From nobody Fri Jun 7 01:58:11 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 393EA12001A for ; Fri, 7 Jun 2019 01:58:10 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.008 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.008 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, HTTPS_HTTP_MISMATCH=1.989, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id slFahpfXPD43 for ; Fri, 7 Jun 2019 01:58:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-io1-xd34.google.com (mail-io1-xd34.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d34]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 47210120099 for ; Fri, 7 Jun 2019 01:58:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-io1-xd34.google.com with SMTP id r185so827892iod.6 for ; Fri, 07 Jun 2019 01:58:07 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=fJnYl0WzUuaIx9SQHJQihj5Xlw3bt0//cp0E8chdNqM=; b=X1EzSwgY/jRzizze2Q7JyLyTT9a442Nt3lYZLlONOFuwkm0UG+0l/bllIsQq4xbuB1 PgUTcQqla2vlr3fWPudpCcGyzLAnB7u35u+H+FWEBm2NtE0xrJ9ogfef8T4NVm9n1rXj +r095pfMCFVXR66AQiimjco0BvPDLAPL2jBraDoLoP8xz1+xIvtY48j2qKGUClDt7n7D sA8iflrMoWuqBXZULyPAS4+QD01YWlCthBZa0E/WP27/G8EWL/8owifPzxVXp8ma3fOM cK5Ky2iRyt+IOVxNE8gkmmQBuVhA+6w2d7EThxAquSS839f7c6DrDJaLQo1qeqw5tAOC zeaQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=fJnYl0WzUuaIx9SQHJQihj5Xlw3bt0//cp0E8chdNqM=; b=a1UGuSCTcUC8E9Ix9AeboJxKWk7kmL58STkuY9hd6WOF98+YhKwO8K28kASC0d7PAA 35jaI8elT9EhIZWcdFn+vKgFIEw/KBIBBtEtqWD6XQ6ZQ4Sh2RkKKVeaLWSHxa2fA5Op 3/QLn3zZ1Hf3y8MWaraGUqATaaq6rwBSU5SK62TacItERQw2IoSDrl14LHBnHyFdvqkZ kepqc19N5/bQGRn68z+Jgwwq58z+V5H+Q4SU/yzcCr/aub7YYuvKfYILqqgJ23MhJivG P2BnhC1NCj+QmauXp3G306o5rYPA0LChsrRYpEEO4bpDgJ08LxU6Zh64r1QArAEXwf69 KghQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVioPF7cdAJ9qkDhij+lypCHdVpur5n9qgt8TS3nH2/xwLALJc0 lACOMBcETSJKwCsUJpDuWxmYfjDiGY2snvg/biU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwTzimfrNbqOyDhRGbzbQBg9u9sOkvLv6P83YhgA8n/WuZqVuc2p63a3qTQ5baqPaFc+V5LLjhncquLAOuC0Lw= X-Received: by 2002:a5d:860e:: with SMTP id f14mr3085600iol.242.1559897886471; Fri, 07 Jun 2019 01:58:06 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <182C9119-59F9-43FA-B116-4D45649B74B5@nbcuni.com> <410f4e4d-aee0-d679-b454-6576de90b21a@nomountain.net> <76EF5603-618C-4A73-A4F9-7489B73B0757@nbcuni.com> <9ad7aa89-d751-e4c6-dede-e9c22faf6d20@nomountain.net> <525969024.22086.1558949269703@appsuite-gw1.open-xchange.com> <11C1E629-A2AE-468E-99B3-C2BBF9E4AE7C@rfc1035.com> <254F5605-B346-4AE1-A1A3-6D27AB76B18F@cable.comcast.com> <1DC2682D-1A1F-4B5B-BB49-B2DAAD8E7E7D@sky.uk> In-Reply-To: From: tirumal reddy Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 14:27:54 +0530 Message-ID: To: "Winfield, Alister" Cc: ADD Mailing list Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000068bc82058ab80734" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: publication of DoH Resolver policies X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Jun 2019 08:58:10 -0000 --00000000000068bc82058ab80734 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Wed, 29 May 2019 at 16:46, Winfield, Alister wrote: > Fair enough, I=E2=80=99m just stating that not all queries/responses are = known as > potentially bad (malware / phishing) until after the fact. That simple fa= ct > is the reason some DNS providers choose to hold logs. > Agreed, updated logging type and duration as follows: LoggingTypes ::=3D BIT STRING { none (0), -- No logging all (1), -- Log all transaction data useridentity (2), -- Log user identity (e.g., username, IP address) notifyuser (3), -- Log to notify user access -- to certain domains is blocked knownmalware (4), -- Log access to malicious domains analytics (5) -- Log transaction data for analytics -- (e.g. to detect malicious domains) } LoggingDuration ::=3D SEQUENCE { all [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL, useridentity [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, notifyuser [2] INTEGER OPTIONAL, knownmalware [3] INTEGER OPTIONAL, analytics [4] INTEGER OPTIONAL } Logging ::=3D SEQUENCE { loggingTypes LoggingTypes DEFAULT {none}, loggingDuration LoggingDuration OPTIONAL -- Transaction data is cleared -- after logging duration, -- Negative one (-1) indicates indefinite -- duration } Updated draft is available at https://github.com/tireddy2/DPRIVE/blob/master/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap= -dns-server-04.txt Cheers, -Tiru > > > Cheers > > Alister > > > > *From: *tirumal reddy > *Date: *Wednesday, 29 May 2019 at 11:54 > *To: *"Winfield, Alister" > *Cc: *ADD Mailing list > *Subject: *[EXTERNAL] Re: [Add] publication of DoH Resolver policies > > > > On Tue, 28 May 2019 at 22:06, Winfield, Alister 40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > > It would be wonderful if every malicious domain was known prior to its > use, sadly except where a DGA is known that=E2=80=99s not the case. So it= can be > useful to have a little historic information to see the extent of the iss= ue > once it=E2=80=99s become known. > > > > DGA is just one technique, malicious domains like C&C domains can possibl= y > be identified by inspecting TXT records (used to send commands to the > compromised host), fast flux service network etc. > > > > Cheers, > > -Tiru > > > > > > It=E2=80=99s also true that with performance issues unless they are very = obvious > (eg impacting say Facebook, Google, Amazon etc), operators necessarily re= ly > on analytics or customers to complain. Given issues can be transient or > periodic only a historic record can provide insight into the root cause. > > > > Alister > > > > *From: *Add on behalf of "Livingood, Jason" < > Jason_Livingood@comcast.com> > *Date: *Tuesday, 28 May 2019 at 16:43 > *To: *tirumal reddy , Jim Reid > *Cc: *ADD Mailing list > *Subject: *Re: [Add] publication of DoH Resolver policies > > > > First =E2=80=93 thanks for the pointer! > > > > Comment =E2=80=93 things like =E2=80=98logging=E2=80=99 seem very binary.= What about default > logging =3D no except if FQDN =3D malware C&C, in which case yes (to supp= ort > notifying the end user of infection)? > > > > *From: *Add on behalf of tirumal reddy < > kondtir@gmail.com> > *Date: *Monday, May 27, 2019 at 9:12 AM > *To: *Jim Reid > *Cc: *ADD Mailing list > *Subject: *Re: [Add] publication of DoH Resolver policies > > > > On Mon, 27 May 2019 at 16:53, Jim Reid wrote: > > On 27 May 2019, at 11:59, tirumal reddy wrote: > > > > If the DOH server provided by the network offers the same level of > privacy preserving data policy as the DOH server pre-configured in the > browser, Why shouldn't the browser use the network provided DOH server ? > > How could the browser tell that both DoH servers have the same policy? > > > How does the browser (or anything else for that matter) know what some > arbitrary DoH server=E2=80=99s privacy preserving data policy is? Where w= ill this > be documented and published in a way that a web-based application or the > end user can understand and then make an informed choice? > > > > > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-03#se= ction-10 > > defines a new privacy certificate extension that identifies the privacy > preserving data policy of the DNS server, it is in a machine-parsable > format. > > > > > Now rinse and repeat that for other server-side policies: data retention, > GDPR compliance, DNS filtering/blocking, TLS session resumption, ECS > behaviour, QNAME minimisation, NXDOMAIN rewriting, query-related adware, > etc, etc. > > Oh, and if some DoH server says =E2=80=9CI do QNAME minimisation=E2=80=9D= (say), does the > browser or end user simply take that on trust or would they somehow be > expected to verify that for themselves? > > > > End user typically does not trust DOH server in a untrusted network (e.g. > public WiFi network) and may only use the DOH server provided by trusted > network (e.g. Enterprise, Secure home networks), similar to the way users > disable VPN connection in specific networks and enable VPN connection by > > default in other networks for privacy. In addition, the privacy extension > includes a URL that points to the security assessment report of the DNS > server by a third party auditor. > > > > Cheers, > > -Tiru > > Information in this email including any attachments may be privileged, > confidential and is intended exclusively for the addressee. The views > expressed may not be official policy, but the personal views of the > originator. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender by > return e-mail and delete it from your system. You should not reproduce, > distribute, store, retransmit, use or disclose its contents to anyone. > Please note we reserve the right to monitor all e-mail communication > through our internal and external networks. SKY and the SKY marks are > trademarks of Sky Limited and Sky International AG and are used under > licence. > > Sky UK Limited (Registration No. 2906991), Sky-In-Home Service Limited > (Registration No. 2067075), Sky Subscribers Services Limited (Registratio= n > No. 2340150) and Sky CP Limited (Registration No. 9513259) are direct or > indirect subsidiaries of Sky Limited (Registration No. 2247735). All of t= he > companies mentioned in this paragraph are incorporated in England and Wal= es > and share the same registered office at Grant Way, Isleworth, Middlesex T= W7 > 5QD > > -- > Add mailing list > Add@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add > > > *--------------------------------------------------------------------* > > *This email is from an external source. Please do not open attachments or > click links from an unknown or suspicious origin. Phishing attempts can b= e > reported by sending them to phishing@sky.uk as > attachments. Thank you* > > *--------------------------------------------------------------------* > > > Information in this email including any attachments may be privileged, > confidential and is intended exclusively for the addressee. The views > expressed may not be official policy, but the personal views of the > originator. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender by > return e-mail and delete it from your system. You should not reproduce, > distribute, store, retransmit, use or disclose its contents to anyone. > Please note we reserve the right to monitor all e-mail communication > through our internal and external networks. SKY and the SKY marks are > trademarks of Sky Limited and Sky International AG and are used under > licence. > > Sky UK Limited (Registration No. 2906991), Sky-In-Home Service Limited > (Registration No. 2067075), Sky Subscribers Services Limited (Registratio= n > No. 2340150) and Sky CP Limited (Registration No. 9513259) are direct or > indirect subsidiaries of Sky Limited (Registration No. 2247735). All of t= he > companies mentioned in this paragraph are incorporated in England and Wal= es > and share the same registered office at Grant Way, Isleworth, Middlesex T= W7 > 5QD > --00000000000068bc82058ab80734 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Wed, 29 May 2019 at 16:46, Winfield, A= lister <Alister.Winfield@sky.= uk> wrote:

Fair enough, I=E2=80=99m just stating that not all q= ueries/responses are known as potentially bad (malware / phishing) until af= ter the fact. That simple fact is the reason some DNS providers choose to h= old logs.


