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From: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com>
To: 'LAMPS' <spasm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Does 6211 actually do what it claims to?
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Date: Tue, 1 Jun 2021 21:26:48 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/B1jEVm-gyDlZmv4GPpFygVO5SJw>
Subject: [lamps] Does 6211 actually do what it claims to?
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This is maybe a dumb question coming from a relative PKIX newcomer.

RFC 6211 sets out to solve algorithm substitution attacks in CMS by includi=
ng the digestAlgorithm, and either signatureAlgorithm or macAlgorithm in th=
e digested-and-signed content.

Cheekily: does this actually solve algorithm substitution attacks?

Seems like a chicken-and-egg situation where, during signature verification=
, you are using the (currently unverified) content to tell you how to verif=
y the content. In particular, 6211 puts the digest alg id inside the digest=
, and therefore it's fair game for manipulation during a hash collision att=
ack.=20

PKCS#1 v1.5 puts the digest alg id outside (ie next to) the digest in the s=
igned data, which seems like it gets you out of the checken-and-egg situati=
on because now you would need a collision in the signature primitive, not i=
n the hash primitive (ie it's now the sig primitive protecting the hash pri=
mitive, rather than the hash primitive protecting itself). RSA-PSS internal=
ly does something that looks distinctly HMAC-y, so it's probably ok too but=
 for different reasons.


Furthermore, a quote from Kaliski, Burton, 2002, "On hash function firewall=
s in signature schemes":

"Note that identifying the hash function in the message itself is not enoug=
h; it is likely as easy for an opponent to control the identifier as any ot=
her part of a message when forging a signature."=20

.. which seems exactly what 6211 has done.



So, am I missing something, or are hash function substitution attacks only =
really solvable via the construction of the signature primitive, and not at=
 the protocol layer? In which case, 6211 does not actually solve the proble=
m that it set out to solve?



PS: I also posted this to stack exchange: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/=
q/90318/24012

---
Mike Ounsworth
Software Security Architect, Entrust


From nobody Wed Jun  2 13:51:23 2021
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] Does 6211 actually do what it claims to?
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Mike:

In CMS SignedData and AuthenticatedData, then algorithm identifiers are =
not covered by the signature or MAC, respectively.

RFC 6211 provides an signed attribute / authenticated attribute to =
provide this capability.=20

      CMSAlgorithmProtection ::=3D SEQUENCE {
          digestAlgorithm         DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
          signatureAlgorithm  [1] SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
          macAlgorithm        [2] MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm =
OPTIONAL }

In X.509 certificates, the signature algorithm appears twice.  One of =
them is covered by the issuer's signature.  RFC 6211 provides =
essentially the same thing.

Russ

> On Jun 1, 2021, at 5:26 PM, Mike Ounsworth =
<Mike.Ounsworth=3D40entrust.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> This is maybe a dumb question coming from a relative PKIX newcomer.
>=20
> RFC 6211 sets out to solve algorithm substitution attacks in CMS by =
including the digestAlgorithm, and either signatureAlgorithm or =
macAlgorithm in the digested-and-signed content.
>=20
> Cheekily: does this actually solve algorithm substitution attacks?
>=20
> Seems like a chicken-and-egg situation where, during signature =
verification, you are using the (currently unverified) content to tell =
you how to verify the content. In particular, 6211 puts the digest alg =
id inside the digest, and therefore it's fair game for manipulation =
during a hash collision attack.=20
>=20
> PKCS#1 v1.5 puts the digest alg id outside (ie next to) the digest in =
the signed data, which seems like it gets you out of the checken-and-egg =
situation because now you would need a collision in the signature =
primitive, not in the hash primitive (ie it's now the sig primitive =
protecting the hash primitive, rather than the hash primitive protecting =
itself). RSA-PSS internally does something that looks distinctly HMAC-y, =
so it's probably ok too but for different reasons.
>=20
>=20
> Furthermore, a quote from Kaliski, Burton, 2002, "On hash function =
firewalls in signature schemes":
>=20
> "Note that identifying the hash function in the message itself is not =
enough; it is likely as easy for an opponent to control the identifier =
as any other part of a message when forging a signature."=20
>=20
> .. which seems exactly what 6211 has done.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> So, am I missing something, or are hash function substitution attacks =
only really solvable via the construction of the signature primitive, =
and not at the protocol layer? In which case, 6211 does not actually =
solve the problem that it set out to solve?
>=20
>=20
>=20
> PS: I also posted this to stack exchange: =
https://crypto.stackexchange.com/q/90318/24012
>=20
> ---
> Mike Ounsworth
> Software Security Architect, Entrust
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm


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From: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: LAMPS <spasm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [EXTERNAL] Re: [lamps] Does 6211 actually do what it claims to?
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/ydVfp0luVj9S8r2SXiLGlDs6Nfs>
Subject: Re: [lamps] [EXTERNAL] Re: Does 6211 actually do what it claims to?
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Hi Russ,

Right. I'm not saying 6211 is any worse than bare CMS SignedData / Authenti=
catedData. My question is: is it actually better?=20

Here's my attack scenario. Say I'm setting out to do an algorithm substitut=
ion attack against a signer who uses, say, an ECDSA-SHA256 signature. For t=
he sake of argument, let's assume that RIPEMD is critically broken and acce=
pted by the verifier. I take a legitimate message-signature pair (m, s) fro=
m the victim. I compute a second message m' where SHA256(m) =3D RIPEMD256(m=
'). Therefore ECDSA-SHA256(m, s) and ECDSA-RIPEMD256(m',s) both appear vali=
d under the victim's pubic key. I have a forged signature on m'.

I believe this is the attack that 6211 is purporting to prevent. I also bel=
ieve that it does not prevent it; by putting the digestAlgorithm inside the=
 message being digested, the signature s is only implicitly bound to the di=
gestAlgorithm; as long as it's changed to digestAlgorithm=3DRIPEMD256 in th=
e forged message m', the algorithm substitution will be undetectable.

I hope I'm missing something ..?

---
Mike Ounsworth

-----Original Message-----
From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>=20
Sent: June 2, 2021 3:51 PM
To: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com>
Cc: LAMPS <spasm@ietf.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [lamps] Does 6211 actually do what it claims to?

WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.
DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know the =
content is safe.

______________________________________________________________________
Mike:

In CMS SignedData and AuthenticatedData, then algorithm identifiers are not=
 covered by the signature or MAC, respectively.

RFC 6211 provides an signed attribute / authenticated attribute to provide =
this capability.=20

      CMSAlgorithmProtection ::=3D SEQUENCE {
          digestAlgorithm         DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
          signatureAlgorithm  [1] SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
          macAlgorithm        [2] MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm OPTION=
AL }

In X.509 certificates, the signature algorithm appears twice.  One of them =
is covered by the issuer's signature.  RFC 6211 provides essentially the sa=
me thing.

Russ

> On Jun 1, 2021, at 5:26 PM, Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth=3D40entrust.co=
m@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> This is maybe a dumb question coming from a relative PKIX newcomer.
>=20
> RFC 6211 sets out to solve algorithm substitution attacks in CMS by inclu=
ding the digestAlgorithm, and either signatureAlgorithm or macAlgorithm in =
the digested-and-signed content.
>=20
> Cheekily: does this actually solve algorithm substitution attacks?
>=20
> Seems like a chicken-and-egg situation where, during signature verificati=
on, you are using the (currently unverified) content to tell you how to ver=
ify the content. In particular, 6211 puts the digest alg id inside the dige=
st, and therefore it's fair game for manipulation during a hash collision a=
ttack.=20
>=20
> PKCS#1 v1.5 puts the digest alg id outside (ie next to) the digest in the=
 signed data, which seems like it gets you out of the checken-and-egg situa=
tion because now you would need a collision in the signature primitive, not=
 in the hash primitive (ie it's now the sig primitive protecting the hash p=
rimitive, rather than the hash primitive protecting itself). RSA-PSS intern=
ally does something that looks distinctly HMAC-y, so it's probably ok too b=
ut for different reasons.
>=20
>=20
> Furthermore, a quote from Kaliski, Burton, 2002, "On hash function firewa=
lls in signature schemes":
>=20
> "Note that identifying the hash function in the message itself is not eno=
ugh; it is likely as easy for an opponent to control the identifier as any =
other part of a message when forging a signature."=20
>=20
> .. which seems exactly what 6211 has done.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> So, am I missing something, or are hash function substitution attacks onl=
y really solvable via the construction of the signature primitive, and not =
at the protocol layer? In which case, 6211 does not actually solve the prob=
lem that it set out to solve?
>=20
>=20
>=20
> PS: I also posted this to stack exchange: https://urldefense.com/v3/__htt=
ps://crypto.stackexchange.com/q/90318/24012__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!Nuglq_FViyrunB=
Em50OHp1mJ7q-7zf2RRwpi_4xhIUEWMcolaQY93uEHNjWfmR1bf9VkMfuLgg$=20
>=20
> ---
> Mike Ounsworth
> Software Security Architect, Entrust
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm__=
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fmR1bf9WyADf3eQ$=20


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Subject: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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In OpenSSL recently a problem has been identified on how to derive a hash a=
lgorithm from signatureAlgorithm OID when using EdDSA, see https://github.c=
om/openssl/openssl/issues/15477

In CMP this implicitly defined hash algorithms is used to calculate the cer=
tHash in a certConf messages. This would fail when using EdDSA.
The CertStatus structure including certHash is defined as follows:
     CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
        certHash    OCTET STRING,
        -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
        -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
        certReqId   INTEGER,
        -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
     }
=20
Therefore, the hash algorithms to be used for computing the certHash must b=
e determined in some other way.
I currently see the following options:
(1) Specify usage of SHA-1 for calculating certHash, similar to the definit=
ion of the keyIdentifier in RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.2.
  This is the cheapest solution, but we explicitly removed SHA-1 from CMP A=
lgorithms, see mail thread "Re: CMP Algorithms I-D".
(2) Specify a hash algorithm on a per signature algorithm basis.
   This is also quite simple to implement, but costly to maintain for upcom=
ing algorithms.
(3) Extend the ASN.1 syntax of CertStatus to allow to specify an optional h=
ashAlg OID for those cases where the hash algorithm cannot be determined au=
tomatically.
   This is probably the cleanest solution, but involves a change to the ASN=
.1 syntax.
=20
Does anyone sees other, better solutions?
What solution is preferred by the WG?

- Hendrik


From nobody Tue Jun  8 08:42:34 2021
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From: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 17:42:06 +0200
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To: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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--000000000000c9505305c44300b6
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

I prefer to use SHA-512 for Ed25519 and SHAKE256(x, 64) for Ed448, as in
RFC8419:

2.3 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8419#section-2.3>.
Message Digest Algorithm Identifiers

   When the signer includes signed attributes, a message digest
   algorithm is used to compute the message digest on the eContent
   value.  When signing with Ed25519, the message digest algorithm MUST
   be SHA-512 [FIPS180
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8419#ref-FIPS180>].
Additional information on SHA-512 is available
   in [RFC6234 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6234>].  When
signing with Ed448, the message digest algorithm
   MUST be SHAKE256 [FIPS202
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8419#ref-FIPS202>] with a
512-bit output value.


On Tue, Jun 8, 2021 at 5:20 PM Brockhaus, Hendrik <
hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com> wrote:

> In OpenSSL recently a problem has been identified on how to derive a hash
> algorithm from signatureAlgorithm OID when using EdDSA, see
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/15477
>
> In CMP this implicitly defined hash algorithms is used to calculate the
> certHash in a certConf messages. This would fail when using EdDSA.
> The CertStatus structure including certHash is defined as follows:
>      CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
>         certHash    OCTET STRING,
>         -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
>         -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
>         certReqId   INTEGER,
>         -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
>         statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>      }
>
> Therefore, the hash algorithms to be used for computing the certHash must
> be determined in some other way.
> I currently see the following options:
> (1) Specify usage of SHA-1 for calculating certHash, similar to the
> definition of the keyIdentifier in RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.2.
>   This is the cheapest solution, but we explicitly removed SHA-1 from CMP
> Algorithms, see mail thread "Re: CMP Algorithms I-D".
> (2) Specify a hash algorithm on a per signature algorithm basis.
>    This is also quite simple to implement, but costly to maintain for
> upcoming algorithms.
> (3) Extend the ASN.1 syntax of CertStatus to allow to specify an optional
> hashAlg OID for those cases where the hash algorithm cannot be determined
> automatically.
>    This is probably the cleanest solution, but involves a change to the
> ASN.1 syntax.
>
> Does anyone sees other, better solutions?
> What solution is preferred by the WG?
>
> - Hendrik
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>


-- 
Lijun Liao

--000000000000c9505305c44300b6
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I prefer to use SHA-512 for Ed25519 and SHAKE256(x, 64) fo=
r Ed448, as in RFC8419:<br><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage"><span class=3D"gmai=
l-h3"><a class=3D"gmail-selflink" id=3D"gmail-section-2.3" href=3D"https://=
datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8419#section-2.3">2.3</a>.  Message Digest=
 Algorithm Identifiers</span>

   When the signer includes signed attributes, a message digest
   algorithm is used to compute the message digest on the eContent
   value.  When signing with Ed25519, the message digest algorithm MUST
   be SHA-512 [<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8419#ref=
-FIPS180" title=3D"&quot;Secure Hash Standard (SHS)&quot;">FIPS180</a>].  A=
dditional information on SHA-512 is available
   in [<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6234" title=3D"&=
quot;US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)&quot;">RFC=
6234</a>].  When signing with Ed448, the message digest algorithm
   MUST be SHAKE256 [<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc84=
19#ref-FIPS202" title=3D"&quot;SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and E=
xtendable-Output Functions&quot;">FIPS202</a>] with a 512-bit output value.=
</pre></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_=
attr">On Tue, Jun 8, 2021 at 5:20 PM Brockhaus, Hendrik &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com">hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">In OpenSSL r=
ecently a problem has been identified on how to derive a hash algorithm fro=
m signatureAlgorithm OID when using EdDSA, see <a href=3D"https://github.co=
m/openssl/openssl/issues/15477" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/15477</a><br>
<br>
In CMP this implicitly defined hash algorithms is used to calculate the cer=
tHash in a certConf messages. This would fail when using EdDSA.<br>
The CertStatus structure including certHash is defined as follows:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 certHash=C2=A0 =C2=A0 OCTET STRING,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- the hash of the certificate, using the same =
hash algorithm<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- as is used to create and verify the certific=
ate signature<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 certReqId=C2=A0 =C2=A0INTEGER,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- to match this confirmation with the correspo=
nding req/rep<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 statusInfo=C2=A0 PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
<br>
Therefore, the hash algorithms to be used for computing the certHash must b=
e determined in some other way.<br>
I currently see the following options:<br>
(1) Specify usage of SHA-1 for calculating certHash, similar to the definit=
ion of the keyIdentifier in RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.2.<br>
=C2=A0 This is the cheapest solution, but we explicitly removed SHA-1 from =
CMP Algorithms, see mail thread &quot;Re: CMP Algorithms I-D&quot;.<br>
(2) Specify a hash algorithm on a per signature algorithm basis.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This is also quite simple to implement, but costly to maintain=
 for upcoming algorithms.<br>
(3) Extend the ASN.1 syntax of CertStatus to allow to specify an optional h=
ashAlg OID for those cases where the hash algorithm cannot be determined au=
tomatically.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This is probably the cleanest solution, but involves a change =
to the ASN.1 syntax.<br>
<br>
Does anyone sees other, better solutions?<br>
What solution is preferred by the WG?<br>
<br>
- Hendrik<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Spasm mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"g=
mail_signature">Lijun Liao</div>

--000000000000c9505305c44300b6--


From nobody Tue Jun  8 08:53:51 2021
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 11:53:39 -0400
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add something =
like:

CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
   hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
   ...

That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol =
version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.

Russ


> On Jun 8, 2021, at 11:19 AM, Brockhaus, Hendrik =
<hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com> wrote:
>=20
> In OpenSSL recently a problem has been identified on how to derive a =
hash algorithm from signatureAlgorithm OID when using EdDSA, see =
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/15477
>=20
> In CMP this implicitly defined hash algorithms is used to calculate =
the certHash in a certConf messages. This would fail when using EdDSA.
> The CertStatus structure including certHash is defined as follows:
>     CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>        certHash    OCTET STRING,
>        -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
>        -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
>        certReqId   INTEGER,
>        -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
>        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>     }
>=20
> Therefore, the hash algorithms to be used for computing the certHash =
must be determined in some other way.
> I currently see the following options:
> (1) Specify usage of SHA-1 for calculating certHash, similar to the =
definition of the keyIdentifier in RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.2.
>  This is the cheapest solution, but we explicitly removed SHA-1 from =
CMP Algorithms, see mail thread "Re: CMP Algorithms I-D".
> (2) Specify a hash algorithm on a per signature algorithm basis.
>   This is also quite simple to implement, but costly to maintain for =
upcoming algorithms.
> (3) Extend the ASN.1 syntax of CertStatus to allow to specify an =
optional hashAlg OID for those cases where the hash algorithm cannot be =
determined automatically.
>   This is probably the cleanest solution, but involves a change to the =
ASN.1 syntax.
>=20
> Does anyone sees other, better solutions?
> What solution is preferred by the WG?
>=20
> - Hendrik
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm


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From: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
To: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
CC: LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>, "david.von.oheimb@siemens.com" <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/7It2jth4orWdaHy0cBDvqeIx3Js>
Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Thanks Liao for pointing me to this section. This would solve the issue for=
 EdDSA. But a similar solution would be needed for upcoming signature algor=
ithms having the same issue.
Using solution (3), like Russ proposes, one could of explicitly specify the=
se hashAlgs. This could as well be mentioned somewhere in CMP Algorithms.
What do you think?

Hendrik

Von: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
Gesendet: Dienstag, 8. Juni 2021 17:42
An: Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
Cc: LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>; von Oheimb, David (T RDA CST SEA-DE) <david.=
von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Betreff: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating cer=
tHash

I prefer to use SHA-512 for Ed25519 and SHAKE256(x, 64) for Ed448, as in RF=
C8419:

2.3<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdat=
atracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8419%23section-2.3&data=3D04%7C01%7Chen=
drik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54b08d92a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd9=
5794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587638146409426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3=
d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000=
&sdata=3DY627fZeD%2BEQVX5f5qy4X%2BU0vQl0NLO329E%2Beqx0p0t4%3D&reserved=3D0>=
.  Message Digest Algorithm Identifiers



   When the signer includes signed attributes, a message digest

   algorithm is used to compute the message digest on the eContent

   value.  When signing with Ed25519, the message digest algorithm MUST

   be SHA-512 [FIPS180<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=
=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8419%23ref-FIPS180&=
data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54b08d9=
2a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587638146409426%7C=
Unknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiL=
CJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=3DmnWxww79bLA1LOJcUAjuU72ofBd1SpZ%2FMPQngC2olgY%=
3D&reserved=3D0>].  Additional information on SHA-512 is available

   in [RFC6234<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%=
3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc6234&data=3D04%7C01%7Chendri=
k.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54b08d92a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd9579=
4fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587638146419422%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8e=
yJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sd=
ata=3D6Z%2BYO8Z9WHBqo%2Flf2ptpZafEV9cp8nKdYFLebB1yo50%3D&reserved=3D0>].  W=
hen signing with Ed448, the message digest algorithm

   MUST be SHAKE256 [FIPS202<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com=
/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc8419%23ref-FIP=
S202&data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54=
b08d92a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C6375876381464194=
22%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1h=
aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=3DATwZyWcQVZQSlPAxY4U8sdOWFmRRQXivUtjTT%2Bu=
OjjA%3D&reserved=3D0>] with a 512-bit output value.

On Tue, Jun 8, 2021 at 5:20 PM Brockhaus, Hendrik <hendrik.brockhaus@siemen=
s.com<mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>> wrote:
In OpenSSL recently a problem has been identified on how to derive a hash a=
lgorithm from signatureAlgorithm OID when using EdDSA, see https://github.c=
om/openssl/openssl/issues/15477<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.=
com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fopenssl%2Fopenssl%2Fissues%2F15477&da=
ta=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54b08d92a=
9400b5%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587638146429413%7CUn=
known%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJ=
XVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=3Dweix2JOonIy8FvoHb0rF8jZIsQPDMSd7ZOJiG8LXkXA%3D&r=
eserved=3D0>

In CMP this implicitly defined hash algorithms is used to calculate the cer=
tHash in a certConf messages. This would fail when using EdDSA.
The CertStatus structure including certHash is defined as follows:
     CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
        certHash    OCTET STRING,
        -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
        -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
        certReqId   INTEGER,
        -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
     }

Therefore, the hash algorithms to be used for computing the certHash must b=
e determined in some other way.
I currently see the following options:
(1) Specify usage of SHA-1 for calculating certHash, similar to the definit=
ion of the keyIdentifier in RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.2.
  This is the cheapest solution, but we explicitly removed SHA-1 from CMP A=
lgorithms, see mail thread "Re: CMP Algorithms I-D".
(2) Specify a hash algorithm on a per signature algorithm basis.
   This is also quite simple to implement, but costly to maintain for upcom=
ing algorithms.
(3) Extend the ASN.1 syntax of CertStatus to allow to specify an optional h=
ashAlg OID for those cases where the hash algorithm cannot be determined au=
tomatically.
   This is probably the cleanest solution, but involves a change to the ASN=
.1 syntax.

Does anyone sees other, better solutions?
What solution is preferred by the WG?

- Hendrik

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3%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1ha=
WwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&sdata=3DgfBHS7RQse%2BFFf4Z2k75gy8Ywr%2FLc9xf%2Flwt=
T4IUUr8%3D&reserved=3D0>


--
Lijun Liao

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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US">Thanks Liao for pointing me to this section. This would solve the iss=
ue for EdDSA. But a similar solution would be needed for upcoming signature=
 algorithms having the same issue.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US">Using solution (3), like Russ proposes, one could of explicitly speci=
fy these hashAlgs. This could as well be mentioned somewhere in CMP Algorit=
hms.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US">What do you think?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US">Hendrik<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt">
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>Von:</b> Lijun Liao &lt;lijun.liao@gmail.com&gt; =
<br>
<b>Gesendet:</b> Dienstag, 8. Juni 2021 17:42<br>
<b>An:</b> Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) &lt;hendrik.brockhaus@siem=
ens.com&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> LAMPS WG &lt;spasm@ietf.org&gt;; von Oheimb, David (T RDA CST SE=
A-DE) &lt;david.von.oheimb@siemens.com&gt;<br>
<b>Betreff:</b> Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculat=
ing certHash<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I prefer to use SHA-512 for Ed25519 and SHAKE256(x, =
64) for Ed448, as in RFC8419:<o:p></o:p></p>
<pre><span class=3D"gmail-h3"><a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection=
.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc84=
19%23section-2.3&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7d=
f84886b3840ccf54b08d92a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C=
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X%2BU0vQl0NLO329E%2Beqx0p0t4%3D&amp;reserved=3D0">2.3</a>.&nbsp; Message Di=
gest Algorithm Identifiers</span><o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; When the signer includes signed attributes, a message dig=
est<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; algorithm is used to compute the message digest on the eC=
ontent<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; value.&nbsp; When signing with Ed25519, the message diges=
t algorithm MUST<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; be SHA-512 [<a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection=
.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc84=
19%23ref-FIPS180&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7d=
f84886b3840ccf54b08d92a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C=
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MzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3DmnWxww79bLA1LOJcUAjuU=
72ofBd1SpZ%2FMPQngC2olgY%3D&amp;reserved=3D0" title=3D"&quot;Secure Hash St=
andard (SHS)&quot;">FIPS180</a>].&nbsp; Additional information on SHA-512 i=
s available<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; in [<a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook=
.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Frfc6234&amp;d=
ata=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54b08d92=
a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587638146419422%7CU=
nknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLC=
JXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3D6Z%2BYO8Z9WHBqo%2Flf2ptpZafEV9cp8nKdYFLebB1=
yo50%3D&amp;reserved=3D0" title=3D"&quot;US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and=
 SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)&quot;">RFC6234</a>].&nbsp; When signing with Ed44=
8, the message digest algorithm<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; MUST be SHAKE256 [<a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.prot=
ection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2=
Frfc8419%23ref-FIPS202&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemens.com=
%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54b08d92a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%=
7C0%7C637587638146419422%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIj=
oiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;sdata=3DATwZyWcQVZQSlPA=
xY4U8sdOWFmRRQXivUtjTT%2BuOjjA%3D&amp;reserved=3D0" title=3D"&quot;SHA-3 St=
andard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions&quot;">FIPS2=
02</a>] with a 512-bit output value.<o:p></o:p></pre>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Tue, Jun 8, 2021 at 5:20 PM Brockhaus, Hendrik &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com">hendrik.brockhaus@siemen=
s.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0c=
m 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">In OpenSSL recently a problem has been identified on=
 how to derive a hash algorithm from signatureAlgorithm OID when using EdDS=
A, see
<a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2=
F%2Fgithub.com%2Fopenssl%2Fopenssl%2Fissues%2F15477&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Che=
ndrik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54b08d92a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd=
95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587638146429413%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb=
3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C300=
0&amp;sdata=3Dweix2JOonIy8FvoHb0rF8jZIsQPDMSd7ZOJiG8LXkXA%3D&amp;reserved=
=3D0" target=3D"_blank">
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/15477</a><br>
<br>
In CMP this implicitly defined hash algorithms is used to calculate the cer=
tHash in a certConf messages. This would fail when using EdDSA.<br>
The CertStatus structure including certHash is defined as follows:<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; certHash&nbsp; &nbsp; OCTET STRING,<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; -- the hash of the certificate, using the same =
hash algorithm<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; -- as is used to create and verify the certific=
ate signature<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; certReqId&nbsp; &nbsp;INTEGER,<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; -- to match this confirmation with the correspo=
nding req/rep<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;}<br>
<br>
Therefore, the hash algorithms to be used for computing the certHash must b=
e determined in some other way.<br>
I currently see the following options:<br>
(1) Specify usage of SHA-1 for calculating certHash, similar to the definit=
ion of the keyIdentifier in RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.2.<br>
&nbsp; This is the cheapest solution, but we explicitly removed SHA-1 from =
CMP Algorithms, see mail thread &quot;Re: CMP Algorithms I-D&quot;.<br>
(2) Specify a hash algorithm on a per signature algorithm basis.<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp;This is also quite simple to implement, but costly to maintain=
 for upcoming algorithms.<br>
(3) Extend the ASN.1 syntax of CertStatus to allow to specify an optional h=
ashAlg OID for those cases where the hash algorithm cannot be determined au=
tomatically.<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp;This is probably the cleanest solution, but involves a change =
to the ASN.1 syntax.<br>
<br>
Does anyone sees other, better solutions?<br>
What solution is preferred by the WG?<br>
<br>
- Hendrik<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Spasm mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2=
F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspasm&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.=
brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb7df84886b3840ccf54b08d92a9400b5%7C38ae3bcd95794f=
d4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587638146429413%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJ=
WIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000&amp;=
sdata=3DgfBHS7RQse%2BFFf4Z2k75gy8Ywr%2FLc9xf%2FlwtT4IUUr8%3D&amp;reserved=
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></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br clear=3D"all">
<br>
-- <o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Lijun Liao<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</body>
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From: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>, "david.von.oheimb@siemens.com" <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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David an I also thought of this solution.
If hashFunc is not used, will it be backward compatible with the current sy=
ntax, due to the tagging?

Hendrik

> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
> Gesendet: Dienstag, 8. Juni 2021 17:54
> An: Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
> Cc: LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>; von Oheimb, David (T RDA CST SEA-DE)
> <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
> Betreff: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating
> certHash
>=20
> The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add something =
like:
>=20
> CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>    hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
>    ...
>=20
> That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol vers=
ion
> comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.
>=20
> Russ
>=20
>=20
> > On Jun 8, 2021, at 11:19 AM, Brockhaus, Hendrik
> <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com> wrote:
> >
> > In OpenSSL recently a problem has been identified on how to derive a ha=
sh
> algorithm from signatureAlgorithm OID when using EdDSA, see
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fgithu=
b.co
> m%2Fopenssl%2Fopenssl%2Fissues%2F15477&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.
> brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Cb42615faad7148e5c72a08d92a959af3%7C38ae
> 3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587644304574885%7CUnk
> nown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1h
> aWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=3DhuwpvD%2FmhG69ELrYfhgq48B7
> txllaBmseogq3%2BrIbLs%3D&amp;reserved=3D0
> >
> > In CMP this implicitly defined hash algorithms is used to calculate the=
 certHash
> in a certConf messages. This would fail when using EdDSA.
> > The CertStatus structure including certHash is defined as follows:
> >     CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
> >        certHash    OCTET STRING,
> >        -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
> >        -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
> >        certReqId   INTEGER,
> >        -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
> >        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
> >     }
> >
> > Therefore, the hash algorithms to be used for computing the certHash mu=
st be
> determined in some other way.
> > I currently see the following options:
> > (1) Specify usage of SHA-1 for calculating certHash, similar to the def=
inition of
> the keyIdentifier in RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.2.
> >  This is the cheapest solution, but we explicitly removed SHA-1 from CM=
P
> Algorithms, see mail thread "Re: CMP Algorithms I-D".
> > (2) Specify a hash algorithm on a per signature algorithm basis.
> >   This is also quite simple to implement, but costly to maintain for up=
coming
> algorithms.
> > (3) Extend the ASN.1 syntax of CertStatus to allow to specify an option=
al
> hashAlg OID for those cases where the hash algorithm cannot be determined
> automatically.
> >   This is probably the cleanest solution, but involves a change to the =
ASN.1
> syntax.
> >
> > Does anyone sees other, better solutions?
> > What solution is preferred by the WG?
> >
> > - Hendrik
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Spasm mailing list
> > Spasm@ietf.org
> >
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.i=
etf
> .org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspasm&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockha
> us%40siemens.com%7Cb42615faad7148e5c72a08d92a959af3%7C38ae3bcd957
> 94fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637587644304574885%7CUnknown%7
> CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJ
> XVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=3D7IIE0jKvlS%2B81cW1eqEn6Rr%2BnYi0i7o5
> NAkwWs3coY4%3D&amp;reserved=3D0


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 12:17:48 -0400
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To: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrustdatacard.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [EXTERNAL] Re: Does 6211 actually do what it claims to?
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It very much constrains the structure of the successful attack.

In your example:

- the RIPEMD160 OID needs to appear in the digestAlgorithm filed in the =
signed attribute defines in RFC 6211 attribute (and also in the =
unprotected SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field).
- the ECDSA-RIPEMD160 OID needs to appear in the signatureAlgorithm =
filed in the signed attribute defines in RFC 6211 attribute (and also in =
the unprotected SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field).
- the RIPEMD160 hash value of the modified content is placed in the =
message-digest attribute.
- the RIPEMD160 has value computed over the signed attributes is input =
to the signature validation function.

The level of "broken" is quite significant here....

Russ

> On Jun 8, 2021, at 11:14 AM, Mike Ounsworth =
<Mike.Ounsworth=3D40entrust.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> Hi Russ,
>=20
> Right. I'm not saying 6211 is any worse than bare CMS SignedData / =
AuthenticatedData. My question is: is it actually better?=20
>=20
> Here's my attack scenario. Say I'm setting out to do an algorithm =
substitution attack against a signer who uses, say, an ECDSA-SHA256 =
signature. For the sake of argument, let's assume that RIPEMD is =
critically broken and accepted by the verifier. I take a legitimate =
message-signature pair (m, s) from the victim. I compute a second =
message m' where SHA256(m) =3D RIPEMD256(m'). Therefore ECDSA-SHA256(m, =
s) and ECDSA-RIPEMD256(m',s) both appear valid under the victim's pubic =
key. I have a forged signature on m'.
>=20
> I believe this is the attack that 6211 is purporting to prevent. I =
also believe that it does not prevent it; by putting the digestAlgorithm =
inside the message being digested, the signature s is only implicitly =
bound to the digestAlgorithm; as long as it's changed to =
digestAlgorithm=3DRIPEMD256 in the forged message m', the algorithm =
substitution will be undetectable.
>=20
> I hope I'm missing something ..?
>=20
> ---
> Mike Ounsworth
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>=20
> Sent: June 2, 2021 3:51 PM
> To: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com>
> Cc: LAMPS <spasm@ietf.org>
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [lamps] Does 6211 actually do what it claims =
to?
>=20
> WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.
> DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know =
the content is safe.
>=20
> ______________________________________________________________________
> Mike:
>=20
> In CMS SignedData and AuthenticatedData, then algorithm identifiers =
are not covered by the signature or MAC, respectively.
>=20
> RFC 6211 provides an signed attribute / authenticated attribute to =
provide this capability.=20
>=20
>      CMSAlgorithmProtection ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>          digestAlgorithm         DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
>          signatureAlgorithm  [1] SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier =
OPTIONAL,
>          macAlgorithm        [2] MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm =
OPTIONAL }
>=20
> In X.509 certificates, the signature algorithm appears twice.  One of =
them is covered by the issuer's signature.  RFC 6211 provides =
essentially the same thing.
>=20
> Russ
>=20
>> On Jun 1, 2021, at 5:26 PM, Mike Ounsworth =
<Mike.Ounsworth=3D40entrust.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>=20
>> This is maybe a dumb question coming from a relative PKIX newcomer.
>>=20
>> RFC 6211 sets out to solve algorithm substitution attacks in CMS by =
including the digestAlgorithm, and either signatureAlgorithm or =
macAlgorithm in the digested-and-signed content.
>>=20
>> Cheekily: does this actually solve algorithm substitution attacks?
>>=20
>> Seems like a chicken-and-egg situation where, during signature =
verification, you are using the (currently unverified) content to tell =
you how to verify the content. In particular, 6211 puts the digest alg =
id inside the digest, and therefore it's fair game for manipulation =
during a hash collision attack.=20
>>=20
>> PKCS#1 v1.5 puts the digest alg id outside (ie next to) the digest in =
the signed data, which seems like it gets you out of the checken-and-egg =
situation because now you would need a collision in the signature =
primitive, not in the hash primitive (ie it's now the sig primitive =
protecting the hash primitive, rather than the hash primitive protecting =
itself). RSA-PSS internally does something that looks distinctly HMAC-y, =
so it's probably ok too but for different reasons.
>>=20
>>=20
>> Furthermore, a quote from Kaliski, Burton, 2002, "On hash function =
firewalls in signature schemes":
>>=20
>> "Note that identifying the hash function in the message itself is not =
enough; it is likely as easy for an opponent to control the identifier =
as any other part of a message when forging a signature."=20
>>=20
>> .. which seems exactly what 6211 has done.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> So, am I missing something, or are hash function substitution attacks =
only really solvable via the construction of the signature primitive, =
and not at the protocol layer? In which case, 6211 does not actually =
solve the problem that it set out to solve?
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> PS: I also posted this to stack exchange: =
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://crypto.stackexchange.com/q/90318/24012=
__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!Nuglq_FViyrunBEm50OHp1mJ7q-7zf2RRwpi_4xhIUEWMcolaQY93uEH=
NjWfmR1bf9VkMfuLgg$=20
>>=20
>> ---
>> Mike Ounsworth
>> Software Security Architect, Entrust
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Spasm mailing list
>> Spasm@ietf.org
>> =
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm__;=
!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!Nuglq_FViyrunBEm50OHp1mJ7q-7zf2RRwpi_4xhIUEWMcolaQY93uEHNjW=
fmR1bf9WyADf3eQ$=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm


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To: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] WG Action: Rechartered Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
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Subject: Re: [lamps] WG Action: Rechartered Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
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From: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com>
To: Ludovic Perret <ludovic.perret@cryptonext-security.com>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] WG Action: Rechartered Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
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Subject: [lamps] =?utf-8?q?RFC_9044_on_Using_the_AES-GMAC_Algorithm_with_?= =?utf-8?q?the_Cryptographic_Message_Syntax_=28CMS=29?=
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 9044

        Title:      Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with 
                    the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 
        Author:     R. Housley
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       June 2021
        Mailbox:    housley@vigilsec.com
        Pages:      9
        Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso:   None

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-05.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9044

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC9044

This document specifies the conventions for using the AES-GMAC
Message Authentication Code algorithm with the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) as specified in RFC 5652.

This document is a product of the Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official
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Subject: [lamps] =?utf-8?q?RFC_9045_on_Algorithm_Requirements_Update_to_t?= =?utf-8?q?he_Internet_X=2E509_Public_Key_Infrastructure_Certificate_Reque?= =?utf-8?q?st_Message_Format_=28CRMF=29?=
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 9045

        Title:      Algorithm Requirements Update to the 
                    Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure  
                    Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 
        Author:     R. Housley
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       June 2021
        Mailbox:    housley@vigilsec.com
        Pages:      9
        Updates:    RFC 4211

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs-07.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9045

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC9045

This document updates the cryptographic algorithm requirements for
the Password-Based Message Authentication Code in the Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
specified in RFC 4211.

This document is a product of the Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official
Internet Protocol Standards (https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards) for the 
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Hello,

> As for defining algorithmID OIDs, parameters, etc for Sphincs+, Falcon, 
> Dilithium, Kyber, etc, I haven't seen any drafts yet.

A while ago Scott Fluhrer has posted a hint to an industry draft 
(https://docs.google.com/document/d/19XfdzkVdHS69rqin-XV72Cn2FjrpEbiyERg7F1lKIVs/edit?usp=sharing 
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/19XfdzkVdHS69rqin-XV72Cn2FjrpEbiyERg7F1lKIVs/edit?usp=sharing>) 
on this list, and we wanted to suggest an alternative apporach:

The industry draft specifies one algorithm id for each parameter set. 
These ids are used as key and signature/kem algorithm ids, too. Taking 
the Dilithium signature algorithm as example the draft specifies three 
ids (with the algorithm name as optional parameter):

dilithium-4x4-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.4.4) for the security-level 2 
parameter set,
dilithium-6x5-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.6.5) for the security-level 3 
parameter set, and
dilithium-8x7-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.8.7) for the security-level 5 
parameter set,

each of them used as key and signature algorihtm id, too.

If there is no absolute requirement to bound the parameter set to the 
signature/kem algorithm, too, we would like to propose an alternativeÂ  
approach for defining the algorithm/parameter ids. The approach is leant 
on the parameter/algorithm id specification used by Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography. EC uses separate ids for keys and (e.g. signature) 
algorithms, and the curve (and thus parameter set) is propageted as 
parameter of the key algorithm id. For the Dilithium example this could 
be done by keeping the three parameter (example) ids dilithium-4x4-r3 
(1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.4.4), dilithium-6x5-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.6.5),Â  
dilithium-8x7-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.8.7)Â  and defining two additional 
ids, one for the key algorithm (e.g. 1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.1) and one for 
the signature algorithm (e.g. 1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.2) for Dilithium (or 
Shake256withDilithium -- to be open for alternative XOFs). The parameter 
field of the key algorithm id must contain the id of the corresponding 
parameter set:

AlgorithmIdentifierÂ  ::=Â  SEQUENCEÂ  {
 Â Â  algorithmÂ  OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- OID: key algorithm
 Â Â Â  parameters PQParameterSet
}

PQParameterSet ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

The encoding of the signature (or kem) algorithm id by default should 
omit the parameter field, except for if the specific signature (or kem) 
algorithm id may have to carry some additional information. For 
Dilithium, e.g., the parameter field could be used to tell the verifier 
whether the signer has used AES (instead of SHAKE) to expand the public 
matrix.

We think that this approach would be more convenient to implement and 
use. McEliece, for instance, defines ten parameter sets. Typically an 
user will have only one McEliece key(pair) which (in the EC-style 
approach) (s)he could use with the McEliece KEM (or. Shake256McEliece) 
algorithm id, regardless of which parameter-set is bound to the key. In 
the current (industry draft) approach the user would have to take care 
to select the right KEM algorithm ID among a set of ten KEM algorithm 
ids to ensure to use her/his, for instance, mceliece460896 key with the 
corresponding mceliece460896 KEM algorithm id.

Regards,
Dieter Bratko
--------
Dieter Bratko mailto:Dieter.Bratko@iaik.tugraz.at 
<mailto:Dieter.Bratko@iaik.tugraz.at>
SIC/IAIK â€“ Graz University Of Technology,
Inffeldgasse 16A, 8010 Graz, Austria,
http://jce.iaik.tugraz.at <http://jce.iaik.tugraz.at>

On 08.06.2021 at 23:57 Mike Ounsworth wrote:
> As for defining algorithmID OIDs, parameters, etc for Sphincs+, Falcon, Dilithium, Kyber, etc, I haven't seen any drafts yet.


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<html>
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    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    Hello,<br>
    <br>
    <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">&gt; As for defining algorithmID OIDs, parameters, etc for Sphincs+, Falcon, 
&gt; Dilithium, Kyber, etc, I haven't seen any drafts yet.</pre>
    A while ago Scott Fluhrer has posted a hint to an industry draft (<a
href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/19XfdzkVdHS69rqin-XV72Cn2FjrpEbiyERg7F1lKIVs/edit?usp=sharing">https://docs.google.com/document/d/19XfdzkVdHS69rqin-XV72Cn2FjrpEbiyERg7F1lKIVs/edit?usp=sharing</a>)
    on this list, and we wanted to suggest an alternative apporach:<br>
    <br>
    The industry draft specifies one algorithm id for each parameter
    set. These ids are used as key and signature/kem algorithm ids, too.
    Taking the Dilithium signature algorithm as example the draft
    specifies three ids (with the algorithm name as optional parameter):<br>
    <br>
    dilithium-4x4-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.4.4) for the security-level 2
    parameter set,<br>
    dilithium-6x5-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.6.5) for the security-level 3
    parameter set, and<br>
    dilithium-8x7-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.8.7) for the security-level 5
    parameter set,<br>
    <br>
    each of them used as key and signature algorihtm id, too.<br>
    <br>
    If there is no absolute requirement to bound the parameter set to
    the signature/kem algorithm, too, we would like to propose an
    alternativeÂ  approach for defining the algorithm/parameter ids. The
    approach is leant on the parameter/algorithm id specification used
    by Elliptic Curve Cryptography. EC uses separate ids for keys and
    (e.g. signature) algorithms, and the curve (and thus parameter set)
    is propageted as parameter of the key algorithm id. For the
    Dilithium example this could be done by keeping the three parameter
    (example) ids dilithium-4x4-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.4.4),
    dilithium-6x5-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.6.5),Â  dilithium-8x7-r3
    (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.8.7)Â  and defining two additional ids, one for
    the key algorithm (e.g. 1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.1) and one for the
    signature algorithm (e.g. 1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.2) for Dilithium (or
    Shake256withDilithium -- to be open for alternative XOFs). The
    parameter field of the key algorithm id must contain the id of the
    corresponding parameter set:<br>
    <br>
    AlgorithmIdentifierÂ  ::=Â  SEQUENCEÂ  {<br>
    Â Â  algorithmÂ  OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- OID: key algorithm <br>
    Â Â Â  parameters PQParameterSet <br>
    }<br>
    <br>
    PQParameterSet ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER<br>
    <br>
    The encoding of the signature (or kem) algorithm id by default
    should omit the parameter field, except for if the specific
    signature (or kem) algorithm id may have to carry some additional
    information. For Dilithium, e.g., the parameter field could be used
    to tell the verifier whether the signer has used AES (instead of
    SHAKE) to expand the public matrix.<br>
    <br>
    We think that this approach would be more convenient to implement
    and use. McEliece, for instance, defines ten parameter sets.
    Typically an user will have only one McEliece key(pair) which (in
    the EC-style approach) (s)he could use with the McEliece KEM (or.
    Shake256McEliece) algorithm id, regardless of which parameter-set is
    bound to the key. In the current (industry draft) approach the user
    would have to take care to select the right KEM algorithm ID among a
    set of ten KEM algorithm ids to ensure to use her/his, for instance,
    mceliece460896 key with the corresponding mceliece460896 KEM
    algorithm id. <br>
    <br>
    Regards,<br>
    Dieter Bratko<br>
    <span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:gray">--------<br>
      Dieter Bratko <a href="mailto:Dieter.Bratko@iaik.tugraz.at">mailto:Dieter.Bratko@iaik.tugraz.at</a><br>
      SIC/IAIK â€“ Graz University Of Technology,<br>
      Inffeldgasse 16A, 8010 Graz, Austria,<br>
      <a href="http://jce.iaik.tugraz.at">http://jce.iaik.tugraz.at</a></span><br>
    <br>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 08.06.2021 at 23:57 Mike Ounsworth
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CH0PR11MB5739DCEDF80918186DF5F5729F379@CH0PR11MB5739.namprd11.prod.outlook.com">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">As for defining algorithmID OIDs, parameters, etc for Sphincs+, Falcon, Dilithium, Kyber, etc, I haven't seen any drafts yet.</pre>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

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From: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
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Thread-Topic: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/LBLRLdjYnB7-dO_pSgKlIi8OJ6w>
Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Russ

Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backward c=
ompatibility of this approach. It works fine.

> Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
>=20
> The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add something =
like:
>=20
> CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>    hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
>    ...

This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the fiel=
d hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.=20
We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines the has=
h algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be conf=
irmed. We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be cr=
ypto agile and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the=
 DEFAULT.
@Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for certifica=
te signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this t=
o CMP Algorithms.
=20
>=20
> That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol vers=
ion
> comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.

You are absolutely right.


To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following section to =
CMP Updates:

---------------------------snip---------------------------
2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content

This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type us=
ed in certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those =
certificates where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm=
 field.

Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:

   CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
      certHash    OCTET STRING,
      certReqId   INTEGER,
      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
   }

The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the signat=
ureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash alg=
orithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., for =
EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used fo=
r calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be co=
mputed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the certi=
ficate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the cert=
Conf message header must be cmp2021(3).
---------------------------snip---------------------------

Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!

Hendrik


From nobody Wed Jun  9 09:04:35 2021
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Cc: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth=40entrust.com@dmarc.ietf.org>,  Ludovic Perret <ludovic.perret@cryptonext-security.com>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>,  Simon Guggi <simon.guggi@iaik.tugraz.at>, Franco Nieddu <franco.nieddu@iaik.tugraz.at>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] WG Action: Rechartered Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (lamps)
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On Wed, Jun 9, 2021 at 5:52 AM Dieter Bratko <Dieter.Bratko@iaik.tugraz.at>
wrote:

> Hello,
>
> > As for defining algorithmID OIDs, parameters, etc for Sphincs+, Falcon,
> > Dilithium, Kyber, etc, I haven't seen any drafts yet.
>
> A while ago Scott Fluhrer has posted a hint to an industry draft (
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/19XfdzkVdHS69rqin-XV72Cn2FjrpEbiyERg7F1lKIVs/edit?usp=sharing)
> on this list, and we wanted to suggest an alternative apporach:
>
> The industry draft specifies one algorithm id for each parameter set.
> These ids are used as key and signature/kem algorithm ids, too. Taking the
> Dilithium signature algorithm as example the draft specifies three ids
> (with the algorithm name as optional parameter):
>
> dilithium-4x4-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.4.4) for the security-level 2
> parameter set,
> dilithium-6x5-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.6.5) for the security-level 3
> parameter set, and
> dilithium-8x7-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.8.7) for the security-level 5
> parameter set,
>
> each of them used as key and signature algorihtm id, too.
>
> If there is no absolute requirement to bound the parameter set to the
> signature/kem algorithm, too, we would like to propose an alternative
> approach for defining the algorithm/parameter ids.
>

This is actually something that came up in past discussions as feedback
from multiple cryptographic library implementers.

In general, the use of parameters in AlgorithmIdentifiers creates a lot of
complexity throughout the system - from CAs issuing certificates (with the
correct parameters, and making sure the parameters make logical sense) to
RPs verifying certificates (which may only support a subset of parameters),
to applications using libraries trying to figure out "Is X supported"

The experience of running code is very much in favor of the explicit "use
the algorithm ID to express your parameters", which is more or less an
expression of the concepts captured at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-iab-protocol-maintenance (now
abandoned?) or the lessons from other protocols (RFC 8701,
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nottingham-http-grease-01 ,
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bishop-httpbis-grease-00 ...
you get the idea :D)

This is also roughly similar to the approach taken in TLS 1.3, which
collapsed the (independent) SignatureAndHashAlgorithm (
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 ) into a
single logical unit (
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.3 ), to ensure no
untoward combinations/permutations.

I wanted to provide that context for why "OID with no params" is generally
prefered, in terms of security, complexity, and interoperability. Even
though ASN.1 technically affords the necessity, having well-scoped
definitions avoid ambiguities, or, worse, issues like
ChainOfFools/Curveball ( https://blog.lessonslearned.org/chain-of-fools/ )

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Jun 9, 2021 at 5:52 AM Dieter=
 Bratko &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Dieter.Bratko@iaik.tugraz.at">Dieter.Bratko@i=
aik.tugraz.at</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddi=
ng-left:1ex">
 =20
   =20
 =20
  <div>
    Hello,<br>
    <br>
    <pre>&gt; As for defining algorithmID OIDs, parameters, etc for Sphincs=
+, Falcon,=20
&gt; Dilithium, Kyber, etc, I haven&#39;t seen any drafts yet.</pre>
    A while ago Scott Fluhrer has posted a hint to an industry draft (<a hr=
ef=3D"https://docs.google.com/document/d/19XfdzkVdHS69rqin-XV72Cn2FjrpEbiyE=
Rg7F1lKIVs/edit?usp=3Dsharing" target=3D"_blank">https://docs.google.com/do=
cument/d/19XfdzkVdHS69rqin-XV72Cn2FjrpEbiyERg7F1lKIVs/edit?usp=3Dsharing</a=
>)
    on this list, and we wanted to suggest an alternative apporach:<br>
    <br>
    The industry draft specifies one algorithm id for each parameter
    set. These ids are used as key and signature/kem algorithm ids, too.
    Taking the Dilithium signature algorithm as example the draft
    specifies three ids (with the algorithm name as optional parameter):<br=
>
    <br>
    dilithium-4x4-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.4.4) for the security-level 2
    parameter set,<br>
    dilithium-6x5-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.6.5) for the security-level 3
    parameter set, and<br>
    dilithium-8x7-r3 (1.3.6.1.4.1.2.267.7.8.7) for the security-level 5
    parameter set,<br>
    <br>
    each of them used as key and signature algorihtm id, too.<br>
    <br>
    If there is no absolute requirement to bound the parameter set to
    the signature/kem algorithm, too, we would like to propose an
    alternative=C2=A0 approach for defining the algorithm/parameter ids. </=
div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is actually something that came u=
p in past discussions as feedback from multiple cryptographic=C2=A0library =
implementers.</div><div><br></div><div>In general, the use of parameters in=
 AlgorithmIdentifiers creates a lot of complexity throughout the system - f=
rom CAs issuing certificates (with the correct parameters, and making sure =
the parameters make logical sense) to RPs verifying certificates (which may=
 only support a subset of parameters), to applications using libraries tryi=
ng to figure out &quot;Is X supported&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>The ex=
perience of running code is very much in favor of the explicit &quot;use th=
e algorithm ID to express your parameters&quot;, which is more or less an e=
xpression of the concepts captured at=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.i=
etf.org/doc/html/draft-iab-protocol-maintenance">https://datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/html/draft-iab-protocol-maintenance</a> (now abandoned?) or the less=
ons from other protocols (RFC 8701,=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.iet=
f.org/doc/html/draft-nottingham-http-grease-01">https://datatracker.ietf.or=
g/doc/html/draft-nottingham-http-grease-01</a> ,=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://da=
tatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bishop-httpbis-grease-00">https://datatra=
cker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bishop-httpbis-grease-00</a> ... you get the i=
dea :D)</div><div><br></div><div>This is also roughly similar to the approa=
ch taken in TLS 1.3, which collapsed the (independent) SignatureAndHashAlgo=
rithm (=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246#secti=
on-7.4.1.4.1">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4=
.1</a> ) into a single logical unit ( <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.o=
rg/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.3">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rf=
c8446#section-4.2.3</a> ), to ensure no untoward combinations/permutations.=
</div><div><br></div><div>I wanted to provide that context for why &quot;OI=
D with no params&quot; is generally prefered, in terms of security, complex=
ity, and interoperability. Even though ASN.1 technically affords the necess=
ity, having well-scoped definitions avoid ambiguities, or, worse, issues li=
ke ChainOfFools/Curveball (=C2=A0<a href=3D"https://blog.lessonslearned.org=
/chain-of-fools/">https://blog.lessonslearned.org/chain-of-fools/</a> )</di=
v></div></div>

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: [lamps] CSRATTRS specifying the SAN
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Eliot has suggested that:
      https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7030#section-4.5.2
does not appear to allow the returned CSR Attributes to contain a value.
Please correct me if I'm understanding the problem wrong.

RFC8994 assignment of IPv6 ULA can not, as far as I can understand, work
without assigning a value.  The Registrar must allocate a prefix for the new
ACP node, and this has to go into the CSR in order for the CA to sign it.

(Yes, the Registrar has to *check* that the CSR contains the right value al=
ong
the way too.  Yes, if the Registrar is ALSO the CA, then it can shortcut, b=
ut
that's not in general true)

My unit testing code is at:
  https://github.com/AnimaGUS-minerva/fountain/blob/master/spec/models/csr_=
attributes_spec.rb


I found the ASN.1 code in section 4.5.2 beyond my understanding, so I muddl=
ed
through, since fortunately, there was an example.

   CsrAttrs ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID
   AttrOrOID ::=3D CHOICE (oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attribute Attribute }
   Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::=3D SEQUENCE {
        type   ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}),
        values SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type}) }

What I think that this says is that one can have:
  a) a Sequence of stuff.
  b) the stuff is either an OID.
  c) or the stuff is a SEQUENCE [ type, value ].

The complicated &id... is just saying that when you have some attribute type
"FOO", then you can have the things that would be valid as values.  I'm
actually rather amazed at this level of meta-programming. (Can CDDL do that=
?)

An example is provided:
   MEEGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiMBYGCSqGSIb3DQEJDjEJ
   BgcrBgEBAQEWBggqhkjOPQQDAw=3D=3D

%echo 'MEEGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiMBYGCSqGSIb3DQEJDjEJBgcr=
BgEBAQEWBggqhkjOPQQDAw=3D=3D' | base64 -d | dumpasn1 -
  0  65: SEQUENCE {
  2   9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7)
 13  18:   SEQUENCE {
 15   7:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
 24   7:     SET {
 26   5:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
       :       }
       :     }
 33  22:   SEQUENCE {
 35   9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14)
 46   9:     SET {
 48   7:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 1 1 1 22'
       :       }
       :     }
 57   8:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
       :   }


At 2, we have the OID "challengePassword", which tells the client that this
attribute should be included (that's [b]).
At 13-26, we have an attributed, ecPublicKey, with a *value* secp384r1.
This tells the client what kind of things to sign with.  (that's [c])
At 33, we have extensionRequest with oid value 1.3.6.1.1.1.1.22. (also [c])
Finally, at 57, we have just the attribute ecdsaWithSHA384, which is telling
the client to use SHA2-384.

In order to get this all right, I used the example above, made sure I could
decode it, and then made sure that I could encode exactly that.

I have an example building the subjectAltName rfc822Name (yes, my code hasn=
't
caught up to otherName as specified in RFC8994 yet) which is:

obiwan-[projects/pandora/fountain](2.6.6) mcr 10263 %dumpasn1 tmp/hellobulb=
0.der
  0  32: SEQUENCE {
  2  30:   SEQUENCE {
  4   3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17)
  9  23:     SET {
 11  21:       SEQUENCE {
 13  19:         [1] {
 15  17:           UTF8String 'hello@example.com'
       :           }
       :         }
       :       }
       :     }
       :   }

I don't know what the [1] is actually, but possibly that's the rfc822Name.
Yup, it is:
  #        rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,   <-- this one

So, I think that I'm entirely within spec for CSR Attributes, and I'd like =
to
understand more from Owen and Eliot as to what problems they are having with
CSR Attributes.

Eliot has suggested we do it all in JSON (CBOR?), and I would certainly be
happy with that.

=2D-
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T consulti=
ng )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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Subject: Re: [lamps] CSRATTRS specifying the SAN
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Subject: Re: [lamps] CSRATTRS specifying the SAN
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Hi Michael,

On 09.06.21 22:15, Michael Richardson wrote:
> I found the ASN.1 code in section 4.5.2 beyond my understanding, so I m=
uddled
> through, since fortunately, there was an example.
>
>     CsrAttrs ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID
>     AttrOrOID ::=3D CHOICE (oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attribute Attribute =
}
>     Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>          type   ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}),
>          values SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type}) }


Forgive me, I have indeed misread. the line.=C2=A0 I do still have one qu=
estion.

I want to understand how to specify the fields that the CA/RA would want =

filled in by the requestor.=C2=A0 For example, how would you say, =E2=80=9C=
please=20
provide a SAN of the following form..." such as a serial#?

Eliot





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From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2021 09:56:37 +0100
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Subject: [lamps] randomized hashes & pqc
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Hello,

*Some observations:*

The prominent NIST PQC lattice sig algorithms (Dilithium and Falcon -- NIST
has stated to standardize at least one of these) and the NIST SP 800-208
stateful signature algorithms (LMS/HSS, XMSS/XMSS^MT) all use randomized
hashing, but not in the way specified in NIST SP 800-106 back in 2009.

Basically, a nonce is prefixed as the first thing of a (SHAKE) hash
computation before the message itself. Hence in verification, one needs to
look at the signature (which contains the nonce) before starting the
message hash.

This is a little different from older PKCS #1 flows. Note that if one takes
the approach of just singing a plain SHA-256 hash of a message using these
algorithms (feeding that hash to be further hashed and signed), this will
effectively halve the security level in both classical or quantum adversary
models.

In signing, the nonce computation happens in various ways; one can use
either h(pk) as the nonce, a PRF of the signature sequence number (for
stateful sigs), or have an entirely random one.. But this is mostly an API
issue, not an IETF problem.

Furthermore, the SHAKE XOF output is directly used for a
sampler/hash-to-point mechanism in Falcon (there is an intermediate hash in
Dilithium). This needs to be an XOF, not SHA-2/3, as many output bytes are
needed for further processing (creating those lattices, essentially).

*Questions / Suggestion:*

I anticipate that (especially in PKI) there will be a need to facilitate
other hash functions apart from the Keccak stuff that the PQC/stateful sig
algorithms use internally. Hybrid classical/pqc schemes may perhaps want to
compute the message hash only once (think of a boot-time firmware
verification, which needs to process a lot of data quickly).

Furthermore, as a hardware interface builder, I really don't want to be
passing multi-gigabyte messages through my signing/verification module
interfaces, just a shorter byte sequence.

So, am I safe in assuming that the byte sequence actually being signed by
these algorithms will be an ASN.1 blob roughly of type:

{  OID_of_RandH, H( nonce | m )  }

Where the OID_of_RandH specifies *both* the hash function and the
randomization mechanism (how was nonce derived)? This would give
authenticated domain separation between different hashes and -- more
importantly -- between different types of randomization pre-padding
mechanisms. So this would be the byte sequence actually going into the
(FIPS 202) engine inside the module.

Cheers,
- markku

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.

--0000000000001cac1105c479b040
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hello,</div><div><u><br></u></div><div><u>Some observ=
ations:</u><br></div><div><br></div><div>The prominent NIST PQC lattice sig=
 algorithms (Dilithium and Falcon -- NIST has stated to standardize at leas=
t one of these) and the NIST SP 800-208 stateful signature algorithms (LMS/=
HSS, XMSS/XMSS^MT) all use randomized hashing, but not in the way specified=
 in NIST SP 800-106 back in 2009.<br></div><div><br></div><div><div>Basical=
ly, a nonce is prefixed as the first thing of a (SHAKE) hash computation be=
fore the message itself. Hence in verification, one needs to look at the si=
gnature (which contains the nonce) before starting the message hash. </div>=
<div><br></div></div><div>This is a little different from older PKCS #1 flo=
ws. Note that if one takes the approach of just singing a plain SHA-256 has=
h of a message using these algorithms (feeding that hash to be further hash=
ed and signed), this will effectively halve the security level in both clas=
sical or quantum adversary models.<br></div><div><br></div><div>In signing,=
 the nonce computation happens in various ways; one can use either h(pk) as=
 the nonce, a PRF of the signature sequence number (for stateful sigs), or =
have an entirely random one.. But this is mostly an API issue, not an IETF =
problem.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Furthermore, the SHAKE XOF output is =
directly used for a sampler/hash-to-point mechanism in Falcon (there is an =
intermediate hash in Dilithium). This needs to be an XOF, not SHA-2/3, as m=
any output bytes are needed for further processing (creating those lattices=
, essentially). <br></div><div><u><br></u></div><div><u>Questions / Suggest=
ion:</u><br></div><div><br></div><div>I anticipate that (especially in PKI)=
 there will be a need to facilitate other hash functions apart from the Kec=
cak stuff that the PQC/stateful sig algorithms use internally. Hybrid class=
ical/pqc schemes may perhaps want to compute the message hash only once (th=
ink of a boot-time firmware verification, which needs to process a lot of d=
ata quickly).<br></div><div><br></div><div>Furthermore, as a hardware inter=
face builder, I really don&#39;t want to be passing multi-gigabyte messages=
 through my signing/verification module interfaces, just a shorter byte seq=
uence.</div><div><br></div><div>So, am I safe in assuming that the byte seq=
uence actually being signed by these algorithms will be an ASN.1 blob rough=
ly of type:<br></div><div><br></div><div>{=C2=A0 OID_of_RandH, H( nonce | m=
 )=C2=A0 }<br></div><div><br></div><div>Where the OID_of_RandH specifies <u=
>both</u> the hash function and the randomization mechanism (how was nonce =
derived)? This would give authenticated domain separation between different=
 hashes and -- more importantly -- between different types of randomization=
 pre-padding mechanisms. So this would be the byte sequence actually going =
into the (FIPS 202) engine inside the module.<br></div><div><br></div><div>=
Cheers,</div><div>- markku</div><div><br></div><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" c=
lass=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr=
">Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div></div><=
/div></div></div>

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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/srEdf2IsIc0wIqQMm-wROxshPiQ>
Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me know.
If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an updated ve=
rsion.

Hendrik

> Von: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> Im Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik
>=20
> Russ
>=20
> Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backward
> compatibility of this approach. It works fine.
>=20
> > Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
> >
> > The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add somethin=
g
> like:
> >
> > CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
> >    hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
> >    ...
>=20
> This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the fi=
eld
> hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.
> We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines the h=
ash
> algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be conf=
irmed.
> We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be crypto =
agile
> and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAULT.
> @Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for certifi=
cate
> signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this to
> CMP Algorithms.
>=20
> >
> > That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol
> > version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.
>=20
> You are absolutely right.
>=20
>=20
> To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following section t=
o CMP
> Updates:
>=20
> ---------------------------snip---------------------------
> 2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content
>=20
> This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type =
used in
> certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those cert=
ificates
> where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.
>=20
> Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
>=20
>    CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>       certHash    OCTET STRING,
>       certReqId   INTEGER,
>       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>    }
>=20
> The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
> signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a =
hash
> algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.g.,=
 for
> EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used =
for
> calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be
> computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the
> certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by t=
he
> certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).
> ---------------------------snip---------------------------
>=20
> Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!
>=20
> Hendrik
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
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To: Eliot Lear <lear@lear.ch>, spasm@ietf.org
In-reply-to: <7384770c-3b0b-bbb1-bdd9-898719787e7e@lear.ch>
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Comments: In-reply-to Eliot Lear <lear@lear.ch> message dated "Thu, 10 Jun 2021 15:01:29 +0200."
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Subject: Re: [lamps] CSRATTRS specifying the SAN
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--=-=-=
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Eliot Lear <lear@lear.ch> wrote:
    > On 09.06.21 22:15, Michael Richardson wrote:
    >> I found the ASN.1 code in section 4.5.2 beyond my understanding, so I
    >> muddled through, since fortunately, there was an example.
    >>
    >> CsrAttrs ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID AttrOrOID ::=3D C=
HOICE
    >> (oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attribute Attribute } Attribute {
    >> ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::=3D SEQUENCE { type ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}), valu=
es
    >> SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type}) }


    > Forgive me, I have indeed misread. the line.=C2=A0 I do still have one
    > question.

    > I want to understand how to specify the fields that the CA/RA would
    > want filled in by the requestor.=C2=A0 For example, how would you say,
    > =E2=80=9Cplease provide a SAN of the following form..." such as a ser=
ial#?

So, just to pick a nit... the serialNumber=3D attribute is part of the Subj=
ectName.
(not SAN).  But, it's all just OIDs as attributes.

You'd make a sequence
      SEQ [ OID-X520SerialNumber, SET["JABA1234"]]

and then you'd add this to your sequence of stuff you want.
I think that "JABA1234" would be of type printableString.

=2D-
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh network=
s [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect=
  [
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails  =
  [









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Subject: Re: [lamps] CSRATTRS specifying the SAN
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From: Eliot Lear <lear@lear.ch>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>, spasm@ietf.org
Message-ID: <a39c01b6-2601-9010-02c0-a18b19aea790@lear.ch>
Subject: Re: [lamps] CSRATTRS specifying the SAN
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Sorry- not quite what I have in mind:

> and then you'd add this to your sequence of stuff you want.
> I think that "JABA1234" would be of type printableString.

I'd want the DEVICE to fill in the serial number.=C2=A0 CSRATTRs was mean=
t to=20
be a signal for such things a'la a template, right?

Eliot




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Comments: In-reply-to Eliot Lear <lear@lear.ch> message dated "Fri, 11 Jun 2021 19:15:23 +0200."
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Eliot Lear <lear@lear.ch> wrote:
    > Sorry- not quite what I have in mind:

    >> and then you'd add this to your sequence of stuff you want.  I think
    >> that "JABA1234" would be of type printableString.

    > I'd want the DEVICE to fill in the serial number.=C2=A0 CSRATTRs was =
meant
    > to be a signal for such things a'la a template, right?

Ah.

Then, you'd add the attribute:
      OID-X520SerialNumber

to your sequence.

=2D-=20
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh network=
s [=20
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect=
  [=20
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails  =
  [=20
=09






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From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Jun 2021 20:13:43 +0100
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Subject: Re: [lamps] randomized hashes & pqc
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Hi,

Even though my posting wasn't about PQC timelines, but about hash
randomization for (pqc) signatures, I did mention "at least one of" Falcon
and Dilithium being selected. It's more like Falcon "xor" Dilithium that
will be selected at the end of this year. If you didn't attend, the
presentations of last week's NIST PQC Standardization Conference are freely
available; The slides of Dustin Moody (NIST) have the most up to date
information.
https://csrc.nist.gov/Presentations/2021/status-update-on-the-3rd-round

In any case, the same issue affects them both, and also the already
NIST-approved algorithms LMS,HSS,XMSS,XMSS^MT. I'd prefer to have OIDs not
just for the algorithms, but also for the hash randomization mechanisms.

Cheers,
- markku

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.


On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 9:56 AM Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com>
wrote:

> Hello,
>
> *Some observations:*
>
> The prominent NIST PQC lattice sig algorithms (Dilithium and Falcon --
> NIST has stated to standardize at least one of these) and the NIST SP
> 800-208 stateful signature algorithms (LMS/HSS, XMSS/XMSS^MT) all use
> randomized hashing, but not in the way specified in NIST SP 800-106 back in
> 2009.
>
> Basically, a nonce is prefixed as the first thing of a (SHAKE) hash
> computation before the message itself. Hence in verification, one needs to
> look at the signature (which contains the nonce) before starting the
> message hash.
>
> This is a little different from older PKCS #1 flows. Note that if one
> takes the approach of just singing a plain SHA-256 hash of a message using
> these algorithms (feeding that hash to be further hashed and signed), this
> will effectively halve the security level in both classical or quantum
> adversary models.
>
> In signing, the nonce computation happens in various ways; one can use
> either h(pk) as the nonce, a PRF of the signature sequence number (for
> stateful sigs), or have an entirely random one.. But this is mostly an API
> issue, not an IETF problem.
>
> Furthermore, the SHAKE XOF output is directly used for a
> sampler/hash-to-point mechanism in Falcon (there is an intermediate hash in
> Dilithium). This needs to be an XOF, not SHA-2/3, as many output bytes are
> needed for further processing (creating those lattices, essentially).
>
> *Questions / Suggestion:*
>
> I anticipate that (especially in PKI) there will be a need to facilitate
> other hash functions apart from the Keccak stuff that the PQC/stateful sig
> algorithms use internally. Hybrid classical/pqc schemes may perhaps want to
> compute the message hash only once (think of a boot-time firmware
> verification, which needs to process a lot of data quickly).
>
> Furthermore, as a hardware interface builder, I really don't want to be
> passing multi-gigabyte messages through my signing/verification module
> interfaces, just a shorter byte sequence.
>
> So, am I safe in assuming that the byte sequence actually being signed by
> these algorithms will be an ASN.1 blob roughly of type:
>
> {  OID_of_RandH, H( nonce | m )  }
>
> Where the OID_of_RandH specifies *both* the hash function and the
> randomization mechanism (how was nonce derived)? This would give
> authenticated domain separation between different hashes and -- more
> importantly -- between different types of randomization pre-padding
> mechanisms. So this would be the byte sequence actually going into the
> (FIPS 202) engine inside the module.
>
> Cheers,
> - markku
>
> Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.
>

--000000000000b4f7e805c4aa8a6f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>Even th=
ough my posting wasn&#39;t about PQC timelines, but about hash randomizatio=
n for (pqc) signatures, I did mention &quot;at least one of&quot; Falcon an=
d Dilithium being selected. It&#39;s more like Falcon &quot;xor&quot; Dilit=
hium that will be selected at the end of this year. If you didn&#39;t atten=
d, the presentations of last week&#39;s NIST PQC Standardization Conference=
 are freely available; The slides of Dustin Moody (NIST) have the most up t=
o date information. <a href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/Presentations/2021/sta=
tus-update-on-the-3rd-round">https://csrc.nist.gov/Presentations/2021/statu=
s-update-on-the-3rd-round</a></div><div><br></div><div>In any case, the sam=
e issue affects them both, and also the already NIST-approved algorithms LM=
S,HSS,XMSS,XMSS^MT. I&#39;d prefer to have OIDs not just for the algorithms=
, but also for the hash randomization mechanisms.<br></div><div><br></div><=
div>Cheers,</div><div>- markku</div><div><br></div><div><div><div dir=3D"lt=
r" class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D=
"ltr">Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com=
" target=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div></d=
iv></div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 9:56 AM Markku-Juhani O. Saarine=
n &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8=
ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr=
"><div>Hello,</div><div><u><br></u></div><div><u>Some observations:</u><br>=
</div><div><br></div><div>The prominent NIST PQC lattice sig algorithms (Di=
lithium and Falcon -- NIST has stated to standardize at least one of these)=
 and the NIST SP 800-208 stateful signature algorithms (LMS/HSS, XMSS/XMSS^=
MT) all use randomized hashing, but not in the way specified in NIST SP 800=
-106 back in 2009.<br></div><div><br></div><div><div>Basically, a nonce is =
prefixed as the first thing of a (SHAKE) hash computation before the messag=
e itself. Hence in verification, one needs to look at the signature (which =
contains the nonce) before starting the message hash. </div><div><br></div>=
</div><div>This is a little different from older PKCS #1 flows. Note that i=
f one takes the approach of just singing a plain SHA-256 hash of a message =
using these algorithms (feeding that hash to be further hashed and signed),=
 this will effectively halve the security level in both classical or quantu=
m adversary models.<br></div><div><br></div><div>In signing, the nonce comp=
utation happens in various ways; one can use either h(pk) as the nonce, a P=
RF of the signature sequence number (for stateful sigs), or have an entirel=
y random one.. But this is mostly an API issue, not an IETF problem.<br></d=
iv><div><br></div><div>Furthermore, the SHAKE XOF output is directly used f=
or a sampler/hash-to-point mechanism in Falcon (there is an intermediate ha=
sh in Dilithium). This needs to be an XOF, not SHA-2/3, as many output byte=
s are needed for further processing (creating those lattices, essentially).=
 <br></div><div><u><br></u></div><div><u>Questions / Suggestion:</u><br></d=
iv><div><br></div><div>I anticipate that (especially in PKI) there will be =
a need to facilitate other hash functions apart from the Keccak stuff that =
the PQC/stateful sig algorithms use internally. Hybrid classical/pqc scheme=
s may perhaps want to compute the message hash only once (think of a boot-t=
ime firmware verification, which needs to process a lot of data quickly).<b=
r></div><div><br></div><div>Furthermore, as a hardware interface builder, I=
 really don&#39;t want to be passing multi-gigabyte messages through my sig=
ning/verification module interfaces, just a shorter byte sequence.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>So, am I safe in assuming that the byte sequence actually =
being signed by these algorithms will be an ASN.1 blob roughly of type:<br>=
</div><div><br></div><div>{=C2=A0 OID_of_RandH, H( nonce | m )=C2=A0 }<br><=
/div><div><br></div><div>Where the OID_of_RandH specifies <u>both</u> the h=
ash function and the randomization mechanism (how was nonce derived)? This =
would give authenticated domain separation between different hashes and -- =
more importantly -- between different types of randomization pre-padding me=
chanisms. So this would be the byte sequence actually going into the (FIPS =
202) engine inside the module.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><d=
iv>- markku</div><div><br></div><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
>Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div></div></=
div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000b4f7e805c4aa8a6f--


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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>, LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>
Cc: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>, "david.von.oheimb@siemens.com" <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
References: <AM0PR10MB24188C86D787842B2C7D9DD6FE379@AM0PR10MB2418.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <783FEFC2-CE5C-430C-8243-F4B80290C80A@vigilsec.com> <AM0PR10MB2418EB88CECDE3315B7388B1FE369@AM0PR10MB2418.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <AM0PR10MB24180B8830DE52C665D631D9FE349@AM0PR10MB2418.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
From: David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Russ, Lijun, et al.,

we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine the
hash alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf messages.
Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in order to
bring it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.

To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the CertStatus
structure as follows, which is binary backward compatible:

Â Â  CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {

Â Â Â Â Â  hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,

Â Â Â Â Â  certHashÂ Â Â  OCTET STRING,

Â Â Â Â Â  certReqIdÂ Â  INTEGER,

Â Â Â Â Â  statusInfoÂ  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL

Â Â  }

In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly contains a
hash alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA came up),
then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be omitted,
which means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.
Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg used
and the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.
(In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft thatÂ 
SHA-512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,
like done for CMS in RFC8419).

Does this sound fine?

Â Â Â  David

On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik wrote:
> If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me know.
> If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an updated version.
>
> Hendrik
>
>> Von: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> Im Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik
>>
>> Russ
>>
>> Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backward
>> compatibility of this approach. It works fine.
>>
>>> Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
>>>
>>> The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add something
>> like:
>>> CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
>>>    hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
>>>    ...
>> This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the field
>> hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.
>> We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines the hash
>> algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be confirmed.
>> We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be crypto agile
>> and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAULT.
>> @Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for certificate
>> signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this to
>> CMP Algorithms.
>>
>>> That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol
>>> version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.
>> You are absolutely right.
>>
>>
>> To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following section to CMP
>> Updates:
>>
>> ---------------------------snip---------------------------
>> 2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content
>>
>> This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type used in
>> certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certificates
>> where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.
>>
>> Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
>>
>>    CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
>>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>>       certHash    OCTET STRING,
>>       certReqId   INTEGER,
>>       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>>    }
>>
>> The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
>> signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash
>> algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., for
>> EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used for
>> calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be
>> computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the
>> certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the
>> certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).
>> ---------------------------snip---------------------------
>>
>> Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!
>>
>> Hendrik
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Spasm mailing list
>> Spasm@ietf.org
>> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf
>> .org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspasm&amp;data=04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockha
>> us%40siemens.com%7C8a0703abedbe44504c8d08d92b5fec60%7C38ae3bcd957
>> 94fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637588513262560559%7CUnknown%7
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    <p>Russ, Lijun, et al.,<br>
      <br>
      we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine
      the hash alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf
      messages.<br>
      Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in
      order to bring it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.</p>
    <p>To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the
      CertStatus structure as follows, which is binary backward
      compatible:</p>
    <pre>Â Â  CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {</pre>
    <pre>Â Â Â Â Â  hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,</pre>
    <pre>Â Â Â Â Â  certHashÂ Â Â  OCTET STRING,</pre>
    <pre>Â Â Â Â Â  certReqIdÂ Â  INTEGER,</pre>
    <pre>Â Â Â Â Â  statusInfoÂ  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL</pre>
    <pre>Â Â  }</pre>
    <p>In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly
      contains a hash alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA
      came up),<br>
      then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be
      omitted, which means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.<br>
      Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg
      used and the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.<br>
      (In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft thatÂ 
      SHA-512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,
      <br>
      like done for CMS in RFC8419).</p>
    <p>Does this sound fine?</p>
    <p>
      Â Â Â  David</p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM0PR10MB24180B8830DE52C665D631D9FE349@AM0PR10MB2418.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me know.
If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an updated version.

Hendrik

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Von: Spasm <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org">&lt;spasm-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</a> Im Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik

Russ

Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backward
compatibility of this approach. It works fine.

</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Von: Russ Housley <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">&lt;housley@vigilsec.com&gt;</a>

The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add something
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">like:
</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
   hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
   ...
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the field
hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.
We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines the hash
algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be confirmed.
We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be crypto agile
and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAULT.
@Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for certificate
signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this to
CMP Algorithms.

</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol
version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
You are absolutely right.


To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following section to CMP
Updates:

---------------------------snip---------------------------
2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content

This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type used in
certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certificates
where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.

Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
      certHash    OCTET STRING,
      certReqId   INTEGER,
      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
   }

The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash
algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., for
EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used for
calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be
computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the
certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the
certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).
---------------------------snip---------------------------

Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!

Hendrik

_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Spasm@ietf.org">Spasm@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf">https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf</a>
.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspasm&amp;amp;data=04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockha
us%40siemens.com%7C8a0703abedbe44504c8d08d92b5fec60%7C38ae3bcd957
94fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637588513262560559%7CUnknown%7
CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJ
XVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;amp;sdata=PTvMzW780CJ3gNrZVhPiRZX%2BwzA7LXIo
LQcLQkgJk%2Bk%3D&amp;amp;reserved=0
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Spasm@ietf.org">Spasm@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a>

</pre>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
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Subject: [lamps] Fwd: [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Russ, what do you think, also on Lijun's response quoted here?


-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: 	Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating
certHash
Date: 	Tue, 15 Jun 2021 13:17:58 +0200
From: 	Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
To: 	David von Oheimb <nl0@von-oheimb.de>



I am fine with the ASN.1 discussed in this email thread.

Since the upgrade to CMPv3
will take much longer than the use of EdDSA, I prefer to fix the hash
algorithm for EdDSA if it is not specified explicitly. This allows the
use of EdDSA in CMPv2.

Lijun

David von Oheimb <nl0@von-oheimb.de <mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de>> schrieb
am Di., 15. Juni 2021, 12:30:

    Yes, in case a certConf message is expected by the server and the
    client needs to positively conform a newly enrolled EdDSA cert, I
    think this cannot be avoided
    because the assumption of CMPv2 that a cert signature alg
    automatically implies/includes a cert hash alg does not hold anymore
    for EdDSA.
    So the client needs to specify which hash alg it uses, since for
    EdDSA in general (except for CMS) there is no clear/mandatory
    implicit hash alg defined.

    Â Â Â  David

    On 15.06.21 12:18, Lijun Liao wrote:
>     Does this mean we need CMPv3 for the EdDSA certificates?Â 
>
>     Lijun
>
>     David von Oheimb <nl0@von-oheimb.de <mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de>>
>     schrieb am Di., 15. Juni 2021, 12:00:
>
>         Russ, Lijun, et al.,
>
>         we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to
>         determine the hash alg to use for the certHash field in CMP
>         certConf messages.
>         Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week
>         in order to bring it into the next version of the CMP-related
>         drafts.
>
>         To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the
>         CertStatus structure as follows, which is binary backward
>         compatible:
>
>         Â Â  CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
>
>         Â Â Â Â Â  hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>
>         Â Â Â Â Â  certHashÂ Â Â  OCTET STRING,
>
>         Â Â Â Â Â  certReqIdÂ Â  INTEGER,
>
>         Â Â Â Â Â  statusInfoÂ  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>
>         Â Â  }
>
>         In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly
>         contains a hash alg (which so far always was the case until
>         EdDSA came up),
>         then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be
>         omitted, which means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.
>         Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash
>         alg used and the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.
>         (In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft
>         thatÂ  SHA-512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,
>         like done for CMS in RFC8419).
>
>         Does this sound fine?
>
>         Â Â Â  David
>
>

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    <p>Russ, what do you think, also on Lijun's response quoted here?<br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-forward-container"><br>
      -------- Forwarded Message --------
      <table class="moz-email-headers-table" cellspacing="0"
        cellpadding="0" border="0">
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <th valign="BASELINE" nowrap="nowrap" align="RIGHT">Subject:
            </th>
            <td>Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for
              calculating certHash</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th valign="BASELINE" nowrap="nowrap" align="RIGHT">Date: </th>
            <td>Tue, 15 Jun 2021 13:17:58 +0200</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th valign="BASELINE" nowrap="nowrap" align="RIGHT">From: </th>
            <td>Lijun Liao <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:lijun.liao@gmail.com">&lt;lijun.liao@gmail.com&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <th valign="BASELINE" nowrap="nowrap" align="RIGHT">To: </th>
            <td>David von Oheimb <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de">&lt;nl0@von-oheimb.de&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <br>
      <br>
      <div dir="auto">
        <div dir="auto">I am fine with the ASN.1 discussed in this email
          thread.</div>
        <div dir="auto"><br>
        </div>
        Since the upgrade to CMPv3
        <div dir="auto">will take much longer than the use of EdDSA, I
          prefer to fix the hash algorithm for EdDSA if it is not
          specified explicitly. This allows the use of EdDSA in CMPv2.</div>
        <div dir="auto"><br>
        </div>
        <div dir="auto">Lijun</div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">David von Oheimb &lt;<a
            href="mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de" moz-do-not-send="true">nl0@von-oheimb.de</a>&gt;
          schrieb am Di., 15. Juni 2021, 12:30:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
          .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
          <div>
            <p>Yes, in case a certConf message is expected by the server
              and the client needs to positively conform a newly
              enrolled EdDSA cert, I think this cannot be avoided <br>
              because the assumption of CMPv2 that a cert signature alg
              automatically implies/includes a cert hash alg does not
              hold anymore for EdDSA.<br>
              So the client needs to specify which hash alg it uses,
              since for EdDSA in general (except for CMS) there is no
              clear/mandatory implicit hash alg defined.<br>
            </p>
            <p>Â Â Â  David<br>
            </p>
            <div>On 15.06.21 12:18, Lijun Liao wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <div dir="auto">Does this mean we need CMPv3 for the EdDSA
                certificates?Â 
                <div dir="auto"><br>
                </div>
                <div dir="auto">Lijun</div>
              </div>
              <br>
              <div class="gmail_quote">
                <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">David von Oheimb &lt;<a
                    href="mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de" target="_blank"
                    rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true">nl0@von-oheimb.de</a>&gt;
                  schrieb am Di., 15. Juni 2021, 12:00:<br>
                </div>
                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
                  .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                  <div>
                    <p>Russ, Lijun, et al.,<br>
                      <br>
                      we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal
                      how to determine the hash alg to use for the
                      certHash field in CMP certConf messages.<br>
                      Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of
                      this week in order to bring it into the next
                      version of the CMP-related drafts.</p>
                    <p>To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg
                      field to the CertStatus structure as follows,
                      which is binary backward compatible:</p>
                    <pre>Â Â  CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {</pre>
                    <pre>Â Â Â Â Â  hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,</pre>
                    <pre>Â Â Â Â Â  certHashÂ Â Â  OCTET STRING,</pre>
                    <pre>Â Â Â Â Â  certReqIdÂ Â  INTEGER,</pre>
                    <pre>Â Â Â Â Â  statusInfoÂ  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL</pre>
                    <pre>Â Â  }</pre>
                    <p>In case the signature alg identifier of the cert
                      explicitly contains a hash alg (which so far
                      always was the case until EdDSA came up),<br>
                      then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg
                      field MUST be omitted, which means the certConf
                      message can keep version CMPv2.<br>
                      Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to
                      specify the hash alg used and the version of the
                      certConf message is CMPv3.<br>
                      (In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP-
                      Algorithms draft thatÂ  SHA-512 SHALL be used for
                      Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448, <br>
                      like done for CMS in RFC8419).</p>
                    <p>Does this sound fine?</p>
                    <p> Â Â Â  David</p>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </div>
  </body>
</html>

--------------3DEABC2901700E837A355B77--


From nobody Tue Jun 15 07:31:45 2021
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Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2021 17:31:36 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] randomized hashes & pqc
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On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 09:56:37AM +0100, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen wrote:
> 
> *Questions / Suggestion:*
> 
> I anticipate that (especially in PKI) there will be a need to facilitate
> other hash functions apart from the Keccak stuff that the PQC/stateful sig
> algorithms use internally. Hybrid classical/pqc schemes may perhaps want to
> compute the message hash only once (think of a boot-time firmware
> verification, which needs to process a lot of data quickly).
> 
> Furthermore, as a hardware interface builder, I really don't want to be
> passing multi-gigabyte messages through my signing/verification module
> interfaces, just a shorter byte sequence.
> 
> So, am I safe in assuming that the byte sequence actually being signed by
> these algorithms will be an ASN.1 blob roughly of type:
> 
> {  OID_of_RandH, H( nonce | m )  }
> 
> Where the OID_of_RandH specifies *both* the hash function and the
> randomization mechanism (how was nonce derived)? This would give
> authenticated domain separation between different hashes and -- more
> importantly -- between different types of randomization pre-padding
> mechanisms. So this would be the byte sequence actually going into the
> (FIPS 202) engine inside the module.

Even in pre-quantum contexts, I think such thing would be useful for
EdDSA, Since:

- Non-randomized prehashing would weaken things, since EdDSA is pre-
  hashed.
- Prehashed Ed25519 is not compatible with Ed25519 (since there was no
  way to make it sound in compatible way). As consequence, almost
  nothing supports prehashed Ed25519. Prehashing in Ed448 is a flag,
  but I do not think much stuff supports that either.
- As said, large messages are problematic (even if one breaks the
  spec in compatible way in order to eliminate two-pass signing).

