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Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2019 15:43:40 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: consultancy@vanderstok.org
Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org,  ace@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12
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I'll try to respond to Peter and Jim in one go.

On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 01:12:46PM +0200, Peter van der Stok wrote:
> HI Jim and Ben,
> 
> Ben, many thanks for a nice and elaborate  review of the draft.
> 
> beginning next week I will provide partial answers to the review.
> Some small remarks below to the much appreciated explanations by Jim.
> 
> An initial answer to the first point precedes the answers by Jim.
> 
> cheerio,
> 
> Peter
> _____________________________________________________________
> 
> Section 2
> 
>    This document also profiles the use of EST to only support
>    certificate-based client authentication.  HTTP Basic or Digest
>    authentication (as described in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC7030]) are not
>    supported.
> 
> Is the intent just to exclude HTTP-layer authentication, or to
> specifically prefer client certificate authentication?  7030 does allow
> for non-certificate TLS-layer authentication (e.g., TLS-SRP), which
> would be compatible with DTLS just fine.  There's also recurrent talk of
> getting modern PAKE(s) integrated with TLS, which might also be an
> option in the constrained space.
> [There are subsequent parts of the document that continue to assume
> only-certificates, so I'm mostly assuming that the intent is
> specifically to prefer client certificates, and have not made specific
> notes at those other places in the document.]
> 
> <pvds>
> client certificate authentication is preferred based on the following
> history:
> est_coaps was initially written as extension to anima BRSKI for small
> devices.
> In that context the only reasonable use case is client certificate
> authentication.
> In a later stage a wider audience of the document was identified beyond
> BRSKI also with a certificate authentication use case.
> The draft is limited to the certificate authentication, other
> authentications are not considered.
> I am not sure if this falls under preference of certificate
> authentication or exclusion of http layer authentication.
> If http layer authentication is wanted, my suggestion is that another
> document specifies this. This draft does not forbid the use of http
> layer authentication.
> Did I interpret your remark as you intended?
> </pvds>

Thanks for the extra background; it seems that there's reasonable
justification for the preference for certificate authentication; if a
TLS-layer password-based use case does arise, it should be possible to
write a companion document.

> Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-08-30 01:15:
> 
> > A couple of answers from my own perspective
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Benjamin Kaduk
> > Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2019 4:37 PM
> > To: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org
> > Cc: ace@ietf.org
> > Subject: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12
> > 
> > Hi all,
> > 
> > A good number of comments here, though many are just nits.  We may need some
> > more in-depth discussion about only using certificates for client
> > authentication (immediately below) and how we discuss server-keygen.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > 
> > Ben
> > 
> > %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
> > 
> > When proof-of-possession is desired, a set of actions are required
> > regarding the use of tls-unique, described in Section 3.5 in
> > [RFC7030].  The tls-unique information consists of the contents of
> > 
> > I see the note in the shepherd writeup about converting EST to use TLS
> > exporters rather than tls-unique in a separate update document.  Where is
> > that work happening?  The discussion in Section 10.1 is helpful (and we
> > could do well to reference it from here) but does not inspire great
> > confidence in the reader that such work will come to fruition.
> > I think we also need to at least mandate extended-master-secret to be used
> > on the underlying DTLS connection.  (That is, assuming that we don't want to
> > lock down to specific, non-vulnerable, ciphersuites -- RFC 7925 only has
> > TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 as MTI, not MTU.)
> > 
> > [JLS]  If this work is going to happen it needs to be done as an update to
> > the EST RFC.  I don't know if it would be better to do that in LAMPS rather
> > than here.  Currently I do not know of anybody who is going to do this.
> > This is my issue and I am willing to let it slide for the time being.
> > 
> > <pvds> I am happy with an update to LAMPS </pvds>

I don't think we'd want to do it in ACE, so LAMPS is a likely home (note
that I haven't checked with Roman).

> > In the context of CoAP, the presence and location of (path to) the
> > EST resources are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-
> > known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value
> > "ace.est*" [RFC6690].  The example below shows the discovery over
> > 
> > Is that a literal asterisk, for ace dot est star?
> > (1) Why?
> > (2) It probably merits a mention in the text to confirm it for the reader.
> > 
> > [JLS] This is standard CoAP searching with the "rt" parameter.  The start is
> > a) literal and b) means a wild chard with the expected meaning.  I don't
> > think that this needs any additional text.
> > <pvds> agree; new text will look much like repetition of text in other documents </pvds>

Okay, that's good to know.  I should probably read up on it a bit more...

> > It's a little unfortunate that we can only indicate ct=62 for the last two,
> > and there's no way to indicate what content types we expect within that
> > container.
> > 
> > [JLS] This was a big topic of discussion both in ace and more importantly in
> > core for the multipart content type.  If this is solved it should be solved
> > in CoRE and not here.  (I recognize from the text that you don't expect it
> > to be solved in this document.)
> > <pvds> finding the other ct's means parsing the CBOR content</pvds>

Agreed on all counts.

> > I can (grudgingly) accept that people are going to do server-side key
> > generation, so I do not propose to remove it from the document.  The policy
> > case is a clear example of why the feature needs to be available, but I'm
> > not 100% sure that I believe that server-keygen could be "more secure" given
> > that the client needs to be able to produce secure random numbers for DTLS
> > (though I do accept that some people will believe it to be so!).  It seems
> > likely to only be possible in some intermediate situation where the
> > client-generated random numbers could be attacked but at substantial
> > expense, such that paying that expense for a single handshake is "too much"
> > for the attacker to bear, but doing it for the key generation that would
> > give the attacker all transactions would make the expense worthwhile; this
> > intermediate situation seems to also be transitory, since attacks only get
> > better/cheaper.
> > For the other case, if we were doing RSA keygen, then going from random
> > numbers to prime generation could be enough incremental expense that
> > offloading to the server would make sense, but I didn't think the elliptic
> > curve stuff had the same kind of issues, so I'd like to hear more about the
> > resource-consumption aspect as well.
> > 
> > [JLS] I would disagree that there is any requirement for a client using
> > DTLS to have any type of secure random numbers to still get a secure
> > channel.  If you do PSK authentication, then it is not required.  The
> > "random numbers" in the protocol are not really random, this is really true
> > because they are public numbers, you would like them to be non-predictable
> > but I do not know that this is even a requirement.  The only question is how
> > much you want to avoid some type of static-ephemeral key agreement state
> > which looses the PFS but is still potentially not horrid to have.
> > <pvds> I would prefer my co-authors to react to this aspect </pvds>

(To be clear, I'm asking for a bit of email discussion here, and not
necessarily any changes to the text.  Hearing Jim's thoughts is helpful,
but should not preclude others from chiming in as well.)

> > with other requests in the same DTLS connection SHOULD revalidate the
> > server certificate chain against the updated Explicit TA from the
> > /crts response before proceeding with the subsequent requests.  If
> > the server certificate chain does not authenticate against the
> > database, the client SHOULD close the connection without completing
> > the rest of the requests.  The updated Explicit TA MUST continue to
> > be used in new DTLS connections.
> > 
> > I'm not going to say you shouldn't do this check, but it seems pretty easy
> > for an attacker that knows it's servicing a /crts request to supply a
> > response that includes a (potentially bogus) trust anchor that can certify
> > the certificate it used for the current connection.  So it's not clear how
> > much protection this really provides.
> > 
> > [JLS] Right, of course the attacker that is going to do this needs to have
> > gotten a trusted channel set up initially to provide that (potentially
> > bogus) trust anchor over.  If you can do that then there is no longer any
> > trust in the system at all.
> > 
> > As described in CMC, Section 6.7 of [RFC5272], "For keys that can be
> > used as signature keys, signing the certification request with the
> > private key serves as a POP on that key pair".  The inclusion of tls-
> > unique in the certificate request links the proof-of-possession to
> > the TLS proof-of-identity.  This implies but does not prove that only
> > the authenticated client currently has access to the private key.
> > 
> > Do we want to further clarify that this means the PoP is weaker than it
> > could be?  ("no" is a fine answer, as always.)
> > 
> > [JLS] My response would be no.  I have spent hours describing the issues
> > that arise here without it always being clear that I have succeeded.  Trying
> > to do this in text and get the corner cases well described is extremely
> > difficult.

Okay.  (And thank you for having spent the time trying!)

> > It also assumes the Registrar has a trust relationship with the
> > upstream EST server in order to act on behalf of the clients.  When a
> > client uses the Implicit TA database for certificate validation, she
> > SHOULD confirm if the server is acting as an RA by the presence of
> > the id-kp-cmcRA EKU [RFC6402] in the server certificate.
> > 
> > Why is this only a SHOULD?
> > 
> > [JLS] Because it could be done by a different method.

Ah, it is supposed to be a "SHOULD do it this way", not "SHOULD check"; I
may have misread it.  I don't have any alternative phrasings that aren't
more words, so it's unclear if we want to make a change.  ("When a client
uses the Implicit TA database for certificate validation, she needs to know
whether the server is acting as an RA; she SHOULD confirm this by checking
for the presence of the id-kp-cmcRA EKU [RFC6402] in the server
certificate" would be one such longer alternative.)

Thanks,

Ben


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From: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12
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Hi Ben,

Below some additional reactions to your review.
In some parts the term "suggest" is used, meaning that I am not sure of
the correctness of my reaction.
A confirmation/denial would be appreciated in those cases.
My co-authors can always improve my changes.

To-morrow I hope to do the follow-up.

many thanks,

peter

________________________________________________________________

Section 4

   As per sections 3.3 and 4.4 of [RFC7925], the mandatory cipher suite

nit: I do see RFC 7925 in the subject heading, but the lead-in here is
still a bit jarring.  Without some statement in this document to that
effect, RFC 7925 is not binding on the protocol specified in this
document, so I think it's better to say something like "In accordance
with", or even to flat out state that "this document conforms to the
DTLS 1.2 profile specified in RFC 7925". 

<pvds> done, used: In accordance with sections …  </pvds>

   DTLS 1.2 implementations must use the Supported Elliptic Curves and
   Supported Point Formats Extensions in [RFC8422].  Uncompressed point
   format must also be supported.  DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
   implementations differ from DTLS 1.2 because they do not support
   point format negotiation in favor of a single point format for each
   curve.  Thus, support for DTLS 1.3 does not mandate point format
   extensions and negotiation.

DTLS 1.3 uses the "supported_groups" extension in contrast to Supported
Elliptic Curves for 1.2; we should mention that disparity as well. 

<pvds> added at the end of the paragraph </pvds> 

   o  a previously issued client certificate (e.g., an existing
      certificate issued by the EST CA); this could be a common case for
      simple re-enrollment of clients.

Is "re-enrollment" intended to cover renewal operations? 

<pvds>RFC7030 states: "An EST client can renew/rekey its existing client
certificate by 

submitting a re-enrollment request to an EST server."

Do you want that emphasized more in the draft?
</pvds>

   o  a previously installed certificate (e.g., manufacturer IDevID
      [ieee802.1ar] or a certificate issued by some other party); the
      server is expected to trust that certificate.  IDevID's are

"trust" can cover a lot of things, many of which we don't really need
here; would "expected to be able to validate" suffice? 

<pvds> s/is expected to trust that certificate/ can use the certificate
for DTLS client Authentication/
</pvds>

   As described in Section 2.1 of [RFC5272] proof-of-identity refers to
   a value that can be used to prove that the private key corresponding
   to the public key is in the possession of and can be used by an end-
   entity or client.  Additionally, channel-binding information can link

nit: "the certified public key", I think, since the certificate is what
binds the identity to the public key.
Also, this sentence is a bit awkward, though I don't have any concrete
rewording suggestions at present. 

<pvds>s/public key/certified public key/ 

Suggestion, is this better?: "a client provides proof of identity by
proving that it possesses the private key corresponding with the
certified public key" 

   Given that after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a
   new EST transaction will take place after a significant amount of
   time, the DTLS connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST messages
   that are relatively close to each other.  In some cases, like NAT
   rebinding, keeping the state of a connection is not possible when
   devices sleep for extended periods of time.  In such occasions,
   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] negotiates a connection ID that can
   eliminate the need for new handshake and its additional cost.

Do we also want to mention DTLS 1.3 session resumption here as less
expensive than a full handshake?  It's not as cheap as "just keep using
the same connection ID", of course, but has somewhat different other
properties. 

<pvds> thanks, added: 

"additional cost; or DTLS 1.3 session resumption provides a less costly
alternative than re-doing a full DTLS handshake."
</pvds>

Section 5

   o  Simple enroll and re-enroll for a CA to sign public client
      identity key.

nit(?): is this "public client identity key" or "client identity public
key" or something else? 

<pvds>by reducing the txt's target, I suggest: 

s/public client identity key/client certificate/ 

</pvds>

   o  Certificate Signing Request (CSR) attribute messages that inform
      the client of the fields to include in a CSR.

nit: "informs" 

<pvds> yep, thanks </pvds>

   o  Server-side key generation messages to provide a private client
      identity key when the client choses so.

(similar nit(?) as above) 

<pvds>also reducing the text's target: 

s/provide a private client identity key/provide the client with a new
private key/ 

</pvds>

Section 5.1

With the current text, I expect us to get several IESG questions about
"why do you have both discovery and well-known URIs?".  I think we need
to treat this more prominently in the first few paragraphs of the
section, perhaps just after we discuss the short-est strings, so we
could tie into the constrained nature of things and how some devices may
need to hardcode assumptions about the endpoint location. 

<pvds> I suggest the following starting text: 

"EST-coaps is targeted for low-resource networks with small packets. Two
types of installations are possible (1)rigid ones where the address and
the supported functions of the EST server(s) are known, and (2) flexible
one where the EST server and it supported functions need to be
discovered. 

For both types of installations, saving header space….."

</pvds>

   Figure 5 in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and
   corresponding paths which are supported by EST.  Table 1 provides the
   mapping from the EST URI path to the shorter EST-coaps URI path.

Our table has the entries in a different order than 7030's table. 

<pvds> correct, has been modified </pvds> 

We also don't say anything about the (lack of the) fullcmc endpoint. 

<pvds>/fullcmc is added in the table with "n.a." as short value </pvds> 

The serverkeygen endpoints could perhaps have some notation to indicate
that the private key is always returned, in addition to the PKCS#7 vs.
pkix-cert question that distinguishes skg and skc. 

<pvds>after "…..an /skc request.", the following text is added: 

"In both cases a private key MUST be returned." 

</pvds>

   The /skg message is the EST /serverkeygen equivalent where the client
   requests for a certificate in PKCS#7 format and a private key.  If

nit: s/requests for a/requests a/ 

<pvds>done</pvds>

   Clients and servers MUST support the short resource EST-coaps URIs.

Are they expected to also support the long EST URIs over CoAP? 

<pvds> It was undecided whether we should add: 

"The corresponding longer URIs from <xref target="RFC7030"/> MAY be
supported." 

</pvds> 

  The first three lines of the discovery response above MUST be
   returned if the server supports resource discovery.  The last three

It may be worth listing out ace.est.crts, ace.est.sen, and ace.est.sren
explicitly for clarity (especially since line breaks are "only for
readability") 

<pvds> after "the first three lines" added 

",describing ace.est.crts, ace.est.sen, and ace.est.sren,"
</pvds>

   lines are only included if the corresponding EST functions are
   implemented.  The Content-Formats in the response allow the client to
   request one that is supported by the server.  These are the values
   that would be sent in the client request with an Accept option.

It seems that these specific values (or a subset thereof) are mandatory;
a forward reference might be in order. 

<pvds> "Added : "(see table 2)"

Section 5.2

Did we consider merging this table with Table 1? 

<pvds> 

The functions of the tables are different. It fits the progress of the
text. Merging will probably mean more forward references. Unless two
tables are too boring, I suggest to leave as is. 

</pvds>

Section 5.2

   While [RFC7030] permits a number of these functions to be used
   without authentication, this specification requires that the client
   MUST be authenticated for all functions.

Perhaps this divergence from 7030 should be noted more prominently,
perhaps in the section title or a dedicated "Differences from RFC 7030"
section? 

<pvds> 

Suggestion to move this phrase to section 5 just before section 5.1? 

</pvds>

Section 5.3

   EST-coaps is designed for low-resource devices and hence does not
   need to send Base64-encoded data.  Simple binary is more efficient
   (30% smaller payload) and well supported by CoAP.  Thus, the payload
   for a given Media-Type follows the ASN.1 structure of the Media-Type
   and is transported in binary format.

This last sentence is only true when scoped to this document, for which
all the content we're handling is specified using ASN.1.  I don't know
whether we want to tweak the wording to reflect that or not, though.
Also, we probably should say DER-encoded ASN.1 structure (or BER?  I'd
have to check what the requirements are) since ASN.1 is just the
abstract syntax and not the encoding rules. 

<pvds> 

s/payload/payload for DER-encoded ASN.1/
</pvds>

   When the client makes an /skc request the certificate returned with
   the private key is a single X.509 certificate (not a PKCS#7
   container) with Content-Format identifier TBD287 (0x011F) instead of
   281.  In cases where the private key is encrypted with CMS (as
   explained in Section 5.8) the Content-Format identifier is 280
   (0x0118) instead of 284.  The key and certificate representations are
   ASN.1 encoded in binary format.  An example is shown in Appendix A.3.

I think these relationships might be more clear in tabular form; I
dind't really understand the scheme at this point in the document, and
needed to get a ways further in before it really "clicked". 

<pvds> the following table is added. Is that sufficient?

             +----------+-----------------+-----------------+ 

             | Function | Response part 1 | Response part 2 | 

             +----------+-----------------+-----------------+ 

             | /skg       | 284                 | 281                | 

             | /skc       | 280                 | TBD287          | 

             +----------+-----------------+-----------------+ 

             Table 3: response content formats for skg and skc 

</pvds>

Section 5.4

   o  EST-coaps servers sometimes need to provide delayed responses
      which are conveyed with an empty ACK or an ACK containing response
      code 5.03 as explained in Section 5.7.  Thus, it is RECOMMENDED

nit: the response itself (delayed or not) is not in the ACK, so maybe
"the need for which is conveyed". 

<pvds> 

s/responses which are conveyed with an/which are preceded by an
immediately returned/ 

Section 5.6

   layer.  In addition, invokers residing on a 6LoWPAN over IEEE
   802.15.4 [ieee802.15.4] network should attempt to size CoAP messages
   such that each DTLS record will fit within one or two IEEE 802.15.4
   frames.

Is this intended to be a normative SHOULD?  If not, it feels like we
need a reference or justification. 

<pvds> 

s/should attempt/are recommended/ 

</pvds>

Section 5.7

   certificate to the client after a short delay.  If the certificate
   response is large, the server will need more than one Block2 blocks
   to transfer it.

nit: "Block2 block" singular 

<pvds> thanks, done </pvds>

POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR (frag# 1)} -->
   <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)

Where is this notation documented?  (Is Appendix B.1 of this document
the
first place it's introduced?)  We need some kind of reference on first
usage. 

<pvds> Just before figure 2 the following phrase is added: 

"The notation of figure 2 is explained in section B.1" 

</pvds> 

   If the server is very slow (i.e. minutes) in providing the response
   (i.e. when a manual intervention is needed), he SHOULD respond with

nit: RFC style puts commas after (and before) "i.e." and "e.g.". 

<pvds>done everywhere </pvds>

   the identical CSR to the server.  As long as the server responds with
   response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) with a Max-Age Option, the
   client SHOULD keep resending the enrollment request until the server
   responds with the certificate or the client abandons for other
   reasons.

nit: the transitive verb "abandons" has no direct object 

<pvds>abandons the request </pvds>

   response.  Note that the server asks for a decrease in the block size
   when acknowledging the first Block2.

nit: From the trace, it looks like the server is the first one to use
a 128-byte block size, and it does happen in an ack message, but that
ack is not acking a block2 (though it contains one).  (That ack message
also happens to contain part of the response.) 

<pvds> Ai, that confuses a lot. 

Should read: Note that the client asks again for a decrease
</pvds>

POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# 1)}-->
  <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR (frag# 2)}  -->
  <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)

The first line doesn't seem to match up -- doesn't the "N1" mean
"fragment N1+1" but the descriptive text at the end say "frag# 1"?
Or is this supposed to be 1:0/1/256? 

<pvds> Difficult to be terse and get it right: 

CSR (frag# n) means fragment n of the request 

Cert resp(frag# m) means fragment m of the response 

Like in figure 2, in figure 3, the line 

"... Immediate response when certificate is ready ...", 

Is added to separate the request sending from the response reception 

</pvds>

Also, it surprised me somewhat that the client has to re-send the whole
request (i.e., all fragments thereof) after the Max-Age interval when
the server says it's ready, since that feels wasteful of bandwidth, but
I assume that's just how CoAP works and not relevant for this document. 

<pvds>We did not see any other mechanism; but we are talking about many
minutes, the relative bandwidth loss is not too high.
This way, there is no need to keep much state, especially when many
simultaneous requests are treated.</pvds>

Section 5.8

   In scenarios where it is desirable that the server generates the
   private key, server-side key generation should be used.  Such

nit: suggest s/should be used/is available/ to avoid the appearance of
tautology. 

<pvds>done</pvds>
--=_b978f585753a6193b20c0bb6854d622a
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
=3DUTF-8" /></head><body style=3D'font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana,Gen=
eva,sans-serif'>
Hi Ben,<br /><br />Below some additional reactions to your review.<br />In =
some parts the term "suggest" is used, meaning that I am not sure of the co=
rrectness of my reaction.<br />A confirmation/denial would be appreciated i=
n those cases.<br />My co-authors can always improve my changes.<br /><br /=
>To-morrow I hope to do the follow-up.<br /><br />many thanks,<br /><br />p=
eter<br /><br />___________________________________________________________=
_____<br /><br />
<p>Section 4<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As per sections 3.3 and 4.4 of =
[RFC7925], the mandatory cipher suite<br /> <br /> nit: I do see RFC 7925 i=
n the subject heading, but the lead-in here is<br /> still a bit jarring. &=
nbsp;Without some statement in this document to that<br /> effect, RFC 7925=
 is not binding on the protocol specified in this<br /> document, so I thin=
k it's better to say something like "In accordance<br /> with", or even to =
flat out state that "this document conforms to the<br /> DTLS 1.2 profile s=
pecified in RFC 7925".</p>
<p><br /></p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; done, used: In accordance with sections &hellip;&nbsp; &lt;=
/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;DTLS 1.2 implementations must use =
the Supported Elliptic Curves and<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Supported Point F=
ormats Extensions in [RFC8422]. &nbsp;Uncompressed point<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;format must also be supported. &nbsp;DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]<b=
r /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;implementations differ from DTLS 1.2 because they do=
 not support<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;point format negotiation in favor of a=
 single point format for each<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;curve. &nbsp;Thus, su=
pport for DTLS 1.3 does not mandate point format<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ex=
tensions and negotiation.<br /> <br /> DTLS 1.3 uses the "supported_groups"=
 extension in contrast to Supported<br /> Elliptic Curves for 1.2; we shoul=
d mention that disparity as well.</p>
<p><br /></p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; added at the end of the paragraph &lt;/pvds&gt;</p>
<p>&nbsp;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;o &nbsp;a previously issued client=
 certificate (e.g., an existing<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;c=
ertificate issued by the EST CA); this could be a common case for<br /> &nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;simple re-enrollment of clients.<br /> <br=
 /> Is "re-enrollment" intended to cover renewal operations?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;RFC7030 states: "An EST client can renew/rekey its existing =
client certificate by</p>
<p>submitting a re-enrollment request to an EST server."<br /><br />Do you =
want that emphasized more in the draft?<br />&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;o &nbsp;a previously installed certificate (e.g., manufactur=
er IDevID<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[ieee802.1ar] or a cert=
ificate issued by some other party); the<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;server is expected to trust that certificate. &nbsp;IDevID's are<br=
 /> <br /> "trust" can cover a lot of things, many of which we don't really=
 need<br /> here; would "expected to be able to validate" suffice?</p>
<p><br /></p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; s/is expected to trust that certificate/ can use the certif=
icate for DTLS client Authentication/<br />&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;As described in Section 2.1 of [RFC5272] proof-of-identity ref=
ers to<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a value that can be used to prove that the p=
rivate key corresponding<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;to the public key is in th=
e possession of and can be used by an end-<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;entity o=
r client. &nbsp;Additionally, channel-binding information can link<br /> <b=
r /> nit: "the certified public key", I think, since the certificate is wha=
t<br /> binds the identity to the public key.<br /> Also, this sentence is =
a bit awkward, though I don't have any concrete<br /> rewording suggestions=
 at present.</p>
<p><br /></p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;s/public key/certified public key/</p>
<p>Suggestion, is this better?: &ldquo;a client provides proof of identity =
by proving that it possesses the private key corresponding with the certifi=
ed public key&rdquo;</p>
<p><br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Given that after a successful enrollment=
, it is more likely that a<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;new EST transaction will=
 take place after a significant amount of<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;time, the=
 DTLS connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST messages<br /> &nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;that are relatively close to each other. &nbsp;In some cases, lik=
e NAT<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;rebinding, keeping the state of a connection =
is not possible when<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;devices sleep for extended per=
iods of time. &nbsp;In such occasions,<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[I-D.ietf-tl=
s-dtls-connection-id] negotiates a connection ID that can<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;eliminate the need for new handshake and its additional cost.<br /> =
<br /> Do we also want to mention DTLS 1.3 session resumption here as less<=
br /> expensive than a full handshake? &nbsp;It's not as cheap as "just kee=
p using<br /> the same connection ID", of course, but has somewhat differen=
t other<br /> properties.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; thanks, added:</p>
<p>&ldquo;additional cost; or DTLS 1.3 session resumption provides a less c=
ostly alternative than re-doing a full DTLS handshake.&rdquo;<br />&lt;/pvd=
s&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 5<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;o &nbsp;Simple =
enroll and re-enroll for a CA to sign public client<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;identity key.<br /> <br /> nit(?): is this "public clien=
t identity key" or "client identity public<br /> key" or something else?</p=
>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;by reducing the txt&rsquo;s target, I suggest:</p>
<p>s/public client identity key/client certificate/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;o &nbsp;Certificate Signing=
 Request (CSR) attribute messages that inform<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;the client of the fields to include in a CSR.<br /> <br /> nit=
: "informs"</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; yep, thanks &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;o =
&nbsp;Server-side key generation messages to provide a private client<br />=
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;identity key when the client choses so=
=2E<br /> <br /> (similar nit(?) as above)</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;also reducing the text&rsquo;s target:</p>
<p>s/provide a private client identity key/provide the client with a new pr=
ivate key/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 5.1<br /> <br /> With the current tex=
t, I expect us to get several IESG questions about<br /> "why do you have b=
oth discovery and well-known URIs?". &nbsp;I think we need<br /> to treat t=
his more prominently in the first few paragraphs of the<br /> section, perh=
aps just after we discuss the short-est strings, so we<br /> could tie into=
 the constrained nature of things and how some devices may<br /> need to ha=
rdcode assumptions about the endpoint location.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; I suggest the following starting text:</p>
<p>&ldquo;EST-coaps is targeted for low-resource networks with small packet=
s. Two types of installations are possible (1)rigid ones where the address =
and the supported functions of the EST server(s) are known, and (2) flexibl=
e one where the EST server and it supported functions need to be discovered=
=2E</p>
<p>For both types of installations, saving header space&hellip;..&rdquo;<br=
 /><br />&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Figure 5 in Section 3=
=2E2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;c=
orresponding paths which are supported by EST. &nbsp;Table 1 provides the<b=
r /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;mapping from the EST URI path to the shorter EST-coa=
ps URI path.<br /> <br /> Our table has the entries in a different order th=
an 7030's table.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; correct, has been modified &lt;/pvds&gt;</p>
<p><br /> We also don't say anything about the (lack of the) fullcmc endpoi=
nt.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;/fullcmc is added in the table with &ldquo;n.a.&rdquo; as sh=
ort value &lt;/pvds&gt;</p>
<p><br /> The serverkeygen endpoints could perhaps have some notation to in=
dicate<br /> that the private key is always returned, in addition to the PK=
CS#7 vs.<br /> pkix-cert question that distinguishes skg and skc.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;after &ldquo;&hellip;..an /skc request.&rdquo;, the followin=
g text is added:</p>
<p>&ldquo;In both cases a private key MUST be returned.&rdquo;</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The /skg message is the EST=
 /serverkeygen equivalent where the client<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;requests=
 for a certificate in PKCS#7 format and a private key. &nbsp;If<br /> <br /=
> nit: s/requests for a/requests a/</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;done&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Clients and=
 servers MUST support the short resource EST-coaps URIs.<br /> <br /> Are t=
hey expected to also support the long EST URIs over CoAP?</p>
<p><br /> &lt;pvds&gt; It was undecided whether we should add:</p>
<p>&ldquo;The corresponding longer URIs from &lt;xref target=3D"RFC7030"/&g=
t; MAY be supported.&rdquo;</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;</p>
<p><br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;The first three lines of the discovery response above=
 MUST be<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;returned if the server supports resource d=
iscovery. &nbsp;The last three<br /> <br /> It may be worth listing out ace=
=2Eest.crts, ace.est.sen, and ace.est.sren<br /> explicitly for clarity (es=
pecially since line breaks are "only for<br /> readability")</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; after &ldquo;the first three lines&rdquo; added</p>
<p>&ldquo;,describing ace.est.crts, ace.est.sen, and ace.est.sren,&rdquo;<b=
r />&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;lines are only included if=
 the corresponding EST functions are<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;implemented. &=
nbsp;The Content-Formats in the response allow the client to<br /> &nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;request one that is supported by the server. &nbsp;These are the =
values<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;that would be sent in the client request wit=
h an Accept option.<br /> <br /> It seems that these specific values (or a =
subset thereof) are mandatory;<br /> a forward reference might be in order=
=2E</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; &ldquo;Added : &ldquo;(see table 2)&rdquo;<br /> <br /> Sec=
tion 5.2<br /> <br /> Did we consider merging this table with Table 1?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>The functions of the tables are different. It fits the progress of the t=
ext. Merging will probably mean more forward references. Unless two tables =
are too boring, I suggest to leave as is.</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 5.2<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Wh=
ile [RFC7030] permits a number of these functions to be used<br /> &nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;without authentication, this specification requires that the clie=
nt<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;MUST be authenticated for all functions.<br /> <=
br /> Perhaps this divergence from 7030 should be noted more prominently,<b=
r /> perhaps in the section title or a dedicated "Differences from RFC 7030=
"<br /> section?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Suggestion to move this phrase to section 5 just before section 5.1?</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 5.3<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ES=
T-coaps is designed for low-resource devices and hence does not<br /> &nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;need to send Base64-encoded data. &nbsp;Simple binary is more =
efficient<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(30% smaller payload) and well supported =
by CoAP. &nbsp;Thus, the payload<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;for a given Media-=
Type follows the ASN.1 structure of the Media-Type<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
and is transported in binary format.<br /> <br /> This last sentence is onl=
y true when scoped to this document, for which<br /> all the content we're =
handling is specified using ASN.1. &nbsp;I don't know<br /> whether we want=
 to tweak the wording to reflect that or not, though.<br /> Also, we probab=
ly should say DER-encoded ASN.1 structure (or BER? &nbsp;I'd<br /> have to =
check what the requirements are) since ASN.1 is just the<br /> abstract syn=
tax and not the encoding rules.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/payload/payload for DER-encoded ASN.1/<br />&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br />=
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;When the client makes an /skc request the certificate re=
turned with<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the private key is a single X.509 certi=
ficate (not a PKCS#7<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;container) with Content-Format=
 identifier TBD287 (0x011F) instead of<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;281. &nbsp;I=
n cases where the private key is encrypted with CMS (as<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;explained in Section 5.8) the Content-Format identifier is 280<br /> &=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(0x0118) instead of 284. &nbsp;The key and certificate rep=
resentations are<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ASN.1 encoded in binary format. &n=
bsp;An example is shown in Appendix A.3.<br /> <br /> I think these relatio=
nships might be more clear in tabular form; I<br /> dind't really understan=
d the scheme at this point in the document, and<br /> needed to get a ways =
further in before it really "clicked".</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; the following table is added. Is that sufficient?<br /> </p=
>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 +----------+-----------------+-----------------+</p>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 | Function | Response part 1 | Response part 2 |</p>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 +----------+-----------------+-----------------+</p>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 | /skg&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;| 284&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;| 281&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &n=
bsp; &nbsp; |</p>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 | /skc&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;| 280&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &=
nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;| TBD287&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; |</p>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 +----------+-----------------+-----------------+</p>
<p><br /></p>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 Table 3: response content formats for skg and skc</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 5.4<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;o =
&nbsp;EST-coaps servers sometimes need to provide delayed responses<br /> &=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;which are conveyed with an empty ACK or =
an ACK containing response<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;code 5=
=2E03 as explained in Section 5.7. &nbsp;Thus, it is RECOMMENDED<br /> <br =
/> nit: the response itself (delayed or not) is not in the ACK, so maybe<br=
 /> "the need for which is conveyed".</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/responses which are conveyed with an/which are preceded by an immediat=
ely returned/</p>
<p><br /> <br /> Section 5.6<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;layer. &nbsp;In=
 addition, invokers residing on a 6LoWPAN over IEEE<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;802.15.4 [ieee802.15.4] network should attempt to size CoAP messages<br />=
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;such that each DTLS record will fit within one or two IE=
EE 802.15.4<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;frames.<br /> <br /> Is this intended t=
o be a normative SHOULD? &nbsp;If not, it feels like we<br /> need a refere=
nce or justification.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/should attempt/are recommended/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 5.7<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ce=
rtificate to the client after a short delay. &nbsp;If the certificate<br />=
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;response is large, the server will need more than one Bl=
ock2 blocks<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;to transfer it.<br /> <br /> nit: "Bloc=
k2 block" singular</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; thanks, done &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> POST [2001:db8::2:1=
]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR (frag# 1)} --&gt;<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&lt;-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)<br /> <br /> Where is this no=
tation documented? &nbsp;(Is Appendix B.1 of this document the<br /> first =
place it's introduced?) &nbsp;We need some kind of reference on first<br />=
 usage.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; Just before figure 2 the following phrase is added:</p>
<p>&ldquo;The notation of figure 2 is explained in section B.1&rdquo;</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;</p>
<p><br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;If the server is very slow (i.e. minutes=
) in providing the response<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(i.e. when a manual int=
ervention is needed), he SHOULD respond with<br /> <br /> nit: RFC style pu=
ts commas after (and before) "i.e." and "e.g.".</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;done everywhere &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;the identical CSR to the server. &nbsp;As long as the server responds with=
<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) with a Ma=
x-Age Option, the<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;client SHOULD keep resending the =
enrollment request until the server<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;responds with t=
he certificate or the client abandons for other<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;rea=
sons.<br /> <br /> nit: the transitive verb "abandons" has no direct object=
</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;abandons the request &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;response. &nbsp;Note that the server asks for a decrease in the block=
 size<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;when acknowledging the first Block2.<br /> <b=
r /> nit: From the trace, it looks like the server is the first one to use<=
br /> a 128-byte block size, and it does happen in an ack message, but that=
<br /> ack is not acking a block2 (though it contains one). &nbsp;(That ack=
 message<br /> also happens to contain part of the response.)</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; Ai, that confuses a lot.</p>
<p>Should read: Note that the client asks again for a decrease<br />&lt;/pv=
ds&gt;<br /> <br /> POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR=
 (frag# 1)}--&gt;<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&lt;-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue=
)<br /> POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR (frag# 2)}=
 &nbsp;--&gt;<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&lt;-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)<br=
 /> <br /> The first line doesn't seem to match up -- doesn't the "N1" mean=
<br /> "fragment N1+1" but the descriptive text at the end say "frag# 1"?<b=
r /> Or is this supposed to be 1:0/1/256?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; Difficult to be terse and get it right:</p>
<p>CSR (frag# n) means fragment n of the request</p>
<p>Cert resp(frag# m) means fragment m of the response</p>
<p>Like in figure 2, in figure 3, the line</p>
<p>&ldquo;... Immediate response when certificate is ready ...&rdquo;,</p>
<p>Is added to separate the request sending from the response reception</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Also, it surprised me somewhat that the clien=
t has to re-send the whole<br /> request (i.e., all fragments thereof) afte=
r the Max-Age interval when<br /> the server says it's ready, since that fe=
els wasteful of bandwidth, but<br /> I assume that's just how CoAP works an=
d not relevant for this document.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;We did not see any other mechanism; but we are talking about=
 many minutes, the relative bandwidth loss is not too high.<br />This way, =
there is no need to keep much state, especially when many simultaneous requ=
ests are treated.&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 5.8<br /> <br /> &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;In scenarios where it is desirable that the server generates th=
e<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;private key, server-side key generation should be=
 used. &nbsp;Such<br /> <br /> nit: suggest s/should be used/is available/ =
to avoid the appearance of<br /> tautology.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;done&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br />&nbsp;</p>
</body></html>

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Hi Ben,

the last part of the responses to your thorough review.
Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.

the openssl example make me worry a bit.

See below.

Peter
_______________________________________________________________________

   When requesting server-side key generation, the client asks for the
   server or proxy to generate the private key and the certificate which
   are transferred back to the client in the server-side key generation
   response.  In all respects, the server SHOULD treat the CSR as it
   would treat any enroll or re-enroll CSR; the only distinction here is
   that the server MUST ignore the public key values and signature in
   the CSR.  These are included in the request only to allow re-use of
   existing codebases for generating and parsing such requests.

We need to reword this; the SHOULD is in conflict with the MUST. 