Agreed, updated l= ogging type and duration as follows:

=C2=A0 =C2=A0LoggingType= s =C2=A0::=3D =C2=A0BIT STRING {
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0none =C2=A0 =C2=A0 = =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 (0),
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2= =A0-- No logging
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0all =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2= =A0 =C2=A0(1),
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- Log al= l transaction data
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0useridentity =C2=A0 (2),
=C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- Log user identity (e.g., us= ername, IP address)
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0notifyuser =C2=A0 =C2=A0 (3),=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- Log to notify user acce= ss
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- to certain domains= is blocked
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0knownmalware =C2=A0 (4),
=C2=A0 =C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- Log access to malicious domains=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0analytics =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0(5)
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- Log transaction data for analytics
=C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- (e.g. to detect malicious d= omains) }

=C2=A0 =C2=A0LoggingDuration ::=3D =C2=A0SEQUENCE {
=C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 all =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0[0]=C2=A0 = =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0INTEGER OPTIONAL,
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 userid= entity [1] =C2=A0INTEGER OPTIONAL,
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 notifyuse= r =C2=A0 [2] =C2=A0INTEGER OPTIONAL,
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 knownma= lware [3] =C2=A0INTEGER OPTIONAL,
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 analytics = =C2=A0 =C2=A0[4] =C2=A0INTEGER OPTIONAL }

=C2=A0 =C2=A0Logging ::=3D= =C2=A0SEQUENCE =C2=A0{
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0loggingTypes =C2=A0 =C2=A0 = =C2=A0 =C2=A0 LoggingTypes DEFAULT {none},
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0loggingDu= ration =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0LoggingDuration OPTIONAL
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0= =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- T= ransaction data is cleared
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- after logging duration,=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- Negative one (-1) indicates indefinite
=C2=A0 =C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 = =C2=A0 -- duration =C2=A0}

Updated draft is av= ailable at https://github.com/tireddy2/DPRIV= E/blob/master/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04.txt=C2=A0

Cheers,
-Tiru=C2=A0

=C2=A0

Cheers

Alister

=C2=A0

From: = tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com&g= t;
Date: Wednesday, 29 May 2019 at 11:54
To: "Winfield, Alister" <Alister.Winfield@sky.uk>
Cc: ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Add] publication of DoH Resolver policies

=C2=A0

On Tue, 28 May 2019 at 22:06, Winfield, Alister <= Alister.Winfield=3D40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

It would be wonderful if every malicious domain was = known prior to its use, sadly except where a DGA is known that=E2=80=99s no= t the case. So it can be useful to have a little historic information to see the extent of the issue once it=E2=80=99s become known.=

=C2=A0

DGA is just one technique, malicious domains like C&= amp;C domains can possibly be identified by inspecting TXT records (used to= send commands to the compromised host), fast flux service network etc.<= /u>

=C2=A0

Cheers,

-Tiru

=C2=A0

=C2=A0

It=E2=80=99s also true that with performance issues = unless they are very obvious (eg impacting say Facebook, Google, Amazon etc= ), operators necessarily rely on analytics or customers to complain. Given issues can be transient or periodic only a historic record= can provide insight into the root cause.

=C2=A0

Alister

=C2=A0

From: Add <add-bounces@ietf.org> o= n behalf of "Livingood, Jason" <Jason_Livingood@comcast.com>
Date: Tuesday, 28 May 2019 at 16:43
To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Cc: ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Add] publication of DoH Resolver policies

=C2=A0

First =E2=80=93 thank= s for the pointer!

=C2=A0<= u>

Comment =E2=80=93 thi= ngs like =E2=80=98logging=E2=80=99 seem very binary. What about default log= ging =3D no except if FQDN =3D malware C&C, in which case yes (to suppo= rt notifying the end user of infection)?

=C2=A0<= u>

From: Add <add-bounces@ietf.org> o= n behalf of tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Monday, May 27, 2019 at 9:12 AM
To: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Cc: ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Add] publication of DoH Resolver policies

=C2=A0

On Mon, 27 May 2019 at 16:53, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote= :

On 27 May 2019, at 11:59, tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> w= rote:
>
> If the DOH server provided by the network offers the same level of pri= vacy preserving data policy as the DOH server pre-configured in the browser= , Why shouldn't the browser use the network provided DOH server ?

How could the browser tell that both DoH servers have the same policy?


How does the browser (or anything else for that matter) know what some arbi= trary DoH server=E2=80=99s privacy preserving data policy is? Where will th= is be documented and published in a way that a web-based application or the= end user can understand and then make an informed choice?

=C2=A0

https://tools.ietf.org/html= /draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-03#section-10 defines a new privacy certificate extension that identifies the privacy pr= eserving data policy of the DNS server, it is in a machine-parsable format.=

=C2=A0


Now rinse and repeat that for other server-side policies: data retention, G= DPR compliance, DNS filtering/blocking, TLS session resumption, ECS behavio= ur, QNAME minimisation, NXDOMAIN rewriting, query-related adware, etc, etc.=

Oh, and if some DoH server says =E2=80=9CI do QNAME minimisation=E2=80=9D (= say), does the browser or end user simply take that on trust or would they = somehow be expected to verify that for themselves?

=C2=A0

End user typically does not trust DOH server in a un= trusted network (e.g. public WiFi network) and may only use the DOH server = provided by trusted network (e.g. Enterprise, Secure home networks), similar to the way users disable VPN connection in specifi= c networks and enable VPN connection by=C2=A0

default in other networks for privacy. In addition, = the privacy extension includes a URL that points to the security assessment= report of the DNS server by a third party auditor.

=C2=A0

Cheers,

-Tiru

Information in this email including any attachments = may be privileged, confidential and is intended exclusively for the address= ee. The views expressed may not be official policy, but the personal views = of the originator. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender by return e-mail and delete it from = your system. You should not reproduce, distribute, store, retransmit, use o= r disclose its contents to anyone. Please note we reserve the right to moni= tor all e-mail communication through our internal and external networks. SKY and the SKY marks are trademarks o= f Sky Limited and Sky International AG and are used under licence.

Sky UK Limited (Registration No. 2906991), Sky-In-Home Service Limited (Reg= istration No. 2067075), Sky Subscribers Services Limited (Registration No. = 2340150) and Sky CP Limited (Registration No. 9513259) are direct or indire= ct subsidiaries of Sky Limited (Registration No. 2247735). All of the companies mentioned in this paragraph are incorpo= rated in England and Wales and share the same registered office at Grant Wa= y, Isleworth, Middlesex TW7 5QD

--
Add mailing list
Add@ietf.org
https://www= .ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add

-----------------------------------= ---------------------------------

This email is from an external sour= ce. Please do not open attachments or click links from an unknown or suspic= ious origin. Phishing attempts can be reported by sending them to phishing@sky.uk as attach= ments. Thank you

-----------------------------------= ---------------------------------

=C2=A0

Information in this email including any attachments may be privileged, conf= idential and is intended exclusively for the addressee. The views expressed= may not be official policy, but the personal views of the originator. If y= ou have received it in error, please notify the sender by return e-mail and delete it from your system. You sho= uld not reproduce, distribute, store, retransmit, use or disclose its conte= nts to anyone. Please note we reserve the right to monitor all e-mail commu= nication through our internal and external networks. SKY and the SKY marks are trademarks of Sky Limited and= Sky International AG and are used under licence.