And it could also be used with RSA and ECDSA to strengthen signatures.
E.g., WebPKI certificate signatures require randomized hashing (via a
hack), even if using SHA-2 hash functions.


And as said, this gets even more useful if you have more than one
signature over some medium/large amount of data, which will come up
with PQC, as the first PQC signatures will be hybrid ones.


I do not quite understand the thing about randomization mechanisms,
but I am sure I-D about randomized prehashing will say more about how
it works.

So in summary: +1 for this work.


-Ilari


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Subject: Re: [lamps] Fwd: [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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David:

I thought that some people were concerned that it was unclear what hash =
to use in with EdDSA in CMPv2.  I thout that wat the question the opened =
this can of worm in the first place.

Russ

> On Jun 15, 2021, at 7:48 AM, David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de> =
wrote:
>=20
> Russ, what do you think, also on Lijun's response quoted here?
>=20
>=20
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject:	Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for =
calculating certHash
> Date:	Tue, 15 Jun 2021 13:17:58 +0200
> From:	Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com> <mailto:lijun.liao@gmail.com>
> To:	David von Oheimb <nl0@von-oheimb.de> <mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de>
>=20
> I am fine with the ASN.1 discussed in this email thread.
>=20
> Since the upgrade to CMPv3
> will take much longer than the use of EdDSA, I prefer to fix the hash =
algorithm for EdDSA if it is not specified explicitly. This allows the =
use of EdDSA in CMPv2.
>=20
> Lijun
>=20
> David von Oheimb <nl0@von-oheimb.de <mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de>> =
schrieb am Di., 15. Juni 2021, 12:30:
> Yes, in case a certConf message is expected by the server and the =
client needs to positively conform a newly enrolled EdDSA cert, I think =
this cannot be avoided=20
> because the assumption of CMPv2 that a cert signature alg =
automatically implies/includes a cert hash alg does not hold anymore for =
EdDSA.
> So the client needs to specify which hash alg it uses, since for EdDSA =
in general (except for CMS) there is no clear/mandatory implicit hash =
alg defined.
>=20
>     David
>=20
> On 15.06.21 12:18, Lijun Liao wrote:
>> Does this mean we need CMPv3 for the EdDSA certificates?=20
>>=20
>> Lijun
>>=20
>> David von Oheimb <nl0@von-oheimb.de <mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de>> =
schrieb am Di., 15. Juni 2021, 12:00:
>> Russ, Lijun, et al.,
>>=20
>> we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine =
the hash alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf messages.
>> Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in order =
to bring it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.
>>=20
>> To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the =
CertStatus structure as follows, which is binary backward compatible:
>>=20
>>    CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>>       certHash    OCTET STRING,
>>       certReqId   INTEGER,
>>       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>>    }
>> In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly contains =
a hash alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA came up),
>> then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be =
omitted, which means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.
>> Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg =
used and the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.
>> (In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that  =
SHA-512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,=20
>> like done for CMS in RFC8419).
>>=20
>> Does this sound fine?
>>=20
>>     David
>>=20
>>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm


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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class="">David:<div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">I thought that some people were concerned that it was unclear what hash to use in with EdDSA in CMPv2. &nbsp;I thout that wat the question the opened this can of worm in the first place.<div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Russ<br class=""><div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On Jun 15, 2021, at 7:48 AM, David von Oheimb &lt;<a href="mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de" class="">nl0@von-Oheimb.de</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class="">
  

    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" class="">
  
  <div class=""><p class="">Russ, what do you think, also on Lijun's response quoted here?<br class="">
    </p>
    <div class="moz-forward-container"><br class="">
      -------- Forwarded Message --------
      <table class="moz-email-headers-table" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0">
        <tbody class="">
          <tr class="">
            <th valign="BASELINE" nowrap="nowrap" align="RIGHT" class="">Subject:
            </th>
            <td class="">Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for
              calculating certHash</td>
          </tr>
          <tr class="">
            <th valign="BASELINE" nowrap="nowrap" align="RIGHT" class="">Date: </th>
            <td class="">Tue, 15 Jun 2021 13:17:58 +0200</td>
          </tr>
          <tr class="">
            <th valign="BASELINE" nowrap="nowrap" align="RIGHT" class="">From: </th>
            <td class="">Lijun Liao <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:lijun.liao@gmail.com">&lt;lijun.liao@gmail.com&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
          <tr class="">
            <th valign="BASELINE" nowrap="nowrap" align="RIGHT" class="">To: </th>
            <td class="">David von Oheimb <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de">&lt;nl0@von-oheimb.de&gt;</a></td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
      <br class="">
      <br class="">
      <div dir="auto" class="">
        <div dir="auto" class="">I am fine with the ASN.1 discussed in this email
          thread.</div>
        <div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
        </div>
        Since the upgrade to CMPv3
        <div dir="auto" class="">will take much longer than the use of EdDSA, I
          prefer to fix the hash algorithm for EdDSA if it is not
          specified explicitly. This allows the use of EdDSA in CMPv2.</div>
        <div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
        </div>
        <div dir="auto" class="">Lijun</div>
      </div>
      <br class="">
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">David von Oheimb &lt;<a href="mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de" moz-do-not-send="true" class="">nl0@von-oheimb.de</a>&gt;
          schrieb am Di., 15. Juni 2021, 12:30:<br class="">
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
          .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
          <div class=""><p class="">Yes, in case a certConf message is expected by the server
              and the client needs to positively conform a newly
              enrolled EdDSA cert, I think this cannot be avoided <br class="">
              because the assumption of CMPv2 that a cert signature alg
              automatically implies/includes a cert hash alg does not
              hold anymore for EdDSA.<br class="">
              So the client needs to specify which hash alg it uses,
              since for EdDSA in general (except for CMS) there is no
              clear/mandatory implicit hash alg defined.<br class="">
            </p><p class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David<br class="">
            </p>
            <div class="">On 15.06.21 12:18, Lijun Liao wrote:<br class="">
            </div>
            <blockquote type="cite" class="">
              <div dir="auto" class="">Does this mean we need CMPv3 for the EdDSA
                certificates?&nbsp;
                <div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
                </div>
                <div dir="auto" class="">Lijun</div>
              </div>
              <br class="">
              <div class="gmail_quote">
                <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">David von Oheimb &lt;<a href="mailto:nl0@von-oheimb.de" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true" class="">nl0@von-oheimb.de</a>&gt;
                  schrieb am Di., 15. Juni 2021, 12:00:<br class="">
                </div>
                <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
                  .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                  <div class=""><p class="">Russ, Lijun, et al.,<br class="">
                      <br class="">
                      we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal
                      how to determine the hash alg to use for the
                      certHash field in CMP certConf messages.<br class="">
                      Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of
                      this week in order to bring it into the next
                      version of the CMP-related drafts.</p><p class="">To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg
                      field to the CertStatus structure as follows,
                      which is binary backward compatible:</p>
                    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {</pre>
                    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,</pre>
                    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,</pre>
                    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,</pre>
                    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL</pre>
                    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp; }</pre><p class="">In case the signature alg identifier of the cert
                      explicitly contains a hash alg (which so far
                      always was the case until EdDSA came up),<br class="">
                      then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg
                      field MUST be omitted, which means the certConf
                      message can keep version CMPv2.<br class="">
                      Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to
                      specify the hash alg used and the version of the
                      certConf message is CMPv3.<br class="">
                      (In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP-
                      Algorithms draft that&nbsp; SHA-512 SHALL be used for
                      Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448, <br class="">
                      like done for CMS in RFC8419).</p><p class="">Does this sound fine?</p><p class=""> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David</p>
                    <br class="">
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
    </div>
  </div>

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2021 11:14:06 -0400
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Cc: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>, LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>, "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>, "david.von.oheimb@siemens.com" <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
To: David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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David:

I think this means that any new signature mechanisms need to say what =
the default hash for use with CMP will be.

Russ


> On Jun 15, 2021, at 6:00 AM, David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de> =
wrote:
>=20
> Russ, Lijun, et al.,
>=20
> we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine the =
hash alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf messages.
> Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in order =
to bring it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.
>=20
> To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the CertStatus =
structure as follows, which is binary backward compatible:
>=20
>    CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>       certHash    OCTET STRING,
>       certReqId   INTEGER,
>       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>    }
> In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly contains a =
hash alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA came up),
> then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be omitted, =
which means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.
> Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg used =
and the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.
> (In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that  =
SHA-512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,=20
> like done for CMS in RFC8419).
>=20
> Does this sound fine?
>=20
>     David
>=20
> On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik wrote:
>> If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me =
know.
>> If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an =
updated version.
>>=20
>> Hendrik
>>=20
>>> Von: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> <mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org> =
Im Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik
>>>=20
>>> Russ
>>>=20
>>> Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the =
backward
>>> compatibility of this approach. It works fine.
>>>=20
>>>> Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> =
<mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>
>>>>=20
>>>> The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add =
something
>>> like:
>>>> CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>>>    hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
>>>>    ...
>>> This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called =
the field
>>> hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.
>>> We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines =
the hash
>>> algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be =
confirmed.
>>> We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be =
crypto agile
>>> and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the =
DEFAULT.
>>> @Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for =
certificate
>>> signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on =
this to
>>> CMP Algorithms.
>>>=20
>>>> That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP =
protocol
>>>> version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.
>>> You are absolutely right.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following =
section to CMP
>>> Updates:
>>>=20
>>> ---------------------------snip---------------------------
>>> 2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content
>>>=20
>>> This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus =
type used in
>>> certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those =
certificates
>>> where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm =
field.
>>>=20
>>> Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
>>>=20
>>>    CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>>>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>>>       certHash    OCTET STRING,
>>>       certReqId   INTEGER,
>>>       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>>>    }
>>>=20
>>> The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
>>> signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not =
specify a hash
>>> algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, =
e.g., for
>>> EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be =
used for
>>> calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL =
be
>>> computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify =
the
>>> certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated =
by the
>>> certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).
>>> ---------------------------snip---------------------------
>>>=20
>>> Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!
>>>=20
>>> Hendrik
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Spasm mailing list
>>> Spasm@ietf.org <mailto:Spasm@ietf.org>
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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class="">David:<div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">I think this means that any new signature mechanisms need to say what the default hash for use with CMP will be.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Russ</div><div class=""><br class=""><div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On Jun 15, 2021, at 6:00 AM, David von Oheimb &lt;<a href="mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de" class="">nl0@von-Oheimb.de</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class="">
  
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" class="">
  
  <div class=""><p class="">Russ, Lijun, et al.,<br class="">
      <br class="">
      we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine
      the hash alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf
      messages.<br class="">
      Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in
      order to bring it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.</p><p class="">To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the
      CertStatus structure as follows, which is binary backward
      compatible:</p>
    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {</pre>
    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,</pre>
    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,</pre>
    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,</pre>
    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL</pre>
    <pre class="">&nbsp;&nbsp; }</pre><p class="">In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly
      contains a hash alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA
      came up),<br class="">
      then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be
      omitted, which means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.<br class="">
      Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg
      used and the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.<br class="">
      (In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that&nbsp;
      SHA-512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,
      <br class="">
      like done for CMS in RFC8419).</p><p class="">Does this sound fine?</p><p class="">
      &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David</p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik
      wrote:<br class="">
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:AM0PR10MB24180B8830DE52C665D631D9FE349@AM0PR10MB2418.EURPRD10.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM" class="">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me know.
If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an updated version.

Hendrik

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite" class="">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Von: Spasm <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org">&lt;spasm-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</a> Im Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik

Russ

Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backward
compatibility of this approach. It works fine.

</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite" class="">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Von: Russ Housley <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">&lt;housley@vigilsec.com&gt;</a>

The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add something
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">like:
</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite" class="">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
   hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
   ...
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the field
hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.
We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines the hash
algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be confirmed.
We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be crypto agile
and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAULT.
@Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for certificate
signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this to
CMP Algorithms.

</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite" class="">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol
version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">You are absolutely right.


To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following section to CMP
Updates:

---------------------------snip---------------------------
2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content

This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type used in
certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certificates
where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.

Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:

   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
      certHash    OCTET STRING,
      certReqId   INTEGER,
      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
   }

The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a hash
algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., for
EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used for
calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be
computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the
certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the
certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).
---------------------------snip---------------------------

Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!

Hendrik

_______________________________________________
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<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf">https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf</a>
.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspasm&amp;amp;data=04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockha
us%<a href="http://40siemens.com" class="">40siemens.com</a>%7C8a0703abedbe44504c8d08d92b5fec60%7C38ae3bcd957
94fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637588513262560559%7CUnknown%7
CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJ
XVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;amp;sdata=PTvMzW780CJ3gNrZVhPiRZX%2BwzA7LXIo
LQcLQkgJk%2Bk%3D&amp;amp;reserved=0
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Spasm@ietf.org">Spasm@ietf.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a>

</pre>
    </blockquote>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] randomized hashes & pqc
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RFC 8708 includes the object identifier for HSS/LMS.

Russ

> On Jun 13, 2021, at 3:13 PM, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen =
<mjos@pqshield.com> wrote:
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> Even though my posting wasn't about PQC timelines, but about hash =
randomization for (pqc) signatures, I did mention "at least one of" =
Falcon and Dilithium being selected. It's more like Falcon "xor" =
Dilithium that will be selected at the end of this year. If you didn't =
attend, the presentations of last week's NIST PQC Standardization =
Conference are freely available; The slides of Dustin Moody (NIST) have =
the most up to date information. =
https://csrc.nist.gov/Presentations/2021/status-update-on-the-3rd-round =
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Presentations/2021/status-update-on-the-3rd-round>
>=20
> In any case, the same issue affects them both, and also the already =
NIST-approved algorithms LMS,HSS,XMSS,XMSS^MT. I'd prefer to have OIDs =
not just for the algorithms, but also for the hash randomization =
mechanisms.
>=20
> Cheers,
> - markku
>=20
> Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com =
<mailto:mjos@pqshield.com>> PQShield, Oxford UK.
>=20
>=20
> On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 9:56 AM Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen =
<mjos@pqshield.com <mailto:mjos@pqshield.com>> wrote:
> Hello,
>=20
> Some observations:
>=20
> The prominent NIST PQC lattice sig algorithms (Dilithium and Falcon -- =
NIST has stated to standardize at least one of these) and the NIST SP =
800-208 stateful signature algorithms (LMS/HSS, XMSS/XMSS^MT) all use =
randomized hashing, but not in the way specified in NIST SP 800-106 back =
in 2009.
>=20
> Basically, a nonce is prefixed as the first thing of a (SHAKE) hash =
computation before the message itself. Hence in verification, one needs =
to look at the signature (which contains the nonce) before starting the =
message hash.
>=20
> This is a little different from older PKCS #1 flows. Note that if one =
takes the approach of just singing a plain SHA-256 hash of a message =
using these algorithms (feeding that hash to be further hashed and =
signed), this will effectively halve the security level in both =
classical or quantum adversary models.
>=20
> In signing, the nonce computation happens in various ways; one can use =
either h(pk) as the nonce, a PRF of the signature sequence number (for =
stateful sigs), or have an entirely random one.. But this is mostly an =
API issue, not an IETF problem.
>=20
> Furthermore, the SHAKE XOF output is directly used for a =
sampler/hash-to-point mechanism in Falcon (there is an intermediate hash =
in Dilithium). This needs to be an XOF, not SHA-2/3, as many output =
bytes are needed for further processing (creating those lattices, =
essentially).=20
>=20
> Questions / Suggestion:
>=20
> I anticipate that (especially in PKI) there will be a need to =
facilitate other hash functions apart from the Keccak stuff that the =
PQC/stateful sig algorithms use internally. Hybrid classical/pqc schemes =
may perhaps want to compute the message hash only once (think of a =
boot-time firmware verification, which needs to process a lot of data =
quickly).
>=20
> Furthermore, as a hardware interface builder, I really don't want to =
be passing multi-gigabyte messages through my signing/verification =
module interfaces, just a shorter byte sequence.
>=20
> So, am I safe in assuming that the byte sequence actually being signed =
by these algorithms will be an ASN.1 blob roughly of type:
>=20
> {  OID_of_RandH, H( nonce | m )  }
>=20
> Where the OID_of_RandH specifies both the hash function and the =
randomization mechanism (how was nonce derived)? This would give =
authenticated domain separation between different hashes and -- more =
importantly -- between different types of randomization pre-padding =
mechanisms. So this would be the byte sequence actually going into the =
(FIPS 202) engine inside the module.
>=20
> Cheers,
> - markku
>=20
> Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com =
<mailto:mjos@pqshield.com>> PQShield, Oxford UK.
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm


--Apple-Mail=_9EF4507A-D0A6-4B59-A4AC-5A968997D179
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">RFC =
8708 includes the object identifier for HSS/LMS.<div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Russ<br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Jun =
13, 2021, at 3:13 PM, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" class=3D"">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Hi,</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Even though my posting wasn't about PQC timelines, but about =
hash randomization for (pqc) signatures, I did mention "at least one of" =
Falcon and Dilithium being selected. It's more like Falcon "xor" =
Dilithium that will be selected at the end of this year. If you didn't =
attend, the presentations of last week's NIST PQC Standardization =
Conference are freely available; The slides of Dustin Moody (NIST) have =
the most up to date information. <a =
href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/Presentations/2021/status-update-on-the-3rd-=
round" =
class=3D"">https://csrc.nist.gov/Presentations/2021/status-update-on-the-3=
rd-round</a></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In =
any case, the same issue affects them both, and also the already =
NIST-approved algorithms LMS,HSS,XMSS,XMSS^MT. I'd prefer to have OIDs =
not just for the algorithms, but also for the hash randomization =
mechanisms.<br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Cheers,</div><div class=3D"">- markku</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford =
UK.</div></div></div><br class=3D""></div></div><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun =
11, 2021 at 9:56 AM Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" class=3D"">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Hello,</div><div class=3D""><u class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></u></div><div class=3D""><u class=3D"">Some =
observations:</u><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The prominent NIST PQC lattice sig =
algorithms (Dilithium and Falcon -- NIST has stated to standardize at =
least one of these) and the NIST SP 800-208 stateful signature =
algorithms (LMS/HSS, XMSS/XMSS^MT) all use randomized hashing, but not =
in the way specified in NIST SP 800-106 back in 2009.<br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div=
 class=3D"">Basically, a nonce is prefixed as the first thing of a =
(SHAKE) hash computation before the message itself. Hence in =
verification, one needs to look at the signature (which contains the =
nonce) before starting the message hash. </div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div><div class=3D"">This is a little different from =
older PKCS #1 flows. Note that if one takes the approach of just singing =
a plain SHA-256 hash of a message using these algorithms (feeding that =
hash to be further hashed and signed), this will effectively halve the =
security level in both classical or quantum adversary models.<br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In =
signing, the nonce computation happens in various ways; one can use =
either h(pk) as the nonce, a PRF of the signature sequence number (for =
stateful sigs), or have an entirely random one.. But this is mostly an =
API issue, not an IETF problem.<br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Furthermore, the SHAKE XOF output is =
directly used for a sampler/hash-to-point mechanism in Falcon (there is =
an intermediate hash in Dilithium). This needs to be an XOF, not =
SHA-2/3, as many output bytes are needed for further processing =
(creating those lattices, essentially). <br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><u class=3D""><br class=3D""></u></div><div class=3D""><u =
class=3D"">Questions / Suggestion:</u><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I anticipate that =
(especially in PKI) there will be a need to facilitate other hash =
functions apart from the Keccak stuff that the PQC/stateful sig =
algorithms use internally. Hybrid classical/pqc schemes may perhaps want =
to compute the message hash only once (think of a boot-time firmware =
verification, which needs to process a lot of data quickly).<br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Furthermore, as a hardware interface builder, I really don't =
want to be passing multi-gigabyte messages through my =
signing/verification module interfaces, just a shorter byte =
sequence.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">So, =
am I safe in assuming that the byte sequence actually being signed by =
these algorithms will be an ASN.1 blob roughly of type:<br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">{&nbsp; OID_of_RandH, H( nonce | m )&nbsp; }<br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Where the OID_of_RandH specifies <u class=3D"">both</u> the =
hash function and the randomization mechanism (how was nonce derived)? =
This would give authenticated domain separation between different hashes =
and -- more importantly -- between different types of randomization =
pre-padding mechanisms. So this would be the byte sequence actually =
going into the (FIPS 202) engine inside the module.<br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Cheers,</div><div class=3D"">- markku</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford =
UK.</div></div></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">Spasm =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm<br =
class=3D""></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_9EF4507A-D0A6-4B59-A4AC-5A968997D179--


From nobody Tue Jun 15 08:30:57 2021
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Subject: Re: [lamps] randomized hashes & pqc
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> On Jun 15, 2021, at 10:31 AM, Ilari Liusvaara =
<ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Fri, Jun 11, 2021 at 09:56:37AM +0100, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen =
wrote:
>>=20
>> *Questions / Suggestion:*
>>=20
>> I anticipate that (especially in PKI) there will be a need to =
facilitate
>> other hash functions apart from the Keccak stuff that the =
PQC/stateful sig
>> algorithms use internally. Hybrid classical/pqc schemes may perhaps =
want to
>> compute the message hash only once (think of a boot-time firmware
>> verification, which needs to process a lot of data quickly).
>>=20
>> Furthermore, as a hardware interface builder, I really don't want to =
be
>> passing multi-gigabyte messages through my signing/verification =
module
>> interfaces, just a shorter byte sequence.
>>=20
>> So, am I safe in assuming that the byte sequence actually being =
signed by
>> these algorithms will be an ASN.1 blob roughly of type:
>>=20
>> {  OID_of_RandH, H( nonce | m )  }
>>=20
>> Where the OID_of_RandH specifies *both* the hash function and the
>> randomization mechanism (how was nonce derived)? This would give
>> authenticated domain separation between different hashes and -- more
>> importantly -- between different types of randomization pre-padding
>> mechanisms. So this would be the byte sequence actually going into =
the
>> (FIPS 202) engine inside the module.
>=20
> Even in pre-quantum contexts, I think such thing would be useful for
> EdDSA, Since:
>=20
> - Non-randomized prehashing would weaken things, since EdDSA is pre-
>  hashed.
> - Prehashed Ed25519 is not compatible with Ed25519 (since there was no
>  way to make it sound in compatible way). As consequence, almost
>  nothing supports prehashed Ed25519. Prehashing in Ed448 is a flag,
>  but I do not think much stuff supports that either.
> - As said, large messages are problematic (even if one breaks the
>  spec in compatible way in order to eliminate two-pass signing).
>=20
> And it could also be used with RSA and ECDSA to strengthen signatures.
> E.g., WebPKI certificate signatures require randomized hashing (via a
> hack), even if using SHA-2 hash functions.
>=20
>=20
> And as said, this gets even more useful if you have more than one
> signature over some medium/large amount of data, which will come up
> with PQC, as the first PQC signatures will be hybrid ones.
>=20
>=20
> I do not quite understand the thing about randomization mechanisms,
> but I am sure I-D about randomized prehashing will say more about how
> it works.
>=20
> So in summary: +1 for this work.

There was a slightly different approach taken in RFC 6210.  I am unaware =
of any lessons from implementations.  Are others?

Russ=


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/BvGR6Sxt5I-Dqr7HVobbemosipM>
Subject: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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I confess that until now I never bothered actually looking with a critical =
eye at RFC 5958, 5208, 5915 and such =E2=80=93 because the apps that presumably us=
e them to interoperate, were already written by somebody else and (sorta ;) =
working.

=20

Now, as I=E2=80=99m looking at extending those definitions to Post-Quantum algori=
thms and parameters, I=E2=80=99m seeing what appears weird to me.

=20

A lot of the ASN.1 definitions seem to describe how to package private keys=
. Considering that interoperability in the majority of cases is about applic=
ations communicating =E2=80=9Cover the wire=E2=80=9D using S/MIME, CMS, TLS or IKE key e=
xchange, etc. =E2=80=93 the predominant need appears to be exchanging public (not =
private) keys?

=20

Yet the definitions invest in the details of the private keys, leaving the =
public key as =E2=80=9CBIT STRING OPTIONAL=E2=80=9D. Why is it so?

=20

IMHO, first =E2=80=93 PublicKey should be OCTET STRING (probably not OPTIONAL), p=
robably CONTAINING {}. Then, each specific IETF-accepted algorithm should ha=
ve its own definition of how to serialize its public key, maybe wrapping the=
 result into an OCTET STRING (usually this is done to allow parser that does=
n=E2=80=99t understand the format, to skip this field)=E2=80=A6=20

=20

Is it too late to rectify? And if I=E2=80=99m missing something, could you enligh=
ten me please? Am I barking at the wrong tree altogether? If so, where is th=
e public key serialization described, if not here? And why not here?

=20

Thank you! And apologies for the exhibited ignorance.

=20

Here are some examples of what I=E2=80=99m talking about:

=20

ECPrivateKey ::=3D SEQUENCE {

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 version=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1)=
,

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 privateKey=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 OCTET STRING,

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 publicKey=C2=A0 [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL

=C2=A0=C2=A0 }

=20

OneAsymmetricKey ::=3D SEQUENCE {

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 version=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Version,

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 privateKeyAlgorithm=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 privateKey=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 PrivateKey,

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 attributes=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 [0] Attributes OPTIONAL,

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ...,

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 [[2: publicKey=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 [1] PublicKey OPTIONAL ]],

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ...

=C2=A0=C2=A0 }

=20

PublicKey ::=3D BIT STRING

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- Content varies based on type of=
 key. The

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- algorithm identifier dictates t=
he format of

=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- the key.

--

Regards,

Uri Blumenthal                              Voice: (781) 981-1638=20

Secure Resilient Systems and Technologies   Cell:  (339) 223-5363

MIT Lincoln Laboratory                     =20

244 Wood Street, Lexington, MA  02420-9108     =20

=20

Web:     https://www.ll.mit.edu/biographies/uri-blumenthal

Root CA: https://www.ll.mit.edu/llrca2.pem

=20

There are two ways to design a system. One is to make is so simple there ar=
e obviously no deficiencies.

The other is to make it so complex there are no obvious deficiencies.

                                                                           =
                                                          -  C. A. R. Hoare

=20


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--></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72" style=3D'wo=
rd-wrap:break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:12.0pt'>I confess that until now I never bothered actually looking=
 with a critical eye at RFC 5958, 5208, 5915 and such =E2=80=93 because the apps t=
hat presumably use them to interoperate, were already written by somebody el=
se and (sorta ;) working.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Now, as I=E2=80=99m looking at extending those definitions =
to Post-Quantum algorithms and parameters, I=E2=80=99m seeing what appears weird t=
o me.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0p=
t'>A lot of the ASN.1 definitions seem to describe how to package <u>private=
</u> keys. Considering that interoperability in the majority of cases is abo=
ut applications communicating =E2=80=9Cover the wire=E2=80=9D using S/MIME, CMS, TLS or =
IKE key exchange, etc. =E2=80=93 the predominant need appears to be exchanging <u>=
public</u> (<u>not</u> private) keys?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Yet the definitions invest in the details=
 of the private keys, leaving the public key as =E2=80=9CBIT STRING OPTIONAL=E2=80=9D. W=
hy is it so?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:=
12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:12.0pt'>IMHO, first =E2=80=93 PublicKey should be OCTET STRING (probably <u>not<=
/u> OPTIONAL), probably CONTAINING {}. Then, each specific IETF-accepted alg=
orithm should have its own definition of how to serialize its public key, ma=
ybe wrapping the result into an OCTET STRING (usually this is done to allow =
parser that doesn=E2=80=99t understand the format, to skip this field)=E2=80=A6 <o:p></o=
:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Is it too =
late to rectify? And if I=E2=80=99m missing something, could you enlighten me plea=
se? Am I barking at the wrong tree altogether? If so, where is the public ke=
y serialization described, if not here? And why not here?<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Thank you! And apolog=
ies for the exhibited ignorance.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Here are some examples of what I=E2=80=99m talking a=
bout:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0p=
t;font-family:Courier'>ECPrivateKey ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 v=
ersion=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1),<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Cou=
rier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 privateKey=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 para=
meters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 p=
ublicKey=C2=A0 [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 }<o:p></o:p></span></=
p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'><o:p=
>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;fon=
t-family:Courier'>OneAsymmetricKey ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ve=
rsion=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Version,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 p=
rivateKeyAlgorithm=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'=
>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 privateKey=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 PrivateKey,<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier=
'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 attributes=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 [0] Attributes OPTIONAL,<o:p></o=
:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:C=
ourier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ...,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 [[2: publicKey=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 [=
1] PublicKey OPTIONAL ]],<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ...<o:p></o:p></span></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0 }<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-f=
amily:Courier'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>PublicKey ::=3D BIT STRING<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'=
>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- Content varies based on type of=
 key. The<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.=
0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- algorit=
hm identifier dictates the format of<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font-family:Courier'>=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- the key.<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'color:black'>--</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:bl=
ack'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;=
font-family:"Andale Mono";color:black'>Regards,</span><span style=3D'font-size=
:12.0pt;color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Andale Mono";color:black'>Uri Blumenthal&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Voice: (781) 981-1638&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.=
0pt;color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-=
size:10.0pt;font-family:"Andale Mono";color:black'>Secure Resilient Systems&=
nbsp;and Technologies&nbsp;&nbsp; Cell: &nbsp;(339) 223-5363</span><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Andale Mono";color:black'>MIT Linc=
oln Laboratory&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Andale Mono";color:black'>244=
 Wood Street, Lexington, MA&nbsp;&nbsp;02420-9108&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'><o:p></o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Andale Mo=
no";color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:"Andale Mono";color:black'>Web:&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=3D"https:/=
/www.ll.mit.edu/biographies/uri-blumenthal" title=3D"https://www.ll.mit.edu/bi=
ographies/uri-blumenthal"><span style=3D'color:#713C56'>https://www.ll.mit.edu=
/biographies/uri-blumenthal</span></a></span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;c=
olor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:=
10.0pt;font-family:"Andale Mono";color:black'>Root CA:&nbsp;<a href=3D"https:/=
/www.ll.mit.edu/llrca2.pem" title=3D"https://www.ll.mit.edu/llrca2.pem"><span =
style=3D'color:#713C56'>https://www.ll.mit.edu/llrca2.pem</span></a></span><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;</span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;co=
lor:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><i><span style=3D'color:bl=
ack'>There are two ways to design a system. One is to make is so simple ther=
e are obviously no deficiencies.</span></i><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;col=
or:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><i><span style=3D'color:bla=
ck'>The other is to make it so complex there are no obvious deficiencies.</s=
pan></i><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><i><span style=3D'color:black'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;-&n=
bsp; C. A. R. Hoare</span></i><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'><o:=
p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div=
></body></html>

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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
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Thread-Topic: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.edu> writes:=0A=0A>Yet the defin=
itions invest in the details of the private keys, leaving the=0A>public key=
 as =93BIT STRING OPTIONAL=94. Why is it so?=0A=0ACargo cult protocol desig=
n.  Back in the late 1980s someone decided that holes=0Acontaining keys had=
 to be BIT STRINGs.  So today, thirty-plus years later,=0Aholes containing =
keys are still (mostly) BIT STRINGs even though what's=0Apresent in the hol=
e is always an OCTET STRING.=0A=0A>A lot of the ASN.1 definitions seem to d=
escribe how to package private keys.=0A>Considering that interoperability i=
n the majority of cases is about=0A>applications communicating =93over the =
wire=94 using S/MIME, CMS, TLS or IKE key=0A>exchange, etc. =96 the predomi=
nant need appears to be exchanging public (not=0A>private) keys?=0A=0AMore =
cargo cult protocol design.  PKCS #8 specified the format for RSA private=
=0Akeys but nothing else, for the simple reason that there was nothing else=
 at=0Athe time.  Then when people needed to store something other than RSA =
keys they=0Ainvented their own formats extending PKCS #8, principally led b=
y OpenSSL (who=0Ahad the most need for it) but occasionally other vendors a=
s well, whoever got=0Athe most mindshare first.  The issue was resolved by =
PKCS #15 which specified=0Aa general format for public and private keys, bu=
t everyone ignored that and=0Ainvented their own new format for each new pu=
blic-key algorithm.=0A=0AAs a result, when you write an RFC specifying the =
format for public keys for=0Aalgorithm X for, for example, S/MIME, you also=
 need to specify the private-key=0Aformat even though it has nothing to do =
with S/MIME.  Rot bilong kago.=0A=0A(And as a general note, a lot of the WT=
F?!!? stuff in PKIX is explainable=0Athrough cargo cult protocol design, it=
's not just these two).=0A=0APeter.


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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> I think the short answer is that public keys are usually exchanged by sen=
ding certificates.

I'm not sure I understand - private keys usually are not exchanged at all, =
and yet there's a whole bunch of ASN.1 stuff describing them.

> Raw public keys that are not associated with an identity can lead to subt=
le security
> vulnerabilities (Mallory swaps Mallory's public key for Alice's without B=
ob noticing).=20

This is supposed to be not about what good a standalone public key is - but=
 about how to represent and encode that public key in an interoperable way. =
Whether such encoding makes sense outside of any context is a totally differ=
ent question, which to me seems irrelevant to the main one - how to encode a=
 public key that is not a simple big integer.

> Sorry to be the bearer of bad news, but you may be headed for a serious e=
ncounter
> with X.509, e.g., via RFC 5280.

That is indeed bad news, but on the other hand - a good start. __

>    >Yet the definitions invest in the details of the private keys, leavin=
g the
>    >public key as =E2=80=9CBIT STRING OPTIONAL=E2=80=9D. Why is it so?
>
>    Cargo cult protocol design.  Back in the late 1980s someone decided th=
at holes
>    containing keys had to be BIT STRINGs.  So today, thirty-plus years la=
ter,
>    holes containing keys are still (mostly) BIT STRINGs even though what'=
s
>    present in the hole is always an OCTET STRING.

Excellent. That means there's no hidden wisdom in there, and I can (and wil=
l) in my design revert this to what Common Sense suggests: an OCTET STRING C=
ONTAINING the specific format/encoding structure that a specific algorithm (=
e.g., lattice-based) would require for ensuring an app can correctly decode =
it in an interoperable way.

>    > A lot of the ASN.1 definitions seem to describe how to package priva=
te keys.
>    >  .  .  . [though]  .  .  . the predominant need appears to be exchan=
ging public
>    > (not private) keys?
>
>    More cargo cult protocol design.  PKCS #8 specified the format for RSA=
 private
>    keys but nothing else, for the simple reason that there was nothing el=
se at
>    the time.  .  .  .
>
>    As a result, when you write an RFC specifying the format for public ke=
ys for
>    algorithm X for, for example, S/MIME, you also need to specify the pri=
vate-key
>    format even though it has nothing to do with S/MIME.  Rot bilong kago.

Hmm... What would happen if in a new document I choose not to specify priva=
te-key format...?=20
Given the fact that it's (practically) never present on the wire, and compl=
iance/interoperability for its implementation cannot be tested?

>    (And as a general note, a lot of the WTF?!!? stuff in PKIX is explaina=
ble
>    through cargo cult protocol design, it's not just these two).

I see. Thank you very much for explaining - unfortunately, it makes a lot o=
f sense. =E2=98=B9

On the other hand, it seems to mean that (due to this lack of definitions) =
there's nothing to be backward-compatible with, so one can (finally, hopeful=
ly, maybe) do it right...

Thanks!

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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL writes:=0A=0A>Hmm... What would happen if in=
 a new document I choose not to specify=0A>private-key format...?=0A=0ATrad=
itionally, somebody would invent one and then whoever shouts loudest would=
=0Aget their version adopted.  Mozilla and Microsoft (at least, and possibl=
y=0Anowadays Google as well) would implement it in a subtly incompatible wa=
y so=0Aevery implementation would have to guess at what it was they were se=
eing.=0AEventually it would be documented in an appendix to an RFC on OSPF =
extensions=0Aor something, but by then everyone would have deployed multipl=
e-format parsers=0Aso it wouldn't matter much.=0A=0AOr you could look at PK=
CS #15 and document it in a format compatible with=0Athat.=0A=0APeter.


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2021 09:50:45 -0400
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [saag] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Uri:

>> I think the short answer is that public keys are usually exchanged by =
sending certificates.
>=20
> I'm not sure I understand - private keys usually are not exchanged at =
all, and yet there's a whole bunch of ASN.1 stuff describing them.

Yes, this is needed.  For example, PKCS#12 can be used to move a private =
key from one device to another.

Russ



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From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 01:06:50PM +0000, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
> 
> This is supposed to be not about what good a standalone public key is
> - but about how to represent and encode that public key in an
> interoperable way. Whether such encoding makes sense outside of any
> context is a totally different question, which to me seems irrelevant
> to the main one - how to encode a public key that is not a simple big
> integer.

Looks like they are even simpler octet strings. :-> Tho there does not
seem to be an operation that takes in private key an pulls public key
out of that.

I took a look at a finalist PQC KEM (Kyber) and a finalist PQC signature
(Dilithium). Seems like everything that is meant to be stored or
transported is an octet string. This includes public keys and private
keys.

Here is what Kyber API looks like (per each variant):

- generate_key() -> (public_key:octets, private_key:octets)
- encapsulate(public_key:octets) -> (ciphertext:octets, shared_sec:octets)
- decapsulate(private_key:octets,ciphertext:octets) -> shared_sec:octets

And Dilithium API (per SSA variant):

- generate_key() -> (public_key:octets, private_key:octets)
- sign(private_key:octets,message:octets) -> signature:octets
- verify(public_key:octets,message:octets,signature:octets) -> ok:boolean


I think this is representative of other KEMs and signatures in NISTPQC.

And furthermore for Kyber/Dilithium, per variant the lengths of all
outputs are fixed:

Variant:	sk:	pk:	ct/sig:		ss:
Kyber512	1632	800	768		32
Kyber768	2400	1184	1088		32
Kyber1024	3168	1568	1568		32
Dilithium2	2528	1312	2420		N/A
Dilithium3	4000	1952	3293		N/A
Dilithium5	4864	2592	4595		N/A


sk => Secret key (bytes)
pk => Public key (bytes)
ct => Ciphertext (bytes)
sig => Signature (bytes)
ss => Shared secret (bytes)



(I think there are some variants of Falcon that have variable signature
size; however it is still always integral number of octets, and taken/
returned as an octet string.)



-Ilari


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Thread-Topic: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/ry2JbUG34t-Y7ExCzL-xEx18om8>
Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On 6/17/21, 10:37, "Ilari Liusvaara" <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
>    > .  .  .  how to encode a public key that is not a simple big integer.
>
>    Looks like they are even simpler octet strings. :-> 

Yes - the question is now to *unwrap* those keys from simple octet string in an architecture-independent way.

>    I took a look at a finalist PQC KEM (Kyber) and a finalist PQC signature
>    (Dilithium). Seems like everything that is meant to be stored or
>    transported is an octet string. This includes public keys and private
>    keys.

Yes. My question is: if I create that OCTET STRING with one app on a 32-bit Big-Endian machine, and attempt to decode it with a different app (i.e., not the same source base) on a 64-bit Little-Endian machine - would it work correctly?

>  I think this is representative of other KEMs and signatures in NISTPQC.

Yes it is, caveat - answers to my question.

>    (I think there are some variants of Falcon that have variable signature
>    size; however it is still always integral number of octets, and taken/
>    returned as an octet string.)

All variants of Falcon that I know of produce variable-size signature, but that's not my concern. 

To repeat myself, my concern is how to create (and unwrap) those octet strings in an interoperable across architectures and platforms way. And whether defining the appropriate encoding (e.g., maybe defining how a vector of integers is encoded into a SEQUENCE that would be contained in that OCTET STRING) would help this.

TNX

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From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 03:09:54PM +0000, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:
> 
> Yes. My question is: if I create that OCTET STRING with one app on a
> 32-bit Big-Endian machine, and attempt to decode it with a different
> app (i.e., not the same source base) on a 64-bit Little-Endian machine
> - would it work correctly?

Yes, it will work correctly (modulo bugs and intentional
incompatbilities). After all, definition of octet string is string over
alphabet consisting of integers [0,255]. This definition is independent
of bitness and endianess of platform. Nor do octet strings have bit-
endianess ("octet strings" that do are actually bit strings).

It is not like such algorithms are a new class: Ed25519/Ed448 has defined
public and private key encodings, and that always uses octet strings for
all things meant to be stored or transported.

And if algorithm has octet string input/output, any nontrivial encoding
is increased complexity on code that is ill-equipped to handle such
complexity. So trying to expand the thing in any way is very bad idea.
Not to mention that the built-in encodings used are often optimized for
size (sometimes to the last byte), so any nontrivial encoding also
bloats the data (and even if it is not optimize to the last byte, ASN.1
overhead would eat any savings).



-Ilari


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From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2021 16:51:23 +0100
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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--00000000000079624e05c4f82e26
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On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 4:40 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 03:09:54PM +0000, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
> wrote:
> >
> > Yes. My question is: if I create that OCTET STRING with one app on a
> > 32-bit Big-Endian machine, and attempt to decode it with a different
> > app (i.e., not the same source base) on a 64-bit Little-Endian machine
> > - would it work correctly?
>
> Yes, it will work correctly (modulo bugs and intentional
> incompatbilities). After all, definition of octet string is string over
> alphabet consisting of integers [0,255]. This definition is independent
> of bitness and endianess of platform. Nor do octet strings have bit-
> endianess ("octet strings" that do are actually bit strings).
>
>
Hi,

Yeah, I don't see problems with this.

For PQC: The NIST API and test vector requirement, fortunately, has helped
with that. Since the PQC standardization effort started in 2016, all
supplied reference and optimized implementations had to comply with a
single set of test vectors, supplied by the design teams. The test vectors
are octet strings. Many of us use those for compliance testing of new and
old implementations.

The better algorithms are very specific about encodings, but if in doubt I
just go to the test vectors to check. So we already have a multitude of
interoperable implementations (hardware implementations, different
languages, embedded, SIMD, etc).

My expectation is that (with a few improvements) a similar test vector
system will be eventually be used for high-level CAVP/ACVT (FIPS 140-3)
testing of NIST algorithm implementations. There is no ASN.1 in the
encoding or decoding of keys, ciphertexts, or signatures, etc.

As it is, those byte strings go directly even into hardware modules. We
view pk/sk/ct/sig octet strings as well defined in the context of a
specific PQC parameter set. Note that PQC parameter sets are very specific
and discrete, a bit like elliptic curve groups (not "sliders" like the RSA
keys). So I personally hope IETF wouldn't go into unwrapping those octet
strings too much, just assign OIDs to the "blobs", or at least give an
option to use blobs.

There are some wrinkles that will no doubt be ironed out in the
standardization process; for example, the 16-bit elements in FrodoKEM
private keys in test vectors are little-endian while public values are in
network byte order. Furthermore, the algorithms that utilize NTT may want
to store some private key material in the "NTT Domain" rather than as
normal mod q integer vectors. One particular NTT representation may not be
ideal for implementation on another platform. But this aspect of private
key encoding is similar to "CRT" values for RSA private keys.

Uri:

> To repeat myself, my concern is how to create (and unwrap) those octet
> strings in an interoperable across architectures and platforms way. And
> whether defining the appropriate encoding (e.g., maybe defining how a
> vector of integers is encoded into a SEQUENCE that would be contained in
> that OCTET STRING) would help this.
>

I doubt that unwrapping PQC octet strings into vectors of integers is
particularly helpful. As you know, the implementations compress bit fields
and secrets in very specific ways that can be interpreted only in the
context of that algorithm. Kyber field elements are 13 bits, for example,
and some algorithms use quite complex encoding schemes. This unwrapping
would directly make testing more difficult.