<pvds> 

Removed the SHOULD -> "…the server treats the CSR …" 

</pvds>

   certificate and a private key.  The private key Content-Format
   requested by the client is depicted in the PKCS#10 CSR request.  If

nit: I suggest s/depicted/indicated/ 

<pvds>done </pvds>

   (Section 5.3) .  The two representations (each consisting of two CBOR
   array items) do not have to be in a particular order since each

<pvds> 

s/do not have to be in a particular order since each representation is/ 

are/ 

</pvds>
[side note: core-multipart-ct is looking to land on "multipart/mixed"
semantics to resolve my outstanding Discuss point; RFC 2046 is pretty
clear about the component parts "need[ing] to be in a particular order",
which this is in conflict with]

   representation is preceded by its Content-Format ID.  The private key
   can be in unprotected PKCS#8 [RFC5958] format (Content-Format 284) or
   protected inside of CMS SignedData (Content-Format 280).  The

Phrasing it like this makes it soun like the server can just
spontaneously decide that it wants to sign the key content, as opposed
to having it be dependant on the CSR's contents.  Also... 

<pvds> 

/The private key/ 

Dependent on the contents of the CSR, the private key/ 

</pvds>

   SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private key,
   which may be the EST server or the EST CA.  The SignedData is further
   protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in
   Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].  In summary, the symmetrically encrypted

.... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't
care
what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
Content-Format for the EnvelopedData. 

<pvds> 

s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container,
is signed/ 

s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS
EnvelopedData/ 

SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional
signing/ 

</pvds>

Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData? 

<pvds> 

Not sure about this 

</pvds>

   key is included in the encryptedKey attribute in a KEKRecipientInfo
   structure.  In the case where the asymmetric encryption key is
   suitable for transport key operations the generated private key is
   encrypted with a symmetric key which is encrypted by the client
   defined (in the CSR) asymmetric public key and is carried in an

nit: hyphenate "client-defined" 

<pvds> done </pvds>

   encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
   Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key
   agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric
   key which is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric

In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
sent. 

<pvds> 

In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a
randomly 

generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The
cryptographic strength of 

the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified


asymmetric key. 

However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value. 

I don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text. 

</pvds>

   public key and is carried in an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.

   [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
   private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
   servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
   support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
   Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
   EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
   deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
   the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
   where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
   connection (Registrar in Figure 4).

This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way. 

<pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the
responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The
recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in
my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you
see a better way to do this. 

</pvds>

Section 6

   The EST-coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar MUST terminate EST-coaps downstream
   and initiate EST connections over TLS upstream.  The Registrar MUST
   authenticate and OPTIONALLY authorize the clients and it MUST be 

<pvds> 

Suggestion: 

s/ authenticate and OPTIONALLY authorize the clients and/ 

authenticate and authorize client request, while/ 

</pvds>

Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only
OPTIONAL.)

   client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
   information that does not match the current TLS session because the
   authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
   acting as an EST server.

This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
actually quoting and using quotation marks.
nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote. 

<pvds> 

Hope my co-authors will react to this 

</pvds>

   For some use cases, clients that leverage server-side key generation
   might prefer for the enrolled keys to be generated by the Registrar
   if the CA does not support server-side key generation.  Such
   Registrar is responsible for generating a new CSR signed by a new key
   which will be returned to the client along with the certificate from

nit: "Such a Registrar" 

<pvds> done </pvds>

   the CA.  In these cases, the Registrar MUST support random number
   generation using proper entropy.

Not just support -- use! 

<pvds>done </pvds>

   Additionally, a conversion from CBOR major type 2 to Base64 encoding
   MUST take place at the Registrar when server-side key generation is
   supported.  [...]

Not always? 

<pvds> IMO always; removed the when…. 

</pvds>

   key, the encrypted CMS EnvelopedData blob MUST be converted to binary
   in CBOR type 2 downstream to the client.

I think we should reword this -- my first reading of "downstream to the
client" is "after the client in the processing path", which doesn't
actually help the client.  Presumably we mean at the registrar, in the
downstream direction, towards the client. 

<pvds> 

s/ MUST be converted to binary in CBOR type 2 downstream to the client./


MUST be converted at the Registrar to binary CBOR type 2 downstream to
the client./ 

</pvds>

   The EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar MUST support resource discovery
   according to the rules in Section 5.1.  Section 5.1. 

<pvds> 

Second section 5.1 is removed 

</pvds>

Do we need to say anything about translation of discovered URIs? 

<pvds> I don't think so; 

The Registrar discovers the EST server, while the TLS client discovers
the registrar. I don't see the client discovering the EST server through
the Registrar 

</pvds>

Section 7

   This section addresses transmission parameters described in sections
   4.7 and 4.8 of [RFC7252].  EST does not impose any unique values on
   the CoAP parameters in [RFC7252], but the EST parameter values need
   to be tuned to the CoAP parameter values.

I don't understand what "but the EST parameter values need to be tuned
to the CoAP parameter values" means. 

<pvds> 

s/ but the EST parameter values need to be tuned to the CoAP parameter
values/ 

but the setting of the CoAP parameter values may have consequences for
the setting of the EST parameter values/ 

</pvds>.

   It is recommended, based on experiments, to follow the default CoAP
   configuration parameters ([RFC7252]).  However, depending on the
   implementation scenario, retransmissions and timeouts can also occur
   on other networking layers, governed by other configuration
   parameters.  A change in a server parameter MUST ensure the adjusted
   value is also available to all the endpoints with which these
   adjusted values are to be used to communicate.

I don't understand who this is a normative requirement upon.  Is it the
network operator's, to propagate configuration changes?  Or is there
supposed to be some automated protocol that makes adjusted values
available? 

<pvds> 

It is meant as reminder to anyone doing the configuration of a given
installation; you want to suppress the text? 

</pvds>

   o  NSTART: A parameter that controls the number of simultaneous
      outstanding interactions that a client maintains to a given
      server.  An EST-coaps client is not expected to interact with more
      than one servers at the same time, which is the default NSTART
      value defined in [RFC7252].

nit: there's a mismatch between "to a given server" and "more than one
servers at the same time".  (Also, s/one servers/one server/.) 

<pvds> 

s/ not expected to interact with more than one servers at the same time/


/is expected to control at most one interaction with a given server,/ 

</pvds>

   o  PROBING_RATE: A parameter which specifies the rate of re-sending
      non-confirmable messages.  The EST messages are defined to be sent
      as CoAP confirmable messages, hence this setting is not
      applicable.

Section 5.4 only has it as RECOMMENDED to send requests in CON messages,
so we should still say something here. 

<pvds> 

s/ The EST messages are defined to be sent as CoAP confirmable messages,
hence this setting is not applicable./ 

In the rare situations that non-confirmable messages are used, the
default PROBING_RATE value defined in RFC7252 applies./ 

</pvds>

Section 9.1

I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are still
of interest even if most details of content encoding lie elsewhere.

Section 9.2

The grammar for these entries is a bit stilted, though the existing
registrations are not so far off.

nit: should ace.est.att include the word "get" like ace.est.crts does? 

<pvds> added get </pvds>

Section 10.1

   The security considerations of Section 6 of [RFC7030] are only
   partially valid for the purposes of this document.  As HTTP Basic
   Authentication is not supported, the considerations expressed for
   using passwords do not apply.

It may be worth explicitly stating that "the other portions of the
security considerations of RFC 7030 continue to apply". 

<pvds>added </pvds>

   Modern security protocols require random numbers to be available
   during the protocol run, for example for nonces, ephemeral (EC)
   Diffie-Hellman key generation.  This capability to generate random

nit: the comma expects a 3+ element list but we only have two elements.
Just "and" suffices? 

<pvds>absolutely right </pvds>

   Analysis SHOULD be done to establish whether server-side key
   generation increases or decreases the probability of digital identity
   theft.

In the abstract sense, this seems like a non-normative "should".  But if
we make it apply specifically to those deploying server-side key
generation then it is appropriately normative. 

<pvds> 

Preceded by: For those deploying server-side key generation, 

</pvds>

   It is important to note that sources contributing to the randomness
   pool used to generate random numbers on laptops or desktop PCs are
   not available on many constrained devices, such as mouse movement,
   timing of keystrokes, air turbulence on the movement of hard drive
   heads, as pointed out in [PsQs].  Other sources have to be used or

nit: need an "and" (or "or") to close the list. 

<pvds>repaired with or</pvds>

   It is also RECOMMENDED that the Implicit Trust Anchor database used
   for EST server authentication is carefully managed to reduce the
   chance of a third-party CA with poor certification practices
   jeopardizing authentication.  Disabling the Implicit Trust Anchor

We may want to call out that since the implicit database is used for the
initial /crts request, that single jeporadized exchange could cause all
subsequent exchanges from that client to be compromised as well. 

<pvds> before Disabling: 

"Remark that the initial /crts request uses the implicit database, and
that a compromised implicit database has as consequence that all
subsequent exchanges from that client are jeopardized." 

</pvds>

   database after successfully receiving the Distribution of CA
   certificates response (Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030]) limits any risk to
   the first DTLS exchange.  Alternatively, in a case where a /sen
   request immediately follows a /crts, a client MAY choose to keep the
   connection authenticated by the Implicit TA open for efficiency
   reasons (Section 4).  A client that pipelines EST-coaps /crts request

nit: is "pipelines" the right word here, given that HTTP pipelining is a
thing and CoAP pipelining (probably?) isn't, and the former isn't what
we're doing anyway? 

<pvds> suggestion: 

s/pipelines/interleaves/ 

<pvds> 

   What's more, POP linking uses tls-unique as it is defined in
   [RFC5929].  The 3SHAKE attack [tripleshake] poses a risk by allowing

nit: "such POP linking" or "the CMC POP linking" 

<pvds>CMC POP </pvds>

   a man-in-the-middle to leverage session resumption and renegotiation
   to inject himself between a client and server even when channel
   binding is in use.  The attack was possible because of certain (D)TLS
   implementation imperfections.  In the context of this specification,

I don't think we can solely blame the attacks on implementation
imperfections (though they were certainly compounding factors).  Does
this sentence really add any value to the current document? 

<pvds> 

Leave this to my co-authors 

</pvds>

   binding mechanism.  Such a mechanism could include an updated tls-
   unique value generation like the tls-unique-prf defined in
   [I-D.josefsson-sasl-tls-cb] by using a TLS exporter [RFC5705] in TLS
   1.2 or TLS 1.3's updated exporter (Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]).  Such
   mechanism has not been standardized yet.  Adopting a channel binding

We probably should be explicit about "using a TLS Exporter value in
place of the tls-unique value in the CSR", just from a writing clarity
perspective. 

<pvds> 

Leave to my co-authors from here to section 10.2 

</pvds>

It might be worth splitting the triple-handshake bits (including open
question) into a separate subsection so that we can make a forward
reference to it from earlier in the document.

   value generated from an exporter would break backwards compatibility.
   Thus, in this specification we still depend on the tls-unique
   mechanism defined in [RFC5929], especially since a 3SHAKE attack does
   not expose messages exchanged with EST-coaps.

I suppose that new endpoint names would be one way to work through the
backwards-compatibility break, though it's not entirely clear that we
need to say so in this document.  We probably do want to say that even
though EST-coaps looks like a new protocol that could get away with
changing the default, we want to preserve the ability for the RA to
proxy through to a "classic" EST HTTPS server, so we are in fact
constrained to use the compatible choice.

   Regarding the Certificate Signing Request (CSR), an EST-coaps server
   is expected to be able to recover from improper CSR requests.

What does "recover" mean?  Is it just "not crash" or is it expected to
somehow still be able to issue a certificate?  (If the former, that
might be implicit in an RFC 3552 threat model, though saying it
explicitly probably doesn't hurt.)

Section 10.2

   The Registrar proposed in Section 6 must be deployed with care, and
   only when the recommended connections are impossible.  When POP

Do we actually explicitly say that the direct connection is recommended
anywhere?  If not, we should. 

<pvds> 

Added at the end of the first paragraph of section 6: 

When not explicitly needed, it is RECOMMENDED to use direct connections
between EST server and client 

</pvds> 

   linking is used the Registrar terminating the TLS connection
   establishes a new one with the upstream CA.  Thus, it is impossible

I think technically it terminates DTLS and esablishes a new TLS
connection. 

<pvds> 

s/ terminating the TLS connection establishes a new one/ 

terminating the DTLS connection establishes a new TLS connection/ 

</pvds>

   for POP linking to be enforced end-to-end for the EST transaction.
   The EST server could be configured to accept POP linking information
   that does not match the current TLS session because the authenticated
   EST Registrar client has verified this information when acting as an
   EST server.

I think we need to say that the EST server "assumes" or "trusts" that
the registrar has verified this information -- it is to some extent a
leap of faith. 

<pvds> Suggestion: 

s/ client has verified this information when acting as an EST server / 

acting as an EST-server, assumes that the client has verified this
information/ 

</pvds>

   The introduction of an EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar assumes the client
   can trust the registrar using its implicit or explicit TA database.

I'm not entirely sold on "trust" as the best word here (vs., e.g.,
validate), but don't object to it.

<pvds> leave as is, have no better word </pvds> 

   generating the key.  In such cases, the existence of a Registrar
   requires the client to put its trust on the registrar doing the right
   thing if it is generating the private key.

This is true, though it (probably correctly, for our purposes) does not
give any indication of what "the right thing" is intended to be :) 

<pvds> 

Remove: "doing the right thing" 

s/if/when/ 

</pvds>

Section 11.2

I think draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis, RFC 5958, RFC 8075, and RFC 8422
should be normative references. 

<pvds>done; </pvds>

If we're going to say that this spec requires conformance to RFC 7925's
DTLS profile (which we currently don't, but I suggest above that we do),
it will need to be a normative reference as well. 

<pvds> 

In section 4, 

/fits into/conforms to/ 

</pvds>

I don't understand why RFC 7231 is in the 'reference' column for
application/csrattrs in Table 4; its presence there would normally
suggest that it should be a normative reference.  

<pvds> 

Removed RFC7231, it is not mentioned in RFC7030 

</pvds>

RFC 5929 is interesting, as it is of course a normative reference for
RFC 7030, which we use normatively, but we may not need to cite it
directly as a normative reference from this document. 

<pvds> 

Continue to do so 

</pvds>

It may be worth citing RFC 7525 as BCP 195 where it appears. 

<pvds>To be done </pvds>

Appendix A

   transported in hex, but in binary.  The payloads are shown
   unencrypted.  In practice the message content would be transferred
   over an encrypted DTLS tunnel.

I expect a tsvart reviewer to complain about the use of the word
"tunnel" here, and suggest "channel" as an alternative. 

<pvds>done </pvds>

   The certificate responses included in the examples contain Content-
   Format 281 (application/pkcs7).  If the client had requested Content-
   Format TBD287 (application/pkix-cert) by querying /est/skc, the
   server would respond with a single DER binary certificate.

Just to check my own understanding: this will always appear within a
multipart-core container, right? 

<pvds> 

Added: in the multipart-core container 

</pvds>

Appendix A.1

     Option (Uri-Port)
        Option Delta = 0x4  (option# 3+4=7)
        Option Length = 0x4
        Option Value = 9085
      Option (Uri-Path)
        Option Delta = 0x4   (option# 7+4=11)
        Option Length = 0x5
        Option Value = "est"

This is more for my own edification than the document's sake, so thank
you for your time, but what accounts for the "extra" length here?  The
"est" is three bytes, and what makes up for the other two?  Also, I
assume that the port value of 9805 is the decimal value, which gets
CBOR encoded into two bytes  of integer encoding plus the byte with
additional information 25 to indicate the two-byte integer, and another
byte that I need help accounting for. 

<pvds> 

Many thanks; an old misreading of an example in 7252. 

For the option length of URI-Path we included the quotations as well;
That is WRONG. 

Repaired it everywhere. 

Options are not CBOR encoded. 

</pvds>

Appendix A.2

Do we want to say anything about the IDevID in the CSR/cert?
I note that the breakdown in Appendix C.2 (looks like openssl output)
does not decode the otherName (though asn1parse can be convinced to do
so). 

<pvds> 

What do you suggest for IDevID? 

Actually openssl was used extensively for generating the examples. 

Will be happy to learn about otherName 

</pvds>

Appendix A.3

I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 component:
asn1parse says: 

<pvds> 

As input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der: 

308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9 

I used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\ 

-passin pass:watnietweet 

The password is may be prohibitive? 

Resulting in:
Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
    61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
    6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
    0c:37
pub: 
    04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
    9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
    0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
    be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
    56:38:e5:9f:d9
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256

$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der
   308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
   6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
   45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
   0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
   cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
    0:d=0  hl=3 l= 135 cons: SEQUENCE          
    3:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :00
    6:d=1  hl=2 l=  19 cons: SEQUENCE          
    8:d=2  hl=2 l=   7 prim: OBJECT            :id-ecPublicKey
   17:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim: OBJECT            :prime256v1
   27:d=1  hl=2 l= 109 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX
DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284CC99F

which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKeyInfo:

      PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
        version                   Version,
        privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
        privateKey                PrivateKey,
        attributes           [0]  IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }

      Version ::= INTEGER

      PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier

      PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING

      Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute

due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, etc.
(`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working example
and
can't rule out user error there.)

Even that giant OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a
PrivateKeyInfo:

$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27
   308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
   6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
   45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
   0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
   cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
    0:d=0  hl=2 l= 107 cons: SEQUENCE          
    2:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
    5:d=1  hl=2 l=  32 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX
DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6
   39:d=1  hl=2 l=  68 cons: cont [ 1 ]        
   41:d=2  hl=2 l=  66 prim: BIT STRING        

though the OCTET STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has
the public key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring
to show).

So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.

Section A.4

I'm not sure how useful repeating the RFC 7030 csrattrs is: do we expect
(e.g.) brainpoolP384r1 to be relevant for our readers? 

<pvds> 

It was added for completeness sake; nothing more. 

Suppressing it may provoke other questions like: Why is it not there? 

</pvds>

Appendix B.1

   and BLOCK option Block2.  The minimum PMTU is 1280 bytes, which is
   the example value assumed for the DTLS datagram size.  The example

I'm not seeing how this relates to the rest of the section. 

<pvds> 

I see. We do not use it anymore.; suppressed it. 

</pvds>

                                  The CoAP message adds around 10 bytes,
   the DTLS record 29 bytes.  To avoid IP fragmentation, the CoAP Block

The DTLS overhead can also vary based on cipher suite, padding, etc., so
a bit more qualification ("we assume", "around", etc.) might be in
order. 

<pvds> 

Added: "in this example" 

</pvds>

   tenth packet of 63 bytes.  The client sends an IPv6 packet containing
   the UDP datagram with the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP
   request 10 times.  The server returns an IPv6 packet containing the
   UDP datagram with the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP
   response.  The CoAP request-response exchange with block option is

The definite vs. indefinite articles here don't seem quite right, and
each of the 10 datagrams do not encapsulate the entire CoAP request. 

<pvds> 

I don't understand your meaning. 

</pvds>

   with exponent (2**(SZX+4)) separated by slashes.  The Length 64 is
   used with SZX=2 to avoid IP fragmentation.  The CoAP Request is sent

We just said "to avoid IP fragmentation" ten lines ago.

<pvds> 

Removed 

</pvds> 

Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in
this document? 

<pvds> 

No opinion 

</pvds>

Appendix B.2

   In this example, the requested Block2 size of 256 bytes, required by
   the client, is transferred to the server in the very first request
   message.  The block size 256=(2**(SZX+4)) which gives SZX=4.  The

I don't see a Block2 size in the first request message, just Block1: 

<pvds> 

Thanks. Block1 it is 

</pvds>

   POST [2001:db8::2:321]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR req} -->
          <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)

Also, we seem to have stopped using the "{CSR req frag#2}" notation that
we had in the main body text. 

<pvds>That is an oversight; adapted 

</pvds>

Appendix C.2

[I mentioned otherName's non-decoding earlier]

Appendix C.3

I find it kind of amusing that we have a "Netscape Comment" in the
generated cert :) 

<pvds> 

This was the result of a lengthy openssl struggle. 

Any suggestions for improvement are very welcome indeed. 

</pvds>

_
--=_1c65d4777981c3d61c556925d741d050
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
=3DUTF-8" /></head><body style=3D'font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana,Gen=
eva,sans-serif'>
Hi Ben,<br /><br />the last part of the responses to your thorough review=
=2E<br />Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.<br /><br />the ope=
nssl example make me worry a bit.<br /><br />See below.<br /><br />Peter<br=
 />_______________________________________________________________________<=
br /><br />
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;When requesting server-side key generation, the client=
 asks for the<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;server or proxy to generate the priva=
te key and the certificate which<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;are transferred ba=
ck to the client in the server-side key generation<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
response. &nbsp;In all respects, the server SHOULD treat the CSR as it<br /=
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;would treat any enroll or re-enroll CSR; the only disti=
nction here is<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;that the server MUST ignore the publ=
ic key values and signature in<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the CSR. &nbsp;These=
 are included in the request only to allow re-use of<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;existing codebases for generating and parsing such requests.<br /> <br />=
 We need to reword this; the SHOULD is in conflict with the MUST.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Removed the SHOULD -&gt; &ldquo;&hellip;the server treats the CSR &helli=
p;&rdquo;</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;certificate and a private k=
ey. &nbsp;The private key Content-Format<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;requested =
by the client is depicted in the PKCS#10 CSR request. &nbsp;If<br /> <br />=
 nit: I suggest s/depicted/indicated/</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;done &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;(Section 5=
=2E3) . &nbsp;The two representations (each consisting of two CBOR<br /> &n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;array items) do not have to be in a particular order since =
each<br /> </p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/do not have to be in a particular order since each representation is/<=
/p>
<p>are/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> [side note: core-multipart-ct is looking to land on =
"multipart/mixed"<br /> semantics to resolve my outstanding Discuss point; =
RFC 2046 is pretty<br /> clear about the component parts "need[ing] to be i=
n a particular order",<br /> which this is in conflict with]<br /> <br /> &=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;representation is preceded by its Content-Format ID. &nbsp=
;The private key<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;can be in unprotected PKCS#8 [RFC5=
958] format (Content-Format 284) or<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;protected insid=
e of CMS SignedData (Content-Format 280). &nbsp;The<br /> <br /> Phrasing i=
t like this makes it soun like the server can just<br /> spontaneously deci=
de that it wants to sign the key content, as opposed<br /> to having it be =
dependant on the CSR's contents. &nbsp;Also...</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>/The private key/</p>
<p>Dependent on the contents of the CSR, the private key/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;SignedData is signed by the=
 party that generated the private key,<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;which may be=
 the EST server or the EST CA. &nbsp;The SignedData is further<br /> &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explai=
ned in<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030]. &nbsp;In summary=
, the symmetrically encrypted<br /> <br /> .... if the SignedData is not th=
e outermost container, then we don't care<br /> what the relevant Content-F=
ormat for it is; we only care about the<br /> Content-Format for the Envelo=
pedData.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, i=
s signed/</p>
<p>s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS Env=
elopedData/</p>
<p>SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional sig=
ning/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Also, did we explicitly consider and reject A=
uthEnvelopedData?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Not sure about this</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;key is included in the encr=
yptedKey attribute in a KEKRecipientInfo<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;structure=
=2E &nbsp;In the case where the asymmetric encryption key is<br /> &nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;suitable for transport key operations the generated private key i=
s<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;encrypted with a symmetric key which is encrypted=
 by the client<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;defined (in the CSR) asymmetric publ=
ic key and is carried in an<br /> <br /> nit: hyphenate "client-defined"</p=
>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; done &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;encrypted=
Key attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key<br /> &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmet=
ric<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;key which is encrypted by the client defined (i=
n the CSR) asymmetric<br /> <br /> In the key-agreement case, the symmetric=
 key-encryption key is the<br /> result of the key-agreement operation, no?=
 &nbsp;In which case it is not<br /> itself encrypted, but rather the serve=
r's ephemeral public value is<br /> sent.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a=
 randomly</p>
<p>generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The =
cryptographic strength of</p>
<p>the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified=
</p>
<p>asymmetric key.</p>
<p>However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value.</p>
<p>I don&rsquo;t know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text.</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;public key and is carried i=
n an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;KeyAgree=
RecipientInfo.<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[RFC7030] recommends the use =
of additional encryption of the returned<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;private ke=
y. &nbsp;For the context of this specification, clients and<br /> &nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST<br =
/> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-For=
mat 284).<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the=
 private key (CMS<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280=
) SHOULD be supported for<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;deployments where end-to-=
end encryption needs to be provided between<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the cli=
ent and a server. &nbsp;Such cases could include architectures<br /> &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DT=
LS<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;connection (Registrar in Figure 4).<br /> <br />=
 This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for<br /> =
software support. &nbsp;Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of<br =
/> encryption stand? &nbsp;It's probably worth being explicit, either way=
=2E</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart =
the responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The recomme=
ndations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in my opinion=
=2E The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you see a bette=
r way to do this.</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 6<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The =
EST-coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar MUST terminate EST-coaps downstream<br /> &nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;and initiate EST connections over TLS upstream. &nbsp;The Reg=
istrar MUST<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;authenticate and OPTIONALLY authorize t=
he clients and it MUST be</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Suggestion:</p>
<p>s/ authenticate and OPTIONALLY authorize the clients and/</p>
<p>authenticate and authorize client request, while/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Why OPTIONAL? &nbsp;(Also, nit: OPTIONALLY is=
n't a 2119 keyword; only OPTIONAL.)<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;client=
=2E &nbsp;For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking<br /> &=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;information that does not match the current TLS session be=
cause the<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;authenticated EST client Registrar has ve=
rified this information when<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;acting as an EST serve=
r.<br /> <br /> This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think=
 about<br /> actually quoting and using quotation marks.<br /> nit: s/POP/P=
oP/ if we don't do the literal quote.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Hope my co-authors will react to this</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For some use cases, clients=
 that leverage server-side key generation<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;might pre=
fer for the enrolled keys to be generated by the Registrar<br /> &nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;if the CA does not support server-side key generation. &nbsp;Such<b=
r /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Registrar is responsible for generating a new CSR si=
gned by a new key<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;which will be returned to the cli=
ent along with the certificate from<br /> <br /> nit: "Such a Registrar"</p=
>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; done &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the CA. &=
nbsp;In these cases, the Registrar MUST support random number<br /> &nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;generation using proper entropy.<br /> <br /> Not just support -=
- use!</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;done &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Additional=
ly, a conversion from CBOR major type 2 to Base64 encoding<br /> &nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;MUST take place at the Registrar when server-side key generation is=
<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;supported. &nbsp;[...]<br /> <br /> Not always?</p=
>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; IMO always; removed the when&hellip;.</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;key, the encrypted CMS Enve=
lopedData blob MUST be converted to binary<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;in CBOR =
type 2 downstream to the client.<br /> <br /> I think we should reword this=
 -- my first reading of "downstream to the<br /> client" is "after the clie=
nt in the processing path", which doesn't<br /> actually help the client. &=
nbsp;Presumably we mean at the registrar, in the<br /> downstream direction=
, towards the client.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/ MUST be converted to binary in CBOR type 2 downstream to the client=
=2E/</p>
<p>MUST be converted at the Registrar to binary CBOR type 2 downstream to t=
he client./</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The EST-coaps-to-HTT=
P Registrar MUST support resource discovery<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;accordi=
ng to the rules in Section 5.1. &nbsp;Section 5.1.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Second section 5.1 is removed</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Do we need to say anything about translation =
of discovered URIs?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; I don&rsquo;t think so;</p>
<p>The Registrar discovers the EST server, while the TLS client discovers t=
he registrar. I don&rsquo;t see the client discovering the EST server throu=
gh the Registrar</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 7<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This=
 section addresses transmission parameters described in sections<br /> &nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;4.7 and 4.8 of [RFC7252]. &nbsp;EST does not impose any uniqu=
e values on<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the CoAP parameters in [RFC7252], but t=
he EST parameter values need<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;to be tuned to the CoA=
P parameter values.<br /> <br /> I don't understand what "but the EST param=
eter values need to be tuned<br /> to the CoAP parameter values" means.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/ but the EST parameter values need to be tuned to the CoAP parameter v=
alues/</p>
<p>but the setting of the CoAP parameter values may have consequences for t=
he setting of the EST parameter values/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;.<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is recommended, based o=
n experiments, to follow the default CoAP<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;configura=
tion parameters ([RFC7252]). &nbsp;However, depending on the<br /> &nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;implementation scenario, retransmissions and timeouts can also oc=
cur<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;on other networking layers, governed by other c=
onfiguration<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;parameters. &nbsp;A change in a server=
 parameter MUST ensure the adjusted<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;value is also a=
vailable to all the endpoints with which these<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;adju=
sted values are to be used to communicate.<br /> <br /> I don't understand =
who this is a normative requirement upon. &nbsp;Is it the<br /> network ope=
rator's, to propagate configuration changes? &nbsp;Or is there<br /> suppos=
ed to be some automated protocol that makes adjusted values<br /> available=
?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>It is meant as reminder to anyone doing the configuration of a given ins=
tallation; you want to suppress the text?</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;o &nbsp;NSTART: A parameter=
 that controls the number of simultaneous<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;outstanding interactions that a client maintains to a given<br /> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;server. &nbsp;An EST-coaps client is no=
t expected to interact with more<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
than one servers at the same time, which is the default NSTART<br /> &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;value defined in [RFC7252].<br /> <br /> nit:=
 there's a mismatch between "to a given server" and "more than one<br /> se=
rvers at the same time". &nbsp;(Also, s/one servers/one server/.)</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/ not expected to interact with more than one servers at the same time/=
</p>
<p>/is expected to control at most one interaction with a given server,/</p=
>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;o &nbsp;PROBING_RATE: A par=
ameter which specifies the rate of re-sending<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;non-confirmable messages. &nbsp;The EST messages are defined t=
o be sent<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;as CoAP confirmable mes=
sages, hence this setting is not<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
applicable.<br /> <br /> Section 5.4 only has it as RECOMMENDED to send req=
uests in CON messages,<br /> so we should still say something here.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/ The EST messages are defined to be sent as CoAP confirmable messages,=
 hence this setting is not applicable./</p>
<p>In the rare situations that non-confirmable messages are used, the defau=
lt PROBING_RATE value defined in RFC7252 applies./</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> <br /> Section 9.1<br /> <br /> I think we pr=
obably need this document as a reference for all the<br /> allocations; as =
the document effectuating the registration, we are still<br /> of interest =
even if most details of content encoding lie elsewhere.<br /> <br /> Sectio=
n 9.2<br /> <br /> The grammar for these entries is a bit stilted, though t=
he existing<br /> registrations are not so far off.<br /> <br /> nit: shoul=
d ace.est.att include the word "get" like ace.est.crts does?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; added get &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 10.1<br /> <br=
 /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The security considerations of Section 6 of [RFC7030]=
 are only<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;partially valid for the purposes of this =
document. &nbsp;As HTTP Basic<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Authentication is not=
 supported, the considerations expressed for<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;using =
passwords do not apply.<br /> <br /> It may be worth explicitly stating tha=
t "the other portions of the<br /> security considerations of RFC 7030 cont=
inue to apply".</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;added &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Modern se=
curity protocols require random numbers to be available<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;during the protocol run, for example for nonces, ephemeral (EC)<br /> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Diffie-Hellman key generation. &nbsp;This capability to g=
enerate random<br /> <br /> nit: the comma expects a 3+ element list but we=
 only have two elements.<br /> Just "and" suffices?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;absolutely right &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;Analysis SHOULD be done to establish whether server-side key<br /> &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;generation increases or decreases the probability of digital id=
entity<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;theft.<br /> <br /> In the abstract sense, t=
his seems like a non-normative "should". &nbsp;But if<br /> we make it appl=
y specifically to those deploying server-side key<br /> generation then it =
is appropriately normative.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Preceded by: For those deploying server-side key generation,</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is important to note tha=
t sources contributing to the randomness<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;pool used =
to generate random numbers on laptops or desktop PCs are<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;not available on many constrained devices, such as mouse movement,<br=
 /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;timing of keystrokes, air turbulence on the movement =
of hard drive<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;heads, as pointed out in [PsQs]. &nbs=
p;Other sources have to be used or<br /> <br /> nit: need an "and" (or "or"=
) to close the list.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;repaired with or&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;It is also RECOMMENDED that the Implicit Trust Anchor database used<br /> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;for EST server authentication is carefully managed to red=
uce the<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;chance of a third-party CA with poor certif=
ication practices<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;jeopardizing authentication. &nbs=
p;Disabling the Implicit Trust Anchor<br /> <br /> We may want to call out =
that since the implicit database is used for the<br /> initial /crts reques=
t, that single jeporadized exchange could cause all<br /> subsequent exchan=
ges from that client to be compromised as well.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; before Disabling:</p>
<p>&ldquo;Remark that the initial /crts request uses the implicit database,=
 and that a compromised implicit database has as consequence that all subse=
quent exchanges from that client are jeopardized.&rdquo;</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;database after successfully=
 receiving the Distribution of CA<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;certificates resp=
onse (Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030]) limits any risk to<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;the first DTLS exchange. &nbsp;Alternatively, in a case where a /sen<br /=
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;request immediately follows a /crts, a client MAY choos=
e to keep the<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;connection authenticated by the Impli=
cit TA open for efficiency<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;reasons (Section 4). &nb=
sp;A client that pipelines EST-coaps /crts request<br /> <br /> nit: is "pi=
pelines" the right word here, given that HTTP pipelining is a<br /> thing a=
nd CoAP pipelining (probably?) isn't, and the former isn't what<br /> we're=
 doing anyway?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; suggestion:</p>
<p>s/pipelines/interleaves/</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p><br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;What's more, POP linking uses tls-unique as it =
is defined in<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[RFC5929]. &nbsp;The 3SHAKE attack [t=
ripleshake] poses a risk by allowing<br /> <br /> nit: "such POP linking" o=
r "the CMC POP linking"</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;CMC POP &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a man-i=
n-the-middle to leverage session resumption and renegotiation<br /> &nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;to inject himself between a client and server even when channel<=
br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;binding is in use. &nbsp;The attack was possible be=
cause of certain (D)TLS<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;implementation imperfection=
s. &nbsp;In the context of this specification,<br /> <br /> I don't think w=
e can solely blame the attacks on implementation<br /> imperfections (thoug=
h they were certainly compounding factors). &nbsp;Does<br /> this sentence =
really add any value to the current document?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Leave this to my co-authors</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;binding mechanism. &nbsp;Su=
ch a mechanism could include an updated tls-<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;unique=
 value generation like the tls-unique-prf defined in<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;[I-D.josefsson-sasl-tls-cb] by using a TLS exporter [RFC5705] in TLS<br /=
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;1.2 or TLS 1.3's updated exporter (Section 7.5 of [RFC8=
446]). &nbsp;Such<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;mechanism has not been standardiz=
ed yet. &nbsp;Adopting a channel binding<br /> <br /> We probably should be=
 explicit about "using a TLS Exporter value in<br /> place of the tls-uniqu=
e value in the CSR", just from a writing clarity<br /> perspective.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Leave to my co-authors from here to section 10.2</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> It might be worth splitting the triple-handsh=
ake bits (including open<br /> question) into a separate subsection so that=
 we can make a forward<br /> reference to it from earlier in the document=
=2E<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;value generated from an exporter would b=
reak backwards compatibility.<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Thus, in this specifi=
cation we still depend on the tls-unique<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;mechanism =
defined in [RFC5929], especially since a 3SHAKE attack does<br /> &nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;not expose messages exchanged with EST-coaps.<br /> <br /> I suppo=
se that new endpoint names would be one way to work through the<br /> backw=
ards-compatibility break, though it's not entirely clear that we<br /> need=
 to say so in this document. &nbsp;We probably do want to say that even<br =
/> though EST-coaps looks like a new protocol that could get away with<br /=
> changing the default, we want to preserve the ability for the RA to<br />=
 proxy through to a "classic" EST HTTPS server, so we are in fact<br /> con=
strained to use the compatible choice.<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Regar=
ding the Certificate Signing Request (CSR), an EST-coaps server<br /> &nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;is expected to be able to recover from improper CSR requests=
=2E<br /> <br /> What does "recover" mean? &nbsp;Is it just "not crash" or =
is it expected to<br /> somehow still be able to issue a certificate? &nbsp=
;(If the former, that<br /> might be implicit in an RFC 3552 threat model, =
though saying it<br /> explicitly probably doesn't hurt.)<br /> <br /> Sect=
ion 10.2<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Registrar proposed in Section 6=
 must be deployed with care, and<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;only when the reco=
mmended connections are impossible. &nbsp;When POP<br /> <br /> Do we actua=
lly explicitly say that the direct connection is recommended<br /> anywhere=
? &nbsp;If not, we should.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Added at the end of the first paragraph of section 6:</p>
<p>When not explicitly needed, it is RECOMMENDED to use direct connections =
between EST server and client</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;</p>
<p><br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;linking is used the Registrar terminatin=
g the TLS connection<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;establishes a new one with the=
 upstream CA. &nbsp;Thus, it is impossible<br /> <br /> I think technically=
 it terminates DTLS and esablishes a new TLS<br /> connection.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>s/ terminating the TLS connection establishes a new one/</p>
<p>terminating the DTLS connection establishes a new TLS connection/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;for POP linking to be enfor=
ced end-to-end for the EST transaction.<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The EST ser=
ver could be configured to accept POP linking information<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;that does not match the current TLS session because the authenticate=
d<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;EST Registrar client has verified this informatio=
n when acting as an<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;EST server.<br /> <br /> I thin=
k we need to say that the EST server "assumes" or "trusts" that<br /> the r=
egistrar has verified this information -- it is to some extent a<br /> leap=
 of faith.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; Suggestion:</p>
<p>s/ client has verified this information when acting as an EST server /</=
p>
<p>acting as an EST-server, assumes that the client has verified this infor=
mation/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The introduction of an EST-=
coaps-to-HTTP Registrar assumes the client<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;can trus=
t the registrar using its implicit or explicit TA database.<br /> <br /> I'=
m not entirely sold on "trust" as the best word here (vs., e.g.,<br /> vali=
date), but don't object to it.<br /> </p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt; leave as is, have no better word &lt;/pvds&gt;</p>
<p><br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;generating the key. &nbsp;In such cases, the ex=
istence of a Registrar<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;requires the client to put i=
ts trust on the registrar doing the right<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;thing if =
it is generating the private key.<br /> <br /> This is true, though it (pro=
bably correctly, for our purposes) does not<br /> give any indication of wh=
at "the right thing" is intended to be :)</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Remove: &ldquo;doing the right thing&rdquo;</p>
<p>s/if/when/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Section 11.2<br /> <br /> I think draft-ietf-=
lamps-rfc5751-bis, RFC 5958, RFC 8075, and RFC 8422<br /> should be normati=
ve references.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;done; &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> If we're going to say that =
this spec requires conformance to RFC 7925's<br /> DTLS profile (which we c=
urrently don't, but I suggest above that we do),<br /> it will need to be a=
 normative reference as well.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>In section 4,</p>
<p>/fits into/conforms to/</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> I don't understand why RFC 7231 is in the 're=
ference' column for<br /> application/csrattrs in Table 4; its presence the=
re would normally<br /> suggest that it should be a normative reference.&nb=
sp;</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Removed RFC7231, it is not mentioned in RFC7030</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> RFC 5929 is interesting, as it is of course a=
 normative reference for<br /> RFC 7030, which we use normatively, but we m=
ay not need to cite it<br /> directly as a normative reference from this do=
cument.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Continue to do so</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> It may be worth citing RFC 7525 as BCP 195 wh=
ere it appears.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;To be done &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Appendix A<br /> <br /=
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;transported in hex, but in binary. &nbsp;The payloads a=
re shown<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;unencrypted. &nbsp;In practice the message=
 content would be transferred<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;over an encrypted DTL=
S tunnel.<br /> <br /> I expect a tsvart reviewer to complain about the use=
 of the word<br /> "tunnel" here, and suggest "channel" as an alternative=
=2E</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;done &lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The certif=
icate responses included in the examples contain Content-<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;Format 281 (application/pkcs7). &nbsp;If the client had requested Co=
ntent-<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Format TBD287 (application/pkix-cert) by que=
rying /est/skc, the<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;server would respond with a sin=
gle DER binary certificate.<br /> <br /> Just to check my own understanding=
: this will always appear within a<br /> multipart-core container, right?</=
p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Added: in the multipart-core container</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Appendix A.1<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;Option (Uri-Port)<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;Option Delta =3D 0x4 &nbsp;(option# 3+4=3D7)<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Option Length =3D 0x4<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Option Value =3D 9085<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Option (Uri-Path)<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Option Delta =3D 0x4 &nbsp;&nbsp;(option# 7+4=3D11)<br /=
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Option Length =3D 0x5<br =
/> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Option Value =3D "est"<b=
r /> <br /> This is more for my own edification than the document's sake, s=
o thank<br /> you for your time, but what accounts for the "extra" length h=
ere? &nbsp;The<br /> "est" is three bytes, and what makes up for the other =
two? &nbsp;Also, I<br /> assume that the port value of 9805 is the decimal =
value, which gets<br /> CBOR encoded into two bytes &nbsp;of integer encodi=
ng plus the byte with<br /> additional information 25 to indicate the two-b=
yte integer, and another<br /> byte that I need help accounting for.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Many thanks; an old misreading of an example in 7252.</p>
<p>For the option length of URI-Path we included the quotations as well; Th=
at is WRONG.</p>
<p>Repaired it everywhere.</p>
<p>Options are not CBOR encoded.</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Appendix A.2<br /> <br /> Do we want to say a=
nything about the IDevID in the CSR/cert?<br /> I note that the breakdown i=
n Appendix C.2 (looks like openssl output)<br /> does not decode the otherN=
ame (though asn1parse can be convinced to do<br /> so).</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>What do you suggest for IDevID?</p>
<p>Actually openssl was used extensively for generating the examples.</p>
<p>Will be happy to learn about otherName</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Appendix A.3<br /> <br /> I'm having trouble =
validating the private key in the PKCS#8 component:<br /> asn1parse says:</=
p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>As input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der:</p>
<p>308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br /> 6b020=
101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7<br /> 679a01ca8c6f0=
c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc<br /> 494f028bc351cc80c03f1=
50bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95<br /> cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b563=
8e59fd9</p>
<p><br /></p>
<p>I used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\</p>
<p>-passin pass:watnietweet</p>
<p>The password is may be prohibitive?</p>
<p>Resulting in:<br />Private-Key: (256 bit)<br /> priv:<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp; 61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; 6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 0=
c:37<br /> pub: <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:=
71:23:bf:2d:<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:1=
5:0b:f5:<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7=
:90:<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:=
<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 56:38:e5:9f:d9<br /> ASN1 OID: prime256v1<br /> N=
IST CURVE: P-256<br /> &nbsp;<br /> <br /> $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -infor=
m der<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648c=
e3d030107046d30<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28=
cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a14403420=
0041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65=
d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f=
3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp=
;hl=3D3 l=3D 135 cons: SEQUENCE &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;3:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&=
nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;:00<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;19 =
cons: SEQUENCE &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />=
 &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;8:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;7 prim: OBJE=
CT &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:id-ec=
PublicKey<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;17:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;8 =
prim: OBJECT &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;:prime256v1<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;27:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D 109 prim=
: OCTET STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A6=
7785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8=
C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A28437=
60FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284CC99F<br /> <br /> which doesn'=
t look like an RFC5208 PrivateKeyInfo:<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyInfo ::=3D SEQUENCE {<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;version &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version,<b=
r /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;privateKeyAlgorithm &n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,<br /> &nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;privateKey &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Priva=
teKey,<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;attributes &nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[0] &nbsp;IMPLICIT=
 Attributes OPTIONAL }<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Ver=
sion ::=3D INTEGER<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Private=
KeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::=3D AlgorithmIdentifier<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey ::=3D OCTET STRING<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Attributes ::=3D SET OF Attribute<br /> <br /> d=
ue to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, etc.<br /> (`openssl pkcs8` =
also chokes on it, but I don't have a working example and<br /> can't rule =
out user error there.)<br /> <br /> Even that giant OCTET STRING 27 bytes i=
n doesn't seem to match a<br /> PrivateKeyInfo:<br /> <br /> $ unhex|openss=
l asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;30818702010030=
1306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02=
010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82<br /> &n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d7=
8<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f<br /> &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D 107 cons: SEQUENCE &nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;2:=
d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:01<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;5:d=
=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;32 prim: OCTET STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;[HEX DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B0169=
7BD8A6<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;39:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;68 cons: co=
nt [ 1 ] &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;41:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;66 prim: BIT STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br /> <br /> though the OCTET STRING does have the pr=
ivate key and the BIT STRING has<br /> the public key's contents as depicte=
d in C.3 (details of that too boring<br /> to show).<br /> <br /> So I have=
 to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.<br /> <br /> Section A=
=2E4<br /> <br /> I'm not sure how useful repeating the RFC 7030 csrattrs i=
s: do we expect<br /> (e.g.) brainpoolP384r1 to be relevant for our readers=
?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>It was added for completeness sake; nothing more.</p>
<p>Suppressing it may provoke other questions like: Why is it not there?</p=
>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Appendix B.1<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a=
nd BLOCK option Block2. &nbsp;The minimum PMTU is 1280 bytes, which is<br /=
> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the example value assumed for the DTLS datagram size. &=
nbsp;The example<br /> <br /> I'm not seeing how this relates to the rest o=
f the section.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>I see. We do not use it anymore.; suppressed it.</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;The CoAP message adds around 10 bytes,<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the=
 DTLS record 29 bytes. &nbsp;To avoid IP fragmentation, the CoAP Block<br /=
> <br /> The DTLS overhead can also vary based on cipher suite, padding, et=
c., so<br /> a bit more qualification ("we assume", "around", etc.) might b=
e in<br /> order.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Added: &ldquo;in this example&rdquo;</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;tenth packet of 63 bytes. &=
nbsp;The client sends an IPv6 packet containing<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the=
 UDP datagram with the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP<br /> &nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;request 10 times. &nbsp;The server returns an IPv6 packet contai=
ning the<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;UDP datagram with the DTLS record that enc=
apsulates the CoAP<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;response. &nbsp;The CoAP request=
-response exchange with block option is<br /> <br /> The definite vs. indef=
inite articles here don't seem quite right, and<br /> each of the 10 datagr=
ams do not encapsulate the entire CoAP request.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>I don&rsquo;t understand your meaning.</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;with exponent (2**(SZX+4)) =
separated by slashes. &nbsp;The Length 64 is<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;used w=
ith SZX=3D2 to avoid IP fragmentation. &nbsp;The CoAP Request is sent<br />=
 <br /> We just said "to avoid IP fragmentation" ten lines ago.<br /> <br /=
> &lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Removed</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;</p>
<p><br /> Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchange=
s in<br /> this document?</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>No opinion</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Appendix B.2<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I=
n this example, the requested Block2 size of 256 bytes, required by<br /> &=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the client, is transferred to the server in the very first=
 request<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;message. &nbsp;The block size 256=3D(2**(S=
ZX+4)) which gives SZX=3D4. &nbsp;The<br /> <br /> I don't see a Block2 siz=
e in the first request message, just Block1:</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>Thanks. Block1 it is</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;POST [2001:db8::2:321]:6161=
6/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR req} --&gt;<br /> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&lt;-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)=
<br /> <br /> <br /> Also, we seem to have stopped using the "{CSR req frag=
#2}" notation that<br /> we had in the main body text.</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;That is an oversight; adapted</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> Appendix C.2<br /> <br /> [I mentioned otherN=
ame's non-decoding earlier]<br /> <br /> Appendix C.3<br /> <br /> I find i=
t kind of amusing that we have a "Netscape Comment" in the<br /> generated =
cert :)</p>
<p>&lt;pvds&gt;</p>
<p>This was the result of a lengthy openssl struggle.</p>
<p>Any suggestions for improvement are very welcome indeed.</p>
<p>&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /> <br /> _</p>
<br /><br />
<p><br /></p>
</body></html>

