect to
> >>>        it; and, for peer-to-peer mode (as described in=20
> RFC 4975, section
> >>>        14.4), the hostname isn't part of the information=20
> used to match
> >>>        the certificate. However, just because I think it=20
> works doesn't
> >>>        mean that it actually does. :) I'd be a lot more=20
> comfortable if we
> >>>        have a brief treatment of this issue in the=20
> security section so
> >>>        that it gets some explicit security review.
> >>>
> >>I suggest we try to get the rest of the stuff fixed first,=20
> and then we can concentrate on the security stuff.
> >
> >
> >"Dealing with security" is not something you do post-WGLC. This=20
> >document is ostensibly moments away from being pushed into the=20
> >publication process. If the document is really so immature that we=20
> >can't form a reasonable security section yet, then the WGLC was=20
> >premature. Apparently we need to withdraw it from last call=20
> and do a bit more work.
>=20
> I didn't mean we deal with it post-WGLC. I simply wanted to=20
> solve your other comments first. However, you seem ok with my=20
> proposals, so we can deal with the security thing.
>=20
> We have discussed the sertificate impacts on the list, and I=20
> think Hadriel has had lots of input on that.
>=20
> So, I don't think we should withdraw it from last call unless=20
> we find an issue, but we can of course ask some security=20
> expert about this.
>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> Christer
> _______________________________________________
> Simple mailing list
> Simple@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple
> =

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Tue Jan 12 00:46:03 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 09:45:56 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments - keepalive
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Cc: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Adam's comments - keepalive
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=20
Hi,

>>>     8. SUBSTANTIVE: Unlike SIP, I don't think MSRP has=20
>>>     rules that require recipients to ignore CRLF sequences in a TCP con=
nection. I'm
>>>     pretty sure that the CRLF mechanism described in section 5 for
>>>     pinhole preservation is NOT backwards compatible.=20
>>>     However, RFC 4975 does talk about NAT binding keepalives in RFC=20
>>>     4975, section
>>>     7.1: "Bodiless requests may also be used in certain applications
>>>     to keep Network Address Translation (NAT) bindings alive, etc."
>>>     =20
>>Good point.
>>
>>I can re-write to:
>>
>>"If an MSRP UA is located behind a NAT the UA MUST keep the NAT=20
>>binding alive, in accordance with section 10 of=20
>>[I.D.ietf-mmusic- ice]. The UA SHOULD use MSRP requests=20
>>without bodies as NAT keepalive messages, as defined in=20
>>section 7.1 of [ref to RFC4975]."
>>   =20
>=20
>Sounds good to me, modulo the change from ice to ice-tcp.

The problem is that ice-tcp says very little about keep-alives, and does no=
t cover lots of the important stuff in section 10 of ICE, e.g. that keep-al=
ives shall be sent when the media stream is inactive.

But, eventhough much of the text in section 10 is generic, it does also tal=
k about UDP.

So, maybe the best thing would be to NOT refer to ICE/ICE-TCP for keepalive=
s, but simply copy some text. Something like:

"If an MSRP UA is located behind a NAT the UA MUST keep the NAT=20
binding alive, regardless of whether the media stream is currently=20
inactive, sendonly, recvonly or sendrecv, and regardless of the=20
presence or value of the bandwidth attribute. The UA SHOULD use=20
MSRP requests without bodies as NAT keepalive messages, as defined in=20
section 7.1 of [ref to RFC4975]."

Regards,

Christer



From ben@estacado.net  Tue Jan 12 13:37:26 2010
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch
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Hi

Comments inline. I've elided sections that I don't think need further =
comment.


On Jan 11, 2010, at 5:59 AM, Christer Holmberg wrote:

>=20
> Hi Ben,
>=20
> Sorry for the delay of my reply. I have been on xmas vacation for a =
few weeks.
>=20

Understood, and so have I :-)

> Comments inline.=20
>=20
>=20
>> -------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
>>=20
>> ** Substantive:
>>=20
>> -- Section 3:
>>=20
>> I'd like to see something to the effect of "Support of this=20
>> specification is optional for MSRP user agents in general.=20
>> User Agents that are likely to be deployed without MSRP=20
>> Relays SHOULD support this specification in order to improve=20
>> the odds of being able to communicate across NATs."
>=20
> I agree it would be good to add something like that.
>=20
> But, I think it would be useful even for MSRP user agents WITH relays =
to implement it, in case the terminating UA is behind a NAT, but does =
not use a relay and therefor needs to be active.
>=20
> So, maybe something like:
>=20
> "Support of this specification is optional for MSRP user agents in =
general. User Agents that are likely to be deployed in networks where =
User Agents need to establish the TCP connections in order to traverse =
NATs SHOULD support this specification in order to improve the odds of =
being able to communicate across NATs."

I think that works

>=20
> -------------
>=20
>> -- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
>>=20
>> I'm not entirely sure it's safe to assume that the presence=20
>> or absence of a NAT on the signaling path always indicates=20
>> the same for the media path. For example, there could be a=20
>> SIP proxy _inside_ the NAT.
>=20
> It is true that media may not always be NATed (I personally think it =
mostly is the case, though), but I still think it's good to make that =
assumption when setting the a=3Dsetup value.

Actually, my comment was more along the line of the fact that SIP does =
not show a NAT doesn't mean there's not one--for example, if your first =
hop proxy is inside the NAT, you would not detect the NAT from the =
response via. But I guess there's not a lot we can do about that.

>=20
> Maybe the paragraph could be re-written to:
>=20
> "The UA can determine whether SIP  whether the SIP signaling will be =
NATed by inspecting the SIP Via header in the
> 200 (OK) response if the initial REGISTER request, by comparing the IP =
addresses in the Via sent-by and received parameters. =20
> If these are not the same then the UA can determine that there is a =
NAT in the path. Eventhough the media transport might not
> be NATed, it is safe to assume that it will, and set the a=3Dsetup =
attribute accordingly."

Okay.

>=20
>=20
> -------------
>=20
>> -- Section 4.3:
>>=20
>> Did we ever close on the COMEDIA-TLS fingerprint=20
>> requirement, and how that could be a problem in the presence=20
>> of relays?
>=20
> I am not sure we wrote down anything.
>=20
> However, my suggestion would be to describe the problem in section =
4.3, ie that there is currently no mechanism to provide to/retreive from =
fingerprints to an MSRP relay, and that the usage of COMEDIA-TLS in =
networks with relays is outside the scope of the specification.
>=20
> We can then see whether people have interest to create a separate =
milestone to look into the issue, because I am sure it will require some =
work.

'I'd hate to disallow the scenario of doing TLS over a relay and COMEDIA =
at the same time. I'm not convinced it's that hard to achieve.

It's not _just_ a problem of relays. It's that COMEDIA-TLS does not =
support the use case where a UA has a CA issued cert. Out of curiosity, =
why do we need COMEDIA-TLS at all? MSRP already has a mechanism to =
advertise TLS in the SDP. RFC 4975 already proposes using the =
fingerprint attribute for self-signed certs.=20

As a compromise, would it make sense to make the use of COMEDIA-TLS =
something the UA SHOULD do if it is using a self-signed cert, but not a =
MUST for all uses of TLS with COMEDIA?




>=20
>=20
> -------------
>=20
>=20
>> -- Section 4.4, third paragraph (NOTE about ICE)
>>=20
>> Is the note really needed? This draft is not about using ICE per se.
>=20
> I can remove it.

Okay

>=20
>=20
> -------------
>=20
>=20
>> -- Section 5:
>>=20
>> Does it make sense to use STUN for this in a TCP stream?
>=20
> The idea is simply to not disallow something which is defined in ICE.
>=20
>> Do we need some statement about not sending a keepalive=20
>> mid-chunk? (I'm not sure why one would need to, but doing so=20
>> is likely to corrupt a message.)
>=20
> I don't think the mid-chunk issue is specific to MSRP, so I don't =
think we need to say anything.

Adam covered this better than I did--I'm not sure ICE style keepalives =
will work in MSRP.

>=20
>> Also, does the default Tr value in ICE apply to TCP?
>=20
> I don't know, but I have made the assumption that we don't need to =
start defining MSRP specific ICE stuff. If there is a need for that, I =
would suggest we do it in a separate draft.

Do we really need anything more here other than a statement that you =
might need to do keepalives, using the empty request technique described =
in 4975?

>=20
>=20
> -------------
>=20
>=20
>> -- Section 6:
>>=20
>> Have we thought through whether changing the active party has=20
>> any impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key=20
>> fingerprints in the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I=20
>> know it does--I just want to make sure we've thought about it.)
>=20
> I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will be =
alligned with other comedia usages.

I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll join that =
discussion rather than rehash it here. But overall, I think a "no new =
considerations" Security Considerations section in a draft like this one =
will be a red flag for the IESG and security reviewers. We need to =
express supporting arguments as to why we believe this to be true.


[...]

>=20
>> -- section 1, last paragraph:
>>=20
>> Am I correct in assuming this would not be limited to TCP?=20
>> For example, if we define an SCTP binding in the future,=20
>> COMEDIA could still apply? If so, perhaps it would be better=20
>> to consistently refer to transport connections rather than=20
>> TCP connections.
>=20
> RFC 4145 talks about TCP, so I assume COMEDIA would have to be updated =
in order to support SCTP first. And, before that is done I don't think =
we can say anything about how it will be applied for MSRP.
>=20

Okay.

[...]

> --------
>=20
>> Also, I tend to think of UAs conforming to this spec as=20
>> (mostly) also conforming to RFC4975. So I'm not sure "[RFC=20
>> 4975] conformant" is the best way to refer to UAs that do not=20
>> implement COMEDIA. Perhaps something along the lines of "...=20
>> from a UA that follows the RFC 4975 connection model..."
>=20
> I can re-write to:
>=20
> 	"An MSRP UA conformant to this document can interoperate with a =
UA that follows the connection model defined in=20
> 	[RFC4975]. However, if an MSRP UA conformant to this document is =
located behind NAT, and does not proxy its MSRP=20
> 	communication via an MSRP-Relay node, and the UA receives an SDP =
offer from a remote UA that follows the connection=20
> 	model defined in [RFC4975], NAT traversal can only be achieved =
if the MSRP UA supports ICE and the network=20
> 	provides TURN servers, or if the network supports SBC assisted =
NAT traversal for TCP."

Okay.

>=20
> -------------
>=20
>> -- section 4.2, paragraph 1:
>>=20
>> We still need to make it more clear that the normative=20
>> language in this spec is scoped to UAs supporting COMEDIA,=20
>> i.e. this MUST is not universal. That might be doable by=20
>> being a little more precise in the applicability statement=20
>> (see my comment on section 3). Otherwise, we need some=20
>> concise term that means "MSRP UAs implementing COMEDIA"
>=20
> I think the best thing is to make the applicability statement more =
clear, because one should be able to assume that the procedures then =
apply to entities which implement the specification.

Okay.

[...]


>=20
>> -------------------- WGLC review of =
draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01:
>=20

[...]

>> -- Section 5, last paragraph:
>>=20
>> Do we need to talk about the security issues created by the=20
>> intermediaries themselves? We don't otherwise specify how=20
>> intermediaries work in this draft.
>=20
> I am not really sure what we could say, with a reasonalble amount of =
text. There is a separate draft about SBCs, so...

Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as much as the =
draft already does about intermediaries. That is, maybe we should drop =
that whole paragraph.

[...]



From santosh.panattu.sethumadhavan@ericsson.com  Tue Jan 12 13:57:23 2010
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From: Santosh Panattu Sethumadhavan <santosh.panattu.sethumadhavan@ericsson.com>
To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 16:57:09 -0500
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch
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 Small typo in the following paragraph.

> "The UA can determine whether SIP  whether the SIP signaling will be=20
> NATed by inspecting the SIP Via header in the 200 (OK) response if the in=
itial REGISTER request, by comparing the IP addresses in the Via sent-by an=
d received parameters.
> If these are not the same then the UA can determine that there is a=20
> NAT in the path. Eventhough the media transport might not be NATed, it is=
 safe to assume that it will, and set the a=3Dsetup attribute accordingly."

Instead of
   SIP Via header in the 200 (OK) response if the initial REGISTER request
It should be
   SIP Via header in the 200 (OK) response of the initial REGISTER request
=20

Thanks,
Santosh Panattu

-----Original Message-----
From: simple-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:simple-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Ben Campbell
Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2010 1:36 PM
To: Christer Holmberg
Cc: Simple WG
Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch

Hi

Comments inline. I've elided sections that I don't think need further comme=
nt.


On Jan 11, 2010, at 5:59 AM, Christer Holmberg wrote:

>=20
> Hi Ben,
>=20
> Sorry for the delay of my reply. I have been on xmas vacation for a few w=
eeks.
>=20

Understood, and so have I :-)

> Comments inline.=20
>=20
>=20
>> -------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
>>=20
>> ** Substantive:
>>=20
>> -- Section 3:
>>=20
>> I'd like to see something to the effect of "Support of this=20
>> specification is optional for MSRP user agents in general.
>> User Agents that are likely to be deployed without MSRP Relays SHOULD=20
>> support this specification in order to improve the odds of being able=20
>> to communicate across NATs."
>=20
> I agree it would be good to add something like that.
>=20
> But, I think it would be useful even for MSRP user agents WITH relays to =
implement it, in case the terminating UA is behind a NAT, but does not use =
a relay and therefor needs to be active.
>=20
> So, maybe something like:
>=20
> "Support of this specification is optional for MSRP user agents in genera=
l. User Agents that are likely to be deployed in networks where User Agents=
 need to establish the TCP connections in order to traverse NATs SHOULD sup=
port this specification in order to improve the odds of being able to commu=
nicate across NATs."

