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From: Dave Lawrence <tale@dd.org>
To: ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Rob Sayre writes:
> After 14 years or so, I think DNSSEC adoption rates speak for themselves.

They do, but not in the way you're implying.  Car manufacturers didn't
want to install seat belts either.  People also aren't naturally
inclined to buy insurance for all of the various risks they are
exposed to.

As you are well aware, adding security to a previously insecure system
inevitably makes the system more difficult to manage and use, whether
we're talking about Internet protocols or physical world things like
adding a lock to a door that never had one.  This not only slows down
the bad guys but also creates a burden for legitimate use.  It might
be a very minor burden that clearly offsets the risks, such as
regularly carrying your house key, or it could balloon into a major
problem, such as when the key is lost.  (Boy do I have a story about
that.)  

DNSSEC is much the same way, but the hazard ratio for not having
DNSSEC versus having it hasn't yet risen enough, in most
organizations' calculus, to warrant signing their zones.  In fact,
they could see the ratio as under 1.0 -- that is, that having signed
zones is in some ways more risky than not having them.  This is not a
completely irrational position to take.

Not only does DNSSEC put several additional burdens on both clients
and servers alike -- CPU, memory and network traffic to varying
degrees -- but, like losing a key, an administrative failure means
being locked out.  What's worse, unlike the physical lock situation,
people who weren't even trying to use a key can get in.  This leads to
situations like Comcast being widely accused of censoring access to
NASA.  Because of Comcast's diligence in checking the answers in the
signed nasa.gov zone, there was an incident where their customers
could not access the NASA site while the majority of people who did
not use a validating resolver had no problems at all. Comcast took the
heat for it in the popular consciousness, which is a bit of
disincentive for resolver operators.

As for the risks that DNSSEC is trying to mitigate, there's very
little evidence of cache poisoning via DNS protocol attacks happening
in practice that would make DNS operators alert to guarding against
it, certainly many fewer than the pre-seatbelt auto accident death
rate.  Some known DNS hijacking wouldn't even be thwarted by DNSSEC,
such as social engineering of a registrar to get registry delegation
information updated.  That seems to still be the easiest way to mount
an attack that involves incorrect DNS information.

This is not to say protocol attacks never happen.  We're aware of some
insignificant rare cases of them in the wild.  It is also possible
that there are more targeted DNS attacks of which the DNS community is
not generally cognizant, thanks to the ephemeral nature of caches.
Imagine, for example, a spear phishing attack that managed to poison
the cache of a company CEO just long enough for credentials to be
stolen via a spoofed web site.   30 seconds later there could well be
no lingering indication that the hostname ever had the wrong address.
DNSSEC would block this type of threat, but without ready visibility
into it being exploited there's less motivation for trying to stop it.

The slow pace of adoption of DNSSEC is thus not an indictment of
DNSSEC itself.  It reflects our essential human nature in managing
security of all forms.  There's a reason English has the idiom "close
the barn door after the horse has bolted", and I bet most other
languages have one of similar meaning.


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On 31 Aug 2019, at 6:08, Rob Sayre wrote:

> The UK has some well-meaning regulations here, but they don't seem to b=
e very effective or well-specified.

UK is one of the most successful States in the world the last couple of y=
ears regarding keeping the Internet open. They have the energy, participa=
te, speak and otherwise work very very hard. They are very successful, an=
d thanks to them also other States can follow with lighter participation.=
 Without the UK the USA would not be able to speak in an as effective way=
 they do when they have to.

   Patrik

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2019 18:44:35 -0700
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On Sun, Sep 1, 2019 at 2:40 PM Dave Lawrence <tale@dd.org> wrote:
> This is not to say protocol attacks never happen.  We're aware of some
> insignificant rare cases of them in the wild.  It is also possible
> that there are more targeted DNS attacks of which the DNS community is
> not generally cognizant, thanks to the ephemeral nature of caches.

Thank you for the thoughtful response. I agree that DNSSEC adoption rates
may not signal a flaw in DNSSEC itself. My hypothesis is that lack of TLS
or equivalent may be hampering a fair evaluation.

In the quote above, who is the "we" in "We're aware"? And what are the
"insignificant rare cases"?

thanks,
Rob

On Sun, Sep 1, 2019 at 2:40 PM Dave Lawrence <tale@dd.org> wrote:

> Rob Sayre writes:
> > After 14 years or so, I think DNSSEC adoption rates speak for themselves.
>
> They do, but not in the way you're implying.  Car manufacturers didn't
> want to install seat belts either.  People also aren't naturally
> inclined to buy insurance for all of the various risks they are
> exposed to.
>
> As you are well aware, adding security to a previously insecure system
> inevitably makes the system more difficult to manage and use, whether
> we're talking about Internet protocols or physical world things like
> adding a lock to a door that never had one.  This not only slows down
> the bad guys but also creates a burden for legitimate use.  It might
> be a very minor burden that clearly offsets the risks, such as
> regularly carrying your house key, or it could balloon into a major
> problem, such as when the key is lost.  (Boy do I have a story about
> that.)
>
> DNSSEC is much the same way, but the hazard ratio for not having
> DNSSEC versus having it hasn't yet risen enough, in most
> organizations' calculus, to warrant signing their zones.  In fact,
> they could see the ratio as under 1.0 -- that is, that having signed
> zones is in some ways more risky than not having them.  This is not a
> completely irrational position to take.
>
> Not only does DNSSEC put several additional burdens on both clients
> and servers alike -- CPU, memory and network traffic to varying
> degrees -- but, like losing a key, an administrative failure means
> being locked out.  What's worse, unlike the physical lock situation,
> people who weren't even trying to use a key can get in.  This leads to
> situations like Comcast being widely accused of censoring access to
> NASA.  Because of Comcast's diligence in checking the answers in the
> signed nasa.gov zone, there was an incident where their customers
> could not access the NASA site while the majority of people who did
> not use a validating resolver had no problems at all. Comcast took the
> heat for it in the popular consciousness, which is a bit of
> disincentive for resolver operators.
>
> As for the risks that DNSSEC is trying to mitigate, there's very
> little evidence of cache poisoning via DNS protocol attacks happening
> in practice that would make DNS operators alert to guarding against
> it, certainly many fewer than the pre-seatbelt auto accident death
> rate.  Some known DNS hijacking wouldn't even be thwarted by DNSSEC,
> such as social engineering of a registrar to get registry delegation
> information updated.  That seems to still be the easiest way to mount
> an attack that involves incorrect DNS information.
>
> This is not to say protocol attacks never happen.  We're aware of some
> insignificant rare cases of them in the wild.  It is also possible
> that there are more targeted DNS attacks of which the DNS community is
> not generally cognizant, thanks to the ephemeral nature of caches.
> Imagine, for example, a spear phishing attack that managed to poison
> the cache of a company CEO just long enough for credentials to be
> stolen via a spoofed web site.   30 seconds later there could well be
> no lingering indication that the hostname ever had the wrong address.
> DNSSEC would block this type of threat, but without ready visibility
> into it being exploited there's less motivation for trying to stop it.
>
> The slow pace of adoption of DNSSEC is thus not an indictment of
> DNSSEC itself.  It reflects our essential human nature in managing
> security of all forms.  There's a reason English has the idiom "close
> the barn door after the horse has bolted", and I bet most other
> languages have one of similar meaning.
>
> --
> Add mailing list
> Add@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add
>

