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From: "Orit Levin (LCA)" <oritl@microsoft.com>
To: "uta@ietf.org" <uta@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [saag] new terminology  ID posted
Thread-Index: AQHPTcNTw+m2HZM/AUCczwBxyT9fgZr89Z0AgAIFmxA=
Date: Wed, 2 Apr 2014 23:44:17 +0000
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Subject: [Uta] FW: [saag] new terminology  ID posted
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FYI for the benefit of those, who hasn't read it on the SAAG list. Please, =
don't reply to this email.

This draft is obviously relevant to UTA's charter. So, please, read the doc=
ument and provide your feedback on SAAG.
It would be really helpful to capture the discussed points and clarificatio=
ns from the recent UTA threads in this security ID.

Cheers,
Orit.

-----Original Message-----
From: saag [mailto:saag-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell
Sent: Tuesday, April 01, 2014 9:37 AM
To: Stephen Kent; saag
Subject: Re: [saag] new terminology ID posted


Thanks Steve,

On 04/01/2014 04:59 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
> revised as per SAAG discussion and directions from Stephen Farrell:
>=20
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kent-opportunistic-security/

Good job. Modulo some wordsmithing, I think this is good enough
to go on with.

I'd like to AD sponsor this as an informational RFC after
we've thrashed about a bit on that wordsmithing, if there
seems to be rough consensus for that.

Does that sound like a good (enough!) plan to folks?

*Please* note I'm asking if this is *good enough* plan
not whether the document will be perfect after wordsmithing.

Ideally, I'd like to see responses like:

a) "go for it, and here are my editorial comments," or,

b) "go for it, sorry no time for comments right now" (note:
more (a)'s than (b)'s is better, a (b) is useful if you
commented before maybe), or,

c) "Don't do it, and here's why" with a link to whichever
mail in the archive makes your point (its probably there
already:-), or, if you really must,

d) a mail that succinctly makes a new point as to why to
not do this at all.

Also: let's try control ourselves and not follow up on
everything in nit-picking style, if we do go ahead with
this there's time for that when we know where we're
headed.

If it looks like there're a good set of go-for-it responses
and no real showstoppers then I think we could try for
letting Steve produce a -01 based on the editorial comments
you send to the list (say in the next week or two?) and then
do a sorta-LC here and then an IETF LC (so maybe a -02
will be needed before IETF LC, we'll see).

Thanks,
S.

>=20
> Steve
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> saag mailing list
> saag@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>=20
>=20

_______________________________________________
saag mailing list
saag@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag


From nobody Thu Apr 10 06:42:24 2014
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From: Dan York <york@isoc.org>
To: "uta@ietf.org" <uta@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Heartbleed... and best practices for app developers in linking to TLS/SSL libraries?
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Subject: [Uta] Heartbleed... and best practices for app developers in linking to TLS/SSL libraries?
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--_000_E1C843F28AA94281A9B1FAC573E5786Bisocorg_
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UTA members,

With the Heartbleed exploit all over the news lately, it was pointed out to=
 me that web *client* applications could be vulnerable to this in that if t=
hey visit a site operated by a malicious server, the server could exploit t=
he bug to capture memory blobs from the client systems.  There is even demo=
nstration code out there that shows how this can work:

https://github.com/Lekensteyn/pacemaker

Now, the path to exploit this on the client side might be more difficult be=
cause:
1. The attacker would have to get the client to visit the malicious site (i=
.e. via phishing or shared links on social media); or
2. The attacker would have to do a MiTM or modify code on an existing legit=
imate site; and
3. The attacker would have to repeatedly be retrieving memory blobs to try =
to see if anything interesting was in there.

Still, the possibility is out there that the client can leak information.  =
Much is being made in the media right now about *servers* updating their us=
e of OpenSSL, but I've not seen much yet about clients that link to the Ope=
nSSL libraries to make TLS/SSL connections.

I guess my thought is... as we develop documents for application developers=
 about how to best use TLS in their apps, are there lessons we can take fro=
m all of this to add into those documents?     (And I haven't really though=
t through it all myself, yet... more just posing the question.)

Dan

--
Dan York
Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society
york@isoc.org<mailto:york@isoc.org>   +1-802-735-1624
Jabber: york@jabber.isoc.org<mailto:york@jabber.isoc.org>
Skype: danyork   http://twitter.com/danyork