Sky UK Limited (Registration No. 2906991), Sky-In-Home Service Limited (Reg= istration No. 2067075), Sky Subscribers Services Limited (Registration No. = 2340150) and Sky CP Limited (Registration No. 9513259) are direct or indire= ct subsidiaries of Sky Limited (Registration No. 2247735). All of the companies mentioned in this paragraph are incorpo= rated in England and Wales and share the same registered office at Grant Wa= y, Isleworth, Middlesex TW7 5QD
--00000000000068bc82058ab80734-- From nobody Wed Jun 12 02:31:40 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E90FC12013D for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 02:31:38 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PZ6DAFDDHU7B for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 02:31:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.hardakers.net (mail.hardakers.net [168.150.192.181]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5BD4812013A for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 02:31:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (unknown [65.222.183.68]) by mail.hardakers.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 841C62C21B for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 02:31:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Wes Hardaker To: add@ietf.org Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 02:31:31 -0700 Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Archived-At: Subject: [Add] Google's DOH(like) being used for evil already X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:31:39 -0000 https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/it-looks-like-another-dns-compromise-hack-happening/ -- Wes Hardaker USC/ISI From nobody Wed Jun 12 03:36:50 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9CCB0120137 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 03:36:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.019 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.019 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FROM_EXCESS_BASE64=0.979, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=nic.cz Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ecM7oCySP6Ch for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 03:36:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.nic.cz (mail.nic.cz [217.31.204.67]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E9DC712007A for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 03:36:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [IPv6:2001:1488:fffe:6:c1d1:acd6:9dce:6bd4] (unknown [IPv6:2001:1488:fffe:6:c1d1:acd6:9dce:6bd4]) by mail.nic.cz (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 73A3313F623; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:36:43 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=nic.cz; s=default; t=1560335803; bh=t5et8aNYODMv5+l4t62b4cUlf9KyHaNb5uc+pH8GaeE=; h=To:From:Date; b=qaEfiRTKlOOMWJBJJaHwa7uJ59QvxZQDN3l4489lRiZW5mPBrXC7uswCGMyH+4LzZ zCjO+SPlVpyYKplD/k5XloWxOrRFRFWL4R1e1JWfPkIGzSsa9c1zP8P5wpgDATP8Yy mWYMn+hXbSc3+Amz/yCQIY/I/XMXqQ6RvbpD5q8Y= To: add@ietf.org References: Cc: Wes Hardaker From: =?UTF-8?B?VmxhZGltw61yIMSMdW7DoXQ=?= Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=vladimir.cunat+ietf@nic.cz; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFgDknYBEADHEQwLBlfqbVCzq7qYcBFFTc1WCAFtqiKehOrsITnKusZw4nhYwlKQxcum gj01xJOhbfHBCBeGlDydYqemKg4IfY2nwSyPwZZYMJn7L7AGrCeytr4VMvDJ7o7qDZjjim4i fv+GUwdk3plXx6oMF4nctesI8aAOuLUHAn0PfrGfNhWoaglOKgdOI6DGjhI/aGkvy+jrI/+X sdMV+3f1RuEOfI+Yu4SXFjJyhAmqEOBRxxdHqKreIIpz3Lg38yWwiVGfwgQT+nFIz9BpHH3l Wg1uS8xM3ezceBmRYV8zT9PvbeZ57BlaTR6rLae5RYwV397PSLBqqLkB5H0TDRUFBnwBsUob LebYHmJCOydvyNv5AFkLmLZ7O4j2jFo1WPSMt3ThM6wRwqrnB4Gi+6onyrZfE1DnVZMqbxZ3 VXa+E4S5YwrfCLUErGEn+d40OtoRZmQXhRPVAsdjimMj9oFM9RoxSgUrDg6Ia3n0IrKFb++z HAFbqkR5g4qzXiOMEG621GYEex2sDEKz/PD4CVKlNI9eld4ToH592kAwzJmd+sAi+Rfos0NE zxuFd0ekAOeWoURo0zoYTSWPlMOmFMvcpH6LP3leJmY7x4z/b1ng/+7UnKonVALVPFbRbElO kIfAtLKcUEofwV1jr7DyYGPalJtiDJPomB041ZHCj2RxyXY/oQARAQABtDBWbGFkaW3DrXIg xIx1bsOhdCAod29yaykgPHZsYWRpbWlyLmN1bmF0QG5pYy5jej6JAlQEEwEIAD4CGyMFCQlm AYAFCwkIBwIGFQgJCgsCBBYCAwECHgECF4AWIQS2AGRgtgqA54IGJEnnR98flXWjqgUCWg3w 3gAKCRDnR98flXWjqmD6D/96U4cDZBrHQ5LhqybocZr/N2IS5Wr2SLLB4k2F5/W/wbL05gq6 Ha9/2TMqXoxRkhug+EAHFHxylPR43yN9rz0pjBXHrra87FAPHMqq/qqrOEUdhkytEqa6WIho aoEkdhaMhUyctjVjL2WZ0+MWeRjqedLQX+VCrOVPcVbLreRRhA9N3KPgNwbp9zCg6hEPi4l2 zZKedHkTNjKIAwJ0xZoMwFa1Y+vL8Em8Or+IBZuGBMP/ZMtasPOIQaT/Gvsyx1DDorwsoCdX 6zaTZy5DOWP3FIrMzus/YDbzwAYxSpWk/jF44ySbnJzdjU67EfG3UrsK+RRGw8aJqs3/4qHK ZMZZnNL+4wJpEdnZyFic/MXcw6FBszQEwrIOaM1WEfwzn2ExUYk2pM5zaBwq76OgrmGMzMEi cfMDyqLodwEQqR70PvRbkrh+R02LphwQ9c5AFXcrLjKMmeQlbQVarTUsrELcTK6rElC1ojS7 M37j0XzFE+kgNWn2fyBRgtnGDWEa7r+oDaueXJnEf0/4Ww28IwxakNc7r0N41GIBekwSxKdk epKFZgtVGGSDlFei5hb5LLWFljA1OS7CRVJKpbHafQjdPdb1vNqZAj4y2SJXvVVpI1KO5kq+ dFdYipORv0N2Iho6MNYbQUT1EBeU46G5N0viCoLS15/PxLhIAo+PzKpW97kCDQRYA5J2ARAA yHww3huLEtsdyqgjiGMhtEKOLmp7yFl450HY9oPcHS02U5BC1370ssNShrdOCi2ACDbe41Zx x85WcuaO1OVqung2umX047mj2xQsiTAFRDLZsQu8cQFoEy/DBL2bk7ThfK1Lh+NyZAs0UaPp DkGodS0De9osA+4T6Nf4POYaeavbYVFSdDKS4lUboBqApKnD/TzKFxFcpuFx6FN92lteTbOo jGMiLoZvELY86Kn9KuFZ8FM2ZSNHx1Z75KouufGrdkeCoZYVYiuzT+fnt2it4dIpIlnF+yxM t5LB/MSrmECB5CAFJtxzuMccm6yDUZQSWWi9vUgxIJwvt5w0CIBT353DGeP4WnH0r5YoBKoR bh7i4fT0lWvMXTG/V2lqyzBdClMebyHffMgba26Kj6oeDygDfC5aGsVaqw1Ue/qQ5QRqTJcJ V7xVLTtS1EamVqkfKwPS0zTfnrF1jQtnO/P4qkfgBRRG9BXGGrykHpXOyqmX6Z0wbV2P4j+p 02oSecDl5yVXplJfsXfbS/xXnaSkaN/7mCU29ul26cAVNxDkDPunztSFi9K9LM2T/XWYJQGX M71OpmONQJGF24lx7Wp/kobnHtbjGDzjDPC4eSL7MA56qtrWaLM+4ePKANct2q0q6c0uSLs0 Q2zochS64Mcg0YzL1sinWPN1rXLDk3lwpIsAEQEAAYkCJQQYAQgADwUCWAOSdgIbDAUJCWYB gAAKCRDnR98flXWjqn4yEACA0f1XBAg+WMaNPtIt0k15yFPfhdbOg9GhDcYGgvFIOxRuaFWw 9SLUt7OGuUnIpKxKRXtQJss98fHkijo70ONYWPuLhfRGK/wg9Ao6MuFw5G8m431CBS/awrie b6iPjvAARXJCPTTBZk/NC988jiKdCh8PbTCHDsl+gSDytP15QUrdqSfS2Wf4653ej7+jtuTj xZzmGgvNSi6JDlb9KNtmBQKQAgpnOQM46ItESmzHDnmdcvhPLUDsjwkpIJ6clasOzaObwxJi ba7iFPcGwcClCSwYjMNXFtneCGUnEAa5RBIx+i+LV1iqB3VRvTC6tMIUueoQ7cdTy6afNkhw QYXm4/pDmNT8UMdnzwnlTpFQ0CegDQRDWc+dIDDBHGEEEYBh2vTOE04KrmYUp1bQsNegPfvL woHib0jEvohPMJ2fJtZAd1SJElgwPbM8H7emKBiTsHwF8gL7G2jo7AoGpqYjqXkCRS0tSLTN r+qHh+7Ltrkbu/ZVTTfh4Q/qw3VaLYQh4C0tBma/YevQy1O2c3TZXXFz1QF8b9/Hj/3sq2Kg T1AcZ51E+xG+cb6cUqgkihmgm39xx24GPlNAdCRuq01+iILol+Wox6OwF6hmqx1EMSmxcmGo UREr0rkMnFVsWeAYeVoE4q689qxCPu9iCMJMJnkRe1o9oQYSN7my+S98gA== Message-ID: <5824a61b-a080-f3f2-07d7-41f8a7a44071@nic.cz> Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:36:43 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.100.3 at mail.nic.cz X-Virus-Status: Clean Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] Google's DOH(like) being used for evil already X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 10:36:48 -0000 On 6/12/19 11:31 AM, Wes Hardaker wrote: > https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/it-looks-like-another-dns-compromise-hack-happening/ This is more about what javascript is allowed to do in particular cases, I believe.  Still, one of the main aims of the DoH RFC is exactly to support doing DNS directly from javascript (without changing anything on the browser side).  On JS/web there seems to be a never-ending tug of war between features and security. Of course, malicious names might better get filtered as well, after detection of widespread misuse, but that's not really a long-term efficient approach. --Vladimir From nobody Wed Jun 12 06:18:56 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDAAB12011A for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:18:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oLbX-IeRqNyV for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:18:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.hardakers.net (mail.hardakers.net [168.150.192.181]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7E12F120115 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:18:53 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (wsip-72-196-48-230.dc.dc.cox.net [72.196.48.230]) by mail.hardakers.