--000000000000f2d86b0591881de8
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Sep 1, 2019 at 2:40 PM Dave Lawre=
nce &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tale@dd.org">tale@dd.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt; This is not to say protocol attacks never happen.=C2=
=A0 We&#39;re aware of some</div><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt; insignificant rare c=
ases of them in the wild.=C2=A0 It is also possible<br>&gt; that there are =
more targeted DNS attacks of which the DNS community is<br>&gt; not general=
ly cognizant, thanks to the ephemeral nature of caches.<br></div><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><br></div><div>Thank you for the thoughtful response. I agree that=
 DNSSEC adoption rates may not signal a flaw in DNSSEC itself. My hypothesi=
s is that lack of TLS or equivalent may be hampering a fair evaluation.</di=
v><div><br></div><div>In the quote above, who is the &quot;we&quot; in &quo=
t;We&#39;re aware&quot;? And what are the &quot;insignificant rare cases&qu=
ot;?</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><br><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, Sep 1, 2019 at 2=
:40 PM Dave Lawrence &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:tale@dd.org">tale@dd.org</a>&gt;=
 wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Rob Sayr=
e writes:<br>
&gt; After 14 years or so, I think DNSSEC adoption rates speak for themselv=
es.<br>
<br>
They do, but not in the way you&#39;re implying.=C2=A0 Car manufacturers di=
dn&#39;t<br>
want to install seat belts either.=C2=A0 People also aren&#39;t naturally<b=
r>
inclined to buy insurance for all of the various risks they are<br>
exposed to.<br>
<br>
As you are well aware, adding security to a previously insecure system<br>
inevitably makes the system more difficult to manage and use, whether<br>
we&#39;re talking about Internet protocols or physical world things like<br=
>
adding a lock to a door that never had one.=C2=A0 This not only slows down<=
br>
the bad guys but also creates a burden for legitimate use.=C2=A0 It might<b=
r>
be a very minor burden that clearly offsets the risks, such as<br>
regularly carrying your house key, or it could balloon into a major<br>
problem, such as when the key is lost.=C2=A0 (Boy do I have a story about<b=
r>
that.)=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
DNSSEC is much the same way, but the hazard ratio for not having<br>
DNSSEC versus having it hasn&#39;t yet risen enough, in most<br>
organizations&#39; calculus, to warrant signing their zones.=C2=A0 In fact,=
<br>
they could see the ratio as under 1.0 -- that is, that having signed<br>
zones is in some ways more risky than not having them.=C2=A0 This is not a<=
br>
completely irrational position to take.<br>
<br>
Not only does DNSSEC put several additional burdens on both clients<br>
and servers alike -- CPU, memory and network traffic to varying<br>
degrees -- but, like losing a key, an administrative failure means<br>
being locked out.=C2=A0 What&#39;s worse, unlike the physical lock situatio=
n,<br>
people who weren&#39;t even trying to use a key can get in.=C2=A0 This lead=
s to<br>
situations like Comcast being widely accused of censoring access to<br>
NASA.=C2=A0 Because of Comcast&#39;s diligence in checking the answers in t=
he<br>
signed <a href=3D"http://nasa.gov" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">nas=
a.gov</a> zone, there was an incident where their customers<br>
could not access the NASA site while the majority of people who did<br>
not use a validating resolver had no problems at all. Comcast took the<br>
heat for it in the popular consciousness, which is a bit of<br>
disincentive for resolver operators.<br>
<br>
As for the risks that DNSSEC is trying to mitigate, there&#39;s very<br>
little evidence of cache poisoning via DNS protocol attacks happening<br>
in practice that would make DNS operators alert to guarding against<br>
it, certainly many fewer than the pre-seatbelt auto accident death<br>
rate.=C2=A0 Some known DNS hijacking wouldn&#39;t even be thwarted by DNSSE=
C,<br>
such as social engineering of a registrar to get registry delegation<br>
information updated.=C2=A0 That seems to still be the easiest way to mount<=
br>
an attack that involves incorrect DNS information.<br>
<br>
This is not to say protocol attacks never happen.=C2=A0 We&#39;re aware of =
some<br>
insignificant rare cases of them in the wild.=C2=A0 It is also possible<br>
that there are more targeted DNS attacks of which the DNS community is<br>
not generally cognizant, thanks to the ephemeral nature of caches.<br>
Imagine, for example, a spear phishing attack that managed to poison<br>
the cache of a company CEO just long enough for credentials to be<br>
stolen via a spoofed web site.=C2=A0 =C2=A030 seconds later there could wel=
l be<br>
no lingering indication that the hostname ever had the wrong address.<br>
DNSSEC would block this type of threat, but without ready visibility<br>
into it being exploited there&#39;s less motivation for trying to stop it.<=
br>
<br>
The slow pace of adoption of DNSSEC is thus not an indictment of<br>
DNSSEC itself.=C2=A0 It reflects our essential human nature in managing<br>
security of all forms.=C2=A0 There&#39;s a reason English has the idiom &qu=
ot;close<br>
the barn door after the horse has bolted&quot;, and I bet most other<br>
languages have one of similar meaning.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Add mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Add@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Add@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

--000000000000f2d86b0591881de8--


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References: <LO2P265MB1327CC055667B8F972AEDC04C2AC0@LO2P265MB1327.GBRP265.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <CAH1iCiqt0YODvxuQf-_Wm3zdC0HAcyRTJ-jMYLe-kMKeLEy9zQ@mail.gmail.com> <09178E42-08B2-4958-A1C8-AF507AEE8834@fugue.com> <LO2P265MB13270AAEC9901FB41632D2F0C2AF0@LO2P265MB1327.GBRP265.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM> <0BDD4F7F-7301-476A-80DA-0CC84EE4557D@fugue.com> <B0B173E7-DA2F-40B9-9DE5-412D4808E9A2@gmail.com> <6698db4f-89ff-e5be-09a5-eb544f76ebc9@nostrum.com> <CAChr6SzBsF8W4-CKqX=m07oZ6hSrkDz0jJxsvT2C1RXh2Vb+bA@mail.gmail.com> <c7696b3e-6f3e-e9b8-94fd-8c36b676a6e4@nomountain.net> <CAChr6SxHWxu=ESVq29dmKTkikGXS=sM_NM5ZTPh15XQNqpBQmQ@mail.gmail.com> <20190817170031.6F71C1691138@fafnir.remote.dragon.net> <CAChr6SxOMcsKQxrEkMOXFsNnYJG33X-JOM+tawKhYtF28JfL5g@mail.gmail.com> <CAJhMdTO6VFzTa_AMRQowrkr9hwgO7hAmHCLekeCXvWdgmmFqjg@mail.gmail.com> <CAChr6Sz4RyKhpKGzUAtUA9dxRNbXpCQ9Xccm8qEAW4aQBJ=FtQ@mail.gmail.com> <CDB00A70-094E-47DC-A440-E06253B56E7C@hopcount.ca> <CAChr6SwjA9EpTpWNNEVQdxGpeTbY61pCQd1eJUx26AvS7aYr7Q@m ail.gmail.com> <20190817205517.1128E16936B5@fafnir.remote.dragon.net> <CAChr6SyfFxnfXQgP+jGV9EOWxbfvNR9hZSgQwM4h8cyTKj1ygg@mail.gmail.com> <43F0291E-1471-4747-9EC4-703013DA99D9@isc.org> <CAChr6Sw5N3zEuZVkq3ts49LMm24jWSEOYAMmX-JVvkJ6fBiAuQ@mail.gmail.com> <23914.38698.225344.835102@gro.dd.org>
To: Dave Lawrence <tale@dd.org>
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If you centralize the DNS via DoH, the entire game changes and you can=E2=80=
=99t afford to really use centralized DoH without DNSSEC.