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I have pruned and tossed in  a few [JLS] comments.

=20

Jim

=20

=20

From: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl>=20
Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5:18 AM
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; =
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; consultancy@vanderstok.org; =
ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2

=20

Hi Ben,

the last part of the responses to your thorough review.
Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.

the openssl example make me worry a bit.

See below.

Peter
_______________________________________________________________________


   SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private key,
   which may be the EST server or the EST CA.  The SignedData is further
   protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in
   Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].  In summary, the symmetrically encrypted

.... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't =
care
what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
Content-Format for the EnvelopedData.

<pvds>

s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, =
is signed/

s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS =
EnvelopedData/

SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional =
signing/

</pvds>

Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData?

<pvds>

Not sure about this

[JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and =
AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.  Which of these is used is totally =
dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.  If one requires the =
use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use =
AuthEnvelopedData.  If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice =
but to use EnvelopedData.  Everybody is slowly moving from EnvelopedData =
to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing algorithms.  I =
do not remember any discussions about this, but AuthEnvelopeData is =
generally going to be the more correct value here.   I will also note =
that there is a space between Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.

</pvds>





   encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
   Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key
   agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric
   key which is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric

In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
sent.

<pvds>

In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a =
randomly

generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The =
cryptographic strength of

the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified

asymmetric key.

However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value.

I don=E2=80=99t know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text.

[JLS] Ben, you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.  =
It does a key agreement -> KDF -> KeyWrap -> Content.  There is always a =
key wrap step between the key agreement and the content encryption key.

</pvds>

   public key and is carried in an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.

   [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
   private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
   servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
   support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
   Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
   EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
   deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
   the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
   where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
   connection (Registrar in Figure 4).

This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way.

<pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the =
responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The =
recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in =
my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you =
see a better way to do this.

</pvds>




Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only =
OPTIONAL.)

   client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
   information that does not match the current TLS session because the
   authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
   acting as an EST server.

This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
actually quoting and using quotation marks.
nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote.

<pvds>

Hope my co-authors will react to this

[JLS] I would disagree with the nit.

[JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think  =
that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS =
as it is terminating the connection.  The only exception would be in =
there is internal authentication for the EST request.

</pvds>





Section 9.1

I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are still
of interest even if most details of content encoding lie elsewhere.

[JLS] No response from Peter?


Appendix A.3

I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 component:
asn1parse says:

<pvds>

As input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der:

308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9

=20

I used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\

-passin pass:watnietweet

[JLS] I would lose the password on the key if possible.

The password is may be prohibitive?

Resulting in:
Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
    61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
    6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
    0c:37
pub:=20
    04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
    9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
    0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
    be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
    56:38:e5:9f:d9
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
=20

$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der
   308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
   6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
   45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
   0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
   cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
    0:d=3D0  hl=3D3 l=3D 135 cons: SEQUENCE         =20
    3:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D   1 prim: INTEGER           :00
    6:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D  19 cons: SEQUENCE         =20
    8:d=3D2  hl=3D2 l=3D   7 prim: OBJECT            :id-ecPublicKey
   17:d=3D2  hl=3D2 l=3D   8 prim: OBJECT            :prime256v1
   27:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D 109 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX =
DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372=
B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52=
C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284=
CC99F

which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKeyInfo:

      PrivateKeyInfo ::=3D SEQUENCE {
        version                   Version,
        privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
        privateKey                PrivateKey,
        attributes           [0]  IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }

      Version ::=3D INTEGER

      PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::=3D AlgorithmIdentifier

      PrivateKey ::=3D OCTET STRING

      Attributes ::=3D SET OF Attribute

due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, etc.
(`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working example =
and
can't rule out user error there.)

Even that giant OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a
PrivateKeyInfo:

$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27
   308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
   6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
   45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
   0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
   cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
    0:d=3D0  hl=3D2 l=3D 107 cons: SEQUENCE         =20
    2:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
    5:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D  32 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX =
DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6
   39:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D  68 cons: cont [ 1 ]       =20
   41:d=3D2  hl=3D2 l=3D  66 prim: BIT STRING       =20

though the OCTET STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has
the public key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring
to show).

So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.





Appendix B.1





Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in
this document?

<pvds>

No opinion

[JLS] As long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this =
makes no difference.  Tokens are reused after an amount of time in CoAP.

</pvds>




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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US =
link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div class=3DWordSection1><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>I have pruned and tossed in=C2=A0 a few [JLS] =
comments.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Jim<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> Peter van der Stok =
&lt;stokcons@bbhmail.nl&gt; <br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, September 3, 2019 =
5:18 AM<br><b>To:</b> Benjamin Kaduk &lt;kaduk@mit.edu&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> =
Jim Schaad &lt;ietf@augustcellars.com&gt;; =
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; consultancy@vanderstok.org; =
ace@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [Ace] AD review of =
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Hi =
Ben,<br><br>the last part of the responses to your thorough =
review.<br>Apart from nits you found some &quot;nice&quot; =
mistakes.<br><br>the openssl example make me worry a bit.<br><br>See =
below.<br><br>Peter<br>__________________________________________________=
_____________________<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private =
key,<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;which may be the EST server or the EST CA. =
&nbsp;The SignedData is further<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;protected by =
placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained =
in<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030]. &nbsp;In summary, =
the symmetrically encrypted<br><br>.... if the SignedData is not the =
outermost container, then we don't care<br>what the relevant =
Content-Format for it is; we only care about the<br>Content-Format for =
the EnvelopedData.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>s/ =
SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, is =
signed/<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>s/ The =
SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS =
EnvelopedData/<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>SignedData =
placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional =
signing/<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br>Also, did we explicitly consider and reject =
AuthEnvelopedData?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Not sure =
about this<o:p></o:p></span></p><p>[JLS] As a CMS person, I would =
consider the use of EnvelopedData and AuthEnvelopedData to be =
equivalent.=C2=A0 Which of these is used is totally dependent on what =
algorithm is used for encryption.=C2=A0 If one requires the use of =
AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use =
AuthEnvelopedData.=C2=A0 If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no =
choice but to use EnvelopedData.=C2=A0 Everybody is slowly moving from =
EnvelopedData to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing =
algorithms.=C2=A0 I do not remember any discussions about this, but =
AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to be the more correct value =
here.=C2=A0=C2=A0 I will also note that there is a space between =
Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.<o:p></o:p></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo =
structure.<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Finally, if the asymmetric encryption =
key is suitable for key<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;agreement, the generated =
private key is encrypted with a symmetric<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;key which =
is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric<br><br>In the =
key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the<br>result of =
the key-agreement operation, no? &nbsp;In which case it is not<br>itself =
encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value =
is<br>sent.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>In RFC7030 =
the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a =
randomly<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>generated =
symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The =
cryptographic strength of<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>the =
symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the =
clientspecified<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>asymmetric =
key.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>However, I =
see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public =
value.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>I =
don=E2=80=99t know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 =
text.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p>[JLS] Ben, you do not have the correct =
view of the key-agreement case.=C2=A0 It does a key agreement -&gt; KDF =
-&gt; KeyWrap -&gt; Content. =C2=A0There is always a key wrap step =
between the key agreement and the content encryption =
key.<o:p></o:p></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;public key and is carried in an =
recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in =
a<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[R=
FC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the =
returned<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;private key. &nbsp;For the context of this =
specification, clients and<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;servers that choose to =
support server-side key generation MUST<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;support =
unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format =
284).<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the =
private key (CMS<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) =
SHOULD be supported for<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;deployments where =
end-to-end encryption needs to be provided =
between<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the client and a server. &nbsp;Such cases =
could include architectures<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;where an entity between =
the client and the CA terminates the =
DTLS<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;connection (Registrar in Figure =
4).<br><br>This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, =
only for<br>software support. &nbsp;Are we letting 7030's recommendation =
for use of<br>encryption stand? &nbsp;It's probably worth being =
explicit, either way.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt; =
I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the =
responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The =
recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in =
my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you =
see a better way to do this.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>Why =
OPTIONAL? &nbsp;(Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only =
OPTIONAL.)<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;client. &nbsp;For example, it could =
be configured to accept POP linking<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;information =
that does not match the current TLS session because =
the<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;authenticated EST client Registrar has verified =
this information when<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;acting as an EST =
server.<br><br>This is close enough to a literal quote that we might =
think about<br>actually quoting and using quotation marks.<br>nit: =
s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal =
quote.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Hope my =
co-authors will react to this<o:p></o:p></span></p><p>[JLS] I would =
disagree with the nit.<o:p></o:p></p><p>[JLS] I would agree with the nit =
on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think=C2=A0 that it ought to be at =
least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS as it is terminating =
the connection.=C2=A0 The only exception would be in there is internal =
authentication for the EST request.<o:p></o:p></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br><br>Secti=
on 9.1<br><br>I think we probably need this document as a reference for =
all the<br>allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, =
we are still<br>of interest even if most details of content encoding lie =
elsewhere.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p>[JLS] No response from =
Peter?<o:p></o:p></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>Appendix =
A.3<br><br>I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 =
component:<br>asn1parse says:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>As input I =
used recently a hex dump of =
Wt1234.key.der:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>3081870201003=
01306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br>6b020101042061336a86ac=
6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7<br>679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b=
421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc<br>494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d=
81a6a245dffae790be95<br>cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9<o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>I used =
openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform =
der\<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>-passin =
pass:watnietweet<o:p></o:p></span></p><p>[JLS] I would lose the password =
on the key if possible.<o:p></o:p></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>The password =
is may be prohibitive?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Resulting =
in:<br>Private-Key: (256 bit)<br>priv:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
0c:37<br>pub: <br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
56:38:e5:9f:d9<br>ASN1 OID: prime256v1<br>NIST CURVE: =
P-256<br>&nbsp;<br><br>$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform =
der<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d=
030107046d30<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1=
d3f3925c0755799deeca7<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041b=
b8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c84=
60c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e=
304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D3 =
l=3D 135 cons: SEQUENCE =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;3:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:00<br>&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;19 cons: SEQUENCE =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;8:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;7 prim: OBJECT =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:id-ecP=
ublicKey<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;17:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;8 =
prim: OBJECT =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:prime2=
56v1<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;27:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D 109 prim: OCTET =
STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX =
DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372=
B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52=
C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284=
CC99F<br><br>which doesn't look like an RFC5208 =
PrivateKeyInfo:<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyInfo=
 ::=3D SEQUENCE =
{<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;version =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version,<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;privateKeyAlgorithm =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,<br>&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;privateKey =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey,<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;attributes =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[0] =
&nbsp;IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL =
}<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version ::=3D =
INTEGER<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyAlgorithmIde=
ntifier ::=3D =
AlgorithmIdentifier<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey=
 ::=3D OCTET =
STRING<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Attributes ::=3D SET =
OF Attribute<br><br>due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, =
etc.<br>(`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working =
example and<br>can't rule out user error there.)<br><br>Even that giant =
OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match =
a<br>PrivateKeyInfo:<br><br>$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der =
-strparse =
27<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0=
30107046d30<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d=
3f3925c0755799deeca7<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb=
8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c846=
0c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e3=
04f1717f8123f1a284cc99f<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D2 =
l=3D 107 cons: SEQUENCE =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;2:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:01<br>&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;5:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;32 prim: OCTET STRING =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX =
DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6<br=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;39:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;68 cons: cont [ 1 ] =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;41:d=3D2 =
&nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;66 prim: BIT STRING =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br><br>though the OCTET =
STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has<br>the public =
key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring<br>to =
show).<br><br>So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, =
somewhere.<br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>Appendix =
B.1<br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>Should =
we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in<br>this =
document?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>No =
opinion<o:p></o:p></span></p><p>[JLS] As long as the Token values are =
not in the same exchange, this makes no difference.=C2=A0 Tokens are =
reused after an amount of time in CoAP.<o:p></o:p></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></body></html>
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8392,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5852

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>

Section: A.3

Original Text
-------------
   d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a701756
   36f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b77037818636f
   61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a5610d
   9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e601d6f
   a29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee743a5
   2b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30

Corrected Text
--------------
   d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a70175
   636f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b7703781863
   6f61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a56
   10d9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e60
   1d6fa29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee
   743a52b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30

Notes
-----
The ASCII representation of binary bytes in Figure 10 is wrapped
on an odd number of ASCII characters. Since there are two ASCII
characters per binary bytes this splits the last byte over two
lines. 

The CBOR playground (http://cbor.me) cannot handle this and
errors out. 

This is slightly confusing for readers.

The actual bytes values are correct by all the checks I did.

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC8392 (draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-15)
--------------------------------------
Title               : CBOR Web Token (CWT)
Publication Date    : May 2018
Author(s)           : M. Jones, E. Wahlstroem, S. Erdtman, H. Tschofenig
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Recommend hold for update.

-----Original Message-----
From: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>=20
Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 11:57 AM
To: mbj@microsoft.com; erik@wahlstromstekniska.se; erdtman@spotify.com; =
Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com; rdd@cert.org; kaduk@mit.edu; =
daniel.migault@ericsson.com; ietf@augustcellars.com
Cc: lgl@island-resort.com; ace@ietf.org; rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8392 (5852)

The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8392, "CBOR Web =
Token (CWT)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5852

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>

Section: A.3

Original Text
-------------
   d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a701756
   36f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b77037818636f
   61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a5610d
   9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e601d6f
   a29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee743a5
   2b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30

Corrected Text
--------------
   d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a70175
   636f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b7703781863
   6f61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a56
   10d9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e60
   1d6fa29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee
   743a52b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30

Notes
-----
The ASCII representation of binary bytes in Figure 10 is wrapped on an =
odd number of ASCII characters. Since there are two ASCII characters per =
binary bytes this splits the last byte over two lines.=20

The CBOR playground (http://cbor.me) cannot handle this and errors out.=20

This is slightly confusing for readers.

The actual bytes values are correct by all the checks I did.

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please use =
"Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a =
decision is reached, the verifying party can log in to change the status =
and edit the report, if necessary.=20

--------------------------------------
RFC8392 (draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-15)
--------------------------------------
Title               : CBOR Web Token (CWT)
Publication Date    : May 2018
Author(s)           : M. Jones, E. Wahlstroem, S. Erdtman, H. Tschofenig
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Authentication and Authorization for Constrained =
Environments
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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--=_233a7b04bc61a60ee4ec531b4c4d9933
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
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I concluded on the pruned .

Peter
Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-09-03 20:48:

> I have pruned and tossed in  a few [JLS] comments. 
> 
> Jim 
> 
> FROM: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl> 
> SENT: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5:18 AM
> TO: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
> CC: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; consultancy@vanderstok.org; ace@ietf.org
> SUBJECT: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2 
> 
> Hi Ben,
> 
> the last part of the responses to your thorough review.
> Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.
> 
> the openssl example make me worry a bit.
> 
> See below.
> 
> Peter
> _______________________________________________________________________ 
> 
> SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private key,
> which may be the EST server or the EST CA.  The SignedData is further
> protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in
> Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].  In summary, the symmetrically encrypted
> 
> .... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't care
> what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
> Content-Format for the EnvelopedData. 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, is signed/ 
> 
> s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData/ 
> 
> SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional signing/ 
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData? 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> Not sure about this 
> 
> [JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.  Which of these is used is totally dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.  If one requires the use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use AuthEnvelopedData.  If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice but to use EnvelopedData.  Everybody is slowly moving from EnvelopedData to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing algorithms.  I do not remember any discussions about this, but AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to be the more correct value here.   I will also note that there is a space between Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.
> 
> <pvds2>
> I don't do anything here
> </pvds2> 
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
> Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key
> agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric
> key which is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric
> 
> In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
> result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
> itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
> sent. 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a randomly 
> 
> generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The cryptographic strength of 
> 
> the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified 
> 
> asymmetric key. 
> 
> However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value. 
> 
> I don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text. 
> 
> [JLS] Ben, you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.  It does a key agreement -> KDF -> KeyWrap -> Content.  There is always a key wrap step between the key agreement and the content encryption key.
> <pvds2>
> Also here I see no room for improvement then.
> <pvds2> 
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> public key and is carried in an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
> KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
> 
> [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
> private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
> servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
> support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
> Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
> EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
> deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
> the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
> where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
> connection (Registrar in Figure 4).
> 
> This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
> software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
> encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way. 
> 
> <pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you see a better way to do this. 
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only OPTIONAL.)
> 
> client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
> information that does not match the current TLS session because the
> authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
> acting as an EST server.
> 
> This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
> actually quoting and using quotation marks.
> nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote. 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> Hope my co-authors will react to this 
> 
> [JLS] I would disagree with the nit. 
> 
> [JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think  that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS as it is terminating the connection.  The only exception would be in there is internal authentication for the EST request.
> <pvds2>
> Suggest to use SHOULD and not distinguish between terminating or not.
> <pvds2> 
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> Section 9.1
> 
> I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
> allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are still
> of interest even if most details of content encoding lie elsewhere. 
> 
> [JLS] No response from Peter?
> <pvds2>
> Sorry, misunderstood. Will add <thisdocument>
> </pvds2> 
> 
> Appendix A.3
> 
> I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 component:
> asn1parse says: 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> As input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der: 
> 
> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
> 6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
> 679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
> 494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
> cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9 
> 
> I used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\ 
> 
> -passin pass:watnietweet 
> 
> [JLS] I would lose the password on the key if possible.
> 
> <pvds2>
> Right, It means changing the whole chain of certificates. and redoing the examples.
> But I understand the reason, being confronted with the disassembly failure.
> </pvds2> 
> 
> The password is may be prohibitive? 
> 
> Resulting in:
> Private-Key: (256 bit)
> priv:
> 61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
> 6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
> 0c:37
> pub: 
> 04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
> 9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
> 0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
> be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
> 56:38:e5:9f:d9
> ASN1 OID: prime256v1
> NIST CURVE: P-256
> 
> $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der
> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
> 6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
> 45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
> 0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
> cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
> 0:d=0  hl=3 l= 135 cons: SEQUENCE          
> 3:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :00
> 6:d=1  hl=2 l=  19 cons: SEQUENCE          
> 8:d=2  hl=2 l=   7 prim: OBJECT            :id-ecPublicKey
> 17:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim: OBJECT            :prime256v1
> 27:d=1  hl=2 l= 109 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284CC99F
> 
> which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKeyInfo:
> 
> PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
> version                   Version,
> privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
> privateKey                PrivateKey,
> attributes           [0]  IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }
> 
> Version ::= INTEGER
> 
> PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
> 
> PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
> 
> Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
> 
> due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, etc.
> (`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working example and
> can't rule out user error there.)
> 
> Even that giant OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a
> PrivateKeyInfo:
> 
> $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27
> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
> 6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
> 45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
> 0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
> cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
> 0:d=0  hl=2 l= 107 cons: SEQUENCE          
> 2:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
> 5:d=1  hl=2 l=  32 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6
> 39:d=1  hl=2 l=  68 cons: cont [ 1 ]        
> 41:d=2  hl=2 l=  66 prim: BIT STRING        
> 
> though the OCTET STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has
> the public key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring
> to show).
> 
> So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.
> 
> Appendix B.1
> 
> Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in
> this document? 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> No opinion 
> 
> [JLS] As long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this makes no difference.  Tokens are reused after an amount of time in CoAP.
> 
> <pvds2>
> No extra text, I gather
> </pvds2> 
> 
> </pvds>
--=_233a7b04bc61a60ee4ec531b4c4d9933
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
=3DUTF-8" /></head><body style=3D'font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana,Gen=
eva,sans-serif'>
I concluded on the pruned .<br /><br />Peter<br />
<p>Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-09-03 20:48:</p>
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0"><!-- html ignored --><!-- head ignored --><!-- meta ig=
nored --><!-- meta ignored -->
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I have pruned and tossed in&nbsp; a few [JLS] commen=
ts.<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Jim<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border: none; border-top: solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt; padding: 3.0pt=
 0in 0in 0in;">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><strong>From:</strong> Peter van der Stok &lt;stokco=
ns@bbhmail.nl&gt; <br /><strong>Sent:</strong> Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5=
:18 AM<br /><strong>To:</strong> Benjamin Kaduk &lt;kaduk@mit.edu&gt;<br />=
<strong>Cc:</strong> Jim Schaad &lt;ietf@augustcellars.com&gt;; draft-ietf-=
ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; consultancy@vanderstok.org; ace@ietf.org<br /><s=
trong>Subject:</strong> Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 p=
art 2<!-- o ignored --></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom: 12.0pt;"><span style=3D"font=
-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Hi Ben,<br /><br />the l=
ast part of the responses to your thorough review.<br />Apart from nits you=
 found some "nice" mistakes.<br /><br />the openssl example make me worry a=
 bit.<br /><br />See below.<br /><br />Peter<br />_________________________=
______________________________________________<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;SignedData is signed by the party that generated the =
private key,<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;which may be the EST server or the EST =
CA. &nbsp;The SignedData is further<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;protected by pla=
cing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030]. &nbsp;In summary, the symmetrically encrypted=
<br /><br />.... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we =
don't care<br />what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care ab=
out the<br />Content-Format for the EnvelopedData.<!-- o ignored --></span>=
</p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">s/=
 SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, is sig=
ned/<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">s/=
 The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS Envelope=
dData/<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Si=
gnedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional signing/=
<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br />Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnve=
lopedData?<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">No=
t sure about this<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p>[JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and Aut=
hEnvelopedData to be equivalent.&nbsp; Which of these is used is totally de=
pendent on what algorithm is used for encryption.&nbsp; If one requires the=
 use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use AuthEnvelopedD=
ata.&nbsp; If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice but to use Env=
elopedData.&nbsp; Everybody is slowly moving from EnvelopedData to AuthEnve=
lopedData just because everybody is changing algorithms.&nbsp; I do not rem=
ember any discussions about this, but AuthEnvelopeData is generally going t=
o be the more correct value here.&nbsp;&nbsp; I will also note that there i=
s a space between Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.<br /><br />&lt;pvds2=
&gt;<br />I don't do anything here<br />&lt;/pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></p=
>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo str=
ucture.<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is=
 suitable for key<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;agreement, the generated private k=
ey is encrypted with a symmetric<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;key which is encryp=
ted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric<br /><br />In the key-agr=
eement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the<br />result of the key=
-agreement operation, no? &nbsp;In which case it is not<br />itself encrypt=
ed, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is<br />sent.<!-- o igno=
red --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">In=
 RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a rand=
omly<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">ge=
nerated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The crypt=
ographic strength of<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">th=
e symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified<!-- =
o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">as=
ymmetric key.<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Ho=
wever, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value.<!-- o ig=
nored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">I =
don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text.<!-- o ignored --=
></span></p>
<p>[JLS] Ben, you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.&n=
bsp; It does a key agreement -&gt; KDF -&gt; KeyWrap -&gt; Content. &nbsp;T=
here is always a key wrap step between the key agreement and the content en=
cryption key.<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<br />Also here I see no room for improveme=
nt then.<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;public key and is carried in an re=
cipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;KeyAgreeRecipien=
tInfo.<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[RFC7030] recommends the use of additio=
nal encryption of the returned<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;private key. &nbsp;Fo=
r the context of this specification, clients and<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ser=
vers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST<br />&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).<br =
/>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (=
CMS<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be sup=
ported for<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;deployments where end-to-end encryption n=
eeds to be provided between<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the client and a server=
=2E &nbsp;Such cases could include architectures<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;whe=
re an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS<br />&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;connection (Registrar in Figure 4).<br /><br />This carefully sa=
ys nothing about recommendations for use, only for<br />software support. &=
nbsp;Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of<br />encryption stand?=
 &nbsp;It's probably worth being explicit, either way.<!-- o ignored --></s=
pan></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt; I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the r=
esponsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The recommendati=
ons at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in my opinion. The=
 alternative is classifying the applications; unless you see a better way t=
o do this.<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />Why OPTIONAL? &nbsp;(Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only O=
PTIONAL.)<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;client. &nbsp;For example, it could =
be configured to accept POP linking<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;information that=
 does not match the current TLS session because the<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when<br />=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;acting as an EST server.<br /><br />This is close enough =
to a literal quote that we might think about<br />actually quoting and usin=
g quotation marks.<br />nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote.<!=
-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Ho=
pe my co-authors will react to this<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p>[JLS] I would disagree with the nit.<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p>[JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think&=
nbsp; that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of CO=
APS as it is terminating the connection.&nbsp; The only exception would be =
in there is internal authentication for the EST request.<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;=
<br />Suggest to use SHOULD and not distinguish between terminating or not=
=2E<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r /><br />Section 9.1<br /><br />I think we probably need this document as =
a reference for all the<br />allocations; as the document effectuating the =
registration, we are still<br />of interest even if most details of content=
 encoding lie elsewhere.<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p>[JLS] No response from Peter?<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<br />Sorry, misundersto=
od. Will add &lt;thisdocument&gt;<br />&lt;/pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />Appendix A.3<br /><br />I'm having trouble validating the private key i=
n the PKCS#8 component:<br />asn1parse says:<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">As=
 input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der:<!-- o ignored --></spa=
n></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">30=
8187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br />6b020101042=
061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7<br />679a01ca8c6f0c37a144=
03420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc<br />494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cf=
f958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95<br />cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9<!=
-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><!=
-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">I =
used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\<!-- o ignore=
d --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">-p=
assin pass:watnietweet<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p>[JLS] I would lose the password on the key if possible.<br /><br />&lt;p=
vds2&gt;<br />Right, It means changing the whole chain of certificates. and=
 redoing the examples.<br />But I understand the reason, being confronted w=
ith the disassembly failure.<br />&lt;/pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Th=
e password is may be prohibitive?<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Re=
sulting in:<br />Private-Key: (256 bit)<br />priv:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 6a:a0=
:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 0c:37<br /=
>pub: <br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d=
:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:<br =
/>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:<br />&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:<br />&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp; 56:38:e5:9f:d9<br />ASN1 OID: prime256v1<br />NIST CURVE: P-256<=
br />&nbsp;<br /><br />$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der<br />&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br />=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799dee=
ca7<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506=
c03d70efbe82<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a613=
70a2843760fc859799d78<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a28=
4cc99f<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D3 l=3D 135 cons: SEQ=
UENCE &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;3:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:00<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;6:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;19 cons: SEQUENCE &nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;8:d=
=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;7 prim: OBJECT &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:id-ecPublicKey<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;17:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;8 prim: OBJECT &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:prime256v1<br />&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;27:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D 109 prim: OCTET STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C=
0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D=
8E38EA97E9D65D52C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1=
717F8123F1A284CC99F<br /><br />which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKe=
yInfo:<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyInfo ::=3D =
SEQUENCE {<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;version &nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version,<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;privateKeyAlgorithm &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Pr=
ivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;privateKey &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey,<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;attributes &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[0] &nbsp;IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }<br /><br />&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version ::=3D INTEGER<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::=3D AlgorithmIden=
tifier<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey ::=3D OCTE=
T STRING<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Attributes ::=3D SE=
T OF Attribute<br /><br />due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, e=
tc.<br />(`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working exa=
mple and<br />can't rule out user error there.)<br /><br />Even that giant =
OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a<br />PrivateKeyInfo:<br />=
<br />$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br />&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7<=
br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d=
70efbe82<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2=
843760fc859799d78<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc9=
9f<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D 107 cons: SEQUENC=
E &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;2:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER &nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:01<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;5:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;32 prim: OCTET STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA=
745372B01697BD8A6<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;39:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;6=
8 cons: cont [ 1 ] &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;41:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;66 prim: BIT STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br /><br />though the OCTET STRING does have=
 the private key and the BIT STRING has<br />the public key's contents as d=
epicted in C.3 (details of that too boring<br />to show).<br /><br />So I h=
ave to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.<br /><br /><br /><!--=
 o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />Appendix B.1<br /><br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in<b=
r />this document?<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">No=
 opinion<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p>[JLS] As long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this mak=
es no difference.&nbsp; Tokens are reused after an amount of time in CoAP=
=2E<br /><br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<br />No extra text, I gather<br />&lt;/pvds2&g=
t;<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</body></html>