I think that works

>=20
> -------------
>=20
>> -- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
>>=20
>> I'm not entirely sure it's safe to assume that the presence or=20
>> absence of a NAT on the signaling path always indicates the same for=20
>> the media path. For example, there could be a SIP proxy _inside_ the=20
>> NAT.
>=20
> It is true that media may not always be NATed (I personally think it most=
ly is the case, though), but I still think it's good to make that assumptio=
n when setting the a=3Dsetup value.

Actually, my comment was more along the line of the fact that SIP does not =
show a NAT doesn't mean there's not one--for example, if your first hop pro=
xy is inside the NAT, you would not detect the NAT from the response via. B=
ut I guess there's not a lot we can do about that.

>=20
> Maybe the paragraph could be re-written to:
>=20
> "The UA can determine whether SIP  whether the SIP signaling will be=20
> NATed by inspecting the SIP Via header in the 200 (OK) response if the in=
itial REGISTER request, by comparing the IP addresses in the Via sent-by an=
d received parameters.
> If these are not the same then the UA can determine that there is a=20
> NAT in the path. Eventhough the media transport might not be NATed, it is=
 safe to assume that it will, and set the a=3Dsetup attribute accordingly."

Okay.

>=20
>=20
> -------------
>=20
>> -- Section 4.3:
>>=20
>> Did we ever close on the COMEDIA-TLS fingerprint requirement, and how=20
>> that could be a problem in the presence of relays?
>=20
> I am not sure we wrote down anything.
>=20
> However, my suggestion would be to describe the problem in section 4.3, i=
e that there is currently no mechanism to provide to/retreive from fingerpr=
ints to an MSRP relay, and that the usage of COMEDIA-TLS in networks with r=
elays is outside the scope of the specification.
>=20
> We can then see whether people have interest to create a separate milesto=
ne to look into the issue, because I am sure it will require some work.

'I'd hate to disallow the scenario of doing TLS over a relay and COMEDIA at=
 the same time. I'm not convinced it's that hard to achieve.

It's not _just_ a problem of relays. It's that COMEDIA-TLS does not support=
 the use case where a UA has a CA issued cert. Out of curiosity, why do we =
need COMEDIA-TLS at all? MSRP already has a mechanism to advertise TLS in t=
he SDP. RFC 4975 already proposes using the fingerprint attribute for self-=
signed certs.=20

As a compromise, would it make sense to make the use of COMEDIA-TLS somethi=
ng the UA SHOULD do if it is using a self-signed cert, but not a MUST for a=
ll uses of TLS with COMEDIA?




>=20
>=20
> -------------
>=20
>=20
>> -- Section 4.4, third paragraph (NOTE about ICE)
>>=20
>> Is the note really needed? This draft is not about using ICE per se.
>=20
> I can remove it.

Okay

>=20
>=20
> -------------
>=20
>=20
>> -- Section 5:
>>=20
>> Does it make sense to use STUN for this in a TCP stream?
>=20
> The idea is simply to not disallow something which is defined in ICE.
>=20
>> Do we need some statement about not sending a keepalive mid-chunk?=20
>> (I'm not sure why one would need to, but doing so is likely to=20
>> corrupt a message.)
>=20
> I don't think the mid-chunk issue is specific to MSRP, so I don't think w=
e need to say anything.

Adam covered this better than I did--I'm not sure ICE style keepalives will=
 work in MSRP.

>=20
>> Also, does the default Tr value in ICE apply to TCP?
>=20
> I don't know, but I have made the assumption that we don't need to start =
defining MSRP specific ICE stuff. If there is a need for that, I would sugg=
est we do it in a separate draft.

Do we really need anything more here other than a statement that you might =
need to do keepalives, using the empty request technique described in 4975?

>=20
>=20
> -------------
>=20
>=20
>> -- Section 6:
>>=20
>> Have we thought through whether changing the active party has any=20
>> impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key fingerprints in=20
>> the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I know it does--I just=20
>> want to make sure we've thought about it.)
>=20
> I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will be allig=
ned with other comedia usages.

I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll join that dis=
cussion rather than rehash it here. But overall, I think a "no new consider=
ations" Security Considerations section in a draft like this one will be a =
red flag for the IESG and security reviewers. We need to express supporting=
 arguments as to why we believe this to be true.


[...]

>=20
>> -- section 1, last paragraph:
>>=20
>> Am I correct in assuming this would not be limited to TCP?=20
>> For example, if we define an SCTP binding in the future, COMEDIA=20
>> could still apply? If so, perhaps it would be better to consistently=20
>> refer to transport connections rather than TCP connections.
>=20
> RFC 4145 talks about TCP, so I assume COMEDIA would have to be updated in=
 order to support SCTP first. And, before that is done I don't think we can=
 say anything about how it will be applied for MSRP.
>=20

Okay.

[...]

> --------
>=20
>> Also, I tend to think of UAs conforming to this spec as
>> (mostly) also conforming to RFC4975. So I'm not sure "[RFC 4975]=20
>> conformant" is the best way to refer to UAs that do not implement=20
>> COMEDIA. Perhaps something along the lines of "...
>> from a UA that follows the RFC 4975 connection model..."
>=20
> I can re-write to:
>=20
> 	"An MSRP UA conformant to this document can interoperate with a UA that =
follows the connection model defined in=20
> 	[RFC4975]. However, if an MSRP UA conformant to this document is located=
 behind NAT, and does not proxy its MSRP=20
> 	communication via an MSRP-Relay node, and the UA receives an SDP offer f=
rom a remote UA that follows the connection=20
> 	model defined in [RFC4975], NAT traversal can only be achieved if the MS=
RP UA supports ICE and the network=20
> 	provides TURN servers, or if the network supports SBC assisted NAT trave=
rsal for TCP."

Okay.

>=20
> -------------
>=20
>> -- section 4.2, paragraph 1:
>>=20
>> We still need to make it more clear that the normative language in=20
>> this spec is scoped to UAs supporting COMEDIA, i.e. this MUST is not=20
>> universal. That might be doable by being a little more precise in the=20
>> applicability statement (see my comment on section 3). Otherwise, we=20
>> need some concise term that means "MSRP UAs implementing COMEDIA"
>=20
> I think the best thing is to make the applicability statement more clear,=
 because one should be able to assume that the procedures then apply to ent=
ities which implement the specification.

Okay.

[...]


>=20
>> -------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-=
01:
>=20

[...]

>> -- Section 5, last paragraph:
>>=20
>> Do we need to talk about the security issues created by the=20
>> intermediaries themselves? We don't otherwise specify how=20
>> intermediaries work in this draft.
>=20
> I am not really sure what we could say, with a reasonalble amount of text=
. There is a separate draft about SBCs, so...

Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as much as the draft=
 already does about intermediaries. That is, maybe we should drop that whol=
e paragraph.

[...]


_______________________________________________
Simple mailing list
Simple@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Wed Jan 13 01:09:59 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Santosh Panattu Sethumadhavan <santosh.panattu.sethumadhavan@ericsson.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 10:09:33 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch
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Hi,=20

>Small typo in the following paragraph.
>=20
>"The UA can determine whether SIP  whether the SIP signaling will be=20
>NATed by inspecting the SIP Via header in the 200 (OK)=20
>response if the initial REGISTER request, by comparing the IP=20
>addresses in the Via sent-by and received parameters.
>If these are not the same then the UA can determine that there is a=20
>NAT in the path. Eventhough the media transport might not=20
>be NATed, it is safe to assume that it will, and set the=20
>a=3Dsetup attribute accordingly."
>=20
>Instead of
>SIP Via header in the 200 (OK) response if the initial REGISTER request It=
 should be
>SIP Via header in the 200 (OK) response of the initial REGISTER request

Yes. I think we also sometimes use "response FOR...".

Regards,

Christer



> -----Original Message-----
> From: simple-bounces@ietf.org=20
> [mailto:simple-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ben Campbell
> Sent: Tuesday, January 12, 2010 1:36 PM
> To: Christer Holmberg
> Cc: Simple WG
> Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch
>=20
> Hi
>=20
> Comments inline. I've elided sections that I don't think need=20
> further comment.
>=20
>=20
> On Jan 11, 2010, at 5:59 AM, Christer Holmberg wrote:
>=20
> >=20
> > Hi Ben,
> >=20
> > Sorry for the delay of my reply. I have been on xmas=20
> vacation for a few weeks.
> >=20
>=20
> Understood, and so have I :-)
>=20
> > Comments inline.=20
> >=20
> >=20
> >> -------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
> >>=20
> >> ** Substantive:
> >>=20
> >> -- Section 3:
> >>=20
> >> I'd like to see something to the effect of "Support of this=20
> >> specification is optional for MSRP user agents in general.
> >> User Agents that are likely to be deployed without MSRP=20
> Relays SHOULD=20
> >> support this specification in order to improve the odds of=20
> being able=20
> >> to communicate across NATs."
> >=20
> > I agree it would be good to add something like that.
> >=20
> > But, I think it would be useful even for MSRP user agents=20
> WITH relays to implement it, in case the terminating UA is=20
> behind a NAT, but does not use a relay and therefor needs to=20
> be active.
> >=20
> > So, maybe something like:
> >=20
> > "Support of this specification is optional for MSRP user=20
> agents in general. User Agents that are likely to be deployed=20
> in networks where User Agents need to establish the TCP=20
> connections in order to traverse NATs SHOULD support this=20
> specification in order to improve the odds of being able to=20
> communicate across NATs."
>=20
> I think that works
>=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >=20
> >> -- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
> >>=20
> >> I'm not entirely sure it's safe to assume that the presence or=20
> >> absence of a NAT on the signaling path always indicates=20
> the same for=20
> >> the media path. For example, there could be a SIP proxy=20
> _inside_ the=20
> >> NAT.
> >=20
> > It is true that media may not always be NATed (I personally=20
> think it mostly is the case, though), but I still think it's=20
> good to make that assumption when setting the a=3Dsetup value.
>=20
> Actually, my comment was more along the line of the fact that=20
> SIP does not show a NAT doesn't mean there's not one--for=20
> example, if your first hop proxy is inside the NAT, you would=20
> not detect the NAT from the response via. But I guess there's=20
> not a lot we can do about that.
>=20
> >=20
> > Maybe the paragraph could be re-written to:
> >=20
> > "The UA can determine whether SIP  whether the SIP=20
> signaling will be=20
> > NATed by inspecting the SIP Via header in the 200 (OK)=20
> response if the initial REGISTER request, by comparing the IP=20
> addresses in the Via sent-by and received parameters.
> > If these are not the same then the UA can determine that there is a=20
> > NAT in the path. Eventhough the media transport might not=20
> be NATed, it is safe to assume that it will, and set the=20
> a=3Dsetup attribute accordingly."
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >=20
> >> -- Section 4.3:
> >>=20
> >> Did we ever close on the COMEDIA-TLS fingerprint=20
> requirement, and how=20
> >> that could be a problem in the presence of relays?
> >=20
> > I am not sure we wrote down anything.
> >=20
> > However, my suggestion would be to describe the problem in=20
> section 4.3, ie that there is currently no mechanism to=20
> provide to/retreive from fingerprints to an MSRP relay, and=20
> that the usage of COMEDIA-TLS in networks with relays is=20
> outside the scope of the specification.
> >=20
> > We can then see whether people have interest to create a=20
> separate milestone to look into the issue, because I am sure=20
> it will require some work.
>=20
> 'I'd hate to disallow the scenario of doing TLS over a relay=20
> and COMEDIA at the same time. I'm not convinced it's that=20
> hard to achieve.
>=20
> It's not _just_ a problem of relays. It's that COMEDIA-TLS=20
> does not support the use case where a UA has a CA issued=20
> cert. Out of curiosity, why do we need COMEDIA-TLS at all?=20
> MSRP already has a mechanism to advertise TLS in the SDP. RFC=20
> 4975 already proposes using the fingerprint attribute for=20
> self-signed certs.=20
>=20
> As a compromise, would it make sense to make the use of=20
> COMEDIA-TLS something the UA SHOULD do if it is using a=20
> self-signed cert, but not a MUST for all uses of TLS with COMEDIA?
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >=20
> >=20
> >> -- Section 4.4, third paragraph (NOTE about ICE)
> >>=20
> >> Is the note really needed? This draft is not about using=20
> ICE per se.
> >=20
> > I can remove it.
>=20
> Okay
>=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >=20
> >=20
> >> -- Section 5:
> >>=20
> >> Does it make sense to use STUN for this in a TCP stream?
> >=20
> > The idea is simply to not disallow something which is=20
> defined in ICE.
> >=20
> >> Do we need some statement about not sending a keepalive mid-chunk?=20
> >> (I'm not sure why one would need to, but doing so is likely to=20
> >> corrupt a message.)
> >=20
> > I don't think the mid-chunk issue is specific to MSRP, so I=20
> don't think we need to say anything.
>=20
> Adam covered this better than I did--I'm not sure ICE style=20
> keepalives will work in MSRP.
>=20
> >=20
> >> Also, does the default Tr value in ICE apply to TCP?
> >=20
> > I don't know, but I have made the assumption that we don't=20
> need to start defining MSRP specific ICE stuff. If there is a=20
> need for that, I would suggest we do it in a separate draft.
>=20
> Do we really need anything more here other than a statement=20
> that you might need to do keepalives, using the empty request=20
> technique described in 4975?
>=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >=20
> >=20
> >> -- Section 6:
> >>=20
> >> Have we thought through whether changing the active party has any=20
> >> impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key=20
> fingerprints in=20
> >> the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I know it does--I just=20
> >> want to make sure we've thought about it.)
> >=20
> > I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP=20
> will be alligned with other comedia usages.
>=20
> I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll=20
> join that discussion rather than rehash it here. But overall,=20
> I think a "no new considerations" Security Considerations=20
> section in a draft like this one will be a red flag for the=20
> IESG and security reviewers. We need to express supporting=20
> arguments as to why we believe this to be true.
>=20
>=20
> [...]
>=20
> >=20
> >> -- section 1, last paragraph:
> >>=20
> >> Am I correct in assuming this would not be limited to TCP?=20
> >> For example, if we define an SCTP binding in the future, COMEDIA=20
> >> could still apply? If so, perhaps it would be better to=20
> consistently=20
> >> refer to transport connections rather than TCP connections.
> >=20
> > RFC 4145 talks about TCP, so I assume COMEDIA would have to=20
> be updated in order to support SCTP first. And, before that=20
> is done I don't think we can say anything about how it will=20
> be applied for MSRP.
> >=20
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
> [...]
>=20
> > --------
> >=20
> >> Also, I tend to think of UAs conforming to this spec as
> >> (mostly) also conforming to RFC4975. So I'm not sure "[RFC 4975]=20
> >> conformant" is the best way to refer to UAs that do not implement=20
> >> COMEDIA. Perhaps something along the lines of "...
> >> from a UA that follows the RFC 4975 connection model..."
> >=20
> > I can re-write to:
> >=20
> > 	"An MSRP UA conformant to this document can=20
> interoperate with a UA that follows the connection model defined in=20
> > 	[RFC4975]. However, if an MSRP UA conformant to this=20
> document is located behind NAT, and does not proxy its MSRP=20
> > 	communication via an MSRP-Relay node, and the UA=20
> receives an SDP offer from a remote UA that follows the connection=20
> > 	model defined in [RFC4975], NAT traversal can only be=20
> achieved if the MSRP UA supports ICE and the network=20
> > 	provides TURN servers, or if the network supports SBC=20
> assisted NAT traversal for TCP."
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >=20
> >> -- section 4.2, paragraph 1:
> >>=20
> >> We still need to make it more clear that the normative language in=20
> >> this spec is scoped to UAs supporting COMEDIA, i.e. this=20
> MUST is not=20
> >> universal. That might be doable by being a little more=20
> precise in the=20
> >> applicability statement (see my comment on section 3).=20
> Otherwise, we=20
> >> need some concise term that means "MSRP UAs implementing COMEDIA"
> >=20
> > I think the best thing is to make the applicability=20
> statement more clear, because one should be able to assume=20
> that the procedures then apply to entities which implement=20
> the specification.
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
> [...]
>=20
>=20
> >=20
> >> -------------------- WGLC review of=20
> draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01:
> >=20
>=20
> [...]
>=20
> >> -- Section 5, last paragraph:
> >>=20
> >> Do we need to talk about the security issues created by the=20
> >> intermediaries themselves? We don't otherwise specify how=20
> >> intermediaries work in this draft.
> >=20
> > I am not really sure what we could say, with a reasonalble=20
> amount of text. There is a separate draft about SBCs, so...
>=20
> Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as=20
> much as the draft already does about intermediaries. That is,=20
> maybe we should drop that whole paragraph.
>=20
> [...]
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Simple mailing list
> Simple@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple
> =