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 3545F26F62; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:18:43 -0700 (PDT) From: Wes Hardaker To: =?utf-8?B?VmxhZGltw61yIMSMdW7DoXQ=?= Cc: add@ietf.org, Wes Hardaker References: <5824a61b-a080-f3f2-07d7-41f8a7a44071@nic.cz> Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:18:42 -0700 In-Reply-To: <5824a61b-a080-f3f2-07d7-41f8a7a44071@nic.cz> (=?utf-8?B?IlZs?= =?utf-8?B?YWRpbcOtciDEjHVuw6F0Iidz?= message of "Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:36:43 +0200") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] Google's DOH(like) being used for evil already X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 13:18:55 -0000 Vladim=C3=ADr =C4=8Cun=C3=A1t writes: > On 6/12/19 11:31 AM, Wes Hardaker wrote: > > https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/it-looks-like-another-dns-compromise-hac= k-happening/ >=20 > Of course, malicious names might better get filtered as well, after > detection of widespread misuse, but that's not really a long-term > efficient approach. Since it's trivial to encode JS in different trivial substitution ciphers, I doubt this can be easily cleaned and filtered. (the better thing would be to ensure data coming in through suspicious paths can't get into the execution stack) --=20 Wes Hardaker USC/ISI From nobody Wed Jun 12 06:22:54 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0CC18120115 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:22:52 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.018 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.018 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FROM_EXCESS_BASE64=0.979, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=nic.cz Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id MCKYpDH3Bd9w for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:22:50 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.nic.cz (mail.nic.cz [217.31.204.67]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D68271200B3 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:22:49 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [IPv6:2001:1488:fffe:6:c1d1:acd6:9dce:6bd4] (unknown [IPv6:2001:1488:fffe:6:c1d1:acd6:9dce:6bd4]) by mail.nic.cz (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BB2DE140C2E; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:22:47 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=nic.cz; s=default; t=1560345767; bh=LFSYY5HPuL71iXqqlpRpvXVce+4DXkU/xgV2XTA4T3g=; h=To:From:Date; b=H7K3dchBGTbr3K1klGRyVsqKVwTSqt01mUUh7tDZrHKW8uQEhGMfWpCyRHg0ByPU6 qLDe31VY8y6UYIHh/ay55ei9f7KLC1/+KwbaetsU+WvKgEFGuLoTIf21qW5Re/qg+j JmhisAfxyUGRTYO1jimWGzk+uuKVReBVLgzSB45E= To: Wes Hardaker Cc: add@ietf.org References: <5824a61b-a080-f3f2-07d7-41f8a7a44071@nic.cz> From: =?UTF-8?B?VmxhZGltw61yIMSMdW7DoXQ=?= Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=vladimir.cunat+ietf@nic.cz; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFgDknYBEADHEQwLBlfqbVCzq7qYcBFFTc1WCAFtqiKehOrsITnKusZw4nhYwlKQxcum gj01xJOhbfHBCBeGlDydYqemKg4IfY2nwSyPwZZYMJn7L7AGrCeytr4VMvDJ7o7qDZjjim4i fv+GUwdk3plXx6oMF4nctesI8aAOuLUHAn0PfrGfNhWoaglOKgdOI6DGjhI/aGkvy+jrI/+X sdMV+3f1RuEOfI+Yu4SXFjJyhAmqEOBRxxdHqKreIIpz3Lg38yWwiVGfwgQT+nFIz9BpHH3l Wg1uS8xM3ezceBmRYV8zT9PvbeZ57BlaTR6rLae5RYwV397PSLBqqLkB5H0TDRUFBnwBsUob LebYHmJCOydvyNv5AFkLmLZ7O4j2jFo1WPSMt3ThM6wRwqrnB4Gi+6onyrZfE1DnVZMqbxZ3 VXa+E4S5YwrfCLUErGEn+d40OtoRZmQXhRPVAsdjimMj9oFM9RoxSgUrDg6Ia3n0IrKFb++z HAFbqkR5g4qzXiOMEG621GYEex2sDEKz/PD4CVKlNI9eld4ToH592kAwzJmd+sAi+Rfos0NE zxuFd0ekAOeWoURo0zoYTSWPlMOmFMvcpH6LP3leJmY7x4z/b1ng/+7UnKonVALVPFbRbElO kIfAtLKcUEofwV1jr7DyYGPalJtiDJPomB041ZHCj2RxyXY/oQARAQABtDBWbGFkaW3DrXIg xIx1bsOhdCAod29yaykgPHZsYWRpbWlyLmN1bmF0QG5pYy5jej6JAlQEEwEIAD4CGyMFCQlm AYAFCwkIBwIGFQgJCgsCBBYCAwECHgECF4AWIQS2AGRgtgqA54IGJEnnR98flXWjqgUCWg3w 3gAKCRDnR98flXWjqmD6D/96U4cDZBrHQ5LhqybocZr/N2IS5Wr2SLLB4k2F5/W/wbL05gq6 Ha9/2TMqXoxRkhug+EAHFHxylPR43yN9rz0pjBXHrra87FAPHMqq/qqrOEUdhkytEqa6WIho aoEkdhaMhUyctjVjL2WZ0+MWeRjqedLQX+VCrOVPcVbLreRRhA9N3KPgNwbp9zCg6hEPi4l2 zZKedHkTNjKIAwJ0xZoMwFa1Y+vL8Em8Or+IBZuGBMP/ZMtasPOIQaT/Gvsyx1DDorwsoCdX 6zaTZy5DOWP3FIrMzus/YDbzwAYxSpWk/jF44ySbnJzdjU67EfG3UrsK+RRGw8aJqs3/4qHK ZMZZnNL+4wJpEdnZyFic/MXcw6FBszQEwrIOaM1WEfwzn2ExUYk2pM5zaBwq76OgrmGMzMEi cfMDyqLodwEQqR70PvRbkrh+R02LphwQ9c5AFXcrLjKMmeQlbQVarTUsrELcTK6rElC1ojS7 M37j0XzFE+kgNWn2fyBRgtnGDWEa7r+oDaueXJnEf0/4Ww28IwxakNc7r0N41GIBekwSxKdk epKFZgtVGGSDlFei5hb5LLWFljA1OS7CRVJKpbHafQjdPdb1vNqZAj4y2SJXvVVpI1KO5kq+ dFdYipORv0N2Iho6MNYbQUT1EBeU46G5N0viCoLS15/PxLhIAo+PzKpW97kCDQRYA5J2ARAA yHww3huLEtsdyqgjiGMhtEKOLmp7yFl450HY9oPcHS02U5BC1370ssNShrdOCi2ACDbe41Zx x85WcuaO1OVqung2umX047mj2xQsiTAFRDLZsQu8cQFoEy/DBL2bk7ThfK1Lh+NyZAs0UaPp DkGodS0De9osA+4T6Nf4POYaeavbYVFSdDKS4lUboBqApKnD/TzKFxFcpuFx6FN92lteTbOo jGMiLoZvELY86Kn9KuFZ8FM2ZSNHx1Z75KouufGrdkeCoZYVYiuzT+fnt2it4dIpIlnF+yxM t5LB/MSrmECB5CAFJtxzuMccm6yDUZQSWWi9vUgxIJwvt5w0CIBT353DGeP4WnH0r5YoBKoR bh7i4fT0lWvMXTG/V2lqyzBdClMebyHffMgba26Kj6oeDygDfC5aGsVaqw1Ue/qQ5QRqTJcJ V7xVLTtS1EamVqkfKwPS0zTfnrF1jQtnO/P4qkfgBRRG9BXGGrykHpXOyqmX6Z0wbV2P4j+p 02oSecDl5yVXplJfsXfbS/xXnaSkaN/7mCU29ul26cAVNxDkDPunztSFi9K9LM2T/XWYJQGX M71OpmONQJGF24lx7Wp/kobnHtbjGDzjDPC4eSL7MA56qtrWaLM+4ePKANct2q0q6c0uSLs0 Q2zochS64Mcg0YzL1sinWPN1rXLDk3lwpIsAEQEAAYkCJQQYAQgADwUCWAOSdgIbDAUJCWYB gAAKCRDnR98flXWjqn4yEACA0f1XBAg+WMaNPtIt0k15yFPfhdbOg9GhDcYGgvFIOxRuaFWw 9SLUt7OGuUnIpKxKRXtQJss98fHkijo70ONYWPuLhfRGK/wg9Ao6MuFw5G8m431CBS/awrie b6iPjvAARXJCPTTBZk/NC988jiKdCh8PbTCHDsl+gSDytP15QUrdqSfS2Wf4653ej7+jtuTj xZzmGgvNSi6JDlb9KNtmBQKQAgpnOQM46ItESmzHDnmdcvhPLUDsjwkpIJ6clasOzaObwxJi ba7iFPcGwcClCSwYjMNXFtneCGUnEAa5RBIx+i+LV1iqB3VRvTC6tMIUueoQ7cdTy6afNkhw QYXm4/pDmNT8UMdnzwnlTpFQ0CegDQRDWc+dIDDBHGEEEYBh2vTOE04KrmYUp1bQsNegPfvL woHib0jEvohPMJ2fJtZAd1SJElgwPbM8H7emKBiTsHwF8gL7G2jo7AoGpqYjqXkCRS0tSLTN r+qHh+7Ltrkbu/ZVTTfh4Q/qw3VaLYQh4C0tBma/YevQy1O2c3TZXXFz1QF8b9/Hj/3sq2Kg T1AcZ51E+xG+cb6cUqgkihmgm39xx24GPlNAdCRuq01+iILol+Wox6OwF6hmqx1EMSmxcmGo UREr0rkMnFVsWeAYeVoE4q689qxCPu9iCMJMJnkRe1o9oQYSN7my+S98gA== Message-ID: Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:22:47 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------CBFB12D01DFF16C83D580DB1" Content-Language: en-US X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.100.3 at mail.nic.cz X-Virus-Status: Clean Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] Google's DOH(like) being used for evil already X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 13:22:52 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------CBFB12D01DFF16C83D580DB1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 6/12/19 3:18 PM, Wes Hardaker wrote: >> Of course, malicious names might better get filtered as well, after >> detection of widespread misuse, but that's not really a long-term >> efficient approach. > Since it's trivial to encode JS in different trivial substitution > ciphers, I doubt this can be easily cleaned and filtered. (the better > thing would be to ensure data coming in through suspicious paths can't > get into the execution stack) By "filtering" here I meant blocking on DNS level - in resolvers and perhaps also killing delegations that are used by malware (on the registry side). --------------CBFB12D01DFF16C83D580DB1 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
On 6/12/19 3:18 PM, Wes Hardaker wrote:
Of course, malicious names might better get filtered as well, after
detection of widespread misuse, but that's not really a long-term
efficient approach.