--=_233a7b04bc61a60ee4ec531b4c4d9933--


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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

+1

On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 9:26 PM Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> Recommend hold for update.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
> Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 11:57 AM
> To: mbj@microsoft.com; erik@wahlstromstekniska.se; erdtman@spotify.com;
> Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com; rdd@cert.org; kaduk@mit.edu;
> daniel.migault@ericsson.com; ietf@augustcellars.com
> Cc: lgl@island-resort.com; ace@ietf.org; rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
> Subject: [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8392 (5852)
>
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8392, "CBOR Web
> Token (CWT)".
>
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5852
>
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
>
> Section: A.3
>
> Original Text
> -------------
>    d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a701756
>    36f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b77037818636f
>    61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a5610d
>    9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e601d6f
>    a29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee743a5
>    2b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30
>
> Corrected Text
> --------------
>    d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a70175
>    636f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b7703781863
>    6f61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a56
>    10d9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e60
>    1d6fa29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee
>    743a52b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30
>
> Notes
> -----
> The ASCII representation of binary bytes in Figure 10 is wrapped on an odd
> number of ASCII characters. Since there are two ASCII characters per binary
> bytes this splits the last byte over two lines.
>
> The CBOR playground (http://cbor.me) cannot handle this and errors out.
>
> This is slightly confusing for readers.
>
> The actual bytes values are correct by all the checks I did.
>
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please use
> "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a
> decision is reached, the verifying party can log in to change the status
> and edit the report, if necessary.
>
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8392 (draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-15)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : CBOR Web Token (CWT)
> Publication Date    : May 2018
> Author(s)           : M. Jones, E. Wahlstroem, S. Erdtman, H. Tschofenig
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : Authentication and Authorization for Constrained
> Environments
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
>
>

--000000000000acf8550591b421f5
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">+1<br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 9:26 PM Jim Schaad &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt; wrote:<b=
r></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Recommend hold fo=
r update.<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: RFC Errata System &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>&gt; <br>
Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 11:57 AM<br>
To: <a href=3D"mailto:mbj@microsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">mbj@microsoft.co=
m</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:erik@wahlstromstekniska.se" target=3D"_blank">erik=
@wahlstromstekniska.se</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:erdtman@spotify.com" target=
=3D"_blank">erdtman@spotify.com</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:Hannes.Tschofenig@ar=
m.com" target=3D"_blank">Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:r=
dd@cert.org" target=3D"_blank">rdd@cert.org</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mi=
t.edu" target=3D"_blank">kaduk@mit.edu</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:daniel.migaul=
t@ericsson.com" target=3D"_blank">daniel.migault@ericsson.com</a>; <a href=
=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com" target=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.com=
</a><br>
Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:lgl@island-resort.com" target=3D"_blank">lgl@island-r=
esort.com</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:ace@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">ace@ietf.o=
rg</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org" target=3D"_blank">rfc-=
editor@rfc-editor.org</a><br>
Subject: [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8392 (5852)<br>
<br>
The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8392, &quot;CBOR Web =
Token (CWT)&quot;.<br>
<br>
--------------------------------------<br>
You may review the report below and at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5852" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5852</a><br>
<br>
--------------------------------------<br>
Type: Editorial<br>
Reported by: Laurence Lundblade &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lgl@island-resort.com=
" target=3D"_blank">lgl@island-resort.com</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
Section: A.3<br>
<br>
Original Text<br>
-------------<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a701=
756<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A036f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b770378186=
36f<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A061703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a56=
10d<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A09f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e601=
d6f<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0a29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee74=
3a5<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A02b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30<br>
<br>
Corrected Text<br>
--------------<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a701=
75<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0636f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b77037818=
63<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A06f61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a=
56<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A010d9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e=
60<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A01d6fa29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ec=
ee<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0743a52b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30<br>
<br>
Notes<br>
-----<br>
The ASCII representation of binary bytes in Figure 10 is wrapped on an odd =
number of ASCII characters. Since there are two ASCII characters per binary=
 bytes this splits the last byte over two lines. <br>
<br>
The CBOR playground (<a href=3D"http://cbor.me" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">http://cbor.me</a>) cannot handle this and errors out. <br>
<br>
This is slightly confusing for readers.<br>
<br>
The actual bytes values are correct by all the checks I did.<br>
<br>
Instructions:<br>
-------------<br>
This erratum is currently posted as &quot;Reported&quot;. If necessary, ple=
ase use &quot;Reply All&quot; to discuss whether it should be verified or r=
ejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party can log in to chan=
ge the status and edit the report, if necessary. <br>
<br>
--------------------------------------<br>
RFC8392 (draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-15)<br>
--------------------------------------<br>
Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: CBOR Web Toke=
n (CWT)<br>
Publication Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 : May 2018<br>
Author(s)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: M. Jones, E. Wahlstroem=
, S. Erdtman, H. Tschofenig<br>
Category=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : PROPOSED STANDARD<br>
Source=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Authentication and=
 Authorization for Constrained Environments<br>
Area=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : Security<br>
Stream=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : IETF<br>
Verifying Party=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: IESG<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div>

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Let me draw back and re-address the comment from Ben about the private =
key in appendix A.3

=20

If I take=20

=20

308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30

6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7

45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82

0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78

cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f

=20

and decode it I get (with comments from me)

=20

SEQUENCE (3 elem)    -- OneAsymmetricKey (replacement of PKCS #8)

  INTEGER 0   -- Version =3D v1

  SEQUENCE (2 elem)  -- privateKeyAlgorithm

    OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.2.1 ecPublicKey (ANSI X9.62 public =
key type)  -- Alg ID

    OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 prime256v1 (ANSI X9.62 named =
elliptic curve) =E2=80=93 Parameters =3D=3D P256

  OCTET STRING (1 elem) =E2=80=93 Private Key

    SEQUENCE (3 elem) =E2=80=93 ECPrivate Key  [RFC 5915]

      INTEGER 1 =E2=80=93 Version =E2=80=93 ecPrivkeyVer1

      OCTET STRING (32 byte) =
0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6 =
=E2=80=93 Private Key value

      [1] (1 elem) =E2=80=93 Public key value

        BIT STRING (520 bit) =
0000010000011011101110001100000100010001011110001001011011111001100011=E2=
=80=A6

=20

=20

This looks correct to me.

=20

Jim

=20

=20

=20

=20

From: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl>=20
Sent: Wednesday, September 4, 2019 12:02 AM
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Cc: consultancy@vanderstok.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>; =
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2

=20

I concluded on the pruned .

Peter

Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-09-03 20:48:

I have pruned and tossed in  a few [JLS] comments.

=20

Jim

=20

=20

From: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl =
<mailto:stokcons@bbhmail.nl> >=20
Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5:18 AM
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu <mailto:kaduk@mit.edu> >
Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com <mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com> =
>; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org =
<mailto:draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org> ; =
consultancy@vanderstok.org <mailto:consultancy@vanderstok.org> ; =
ace@ietf.org <mailto:ace@ietf.org>=20
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2

=20

Hi Ben,

the last part of the responses to your thorough review.
Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.

the openssl example make me worry a bit.

See below.

Peter
_______________________________________________________________________


   SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private key,
   which may be the EST server or the EST CA.  The SignedData is further
   protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in
   Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].  In summary, the symmetrically encrypted

.... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't =
care
what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
Content-Format for the EnvelopedData.

<pvds>

s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, =
is signed/

s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS =
EnvelopedData/

SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional =
signing/

</pvds>

Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData?

<pvds>

Not sure about this

[JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and =
AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.  Which of these is used is totally =
dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.  If one requires the =
use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use =
AuthEnvelopedData.  If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice =
but to use EnvelopedData.  Everybody is slowly moving from EnvelopedData =
to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing algorithms.  I =
do not remember any discussions about this, but AuthEnvelopeData is =
generally going to be the more correct value here.   I will also note =
that there is a space between Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.

<pvds2>
I don't do anything here
</pvds2>

</pvds>






   encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
   Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key
   agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric
   key which is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric

In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
sent.

<pvds>

In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a =
randomly

generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The =
cryptographic strength of

the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified

asymmetric key.

However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value.

I don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text.

[JLS] Ben, you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.  =
It does a key agreement -> KDF -> KeyWrap -> Content.  There is always a =
key wrap step between the key agreement and the content encryption key.
<pvds2>
Also here I see no room for improvement then.
<pvds2>

</pvds>

   public key and is carried in an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.

   [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
   private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
   servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
   support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
   Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
   EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
   deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
   the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
   where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
   connection (Registrar in Figure 4).

This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way.

<pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the =
responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The =
recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in =
my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you =
see a better way to do this.

</pvds>





Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only =
OPTIONAL.)

   client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
   information that does not match the current TLS session because the
   authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
   acting as an EST server.

This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
actually quoting and using quotation marks.
nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote.

<pvds>

Hope my co-authors will react to this

[JLS] I would disagree with the nit.

[JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think  =
that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS =
as it is terminating the connection.  The only exception would be in =
there is internal authentication for the EST request.
<pvds2>
Suggest to use SHOULD and not distinguish between terminating or not.
<pvds2>

</pvds>






Section 9.1

I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are still
of interest even if most details of content encoding lie elsewhere.

[JLS] No response from Peter?
<pvds2>
Sorry, misunderstood. Will add <thisdocument>
</pvds2>


Appendix A.3

I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 component:
asn1parse says:

<pvds>

As input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der:

308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9

=20

I used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\

-passin pass:watnietweet

[JLS] I would lose the password on the key if possible.

<pvds2>
Right, It means changing the whole chain of certificates. and redoing =
the examples.
But I understand the reason, being confronted with the disassembly =
failure.
</pvds2>

The password is may be prohibitive?

Resulting in:
Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
    61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
    6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
    0c:37
pub:=20
    04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
    9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
    0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
    be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
    56:38:e5:9f:d9
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
=20

$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der
   308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
   6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
   45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
   0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
   cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
    0:d=3D0  hl=3D3 l=3D 135 cons: SEQUENCE         =20
    3:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D   1 prim: INTEGER           :00
    6:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D  19 cons: SEQUENCE         =20
    8:d=3D2  hl=3D2 l=3D   7 prim: OBJECT            :id-ecPublicKey
   17:d=3D2  hl=3D2 l=3D   8 prim: OBJECT            :prime256v1
   27:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D 109 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX =
DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372=
B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52=
C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284=
CC99F

which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKeyInfo:

      PrivateKeyInfo ::=3D SEQUENCE {
        version                   Version,
        privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
        privateKey                PrivateKey,
        attributes           [0]  IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }

      Version ::=3D INTEGER

      PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::=3D AlgorithmIdentifier

      PrivateKey ::=3D OCTET STRING

      Attributes ::=3D SET OF Attribute

due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, etc.
(`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working example =
and
can't rule out user error there.)

Even that giant OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a
PrivateKeyInfo:

$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27
   308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
   6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
   45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
   0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
   cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
    0:d=3D0  hl=3D2 l=3D 107 cons: SEQUENCE         =20
    2:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
    5:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D  32 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX =
DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6
   39:d=3D1  hl=3D2 l=3D  68 cons: cont [ 1 ]       =20
   41:d=3D2  hl=3D2 l=3D  66 prim: BIT STRING       =20

though the OCTET STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has
the public key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring
to show).

So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.






Appendix B.1






Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in
this document?

<pvds>

No opinion

[JLS] As long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this =
makes no difference.  Tokens are reused after an amount of time in CoAP.

<pvds2>
No extra text, I gather
</pvds2>

</pvds>





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link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div class=3DWordSection1><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Let me draw back and re-address the comment from Ben =
about the private key in appendix A.3<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>If I take =
<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Courier =
New"'>cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>and decode =
it I get (with comments from me)<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>SEQUENCE (3 =
elem)=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- OneAsymmetricKey (replacement of PKCS =
#8)<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; INTEGER 0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- =
Version =3D v1<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; SEQUENCE (2 =
elem)=C2=A0 -- privateKeyAlgorithm<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.2.1 =
ecPublicKey (ANSI X9.62 public key type)=C2=A0 -- Alg =
ID<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER =
1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 prime256v1 (ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curve) =
=E2=80=93 Parameters =3D=3D P256<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; OCTET STRING (1 elem) =E2=80=93 Private =
Key<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; &nbsp; SEQUENCE (3 elem) =
=E2=80=93 ECPrivate Key=C2=A0 [RFC 5915]<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; INTEGER 1 =E2=80=93 Version =
=E2=80=93 ecPrivkeyVer1<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; OCTET STRING (32 byte) =
0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6 =
=E2=80=93 Private Key value<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; [1] (1 elem) =E2=80=93 Public key value<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; BIT STRING (520 bit) =
0000010000011011101110001100000100010001011110001001011011111001100011=E2=
=80=A6<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>This looks =
correct to me.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Jim<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b>From:</b> Peter van der Stok =
&lt;stokcons@bbhmail.nl&gt; <br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, September 4, =
2019 12:02 AM<br><b>To:</b> Jim Schaad =
&lt;ietf@augustcellars.com&gt;<br><b>Cc:</b> consultancy@vanderstok.org; =
'Benjamin Kaduk' &lt;kaduk@mit.edu&gt;; =
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b> =
Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part =
2<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>I concluded =
on the pruned .<br><br>Peter<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Jim Schaad =
schreef op 2019-09-03 20:48:<o:p></o:p></span></p><blockquote =
style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid #1010FF 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
5.0pt;margin-left:0in;margin-right:0in'><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>I have =
pruned and tossed in&nbsp; a few [JLS] comments.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&nbsp;<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Jim<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&nbsp;<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&nbsp;<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><strong><spa=
n =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>From:</span><=
/strong><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'> Peter van =
der Stok &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:stokcons@bbhmail.nl">stokcons@bbhmail.nl</a>&gt; =
<br><strong><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Sent:</span></strong> =
Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5:18 AM<br><strong><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>To:</span></strong> Benjamin =
Kaduk &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt;<br><strong><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Cc:</span></strong> Jim =
Schaad &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt;; =
<a =
href=3D"mailto:draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org">draft-ietf-ace-coap-=
est.all@ietf.org</a>; <a =
href=3D"mailto:consultancy@vanderstok.org">consultancy@vanderstok.org</a>=
; <a href=3D"mailto:ace@ietf.org">ace@ietf.org</a><br><strong><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Subject:</span></strong> Re: =
[Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part =
2<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&nbsp;<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'mso-margin-top-alt:auto;margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Hi =
Ben,<br><br>the last part of the responses to your thorough =
review.<br>Apart from nits you found some &quot;nice&quot; =
mistakes.<br><br>the openssl example make me worry a bit.<br><br>See =
below.<br><br>Peter<br>__________________________________________________=
_____________________<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private =
key,<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;which may be the EST server or the EST CA. =
&nbsp;The SignedData is further<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;protected by =
placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained =
in<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030]. &nbsp;In summary, =
the symmetrically encrypted<br><br>.... if the SignedData is not the =
outermost container, then we don't care<br>what the relevant =
Content-Format for it is; we only care about the<br>Content-Format for =
the EnvelopedData.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>s/ =
SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, is =
signed/<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>s/ The =
SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS =
EnvelopedData/<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>SignedData =
placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional =
signing/<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br>Also, did we explicitly consider and reject =
AuthEnvelopedData?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Not sure =
about this<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>[JLS] As a =
CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and =
AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.&nbsp; Which of these is used is =
totally dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.&nbsp; If one =
requires the use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use =
AuthEnvelopedData.&nbsp; If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no =
choice but to use EnvelopedData.&nbsp; Everybody is slowly moving from =
EnvelopedData to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing =
algorithms.&nbsp; I do not remember any discussions about this, but =
AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to be the more correct value =
here.&nbsp;&nbsp; I will also note that there is a space between =
Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.<br><br>&lt;pvds2&gt;<br>I don't do =
anything here<br>&lt;/pvds2&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo =
structure.<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Finally, if the asymmetric encryption =
key is suitable for key<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;agreement, the generated =
private key is encrypted with a symmetric<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;key which =
is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric<br><br>In the =
key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the<br>result of =
the key-agreement operation, no? &nbsp;In which case it is not<br>itself =
encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value =
is<br>sent.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>In RFC7030 =
the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a =
randomly<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>generated =
symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The =
cryptographic strength of<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>the =
symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the =
clientspecified<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>asymmetric =
key.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>However, I =
see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public =
value.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>I don't know =
what to do here; probably insert the 7030 =
text.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>[JLS] Ben, =
you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.&nbsp; It =
does a key agreement -&gt; KDF -&gt; KeyWrap -&gt; Content. &nbsp;There =
is always a key wrap step between the key agreement and the content =
encryption key.<br>&lt;pvds2&gt;<br>Also here I see no room for =
improvement then.<br>&lt;pvds2&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;public key and is carried in an =
recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in =
a<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[R=
FC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the =
returned<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;private key. &nbsp;For the context of this =
specification, clients and<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;servers that choose to =
support server-side key generation MUST<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;support =
unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format =
284).<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the =
private key (CMS<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) =
SHOULD be supported for<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;deployments where =
end-to-end encryption needs to be provided =
between<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the client and a server. &nbsp;Such cases =
could include architectures<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;where an entity between =
the client and the CA terminates the =
DTLS<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;connection (Registrar in Figure =
4).<br><br>This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, =
only for<br>software support. &nbsp;Are we letting 7030's recommendation =
for use of<br>encryption stand? &nbsp;It's probably worth being =
explicit, either way.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt; =
I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the =
responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The =
recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in =
my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you =
see a better way to do this.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>Why =
OPTIONAL? &nbsp;(Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only =
OPTIONAL.)<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;client. &nbsp;For example, it could =
be configured to accept POP linking<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;information =
that does not match the current TLS session because =
the<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;authenticated EST client Registrar has verified =
this information when<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;acting as an EST =
server.<br><br>This is close enough to a literal quote that we might =
think about<br>actually quoting and using quotation marks.<br>nit: =
s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal =
quote.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Hope my =
co-authors will react to this<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>[JLS] I =
would disagree with the nit.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>[JLS] I =
would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think&nbsp; =
that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS =
as it is terminating the connection.&nbsp; The only exception would be =
in there is internal authentication for the EST =
request.<br>&lt;pvds2&gt;<br>Suggest to use SHOULD and not distinguish =
between terminating or =
not.<br>&lt;pvds2&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br><br>Secti=
on 9.1<br><br>I think we probably need this document as a reference for =
all the<br>allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, =
we are still<br>of interest even if most details of content encoding lie =
elsewhere.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>[JLS] No =
response from Peter?<br>&lt;pvds2&gt;<br>Sorry, misunderstood. Will add =
&lt;thisdocument&gt;<br>&lt;/pvds2&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>Appendix =
A.3<br><br>I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 =
component:<br>asn1parse says:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>As input I =
used recently a hex dump of =
Wt1234.key.der:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>3081870201003=
01306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br>6b020101042061336a86ac=
6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7<br>679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b=
421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc<br>494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d=
81a6a245dffae790be95<br>cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9<o:p></o:p></=
span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&nbsp;<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>I used =
openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform =
der\<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>-passin =
pass:watnietweet<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>[JLS] I =
would lose the password on the key if =
possible.<br><br>&lt;pvds2&gt;<br>Right, It means changing the whole =
chain of certificates. and redoing the examples.<br>But I understand the =
reason, being confronted with the disassembly =
failure.<br>&lt;/pvds2&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>The password =
is may be prohibitive?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>Resulting =
in:<br>Private-Key: (256 bit)<br>priv:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
0c:37<br>pub: <br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
56:38:e5:9f:d9<br>ASN1 OID: prime256v1<br>NIST CURVE: =
P-256<br>&nbsp;<br><br>$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform =
der<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d=
030107046d30<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1=
d3f3925c0755799deeca7<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041b=
b8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c84=
60c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e=
304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D3 =
l=3D 135 cons: SEQUENCE =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;3:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:00<br>&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;19 cons: SEQUENCE =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;8:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;7 prim: OBJECT =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:id-ecP=
ublicKey<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;17:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;8 =
prim: OBJECT =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:prime2=
56v1<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;27:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D 109 prim: OCTET =
STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX =
DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372=
B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52=
C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284=
CC99F<br><br>which doesn't look like an RFC5208 =
PrivateKeyInfo:<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyInfo=
 ::=3D SEQUENCE =
{<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;version =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version,<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;privateKeyAlgorithm =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,<br>&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;privateKey =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey,<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;attributes =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[0] =
&nbsp;IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL =
}<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version ::=3D =
INTEGER<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyAlgorithmIde=
ntifier ::=3D =
AlgorithmIdentifier<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey=
 ::=3D OCTET =
STRING<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Attributes ::=3D SET =
OF Attribute<br><br>due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, =
etc.<br>(`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working =
example and<br>can't rule out user error there.)<br><br>Even that giant =
OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match =
a<br>PrivateKeyInfo:<br><br>$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der =
-strparse =
27<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d0=
30107046d30<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d=
3f3925c0755799deeca7<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb=
8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c846=
0c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e3=
04f1717f8123f1a284cc99f<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D2 =
l=3D 107 cons: SEQUENCE =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;2:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:01<br>&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;5:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;32 prim: OCTET STRING =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX =
DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6<br=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;39:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;68 cons: cont [ 1 ] =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;41:d=3D2 =
&nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;66 prim: BIT STRING =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br><br>though the OCTET =
STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has<br>the public =
key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring<br>to =
show).<br><br>So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, =
somewhere.<br><br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>Appendix =
B.1<br><br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'><br>Should =
we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in<br>this =
document?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;pvds&gt;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>No =
opinion<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>[JLS] As =
long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this makes no =
difference.&nbsp; Tokens are reused after an amount of time in =
CoAP.<br><br>&lt;pvds2&gt;<br>No extra text, I =
gather<br>&lt;/pvds2&gt;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif'>&lt;/pvds&gt;=
<br><br><br><o:p></o:p></span></p></div></blockquote></div></body></html>
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Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2019 08:40:14 +0200
From: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Cc: consultancy@vanderstok.org, draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org, 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>, ace@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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Hi Jim,

I removed the passwd from the example, and did the disassembly as Ben
proposed.
That seems to work correctly for me.

308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9 

Peter
Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-09-04 20:02:

> Let me draw back and re-address the comment from Ben about the private key in appendix A.3 
> 
> If I take 
> 
> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30 
> 
> 6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7 
> 
> 45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82 
> 
> 0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78 
> 
> cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f 
> 
> and decode it I get (with comments from me) 
> 
> SEQUENCE (3 elem)    -- OneAsymmetricKey (replacement of PKCS #8) 
> 
> INTEGER 0   -- Version = v1 
> 
> SEQUENCE (2 elem)  -- privateKeyAlgorithm 
> 
> OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.2.1 ecPublicKey (ANSI X9.62 public key type)  -- Alg ID 
> 
> OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 prime256v1 (ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curve) - Parameters == P256 
> 
> OCTET STRING (1 elem) - Private Key 
> 
> SEQUENCE (3 elem) - ECPrivate Key  [RFC 5915] 
> 
> INTEGER 1 - Version - ecPrivkeyVer1 
> 
> OCTET STRING (32 byte) 0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6 - Private Key value 
> 
> [1] (1 elem) - Public key value 
> 
> BIT STRING (520 bit) 0000010000011011101110001100000100010001011110001001011011111001100011... 
> 
> This looks correct to me. 
> 
> Jim 
> 
> FROM: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl> 
> SENT: Wednesday, September 4, 2019 12:02 AM
> TO: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> CC: consultancy@vanderstok.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
> SUBJECT: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2 
> 
> I concluded on the pruned .
> 
> Peter 
> 
> Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-09-03 20:48:
> 
>> I have pruned and tossed in  a few [JLS] comments. 
>> 
>> Jim 
>> 
>> FROM: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl> 
>> SENT: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5:18 AM
>> TO: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
>> CC: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; consultancy@vanderstok.org; ace@ietf.org
>> SUBJECT: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2 
>> 
>> Hi Ben,
>> 
>> the last part of the responses to your thorough review.
>> Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.
>> 
>> the openssl example make me worry a bit.
>> 
>> See below.
>> 
>> Peter
>> _______________________________________________________________________ 
>> 
>> SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private key,
>> which may be the EST server or the EST CA.  The SignedData is further
>> protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in
>> Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].  In summary, the symmetrically encrypted
>> 
>> .... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't care
>> what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
>> Content-Format for the EnvelopedData. 
>> 
>> <pvds> 
>> 
>> s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, is signed/ 
>> 
>> s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData/ 
>> 
>> SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional signing/ 
>> 
>> </pvds>
>> 
>> Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData? 
>> 
>> <pvds> 
>> 
>> Not sure about this 
>> 
>> [JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.  Which of these is used is totally dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.  If one requires the use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use AuthEnvelopedData.  If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice but to use EnvelopedData.  Everybody is slowly moving from EnvelopedData to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing algorithms.  I do not remember any discussions about this, but AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to be the more correct value here.   I will also note that there is a space between Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.
>> 
>> <pvds2>
>> I don't do anything here
>> </pvds2> 
>> 
>> </pvds>
>> 
>> encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
>> Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key
>> agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric
>> key which is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric
>> 
>> In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
>> result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
>> itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
>> sent. 
>> 
>> <pvds> 
>> 
>> In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a randomly 
>> 
>> generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The cryptographic strength of 
>> 
>> the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified 
>> 
>> asymmetric key. 
>> 
>> However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value. 
>> 
>> I don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text. 
>> 
>> [JLS] Ben, you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.  It does a key agreement -> KDF -> KeyWrap -> Content.  There is always a key wrap step between the key agreement and the content encryption key.
>> <pvds2>
>> Also here I see no room for improvement then.
>> <pvds2> 
>> 
>> </pvds>
>> 
>> public key and is carried in an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
>> KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
>> 
>> [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
>> private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
>> servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
>> support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
>> Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
>> EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
>> deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
>> the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
>> where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
>> connection (Registrar in Figure 4).
>> 
>> This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
>> software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
>> encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way. 
>> 
>> <pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you see a better way to do this. 
>> 
>> </pvds>
>> 
>> Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only OPTIONAL.)
>> 
>> client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
>> information that does not match the current TLS session because the
>> authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
>> acting as an EST server.
>> 
>> This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
>> actually quoting and using quotation marks.
>> nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote. 
>> 
>> <pvds> 
>> 
>> Hope my co-authors will react to this 
>> 
>> [JLS] I would disagree with the nit. 
>> 
>> [JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think  that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS as it is terminating the connection.  The only exception would be in there is internal authentication for the EST request.
>> <pvds2>
>> Suggest to use SHOULD and not distinguish between terminating or not.
>> <pvds2> 
>> 
>> </pvds>
>> 
>> Section 9.1
>> 
>> I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
>> allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are still
>> of interest even if most details of content encoding lie elsewhere. 
>> 
>> [JLS] No response from Peter?
>> <pvds2>
>> Sorry, misunderstood. Will add <thisdocument>
>> </pvds2> 
>> 
>> Appendix A.3
>> 
>> I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 component:
>> asn1parse says: 
>> 
>> <pvds> 
>> 
>> As input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der: 
>> 
>> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
>> 6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
>> 679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
>> 494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
>> cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9 
>> 
>> I used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\ 
>> 
>> -passin pass:watnietweet 
>> 
>> [JLS] I would lose the password on the key if possible.
>> 
>> <pvds2>
>> Right, It means changing the whole chain of certificates. and redoing the examples.
>> But I understand the reason, being confronted with the disassembly failure.
>> </pvds2> 
>> 
>> The password is may be prohibitive? 
>> 
>> Resulting in:
>> Private-Key: (256 bit)
>> priv:
>> 61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
>> 6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
>> 0c:37
>> pub: 
>> 04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
>> 9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
>> 0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
>> be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
>> 56:38:e5:9f:d9
>> ASN1 OID: prime256v1
>> NIST CURVE: P-256
>> 
>> $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der
>> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
>> 6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
>> 45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
>> 0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
>> cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
>> 0:d=0  hl=3 l= 135 cons: SEQUENCE          
>> 3:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :00
>> 6:d=1  hl=2 l=  19 cons: SEQUENCE          
>> 8:d=2  hl=2 l=   7 prim: OBJECT            :id-ecPublicKey
>> 17:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim: OBJECT            :prime256v1
>> 27:d=1  hl=2 l= 109 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284CC99F
>> 
>> which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKeyInfo:
>> 
>> PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
>> version                   Version,
>> privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
>> privateKey                PrivateKey,
>> attributes           [0]  IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }
>> 
>> Version ::= INTEGER
>> 
>> PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
>> 
>> PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
>> 
>> Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
>> 
>> due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, etc.
>> (`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working example and
>> can't rule out user error there.)
>> 
>> Even that giant OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a
>> PrivateKeyInfo:
>> 
>> $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27
>> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
>> 6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
>> 45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
>> 0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
>> cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
>> 0:d=0  hl=2 l= 107 cons: SEQUENCE          
>> 2:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
>> 5:d=1  hl=2 l=  32 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6
>> 39:d=1  hl=2 l=  68 cons: cont [ 1 ]        
>> 41:d=2  hl=2 l=  66 prim: BIT STRING        
>> 
>> though the OCTET STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has
>> the public key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring
>> to show).
>> 
>> So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.
>> 
>> Appendix B.1
>> 
>> Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in
>> this document? 
>> 
>> <pvds> 
>> 
>> No opinion 
>> 
>> [JLS] As long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this makes no difference.  Tokens are reused after an amount of time in CoAP.
>> 
>> <pvds2>
>> No extra text, I gather
>> </pvds2> 
>> 
>> </pvds>
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Ace mailing list
> Ace@ietf.org
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--=_6fae8065d48b48a1219a00324330234d
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
=3DUTF-8" /></head><body style=3D'font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana,Gen=
eva,sans-serif'>
Hi Jim,<br /><br />I removed the passwd from the example, and did the disas=
sembly as Ben proposed.<br />That seems to work correctly for me.<br /><br =
/>
<p>308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br /> 6b020=
101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7<br /> 679a01ca8c6f0=
c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc<br /> 494f028bc351cc80c03f1=
50bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95<br /> cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b563=
8e59fd9</p>
<br /><br />Peter<br />
<p>Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-09-04 20:02:</p>
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0"><!-- html ignored --><!-- head ignored --><!-- meta ig=
nored --><!-- meta ignored -->
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Let me draw back and re-address the comment from Ben=
 about the private key in appendix A.3<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">If I take <!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Cour=
ier New';">308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<!--=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Cour=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Cour=
ier New';">45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82<!--=
 o ignored --></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Cour=
ier New';">0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78<!--=
 o ignored --></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Cour=
ier New';">cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f<!-- o ignored --></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">and decode it I get (with comments from me)<!-- o ig=
nored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">SEQUENCE (3 elem)&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -- OneAsymmetric=
Key (replacement of PKCS #8)<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; INTEGER 0&nbsp;&nbsp; -- Version =3D v1<!-- o=
 ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; SEQUENCE (2 elem)&nbsp; -- privateKeyAlgorith=
m<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.2.1 ec=
PublicKey (ANSI X9.62 public key type)&nbsp; -- Alg ID<!-- o ignored --></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 =
prime256v1 (ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curve) &ndash; Parameters =3D=3D P256=
<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; OCTET STRING (1 elem) &ndash; Private Key<!--=
 o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; SEQUENCE (3 elem) &ndash; ECPrivate Ke=
y&nbsp; [RFC 5915]<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; INTEGER 1 &ndash; Version &ndas=
h; ecPrivkeyVer1<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; OCTET STRING (32 byte) 0B9A6778=
5B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6 &ndash; Private Ke=
y value<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; [1] (1 elem) &ndash; Public key=
 value<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; BIT STRING (520 bit) 000=
0010000011011101110001100000100010001011110001001011011111001100011...<!-- =
o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This looks correct to me.<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Jim<!-- o ignored --></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border: none; border-top: solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt; padding: 3.0pt=
 0in 0in 0in;">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><strong>From:</strong> Peter van der Stok &lt;stokco=
ns@bbhmail.nl&gt; <br /><strong>Sent:</strong> Wednesday, September 4, 2019=
 12:02 AM<br /><strong>To:</strong> Jim Schaad &lt;ietf@augustcellars.com&g=
t;<br /><strong>Cc:</strong> consultancy@vanderstok.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' &=
lt;kaduk@mit.edu&gt;; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org<br=
 /><strong>Subject:</strong> Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est=
-12 part 2<!-- o ignored --></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><!-- o ignored -->&nbsp;</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verd=
ana',sans-serif;">I concluded on the pruned .<br /><br />Peter<!-- o ignore=
d --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Ji=
m Schaad schreef op 2019-09-03 20:48:<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<blockquote style=3D"border: none; border-left: solid #1010FF 1.5pt; paddin=
g: 0in 0in 0in 5.0pt; margin-left: 0in; margin-right: 0in;">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom=
-alt: auto;"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-=
serif;">I have pruned and tossed in&nbsp; a few [JLS] comments.<!-- o ignor=
ed --></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom=
-alt: auto;"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-=
serif;">&nbsp;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom=
-alt: auto;"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-=
serif;">Jim<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom=
-alt: auto;"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-=
serif;">&nbsp;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom=
-alt: auto;"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-=
serif;">&nbsp;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border: none; border-top: solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt; padding: 3.0pt=
 0in 0in 0in;">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom=
-alt: auto;"><strong><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdan=
a',sans-serif;">From:</span></strong><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font=
-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"> Peter van der Stok &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:s=
tokcons@bbhmail.nl" rel=3D"noreferrer">stokcons@bbhmail.nl</a>&gt; <br /><s=
trong><span style=3D"font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Sent:</span></stro=
ng> Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5:18 AM<br /><strong><span style=3D"font-fam=
ily: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">To:</span></strong> Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu" rel=3D"noreferrer">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt;<br /><st=
rong><span style=3D"font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Cc:</span></strong>=
 Jim Schaad &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com" rel=3D"noreferrer=
">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt;; <a href=3D"mailto:draft-ietf-ace-coap-est=
=2Eall@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer">draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org</a=
>; <a href=3D"mailto:consultancy@vanderstok.org" rel=3D"noreferrer">consult=
ancy@vanderstok.org</a>; <a href=3D"mailto:ace@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
>ace@ietf.org</a><br /><strong><span style=3D"font-family: 'Verdana',sans-s=
erif;">Subject:</span></strong> Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-=
est-12 part 2<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; mso-margin-bottom=
-alt: auto;"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-=
serif;">&nbsp;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt: auto; margin-bottom: 12=
=2E0pt;"><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-seri=
f;">Hi Ben,<br /><br />the last part of the responses to your thorough revi=
ew.<br />Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.<br /><br />the ope=
nssl example make me worry a bit.<br /><br />See below.<br /><br />Peter<br=
 />_______________________________________________________________________<=
!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;SignedData is signed by the party that generated the =
private key,<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;which may be the EST server or the EST =
CA. &nbsp;The SignedData is further<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;protected by pla=
cing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030]. &nbsp;In summary, the symmetrically encrypted=
<br /><br />.... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we =
don't care<br />what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care ab=
out the<br />Content-Format for the EnvelopedData.<!-- o ignored --></span>=
</p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">s/=
 SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, is sig=
ned/<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">s/=
 The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS Envelope=
dData/<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Si=
gnedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional signing/=
<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br />Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnve=
lopedData?<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">No=
t sure about this<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">[J=
LS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and AuthEnve=
lopedData to be equivalent.&nbsp; Which of these is used is totally depende=
nt on what algorithm is used for encryption.&nbsp; If one requires the use =
of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use AuthEnvelopedData=
=2E&nbsp; If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice but to use Enve=
lopedData.&nbsp; Everybody is slowly moving from EnvelopedData to AuthEnvel=
opedData just because everybody is changing algorithms.&nbsp; I do not reme=
mber any discussions about this, but AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to=
 be the more correct value here.&nbsp;&nbsp; I will also note that there is=
 a space between Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.<br /><br />&lt;pvds2&=
gt;<br />I don't do anything here<br />&lt;/pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></sp=
an></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo str=
ucture.<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is=
 suitable for key<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;agreement, the generated private k=
ey is encrypted with a symmetric<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;key which is encryp=
ted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric<br /><br />In the key-agr=
eement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the<br />result of the key=
-agreement operation, no? &nbsp;In which case it is not<br />itself encrypt=
ed, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is<br />sent.<!-- o igno=
red --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">In=
 RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a rand=
omly<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">ge=
nerated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The crypt=
ographic strength of<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">th=
e symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified<!-- =
o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">as=
ymmetric key.<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Ho=
wever, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value.<!-- o ig=
nored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">I =
don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text.<!-- o ignored --=
></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">[J=
LS] Ben, you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.&nbsp; =
It does a key agreement -&gt; KDF -&gt; KeyWrap -&gt; Content. &nbsp;There =
is always a key wrap step between the key agreement and the content encrypt=
ion key.<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<br />Also here I see no room for improvement th=
en.<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;public key and is carried in an re=
cipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;KeyAgreeRecipien=
tInfo.<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[RFC7030] recommends the use of additio=
nal encryption of the returned<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;private key. &nbsp;Fo=
r the context of this specification, clients and<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;ser=
vers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST<br />&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).<br =
/>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (=
CMS<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be sup=
ported for<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;deployments where end-to-end encryption n=
eeds to be provided between<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the client and a server=
=2E &nbsp;Such cases could include architectures<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;whe=
re an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS<br />&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;connection (Registrar in Figure 4).<br /><br />This carefully sa=
ys nothing about recommendations for use, only for<br />software support. &=
nbsp;Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of<br />encryption stand?=
 &nbsp;It's probably worth being explicit, either way.<!-- o ignored --></s=
pan></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt; I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the r=
esponsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The recommendati=
ons at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in my opinion. The=
 alternative is classifying the applications; unless you see a better way t=
o do this.<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />Why OPTIONAL? &nbsp;(Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only O=
PTIONAL.)<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;client. &nbsp;For example, it could =
be configured to accept POP linking<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;information that=
 does not match the current TLS session because the<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when<br />=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;acting as an EST server.<br /><br />This is close enough =
to a literal quote that we might think about<br />actually quoting and usin=
g quotation marks.<br />nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote.<!=
-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Ho=
pe my co-authors will react to this<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">[J=
LS] I would disagree with the nit.<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">[J=
LS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think&nbsp;=
 that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS a=
s it is terminating the connection.&nbsp; The only exception would be in th=
ere is internal authentication for the EST request.<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<br /=
>Suggest to use SHOULD and not distinguish between terminating or not.<br /=
>&lt;pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r /><br />Section 9.1<br /><br />I think we probably need this document as =
a reference for all the<br />allocations; as the document effectuating the =
registration, we are still<br />of interest even if most details of content=
 encoding lie elsewhere.<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">[J=
LS] No response from Peter?<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<br />Sorry, misunderstood. W=
ill add &lt;thisdocument&gt;<br />&lt;/pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></=
p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />Appendix A.3<br /><br />I'm having trouble validating the private key i=
n the PKCS#8 component:<br />asn1parse says:<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">As=
 input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der:<!-- o ignored --></spa=
n></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">30=
8187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br />6b020101042=
061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7<br />679a01ca8c6f0c37a144=
03420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc<br />494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cf=
f958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95<br />cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9<!=
-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&n=
bsp;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">I =
used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\<!-- o ignore=
d --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">-p=
assin pass:watnietweet<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">[J=
LS] I would lose the password on the key if possible.<br /><br />&lt;pvds2&=
gt;<br />Right, It means changing the whole chain of certificates. and redo=
ing the examples.<br />But I understand the reason, being confronted with t=
he disassembly failure.<br />&lt;/pvds2&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Th=
e password is may be prohibitive?<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">Re=
sulting in:<br />Private-Key: (256 bit)<br />priv:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 6a:a0=
:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 0c:37<br /=
>pub: <br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d=
:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:<br =
/>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:<br />&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp; be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:<br />&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp; 56:38:e5:9f:d9<br />ASN1 OID: prime256v1<br />NIST CURVE: P-256<=
br />&nbsp;<br /><br />$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der<br />&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br />=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799dee=
ca7<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506=
c03d70efbe82<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a613=
70a2843760fc859799d78<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a28=
4cc99f<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D3 l=3D 135 cons: SEQ=
UENCE &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;3:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER &nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:00<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;6:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;19 cons: SEQUENCE &nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;8:d=
=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;7 prim: OBJECT &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:id-ecPublicKey<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;17:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;8 prim: OBJECT &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:prime256v1<br />&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;27:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D 109 prim: OCTET STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C=
0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D=
8E38EA97E9D65D52C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1=
717F8123F1A284CC99F<br /><br />which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKe=
yInfo:<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyInfo ::=3D =
SEQUENCE {<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;version &nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version,<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;privateKeyAlgorithm &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Pr=
ivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;privateKey &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey,<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;attributes &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[0] &nbsp;IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }<br /><br />&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Version ::=3D INTEGER<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::=3D AlgorithmIden=
tifier<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;PrivateKey ::=3D OCTE=
T STRING<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Attributes ::=3D SE=
T OF Attribute<br /><br />due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, e=
tc.<br />(`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working exa=
mple and<br />can't rule out user error there.)<br /><br />Even that giant =
OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a<br />PrivateKeyInfo:<br />=
<br />$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30<br />&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7<=
br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d=
70efbe82<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2=
843760fc859799d78<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc9=
9f<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;0:d=3D0 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D 107 cons: SEQUENC=
E &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;2:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;&nbsp;1 prim: INTEGER &nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;:01<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;5:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;32 prim: OCTET STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;[HEX DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA=
745372B01697BD8A6<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;39:d=3D1 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;6=
8 cons: cont [ 1 ] &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br />&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;41:d=3D2 &nbsp;hl=3D2 l=3D &nbsp;66 prim: BIT STRING &nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br /><br />though the OCTET STRING does have=
 the private key and the BIT STRING has<br />the public key's contents as d=
epicted in C.3 (details of that too boring<br />to show).<br /><br />So I h=
ave to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.<br /><br /><br /><br =
/><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />Appendix B.1<br /><br /><br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;"><b=
r />Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in<b=
r />this document?<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;pvds&gt;<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">No=
 opinion<!-- o ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">[J=
LS] As long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this makes no=
 difference.&nbsp; Tokens are reused after an amount of time in CoAP.<br />=
<br />&lt;pvds2&gt;<br />No extra text, I gather<br />&lt;/pvds2&gt;<!-- o =
ignored --></span></p>
<p><span style=3D"font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Verdana',sans-serif;">&l=
t;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><br /><!-- o ignored --></span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<!-- html ignored --><br />
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
_______________________________________________<br /> Ace mailing list<br /=
> <a href=3D"mailto:Ace@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer">Ace@ietf.org</a><br />=
 <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace" target=3D"_blank" re=
l=3D"noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace</a></div>
</blockquote>
</body></html>