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Wed Jan 13 02:47:36 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Ben Campbell <ben@estacado.net>
Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2010 11:47:29 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Hi,=20

-------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
>>> =20
>>>-- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
>>>=20
>>>I'm not entirely sure it's safe to assume that the presence or=20
>>>absence of a NAT on the signaling path always indicates=20
>>>the same for the media path. For example, there could be a SIP proxy=20
>>>_inside_ the NAT.
>>=20
>>It is true that media may not always be NATed (I personally=20
>>think it mostly is the case, though), but I still think it's=20
>>good to make that assumption when setting the a=3Dsetup value.
>=20
>Actually, my comment was more along the line of the fact that=20
>SIP does not show a NAT doesn't mean there's not one--for=20
>example, if your first hop proxy is inside the NAT, you would=20
>not detect the NAT from the response via. But I guess there's=20
>not a lot we can do about that.

Ok, now I understand.=20

So, what about adding the following note below the paragraph:

"NOTE: If the NAT contains a SIP proxy, the UA will not be able to detect t=
he NAT by comparing the IP addresses."


>>Maybe the paragraph could be re-written to:
>>=20
>>"The UA can determine whether SIP whether the SIP signaling will be=20
>>NATed by inspecting the SIP Via header in the 200 (OK)=20
>>response if the initial REGISTER request, by comparing the IP=20
>>addresses in the Via sent-by and received parameters.
>>If these are not the same then the UA can determine that there is a=20
>>NAT in the path. Eventhough the media transport might not=20
>>be NATed, it is safe to assume that it will, and set the=20
>>a=3Dsetup attribute accordingly."
>=20
>Okay.

Good. I will add the text to the next version, plus the note above if you'r=
e ok with it.

-------------

>>> -- Section 4.3:
>>>=20
>>>Did we ever close on the COMEDIA-TLS fingerprint requirement, and how=20
>>>that could be a problem in the presence of relays?
>>=20
>>I am not sure we wrote down anything.
>>=20
>>However, my suggestion would be to describe the problem in=20
>>section 4.3, ie that there is currently no mechanism to=20
>>provide to/retreive from fingerprints to an MSRP relay, and=20
>>that the usage of COMEDIA-TLS in networks with relays is=20
>>outside the scope of the specification.
>>=20
>>We can then see whether people have interest to create a=20
>>separate milestone to look into the issue, because I am sure=20
>>it will require some work.
>=20
>'I'd hate to disallow the scenario of doing TLS over a relay=20
>and COMEDIA at the same time. I'm not convinced it's that=20
>hard to achieve.
>=20
>It's not _just_ a problem of relays. It's that COMEDIA-TLS=20
>does not support the use case where a UA has a CA issued=20
>cert. Out of curiosity, why do we need COMEDIA-TLS at all?=20
>MSRP already has a mechanism to advertise TLS in the SDP. RFC=20
>4975 already proposes using the fingerprint attribute for=20
>self-signed certs.=20
>
>As a compromise, would it make sense to make the use of=20
>COMEDIA-TLS something the UA SHOULD do if it is using a=20
>self-signed cert, but not a MUST for all uses of TLS with COMEDIA?

Alt 1:
------

"4.3.  TLS

This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for MSRP. If an MSR=
P UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it MUST use the TLS mechanisms d=
efined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."


Alt 2:
------

"4.3.  TLS

   If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport connection for MSRP, using self-si=
gned certificates, the role
   of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD negotiate the relevant parameter as =
defined in COMEDIA-TLS [RFC4572],=20
   and in accordance with [RFC4975] the MSRP URI scheme SHOULD be msrps and=
 the m-line protocol indicator
   SHOULD be TCP/TLS/MSRP.

   If self-signed certificates are not used, MSRP Uas MUST use the TLS mech=
anisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."


Pick your favorite :)

-------------
 =20
>>> -- Section 5:
>>>=20
>>>Does it make sense to use STUN for this in a TCP stream?
>>=20
>>The idea is simply to not disallow something which is defined in ICE.
>>=20
>>>Do we need some statement about not sending a keepalive mid-chunk?=20
>>>(I'm not sure why one would need to, but doing so is likely to=20
>>>corrupt a message.)
>>=20
>>I don't think the mid-chunk issue is specific to MSRP, so I don't think w=
e need to say anything.
>=20
>Adam covered this better than I did--I'm not sure ICE style keepalives wil=
l work in MSRP.

Yes. Based on Adam's comments, I've modified the text:

"If an MSRP UA is located behind a NAT the UA MUST keep the NAT
 binding alive, regardless of whether the media stream is currently
 inactive, sendonly, recvonly or sendrecv, and regardless of the
 presence or value of the bandwidth attribute.  The UA SHOULD use MSRP
 requests without bodies as NAT keepalive messages, as defined in
 section 7.1 of [RFC4975]."

>>>Also, does the default Tr value in ICE apply to TCP?
>>=20
>>I don't know, but I have made the assumption that we don't=20
>>need to start defining MSRP specific ICE stuff. If there is a=20
>>need for that, I would suggest we do it in a separate draft.
>=20
>Do we really need anything more here other than a statement=20
>that you might need to do keepalives, using the empty request=20
>technique described in 4975?

I think that is what the text above now says.
=20
-------------
 =20
>>> -- Section 6:
>>>=20
>>>Have we thought through whether changing the active party has any=20
>>>impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key fingerprints in=20
>>>the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I know it does--I just=20
>>>want to make sure we've thought about it.)
>>=20
>>I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will be allig=
ned with other comedia usages.
>=20
>I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll=20
>join that discussion rather than rehash it here. But overall,=20
>I think a "no new considerations" Security Considerations=20
>section in a draft like this one will be a red flag for the=20
>IESG and security reviewers. We need to express supporting=20
>arguments as to why we believe this to be true.

We can do that, but I would really appretiate some help with putting text t=
ogether.

-------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01:

>>> -- Section 5, last paragraph:
>>>=20
>>>Do we need to talk about the security issues created by the=20
>>>intermediaries themselves? We don't otherwise specify how=20
>>>intermediaries work in this draft.
>>=20
>>I am not really sure what we could say, with a reasonalble amount of text=
. There is a separate draft about SBCs, so...
>=20
>Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as=20
>much as the draft already does about intermediaries. That is,=20
>maybe we should drop that whole paragraph.

I don't think the text talks so much about how intermediaries work as such,=
 but more what the impact of inserting them are for the UAs.

Is it the last, or second last, paragraph that you think we should drop?

Regards,

Christer

From ben@estacado.net  Wed Jan 13 14:21:06 2010
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Hi--inline:


On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:47 AM, Christer Holmberg wrote:

>=20
> Hi,=20
>=20
> -------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
>>>>=20
>>>> -- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
>>>>=20
>>>> I'm not entirely sure it's safe to assume that the presence or=20
>>>> absence of a NAT on the signaling path always indicates=20
>>>> the same for the media path. For example, there could be a SIP =
proxy=20
>>>> _inside_ the NAT.
>>>=20
>>> It is true that media may not always be NATed (I personally=20
>>> think it mostly is the case, though), but I still think it's=20
>>> good to make that assumption when setting the a=3Dsetup value.
>>=20
>> Actually, my comment was more along the line of the fact that=20
>> SIP does not show a NAT doesn't mean there's not one--for=20
>> example, if your first hop proxy is inside the NAT, you would=20
>> not detect the NAT from the response via. But I guess there's=20
>> not a lot we can do about that.
>=20
> Ok, now I understand.=20
>=20
> So, what about adding the following note below the paragraph:
>=20
> "NOTE: If the NAT contains a SIP proxy, the UA will not be able to =
detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses."

I did not so much mean the NAT box contained the proxy (although it =
might) as much as there might be a proxy inside the NATed address space. =
But on reflection, I think I may be over-nitpicking on this point. As =
long as the language makes it clear that detecting (or not detecting) a =
NAT in SIP helps you to make educated guesses about NAT in media, rather =
than it being a positive test one way or another, I think it is okay.

[...]

> -------------
>=20
>>>> -- Section 4.3:
>>>>=20
>>>> Did we ever close on the COMEDIA-TLS fingerprint requirement, and =
how=20
>>>> that could be a problem in the presence of relays?
>>>=20
>>> I am not sure we wrote down anything.
>>>=20
>>> However, my suggestion would be to describe the problem in=20
>>> section 4.3, ie that there is currently no mechanism to=20
>>> provide to/retreive from fingerprints to an MSRP relay, and=20
>>> that the usage of COMEDIA-TLS in networks with relays is=20
>>> outside the scope of the specification.
>>>=20
>>> We can then see whether people have interest to create a=20
>>> separate milestone to look into the issue, because I am sure=20
>>> it will require some work.
>>=20
>> 'I'd hate to disallow the scenario of doing TLS over a relay=20
>> and COMEDIA at the same time. I'm not convinced it's that=20
>> hard to achieve.
>>=20
>> It's not _just_ a problem of relays. It's that COMEDIA-TLS=20
>> does not support the use case where a UA has a CA issued=20
>> cert. Out of curiosity, why do we need COMEDIA-TLS at all?=20
>> MSRP already has a mechanism to advertise TLS in the SDP. RFC=20
>> 4975 already proposes using the fingerprint attribute for=20
>> self-signed certs.=20
>>=20
>> As a compromise, would it make sense to make the use of=20
>> COMEDIA-TLS something the UA SHOULD do if it is using a=20
>> self-signed cert, but not a MUST for all uses of TLS with COMEDIA?
>=20
> Alt 1:
> ------
>=20
> "4.3.  TLS
>=20
> This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for MSRP. If =
an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it MUST use the TLS =
mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>=20
>=20
> Alt 2:
> ------
>=20
> "4.3.  TLS
>=20
>   If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport connection for MSRP, using =
self-signed certificates, the role
>   of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD negotiate the relevant parameter =
as defined in COMEDIA-TLS [RFC4572],=20
>   and in accordance with [RFC4975] the MSRP URI scheme SHOULD be msrps =
and the m-line protocol indicator
>   SHOULD be TCP/TLS/MSRP.
>=20
>   If self-signed certificates are not used, MSRP Uas MUST use the TLS =
mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>=20
>=20
> Pick your favorite :)

Ah, now I see what I was missing. Refresh my memory--does COMEDIA-TLS =
allow one to negotiate the TLS client and server roles independent of =
the TCP active and passive roles? If so, then I lean towards Alt 2 (but =
am not sure we need the second paragraph.