http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/


--_000_E1C843F28AA94281A9B1FAC573E5786Bisocorg_
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<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
</head>
<body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-lin=
e-break: after-white-space; ">
<div>UTA members,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>With the Heartbleed exploit all over the news lately, it was pointed o=
ut to me that web *client* applications could be vulnerable to this in that=
 if they visit a site operated by a malicious server, the server could expl=
oit the bug to capture memory blobs
 from the client systems. &nbsp;There is even demonstration code out there =
that shows how this can work:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><a href=3D"https://github.com/Lekensteyn/pacemaker">https://github.com=
/Lekensteyn/pacemaker</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Now, the path to exploit this on the client side might be more difficu=
lt because:</div>
<div>1. The attacker would have to get the client to visit the malicious si=
te (i.e. via phishing or shared links on social media); or</div>
<div>2. The attacker would have to do a MiTM or modify code on an existing =
legitimate site; and</div>
<div>3. The attacker would have to repeatedly be retrieving memory blobs to=
 try to see if anything interesting was in there.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Still, the possibility is out there that the client can leak informati=
on. &nbsp;Much is being made in the media right now about *servers* updatin=
g their use of OpenSSL, but I've not seen much yet about clients that link =
to the OpenSSL libraries to make TLS/SSL
 connections.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I guess my thought is... as we develop documents for application devel=
opers about how to best use TLS in their apps, are there lessons we can tak=
e from all of this to add into those documents? &nbsp; &nbsp; (And I haven'=
t really thought through it all myself, yet...
 more just posing the question.)</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Dan</div>
<br>
<div apple-content-edited=3D"true">
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); position: static; z-index: auto; ">
--</div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif">Dan York</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif">Senior Content Strategist, Internet Socie=
ty</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif"><a href=3D"mailto:york@isoc.org">york@iso=
c.org</a> &nbsp; &#43;1-802-735-1624</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif">Jabber: <a href=3D"mailto:york@jabber.iso=
c.org">york@jabber.isoc.org</a>&nbsp;</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif">Skype: danyork &nbsp; <a href=3D"http://t=
witter.com/danyork">
http://twitter.com/danyork</a></font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div style=3D"font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 14px; background=
-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); ">
<font face=3D"Calibri,sans-serif"><a href=3D"http://www.internetsociety.org=
/deploy360/">http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/</a>&nbsp;</font></di=
v>
</div>
<br>
</body>
</html>

--_000_E1C843F28AA94281A9B1FAC573E5786Bisocorg_--


From nobody Thu Apr 10 13:44:17 2014
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Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2014 21:44:10 +0100
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From: Richard Moore <richmoore44@gmail.com>
To: Dan York <york@isoc.org>
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Subject: Re: [Uta] Heartbleed... and best practices for app developers in linking to TLS/SSL libraries?
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On 10 April 2014 14:42, Dan York <york@isoc.org> wrote:

>  Now, the path to exploit this on the client side might be more difficult
> because:
> 1. The attacker would have to get the client to visit the malicious site
> (i.e. via phishing or shared links on social media); or
> 2. The attacker would have to do a MiTM or modify code on an existing
> legitimate site; and
>
>
Note that the attack works after the serverhello, but before the cert is
transmitted so there's no MITM protection for clients against the attack.

Rich.

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On 10 April 2014 14:42, Dan York <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:york@isoc.org" target=3D"_blank">york@isoc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<=
br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left=
:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">




<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">
<div>Now, the path to exploit this on the client side might be more difficu=
lt because:<br></div>
<div>1. The attacker would have to get the client to visit the malicious si=
te (i.e. via phishing or shared links on social media); or</div>
<div>2. The attacker would have to do a MiTM or modify code on an existing =
legitimate site; and</div>
<div><br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Note that the attack =
works after the serverhello, but before the cert is transmitted so there&#3=
9;s no MITM protection for clients against the attack.</div><div><br></div>
<div>Rich.</div><div>=A0</div></div></div></div>

--001a11c16f5c81b03f04f6b6472c--


From nobody Thu Apr 10 15:33:53 2014
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Subject: Re: [Uta] Heartbleed... and best practices for app developers in linking to TLS/SSL libraries?
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On 10 April 2014 06:42, Dan York <york@isoc.org> wrote:
> 1. The attacker would have to get the client to visit the malicious site
> (i.e. via phishing or shared links on social media); or

Accepted wisdom suggests that this is not hard.  As ekr points out,
all you need is a link:

[Free porn: click here]

The good news is that most (not all) of the current browsers don't use
OpenSSL.  But there are a lot of other *things* that do.

Even though this is a major problem, the general guidance is largely
the same: make sure to update bad software, quickly.


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Any thoughts on this path forward?

On 3/26/14, 10:26 AM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> On 3/17/14, 7:47 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>> I'd like suggest a change of direction for this discussion.
>
> I would, too. :-)
>
> My recollection from conversations in Vancouver is that we were seeking
> a quick win of documenting best practices for the existing use of TLS
> and PKI - TLS versions, cipher suites, etc. With all the conversations
> over terminology, unauthenticated encryption, DANE as a new mode in
> addition to PKI, etc., I wonder if we could at least push forward
> quickly with the TLS-PKI recommendations and, in parallel, work out the
> thornier issues.


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Johannes Merkle wrote on 19.03.2014 17:34:
> Yaron, Ralf,
> 
> shouldn't draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-02 also give recommendations for clients on signaling minimum required hash functions
> via the signature algorithm extensions?
> 

maybe my post has been overlooked... Or is there simply no interest in this aspect?
Shouldn't a BCP for TLS include an option to avoid SHA-1 in digital signatures.