Since it's trivial to encode JS in different trivial substitution
ciphers, I doubt this can be easily cleaned and filtered.  (the better
thing would be to ensure data coming in through suspicious paths can't
get into the execution stack)

By "filtering" here I meant blocking on DNS level - in resolvers and perhaps also killing delegations that are used by malware (on the registry side).


--------------CBFB12D01DFF16C83D580DB1-- From nobody Wed Jun 12 06:24:37 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 982A0120115 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:24:35 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8eZczziFQAes for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:24:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx4.nic.fr (mx4.nic.fr [IPv6:2001:67c:2218:2::4:12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2976F1200B3 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:24:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx4.nic.fr (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx4.nic.fr (Postfix) with SMTP id 668A628068C; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:24:30 +0200 (CEST) Received: from relay01.prive.nic.fr (pa-th3.interco.nic.fr [192.134.4.74]) by mx4.nic.fr (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60B46280606; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:24:30 +0200 (CEST) Received: from b12.nic.fr (b12.tech.ipv6.nic.fr [IPv6:2001:67c:1348:7::86:133]) by relay01.prive.nic.fr (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5D816642A7A1; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:24:30 +0200 (CEST) Received: by b12.nic.fr (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 5834B40237; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:24:30 +0200 (CEST) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:24:30 +0200 From: Stephane Bortzmeyer To: Wes Hardaker Cc: add@ietf.org Message-ID: <20190612132430.ephihrsbijxprfan@nic.fr> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Operating-System: Debian GNU/Linux 9.9 X-Kernel: Linux 4.9.0-8-amd64 x86_64 X-Charlie: Je suis Charlie Organization: NIC France X-URL: http://www.nic.fr/ User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] Google's DOH(like) being used for evil already X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 13:24:36 -0000 On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 02:31:31AM -0700, Wes Hardaker wrote a message of 11 lines which said: >https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/it-looks-like-another-dns-compromise-hack-happening/ It's not DoH but a Google's proprietary protocol (which is something that many people miss: in the permissionless environment of the Internet, anyone can invent and deploy a name resolution protocol). They could have used any of the many DNS->Web gateways. From nobody Wed Jun 12 06:26:01 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B6771201D9 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:25:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 2rSOXY5rJP3J for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:25:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx4.nic.fr (mx4.nic.fr [IPv6:2001:67c:2218:2::4:12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 70162120182 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 06:25:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mx4.nic.fr (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx4.nic.fr (Postfix) with SMTP id ECACD280606; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:25:50 +0200 (CEST) Received: by mx4.nic.fr (Postfix, from userid 500) id E6D352806AB; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:25:50 +0200 (CEST) Received: from relay01.prive.nic.fr (relay01.prive.nic.fr [IPv6:2001:67c:2218:15::11]) by mx4.nic.fr (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF68B280606; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:25:50 +0200 (CEST) Received: from b12.nic.fr (b12.users.prive.nic.fr [10.10.86.133]) by relay01.prive.nic.fr (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC4BB642A7A1; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:25:50 +0200 (CEST) Received: by b12.nic.fr (Postfix, from userid 1000) id DA17F40237; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:25:50 +0200 (CEST) Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 15:25:50 +0200 From: Stephane Bortzmeyer To: Wes Hardaker Cc: add@ietf.org Message-ID: <20190612132550.4dnhckxsnpa3zwik@nic.fr> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: X-Operating-System: Debian GNU/Linux 9.9 X-Kernel: Linux 4.9.0-8-amd64 x86_64 X-Charlie: Je suis Charlie Organization: NIC France X-URL: http://www.nic.fr/ User-Agent: NeoMutt/20170113 (1.7.2) X-Bogosity: No, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.084081, version=1.2.2 X-PMX-Version: 6.0.0.2142326, Antispam-Engine: 2.7.2.2107409, Antispam-Data: 2019.6.12.131816 Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] Google's DOH(like) being used for evil already X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 13:26:00 -0000 On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 02:31:31AM -0700, Wes Hardaker wrote a message of 11 lines which said: > https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/it-looks-like-another-dns-compromise-hack-happening/ Next time there is a phishing somewhere on the Internet, with a look-alike Web page, I expect reports titled "W3C's HTML and IETF's HTTP used for bad". From nobody Wed Jun 12 07:38:52 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8FF451200E3 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 07:38:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.2 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id miOByrWx96wt for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 07:38:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:3:216:3eff:fe7c:d1f3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45DBE1200B3 for ; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 07:38:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from sandelman.ca (unknown [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:2:56b2:3ff:fe0b:d84]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 47F70380BE; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 10:37:21 -0400 (EDT) Received: by sandelman.ca (Postfix, from userid 179) id B82B9F4A; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 10:38:44 -0400 (EDT) Received: from sandelman.ca (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5B6855A; Wed, 12 Jun 2019 10:38:44 -0400 (EDT) From: Michael Richardson To: Wes Hardaker cc: add@ietf.org In-Reply-To: References: X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.7+dev; GNU Emacs 24.5.1 X-Face: $\n1pF)h^`}$H>Hk{L"x@)JS7<%Az}5RyS@k9X%29-lHB$Ti.V>2bi.~ehC0; <'$9xN5Ub# z!G,p`nR&p7Fz@^UXIn156S8.~^@MJ*mMsD7=QFeq%AL4m Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] Google's DOH(like) being used for evil already X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 14:38:49 -0000 --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain Wes Hardaker wrote: > https://myonlinesecurity.co.uk/it-looks-like-another-dns-compromise-hack-happening/ It's just executing untrusted code in MIME, while downloading part of the payload via google. It's nothing that didn't occur 25 years ago to mail user agents that ignored MIME's Security Considerations. What's new is that it (ab)uses google to transfer the payload. -- Michael Richardson , Sandelman Software Works -= IPv6 IoT consulting =- --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEbsyLEzg/qUTA43uogItw+93Q3WUFAl0BDnQACgkQgItw+93Q 3WWIAgf8COBveoUg8uX3kjkjJiSu7PICHxkSzSFfz/7jVq8r6jqLwb6X0YltLgVv dHS7Qa+jL6cJ0gkGJ4vwk0rjzM4358t+X/JXQDbENEevmaOtx0B3XKfCDYt7rdpR cYqPn43zCMF9Uv/5mxvAmFfZIcPIjc6NwITYSYaaNCNu+E0eL4YUtWkgOrXGhRAt LmB2ZUJ57b9BUVTLAolyRHAoTDEUr9v8MlWSoYV00nukAsUQVvCLNzDZZ36UE0IL N0pxQIoiRBAjjum+iRQvrIU9L4pr6IDsiRWEa9UGuAtPpgwj9FaxIsnkXYEVCYK8 RbdhT4TLjqt2OHqSfZn38kv6+QEgTg== =hEXc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=-- From nobody Thu Jun 13 09:47:40 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietf.org Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAC09120147; Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:47:21 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: IETF Meeting Session Request Tool To: Cc: add@ietf.org, lflynn@amsl.com, barryleiba@computer.org, add-chairs@ietf.org X-Test-IDTracker: no X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.97.0 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated Precedence: bulk Message-ID: <156044084195.12668.3784271992179167597.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 08:47:21 -0700 Archived-At: X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 09:47:38 -0700 Subject: [Add] add - New Meeting Session Request for IETF 105 X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 15:47:22 -0000 A new meeting session request has just been submitted by Liz Flynn, on behalf of the add working group. --------------------------------------------------------- Working Group Name: Applications Using DoH Area Name: Applications and Real-Time Area Session Requester: Liz Flynn Number of Sessions: 1 Length of Session(s): 1.5 Hours Number of Attendees: 200 Conflicts to Avoid: First Priority: doh, dnsop, dprive, tls, httpbis People who must be present: Barry Leiba David C Lawrence Resources Requested: Special Requests: --------------------------------------------------------- From nobody Fri Jun 14 06:50:49 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6716120044 for ; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 06:50:47 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.997 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id MvBpagW2YnH0 for ; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 06:50:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-io1-xd2b.google.com (mail-io1-xd2b.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::d2b]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 100FB120112 for ; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 06:50:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-io1-xd2b.google.com with SMTP id e3so5776891ioc.12 for ; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 06:50:45 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=RlUulW/GE/BcNW/otX0APtcqridHoVOwOem4Y13/vwo=; b=koLAbdo9E5mZ5DRgOmQxGIpNJYslT5/OlSe8HcjGrKY2kXlxZN7wdLXiuCU3AKZ/KU EWwWsSijzLV6Y9HyKDMtJfmIKgys2glQYQ9shgmwvXNmzEr7Gjh65uaJxwlFlVWZlRxD 30P+lF609jXLp2jXHFwKtRCdSNMEJh5JQnp5iyRH01wRUdmJ8LgyTu/tOeBitzkaY946 UtSZ5ZwLIQvvikV+hZILvUZpsrliotRLdLEmIk/rEtlpZL+GGn75JBq7prVMaz9EWzS3 91t1JEf8nJGx8Dv0iaLpGyotidF6yEqdTXnvWx/SWSrvHcK05jd+Eo2j1leWVwgqeVhz QVxQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=RlUulW/GE/BcNW/otX0APtcqridHoVOwOem4Y13/vwo=; b=R7fctamPwBh6Gnj1zRE9uWBDhrWFKRI1szN8ND47t/FHnQYZChzJ4dL+kp+0Pr3RZG LVNHkpP4VI1hIgrZhfcL2XDq0xsVr+qvL+UBN/EI48E9fFgr+3Sc2f3Iibyj/EPbErQ5 iVsa8cxRijLeR/KhBKq6Xbf6QuKtXq97wf1iAGPgIUnKEG7UyR7KAfuiflTBF2tdIMe+ WT2O6Xx2qB2VuGnc22zHlM4ldUJdg+SzRKj9GiaWw2QGjZUss9eKn3IjwHxMb141Egjg dvrVRMuLoFKxqzDz3KsUBFujsMWfP/u0UVHkqkTAKUiQTeUJpXCw70LZkmksuJ9JLyIK 0ApQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVwao/kKZ2CJvj5LRCU4xf5rjgJvglg136oml/AsN1f4+b3FB1p Td8ZsPgKNtMefvuwyE0XD2dCmLqNY+CfG/TmsYdZ0vUuEa8= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzgJwPeCC2nxPuH4anq31GTValU7wTvb3wS1dBNlKw9RUiFfKVlRsEj8xUo9+XccEyPCX6XmrYntG1aW8z6iT0= X-Received: by 2002:a5e:de45:: with SMTP id e5mr6280000ioq.208.1560520244022; Fri, 14 Jun 2019 06:50:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <156050061783.31878.1596494044040764568.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> In-Reply-To: <156050061783.31878.1596494044040764568.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> From: tirumal reddy Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 19:20:31 +0530 Message-ID: To: ADD Mailing list Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000cf534b058b48ee5e" Archived-At: Subject: [Add] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04.txt X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 13:50:48 -0000 --000000000000cf534b058b48ee5e Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi all, The revised draft https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04 addresses comments from Alister and Jason. The privacy extension is updated to include various logging types and corresponding logging duration. The logging types are user identity (e.g., username, IP address), transaction data, log to notify user access to certain domains is blocked, log access to malicious domains and log transaction data for analytics. Comments, suggestions, and questions are more than welcome. -Tiru ---------- Forwarded message --------- From: Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 at 13:53 Subject: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04.txt To: Mohamed Boucadair , Tirumaleswar Reddy < kondtir@gmail.com>, Dan Wing , Michael C. Richardson A new version of I-D, draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04.txt has been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server Revision: 04 Title: A Bootstrapping Procedure to Discover and Authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS Servers Document date: 2019-06-14 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 21 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04 Htmlized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04 Abstract: This document specifies mechanisms to automatically bootstrap endpoints (e.g., hosts, Customer Equipment) to discover and authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS servers provided by a local network. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat --000000000000cf534b058b48ee5e Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi all,

The revised= draft https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns= -server-04 addresses comments from Alister and Jason.

The priva= cy extension is updated to include various logging types and corresponding = logging duration. The logging types are user identity (e.g., username, IP a= ddress), transaction data, log to notify user access to certain domains is = blocked, log access to malicious domains and log transaction data for analy= tics.

Comments, suggestions, and questions are more than welcome.
-Tiru=C2=A0=C2=A0

---------- Forwarded message ---------
Fr= om: <inte= rnet-drafts@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 at 13:53
S= ubject: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-serve= r-04.txt
To: Mohamed Boucadair <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>, Tirumaleswar Reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>, Dan Wing <<= a href=3D"mailto:dwing-ietf@fuggles.com">dwing-ietf@fuggles.com>, Mi= chael C. Richardson <mcr+ietf= @sandelman.ca>



A new version of I-D, draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04.txt
has been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-= dns-server
Revision:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A004
Title:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 A Bootstrapping Procedure to Disco= ver and Authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS Servers
Document date:=C2=A0 2019-06-14
Group:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Individual Submission
Pages:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 21
URL:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-red= dy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04.txt
Status:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap= -dns-server/
Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-0= 4
Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-dprive-boots= trap-dns-server
Diff:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-reddy-dpr= ive-bootstrap-dns-server-04

Abstract:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document specifies mechanisms to automatically bootstrap<= br> =C2=A0 =C2=A0endpoints (e.g., hosts, Customer Equipment) to discover and =C2=A0 =C2=A0authenticate DNS-over-(D)TLS and DNS-over-HTTPS servers provid= ed by a
=C2=A0 =C2=A0local network.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio= n
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat

--000000000000cf534b058b48ee5e-- From nobody Mon Jun 17 03:42:37 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9B601200D7 for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 03:42:34 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.01 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.01 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=sky.uk Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9RyycuzNITZX for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 03:42:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from EUR02-AM5-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-eopbgr00070.outbound.protection.outlook.com [40.107.0.70]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3A30512008F for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 03:42:31 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sky.uk; s=selector2; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=Tp74BueUVp7j6BHEHavV+F+/TAz2KAWeqUxf7t6fnr0=; b=IdDsfU2Nsg/0W3WIjTVFjGzeZHLbNhmWvpKnZz1tf4DxTx1bLN86YqGHKsTyU5eMV8POKQqWOXtYwAXWh8c2YuhiQDkkh+m3EnxDVaFhisQLzjeiB8fdbpsoVDBeYdYzR3WoDxLLvEk2uL2vq5wmIHZI3bir5IityY0Vp9vQavA= Received: from DB6PR0601MB2184.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com (10.168.51.153) by DB6PR0601MB2136.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com (10.168.57.145) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.1987.15; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:42:14 +0000 Received: from DB6PR0601MB2184.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::410:431d:7a2f:a9b5]) by DB6PR0601MB2184.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::410:431d:7a2f:a9b5%8]) with mapi id 15.20.1987.014; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:42:14 +0000 From: "Winfield, Alister" To: "add@ietf.org" Thread-Topic: Looking at the problem space for real numbers.... Thread-Index: AQHVJPlTXlqpLVD6nE++2HSJ9sYx/g== Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:42:13 +0000 Message-ID: <2C83F6FC-F7DA-429B-84D7-0083229CBF8C@sky.uk> Accept-Language: en-GB, en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/10.1a.0.190609 authentication-results: spf=none (sender IP is ) smtp.mailfrom=Alister.Winfield@sky.uk; x-originating-ip: [78.86.186.237] x-ms-publictraffictype: Email x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 867845b3-ea07-491c-1372-08d6f31075df x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0; PCL:0; RULEID:(2390118)(7020095)(4652040)(8989299)(4534185)(4627221)(201703031133081)(201702281549075)(8990200)(5600148)(711020)(4605104)(1401327)(2017052603328)(7193020); SRVR:DB6PR0601MB2136; x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: DB6PR0601MB2136: x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: x-ms-oob-tlc-oobclassifiers: OLM:9508; x-forefront-prvs: 0071BFA85B x-forefront-antispam-report: SFV:NSPM; SFS:(10009020)(366004)(346002)(396003)(136003)(39860400002)(376002)(199004)(189003)(6916009)(102836004)(6506007)(256004)(14444005)(5024004)(5660300002)(478600001)(2501003)(186003)(476003)(71200400001)(2616005)(73956011)(486006)(26005)(66476007)(66946007)(91956017)(76116006)(66446008)(64756008)(66556008)(71190400001)(7736002)(86362001)(99286004)(5640700003)(8936002)(81166006)(81156014)(1730700003)(8676002)(2906002)(53936002)(6436002)(58126008)(36756003)(316002)(68736007)(6306002)(6512007)(25786009)(72206003)(33656002)(2351001)(74482002)(6116002)(6486002)(3846002)(14454004)(66066001)(54896002); DIR:OUT; SFP:1101; SCL:1; SRVR:DB6PR0601MB2136; H:DB6PR0601MB2184.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com; FPR:; SPF:None; LANG:en; PTR:InfoNoRecords; A:0; MX:1; received-spf: None (protection.outlook.com: sky.uk does not designate permitted sender hosts) x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1 x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: 8lg2NdZekhMvY9WzlMWFFLUvj0VGyXxrE+ueitcLYYgVxK24KLxXdiJh0fMub/mUNst47xn11aReMa7/HZFUkeObWeDmkjhFBwP7ahn/dRnmo0cff7vWbLXfK8vtB4xwvic7DWJINiNXrfe7JiXbm06Zj2q2ot0DFTYjFHZpurW7CmA2fIv0YGMNJjtejhNHli7c5cP2RQpmeHuCba9pExXSmNeHoiPI2tOWtrfdoc3yzOHfGsWzAPMXgypIIllHqDyYukdbFtU6vHXuMHtn1YCsf5vzp90HDluf7rG522Mmr3ELHKTLmx4fFwBzHZgZ1MABtBuxtd13kx/N2IvgzrqNxO4z4x2bcJnB5PDkDwYpmhvU6+ISjCdzMMpZR7ZHeB7RMxJ7vUoRbFbMkr54iMEoXTQXfJzhiZG2x31Hahs= Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_2C83F6FCF7DA429B84D70083229CBF8Cskyuk_" MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginatorOrg: sky.uk X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 867845b3-ea07-491c-1372-08d6f31075df X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 17 Jun 2019 10:42:14.0722 (UTC) X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 68b865d5-cf18-4b2b-82a4-a4eddb9c5237 X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-mailboxtype: HOSTED X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-userprincipalname: alister.winfield@sky.uk X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: DB6PR0601MB2136 Archived-At: Subject: [Add] Looking at the problem space for real numbers.... X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:42:35 -0000 --_000_2C83F6FCF7DA429B84D70083229CBF8Cskyuk_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 SSBoYXZlIG1hbnkgcXVlc3Rpb25zIHRoYXQgcmVxdWlyZSBmYWN0cyB0b3AgYmFjayB0aGVtIHVw IHBhcnRseSB0byBoZWxwIGd1aWRlIHVzIG9uIHByaW9yaXR5IG9mIGlzc3VlcyB0aGF0IHdlIG91 Z2h0IHRvIGJlIGRpc2N1c3NpbmcgYW5kIG9uIHRoZSBzY2FsZSBvZiB0aGUgcHJvYmxlbXMgd2Ug YXJlIGxpa2VseSB0byBiZSBmYWNpbmcgYXMgaW1wbGVtZW50b3JzIGFuZCBkZXBsb3llcnMgb2Yg RG9ILg0KDQpTdGFydGluZyB3aXRoIHByb2JhYmx5IHRoZSBlYXNpZXN0IHRvIHN0YXRlIHF1ZXN0 aW9uLiBVcCBzY2FsaW5nIHJlcXVpcmVkIHdpdGggYW55IHRyYW5zaXRpb24gdG8gRG9ILg0KDQpE b2VzIGFueW9uZSBoZXJlIGhhdmUgYW55IG1lYXN1cmVtZW50cyB0byBkZWZpbmUgdGhlIHNpemlu ZyBpbiB0ZXJtcyBvZjoNCg0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIE51bWJlciBvZiBjb25uZWN0aW9ucyBh dCB0aGUgRG9IIHNlcnZlciB2cyB0aGUgc2FtZSBzZXJ2aWNlIG9uIHBsYWluIEROUyAoYXNzdW1p bmcgVURQIGNvbm5lY3Rpb24gaXMgcm91Z2hseSBlcXVpdmFsZW50IHRvIHVuaXF1ZSBJUOKAmXMg c2VlbiBwZXIgbiBzZWNvbmRzKS4NCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBDb25uZWN0aW9uIHJhdGUgYXQg dGhlIERvSCBzZXJ2ZXJzICh0cmlja3kgZ2l2ZW4gd2UgaGF2ZSBzbyBmZXcgY2xpZW50cyBhdCB0 aGUgbW9tZW50KS4NCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBRdWVyeSByYXRlcyB2cyBwbGFpbiBETlMgYXNz dW1pbmcgdGhhdCBpbiB0aGUgZW5kIHNvbHV0aW9ucyBtYXkgd2VsbCBsb3NlIGFsbCBETlMgY2Fj aGluZyBhdCB0aGUgT1MgLyBDdXN0b21lcnMgQWNjZXNzIERldmljZSAoQ1BFKSBsYXllcnMgLyBP dGhlci4NCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIChCZWZvcmUgYW55b25lIHNheXMgaXQgeWVzIHNvbWUgb2Yg dGhlc2UgY2FjaGVzIGFyZSBieXBhc3NlZCBhbHJlYWR5IHRoYXTigJlzIG9uZSByZWFzb24gc2lt cGxlIG1vZGVsbGluZyBvZiB0aGUgc3lzdGVtIHRvIGdldCBhIGxpa2VseSBzY2FsaW5nIGZhY3Rv ciBpcyBzbyBjb21wbGV4KQ0KDQpBbGlzdGVyLg0KSW5mb3JtYXRpb24gaW4gdGhpcyBlbWFpbCBp bmNsdWRpbmcgYW55IGF0dGFjaG1lbnRzIG1heSBiZSBwcml2aWxlZ2VkLCBjb25maWRlbnRpYWwg YW5kIGlzIGludGVuZGVkIGV4Y2x1c2l2ZWx5IGZvciB0aGUgYWRkcmVzc2VlLiBUaGUgdmlld3Mg ZXhwcmVzc2VkIG1heSBub3QgYmUgb2ZmaWNpYWwgcG9saWN5LCBidXQgdGhlIHBlcnNvbmFsIHZp ZXdzIG9mIHRoZSBvcmlnaW5hdG9yLiBJZiB5b3UgaGF2ZSByZWNlaXZlZCBpdCBpbiBlcnJvciwg cGxlYXNlIG5vdGlmeSB0aGUgc2VuZGVyIGJ5IHJldHVybiBlLW1haWwgYW5kIGRlbGV0ZSBpdCBm cm9tIHlvdXIgc3lzdGVtLiBZb3Ugc2hvdWxkIG5vdCByZXByb2R1Y2UsIGRpc3RyaWJ1dGUsIHN0 b3JlLCByZXRyYW5zbWl0LCB1c2Ugb3IgZGlzY2xvc2UgaXRzIGNvbnRlbnRzIHRvIGFueW9uZS4g UGxlYXNlIG5vdGUgd2UgcmVzZXJ2ZSB0aGUgcmlnaHQgdG8gbW9uaXRvciBhbGwgZS1tYWlsIGNv bW11bmljYXRpb24gdGhyb3VnaCBvdXIgaW50ZXJuYWwgYW5kIGV4dGVybmFsIG5ldHdvcmtzLiBT S1kgYW5kIHRoZSBTS1kgbWFya3MgYXJlIHRyYWRlbWFya3Mgb2YgU2t5IExpbWl0ZWQgYW5kIFNr eSBJbnRlcm5hdGlvbmFsIEFHIGFuZCBhcmUgdXNlZCB1bmRlciBsaWNlbmNlLg0KDQpTa3kgVUsg TGltaXRlZCAoUmVnaXN0cmF0aW9uIE5vLiAyOTA2OTkxKSwgU2t5LUluLUhvbWUgU2VydmljZSBM aW1pdGVkIChSZWdpc3RyYXRpb24gTm8uIDIwNjcwNzUpLCBTa3kgU3Vic2NyaWJlcnMgU2Vydmlj ZXMgTGltaXRlZCAoUmVnaXN0cmF0aW9uIE5vLiAyMzQwMTUwKSBhbmQgU2t5IENQIExpbWl0ZWQg KFJlZ2lzdHJhdGlvbiBOby4gOTUxMzI1OSkgYXJlIGRpcmVjdCBvciBpbmRpcmVjdCBzdWJzaWRp YXJpZXMgb2YgU2t5IExpbWl0ZWQgKFJlZ2lzdHJhdGlvbiBOby4gMjI0NzczNSkuIEFsbCBvZiB0 aGUgY29tcGFuaWVzIG1lbnRpb25lZCBpbiB0aGlzIHBhcmFncmFwaCBhcmUgaW5jb3Jwb3JhdGVk IGluIEVuZ2xhbmQgYW5kIFdhbGVzIGFuZCBzaGFyZSB0aGUgc2FtZSByZWdpc3RlcmVkIG9mZmlj ZSBhdCBHcmFudCBXYXksIElzbGV3b3J0aCwgTWlkZGxlc2V4IFRXNyA1UUQNCg== --_000_2C83F6FCF7DA429B84D70083229CBF8Cskyuk_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="utf-8" Content-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 PGh0bWwgeG1sbnM6bz0idXJuOnNjaGVtYXMtbWljcm9zb2Z0LWNvbTpvZmZpY2U6b2ZmaWNlIiB4 bWxuczp3PSJ1cm46c2NoZW1hcy1taWNyb3NvZnQtY29tOm9mZmljZTp3b3JkIiB4bWxuczptPSJo dHRwOi8vc2NoZW1hcy5taWNyb3NvZnQuY29tL29mZmljZS8yMDA0LzEyL29tbWwiIHhtbG5zPSJo dHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy9UUi9SRUMtaHRtbDQwIj4NCjxoZWFkPg0KPG1ldGEgaHR0cC1lcXVp dj0iQ29udGVudC1UeXBlIiBjb250ZW50PSJ0ZXh0L2h0bWw7IGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgiPg0KPG1l dGEgbmFtZT0iR2VuZXJhdG9yIiBjb250ZW50PSJNaWNyb3NvZnQgV29yZCAxNSAoZmlsdGVyZWQg bWVkaXVtKSI+DQo8c3R5bGU+PCEtLQ0KLyogRm9udCBEZWZpbml0aW9ucyAqLw0KQGZvbnQtZmFj ZQ0KCXtmb250LWZhbWlseToiQ2FtYnJpYSBNYXRoIjsNCglwYW5vc2UtMToyIDQgNSAzIDUgNCA2 IDMgMiA0O30NCkBmb250LWZhY2UNCgl7Zm9udC1mYW1pbHk6Q2FsaWJyaTsNCglwYW5vc2UtMToy