Sent from mobile device

> On Aug 31, 2019, at 11:50, Dave Lawrence <tale@dd.org> wrote:
>=20
> Rob Sayre writes:
>> After 14 years or so, I think DNSSEC adoption rates speak for themselves.=

>=20
> They do, but not in the way you're implying.  Car manufacturers didn't
> want to install seat belts either.  People also aren't naturally
> inclined to buy insurance for all of the various risks they are
> exposed to.
>=20
> As you are well aware, adding security to a previously insecure system
> inevitably makes the system more difficult to manage and use, whether
> we're talking about Internet protocols or physical world things like
> adding a lock to a door that never had one.  This not only slows down
> the bad guys but also creates a burden for legitimate use.  It might
> be a very minor burden that clearly offsets the risks, such as
> regularly carrying your house key, or it could balloon into a major
> problem, such as when the key is lost.  (Boy do I have a story about
> that.) =20
>=20
> DNSSEC is much the same way, but the hazard ratio for not having
> DNSSEC versus having it hasn't yet risen enough, in most
> organizations' calculus, to warrant signing their zones.  In fact,
> they could see the ratio as under 1.0 -- that is, that having signed
> zones is in some ways more risky than not having them.  This is not a
> completely irrational position to take.
>=20
> Not only does DNSSEC put several additional burdens on both clients
> and servers alike -- CPU, memory and network traffic to varying
> degrees -- but, like losing a key, an administrative failure means
> being locked out.  What's worse, unlike the physical lock situation,
> people who weren't even trying to use a key can get in.  This leads to
> situations like Comcast being widely accused of censoring access to
> NASA.  Because of Comcast's diligence in checking the answers in the
> signed nasa.gov zone, there was an incident where their customers
> could not access the NASA site while the majority of people who did
> not use a validating resolver had no problems at all. Comcast took the
> heat for it in the popular consciousness, which is a bit of
> disincentive for resolver operators.
>=20
> As for the risks that DNSSEC is trying to mitigate, there's very
> little evidence of cache poisoning via DNS protocol attacks happening
> in practice that would make DNS operators alert to guarding against
> it, certainly many fewer than the pre-seatbelt auto accident death
> rate.  Some known DNS hijacking wouldn't even be thwarted by DNSSEC,
> such as social engineering of a registrar to get registry delegation
> information updated.  That seems to still be the easiest way to mount
> an attack that involves incorrect DNS information.
>=20
> This is not to say protocol attacks never happen.  We're aware of some
> insignificant rare cases of them in the wild.  It is also possible
> that there are more targeted DNS attacks of which the DNS community is
> not generally cognizant, thanks to the ephemeral nature of caches.
> Imagine, for example, a spear phishing attack that managed to poison
> the cache of a company CEO just long enough for credentials to be
> stolen via a spoofed web site.   30 seconds later there could well be
> no lingering indication that the hostname ever had the wrong address.
> DNSSEC would block this type of threat, but without ready visibility
> into it being exploited there's less motivation for trying to stop it.
>=20
> The slow pace of adoption of DNSSEC is thus not an indictment of
> DNSSEC itself.  It reflects our essential human nature in managing
> security of all forms.  There's a reason English has the idiom "close
> the barn door after the horse has bolted", and I bet most other
> languages have one of similar meaning.
>=20
> --=20
> Add mailing list
> Add@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add


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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2019 06:46:52 -0700
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To: Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>
Cc: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
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On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 6:15 AM Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com> wrote=
:

>
>
> On 23 Aug 2019, at 06:39, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On 22 Aug 2019, at 08:00, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com <ekr@rtfm..com>>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > Suppose that I receive a bogus response to my A record query, how am I
>> to usefully distinguish "this is malware blocking" from "this resolver i=
s
>> malicious=E2=80=9D?
>>
>
> ...
>
> To be slightly less glib, the dnsop WG has an I-D on extended error codes=
.
>> [And FWIW lack of a discrete error code(s) for validation failure is one=
 of
>> the things I think DNSSEC got wrong.] draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error
>> already goes some way to answering your question:
>>
>> 4.16.  Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked
>>
>>    The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain is
>>    blacklisted due to a security policy implemented on the server being
>>    directly talked to.
>>
>> 4.17.  Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored
>>
>>    The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain was
>>    blacklisted by a security policy imposed upon the server being talked
>>    to.  Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrelevant (in-
>>    band DNS somehow, court order, etc).
>>
>> 4.18.  Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Prohibited
>>
>>    An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query from an
>>    "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with this
>>    code.  Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries from
>>    IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, local
>>    policy, etc.
>>
>> I suppose draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error could add another error code
>> for the specific case of a malicious resolver. Whatever that might mean.
>> Though I doubt the operators of such servers will choose to set that evi=
l
>> bit on their responses.
>>
>> PS A potential problem with this I-D is these extended error codes won=
=E2=80=99t
>> be signed. So they can be spoofed by bad actors.
>
>
>
> I don=E2=80=99t see why malicious resolvers would tell clients they are r=
eturning
> bogus results.
>
> Yes, and for this reason I don't see how this solves the problem. It's
> just "resolver blocked it and claims reason X".
>
>
> It=E2=80=99s not entirely  useless. The problem it does solve is giving t=
he user a
> better experience when a site is blocked for resolvers that support this
> extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS
> connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a
> resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D response=
, then the browser
> can tell the user that the web page was blocked with an informative
> message. Assuming this becomes the default behaviour for non-malicious
> resolvers then I think it will a good signal for distinguishing  "this is
> malware blocking" from "this resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.
>

I'm not following. Suppose that we add an error code that says "this site
has malware". Now, I operate a resolver which is malicious in the sense
that it wishes to block a certain form of content (say, access to the IETF)
but don't want the people whose content I am blocking is being blocked for
that reason. So, instead I return "this site has malware".

My point here is that a code of this type only tells you what the resolver
*asserts* the reason it blocked it is, it doesn't necessarily tell you what
the actual reason that the content was blocked.

-Ekr


>
> Neil Cook
> neil.cook@open-xchange.com
>
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------
> Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, 90408 Nuremberg, District Court
> Nuremberg HRB 24738
> Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael
> Knapstein, Stephan Martin
> Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt
>
> European Office:
> Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f, D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District
> Court Siegen, HRB 8718
> Managing Director: Frank Hoberg
>
> US Office:
> Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------=
------------
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 6:15 AM Neil C=
ook &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:neil.cook@open-xchange.com">neil.cook@open-xchang=
e.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:=
1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;"><br><div><br><blockquote typ=
e=3D"cite"><div>On 23 Aug 2019, at 06:39, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:ekr@rtfm.com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br cla=
ss=3D"gmail-m_4067535798681961582Apple-interchange-newline"><div><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jim Reid &lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:jim@rfc1035.com" target=3D"_blank">jim@rfc1035.com</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px=
 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
<br>
&gt; On 22 Aug 2019, at 08:00, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm=
..com" target=3D"_blank">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Suppose that I receive a bogus response to my A record query, how am I=
 to usefully distinguish &quot;this is malware blocking&quot; from &quot;th=
is resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D?<br></blockquote></div></div></div></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>...</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);pad=
ding-left:1ex">
To be slightly less glib, the dnsop WG has an I-D on extended error codes. =
[And FWIW lack of a discrete error code(s) for validation failure is one of=
 the things I think DNSSEC got wrong.] draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error alre=
ady goes some way to answering your question:<br>
<br>
4.16.=C2=A0 Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain is=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0blacklisted due to a security policy implemented on the server=
 being<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0directly talked to.<br>
<br>
4.17.=C2=A0 Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain wa=
s<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0blacklisted by a security policy imposed upon the server being=
 talked<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0to.=C2=A0 Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrel=
evant (in-<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0band DNS somehow, court order, etc).<br>
<br>
4.18.=C2=A0 Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Prohibited<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query f=
rom an<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;unauthorized&quot; client can annotate its REFUSED messa=
ge with this<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0code.=C2=A0 Examples of &quot;unauthorized&quot; clients are r=
ecursive queries from<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, lo=
cal<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0policy, etc.<br>
<br>
I suppose draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error could add another error code for =
the specific case of a malicious resolver. Whatever that might mean. Though=
 I doubt the operators of such servers will choose to set that evil bit on =
their responses.<br>
<br>
PS A potential problem with this I-D is these extended error codes won=E2=
=80=99t be signed. So they can be spoofed by bad actors.</blockquote><div><=
br></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don=E2=80=99t=
 see why malicious resolvers would tell clients they are returning bogus re=
sults.=C2=A0</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><div>Yes, and for this reason I don&#39;t see how thi=
s solves the problem. It&#39;s just &quot;resolver blocked it and claims re=
ason X&quot;.<br></div><div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><=
br></div><div>It=E2=80=99s not entirely =C2=A0useless. The problem it does =
solve is giving the user a better experience when a site is blocked for res=
olvers that support this extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user =
will end up with a TLS connection error of some kind (or a blank page in so=
me browsers). If a resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=
=E2=80=9D response, then the browser can tell the user that the web page wa=
s blocked with an informative message. Assuming this becomes the default be=
haviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it will a good signal for =
distinguishing =C2=A0&quot;this is malware blocking&quot; from &quot;this r=
esolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>I&#39;m not following. Suppose that we add an error code that says &q=
uot;this site has malware&quot;. Now, I operate a resolver which is malicio=
us in the sense that it wishes to block a certain form of content (say, acc=
ess to the IETF) but don&#39;t want the people whose content I am blocking =
is being blocked for that reason. So, instead I return &quot;this site has =
malware&quot;.</div><div><br></div><div>My point here is that a code of thi=
s type only tells you what the resolver *asserts* the reason it blocked it =
is, it doesn&#39;t necessarily tell you what the actual reason that the con=
tent was blocked.<br></div><div><br></div><div>-Ekr</div><div><br></div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap:=
 break-word;"><br><div>
<div style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-=
indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><br cla=
ss=3D"gmail-m_4067535798681961582Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"=
color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;fon=
t-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-east-asian=
:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-inde=
nt:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;float:none;d=
isplay:inline">Neil Cook</span><br style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:He=
lvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font=
-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;font-weight:normal;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whit=
e-space:normal;word-spacing:0px"><span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-famil=
y:Helvetica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;=
font-variant-caps:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;font-weight:normal;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;=
white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;float:none;display:inline"><a href=3D"m=
ailto:neil.cook@open-xchange.com" target=3D"_blank">neil.cook@open-xchange.=
com</a></span><div style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helvetica;font-siz=
e:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:no=
rmal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-spacing:norma=
l;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;w=
ord-spacing:0px"><br></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:Helve=
tica;font-size:12px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-variant-east-asian:normal;font-weight:normal;letter-=
spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-s=
pace:normal;word-spacing:0px">---------------------------------------------=
----------------------------------------<br>Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14=
, 90408=C2=A0Nuremberg, District Court Nuremberg=C2=A0HRB 24738<br>Managing=
 Board: Rafael Laguna de la=C2=A0Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael Knapstein,=C2=
=A0Stephan Martin=C2=A0<br>Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt<br><br>Euro=
pean Office:=C2=A0<br>Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f,=C2=A0D-57462 Olpe=
, Germany, District Court=C2=A0Siegen, HRB 8718=C2=A0<br>Managing Director:=
 Frank Hoberg<br><br>US Office:=C2=A0<br>Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Ave=
nue,=C2=A0Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA=C2=A0<br>-------------------------------=
------------------------------------------------------</div></div>
</div>
<br></div></blockquote></div></div>