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Subject: [Ace] [Errata Held for Document Update] RFC8392 (5852)
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The following errata report has been held for document update 
for RFC8392, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5852

--------------------------------------
Status: Held for Document Update
Type: Editorial

Reported by: Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>
Date Reported: 2019-09-03
Held by: Benjamin Kaduk (IESG)

Section: A.3

Original Text
-------------
   d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a701756
   36f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b77037818636f
   61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a5610d
   9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e601d6f
   a29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee743a5
   2b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30

Corrected Text
--------------
   d28443a10126a104524173796d6d657472696345434453413235365850a70175
   636f61703a2f2f61732e6578616d706c652e636f6d02656572696b7703781863
   6f61703a2f2f6c696768742e6578616d706c652e636f6d041a5612aeb0051a56
   10d9f0061a5610d9f007420b7158405427c1ff28d23fbad1f29c4c7c6a555e60
   1d6fa29f9179bc3d7438bacaca5acd08c8d4d4f96131680c429a01f85951ecee
   743a52b9b63632c57209120e1c9e30

Notes
-----
The ASCII representation of binary bytes in Figure 10 is wrapped
on an odd number of ASCII characters. Since there are two ASCII
characters per binary bytes this splits the last byte over two
lines. 

The CBOR playground (http://cbor.me) cannot handle this and
errors out. 

This is slightly confusing for readers.

The actual bytes values are correct by all the checks I did.

--------------------------------------
RFC8392 (draft-ietf-ace-cbor-web-token-15)
--------------------------------------
Title               : CBOR Web Token (CWT)
Publication Date    : May 2018
Author(s)           : M. Jones, E. Wahlstroem, S. Erdtman, H. Tschofenig
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Hi Jim,

Thanks for taking a closer look.  It's been a long week, so I'm not sure if
you're saying that I was doing the decoding wrong, expecting the wrong
structure, or both.

-Ben

On Wed, Sep 04, 2019 at 11:02:31AM -0700, Jim Schaad wrote:
> Let me draw back and re-address the comment from Ben about the private key in appendix A.3
> 
>  
> 
> If I take 
> 
>  
> 
> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
> 
> 6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
> 
> 45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
> 
> 0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
> 
> cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
> 
>  
> 
> and decode it I get (with comments from me)
> 
>  
> 
> SEQUENCE (3 elem)    -- OneAsymmetricKey (replacement of PKCS #8)
> 
>   INTEGER 0   -- Version = v1
> 
>   SEQUENCE (2 elem)  -- privateKeyAlgorithm
> 
>     OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.2.1 ecPublicKey (ANSI X9.62 public key type)  -- Alg ID
> 
>     OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 prime256v1 (ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curve) – Parameters == P256
> 
>   OCTET STRING (1 elem) – Private Key
> 
>     SEQUENCE (3 elem) – ECPrivate Key  [RFC 5915]
> 
>       INTEGER 1 – Version – ecPrivkeyVer1
> 
>       OCTET STRING (32 byte) 0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6 – Private Key value
> 
>       [1] (1 elem) – Public key value
> 
>         BIT STRING (520 bit) 0000010000011011101110001100000100010001011110001001011011111001100011…
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> This looks correct to me.
> 
>  
> 
> Jim
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl> 
> Sent: Wednesday, September 4, 2019 12:02 AM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> Cc: consultancy@vanderstok.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
> 
>  
> 
> I concluded on the pruned .
> 
> Peter
> 
> Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-09-03 20:48:
> 
> I have pruned and tossed in  a few [JLS] comments.
> 
>  
> 
> Jim
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl <mailto:stokcons@bbhmail.nl> > 
> Sent: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5:18 AM
> To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu <mailto:kaduk@mit.edu> >
> Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com <mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com> >; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org <mailto:draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org> ; consultancy@vanderstok.org <mailto:consultancy@vanderstok.org> ; ace@ietf.org <mailto:ace@ietf.org> 
> Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
> 
>  
> 
> Hi Ben,
> 
> the last part of the responses to your thorough review.
> Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.
> 
> the openssl example make me worry a bit.
> 
> See below.
> 
> Peter
> _______________________________________________________________________
> 
> 
>    SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private key,
>    which may be the EST server or the EST CA.  The SignedData is further
>    protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in
>    Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].  In summary, the symmetrically encrypted
> 
> .... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't care
> what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
> Content-Format for the EnvelopedData.
> 
> <pvds>
> 
> s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, is signed/
> 
> s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData/
> 
> SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional signing/
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData?
> 
> <pvds>
> 
> Not sure about this
> 
> [JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.  Which of these is used is totally dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.  If one requires the use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use AuthEnvelopedData.  If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice but to use EnvelopedData.  Everybody is slowly moving from EnvelopedData to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing algorithms.  I do not remember any discussions about this, but AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to be the more correct value here.   I will also note that there is a space between Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.
> 
> <pvds2>
> I don't do anything here
> </pvds2>
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>    encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
>    Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key
>    agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric
>    key which is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric
> 
> In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
> result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
> itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
> sent.
> 
> <pvds>
> 
> In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a randomly
> 
> generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The cryptographic strength of
> 
> the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified
> 
> asymmetric key.
> 
> However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value.
> 
> I don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text.
> 
> [JLS] Ben, you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.  It does a key agreement -> KDF -> KeyWrap -> Content.  There is always a key wrap step between the key agreement and the content encryption key.
> <pvds2>
> Also here I see no room for improvement then.
> <pvds2>
> 
> </pvds>
> 
>    public key and is carried in an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
>    KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
> 
>    [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
>    private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
>    servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
>    support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
>    Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
>    EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
>    deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
>    the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
>    where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
>    connection (Registrar in Figure 4).
> 
> This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
> software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
> encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way.
> 
> <pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you see a better way to do this.
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only OPTIONAL.)
> 
>    client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
>    information that does not match the current TLS session because the
>    authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
>    acting as an EST server.
> 
> This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
> actually quoting and using quotation marks.
> nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote.
> 
> <pvds>
> 
> Hope my co-authors will react to this
> 
> [JLS] I would disagree with the nit.
> 
> [JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think  that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS as it is terminating the connection.  The only exception would be in there is internal authentication for the EST request.
> <pvds2>
> Suggest to use SHOULD and not distinguish between terminating or not.
> <pvds2>
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Section 9.1
> 
> I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
> allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are still
> of interest even if most details of content encoding lie elsewhere.
> 
> [JLS] No response from Peter?
> <pvds2>
> Sorry, misunderstood. Will add <thisdocument>
> </pvds2>
> 
> 
> Appendix A.3
> 
> I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 component:
> asn1parse says:
> 
> <pvds>
> 
> As input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der:
> 
> 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
> 6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
> 679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
> 494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
> cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9
> 
>  
> 
> I used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\
> 
> -passin pass:watnietweet
> 
> [JLS] I would lose the password on the key if possible.
> 
> <pvds2>
> Right, It means changing the whole chain of certificates. and redoing the examples.
> But I understand the reason, being confronted with the disassembly failure.
> </pvds2>
> 
> The password is may be prohibitive?
> 
> Resulting in:
> Private-Key: (256 bit)
> priv:
>     61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
>     6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
>     0c:37
> pub: 
>     04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
>     9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
>     0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
>     be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
>     56:38:e5:9f:d9
> ASN1 OID: prime256v1
> NIST CURVE: P-256
>  
> 
> $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der
>    308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
>    6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
>    45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
>    0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
>    cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
>     0:d=0  hl=3 l= 135 cons: SEQUENCE          
>     3:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :00
>     6:d=1  hl=2 l=  19 cons: SEQUENCE          
>     8:d=2  hl=2 l=   7 prim: OBJECT            :id-ecPublicKey
>    17:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim: OBJECT            :prime256v1
>    27:d=1  hl=2 l= 109 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284CC99F
> 
> which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKeyInfo:
> 
>       PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
>         version                   Version,
>         privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
>         privateKey                PrivateKey,
>         attributes           [0]  IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }
> 
>       Version ::= INTEGER
> 
>       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
> 
>       PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
> 
>       Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
> 
> due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, etc.
> (`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working example and
> can't rule out user error there.)
> 
> Even that giant OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a
> PrivateKeyInfo:
> 
> $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27
>    308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
>    6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
>    45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
>    0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
>    cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
>     0:d=0  hl=2 l= 107 cons: SEQUENCE          
>     2:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
>     5:d=1  hl=2 l=  32 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6
>    39:d=1  hl=2 l=  68 cons: cont [ 1 ]        
>    41:d=2  hl=2 l=  66 prim: BIT STRING        
> 
> though the OCTET STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has
> the public key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring
> to show).
> 
> So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Appendix B.1
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in
> this document?
> 
> <pvds>
> 
> No opinion
> 
> [JLS] As long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this makes no difference.  Tokens are reused after an amount of time in CoAP.
> 
> <pvds2>
> No extra text, I gather
> </pvds2>
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> 
> 
> 


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Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 18:17:31 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: consultancy@vanderstok.org
Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org,  ace@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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On Wed, Sep 04, 2019 at 09:02:06AM +0200, Peter van der Stok wrote:
> I concluded on the pruned .
> 
> Peter
> Jim Schaad schreef op 2019-09-03 20:48:
> 
> > I have pruned and tossed in  a few [JLS] comments. 
> > 
> > Jim 
> > 
> > FROM: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl> 
> > SENT: Tuesday, September 3, 2019 5:18 AM
> > TO: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
> > CC: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; consultancy@vanderstok.org; ace@ietf.org
> > SUBJECT: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2 
> > 
> > Hi Ben,
> > 
> > the last part of the responses to your thorough review.
> > Apart from nits you found some "nice" mistakes.
> > 
> > the openssl example make me worry a bit.
> > 
> > See below.
> > 
> > Peter
> > _______________________________________________________________________ 
> > 
> > SignedData is signed by the party that generated the private key,
> > which may be the EST server or the EST CA.  The SignedData is further
> > protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData as explained in
> > Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].  In summary, the symmetrically encrypted
> > 
> > .... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't care
> > what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
> > Content-Format for the EnvelopedData. 
> > 
> > <pvds> 
> > 
> > s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container, is signed/ 
> > 
> > s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS EnvelopedData/ 
> > 
> > SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional signing/ 
> > 
> > </pvds>
> > 
> > Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData? 
> > 
> > <pvds> 
> > 
> > Not sure about this 
> > 
> > [JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.  Which of these is used is totally dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.  If one requires the use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use AuthEnvelopedData.  If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice but to use EnvelopedData.  Everybody is slowly moving from EnvelopedData to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing algorithms.  I do not remember any discussions about this, but AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to be the more correct value here.   I will also note that there is a space between Enveloped and Data which is not CMS.
> > 
> > <pvds2>
> > I don't do anything here
> > </pvds2> 

I was reading Jim as suggesting to make a change here (though exactly what
change, I'm not sure).

> > </pvds>
> > 
> > encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
> > Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key
> > agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric
> > key which is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric
> > 
> > In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
> > result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
> > itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
> > sent. 
> > 
> > <pvds> 
> > 
> > In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using a randomly 
> > 
> > generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The cryptographic strength of 
> > 
> > the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the clientspecified 
> > 
> > asymmetric key. 
> > 
> > However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value. 
> > 
> > I don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text. 
> > 
> > [JLS] Ben, you do not have the correct view of the key-agreement case.  It does a key agreement -> KDF -> KeyWrap -> Content.  There is always a key wrap step between the key agreement and the content encryption key.
> > <pvds2>
> > Also here I see no room for improvement then.
> > <pvds2> 
> > 
> > </pvds>
> > 
> > public key and is carried in an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
> > KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
> > 
> > [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
> > private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
> > servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
> > support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
> > Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
> > EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
> > deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
> > the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
> > where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
> > connection (Registrar in Figure 4).
> > 
> > This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
> > software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
> > encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way. 
> > 
> > <pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you see a better way to do this. 
> > 
> > </pvds>
> > 
> > Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only OPTIONAL.)
> > 
> > client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
> > information that does not match the current TLS session because the
> > authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
> > acting as an EST server.
> > 
> > This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
> > actually quoting and using quotation marks.
> > nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we don't do the literal quote. 
> > 
> > <pvds> 
> > 
> > Hope my co-authors will react to this 
> > 
> > [JLS] I would disagree with the nit. 
> > 
> > [JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think  that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of COAPS as it is terminating the connection.  The only exception would be in there is internal authentication for the EST request.
> > <pvds2>
> > Suggest to use SHOULD and not distinguish between terminating or not.
> > <pvds2> 

I'm not 100% sure I understand the proposal, but if I do, it seems okay.
I'll just have to look at the new rev when it comes out, I suppose.

-Ben

> > </pvds>
> > 
> > Section 9.1
> > 
> > I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
> > allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are still
> > of interest even if most details of content encoding lie elsewhere. 
> > 
> > [JLS] No response from Peter?
> > <pvds2>
> > Sorry, misunderstood. Will add <thisdocument>
> > </pvds2> 
> > 
> > Appendix A.3
> > 
> > I'm having trouble validating the private key in the PKCS#8 component:
> > asn1parse says: 
> > 
> > <pvds> 
> > 
> > As input I used recently a hex dump of Wt1234.key.der: 
> > 
> > 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
> > 6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
> > 679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
> > 494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
> > cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9 
> > 
> > I used openssl pkey -in Wt1234.key.der -text -noout -inform der\ 
> > 
> > -passin pass:watnietweet 
> > 
> > [JLS] I would lose the password on the key if possible.
> > 
> > <pvds2>
> > Right, It means changing the whole chain of certificates. and redoing the examples.
> > But I understand the reason, being confronted with the disassembly failure.
> > </pvds2> 
> > 
> > The password is may be prohibitive? 
> > 
> > Resulting in:
> > Private-Key: (256 bit)
> > priv:
> > 61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
> > 6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
> > 0c:37
> > pub: 
> > 04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
> > 9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
> > 0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
> > be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
> > 56:38:e5:9f:d9
> > ASN1 OID: prime256v1
> > NIST CURVE: P-256
> > 
> > $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der
> > 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
> > 6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
> > 45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
> > 0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
> > cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
> > 0:d=0  hl=3 l= 135 cons: SEQUENCE          
> > 3:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :00
> > 6:d=1  hl=2 l=  19 cons: SEQUENCE          
> > 8:d=2  hl=2 l=   7 prim: OBJECT            :id-ecPublicKey
> > 17:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim: OBJECT            :prime256v1
> > 27:d=1  hl=2 l= 109 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:306B02010104200B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6A144034200041BB8C1117896F98E4506C03D70EFBE820D8E38EA97E9D65D52C8460C5852C51DD89A61370A2843760FC859799D78CD33F3C1846E304F1717F8123F1A284CC99F
> > 
> > which doesn't look like an RFC5208 PrivateKeyInfo:
> > 
> > PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
> > version                   Version,
> > privateKeyAlgorithm       PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
> > privateKey                PrivateKey,
> > attributes           [0]  IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }
> > 
> > Version ::= INTEGER
> > 
> > PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
> > 
> > PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
> > 
> > Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
> > 
> > due to the lack of OID for privateKeyAlgorithm, etc.
> > (`openssl pkcs8` also chokes on it, but I don't have a working example and
> > can't rule out user error there.)
> > 
> > Even that giant OCTET STRING 27 bytes in doesn't seem to match a
> > PrivateKeyInfo:
> > 
> > $ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 27
> > 308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
> > 6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
> > 45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
> > 0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
> > cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
> > 0:d=0  hl=2 l= 107 cons: SEQUENCE          
> > 2:d=1  hl=2 l=   1 prim: INTEGER           :01
> > 5:d=1  hl=2 l=  32 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:0B9A67785B65E07360B6D28CFC1D3F3925C0755799DEECA745372B01697BD8A6
> > 39:d=1  hl=2 l=  68 cons: cont [ 1 ]        
> > 41:d=2  hl=2 l=  66 prim: BIT STRING        
> > 
> > though the OCTET STRING does have the private key and the BIT STRING has
> > the public key's contents as depicted in C.3 (details of that too boring
> > to show).
> > 
> > So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.
> > 
> > Appendix B.1
> > 
> > Should we be using the same Token value in two different exchanges in
> > this document? 
> > 
> > <pvds> 
> > 
> > No opinion 
> > 
> > [JLS] As long as the Token values are not in the same exchange, this makes no difference.  Tokens are reused after an amount of time in CoAP.
> > 
> > <pvds2>
> > No extra text, I gather
> > </pvds2> 
> > 
> > </pvds>


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: consultancy@vanderstok.org
Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org,  ace@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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[trimming]
On Tue, Sep 03, 2019 at 02:18:22PM +0200, Peter van der Stok wrote:
> 
>    [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
>    private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
>    servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
>    support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
>    Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
>    EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
>    deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
>    the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
>    where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
>    connection (Registrar in Figure 4).
> 
> This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
> software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
> encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way. 
> 
> <pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the
> responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The
> recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in
> my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you
> see a better way to do this. 

I think the 7030 text I was thinking of is this:

   It is strongly RECOMMENDED that the clients request that the returned
   private key be afforded the additional security of the Cryptographic
   Message Syntax (CMS) EnvelopedData in addition to the TLS-provided
   security to protect against unauthorized disclosure.

> 
> </pvds>
> 
[...]
> 
>    It is recommended, based on experiments, to follow the default CoAP
>    configuration parameters ([RFC7252]).  However, depending on the
>    implementation scenario, retransmissions and timeouts can also occur
>    on other networking layers, governed by other configuration
>    parameters.  A change in a server parameter MUST ensure the adjusted
>    value is also available to all the endpoints with which these
>    adjusted values are to be used to communicate.
> 
> I don't understand who this is a normative requirement upon.  Is it the
> network operator's, to propagate configuration changes?  Or is there
> supposed to be some automated protocol that makes adjusted values
> available? 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> It is meant as reminder to anyone doing the configuration of a given
> installation; you want to suppress the text? 

I don't want to suppress it, no.

Maybe "A configuration change in a server parameter MUST be coordinated
with all the endpoints with which these adjusted values are to be used to
communicate"?  Though I guess "coordinate" does not necessarily force the
other endpoint to be using the identical value, just to know about it.

> </pvds>
> 
[...]
> 
> Appendix A.1
> 
>      Option (Uri-Port)
>         Option Delta = 0x4  (option# 3+4=7)
>         Option Length = 0x4
>         Option Value = 9085
>       Option (Uri-Path)
>         Option Delta = 0x4   (option# 7+4=11)
>         Option Length = 0x5
>         Option Value = "est"
> 
> This is more for my own edification than the document's sake, so thank
> you for your time, but what accounts for the "extra" length here?  The
> "est" is three bytes, and what makes up for the other two?  Also, I
> assume that the port value of 9805 is the decimal value, which gets
> CBOR encoded into two bytes  of integer encoding plus the byte with
> additional information 25 to indicate the two-byte integer, and another
> byte that I need help accounting for. 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> Many thanks; an old misreading of an example in 7252. 
> 
> For the option length of URI-Path we included the quotations as well;
> That is WRONG. 
> 
> Repaired it everywhere. 
> 
> Options are not CBOR encoded. 

Well, now I'm glad I asked -- thanks!

> </pvds>
> 
> Appendix A.2
> 
> Do we want to say anything about the IDevID in the CSR/cert?
> I note that the breakdown in Appendix C.2 (looks like openssl output)
> does not decode the otherName (though asn1parse can be convinced to do
> so). 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> What do you suggest for IDevID? 

If we were going to add something (which remains unclear to me), it could
be after the sentence "[...] the CSR contains a ChallengePassword which is
used for POP linking (Section 4).", and be something like "This CSR also
contains an RFC 7299 id-on-hardwareModuleName hardware identifier to
customize the returned certificate to the requesting device."
(The actual identifier here is the same one mentioned in
https://www.mail-archive.com/anima@ietf.org/msg00938.html, from Bob
Moskowitz's OID arc.)

> Actually openssl was used extensively for generating the examples. 
> 
> Will be happy to learn about otherName 

otherName is an OID-indexed generic name container for the cert; it's a
form of subjectAltName.  What I did here was:

~$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der
   3082018b30820131020100305c310b3009060355040613025553310b3009
   06035504080c024341310b300906035504070c024c413114301206035504
   0a0c0b6578616d706c6520496e63310c300a060355040b0c03496f54310f
   300d060355040513065774313233343059301306072a8648ce3d02010608
   2a8648ce3d03010703420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc494f
   028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95cf75
   f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9a073303406092a864886f70d0109
   0731270c2576437630292a264a4b4a3bc3a2c280c2992f3e3c2e2c3d6b6e
   7634332323403d204e787e60303b06092a864886f70d01090e312e302c30
   2a0603551d1104233021a01f06082b06010505070804a013301106092b06
   010401b43b0a01040401020304300a06082a8648ce3d0403020348003045
   02210092563a546463bd9ecff170d0fd1f2ef0d3d012160e5ee90cffedab
   ec9b9a38920220179f10a3436109051abad17590a09bc87c4dce5453a6fc
   1135a1e84eed754377
    0:d=0  hl=4 l= 395 cons: SEQUENCE          
  [...]
  271:d=7  hl=2 l=   3 prim: OBJECT            :X509v3 Subject Alternative
Name
  276:d=7  hl=2 l=  35 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX
DUMP]:3021A01F06082B06010505070804A013301106092B06010401B43B0A01040401020304
  313:d=1  hl=2 l=  10 cons: SEQUENCE          
  315:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim: OBJECT            :ecdsa-with-SHA256
  325:d=1  hl=2 l=  72 prim: BIT STRING        

to note that there's a SAN that's not decoded automatically, and then

~$ unhex|openssl asn1parse -inform der -strparse 276
   3082018b30820131020100305c310b3009060355040613025553310b3009
   [...]
   1135a1e84eed754377
    0:d=0  hl=2 l=  33 cons: SEQUENCE          
    2:d=1  hl=2 l=  31 cons: cont [ 0 ]        
    4:d=2  hl=2 l=   8 prim: OBJECT            :1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4
   14:d=2  hl=2 l=  19 cons: cont [ 0 ]        
   16:d=3  hl=2 l=  17 cons: SEQUENCE          
   18:d=4  hl=2 l=   9 prim: OBJECT            :1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.10.1
   29:d=4  hl=2 l=   4 prim: OCTET STRING      [HEX DUMP]:01020304

to look at the contents.  1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4 (with the symbolic name in my
suggested text) is the type of the otherName, here.

I'm pretty sure there's not a more-"automatic" way to get openssl to peek
inside otherName.

> </pvds>
> 
[...]
> 
> Section A.4
> 
> I'm not sure how useful repeating the RFC 7030 csrattrs is: do we expect
> (e.g.) brainpoolP384r1 to be relevant for our readers? 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> It was added for completeness sake; nothing more. 
> 
> Suppressing it may provoke other questions like: Why is it not there? 

Okay.

> </pvds>
> 
[...]
> 
>    tenth packet of 63 bytes.  The client sends an IPv6 packet containing
>    the UDP datagram with the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP
>    request 10 times.  The server returns an IPv6 packet containing the
>    UDP datagram with the DTLS record that encapsulates the CoAP
>    response.  The CoAP request-response exchange with block option is
> 
> The definite vs. indefinite articles here don't seem quite right, and
> each of the 10 datagrams do not encapsulate the entire CoAP request. 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> I don't understand your meaning. 

I'm complaining that the "an"s and "the"s don't match up.
I think I also misunderstood the sense of what was happening, so my "do not
encapsualte the entire CoAP request" is not quite right.

NEW:

   tenth packet of 63 bytes.  The client sends an IPv6 packet containing
   a UDP datagram with DTLS record protection that encapsulates a block
   of the CoAP request 10 times (one packet per block).  The server returns
   an IPv6 packet containing the UDP datagram with the DTLS record that
   encapsulates the CoAP response.  The CoAP request-response exchange
   with block option is [...]


> </pvds>
> 
[...]
> Appendix C.2
> 
> [I mentioned otherName's non-decoding earlier]

Specifically, in crypto/x509/v3_alt.c:

STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *i2v_GENERAL_NAME(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
                                       GENERAL_NAME *gen,
                                       STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ret)
{
    [...]
    switch (gen->type) {
    case GEN_OTHERNAME:
        if (!X509V3_add_value("othername", "<unsupported>", &ret))
            return NULL;

So openssl is explicitly just punting on all otherNames.

> 
> Appendix C.3
> 
> I find it kind of amusing that we have a "Netscape Comment" in the
> generated cert :) 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> This was the result of a lengthy openssl struggle. 
> 
> Any suggestions for improvement are very welcome indeed. 

Do you have a line with a "nsComment" in any config file (e.g., openssl.cfg)
floating around (i.e., the -config <filename> argument to openssl req)?  It
*sounds* from the documentation like this is not supposed to be added by
default (though many of the apps/ and demos/ config files in the tree do
include it).

-Ben

> </pvds>
> 
> _


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Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 20:05:04 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: consultancy@vanderstok.org
Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org,  ace@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12
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On Mon, Sep 02, 2019 at 02:47:10PM +0200, Peter van der Stok wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> Below some additional reactions to your review.
> In some parts the term "suggest" is used, meaning that I am not sure of
> the correctness of my reaction.
> A confirmation/denial would be appreciated in those cases.

Okay, I'll try to remark at those locations, and sorry for not trimming
stuff without comments.

> My co-authors can always improve my changes.
> 
> To-morrow I hope to do the follow-up.
> 
> many thanks,
> 
> peter
> 
> ________________________________________________________________
> 
> Section 4
> 
>    As per sections 3.3 and 4.4 of [RFC7925], the mandatory cipher suite
> 
> nit: I do see RFC 7925 in the subject heading, but the lead-in here is
> still a bit jarring.  Without some statement in this document to that
> effect, RFC 7925 is not binding on the protocol specified in this
> document, so I think it's better to say something like "In accordance
> with", or even to flat out state that "this document conforms to the
> DTLS 1.2 profile specified in RFC 7925". 
> 
> <pvds> done, used: In accordance with sections …  </pvds>
> 
>    DTLS 1.2 implementations must use the Supported Elliptic Curves and
>    Supported Point Formats Extensions in [RFC8422].  Uncompressed point
>    format must also be supported.  DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
>    implementations differ from DTLS 1.2 because they do not support
>    point format negotiation in favor of a single point format for each
>    curve.  Thus, support for DTLS 1.3 does not mandate point format
>    extensions and negotiation.
> 
> DTLS 1.3 uses the "supported_groups" extension in contrast to Supported
> Elliptic Curves for 1.2; we should mention that disparity as well. 
> 
> <pvds> added at the end of the paragraph </pvds> 
> 
>    o  a previously issued client certificate (e.g., an existing
>       certificate issued by the EST CA); this could be a common case for
>       simple re-enrollment of clients.
> 
> Is "re-enrollment" intended to cover renewal operations? 
> 
> <pvds>RFC7030 states: "An EST client can renew/rekey its existing client
> certificate by 
> 
> submitting a re-enrollment request to an EST server."
> 
> Do you want that emphasized more in the draft?

I don't think it's necessary; thanks for finding the right 7030 quote to
quiet me up.

> </pvds>
> 
>    o  a previously installed certificate (e.g., manufacturer IDevID
>       [ieee802.1ar] or a certificate issued by some other party); the
>       server is expected to trust that certificate.  IDevID's are
> 
> "trust" can cover a lot of things, many of which we don't really need
> here; would "expected to be able to validate" suffice? 
> 
> <pvds> s/is expected to trust that certificate/ can use the certificate
> for DTLS client Authentication/
> </pvds>
> 
>    As described in Section 2.1 of [RFC5272] proof-of-identity refers to
>    a value that can be used to prove that the private key corresponding
>    to the public key is in the possession of and can be used by an end-
>    entity or client.  Additionally, channel-binding information can link
> 
> nit: "the certified public key", I think, since the certificate is what
> binds the identity to the public key.
> Also, this sentence is a bit awkward, though I don't have any concrete
> rewording suggestions at present. 
> 
> <pvds>s/public key/certified public key/ 
> 
> Suggestion, is this better?: "a client provides proof of identity by
> proving that it possesses the private key corresponding with the
> certified public key" 
> 
>    Given that after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a
>    new EST transaction will take place after a significant amount of
>    time, the DTLS connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST messages
>    that are relatively close to each other.  In some cases, like NAT
>    rebinding, keeping the state of a connection is not possible when
>    devices sleep for extended periods of time.  In such occasions,
>    [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] negotiates a connection ID that can
>    eliminate the need for new handshake and its additional cost.
> 
> Do we also want to mention DTLS 1.3 session resumption here as less
> expensive than a full handshake?  It's not as cheap as "just keep using
> the same connection ID", of course, but has somewhat different other
> properties. 
> 
> <pvds> thanks, added: 
> 
> "additional cost; or DTLS 1.3 session resumption provides a less costly
> alternative than re-doing a full DTLS handshake."
> </pvds>
> 
> Section 5
> 
>    o  Simple enroll and re-enroll for a CA to sign public client
>       identity key.
> 
> nit(?): is this "public client identity key" or "client identity public
> key" or something else? 
> 
> <pvds>by reducing the txt's target, I suggest: 
> 
> s/public client identity key/client certificate/ 

That seems to work.

> </pvds>
> 
>    o  Certificate Signing Request (CSR) attribute messages that inform
>       the client of the fields to include in a CSR.
> 
> nit: "informs" 
> 
> <pvds> yep, thanks </pvds>
> 
>    o  Server-side key generation messages to provide a private client
>       identity key when the client choses so.
> 
> (similar nit(?) as above) 
> 
> <pvds>also reducing the text's target: 
> 
> s/provide a private client identity key/provide the client with a new
> private key/ 

Thanks

> </pvds>
> 
> Section 5.1
> 
> With the current text, I expect us to get several IESG questions about
> "why do you have both discovery and well-known URIs?".  I think we need
> to treat this more prominently in the first few paragraphs of the
> section, perhaps just after we discuss the short-est strings, so we
> could tie into the constrained nature of things and how some devices may
> need to hardcode assumptions about the endpoint location. 
> 
> <pvds> I suggest the following starting text: 
> 
> "EST-coaps is targeted for low-resource networks with small packets. Two
> types of installations are possible (1)rigid ones where the address and
> the supported functions of the EST server(s) are known, and (2) flexible
> one where the EST server and it supported functions need to be
> discovered. 
> 
> For both types of installations, saving header space….."

That looks great; thank you!

> </pvds>
> 
>    Figure 5 in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and
>    corresponding paths which are supported by EST.  Table 1 provides the
>    mapping from the EST URI path to the shorter EST-coaps URI path.
> 
> Our table has the entries in a different order than 7030's table. 
> 
> <pvds> correct, has been modified </pvds> 

(It may be ever so slightly easier for readers that have both documents
open, if we keep the ordering the same for the entries that are common to
both documents.)

> We also don't say anything about the (lack of the) fullcmc endpoint. 
> 
> <pvds>/fullcmc is added in the table with "n.a." as short value </pvds> 
> 
> The serverkeygen endpoints could perhaps have some notation to indicate
> that the private key is always returned, in addition to the PKCS#7 vs.
> pkix-cert question that distinguishes skg and skc. 
> 
> <pvds>after "…..an /skc request.", the following text is added: 
> 
> "In both cases a private key MUST be returned." 

I was thinking we could have something in the table, though we may be too
short on horizontal space for that to actually work.

> </pvds>
> 
>    The /skg message is the EST /serverkeygen equivalent where the client
>    requests for a certificate in PKCS#7 format and a private key.  If
> 
> nit: s/requests for a/requests a/ 
> 
> <pvds>done</pvds>
> 
>    Clients and servers MUST support the short resource EST-coaps URIs.
> 
> Are they expected to also support the long EST URIs over CoAP? 
> 
> <pvds> It was undecided whether we should add: 
> 
> "The corresponding longer URIs from <xref target="RFC7030"/> MAY be
> supported." 