-- 
Johannes


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Subject: [Uta]  draft-sheffer-tls-bcp: ECDHE checks
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Another suggestion for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp

When re-using keys for ECDHE (which is the default behavior in some implementations, e.g. OpenSSL) or when using
non-ephemeral ECDH, the validity of the received public DH-key should be checked to avoid non-group attacks (if the
curve is not twist secure). That is, it should be checked that the received point P is on the curve (unless point
compression was used).

In addition, in case of classical DHE / DH, unless Sophie-Germain primes are used, it could make sense to check for
small subgroups.
-- 
Johannes


From nobody Fri Apr 25 04:53:47 2014
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Hi,

>> shouldn't draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-02 also give recommendations for clients on signaling minimum required hash functions
>> via the signature algorithm extensions?
>>
> 
> maybe my post has been overlooked... Or is there simply no interest in this aspect?
> Shouldn't a BCP for TLS include an option to avoid SHA-1 in digital signatures.

I am sure there is interest, but I am not so sure we've made up our mind
on what to recommend. :)

The BCP's scope is to make workable yet secure recommendations, so in
order to suggest something other/better than SHA-1, I would like to have
some data on what current implementations do already support and what
they may support in the near future.

At least on browser side, I think support for the SHA-2 family is pretty
good, and auto-updates take care of the upgrading problem.

Ralph

-- 
Ralph Holz
I8 - Network Architectures and Services
Technische Universität München
http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/
Phone +49.89.289.18043
PGP: A805 D19C E23E 6BBB E0C4  86DC 520E 0C83 69B0 03EF


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Subject: Re: [Uta] draft-sheffer-tls-bcp: ECDHE checks
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On 25/04/2014 11:57, Johannes Merkle wrote:
> When re-using keys for ECDHE (which is the default behavior in some
> implementations, e.g. OpenSSL) or when using non-ephemeral ECDH, the validity
> of the received public DH-key should be checked to avoid non-group attacks
> (if the curve is not twist secure).

I disagree with the parenthesis. Unless I'm seriously mistaken, as long as both
x and y coordinates are transmitted, implementations have to check if the point
lies on the curve even if the curve is twist secure.

Manuel.


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Subject: Re: [Uta] draft-sheffer-tls-bcp: ECDHE checks
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard wrote on 25.04.2014 13:57:
> On 25/04/2014 11:57, Johannes Merkle wrote:
>> When re-using keys for ECDHE (which is the default behavior in some
>> implementations, e.g. OpenSSL) or when using non-ephemeral ECDH, the validity
>> of the received public DH-key should be checked to avoid non-group attacks
>> (if the curve is not twist secure).
> 
> I disagree with the parenthesis. Unless I'm seriously mistaken, as long as both
> x and y coordinates are transmitted, implementations have to check if the point
> lies on the curve even if the curve is twist secure.
> 

you are right, I was mistaken. As long as the curve is twist secure AND sngle co-ordinate formulas (ladders) are used,
you need to check the validity in order to prevent serious key leakage.

-- 
Johannes


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Subject: Re: [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue
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On 23/04/2014 02:29, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> Any thoughts on this path forward?
I was also under the impression that we want to make quick progress on 
main documents and work on harder issues in parallel or even later 
revisions of them.

> On 3/26/14, 10:26 AM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>> On 3/17/14, 7:47 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>>> I'd like suggest a change of direction for this discussion.
>>
>> I would, too. :-)
>>
>> My recollection from conversations in Vancouver is that we were seeking
>> a quick win of documenting best practices for the existing use of TLS
>> and PKI - TLS versions, cipher suites, etc. With all the conversations
>> over terminology, unauthenticated encryption, DANE as a new mode in
>> addition to PKI, etc., I wonder if we could at least push forward
>> quickly with the TLS-PKI recommendations and, in parallel, work out the
>> thornier issues.


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Subject: Re: [Uta] getting back to UTA and injecting clue
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> 25 apr 2014 kl. 18:27 skrev Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>:
>=20
>> On 23/04/2014 02:29, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>> Any thoughts on this path forward?
> I was also under the impression that we want to make quick progress on mai=
n documents and work on harder issues in parallel or even later revisions of=
 them.

As always, progress can start with review of the documents we have actually s=
tarted writing.=20

I haven't seen any review of the three wg docs we have on the books right no=
w (nudge nudge)...

>=20
>>> On 3/26/14, 10:26 AM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>>>> On 3/17/14, 7:47 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>>>> I'd like suggest a change of direction for this discussion.
>>>=20
>>> I would, too. :-)
>>>=20
>>> My recollection from conversations in Vancouver is that we were seeking
>>> a quick win of documenting best practices for the existing use of TLS
>>> and PKI - TLS versions, cipher suites, etc. With all the conversations
>>> over terminology, unauthenticated encryption, DANE as a new mode in
>>> addition to PKI, etc., I wonder if we could at least push forward
>>> quickly with the TLS-PKI recommendations and, in parallel, work out the
>>> thornier issues.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Uta mailing list
> Uta@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta