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From: Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>
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> On 23 Aug 2019, at 06:39, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com =
<mailto:jim@rfc1035.com>> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> > On 22 Aug 2019, at 08:00, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com =
<mailto:ekr@rtfm..com>> wrote:
> >=20
> > Suppose that I receive a bogus response to my A record query, how am =
I to usefully distinguish "this is malware blocking" from "this resolver =
is malicious=E2=80=9D?

...

> To be slightly less glib, the dnsop WG has an I-D on extended error =
codes. [And FWIW lack of a discrete error code(s) for validation failure =
is one of the things I think DNSSEC got wrong.] =
draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error already goes some way to answering your =
question:
>=20
> 4.16.  Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked
>=20
>    The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain is
>    blacklisted due to a security policy implemented on the server =
being
>    directly talked to.
>=20
> 4.17.  Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored
>=20
>    The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain was
>    blacklisted by a security policy imposed upon the server being =
talked
>    to.  Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrelevant (in-
>    band DNS somehow, court order, etc).
>=20
> 4.18.  Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Prohibited
>=20
>    An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query from =
an
>    "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with this
>    code.  Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries =
from
>    IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, local
>    policy, etc.
>=20
> I suppose draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error could add another error code =
for the specific case of a malicious resolver. Whatever that might mean. =
Though I doubt the operators of such servers will choose to set that =
evil bit on their responses.
>=20
> PS A potential problem with this I-D is these extended error codes =
won=E2=80=99t be signed. So they can be spoofed by bad actors.
>=20

I don=E2=80=99t see why malicious resolvers would tell clients they are =
returning bogus results.=20

> Yes, and for this reason I don't see how this solves the problem. It's =
just "resolver blocked it and claims reason X".
>=20

It=E2=80=99s not entirely  useless. The problem it does solve is giving =
the user a better experience when a site is blocked for resolvers that =
support this extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will end =
up with a TLS connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some =
browsers). If a resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=
=80=9D response, then the browser can tell the user that the web page =
was blocked with an informative message. Assuming this becomes the =
default behaviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it will a =
good signal for distinguishing  "this is malware blocking" from "this =
resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.


Neil Cook
neil.cook@open-xchange.com

=
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------
Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, 90408 Nuremberg, District Court =
Nuremberg HRB 24738
Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael =
Knapstein, Stephan Martin=20
Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt

European Office:=20
Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f, D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District =
Court Siegen, HRB 8718=20
Managing Director: Frank Hoberg

US Office:=20
Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA=20
=
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------


--Apple-Mail=_3FA8E118-38F2-40B4-B195-48AF885333B9
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 23 Aug 2019, at 06:39, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jim =
Reid &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jim@rfc1035.com" =
class=3D"">jim@rfc1035.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&gt; On 22 Aug 2019, at 08:00, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm..com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D"">
&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt; Suppose that I receive a bogus response to my A record query, how =
am I to usefully distinguish "this is malware blocking" from "this =
resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D?<br =
class=3D""></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>...</div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
To be slightly less glib, the dnsop WG has an I-D on extended error =
codes. [And FWIW lack of a discrete error code(s) for validation failure =
is one of the things I think DNSSEC got wrong.] =
draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error already goes some way to answering your =
question:<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
4.16.&nbsp; Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain =
is<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;blacklisted due to a security policy implemented on the =
server being<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;directly talked to.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
4.17.&nbsp; Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain =
was<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;blacklisted by a security policy imposed upon the server =
being talked<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;to.&nbsp; Note that how the imposed policy is applied is =
irrelevant (in-<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;band DNS somehow, court order, etc).<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
4.18.&nbsp; Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Prohibited<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a =
query from an<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;"unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with =
this<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;code.&nbsp; Examples of "unauthorized" clients are =
recursive queries from<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, =
local<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;policy, etc.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
I suppose draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error could add another error code =
for the specific case of a malicious resolver. Whatever that might mean. =
Though I doubt the operators of such servers will choose to set that =
evil bit on their responses.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
PS A potential problem with this I-D is these extended error codes =
won=E2=80=99t be signed. So they can be spoofed by bad =
actors.</blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>I don=E2=80=99t see why malicious resolvers would =
tell clients they are returning bogus results.&nbsp;</div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"">Yes, =
and for this reason I don't see how this solves the problem. It's just =
"resolver blocked it and claims reason X".<br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>It=E2=80=99s not entirely &nbsp;useless. The =
problem it does solve is giving the user a better experience when a site =
is blocked for resolvers that support this extended Error Code. =
Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS connection error of =
some kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a resolver returns a =
=E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D response, then the browser =
can tell the user that the web page was blocked with an informative =
message. Assuming this becomes the default behaviour for non-malicious =
resolvers then I think it will a good signal for distinguishing =
&nbsp;"this is malware blocking" from "this resolver is =
malicious=E2=80=9D.</div></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: normal; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-wrap: =
break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">Neil Cook</span><br style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:neil.cook@open-xchange.com" =
class=3D"">neil.cook@open-xchange.com</a></span><div style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">---------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, =
90408&nbsp;Nuremberg, District Court Nuremberg&nbsp;HRB 24738<br =
class=3D"">Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la&nbsp;Vera, Carsten Dirks, =
Michael Knapstein,&nbsp;Stephan Martin&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Chairman of =
the Board: Richard Seibt<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">European =
Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette =
5f,&nbsp;D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District Court&nbsp;Siegen, HRB =
8718&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Managing Director: Frank Hoberg<br class=3D""><br=
 class=3D"">US Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 =
Lytton Avenue,&nbsp;Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">---------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------</div></div>
</div>
<br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From: Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>
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Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2019 16:34:49 +0200
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Cc: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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> On 3 Sep 2019, at 15:46, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>=20
> It=E2=80=99s not entirely  useless. The problem it does solve is =
giving the user a better experience when a site is blocked for resolvers =
that support this extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will =
end up with a TLS connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some =
browsers). If a resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=
=80=9D response, then the browser can tell the user that the web page =
was blocked with an informative message. Assuming this becomes the =
default behaviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it will a =
good signal for distinguishing  "this is malware blocking" from "this =
resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.
>=20
> I'm not following. Suppose that we add an error code that says "this =
site has malware". Now, I operate a resolver which is malicious in the =
sense that it wishes to block a certain form of content (say, access to =
the IETF) but don't want the people whose content I am blocking is being =
blocked for that reason. So, instead I return "this site has malware".
>=20
> My point here is that a code of this type only tells you what the =
resolver *asserts* the reason it blocked it is, it doesn't necessarily =
tell you what the actual reason that the content was blocked.
>=20

Ok yes I understand. The blocking reason wouldn=E2=80=99t be that useful =
in the general case of not knowing whether a resolver was malicious. =
However I think the fact that the resolver is telling you that the =
content is blocked is still useful, no matter what the reason for the =
blocking is, for the reason described above. For example in your =
use-case, the user would see =E2=80=9Cthis site is blocked by the DNS =
resolver=E2=80=9D (or whatever) rather than =E2=80=9CTLS connection =
error=E2=80=9D which would be the case today.

Also assuming the resolver is =E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D in some way =
(e.g. Mozilla TRR program) then the reason for blocking may then become =
useful I=E2=80=99d have thought.

Neil

> -Ekr
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Neil Cook
> neil.cook@open-xchange.com <mailto:neil.cook@open-xchange.com>
>=20
> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------
> Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, 90408 Nuremberg, District Court =
Nuremberg HRB 24738
> Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael =
Knapstein, Stephan Martin=20
> Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt
>=20
> European Office:=20
> Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f, D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District =
Court Siegen, HRB 8718=20
> Managing Director: Frank Hoberg
>=20
> US Office:=20
> Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA=20
> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------
>=20


Neil Cook
neil.cook@open-xchange.com

=
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------
Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, 90408 Nuremberg, District Court =
Nuremberg HRB 24738
Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael =
Knapstein, Stephan Martin=20
Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt

European Office:=20
Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f, D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District =
Court Siegen, HRB 8718=20
Managing Director: Frank Hoberg

US Office:=20
Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA=20
=
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------


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charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 3 Sep 2019, at 15:46, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: =
break-word;" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It=E2=80=99s not entirely =
&nbsp;useless. The problem it does solve is giving the user a better =
experience when a site is blocked for resolvers that support this =
extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS =
connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a =
resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D =
response, then the browser can tell the user that the web page was =
blocked with an informative message. Assuming this becomes the default =
behaviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it will a good signal =
for distinguishing &nbsp;"this is malware blocking" from "this resolver =
is malicious=E2=80=9D.</div></div></div></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I'm not following. Suppose that we add =
an error code that says "this site has malware". Now, I operate a =
resolver which is malicious in the sense that it wishes to block a =
certain form of content (say, access to the IETF) but don't want the =
people whose content I am blocking is being blocked for that reason. So, =
instead I return "this site has malware".</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">My point here is that a code of this =
type only tells you what the resolver *asserts* the reason it blocked it =
is, it doesn't necessarily tell you what the actual reason that the =
content was blocked.<br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Ok yes I understand. The blocking reason =
wouldn=E2=80=99t be that useful in the general case of not knowing =
whether a resolver was malicious. However I think the fact that the =
resolver is telling you that the content is blocked is still useful, no =
matter what the reason for the blocking is, for the reason described =
above. For example in your use-case, the user would see =E2=80=9Cthis =
site is blocked by the DNS resolver=E2=80=9D (or whatever) rather than =
=E2=80=9CTLS connection error=E2=80=9D which would be the case =
today.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Also assuming the resolver is =
=E2=80=9Ctrusted=E2=80=9D in some way (e.g. Mozilla TRR program) then =
the reason for blocking may then become useful I=E2=80=99d have =
thought.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Neil</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
class=3D"">-Ekr</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: =
break-word;" class=3D""><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;" =
class=3D""><br =
class=3D"gmail-m_4067535798681961582Apple-interchange-newline"><span =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; float: none; display: inline;" =
class=3D"">Neil Cook</span><br style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: =
normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; =
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; float: =
none; display: inline;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:neil.cook@open-xchange.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">neil.cook@open-xchange.com</a></span><div style=3D"font-family:=
 Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
style=3D"font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px;" =
class=3D"">---------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, =
90408&nbsp;Nuremberg, District Court Nuremberg&nbsp;HRB 24738<br =
class=3D"">Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la&nbsp;Vera, Carsten Dirks, =
Michael Knapstein,&nbsp;Stephan Martin&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Chairman of =
the Board: Richard Seibt<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">European =
Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette =
5f,&nbsp;D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District Court&nbsp;Siegen, HRB =
8718&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Managing Director: Frank Hoberg<br class=3D""><br=
 class=3D"">US Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 =
Lytton Avenue,&nbsp;Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">---------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------</div></div>
</div>
<br class=3D""></div></blockquote></div></div>
</div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: normal; text-align: =
start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-wrap: =
break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D"">Neil Cook</span><br style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:neil.cook@open-xchange.com" =
class=3D"">neil.cook@open-xchange.com</a></span><div style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">---------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, =
90408&nbsp;Nuremberg, District Court Nuremberg&nbsp;HRB 24738<br =
class=3D"">Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la&nbsp;Vera, Carsten Dirks, =
Michael Knapstein,&nbsp;Stephan Martin&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Chairman of =
the Board: Richard Seibt<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">European =
Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette =
5f,&nbsp;D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District Court&nbsp;Siegen, HRB =
8718&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Managing Director: Frank Hoberg<br class=3D""><br=
 class=3D"">US Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 =
Lytton Avenue,&nbsp;Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">---------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------</div></div>
</div>
<br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From: Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>
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Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2019 18:35:11 +0200
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Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
References: <A1128702-1E19-4657-9740-E84AE09992F2@piuha.net> <CABcZeBMfOTjq-8hDDoKMtJvfHUA5nC8o60zuk-2Xe-ZhfwriJQ@mail.gmail.com> <766112E1-F532-4C6B-8CA8-A096671E02EE@piuha.net> <CA+9kkMAfuOwJu8_qJTuhAY4mUwR+tVUxr+k3QFHBk3byV672Ow@mail.gmail.com> <A7EA862E-8E80-40E3-834D-E628988C0A24@virtualized.org> <CAFWeb9KT=2JL0oHUgJ2WMcduR3na+hP2QncvRR4YurmqsAWxTA@mail.gmail.com> <59E0EC53-0E30-431C-8376-52C7BFC121A8@virtualized.org> <CAFWeb9+Z7RmXEr46qx5PaUcxh2R3+HXhrZeW-8QEMX4HLt7a-w@mail.gmail.com> <589DAFCB-1BDC-4156-A2CA-179C4559A6B2@virtualized.org> <cf2152d7-8618-7ad2-b8f9-7a259ab5df19@cs.tcd.ie> <683A176C-3CE6-4866-A736-F2A7465FA5B5@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBPmWYBKcKhjTUBLw62xJT=OXbp3v6MZ+8Gtr=gFmQ-g6A@mail.gmail.com> <E40CC478-BBA1-4DA9-8F6A-FE1782E0F27E@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBMnG_HJHYrGpQD1LWWNi8zuhAm=0Uy2HNRRmhYS9PsCtg@mail.gmail.com> <06613304-C325-4BA4-AB6F-32D79DFCECA0@open-xchange.com> <CABcZeBMr6WtzbyPPA6W1Da0A9bUoowMVucbBf5K0BQgqZrNdwg@mail.gmail.com> <F66D555F-7533-4B42-A036-016345F7 65A7@open-xchange.com> <0B481BB1-5BF9-409F-B41D-2DFC4675450A@huitema.net>
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> On 3 Sep 2019, at 18:16, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> =
wrote:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> On Sep 3, 2019, at 7:34 AM, Neil Cook =
<neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org =
<mailto:neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On 3 Sep 2019, at 15:46, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com =
<mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> It=E2=80=99s not entirely  useless. The problem it does solve is =
giving the user a better experience when a site is blocked for resolvers =
that support this extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will =
end up with a TLS connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some =
browsers). If a resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=
=80=9D response, then the browser can tell the user that the web page =
was blocked with an informative message. Assuming this becomes the =
default behaviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it will a =
good signal for distinguishing  "this is malware blocking" from "this =
resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.
>>>=20
>>> I'm not following. Suppose that we add an error code that says "this =
site has malware". Now, I operate a resolver which is malicious in the =
sense that it wishes to block a certain form of content (say, access to =
the IETF) but don't want the people whose content I am blocking is being =
blocked for that reason. So, instead I return "this site has malware".
>>>=20
>>> My point here is that a code of this type only tells you what the =
resolver *asserts* the reason it blocked it is, it doesn't necessarily =
tell you what the actual reason that the content was blocked.
>>>=20
>>=20
>> Ok yes I understand. The blocking reason wouldn=E2=80=99t be that =
useful in the general case of not knowing whether a resolver was =
malicious. However I think the fact that the resolver is telling you =
that the content is blocked is still useful, no matter what the reason =
for the blocking is, for the reason described above. For example in your =
use-case, the user would see =E2=80=9Cthis site is blocked by the DNS =
resolver=E2=80=9D (or whatever) rather than =E2=80=9CTLS connection =
error=E2=80=9D which would be the case today.
>=20
> Is there a way to explain how the message is blocked? Such as, "this =
domain is listed as malware in RBZ malware.example.net =
<http://malware.example.net/>." Information like that would allow the =
client to make an informed decision.
>=20

The proposal as it=E2=80=99s currently specified doesn=E2=80=99t allow =
further granularity. Also Eric=E2=80=99s point is that you can=E2=80=99t =
trust the reason the resolver gives you, so this wouldn=E2=80=99t be =
useful. Assuming the client did trust the resolver however it may be =
useful;  although I=E2=80=99m not sure how the client would make an =
=E2=80=9Cinformed decision=E2=80=9D - I mean, what can the client do =
except try a different resolver perhaps?=20

Neil Cook
neil.cook@open-xchange.com

=
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------
Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, 90408 Nuremberg, District Court =
Nuremberg HRB 24738
Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael =
Knapstein, Stephan Martin=20
Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt

European Office:=20
Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f, D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District =
Court Siegen, HRB 8718=20
Managing Director: Frank Hoberg

US Office:=20
Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA=20
=
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 3 Sep 2019, at 18:16, Christian Huitema &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:huitema@huitema.net" class=3D"">huitema@huitema.net</a>&gt;=
 wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><meta=
 http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"auto" class=3D"">&nbsp;<br class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><br class=3D"">On Sep 3, 2019, at 7:34 AM, Neil =
Cook &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org" =
class=3D"">neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" =
content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8" class=3D""><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 3 Sep 2019, at 15:46, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" =
style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: =
break-word;" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It=E2=80=99s not entirely =
&nbsp;useless. The problem it does solve is giving the user a better =
experience when a site is blocked for resolvers that support this =
extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS =
connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a =
resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D =
response, then the browser can tell the user that the web page was =
blocked with an informative message. Assuming this becomes the default =
behaviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it will a good signal =
for distinguishing &nbsp;"this is malware blocking" from "this resolver =
is malicious=E2=80=9D.</div></div></div></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I'm not following. Suppose that we add =
an error code that says "this site has malware". Now, I operate a =
resolver which is malicious in the sense that it wishes to block a =
certain form of content (say, access to the IETF) but don't want the =
people whose content I am blocking is being blocked for that reason. So, =
instead I return "this site has malware".</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">My point here is that a code of this =
type only tells you what the resolver *asserts* the reason it blocked it =
is, it doesn't necessarily tell you what the actual reason that the =
content was blocked.<br class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Ok yes I understand. The blocking =
reason wouldn=E2=80=99t be that useful in the general case of not =
knowing whether a resolver was malicious. However I think the fact that =
the resolver is telling you that the content is blocked is still useful, =
no matter what the reason for the blocking is, for the reason described =
above. For example in your use-case, the user would see =E2=80=9Cthis =
site is blocked by the DNS resolver=E2=80=9D (or whatever) rather than =
=E2=80=9CTLS connection error=E2=80=9D which would be the case =
today.</div></div></div></blockquote><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Is there a way to explain how the =
message is blocked? Such as, "this domain is listed as malware in RBZ <a =
href=3D"http://malware.example.net/" class=3D"">malware.example.net</a>." =
Information like that would allow the client to make an informed =
decision.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>The proposal as it=E2=80=99s currently specified =
doesn=E2=80=99t allow further granularity. Also Eric=E2=80=99s point is =
that you can=E2=80=99t trust the reason the resolver gives you, so this =
wouldn=E2=80=99t be useful. Assuming the client did trust the resolver =
however it may be useful; &nbsp;although I=E2=80=99m not sure how the =
client would make an =E2=80=9Cinformed decision=E2=80=9D - I mean, what =
can the client do except try a different resolver =
perhaps?&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div></div><div class=3D""><div =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-wrap: =
break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; =
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; =
float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">Neil Cook</span><br =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: =
normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: =
inline !important;" class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:neil.cook@open-xchange.com" =
class=3D"">neil.cook@open-xchange.com</a></span><div style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: =
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: =
Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: =
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; =
font-variant-position: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: =
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; =
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" =
class=3D"">---------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, =
90408&nbsp;Nuremberg, District Court Nuremberg&nbsp;HRB 24738<br =
class=3D"">Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la&nbsp;Vera, Carsten Dirks, =
Michael Knapstein,&nbsp;Stephan Martin&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Chairman of =
the Board: Richard Seibt<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">European =
Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette =
5f,&nbsp;D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District Court&nbsp;Siegen, HRB =
8718&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Managing Director: Frank Hoberg<br class=3D""><br=
 class=3D"">US Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 =
Lytton Avenue,&nbsp;Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA&nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">---------------------------------------------------------------=
----------------------</div></div>
</div>
<br class=3D""></body></html>=

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References: <A1128702-1E19-4657-9740-E84AE09992F2@piuha.net> <CABcZeBMfOTjq-8hDDoKMtJvfHUA5nC8o60zuk-2Xe-ZhfwriJQ@mail.gmail.com> <766112E1-F532-4C6B-8CA8-A096671E02EE@piuha.net> <CA+9kkMAfuOwJu8_qJTuhAY4mUwR+tVUxr+k3QFHBk3byV672Ow@mail.gmail.com> <A7EA862E-8E80-40E3-834D-E628988C0A24@virtualized.org> <CAFWeb9KT=2JL0oHUgJ2WMcduR3na+hP2QncvRR4YurmqsAWxTA@mail.gmail.com> <59E0EC53-0E30-431C-8376-52C7BFC121A8@virtualized.org> <CAFWeb9+Z7RmXEr46qx5PaUcxh2R3+HXhrZeW-8QEMX4HLt7a-w@mail.gmail.com> <589DAFCB-1BDC-4156-A2CA-179C4559A6B2@virtualized.org> <cf2152d7-8618-7ad2-b8f9-7a259ab5df19@cs.tcd.ie> <683A176C-3CE6-4866-A736-F2A7465FA5B5@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBPmWYBKcKhjTUBLw62xJT=OXbp3v6MZ+8Gtr=gFmQ-g6A@mail.gmail.com> <E40CC478-BBA1-4DA9-8F6A-FE1782E0F27E@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBMnG_HJHYrGpQD1LWWNi8zuhAm=0Uy2HNRRmhYS9PsCtg@mail.gmail.com> <06613304-C325-4BA4-AB6F-32D79DFCECA0@open-xchange.com>
To: Neil Cook <neil.cook=40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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That=E2=80=99s why you move the censored Answer Section: data to the Authori=
tative Section.