Some additional notes on testing:

- A detached signature format needs to be explicitly defined in addition to
the "signed envelope" format from NIST. However, I hope that this is a byte
string too.

- The algorithms fail in very specific ways. A good test vector set needs
to include malformed signatures, ciphertexts, public keys.

- The minimalistic NIST PQC API required that the decapsulation and
signature operation can be completed without access to the public key (with
a private key only). This led to the situation where the public key is
often fully contained in the private key ( A Fujisaki-Okamoto CCA
decapsulation requires re-encryption and hence a public key, of course ).
If specified with an API that also has access to the public key for private
key operations, the private key can be made smaller in some cases as this
redundancy is removed.

- Furthermore, the major algorithms (Falcon, Kyber, Dilithium, NTRU, SIKE,
FrodoKEM, McEliece) can be fairly easily be transformed into deterministic
versions where relatively short seed keys are used for key generation,
signature, decapsulation operations. This helps with testing of course, as
I can record those seeds along with NIST test vectors.

- The origin of this feature is a bit amusing; short-seed determinism was
not explicitly stated to be desirable (in the original call for algorithms
) but the "fake reference RBG" supplied by NIST was just horrendously slow
due to a programming oversight (a full AES-256 key schedule for each
CTR_DRBG output block) so many teams decided to only take a minimal seed
amount from that RNG and expand it with a good SHAKE implementation
themselves. This gave a very large advantage in benchmarking (as some
implementations spent 90% of cycles in the NIST RNG code).

Cheers,
- markku

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.

--00000000000079624e05c4f82e26
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 4:40 PM Ilari Liu=
svaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaara@welho.com" target=3D"_blank">il=
ariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 03=
:09:54PM +0000, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Yes. My question is: if I create that OCTET STRING with one app on a<b=
r>
&gt; 32-bit Big-Endian machine, and attempt to decode it with a different<b=
r>
&gt; app (i.e., not the same source base) on a 64-bit Little-Endian machine=
<br>
&gt; - would it work correctly?<br>
<br>
Yes, it will work correctly (modulo bugs and intentional<br>
incompatbilities). After all, definition of octet string is string over<br>
alphabet consisting of integers [0,255]. This definition is independent<br>
of bitness and endianess of platform. Nor do octet strings have bit-<br>
endianess (&quot;octet strings&quot; that do are actually bit strings).<br>
<br></blockquote><br><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Hi,<br></div><div=
><br></div><div>Yeah, I don&#39;t see problems with this. </div><div><br></=
div><div>For PQC: The NIST API and test vector requirement, fortunately, ha=
s helped with that. Since the PQC standardization effort started in 2016, a=
ll supplied reference and optimized implementations had to comply with a si=
ngle set of test vectors, supplied by the design teams. The test vectors ar=
e octet strings. Many of us use those for compliance testing of new and old=
 implementations.<br></div><div><br></div><div><div>The better algorithms a=
re very specific about encodings, but if in doubt I just go to the test vec=
tors to check. So we already have a multitude of interoperable implementati=
ons (hardware implementations, different languages, embedded, SIMD, etc). <=
br></div></div><div><br></div><div>My expectation is that (with a few impro=
vements) a similar test vector system will be eventually be used for high-l=
evel CAVP/ACVT (FIPS 140-3) testing of NIST algorithm implementations. Ther=
e is no ASN.1 in the encoding or decoding of keys, ciphertexts, or signatur=
es, etc. <br></div><div><br></div><div><div> As it is, those byte strings g=
o directly even into hardware modules. We view pk/sk/ct/sig octet strings a=
s well defined in the context of a specific PQC parameter set. Note that PQ=
C parameter sets are very specific and discrete, a bit like elliptic curve =
groups (not &quot;sliders&quot; like the RSA keys). So I personally hope IE=
TF wouldn&#39;t go into unwrapping those octet strings too much, just assig=
n OIDs to the &quot;blobs&quot;, or at least give an option to use blobs.<b=
r></div></div><div><br></div><div>There are some wrinkles that will no doub=
t be ironed out in the standardization process; for example, the 16-bit ele=
ments in FrodoKEM private keys in test vectors are little-endian while publ=
ic values are in network byte order. Furthermore, the algorithms that utili=
ze NTT may want to store some private key material in the &quot;NTT Domain&=
quot; rather than as normal mod q integer vectors. One particular NTT repre=
sentation may not be ideal for implementation on another platform. But this=
 aspect of private key encoding is similar to &quot;CRT&quot; values for RS=
A private keys.<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote">Uri:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid=
 rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
To repeat myself, my concern is how to create (and unwrap) those octet stri=
ngs in an interoperable across architectures and platforms way. And whether=
 defining the appropriate encoding (e.g., maybe defining how a vector of in=
tegers is encoded into a SEQUENCE that would be contained in that OCTET STR=
ING) would help this.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I doubt that unwr=
apping PQC octet strings into vectors of integers is particularly helpful. =
As you know, the implementations compress bit fields and secrets in very sp=
ecific ways that can be interpreted only in the context of that algorithm. =
Kyber field elements are 13 bits, for example, and some algorithms use quit=
e complex encoding schemes. This unwrapping would directly make testing mor=
e difficult.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Some additional notes on testing:=
<br></div><div><br></div><div>- A detached signature format needs to be exp=
licitly defined in addition to the &quot;signed envelope&quot; format from =
NIST. However, I hope that this is a byte string too.<br></div><div><br></d=
iv><div><div>- The algorithms fail in very specific ways. A good test vecto=
r set needs to include malformed signatures, ciphertexts, public keys.<br><=
/div></div><div><br></div><div>- The minimalistic NIST PQC API required tha=
t the decapsulation and signature operation can be completed without access=
 to the public key (with a private key only). This led to the situation whe=
re the public key is often fully contained in the private key ( A Fujisaki-=
Okamoto CCA decapsulation requires re-encryption and hence a public key, of=
 course ). If specified with an API that also has access to the public key =
for private key operations, the private key can be made smaller in some cas=
es as this redundancy is removed.<br><br>- Furthermore, the major algorithm=
s (Falcon, Kyber, Dilithium, NTRU, SIKE, FrodoKEM, McEliece) can be fairly =
easily be transformed into deterministic versions where relatively short se=
ed keys are used for key generation, signature, decapsulation operations. T=
his helps with testing of course, as I can record those seeds along with NI=
ST test vectors. <br><br>- The origin of this feature is a bit amusing; sho=
rt-seed determinism was not explicitly stated to be desirable (in the origi=
nal call for algorithms ) but the &quot;fake reference RBG&quot; supplied b=
y NIST was just horrendously slow due to a programming oversight (a full AE=
S-256 key schedule for each CTR_DRBG output block) so many teams decided to=
 only take a minimal seed amount from that RNG and expand it with a good SH=
AKE implementation themselves. This gave a very large advantage in benchmar=
king (as some implementations spent 90% of cycles in the NIST RNG code).<br=
></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>- markku<br></div><div><br></d=
iv><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarine=
n &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" target=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshield.=
com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div></div></div>=C2=A0</div></div></div><=
/div></div>

--00000000000079624e05c4f82e26--


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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On 6/17/21, 11:42, "Ilari Liusvaara" <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
>    > My question is: if I create that OCTET STRING with one app on a
>    > 32-bit Big-Endian machine, and attempt to decode it with a different
>    > app (i.e., not the same source base) on a 64-bit Little-Endian machine
>    > - would it work correctly?
>
>    Yes, it will work correctly (modulo bugs and intentional
>    incompatbilities). After all, definition of octet string is string over
>    alphabet consisting of integers [0,255]. This definition is independent
>    of bitness and endianess of platform. Nor do octet strings have bit-
>    endianess ("octet strings" that do are actually bit strings).

I don't think I made my question clear. I know that byte strings are the same - but since the integers that are encoded into that string have different representations on different platforms, my worry is recovering/re-interpreting the values into the correct (and different) representation.

>    And if algorithm has octet string input/output, any nontrivial encoding
>    is increased complexity on code that is ill-equipped to handle such
>    complexity. So trying to expand the thing in any way is very bad idea.

Understood.

>    Not to mention that the built-in encodings used are often optimized for
>    size (sometimes to the last byte), so any nontrivial encoding also
>    bloats the data (and even if it is not optimize to the last byte, ASN.1
>    overhead would eat any savings).

I disagree here. ASN.1 is a descriptive format that is translated into various binary encodings.
While DER (traditionally used for certs, etc.) is indeed "verbose", other formats such as PER or OER are quite compact, and optimize not only to the byte but to the bit level.


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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To: Uri Blumenthal <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Uri:

> On 6/17/21, 11:42, "Ilari Liusvaara" <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
>>> My question is: if I create that OCTET STRING with one app on a
>>> 32-bit Big-Endian machine, and attempt to decode it with a different
>>> app (i.e., not the same source base) on a 64-bit Little-Endian =
machine
>>> - would it work correctly?
>>=20
>>   Yes, it will work correctly (modulo bugs and intentional
>>   incompatbilities). After all, definition of octet string is string =
over
>>   alphabet consisting of integers [0,255]. This definition is =
independent
>>   of bitness and endianess of platform. Nor do octet strings have =
bit-
>>   endianess ("octet strings" that do are actually bit strings).
>=20
> I don't think I made my question clear. I know that byte strings are =
the same - but since the integers that are encoded into that string have =
different representations on different platforms, my worry is =
recovering/re-interpreting the values into the correct (and different) =
representation.

This has not been a major source of interoperability issues.  RSA uses =
integers, and the conversion to octets is specified in PKCS#1.  That =
approach has worked regardless of endian differences.

Russ


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To: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Yeah, I don't see problems with this.=20

=20

For PQC: The NIST API and test vector requirement, fortunately, has helped =
with that. Since the PQC standardization effort started in 2016, all supplie=
d reference and optimized implementations had to comply with a single set of=
 test vectors, supplied by the design teams. The test vectors are octet stri=
ngs. Many of us use those for compliance testing of new and old implementati=
ons.

=20

The better algorithms are very specific about encodings, but if in doubt I =
just go to the test vectors to check. So we already have a multitude of inte=
roperable implementations (hardware implementations, different languages, em=
bedded, SIMD, etc).=20

=20

My expectation is that (with a few improvements) a similar test vector syst=
em will be eventually be used for high-level CAVP/ACVT (FIPS 140-3) testing =
of NIST algorithm implementations. There is no ASN.1 in the encoding or deco=
ding of keys, ciphertexts, or signatures, etc.=20

=20

In other words, it=E2=80=99s the application=E2=80=99s job to do this right =E2=80=93 and the=
refore, ASN.1 definitions do not need to go inside of those OCTET STRINGs. R=
ight?

=20

As it is, those byte strings go directly even into hardware modules. We vie=
w pk/sk/ct/sig octet strings as well defined in the context of a specific PQ=
C parameter set. Note that PQC parameter sets are very specific and discrete=
, a bit like elliptic curve groups (not "sliders" like the RSA keys). So I p=
ersonally hope IETF wouldn't go into unwrapping those octet strings too much=
, just assign OIDs to the "blobs", or at least give an option to use blobs.=C2=
=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 I doubt that unwrapping PQC octet strings into vectors of inte=
gers is particularly helpful. As you know, the implementations compress bit =
fields and secrets in very specific ways that can be interpreted only in the=
 context of that algorithm. Kyber field elements are 13 bits, for example, a=
nd some algorithms use quite complex encoding schemes. This unwrapping would=
 directly make testing more difficult.

=20

Understood. If it=E2=80=99s counterproductive unwrapping those blobs =E2=80=93 it=E2=80=99s s=
imple enough to just assign them the appropriate labels (aka, OIDs) and be d=
one with it. That=E2=80=99s what I=E2=80=99m planning to do then.

=20

Some additional notes on testing:

=20

- A detached signature format needs to be explicitly defined in addition to=
 the "signed envelope" format from NIST. However, I hope that this is a byte=
 string too.

=20

Yep.

=20

- The algorithms fail in very specific ways. A good test vector set needs t=
o include malformed signatures, ciphertexts, public keys.

=20

;-) Noted.

=20

- The minimalistic NIST PQC API required that the decapsulation and signatu=
re operation can be completed without access to the public key (with a priva=
te key only). This led to the situation where the public key is often fully =
contained in the private key ( A Fujisaki-Okamoto CCA decapsulation requires=
 re-encryption and hence a public key, of course ). If specified with an API=
 that also has access to the public key for private key operations, the priv=
ate key can be made smaller in some cases as this redundancy is removed.

=20

Good point.=20

=20

I wonder why it wasn=E2=80=99t brought up with NIST, either on their PQC mailing =
list, or at the one of the PQC workshops.


- Furthermore, the major algorithms (Falcon, Kyber, Dilithium, NTRU, SIKE, =
FrodoKEM, McEliece) can be fairly easily be transformed into deterministic v=
ersions where relatively short seed keys are used for key generation, signat=
ure, decapsulation operations. This helps with testing of course, as I can r=
ecord those seeds along with NIST test vectors.=20


Noted, thanks.


- The origin of this feature is a bit amusing; short-seed determinism was n=
ot explicitly stated to be desirable (in the original call for algorithms ) =
but the "fake reference RBG" supplied by NIST was just horrendously slow due=
 to a programming oversight (a full AES-256 key schedule for each CTR_DRBG o=
utput block) so many teams decided to only take a minimal seed amount from t=
hat RNG and expand it with a good SHAKE implementation themselves. This gave=
 a very large advantage in benchmarking (as some implementations spent 90% o=
f cycles in the NIST RNG code).

=20

:-)

=20

And thank you very much for an excellent explanation!


--B_3706778606_76810326
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<html xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schema=
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04/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta http-equiv=3DC=
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--></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap:=
break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Yeah, I don't see problems with this. <o:p></o:=
p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>For PQC: The NI=
ST API and test vector requirement, fortunately, has helped with that. Since=
 the PQC standardization effort started in 2016, all supplied reference and =
optimized implementations had to comply with a single set of test vectors, s=
upplied by the design teams. The test vectors are octet strings. Many of us =
use those for compliance testing of new and old implementations.<o:p></o:p><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>The better =
algorithms are very specific about encodings, but if in doubt I just go to t=
he test vectors to check. So we already have a multitude of interoperable im=
plementations (hardware implementations, different languages, embedded, SIMD=
, etc). <o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-lef=
t:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-lef=
t:.5in'>My expectation is that (with a few improvements) a similar test vect=
or system will be eventually be used for high-level CAVP/ACVT (FIPS 140-3) t=
esting of NIST algorithm implementations. There is no ASN.1 in the encoding =
or decoding of keys, ciphertexts, or signatures, etc. <o:p></o:p></p></div><=
div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In other words, it=E2=
=80=99s the application=E2=80=99s job to do this right =E2=80=93 and therefore, ASN.1 defini=
tions do <u>not</u> need to go inside of those OCTET STRINGs. Right?<o:p></o=
:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>As it is, tho=
se byte strings go directly even into hardware modules. We view pk/sk/ct/sig=
 octet strings as well defined in the context of a specific PQC parameter se=
t. Note that PQC parameter sets are very specific and discrete, a bit like e=
lliptic curve groups (not &quot;sliders&quot; like the RSA keys). So I perso=
nally hope IETF wouldn't go into unwrapping those octet strings too much, ju=
st assign OIDs to the &quot;blobs&quot;, or at least give an option to use b=
lobs.=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 I doubt that unwrapping PQC octet strings into vectors o=
f integers is particularly helpful. As you know, the implementations compres=
s bit fields and secrets in very specific ways that can be interpreted only =
in the context of that algorithm. Kyber field elements are 13 bits, for exam=
ple, and some algorithms use quite complex encoding schemes. This unwrapping=
 would directly make testing more difficult.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNorma=
l><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Understood. If it=E2=80=99s count=
erproductive unwrapping those blobs =E2=80=93 it=E2=80=99s simple enough to just assign =
them the appropriate labels (aka, OIDs) and be done with it. That=E2=80=99s what I=
=E2=80=99m planning to do then.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div><div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Some additional notes on testing:=
<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>- A de=
tached signature format needs to be explicitly defined in addition to the &q=
uot;signed envelope&quot; format from NIST. However, I hope that this is a b=
yte string too.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0=
pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12=
.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Yep.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>- The algorithms fail in very specific ways. A=
 good test vector set needs to include malformed signatures, ciphertexts, pu=
blic keys.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;=
color:#0070C0'>;-) Noted.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>- The minimalistic NIST PQC API required tha=
t the decapsulation and signature operation can be completed without access =
to the public key (with a private key only). This led to the situation where=
 the public key is often fully contained in the private key ( A Fujisaki-Oka=
moto CCA decapsulation requires re-encryption and hence a public key, of cou=
rse ). If specified with an API that also has access to the public key for p=
rivate key operations, the private key can be made smaller in some cases as =
this redundancy is removed.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Good point. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I wond=
er why it wasn=E2=80=99t brought up with NIST, either on their PQC mailing list, o=
r at the one of the PQC workshops.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'margin-left:.5in'><br>- Furthermore, the major algorithms (Falcon, Kyb=
er, Dilithium, NTRU, SIKE, FrodoKEM, McEliece) can be fairly easily be trans=
formed into deterministic versions where relatively short seed keys are used=
 for key generation, signature, decapsulation operations. This helps with te=
sting of course, as I can record those seeds along with NIST test vectors. <=
br><br><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color=
:#0070C0'>Noted, thanks.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'marg=
in-left:.5in'><br>- The origin of this feature is a bit amusing; short-seed =
determinism was not explicitly stated to be desirable (in the original call =
for algorithms ) but the &quot;fake reference RBG&quot; supplied by NIST was=
 just horrendously slow due to a programming oversight (a full AES-256 key s=
chedule for each CTR_DRBG output block) so many teams decided to only take a=
 minimal seed amount from that RNG and expand it with a good SHAKE implement=
ation themselves. This gave a very large advantage in benchmarking (as some =
implementations spent 90% of cycles in the NIST RNG code).<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><=
p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>:-)<o:p></o:p=
></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbs=
p;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>=
And thank you very much for an excellent explanation!<o:p></o:p></span></p><=
/div></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>

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From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2021 21:54:10 +0100
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Cc: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 5:43 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

>
> My expectation is that (with a few improvements) a similar test vector
> system will be eventually be used for high-level CAVP/ACVT (FIPS 140-3)
> testing of NIST algorithm implementations. There is no ASN.1 in the
> encoding or decoding of keys, ciphertexts, or signatures, etc.
>
>
>
> In other words, it=E2=80=99s the application=E2=80=99s job to do this rig=
ht =E2=80=93 and
> therefore, ASN.1 definitions do *not* need to go inside of those OCTET
> STRINGs. Right?
>

Hi Uri,

Yep. The way things are for PQC, generic APIs handle { public keys,
signatures, ciphertexts, private keys, .. } as octet strings, and the
interpretation of those bytes is defined in the algorithm specifications
and reference information.

As noted by Ilari, modern elliptic curve point encodings are similarly
stated simply as octet strings, not as pairs of "integers" (See e.g. RFC
7748, Sect 5 or RFC8032, Sect 2.)  Much of this has to do with the security
aspects of input validation; ASN.1 en/decoding is difficult to guarantee to
be constant time, for example. Hence there is a general acceptance that
encoding and decoding of sensitive security parameters is an
algorithm-specific matter and generic mechanisms (like ASN.1) can do more
harm than good.

As it is, those byte strings go directly even into hardware modules. We
> view pk/sk/ct/sig octet strings as well defined in the context of a
> specific PQC parameter set. Note that PQC parameter sets are very specifi=
c
> and discrete, a bit like elliptic curve groups (not "sliders" like the RS=
A
> keys). So I personally hope IETF wouldn't go into unwrapping those octet
> strings too much, just assign OIDs to the "blobs", or at least give an
> option to use blobs.  .  .  .  I doubt that unwrapping PQC octet strings
> into vectors of integers is particularly helpful. As you know, the
> implementations compress bit fields and secrets in very specific ways tha=
t
> can be interpreted only in the context of that algorithm. Kyber field
> elements are 13 bits, for example, and some algorithms use quite complex
> encoding schemes. This unwrapping would directly make testing more
> difficult.
>
>
>
> Understood. If it=E2=80=99s counterproductive unwrapping those blobs =E2=
=80=93 it=E2=80=99s simple
> enough to just assign them the appropriate labels (aka, OIDs) and be done
> with it. That=E2=80=99s what I=E2=80=99m planning to do then.
>

Great. In addition to OIDs, the integration into PKI will of course require
a few additional definitions, so labels alone may not be sufficient. They
may still be too generic.

Example: For Dilithium PKI integration, I'd probably define an OID for a
specific randomized hash mechanism (with other hash functions than the
SHAKE used by Dilithium internally) for generating and verifying a
*detached* Dilithium signature, rather than just for "Dilithium".
Integrating Kyber in S/MIME would similarly require specification of how to
turn a KEM into a PKE (via arbitrary AEADs, specified via their OIDs,
probably). So the Kyber OID would refer to that mechanism in addition to
the internal Kyber parameter set and behavioral definitions (i.e. "Kyber"
the KEM).

Cheers,
- markku

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.

--000000000000539ab805c4fc6973
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 5:43 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - M=
ITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu=
</a>&gt; wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div><div><div><div><div><br><div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">My expectation is that (=
with a few improvements) a similar test vector system will be eventually be=
 used for high-level CAVP/ACVT (FIPS 140-3) testing of NIST algorithm imple=
mentations. There is no ASN.1 in the encoding or decoding of keys, cipherte=
xts, or signatures, etc. <u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">In other words, it=E2=
=80=99s the application=E2=80=99s job to do this right =E2=80=93 and theref=
ore, ASN.1 definitions do <u>not</u> need to go inside of those OCTET STRIN=
Gs. Right?</span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote=
><div><br></div><div><div>Hi Uri,</div><div><br></div><div>Yep. The way thi=
ngs are for PQC, generic APIs handle { public keys, signatures, ciphertexts=
, private keys, .. } as octet strings, and the interpretation of those byte=
s is defined in the algorithm specifications and reference information.<br>=
</div><div><br></div><div><div>As noted by Ilari, modern elliptic curve poi=
nt encodings are similarly stated simply as octet strings, not as pairs of =
&quot;integers&quot; (See e.g. RFC 7748, Sect 5 or RFC8032, Sect 2.)=C2=A0 =
Much of this has to do with the security aspects of input validation; ASN.1=
 en/decoding is difficult to guarantee to be constant time, for example. He=
nce there is a general acceptance that encoding and decoding of sensitive s=
ecurity parameters is an algorithm-specific matter and generic mechanisms (=
like ASN.1) can do more harm than good. <br></div><div> <br></div></div></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><d=
iv><div><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-lef=
t:0.5in">As it is, those byte strings go directly even into hardware module=
s. We view pk/sk/ct/sig octet strings as well defined in the context of a s=
pecific PQC parameter set. Note that PQC parameter sets are very specific a=
nd discrete, a bit like elliptic curve groups (not &quot;sliders&quot; like=
 the RSA keys). So I personally hope IETF wouldn&#39;t go into unwrapping t=
hose octet strings too much, just assign OIDs to the &quot;blobs&quot;, or =
at least give an option to use blobs.=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 I doubt=
 that unwrapping PQC octet strings into vectors of integers is particularly=
 helpful. As you know, the implementations compress bit fields and secrets =
in very specific ways that can be interpreted only in the context of that a=
lgorithm. Kyber field elements are 13 bits, for example, and some algorithm=
s use quite complex encoding schemes. This unwrapping would directly make t=
esting more difficult.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Understood. If it=E2=80=
=99s counterproductive unwrapping those blobs =E2=80=93 it=E2=80=99s simple=
 enough to just assign them the appropriate labels (aka, OIDs) and be done =
with it. That=E2=80=99s what I=E2=80=99m planning to do then.</span></p></d=
iv></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><d=
iv>Great. In addition to OIDs, the integration into PKI will of course requ=
ire a few additional definitions, so labels alone may not be sufficient. Th=
ey may still be too generic.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Example: For Dili=
thium PKI integration, I&#39;d probably define an OID for a specific random=
ized hash mechanism (with other hash functions than the SHAKE used by Dilit=
hium internally) for generating and verifying a <i>detached</i> Dilithium s=
ignature, rather than just for &quot;Dilithium&quot;. Integrating Kyber in =
S/MIME would similarly require specification of how to turn a KEM into a PK=
E (via arbitrary AEADs, specified via their OIDs, probably). So the Kyber O=
ID would refer to that mechanism in addition to the internal Kyber paramete=
r set and behavioral definitions (i.e. &quot;Kyber&quot; the KEM).<br></div=
><div><br></div><div><div>Cheers,</div><div>- markku</div><div><br clear=3D=
"all"></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Dr. Mar=
kku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" target=3D"_=
blank">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div></div></div><br>=
<div><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"></span></p></div></div></div></div></div></di=
v></div></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000539ab805c4fc6973--


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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2021 17:19:34 -0400
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Subject: [lamps] META Re: [saag] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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I agree with much of Uri's frustration here. My concern is the meta level.
If LAMPS is going to ever close, we have to make sure we are not going to
need something similar in future. Which means that we need to define what
is required to specify a cryptographic algorithm so it is available for use
with IETF protocols.

Note that adding an algorithm to a registry does not mean it is approved
for use by a particular protocol.

CMS serves a much wider audience than S/MIME. PKIX, a wider audience than
either the WebPKI or PKI in general. Same for JOSE, XML Signature and
Encryption, etc. etc.

So I conclude that one of the exit criteria for LAMPS should be a
document describing the list of things that need to be specified so that an
algorithm can be used in various specific IETF protocols and conversely,
what applications using the IETF maintained IANA registries can expect.


I do not want to get into discussions of why the decisions of some
working group ten years ago on algorithm requirements should bind some
other group doing something different today. HTTP is not based on MIME but
it uses the same IANA registry. That is the correct approach in my view.

Going forward, I see no reason why it should be necessary to specify
separate identifiers for the use of a particular algorithm in every
different application protocol. The ASN.1 world is going to need OIDs for
quite some time and the JOSE world is going to be needing text based
labels. The XML world consumes URIs but there is no reason we couldn't
specify a URN prefix to the JOSE labels and use that to avoid further
maintenance issues.

TLS and IPSEC both operate at a layer that is sufficiently deep that we
should just let them do their own thing. And PEM probably isn't much of a
concern going forward.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">I a=
gree with much of Uri&#39;s frustration here. My concern is the meta level.=
 If LAMPS is going to ever close, we have to make sure we are not going to =
need something similar in future. Which means that we need to define what i=
s required to specify a cryptographic algorithm so it is available for use =
with IETF protocols.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:s=
mall"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Note=
 that adding an algorithm to a registry does not mean it is approved for us=
e by a particular protocol.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-s=
ize:small">CMS serves a much wider audience than S/MIME. PKIX, a wider audi=
ence than either the WebPKI or PKI in general. Same for JOSE, XML Signature=
 and Encryption, etc. etc.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small=
">So I conclude that one of the exit=C2=A0criteria for LAMPS should be a do=
cument=C2=A0describing the list of things that need to be specified so that=
 an algorithm can be used in various specific IETF protocols and conversely=
, what applications using the IETF maintained IANA registries can expect.</=
div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">I do not want to get into discussion=
s of why the decisions of some working=C2=A0group ten years ago on algorith=
m requirements should bind some other group doing something different today=
. HTTP is not based on MIME but it uses the same IANA registry. That is the=
 correct approach in my view.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fo=
nt-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:sm=
all">Going forward, I see no reason why it should be necessary to specify s=
eparate identifiers for the use of a particular algorithm in every differen=
t application protocol. The ASN.1 world is going to need OIDs for quite som=
e time and the JOSE world is going to be needing text based labels. The XML=
 world consumes URIs but there is no reason we couldn&#39;t specify a URN p=
refix to the JOSE labels and use that to avoid further maintenance issues.<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">TLS and IPSEC both operat=
e at a layer that is sufficiently deep that we should=C2=A0just let them do=
 their own thing. And PEM probably isn&#39;t much of a concern going forwar=
d.=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></=
div></div>

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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In other words, it=E2=80=99s the application=E2=80=99s job to do this right =E2=80=93 and the=
refore, ASN.1 definitions do not need to go inside of those OCTET STRINGs. R=
ight?

Yep. The way things are for PQC, generic APIs handle { public keys, signatu=
res, ciphertexts, private keys, .. } as octet strings, and the interpretatio=
n of those bytes is defined in the algorithm specifications and reference in=
formation.

=20

Good, thanks!

If it=E2=80=99s counterproductive unwrapping those blobs =E2=80=93 it=E2=80=99s simple enough=
 to just assign them the appropriate labels (aka, OIDs) and be done with it.=
 That=E2=80=99s what I=E2=80=99m planning to do then.

=20

Great. In addition to OIDs, the integration into PKI will of course require=
 a few additional definitions, so labels alone may not be sufficient. They m=
ay still be too generic.

.=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .

Example: For Dilithium PKI integration, I'd probably define an OID for a sp=
ecific randomized hash mechanism (with other hash functions than the SHAKE u=
sed by Dilithium internally) for generating and verifying a detached Dilithi=
um signature, rather than just for "Dilithium". Integrating Kyber in S/MIME =
would similarly require=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .

=20

Oh yes =E2=80=93 I intend for those OIDs to identify very specific (unambiguous) =
cases, including everything you outlined above, so that the OCTET STRING tha=
t follows can be interpreted and processed unambiguously.

=20

TNX

=20


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break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><div><div><blockquote style=3D'border:none=
;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt=
;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal sty=
le=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In other words, it=E2=80=99s the applica=
tion=E2=80=99s job to do this right =E2=80=93 and therefore, ASN.1 definitions do <u>not=
</u> need to go inside of those OCTET STRINGs. Right?</span><o:p></o:p></p><=
/div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Yep. The way things are for PQC, generic API=
s handle { public keys, signatures, ciphertexts, private keys, .. } as octet=
 strings, and the interpretation of those bytes is defined in the algorithm =
specifications and reference information.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Good, thanks!<o:p></o:p></span=
></p></div></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.=
0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div>=
<div><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:a=
uto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0=
pt;color:#0070C0'>If it=E2=80=99s counterproductive unwrapping those blobs =E2=80=93 it=E2=
=80=99s simple enough to just assign them the appropriate labels (aka, OIDs) and=
 be done with it. That=E2=80=99s what I=E2=80=99m planning to do then.</span><o:p></o:p>=
</p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Great. In addition to OIDs, the integr=
ation into PKI will of course require a few additional definitions, so label=
s alone may not be sufficient. They may still be too generic.<o:p></o:p></p>=
</div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>.=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .<o:p=
></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Example: F=
or Dilithium PKI integration, I'd probably define an OID for a specific rand=
omized hash mechanism (with other hash functions than the SHAKE used by Dili=
thium internally) for generating and verifying a <i>detached</i> Dilithium s=
ignature, rather than just for &quot;Dilithium&quot;. Integrating Kyber in S=
/MIME would similarly require=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .=C2=A0 .<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Oh yes =E2=80=93 I intend fo=
r those OIDs to identify <u>very specific (unambiguous) cases</u>, including=
 everything you outlined above, so that the OCTET STRING that follows can be=
 interpreted and processed unambiguously.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>TNX<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>

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Thread-Topic: [lamps] META Re: [saag] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Subject: Re: [lamps] META Re: [saag] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Thank you, and I concur.

 

--

Regards,

Uri

 

There are two ways to design a system. One is to make is so simple there are obviously no deficiencies.

The other is to make it so complex there are no obvious deficiencies.

                                                                                                                                     -  C. A. R. Hoare

 

 

From: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Thursday, June 17, 2021 at 17:20
Cc: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, "saag@ietf.org" <saag@ietf.org>
Subject: [lamps] META Re: [saag] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages

 

I agree with much of Uri's frustration here. My concern is the meta level. If LAMPS is going to ever close, we have to make sure we are not going to need something similar in future. Which means that we need to define what is required to specify a cryptographic algorithm so it is available for use with IETF protocols.

 

Note that adding an algorithm to a registry does not mean it is approved for use by a particular protocol. 

 

CMS serves a much wider audience than S/MIME. PKIX, a wider audience than either the WebPKI or PKI in general. Same for JOSE, XML Signature and Encryption, etc. etc.

 

So I conclude that one of the exit criteria for LAMPS should be a document describing the list of things that need to be specified so that an algorithm can be used in various specific IETF protocols and conversely, what applications using the IETF maintained IANA registries can expect.

 

I do not want to get into discussions of why the decisions of some working group ten years ago on algorithm requirements should bind some other group doing something different today. HTTP is not based on MIME but it uses the same IANA registry. That is the correct approach in my view.

 

Going forward, I see no reason why it should be necessary to specify separate identifiers for the use of a particular algorithm in every different application protocol. The ASN.1 world is going to need OIDs for quite some time and the JOSE world is going to be needing text based labels. The XML world consumes URIs but there is no reason we couldn't specify a URN prefix to the JOSE labels and use that to avoid further maintenance issues.

 

TLS and IPSEC both operate at a layer that is sufficiently deep that we should just let them do their own thing. And PEM probably isn't much of a concern going forward. 

 


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an style=3D'color:#0070C0'>Thank you, and I concur.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'color:#0070C0'>--<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMs=
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p></span></i></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><i><span style=3D'color:#0070C0'>There are=
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nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;-&nbsp; C=
. A. R. Hoare</span></i><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'=
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t'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C=
4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.=
5in'><b><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>From: </span></b><span st=
yle=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:black'>Spasm &lt;spasm-bounces@ietf.org&gt; on b=
ehalf of Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;phill@hallambaker.com&gt;<br><b>Date: </b>=
Thursday, June 17, 2021 at 17:20<br><b>Cc: </b>&quot;spasm@ietf.org&quot; &l=
t;spasm@ietf.org&gt;, &quot;saag@ietf.org&quot; &lt;saag@ietf.org&gt;<br><b>=
Subject: </b>[lamps] META Re: [saag] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of K=
ey Packages<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin=
-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'm=
argin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>I agree with much of Uri's f=
rustration here. My concern is the meta level. If LAMPS is going to ever clo=
se, we have to make sure we are not going to need something similar in futur=
e. Which means that we need to define what is required to specify a cryptogr=
aphic algorithm so it is available for use with IETF protocols.<o:p></o:p></=
span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D=
'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal=
 style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Note that adding an=
 algorithm to a registry does not mean it is approved for use by a particula=
r protocol.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'=
margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p=
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ze:12.0pt'>CMS serves a much wider audience than S/MIME. PKIX, a wider audie=
nce than either the WebPKI or PKI in general. Same for JOSE, XML Signature a=
nd Encryption, etc. etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></s=
pan></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'=
font-size:12.0pt'>So I conclude that one of the exit&nbsp;criteria for LAMPS=
 should be a document&nbsp;describing the list of things that need to be spe=
cified so that an algorithm can be used in various specific IETF protocols a=
nd conversely, what applications using the IETF maintained IANA registries c=
an expect.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-=
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<div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0=
pt'>I do not want to get into discussions of why the decisions of some worki=
ng&nbsp;group ten years ago on algorithm requirements should bind some other=
 group doing something different today. HTTP is not based on MIME but it use=
s the same IANA registry. That is the correct approach in my view.<o:p></o:p=
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le=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Going forward, I=
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r the use of a particular algorithm in every different application protocol.=
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d is going to be needing text based labels. The XML world consumes URIs but =
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--B_3706798019_329015571--


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Thread-Topic: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Thanks Russ and Lijun for your feedback.



Trying to address Lijun's concerns and still keeping full crypto agility we=
 could also do the following:



Old Syntax as of RFC 4210:

     CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

        certHash    OCTET STRING,

        -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm

        -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature

        certReqId   INTEGER,

        -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep

        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL

     }



Proposed new Syntax:

   CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,

      -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash

      -- MUST be present if the hash algorithm to use is neither implied by=
 the AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature nor by other standard=
s like [CMP Algorithms]

      -- SHOULD be present only if this field is supported on client and se=
rver side and MUST be indicated by using cmp2021(3)

       certHash    OCTET STRING,

      -- the hash of the certificate to be confirmed

      -- if hashAlg is present, the given hash algorithm MUST be used

      -- if hashAlg is not present, the hash algorithm implied by the Algor=
ithmIdentifier of the certificate signature or by other standards like [CMP=
 Algorithms] MUST be used

       certReqId   INTEGER,

       -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep

       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }



Would this help to be as backward compatible and as crypto agile as possibl=
e.



What do you think?



Hendrik


Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Gesendet: Dienstag, 15. Juni 2021 17:14
An: David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de>
Cc: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>; LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>; Brockhaus=
, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>; von Oheimb, D=
avid (T RDA CST SEA-DE) <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Betreff: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating cer=
tHash

David:

I think this means that any new signature mechanisms need to say what the d=
efault hash for use with CMP will be.

Russ



On Jun 15, 2021, at 6:00 AM, David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de<mailto:nl0=
@von-Oheimb.de>> wrote:

Russ, Lijun, et al.,

we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine the hash=
 alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf messages.
Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in order to br=
ing it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.
To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the CertStatus stru=
cture as follows, which is binary backward compatible:

   CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,

      certHash    OCTET STRING,

      certReqId   INTEGER,

      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL

   }
In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly contains a hash=
 alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA came up),
then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be omitted, whic=
h means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.
Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg used and =
the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.
(In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that  SHA-512 S=
HALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,
like done for CMS in RFC8419).
Does this sound fine?
    David
On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik wrote:

If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me know.

If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an updated ve=
rsion.



Hendrik



Von: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org><mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org> Im Auftr=
ag von Brockhaus, Hendrik



Russ



Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backward

compatibility of this approach. It works fine.



Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com><mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>



The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add something

like:

CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

   hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,

   ...

This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the fiel=
d

hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.

We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines the has=
h

algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be confir=
med.

We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be crypto ag=
ile

and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAULT.

@Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for certifica=
te

signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this to

CMP Algorithms.



That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol

version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.

You are absolutely right.





To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following section to =
CMP

Updates:



---------------------------snip---------------------------

2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content



This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type us=
ed in

certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certif=
icates

where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.



Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:



   CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,

      certHash    OCTET STRING,

      certReqId   INTEGER,

      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL

   }



The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the

signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a ha=
sh

algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., f=
or

EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used fo=
r

calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be

computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the

certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the

certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).

---------------------------snip---------------------------



Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!



Hendrik



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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Thanks Russ and Lijun for yo=
ur feedback.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Trying to address Lijun's co=
ncerns and still keeping full crypto agility we could also do the following=
:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Old Syntax as of RFC 4210:<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cer=
tStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorith=
m<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Proposed new Syntax:<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=
=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; -- MUST be present if the hash algorithm to use is neither implied by th=
e AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature nor by other standards l=
ike [CMP Algorithms]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; -- SHOULD be present only if this field is supported on client and serve=
r side and MUST be indicated by using cmp2021(3)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; -- the hash of the certificate to be confirmed<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; -- if hashAlg is present, the given hash algorithm MUST be used<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; -- if hashAlg is not present, the hash algorithm implied by the Algorith=
mIdentifier of the certificate signature or by other standards like [CMP Al=
gorithms] MUST be used<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Would this help to be as bac=
kward compatible and as crypto agile as possible.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">What do you think?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">Hendrik<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbs=
p;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbs=
p;</o:p></span></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt">
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>Von:</b> Russ Housley &lt;housley@vigilsec.com&gt=
; <br>
<b>Gesendet:</b> Dienstag, 15. Juni 2021 17:14<br>
<b>An:</b> David von Oheimb &lt;nl0@von-Oheimb.de&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Lijun Liao &lt;lijun.liao@gmail.com&gt;; LAMPS WG &lt;spasm@ietf=
.org&gt;; Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) &lt;hendrik.brockhaus@sieme=
ns.com&gt;; von Oheimb, David (T RDA CST SEA-DE) &lt;david.von.oheimb@sieme=
ns.com&gt;<br>
<b>Betreff:</b> Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculat=
ing certHash<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">David:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I think this means that any new signature mechanisms=
 need to say what the default hash for use with CMP will be.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Russ<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Jun 15, 2021, at 6:00 AM, David von Oheimb &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de">nl0@von-Oheimb.de</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Russ, Lijun, et al.,<br>
<br>
we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine the hash=
 alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf messages.<br>
Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in order to br=
ing it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the CertSt=
atus structure as follows, which is binary backward compatible:<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONA=
L,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING=
,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p></o:=
p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL=
<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></pre>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly contai=
ns a hash alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA came up),<br>
then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be omitted, whic=
h means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.<br>
Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg used and =
the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.<br>
(In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that&nbsp; SHA-=
512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,
<br>
like done for CMS in RFC8419).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Does this sound fine?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik wrote:<o:p></o=
:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me kn=
ow.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an updat=
ed version.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>Hendrik<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>Von: Spasm <a href=3D"mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org">&lt;spasm-bounces=
@ietf.org&gt;</a> Im Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>Russ<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backw=
ard<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>compatibility of this approach. It works fine.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>Von: Russ Housley <a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">&lt;housley@=
vigilsec.com&gt;</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.&nbsp; You can add so=
mething<o:p></o:p></pre>
</blockquote>
<pre>like:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier=
,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; ...<o:p></o:p></pre>
</blockquote>
<pre>This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the=
 field<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines th=
e hash<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be c=
onfirmed.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be cryp=
to agile<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAU=
LT.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>@Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for cert=
ificate<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this=
 to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>CMP Algorithms.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol<o=
:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.<o:p></o:p></pre>
</blockquote>
<pre>You are absolutely right.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following sectio=
n to CMP<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Updates:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>---------------------------snip---------------------------<o:p></o:p><=
/pre>
<pre>2.10.&nbsp; Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content<=
o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus ty=
pe used in<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those c=
ertificates<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.<=
o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:<o:p></=
o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONA=
L,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING=
,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p></o:=
p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL=
<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the<o=
:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify=
 a hash<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.=
g., for<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be us=
ed for<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be=
<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify th=
e<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated b=
y the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>---------------------------snip---------------------------<o:p></o:p><=
/pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!<o:p=
></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>Hendrik<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
<pre>_______________________________________________<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Spasm mailing list<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org">Spasm@ietf.org</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps=
%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf">https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dht=
tps%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspasm&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.bro=
ckha<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>us%<a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dht=
tp%3A%2F%2F40siemens.com%2F&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemen=
s.com%7Ce1783822e46b46c9adfb08d930103e1e%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a=
%7C1%7C0%7C637593668582071924%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiL=
CJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=3DS3h7Tv55%2=
Bnn90ytEd4BfxrlbzHRDnWrNZ2uVvozcTzs%3D&amp;reserved=3D0">40siemens.com</a>%=
7C8a0703abedbe44504c8d08d92b5fec60%7C38ae3bcd957<o:p></o:p></pre>
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o:p></o:p></pre>
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</blockquote>
<pre>_______________________________________________<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Spasm mailing list<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org">Spasm@ietf.org</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps=
%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspasm&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chen=
drik.brockhaus%40siemens.com%7Ce1783822e46b46c9adfb08d930103e1e%7C38ae3bcd9=
5794fd4addab42e1495d55a%7C1%7C0%7C637593668582081915%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3=
d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000=
&amp;sdata=3DDVxMQedBsxAQ2EvJiEigZ9bziuvCF5wOjfWJu5u6344%3D&amp;reserved=3D=
0">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></pre>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
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From: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
CC: LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>, "david.von.oheimb@siemens.com" <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/_gqc_mzfqnYZiOkR3M0T-KQCRto>
Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Thanks Lijun for you feedback.
I would also change CMP Algorithms Section 3.3 to make it clear which hash =
algorithms to use with CMP.

Current text:
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 8419 [RFC8419].

New text:
Specific conventions to be considered are specified in RFC 8419 [RFC8419]. =
The hash algorithm used to calculate the certHash in certConf messages MUST=
 be SHA512 if the certificate is signed using Ed25519 and SHAKE256 if signe=
d using Ed448.

Hendrik

Von: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
Gesendet: Freitag, 18. Juni 2021 09:14
An: Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
Betreff: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating cer=
tHash

Fine for me.

Brockhaus, Hendrik <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com<mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@=
siemens.com>> schrieb am Fr., 18. Juni 2021, 08:55:

Thanks Russ and Lijun for your feedback.



Trying to address Lijun's concerns and still keeping full crypto agility we=
 could also do the following:



Old Syntax as of RFC 4210:

     CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

        certHash    OCTET STRING,

        -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm

        -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature

        certReqId   INTEGER,

        -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep

        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL

     }



Proposed new Syntax:

   CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,

      -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash

      -- MUST be present if the hash algorithm to use is neither implied by=
 the AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature nor by other standard=
s like [CMP Algorithms]

      -- SHOULD be present only if this field is supported on client and se=
rver side and MUST be indicated by using cmp2021(3)

       certHash    OCTET STRING,

      -- the hash of the certificate to be confirmed

      -- if hashAlg is present, the given hash algorithm MUST be used

      -- if hashAlg is not present, the hash algorithm implied by the Algor=
ithmIdentifier of the certificate signature or by other standards like [CMP=
 Algorithms] MUST be used

       certReqId   INTEGER,

       -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep

       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }



Would this help to be as backward compatible and as crypto agile as possibl=
e.



What do you think?



Hendrik


Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com<mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>>
Gesendet: Dienstag, 15. Juni 2021 17:14
An: David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de<mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de>>
Cc: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com<mailto:lijun.liao@gmail.com>>; LAMPS W=
G <spasm@ietf.org<mailto:spasm@ietf.org>>; Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SE=
A-DE) <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com<mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>>=
; von Oheimb, David (T RDA CST SEA-DE) <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com<mailto=
:david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>>
Betreff: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating cer=
tHash

David:

I think this means that any new signature mechanisms need to say what the d=
efault hash for use with CMP will be.

Russ


On Jun 15, 2021, at 6:00 AM, David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de<mailto:nl0=
@von-Oheimb.de>> wrote:

Russ, Lijun, et al.,

we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine the hash=
 alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf messages.
Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in order to br=
ing it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.
To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the CertStatus stru=
cture as follows, which is binary backward compatible:

   CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,

      certHash    OCTET STRING,

      certReqId   INTEGER,

      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL

   }
In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly contains a hash=
 alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA came up),
then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be omitted, whic=
h means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.
Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg used and =
the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.
(In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that  SHA-512 S=
HALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,
like done for CMS in RFC8419).
Does this sound fine?
    David
On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik wrote:

If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me know.

If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an updated ve=
rsion.



Hendrik



Von: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org><mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org> Im Auftr=
ag von Brockhaus, Hendrik



Russ



Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backward

compatibility of this approach. It works fine.



Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com><mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>



The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add something

like:

CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

   hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,

   ...

This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the fiel=
d

hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.

We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines the has=
h

algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be confir=
med.

We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be crypto ag=
ile

and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAULT.

@Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for certifica=
te

signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this to

CMP Algorithms.



That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol

version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.

You are absolutely right.





To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following section to =
CMP

Updates:



---------------------------snip---------------------------

2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content



This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus type us=
ed in

certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those certif=
icates

where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.



Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:



   CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {

      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,

      certHash    OCTET STRING,

      certReqId   INTEGER,

      statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL

   }



The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the

signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify a ha=
sh

algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.g., f=
or

EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be used fo=
r

calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be

computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify the

certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated by the

certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).

---------------------------snip---------------------------



Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!



Hendrik



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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US">Thanks Lijun for you feedback.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US">I would also change CMP Algorithms Section 3.3 to make it clear which=
 hash algorithms to use with CMP.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US">Current text:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Specific conventions to be cons=
idered are specified in RFC 8419 [RFC8419].
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">New text:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Specific conventions to be cons=
idered are specified in RFC 8419 [RFC8419]. The hash algorithm used to calc=
ulate the certHash in certConf messages MUST be SHA512 if the certificate i=
s signed using Ed25519 and SHAKE256
 if signed using Ed448.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Hendrik</span><span lang=3D"EN-=
US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"EN-US" style=3D"mso-fareast-language:E=
N-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt">
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>Von:</b> Lijun Liao &lt;lijun.liao@gmail.com&gt; =
<br>
<b>Gesendet:</b> Freitag, 18. Juni 2021 09:14<br>
<b>An:</b> Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) &lt;hendrik.brockhaus@siem=
ens.com&gt;<br>
<b>Betreff:</b> Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculat=
ing certHash<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Fine for me.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Brockhaus, Hendrik &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hendrik.bro=
ckhaus@siemens.com">hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</a>&gt; schrieb am Fr., 1=
8. Juni 2021, 08:55:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0c=
m 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Thanks =
Russ and Lijun for your feedback.</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;<=
/span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Trying =
to address Lijun's concerns and still keeping full crypto agility we could =
also do the following:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;<=
/span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Old Syn=
tax as of RFC 4210:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING=
,</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- the hash of the certificate, using t=
he same hash algorithm</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- as is used to create and verify the =
certificate signature</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,</span><o=
:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- to match this confirmation with the =
corresponding req/rep</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL=
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;<=
/span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Propose=
d new Syntax:</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,</span><o:=
p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHa=
sh</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- MUST be present if the hash algorithm to use is =
neither implied by the AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature nor=
 by other standards like [CMP Algorithms]</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- SHOULD be present only if this field is supporte=
d on client and server side and MUST be indicated by using cmp2021(3)</span=
><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,</spa=
n><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- the hash of the certificate to be confirmed</spa=
n><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- if hashAlg is present, the given hash algorithm =
MUST be used</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- if hashAlg is not present, the hash algorithm im=
plied by the AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature or by other s=
tandards like [CMP Algorithms] MUST be used</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,</span><o:p></o=
:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- to match this confirmation with the corres=
ponding req/rep</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }</sp=
an><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;<=
/span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">Would t=
his help to be as backward compatible and as crypto agile as possible.
</span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext"><span lang=3D"EN-US">&nbsp;<=
/span><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext">What do you think?<o:p></o:p=
></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"m-5310772524002696541msoplaintext">Hendrik<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm =
4.0pt">
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm =
0cm 0cm">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto"><b>Von:</b> Russ Housley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.co=
m" target=3D"_blank">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt;
<br>
<b>Gesendet:</b> Dienstag, 15. Juni 2021 17:14<br>
<b>An:</b> David von Oheimb &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de">nl0@vo=
n-Oheimb.de</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Cc:</b> Lijun Liao &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lijun.liao@gmail.com" target=3D=
"_blank">lijun.liao@gmail.com</a>&gt;; LAMPS WG &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:spasm=
@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">spasm@ietf.org</a>&gt;; Brockhaus, Hendrik (T =
RDA CST SEA-DE) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com" target=
=3D"_blank">hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</a>&gt;;
 von Oheimb, David (T RDA CST SEA-DE) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:david.von.oheim=
b@siemens.com" target=3D"_blank">david.von.oheimb@siemens.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Betreff:</b> Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculat=
ing certHash<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">David:<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">I think this means that any new signature mechanisms need to say w=
hat the default hash for use with CMP will be.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Russ<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0p=
t"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">On Jun 15, 2021, at 6:00 AM, David von Oheimb &lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:nl0@von-Oheimb.de" target=3D"_blank">nl0@von-Oheimb.de</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p=
></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Russ, Lijun, et al.,<br>
<br>
we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine the hash=
 alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf messages.<br>
Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in order to br=
ing it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the CertSt=
atus structure as follows, which is binary backward compatible:<o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONA=
L,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING=
,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p></o:=
p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL=
<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></pre>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly contai=
ns a hash alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA came up),<br>
then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be omitted, whic=
h means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.<br>
Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg used and =
the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.<br>
(In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that&nbsp; SHA-=
512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,
<br>
like done for CMS in RFC8419).<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">Does this sound fine?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto">On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me kn=
ow.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an updat=
ed version.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Hendrik<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>Von: Spasm <a href=3D"mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>&lt;spasm-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</a> Im Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik<o:p><=
/o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Russ<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the backw=
ard<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>compatibility of this approach. It works fine.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>Von: Russ Housley <a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" target=3D"_b=
lank">&lt;housley@vigilsec.com&gt;</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.&nbsp; You can add so=
mething<o:p></o:p></pre>
</blockquote>
<pre>like:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier=
,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; ...<o:p></o:p></pre>
</blockquote>
<pre>This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the=
 field<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines th=
e hash<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be c=
onfirmed.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be cryp=
to agile<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAU=
LT.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>@Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for cert=
ificate<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this=
 to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>CMP Algorithms.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<pre>That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol<o=
:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.<o:p></o:p></pre>
</blockquote>
<pre>You are absolutely right.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following sectio=
n to CMP<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Updates:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>---------------------------snip---------------------------<o:p></o:p><=
/pre>
<pre>2.10.&nbsp; Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content<=
o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus ty=
pe used in<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those c=
ertificates<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.<=
o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:<o:p></=
o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONA=
L,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING=
,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p></o:=
p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL=
<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the<o=
:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify=
 a hash<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, e.=
g., for<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be us=
ed for<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be=
<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify th=
e<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated b=
y the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>---------------------------snip---------------------------<o:p></o:p><=
/pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!<o:p=
></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Hendrik<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>_______________________________________________<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Spasm mailing list<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.org</a>=
<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps=
%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf" target=3D"_blank">https://eur01.safelinks.protection.out=
look.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf</a><o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fspasm&amp;amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.bro=
ckha<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>us%<a href=3D"https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dht=
tp%3A%2F%2F40siemens.com%2F&amp;data=3D04%7C01%7Chendrik.brockhaus%40siemen=
s.com%7Cbcc6e177123949512a8908d93228ac99%7C38ae3bcd95794fd4addab42e1495d55a=
%7C1%7C0%7C637595972536970561%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiL=
CJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&amp;sdata=3DftxARzek3Q=
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p></pre>
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Hendrik:

This seems fine to me, but the text that goes with it needs to say that =
you must use CMPv3 in order to include the optional hashAlg.

Russ


> On Jun 18, 2021, at 2:55 AM, Brockhaus, Hendrik =
<hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com> wrote:
>=20
> Thanks Russ and Lijun for your feedback.
> =20
> Trying to address Lijun's concerns and still keeping full crypto =
agility we could also do the following:
> =20
> Old Syntax as of RFC 4210:
>      CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>         certHash    OCTET STRING,
>         -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
>         -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
>         certReqId   INTEGER,
>         -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
>         statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>      }
> =20
> Proposed new Syntax:
>    CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>       -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
>       -- MUST be present if the hash algorithm to use is neither =
implied by the AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature nor by =
other standards like [CMP Algorithms]
>       -- SHOULD be present only if this field is supported on client =
and server side and MUST be indicated by using cmp2021(3)
>        certHash    OCTET STRING,
>       -- the hash of the certificate to be confirmed
>       -- if hashAlg is present, the given hash algorithm MUST be used
>       -- if hashAlg is not present, the hash algorithm implied by the =
AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature or by other standards =
like [CMP Algorithms] MUST be used
>        certReqId   INTEGER,
>        -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
>        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }
> =20
> Would this help to be as backward compatible and as crypto agile as =
possible.
> =20
> What do you think?
> =20
> Hendrik
> =20
> =20
> Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>>=20=

> Gesendet: Dienstag, 15. Juni 2021 17:14
> An: David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de <mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de>>
> Cc: Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com <mailto:lijun.liao@gmail.com>>; =
LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org <mailto:spasm@ietf.org>>; Brockhaus, Hendrik (T =
RDA CST SEA-DE) <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com =
<mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>>; von Oheimb, David (T RDA CST =
SEA-DE) <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com =
<mailto:david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>>
> Betreff: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for =
calculating certHash
> =20
> David:
> =20
> I think this means that any new signature mechanisms need to say what =
the default hash for use with CMP will be.
> =20
> Russ
> =20
>=20
>=20
> On Jun 15, 2021, at 6:00 AM, David von Oheimb <nl0@von-Oheimb.de =
<mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de>> wrote:
> =20
> Russ, Lijun, et al.,
>=20
> we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to determine the =
hash alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf messages.
> Would be good to finalize this topic by the end of this week in order =
to bring it into the next version of the CMP-related drafts.
> To summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the CertStatus =
structure as follows, which is binary backward compatible:
>    CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>       certHash    OCTET STRING,
>       certReqId   INTEGER,
>       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>    }
> In case the signature alg identifier of the cert explicitly contains a =
hash alg (which so far always was the case until EdDSA came up),
> then use that hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be omitted, =
which means the certConf message can keep version CMPv2.
> Otherwise, the hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg used =
and the version of the certConf message is CMPv3.
> (In addition, we gonna specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that  =
SHA-512 SHALL be used for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,=20
> like done for CMS in RFC8419).
> Does this sound fine?
>     David
> On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik wrote:
> If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please let me =
know.
> If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit an =
updated version.
> =20
> Hendrik
> =20
> Von: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> <mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org> Im =
Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik
> =20
> Russ
> =20
> Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested the =
backward
> compatibility of this approach. It works fine.
> =20
> Von: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>
> =20
> The 3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.  You can add =
something
> like:
> CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>    hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha256Identifier,
>    ...
> This was the solution David and I discussed as well. But we called the =
field
> hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.
> We feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines =
the hash
> algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate to be =
confirmed.
> We also tried to prevent to specify fixed algorithms in CMP to be =
crypto agile
> and prevent future updates. Therefore, we propose not to use the =
DEFAULT.
> @Liao, using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for =
certificate
> signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a note on this =
to
> CMP Algorithms.
> =20
> That said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol
> version comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.
> You are absolutely right.
> =20
> =20
> To introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following =
section to CMP
> Updates:
> =20
> ---------------------------snip---------------------------
> 2.10.  Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation Content
> =20
> This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the CertStatus =
type used in
> certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash algorithm for those =
certificates
> where no hash algorithm is specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.
> =20
> Replace the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:
> =20
>    CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>       certHash    OCTET STRING,
>       certReqId   INTEGER,
>       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>    }
> =20
> The hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the
> signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does not specify =
a hash
> algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such cases, =
e.g., for
> EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm to be =
used for
> calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value SHALL be
> computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and verify =
the
> certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version indicated =
by the
> certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).
> ---------------------------snip---------------------------
> =20
> Any comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!
> =20
> Hendrik
> =20
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	charset=us-ascii

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Hendrik:<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">This seems fine to me, but the text that goes with it needs =
to say that you must use CMPv3 in order to include the optional =
hashAlg.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Russ</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Jun =
18, 2021, at 2:55 AM, Brockhaus, Hendrik &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com" =
class=3D"">hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; caret-color: rgb(0, =
0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">Thanks Russ and Lijun for your feedback.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">Trying to address Lijun's concerns and still =
keeping full crypto agility we could also do the following:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">Old Syntax as of RFC 4210:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- the hash of the =
certificate, using the same hash algorithm<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- as is used to =
create and verify the certificate signature<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- to match this =
confirmation with the corresponding req/rep<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; =
PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">Proposed new Syntax:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] =
AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- the hash algorithm to use =
for calculating certHash<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- MUST be present if the hash =
algorithm to use is neither implied by the AlgorithmIdentifier of the =
certificate signature nor by other standards like [CMP Algorithms]<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- SHOULD be present only if =
this field is supported on client and server side and MUST be indicated =
by using cmp2021(3)<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- the hash of the certificate =
to be confirmed<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- if hashAlg =
is present, the given hash algorithm MUST be used<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- if hashAlg is not present, =
the hash algorithm implied by the AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate =
signature or by other standards like [CMP Algorithms] MUST be used<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; =
INTEGER,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- to =
match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; statusInfo&nbsp; =
PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D"">Would this help to be as backward compatible =
and as crypto agile as possible.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">What do =
you think?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Hendrik<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"border-style: none none none solid; border-left-width: 1.5pt; =
border-left-color: blue; padding: 0cm 0cm 0cm 4pt;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"border-style: solid none none; =
border-top-width: 1pt; border-top-color: rgb(225, 225, 225); padding: =
3pt 0cm 0cm;" class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Von:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Russ Housley &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" style=3D"color: blue; =
text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt;<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">Gesendet:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Dienstag, 15. Juni 2021 =
17:14<br class=3D""><b class=3D"">An:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>David von Oheimb &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de" style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: =
underline;" class=3D"">nl0@von-Oheimb.de</a>&gt;<br class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">Cc:</b><span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Lijun=
 Liao &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lijun.liao@gmail.com" style=3D"color: blue; =
text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">lijun.liao@gmail.com</a>&gt;; =
LAMPS WG &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:spasm@ietf.org" style=3D"color: blue; =
text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">spasm@ietf.org</a>&gt;; =
Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com" style=3D"color: blue; =
text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</a>&gt;; von Oheimb, David (T =
RDA CST SEA-DE) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:david.von.oheimb@siemens.com" =
style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">david.von.oheimb@siemens.com</a>&gt;<br class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">Betreff:</b><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] =
Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">David:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">I =
think this means that any new signature mechanisms need to say what the =
default hash for use with CMP will be.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D"">Russ<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><blockquote style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; =
margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">On =
Jun 15, 2021, at 6:00 AM, David von Oheimb &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:nl0@von-Oheimb.de" style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: =
underline;" class=3D"">nl0@von-Oheimb.de</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D"">Russ, Lijun, et al.,<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">we have not yet heard back on our latest proposal how to =
determine the hash alg to use for the certHash field in CMP certConf =
messages.<br class=3D"">Would be good to finalize this topic by the end =
of this week in order to bring it into the next version of the =
CMP-related drafts.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">To =
summarize, our proposal is to add a hashAlg field to the CertStatus =
structure as follows, which is binary backward compatible:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] =
AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">In case the signature alg =
identifier of the cert explicitly contains a hash alg (which so far =
always was the case until EdDSA came up),<br class=3D"">then use that =
hash alg and the optional hashAlg field MUST be omitted, which means the =
certConf message can keep version CMPv2.<br class=3D"">Otherwise, the =
hashAlg field MUST be used to specify the hash alg used and the version =
of the certConf message is CMPv3.<br class=3D"">(In addition, we gonna =
specify in the CMP- Algorithms draft that&nbsp; SHA-512 SHALL be used =
for Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448,<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><br class=3D"">like done =
for CMS in RFC8419).<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Does =
this sound fine?<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; David<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">On 11.06.21 15:21, Brockhaus, Hendrik =
wrote:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><blockquote style=3D"margin-top: =
5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=3D""><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">If there is any further feedback to this from the WG, please =
let me know.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">If not, I would include the section into the draft and submit =
an updated version.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">Hendrik<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><blockquote =
style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=3D""><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">Von: Spasm <a =
href=3D"mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org" style=3D"color: blue; =
text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">&lt;spasm-bounces@ietf.org&gt;</a>=
 Im Auftrag von Brockhaus, Hendrik<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">Russ<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">Thank you for this suggestion. In the meantime, David tested =
the backward<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">compatibility of this approach. It works fine.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><blockquote style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; =
margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=3D""><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">Von: =
Russ Housley <a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com" style=3D"color: =
blue; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">&lt;housley@vigilsec.com&gt;</a><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">The =
3rd choice seems to be the most future proof.&nbsp; You can add =
something<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre></blockquote><pre style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier =
New&quot;;" class=3D"">like:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><blockquote =
style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=3D""><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT =
sha256Identifier,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; ...<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre></blockquote><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">This was the solution David and I =
discussed as well. But we called the field<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre=
 style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">hashAlg, like in OOBCertHash.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">We =
feel the DEFAULT is in conflict with the CMP V2, that determines the =
hash<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">algorithm from the signatureAlgorithm field of the =
certificate to be confirmed.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">We also tried to prevent to specify =
fixed algorithms in CMP to be crypto agile<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre=
 style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">and prevent future updates. =
Therefore, we propose not to use the DEFAULT.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">@Liao, =
using this approach, you would need to specify SHA-512 for =
certificate<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">signed with Ed25519 and SHAKE256 for Ed448. I would add a =
note on this to<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">CMP Algorithms.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><blockquote style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; =
margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=3D""><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">That =
said, this would introduce another place where the CMP protocol<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">version=
 comes into play with the ASN.1 parsing.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre></blockquote><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">You are absolutely right.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">To =
introduce the hashAlg field, we propose to add the following section to =
CMP<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">Updates:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">---------------------------snip---------------------------<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">2.10.&nbsp; Update Section 5.3.18. - Certificate Confirmation =
Content<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">This section introduces an optional hashAlg field to the =
CertStatus type used in<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: =
0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier =
New&quot;;" class=3D"">certConf messages to explicitly specify the hash =
algorithm for those certificates<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">where no hash algorithm is =
specified in the signatureAlgorithm field.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre=
 style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">Replace=
 the ASN.1 Syntax of CertStatus with the following text:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; CertStatus ::=3D SEQUENCE {<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; hashAlg [0] =
AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
certHash&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OCTET STRING,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
certReqId&nbsp;&nbsp; INTEGER,<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
statusInfo&nbsp; PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre =
style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: =
&quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; }<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">The =
hashAlg field SHOULD be used only in exceptional cases where the<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">signatureAlgorithm of the certificate to be confirmed does =
not specify a hash<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">algorithm, neither in the OID nor in the parameters. In such =
cases, e.g., for<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">EdDSA, the hashAlg MUST be used to specify the hash algorithm =
to be used for<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">calculating the certHash value. Otherwise, the certHash value =
SHALL be<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">computed using the same hash algorithm as used to create and =
verify the<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm =
0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">certificate signature. If hashAlg is used, the CMP version =
indicated by the<o:p class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm =
0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">certConf message header must be cmp2021(3).<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" =
class=3D"">---------------------------snip---------------------------<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D"">Any =
comments and feedback on this proposal from the WG is welcome!<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></pre><pre style=3D"margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; =
font-size: 10pt; font-family: &quot;Courier New&quot;;" class=3D""><o:p =
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
Cc: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>, LAMPS WG <spasm@ietf.org>
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From: David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for calculating certHash
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Russ and Lijun,

pleased to hear.

On 18.06.21 18:59, Russ Housley wrote:
> This seems fine to me, but the text that goes with it needs to say
> that you must use CMPv3 in order to include the optional hashAlg.

Sure - this is what we meant by: "SHOULD be present only if this field
is supported on client and server side and MUST be indicated by using
cmp2021(3)"

We are also going to specify in the section on version negotiation:

If a client is supposed to send a certConf message containing the
hashAlg field
the client MUST choose the version for the message as follows:
* If the client supports cmp2021 it MUST use cmp2021 in the certConf
message.
* If the client does not support cmp2021 it MUST reject the certificate.

    David

*Von:* Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>
*Gesendet:* Freitag, 18. Juni 2021 09:14
*An:* Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE) <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
*Betreff:* Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us for
calculating certHash

Fine for me.


> On Jun 18, 2021, at 2:55 AM, Brockhaus, Hendrik
> <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com <mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>>
> wrote:
>>
>> Thanks Russ and Lijun for your feedback.
>>  
>> Trying to address Lijun's concerns and still keeping full crypto
>> agility we could also do the following:
>>  
>> Old Syntax as of RFC 4210:
>>      CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
>>         certHash    OCTET STRING,
>>         -- the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
>>         -- as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
>>         certReqId   INTEGER,
>>         -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
>>         statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL
>>      }
>>  
>> Proposed new Syntax:
>>    CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {
>>       hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
>>       -- the hash algorithm to use for calculating certHash
>>       -- MUST be present if the hash algorithm to use is neither
>> implied by the AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature nor
>> by other standards like [CMP Algorithms]
>>       -- SHOULD be present only if this field is supported on client
>> and server side and MUST be indicated by using cmp2021(3)
>>        certHash    OCTET STRING,
>>       -- the hash of the certificate to be confirmed
>>       -- if hashAlg is present, the given hash algorithm MUST be used
>>       -- if hashAlg is not present, the hash algorithm implied by the
>> AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature or by other
>> standards like [CMP Algorithms] MUST be used
>>        certReqId   INTEGER,
>>        -- to match this confirmation with the corresponding req/rep
>>        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo OPTIONAL }
>>  
>> Would this help to be as backward compatible and as crypto agile as
>> possible.
>>  
>> What do you think?
>>  
>> Hendrik
>>  

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    <p>Russ and Lijun,</p>
    <p>pleased to hear.</p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18.06.21 18:59, Russ Housley wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:166E2C71-4175-41FF-B0CB-8B938C13E813@vigilsec.com">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
        charset=windows-1252">
      <div class="">This seems fine to me, but the text that goes with
        it needs to say that you must use CMPv3 in order to include the
        optional hashAlg.</div>
    </blockquote>
    <p>Sure - this is what we meant by: "<span class="" lang="EN-US">SHOULD
        be present only if this field is supported on client and server
        side and MUST be indicated by using cmp2021(3)</span>"</p>
    <p>We are also going to specify in the section on version
      negotiation:<br>
    </p>
    <p class="MsoPlainText"><span style="font-family:&quot;Courier
        New&quot;">If a client is supposed to send a certConf message
        containing the hashAlg field<br>
        the client MUST choose the version for the message as follows:</span><span
        style="font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><br>
        * If the client supports cmp2021 it MUST use cmp2021 in the
        certConf message.</span><span style="font-family:&quot;Courier
        New&quot;"></span><br>
      <span style="font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;">* If the client
        does not support cmp2021 it MUST reject the certificate.</span></p>
    <p>    David</p>
    <div>
      <div style="border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1
        1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm">
        <p class="MsoNormal"><b>Von:</b> Lijun Liao
          <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:lijun.liao@gmail.com">&lt;lijun.liao@gmail.com&gt;</a> <br>
          <b>Gesendet:</b> Freitag, 18. Juni 2021 09:14<br>
          <b>An:</b> Brockhaus, Hendrik (T RDA CST SEA-DE)
          <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com">&lt;hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com&gt;</a><br>
          <b>Betreff:</b> Re: [lamps] [CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us
          for calculating certHash</p>
        Fine for me.</div>
    </div>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:166E2C71-4175-41FF-B0CB-8B938C13E813@vigilsec.com">
      <div class="">
        <div class="">On Jun 18, 2021, at 2:55 AM, Brockhaus, Hendrik
          &lt;<a href="mailto:hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com" class=""
            moz-do-not-send="true">hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com</a>&gt;
          wrote:
          <div>
            <blockquote type="cite" class=""><br
                class="Apple-interchange-newline">
              <div class="">
                <div class="WordSection1" style="page: WordSection1;
                  caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica;
                  font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
                  font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal;
                  letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
                  text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space:
                  normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width:
                  0px; text-decoration: none;">
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">Thanks Russ and Lijun for your
                      feedback.<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US"><o:p class=""> </o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">Trying to address Lijun's concerns
                      and still keeping full crypto agility we could
                      also do the following:<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US"><o:p class=""> </o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">Old Syntax as of RFC 4210:<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">     CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">        certHash    OCTET STRING,<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">        -- the hash of the
                      certificate, using the same hash algorithm<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">        -- as is used to create and
                      verify the certificate signature<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">        certReqId   INTEGER,<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">        -- to match this confirmation
                      with the corresponding req/rep<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">        statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo
                      OPTIONAL<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">     }<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US"><o:p class=""> </o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">Proposed new Syntax:<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">   CertStatus ::= SEQUENCE {<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">      hashAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier
                      OPTIONAL,<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">      -- the hash algorithm to use
                      for calculating certHash<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">      -- MUST be present if the hash
                      algorithm to use is neither implied by the
                      AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature
                      nor by other standards like [CMP Algorithms]<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">      -- SHOULD be present only if
                      this field is supported on client and server side
                      and MUST be indicated by using cmp2021(3)<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">       certHash    OCTET STRING,<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">      -- the hash of the certificate
                      to be confirmed<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">      -- if hashAlg is present, the
                      given hash algorithm MUST be used<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">      -- if hashAlg is not present,
                      the hash algorithm implied by the
                      AlgorithmIdentifier of the certificate signature
                      or by other standards like [CMP Algorithms] MUST
                      be used<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">       certReqId   INTEGER,<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">       -- to match this confirmation
                      with the corresponding req/rep<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">       statusInfo  PKIStatusInfo
                      OPTIONAL }<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US"><o:p class=""> </o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US">Would this help to be as backward
                      compatible and as crypto agile as possible.<o:p
                        class=""></o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""
                      lang="EN-US"><o:p class=""> </o:p></span></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">What do you think?<o:p
                      class=""></o:p></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><o:p class=""> </o:p></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class="">Hendrik<o:p class=""></o:p></div>
                  <div style="margin: 0cm; font-size: 11pt; font-family:
                    Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><span class=""><o:p
                        class=""> </o:p></span></div>
                </div>
              </div>
            </blockquote>
          </div>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

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Subject: Re: [lamps] [saag] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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-saag

> On Jun 16, 2021, at 16:53, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL =
<uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> Yet the definitions invest in the details of the private keys, leaving =
the public key as =E2=80=9CBIT STRING OPTIONAL=E2=80=9D. Why is it so?

Uri,

In ECPrivateKey, publicKey is OPTIONAL because that=E2=80=99s the way it =
was defined in the SECG specifications (see c.4 of SEC1). The text in =
c.4 leads me to believe the entire structure was created to support =
providing CA-generated keys to the EE. If the CA creates the keys and =
generates a certificate, there is no need to return the raw public key =
in the structure; you can get the public key from the certificate.

In OneAsymmetricKey, I followed the same pattern.

As far as identifying the PublicKey serialization, why can=E2=80=99t you =
use the algorithm identifier?

spt

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Subject: Re: [lamps] CSRATTRS specifying the SAN
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Sorry for just getting to this now. I haven=E2=80=99t read upstream so =
if this gets answer there oops.

> On Jun 9, 2021, at 16:15, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> =
wrote:
>=20
> Signed PGP part
>=20
> Eliot has suggested that:
>      https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7030#section-4.5.2
> does not appear to allow the returned CSR Attributes to contain a =
value.
> Please correct me if I'm understanding the problem wrong.

Oh yeah it does! The whole point of CSRattrs is to allow the client to =
say =E2=80=9Chey RA/CA what do you want my CSR to look like=E2=80=9D. =
The response could just be an OID or it can be an actual attribute with =
some values:

  Requests for descriptive information from the client are made
  by an attribute, to be represented as Attributes of the CSR, with
  a type indicating the [RFC2985] extensionRequest and the
  values indicating the particular attributes desired to be included
  in the resulting certificate=E2=80=99s extensions.=20

Note the word =E2=80=9Cvalues=E2=80=9D above.

I also figured that there might be brain dead EEs out there so instead =
of returning a string of attributes the EST server could just return the =
entire CSR - see Appendix B of RFC 8295. That way the EE would only need =
sign the request (for PoP).

> RFC8994 assignment of IPv6 ULA can not, as far as I can understand, =
work
> without assigning a value.  The Registrar must allocate a prefix for =
the new
> ACP node, and this has to go into the CSR in order for the CA to sign =
it.
>=20
> (Yes, the Registrar has to *check* that the CSR contains the right =
value along
> the way too.  Yes, if the Registrar is ALSO the CA, then it can =
shortcut, but
> that's not in general true)
>=20
> My unit testing code is at:
>  =
https://github.com/AnimaGUS-minerva/fountain/blob/master/spec/models/csr_a=
ttributes_spec.rb
>=20
>=20
> I found the ASN.1 code in section 4.5.2 beyond my understanding, so I =
muddled
> through, since fortunately, there was an example.
>=20
>   CsrAttrs ::=3D SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID
>   AttrOrOID ::=3D CHOICE (oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attribute Attribute }
>   Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::=3D SEQUENCE {
>        type   ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}),
>        values SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type}) }
>=20
> What I think that this says is that one can have:
>  a) a Sequence of stuff.

a sequence of stuff that might be empty

>  b) the stuff is either an OID.
>  c) or the stuff is a SEQUENCE [ type, value ].

> The complicated &id... is just saying that when you have some =
attribute type
> "FOO", then you can have the things that would be valid as values.  =
I'm
> actually rather amazed at this level of meta-programming. (Can CDDL do =
that?)

So this is the parameterized ASN.1 syntax. What you could so is define =
an IOSet of attributes. These attributes value values. But, yeah if =
it=E2=80=99s an attribute it=E2=80=99s an OID and the associated syntax. =
e.g.,

pKCS7PDU ATTRIBUTE ::=3D {
       WITH SYNTAX ContentInfo
       ID pkcs-9-at-pkcs7PDU
       }

   pkcs-9-at-pkcs7PDU OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D {
       iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
       pkcs-9-at(25) 5
       }

The OID would be 1.2.840.113549.1.9.25.5

and the values (really only one) is:

PKIData ::=3D SEQUENCE {
       reqSequence        SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF TaggedRequest
       }

> An example is provided:
>   MEEGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiMBYGCSqGSIb3DQEJDjEJ
>   BgcrBgEBAQEWBggqhkjOPQQDAw=3D=3D
>=20
> %echo =
'MEEGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiMBYGCSqGSIb3DQEJDjEJBgcrBgEBA=
QEWBggqhkjOPQQDAw=3D=3D' | base64 -d | dumpasn1 -
>  0  65: SEQUENCE {
>  2   9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7)
> 13  18:   SEQUENCE {
> 15   7:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1)
> 24   7:     SET {
> 26   5:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34)
>       :       }
>       :     }
> 33  22:   SEQUENCE {
> 35   9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14)
> 46   9:     SET {
> 48   7:       OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 1 1 1 22'
>       :       }
>       :     }
> 57   8:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3)
>       :   }
>=20
>=20
> At 2, we have the OID "challengePassword", which tells the client that =
this
> attribute should be included (that's [b]).
> At 13-26, we have an attributed, ecPublicKey, with a *value* =
secp384r1.
> This tells the client what kind of things to sign with.  (that's [c])
> At 33, we have extensionRequest with oid value 1.3.6.1.1.1.1.22. (also =
[c])
> Finally, at 57, we have just the attribute ecdsaWithSHA384, which is =
telling
> the client to use SHA2-384.
>=20
> In order to get this all right, I used the example above, made sure I =
could
> decode it, and then made sure that I could encode exactly that.

Yep!

> I have an example building the subjectAltName rfc822Name (yes, my code =
hasn't
> caught up to otherName as specified in RFC8994 yet) which is:
>=20
> obiwan-[projects/pandora/fountain](2.6.6) mcr 10263 %dumpasn1 =
tmp/hellobulb0.der
>  0  32: SEQUENCE {
>  2  30:   SEQUENCE {
>  4   3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17)
>  9  23:     SET {
> 11  21:       SEQUENCE {
> 13  19:         [1] {
> 15  17:           UTF8String 'hello@example.com'
>       :           }
>       :         }
>       :       }
>       :     }
>       :   }
>=20
> I don't know what the [1] is actually, but possibly that's the =
rfc822Name.
> Yup, it is:
>  #        rfc822Name                      [1]     IA5String,   <-- =
this one

The one is the tag.

> So, I think that I'm entirely within spec for CSR Attributes, and I'd =
like to
> understand more from Owen and Eliot as to what problems they are =
having with
> CSR Attributes.
>=20
> Eliot has suggested we do it all in JSON (CBOR?), and I would =
certainly be
> happy with that.
>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 I=C3=B8T =
consulting )
>           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
>=20
>=20


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Subject: Re: [lamps] PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 11:51 AM Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
<mjos@pqshield.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 4:40 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com=
> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 03:09:54PM +0000, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL=
 wrote:
>> >
>> > Yes. My question is: if I create that OCTET STRING with one app on a
>> > 32-bit Big-Endian machine, and attempt to decode it with a different
>> > app (i.e., not the same source base) on a 64-bit Little-Endian machine
>> > - would it work correctly?
>>
>> Yes, it will work correctly (modulo bugs and intentional
>> incompatbilities). After all, definition of octet string is string over
>> alphabet consisting of integers [0,255]. This definition is independent
>> of bitness and endianess of platform. Nor do octet strings have bit-
>> endianess ("octet strings" that do are actually bit strings).
>>
>
> Yeah, I don't see problems with this.
>
> For PQC: The NIST API and test vector requirement, fortunately, has helpe=
d with that. Since the PQC standardization effort started in 2016, all supp=
lied reference and optimized implementations had to comply with a single se=
t of test vectors, supplied by the design teams. The test vectors are octet=
 strings. Many of us use those for compliance testing of new and old implem=
entations.
>
> The better algorithms are very specific about encodings, but if in doubt =
I just go to the test vectors to check. So we already have a multitude of i=
nteroperable implementations (hardware implementations, different languages=
, embedded, SIMD, etc).
>
> My expectation is that (with a few improvements) a similar test vector sy=
stem will be eventually be used for high-level CAVP/ACVT (FIPS 140-3) testi=
ng of NIST algorithm implementations. There is no ASN.1 in the encoding or =
decoding of keys, ciphertexts, or signatures, etc.
>
> As it is, those byte strings go directly even into hardware modules. We v=
iew pk/sk/ct/sig octet strings as well defined in the context of a specific=
 PQC parameter set. Note that PQC parameter sets are very specific and disc=
rete, a bit like elliptic curve groups (not "sliders" like the RSA keys). S=
o I personally hope IETF wouldn't go into unwrapping those octet strings to=
o much, just assign OIDs to the "blobs", or at least give an option to use =
blobs.
>
> There are some wrinkles that will no doubt be ironed out in the standardi=
zation process; for example, the 16-bit elements in FrodoKEM private keys i=
n test vectors are little-endian while public values are in network byte or=
der. Furthermore, the algorithms that utilize NTT may want to store some pr=
ivate key material in the "NTT Domain" rather than as normal mod q integer =
vectors. One particular NTT representation may not be ideal for implementat=
ion on another platform. But this aspect of private key encoding is similar=
 to "CRT" values for RSA private keys.
>
> Uri:
>>
>> To repeat myself, my concern is how to create (and unwrap) those octet s=
trings in an interoperable across architectures and platforms way. And whet=
her defining the appropriate encoding (e.g., maybe defining how a vector of=
 integers is encoded into a SEQUENCE that would be contained in that OCTET =
STRING) would help this.
>
> I doubt that unwrapping PQC octet strings into vectors of integers is par=
ticularly helpful. As you know, the implementations compress bit fields and=
 secrets in very specific ways that can be interpreted only in the context =
of that algorithm. Kyber field elements are 13 bits, for example, and some =
algorithms use quite complex encoding schemes. This unwrapping would direct=
ly make testing more difficult.
>
> Some additional notes on testing:
>
> - A detached signature format needs to be explicitly defined in addition =
to the "signed envelope" format from NIST. However, I hope that this is a b=
yte string too.
>
> - The algorithms fail in very specific ways. A good test vector set needs=
 to include malformed signatures, ciphertexts, public keys.
>
> - The minimalistic NIST PQC API required that the decapsulation and signa=
ture operation can be completed without access to the public key (with a pr=
ivate key only). This led to the situation where the public key is often fu=
lly contained in the private key ( A Fujisaki-Okamoto CCA decapsulation req=
uires re-encryption and hence a public key, of course ). If specified with =
an API that also has access to the public key for private key operations, t=
he private key can be made smaller in some cases as this redundancy is remo=
ved.
>
> - Furthermore, the major algorithms (Falcon, Kyber, Dilithium, NTRU, SIKE=
, FrodoKEM, McEliece) can be fairly easily be transformed into deterministi=
c versions where relatively short seed keys are used for key generation, si=
gnature, decapsulation operations. This helps with testing of course, as I =
can record those seeds along with NIST test vectors.
>
> - The origin of this feature is a bit amusing; short-seed determinism was=
 not explicitly stated to be desirable (in the original call for algorithms=
 ) but the "fake reference RBG" supplied by NIST was just horrendously slow=
 due to a programming oversight (a full AES-256 key schedule for each CTR_D=
RBG output block) so many teams decided to only take a minimal seed amount =
from that RNG and expand it with a good SHAKE implementation themselves. Th=
is gave a very large advantage in benchmarking (as some implementations spe=
nt 90% of cycles in the NIST RNG code).

OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.

It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.

It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
happened with x25519.

Jeff


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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 10:44:57 -0400
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Subject: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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--000000000000f542b705c56ff3f4
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When do we want them - NOW!


I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for
PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the
same algorithm by the time we need to use them.

Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the
Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that
one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF
or the group itself specify an OID etc.

This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because
it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the
principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance
and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the
proposals, I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the
code.


That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred
identifiers as part of their submissions.



On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

> OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
> assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.
>
> It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
> in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.
>
> It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
> happened with x25519.
>
> Jeff
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>

--000000000000f542b705c56ff3f4
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-size:small">When do we want them - NOW!</div><div class=3D"gmail_default"=
 style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"=
font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:=
small">I second Jeffrey&#39;s request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags de=
fined for PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OI=
Ds for the same algorithm by the time we need to use them.</div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_=
default" style=3D"font-size:small">Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE=
 appears to be compatible with the Threshold techniques I am using in the M=
esh so I will be implementing that one irregardless of the final NIST choic=
e. I would prefer that either IETF or the group itself specify an OID etc.<=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">This particular contest i=
s not the same as previous=C2=A0NIST contests because it may be a decade be=
fore these algorithms are being widely used, the principles behind the algo=
rithms are very new, there are major performance and functional differences=
, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals, I would probably=
 implement two or more just to stress test the code.</div><div class=3D"gma=
il_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default=
" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D=
"font-size:small">That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify thei=
r preferred identifiers as part of their submissions.</div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_defaul=
t" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jef=
frey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com">noloader@gmail.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private<br>
assignments at <a href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids=
.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://botan.randombit.net/han=
dbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br>
<br>
It is reminiscent of Bernstein&#39;s x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs<b=
r>
in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.<br>
<br>
It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br>
happened with x25519.<br>
<br>
Jeff<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Spasm mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
References: <B8006164-51AD-4B3B-9CE7-83B0574294F8@ll.mit.edu> <SY4PR01MB62511B1911DD23ADF0169307EE0E9@SY4PR01MB6251.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com> <F1A6EE33-5CEE-4DA2-88D3-A87133F897CF@ll.mit.edu> <YMtd336pK+0Efves@LK-Perkele-VII2.locald> <F14BD4A5-2556-4353-AFF9-7E54E55C0912@ll.mit.edu> <YMts73u4XH6uv/4M@LK-Perkele-VII2.locald> <CAPwdP4Nmvd1=TDSBbPtBj+5W02ysqSkSE4mQXawE-UnERmm6_Q@mail.gmail.com> <CAH8yC8=9c=j8VKKc9rcqXPJ2ZpF89mkeLeTboKXdYwaUuqiNwA@mail.gmail.com> <CAMm+LwjXV98Eiu_AS7FBZMkFeGKdhMrSzm0sSbU_mYcFc9it8A@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send =
the request for OIDs to NIST.

Russ


> On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker =
<phill@hallambaker.com> wrote:
>=20
> When do we want them - NOW!
>=20
>=20
> I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined =
for PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs =
for the same algorithm by the time we need to use them.
>=20
> Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with =
the Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be =
implementing that one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would =
prefer that either IETF or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>=20
> This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests =
because it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely =
used, the principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major =
performance and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more =
than one of the proposals, I would probably implement two or more just =
to stress test the code.
>=20
>=20
> That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred =
identifiers as part of their submissions.
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com =
<mailto:noloader@gmail.com>> wrote:
> OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
> assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html =
<https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html>.
>=20
> It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
> in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.
>=20
> It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
> happened with x25519.
>=20
> Jeff
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org <mailto:Spasm@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Our =
charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs. &nbsp;Please send =
the request for OIDs to NIST.<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Russ</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Jun =
23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com" =
class=3D"">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-size:small">When do we want them - NOW!</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-size:small"><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">I second Jeffrey's =
request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for PQC algorithms =
now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the same =
algorithm by the time we need to use them.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Of=
 the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the =
Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing =
that one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that =
either IETF or the group itself specify an OID etc.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-size:small">This particular contest is not the same as =
previous&nbsp;NIST contests because it may be a decade before these =
algorithms are being widely used, the principles behind the algorithms =
are very new, there are major performance and functional differences, =
etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals, I would =
probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.</div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-size:small"><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">That said, maybe we =
should ask the groups to specify their preferred identifiers as part of =
their submissions.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-size:small"><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br =
class=3D""></div></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM =
Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private<br =
class=3D"">
assignments at <a =
href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br =
class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs<br =
class=3D"">
in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br =
class=3D"">
happened with x25519.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
Jeff<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">
Spasm mailing list<br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br class=3D"">
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><br class=3D"">
</blockquote></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br class=3D"">Spasm =
mailing list<br class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" =
class=3D"">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm<br =
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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/5MLO8Wur8QC2h_pi2beBiCtER6M>
Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send the =
request for OIDs to NIST.

=20

It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding O=
ID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the ch=
arter correction.

=20

In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e=
.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms not =
selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choo=
se different algorithms.=20

=20

In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign th=
em is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.

=20

I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.

=20

Thanks!

=20



On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> =
wrote:

=20

When do we want them - NOW!

=20

=20

I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for P=
QC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the s=
ame algorithm by the time we need to use them.

=20

Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the =
Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that o=
ne irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or=
 the group itself specify an OID etc.

=20

This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because i=
t may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the princip=
les behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance and func=
tional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals,=
 I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.

=20

=20

That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred identi=
fiers as part of their submissions.

=20

=20

=20

On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.

It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.

It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
happened with x25519.

Jeff

_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
Spasm@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm

_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
Spasm@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm

=20


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<html xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schema=
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--></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap:=
break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'>Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs. &nbsp;Please s=
end the request for OIDs to NIST.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal styl=
e=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>It was my understanding that the NIST usually =
follows IANA/IETF regarding OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough =
to request and receive the charter correction.</span><span style=3D'font-size:=
12.0pt'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0=
pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12=
.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs =
to pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs=
 to algorithms <u>not</u> selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries ma=
y (and probably will) choose different algorithms. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'=
>In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign th=
em is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o=
:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;c=
olor:#0070C0'>I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMso=
Normal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Thanks!<=
o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><br><b=
r><o:p></o:p></p><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM,=
 Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com">phill@halla=
mbaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'marg=
in-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal st=
yle=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>When do we want them -=
 NOW!<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:=
.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:=
.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>I second Jeffrey's request, we have to =
get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for PQC algorithms now or else we will have h=
alf a dozen different OIDs for the same algorithm by the time we need to use=
 them.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left=
:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>=
Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the T=
hreshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that on=
e irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or =
the group itself specify an OID etc.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nb=
sp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><=
span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>This particular contest is not the same as pre=
vious&nbsp;NIST contests because it may be a decade before these algorithms =
are being widely used, the principles behind the algorithms are very new, th=
ere are major performance and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could u=
se more than one of the proposals, I would probably implement two or more ju=
st to stress test the code.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>That said, maybe =
we should ask the groups to specify their preferred identifiers as part of t=
heir submissions.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'=
margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p=
></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D=
'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'=
margin-left:.5in'>On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></=
p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;paddi=
ng:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has =
some private<br>assignments at <a href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook=
/dev_ref/oids.html" target=3D"_blank">https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev=
_ref/oids.html</a>.<br><br>It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. The=
re are multiple OIDs<br>in the wild that a program must recognize to interop=
erate.<br><br>It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid wh=
at<br>happened with x25519.<br><br>Jeff<br><br>_____________________________=
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 11:46:13 -0400
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>,  "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Since NIST has tweaked algorithms in the past after the close of
competition, they probably can't assign OIDs yet. Also, at one remove, the
'prize' in this competition might be fairly considered to be the assignment
of an OID in the NIST arc.

One peculiarity of such competitions is that after they start, the bulk of
the contestants attention is naturally focused on all the submissions
except their own. Once they have placed their bet, there is little they can
do to improve it. So the way to win is to attempt to knock down rival
claims.

So maybe asking entrants to specify a pro-tem OID and show them how to
register an arc (if they haven't already) would be sufficient.

That way, we still end up dealing with two OIDs in the end but two is a lot
better than a half dozen.



On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 11:37 AM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send th=
e
> request for OIDs to NIST.
>
>
>
> It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding
> OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive th=
e
> charter correction.
>
>
>
> In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection
> (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms
> *not* selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably
> will) choose different algorithms.
>
>
>
> In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign
> them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.
>
>
>
> I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
>
>
> On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com=
>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> When do we want them - NOW!
>
>
>
>
>
> I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for
> PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for t=
he
> same algorithm by the time we need to use them.
>
>
>
> Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with th=
e
> Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing tha=
t
> one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IET=
F
> or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>
>
>
> This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because
> it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the
> principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performanc=
e
> and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the
> proposals, I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the
> code.
>
>
>
>
>
> That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred
> identifiers as part of their submissions.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
> assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.
>
> It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
> in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.
>
> It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
> happened with x25519.
>
> Jeff
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>

--000000000000078cbd05c570cf19
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Sin=
ce NIST has tweaked algorithms in the past after the close of competition, =
they probably can&#39;t assign OIDs yet. Also, at one remove, the &#39;priz=
e&#39; in this competition might be fairly considered to be the assignment =
of an OID in the NIST arc.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-=
size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small=
">One peculiarity of such competitions is that after they start, the bulk o=
f the contestants attention is naturally focused on all the submissions exc=
ept their own. Once they have placed their bet, there is little they can do=
 to improve it. So the way to win is to attempt to knock down rival claims.=
</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">So maybe asking entrants=
 to specify a pro-tem OID and show them how to register an arc (if they hav=
en&#39;t already) would be sufficient.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" st=
yle=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-size:small">That way, we still end up dealing=C2=A0with two OIDs in the e=
nd but two is a lot better than a half dozen.</div><div class=3D"gmail_defa=
ult" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=
=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-s=
ize:small"></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 11:37 AM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - =
MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-U=
S" style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div class=3D"gmail-m_-611958046916=
5799442WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">Our=
 charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.=C2=A0 Please send th=
e request for OIDs to NIST.<u></u><u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" st=
yle=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">It was my understanding t=
hat the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding OID assignment? If so, it =
should be easy enough to request and receive the charter correction.</span>=
<span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">In any c=
ase, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., Rou=
nd 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms <u>not</u> =
selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) cho=
ose different algorithms. <u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></sp=
an></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112=
,192)">In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to as=
sign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.<u><=
/u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;c=
olor:rgb(0,112,192)"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">I=E2=80=99m calling for=
 consensus.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Thanks!<=
u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mar=
gin-left:0.5in"><br><br><u></u><u></u></p><blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5=
pt;margin-bottom:5pt"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5i=
n">On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:phill@hallambaker.com" target=3D"_blank">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wro=
te:<u></u><u></u></p></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5i=
n"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">When do we want them =
- NOW!<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"m=
argin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">I=
 second Jeffrey&#39;s request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined fo=
r PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for t=
he same algorithm by the time we need to use them.<u></u><u></u></span></p>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">Of the=
 current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the Thresh=
old techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that one ir=
regardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or the=
 group itself specify an OID etc.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"=
><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"=
margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">This particular contest i=
s not the same as previous=C2=A0NIST contests because it may be a decade be=
fore these algorithms are being widely used, the principles behind the algo=
rithms are very new, there are major performance and functional differences=
, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals, I would probably=
 implement two or more just to stress test the code.<u></u><u></u></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u=
>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-=
left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">That said, maybe we should ask t=
he groups to specify their preferred identifiers as part of their submissio=
ns.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"marg=
in-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></=
p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div></div><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><div><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10=
:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" target=3D"_=
blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote=
 style=3D"border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:=
1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin=
-right:0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">OIDs are alr=
eady showing up in the wild. Botan has some private<br>assignments at <a hr=
ef=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br><br>It =
is reminiscent of Bernstein&#39;s x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs<br>i=
n the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.<br><br>It would p=
robably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br>happened with x25=
519.<br><br>Jeff<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>=
Spasm mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">S=
pasm@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm=
" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><u></u><=
u></u></p></blockquote></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0.5in">_______________________________________________<br>Spasm mailing=
 list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.org=
</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" target=3D"_=
blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><u></u><u></u></p></d=
iv></blockquote></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><u=
></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>
Spasm mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

--000000000000078cbd05c570cf19--


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 11:59:04 -0400
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Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
To: Uri Blumenthal <uri@ll.mit.edu>
References: <B8006164-51AD-4B3B-9CE7-83B0574294F8@ll.mit.edu> <SY4PR01MB62511B1911DD23ADF0169307EE0E9@SY4PR01MB6251.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com> <F1A6EE33-5CEE-4DA2-88D3-A87133F897CF@ll.mit.edu> <YMtd336pK+0Efves@LK-Perkele-VII2.locald> <F14BD4A5-2556-4353-AFF9-7E54E55C0912@ll.mit.edu> <YMts73u4XH6uv/4M@LK-Perkele-VII2.locald> <CAPwdP4Nmvd1=TDSBbPtBj+5W02ysqSkSE4mQXawE-UnERmm6_Q@mail.gmail.com> <CAH8yC8=9c=j8VKKc9rcqXPJ2ZpF89mkeLeTboKXdYwaUuqiNwA@mail.gmail.com> <CAMm+LwjXV98Eiu_AS7FBZMkFeGKdhMrSzm0sSbU_mYcFc9it8A@mail.gmail.com> <1A7308DC-1ED3-4B8C-9DBB-948B4DF2483D@vigilsec.com> <2F9DB224-83D5-4039-AC96-E5871696D851@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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NIST has assigned many OIDs:  =
https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/computer-security-objects-register/algorith=
m-registration

When NIST approves the use of algorithms that were made standards by =
others, then NIST will use the OIDs that ware already assigned.  The =
stateful hash-based signatures is one example.

I do not think that the LAMPS WG should get ahead of NIST.  However, we =
can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figuring out the =
information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.

Russ

> On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL =
<uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>=20
> Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send =
the request for OIDs to NIST.
>=20
> It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF =
regarding OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and =
receive the charter correction.
>=20
> In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to =
pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign =
OIDs to algorithms not selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries =
may (and probably will) choose different algorithms.
>=20
> In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to =
assign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as =
any.
>=20
> I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.
>=20
> Thanks!
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker =
<phill@hallambaker.com <mailto:phill@hallambaker.com>> wrote:
>>=20
>> When do we want them - NOW!
>>=20
>>=20
>> I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined =
for PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs =
for the same algorithm by the time we need to use them.
>>=20
>> Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible =
with the Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be =
implementing that one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would =
prefer that either IETF or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>>=20
>> This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests =
because it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely =
used, the principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major =
performance and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more =
than one of the proposals, I would probably implement two or more just =
to stress test the code.
>>=20
>>=20
>> That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred =
identifiers as part of their submissions.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com =
<mailto:noloader@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
>>> assignments at =
https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html =
<https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html>.
>>>=20
>>> It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple =
OIDs
>>> in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.
>>>=20
>>> It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
>>> happened with x25519.
>>>=20
>>> Jeff
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Spasm mailing list
>>> Spasm@ietf.org <mailto:Spasm@ietf.org>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Spasm mailing list
>> Spasm@ietf.org <mailto:Spasm@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm>
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org <mailto:Spasm@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm =
<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm>

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">NIST =
has assigned many OIDs: &nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/computer-security-objects-register/=
algorithm-registration" =
class=3D"">https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/computer-security-objects-regist=
er/algorithm-registration</a><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">When NIST approves the use of algorithms that were made =
standards by others, then NIST will use the OIDs that ware already =
assigned. &nbsp;The stateful hash-based signatures is one =
example.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I do =
not think that the LAMPS WG should get ahead of NIST. &nbsp;However, we =
can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figuring out the =
information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Russ<br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" class=3D"">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"WordSection1" style=3D"page: WordSection1; caret-color: rgb(0, =
0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: =
normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
text-decoration: none;"><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">Our =
charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs. &nbsp;Please send =
the request for OIDs to NIST.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
12pt; color: rgb(0, 112, 192);" class=3D"">It was my understanding that =
the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding OID assignment? If so, it =
should be easy enough to request and receive the charter =
correction.</span><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 112, 192);" class=3D"">In any =
case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., =
Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D"">not</u><span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>selected at the end of =
Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choose different =
algorithms.<span class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 112, 192);" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 112, 192);" class=3D"">In short, =
it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign them is =
IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in; font-size: =
11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 112, 192);" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 112, 192);" class=3D"">I=E2=80=99m=
 calling for consensus.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, =
112, 192);" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, =
sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, =
112, 192);" class=3D"">Thanks!<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div><blockquote style=3D"margin-top: 5pt; =
margin-bottom: 5pt;" class=3D"" type=3D"cite"><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip =
Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com" style=3D"color: =
blue; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></div></div><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" class=3D"">When do we want them - NOW!<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
12pt;" class=3D"">I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and =
JOSE tags defined for PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a =
dozen different OIDs for the same algorithm by the time we need to use =
them.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
12pt;" class=3D"">Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be =
compatible with the Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I =
will be implementing that one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I =
would prefer that either IETF or the group itself specify an OID =
etc.<o:p class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
12pt;" class=3D"">This particular contest is not the same as =
previous&nbsp;NIST contests because it may be a decade before these =
algorithms are being widely used, the principles behind the algorithms =
are very new, there are major performance and functional differences, =
etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals, I would =
probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; =
font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: =
12pt;" class=3D"">That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify =
their preferred identifiers as part of their submissions.<o:p =
class=3D""></o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: =
0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" class=3D""><o:p =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-size: 12pt;" =
class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></span></div></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: =
Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D""><o:p class=3D"">&nbsp;</o:p></div><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin: 0in 0in 0in 0.5in; =
font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=3D"">On Wed, =
Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" style=3D"color: blue; =
text-decoration: underline;" class=3D"">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p class=3D""></o:p></div></div><blockquote style=3D"border-style:=
 none none none solid; border-left-width: 1pt; border-left-color: =
rgb(204, 204, 204); padding: 0in 0in 0in 6pt; margin-left: 4.8pt; =
margin-right: 0in;" class=3D"" type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"margin: 0in =
0in 0in 0.5in; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" =
class=3D"">OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some =
private<br class=3D"">assignments at<span =
class=3D"Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><a =
href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html" =
target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: blue; text-decoration: underline;" =
class=3D"">https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. =
There are multiple OIDs<br class=3D"">in the wild that a program must =
recognize to interoperate.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">It would =
probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br =
class=3D"">happened with x25519.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Jeff<br =
class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">Spasm mailing list<br class=3D""><a =
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Phillip,
> Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the
> Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that
> one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF
> or the group itself specify an OID etc.

Looks like interesting statement. Can you explain why only SIKE is good
for Theshold techniques?

Br,
Kris


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    <pre class="wordwrap"><span id="msg-from" class="pipe">Phillip,
</span>
&gt; Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the
&gt; Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that
&gt; one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF
&gt; or the group itself specify an OID etc.

Looks like interesting statement. Can you explain why only SIKE is good
for Theshold techniques?

Br,
Kris
</pre>
  </body>
</html>

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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NIST has assigned many OIDs:  https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/computer-secur=
ity-objects-register/algorithm-registration

When NIST approves the use of algorithms that were made standards by others=
, then NIST will use the OIDs that ware already assigned.  The stateful hash=
-based signatures is one example.

=20

Understood, thanks.

=20

I do not think that the LAMPS WG should get ahead of NIST. =20

=20

As I said, one problem I see with the above is that NIST would only assign =
OIDs to the algorithms it selects in the end of PQC. By that time, other app=
lications may already use some of the finalists. Also, applications already =
started experimenting (e.g., see Open Quantum Safe project, and their fork o=
f OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Creal=E2=80=9D OIDs to use would alleviate the need fo=
r kludges they currently have to employ.

=20

This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in general, and LAMPS in partic=
ular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC Round 3 finalists.=20

=20

Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign a=
 brand new one from their MIB space.

=20

However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figuring =
out the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.

=20

Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OIDs here or=
 not. =C2=A0

=20

Thanks!



On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.ed=
u> wrote:

=20

Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send the =
request for OIDs to NIST.

=20

It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding O=
ID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the ch=
arter correction.

=20

In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e=
.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms not =
selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choo=
se different algorithms.=20

=20

In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign th=
em is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.

=20

I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.

=20

Thanks!

=20




On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> =
wrote:

=20

When do we want them - NOW!

=20

=20

I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for P=
QC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the s=
ame algorithm by the time we need to use them.

=20

Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the =
Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that o=
ne irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or=
 the group itself specify an OID etc.

=20

This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because i=
t may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the princip=
les behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance and func=
tional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals,=
 I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.

=20

=20

That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred identi=
fiers as part of their submissions.

=20

=20

=20

On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.

It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.

It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
happened with x25519.

Jeff

_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
Spasm@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm

_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
Spasm@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm

=20

_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
Spasm@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm

=20


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break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'>NIST has assigned many OIDs: &nbsp;<a href=3D"https://csrc.nist.gov/projec=
ts/computer-security-objects-register/algorithm-registration">https://csrc.n=
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a><o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>When NIST =
approves the use of algorithms that were made standards by others, then NIST=
 will use the OIDs that ware already assigned. &nbsp;The stateful hash-based=
 signatures is one example.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Understood, thanks.<o:p></o:p></span></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>I do not think that the =
LAMPS WG should get ahead of NIST. &nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>As I said, one problem I see w=
ith the above is that NIST would only assign OIDs to the algorithms it selec=
ts in the end of PQC. By that time, other applications may already use some =
of the finalists. Also, applications already started experimenting (e.g., se=
e Open Quantum Safe project, and their fork of OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Cre=
al=E2=80=9D OIDs to use would alleviate the need for kludges they currently have t=
o employ.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.=
0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>This is why I think it makes sense for IE=
TF in general, and LAMPS in particular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST P=
QC Round 3 finalists. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'=
font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe o=
ne=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign a brand new one from their MIB=
 space.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0p=
t'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>H=
owever, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figuring ou=
t the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.<o:p></o:=
p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></s=
pan></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Yes,=
 let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OIDs here or not.=
 =C2=A0<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;co=
lor:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Thanks!<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><blockquote=
 style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D=
'margin-left:.5in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MI=
TLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></=
o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p><=
/p><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:=
.5in'>Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs. &nbsp;Please=
 send the request for OIDs to NIST.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div style=3D'mar=
gin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font=
-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>It was my understanding that the NIST usually fo=
llows IANA/IETF regarding OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to=
 request and receive the charter correction.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>=
&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left=
:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In any case, the NIST is=
 highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates.=
 Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms<span class=3Dapple-converted-sp=
ace>&nbsp;</span><u>not</u><span class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span>se=
lected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choose=
 different algorithms.<span class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span></span>=
<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><di=
v><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;=
color:#0070C0'>In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entit=
y to assign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as an=
y.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5i=
n'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p>=
</div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.</span><o:p></o:p></p></=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:=
12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Th=
anks!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><d=
iv style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><br>=
<br><br><o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bott=
om:5.0pt'><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margi=
n-left:.5in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:=
p></p></div></div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'ma=
rgin-left:.5in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div><div><div style=3D'm=
argin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:12.0pt'>When do we want them - NOW!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div=
><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><=
div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in=
'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><di=
v><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>=
<span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OI=
Ds and JOSE tags defined for PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a =
dozen different OIDs for the same algorithm by the time we need to use them.=
</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</=
span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3D=
MsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Of the cur=
rent finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the Threshold t=
echniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that one irregard=
less of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or the group =
itself specify an OID etc.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D=
'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'=
font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'm=
argin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:12.0pt'>This particular contest is not the same as previous&nbsp;NIS=
T contests because it may be a decade before these algorithms are being wide=
ly used, the principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major =
performance and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than o=
ne of the proposals, I would probably implement two or more just to stress t=
est the code.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:=
.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.=
0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0p=
t'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in=
'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'=
>That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred identi=
fiers as part of their submissions.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><d=
iv style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div=
 style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><div =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>&nbsp;<=
o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:=
p></o:p></p></div></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CC=
CCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;marg=
in-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Bot=
an has some private<br>assignments at<span class=3Dapple-converted-space>&nbsp=
;</span><a href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html" tar=
get=3D"_blank">https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br>=
<br>It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs<br=
>in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.<br><br>It would =
probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br>happened with x25=
519.<br><br>Jeff<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>S=
pasm mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@i=
etf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" target=3D=
"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><o:p></o:p></p></div=
></blockquote></div></div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'margin-left:.5in'>_______________________________________________<br>S=
pasm mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br><=
a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm">https://www.ietf.org/ma=
ilman/listinfo/spasm</a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote></div><div s=
tyle=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>&nbsp;<o=
:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:Helvetica'>_______________________________=
________________<br>Spasm mailing list<br></span><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.=
org"><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:Helvetica'>Spasm@ietf.org</spa=
n></a><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:Helvetica'><br></span><a href=
=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm"><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;=
font-family:Helvetica'>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</span></a=
><o:p></o:p></p></div></blockquote></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-le=
ft:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></body></html>

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 15:26:13 -0400
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To: Kris Kwiatkowski <kris@amongbytes.com>
Cc: SPASM <spasm@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 2:43 PM Kris Kwiatkowski <kris@amongbytes.com>
wrote:

> Phillip,
> > Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the
> > Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that
> > one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF
> > or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>
> Looks like interesting statement. Can you explain why only SIKE is good
> for Theshold techniques?
>
>
I did not say that SIKE was the only proposal that is good for threshold.
What I said is that it is the only one that is the only one that is
compatible with the techniques I am using in the Mesh.

Being a bear of very little brain, I cannot see how to extend the lattice
and code stuff to support the threshold techniques I use. But SIKE is a
Diffie Hellman scheme and and so are the schemes I use in the Mesh. So
unless torsion points behave in very different ways, I should be able to
beat SIKE into a form I can use.

Now given that I have only been looking at this for a few days and this is
new math for me, in SIKE, Alice's private key is phiA and her public key is
the corresponding torsion basis (Pa, Qa, Ra).

All I need to get threshold key distribution to work is to find operators @
and # such that

if phiA = phiX @ phiY then  (Pa, Qa, Ra) =  (PX, QX, RX) #  (PY, QY, RY)

I don't know what they are at this point, my first approach to working out
what they might be was to send a note to the authors. Failing that, I will
start looking at their code.

--000000000000cbd93e05c573e120
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"fon=
t-size:small">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 2:43 PM Kris Kwiatkowski &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:kris@amongbytes.com">kris@amongbytes.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div=
></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <pre><span id=3D"gmail-m_6023271870586697917msg-from">Phillip,
</span>
&gt; Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with=
 the
&gt; Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing =
that
&gt; one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either =
IETF
&gt; or the group itself specify an OID etc.

Looks like interesting statement. Can you explain why only SIKE is good
for Theshold techniques?</pre></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">I did not say that SIKE was th=
e only proposal that is good for threshold. What I said is that it is the o=
nly one that is the only one that is compatible with the techniques I am us=
ing in the Mesh.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small=
"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Being a =
bear of very little brain, I cannot see how to extend the lattice and code =
stuff to support the threshold techniques I use. But SIKE is a Diffie Hellm=
an scheme and and so are the schemes I use in the Mesh. So unless torsion p=
oints behave in very different ways, I should be able to beat SIKE into a f=
orm I can use.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">=
<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">Now given =
that I have only been looking at this for a few days and this is new math f=
or me, in SIKE, Alice&#39;s private key is phiA and her public key is the c=
orresponding torsion basis (Pa, Qa, Ra).</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" =
style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"f=
ont-size:small">All I need to get threshold key distribution to work is to =
find operators @ and # such that</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D=
"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size=
:small">if phiA =3D phiX=C2=A0@ phiY then=C2=A0

(Pa, Qa, Ra) =3D=C2=A0

(PX, QX, RX) #=C2=A0

(PY, QY, RY)

</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small">I don&#39;t know what th=
ey are at this point, my first approach to working out what they might be w=
as to send a note to the authors. Failing that, I will start looking at the=
ir code.</div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></=
div><div class=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div c=
lass=3D"gmail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"><br></div><div class=3D"gm=
ail_default" style=3D"font-size:small"></div></div></div>

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From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 21:10:06 +0100
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>,  "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 8:24 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> As I said, one problem I see with the above is that NIST would only assig=
n
> OIDs to the algorithms it selects in the end of PQC. By that time, other
> applications may already use some of the finalists. Also, applications
> already started experimenting (e.g., see Open Quantum Safe project, and
> their fork of OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Creal=E2=80=9D OIDs t=
o use would alleviate the
> need for kludges they currently have to employ.
>
>
>
> This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in general, and LAMPS in
> particular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC Round 3 finalists.
>

Hi,

Yes, But what would that OID specify exactly? Perhaps this LAMPS would like
to do things like:

1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to create *detached signatures*
(not message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary
formatting, as used in the NIST competition).
2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (also
not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this breaks
their security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs
are harder to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )

So after such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/padding
method rather than the plain "algorithm".. after all we don't use OIDs that
refer to plain "RSA" covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding methods
either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate PQC
into X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purpose,
such as public-key encryption, requires specification for the formatting of
the KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific
formatting + algorithm combination after it is defined.

I don't see the existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without
versioning as not as a prerequisite for standards definition work but as a
plainly harmful as it leaves many things up for interpretation, even if the
internal parameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security
parameters).

By the way, this is not something that stops me from writing
Internet-Drafts, which I'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for
ambiguous algorithm names. If someone wants an OID for, say,
Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign it within a day from our PEN
(IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. it's
just a matter of asking for a permission from the design team. Note that
the OID would be for that specific version since I know that Falcon will be
changed soon. Dilithium has already been updated during Round3 -- v3.1 had
substantial functional changes in February (a couple of internal parameters
and a few other things). Hence the current version (
https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3-20210=
208.pdf
) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last October.

So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from the
design teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet Drafts at
this stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms are
used in IETF protocols as an useful step.

Cheers,
- markku

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.


>
>
> Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF O=
ID or assign a
> brand new one from their MIB space.
>
>
>
> However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figurin=
g
> out the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.
>
>
>
> Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OIDs=
 here or
> not.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
> On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
> uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>
>
>
> Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send th=
e
> request for OIDs to NIST.
>
>
>
> It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding
> OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive th=
e
> charter correction.
>
>
>
> In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection
> (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms
> *not* selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably
> will) choose different algorithms.
>
>
>
> In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign
> them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.
>
>
>
> I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com=
>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> When do we want them - NOW!
>
>
>
>
>
> I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for
> PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for t=
he
> same algorithm by the time we need to use them.
>
>
>
> Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with th=
e
> Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing tha=
t
> one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IET=
F
> or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>
>
>
> This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because
> it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the
> principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performanc=
e
> and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the
> proposals, I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the
> code.
>
>
>
>
>
> That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred
> identifiers as part of their submissions.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
> assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.
>
> It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
> in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.
>
> It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
> happened with x25519.
>
> Jeff
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>
>
>

--000000000000d506a905c5747e45
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 8:24 PM Blumentha=
l, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu">uri@ll.mit.edu<=
/a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,2=
04,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;" lang=3D=
"EN-US"><div class=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496WordSection1"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt"></span><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-=
size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">As I said, one problem I see with the above=
 is that NIST would only assign OIDs to the algorithms it selects in the en=
d of PQC. By that time, other applications may already use some of the fina=
lists. Also, applications already started experimenting (e.g., see Open Qua=
ntum Safe project, and their fork of OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=
=9Creal=E2=80=9D OIDs to use would alleviate the need for kludges they curr=
ently have to employ.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)=
">This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in general, and LAMPS in part=
icular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC Round 3 finalists. </span></=
p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><div dir=3D"auto"><div=
 dir=3D"auto">Hi,</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div>Yes, But what would=
 that OID specify exactly? Perhaps this LAMPS would like to do things like:=
</div><div> <br></div><div>1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to crea=
te <u>detached signatures</u> (not message+signature combinations with a fi=
xed hash and arbitrary formatting, as used in the NIST competition).<br></d=
iv><div>2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with the=
m (also not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this=
 breaks their security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the interna=
l XOFs are harder to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an R=
FC. )<br></div></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">So after=
 such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/padding method ra=
ther than the plain &quot;algorithm&quot;.. after all we don&#39;t use OIDs=
 that refer to plain &quot;RSA&quot; covering all of its use cases and PKCS=
 padding methods either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to=
 integrate PQC into X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some sp=
ecific purpose, such as public-key encryption, requires specification for t=
he formatting of the KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to t=
hat specific formatting + algorithm combination after it is defined.<br><di=
v dir=3D"auto"><br></div></div><div>I don&#39;t see the existence of OID nu=
mbers for plain algorithms without versioning as not as a prerequisite for =
standards definition work but as a plainly harmful as it leaves many things=
 up for interpretation, even if the internal parameters are fixed (and PQC =
algorithms have a lot of security parameters). <br></div><div><br></div><di=
v dir=3D"auto"><div>By the way, this is not something that stops me from wr=
iting Internet-Drafts, which I&#39;d see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs=
 for ambiguous algorithm names. If someone wants an OID for, say, Falcon-10=
24-Round3.0, I could probably assign it within a day from our PEN (IANA has=
 assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. it&#39;s just a =
matter of asking for a permission from the design team. Note that the OID w=
ould be for that specific version since I know that Falcon will be changed =
soon. Dilithium has already been updated during Round3 -- v3.1 had substant=
ial functional changes in February (a couple of internal parameters and a f=
ew other things). Hence the current version ( <a href=3D"https://pq-crystal=
s.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3-20210208.pdf">https://p=
q-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3-20210208.pdf</=
a> ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last October. <br>=
</div><div><br></div><div>So, I&#39;d suggest defining a temporary OID your=
self or get an OID from the design teams if you want to use them in applica=
tions or Internet Drafts at this stage. But I see the concrete definition o=
f how PQC algorithms are used in IETF protocols as an useful step.<br></div=
><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>- markku</div><div><br></div><div><d=
iv><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr">Dr. Markku-J=
uhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" target=3D"_blank=
">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div></div></div></div></d=
iv></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"=
><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;" lang=3D"EN-US"><div class=3D"gma=
il-m_-3365790423456179496WordSection1"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"><u></u=
>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12=
pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let=
 them re-use the IETF OID or assign a brand new one from their MIB space.<u=
></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-lef=
t:0.5in">However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as =
figuring out the information, if any, that needs to be included in paramete=
rs.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=
<u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whe=
ther we decide to assign OIDs here or not. =C2=A0<u></u><u></u></span></p><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"><=
u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-si=
ze:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Thanks!<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><br><br><u></u><u></u=
></p><blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5pt;margin-bottom:5pt"><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Bl=
umenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" target=
=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><div><di=
v style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0=
.5in">Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.=C2=A0 Pleas=
e send the request for OIDs to NIST.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><div style=
=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=
=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">It was my un=
derstanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding OID assignmen=
t? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the charter corre=
ction.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"m=
argin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">In any case, the NIST is highly=
 unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor i=
s it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms<span class=3D"gmail-m_-33657904234=
56179496apple-converted-space">=C2=A0</span><u>not</u><span class=3D"gmail-=
m_-3365790423456179496apple-converted-space">=C2=A0</span>selected at the e=
nd of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choose different alg=
orithms.<span class=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496apple-converted-space">=
=C2=A0</span></span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" sty=
le=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)=
">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D=
"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">In =
short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign them =
is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.</span><u></u>=
<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></=
u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">I=E2=80=99m calling for consen=
sus.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mar=
gin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">=C2=A0<=
/span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Thanks!</spa=
n><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div=
><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"marg=
in-left:0.5in"><br><br><br><u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style=3D"mar=
gin-top:5pt;margin-bottom:5pt"><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, =
Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com" target=3D=
"_blank">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div></div>=
<div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-lef=
t:0.5in">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><div><div><div><div style=3D"ma=
rgin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:12pt">When do we want them - NOW!</span><u></u><u></u></p=
></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" s=
tyle=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u><=
/u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=
=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5i=
n"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:12pt">I second Jeffrey&#39;s request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags=
 defined for PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different=
 OIDs for the same algorithm by the time we need to use them.</span><u></u>=
<u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"Ms=
oNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0<=
/span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><=
p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:=
12pt">Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible wit=
h the Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing=
 that one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either=
 IETF or the group itself specify an OID etc.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div=
></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><=
u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">This par=
ticular contest is not the same as previous=C2=A0NIST contests because it m=
ay be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the principle=
s behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance and funct=
ional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals,=
 I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.</span=
><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"=
>=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:=
0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D=
"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:12pt">That said, maybe we should ask the groups to spe=
cify their preferred identifiers as part of their submissions.</span><u></u=
><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"M=
soNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0=
</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size=
:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div></div><div style=3D"margi=
n-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=C2=A0<u><=
/u><u></u></p></div><div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jef=
frey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">nol=
oader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><blockquote sty=
le=3D"border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentcolor rgb(204,204,204);=
border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium medium medium 1pt;pad=
ding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin:5pt 0in 5pt 4.8pt"><div style=3D"margin-left:0.=
5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">OIDs are already sh=
owing up in the wild. Botan has some private<br>assignments at<span class=
=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496apple-converted-space">=C2=A0</span><a href=
=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br><br>It is=
 reminiscent of Bernstein&#39;s x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs<br>in =
the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.<br><br>It would pro=
bably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br>happened with x2551=
9.<br><br>Jeff<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>Sp=
asm mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spa=
sm@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><u></u><u>=
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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To: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>, Uri Blumenthal <uri@ll.mit.edu>
References: <B8006164-51AD-4B3B-9CE7-83B0574294F8@ll.mit.edu> <SY4PR01MB62511B1911DD23ADF0169307EE0E9@SY4PR01MB6251.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com> <F1A6EE33-5CEE-4DA2-88D3-A87133F897CF@ll.mit.edu> <YMtd336pK+0Efves@LK-Perkele-VII2.locald> <F14BD4A5-2556-4353-AFF9-7E54E55C0912@ll.mit.edu> <YMts73u4XH6uv/4M@LK-Perkele-VII2.locald> <CAPwdP4Nmvd1=TDSBbPtBj+5W02ysqSkSE4mQXawE-UnERmm6_Q@mail.gmail.com> <CAH8yC8=9c=j8VKKc9rcqXPJ2ZpF89mkeLeTboKXdYwaUuqiNwA@mail.gmail.com> <CAMm+LwjXV98Eiu_AS7FBZMkFeGKdhMrSzm0sSbU_mYcFc9it8A@mail.gmail.com> <1A7308DC-1ED3-4B8C-9DBB-948B4DF2483D@vigilsec.com> <2F9DB224-83D5-4039-AC96-E5871696D851@ll.mit.edu> <9301ADDA-AC3F-47AC-805E-DEB1B70E95D5@vigilsec.com> <58901B59-2D0E-4FD9-8E96-F1409DF403AB@ll.mit.edu> <CAPwdP4MkCDpEu08Nec396b1AOoGvanVEVuP67kGy1rFfq45g6Q@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Markku and Uri:

I think that LAMPS can do item 1 and item 2 below under the current =
charter.  However, I thing there would be TBD in the OIDs that could be =
filled when the competition is finished.  The charter says that the =
algorithms need to be vetted by NIST or the CFRG.

Russ


> On Jun 23, 2021, at 4:10 PM, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen =
<mjos@pqshield.com> wrote:
>=20
> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 8:24 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL =
<uri@ll.mit.edu <mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu>> wrote:
> As I said, one problem I see with the above is that NIST would only =
assign OIDs to the algorithms it selects in the end of PQC. By that =
time, other applications may already use some of the finalists. Also, =
applications already started experimenting (e.g., see Open Quantum Safe =
project, and their fork of OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Creal=E2=80=
=9D OIDs to use would alleviate the need for kludges they currently have =
to employ.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in general, and LAMPS in =
particular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC Round 3 finalists.
>=20
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> Yes, But what would that OID specify exactly? Perhaps this LAMPS would =
like to do things like:
>=20
> 1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to create detached signatures =
(not message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary =
formatting, as used in the NIST competition).
> 2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them =
(also not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing =
this breaks their security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the =
internal XOFs are harder to change/specify, but this needs to be =
discussed in an RFC. )
>=20
> So after such definitions, the OID could refer to that =
formatting/padding method rather than the plain "algorithm".. after all =
we don't use OIDs that refer to plain "RSA" covering all of its use =
cases and PKCS padding methods either. At least the above two steps =
would be necessary to integrate PQC into X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, =
to use KEMs for some specific purpose, such as public-key encryption, =
requires specification for the formatting of the KEM-DEM/AEAD =
combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific formatting + =
algorithm combination after it is defined.
>=20
> I don't see the existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without =
versioning as not as a prerequisite for standards definition work but as =
a plainly harmful as it leaves many things up for interpretation, even =
if the internal parameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of =
security parameters).=20
>=20
> By the way, this is not something that stops me from writing =
Internet-Drafts, which I'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for =
ambiguous algorithm names. If someone wants an OID for, say, =
Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign it within a day from our =
PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. =
it's just a matter of asking for a permission from the design team. Note =
that the OID would be for that specific version since I know that Falcon =
will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been updated during Round3 =
-- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February (a couple of =
internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current version ( =
https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3-2021=
0208.pdf =
<https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3-202=
10208.pdf> ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last =
October.=20
>=20
> So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from =
the design teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet =
Drafts at this stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC =
algorithms are used in IETF protocols as an useful step.
>=20
> Cheers,
> - markku
>=20
> Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com =
<mailto:mjos@pqshield.com>> PQShield, Oxford UK.
> =20
> =20
>=20
> Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the =
IETF OID or assign a brand new one from their MIB space.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as =
figuring out the information, if any, that needs to be included in =
parameters.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign =
OIDs here or not. =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Thanks!
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL =
<uri@ll.mit.edu <mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu>> wrote:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send =
the request for OIDs to NIST.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF =
regarding OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and =
receive the charter correction.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to =
pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign =
OIDs to algorithms not selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries =
may (and probably will) choose different algorithms.=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to =
assign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as =
any.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Thanks!
>=20
> =20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker =
<phill@hallambaker.com <mailto:phill@hallambaker.com>> wrote:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> When do we want them - NOW!
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined =
for PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs =
for the same algorithm by the time we need to use them.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with =
the Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be =
implementing that one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would =
prefer that either IETF or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests =
because it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely =
used, the principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major =
performance and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more =
than one of the proposals, I would probably implement two or more just =
to stress test the code.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred =
identifiers as part of their submissions.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com =
<mailto:noloader@gmail.com>> wrote:
>=20
> OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
> assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html =
<https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html>.
>=20
> It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
> in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.
>=20
> It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
> happened with x25519.
>=20
> Jeff
>=20
> _______________________________________________
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>=20
> _______________________________________________
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D"">Markku and Uri:<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">I think that LAMPS can do item 1 and item 2 below under the =
current charter. &nbsp;However, I thing there would be TBD in the OIDs =
that could be filled when the competition is finished. &nbsp;The charter =
says that the algorithms need to be vetted by NIST or the CFRG.<div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Russ</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">On Jun 23, 2021, at 4:10 PM, Markku-Juhani O. =
Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" =
class=3D"">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 8:24 PM =
Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" =
class=3D"">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: =
break-word;" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496WordSection1"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt" class=3D""></span><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" =
class=3D"">As I said, one problem I see with the above is that NIST =
would only assign OIDs to the algorithms it selects in the end of PQC. =
By that time, other applications may already use some of the finalists. =
Also, applications already started experimenting (e.g., see Open Quantum =
Safe project, and their fork of OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Crea=
l=E2=80=9D OIDs to use would alleviate the need for kludges they =
currently have to employ.<u class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></span></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" =
class=3D""><u class=3D""></u>&nbsp;<u class=3D""></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" =
class=3D"">This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in general, and =
LAMPS in particular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC Round 3 =
finalists. </span></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">Hi,</div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Yes, But what would that OID specify =
exactly? Perhaps this LAMPS would like to do things like:</div><div =
class=3D""> <br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">1. Specify how to use =
the PQC algorithms to create <u class=3D"">detached signatures</u> (not =
message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary =
formatting, as used in the NIST competition).<br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 =
with them (also not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of =
doing this breaks their security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know =
that the internal XOFs are harder to change/specify, but this needs to =
be discussed in an RFC. )<br class=3D""></div></div><div dir=3D"auto" =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">So after =
such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/padding method =
rather than the plain "algorithm".. after all we don't use OIDs that =
refer to plain "RSA" covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding =
methods either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to =
integrate PQC into X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some =
specific purpose, such as public-key encryption, requires specification =
for the formatting of the KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an =
OID to that specific formatting + algorithm combination after it is =
defined.<br class=3D""><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div><div class=3D"">I don't see the existence of OID =
numbers for plain algorithms without versioning as not as a prerequisite =
for standards definition work but as a plainly harmful as it leaves many =
things up for interpretation, even if the internal parameters are fixed =
(and PQC algorithms have a lot of security parameters). <br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div dir=3D"auto" =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">By the way, this is not something that stops =
me from writing Internet-Drafts, which I'd see as an useful activity, =
unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorithm names. If someone wants an OID for, =
say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign it within a day from =
our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) =
.. it's just a matter of asking for a permission from the design team. =
Note that the OID would be for that specific version since I know that =
Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been updated during =
Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February (a couple =
of internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current =
version ( <a =
href=3D"https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-rou=
nd3-20210208.pdf" =
class=3D"">https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-=
round3-20210208.pdf</a> ) is not compatible with the one submitted to =
Round 3 last October. <br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">So, I'd suggest defining a temporary =
OID yourself or get an OID from the design teams if you want to use them =
in applications or Internet Drafts at this stage. But I see the concrete =
definition of how PQC algorithms are used in IETF protocols as an useful =
step.<br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">Cheers,</div><div class=3D"">- markku</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Dr. Markku-Juhani =
O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford =
UK.</div></div></div></div></div></div><div =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: =
break-word;" lang=3D"EN-US" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496WordSection1"><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" =
class=3D""><u class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" =
class=3D""><u class=3D""></u>&nbsp;<u class=3D""></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" =
class=3D"">Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them =
re-use the IETF OID or assign a brand new one from their MIB space.<u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt" class=3D""><u class=3D""></u>&nbsp;<u =
class=3D""></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">However, we can do a lot of work prior to =
OID assignment, such as figuring out the information, if any, that needs =
to be included in parameters.<u class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" class=3D""><u =
class=3D""></u>&nbsp;<u class=3D""></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" =
class=3D"">Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to =
assign OIDs here or not. &nbsp;<u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D""><u =
class=3D""></u>&nbsp;<u class=3D""></u></span></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" =
class=3D"">Thanks!<u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></span></p></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><u class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p><blockquote =
style=3D"margin-top:5pt;margin-bottom:5pt" class=3D""><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Jun 23, 2021, at =
11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><u class=3D""></u>&nbsp;<u =
class=3D""></u></p><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" =
class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">Our =
charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.&nbsp; Please send =
the request for OIDs to NIST.<u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" =
class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">&nbsp;<u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D"">It was my =
understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding OID =
assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the =
charter correction.</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div><div=
 class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D"">In any case, =
the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., Round =
3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms<span =
class=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><=
u class=3D"">not</u><span =
class=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>s=
elected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) =
choose different algorithms.<span =
class=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><=
/span><u class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D"">In short, it =
appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign them is =
IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.</span><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D"">I=E2=80=99m =
calling for consensus.</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)" class=3D"">Thanks!</span><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">&nbsp;<u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" =
class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D""><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D"margin-top:5pt;margin-bottom:5pt" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div=
 style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip =
Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">&nbsp;<u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt" class=3D"">When do we want them - NOW!</span><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" class=3D"">I =
second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for =
PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for =
the same algorithm by the time we need to use them.</span><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" class=3D"">Of =
the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the =
Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing =
that one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that =
either IETF or the group itself specify an OID etc.</span><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" class=3D"">This=
 particular contest is not the same as previous&nbsp;NIST contests =
because it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely =
used, the principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major =
performance and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more =
than one of the proposals, I would probably implement two or more just =
to stress test the code.</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" class=3D"">That=
 said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred =
identifiers as part of their submissions.</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;</span><u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div></div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" =
class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">&nbsp;<u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at =
10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></div><blockquote =
style=3D"border-color:currentcolor currentcolor currentcolor =
rgb(204,204,204);border-style:none none none solid;border-width:medium =
medium medium 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin:5pt 0in 5pt 4.8pt" =
class=3D""><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">OIDs are already showing =
up in the wild. Botan has some private<br class=3D"">assignments at<span =
class=3D"gmail-m_-3365790423456179496apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span><=
a href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html" =
target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. =
There are multiple OIDs<br class=3D"">in the wild that a program must =
recognize to interoperate.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">It would =
probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br =
class=3D"">happened with x25519.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Jeff<br =
class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">Spasm mailing list<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></blockquote></div></div><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">______________________________________________=
_<br class=3D"">Spasm mailing list<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></div></blockquote></div><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in" class=3D""><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">&nbsp;<u class=3D""></u><u =
class=3D""></u></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:Helvetica" =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">Spasm mailing list<br class=3D""></span><a =
href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:Helvetica" =
class=3D"">Spasm@ietf.org</span></a><span =
style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:Helvetica" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" =
target=3D"_blank" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:Helvetica" =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</span></a><u =
class=3D""></u><u class=3D""></u></p></div></blockquote></div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><u class=3D""></u>&nbsp;<u=
 class=3D""></u></p></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""></div></div></body></html>=

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In-Reply-To: <A0589B3D-8C13-4A4C-86EC-803079FA21BF@vigilsec.com>
From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Jun 2021 21:40:32 +0100
Message-ID: <CAPwdP4PzHr+=5SyVMoK6fDO5c5PjpCBx2F1eYYXOoBwDX2AhtQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: Uri Blumenthal <uri@ll.mit.edu>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 9:16 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> Markku and Uri:
>
> I think that LAMPS can do item 1 and item 2 below under the current
> charter.  However, I thing there would be TBD in the OIDs that could be
> filled when the competition is finished.  The charter says that the
> algorithms need to be vetted by NIST or the CFRG.
>
>
Yeah.. I'd like to add that OIDs from PEN trees would be appropriate only
for Informational RFCs and perhaps for test vectors / interoperability in
the draft stage, not final standards track deliverables. I've used such
private things for hash functions ( RFC 7693 ), and I recall that the
Certificate Transparency OIDs are simply under Google's private PEN tree,
but those RFCs are informational.

Cheers,
- markku

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.



> Russ
>
>
> On Jun 23, 2021, at 4:10 PM, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com=
>
> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 8:24 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
> uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>
>> As I said, one problem I see with the above is that NIST would only
>> assign OIDs to the algorithms it selects in the end of PQC. By that time=
,
>> other applications may already use some of the finalists. Also,
>> applications already started experimenting (e.g., see Open Quantum Safe
>> project, and their fork of OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Creal=
=E2=80=9D OIDs to use would
>> alleviate the need for kludges they currently have to employ.
>>
>>
>>
>> This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in general, and LAMPS in
>> particular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC Round 3 finalists.
>>
>
> Hi,
>
> Yes, But what would that OID specify exactly? Perhaps this LAMPS would
> like to do things like:
>
> 1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to create *detached signatures*
> (not message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary
> formatting, as used in the NIST competition).
> 2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (als=
o
> not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this break=
s
> their security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs
> are harder to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )
>
> So after such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/padding
> method rather than the plain "algorithm".. after all we don't use OIDs th=
at
> refer to plain "RSA" covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding metho=
ds
> either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate PQC
> into X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purpos=
e,
> such as public-key encryption, requires specification for the formatting =
of
> the KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific
> formatting + algorithm combination after it is defined.
>
> I don't see the existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without
> versioning as not as a prerequisite for standards definition work but as =
a
> plainly harmful as it leaves many things up for interpretation, even if t=
he
> internal parameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security
> parameters).
>
> By the way, this is not something that stops me from writing
> Internet-Drafts, which I'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for
> ambiguous algorithm names. If someone wants an OID for, say,
> Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign it within a day from our PE=
N
> (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. it's
> just a matter of asking for a permission from the design team. Note that
> the OID would be for that specific version since I know that Falcon will =
be
> changed soon. Dilithium has already been updated during Round3 -- v3.1 ha=
d
> substantial functional changes in February (a couple of internal paramete=
rs
> and a few other things). Hence the current version (
> https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3-202=
10208.pdf
> ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last October.
>
> So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from the
> design teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet Drafts a=
t
> this stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms are
> used in IETF protocols as an useful step.
>
> Cheers,
> - markku
>
> Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.
>
>
>>
>>
>> Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF =
OID or assign a
>> brand new one from their MIB space.
>>
>>
>>
>> However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as
>> figuring out the information, if any, that needs to be included in
>> parameters.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OID=
s here or
>> not.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
>> uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send
>> the request for OIDs to NIST.
>>
>>
>>
>> It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regardin=
g
>> OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive t=
he
>> charter correction.
>>
>>
>>
>> In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection
>> (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithm=
s
>>  *not* selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably
>> will) choose different algorithms.
>>
>>
>>
>> In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign
>> them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.
>>
>>
>>
>> I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.co=
m>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> When do we want them - NOW!
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined fo=
r
>> PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for =
the
>> same algorithm by the time we need to use them.
>>
>>
>>
>> Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with
>> the Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementin=
g
>> that one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that eith=
er
>> IETF or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>>
>>
>>
>> This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests becaus=
e
>> it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the
>> principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performan=
ce
>> and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of th=
e
>> proposals, I would probably implement two or more just to stress test th=
e
>> code.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred
>> identifiers as part of their submissions.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
>> assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.
>>
>> It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
>> in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.
>>
>> It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
>> happened with x25519.
>>
>> Jeff
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Spasm mailing list
>> Spasm@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Spasm mailing list
>> Spasm@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Spasm mailing list
>> Spasm@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>>
>>
>>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 9:16 PM Russ Hous=
ley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilsec.com">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204=
);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;">Markku and Ur=
i:<div><br></div><div>I think that LAMPS can do item 1 and item 2 below und=
er the current charter.=C2=A0 However, I thing there would be TBD in the OI=
Ds that could be filled when the competition is finished.=C2=A0 The charter=
 says that the algorithms need to be vetted by NIST or the CFRG.<div><br></=
div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yeah.. I&#39;d like to add=
 that OIDs from PEN trees would be appropriate only for Informational RFCs =
and perhaps for test vectors / interoperability in the draft stage, not fin=
al standards track deliverables. I&#39;ve used such private things for hash=
 functions ( RFC 7693 ), and I recall that the Certificate Transparency OID=
s are simply under Google&#39;s private PEN tree, but those RFCs are inform=
ational. <br></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>- markku<br></div>=
<div><br></div><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature"><div di=
r=3D"ltr">Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield=
.com" target=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div=
><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div></div></div></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-wo=
rd;"><div><div></div><div>Russ</div><div><br><div><br><blockquote type=3D"c=
ite"><div>On Jun 23, 2021, at 4:10 PM, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" target=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021=
 at 8:24 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit=
.edu" target=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lan=
g=3D"EN-US"><div><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"></span><div><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">As I said, one =
problem I see with the above is that NIST would only assign OIDs to the alg=
orithms it selects in the end of PQC. By that time, other applications may =
already use some of the finalists. Also, applications already started exper=
imenting (e.g., see Open Quantum Safe project, and their fork of OpenSSL) =
=E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Creal=E2=80=9D OIDs to use would alleviate the=
 need for kludges they currently have to employ.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"><u=
></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in=
 general, and LAMPS in particular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC R=
ound 3 finalists. </span></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>=
<div><div dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"auto">Hi,</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></d=
iv><div>Yes, But what would that OID specify exactly? Perhaps this LAMPS wo=
uld like to do things like:</div><div> <br></div><div>1. Specify how to use=
 the PQC algorithms to create <u>detached signatures</u> (not message+signa=
ture combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary formatting, as used in th=
e NIST competition).<br></div><div>2. Specify how to use general hash funct=
ions such as SHA-2 with them (also not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-r=
andomized way of doing this breaks their security, and must be avoided. ( Y=
es, I know that the internal XOFs are harder to change/specify, but this ne=
eds to be discussed in an RFC. )<br></div></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div=
><div dir=3D"auto">So after such definitions, the OID could refer to that f=
ormatting/padding method rather than the plain &quot;algorithm&quot;.. afte=
r all we don&#39;t use OIDs that refer to plain &quot;RSA&quot; covering al=
l of its use cases and PKCS padding methods either. At least the above two =
steps would be necessary to integrate PQC into X.509 PKI framework. Similar=
ly, to use KEMs for some specific purpose, such as public-key encryption, r=
equires specification for the formatting of the KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. L=
AMPS can assign an OID to that specific formatting + algorithm combination =
after it is defined.<br><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div></div><div>I don&#39;t =
see the existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without versioning as=
 not as a prerequisite for standards definition work but as a plainly harmf=
ul as it leaves many things up for interpretation, even if the internal par=
ameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security parameters). <=
br></div><div><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><div>By the way, this is not some=
thing that stops me from writing Internet-Drafts, which I&#39;d see as an u=
seful activity, unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorithm names. If someone wants=
 an OID for, say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign it within a=
 day from our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQ=
Shield) .. it&#39;s just a matter of asking for a permission from the desig=
n team. Note that the OID would be for that specific version since I know t=
hat Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been updated during =
Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February (a couple of =
internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current version ( <a=
 href=3D"https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-rou=
nd3-20210208.pdf" target=3D"_blank">https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/=
dilithium-specification-round3-20210208.pdf</a> ) is not compatible with th=
e one submitted to Round 3 last October. <br></div><div><br></div><div>So, =
I&#39;d suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from the de=
sign teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet Drafts at th=
is stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms are used =
in IETF protocols as an useful step.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</=
div><div>- markku</div><div><br></div><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.=
com" target=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div>=
</div></div></div></div></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,2=
04);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US"><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)"><u></u><u></u></span></=
p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)=
"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font=
-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=
=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign a brand new one from their MIB =
space.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"ma=
rgin-left:0.5in">However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, =
such as figuring out the information, if any, that needs to be included in =
parameters.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:12pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardl=
ess of whether we decide to assign OIDs here or not. =C2=A0<u></u><u></u></=
span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,1=
12,192)"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=
=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Thanks!<u></u><u></u></span></p></=
div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><br><br><u=
></u><u></u></p><blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5pt;margin-bottom:5pt"><div=
><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:=
36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu"=
 target=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p><di=
v><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0.5in">Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.=C2=A0 =
Please send the request for OIDs to NIST.<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><div =
style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5=
in">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"marg=
in-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">It was m=
y understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding OID assig=
nment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the charter c=
orrection.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><=
u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><sp=
an style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">In any case, the NIST is h=
ighly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates. =
Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms<span>=C2=A0</span><u>not</u><=
span>=C2=A0</span>selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and =
probably will) choose different algorithms.<span>=C2=A0</span></span><u></u=
><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><=
span style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u><=
/u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span =
style=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">In short, it appears that OID=
s are needed now, the best entity to assign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG =
is as good a starting place as any.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12p=
t;color:rgb(0,112,192)">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;co=
lor:rgb(0,112,192)">I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.</span><u></u><u></u>=
</p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span sty=
le=3D"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p><=
/div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D=
"font-size:12pt;color:rgb(0,112,192)">Thanks!</span><u></u><u></u></p></div=
></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><div style=3D"mar=
gin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><br><br>=
<br><u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5pt;margin-bott=
om:5pt"><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin-left:0.5in">On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com" target=3D"_blank">phill@hallamb=
aker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=C2=A0<u></u>=
<u></u></p></div><div><div><div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt=
">When do we want them - NOW!</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div=
 style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.=
5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></=
div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"m=
argin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u=
></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNorma=
l" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">I second Jeff=
rey&#39;s request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for PQC algori=
thms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the same algo=
rithm by the time we need to use them.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div>=
<div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margi=
n-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p=
></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" s=
tyle=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">Of the current fi=
nalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the Threshold techniq=
ues I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that one irregardless =
of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or the group itse=
lf specify an OID etc.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=
=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><=
span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><d=
iv><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-=
left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">This particular contest is not t=
he same as previous=C2=A0NIST contests because it may be a decade before th=
ese algorithms are being widely used, the principles behind the algorithms =
are very new, there are major performance and functional differences, etc. =
etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals, I would probably implem=
ent two or more just to stress test the code.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div=
></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><=
u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"Mso=
Normal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</=
span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
2pt">That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred i=
dentifiers as part of their submissions.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></di=
v><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mar=
gin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u><=
/p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
 style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">=C2=A0</span><u=
></u><u></u></p></div></div></div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div><d=
iv><div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"ma=
rgin-left:0.5in">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt=
; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><blockquote style=3D"border-color:cur=
rentcolor currentcolor currentcolor rgb(204,204,204);border-style:none none=
 none solid;border-width:medium medium medium 1pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;m=
argin:5pt 0in 5pt 4.8pt"><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">OIDs are already showing up in the wild. =
Botan has some private<br>assignments at<span>=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https=
://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br><br>It is reminisc=
ent of Bernstein&#39;s x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs<br>in the wild =
that a program must recognize to interoperate.<br><br>It would probably be =
useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br>happened with x25519.<br><br=
>Jeff<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>Spasm maili=
ng list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.o=
rg</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" target=3D=
"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><u></u><u></u></p><=
/div></blockquote></div></div><div style=3D"margin-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">____________________________________=
___________<br>Spasm mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" targ=
et=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman=
/listinfo/spasm" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sp=
asm</a><u></u><u></u></p></div></div></blockquote></div><div style=3D"margi=
n-left:0.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=C2=A0<u><=
/u><u></u></p></div></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in=
"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:Helvetica">_____________________=
__________________________<br>Spasm mailing list<br></span><a href=3D"mailt=
o:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-famil=
y:Helvetica">Spasm@ietf.org</span></a><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-fam=
ily:Helvetica"><br></span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/=
spasm" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D"font-size:9pt;font-family:Helvetica=
">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</span></a><u></u><u></u></p><=
/div></blockquote></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:0.5in">=
<u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div>

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
CC: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] What do we want OIDs! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDs! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Yes, but what would that OID specify exactly?=20

=20

IMHO, they would define the instance of an algorithm with a specific parame=
ter set, like you suggested below. E.g., Kyber-1024-90s, or Kyber-1024.

=20

Perhaps this LAMPS would like to do things like:

=20

1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to create detached signatures (not=
 message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary formatting, =
as used in the NIST competition).

2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (also =
not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this breaks t=
heir security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs are=
 harder to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )

=20

Yes =E2=80=93 these two make sense.=20

=20

IMHO, we should treat these algorithms as Black Boxes: OCTET STRING argumen=
ts as input, OCTET STRING output. And leave the internal XOF (and RNG where =
appropriate) to the algorithm itself. Unless I misunderstood you? Could you =
please make =C2=A0clearer your concern with the =E2=80=9Cnon-randomized way=E2=80=9D?

=20

So, after such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/padding =
method rather than the plain "algorithm"=E2=80=A6 After all we don't use OIDs that=
 refer to plain "RSA" covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding methods=
 either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate PQC in=
to X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purpose, su=
ch as public-key encryption, requires specification for the formatting of th=
e KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific formatt=
ing + algorithm combination after it is defined.

=20

In general, I like this. Except that KEM is a useful standalone construct. =
I don=E2=80=99t think it would be good to tie it to a specific single AEAD, or to =
create an OID for a given KEM and all the AEAD modes (and ciphers!) that are=
 floating around.

=20

I don't see the existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without versi=
oning as not as a prerequisite for standards definition work but as a plainl=
y harmful as it leaves many things up for interpretation, even if the intern=
al parameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security parameter=
s).=20

=20

I agree that versioning should be reflected by these OIDs. As far as a KEM =
(or a Signature) algorithm is concerned =E2=80=93 an assigned OID should leave not=
hing to interpretation (parameter set, etc. must be covered by this OID).=20

=20

By the way, this is not something that stops me from writing Internet-Draft=
s, which I'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorithm =
names. If someone wants an OID for, say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could proba=
bly assign it within a day from our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.=
3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. it's just a matter of asking for a permissio=
n from the design team. Note that the OID would be for that specific version=
 since I know that Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been u=
pdated during Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February =
(a couple of internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current =
version ( https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-rou=
nd3-20210208.pdf ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last =
October.=20

=20

Since those OIDs aren=E2=80=99t going to expire =E2=80=93 yes, I agree. The above is wh=
at we should do IMHO=E2=80=A6

=20

So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from the de=
sign teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet Drafts at thi=
s stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms are used in=
 IETF protocols as a useful step.

=20

Yes, I agree with both parts of the above.=20

=20

One goal here is to avoid proliferation of OIDs for the same algorithms. As=
 Jeffrey said, we can live with two (IETF-agreed, and NIST-assigned), especi=
ally since it could only happen to the winner algorithms. For all the other =
candidates that we=E2=80=99d choose to =E2=80=9Csanctify=E2=80=9D by assigning OIDs, my hope i=
s that they=E2=80=99ll have a single OID each.

=20

Thanks!

=20

Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign a=
 brand new one from their MIB space.

However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figuring =
out the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.

 Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OIDs here o=
r not. =20

 Thanks!

On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.ed=
u> wrote:

Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send the =
request for OIDs to NIST.

It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding O=
ID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the ch=
arter correction.

In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e=
.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms not =
selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choo=
se different algorithms.=20

In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign th=
em is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.

I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.

Thanks!

On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> =
wrote:

When do we want them - NOW!

I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for P=
QC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the s=
ame algorithm by the time we need to use them.

Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the =
Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that o=
ne irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or=
 the group itself specify an OID etc.

This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because i=
t may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the princip=
les behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance and func=
tional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals,=
 I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.

That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred identi=
fiers as part of their submissions.

On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.

It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.

It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
happened with x25519.

Jeff

=20


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break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Yes, but what would that OID specify exactly? <=
o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070=
C0'>IMHO, they would define the instance of an <u>algorithm with a specific =
parameter set</u>, like you suggested below. E.g., Kyber-1024-90s, or Kyber-=
1024.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'=
><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Per=
haps this LAMPS would like to do things like:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>1. Specify how to use the PQC algorit=
hms to create <u>detached signatures</u> (not message+signature combinations=
 with a fixed hash and arbitrary formatting, as used in the NIST competition=
).<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>2. S=
pecify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (also not d=
efined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this breaks their =
security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs are hard=
er to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )<o:p></o:p>=
</p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Ye=
s =E2=80=93 these two make sense. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DM=
soNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>IMHO, we should treat =
these algorithms as Black Boxes: OCTET STRING arguments as input, OCTET STRI=
NG output. And leave the internal XOF (and RNG where appropriate) to the alg=
orithm itself. Unless I misunderstood you? Could you please make =C2=A0clearer y=
our concern with the =E2=80=9Cnon-randomized way=E2=80=9D?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=
=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div>=
<div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>So, after such definitions,=
 the OID could refer to that formatting/padding method rather than the plain=
 &quot;algorithm&quot;=E2=80=A6 After all we don't use OIDs that refer to plain &q=
uot;RSA&quot; covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding methods either.=
 At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate PQC into X.509=
 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purpose, such as pu=
blic-key encryption, requires specification for the formatting of the KEM-DE=
M/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific formatting + al=
gorithm combination after it is defined.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>=
<span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In general, I like this. Except=
 that KEM is a useful standalone construct. I don=E2=80=99t think it would be good=
 to tie it to a specific single AEAD, or to create an OID for a given KEM an=
d all the AEAD modes (and ciphers!) that are floating around.<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p=
></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>I don't see th=
e existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without versioning as not as=
 a prerequisite for standards definition work but as a plainly harmful as it=
 leaves many things up for interpretation, even if the internal parameters a=
re fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security parameters). <o:p></o:p>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></spa=
n></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I agre=
e that versioning should be reflected by these OIDs. As far as a KEM (or a S=
ignature) algorithm is concerned =E2=80=93 an assigned OID should leave <u>nothing=
</u> to interpretation (parameter set, etc. must be covered by this OID). <o=
:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'>By the way, this is not something that stops me from writing Internet-Dr=
afts, which I'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorit=
hm names. If someone wants an OID for, say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could pr=
obably assign it within a day from our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under=
 1.3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. it's just a matter of asking for a permis=
sion from the design team. Note that the OID would be for that specific vers=
ion since I know that Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already bee=
n updated during Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in Februa=
ry (a couple of internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the curre=
nt version ( <a href=3D"https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-speci=
fication-round3-20210208.pdf">https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithi=
um-specification-round3-20210208.pdf</a> ) is not compatible with the one su=
bmitted to Round 3 last October. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Since those OIDs aren=E2=80=99t going to exp=
ire =E2=80=93 yes, I agree. The above is what we should do IMHO=E2=80=A6<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>So, I'd suggest=
 defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from the design teams if yo=
u want to use them in applications or Internet Drafts at this stage. But I s=
ee the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms are used in IETF protocols =
as a useful step.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12=
.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:=
12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Yes, I agree with both parts of the above. <o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;=
color:#0070C0'>One goal here is to avoid proliferation of OIDs for the same =
algorithms. As Jeffrey said, we can live with two (IETF-agreed, and NIST-ass=
igned), especially since it could only happen to the winner algorithms. For =
all the other candidates that we=E2=80=99d choose to =E2=80=9Csanctify=E2=80=9D by assigning O=
IDs, my hope is that they=E2=80=99ll have a single OID each.<o:p></o:p></span></p>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070=
C0'>Thanks!<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'margin-left:.5in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border=
:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:=
4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-=
top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-=
size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-us=
e the IETF OID or assign a brand new one from their MIB space.</span><o:p></=
o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-=
alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID as=
signment, such as figuring out the information, if any, that needs to be inc=
luded in parameters.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-=
alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size=
:12.0pt'>&nbsp;<span style=3D'color:#0070C0'>Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless o=
f whether we decide to assign OIDs here or not. &nbsp;</span></span><o:p></o=
:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp=
;Thanks!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:=
5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt=
:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:3=
6 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" tar=
get=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div sty=
le=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-=
margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>Our charter says that we will use =
the NIST-assigned OIDs.&nbsp; Please send the request for OIDs to NIST.<o:p>=
</o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;=
mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;=
color:#0070C0'>It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IE=
TF regarding OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and =
receive the charter correction.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left=
:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In any case, the NIST i=
s highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates=
. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms<span class=3Dgmail-m-336579042=
3456179496apple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><u>not</u><span class=3Dgmail-m-3=
365790423456179496apple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span>selected at the end of =
Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choose different algorithms=
.<span class=3Dgmail-m-3365790423456179496apple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><=
/span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt=
:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:1=
2.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best=
 entity to assign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place=
 as any.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margi=
n-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.</span><o:p></o:p>=
</p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-=
bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070=
C0'>Thanks!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div><blockquote style=3D'ma=
rgin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;marg=
in-left:1.0in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com" target=3D"_blank">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&g=
t; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div><div><div><div style=3D'margin-l=
eft:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-botto=
m-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>When do we want=
 them - NOW!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.=
5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>I second Jeffrey's r=
equest, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for PQC algorithms now or =
else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the same algorithm by the =
time we need to use them.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'=
margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-marg=
in-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Of the =
current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the Threshol=
d techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that one irreg=
ardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or the gro=
up itself specify an OID etc.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div sty=
le=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-=
margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Thi=
s particular contest is not the same as previous&nbsp;NIST contests because =
it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the princi=
ples behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance and fun=
ctional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals=
, I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.</span=
><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:=
1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>That said, maybe we should ask the gro=
ups to specify their preferred identifiers as part of their submissions.</sp=
an><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto=
;margin-left:1.0in'>On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; w=
rote:<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:s=
olid windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top=
:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;border-color:currentcolor curren=
tcolor currentcolor rgb(204,204,204)'><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=
=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-right:1.0in;mso-margin-bott=
om-alt:auto;margin-left:203.1pt'>OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Bo=
tan has some private<br>assignments at<span class=3Dgmail-m-336579042345617949=
6apple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/han=
dbook/dev_ref/oids.html" target=3D"_blank">https://botan.randombit.net/handboo=
k/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br><br>It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear=
. There are multiple OIDs<br>in the wild that a program must recognize to in=
teroperate.<br><br>It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avo=
id what<br>happened with x25519.<br><br>Jeff<o:p></o:p></p></div></blockquot=
e></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote></div><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margi=
n-left:1.0in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></di=
v></div></body></html>

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 02:46:52 +0000
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Markku and Uri:

=20

I think that LAMPS can do item 1 and item 2 below under the current charter=
.  However, I thing there would be TBD in the OIDs that could be filled when=
 the competition is finished.  The charter says that the algorithms need to =
be vetted by NIST or the CFRG.

=20

The main two concerns I have here are:
The NIST will select one algorithm, while implementations may need to inter=
operate using one of the =E2=80=9Cnot-selected=E2=80=9D finalists;
Leaving OIDs as TBD would preclude applications from experimenting and tryi=
ng to interoperate today.
=20

I=E2=80=99m perfectly OK with vetting the algorithms with CFRG and/or NIST.=20

Note: Round 3 finalists have already been =E2=80=9Cvetted by NIST=E2=80=9D =E2=80=93 that=E2=80=99s=
 how they got to where they are now. =F0=9F=98=89

=20

Thanks!

=20

On Jun 23, 2021, at 4:10 PM, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> =
wrote:

=20

On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 8:24 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.=
edu> wrote:

As I said, one problem I see with the above is that NIST would only assign =
OIDs to the algorithms it selects in the end of PQC. By that time, other app=
lications may already use some of the finalists. Also, applications already =
started experimenting (e.g., see Open Quantum Safe project, and their fork o=
f OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Creal=E2=80=9D OIDs to use would alleviate the need fo=
r kludges they currently have to employ.

 This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in general, and LAMPS in parti=
cular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC Round 3 finalists.=20

Hi,

=20

Yes, But what would that OID specify exactly? Perhaps this LAMPS would like=
 to do things like:

=20

1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to create detached signatures (not=
 message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary formatting, =
as used in the NIST competition).

2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (also =
not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this breaks t=
heir security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs are=
 harder to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )

=20

So after such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/padding m=
ethod rather than the plain "algorithm".. after all we don't use OIDs that r=
efer to plain "RSA" covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding methods e=
ither. At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate PQC into=
 X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purpose, such=
 as public-key encryption, requires specification for the formatting of the =
KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific formattin=
g + algorithm combination after it is defined.

=20

I don't see the existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without versi=
oning as not as a prerequisite for standards definition work but as a plainl=
y harmful as it leaves many things up for interpretation, even if the intern=
al parameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security parameter=
s).=20

=20

By the way, this is not something that stops me from writing Internet-Draft=
s, which I'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorithm =
names. If someone wants an OID for, say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could proba=
bly assign it within a day from our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.=
3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. it's just a matter of asking for a permissio=
n from the design team. Note that the OID would be for that specific version=
 since I know that Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been u=
pdated during Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February =
(a couple of internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current =
version ( https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-rou=
nd3-20210208.pdf ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last =
October.=20

=20

So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from the de=
sign teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet Drafts at thi=
s stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms are used in=
 IETF protocols as an useful step.

=20

Cheers,

- markku

=20

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.

=20

=20

Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign a=
 brand new one from their MIB space.

=20

However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figuring =
out the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.

=20

Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OIDs here or=
 not. =20

=20

Thanks!

=20

On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.ed=
u> wrote:

=20

Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send the =
request for OIDs to NIST.

=20

It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding O=
ID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the ch=
arter correction.

=20

In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e=
.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms not =
selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choo=
se different algorithms.=20

=20

In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign th=
em is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.

=20

I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.

=20

Thanks!

=20



On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> =
wrote:

=20

When do we want them - NOW!

=20

=20

I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for P=
QC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the s=
ame algorithm by the time we need to use them.

=20

Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the =
Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that o=
ne irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or=
 the group itself specify an OID etc.

=20

This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because i=
t may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the princip=
les behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance and func=
tional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals,=
 I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.

=20

=20

That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred identi=
fiers as part of their submissions.

=20

=20

=20

On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.

It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.

It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
happened with x25519.

Jeff

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=20

_______________________________________________
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=20

=20


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--></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap:=
break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'>Markku and Uri:<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left=
:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left=
:.5in'>I think that LAMPS can do item 1 and item 2 below under the current c=
harter. &nbsp;However, I thing there would be TBD in the OIDs that could be =
filled when the competition is finished. &nbsp;The charter says that the alg=
orithms need to be vetted by NIST or the CFRG.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>The main two concerns I h=
ave here are:<o:p></o:p></span></p><ul style=3D'margin-top:0in' type=3Ddisc><li =
class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'color:#0070C0;margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo1'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>The NIST will select one algorithm, =
while implementations may need to interoperate using one of the =E2=80=9Cnot-selec=
ted=E2=80=9D finalists;<o:p></o:p></span></li><li class=3DMsoListParagraph style=3D'co=
lor:#0070C0;margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo1'><span style=3D'font-size:=
12.0pt'>Leaving OIDs as TBD would preclude applications from experimenting a=
nd trying to interoperate <u>today</u>.<o:p></o:p></span></li></ul><p class=3D=
MsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></sp=
an></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I=E2=80=99m=
 perfectly OK with vetting the algorithms with CFRG and/or NIST. <o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>N=
ote: Round 3 finalists have already been =E2=80=9Cvetted by NIST=E2=80=9D =E2=80=93 that=E2=80=99s h=
ow they got to where they are now. </span><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;font=
-family:"Apple Color Emoji";color:#0070C0'>&#128521;</span><span style=3D'font=
-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span=
 style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Thanks!<o:p></o:p></span></p><div><d=
iv><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=3DMs=
oNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal sty=
le=3D'margin-left:.5in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 4:10 PM, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p=
></o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></p><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>On Wed, Jun=
 23, 2021 at 8:24 PM Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@=
ll.mit.edu">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><blockquo=
te style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.=
0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal st=
yle=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><s=
pan style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>As I said, one problem I see with=
 the above is that NIST would only assign OIDs to the algorithms it selects =
in the end of PQC. By that time, other applications may already use some of =
the finalists. Also, applications already started experimenting (e.g., see O=
pen Quantum Safe project, and their fork of OpenSSL) =E2=80=93 and having =E2=80=9Creal=E2=
=80=9D OIDs to use would alleviate the need for kludges they currently have to e=
mploy.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:aut=
o;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt=
;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;This is why I think it makes sense for IETF in general=
, and LAMPS in particular, to assign OIDs for all of the NIST PQC Round 3 fi=
nalists. </span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Hi,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Yes, But what would that OID speci=
fy exactly? Perhaps this LAMPS would like to do things like:<o:p></o:p></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>1. Specify how to use =
the PQC algorithms to create <u>detached signatures</u> (not message+signatu=
re combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary formatting, as used in the N=
IST competition).<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-=
left:.5in'>2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with t=
hem (also not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing thi=
s breaks their security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the interna=
l XOFs are harder to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an RF=
C. )<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5=
in'>So after such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/paddin=
g method rather than the plain &quot;algorithm&quot;.. after all we don't us=
e OIDs that refer to plain &quot;RSA&quot; covering all of its use cases and=
 PKCS padding methods either. At least the above two steps would be necessar=
y to integrate PQC into X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some=
 specific purpose, such as public-key encryption, requires specification for=
 the formatting of the KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to =
that specific formatting + algorithm combination after it is defined.<o:p></=
o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></=
p></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>I don't see t=
he existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without versioning as not a=
s a prerequisite for standards definition work but as a plainly harmful as i=
t leaves many things up for interpretation, even if the internal parameters =
are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security parameters). <o:p></o:p=
></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p=
></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>By the way,=
 this is not something that stops me from writing Internet-Drafts, which I'd=
 see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorithm names. If so=
meone wants an OID for, say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign i=
t within a day from our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.54=
575 to PQShield) .. it's just a matter of asking for a permission from the d=
esign team. Note that the OID would be for that specific version since I kno=
w that Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been updated durin=
g Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February (a couple of=
 internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current version ( <a=
 href=3D"https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3=
-20210208.pdf">https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specificatio=
n-round3-20210208.pdf</a> ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Roun=
d 3 last October. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin=
-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin=
-left:.5in'>So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID =
from the design teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet Dr=
afts at this stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms =
are used in IETF protocols as an useful step.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Cheers,<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>- markku<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><d=
iv><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>Dr. Markku-Juhani O=
. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" target=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshi=
eld.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div><=
/div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p=
></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;pa=
dding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;=
margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span>=
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-=
bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C=
0'>Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign=
 a brand new one from their MIB space.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5i=
n'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1=
.0in'>However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figu=
ring out the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.<o=
:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bo=
ttom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span>=
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-=
bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C=
0'>Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OIDs here =
or not. &nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top=
-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=
=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span=
 style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Thanks!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><=
div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.=
0pt;margin-left:1.0in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.=
0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:a=
uto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 =
AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" targe=
t=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.=
0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNor=
mal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.=
0in'>Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.&nbsp; Please =
send the request for OIDs to NIST.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div style=3D'marg=
in-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-b=
ottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-le=
ft:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>It was my understandi=
ng that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding OID assignment? If so, =
it should be easy enough to request and receive the charter correction.</spa=
n><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:aut=
o;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0p=
t'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-marg=
in-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to a=
ssign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to =
assign OIDs to algorithms<span class=3Dgmail-m-3365790423456179496apple-conver=
ted-space>&nbsp;</span><u>not</u><span class=3Dgmail-m-3365790423456179496appl=
e-converted-space>&nbsp;</span>selected at the end of Round 3. Other countri=
es may (and probably will) choose different algorithms.<span class=3Dgmail-m-3=
365790423456179496apple-converted-space>&nbsp;</span></span><o:p></o:p></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-botto=
m-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&=
nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-t=
op-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-=
size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, th=
e best entity to assign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting=
 place as any.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso=
-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span sty=
le=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><=
p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;=
margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I=E2=80=99m callin=
g for consensus.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'm=
so-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span s=
tyle=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:aut=
o;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Thanks!</s=
pan><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DM=
soNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-le=
ft:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-le=
ft:1.0in'><br><br><o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;m=
argin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal st=
yle=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>O=
n Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill@=
hallambaker.com" target=3D"_blank">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></=
o:p></p></div></div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'=
mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;=
<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;marg=
in-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>When do we want them - NOW!</s=
pan><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DM=
soNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-le=
ft:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><=
/div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin=
-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'marg=
in-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-b=
ottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>I second Je=
ffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for PQC algorithm=
s now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the same algorith=
m by the time we need to use them.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><di=
v style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto=
;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt=
'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:aut=
o;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Of the current finalists=
, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the Threshold techniques I am=
 using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that one irregardless of the fi=
nal NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or the group itself specify=
 an OID etc.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.=
5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></=
o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal st=
yle=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><=
span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>This particular contest is not the same as pre=
vious&nbsp;NIST contests because it may be a decade before these algorithms =
are being widely used, the principles behind the algorithms are very new, th=
ere are major performance and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could u=
se more than one of the proposals, I would probably implement two or more ju=
st to stress test the code.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=
=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-ma=
rgin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp=
;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p cla=
ss=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margi=
n-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></d=
iv></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-ma=
rgin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D=
'font-size:12.0pt'>That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify thei=
r preferred identifiers as part of their submissions.</span><o:p></o:p></p><=
/div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-=
margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=
=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-ma=
rgin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp=
;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;marg=
in-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:=
.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-al=
t:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &l=
t;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>=
&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-=
left:solid windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;marg=
in-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;border-color:currentcolor =
currentcolor currentcolor rgb(204,204,204)'><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p=
 class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;m=
argin-left:1.0in'>OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some pr=
ivate<br>assignments at<span class=3Dgmail-m-3365790423456179496apple-converte=
d-space>&nbsp;</span><a href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/o=
ids.html" target=3D"_blank">https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.=
html</a>.<br><br>It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are mul=
tiple OIDs<br>in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.<br>=
<br>It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br>happ=
ened with x25519.<br><br>Jeff<br><br>_______________________________________=
________<br>Spasm mailing list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_b=
lank">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/s=
pasm" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><o:p></=
o:p></p></div></blockquote></div></div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin=
-left:1.0in'>_______________________________________________<br>Spasm mailin=
g list<br><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Spasm@ietf.org</a>=
<br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></bl=
ockquote></div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-m=
argin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p>=
</o:p></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-=
margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-=
family:Helvetica'>_______________________________________________<br>Spasm m=
ailing list<br></span><a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank"><span =
style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:Helvetica'>Spasm@ietf.org</span></a><span=
 style=3D'font-size:9.0pt;font-family:Helvetica'><br></span><a href=3D"https://w=
ww.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" target=3D"_blank"><span style=3D'font-size:9=
.0pt;font-family:Helvetica'>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm</spa=
n></a><o:p></o:p></p></div></blockquote></div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-=
margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p=
></o:p></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote></d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></=
div></div></body></html>

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From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 06:11:42 +0300
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, spasm@ietf.org, noloader@gmail.com,  Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDs! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Thu, Jun 24, 2021, 05:41 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.edu>
wrote:

> Yes, but what would that OID specify exactly?
>
>
>
> IMHO, they would define the instance of an *algorithm with a specific
> parameter set*, like you suggested below. E.g., Kyber-1024-90s, or
> Kyber-1024.
>

Hi Uri,

I think it would be a bit more useful for us to define a way to use PQC
KEMs within the IETF protocols within the charter, eg PKI and Public Key
Encryption for S/MIME. And define an OID for the precise key wrap
mechanisms etc.

For signatures one needs to define the way they can be used in PKI in safe
and interoperable way. This is the nontrivial part.

As noted, the algorithms have changed even during the third round. If I
want define an OID for my PQ Sig algorithm I can put that in an informal
RFC together with test vectors etc (and there will be more of those even
after the competition "finishes" due to the fourth round and pq sig on-ramp
announced by NIST.) But: I'd like to have the help of this group to define
a way to use it for various purposes.

So, I would strongly advice against issuing OIDs for round 3 draft
parameter sets. Let the teams do it if they want. There would be a risk
that someone would just stick those OIDs into certificates, thinking that
signing a hash is fine .. or not understanding the failure mechanisms of
PQC CCA KEMs in encryption, for example.

I think it is best to put this into an internet draft at this stage,
explaining the properties and concepts and algorithm classes
(hash-and-sign, cca, cpa etc) and iterate on that.

Cheers,
-Markku

As noted algor



>
> Perhaps this LAMPS would like to do things like:
>
>
>
> 1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to create *detached signatures*
> (not message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary
> formatting, as used in the NIST competition).
>
> 2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (als=
o
> not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this break=
s
> their security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs
> are harder to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )
>
>
>
> Yes =E2=80=93 these two make sense.
>
>
>
> IMHO, we should treat these algorithms as Black Boxes: OCTET STRING
> arguments as input, OCTET STRING output. And leave the internal XOF (and
> RNG where appropriate) to the algorithm itself. Unless I misunderstood yo=
u?
> Could you please make  clearer your concern with the =E2=80=9Cnon-randomi=
zed way=E2=80=9D?
>
>
>
> So, after such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/paddin=
g
> method rather than the plain "algorithm"=E2=80=A6 After all we don't use =
OIDs that
> refer to plain "RSA" covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding metho=
ds
> either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate PQC
> into X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purpos=
e,
> such as public-key encryption, requires specification for the formatting =
of
> the KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific
> formatting + algorithm combination after it is defined.
>
>
>
> In general, I like this. Except that KEM is a useful standalone construct=
.
> I don=E2=80=99t think it would be good to tie it to a specific single AEA=
D, or to
> create an OID for a given KEM and all the AEAD modes (and ciphers!) that
> are floating around.
>
>
>
> I don't see the existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without
> versioning as not as a prerequisite for standards definition work but as =
a
> plainly harmful as it leaves many things up for interpretation, even if t=
he
> internal parameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security
> parameters).
>
>
>
> I agree that versioning should be reflected by these OIDs. As far as a KE=
M
> (or a Signature) algorithm is concerned =E2=80=93 an assigned OID should =
leave
> *nothing* to interpretation (parameter set, etc. must be covered by this
> OID).
>
>
>
> By the way, this is not something that stops me from writing
> Internet-Drafts, which I'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for
> ambiguous algorithm names. If someone wants an OID for, say,
> Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign it within a day from our PE=
N
> (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. it's
> just a matter of asking for a permission from the design team. Note that
> the OID would be for that specific version since I know that Falcon will =
be
> changed soon. Dilithium has already been updated during Round3 -- v3.1 ha=
d
> substantial functional changes in February (a couple of internal paramete=
rs
> and a few other things). Hence the current version (
> https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3-202=
10208.pdf
> ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last October.
>
>
>
> Since those OIDs aren=E2=80=99t going to expire =E2=80=93 yes, I agree. T=
he above is what
> we should do IMHO=E2=80=A6
>
>
>
> So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from the
> design teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet Drafts a=
t
> this stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms are
> used in IETF protocols as a useful step.
>
>
>
> Yes, I agree with both parts of the above.
>
>
>
> One goal here is to avoid proliferation of OIDs for the same algorithms.
> As Jeffrey said, we can live with two (IETF-agreed, and NIST-assigned),
> especially since it could only happen to the winner algorithms. For all t=
he
> other candidates that we=E2=80=99d choose to =E2=80=9Csanctify=E2=80=9D b=
y assigning OIDs, my hope
> is that they=E2=80=99ll have a single OID each.
>
>
>
> Thanks!
>
>
>
> Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF O=
ID or assign a
> brand new one from their MIB space.
>
> However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figurin=
g
> out the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.
>
>  Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OID=
s here
> or not.
>
>  Thanks!
>
> On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
> uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:
>
> Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send th=
e
> request for OIDs to NIST.
>
> It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding
> OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive th=
e
> charter correction.
>
> In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection
> (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms
> *not* selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably
> will) choose different algorithms.
>
> In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign
> them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.
>
> I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.
>
> Thanks!
>
> On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com=
>
> wrote:
>
> When do we want them - NOW!
>
> I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for
> PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for t=
he
> same algorithm by the time we need to use them.
>
> Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with th=
e
> Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing tha=
t
> one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IET=
F
> or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>
> This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because
> it may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the
> principles behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performanc=
e
> and functional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the
> proposals, I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the
> code.
>
> That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred
> identifiers as part of their submissions.
>
> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
> assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.
>
> It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
> in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.
>
> It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
> happened with x25519.
>
> Jeff
>
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"auto"><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Jun 24, 2021, 05:41 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL=
 &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
>uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div=
 lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"word-wrap:break-wor=
d"><div><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-lef=
t:.5in">Yes, but what would that OID specify exactly? <u></u><u></u></p><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></=
span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070=
c0">IMHO, they would define the instance of an <u>algorithm with a specific=
 parameter set</u>, like you suggested below. E.g., Kyber-1024-90s, or Kybe=
r-1024.</span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></=
div></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Hi Uri,</div><div d=
ir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"></div><div dir=3D"auto">I think it =
would be a bit more useful for us to define a way to use PQC KEMs within th=
e IETF protocols within the charter, eg PKI and Public Key Encryption for S=
/MIME. And define an OID for the precise key wrap mechanisms etc.=C2=A0</di=
v><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">For signatures one needs to=
 define the way they can be used in PKI in safe and interoperable way. This=
 is the nontrivial part.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"=
>As noted, the algorithms have changed even during the third round. If I wa=
nt define an OID for my PQ Sig algorithm I can put that in an informal RFC =
together with test vectors etc (and there will be more of those even after =
the competition &quot;finishes&quot; due to the fourth round and pq sig on-=
ramp announced by NIST.) But: I&#39;d like to have the help of this group t=
o define a way to use it for various purposes.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br><=
/div><div dir=3D"auto">So, I would strongly advice against issuing OIDs for=
 round 3 draft parameter sets. Let the teams do it if they want. There woul=
d be a risk that someone would just stick those OIDs into certificates, thi=
nking that signing a hash is fine .. or not understanding the failure mecha=
nisms of PQC CCA KEMs in encryption, for example.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><b=
r></div><div dir=3D"auto">I think it is best to put this into an internet d=
raft at this stage, explaining the properties and concepts and algorithm cl=
asses (hash-and-sign, cca, cpa etc) and iterate on that.</div><div dir=3D"a=
uto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Cheers,</div><div dir=3D"auto">-Markku</di=
v><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">As noted algor</div><div di=
r=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-US" link=
=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><div><d=
iv><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#=
0070c0"><u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font=
-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=
=3D"margin-left:.5in">Perhaps this LAMPS would like to do things like:<u></=
u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><=
u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-le=
ft:.5in">1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to create <u>detached sig=
natures</u> (not message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbit=
rary formatting, as used in the NIST competition).<u></u><u></u></p></div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">2. Specify how to use=
 general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (also not defined by NIST).=
 The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this breaks their security, and m=
ust be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs are harder to change/s=
pecify, but this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )<u></u><u></u></p></div>=
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<=
u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#007=
0c0">Yes =E2=80=93 these two make sense. <u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0"><u></u>=C2=A0=
<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;co=
lor:#0070c0">IMHO, we should treat these algorithms as Black Boxes: OCTET S=
TRING arguments as input, OCTET STRING output. And leave the internal XOF (=
and RNG where appropriate) to the algorithm itself. Unless I misunderstood =
you? Could you please make =C2=A0clearer your concern with the =E2=80=9Cnon=
-randomized way=E2=80=9D?<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p=
 class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">So, after such definitions,=
 the OID could refer to that formatting/padding method rather than the plai=
n &quot;algorithm&quot;=E2=80=A6 After all we don&#39;t use OIDs that refer=
 to plain &quot;RSA&quot; covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding me=
thods either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate =
PQC into X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purp=
ose, such as public-key encryption, requires specification for the formatti=
ng of the KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specifi=
c formatting + algorithm combination after it is defined.<u></u><u></u></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0=
070c0">In general, I like this. Except that KEM is a useful standalone cons=
truct. I don=E2=80=99t think it would be good to tie it to a specific singl=
e AEAD, or to create an OID for a given KEM and all the AEAD modes (and cip=
hers!) that are floating around.<u></u><u></u></span></p><div><p class=3D"M=
soNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">I don&#39;t see the ex=
istence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without versioning as not as a =
prerequisite for standards definition work but as a plainly harmful as it l=
eaves many things up for interpretation, even if the internal parameters ar=
e fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security parameters). <u></u><u><=
/u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=
=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt=
;color:#0070c0">I agree that versioning should be reflected by these OIDs. =
As far as a KEM (or a Signature) algorithm is concerned =E2=80=93 an assign=
ed OID should leave <u>nothing</u> to interpretation (parameter set, etc. m=
ust be covered by this OID). <u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><di=
v><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in">By the way, this i=
s not something that stops me from writing Internet-Drafts, which I&#39;d s=
ee as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorithm names. If som=
eone wants an OID for, say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign i=
t within a day from our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.5=
4575 to PQShield) .. it&#39;s just a matter of asking for a permission from=
 the design team. Note that the OID would be for that specific version sinc=
e I know that Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been updat=
ed during Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February (a =
couple of internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current ve=
rsion ( <a href=3D"https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specifi=
cation-round3-20210208.pdf" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank"=
>https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-round3-2021=
0208.pdf</a> ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last Oct=
ober. <u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.=
0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0">Since those OIDs aren=E2=80=99t going to exp=
ire =E2=80=93 yes, I agree. The above is what we should do IMHO=E2=80=A6<u>=
</u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-lef=
t:.5in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"=
margin-left:.5in">So, I&#39;d suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or =
get an OID from the design teams if you want to use them in applications or=
 Internet Drafts at this stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQ=
C algorithms are used in IETF protocols as a useful step.<u></u><u></u></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u=
></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0=
070c0">Yes, I agree with both parts of the above. <u></u><u></u></span></p>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0"><u></=
u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
2.0pt;color:#0070c0">One goal here is to avoid proliferation of OIDs for th=
e same algorithms. As Jeffrey said, we can live with two (IETF-agreed, and =
NIST-assigned), especially since it could only happen to the winner algorit=
hms. For all the other candidates that we=E2=80=99d choose to =E2=80=9Csanc=
tify=E2=80=9D by assigning OIDs, my hope is that they=E2=80=99ll have a sin=
gle OID each.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D=
"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p><p class=3D=
"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0">Thanks!<u></u><u=
></u></span></p></div></div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"marg=
in-left:.5in">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style=3D"border:non=
e;border-left:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8=
pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-=
left:.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0">Once the NIST pic=
ks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign a bran=
d new one from their MIB space.</span><u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNorm=
al" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in">However, we can do a lot of work prior to O=
ID assignment, such as figuring out the information, if any, that needs to =
be included in parameters.<u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D=
"margin-left:.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">=C2=A0<span style=3D"co=
lor:#0070c0">Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to =
assign OIDs here or not. =C2=A0</span></span><u></u><u></u></p><p class=3D"=
MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color=
:#0070c0">=C2=A0Thanks!</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><div><blockquote=
 style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
 style=3D"margin-left:1.0in">On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri =
- 0553 - MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" rel=3D"noreferrer nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></=
div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"ma=
rgin-left:1.0in">Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.=
=C2=A0 Please send the request for OIDs to NIST.<u></u><u></u></p></div><di=
v><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"fo=
nt-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0">It was my understanding that the NIST usually=
 follows IANA/IETF regarding OID assignment? If so, it should be easy enoug=
h to request and receive the charter correction.</span><u></u><u></u></p></=
div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"=
font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0">In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to=
 assign OIDs to pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely =
to assign OIDs to algorithms<span>=C2=A0</span><u>not</u><span>=C2=A0</span=
>selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) ch=
oose different algorithms.<span>=C2=A0</span></span><u></u><u></u></p></div=
><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0">In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now,=
 the best entity to assign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a star=
ting place as any.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070c0=
">I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-size:12=
.0pt;color:#0070c0">Thanks!</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div><=
blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt"><div><div style=
=3D"margin-left:.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in">On=
 Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phil=
l@hallambaker.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">phill@ha=
llambaker.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div><div><d=
iv><div style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">When do we want them - NOW!</sp=
an><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0=
pt">I second Jeffrey&#39;s request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defin=
ed for PQC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs =
for the same algorithm by the time we need to use them.</span><u></u><u></u=
></p></div></div><div><div style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">Of the curre=
nt finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the Threshold te=
chniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that one irregard=
less of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or the group=
 itself specify an OID etc.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><div><div s=
tyle=3D"margin-left:.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in=
"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">This particular contest is not the same =
as previous=C2=A0NIST contests because it may be a decade before these algo=
rithms are being widely used, the principles behind the algorithms are very=
 new, there are major performance and functional differences, etc. etc. If =
I could use more than one of the proposals, I would probably implement two =
or more just to stress test the code.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><=
div><div style=3D"margin-left:.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-=
left:1.0in"><span style=3D"font-size:12.0pt">That said, maybe we should ask=
 the groups to specify their preferred identifiers as part of their submiss=
ions.</span><u></u><u></u></p></div></div></div><div><div><div style=3D"mar=
gin-left:.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:1.0in">On Wed, J=
un 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail=
.com" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a=
>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><blockquote style=3D"border:none;=
border-left:solid windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.=
8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;border-color:curr=
entcolor currentcolor currentcolor rgb(204,204,204)"><div style=3D"margin-l=
eft:.5in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-right:1.0in;margin-left:20=
3.1pt">OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private<br>a=
ssignments at<span>=C2=A0</span><a href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/hand=
book/dev_ref/oids.html" rel=3D"noreferrer noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br><br>It is remin=
iscent of Bernstein&#39;s x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs<br>in the wi=
ld that a program must recognize to interoperate.<br><br>It would probably =
be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what<br>happened with x25519.<br>=
<br>Jeff<u></u><u></u></p></div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote=
></div></div></div></blockquote></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margi=
n-left:1.0in"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div>=
</div></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

--000000000000b22c5d05c57a6219--


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From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Jun 2021 05:15:19 +0100
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDS! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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--00000000000013109305c57b466b
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 8:26 PM Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
wrote:

> On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 2:43 PM Kris Kwiatkowski <kris@amongbytes.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Phillip,
>> > Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the
>> > Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that
>> > one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF
>> > or the group itself specify an OID etc.
>>
>> Looks like interesting statement. Can you explain why only SIKE is good
>> for Theshold techniques?
>>
>>
> I did not say that SIKE was the only proposal that is good for threshold.
> What I said is that it is the only one that is the only one that is
> compatible with the techniques I am using in the Mesh.
>

Phillip,

Threshold schemes can probably be built from Isogeny assumptions but they
are likely to be quite different from SIKE (See e.g. Threshold version of
CSI-FiSh, PKC 2020 ..  https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1288.pdf ). I'd
consider them to be highly experimental at this stage.

Also, note that SIKE is not a NIST Finalist, but an alternate Round 3
candidate. So it will not be standardized among the first batch. See NISTIR
8309 Sect 3.9 for their specific rationale, but generally, it is just "too
new" for them: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8309

Being a bear of very little brain, I cannot see how to extend the lattice
> and code stuff to support the threshold techniques I use. But SIKE is a
> Diffie Hellman scheme and and so are the schemes I use in the Mesh. So
> unless torsion points behave in very different ways, I should be able to
> beat SIKE into a form I can use.
>

Note that technically SIKE is a KEM with a CCA transforn. Arguably calling
the CPA component, SIDH, a Diffie-Hellman is a bit of a misnomer as well
(David Jao attributed the acrony to an "anonymous wikipedia editor" when
asked -- anyway the name has stuck). It does not have the algebraic
properties typically associated with DH, such as commutativity. Obviously
no group operator / discrete log like that as it is a PQ algorithm. The
"KE" letters indicate that SIKE should be viewed is just as a KEM.

So, Isogeny-based cryptography may allow threshold schemes to be
constructed but parameter selection will be no doubt quite different from
the requirements of the NIST competition.

Cheers,
- markku

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@pqshield.com> PQShield, Oxford UK.

--00000000000013109305c57b466b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 8:26 PM Phillip H=
allam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:phill@hallambaker.com">phill@hallambaker.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=
=3D"font-size:small">On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 2:43 PM Kris Kwiatkowski &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:kris@amongbytes.com" target=3D"_blank">kris@amongbytes.com=
</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
 =20

   =20
 =20
  <div>
    <pre><span id=3D"gmail-m_-1762204647358652253gmail-m_602327187058669791=
7msg-from">Phillip,
</span>
&gt; Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with=
 the
&gt; Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing =
that
&gt; one irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either =
IETF
&gt; or the group itself specify an OID etc.

Looks like interesting statement. Can you explain why only SIKE is good
for Theshold techniques?</pre></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div style=
=3D"font-size:small">I did not say that SIKE was the only proposal that is =
good for threshold. What I said is that it is the only one that is the only=
 one that is compatible with the techniques I am using in the Mesh.</div></=
div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Phillip,<br></div><div><br></div=
><div>Threshold schemes can probably be built from Isogeny assumptions but =
they are likely to be quite different from SIKE (See e.g. Threshold version=
 of CSI-FiSh, PKC 2020 ..=C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/128=
8.pdf">https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1288.pdf</a> ). I&#39;d consider them t=
o be highly experimental at this stage.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Also, =
note that SIKE is not a NIST Finalist, but an alternate Round 3 candidate. =
So it will not be standardized among the first batch. See NISTIR 8309 Sect =
3.9 for their specific rationale, but generally, it is just &quot;too new&q=
uot; for them: <a href=3D"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8309">https://doi=
.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8309</a></div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,20=
4,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div s=
tyle=3D"font-size:small">Being a bear of very little brain, I cannot see ho=
w to extend the lattice and code stuff to support the threshold techniques =
I use. But SIKE is a Diffie Hellman scheme and and so are the schemes I use=
 in the Mesh. So unless torsion points behave in very different ways, I sho=
uld be able to beat SIKE into a form I can use.</div></div></div></blockquo=
te><div><br></div><div>Note that technically SIKE is a KEM with a CCA trans=
forn. Arguably calling the CPA component, SIDH, a Diffie-Hellman is a bit o=
f a misnomer as well (David Jao attributed the acrony to an &quot;anonymous=
 wikipedia editor&quot; when asked -- anyway the name has stuck). It does n=
ot have the algebraic properties typically associated with DH, such as comm=
utativity. Obviously no group operator / discrete log like that as it is a =
PQ algorithm. The &quot;KE&quot; letters indicate that SIKE should be viewe=
d is just as a KEM.<br></div><div><br></div><div>So, Isogeny-based cryptogr=
aphy may allow threshold schemes to be constructed but parameter selection =
will be no doubt quite different from the requirements of the NIST competit=
ion.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>- markku</div><div><br =
clear=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"l=
tr">Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mjos@pqshield.com" =
target=3D"_blank">mjos@pqshield.com</a>&gt; PQShield, Oxford UK.</div></div=
></div></div><br></div></div>

--00000000000013109305c57b466b--


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An update to a meeting session request has just been submitted by Liz Flynn, on behalf of the lamps working group.


---------------------------------------------------------
Working Group Name: Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME
Area Name: Security Area
Session Requester: Liz Flynn


Number of Sessions: 2
Length of Session(s):  1 Hour, 1 Hour
Number of Attendees: 45
Conflicts to Avoid: 
 Chair Conflict: ipwave suit stir
 Technology Overlap: acme cfrg
 Key Participant Conflict: oauth secdispatch saag tls mls teep emu ace rats





People who must be present:
  Russ Housley
  Rich Salz
  Sean Turner
  Alexey Melnikov
  Michael Richardson
  Roman Danyliw
  Bernie Hoeneisen
  Tim Hollebeek
  Hendrik Brockhaus

Resources Requested:

Special Requests:
  
---------------------------------------------------------



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Subject: [lamps] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8649 (6623)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8649,
"Hash Of Root Key Certificate Extension".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6623

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: Yeye <ye4825070@gmail.com>

Section: 11.1

Original Text
-------------
Faceback

Corrected Text
--------------
Hioo

Notes
-----
Inline

Instructions:
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This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
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--------------------------------------
RFC8649 (draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-07)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Hash Of Root Key Certificate Extension
Publication Date    : August 2019
Author(s)           : R. Housley
Category            : INFORMATIONAL
Source              : Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Subject: Re: [lamps] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8649 (6623)
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This looks like noise to me.

Russ

> On Jun 25, 2021, at 3:52 PM, RFC Errata System =
<rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>=20
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8649,
> "Hash Of Root Key Certificate Extension".
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6623
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Yeye <ye4825070@gmail.com>
>=20
> Section: 11.1
>=20
> Original Text
> -------------
> Faceback
>=20
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> Hioo
>=20
> Notes
> -----
> Inline
>=20
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party =20
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.=20
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8649 (draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-07)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Hash Of Root Key Certificate Extension
> Publication Date    : August 2019
> Author(s)           : R. Housley
> Category            : INFORMATIONAL
> Source              : Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG


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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos@pqshield.com>
CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, "noloader@gmail.com" <noloader@gmail.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] What do we want OIDs! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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Subject: Re: [lamps] What do we want OIDs! Re: PKIX and related RFCs - definition of Key Packages
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On Thu, Jun 24, 2021, 05:41 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.edu>=
 wrote:

Yes, but what would that OID specify exactly?=20

IMHO, they would define the instance of an algorithm with a specific parame=
ter set, like you suggested below. E.g., Kyber-1024-90s, or Kyber-1024.

I think it would be a bit more useful for us to define a way to use PQC KEM=
s within the IETF protocols within the charter, e.g., PKI and Public Key Enc=
ryption for S/MIME. And define an OID for the precise key wrap mechanisms et=
c.=20

=20

You made a good point =E2=80=93 the actual Internet protocols don=E2=80=99t just need a=
 =E2=80=9Cgeneric=E2=80=9D algorithm (like AES256) =E2=80=93 they need to know how to use it.=20

=20

For signatures one needs to define the way they can be used in PKI in safe =
and interoperable way. This is the nontrivial part.

=20

I agree.

=20

As noted, the algorithms have changed even during the third round. If I wan=
t define an OID for my PQ Sig algorithm I can put that in an informal RFC to=
gether with test vectors etc (and there will be more of those even after the=
 competition "finishes" due to the fourth round and pq sig on-ramp announced=
 by NIST.) But: I'd like to have the help of this group to define a way to u=
se it for various purposes.

=20

Yes. But it seems counterproductive to wait with experimenting and testing =
interoperability before the winners are announced. And it is pretty certain =
that some companies and countries are working with Round 3 candidates.

=20

So, I would strongly advice against issuing OIDs for round 3 draft paramete=
r sets. Let the teams do it if they want. There would be a risk that someone=
 would just stick those OIDs into certificates, thinking that signing a hash=
 is fine .. or not understanding the failure mechanisms of PQC CCA KEMs in e=
ncryption, for example.

=20

I do not see how this follows from the initial argument.=20

=20

Yes, I agree that if we define OIDs, they must specify more than just an al=
gorithm with a given parameter set =E2=80=93 but include sufficient details for it=
s use with, e.g., S/MIME, or X.509 PKI.

=20

But I don=E2=80=99t see why that we cannot or shouldn=E2=80=99t do this work for Round =
3 candidates with their parameters. Yes, some of them will change. So=E2=80=A6?

=20

I think it is best to put this into an internet draft at this stage, explai=
ning the properties and concepts and algorithm classes (hash-and-sign, cca, =
cpa etc) and iterate on that.

=20

Noted. Thank you!

=20

=20

=20

=20

Perhaps this LAMPS would like to do things like:

=20

1. Specify how to use the PQC algorithms to create detached signatures (not=
 message+signature combinations with a fixed hash and arbitrary formatting, =
as used in the NIST competition).

2. Specify how to use general hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (also =
not defined by NIST). The obvious, non-randomized way of doing this breaks t=
heir security, and must be avoided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs are=
 harder to change/specify, but this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )

=20

Yes =E2=80=93 these two make sense.=20

=20

IMHO, we should treat these algorithms as Black Boxes: OCTET STRING argumen=
ts as input, OCTET STRING output. And leave the internal XOF (and RNG where =
appropriate) to the algorithm itself. Unless I misunderstood you? Could you =
please make  clearer your concern with the =E2=80=9Cnon-randomized way=E2=80=9D?

=20

So, after such definitions, the OID could refer to that formatting/padding =
method rather than the plain "algorithm"=E2=80=A6 After all we don't use OIDs that=
 refer to plain "RSA" covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding methods=
 either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate PQC in=
to X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purpose, su=
ch as public-key encryption, requires specification for the formatting of th=
e KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific formatt=
ing + algorithm combination after it is defined.

=20

In general, I like this. Except that KEM is a useful standalone construct. =
I don=E2=80=99t think it would be good to tie it to a specific single AEAD, or to =
create an OID for a given KEM and all the AEAD modes (and ciphers!) that are=
 floating around.

=20

I don't see the existence of OID numbers for plain algorithms without versi=
oning as not as a prerequisite for standards definition work but as a plainl=
y harmful as it leaves many things up for interpretation, even if the intern=
al parameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot of security parameter=
s).=20

=20

I agree that versioning should be reflected by these OIDs. As far as a KEM =
(or a Signature) algorithm is concerned =E2=80=93 an assigned OID should leave not=
hing to interpretation (parameter set, etc. must be covered by this OID).=20

=20

By the way, this is not something that stops me from writing Internet-Draft=
s, which I'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorithm =
names. If someone wants an OID for, say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could proba=
bly assign it within a day from our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.=
3.6.1.4.1.54575 to PQShield) .. it's just a matter of asking for a permissio=
n from the design team. Note that the OID would be for that specific version=
 since I know that Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been u=
pdated during Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February =
(a couple of internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current =
version ( https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-rou=
nd3-20210208.pdf ) is not compatible with the one submitted to Round 3 last =
October.=20

=20

Since those OIDs aren=E2=80=99t going to expire =E2=80=93 yes, I agree. The above is wh=
at we should do IMHO=E2=80=A6

=20

So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an OID from the de=
sign teams if you want to use them in applications or Internet Drafts at thi=
s stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorithms are used in=
 IETF protocols as a useful step.

=20

Yes, I agree with both parts of the above.=20

=20

One goal here is to avoid proliferation of OIDs for the same algorithms. As=
 Jeffrey said, we can live with two (IETF-agreed, and NIST-assigned), especi=
ally since it could only happen to the winner algorithms. For all the other =
candidates that we=E2=80=99d choose to =E2=80=9Csanctify=E2=80=9D by assigning OIDs, my hope i=
s that they=E2=80=99ll have a single OID each.

=20

Thanks!

=20

Once the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign a=
 brand new one from their MIB space.

However, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figuring =
out the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.

 Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign OIDs here o=
r not. =20

 Thanks!

On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <uri@ll.mit.ed=
u> wrote:

Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.  Please send the =
request for OIDs to NIST.

It was my understanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding O=
ID assignment? If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the ch=
arter correction.

In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign OIDs to pre-selection (e=
.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign OIDs to algorithms not =
selected at the end of Round 3. Other countries may (and probably will) choo=
se different algorithms.=20

In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best entity to assign th=
em is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as any.

I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.

Thanks!

On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> =
wrote:

When do we want them - NOW!

I second Jeffrey's request, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for P=
QC algorithms now or else we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the s=
ame algorithm by the time we need to use them.

Of the current finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the =
Threshold techniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that o=
ne irregardless of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or=
 the group itself specify an OID etc.

This particular contest is not the same as previous NIST contests because i=
t may be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the princip=
les behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance and func=
tional differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals,=
 I would probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.

That said, maybe we should ask the groups to specify their preferred identi=
fiers as part of their submissions.

On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:

OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan has some private
assignments at https://botan.randombit.net/handbook/dev_ref/oids.html.

It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 gear. There are multiple OIDs
in the wild that a program must recognize to interoperate.

It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to avoid what
happened with x25519.

Jeff

=20


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--></style></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'word-wrap:=
break-word'><div class=3DWordSection1><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal s=
tyle=3D'margin-left:.5in'>On Thu, Jun 24, 2021, 05:41 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 -=
 MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</a=
>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:=
solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right=
:0in'><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margi=
n-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>Yes, but what w=
ould that OID specify exactly? <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-=
margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=
=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>IMHO, they would define the instance of an=
 <u>algorithm with a specific parameter set</u>, like you suggested below. E=
.g., Kyber-1024-90s, or Kyber-1024.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><=
/div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal styl=
e=3D'margin-left:.5in'>I think it would be a bit more useful for us to define =
a way to use PQC KEMs within the IETF protocols within the charter, e.g., PK=
I and Public Key Encryption for S/MIME. And define an OID for the precise ke=
y wrap mechanisms etc.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'f=
ont-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D=
'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>You made a good point =E2=80=93 the actual Intern=
et protocols don=E2=80=99t just need a =E2=80=9Cgeneric=E2=80=9D algorithm (like AES256) =E2=80=93 t=
hey need to know how to <u>use</u> it. <o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>For signatures one needs to define t=
he way they can be used in PKI in safe and interoperable way. This is the no=
ntrivial part.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0p=
t'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.=
0pt;color:#0070C0'>I agree.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNorm=
al style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>As noted, the algorithms have changed even durin=
g the third round. If I want define an OID for my PQ Sig algorithm I can put=
 that in an informal RFC together with test vectors etc (and there will be m=
ore of those even after the competition &quot;finishes&quot; due to the four=
th round and pq sig on-ramp announced by NIST.) But: I'd like to have the he=
lp of this group to define a way to use it for various purposes.<o:p></o:p><=
/p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span=
></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Yes. Bu=
t it seems counterproductive to wait with experimenting <u>and testing inter=
operability</u> before the winners are announced. And it is pretty certain t=
hat some companies and countries are working with Round 3 candidates.<o:p></=
o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><o:p>&=
nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>So, I =
would strongly advice against issuing OIDs for round 3 draft parameter sets.=
 Let the teams do it if they want. There would be a risk that someone would =
just stick those OIDs into certificates, thinking that signing a hash is fin=
e .. or not understanding the failure mechanisms of PQC CCA KEMs in encrypti=
on, for example.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.=
0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:1=
2.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I do not see how this follows from the initial argument=
. <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;col=
or:#0070C0'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font=
-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Yes, I agree that if we define OIDs, they must s=
pecify more than just an algorithm with a given parameter set =E2=80=93 but includ=
e sufficient details for its use with, e.g., S/MIME, or X.509 PKI.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>=
<o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt=
;color:#0070C0'>But I don=E2=80=99t see why that we cannot or shouldn=E2=80=99t do this =
work for Round 3 candidates with their parameters. Yes, some of them will ch=
ange. So=E2=80=A6?<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margi=
n-left:.5in'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margi=
n-left:.5in'>I think it is best to put this into an internet draft at this s=
tage, explaining the properties and concepts and algorithm classes (hash-and=
-sign, cca, cpa etc) and iterate on that.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><=
span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Noted. Thank you!<o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:=
p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p></div><div><div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:so=
lid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0=
in'><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-=
top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbs=
p;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;ms=
o-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>Perhaps this LAMPS would like to=
 do things like:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-marg=
in-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o=
:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-marg=
in-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>1. Specify how to use the PQC algorith=
ms to create <u>detached signatures</u> (not message+signature combinations =
with a fixed hash and arbitrary formatting, as used in the NIST competition)=
.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto=
;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>2. Specify how to use general=
 hash functions such as SHA-2 with them (also not defined by NIST). The obvi=
ous, non-randomized way of doing this breaks their security, and must be avo=
ided. ( Yes, I know that the internal XOFs are harder to change/specify, but=
 this needs to be discussed in an RFC. )<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mar=
gin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-to=
p-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Yes =E2=80=93 these two make sense. </span><o:p></o:p></p=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:aut=
o;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</spa=
n><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margi=
n-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#007=
0C0'>IMHO, we should treat these algorithms as Black Boxes: OCTET STRING arg=
uments as input, OCTET STRING output. And leave the internal XOF (and RNG wh=
ere appropriate) to the algorithm itself. Unless I misunderstood you? Could =
you please make &nbsp;clearer your concern with the =E2=80=9Cnon-randomized way=E2=80=9D=
?</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso=
-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nb=
sp;</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top=
-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>So, after such defin=
itions, the OID could refer to that formatting/padding method rather than th=
e plain &quot;algorithm&quot;=E2=80=A6 After all we don't use OIDs that refer to p=
lain &quot;RSA&quot; covering all of its use cases and PKCS padding methods =
either. At least the above two steps would be necessary to integrate PQC int=
o X.509 PKI framework. Similarly, to use KEMs for some specific purpose, suc=
h as public-key encryption, requires specification for the formatting of the=
 KEM-DEM/AEAD combination. LAMPS can assign an OID to that specific formatti=
ng + algorithm combination after it is defined.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNo=
rmal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.=
5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMso=
Normal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left=
:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In general, I like this.=
 Except that KEM is a useful standalone construct. I don=E2=80=99t think it would =
be good to tie it to a specific single AEAD, or to create an OID for a given=
 KEM and all the AEAD modes (and ciphers!) that are floating around.</span><=
o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-mar=
gin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:aut=
o;margin-left:1.0in'>I don't see the existence of OID numbers for plain algo=
rithms without versioning as not as a prerequisite for standards definition =
work but as a plainly harmful as it leaves many things up for interpretation=
, even if the internal parameters are fixed (and PQC algorithms have a lot o=
f security parameters). <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-=
top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-=
size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margi=
n-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'fon=
t-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I agree that versioning should be reflected by =
these OIDs. As far as a KEM (or a Signature) algorithm is concerned =E2=80=93 an a=
ssigned OID should leave <u>nothing</u> to interpretation (parameter set, et=
c. must be covered by this OID). </span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DM=
soNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-le=
ft:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso=
-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>By the wa=
y, this is not something that stops me from writing Internet-Drafts, which I=
'd see as an useful activity, unlike OIDs for ambiguous algorithm names. If =
someone wants an OID for, say, Falcon-1024-Round3.0, I could probably assign=
 it within a day from our PEN (IANA has assigned the tree under 1.3.6.1.4.1.=
54575 to PQShield) .. it's just a matter of asking for a permission from the=
 design team. Note that the OID would be for that specific version since I k=
now that Falcon will be changed soon. Dilithium has already been updated dur=
ing Round3 -- v3.1 had substantial functional changes in February (a couple =
of internal parameters and a few other things). Hence the current version ( =
<a href=3D"https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dilithium-specification-roun=
d3-20210208.pdf" target=3D"_blank">https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/data/dili=
thium-specification-round3-20210208.pdf</a> ) is not compatible with the one=
 submitted to Round 3 last October. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D=
'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span =
style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal styl=
e=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><spa=
n style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Since those OIDs aren=E2=80=99t going to =
expire =E2=80=93 yes, I agree. The above is what we should do IMHO=E2=80=A6</span><o:p><=
/o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-ma=
rgin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p c=
lass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;mar=
gin-left:1.0in'>So, I'd suggest defining a temporary OID yourself or get an =
OID from the design teams if you want to use them in applications or Interne=
t Drafts at this stage. But I see the concrete definition of how PQC algorit=
hms are used in IETF protocols as a useful step.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:=
.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMs=
oNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-lef=
t:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Yes, I agree with both =
parts of the above. </span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-marg=
in-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'fo=
nt-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal=
 style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'=
><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>One goal here is to avoid prol=
iferation of OIDs for the same algorithms. As Jeffrey said, we can live with=
 two (IETF-agreed, and NIST-assigned), especially since it could only happen=
 to the winner algorithms. For all the other candidates that we=E2=80=99d choose t=
o =E2=80=9Csanctify=E2=80=9D by assigning OIDs, my hope is that they=E2=80=99ll have a single =
OID each.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:=
auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.=
0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso=
-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:.5in'><span styl=
e=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Thanks!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div>=
</div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bott=
om-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style=3D=
'border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margi=
n-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><di=
v><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-a=
lt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>Once=
 the NIST picks =E2=80=9Cthe one=E2=80=9D, let them re-use the IETF OID or assign a bran=
d new one from their MIB space.</span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal styl=
e=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.5in'>How=
ever, we can do a lot of work prior to OID assignment, such as figuring out =
the information, if any, that needs to be included in parameters.<o:p></o:p>=
</p><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:=
auto;margin-left:1.0in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>&nbsp;<span style=3D'co=
lor:#0070C0'>Yes, let=E2=80=99s do that regardless of whether we decide to assign =
OIDs here or not. &nbsp;</span></span><o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal styl=
e=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.0in'><sp=
an style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>&nbsp;Thanks!</span><o:p></o:p></p=
></div><div><div><blockquote style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:a=
uto;margin-left:1.5in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 11:36 AM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 =
- MITLL &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:uri@ll.mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">uri@ll.mit.edu</=
a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p clas=
s=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin=
-left:1.5in'>Our charter says that we will use the NIST-assigned OIDs.&nbsp;=
 Please send the request for OIDs to NIST.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;ma=
rgin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>It was my unde=
rstanding that the NIST usually follows IANA/IETF regarding OID assignment? =
If so, it should be easy enough to request and receive the charter correctio=
n.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-=
alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-siz=
e:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>In any case, the NIST is highly unlikely to assign O=
IDs to pre-selection (e.g., Round 3) candidates. Nor is it likely to assign =
OIDs to algorithms&nbsp;<u>not</u>&nbsp;selected at the end of Round 3. Othe=
r countries may (and probably will) choose different algorithms.&nbsp;</span=
><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto=
;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt=
;color:#0070C0'>In short, it appears that OIDs are needed now, the best enti=
ty to assign them is IETF/IANA, and this WG is as good a starting place as a=
ny.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top=
-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-si=
ze:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>I=E2=80=99m calling for consensus.</span><o:p></o:p></p><=
/div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-botto=
m-alt:auto;margin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;color:#0070C0'>T=
hanks!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div><blockquote style=3D'margin-=
top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DM=
soNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-le=
ft:1.5in'>On Jun 23, 2021, at 10:44 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:phill@hallambaker.com" target=3D"_blank">phill@hallambaker.com</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div><div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.=
5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt=
:auto;margin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>When do we want them=
 - NOW!</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto=
;margin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>I second Jeffrey's reques=
t, we have to get OIDs and JOSE tags defined for PQC algorithms now or else =
we will have half a dozen different OIDs for the same algorithm by the time =
we need to use them.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margi=
n-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bo=
ttom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>Of the curre=
nt finalists, only one, SIKE appears to be compatible with the Threshold tec=
hniques I am using in the Mesh so I will be implementing that one irregardle=
ss of the final NIST choice. I would prefer that either IETF or the group it=
self specify an OID etc.</span><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'm=
argin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margi=
n-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.5in'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>This par=
ticular contest is not the same as previous&nbsp;NIST contests because it ma=
y be a decade before these algorithms are being widely used, the principles =
behind the algorithms are very new, there are major performance and function=
al differences, etc. etc. If I could use more than one of the proposals, I w=
ould probably implement two or more just to stress test the code.</span><o:p=
></o:p></p></div></div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoNormal=
 style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:1.5in=
'><span style=3D'font-size:12.0pt'>That said, maybe we should ask the groups t=
o specify their preferred identifiers as part of their submissions.</span><o=
:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><div><div><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p cl=
ass=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;marg=
in-left:1.5in'>On Wed, Jun 23, 2021 at 10:16 AM Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:noloader@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid =
windowtext 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-top:5.0p=
t;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt;border-color:currentcolor currentcolo=
r currentcolor rgb(204,204,204)'><div style=3D'margin-left:.5in'><p class=3DMsoN=
ormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-right:1.0in;mso-margin-bottom-al=
t:auto;margin-left:239.1pt'>OIDs are already showing up in the wild. Botan h=
as some private<br>assignments at&nbsp;<a href=3D"https://botan.randombit.net/=
handbook/dev_ref/oids.html" target=3D"_blank">https://botan.randombit.net/hand=
book/dev_ref/oids.html</a>.<br><br>It is reminiscent of Bernstein's x25519 g=
ear. There are multiple OIDs<br>in the wild that a program must recognize to=
 interoperate.<br><br>It would probably be useful to get OID assignments to =
avoid what<br>happened with x25519.<br><br>Jeff<o:p></o:p></p></div></blockq=
uote></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;ma=
rgin-left:1.5in'>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></blockquote></div><=
/div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></div></body></html>

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--B_3707485267_1063572312--


From nobody Mon Jun 28 13:00:36 2021
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From: Chris Smiley <csmiley@amsl.com>
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com>, spasm@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [lamps] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8649 (6623)
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Greetings,

FYI - this report has been deleted as junk.

Thank you.

RFC Editor/cs

> On Jun 25, 2021, at 12:52 PM, RFC Errata System =
<rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>=20
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8649,
> "Hash Of Root Key Certificate Extension".
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6623
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Yeye <ye4825070@gmail.com>
>=20
> Section: 11.1
>=20
> Original Text
> -------------
> Faceback
>=20
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> Hioo
>=20
> Notes
> -----
> Inline
>=20
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party =20
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.=20
>=20
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8649 (draft-ietf-lamps-hash-of-root-key-cert-extn-07)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Hash Of Root Key Certificate Extension
> Publication Date    : August 2019
> Author(s)           : R. Housley
> Category            : INFORMATIONAL
> Source              : Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
>=20


From nobody Wed Jun 30 05:24:06 2021
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Subject: [lamps] I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithms
        Authors         : Hendrik Brockhaus
                          Hans Aschauer
                          Mike Ounsworth
                          John Gray
	Filename        : draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-06.txt
	Pages           : 29
	Date            : 2021-06-30

Abstract:
   This document describes the conventions for using concrete
   cryptographic algorithms with the Certificate Management Protocol
   (CMP).  CMP is used to enroll and further manage the lifecycle of
   X.509 certificates.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-06.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-06


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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Subject: [lamps] I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
        Authors         : Hendrik Brockhaus
                          David von Oheimb
	Filename        : draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11.txt
	Pages           : 55
	Date            : 2021-06-30

Abstract:
   This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport
   of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2.  This document
   updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712.

   The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
   instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
   improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
   types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
   and '.well-known' HTTP path segments.

   To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
   EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction
   is supposed to use EnvelopedData.

   CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of
   EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an
   explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as
   needed.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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From: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
To: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
CC: Tomas Gustavsson <tomas.gustavsson@primekey.com>, Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com>, John Gray <John.Gray@entrust.com>, "hans.aschauer@siemens.com" <hans.aschauer@siemens.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-06.txt
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/iURzmHhxjTifb5AQYhakTc_2SfA>
Subject: Re: [lamps] I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-06.txt
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Hi

I just submitted an update of CMP Algorithms draft containing the following=
 changes.

   *  Added text to Section 2 and Section 3.3 to clearly specify the
      hash algorithm to use for certConf messages for certificates
      signed with EdDSA (see thread "[CMP Updates] Hash algorithm to us
      for calculating certHash")
   *  Updated new RFC numbers for I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg and I-
      D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs

Many thanks to all of you for your support and contribution to the document=
.
Any further feedback is welcome.

Hendrik

> Von: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> Im Auftrag von internet-drafts@ietf.o=
rg
> Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. Juni 2021 14:24
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
> This draft is a work item of the Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX a=
nd
> SMIME WG of the IETF.
>=20
>         Title           : Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Algorithm=
s
>         Authors         : Hendrik Brockhaus
>                           Hans Aschauer
>                           Mike Ounsworth
>                           John Gray
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-algorithms-06.txt
> 	Pages           : 29
> 	Date            : 2021-06-30
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document describes the conventions for using concrete
>    cryptographic algorithms with the Certificate Management Protocol
>    (CMP).  CMP is used to enroll and further manage the lifecycle of
>    X.509 certificates.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fdatat=
rac
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From: "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>
To: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>
CC: Tomas Gustavsson <tomas.gustavsson@primekey.com>, Lijun Liao <lijun.liao@gmail.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "david.von.oheimb@siemens.com" <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Thread-Topic: [lamps] I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11.txt
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/nS3TGtA7X9m2orhEGYFX4d9PjsA>
Subject: Re: [lamps] I-D Action: draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11.txt
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X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 13:05:13 -0000

Hi

I just submitted an update of CMP Updates draft containing the following ch=
anges.

   *  Add Section 2.10 to add an additional hashAlg field to the
      CertStatus type to support certificates signed with a signature
      algorithm not explicitly indicating a hash algorithm in the
      AlgorithmIdentifier (see thread "Hash algorithm to us for
      calculating certHash")
   *  Added newly registered OIDs and temporarily registered URI suffix
   *  Exchanged the import of CertificationRequest from RFC 2986 to the
      definition from RFC 6402 Appendix A.1 (see thread "CMP Update of
      CertificationRequest")
   *  Corrected the definition of LocalKeyIdValue in Appendix A.1
   *  Updated new RFC numbers for I-D.ietf-lamps-crmf-update-algs

Many thanks to all of you for your support and contribution to the document=
.
Any further feedback is welcome.

Hendrik

> Von: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> Im Auftrag von internet-drafts@ietf.o=
rg
> Gesendet: Mittwoch, 30. Juni 2021 14:24
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
> This draft is a work item of the Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX a=
nd
> SMIME WG of the IETF.
>=20
>         Title           : Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Updates
>         Authors         : Hendrik Brockhaus
>                           David von Oheimb
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-lamps-cmp-updates-11.txt
> 	Pages           : 55
> 	Date            : 2021-06-30
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document contains a set of updates to the syntax and transport
>    of Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2.  This document
>    updates RFC 4210 and RFC 6712.
>=20
>    The aspects of CMP updated in this document are using EnvelopedData
>    instead of EncryptedValue, clarifying the handling of p10cr messages,
>    improving the crypto agility, as well as adding new general message
>    types, extended key usages to identify certificates for use with CMP,
>    and '.well-known' HTTP path segments.
>=20
>    To properly differentiate the support of EnvelopedData instead of
>    EncryptedValue, the CMP version 3 is introduced in case a transaction
>    is supposed to use EnvelopedData.
>=20
>    CMP version 3 is introduced to enable signaling support of
>    EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and signaling the use of an
>    explicit hash AlgorithmIdentifier in certConf messages, as far as
>    needed.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
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