Also, Am I correct in guessing you meant the 2nd clause in paragraph1 of =
Alt 2 to say something along the lines of "... the role of TLS client =
and TLS server SHOULD be negoatiated using the relevant parameter..." =
rather than "SHOULD negotiate the relevant parameter..." ?


>=20
> -------------
>=20
>>>> -- Section 5:
>>>>=20
>>>> Does it make sense to use STUN for this in a TCP stream?
>>>=20
>>> The idea is simply to not disallow something which is defined in =
ICE.
>>>=20
>>>> Do we need some statement about not sending a keepalive mid-chunk?=20=

>>>> (I'm not sure why one would need to, but doing so is likely to=20
>>>> corrupt a message.)
>>>=20
>>> I don't think the mid-chunk issue is specific to MSRP, so I don't =
think we need to say anything.
>>=20
>> Adam covered this better than I did--I'm not sure ICE style =
keepalives will work in MSRP.
>=20
> Yes. Based on Adam's comments, I've modified the text:
>=20
> "If an MSRP UA is located behind a NAT the UA MUST keep the NAT
> binding alive, regardless of whether the media stream is currently
> inactive, sendonly, recvonly or sendrecv, and regardless of the
> presence or value of the bandwidth attribute.  The UA SHOULD use MSRP
> requests without bodies as NAT keepalive messages, as defined in
> section 7.1 of [RFC4975]."

I'm okay with it in principle, but thin the MUST keep the NAT alive =
language is a bit strong here. It may need to do this. For example, it =
is very likely that keep-alives would not be needed for a file-xfer =
session, since it would tend to move data continuously over it's =
lifetime. I think the point we're making is that, if you need =
keep-alives (and you probably do unless you know for sure that you =
don't), you should use the bodiless request technique mentioned in =
section 7.1 of 4975, rather than things like CRLF or STUN packets.



>=20
>>>> Also, does the default Tr value in ICE apply to TCP?
>>>=20
>>> I don't know, but I have made the assumption that we don't=20
>>> need to start defining MSRP specific ICE stuff. If there is a=20
>>> need for that, I would suggest we do it in a separate draft.
>>=20
>> Do we really need anything more here other than a statement=20
>> that you might need to do keepalives, using the empty request=20
>> technique described in 4975?
>=20
> I think that is what the text above now says.
>=20

On further reflection, I'm not sure _this_ draft needs to say anything =
_normative_ about keep-alives. As I understand it, this is not really =
about COMEDIA conformant UAs--the same keep-alive guidance could apply =
to any MSRP UA.


> -------------
>=20
>>>> -- Section 6:
>>>>=20
>>>> Have we thought through whether changing the active party has any=20=

>>>> impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key fingerprints in=20=

>>>> the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I know it does--I just=20=

>>>> want to make sure we've thought about it.)
>>>=20
>>> I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will be =
alligned with other comedia usages.
>>=20
>> I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll=20
>> join that discussion rather than rehash it here. But overall,=20
>> I think a "no new considerations" Security Considerations=20
>> section in a draft like this one will be a red flag for the=20
>> IESG and security reviewers. We need to express supporting=20
>> arguments as to why we believe this to be true.
>=20
> We can do that, but I would really appretiate some help with putting =
text together.

Okay--Let me think if I can propose some text, or at least some more =
details.=20

>=20
> -------------------- WGLC review of =
draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01:
>=20
>>>> -- Section 5, last paragraph:
>>>>=20
>>>> Do we need to talk about the security issues created by the=20
>>>> intermediaries themselves? We don't otherwise specify how=20
>>>> intermediaries work in this draft.
>>>=20
>>> I am not really sure what we could say, with a reasonalble amount of =
text. There is a separate draft about SBCs, so...
>>=20
>> Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as=20
>> much as the draft already does about intermediaries. That is,=20
>> maybe we should drop that whole paragraph.
>=20
> I don't think the text talks so much about how intermediaries work as =
such, but more what the impact of inserting them are for the UAs.
>=20
> Is it the last, or second last, paragraph that you think we should =
drop?

The last one.

I think we should either drop it, or elaborate on it with an example of =
a middlebox breaking the end-to-end-ness of a TLS security association. =
I think we might could get away with dropping it, because that is not =
really a problem caused by this draft (i.e. the problem exists even if =
you don't have this draft. SBCs would still pin MSRP sessions, they'd =
just have to do more work in the process.)=20


Thanks!

Ben.


From deepanshu@huawei.com  Wed Jan 13 22:24:57 2010
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Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2010 14:24:33 +0800
From: Deepanshu Gautam <deepanshu@huawei.com>
To: simple@ietf.org
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Subject: [Simple] Quick Answer Revision
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Dear All,
 
I have uploaded the revision of the draft as per the discussion
(offline/online) held till now. The main changes are:
 
1. A new section providing use case and derived requirements.
2. Initial adaptation to XCAP (which is further prone to discussions and
improvements once we agree to work on it)
 
Please let me know your opinion.
 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gautam-simple-quick-answer-01.txt
<BLOCKED::http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gautam-simple-quick-answ
er-01.txt> 


Regards
Deepanshu

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<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN class=178443201-14012010>Dear 
All,</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN 
class=178443201-14012010></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN class=178443201-14012010>I have uploaded the 
revision of the draft as per the discussion (offline/online) held till now. The 
main changes are:</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN 
class=178443201-14012010></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN class=178443201-14012010>1. A new section 
providing use case and derived requirements.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN class=178443201-14012010>2. Initial 
adaptation to XCAP (which is further prone to&nbsp;discussions and improvements 
once we agree to work on it)</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN 
class=178443201-14012010></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN class=178443201-14012010>Please let me know 
your opinion.</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN 
class=178443201-14012010></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial><SPAN class=178443201-14012010><SPAN 
class=178443201-14012010><A class=moz-txt-link-freetext 
title=http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gautam-simple-quick-answer-01.txt 
href="BLOCKED::http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gautam-simple-quick-answer-01.txt">http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gautam-simple-quick-answer-01.txt</A><BR><BR></SPAN></SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN 
class=178443201-14012010>Regards</SPAN></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=Arial size=2><SPAN 
class=178443201-14012010>Deepanshu</SPAN></FONT></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Thu Jan 14 04:39:00 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Ben Campbell <ben@estacado.net>
Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2010 13:38:52 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Hi,=20

-------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:

>>>>>=20
>>>>>-- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>I'm not entirely sure it's safe to assume that the presence or=20
>>>>>absence of a NAT on the signaling path always indicates the same=20
>>>>>for the media path. For example, there could be a SIP proxy=20
>>>>>_inside_ the NAT.
>>>>=20
>>>>It is true that media may not always be NATed (I personally think it=20
>>>>mostly is the case, though), but I still think it's good to make=20
>>>>that assumption when setting the a=3Dsetup value.
>>>=20
>>>Actually, my comment was more along the line of the fact that SIP=20
>>>does not show a NAT doesn't mean there's not one--for example, if=20
>>>your first hop proxy is inside the NAT, you would not detect the NAT=20
>>>from the response via. But I guess there's not a lot we can do about=20
>>>that.
>>=20
>>Ok, now I understand.=20
>>=20
>>So, what about adding the following note below the paragraph:
>>=20
>>"NOTE: If the NAT contains a SIP proxy, the UA will not be=20
>>able to detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses."
>=20
>I did not so much mean the NAT box contained the proxy=20
>(although it might) as much as there might be a proxy inside=20
>the NATed address space. But on reflection, I think I may be=20
>over-nitpicking on this point. As long as the language makes=20
>it clear that detecting (or not detecting) a NAT in SIP helps=20
>you to make educated guesses about NAT in media, rather than=20
>it being a positive test one way or another, I think it is okay.

So, are you ok with the existing paragraph, or do you want me to change som=
ething?

I could add a note, saying:

"NOTE: If a proxy is located between the UA and the UA will not be=20
able to detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses, since the IP=20
addresses in the Via sent-by and the received header field parameters
will match."

It is also good to note that the intention is not to specify how a UA detec=
ts NATs, but simply to indicate what kind of mechanism deployments use.

-------------
=20
>>>>> -- Section 4.3:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>Did we ever close on the COMEDIA-TLS fingerprint requirement, and=20
>>>>>how that could be a problem in the presence of relays?
>>>>=20
>>>>I am not sure we wrote down anything.
>>>>=20
>>>>However, my suggestion would be to describe the problem in section=20
>>>>4.3, ie that there is currently no mechanism to provide to/retreive=20
>>>>from fingerprints to an MSRP relay, and that the usage of=20
>>>>COMEDIA-TLS in networks with relays is outside the scope of the=20
>>>>specification.
>>>>=20
>>>>We can then see whether people have interest to create a separate=20
>>>>milestone to look into the issue, because I am sure it will require=20
>>>>some work.
>>>=20
>>>'I'd hate to disallow the scenario of doing TLS over a relay and=20
>>>COMEDIA at the same time. I'm not convinced it's that hard to=20
>>>achieve.
>>>=20
>>>It's not _just_ a problem of relays. It's that COMEDIA-TLS does not=20
>>>support the use case where a UA has a CA issued cert. Out of=20
>>>curiosity, why do we need COMEDIA-TLS at all?
>>>MSRP already has a mechanism to advertise TLS in the SDP. RFC
>>>4975 already proposes using the fingerprint attribute for self-signed=20
>>>certs.
>>>=20
>>>As a compromise, would it make sense to make the use of COMEDIA-TLS=20
>>>something the UA SHOULD do if it is using a self-signed cert, but not=20
>>>a MUST for all uses of TLS with COMEDIA?
>>=20
>>Alt 1:
>>------
>>=20
>> "4.3.  TLS
>>=20
>> This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for=20
>> MSRP. If an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it=20
>> MUST use the TLS mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>>=20
>>=20
>> Alt 2:
>> ------
>>=20
>> "4.3.  TLS
>>=20
>>   If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport connection for=20
>>   MSRP, using self-signed certificates, the role
>>   of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD negotiate the=20
>>   relevant parameter as defined in COMEDIA-TLS [RFC4572],=20
>>   and in accordance with [RFC4975] the MSRP URI scheme=20
>>   SHOULD be msrps and the m-line protocol indicator SHOULD=20
>>   be TCP/TLS/MSRP.
>>=20
>>   If self-signed certificates are not used, MSRP Uas MUST=20
>>   use the TLS mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>>=20
>>=20
>>Pick your favorite :)
>=20
>Ah, now I see what I was missing. Refresh my memory--does=20
>COMEDIA-TLS allow one to negotiate the TLS client and server=20
>roles independent of the TCP active and passive roles? If so,=20
>then I lean towards Alt 2 (but am not sure we need the second=20
>paragraph.

According to section 6.2 of RFC 4572 the endpoint taking the passive role a=
cts as TLS server, and the endpoint taking the active role acts as TLS clie=
nt.

>Also, Am I correct in guessing you meant the 2nd clause in=20
>paragraph1 of Alt 2 to say something along the lines of "...=20
>the role of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD be negoatiated=20
>using the relevant parameter..." rather than "SHOULD=20
>negotiate the relevant parameter..." ?

No, it means that the TLS client and server negotiate the relevant paramete=
rs. However, that is not MSRP specific, so I am not sure we need it.

In fact, I don't think we need the first paragraph (the current one, that i=
s) at all.

-------------
=20
>>>>>-- Section 5:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>Does it make sense to use STUN for this in a TCP stream?
>>>>The idea is simply to not disallow something which is=20
>>>>defined in ICE.
>>>>=20
>>>>>Do we need some statement about not sending a keepalive=20
>>>>>mid-chunk?=20
>>>>>(I'm not sure why one would need to, but doing so is likely to=20
>>>>>corrupt a message.)
>>>>=20
>>>>I don't think the mid-chunk issue is specific to MSRP, so I don't=20
>>>>think we need to say anything.
>>>=20
>>>Adam covered this better than I did--I'm not sure ICE style keepalives w=
ill work in MSRP.
>>=20
>> Yes. Based on Adam's comments, I've modified the text:
>>=20
>> "If an MSRP UA is located behind a NAT the UA MUST keep the NAT=20
>> binding alive, regardless of whether the media stream is currently=20
>> inactive, sendonly, recvonly or sendrecv, and regardless of the=20
>> presence or value of the bandwidth attribute. The UA SHOULD use MSRP=20
>> requests without bodies as NAT keepalive messages, as defined in=20
>> section 7.1 of [RFC4975]."
>=20
>I'm okay with it in principle, but thin the MUST keep the NAT=20
>alive language is a bit strong here. It may need to do this.=20
>For example, it is very likely that keep-alives would not be=20
>needed for a file-xfer session, since it would tend to move=20
>data continuously over it's lifetime. I think the point we're=20
>making is that, if you need keep-alives (and you probably do=20
>unless you know for sure that you don't), you should use the=20
>bodiless request technique mentioned in section 7.1 of 4975,=20
>rather than things like CRLF or STUN packets.
>
>>>>>Also, does the default Tr value in ICE apply to TCP?
>>>>>I don't know, but I have made the assumption that we=20
>>>>>don't need to start defining MSRP specific ICE stuff. If there is a=20
>>>>>need for that, I would suggest we do it in a separate draft.
>>>=20
>>>Do we really need anything more here other than a=20
>>>statement that you might need to do keepalives, using the empty request =
technique=20
>>>described in 4975?
>>=20
>>I think that is what the text above now says.
>>=20
>=20
>On further reflection, I'm not sure _this_ draft needs to say=20
>anything _normative_ about keep-alives. As I understand it,=20
>this is not really about COMEDIA conformant UAs--the same=20
>keep-alive guidance could apply to any MSRP UA.

True. When I wrote the section I wasn't thinking of section 7.1 of 4975.=20

So, if nobody objects, I will remove the who section ("NAT keepalive").

-------------

>>>>> -- Section 6:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>Have we thought through whether changing the active=20
>>>>>party has any impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key=20
>>>>>fingerprints in the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I know it=
=20
>>>>>does--I just want to make sure we've thought about it.)
>>>>=20
>>>>I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will=20
>>>>be alligned with other comedia usages.
>>>=20
>>>I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll join=20
>>>that discussion rather than rehash it here. But overall, I think a=20
>>>"no new considerations" Security Considerations section in a draft=20
>>>like this one will be a red flag for the IESG and security=20
>>>reviewers.=20
>>>We need to express supporting arguments as to why we believe this to=20
>>>be true.
>>=20
>>We can do that, but I would really appretiate some help with putting text=
 together.
>=20
>Okay--Let me think if I can propose some text, or at least=20
>some more details.=20

Great. I would really appretiate that. I will also try to come up with some=
thing.


-------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01:
=20

>>>>> -- Section 5, last paragraph:
>>>>>=20
>>>>>Do we need to talk about the security issues created by the=20
>>>>>intermediaries themselves? We don't otherwise specify how=20
>>>>>intermediaries work in this draft.
>>>>=20
>>>>I am not really sure what we could say, with a reasonalble amount of te=
xt. There is a separate draft about=20
>>>>SBCs, so...
>>>=20
>>>Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as much as the=20
>>>draft already does about intermediaries. That is, maybe we should=20
>>>drop that whole paragraph.
>>=20
>>I don't think the text talks so much about how intermediaries work as suc=
h, but more what the impact of=20
>>inserting them are for the UAs.
>>=20
>>Is it the last, or second last, paragraph that you think we should drop?
>=20
>The last one.
>=20
>I think we should either drop it, or elaborate on it with an=20
>example of a middlebox breaking the end-to-end-ness of a TLS=20
>security association. I think we might could get away with=20
>dropping it, because that is not really a problem caused by=20
>this draft (i.e. the problem exists even if you don't have=20
>this draft. SBCs would still pin MSRP sessions, they'd just=20
>have to do more work in the process.)=20

True. And, that is actually described in the second last paragraph.

So, I will remove the last paragraph.

Regards,

Christer

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To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Hi,


On Jan 14, 2010, at 6:38 AM, Christer Holmberg wrote:

>=20
> Hi,=20
>=20
> -------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
>=20
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> -- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I'm not entirely sure it's safe to assume that the presence or=20
>>>>>> absence of a NAT on the signaling path always indicates the same=20=

>>>>>> for the media path. For example, there could be a SIP proxy=20
>>>>>> _inside_ the NAT.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> It is true that media may not always be NATed (I personally think =
it=20
>>>>> mostly is the case, though), but I still think it's good to make=20=

>>>>> that assumption when setting the a=3Dsetup value.
>>>>=20
>>>> Actually, my comment was more along the line of the fact that SIP=20=

>>>> does not show a NAT doesn't mean there's not one--for example, if=20=

>>>> your first hop proxy is inside the NAT, you would not detect the =
NAT=20
>>>> from the response via. But I guess there's not a lot we can do =
about=20
>>>> that.
>>>=20
>>> Ok, now I understand.=20
>>>=20
>>> So, what about adding the following note below the paragraph:
>>>=20
>>> "NOTE: If the NAT contains a SIP proxy, the UA will not be=20
>>> able to detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses."
>>=20
>> I did not so much mean the NAT box contained the proxy=20
>> (although it might) as much as there might be a proxy inside=20
>> the NATed address space. But on reflection, I think I may be=20
>> over-nitpicking on this point. As long as the language makes=20
>> it clear that detecting (or not detecting) a NAT in SIP helps=20
>> you to make educated guesses about NAT in media, rather than=20
>> it being a positive test one way or another, I think it is okay.
>=20
> So, are you ok with the existing paragraph, or do you want me to =
change something?
>=20
> I could add a note, saying:
>=20
> "NOTE: If a proxy is located between the UA and the UA will not be=20
> able to detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses, since the IP=20
> addresses in the Via sent-by and the received header field parameters
> will match."
>=20
> It is also good to note that the intention is not to specify how a UA =
detects NATs, but simply to indicate what kind of mechanism deployments =
use.

Okay, I went back and reread the paragraph. I don't think the guidance =
is very useful, as there are too many scenarios in which it breaks down. =
We already have the example where a NAT exists but not between the UA =
and the first-hop SIP proxy. It also breaks down if the peer UA is =
behind the same NAT.

I'd be okay with something to the effect that some implementations do =
this to make guesses about NATs. It may be useful in some cases,  but it =
doesn't work in all cases, such as the ones we've discussed.

>=20
> -------------
>=20
>>>>>> -- Section 4.3:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Did we ever close on the COMEDIA-TLS fingerprint requirement, and=20=

>>>>>> how that could be a problem in the presence of relays?
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I am not sure we wrote down anything.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> However, my suggestion would be to describe the problem in section=20=

>>>>> 4.3, ie that there is currently no mechanism to provide =
to/retreive=20
>>>>> from fingerprints to an MSRP relay, and that the usage of=20
>>>>> COMEDIA-TLS in networks with relays is outside the scope of the=20
>>>>> specification.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> We can then see whether people have interest to create a separate=20=

>>>>> milestone to look into the issue, because I am sure it will =
require=20
>>>>> some work.
>>>>=20
>>>> 'I'd hate to disallow the scenario of doing TLS over a relay and=20
>>>> COMEDIA at the same time. I'm not convinced it's that hard to=20
>>>> achieve.
>>>>=20
>>>> It's not _just_ a problem of relays. It's that COMEDIA-TLS does not=20=

>>>> support the use case where a UA has a CA issued cert. Out of=20
>>>> curiosity, why do we need COMEDIA-TLS at all?
>>>> MSRP already has a mechanism to advertise TLS in the SDP. RFC
>>>> 4975 already proposes using the fingerprint attribute for =
self-signed=20
>>>> certs.
>>>>=20
>>>> As a compromise, would it make sense to make the use of COMEDIA-TLS=20=

>>>> something the UA SHOULD do if it is using a self-signed cert, but =
not=20
>>>> a MUST for all uses of TLS with COMEDIA?
>>>=20
>>> Alt 1:
>>> ------
>>>=20
>>> "4.3.  TLS
>>>=20
>>> This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for=20
>>> MSRP. If an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it=20
>>> MUST use the TLS mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Alt 2:
>>> ------
>>>=20
>>> "4.3.  TLS
>>>=20
>>>  If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport connection for=20
>>>  MSRP, using self-signed certificates, the role
>>>  of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD negotiate the=20
>>>  relevant parameter as defined in COMEDIA-TLS [RFC4572],=20
>>>  and in accordance with [RFC4975] the MSRP URI scheme=20
>>>  SHOULD be msrps and the m-line protocol indicator SHOULD=20
>>>  be TCP/TLS/MSRP.
>>>=20
>>>  If self-signed certificates are not used, MSRP Uas MUST=20
>>>  use the TLS mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Pick your favorite :)
>>=20
>> Ah, now I see what I was missing. Refresh my memory--does=20
>> COMEDIA-TLS allow one to negotiate the TLS client and server=20
>> roles independent of the TCP active and passive roles? If so,=20
>> then I lean towards Alt 2 (but am not sure we need the second=20
>> paragraph.
>=20
> According to section 6.2 of RFC 4572 the endpoint taking the passive =
role acts as TLS server, and the endpoint taking the active role acts as =
TLS client.

So it's really no different with COMEDIA than without, other than the =
fact that the offerer is not always the active party.

>=20
>> Also, Am I correct in guessing you meant the 2nd clause in=20
>> paragraph1 of Alt 2 to say something along the lines of "...=20
>> the role of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD be negoatiated=20
>> using the relevant parameter..." rather than "SHOULD=20
>> negotiate the relevant parameter..." ?
>=20
> No, it means that the TLS client and server negotiate the relevant =
parameters. However, that is not MSRP specific, so I am not sure we need =
it.
>=20
> In fact, I don't think we need the first paragraph (the current one, =
that is) at all.

The more I think about it, I don't think we get anything from =
COMEDIA-TLS that is not already covered in section 14.4 of RFC 4975. So =
I'm back to preferring Alt 1, with the addition of something to the =
effect of:

"Note that the active UA will take the role of the TLS client, and the =
passive UA will take the roll of the TLS server. UAs using self-signed =
TLS certificates SHOULD include certificate fingerprints as described in =
RFC 4975 section 14.4."


>=20
> -------------
>=20
>>>>>> -- Section 5:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Does it make sense to use STUN for this in a TCP stream?
>>>>> The idea is simply to not disallow something which is=20
>>>>> defined in ICE.
>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Do we need some statement about not sending a keepalive=20
>>>>>> mid-chunk?=20
>>>>>> (I'm not sure why one would need to, but doing so is likely to=20
>>>>>> corrupt a message.)
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I don't think the mid-chunk issue is specific to MSRP, so I don't=20=

>>>>> think we need to say anything.
>>>>=20
>>>> Adam covered this better than I did--I'm not sure ICE style =
keepalives will work in MSRP.
>>>=20
>>> Yes. Based on Adam's comments, I've modified the text:
>>>=20
>>> "If an MSRP UA is located behind a NAT the UA MUST keep the NAT=20
>>> binding alive, regardless of whether the media stream is currently=20=

>>> inactive, sendonly, recvonly or sendrecv, and regardless of the=20
>>> presence or value of the bandwidth attribute. The UA SHOULD use MSRP=20=

>>> requests without bodies as NAT keepalive messages, as defined in=20
>>> section 7.1 of [RFC4975]."
>>=20
>> I'm okay with it in principle, but thin the MUST keep the NAT=20
>> alive language is a bit strong here. It may need to do this.=20
>> For example, it is very likely that keep-alives would not be=20
>> needed for a file-xfer session, since it would tend to move=20
>> data continuously over it's lifetime. I think the point we're=20
>> making is that, if you need keep-alives (and you probably do=20
>> unless you know for sure that you don't), you should use the=20
>> bodiless request technique mentioned in section 7.1 of 4975,=20
>> rather than things like CRLF or STUN packets.
>>=20
>>>>>> Also, does the default Tr value in ICE apply to TCP?
>>>>>> I don't know, but I have made the assumption that we=20
>>>>>> don't need to start defining MSRP specific ICE stuff. If there is =
a=20
>>>>>> need for that, I would suggest we do it in a separate draft.
>>>>=20
>>>> Do we really need anything more here other than a=20
>>>> statement that you might need to do keepalives, using the empty =
request technique=20
>>>> described in 4975?
>>>=20
>>> I think that is what the text above now says.
>>>=20
>>=20
>> On further reflection, I'm not sure _this_ draft needs to say=20
>> anything _normative_ about keep-alives. As I understand it,=20
>> this is not really about COMEDIA conformant UAs--the same=20
>> keep-alive guidance could apply to any MSRP UA.
>=20
> True. When I wrote the section I wasn't thinking of section 7.1 of =
4975.=20
>=20
> So, if nobody objects, I will remove the who section ("NAT =
keepalive").

No objection from me :-)

>=20
> -------------
>=20
>>>>>> -- Section 6:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Have we thought through whether changing the active=20
>>>>>> party has any impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key=20=

>>>>>> fingerprints in the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I =
know it=20
>>>>>> does--I just want to make sure we've thought about it.)
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will=20=

>>>>> be alligned with other comedia usages.
>>>>=20
>>>> I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll join=20=

>>>> that discussion rather than rehash it here. But overall, I think a=20=

>>>> "no new considerations" Security Considerations section in a draft=20=

>>>> like this one will be a red flag for the IESG and security=20
>>>> reviewers.=20
>>>> We need to express supporting arguments as to why we believe this =
to=20
>>>> be true.
>>>=20
>>> We can do that, but I would really appretiate some help with putting =
text together.
>>=20
>> Okay--Let me think if I can propose some text, or at least=20
>> some more details.=20
>=20
> Great. I would really appretiate that. I will also try to come up with =
something.

Working on it.

>=20
>=20
> -------------------- WGLC review of =
draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01:
>=20
>=20
>>>>>> -- Section 5, last paragraph:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Do we need to talk about the security issues created by the=20
>>>>>> intermediaries themselves? We don't otherwise specify how=20
>>>>>> intermediaries work in this draft.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I am not really sure what we could say, with a reasonalble amount =
of text. There is a separate draft about=20
>>>>> SBCs, so...
>>>>=20
>>>> Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as much as =
the=20
>>>> draft already does about intermediaries. That is, maybe we should=20=

>>>> drop that whole paragraph.
>>>=20
>>> I don't think the text talks so much about how intermediaries work =
as such, but more what the impact of=20
>>> inserting them are for the UAs.
>>>=20
>>> Is it the last, or second last, paragraph that you think we should =
drop?
>>=20
>> The last one.
>>=20
>> I think we should either drop it, or elaborate on it with an=20
>> example of a middlebox breaking the end-to-end-ness of a TLS=20
>> security association. I think we might could get away with=20
>> dropping it, because that is not really a problem caused by=20
>> this draft (i.e. the problem exists even if you don't have=20
>> this draft. SBCs would still pin MSRP sessions, they'd just=20
>> have to do more work in the process.)=20
>=20
> True. And, that is actually described in the second last paragraph.
>=20
> So, I will remove the last paragraph.

Okay.

>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> Christer
> _______________________________________________
> Simple mailing list
> Simple@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple


From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Fri Jan 15 04:55:47 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Ben Campbell <ben@estacado.net>
Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2010 13:55:40 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Hi,=20

-------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:

>>>>>>> -- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:

<fast forward>

>>I could add a note, saying:
>>=20
>>"NOTE: If a proxy is located between the UA and the UA will not be=20
>>able to detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses, since the IP=20
>>addresses in the Via sent-by and the received header field parameters=20
>>will match."
>>=20
>>It is also good to note that the intention is not to=20
>>specify how a UA detects NATs, but simply to indicate what=20
>>kind of mechanism deployments use.
>>=20
>Okay, I went back and reread the paragraph. I don't think the=20
>guidance is very useful, as there are too many scenarios in=20
>which it breaks down. We already have the example where a NAT=20
>exists but not between the UA and the first-hop SIP proxy. It=20
>also breaks down if the peer UA is behind the same NAT.
>=20
>I'd be okay with something to the effect that some=20
>implementations do this to make guesses about NATs. It may be=20
>useful in some cases, but it doesn't work in all cases, such=20
>as the ones we've discussed.

"Some UAs can determinte whether the SIP signaling has traversed a NAT by
inspecting the SIP Via header field in the 200 (OK) response to the
initial REGISTER request, and comparing the IP addresses in the Via
sent-by and the received header field parameters.  If these are not
the same then the UA can determine that there is a NAT in the path.
Even though the media transport might not traverse the NAT, it is
safe to assume that it will, and set the a=3Dsetup attribute
accordingly. This comparing mechanism does not work in all scenarios,=20
though. For example, if the NAT contains a SIP proxy, the UA will not be ab=
le to
detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses."

-------------

>>>>>>> -- Section 4.3:

<fast forward>

>>>> Alt 1:
>>>> ------
>>>>=20
>>>> "4.3.  TLS
>>>>=20
>>>> This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for MSRP. If=20
>>>> an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it MUST use the TLS=20
>>>> mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Alt 2:
>>>> ------
>>>>=20
>>>> "4.3.  TLS
>>>>=20
>>>>  If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport connection for MSRP, using=20
>>>> self-signed certificates, the role  of TLS client and TLS server=20
>>>> SHOULD negotiate the  relevant parameter as defined in COMEDIA-TLS=20
>>>> [RFC4572], and in accordance with [RFC4975] the MSRP URI scheme =20
>>>> SHOULD be msrps and the m-line protocol indicator SHOULD  be=20
>>>> TCP/TLS/MSRP.
>>>>=20
>>>> If self-signed certificates are not used, MSRP Uas MUST  use the=20
>>>> TLS mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> Pick your favorite :)
>>>=20
>>> Ah, now I see what I was missing. Refresh my memory--does COMEDIA-TLS=20
>>> allow one to negotiate the TLS client and server roles independent of=20
>>> the TCP active and passive roles? If so, then I lean towards Alt 2=20
>>> (but am not sure we need the second paragraph.
>>=20
>> According to section 6.2 of RFC 4572 the endpoint taking the passive rol=
e=20
>> acts as TLS server, and the endpoint taking the active role acts as TLS =
client.
>=20
>So it's really no different with COMEDIA than without, other=20
>than the fact that the offerer is not always the active party.
> =20
>>> Also, Am I correct in guessing you meant the 2nd clause in
>>> paragraph1 of Alt 2 to say something along the lines of "...=20
>>> the role of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD be negoatiated using the=20
>>> relevant parameter..." rather than "SHOULD negotiate the relevant=20
>>> parameter..." ?
>>=20
>>No, it means that the TLS client and server negotiate the relevant parame=
ters.=20
>However, that is not MSRP specific, so I am not sure we need it.
>>=20
>>In fact, I don't think we need the first paragraph (the current one, that=
 is) at all.
>=20
>The more I think about it, I don't think we get anything from=20
>COMEDIA-TLS that is not already covered in section 14.4 of=20
>RFC 4975. So I'm back to preferring Alt 1, with the addition=20
>of something to the effect of:
>=20
>"Note that the active UA will take the role of the TLS=20
>client, and the passive UA will take the roll of the TLS=20
>server. UAs using self-signed TLS certificates SHOULD include=20
>certificate fingerprints as described in RFC 4975 section 14.4."

"4.3.  TLS
=20
This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for MSRP. If=20
an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it MUST use the TLS=20
mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976.

Note that the active UA will take the role of the TLS=20
client, and the passive UA will take the roll of the TLS=20
server. UAs using self-signed TLS certificates SHOULD include=20
certificate fingerprints as described in RFC 4975 section 14.4."

-------------

>>>>>>> -- Section 5:

<fast forward>

>>So, if nobody objects, I will remove the who section ("NAT keepalive").
>=20
>No objection from me :-)

Fixed.

In addition, the following text is removed from the Abstract section:

"The document also defines how an MSRP UA which is located behind a NAT kee=
ps the NAT binding alive."

-------------
>>>>>>>-- Section 6:
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>Have we thought through whether changing the active party has any=20
>>>>>>>impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key fingerprints=20
>>>>>>>in the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I know=20
>>>>>>>it does--I just want to make sure we've thought about it.)
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will=20
>>>>>>be alligned with other comedia usages.
>>>>>=20
>>>>>I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll join=20
>>>>>that discussion rather than rehash it here. But overall,=20
>>>>>I think a "no new considerations" Security Considerations section=20
>>>>>in a draft like this one will be a red flag for the IESG and security=
=20
>>>>>reviewers.
>>>>>We need to express supporting arguments as to why we=20
>>>>>believe this to be true.
>>>>=20
>>>>We can do that, but I would really appretiate some help with putting te=
xt together.
>>>=20
>>>Okay--Let me think if I can propose some text, or at least some more=20
>>>details.
>>=20
>>Great. I would really appretiate that. I will also try to come up with so=
mething.
>=20
>Working on it.

If we don't use COMEDIA-TLS, but simply refer to 4975 for TLS, I guess ther=
e shouldn't be any issues. Or?

-------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01:

>>>>>>>-- Section 5, last paragraph:

<fast forward>

>>>>> Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as much as=20
>>>>> the draft already does about intermediaries. That is, maybe we=20
>>>>> should drop that whole paragraph.

<fast forward>

>>True. And, that is actually described in the second last paragraph.
>>=20
>> So, I will remove the last paragraph.
>=20
>Okay.

Fixed.

-------------

Regards,

Christer

From ben@estacado.net  Fri Jan 15 14:25:25 2010
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References: <05FD3015-9D28-43CF-B44A-E14CBEB4E464@nostrum.com> <7BA83419-CE5E-4677-99F7-9B19F8863DCD@estacado.net> <FF84A09F50A6DC48ACB6714F4666CC743C571987A8@ESESSCMS0354.eemea.ericsson.se> <6F445EC4-32AD-4A12-82B3-37ED00F3DC30@estacado.net> <FF84A09F50A6DC48ACB6714F4666CC743C5720739D@ESESSCMS0354.eemea.ericsson.se> <44628806-B9D9-43AB-8E51-809ECDE94236@estacado.net> <FF84A09F50A6DC48ACB6714F4666CC743C57241F38@ESESSCMS0354.eemea.ericsson.se> <CE9069DC-4359-4E81-89BA-0075D2876308@estacado.net> <FF84A09F50A6DC48ACB6714F4666CC743C57242720@ESESSCMS0354.eemea.ericsson.se>
To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1077)
Cc: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Hi again,

On Jan 15, 2010, at 6:55 AM, Christer Holmberg wrote:

>=20
> Hi,=20
>=20
> -------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
>=20
>>>>>>>> -- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
>=20
> <fast forward>
>=20
>>> I could add a note, saying:
>>>=20
>>> "NOTE: If a proxy is located between the UA and the UA will not be=20=

>>> able to detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses, since the IP=20=

>>> addresses in the Via sent-by and the received header field =
parameters=20
>>> will match."
>>>=20
>>> It is also good to note that the intention is not to=20
>>> specify how a UA detects NATs, but simply to indicate what=20
>>> kind of mechanism deployments use.
>>>=20
>> Okay, I went back and reread the paragraph. I don't think the=20
>> guidance is very useful, as there are too many scenarios in=20
>> which it breaks down. We already have the example where a NAT=20
>> exists but not between the UA and the first-hop SIP proxy. It=20
>> also breaks down if the peer UA is behind the same NAT.
>>=20
>> I'd be okay with something to the effect that some=20
>> implementations do this to make guesses about NATs. It may be=20
>> useful in some cases, but it doesn't work in all cases, such=20
>> as the ones we've discussed.
>=20
> "Some UAs can determinte whether the SIP signaling has traversed a NAT =
by
> inspecting the SIP Via header field in the 200 (OK) response to the
> initial REGISTER request, and comparing the IP addresses in the Via
> sent-by and the received header field parameters.  If these are not
> the same then the UA can determine that there is a NAT in the path.
> Even though the media transport might not traverse the NAT, it is
> safe to assume that it will, and set the a=3Dsetup attribute
> accordingly. This comparing mechanism does not work in all scenarios,=20=

> though. For example, if the NAT contains a SIP proxy, the UA will not =
be able to
> detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses."

I can live with that.

>=20
> -------------
>=20
>>>>>>>> -- Section 4.3:
>=20
> <fast forward>
>=20
>>>>> Alt 1:
>>>>> ------
>>>>>=20
>>>>> "4.3.  TLS
>>>>>=20
>>>>> This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for MSRP. =
If=20
>>>>> an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it MUST use the =
TLS=20
>>>>> mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Alt 2:
>>>>> ------
>>>>>=20
>>>>> "4.3.  TLS
>>>>>=20
>>>>> If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport connection for MSRP, using=20=

>>>>> self-signed certificates, the role  of TLS client and TLS server=20=

>>>>> SHOULD negotiate the  relevant parameter as defined in COMEDIA-TLS=20=

>>>>> [RFC4572], and in accordance with [RFC4975] the MSRP URI scheme =20=

>>>>> SHOULD be msrps and the m-line protocol indicator SHOULD  be=20
>>>>> TCP/TLS/MSRP.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> If self-signed certificates are not used, MSRP Uas MUST  use the=20=

>>>>> TLS mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
>>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Pick your favorite :)
>>>>=20
>>>> Ah, now I see what I was missing. Refresh my memory--does =
COMEDIA-TLS=20
>>>> allow one to negotiate the TLS client and server roles independent =
of=20
>>>> the TCP active and passive roles? If so, then I lean towards Alt 2=20=

>>>> (but am not sure we need the second paragraph.
>>>=20
>>> According to section 6.2 of RFC 4572 the endpoint taking the passive =
role=20
>>> acts as TLS server, and the endpoint taking the active role acts as =
TLS client.
>>=20
>> So it's really no different with COMEDIA than without, other=20
>> than the fact that the offerer is not always the active party.
>>=20
>>>> Also, Am I correct in guessing you meant the 2nd clause in
>>>> paragraph1 of Alt 2 to say something along the lines of "...=20
>>>> the role of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD be negoatiated using =
the=20
>>>> relevant parameter..." rather than "SHOULD negotiate the relevant=20=

>>>> parameter..." ?
>>>=20
>>> No, it means that the TLS client and server negotiate the relevant =
parameters.=20
>> However, that is not MSRP specific, so I am not sure we need it.
>>>=20
>>> In fact, I don't think we need the first paragraph (the current one, =
that is) at all.
>>=20
>> The more I think about it, I don't think we get anything from=20
>> COMEDIA-TLS that is not already covered in section 14.4 of=20
>> RFC 4975. So I'm back to preferring Alt 1, with the addition=20
>> of something to the effect of:
>>=20
>> "Note that the active UA will take the role of the TLS=20
>> client, and the passive UA will take the roll of the TLS=20
>> server. UAs using self-signed TLS certificates SHOULD include=20
>> certificate fingerprints as described in RFC 4975 section 14.4."
>=20
> "4.3.  TLS
>=20
> This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for MSRP. If=20=

> an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it MUST use the TLS=20=

> mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976.
>=20
> Note that the active UA will take the role of the TLS=20
> client, and the passive UA will take the roll of the TLS=20
> server. UAs using self-signed TLS certificates SHOULD include=20
> certificate fingerprints as described in RFC 4975 section 14.4."

Works for me.

>=20
> -------------
>=20
>>>>>>>> -- Section 5:
>=20
> <fast forward>
>=20
>>> So, if nobody objects, I will remove the who section ("NAT =
keepalive").
>>=20
>> No objection from me :-)
>=20
> Fixed.
>=20
> In addition, the following text is removed from the Abstract section:
>=20
> "The document also defines how an MSRP UA which is located behind a =
NAT keeps the NAT binding alive."

Okay.


>=20
> -------------
>>>>>>>> -- Section 6:
>>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>>> Have we thought through whether changing the active party has =
any=20
>>>>>>>> impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key =
fingerprints=20
>>>>>>>> in the signaling channel? (I'm not saying that I know=20
>>>>>>>> it does--I just want to make sure we've thought about it.)
>>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>> I don't think there should be any impacts, because now MSRP will=20=

>>>>>>> be alligned with other comedia usages.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll =
join=20
>>>>>> that discussion rather than rehash it here. But overall,=20
>>>>>> I think a "no new considerations" Security Considerations section=20=

>>>>>> in a draft like this one will be a red flag for the IESG and =
security=20
>>>>>> reviewers.
>>>>>> We need to express supporting arguments as to why we=20
>>>>>> believe this to be true.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> We can do that, but I would really appretiate some help with =
putting text together.
>>>>=20
>>>> Okay--Let me think if I can propose some text, or at least some =
more=20
>>>> details.
>>>=20
>>> Great. I would really appretiate that. I will also try to come up =
with something.
>>=20
>> Working on it.
>=20
> If we don't use COMEDIA-TLS, but simply refer to 4975 for TLS, I guess =
there shouldn't be any issues. Or?
>=20

I think there may be some language in the security consideration section =
of 4975 concerning how you match the certificate to the server that we =
need to check to make sure it does not contain assumptions about which =
party is client or server.=20


> -------------------- WGLC review of =
draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessionmatch-01:
>=20
>>>>>>>> -- Section 5, last paragraph:
>=20
> <fast forward>
>=20
>>>>>> Actually, my point was to suggest we don't need to say as much as=20=

>>>>>> the draft already does about intermediaries. That is, maybe we=20
>>>>>> should drop that whole paragraph.
>=20
> <fast forward>
>=20
>>> True. And, that is actually described in the second last paragraph.
>>>=20
>>> So, I will remove the last paragraph.
>>=20
>> Okay.
>=20
> Fixed.
>=20
> -------------
>=20
> Regards,
>=20
> Christer
> _______________________________________________
> Simple mailing list
> Simple@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple


From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Sun Jan 17 08:50:21 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Ben Campbell <ben@estacado.net>
Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2010 17:46:43 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments
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Hi,

-------------
>>
>>>>>>>>> -- Section 5:
>>
>> <fast forward>
>>
>>>> So, if nobody objects, I will remove the who section ("NAT keepalive")=
.
>>>
>>> No objection from me :-)
>>
>> Fixed.
>>
>> In addition, the following text is removed from the Abstract section:
>>
>> "The document also defines how an MSRP UA which is located behind a NAT =
keeps the NAT binding alive."
>
>Okay.

And, from the Introduction section I removed the following:

", how an MSRP UA can use the COMEDIA TLS extensions defined in [RFC4572], =
and how an MSRP UA keeps a NAT binding alive."

Because, I don't think we need to say that we describe how COMEDIA TLS is u=
sed, since we later say that it is not used...

Regards,

Christer=

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Sun Jan 17 23:07:11 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 08:07:04 +0100
Thread-Topic: Draft new version: draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-04
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Hi,

Based on the WGLC comments, I've submitted a new version of the acm draft.

It can also be found at:

http://users.piuha.net/cholmber/drafts/draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-04.txt

Note that we are still working on some text for the security considerations=
 section, but please take a look that your other comments/issues have been =
addressed.

Regards,

Christer


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<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Hi,</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Based on the WGLC comments, I've submitted a new vers=
ion of the acm draft.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">It can also be found at:</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><a href=3D"http://users.piuha.net/cholmber/drafts/dra=
ft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-04.txt"><font color=3D"#0000FF"><u>http://users.piu=
ha.net/cholmber/drafts/draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-04.txt</u></font></a></fo=
nt></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Note that we are still working on some text for the s=
ecurity considerations section, but please take a look that your other comm=
ents/issues have been addressed.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Regards,</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Christer</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
</font>
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the SIP for Instant Messaging and Presence Leveraging Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : An Alternative Connection Model for the Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)
	Author(s)       : C. Holmberg, S. Blau
	Filename        : draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-04.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2010-01-17

This document defines an alternative connection model for Message
Session Relay Protocol (MSRP) User Agents (UAs), which uses the
connection-oriended media (COMEDIA) mechanism in order to create the
MSRP transport connection.  The model allows MSRP UAs behind NATs to
negotiate which UA will initiate the establishment of the TCP
connection, in order for MSRP messages to traverse the NAT.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Sun Jan 17 23:20:18 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 08:20:07 +0100
Thread-Topic: Draft new version: draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessmatch-02
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Hi,

Based on the WGLC comments, I've submitted a new version of the sessmatch d=
raft.

It can also be found at:

http://users.piuha.net/cholmber/drafts/draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessmatch-02.=
txt

Note that we are still working on some text for the security considerations=
 section, but please take a look that your other comments/issues have been =
addressed.

Regards,

Christer



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<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Hi,</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Based on the WGLC comments, I've submitted a new vers=
ion of the sessmatch draft.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">It can also be found at:</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><a href=3D"http://users.piuha.net/cholmber/drafts/dra=
ft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessmatch-02.txt"><font color=3D"#0000FF"><u>http://use=
rs.piuha.net/cholmber/drafts/draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessmatch-02.txt</u></f=
ont></a></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Note that we are still working on some text for the s=
ecurity considerations section, but please take a look that your other comm=
ents/issues have been addressed.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Regards,</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Christer</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the SIP for Instant Messaging and Presence Leveraging Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Session Matching Update for the Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)
	Author(s)       : C. Holmberg, S. Blau
	Filename        : draft-ietf-simple-msrp-sessmatch-02.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2010-01-17

This document updates the session matching procedure defined in
sections 5.4 and 7.3 of RFC 4975, so that an Message Session Relay
Protocol (MSRP) User Agent (UA) only uses the session-id part of the
MSRP URI in order to perform the consistency checks.  The update
allows intermediaries, Application Layer Gateways (ALGs), to modify
the address information in the MSRP URI of the Session Description
Protocol (SDP) a=path attribute, without the need for the
intermediaries to terminate and do the correlating modifications in
the associated MSRP messages.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcapevent

The other draft is very old and obsolete.

Regards,
Hisham

On 28 December 2009 09:47, I=F1aki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net> wrote:

> Hi, my question is related to subscription for XCAP document changes:
>
>
> a)
> The format for XCAP diff is defined in:
>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-simple-xcap-diff
>
>
> b)
> How a SIP user agent subscribes to changes in XCAP documents is defined i=
n:
>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcapevent
> However it's also defined in:
>  http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcap-config  (page 8)
>
> This last draft is an extension to draft-ietf-sipping-config-framework so=
 a
> device can get its provisioned configuration from a XCAP resource. But it
> also
> allows a SIP user to subscribe to changes in XCAP documents.
>
> So, which is the definitive way?
>
> Thanks a lot.
>
>
> --
> I=F1aki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>
> _______________________________________________
> Simple mailing list
> Simple@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple
>

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<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcapevent" target=3D"_=
blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcapevent</a><br><br>The o=
ther draft is very old and obsolete.<br><br>Regards,<br>Hisham<br><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">
On 28 December 2009 09:47, I=F1aki Baz Castillo <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:ibc@aliax.net">ibc@aliax.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204=
); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
Hi, my question is related to subscription for XCAP document changes:<br>
<br>
<br>
a)<br>
The format for XCAP diff is defined in:<br>
 =A0<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-simple-xcap-diff" targ=
et=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-simple-xcap-diff</a><br=
>
<br>
<br>
b)<br>
How a SIP user agent subscribes to changes in XCAP documents is defined in:=
<br>
 =A0<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcapevent" target=
=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcapevent</a><br>
However it&#39;s also defined in:<br>
 =A0<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcap-config" targe=
t=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcap-config</a> =A0(=
page 8)<br>
<br>
This last draft is an extension to draft-ietf-sipping-config-framework so a=
<br>
device can get its provisioned configuration from a XCAP resource. But it a=
lso<br>
allows a SIP user to subscribe to changes in XCAP documents.<br>
<br>
So, which is the definitive way?<br>
<br>
Thanks a lot.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
<br>
--<br>
I=F1aki Baz Castillo &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ibc@aliax.net">ibc@aliax.net</a>=
&gt;<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Simple mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Simple@ietf.org">Simple@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple</a><br>
</font></blockquote></div><br>

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Subject: Re: [Simple] Subscription to XCAP document: which is the definitive draft?
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El Martes, 19 de Enero de 2010, Hisham Khartabil escribi=C3=B3:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sip-xcapevent
>=20
> The other draft is very old and obsolete.

Great :)
Thanks a lot.