Paul

Sent from mobile device

> On Sep 3, 2019, at 09:15, Neil Cook <neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.=
ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
>> On 23 Aug 2019, at 06:39, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:41 PM Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> > On 22 Aug 2019, at 08:00, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>> >=20
>>> > Suppose that I receive a bogus response to my A record query, how am I=
 to usefully distinguish "this is malware blocking" from "this resolver is m=
alicious=E2=80=9D?
>=20
> ...
>=20
>>> To be slightly less glib, the dnsop WG has an I-D on extended error code=
s. [And FWIW lack of a discrete error code(s) for validation failure is one o=
f the things I think DNSSEC got wrong.] draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error alre=
ady goes some way to answering your question:
>>>=20
>>> 4.16.  Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked
>>>=20
>>>    The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain is
>>>    blacklisted due to a security policy implemented on the server being
>>>    directly talked to.
>>>=20
>>> 4.17.  Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored
>>>=20
>>>    The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain was
>>>    blacklisted by a security policy imposed upon the server being talked=

>>>    to.  Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrelevant (in-
>>>    band DNS somehow, court order, etc).
>>>=20
>>> 4.18.  Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Prohibited
>>>=20
>>>    An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query from an
>>>    "unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with this
>>>    code.  Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive queries from
>>>    IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, local
>>>    policy, etc.
>>>=20
>>> I suppose draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error could add another error code f=
or the specific case of a malicious resolver. Whatever that might mean. Thou=
gh I doubt the operators of such servers will choose to set that evil bit on=
 their responses.
>>>=20
>>> PS A potential problem with this I-D is these extended error codes won=E2=
=80=99t be signed. So they can be spoofed by bad actors.
>>=20
>=20
> I don=E2=80=99t see why malicious resolvers would tell clients they are re=
turning bogus results.=20
>=20
>> Yes, and for this reason I don't see how this solves the problem. It's ju=
st "resolver blocked it and claims reason X".
>>=20
>=20
> It=E2=80=99s not entirely  useless. The problem it does solve is giving th=
e user a better experience when a site is blocked for resolvers that support=
 this extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a T=
LS connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a re=
solver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D response, the=
n the browser can tell the user that the web page was blocked with an inform=
ative message. Assuming this becomes the default behaviour for non-malicious=
 resolvers then I think it will a good signal for distinguishing  "this is m=
alware blocking" from "this resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.
>=20
>=20
> Neil Cook
> neil.cook@open-xchange.com
>=20
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------
> Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, 90408 Nuremberg, District Court Nuremberg=
 HRB 24738
> Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de la Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael Knapstein=
, Stephan Martin=20
> Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt
>=20
> European Office:=20
> Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f, D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District Court S=
iegen, HRB 8718=20
> Managing Director: Frank Hoberg
>=20
> US Office:=20
> Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA=20
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----------
>=20
> --=20
> Add mailing list
> Add@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto">That=E2=80=99s why you move the censored An=
swer Section: data to the Authoritative Section.<div><br></div><div>Paul<br>=
<br><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature" dir=3D"ltr">Sent from mobile device</div>=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>On Sep 3, 2019, at 09:15, Neil Cook &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org">neil.cook=3D40open-xchange=
.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; chars=
et=3Dutf-8"><br class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" cla=
ss=3D""><div class=3D"">On 23 Aug 2019, at 06:39, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br class=3D=
"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Aug 22, 2019 at 1:4=
1 PM Jim Reid &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jim@rfc1035.com" class=3D"">jim@rfc1035.=
com</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);paddin=
g-left:1ex"><br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&gt; On 22 Aug 2019, at 08:00, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.=
.com" target=3D"_blank" class=3D"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br class=3D""=
>
&gt; <br class=3D"">
&gt; Suppose that I receive a bogus response to my A record query, how am I t=
o usefully distinguish "this is malware blocking" from "this resolver is mal=
icious=E2=80=9D?<br class=3D""></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote><=
div><br class=3D""></div><div>...</div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"ci=
te" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
To be slightly less glib, the dnsop WG has an I-D on extended error codes. [=
And FWIW lack of a discrete error code(s) for validation failure is one of t=
he things I think DNSSEC got wrong.] draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error already=
 goes some way to answering your question:<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
4.16.&nbsp; Extended DNS Error Code 15 - Blocked<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain is<=
br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;blacklisted due to a security policy implemented on the server b=
eing<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;directly talked to.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
4.17.&nbsp; Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;The resolver attempted to perfom a DNS query but the domain was=
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;blacklisted by a security policy imposed upon the server being t=
alked<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;to.&nbsp; Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrele=
vant (in-<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;band DNS somehow, court order, etc).<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
4.18.&nbsp; Extended DNS Error Code 17 - Prohibited<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;An authoritative or recursive resolver that receives a query fr=
om an<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;"unauthorized" client can annotate its REFUSED message with thi=
s<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;code.&nbsp; Examples of "unauthorized" clients are recursive qu=
eries from<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;IP addresses outside the network, blacklisted IP addresses, loc=
al<br class=3D"">
&nbsp; &nbsp;policy, etc.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
I suppose draft-ietf-dnsop-extended-error could add another error code for t=
he specific case of a malicious resolver. Whatever that might mean. Though I=
 doubt the operators of such servers will choose to set that evil bit on the=
ir responses.<br class=3D"">
<br class=3D"">
PS A potential problem with this I-D is these extended error codes won=E2=80=
=99t be signed. So they can be spoofed by bad actors.</blockquote><div class=
=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D"=
"></div><div>I don=E2=80=99t see why malicious resolvers would tell clients t=
hey are returning bogus results.&nbsp;</div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D=
"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"=
gmail_quote"><div class=3D"">Yes, and for this reason I don't see how this s=
olves the problem. It's just "resolver blocked it and claims reason X".<br c=
lass=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blo=
ckquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>It=E2=80=99s not entirely &nbsp;usele=
ss. The problem it does solve is giving the user a better experience when a s=
ite is blocked for resolvers that support this extended Error Code. Currentl=
y for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS connection error of some kind (o=
r a blank page in some browsers). If a resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/c=
ensored/prohibited=E2=80=9D response, then the browser can tell the user tha=
t the web page was blocked with an informative message. Assuming this become=
s the default behaviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it will a g=
ood signal for distinguishing &nbsp;"this is malware blocking" from "this re=
solver is malicious=E2=80=9D.</div></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start=
; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing:=
 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mo=
de: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br class=3D"Apple-int=
erchange-newline"><span style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica=
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xt-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px=
; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: none; display: inline !important;" c=
lass=3D"">Neil Cook</span><br style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Hel=
vetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal;=
 font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-po=
sition: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: sta=
rt; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacin=
g: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><span style=3D"color: rg=
b(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; fon=
t-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-as=
ian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spac=
ing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; whit=
e-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; float: n=
one; display: inline !important;" class=3D""><a href=3D"mailto:neil.cook@ope=
n-xchange.com" class=3D"">neil.cook@open-xchange.com</a></span><div style=3D=
"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: n=
ormal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-varia=
nt-east-asian: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-weight: normal; l=
etter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: n=
one; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;=
" class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-fa=
mily: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures=
: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-v=
ariant-position: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-a=
lign: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; wo=
rd-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D"">---------------=
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br cl=
ass=3D"">Open-Xchange AG, Rollnerstr. 14, 90408&nbsp;Nuremberg, District Cou=
rt Nuremberg&nbsp;HRB 24738<br class=3D"">Managing Board: Rafael Laguna de l=
a&nbsp;Vera, Carsten Dirks, Michael Knapstein,&nbsp;Stephan Martin&nbsp;<br c=
lass=3D"">Chairman of the Board: Richard Seibt<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">=
European Office:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange GmbH, Olper Huette 5f,&nbs=
p;D-57462 Olpe, Germany, District Court&nbsp;Siegen, HRB 8718&nbsp;<br class=
=3D"">Managing Director: Frank Hoberg<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">US Office=
:&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Open-Xchange. Inc., 530 Lytton Avenue,&nbsp;Palo Alto,=
 CA 94301, USA&nbsp;<br class=3D"">-----------------------------------------=
--------------------------------------------</div></div>
</div>
<br class=3D""></div></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"=
><span>-- </span><br><span>Add mailing list</span><br><span><a href=3D"mailt=
o:Add@ietf.org">Add@ietf.org</a></span><br><span><a href=3D"https://www.ietf=
.org/mailman/listinfo/add">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add</a></sp=
an><br></div></blockquote></div></body></html>=