IDE1IDUgMiAyIDIgNCAzIDIgNDt9DQpAZm9udC1mYWNlDQoJe2ZvbnQtZmFtaWx5OiJNYWxndW4g R290aGljIjsNCglwYW5vc2UtMToyIDExIDUgMyAyIDAgMCAyIDAgNDt9DQpAZm9udC1mYWNlDQoJ e2ZvbnQtZmFtaWx5OiJcQE1hbGd1biBHb3RoaWMiO30NCi8qIFN0eWxlIERlZmluaXRpb25zICov DQpwLk1zb05vcm1hbCwgbGkuTXNvTm9ybWFsLCBkaXYuTXNvTm9ybWFsDQoJe21hcmdpbjowY207 DQoJbWFyZ2luLWJvdHRvbTouMDAwMXB0Ow0KCWZvbnQtc2l6ZToxMi4wcHQ7DQoJZm9udC1mYW1p bHk6IkNhbGlicmkiLHNhbnMtc2VyaWY7fQ0KYTpsaW5rLCBzcGFuLk1zb0h5cGVybGluaw0KCXtt c28tc3R5bGUtcHJpb3JpdHk6OTk7DQoJY29sb3I6IzA1NjNDMTsNCgl0ZXh0LWRlY29yYXRpb246 dW5kZXJsaW5lO30NCmE6dmlzaXRlZCwgc3Bhbi5Nc29IeXBlcmxpbmtGb2xsb3dlZA0KCXttc28t c3R5bGUtcHJpb3JpdHk6OTk7DQoJY29sb3I6Izk1NEY3MjsNCgl0ZXh0LWRlY29yYXRpb246dW5k ZXJsaW5lO30NCnNwYW4uRW1haWxTdHlsZTE3DQoJe21zby1zdHlsZS10eXBlOnBlcnNvbmFsLWNv bXBvc2U7DQoJZm9udC1mYW1pbHk6IkNhbGlicmkiLHNhbnMtc2VyaWY7DQoJY29sb3I6d2luZG93 dGV4dDt9DQouTXNvQ2hwRGVmYXVsdA0KCXttc28tc3R5bGUtdHlwZTpleHBvcnQtb25seTsNCglm b250LWZhbWlseToiQ2FsaWJyaSIsc2Fucy1zZXJpZjt9DQpAcGFnZSBXb3JkU2VjdGlvbjENCgl7 c2l6ZTo2MTIuMHB0IDc5Mi4wcHQ7DQoJbWFyZ2luOjcyLjBwdCA3Mi4wcHQgNzIuMHB0IDcyLjBw dDt9DQpkaXYuV29yZFNlY3Rpb24xDQoJe3BhZ2U6V29yZFNlY3Rpb24xO30NCi0tPjwvc3R5bGU+ DQo8L2hlYWQ+DQo8Ym9keSBsYW5nPSJFTi1HQiIgbGluaz0iIzA1NjNDMSIgdmxpbms9IiM5NTRG NzIiPg0KPGRpdiBjbGFzcz0iV29yZFNlY3Rpb24xIj4NCjxwIGNsYXNzPSJNc29Ob3JtYWwiPjxz cGFuIHN0eWxlPSJmb250LXNpemU6MTEuMHB0Ij5JIGhhdmUgbWFueSBxdWVzdGlvbnMgdGhhdCBy ZXF1aXJlIGZhY3RzIHRvcCBiYWNrIHRoZW0gdXAgcGFydGx5IHRvIGhlbHAgZ3VpZGUgdXMgb24g cHJpb3JpdHkgb2YgaXNzdWVzIHRoYXQgd2Ugb3VnaHQgdG8gYmUgZGlzY3Vzc2luZyBhbmQgb24g dGhlIHNjYWxlIG9mIHRoZSBwcm9ibGVtcyB3ZSBhcmUgbGlrZWx5IHRvIGJlIGZhY2luZyBhcyBp bXBsZW1lbnRvcnMNCiBhbmQgZGVwbG95ZXJzIG9mIERvSC48bzpwPjwvbzpwPjwvc3Bhbj48L3A+ DQo8cCBjbGFzcz0iTXNvTm9ybWFsIj48c3BhbiBzdHlsZT0iZm9udC1zaXplOjExLjBwdCI+PG86 cD4mbmJzcDs8L286cD48L3NwYW4+PC9wPg0KPHAgY2xhc3M9Ik1zb05vcm1hbCI+PHNwYW4gc3R5 bGU9ImZvbnQtc2l6ZToxMS4wcHQiPlN0YXJ0aW5nIHdpdGggcHJvYmFibHkgdGhlIGVhc2llc3Qg dG8gc3RhdGUgcXVlc3Rpb24uIFVwIHNjYWxpbmcgcmVxdWlyZWQgd2l0aCBhbnkgdHJhbnNpdGlv biB0byBEb0guDQo8bzpwPjwvbzpwPjwvc3Bhbj48L3A+DQo8cCBjbGFzcz0iTXNvTm9ybWFsIj48 c3BhbiBzdHlsZT0iZm9udC1zaXplOjExLjBwdCI+PG86cD4mbmJzcDs8L286cD48L3NwYW4+PC9w Pg0KPHAgY2xhc3M9Ik1zb05vcm1hbCI+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImZvbnQtc2l6ZToxMS4wcHQiPkRv ZXMgYW55b25lIGhlcmUgaGF2ZSBhbnkgbWVhc3VyZW1lbnRzIHRvIGRlZmluZSB0aGUgc2l6aW5n IGluIHRlcm1zIG9mOjxvOnA+PC9vOnA+PC9zcGFuPjwvcD4NCjxwIGNsYXNzPSJNc29Ob3JtYWwi PjxzcGFuIHN0eWxlPSJmb250LXNpemU6MTEuMHB0Ij48bzpwPiZuYnNwOzwvbzpwPjwvc3Bhbj48 L3A+DQo8cCBjbGFzcz0iTXNvTm9ybWFsIj48c3BhbiBzdHlsZT0iZm9udC1zaXplOjExLjBwdCI+ Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5i c3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7IE51bWJlciBvZiBjb25uZWN0aW9ucyBh dCB0aGUgRG9IIHNlcnZlciB2cyB0aGUgc2FtZSBzZXJ2aWNlIG9uIHBsYWluIEROUyAoYXNzdW1p bmcgVURQIGNvbm5lY3Rpb24gaXMgcm91Z2hseSBlcXVpdmFsZW50IHRvIHVuaXF1ZSBJUOKAmXMg c2VlbiBwZXIgbiBzZWNvbmRzKS48bzpwPjwvbzpwPjwvc3Bhbj48L3A+DQo8cCBjbGFzcz0iTXNv Tm9ybWFsIj48c3BhbiBzdHlsZT0iZm9udC1zaXplOjExLjBwdCI+Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7 Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5i c3A7Jm5ic3A7Jm5ic3A7IENvbm5lY3Rpb24gcmF0ZSBhdCB0aGUgRG9IIHNlcnZlcnMgKHRyaWNr eSBnaXZlbiB3ZSBoYXZlIHNvIGZldyBjbGllbnRzIGF0IHRoZSBtb21lbnQpLjxvOnA+PC9vOnA+ PC9zcGFuPjwvcD4NCjxwIGNsYXNzPSJNc29Ob3JtYWwiPjxzcGFuIHN0eWxlPSJmb250LXNpemU6 MTEuMHB0Ij4mbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsm bmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsmbmJzcDsgUXVlcnkgcmF0ZXMgdnMg cGxhaW4gRE5TIGFzc3VtaW5nIHRoYXQgaW4gdGhlIGVuZCBzb2x1dGlvbnMgbWF5IHdlbGwgbG9z ZSBhbGwgRE5TIGNhY2hpbmcgYXQgdGhlIE9TIC8gQ3VzdG9tZXJzIEFjY2VzcyBEZXZpY2UgKENQ RSkgbGF5ZXJzIC8gT3RoZXIuPG86cD48L286cD48L3NwYW4+PC9wPg0KPHAgY2xhc3M9Ik1zb05v cm1hbCI+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImZvbnQtc2l6ZToxMS4wcHQiPiZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZu YnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNwOyZuYnNw OyZuYnNwOyAoQmVmb3JlIGFueW9uZSBzYXlzIGl0IHllcyBzb21lIG9mIHRoZXNlIGNhY2hlcyBh cmUgYnlwYXNzZWQgYWxyZWFkeSB0aGF04oCZcyBvbmUgcmVhc29uIHNpbXBsZSBtb2RlbGxpbmcg b2YgdGhlIHN5c3RlbSB0byBnZXQgYSBsaWtlbHkgc2NhbGluZyBmYWN0b3IgaXMgc28gY29tcGxl eCk8bzpwPjwvbzpwPjwvc3Bhbj48L3A+DQo8cCBjbGFzcz0iTXNvTm9ybWFsIj48c3BhbiBzdHls ZT0iZm9udC1zaXplOjExLjBwdCI+PG86cD4mbmJzcDs8L286cD48L3NwYW4+PC9wPg0KPHAgY2xh c3M9Ik1zb05vcm1hbCI+PHNwYW4gc3R5bGU9ImZvbnQtc2l6ZToxMS4wcHQiPkFsaXN0ZXIuPG86 cD48L286cD48L3NwYW4+PC9wPg0KPC9kaXY+DQpJbmZvcm1hdGlvbiBpbiB0aGlzIGVtYWlsIGlu Y2x1ZGluZyBhbnkgYXR0YWNobWVudHMgbWF5IGJlIHByaXZpbGVnZWQsIGNvbmZpZGVudGlhbCBh bmQgaXMgaW50ZW5kZWQgZXhjbHVzaXZlbHkgZm9yIHRoZSBhZGRyZXNzZWUuIFRoZSB2aWV3cyBl eHByZXNzZWQgbWF5IG5vdCBiZSBvZmZpY2lhbCBwb2xpY3ksIGJ1dCB0aGUgcGVyc29uYWwgdmll d3Mgb2YgdGhlIG9yaWdpbmF0b3IuIElmIHlvdSBoYXZlIHJlY2VpdmVkIGl0IGluIGVycm9yLCBw bGVhc2UNCiBub3RpZnkgdGhlIHNlbmRlciBieSByZXR1cm4gZS1tYWlsIGFuZCBkZWxldGUgaXQg ZnJvbSB5b3VyIHN5c3RlbS4gWW91IHNob3VsZCBub3QgcmVwcm9kdWNlLCBkaXN0cmlidXRlLCBz dG9yZSwgcmV0cmFuc21pdCwgdXNlIG9yIGRpc2Nsb3NlIGl0cyBjb250ZW50cyB0byBhbnlvbmUu IFBsZWFzZSBub3RlIHdlIHJlc2VydmUgdGhlIHJpZ2h0IHRvIG1vbml0b3IgYWxsIGUtbWFpbCBj b21tdW5pY2F0aW9uIHRocm91Z2ggb3VyIGludGVybmFsIGFuZA0KIGV4dGVybmFsIG5ldHdvcmtz LiBTS1kgYW5kIHRoZSBTS1kgbWFya3MgYXJlIHRyYWRlbWFya3Mgb2YgU2t5IExpbWl0ZWQgYW5k IFNreSBJbnRlcm5hdGlvbmFsIEFHIGFuZCBhcmUgdXNlZCB1bmRlciBsaWNlbmNlLg0KPGJyPg0K PGJyPg0KU2t5IFVLIExpbWl0ZWQgKFJlZ2lzdHJhdGlvbiBOby4gMjkwNjk5MSksIFNreS1Jbi1I b21lIFNlcnZpY2UgTGltaXRlZCAoUmVnaXN0cmF0aW9uIE5vLiAyMDY3MDc1KSwgU2t5IFN1YnNj cmliZXJzIFNlcnZpY2VzIExpbWl0ZWQgKFJlZ2lzdHJhdGlvbiBOby4gMjM0MDE1MCkgYW5kIFNr eSBDUCBMaW1pdGVkIChSZWdpc3RyYXRpb24gTm8uIDk1MTMyNTkpIGFyZSBkaXJlY3Qgb3IgaW5k aXJlY3Qgc3Vic2lkaWFyaWVzIG9mIFNreSBMaW1pdGVkIChSZWdpc3RyYXRpb24NCiBOby4gMjI0 NzczNSkuIEFsbCBvZiB0aGUgY29tcGFuaWVzIG1lbnRpb25lZCBpbiB0aGlzIHBhcmFncmFwaCBh cmUgaW5jb3Jwb3JhdGVkIGluIEVuZ2xhbmQgYW5kIFdhbGVzIGFuZCBzaGFyZSB0aGUgc2FtZSBy ZWdpc3RlcmVkIG9mZmljZSBhdCBHcmFudCBXYXksIElzbGV3b3J0aCwgTWlkZGxlc2V4IFRXNyA1 UUQNCjwvYm9keT4NCjwvaHRtbD4NCg== --_000_2C83F6FCF7DA429B84D70083229CBF8Cskyuk_-- From nobody Mon Jun 17 07:56:51 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37E9612011A for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 07:56:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Hf5w0dErZpXk for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 07:56:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from relay.sandelman.ca (relay.cooperix.net [176.58.120.209]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 51777120144 for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 07:56:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dooku.sandelman.ca (unknown [75.98.19.133]) by relay.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 272D91F450; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 14:56:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: by dooku.sandelman.ca (Postfix, from userid 179) id 2C75C3810; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:56:55 -0400 (EDT) From: Michael Richardson To: "Winfield\, Alister" cc: "add\@ietf.org" In-reply-to: <2C83F6FC-F7DA-429B-84D7-0083229CBF8C@sky.uk> References: <2C83F6FC-F7DA-429B-84D7-0083229CBF8C@sky.uk> Comments: In-reply-to "Winfield, Alister" message dated "Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:42:13 -0000." X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.6; GNU Emacs 24.5.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature" Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 10:56:55 -0400 Message-ID: <888.1560783415@dooku.sandelman.ca> Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] Looking at the problem space for real numbers.... X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 14:56:49 -0000 --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Winfield, Alister wrote: > Does anyone here have any measurements to define the sizing in terms > of: I have no data, but I can suggest how to get the data. > Query rates vs plain DNS assuming that in the end solutions may well > lose all DNS caching at the OS / Customers Access Device (CPE) layers > / Other. > > (Before anyone says it yes some of these caches are bypassed already > that=E2=80=99s one reason simple modelling of the system to get a likely > scaling factor is so complex) Are you asking on behalf of sky.uk, which I think is an ISP? Assuming that you have no IPv6 and no CGN, and your customer's CPEs do NAT44 for clients behind the CPE, then you should be able to measure number of requests to port-53 outgoing from your clients. That should be a simple netflow (or equivalent) sampling of counters. OSes and applications, even if they are talking to 8.8.8.8/etc. do cache answers, usually for longer than they ought to. Some ignore TTLs, asking t= oo often. That would give you some data on the lower bound; I think you are right that if DoH goes directly to the device, and the CPE does not eventually get involved, then we lose a lot of caching. =2D- Michael Richardson , Sandelman Software Works -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D- --=-=-= Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEERK+9HEcJHTJ9UqTMlUzhVv38QpAFAl0HqjYACgkQlUzhVv38 QpDZDQf/VWKelyhTmQliXP0BoBrvD/+14i0JeRKorBDDFVcuhhzH3gGD8B/vse9x EjNGB0wqg22Y5UDyBIP07Ev8sfpAWEwENsosslqG8pbr4/utktrbOYDSG+ApWEdl KMTwGDPCXNOxvEJfoWS2geii3GtfyrEnUoh0aaPhLtHsxdjl1eZfSae8xmgQwH+w WEKED3kjYHn6pKvhJ//Z0OXOjfK2/HGNDskTsuQyIOHvk/gos3MnFp7U+6fi8LmM 8KcW6YTRp95BTh2JEQwQrX5Bpiwtl82NIqSEmophk5CF1zXS0N9G6UNhx1SV7vc8 1CY4Tx2Ovhhn2+PDV+yWqE7NPEIczw== =oLse -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-=-=-- From nobody Wed Jun 19 11:04:38 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0D0F11207AE for ; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 11:04:36 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.898 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.898 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Tw0ZvECd3-ph for ; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 11:04:34 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ppsw-41.csi.cam.ac.uk (ppsw-41.csi.cam.ac.uk [131.111.8.141]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D9DC31207C8 for ; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 11:04:22 -0700 (PDT) X-Cam-AntiVirus: no malware found X-Cam-ScannerInfo: http://help.uis.cam.ac.uk/email-scanner-virus Received: from grey.csi.cam.ac.uk ([131.111.57.57]:60732) by ppsw-41.csi.cam.ac.uk (ppsw.cam.ac.uk [131.111.8.139]:25) with esmtps (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) id 1hdewV-000hfZ-Sj (Exim 4.92) (return-path ); Wed, 19 Jun 2019 19:04:19 +0100 Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 19:04:19 +0100 From: Tony Finch To: "Winfield, Alister" cc: "add@ietf.org" In-Reply-To: <2C83F6FC-F7DA-429B-84D7-0083229CBF8C@sky.uk> Message-ID: References: <2C83F6FC-F7DA-429B-84D7-0083229CBF8C@sky.uk> User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (DEB 67 2015-01-07) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Add] Looking at the problem space for real numbers.... X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 19 Jun 2019 18:04:36 -0000 Winfield, Alister wrote: > > Does anyone here have any measurements to define the sizing in terms of: My numbers are too small to be useful :-) I have about 4 people out of 40,000 using my DoH service. I'm using it with Firefox, which appears to use fairly long-lived https connections - I see hundreds of queries with the same client port number from my browser. I have quite a lot more people using DoT from Android devices, but the numbers are not very comparable because I have tuned the DNS TCP keepalive parameters to relatively short idle timeouts but I have not done the same for https. Last time I looked I was getting average 2 queries per connection (with large variance) on DoT with a 5 second idle timeout, and clients on v4 only. I have assumed the per-user query rate is the same regardless of the transport. Tony. -- f.anthony.n.finch http://dotat.at/ disperse power, foster diversity, and nurture creativity From nobody Thu Jun 20 14:19:25 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 153A212006F for ; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 14:19:23 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.898 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.898 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id NaGqySadUm2B for ; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 14:19:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from shaun.rfc1035.com (smtp.v6.rfc1035.com [IPv6:2001:4b10:100:7::25]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 69808120153 for ; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 14:19:21 -0700 (PDT) Received: from gromit.rfc1035.com (gromit.rfc1035.com [195.54.233.69]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by shaun.rfc1035.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E908F24205E6 for ; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 21:19:18 +0000 (UTC) From: Jim Reid Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 11.5 \(3445.9.1\)) Message-Id: <6808B9B2-4A12-42A9-B7AD-B990E4A886FE@rfc1035.com> Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 22:19:18 +0100 To: ADD Mailing list X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.9.1) Archived-At: Subject: [Add] BoF at IETF105 X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 21:19:23 -0000 There=E2=80=99s going to be a non WG-forming BoF in Montreal. The date = and time will be announced shortly once the overall draft meeting plan = is ready. Here=E2=80=99s the proposed agenda. Which is subject to change, largely = depending on comments and suggestions on this list. If anyone has = suggestions for other topics for further protocol work, please speak up. 1. Agenda bashing (5 mins) 2. Current factual state, expected trends and concerns related to = applications doing DNS resolution, and areas where we all have common = interest in figuring stuff out. (20 mins) 3. Potential areas for future protocol work, best practices, or = guidance: =E2=80=A2 Server discovery (15 mins) =E2=80=A2 Expression of resolver policy (15 mins) =E2=80=A2 Supporting split-horizon (15 mins) 4. Discussion (15 mins) =E2=80=A2 Overlap with existing chartered work in DPRIVE, DOH, = and DNSOP =E2=80=A2 Expressions of interest in working on specific work = items Further info about the BoF is on the wiki at = https://trac.tools.ietf.org/bof/trac From nobody Fri Jun 21 04:18:36 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAFAA120264 for ; Fri, 21 Jun 2019 04:18:27 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.198 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.198 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id r-DVCdeGXGkE for ; Fri, 21 Jun 2019 04:18:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ppsw-30.csi.cam.ac.uk (ppsw-30.csi.cam.ac.uk [131.111.8.130]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 071DE1202AA for ; Fri, 21 Jun 2019 04:18:24 -0700 (PDT) X-Cam-AntiVirus: no malware found X-Cam-ScannerInfo: http://help.uis.cam.ac.uk/email-scanner-virus Received: from grey.csi.cam.ac.uk ([131.111.57.57]:37198) by ppsw-30.csi.cam.ac.uk (ppsw.cam.ac.uk [131.111.8.136]:25) with esmtps (TLSv1.2:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) id 1heHYk-0012R7-ct (Exim 4.92) for add@ietf.org (return-path ); Fri, 21 Jun 2019 12:18:22 +0100 Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 12:18:21 +0100 From: Tony Finch To: add@ietf.org Message-ID: User-Agent: Alpine 2.20 (DEB 67 2015-01-07) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Archived-At: Subject: [Add] Envoy Mobile X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 11:18:35 -0000 This is kind of tangential, but I think it's worth keeping an eye on this and related areas - https://eng.lyft.com/announcing-envoy-mobile-5c2067d9ade0 The point in that article that is relevant here is "DNS replacements". One of the uses for DoH that was discussed when DoH was initially proposed was front end apps (in the browser) using DoH for making queries about the app's back end that can't otherwise be done by the browser. My guess is that this kind of back-end query will move to completely non-DNS protocols. [ The related areas are the use of DNS for service discovery within a distributed back-end system - coredns etc. ] Tony. -- f.anthony.n.finch http://dotat.at/ Great Orme Head to the Mull of Galloway: Mainly variable 3 or less, but southwesterly 4 or 5 for a time in Solway Firth. Smooth or slight. Fair. Good. From nobody Fri Jun 28 16:02:31 2019 Return-Path: X-Original-To: add@ietf.org Delivered-To: add@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 052D01209AF; Fri, 28 Jun 2019 15:58:00 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: "\"IETF Secretariat\"" To: , Cc: add@ietf.org, barryleiba@computer.org X-Test-IDTracker: no X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.98.1 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated Precedence: bulk Message-ID: <156176267993.11015.16190068261246219100.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 15:57:59 -0700 Archived-At: Subject: [Add] add - Requested session has been scheduled for IETF 105 X-BeenThere: add@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: Applications Doing DNS List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 22:58:13 -0000 Dear Liz Flynn, The session(s) that you have requested have been scheduled. Below is the scheduled session information followed by the original request. add Session 1 (1:30 requested) Tuesday, 23 July 2019, Afternoon Session I 1330-1500 Room Name: Place du Canada size: 300 --------------------------------------------- iCalendar: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/105/sessions/add.ics Request Information: --------------------------------------------------------- Working Group Name: Applications Using DoH Area Name: Applications and Real-Time Area Session Requester: Liz Flynn Number of Sessions: 1 Length of Session(s): 1.5 Hours Number of Attendees: 200 Conflicts to Avoid: First Priority: doh dnsop dprive tls httpbis People who must be present: Barry Leiba David C Lawrence Resources Requested: Special Requests: ---------------------------------------------------------