=2D-=20
I=C3=B1aki Baz Castillo <ibc@aliax.net>

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Mon Jan 25 05:42:09 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Ben Campbell <ben@estacado.net>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2010 14:42:10 +0100
Thread-Topic: WGLC MSRP ACM Security Considerations [was: RE: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments]
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Subject: [Simple] WGLC MSRP ACM Security Considerations [was: RE: WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments]
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=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ben Campbell [mailto:ben@estacado.net]=20
> Sent: 16. tammikuuta 2010 0:24
> To: Christer Holmberg
> Cc: Simple WG
> Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch=20
> - Ben's comments
>=20
> Hi again,
>=20
> On Jan 15, 2010, at 6:55 AM, Christer Holmberg wrote:
>=20
> >=20
> > Hi,
> >=20
> > -------------------- WGLC review of draft-ietf-simple-msrp-acm-03:
> >=20
> >>>>>>>> -- Section 4.2, 4th paragraph from end:
> >=20
> > <fast forward>
> >=20
> >>> I could add a note, saying:
> >>>=20
> >>> "NOTE: If a proxy is located between the UA and the UA=20
> will not be=20
> >>> able to detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses,=20
> since the IP=20
> >>> addresses in the Via sent-by and the received header field=20
> >>> parameters will match."
> >>>=20
> >>> It is also good to note that the intention is not to=20
> specify how a=20
> >>> UA detects NATs, but simply to indicate what kind of mechanism=20
> >>> deployments use.
> >>>=20
> >> Okay, I went back and reread the paragraph. I don't think the=20
> >> guidance is very useful, as there are too many scenarios=20
> in which it=20
> >> breaks down. We already have the example where a NAT=20
> exists but not=20
> >> between the UA and the first-hop SIP proxy. It also breaks down if=20
> >> the peer UA is behind the same NAT.
> >>=20
> >> I'd be okay with something to the effect that some=20
> implementations do=20
> >> this to make guesses about NATs. It may be useful in some=20
> cases, but=20
> >> it doesn't work in all cases, such as the ones we've discussed.
> >=20
> > "Some UAs can determinte whether the SIP signaling has=20
> traversed a NAT=20
> > by inspecting the SIP Via header field in the 200 (OK)=20
> response to the=20
> > initial REGISTER request, and comparing the IP addresses in the Via=20
> > sent-by and the received header field parameters.  If these are not=20
> > the same then the UA can determine that there is a NAT in the path.
> > Even though the media transport might not traverse the NAT,=20
> it is safe=20
> > to assume that it will, and set the a=3Dsetup attribute accordingly.=20
> > This comparing mechanism does not work in all scenarios,=20
> though. For=20
> > example, if the NAT contains a SIP proxy, the UA will not=20
> be able to=20
> > detect the NAT by comparing the IP addresses."
>=20
> I can live with that.
>=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >=20
> >>>>>>>> -- Section 4.3:
> >=20
> > <fast forward>
> >=20
> >>>>> Alt 1:
> >>>>> ------
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> "4.3.  TLS
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS=20
> for MSRP.=20
> >>>>> If an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it MUST use=20
> >>>>> the TLS mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> Alt 2:
> >>>>> ------
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> "4.3.  TLS
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport connection for=20
> MSRP, using=20
> >>>>> self-signed certificates, the role  of TLS client and=20
> TLS server=20
> >>>>> SHOULD negotiate the  relevant parameter as defined in=20
> COMEDIA-TLS=20
> >>>>> [RFC4572], and in accordance with [RFC4975] the MSRP URI scheme=20
> >>>>> SHOULD be msrps and the m-line protocol indicator SHOULD  be=20
> >>>>> TCP/TLS/MSRP.
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> If self-signed certificates are not used, MSRP Uas MUST=20
>  use the=20
> >>>>> TLS mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976."
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> Pick your favorite :)
> >>>>=20
> >>>> Ah, now I see what I was missing. Refresh my memory--does=20
> >>>> COMEDIA-TLS allow one to negotiate the TLS client and=20
> server roles=20
> >>>> independent of the TCP active and passive roles? If so,=20
> then I lean=20
> >>>> towards Alt 2 (but am not sure we need the second paragraph.
> >>>=20
> >>> According to section 6.2 of RFC 4572 the endpoint taking=20
> the passive=20
> >>> role acts as TLS server, and the endpoint taking the=20
> active role acts as TLS client.
> >>=20
> >> So it's really no different with COMEDIA than without,=20
> other than the=20
> >> fact that the offerer is not always the active party.
> >>=20
> >>>> Also, Am I correct in guessing you meant the 2nd clause in
> >>>> paragraph1 of Alt 2 to say something along the lines of "...=20
> >>>> the role of TLS client and TLS server SHOULD be=20
> negoatiated using=20
> >>>> the relevant parameter..." rather than "SHOULD negotiate the=20
> >>>> relevant parameter..." ?
> >>>=20
> >>> No, it means that the TLS client and server negotiate the=20
> relevant parameters.=20
> >> However, that is not MSRP specific, so I am not sure we need it.
> >>>=20
> >>> In fact, I don't think we need the first paragraph (the=20
> current one, that is) at all.
> >>=20
> >> The more I think about it, I don't think we get anything from=20
> >> COMEDIA-TLS that is not already covered in section 14.4 of=20
> RFC 4975.=20
> >> So I'm back to preferring Alt 1, with the addition of something to=20
> >> the effect of:
> >>=20
> >> "Note that the active UA will take the role of the TLS client, and=20
> >> the passive UA will take the roll of the TLS server. UAs using=20
> >> self-signed TLS certificates SHOULD include certificate=20
> fingerprints=20
> >> as described in RFC 4975 section 14.4."
> >=20
> > "4.3.  TLS
> >=20
> > This document does not specify the usage of COMEDIA-TLS for=20
> MSRP. If=20
> > an MSRP UA conformant to this document uses TLS, it MUST=20
> use the TLS=20
> > mechanisms defined in RFC4975 and RFC4976.
> >=20
> > Note that the active UA will take the role of the TLS=20
> client, and the=20
> > passive UA will take the roll of the TLS server. UAs using=20
> self-signed=20
> > TLS certificates SHOULD include certificate fingerprints as=20
> described=20
> > in RFC 4975 section 14.4."
>=20
> Works for me.
>=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >=20
> >>>>>>>> -- Section 5:
> >=20
> > <fast forward>
> >=20
> >>> So, if nobody objects, I will remove the who section=20
> ("NAT keepalive").
> >>=20
> >> No objection from me :-)
> >=20
> > Fixed.
> >=20
> > In addition, the following text is removed from the=20
> Abstract section:
> >=20
> > "The document also defines how an MSRP UA which is located=20
> behind a NAT keeps the NAT binding alive."
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
>=20
> >=20
> > -------------
> >>>>>>>> -- Section 6:
> >>>>>>>>=20
> >>>>>>>> Have we thought through whether changing the active=20
> party has=20
> >>>>>>>> any impact on TLS security? Does this interact with key=20
> >>>>>>>> fingerprints in the signaling channel? (I'm not=20
> saying that I=20
> >>>>>>>> know it does--I just want to make sure we've thought=20
> about it.)
> >>>>>>>=20
> >>>>>>> I don't think there should be any impacts, because=20
> now MSRP will=20
> >>>>>>> be alligned with other comedia usages.
> >>>>>>=20
> >>>>>> I see  you and Adam have discussed this one quite a bit--I'll=20
> >>>>>> join that discussion rather than rehash it here. But=20
> overall, I=20
> >>>>>> think a "no new considerations" Security=20
> Considerations section=20

Hi,

>>>>>>>in a draft like this one will be a red flag for the IESG and=20
>>>>>>>security reviewers.
>>>>>>>We need to express supporting arguments as to why we believe this=20
>>>>>>>to be true.
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>We can do that, but I would really appretiate some help with putting =
text together.
>>>>>=20
>>>>>Okay--Let me think if I can propose some text, or at least some more d=
etails.
>>>>=20
>>>>Great. I would really appretiate that. I will also try to come up with =
something.
>>>=20
>>>Working on it.
>>=20
>>If we don't use COMEDIA-TLS, but simply refer to 4975 for TLS, I guess th=
ere shouldn't be any issues. Or?
>> =20
>I think there may be some language in the security=20
>consideration section of 4975 concerning how you match the=20
>certificate to the server that we need to check to make sure=20
>it does not contain assumptions about which party is client=20
>or server.=20

I was reading the security considerations of 4975, and didn't find any such=
 assumptions.

The text generally talks about sending the fingerprint in SDP, but I can't =
find any specific assumptions.

Regards,

Christer


From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Mon Jan 25 05:44:45 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Ben Campbell <ben@estacado.net>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2010 14:44:47 +0100
Thread-Topic: WGLC MSRP ACM Security Considerations [was: RE: WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments]
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Cc: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>
Subject: [Simple] WGLC MSRP ACM Security Considerations [was: RE: WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments]
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Hi,

Sorry, forgot to remove some text, in order to make it more clear.

>>If we don't use COMEDIA-TLS, but simply refer to 4975 for TLS, I guess th=
ere shouldn't be any issues. Or?
>> =20
>I think there may be some language in the security=20
>consideration section of 4975 concerning how you match the=20
>certificate to the server that we need to check to make sure=20
>it does not contain assumptions about which party is client=20
>or server.=20
>=20

I was reading the security considerations of 4975, and didn't=20
find any such assumptions.
=20
The text generally talks about sending the fingerprint in=20
SDP, but I can't find any specific assumptions.
=20
Regards,
=20
Christer

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Tue Jan 26 01:19:39 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>, Ben Campbell <ben@estacado.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 10:19:44 +0100
Thread-Topic: [Simple] WGLC MSRP ACM Security Considerations [was: RE: WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments]
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Cc: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Simple] WGLC MSRP ACM Security Considerations [was: RE: WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments]
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What about the following text?

---------

According to the connection model defined in [RFC4975], the MSRP UA which s=
ends the SDP offer is the "active", ", and it is responsible for creating t=
he MSRP transport
connection towards the remote UA if a new connection is required. The "acti=
ve" UA also takes the role as TLS client, if TLS is used to protect the MSR=
P messages.

When COMEDIA is used, either the sender or the receiver of the SDP offer ca=
n become "active", and therefor also take the role as TLS client. However, =
there are no procedures in
[RFC4975] that would break in case the receiver of the SDP offerer takes th=
e role as TLS client, and the level of security provided by TLS is not affe=
cted."

---------

Regards,

Christer

=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: simple-bounces@ietf.org=20
> [mailto:simple-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Christer Holmberg
> Sent: 25. tammikuuta 2010 15:45
> To: Ben Campbell
> Cc: Simple WG
> Subject: [Simple] WGLC MSRP ACM Security Considerations [was:=20
> RE: WGLC of msrp-acm and msrp-sessionmatch - Ben's comments]
>=20
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> Sorry, forgot to remove some text, in order to make it more clear.
>=20
> >>If we don't use COMEDIA-TLS, but simply refer to 4975 for=20
> TLS, I guess there shouldn't be any issues. Or?
> >> =20
> >I think there may be some language in the security consideration=20
> >section of 4975 concerning how you match the certificate to=20
> the server=20
> >that we need to check to make sure it does not contain assumptions=20
> >about which party is client or server.
> >=20
>=20
> I was reading the security considerations of 4975, and didn't=20
> find any such assumptions.
> =20
> The text generally talks about sending the fingerprint in=20
> SDP, but I can't find any specific assumptions.
> =20
> Regards,
> =20
> Christer
> _______________________________________________
> Simple mailing list
> Simple@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/simple
> =

From christer.holmberg@ericsson.com  Fri Jan 29 03:23:32 2010
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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Simple WG <simple@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2010 12:23:49 +0100
Thread-Topic: MSRP ACM: Usage of COMEDIA-TLS needed after all?
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Hi,

A while ago, it was agreed that we will not refer to COMEDIA-TLS in the ACM=
 draft, based on the argument that the TLS procedures in 4975 already cover=
s all we need.

However, when reading the 4975 text we've spotted an issue with using only =
the 4975 TLS procedures in ACM:

4975 says that the "SDP offerer" provides the fingerprint. The text does NO=
T talk about the "active party" providing the fingerprint, which I guess is=
 due to the 4975 definition that the SDP offerer is always the active party=
.

But, when COMEDIA is used, the SDP answerer can become the active party. Bu=
t, there is no text in 4975 about the SDP answerer providing the fingerprin=
t.

Now, there are two ways of solving this:

1. In ACM we specify that an SDP offer with active and actpass shall contai=
n the fingerprint, and that an SDP answer with active shall contain the fin=
gerprint.

OR

2. In ACM we refer to the COMEDIA-TLS procedures, that species the usage of=
 mutual authentication, which means both the SDP offer and SDP answer will =
always contain the fingerprint.

My preference is option 2. Since we use COMEDIA, I think it is much more fe=
asible to also use COMEDIA-TLS, instead of specifying new additional MSRP s=
pecific TLS procedures.

So, if we go for option 2, I propose the following changes/additions to the=
 ACM draft:

----------

4.3.  TLS

   If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport connection for MSRP, the Uas SHALL=
 follow the procedures defined in [RFC4975]. The
   active MSRP UA will take the role of the TLS client, and the passive UA =
will take the role of the TLS server.

----------

6.  Security Considerations

   Use of the COMEDIA procedures changes the connection model described in =
RFC 4975 in that any MSRP endpoint might set up the TCP or
   TCP/TLS connection, and not only the client sending the SDP offer.

   TLS security is not compromised by this fact, since mutual authenticatio=
n [RFC4572] is used - both endpoints provides certificate fingerprints
   in SDP and certificates in TLS independent of if they are active or pass=
ive. The endpoint that receives the TLS connection can always verify the so=
urce
   of the connection, independent of if the connection is set up from the S=
DP offerer or answerer.

----------

If people are ok with this, I will add the text to the draft.


Regards,

Christer



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<font face=3D"Arial, sans-serif" size=3D"3">
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Hi,</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">A while ago, it was agreed that we will not refer to =
COMEDIA-TLS in the ACM draft, based on the argument that the TLS procedures=
 in 4975 already covers all we need.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">However, when reading the 4975 text we've spotted an =
issue with using only the 4975 TLS procedures in ACM:</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">4975 says that the &quot;SDP offerer&quot; provides t=
he fingerprint. The text does NOT talk about the &quot;active party&quot; p=
roviding the fingerprint, which I guess is due to the 4975 definition that =
the SDP offerer is always the active party.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">But, when COMEDIA is used, the SDP answerer can becom=
e the active party. But, there is no text in 4975 about the SDP answerer pr=
oviding the fingerprint.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Now, there are two ways of solving this:</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">1. In ACM we specify that an SDP offer with active an=
d actpass shall contain the fingerprint, and that an SDP answer with active=
 shall contain the fingerprint.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">OR</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">2. In ACM we refer to the COMEDIA-TLS procedures, tha=
t species the usage of mutual authentication, which means both the SDP offe=
r and SDP answer will always contain the fingerprint.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">My preference is option 2. Since we use COMEDIA, I th=
ink it is much more feasible to also use COMEDIA-TLS, instead of specifying=
 new additional MSRP specific TLS procedures.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">So, if we go for option 2, I propose the following ch=
anges/additions to the ACM draft:</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">----------</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font face=3D"Courier New, monospace" size=3D"2">4.3.&nbsp; TLS</font>=
</div>
<div><font face=3D"Courier New, monospace" size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;&nbsp; If MSRP UAs negotiate a TLS transport co=
nnection for MSRP, the Uas SHALL follow the procedures defined in [RFC4975]=
. The </font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;&nbsp; active MSRP UA will take the role of the=
 TLS client, and the passive UA will take the role of the TLS server.</font=
></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">----------</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">6.&nbsp; Security Considerations</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;&nbsp; Use of the COMEDIA procedures changes th=
e connection model described in RFC 4975 in that any MSRP endpoint might se=
t up the TCP or</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;&nbsp; TCP/TLS connection, and not only the cli=
ent sending the SDP offer. </font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS security is not compromised by this =
fact, since mutual authentication [RFC4572] is used - both endpoints provid=
es certificate fingerprints</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;&nbsp; in SDP and certificates in TLS independe=
nt of if they are active or passive. The endpoint that receives the TLS con=
nection can always verify the source </font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;&nbsp; of the connection, independent of if the=
 connection is set up from the SDP offerer or answerer.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">----------</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">If people are ok with this, I will add the text to th=
e draft. </font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Regards,</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">Christer</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2">&nbsp;</font></div>
</font>
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