I have no strong preference here, but would not be surprised if we got a
question on it from the IESG.  (Which I guess means a weak preference for
adding the above text.)

> </pvds> 
> 
>   The first three lines of the discovery response above MUST be
>    returned if the server supports resource discovery.  The last three
> 
> It may be worth listing out ace.est.crts, ace.est.sen, and ace.est.sren
> explicitly for clarity (especially since line breaks are "only for
> readability") 
> 
> <pvds> after "the first three lines" added 
> 
> ",describing ace.est.crts, ace.est.sen, and ace.est.sren,"
> </pvds>
> 
>    lines are only included if the corresponding EST functions are
>    implemented.  The Content-Formats in the response allow the client to
>    request one that is supported by the server.  These are the values
>    that would be sent in the client request with an Accept option.
> 
> It seems that these specific values (or a subset thereof) are mandatory;
> a forward reference might be in order. 
> 
> <pvds> "Added : "(see table 2)"

Hmm, I think I was not very clear about what I meant: for the given
resources, the only defined content types for that resource are the ones
listed in the example request.  If a server tries to advertise anything
else, it seems like that would be out of spec (and maybe a client should
bail on seeing it?).  But maybe I'm misinterpreting things and we should
leave open space for future expansions to other content formats.

> Section 5.2
> 
> Did we consider merging this table with Table 1? 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> The functions of the tables are different. It fits the progress of the
> text. Merging will probably mean more forward references. Unless two
> tables are too boring, I suggest to leave as is. 

Okay.  Thank you for the explanation!

> </pvds>
> 
> Section 5.2
> 
>    While [RFC7030] permits a number of these functions to be used
>    without authentication, this specification requires that the client
>    MUST be authenticated for all functions.
> 
> Perhaps this divergence from 7030 should be noted more prominently,
> perhaps in the section title or a dedicated "Differences from RFC 7030"
> section? 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> Suggestion to move this phrase to section 5 just before section 5.1? 

That would be a big help, thanks..

> </pvds>
> 
> Section 5.3
> 
>    EST-coaps is designed for low-resource devices and hence does not
>    need to send Base64-encoded data.  Simple binary is more efficient
>    (30% smaller payload) and well supported by CoAP.  Thus, the payload
>    for a given Media-Type follows the ASN.1 structure of the Media-Type
>    and is transported in binary format.
> 
> This last sentence is only true when scoped to this document, for which
> all the content we're handling is specified using ASN.1.  I don't know
> whether we want to tweak the wording to reflect that or not, though.
> Also, we probably should say DER-encoded ASN.1 structure (or BER?  I'd
> have to check what the requirements are) since ASN.1 is just the
> abstract syntax and not the encoding rules. 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> s/payload/payload for DER-encoded ASN.1/
> </pvds>
> 
>    When the client makes an /skc request the certificate returned with
>    the private key is a single X.509 certificate (not a PKCS#7
>    container) with Content-Format identifier TBD287 (0x011F) instead of
>    281.  In cases where the private key is encrypted with CMS (as
>    explained in Section 5.8) the Content-Format identifier is 280
>    (0x0118) instead of 284.  The key and certificate representations are
>    ASN.1 encoded in binary format.  An example is shown in Appendix A.3.
> 
> I think these relationships might be more clear in tabular form; I
> dind't really understand the scheme at this point in the document, and
> needed to get a ways further in before it really "clicked". 
> 
> <pvds> the following table is added. Is that sufficient?
> 
>              +----------+-----------------+-----------------+ 
> 
>              | Function | Response part 1 | Response part 2 | 
> 
>              +----------+-----------------+-----------------+ 
> 
>              | /skg       | 284                 | 281                | 
> 
>              | /skc       | 280                 | TBD287          | 
> 
>              +----------+-----------------+-----------------+ 
> 
>              Table 3: response content formats for skg and skc 

I think so.  Just splitting out and naming "part 1" and "part 2" for the
comparison helps the clarity.

> </pvds>
> 
> Section 5.4
> 
>    o  EST-coaps servers sometimes need to provide delayed responses
>       which are conveyed with an empty ACK or an ACK containing response
>       code 5.03 as explained in Section 5.7.  Thus, it is RECOMMENDED
> 
> nit: the response itself (delayed or not) is not in the ACK, so maybe
> "the need for which is conveyed". 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> s/responses which are conveyed with an/which are preceded by an
> immediately returned/ 

That should work (but please check that the final text still has "delayed
responses", the expression here would have dropped the "responses" part)

> Section 5.6
> 
>    layer.  In addition, invokers residing on a 6LoWPAN over IEEE
>    802.15.4 [ieee802.15.4] network should attempt to size CoAP messages
>    such that each DTLS record will fit within one or two IEEE 802.15.4
>    frames.
> 
> Is this intended to be a normative SHOULD?  If not, it feels like we
> need a reference or justification. 
> 
> <pvds> 
> 
> s/should attempt/are recommended/ 
> 
> </pvds>
> 
> Section 5.7
> 
>    certificate to the client after a short delay.  If the certificate
>    response is large, the server will need more than one Block2 blocks
>    to transfer it.
> 
> nit: "Block2 block" singular 
> 
> <pvds> thanks, done </pvds>
> 
> POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR (frag# 1)} -->
>    <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
> 
> Where is this notation documented?  (Is Appendix B.1 of this document
> the
> first place it's introduced?)  We need some kind of reference on first
> usage. 
> 
> <pvds> Just before figure 2 the following phrase is added: 
> 
> "The notation of figure 2 is explained in section B.1" 
> 
> </pvds> 
> 
>    If the server is very slow (i.e. minutes) in providing the response
>    (i.e. when a manual intervention is needed), he SHOULD respond with
> 
> nit: RFC style puts commas after (and before) "i.e." and "e.g.". 
> 
> <pvds>done everywhere </pvds>
> 
>    the identical CSR to the server.  As long as the server responds with
>    response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) with a Max-Age Option, the
>    client SHOULD keep resending the enrollment request until the server
>    responds with the certificate or the client abandons for other
>    reasons.
> 
> nit: the transitive verb "abandons" has no direct object 
> 
> <pvds>abandons the request </pvds>
> 
>    response.  Note that the server asks for a decrease in the block size
>    when acknowledging the first Block2.
> 
> nit: From the trace, it looks like the server is the first one to use
> a 128-byte block size, and it does happen in an ack message, but that
> ack is not acking a block2 (though it contains one).  (That ack message
> also happens to contain part of the response.) 
> 
> <pvds> Ai, that confuses a lot. 
> 
> Should read: Note that the client asks again for a decrease
> </pvds>
> 
> POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# 1)}-->
>   <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
> POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR (frag# 2)}  -->
>   <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
> 
> The first line doesn't seem to match up -- doesn't the "N1" mean
> "fragment N1+1" but the descriptive text at the end say "frag# 1"?
> Or is this supposed to be 1:0/1/256? 
> 
> <pvds> Difficult to be terse and get it right: 
> 
> CSR (frag# n) means fragment n of the request 
> 
> Cert resp(frag# m) means fragment m of the response 
> 
> Like in figure 2, in figure 3, the line 
> 
> "... Immediate response when certificate is ready ...", 
> 
> Is added to separate the request sending from the response reception 

Thanks for adding that line, but I think you were looking at one chunk
later than I was looking at.  I was looking at:

(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# 1)}

and seeing that the "N1" in "N1/0/256" should correspond to "fragment
N1+1", but the parenthetical at the end says "frag# 1".

Thanks,

Ben

> </pvds>
> 
> Also, it surprised me somewhat that the client has to re-send the whole
> request (i.e., all fragments thereof) after the Max-Age interval when
> the server says it's ready, since that feels wasteful of bandwidth, but
> I assume that's just how CoAP works and not relevant for this document. 
> 
> <pvds>We did not see any other mechanism; but we are talking about many
> minutes, the relative bandwidth loss is not too high.
> This way, there is no need to keep much state, especially when many
> simultaneous requests are treated.</pvds>
> 
> Section 5.8
> 
>    In scenarios where it is desirable that the server generates the
>    private key, server-side key generation should be used.  Such
> 
> nit: suggest s/should be used/is available/ to avoid the appearance of
> tautology. 
> 
> <pvds>done</pvds>


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Comments: In-reply-to Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl> message dated "Tue, 03 Sep 2019 14:18:22 +0200."
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Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl> wrote:
    > ..... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't
    > care what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
    > Content-Format for the EnvelopedData.

    > <pvds>

    > s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container,
    > is signed/

    > s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS
    > EnvelopedData/

    > SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional
    > signing/

    > </pvds>

    > Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData?

    > <pvds>

    > Not sure about this

Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:
    > [JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and
    > AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.  Which of these is used is totally
    > dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.  If one requires
    > the use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use
    > AuthEnvelopedData.  If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice
    > but to use EnvelopedData.  Everybody is slowly moving from
    > EnvelopedData to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing
    > algorithms.  I do not remember any discussions about this, but
    > AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to be the more correct value here.
    > I will also note that there is a space between Enveloped and Data which
    > is not CMS.
    > </pvds>

So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what to code
for).  While I do'nt particularly care for server-generated keys, it should
probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complexity of sorting this
means that I think that Content-Format 284 (unprotected) will get used most
often.

Is there a good reference that would let us rip out more of this paragraph?

    > This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
    > software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
    > encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way.

Server-side key generation is optional, but when used, I agree that the
question of which mechanism the server should use to return the key is
completely open.   The client can indicate what it supports via CoAP Accept
"header".  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-amsuess-core-accept-any/
might be useful here.

    > <pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the
    > responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The
    > recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in
    > my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you
    > see a better way to do this.

    > </pvds>

    > Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only
    > OPTIONAL.)

    >    client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
    > information that does not match the current TLS session because the
    > authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
    > acting as an EST server.

    > This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
    > actually quoting and using quotation marks.  nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we
    > don't do the literal quote.

    > <pvds>

    > Hope my co-authors will react to this

    > [JLS] I would disagree with the nit.

    > [JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think
    > that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of
    > COAPS as it is terminating the connection.  The only exception would be
    > in there is internal authentication for the EST request.

    > </pvds>


Okay, I'm seeing three things here.
1) tls-unique can't be used across the proxy, and we need additional
   configuration.  I don't think we should quote literally, I think the
   point is to hammer the point home.

2) You are saying that we should replace tls-unique (RFC5929) with a TLS
   Exporter. But RFC7030 didn't reference RFC5705.
   You are suggesting that we update ourselves to use RFC5705.
   That would seem to require that we change some PKIX things in CSR.

3) I'm wondering if we need to have a clear response/error code for the case
   where the tls-unique does not match.  At least, from the HTTPS-EST
   server to the COAPS-EST "proxy" that might be valuable, even if the
   code it not sent back to the client.

    > Section 9.1

    > I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
    > allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are
    > still of interest even if most details of content encoding lie
    > elsewhere.

    > [JLS] No response from Peter?

Is Ben suggesting that the table should say:

   +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+
   | HTTP Media-Type              |    ID | Reference                  |
   +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+
   | application/pkcs7-mime;      |   280 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
   | smime-type=server-generated- |       |                            |
   | key                          |       |                            |
   | application/pkcs7-mime;      |   281 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
   | smime-type=certs-only        |       |                            |
   | application/pkcs8            |   284 | [THISDOCUMENT]           - |
   |                              |       |                            |
   | application/csrattrs         |   285 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
   | application/pkcs10           |   286 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
   |                              |       |                            |
   | application/pkix-cert        | TBD28 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
   |                              |     7 |                            |
   +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+

And I guess rfc5751-bis is now RFC8551.

    > So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.

I see that Peter has posted new examples.

    > In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
    > result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
    > itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
    > sent.

    > <pvds>

    > In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using
    > a randomly

    > generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The
    > cryptographic strength of

    > the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the
    > clientspecified
    > asymmetric key.

    > However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value.

    pvds> I don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text.

I not understand the question here.

    >    What's more, POP linking uses tls-unique as it is defined in
    > [RFC5929].  The 3SHAKE attack [tripleshake] poses a risk by allowing

    > nit: "such POP linking" or "the CMC POP linking"

    > <pvds>CMC POP </pvds>

    >    a man-in-the-middle to leverage session resumption and renegotiation
    > to inject himself between a client and server even when channel binding
    > is in use.  The attack was possible because of certain (D)TLS
    > implementation imperfections.  In the context of this specification,

    > I don't think we can solely blame the attacks on implementation
    > imperfections (though they were certainly compounding factors).  Does
    > this sentence really add any value to the current document?

    > <pvds>

    > Leave this to my co-authors

    > </pvds>

I think that 3SHAKE requires session resumption to be supported.
I'm not sure that using session resumption is the best thing in a constrained
client system.  I think that whenever we get to doing a new operation, that
we actually need a new session setup at that point anyway.

    >    binding mechanism.  Such a mechanism could include an updated tls-
    > unique value generation like the tls-unique-prf defined in
    > [I-D.josefsson-sasl-tls-cb] by using a TLS exporter [RFC5705] in TLS
    > 1.2 or TLS 1.3's updated exporter (Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]).  Such
    > mechanism has not been standardized yet.  Adopting a channel binding

    > We probably should be explicit about "using a TLS Exporter value in
    > place of the tls-unique value in the CSR", just from a writing clarity
    > perspective.

    > <pvds>

    > Leave to my co-authors from here to section 10.2

    > </pvds>

I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would take some work.


    > Do we want to say anything about the IDevID in the CSR/cert?  I note
    > that the breakdown in Appendix C.2 (looks like openssl output) does not
    > decode the otherName (though asn1parse can be convinced to do so).

    > <pvds>

    > What do you suggest for IDevID?

    > Actually openssl was used extensively for generating the examples.

    > Will be happy to learn about otherName

    > </pvds>

there is a whole bunch of othername not supported.
asn1parse isn't terribly informative here, in my opinion.


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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On Mon, Sep 09, 2019 at 12:54:12PM +0100, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl> wrote:
>     > ..... if the SignedData is not the outermost container, then we don't
>     > care what the relevant Content-Format for it is; we only care about the
>     > Content-Format for the EnvelopedData.
> 
>     > <pvds>
> 
>     > s/ SignedData is signed/SignedData, placed in the outermost container,
>     > is signed/
> 
>     > s/ The SignedData is further protected by placing it inside of a CMS
>     > EnvelopedData/
> 
>     > SignedData placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional
>     > signing/
> 
>     > </pvds>
> 
>     > Also, did we explicitly consider and reject AuthEnvelopedData?
> 
>     > <pvds>
> 
>     > Not sure about this
> 
> Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:
>     > [JLS] As a CMS person, I would consider the use of EnvelopedData and
>     > AuthEnvelopedData to be equivalent.  Which of these is used is totally
>     > dependent on what algorithm is used for encryption.  If one requires
>     > the use of AES-GCM or AES-CCM then one has no choice but to use
>     > AuthEnvelopedData.  If one wants to use AES-CCM ten one has no choice
>     > but to use EnvelopedData.  Everybody is slowly moving from
>     > EnvelopedData to AuthEnvelopedData just because everybody is changing
>     > algorithms.  I do not remember any discussions about this, but
>     > AuthEnvelopeData is generally going to be the more correct value here.
>     > I will also note that there is a space between Enveloped and Data which
>     > is not CMS.
>     > </pvds>
> 
> So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what to code
> for).  While I do'nt particularly care for server-generated keys, it should
> probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complexity of sorting this
> means that I think that Content-Format 284 (unprotected) will get used most
> often.

Your constrained device is probably only going to implement one cipher
[mode], too, right?  If it's an AEAD mode, you use AuthEnvelopedData;
otherwise, classic EnvelopedData.

> Is there a good reference that would let us rip out more of this paragraph?

We seem to have dropped enough quoting that there's not any paragraph here
that's in the current document :)

>     > This carefully says nothing about recommendations for use, only for
>     > software support.  Are we letting 7030's recommendation for use of
>     > encryption stand?  It's probably worth being explicit, either way.
> 
> Server-side key generation is optional, but when used, I agree that the
> question of which mechanism the server should use to return the key is
> completely open.   The client can indicate what it supports via CoAP Accept
> "header".  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-amsuess-core-accept-any/
> might be useful here.

That seems like a good point.

>     > <pvds> I did not find any recommendation for use in RFC7030 apart the
>     > responsibility of the server for generating random numbers. The
>     > recommendations at the top of section 5.8 of the draft seem adequate in
>     > my opinion. The alternative is classifying the applications; unless you
>     > see a better way to do this.
> 
>     > </pvds>
> 
>     > Why OPTIONAL?  (Also, nit: OPTIONALLY isn't a 2119 keyword; only
>     > OPTIONAL.)
> 
>     >    client.  For example, it could be configured to accept POP linking
>     > information that does not match the current TLS session because the
>     > authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
>     > acting as an EST server.
> 
>     > This is close enough to a literal quote that we might think about
>     > actually quoting and using quotation marks.  nit: s/POP/PoP/ if we
>     > don't do the literal quote.
> 
>     > <pvds>
> 
>     > Hope my co-authors will react to this
> 
>     > [JLS] I would disagree with the nit.
> 
>     > [JLS] I would agree with the nit on OPTIONALLY being wrong, but I think
>     > that it ought to be at least a SHOULD if not a MUST for the use of
>     > COAPS as it is terminating the connection.  The only exception would be
>     > in there is internal authentication for the EST request.
> 
>     > </pvds>
> 
> 
> Okay, I'm seeing three things here.
> 1) tls-unique can't be used across the proxy, and we need additional
>    configuration.  I don't think we should quote literally, I think the
>    point is to hammer the point home.
> 
> 2) You are saying that we should replace tls-unique (RFC5929) with a TLS
>    Exporter. But RFC7030 didn't reference RFC5705.
>    You are suggesting that we update ourselves to use RFC5705.
>    That would seem to require that we change some PKIX things in CSR.

>From a crypto perspective, we should do that.  From a
protocol-specification perspective, we should retain parity with classic
EST and only update when it does.  So we should probably mostly ignore this
other than trying to kick off work on classic EST, and mandating
extended-master-secret.

> 3) I'm wondering if we need to have a clear response/error code for the case
>    where the tls-unique does not match.  At least, from the HTTPS-EST
>    server to the COAPS-EST "proxy" that might be valuable, even if the
>    code it not sent back to the client.

[I didn't think much about whether this would give an attacker leverage
from which to execute new attacks]

>     > Section 9.1
> 
>     > I think we probably need this document as a reference for all the
>     > allocations; as the document effectuating the registration, we are
>     > still of interest even if most details of content encoding lie
>     > elsewhere.
> 
>     > [JLS] No response from Peter?
> 
> Is Ben suggesting that the table should say:
> 
>    +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+
>    | HTTP Media-Type              |    ID | Reference                  |
>    +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+
>    | application/pkcs7-mime;      |   280 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
>    | smime-type=server-generated- |       |                            |
>    | key                          |       |                            |
>    | application/pkcs7-mime;      |   281 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
>    | smime-type=certs-only        |       |                            |
>    | application/pkcs8            |   284 | [THISDOCUMENT]           - |
>    |                              |       |                            |
>    | application/csrattrs         |   285 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
>    | application/pkcs10           |   286 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
>    |                              |       |                            |
>    | application/pkix-cert        | TBD28 | [THISDOCUMENT]             |
>    |                              |     7 |                            |
>    +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+

No, I was thinking we should add "[THISDOCUMENT]" to the existing entries,
not replace them.

> And I guess rfc5751-bis is now RFC8551.
> 
>     > So I have to wonder if I'm messing something up, somewhere.
> 
> I see that Peter has posted new examples.
> 
>     > In the key-agreement case, the symmetric key-encryption key is the
>     > result of the key-agreement operation, no?  In which case it is not
>     > itself encrypted, but rather the server's ephemeral public value is
>     > sent.
> 
>     > <pvds>
> 
>     > In RFC7030 the text says: the EnvelopedData content is encrypted using
>     > a randomly
> 
>     > generated symmetric encryption key (that means ephemeral I assume). The
>     > cryptographic strength of
> 
>     > the symmetric encryption key SHOULD be equivalent to the
>     > clientspecified
>     > asymmetric key.
> 
>     > However, I see no explicit relation with the ephemeral public value.
> 
>     pvds> I don't know what to do here; probably insert the 7030 text.
> 
> I not understand the question here.

I think this was about relating the strength of the symmetric encryption
key to the strength of the ephemeral asymmetric share; 7030 has some text
here (quoted above, I think) but we currently do not.  So Peter is
proposing to just crib the text from 7030.

>     >    What's more, POP linking uses tls-unique as it is defined in
>     > [RFC5929].  The 3SHAKE attack [tripleshake] poses a risk by allowing
> 
>     > nit: "such POP linking" or "the CMC POP linking"
> 
>     > <pvds>CMC POP </pvds>
> 
>     >    a man-in-the-middle to leverage session resumption and renegotiation
>     > to inject himself between a client and server even when channel binding
>     > is in use.  The attack was possible because of certain (D)TLS
>     > implementation imperfections.  In the context of this specification,
> 
>     > I don't think we can solely blame the attacks on implementation
>     > imperfections (though they were certainly compounding factors).  Does
>     > this sentence really add any value to the current document?
> 
>     > <pvds>
> 
>     > Leave this to my co-authors
> 
>     > </pvds>
> 
> I think that 3SHAKE requires session resumption to be supported.
> I'm not sure that using session resumption is the best thing in a constrained
> client system.  I think that whenever we get to doing a new operation, that
> we actually need a new session setup at that point anyway.

Hmm, but we perhaps cannot guarantee that this will hold universally for
all devices implementing coap-est.
I do think that we can mandate other aspects that make 3SHAKE impossible
(like extended-master-secret), though.

>     >    binding mechanism.  Such a mechanism could include an updated tls-
>     > unique value generation like the tls-unique-prf defined in
>     > [I-D.josefsson-sasl-tls-cb] by using a TLS exporter [RFC5705] in TLS
>     > 1.2 or TLS 1.3's updated exporter (Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]).  Such
>     > mechanism has not been standardized yet.  Adopting a channel binding
> 
>     > We probably should be explicit about "using a TLS Exporter value in
>     > place of the tls-unique value in the CSR", just from a writing clarity
>     > perspective.
> 
>     > <pvds>
> 
>     > Leave to my co-authors from here to section 10.2
> 
>     > </pvds>
> 
> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would take some work.

I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just coap-EST.

-Ben

> 
>     > Do we want to say anything about the IDevID in the CSR/cert?  I note
>     > that the breakdown in Appendix C.2 (looks like openssl output) does not
>     > decode the otherName (though asn1parse can be convinced to do so).
> 
>     > <pvds>
> 
>     > What do you suggest for IDevID?
> 
>     > Actually openssl was used extensively for generating the examples.
> 
>     > Will be happy to learn about otherName
> 
>     > </pvds>
> 
> there is a whole bunch of othername not supported.
> asn1parse isn't terribly informative here, in my opinion.
> 

> -- 
> ]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [ 
> ]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [ 
> ]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [ 
> 	




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Comments: In-reply-to Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> message dated "Mon, 09 Sep 2019 09:42:33 -0500."
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Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
    >> So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what to
    >> code for).  While I do'nt particularly care for server-generated key=
s,
    >> it should probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complexity
    >> of sorting this means that I think that Content-Format 284
    >> (unprotected) will get used most often.

    > Your constrained device is probably only going to implement one cipher
    > [mode], too, right?  If it's an AEAD mode, you use AuthEnvelopedData;
    > otherwise, classic EnvelopedData.

Yes, but each constrained device type might have a different set, and the E=
ST
server for such an installation has to figure out how to send the right thi=
ng.

    >> 2) You are saying that we should replace tls-unique (RFC5929) with a
    >> TLS Exporter. But RFC7030 didn't reference RFC5705.  You are
    >> suggesting that we update ourselves to use RFC5705.  That would seem
    >> to require that we change some PKIX things in CSR.

    > From a crypto perspective, we should do that.  From a
    > protocol-specification perspective, we should retain parity with
    > classic EST and only update when it does.  So we should probably most=
ly
    > ignore this other than trying to kick off work on classic EST, and
    > mandating extended-master-secret.

okay, good.

    >> 3) I'm wondering if we need to have a clear response/error code for
    >> the case where the tls-unique does not match.  At least, from the
    >> HTTPS-EST server to the COAPS-EST "proxy" that might be valuable, ev=
en
    >> if the code it not sent back to the client.

    > [I didn't think much about whether this would give an attacker levera=
ge
    > from which to execute new attacks]

An HTTPS-EST server that responses to the COAPS-EST with such an error is
probably mis-configured for that end point.  It probably does not believe
that the CoAPS-EST proxy is authorized to speak for the end point.
Both are already trusted.

The end point is probably already also trusted btw.  The major use case that
we had for server-generating keys is for updating keys for existing
installations.  Such as moving from 10yr old 1024RSA keys that were manually
deployed (at the factory) to 256bit ECDSA keys, etc.

    >> +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+
    >> | HTTP Media-Type | ID | Reference |
    >> +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+
    >> | application/pkcs7-mime; | 280 | [THISDOCUMENT] | |
    >> smime-type=3Dserver-generated- | | | | key | | | |
    >> application/pkcs7-mime; | 281 | [THISDOCUMENT] | |
    >> smime-type=3Dcerts-only | | | | application/pkcs8 | 284 | [THISDOCUM=
ENT]
    >> - |
    >> |                              |       |                            |
    >> | application/csrattrs | 285 | [THISDOCUMENT] | | application/pkcs10=
 |
    >> 286 | [THISDOCUMENT] |
    >> |                              |       |                            |
    >> | application/pkix-cert | TBD28 | [THISDOCUMENT] | | | 7 | |
    >> +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+

    > No, I was thinking we should add "[THISDOCUMENT]" to the existing
    > entries, not replace them.

got it.

    >> I think that 3SHAKE requires session resumption to be supported.  I'm
    >> not sure that using session resumption is the best thing in a
    >> constrained client system.  I think that whenever we get to doing a
    >> new operation, that we actually need a new session setup at that poi=
nt
    >> anyway.

    > Hmm, but we perhaps cannot guarantee that this will hold universally
    > for all devices implementing coap-est.  I do think that we can mandate
    > other aspects that make 3SHAKE impossible (like
    > extended-master-secret), though.

okay.

    >> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would take
    >> some work.

    > I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just
    > coap-EST.

So you'd agree to deferring this to a document (maybe in LAMPS?) that would
Updates: 7030 and this document.

=2D-=20
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh network=
s [=20
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect=
  [=20
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails  =
  [=20
=09

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On Mon, Sep 09, 2019 at 05:38:23PM +0100, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>     >> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would take
>     >> some work.
> 
>     > I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just
>     > coap-EST.
> 
> So you'd agree to deferring this to a document (maybe in LAMPS?) that would
> Updates: 7030 and this document.

Right.

-Ben


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To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>
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References: <20190828233639.GI84368@kduck.mit.edu> <027701d55ebf$994184b0$cbc48e10$@augustcellars.com> <edcbc2a243cc7118e35aec77b2e1599c@bbhmail.nl> <20190901204340.GG27269@kduck.mit.edu> <6b482aaed0ce510c503984dfbac7286c@bbhmail.nl> <7cd78133c263214be535ec36734f7ec1@bbhmail.nl> <30070.1568030052@dooku.sandelman.ca> <20190909144232.GH18198@kduck.mit.edu> <7801.1568047103@dooku.sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> 
Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 9:38 AM
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2


Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
    >> So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what to
    >> code for).  While I do'nt particularly care for server-generated
keys,
    >> it should probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complexity
    >> of sorting this means that I think that Content-Format 284
    >> (unprotected) will get used most often.

    > Your constrained device is probably only going to implement one cipher
    > [mode], too, right?  If it's an AEAD mode, you use AuthEnvelopedData;
    > otherwise, classic EnvelopedData.

Yes, but each constrained device type might have a different set, and the
EST server for such an installation has to figure out how to send the right
thing.

[JLS] This is the function of section 4.4.1.1 in RFC 7030 which says that
the DecryptKeyIdentifier must be present.  This will provide the EST server
a method to identify the correct key and the correct symmetric encryption
algorithm.

    >> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would take
    >> some work.

    > I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just
    > coap-EST.

So you'd agree to deferring this to a document (maybe in LAMPS?) that would
Updates: 7030 and this document.

-- 
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks
[ 
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect
[ 
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails
[ 
	


From nobody Mon Sep  9 20:34:11 2019
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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
CC: <draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org>, <ace@ietf.org>, 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>
References: <20190828233639.GI84368@kduck.mit.edu> <027701d55ebf$994184b0$cbc48e10$@augustcellars.com> <edcbc2a243cc7118e35aec77b2e1599c@bbhmail.nl> <20190901204340.GG27269@kduck.mit.edu> <6b482aaed0ce510c503984dfbac7286c@bbhmail.nl> <7cd78133c263214be535ec36734f7ec1@bbhmail.nl> <30070.1568030052@dooku.sandelman.ca> <20190909144232.GH18198@kduck.mit.edu> <7801.1568047103@dooku.sandelman.ca> <007901d5674b$9bc75e00$d3561a00$@augustcellars.com>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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Authors,

Are we ready to produce a new draft that addresses most, if not all, of
Ben's comments?  Do we have a pull request to deal with this that we can
point to?

Jim


-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> 
Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 1:17 PM
To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; 'Benjamin Kaduk'
<kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2



-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> 
Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 9:38 AM
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2


Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
    >> So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what to
    >> code for).  While I do'nt particularly care for server-generated
keys,
    >> it should probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complexity
    >> of sorting this means that I think that Content-Format 284
    >> (unprotected) will get used most often.

    > Your constrained device is probably only going to implement one cipher
    > [mode], too, right?  If it's an AEAD mode, you use AuthEnvelopedData;
    > otherwise, classic EnvelopedData.

Yes, but each constrained device type might have a different set, and the
EST server for such an installation has to figure out how to send the right
thing.

[JLS] This is the function of section 4.4.1.1 in RFC 7030 which says that
the DecryptKeyIdentifier must be present.  This will provide the EST server
a method to identify the correct key and the correct symmetric encryption
algorithm.

    >> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would take
    >> some work.

    > I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just
    > coap-EST.

So you'd agree to deferring this to a document (maybe in LAMPS?) that would
Updates: 7030 and this document.

-- 
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks
[ 
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect
[ 
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails
[ 
	


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From: "Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)" <pkampana@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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Hi Jim,

We are tracking all of Ben's feedback here https://github.com/SanKumar2015/=
EST-coaps/issues/150=20

The fixes that have gone in the draft so far are after each comment. There =
are still some that we still need to update after the threads converged.=20

Panos


-----Original Message-----
From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Jim Schaad
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2019 11:34 PM
To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>;=
 ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2

Authors,

Are we ready to produce a new draft that addresses most, if not all, of Ben=
's comments?  Do we have a pull request to deal with this that we can point=
 to?

Jim


-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 1:17 PM
To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; 'Benjamin Kaduk'
<kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2



-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>=20
Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 9:38 AM
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2


Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
    >> So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what t=
o
    >> code for).  While I do'nt particularly care for server-generated
keys,
    >> it should probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complexit=
y
    >> of sorting this means that I think that Content-Format 284
    >> (unprotected) will get used most often.

    > Your constrained device is probably only going to implement one ciphe=
r
    > [mode], too, right?  If it's an AEAD mode, you use AuthEnvelopedData;
    > otherwise, classic EnvelopedData.

Yes, but each constrained device type might have a different set, and the
EST server for such an installation has to figure out how to send the right
thing.

[JLS] This is the function of section 4.4.1.1 in RFC 7030 which says that
the DecryptKeyIdentifier must be present.  This will provide the EST server
a method to identify the correct key and the correct symmetric encryption
algorithm.

    >> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would tak=
e
    >> some work.

    > I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just
    > coap-EST.

So you'd agree to deferring this to a document (maybe in LAMPS?) that would
Updates: 7030 and this document.

--=20
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh network=
s
[=20
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect
[=20
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails
[=20
=09

_______________________________________________
Ace mailing list
Ace@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace


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--=_2c38dd72f09943092f87eb7d43c56829
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8;
 format=flowed

>> Hi all,
>> 
>> below are comments to a subset of not yet concluded review exchanges.
>> 
>> Peter
>> _______________________________________________________
>> 
>> The serverkeygen endpoints could perhaps have some notation to indicate
>> that the private key is always returned, in addition to the PKCS#7 vs.
>> pkix-cert question that distinguishes skg and skc. 
>> 
>> <pvds>after ".....an /skc request.", the following text is added: 
>> 
>> "In both cases a private key MUST be returned."
> 
> I was thinking we could have something in the table, though we may be too
> short on horizontal space for that to actually work.
> 
>> </pvds>
>> 
>> <pvds3>
>> The tables seem to be full, so I left them as they were
>> </pvds3>
>> 
>> Clients and servers MUST support the short resource EST-coaps URIs.
>> 
>> Are they expected to also support the long EST URIs over CoAP? 
>> 
>> <pvds> It was undecided whether we should add: 
>> 
>> "The corresponding longer URIs from <xref target="RFC7030"/> MAY be
>> supported."
> 
> I have no strong preference here, but would not be surprised if we got a
> question on it from the IESG.  (Which I guess means a weak preference for
> adding the above text.)
> 
> <pvds3>
> slightly preferred text has been added 
> </pvds3>
> 
> Hmm, I think I was not very clear about what I meant: for the given
> resources, the only defined content types for that resource are the ones
> listed in the example request.  If a server tries to advertise anything
> else, it seems like that would be out of spec (and maybe a client should
> bail on seeing it?).  But maybe I'm misinterpreting things and we should
> leave open space for future expansions to other content formats.
> 
> <pvds3>
> I added the text:
> "This approach allows future servers to incorporate currently not specified content-formats and resources."
> 
>> Section 5.2
>> 
>> While [RFC7030] permits a number of these functions to be used
>> without authentication, this specification requires that the client
>> MUST be authenticated for all functions.
>> 
>> Perhaps this divergence from 7030 should be noted more prominently,
>> perhaps in the section title or a dedicated "Differences from RFC 7030"
>> section? 
>> 
>> <pvds> 
>> 
>> Suggestion to move this phrase to section 5 just before section 5.1?
> 
> That would be a big help, thanks..
> 
>> </pvds>
>> 
>> <pvds3>
>> done
>> </pvds3>
>> 
>> </pvds>
--=_2c38dd72f09943092f87eb7d43c56829
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
=3DUTF-8" /></head><body style=3D'font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana,Gen=
eva,sans-serif'>
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">Hi all,<br /><br />below are comments to a subset of n=
ot yet concluded review exchanges.<br /><br />Peter<br />__________________=
_____________________________________<br /><br />The serverkeygen endpoints=
 could perhaps have some notation to indicate<br />that the private key is =
always returned, in addition to the PKCS#7 vs.<br />pkix-cert question that=
 distinguishes skg and skc. <br /><br />&lt;pvds&gt;after ".....an /skc req=
uest.", the following text is added: <br /><br />"In both cases a private k=
ey MUST be returned."</blockquote>
<br />I was thinking we could have something in the table, though we may be=
 too<br />short on horizontal space for that to actually work.<br /><br />
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /><br />&lt;pvds3&gt;<br />The tables=
 seem to be full, so I left them as they were<br />&lt;/pvds3&gt;<br /><br =
/>&nbsp; &nbsp;Clients and servers MUST support the short resource EST-coap=
s URIs.<br /><br />Are they expected to also support the long EST URIs over=
 CoAP? <br /><br />&lt;pvds&gt; It was undecided whether we should add: <br=
 /><br />"The corresponding longer URIs from &lt;xref target=3D"RFC7030"/&g=
t; MAY be<br />supported."</blockquote>
<br />I have no strong preference here, but would not be surprised if we go=
t a<br />question on it from the IESG. &nbsp;(Which I guess means a weak pr=
eference for<br />adding the above text.)<br /><br />&lt;pvds3&gt;<br />sli=
ghtly preferred text has been added&nbsp;<br />&lt;/pvds3&gt;<br /><br /><b=
r />Hmm, I think I was not very clear about what I meant: for the given<br =
/>resources, the only defined content types for that resource are the ones<=
br />listed in the example request. &nbsp;If a server tries to advertise an=
ything<br />else, it seems like that would be out of spec (and maybe a clie=
nt should<br />bail on seeing it?). &nbsp;But maybe I'm misinterpreting thi=
ngs and we should<br />leave open space for future expansions to other cont=
ent formats.<br /><br />&lt;pvds3&gt;<br />I added the text:<br />"This app=
roach allows future servers to incorporate currently not specified content-=
formats and resources."<br /><br /><br />
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">Section 5.2<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;While [RFC703=
0] permits a number of these functions to be used<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;wi=
thout authentication, this specification requires that the client<br />&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;MUST be authenticated for all functions.<br /><br />Perhaps t=
his divergence from 7030 should be noted more prominently,<br />perhaps in =
the section title or a dedicated "Differences from RFC 7030"<br />section? =
<br /><br />&lt;pvds&gt; <br /><br />Suggestion to move this phrase to sect=
ion 5 just before section 5.1?</blockquote>
<br />That would be a big help, thanks..<br /><br />
<blockquote type=3D"cite" style=3D"padding: 0 0.4em; border-left: #1010ff 2=
px solid; margin: 0">&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /><br />&lt;pvds3&gt;<br />done<br />=
&lt;/pvds3&gt;<br /><br />&lt;/pvds&gt;<br /><br /><br /></blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
</body></html>

--=_2c38dd72f09943092f87eb7d43c56829--


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Subject: [Ace] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments WG of the IETF.

        Title           : EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)
        Authors         : Peter van der Stok
                          Panos Kampanakis
                          Michael C. Richardson
                          Shahid Raza
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13.txt
	Pages           : 50
	Date            : 2019-09-10

Abstract:
   Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is used as a certificate
   provisioning protocol over HTTPS.  Low-resource devices often use the
   lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message
   exchanges.  This document defines how to transport EST payloads over
   secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allows constrained devices to use
   existing EST functionality for provisioning certificates.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Hi all,

This draft includes most reactions to Benjamin Kaduk's review.
A few open points remain; but given the recursion depth on the comments
to the comments, it seems appropriate to produce and publish a new
version to continue the discussion, thus diminishing the probabilty of
misunderstanding.

Peter
-------- Oorspronkelijke bericht -------- 

 		ONDERWERP:
 		[Ace] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13.txt

 		DATUM:
 		2019-09-10 11:46

 		AFZENDER:
 		internet-drafts@ietf.org

 		ONTVANGER:
 		<i-d-announce@ietf.org>

 		KOPIE:
 		ace@ietf.org

 		ANTWOORD-AAN:
 		ace@ietf.org

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments WG of the IETF.

        Title           : EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)
        Authors         : Peter van der Stok
                          Panos Kampanakis
                          Michael C. Richardson
                          Shahid Raza
    Filename        : draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13.txt
    Pages           : 50
    Date            : 2019-09-10

Abstract:
   Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is used as a certificate
   provisioning protocol over HTTPS.  Low-resource devices often use the
   lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message
   exchanges.  This document defines how to transport EST payloads over
   secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allows constrained devices to use
   existing EST functionality for provisioning certificates.

The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13

Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

_______________________________________________
Ace mailing list
Ace@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace
--=_f504539c335bff137d1bdcf2cb638ded
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
=3DUTF-8" /></head><body style=3D'font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana,Gen=
eva,sans-serif'>
Hi all,<br /><br />This draft includes most reactions to Benjamin Kaduk's r=
eview.<br />A few open points remain; but given the recursion depth on the =
comments to the comments, it seems appropriate to produce and publish a new=
 version to continue the discussion, thus diminishing the probabilty of mis=
understanding.<br /><br />Peter<br />
<p>-------- Oorspronkelijke bericht --------</p>
<table border=3D"0" cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th align=3D"right" valign=3D"baseline" nowrap=3D"nowrap">Onderwerp:</th>
<td>[Ace] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13.txt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th align=3D"right" valign=3D"baseline" nowrap=3D"nowrap">Datum:</th>
<td>2019-09-10 11:46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th align=3D"right" valign=3D"baseline" nowrap=3D"nowrap">Afzender:</th>
<td>internet-drafts@ietf.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th align=3D"right" valign=3D"baseline" nowrap=3D"nowrap">Ontvanger:</th>
<td>&lt;i-d-announce@ietf.org&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th align=3D"right" valign=3D"baseline" nowrap=3D"nowrap">Kopie:</th>
<td>ace@ietf.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th align=3D"right" valign=3D"baseline" nowrap=3D"nowrap">Antwoord-aan:</th=
>
<td>ace@ietf.org</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<br /><!-- html ignored --><!-- head ignored --><!-- meta ignored -->
<div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
<br />A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts di=
rectories.<br />This draft is a work item of the Authentication and Authori=
zation for Constrained Environments WG of the IETF.<br /><br />&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Title &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)<br />&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Authors &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: Peter van der Stok<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Panos Kampanakis<br />=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;Michael C. Richardson<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Shahid Raza<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;Filename &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: draft-ietf-ace-co=
ap-est-13.txt<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Pages &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: 50<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Date &n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;: 2019-09-1=
0<br /><br />Abstract:<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Enrollment over Secure Transp=
ort (EST) is used as a certificate<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;provisioning prot=
ocol over HTTPS. &nbsp;Low-resource devices often use the<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message<br />=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;exchanges. &nbsp;This document defines how to transport E=
ST payloads over<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allo=
ws constrained devices to use<br />&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;existing EST functiona=
lity for provisioning certificates.<br /><br /><br />The IETF datatracker s=
tatus page for this draft is:<br /><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/=
doc/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est/" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer"=
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est/</a><br /><br />T=
here are also htmlized versions available at:<br /><a href=3D"https://tools=
=2Eietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noope=
ner noreferrer">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13</a><=
br /><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-e=
st-13" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer">https://datatracker.ie=
tf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13</a><br /><br />A diff from the p=
revious version is available at:<br /><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdi=
ff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noopener nor=
eferrer">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13</a>=
<br /><br /><br />Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the=
 time of submission<br />until the htmlized version and diff are available =
at tools.ietf.org.<br /><br />Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymo=
us FTP at:<br /><a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_=
blank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><=
br /><br />_______________________________________________<br />Ace mailing=
 list<br /><a href=3D"mailto:Ace@ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer">Ace@ietf.org<=
/a><br /><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace" target=3D"_b=
lank" rel=3D"noopener noreferrer">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace=
</a></div>
</body></html>

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From: "Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)" <pkampana@cisco.com>
To: "'Benjamin Kaduk'" <kaduk@mit.edu>
CC: "draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org>, "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>, "Jim Schaad" <ietf@augustcellars.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>, Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl>
Thread-Topic: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ace/UUpR_JMLINY3zi8J5zZzFS_L5f8>
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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Hi Ben,

I think we have now addressed all your feedback from the AD review. A big c=
hunk of the changes were agreed upon in the list emails threads.=20

The iteration that we are planning to upload that includes all the changes =
is at https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/blob/master/draft-ietf-ace-=
coap-est.txt=20

The summary of all your comments and what went into the text is in the git =
issue https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150 To break it down=
=20
- https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issue-489289217 has =
most of the changes agreed on the list.
-  https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issuecomment-528001=
807 has an answer to your question about addressing the tls-unique issue in=
 a new draft.=20
- https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issuecomment-5318532=
81 has the last changes in response to your feedback that went into the dra=
ft after Peter uploade the -13 iteration.=20

Two places to pay attention to is that I removed the=20
>   It is strongly RECOMMENDED that the clients request that the returned
>   private key be afforded the additional security of the Cryptographic
>   Message Syntax (CMS) EnvelopedData in addition to the TLS-provided
>   security to protect against unauthorized disclosure."
and the=20
>   The corresponding longer URIs from [RFC7030] MAY be supported."
The rationale behind that is in the git issue.=20

Please have a look and let us know if there is anything missing. Otherwise =
we will upload at the end of the week.=20

Rgs,
Panos


-----Original Message-----
From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)
Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2019 12:18 AM
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@san=
delman.ca>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>;=
 ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2

Hi Jim,

We are tracking all of Ben's feedback here https://github.com/SanKumar2015/=
EST-coaps/issues/150=20

The fixes that have gone in the draft so far are after each comment. There =
are still some that we still need to update after the threads converged.=20

Panos


-----Original Message-----
From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Jim Schaad
Sent: Monday, September 09, 2019 11:34 PM
To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>;=
 ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2

Authors,

Are we ready to produce a new draft that addresses most, if not all, of Ben=
's comments?  Do we have a pull request to deal with this that we can point=
 to?

Jim


-----Original Message-----
From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 1:17 PM
To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; 'Benjamin Kaduk'
<kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2



-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>=20
Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 9:38 AM
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2


Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
    >> So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what t=
o
    >> code for).  While I do'nt particularly care for server-generated
keys,
    >> it should probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complexit=
y
    >> of sorting this means that I think that Content-Format 284
    >> (unprotected) will get used most often.

    > Your constrained device is probably only going to implement one ciphe=
r
    > [mode], too, right?  If it's an AEAD mode, you use AuthEnvelopedData;
    > otherwise, classic EnvelopedData.

Yes, but each constrained device type might have a different set, and the
EST server for such an installation has to figure out how to send the right
thing.

[JLS] This is the function of section 4.4.1.1 in RFC 7030 which says that
the DecryptKeyIdentifier must be present.  This will provide the EST server
a method to identify the correct key and the correct symmetric encryption
algorithm.

    >> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would tak=
e
    >> some work.

    > I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just
    > coap-EST.

So you'd agree to deferring this to a document (maybe in LAMPS?) that would
Updates: 7030 and this document.


From nobody Wed Sep 18 19:59:20 2019
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Subject: [Ace] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)
        Authors         : Michael B. Jones
                          Ludwig Seitz
                          Göran Selander
                          Samuel Erdtman
                          Hannes Tschofenig
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
	Pages           : 16
	Date            : 2019-09-18

Abstract:
   This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)
   that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-
   possession key.  Being able to prove possession of a key is also
   sometimes described as being the holder-of-key.  This specification
   provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
   Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using CBOR and
   CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) spec addressing Area Director review comments
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ace/3lwMvM8nDD4b7xlUYJC6I6o_gKQ>
Subject: [Ace] Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) spec addressing Area Director review comments
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The Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) specificat=
ion has been updated to address the Area Director review comments by Benjam=
in Kaduk.  Thanks to Ludwig Seitz and Hannes Tschofenig for their work on r=
esolving the issues raised.

The specification is available at:

  *   https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07

An HTML-formatted version is also available at:

  *   http://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-0=
7.html

                                                       -- Mike

P.S.  This notice was also posted at http://self-issued.info/?p=3D2004 and =
@selfissued<https://twitter.com/selfissued>.

--_000_MN2PR00MB05763FF4AF3418C8B451A53AF5890MN2PR00MB0576namp_
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web T=
okens (CWTs) specification has been updated to address the Area Director re=
view comments by Benjamin Kaduk.&nbsp; Thanks to Ludwig Seitz and Hannes Ts=
chofenig for their work on resolving the
 issues raised.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The specification is available at:<o:p></o:p></p>
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<li class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-left:0in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
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ssession-07">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-posses=
sion-07</a><o:p></o:p></li></ul>
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lfo1"><a href=3D"http://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-p=
ossession-07.html">http://self-issued.info/docs/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of=
-possession-07.html</a><o:p></o:p></li></ul>
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
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sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal">P.S.&nbsp; This notice was also posted at <a href=3D=
"http://self-issued.info/?p=3D2004">
http://self-issued.info/?p=3D2004</a> and <a href=3D"https://twitter.com/se=
lfissued">
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From nobody Fri Sep 20 20:53:51 2019
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Subject: [Ace] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments WG of the IETF.

        Title           : EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)
        Authors         : Peter van der Stok
                          Panos Kampanakis
                          Michael C. Richardson
                          Shahid Raza
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14.txt
	Pages           : 50
	Date            : 2019-09-20

Abstract:
   Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is used as a certificate
   provisioning protocol over HTTPS.  Low-resource devices often use the
   lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message
   exchanges.  This document defines how to transport EST payloads over
   secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allows constrained devices to use
   existing EST functionality for provisioning certificates.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Subject: Re: [Ace] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14.txt
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Hi everyone,

This iteration addresses comments we received from Ben's AD Review. Thanks =
Ben.=20

The summary of all comments and what went into the text after the discussio=
ns in the list is in the git issue https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coap=
s/issues/150=20

Rgs,
Panos



-----Original Message-----
From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of internet-drafts@ietf.org
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2019 11:54 PM
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: ace@ietf.org
Subject: [Ace] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14.txt


A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
This draft is a work item of the Authentication and Authorization for Const=
rained Environments WG of the IETF.

        Title           : EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)
        Authors         : Peter van der Stok
                          Panos Kampanakis
                          Michael C. Richardson
                          Shahid Raza
	Filename        : draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14.txt
	Pages           : 50
	Date            : 2019-09-20

Abstract:
   Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is used as a certificate
   provisioning protocol over HTTPS.  Low-resource devices often use the
   lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message
   exchanges.  This document defines how to transport EST payloads over
   secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allows constrained devices to use
   existing EST functionality for provisioning certificates.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-ace-coap-est-14


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

_______________________________________________
Ace mailing list
Ace@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace


From nobody Mon Sep 23 15:48:52 2019
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Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2019 15:48:28 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: "Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)" <pkampana@cisco.com>
Cc: "draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org>,  "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>, Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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Hi Panos,

Sorry for the slow response here -- I was in telechat-prep mode last week.

This is in pretty good shape, and I wanted to especially thank you for the
presentation in the github issue -- that format was extremely helpful for
me.

I think we will probably need to upload one more minor revision before I
initiate the IETF LC; please seem my comments below.


In Section 4, I think we need to put the "for" back in "requests for a
trusted certificate list".

Also, refresh my memory: did we decide that there's no need to
explicitly mandate the use of the "extended_master_secret" TLS
extension?

I'd also change the note about supported_groups vs. Supported Elliptic
Curves to read "In addition, in DTLS 1.3 the Supported Elliptic Curves
extension has been renamed to Supported Groups."

I think we can move /csrattrs to the bottom of Table 2 (thank you for
changing Table 1!).

With the changes to the example in Figure 3, can you walk me through the
block-size negotiation?  Quoting:

    POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# N1+1)}-->
		      |
       ... Immediate response when certificate is ready ...
		      |
      <-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (2:0/1/256) (2.04 Changed){Cert resp (frag# 1)}
    POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/128)           -->
      <-- (ACK) (2:1/1/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# 2)}

So the ACK to the final fragment of the POST includes (2:0/1/256), or
the first fragment of a 256-byte-fragmented version of the response.
The client then goes and asks for (2:1/0/128), which is the second
fragment of a 128-byte-fragmented version of the response.  Is that just
going to be the last 128 bytes of the thing it already got from the
server?  If so, is that something it would actually do (e.g., if it had
to drop part of the server's response due to a buffer-size limitation)
or is it not possible to only have part of a fragment (so it would need
to either ask for (2:0/0/128) or (2:2/0/128)?

It looks like you removed the text about "[the two representations] do
not have to be in a particular order since each representation is
preceded by its Content-Format ID" based on my remark about
core-multipart-ct; that document has since been approved by the IESG and
is explicitly confirming that there is no specific ordering requirement
(in contrast to multipart/mixed), so we could put that clause back in
this document if desired.

I consider it more likely than not that a directorate reviewer will want
to tweak the added language at the end of Section 5.8 explaining our
divergence from RFC 7030; if you want to preemptively reword, my
suggestion would be "Although [RFC7030] strongly recommends that clients
request the use of CMS encryption on top of the TLS channel's
protection, this document does not make such a recommendation; CMS
encryption can still be used when mandated by the use case."

Thanks!

-Ben


On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 05:38:59PM +0000, Panos Kampanakis (pkampana) wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> I think we have now addressed all your feedback from the AD review. A big chunk of the changes were agreed upon in the list emails threads. 
> 
> The iteration that we are planning to upload that includes all the changes is at https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/blob/master/draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.txt 
> 
> The summary of all your comments and what went into the text is in the git issue https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150 To break it down 
> - https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issue-489289217 has most of the changes agreed on the list.
> -  https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issuecomment-528001807 has an answer to your question about addressing the tls-unique issue in a new draft. 
> - https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issuecomment-531853281 has the last changes in response to your feedback that went into the draft after Peter uploade the -13 iteration. 
> 
> Two places to pay attention to is that I removed the 
> >   It is strongly RECOMMENDED that the clients request that the returned
> >   private key be afforded the additional security of the Cryptographic
> >   Message Syntax (CMS) EnvelopedData in addition to the TLS-provided
> >   security to protect against unauthorized disclosure."
> and the 
> >   The corresponding longer URIs from [RFC7030] MAY be supported."
> The rationale behind that is in the git issue. 
> 
> Please have a look and let us know if there is anything missing. Otherwise we will upload at the end of the week. 
> 
> Rgs,
> Panos
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)
> Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2019 12:18 AM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
> Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
> 
> Hi Jim,
> 
> We are tracking all of Ben's feedback here https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150 
> 
> The fixes that have gone in the draft so far are after each comment. There are still some that we still need to update after the threads converged. 
> 
> Panos
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Jim Schaad
> Sent: Monday, September 09, 2019 11:34 PM
> To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
> Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk' <kaduk@mit.edu>; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
> 
> Authors,
> 
> Are we ready to produce a new draft that addresses most, if not all, of Ben's comments?  Do we have a pull request to deal with this that we can point to?
> 
> Jim
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 1:17 PM
> To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; 'Benjamin Kaduk'
> <kaduk@mit.edu>
> Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> 
> Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 9:38 AM
> To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
> Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
> 
> 
> Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>     >> So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what to
>     >> code for).  While I do'nt particularly care for server-generated
> keys,
>     >> it should probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complexity
>     >> of sorting this means that I think that Content-Format 284
>     >> (unprotected) will get used most often.
> 
>     > Your constrained device is probably only going to implement one cipher
>     > [mode], too, right?  If it's an AEAD mode, you use AuthEnvelopedData;
>     > otherwise, classic EnvelopedData.
> 
> Yes, but each constrained device type might have a different set, and the
> EST server for such an installation has to figure out how to send the right
> thing.
> 
> [JLS] This is the function of section 4.4.1.1 in RFC 7030 which says that
> the DecryptKeyIdentifier must be present.  This will provide the EST server
> a method to identify the correct key and the correct symmetric encryption
> algorithm.
> 
>     >> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would take
>     >> some work.
> 
>     > I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just
>     > coap-EST.
> 
> So you'd agree to deferring this to a document (maybe in LAMPS?) that would
> Updates: 7030 and this document.


From nobody Tue Sep 24 16:33:27 2019
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Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 16:33:18 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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Hi all,

Thanks for the updates; they look good!

Before I kick off the IETF LC, I just have two things I wanted to
double-check (we may not need a new rev before the LC):

(1) In Section 3.2 (Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession
Key), the last paragraph is a somewhat different from the main content, in
that it mentions using "COSE_Key" for an encrypted symmetric key, analogous
to the last paragraph of Section 3.2 of RFC 7800.  I had wanted to see some
additional discussion, but we agreed that this was analogous to RFC 7800
and we did not need to go "out of parity" with it on this point.  So we
should be able to go ahead without new text here, but did we want to
explicitly refer back to that portion of RFC 7800 to make the connection
clear?

(2) In https://github.com/cwt-cnf/i-d/pull/27/files we removed a large
chunk of text since it contained several things that are inaccurate.  The
only things that were removed that I wanted to check if we should think
about keeping was the note that the same key might be referred to by
different key IDs in messages directed to different recipients.  What do
people think about that?

Thanks,

Ben

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 07:59:18PM -0700, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> 
> A new version (-07) has been submitted for draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession:
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
> 
> Sub state has been changed to AD Followup from Revised ID Needed
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker page for this Internet-Draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession/
> 
> Diff from previous version:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the diff is available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> IETF Secretariat.
> 


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 04:33:18PM -0700, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> Thanks for the updates; they look good!
> 
> Before I kick off the IETF LC, I just have two things I wanted to
> double-check (we may not need a new rev before the LC):
> 
> (1) In Section 3.2 (Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession
> Key), the last paragraph is a somewhat different from the main content, in
> that it mentions using "COSE_Key" for an encrypted symmetric key, analogous
> to the last paragraph of Section 3.2 of RFC 7800.  I had wanted to see some
> additional discussion, but we agreed that this was analogous to RFC 7800
> and we did not need to go "out of parity" with it on this point.  So we
> should be able to go ahead without new text here, but did we want to
> explicitly refer back to that portion of RFC 7800 to make the connection
> clear?
> 
> (2) In https://github.com/cwt-cnf/i-d/pull/27/files we removed a large
> chunk of text since it contained several things that are inaccurate.  The
> only things that were removed that I wanted to check if we should think
> about keeping was the note that the same key might be referred to by
> different key IDs in messages directed to different recipients.  What do
> people think about that?

Oops, and my notes were unfortunately misalgined to the terminal window
size:

(3) I think we were going to change the [JWT] reference to [CWT], in
Section 4:

   Applications utilizing proof of possession SHOULD also utilize
   audience restriction, as described in Section 4.1.3 of [JWT], as it
   provides additional protections.  Audience restriction can be used by
   recipients to reject messages intended for different recipients.

That way we won't get asked to make [JWT] a normative reference.

-Ben


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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I'm fine with us making both of the proposed changes.

				Thanks,
				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>=20
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2019 4:35 PM
To: draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org
Cc: ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possess=
ion-07.txt

On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 04:33:18PM -0700, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> Hi all,
>=20
> Thanks for the updates; they look good!
>=20
> Before I kick off the IETF LC, I just have two things I wanted to=20
> double-check (we may not need a new rev before the LC):
>=20
> (1) In Section 3.2 (Representation of an Asymmetric=20
> Proof-of-Possession Key), the last paragraph is a somewhat different=20
> from the main content, in that it mentions using "COSE_Key" for an=20
> encrypted symmetric key, analogous to the last paragraph of Section=20
> 3.2 of RFC 7800.  I had wanted to see some additional discussion, but=20
> we agreed that this was analogous to RFC 7800 and we did not need to=20
> go "out of parity" with it on this point.  So we should be able to go=20
> ahead without new text here, but did we want to explicitly refer back=20
> to that portion of RFC 7800 to make the connection clear?
>=20
> (2) In=20
> https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fgith
> ub.com%2Fcwt-cnf%2Fi-d%2Fpull%2F27%2Ffiles&amp;data=3D02%7C01%7CMichael.
> Jones%40microsoft.com%7C3db4c9b38e6a4b2a13e408d74147db9e%7C72f988bf86f
> 141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C1%7C637049649201375862&amp;sdata=3DvAL0NqVzv
> sqDAt5JYv0HdtUomFc5ldKJQtla3dtL%2BuM%3D&amp;reserved=3D0 we removed a lar=
ge chunk of text since it contained several things that are inaccurate.  Th=
e only things that were removed that I wanted to check if we should think a=
bout keeping was the note that the same key might be referred to by differe=
nt key IDs in messages directed to different recipients.  What do people th=
ink about that?

Oops, and my notes were unfortunately misalgined to the terminal window
size:

(3) I think we were going to change the [JWT] reference to [CWT], in Sectio=
n 4:

   Applications utilizing proof of possession SHOULD also utilize
   audience restriction, as described in Section 4.1.3 of [JWT], as it
   provides additional protections.  Audience restriction can be used by
   recipients to reject messages intended for different recipients.

That way we won't get asked to make [JWT] a normative reference.

-Ben


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To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>,  "draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org>
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From: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se>
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Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 08:31:03 +0200
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ace/4Kqb9O_UXyw_g7gXaGU5zUdNCwQ>
Subject: Re: [Ace] New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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On 25/09/2019 02:23, Mike Jones wrote:
> I'm fine with us making both of the proposed changes.
>=20
> 				Thanks,
> 				-- Mike
>=20

+1

--=20
Ludwig Seitz, PhD
Security Lab, RISE
Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51


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From: Samuel Erdtman <erdtman@spotify.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2019 09:17:58 +0200
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To: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se>
Cc: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>,  "draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org>,  "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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+1

On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 8:31 AM Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se> wrote:

> On 25/09/2019 02:23, Mike Jones wrote:
> > I'm fine with us making both of the proposed changes.
> >
> >                               Thanks,
> >                               -- Mike
> >
>
> +1
>
> --
> Ludwig Seitz, PhD
> Security Lab, RISE
> Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">+1<br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr=
" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 8:31 AM Ludwig Seitz &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ludwig.seitz@ri.se">ludwig.seitz@ri.se</a>&gt; wrote:<br></d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On 25/09/2019 02:23, M=
ike Jones wrote:<br>
&gt; I&#39;m fine with us making both of the proposed changes.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Thanks,<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- Mike<br>
&gt; <br>
<br>
+1<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Ludwig Seitz, PhD<br>
Security Lab, RISE<br>
Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000085fb1505935b7406--


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Samuel Erdtman <erdtman@spotify.com>, Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se>
CC: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org>, "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ace/nUnujFxVV5awNZAACY-PH5OaIzI>
Subject: Re: [Ace] New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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On 25/09/2019 10:13, Mike Jones wrote:
> Does one of you have the time to create a PR today making the two=20
> changes?=C2=A0 I=E2=80=99ll then be able to review it and publish somet=
ime in the=20
> next 24 hours.=C2=A0 Or if not, I=E2=80=99ll plan to do it myself while=
 flying back=20
> from Korea to the US tomorrow.
>=20
>  =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Thanks all,
>=20
>  =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 -- Mike
>=20
> *From:* Samuel Erdtman <erdtman@spotify.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, September 25, 2019 12:18 AM
> *To:* Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se>
> *Cc:* Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>; Benjamin Kaduk=20
> <kaduk@mit.edu>; draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org;=20
> ace@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: New Version Notification -=20
> draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
>=20
> +1
>=20
> On Wed, Sep 25, 2019 at 8:31 AM Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se=20
> <mailto:ludwig.seitz@ri.se>> wrote:
>=20
>     On 25/09/2019 02:23, Mike Jones wrote:
>      > I'm fine with us making both of the proposed changes.
>      >
>      >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Thanks,
>      >=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- Mike
>      >
>=20
>     +1
>=20
>     --=20
>     Ludwig Seitz, PhD
>     Security Lab, RISE
>     Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51
>=20


I'm in the process of doing the PR, but I noticed that I can only=20
address Ben's (1) and (3).

For (2) Ben was asking for our opinion.

I think we could take the note about different key IDs referring to the=20
same key and reintroduce it in the text as it is a useful reminder.

(I mean that chunk:
" Note that the value of a Key ID is not always the same for different=20
parties. When sending a COSE encrypted message with a shared key,
the Key ID may be different on both sides of the conversation,
with the appropriate one being included in the message based on the=20
recipient of the message.")



/Ludwig


--=20
Ludwig Seitz, PhD
Security Lab, RISE
Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51


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Subject: [Ace] Last Call: <draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt> (Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments WG (ace) to consider the following document: -
'Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)'
  <draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-10-09. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT)
   that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-
   possession key.  Being able to prove possession of a key is also
   sometimes described as being the holder-of-key.  This specification
   provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key
   Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using CBOR and
   CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.





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From: "Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)" <pkampana@cisco.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
CC: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl>, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, "draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org>, Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>, "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
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Hi Ben,

Thank you again for the additional feedback.=20

The changes are summarized in the git issue https://github.com/SanKumar2015=
/EST-coaps/issues/150#issuecomment-535065314 I mostly made all the suggeste=
d text changes, summarized our discussion about extended-master-secret. I a=
lso made a change in Fig 2 and Fig 3 to address the issue you caught with t=
he /128 blocks.=20

The diff is here https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/commit/d16c53d33=
60430b5587021dc1a2d31f668c0c0fe . And a minor nit fix in https://github.com=
/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/commit/ff5b303781231e34571352cb07fb895d5ecab791=20

I will reupload early next week. Please check out the issue in case you hav=
e further comments.=20

Panos


-----Original Message-----
From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Benjamin Kaduk
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2019 6:48 PM
To: Panos Kampanakis (pkampana) <pkampana@cisco.com>
Cc: Peter van der Stok <stokcons@bbhmail.nl>; Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellar=
s.com>; draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; Michael Richardson <mcr@sande=
lman.ca>; ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2

Hi Panos,

Sorry for the slow response here -- I was in telechat-prep mode last week.

This is in pretty good shape, and I wanted to especially thank you for the =
presentation in the github issue -- that format was extremely helpful for m=
e.

I think we will probably need to upload one more minor revision before I in=
itiate the IETF LC; please seem my comments below.


In Section 4, I think we need to put the "for" back in "requests for a trus=
ted certificate list".

Also, refresh my memory: did we decide that there's no need to explicitly m=
andate the use of the "extended_master_secret" TLS extension?

I'd also change the note about supported_groups vs. Supported Elliptic Curv=
es to read "In addition, in DTLS 1.3 the Supported Elliptic Curves extensio=
n has been renamed to Supported Groups."

I think we can move /csrattrs to the bottom of Table 2 (thank you for chang=
ing Table 1!).

With the changes to the example in Figure 3, can you walk me through the bl=
ock-size negotiation?  Quoting:

    POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# N1+1)}--=
>
		      |
       ... Immediate response when certificate is ready ...
		      |
      <-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (2:0/1/256) (2.04 Changed){Cert resp (frag# 1)=
}
    POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/128)           -->
      <-- (ACK) (2:1/1/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# 2)}

So the ACK to the final fragment of the POST includes (2:0/1/256), or the f=
irst fragment of a 256-byte-fragmented version of the response.
The client then goes and asks for (2:1/0/128), which is the second fragment=
 of a 128-byte-fragmented version of the response.  Is that just going to b=
e the last 128 bytes of the thing it already got from the server?  If so, i=
s that something it would actually do (e.g., if it had to drop part of the =
server's response due to a buffer-size limitation) or is it not possible to=
 only have part of a fragment (so it would need to either ask for (2:0/0/12=
8) or (2:2/0/128)?

It looks like you removed the text about "[the two representations] do not =
have to be in a particular order since each representation is preceded by i=
ts Content-Format ID" based on my remark about core-multipart-ct; that docu=
ment has since been approved by the IESG and is explicitly confirming that =
there is no specific ordering requirement (in contrast to multipart/mixed),=
 so we could put that clause back in this document if desired.

I consider it more likely than not that a directorate reviewer will want to=
 tweak the added language at the end of Section 5.8 explaining our divergen=
ce from RFC 7030; if you want to preemptively reword, my suggestion would b=
e "Although [RFC7030] strongly recommends that clients request the use of C=
MS encryption on top of the TLS channel's protection, this document does no=
t make such a recommendation; CMS encryption can still be used when mandate=
d by the use case."

Thanks!

-Ben


On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 05:38:59PM +0000, Panos Kampanakis (pkampana) wrote=
:
> Hi Ben,
>=20
> I think we have now addressed all your feedback from the AD review. A big=
 chunk of the changes were agreed upon in the list emails threads.=20
>=20
> The iteration that we are planning to upload that includes all the=20
> changes is at=20
> https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/blob/master/draft-ietf-ace-c
> oap-est.txt
>=20
> The summary of all your comments and what went into the text is in the=20
> git issue https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150 To=20
> break it down
> - https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issue-489289217 ha=
s most of the changes agreed on the list.
> -  https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issuecomment-5280=
01807 has an answer to your question about addressing the tls-unique issue =
in a new draft.=20
> - https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150#issuecomment-53185=
3281 has the last changes in response to your feedback that went into the d=
raft after Peter uploade the -13 iteration.=20
>=20
> Two places to pay attention to is that I removed the
> >   It is strongly RECOMMENDED that the clients request that the returned
> >   private key be afforded the additional security of the Cryptographic
> >   Message Syntax (CMS) EnvelopedData in addition to the TLS-provided
> >   security to protect against unauthorized disclosure."
> and the
> >   The corresponding longer URIs from [RFC7030] MAY be supported."
> The rationale behind that is in the git issue.=20
>=20
> Please have a look and let us know if there is anything missing. Otherwis=
e we will upload at the end of the week.=20
>=20
> Rgs,
> Panos
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Panos Kampanakis=20
> (pkampana)
> Sent: Tuesday, September 10, 2019 12:18 AM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; 'Michael Richardson'=20
> <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
> Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk'=20
> <kaduk@mit.edu>; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
>=20
> Hi Jim,
>=20
> We are tracking all of Ben's feedback here=20
> https://github.com/SanKumar2015/EST-coaps/issues/150
>=20
> The fixes that have gone in the draft so far are after each comment. Ther=
e are still some that we still need to update after the threads converged.=
=20
>=20
> Panos
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ace <ace-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Jim Schaad
> Sent: Monday, September 09, 2019 11:34 PM
> To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
> Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; 'Benjamin Kaduk'=20
> <kaduk@mit.edu>; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
>=20
> Authors,
>=20
> Are we ready to produce a new draft that addresses most, if not all, of B=
en's comments?  Do we have a pull request to deal with this that we can poi=
nt to?
>=20
> Jim
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 1:17 PM
> To: 'Michael Richardson' <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>; 'Benjamin Kaduk'
> <kaduk@mit.edu>
> Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
>=20
>=20
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
> Sent: Monday, September 9, 2019 9:38 AM
> To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
> Cc: draft-ietf-ace-coap-est.all@ietf.org; ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-12 part 2
>=20
>=20
> Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>     >> So, on a constrained device, I'd like to know what to expect (what=
 to
>     >> code for).  While I do'nt particularly care for=20
> server-generated keys,
>     >> it should probably be specified correctly.  I see that the complex=
ity
>     >> of sorting this means that I think that Content-Format 284
>     >> (unprotected) will get used most often.
>=20
>     > Your constrained device is probably only going to implement one cip=
her
>     > [mode], too, right?  If it's an AEAD mode, you use AuthEnvelopedDat=
a;
>     > otherwise, classic EnvelopedData.
>=20
> Yes, but each constrained device type might have a different set, and=20
> the EST server for such an installation has to figure out how to send=20
> the right thing.
>=20
> [JLS] This is the function of section 4.4.1.1 in RFC 7030 which says=20
> that the DecryptKeyIdentifier must be present.  This will provide the=20
> EST server a method to identify the correct key and the correct=20
> symmetric encryption algorithm.
>=20
>     >> I think that we could go to TLS Exporter right now, but it would t=
ake
>     >> some work.
>=20
>     > I'd rather have both classic-EST and coap-EST benefit than just
>     > coap-EST.
>=20
> So you'd agree to deferring this to a document (maybe in LAMPS?) that=20
> would
> Updates: 7030 and this document.

_______________________________________________
Ace mailing list
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ace


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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se>, Samuel Erdtman <erdtman@spotify.com>
CC: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession.all@ietf.org>, "ace@ietf.org" <ace@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 00:47:46 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Ace] New Version Notification - draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-07.txt
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Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 18:51:54 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Hi all,

The length of this review notwithstanding, this document is generally in
good shape -- there's a bunch of localized items to tighten up, and we
can flesh out the security considerations some more, but nothing too
drastic should be needed.  Perhaps the most far-reaching changes needed
will be to rename the "profile" claim, since that has already been
allocated to OIDC Core for a very different usage.  I also made a pull
request with a bunch of trivial editorial stuff that's easier to fix
than describe how to fix, up at
https://github.com/ace-wg/ace-oauth/pull/175 .

One general note before getting into the section-by-section comments:

There's a bunch of places where we talk about parameters that "MUST be
mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure N"; we may want to point to
the IANA registry as authoritative and just give the figure reference
for description.

Abstract

   OAuth.  The framework is based on a set of building blocks including
   OAuth 2.0 and CoAP, thus making a well-known and widely used
   authorization solution suitable for IoT devices.  Existing

nit: It's easy to (mis)read this text as saying that just amalgamating
OAuth 2.0 and CoAP magically makes for a solution that is well-known and
widely used.  I'd suggest rewording slightly, perhaps "thus transforming
a well-known and widely used authorization solution into a form suitable
for IoT devices".

   specifications are used where possible, but where the constraints of
   IoT devices require it, extensions are added and profiles are
   defined.

nit: from a rhetorical point of view, it's probably better to reiterate
why the extensions are added and profiles defined ("to better serve the
IoT case") than to just stop with a flat declaration of what is done.

Section 1

   Authorization is the process for granting approval to an entity to
   access a resource [RFC4949].  The authorization task itself can best
   be described as granting access to a requesting client, for a
   resource hosted on a device, the resource server (RS).  This exchange

I had to pause for a while after reading this and ponder whether I
agreed with it.  I think that my reticence stems from some friction
between the most generic abstract definition of "resource" and a more
specific one used in the web/HTTP world and, to a lesser extent, the
world of URIs and URNs in general.  The resources we are discussing here
are not always specific named resources, but can also refer to
attributes or capabilities mediated by a RS; similarly, we may be
creating/modifying named resources as part of the resource access
performed by a client in the OAuth model.  I don't think it's wise to
diverge from the RFC 4949 definition just yet, but am still considering
whether adding some additional clarifying text here is worthwhile.

Section 3

It's probably worth adding (informative) references for HTTP/2, MQTT,
BLE, and QUIC.

   A fourth building block is the compact CBOR-based secure message

"compact CBOR" has the "PIN number" nature and is probably redundant.

   format COSE [RFC8152], which enables application layer security as an
   alternative or complement to transport layer security (DTLS [RFC6347]

I'm undecided whether it's better to think of this as "application layer
security" or "object-level security".

   or TLS [RFC8446]).  COSE is used to secure self-contained tokens such
   as proof-of-possession (PoP) tokens, which is an extension to the
   OAuth tokens.  The default token format is defined in CBOR web token

nit: I think there's a singular/plural mismatch in "is an extension",
which currently seems to be talking about the PoP tokens themselves.

Section 3.1

   Refresh Tokens:
      Refresh tokens are credentials used to obtain access tokens.
      Refresh tokens are issued to the client by the authorization
      server and are used to obtain a new access token when the current
      access token becomes invalid or expires, or to obtain additional
      access tokens with identical or narrower scope (access tokens may
      have a shorter lifetime and fewer permissions than authorized by
      the resource owner).  Issuing a refresh token is optional at the

nit: I'd suggest "such access tokens" in the parenthetical.

      A refresh token in OAuth 2.0 is a string representing the
      authorization granted to the client by the resource owner.  The
      string is usually opaque to the client.  The token denotes an

Apparently I'd forgotten that this couldn't be binary.

   Proof of Possession Tokens:
      An access token may be bound to a cryptographic key, which is then

Can refresh tokens not be PoP?

      The proof-of-possession (PoP) security concept assumes that the AS
      acts as a trusted third party that binds keys to access tokens.

nit: I think we're describing the PoP model used by ace, not the generic
PoP concept.

   Scopes and Permissions:
      In OAuth 2.0, the client specifies the type of permissions it is
      seeking to obtain (via the scope parameter) in the access token
      request.  In turn, the AS may use the scope response parameter to
      inform the client of the scope of the access token issued.  As the
      client could be a constrained device as well, this specification
      defines the use of CBOR encoding as data format, see Section 5, to
      request scopes and to be informed what scopes the access token
      actually authorizes.

nit: I think there's a word missing in "the use of CBOR encoding as data
format".

Section 3.2

   One application of COSE is OSCORE [I-D.ietf-core-object-security],
   which provides end-to-end confidentiality, integrity and replay
   protection, and a secure binding between CoAP request and response
   messages.  In OSCORE, the CoAP messages are wrapped in COSE objects
   and sent using CoAP.

   This framework RECOMMENDS the use of CoAP as replacement for HTTP for
   use in constrained environments.

Do we have a reason to mention OSCORE if we're not going to make a
recommendation about its use?

Section 4

If the description for step (C) is going to refer to the "profile (see
step B)", then we need to mention the profile as an example of the
Access Information in step (B).

                                                               The RS
      verifies that the token is integrity protected by the AS and
      compares the claims contained in the access token with the
      resource request.  [...]

I note that this verification of "integrity protected by the AS"
implicitly also includes verification of the source authentication
(i.e., signature or keyed MAC in key known only to AS and RS, in the
non-introspection case); do we want to make that more explicit in the
text?

Section 5

   Credential Provisioning
      For IoT, it cannot be assumed that the client and RS are part of a
      common key infrastructure, so the AS provisions credentials or
      associated information to allow mutual authentication.  These
      credentials need to be provided to the parties before or during
      the authentication protocol is executed, and may be re-used for
      subsequent token requests.

nit: either "before or during the execution of the authentication
protocol" or "before or during the authentication protocol's execution".
And just to double-check that we mean the authentication protocol of
provisioning in the last sentence, not the authorization protocol that
occurs between the client and RS.

   OAuth 2.0 requires the use of TLS both to protect the communication
   between AS and client when requesting an access token; between client
   and RS when accessing a resource and between AS and RS if
   introspection is used.  In constrained settings TLS is not always
   feasible, or desirable.  Nevertheless it is REQUIRED that the data
   exchanged with the AS is encrypted, integrity protected and protected
   against message replay.  It is also REQUIRED that the AS and the
   endpoint communicating with it (client or RS) perform mutual
   authentication.  [...]

This seems to leave open the possibility that client/RS interactions are
not encrypted, integrity protected, and/or replay protected; is that
intentional?  (We do require later on that all resource access gets the
"usual protections" other than the authz-info endpoint, so this is
mostly just an editorial remark.)

   In OAuth 2.0 the communication with the Token and the Introspection
   endpoints at the AS is assumed to be via HTTP and may use Uri-query
   parameters.  When profiles of this framework use CoAP instead, this
   framework REQUIRES the use of the following alternative instead of

nit: REQUIRES is not an RFC 2119 keyword (just REQUIRED).

   Uri-query parameters: The sender (client or RS) encodes the
   parameters of its request as a CBOR map and submits that map as the
   payload of the POST request.  Profiles that use CBOR encoding of
   protocol message parameters MUST use the media format 'application/
   ace+cbor', unless the protocol message is wrapped in another Content-
   Format (e.g. object security).  [...]

Is the bit starting at "Profiles that use CBOR" directly tied to the
CBOR-map submission to the AS, or a more general requirement on all
protocol flows (that would better be split off in its own paragraph)?

Also, some IESG members have not liked the "MUST [...], unless [...]"
construction, as it makes the MUST "no longer a MUST".  So perhaps we
could rephrase this as a positive statement, such as "CBOR-encoded
protocol messages that appeare at the outermost encoding layer MUST use the
media type "application/ace+cbor or, for CoAP, the corresponding
Content-Format's short ID of 19".

Section 5.1

   Instead of the initial Unauthorized Resource Request message, other
   discovery methods may be used, or the client may be pre-provisioned
   with the address of the AS.

nit: I suggest "pre-provisioned with an RS-to-AS mapping" so that we
don't have the "the AS" construct that implies there is only a single
AS.

Section 5.1.1

   Note: These conditions ensure that RS can handle requests
   autonomously once access was granted and a secure channel has been
   established between C and RS.  The authz-info endpoint MUST NOT be
   protected as specified above, in order to allow clients to upload
   access tokens to RS (cf.  Section 5.8.1).

I have some editorial suggestions here that I'll put into a pull requeste.

Section 5.1.2

It may not be worth having an attempt at a printable version of the
cnonce in the comments in Figure 4.

Section 5.1.2.1

   o  A RS sending a "cnonce" parameter in an an AS Request Creation
      Hints message MUST store information to validate that a given
      cnonce is fresh.  How this is implemented internally is out of
      scope for this specification.  Expiration of client-nonces should
      be based roughly on the time it would take a client to obtain an
      access token after receiving the AS Request Creation Hints
      message.

nit: I suggest to add something like "with some allowance for slop".

Section 5.2

   The grant type is selected depending on the use case.  In cases where
   the client acts on behalf of the resource owner, authorization code
   grant is recommended.  If the client acts on behalf of the resource
   owner, but does not have any display or very limited interaction
   possibilities it is recommended to use the device code grant defined
   in [I-D.ietf-oauth-device-flow].  In cases where the client does not
   acts autonomously the client credentials grant is recommended.

The context seems to suggest that this last sentence was intended as
"cases where the client acts autonomously"; is that correct?

Section 5.5

   well.  Non-constrained clients interacting with constrained resource
   servers can use the specifications in section 3.1 of [RFC6749] and of
   section 4.2 of [RFC6819].

nit: Section 4.2 of RFC 6819 isn't exactly a "specification" per se; we
might want to reword this.

Section 5.6

   For the AS to be able to issue a token, the client MUST be
   authenticated and present a valid grant for the scopes requested.
   Profiles of this framework MUST specify how the AS authenticates the
   client and how the communication between client and AS is protected.

We should probably list what attributes this protection entails --
confidentiality+integrity, of course, and we already mentioned both
sides of the mutual authentiation; do we need anything else like replay
protection?

   The default name of this endpoint in an url-path is '/token', however
   implementations are not required to use this name and can define
   their own instead.

We may get questions about the relationship between this "default" and
BCP 190; unfortunately, I haven't had a time to internalize the changes
proposed for draft-nottingham-rfc7320bis yet to see whether they would
affect us.  (To be clear, "leave it as-is for now and see if we get
complaints from the experts" is the right thing to do.)

Section 5.6.1

   The client sends a POST request to the token endpoint at the AS.  The
   profile MUST specify how the communication is protected.  The content

In the previous section we said that maybe even other transports than
coaps or https would be possible; are we limited to those that have POST
verbs?
Also, a similar comment as above about what attributes the protection
entails seems to apply.

   o  The "scope" parameter MAY be encoded as a byte string instead of
      the string encoding specified in section 3.3 of [RFC6749], in
      order allow compact encoding of complex scopes.

"scope" is a space-separated list (in the string encoding); is 0x20
still the list separator in the binary encoding?

   o  A client MUST be able to use the parameters from
      [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params] in an access token request to the
      token endpoint and the AS MUST be able to process these additional
      parameters.

[we might get someone complaining that if support for these is mandatory
they might as well be in the core document.  I don't mind the split, but
be forewarned.]

    Figure 5: Example request for an access token bound to a symmetric
                                   key.

I wouldn't be surprised is some reviewers asked for more text to clarify
that the AS-generated symmetric key is the default, so we don't need any
extra parameters to indicate that's what's being requested.

I'm a little surprised that OSCORE didn't provide some more scrutable
diagnostic notation for the OSCORE CoAP option.  To check: h is set, n is 1,
k is not set, the (1-byte) partial IV is 0x05, s is 5, and the rest of
the option is the kid context?

   Figure 7 shows a request for a token where a previously communicated
   proof-of-possession key is only referenced.  Note that the client
   performs a password based authentication in this example by
   submitting its client_secret (see Section 2.3.1 of [RFC6749]).  Note

RFC 6749 says about the bare "client_secret" that "[i]ncluding the
client credentials in the request-body using the two parameters is NOT
RECOMMENDED and SHOULD be limited to clients unable to directly utilize
the HTTP Basic authentication scheme (or other password-based HTTP
authentication schemes)."  I know this is "just an example", so our
obligations are somewhat weak, but I still think we should note that
this is not recommended by 6749 (but since there is no CoAP analogue of
HTTP Basic, it's the only plain-password scheme available).

   that this example uses the "req_cnf" parameter from
   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-params].

Er, the "req_cnf" parameter is exactly how the previously communicated
key is being referenced.  So we should not have a separate "Note" that
doesn't link back to the point of the example.

   Refresh tokens are typically not stored as securely as proof-of-
   possession keys in requesting clients.  Proof-of-possession based
   refresh token requests MUST NOT request different proof-of-possession
   keys or different audiences in token requests.  Refresh token
   requests can only use to request access tokens bound to the same
   proof-of-possession key and the same audience as access tokens issued
   in the initial token request.

This is perhaps something of a philosophical question, but if a refresh
token is only usable at the token endpoint, in some sense its audience
is definitionally the AS.  So there's a little bit of a mismatch in
treating it as having the audience value that the access tokens issued
from it will have.  I don't know the background for audience-restriced
refresh tokens in regular OAuth 2.0, though, so hopefully someone can
educate me.

Section 5.6.2

   Note that the AS decides which token type and profile to use when
   issuing a successful response.  It is assumed that the AS has prior

Would it be useful to note that this can be shaped by the "req_cnf"
contents?

   token_type:
      This parameter is OPTIONAL, as opposed to 'required' in [RFC6749].
      By default implementations of this framework SHOULD assume that
      the token_type is "pop".  If a specific use case requires another
      token_type (e.g., "Bearer") to be used then this parameter is
      REQUIRED.

When we are "weakening" the formal requirements of the parent spec like
this, we should be careful about what happens when someone is trying to
use the ACE stuff but ends up needing to go over HTTPS like traditional
OAuth -- do they have to fall back to the OAuth required behavior in
that case or are we trying to preempt that as well?


Given that we're requiring support for them, I think including the
parameters from draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params in Figure 8 (and removing
the note above it) would be helpful to the reader.  We probably also
want to leave some room for future extensions when we talk about it
("summarizes the parameters that may be part of the Access Information"
could maybe be read as restrictive, though it's clearly not meant to
be).

     "cnf" : {
       "COSE_Key" : {
         "kty" : "Symmetric",
         "kid" : b64'39Gqlw',
         "k" : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxCcQh'
       }
     }
   }

       Figure 9: Example AS response with an access token bound to a
                              symmetric key.

In light of the related discussion on cwt-proof-of-possession (resulting
in the removal of a bunch of text), do we want to say anything about the
scope of the 'kid' (that is, which participants are expecting to receive
and understand that value)?

Section 5.6.3

   The error responses for CoAP-based interactions with the AS are
   equivalent to the ones for HTTP-based interactions as defined in
   Section 5.2 of [RFC6749], with the following differences:

"equivalent [...] with the following differences" is going to get
complaints from the IESG.  I suggest "generally equivalent".

   o  A response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request)
      MUST be used for all error responses, except for invalid_client
      where a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01
      (Unauthorized) MAY be used under the same conditions as specified
      in Section 5.2 of [RFC6749].

6749 has a case where 401 MUST be used, but I think it does not apply to
us (since WWW-Authenticate would have to have been used).  I'm not sure
whether it makes sense to note that or not, though.

Section 5.6.4.3

   responses.  Furthermore profiles MUST define proof-of-possession
   methods, if they support proof-of-possession tokens.

nit: define the *methods* or the *list* of allowed ones?

   A profile MUST specify an identifier that MUST be used to uniquely
   identify itself in the "profile" parameter.  The textual
   representation of the profile identifier is just intended for human
   readability and MUST NOT be used in parameters and claims.

This seems like an opportunity for a registry...just like we have in
Section 8.7.  I'd suggest mentioning that registry here.

Section 5.6.5

Perhaps the title of Figure 12 should include both requests and
responses?

Section 5.7.1

   map with a "token" entry containing either the access token or a
   reference to the token (e.g., the cti).  Further optional parameters
   [...]
   The same parameters are required and optional as in Section 2.1 of
   [RFC7662].

This seems somewhat problematic, in that 7662 is pretty clear that the
"token" value is, well, the actual token.  So if we want to be able to
use "cti" instead, then we need to have some text saying that we're
deviating from 7662 and the specification for how "cti" is used there.

   {
     "token" : b64'7gj0dXJQ43U',
     "token_type_hint" : "pop"
   }

                         Figure 14: Decoded token.

nit: I think this is a decoded payload, not a decoded token.

Section 5.7.2

   cnonce  OPTIONAL.  A client-nonce previously provided to the AS by
      the RS via the client.  See Section 5.6.4.4.

I think this statement is only true after the token in question has been
properly validated at the RS.  Before that, all we can say is that it is
the client-nonce provided to the AS by the client, since there is
nothing to enforce that the client actually provided the same value that
was generated by the RS.

Section 5.7.4

"scope" is showing up with the key 9 a lot; I have mixed feelings about
having the CBOR map key value be aliased across different contexts (but
it's probably too late to change without disruption anyway).

Section 5.8

   In order to facilitate offline processing of access tokens, this
   document uses the "cnf" claim from
   [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession] and specifies the "scope"
   claim for JWT- and CWT-encoded tokens.

[looks like draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange is going to beat us for the
JWT version of "scope":
https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml#claims ]

   The "scope" claim explicitly encodes the scope of a given access
   token.  This claim follows the same encoding rules as defined in
   Section 3.3 of [RFC6749], but in addition implementers MAY use byte
   strings as scope values, to achieve compact encoding of large scope
   elements.  The meaning of a specific scope value is application
   specific and expected to be known to the RS running that application.

I think I commented above about the use of 0x20 as the list separator;
whatever we do there should be applied here as well (or the text
otherwise consolidated to only need to say it once).

Section 5.8.1

   The access token, containing authorization information and
   information about the key used by the client, needs to be transported
   to the RS so that the RS can authenticate and authorize the client
   request.

nit(?): do we want to talk about the "confirmation method" rather than
the "key", out of some sense of remaining generic?

   This specification RECOMMENDS that an RS stores only one token per
   proof-of-possession key, meaning that an additional token linked to
   the same key will overwrite any existing token at the RS.

I might consider mentioning that this greatly simplifies implementation,
as not only is there not a need for the extra storage, but when a
request comes in using a given key, there's no need to resolve which
token to use with that request (and whether there would be different
access decisions made depending on which token was used), since the key
can be used directly for dispatch (e.g., with DTLS raw public key).

   If the payload sent to the authz-info endpoint does not parse to a
   token, the RS MUST respond with a response code equivalent to the
   CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request).

Do we want this to specifically be about "parse to a token" with no need
to be a valid token?  (What error do we return for a syntactically valid
but semantically invalid token?)

   Profiles MUST specify whether the authz-info endpoint is protected,
   including whether error responses from this endpoint are protected.
   Note that since the token contains information that allow the client
   and the RS to establish a security context in the first place, mutual
   authentication may not be possible at this point.

We'll need some careful reasoning about this for the security
considerations, since the authz-info transaction can impact what profile
the RS thinks is in use.  E.g., whether a network attacker could
cause the client to think that a different (vulnerable) profile is in
use than the one the RS expects to use.

   The RS MAY make an introspection request to validate the token before
   responding to the POST request to the authz-info endpoint.
   [...]
   A RS MAY use introspection on a token received through the authz-info
   endpoint, e.g. if the token is an opaque reference.  Some transport

We should probably deduplicate the "MAY use introspection"s.

Section 5.8.1.1

I think we whould make an explicit note at the end of the list of claims
that we specify processing for, that additional processing is done (in a
profile-specific manner?) for other claims in the token.

   If the access token contains any other claims that the RS cannot
   process the RS MUST discard the token.  If this was an interaction

Just to double-check: this is overriding the JWT/CWT default so that all
token claims are comprehension-mandatory?  It might be worth making this
deviation from the core [JC]WT more explicitly a deviation.

Section 5.8.2

   If an RS receives a request from a client, and the target resource
   requires authorization, the RS MUST first verify that it has an
   access token that authorizes this request, and that the client has
   performed the proof-of-possession for that token.

As written, this sounds like it's okay to only do proof-of-possession
when posting tokens to the authz-info endpoint and not bind the
proof/key to the current request.  Is that intended?

   The response code MUST be 4.01 (Unauthorized) in case the client has
   not performed the proof-of-possession, or if RS has no valid access
   token for the client.  If RS has an access token for the client but
   not for the resource that was requested, RS MUST reject the request

nit: I suggest "but the token does not authorize access for".

Section 5.8.3

   o  The RS verifies the validity of the token by performing an
      introspection request as specified in Section 5.7.  This requires
      the RS to have a reliable network connection to the AS and to be
      able to handle two secure sessions in parallel (C to RS and AS to
      RS).

nit: isn't the second one RS to AS, not AS to RS?

      specification defines the following approach: The claim "exi"
      ("expires in") can be used, to provide the RS with the lifetime of
      the token in seconds from the time the RS first receives the
      token.  This approach is of course vulnerable to malicious clients
      holding back tokens they do not want to expire.  Such an attack

It also has suboptimal behavior if the RS loses state (e.g., by
rebooting), and possibly requires the RS to store indefinitely all
tokens with an "exi" value.  I have mixed feelings about specifying it
at all, though I concede it probably does have some value.  Regardless,
I think a dedicated subsection in the security considerations is in
order.

Section 5.8.4

   The AS provides the client with key material that the RS uses.  This
   can either be a common symmetric pop-key, or an asymmetric key used
   by the RS to authenticate towards the client.  Since there is no

Can you walk me through how a symmetric PoP key would be used for mutual
authentication (i.e., authentication of RS to client)?  It's easy/common
to do the PoP the other way, making the client prove it knows the key
associated with the token, but the other direction is not always
possible, depending on the protocol.

   o  The client knows a default validity period for all tokens it is
      using.  This information could be provisioned to the client when
      it is registered at the AS, or published by the AS in a way that
      the client can query.

Just to double-check: this validity period is time since issuance?  I'm
not sure whether this is sufficiently obvious that it goes without
saying (but it might be).

   o  The client performs an introspection of the token.  Although this
      is not explicitly forbidden, how exactly a client does
      introspection is not currently specified for OAuth.

I'm pretty sure this is overtaken by events (sorry for my part in
that!).  E.g., draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-introspection-response discusses
clients doing introspection, and even RFC 7662 itself discusses using a
client secret to authenticate to the introspection endpoint.  I think
there's another document between those two that's also relevant, but
can't find it right now :(

Section 6

There could perhaps be some security considerations relating to
discovery of RSes/resources thereon, but since we don't really talk
about that much to begin with, it's probably okay to skip the security
considerations discussion as well.

Both the client and the RS need to have their own respective long-term
credentials with the AS; we should talk about protecting those
credentials, what is risked/lost if the credentials are compromised,
how to recover from compromise, and the general key management
lifecycle (per BCP 107).

We should probably mention revocation in some fashion (even if only to
say that it's unlikely in practice) -- right now we just have one
passing mention as an optional responsibility of the AS, in Appendix B.

   A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the contents
   of the access token by using a digital signature or a keyed message
   digest (MAC) or an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data

I won't be surprised if someone asks for examples of that "large range
of threats", so be prepared to answer...

   (AEAD) algorithm.  Consequently, the token integrity protection MUST
   be applied to prevent the token from being modified, particularly
   since it contains a reference to the symmetric key or the asymmetric
   key.  [...]

nit: "key used for proof of possession" (though my previous remark about
limiting to keys may apply as well).

   key.  If the access token contains the symmetric key, this symmetric
   key MUST be encrypted by the authorization server so that only the
   resource server can decrypt it.  Note that using an AEAD algorithm is
   preferable over using a MAC unless the message needs to be publicly
   readable.

nit(?) is "the message" here still "the token" like it was for the rest
of the paragraph?

   If the token is intended for multiple recipients (i.e. an audience
   that is a group), integrity protection of the token with a symmetric
   key is not sufficient, since any of the recipients could modify the
   token undetected by the other recipients.  Therefore a token with a

I can't decide whether we should clarify that this is "integrity
protection of the token with a symmetric key shared by the AS and RS"
(as opposed to a symmetric PoP key).

   It is important for the authorization server to include the identity
   of the intended recipient (the audience), typically a single resource
   server (or a list of resource servers), in the token.  Using a single
   shared secret with multiple resource servers to simplify key
   management is NOT RECOMMENDED since the benefit from using the proof-
   of-possession concept is significantly reduced.

I think we should word this more clearly with respect to "single shared
secret" -- is this the credential used by the RS to authenticate itself
to the client?  I'm not even sure if this text is intended to be
describing a workflow using symmetric or asymmetric keys.

              Profiles MUST specify how confidentiality protection is
   provided, and additional protection can be applied by encrypting the
   token, for example encryption of CWTs is specified in Section 5.1 of
   [RFC8392].

We should probably be a little more precise about what the additional
protection is -- it's not exactly protection for the PoP key, since
that's transmitted alongside the token in the authorization info (i.e.,
outside the token contents), but it does provide protection when the
token is subsequently used.
also, nit: comma splice

Section 6.1

I think we should have a little bit more discussion about what attacks
are possible even when a client hard-codes a list of trustworthy ASes,
e.g., when a device in one AS's purview is compromised and tries to get
the client to use a different (possibly also compromised, or maybe just
buggy) AS than the one that's supposed to be responsible for the device
in question.  In short, yes, spoofing is only possible within that set
of trusted ASes, but spoofing can still cause problems.

Are there any AS parameters other than URI that might be useful for an
out-of-band-configured list of valid values?

Section 6.2

      client MUST be able to determine whether an AS has the authority
      to issue access tokens for a certain RS.  This can be done through
      pre-configured lists, or through an online lookup mechanism that
      in turn also must be secured.

nit: I suggest "for example" to preempt anyone complaining about this
being needlessly prescriptive.

Section 6.4

   There may be use cases were different profiles of this framework are
   combined.  For example, an MQTT-TLS profile is used between the
   client and the RS in combination with a CoAP-DTLS profile for
   interactions between the client and the AS.  Ideally, profiles should
   be designed in a way that the security of system should not depend on
   the specific security mechanisms used in individual protocol
   interactions.

I think the IESG is going to pounce on this "ideally" -- what can we do
to ensure this is the case and/or warn when it isn't?  Can we just
say that profiles MUST NOT make assume that the same profile is used for
the different types of interactions?

Section 6.6

   inadvertently communicating with the wrong RS.  The correct values
   for "audience" can either be provisioned to the client as part of its
   configuration, or provided by the RS as part of the "AS Request
   Creation Hints" Section 5.1.2 or dynamically looked up by the client

I'm not sure that the AS Request Creation Hints are a big help here,
since they are untrusted input and it seems like bogus hints could cause
the client to obtain a token for a "wrong" RS.

Section 6.7

   First an attacker could perform a denial of service attack against
   the introspection endpoint at the AS in order to prevent validation
   of access tokens.  To mitigate this attack, an RS that is configured
   to use introspection MUST NOT allow access based on a token for which
   it couldn't reach the introspection endpoint.

I'm not sure that "mitigate" is quite right, as the attack (denial of
service) succeeds!  Probably we want something like "To maintain the
security of the system" instead.
nit: comma after First (and Second, in the next paragraph).

   an introspection call.  RS can mitigate such attacks by implementing
   a rate limit on how many introspection requests they perform in a
   given time interval and rejecting incoming requests to authz-info for
   a certain amount of time, when that rate limit has been reached.

I think the rate limit can be partially per client IP address (but a
global limit will probably still be necessary, too).

Section 7

Introspection could potentially output a lot of information from a given
token; some of the claims that might be found in a JWT or CWT can have
privacy considerations.  Though for constrained usage, it is likely that
the claims set will be pretty stripped down, so that might be more of an
exceptional case.  (When signed-only CWT/JWT are used, similar
considerations apply to the same claims, which is mostly covered already
under the "if access tokens are only integrity protected" part.

   information as possible in an unencrypted response.  Means of
   encrypting communication between C and RS already exist, more
   detailed information may be included with an error response to
   provide C with sufficient information to react on that particular
   error.

nit: I think the sentence is supposed to start with "When" or "If".

Section 8.X

I might consider adding a sentence to the toplevel Section 8 that notes
"this document creates several registries with a registration policy of
Expert Review; guidelines to the experts are given in Section 8.16" so
that we have a heads-up that these guidelines exist while we're reading
through the rest of the sections.  Though, perhaps most people aren't
reading it straight through like I am...

Section 8.3

   Name  The OAuth Error Code name, refers to the name in Section 5.2.
      of [RFC6749], e.g., "invalid_request".

We should refer to the OAuth registry as the authority on names, not the
immutable RFC.  (Similarly for the other mappings registries; I won't
repeat it each time, though for the later ones we're already doing the
right thing.)

Section 8.5

We should check what capitalization we want for the token type name, as
it's used all-lowercase elsewhere in the document but appears here as
"PoP".

Section 8.9

   Note that the mappings of parameters corresponding to claim names
   intentionally coincide with the CWT claim name mappings from
   [RFC8392].

I tried to spot-check this but couldn't find any that match up; am I
looking in the wrong place?

Section 8.11

   Reference  This contains a pointer to the public specification of the
      grant type abbreviation, if one exists.

Do we have some copy/paste issue with the "grant type abbreviation"
going on here (and elsewhere)?

Section 8.12

"scope" is already registered by draft-ietf-oauth-token-exchange (for
the same meaning).
"profile" is already registered by OIDC Core, for a "profile page URL".
So we will probably have to change to (e.g.) "ace_profile" everywhere.
:( :( :(

Section 8.13

The entry for "scope" should maybe also point to the oauth draft that
defined it for JWT.

(We can't get "profile" here, either.)

Section 8.14

I think for the media type we still want to use the IESG as the contact.

Section 8.16

   o  Specifications are required for the standards track range of point
      assignment.  Specifications should exist for specification
      required ranges, but early assignment before a specification is
      available is considered to be permissible.  Specifications are

This seems to be attempting to re-explain things already in RFC 8126,
but introduces some divergence along the way (which is bad).  I do note
that RFC 7120 covers early allocations, but specifically excludes doing
so from Expert Review registries.  I think technically that would
exclude using the early allocation procedure even for the "standards
action" or "specification required" ranges, though the experts would
still have leeway to make allocations under essentially the same
circumstances.

      document cannot have points assigned outside of that range.  The
      length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many
      code points of that length are left, the size of device it will be
      used on, and the number of code points left that encode to that
      size.

seems to duplicate "number of code points of that length that are left".

Section 10.1

We may get some debate about whether IANA registries are properly
Normative of Informative references, but we can wait for that to happen
-- no need to do anything now.

Section 10.2

If we're using RFC 4949 for terminology definitions, I think that makes
it a normative reference.

If we REQUIRE CBOR when used with CoAP, that also feels like a normative
reference.

I also think 7519 needs to be normative, since we mandate some of its
processing rules.

Appendix A

   Proof-of-Possession:

      This framework makes use of proof-of-possession tokens, using the
      "cnf" claim [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].  A
      semantically and syntactically identical request and response
      parameter is defined for the token endpoint, to allow requesting
      and stating confirmation keys.  This aims at making token theft

nit: the wording here is a little weird in terms of specifying what is
identical.  I'm not sure I have a great suggestion for improvement,
though; what I'm coming up with is a lot more words.

Appendix C

Skimming through the main text, a couple more items we may want to list
here:

- optional procedures for client discovery of RS/resources/permissions
  (Section 4)
- optionally define new grant types (Section 5.2)
- optional use of client certificate as client credentials (Section 5.3)

   o  Specify the security protocol the client and RS must use to
      protect their communication (e.g., OSCORE or DTLS over CoAP).

IIRC both DTLS over CoAP and CoAP over DTLS are defined; do we need
specifically one of them?

Appendix D

   o  The symmetric key shared between client or RS and AS (if any).

I suggest splitting this into separate bullet points for client/AS and
RS/AS, to avoid chance of confusion.

Appendix E.1

      the Access Information contains the public key of the RS.  For
      communication security this example uses DTLS RawPublicKey between
      the client and the RS.  The issued token will have a short
      validity time, i.e., "exp" close to "iat", to protect the RS from
      replay attacks.  The token includes the claim such as "scope" with

With DTLS RPK I don't think replay is a huge concern; the short lifetime
seems more of a bound on how soon the authorization might be
invalidated.

In Figure 18 and the other example request payloads, let's use a
higher-entropy client_secret than "qwerty" (or "ytrewq"), so as to not
give anyone bad ideas.

I'm not 100% sure, but the << "access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...', >>
snippet doesn't seem to decode to the start of the expanded token
contents shown in Figure 19.

Do we want to update the times in the tokens/etc. to be closer to "now"?

   Messages C and F are shown in Figure 20 - Figure 21.

      C: The client then sends the PoP access token to the authz-info
      endpoint at the RS.  This is a plain CoAP request, i.e., no
      transport or application layer security is used between client and
      RS since the token is integrity protected between the AS and RS.
      The RS verifies that the PoP access token was created by a known
      and trusted AS, is valid, and has been issued to the client.  The

How can the RS check that the token "has been issued to the client"?
(How does it identify the client at this point to do so?)

      The client sends the CoAP request GET to /temperature on RS over
      DTLS.  The RS verifies that the request is authorized, based on
      previously established security context.
      F: The RS responds with a resource representation over DTLS.

nit: we should probably be consistent about whether we mention the CoAP
layer in the request+response.

Appendix E.2

   Note: In this example the client does not know the exact door it will
   be used to access since the token request is not send at the time of
   access.  So the scope and audience parameters are set quite wide to
   start with and new values different form the original once can be
   returned from introspection later on.

Maybe add "and tailored to the RS performing introspection"?

      A: The client sends the request using POST to the token endpoint
      at AS.  The request contains the Audience parameter set to
      "PACS1337" (PACS, Physical Access System), a value the that the
      online door in question identifies itself with.  The AS generates

Didn't we just say that the client doesn't know the exact door it is
going to be talking to?

      an access token as an opaque string, which it can match to the
      specific client, a targeted audience and a symmetric key.  The

So we're handing out a symmetric PoP key for a long-lived token that may
be used at multiple resources?  Isn't that the example we gave earlier
that lets RSes impersonate the client to each other?

In Figure 22, should we show the communications security layer between
client and AS?

The introspection response in Figure 25 only has a 'kid' element for the
confirmation claim (that corresponds to a symmetric key); how is the RS
supposed to know/learn the corresponding key so as to be able to verify
the client's proof of possession?

Thanks!

-Ben


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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, <draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz.all@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-24
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--------------ms050603040507050608090203
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On 27/09/2019 03:51, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> Hi all,
>=20
> The length of this review notwithstanding, this document is generally i=
n
> good shape -- there's a bunch of localized items to tighten up, and we
> can flesh out the security considerations some more, but nothing too
> drastic should be needed.  Perhaps the most far-reaching changes needed=

> will be to rename the "profile" claim, since that has already been
> allocated to OIDC Core for a very different usage.  I also made a pull
> request with a bunch of trivial editorial stuff that's easier to fix
> than describe how to fix, up at
> https://github.com/ace-wg/ace-oauth/pull/175 .
>=20

I have a non-trivial comment on your pull request: In appendix B we=20
summarize the steps taken by an RS to process a freshly received access=20
token. You changed the suggested sequence from:

* Verify the token is from a recognized AS.
* Verify that the token applies to this RS.
* Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides expiration =

information).
* Check the token's integrity.
* Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context of a=20
matching request.

To

* Verify the token is from a recognized AS.
* Check the token's integrity.
* Verify that the token applies to this RS.
* Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides expiration =

information).
* Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context of a=20
matching request.


I don't think this is a big deal, but I put the integrity check later=20
for a good reason (or so I believe): The integrity check is a=20
potentially expensive cryptographic operation. Checking that the token=20
applies to the RS is a matter of checking the audience claim, and=20
checking that the token is not expired is a matter of comparing two=20
timestamps, I consider both to be computationally much lighter and=20
therefore quicker to execute. A failure of any of those two may make it=20
unnecessary to verify the token integrity.

BUT! My suggested sequence only works if the token is signed or MACed=20
and not if it is encrypted. If the token is encrypted the AEAD integrity =

check (and decryption) is necessarily the first processing step.

Any ideas how to resolve this gracefully (i.e. without adding a large=20
amount of text) are most welcome.


Regards,

Ludwig

--=20
Ludwig Seitz, PhD
Security Lab, RISE
Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51


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From nobody Fri Sep 27 03:22:58 2019
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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-24
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-----Original Message-----
From: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se>=20
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2019 12:03 AM
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>; =
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz.all@ietf.org
Cc: ace@ietf.org
Subject: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-24

On 27/09/2019 03:51, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> Hi all,
>=20
> The length of this review notwithstanding, this document is generally =
in
> good shape -- there's a bunch of localized items to tighten up, and we
> can flesh out the security considerations some more, but nothing too
> drastic should be needed.  Perhaps the most far-reaching changes =
needed
> will be to rename the "profile" claim, since that has already been
> allocated to OIDC Core for a very different usage.  I also made a pull
> request with a bunch of trivial editorial stuff that's easier to fix
> than describe how to fix, up at
> https://github.com/ace-wg/ace-oauth/pull/175 .
>=20

I have a non-trivial comment on your pull request: In appendix B we=20
summarize the steps taken by an RS to process a freshly received access=20
token. You changed the suggested sequence from:

* Verify the token is from a recognized AS.
* Verify that the token applies to this RS.
* Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides expiration =

information).
* Check the token's integrity.
* Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context of a=20
matching request.

To

* Verify the token is from a recognized AS.
* Check the token's integrity.
* Verify that the token applies to this RS.
* Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides expiration =

information).
* Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context of a=20
matching request.


I don't think this is a big deal, but I put the integrity check later=20
for a good reason (or so I believe): The integrity check is a=20
potentially expensive cryptographic operation. Checking that the token=20
applies to the RS is a matter of checking the audience claim, and=20
checking that the token is not expired is a matter of comparing two=20
timestamps, I consider both to be computationally much lighter and=20
therefore quicker to execute. A failure of any of those two may make it=20
unnecessary to verify the token integrity.

BUT! My suggested sequence only works if the token is signed or MACed=20
and not if it is encrypted. If the token is encrypted the AEAD integrity =

check (and decryption) is necessarily the first processing step.

Any ideas how to resolve this gracefully (i.e. without adding a large=20
amount of text) are most welcome.

[JLS] I normally get out of this type of problem by saying "The order of =
the steps is not normative, any process which produces an equivalent =
result can be used."  And then you can add a comment about switching the =
two steps for signed items.


Regards,

Ludwig

--=20
Ludwig Seitz, PhD
Security Lab, RISE
Phone +46(0)70-349 92 51



From nobody Mon Sep 30 20:13:52 2019
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Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 20:13:40 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>, "'Ludwig Seitz'" <ludwig.seitz@ri.se>
Cc: draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz.all@ietf.org, ace@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ace] AD review of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-24
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On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 03:22:45AM -0700, Jim Schaad wrote:
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ludwig Seitz <ludwig.seitz@ri.se> 
> Sent: Friday, September 27, 2019 12:03 AM
> To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>; draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz.all@ietf.org
> Cc: ace@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: AD review of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-24
> 
> On 27/09/2019 03:51, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > Hi all,
> > 
> > The length of this review notwithstanding, this document is generally in
> > good shape -- there's a bunch of localized items to tighten up, and we
> > can flesh out the security considerations some more, but nothing too
> > drastic should be needed.  Perhaps the most far-reaching changes needed
> > will be to rename the "profile" claim, since that has already been
> > allocated to OIDC Core for a very different usage.  I also made a pull
> > request with a bunch of trivial editorial stuff that's easier to fix
> > than describe how to fix, up at
> > https://github.com/ace-wg/ace-oauth/pull/175 .
> > 
> 
> I have a non-trivial comment on your pull request: In appendix B we 
> summarize the steps taken by an RS to process a freshly received access 
> token. You changed the suggested sequence from:

First off, thank you for spotting it and bringing the discussion here!  I'm
sorry that you had to do so; I wasn't trying to sneak it in :)

> * Verify the token is from a recognized AS.
> * Verify that the token applies to this RS.
> * Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides expiration 
> information).
> * Check the token's integrity.
> * Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context of a 
> matching request.
> 
> To
> 
> * Verify the token is from a recognized AS.
> * Check the token's integrity.
> * Verify that the token applies to this RS.
> * Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides expiration 
> information).
> * Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context of a 
> matching request.
> 
> 
> I don't think this is a big deal, but I put the integrity check later 
> for a good reason (or so I believe): The integrity check is a 
> potentially expensive cryptographic operation. Checking that the token 
> applies to the RS is a matter of checking the audience claim, and 
> checking that the token is not expired is a matter of comparing two 
> timestamps, I consider both to be computationally much lighter and 
> therefore quicker to execute. A failure of any of those two may make it 
> unnecessary to verify the token integrity.
> 
> BUT! My suggested sequence only works if the token is signed or MACed 
> and not if it is encrypted. If the token is encrypted the AEAD integrity 
> check (and decryption) is necessarily the first processing step.
> 
> Any ideas how to resolve this gracefully (i.e. without adding a large 
> amount of text) are most welcome.
> 
> [JLS] I normally get out of this type of problem by saying "The order of the steps is not normative, any process which produces an equivalent result can be used."  And then you can add a comment about switching the two steps for signed items.

That seems like a reasonable approach.  FWIW, my thinking was that
signature validation is a great way to toss out a bunch of malformed input,
and we tend to do it first in non-constrained environments, but I can see
the tradeoff running the other way in some cases.

-Ben