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From: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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References: <A1128702-1E19-4657-9740-E84AE09992F2@piuha.net> <CABcZeBMfOTjq-8hDDoKMtJvfHUA5nC8o60zuk-2Xe-ZhfwriJQ@mail.gmail.com> <766112E1-F532-4C6B-8CA8-A096671E02EE@piuha.net> <CA+9kkMAfuOwJu8_qJTuhAY4mUwR+tVUxr+k3QFHBk3byV672Ow@mail.gmail.com> <A7EA862E-8E80-40E3-834D-E628988C0A24@virtualized.org> <CAFWeb9KT=2JL0oHUgJ2WMcduR3na+hP2QncvRR4YurmqsAWxTA@mail.gmail.com> <59E0EC53-0E30-431C-8376-52C7BFC121A8@virtualized.org> <CAFWeb9+Z7RmXEr46qx5PaUcxh2R3+HXhrZeW-8QEMX4HLt7a-w@mail.gmail.com> <589DAFCB-1BDC-4156-A2CA-179C4559A6B2@virtualized.org> <cf2152d7-8618-7ad2-b8f9-7a259ab5df19@cs.tcd.ie> <683A176C-3CE6-4866-A736-F2A7465FA5B5@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBPmWYBKcKhjTUBLw62xJT=OXbp3v6MZ+8Gtr=gFmQ-g6A@mail.gmail.com> <E40CC478-BBA1-4DA9-8F6A-FE1782E0F27E@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBMnG_HJHYrGpQD1LWWNi8zuhAm=0Uy2HNRRmhYS9PsCtg@mail.gmail.com> <06613304-C325-4BA4-AB6F-32D79DFCECA0@open-xchange.com> <CABcZeBMr6WtzbyPPA6W1Da0A9bUoowMVucbBf5K0BQgqZrNdwg@mail.gmail.com> <F66D555F-7533-4B42-A036-016345F7 65A7@open-xchange.com>
To: Neil Cook <neil.cook=40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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--Apple-Mail-AEE47544-9E93-49EE-B5C2-1AA05D6A7B5A
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=20

> On Sep 3, 2019, at 7:34 AM, Neil Cook <neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmar=
c.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>=20
>>> On 3 Sep 2019, at 15:46, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>> It=E2=80=99s not entirely  useless. The problem it does solve is giving t=
he user a better experience when a site is blocked for resolvers that suppor=
t this extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a T=
LS connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a re=
solver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D response, the=
n the browser can tell the user that the web page was blocked with an inform=
ative message. Assuming this becomes the default behaviour for non-malicious=
 resolvers then I think it will a good signal for distinguishing  "this is m=
alware blocking" from "this resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.
>>=20
>> I'm not following. Suppose that we add an error code that says "this site=
 has malware". Now, I operate a resolver which is malicious in the sense tha=
t it wishes to block a certain form of content (say, access to the IETF) but=
 don't want the people whose content I am blocking is being blocked for that=
 reason. So, instead I return "this site has malware".
>>=20
>> My point here is that a code of this type only tells you what the resolve=
r *asserts* the reason it blocked it is, it doesn't necessarily tell you wha=
t the actual reason that the content was blocked.
>>=20
>=20
> Ok yes I understand. The blocking reason wouldn=E2=80=99t be that useful i=
n the general case of not knowing whether a resolver was malicious. However I=
 think the fact that the resolver is telling you that the content is blocked=
 is still useful, no matter what the reason for the blocking is, for the rea=
son described above. For example in your use-case, the user would see =E2=80=
=9Cthis site is blocked by the DNS resolver=E2=80=9D (or whatever) rather th=
an =E2=80=9CTLS connection error=E2=80=9D which would be the case today.

Is there a way to explain how the message is blocked? Such as, "this domain i=
s listed as malware in RBZ malware.example.net." Information like that would=
 allow the client to make an informed decision.

-- Christian Huitema=20




--Apple-Mail-AEE47544-9E93-49EE-B5C2-1AA05D6A7B5A
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto">&nbsp;<br><div dir=3D"ltr"><br>On Sep 3, 20=
19, at 7:34 AM, Neil Cook &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.c=
om@dmarc.ietf.org">neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wro=
te:<br><br></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><meta http-equiv=
=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8"><br class=3D""><div=
><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">On 3 Se=
p 2019, at 15:46, Eric Rescorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com" class=3D=
"">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D=
""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div=
 class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">It=E2=80=99s not entirely &=
nbsp;useless. The problem it does solve is giving the user a better experien=
ce when a site is blocked for resolvers that support this extended Error Cod=
e. Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS connection error of s=
ome kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a resolver returns a =E2=80=9C=
blocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D response, then the browser can tell the=
 user that the web page was blocked with an informative message. Assuming th=
is becomes the default behaviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it=
 will a good signal for distinguishing &nbsp;"this is malware blocking" from=
 "this resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.</div></div></div></blockquote><div cl=
ass=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I'm not following. Suppose tha=
t we add an error code that says "this site has malware". Now, I operate a r=
esolver which is malicious in the sense that it wishes to block a certain fo=
rm of content (say, access to the IETF) but don't want the people whose cont=
ent I am blocking is being blocked for that reason. So, instead I return "th=
is site has malware".</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D=
"">My point here is that a code of this type only tells you what the resolve=
r *asserts* the reason it blocked it is, it doesn't necessarily tell you wha=
t the actual reason that the content was blocked.<br class=3D""></div><div c=
lass=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=
=3D""></div><div>Ok yes I understand. The blocking reason wouldn=E2=80=99t b=
e that useful in the general case of not knowing whether a resolver was mali=
cious. However I think the fact that the resolver is telling you that the co=
ntent is blocked is still useful, no matter what the reason for the blocking=
 is, for the reason described above. For example in your use-case, the user w=
ould see =E2=80=9Cthis site is blocked by the DNS resolver=E2=80=9D (or what=
ever) rather than =E2=80=9CTLS connection error=E2=80=9D which would be the c=
ase today.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Is there a way t=
o explain how the message is blocked? Such as, "this domain is listed as mal=
ware in RBZ <a href=3D"http://malware.example.net">malware.example.net</a>."=
 Information like that would allow the client to make an informed decision.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>-- Christian Huitema&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div=
><br></div><br></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail-AEE47544-9E93-49EE-B5C2-1AA05D6A7B5A--


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To: Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>
Cc: ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
References: <A1128702-1E19-4657-9740-E84AE09992F2@piuha.net> <A7EA862E-8E80-40E3-834D-E628988C0A24@virtualized.org> <CAFWeb9KT=2JL0oHUgJ2WMcduR3na+hP2QncvRR4YurmqsAWxTA@mail.gmail.com> <59E0EC53-0E30-431C-8376-52C7BFC121A8@virtualized.org> <CAFWeb9+Z7RmXEr46qx5PaUcxh2R3+HXhrZeW-8QEMX4HLt7a-w@mail.gmail.com> <589DAFCB-1BDC-4156-A2CA-179C4559A6B2@virtualized.org> <cf2152d7-8618-7ad2-b8f9-7a259ab5df19@cs.tcd.ie> <683A176C-3CE6-4866-A736-F2A7465FA5B5@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBPmWYBKcKhjTUBLw62xJT=OXbp3v6MZ+8Gtr=gFmQ-g6A@mail.gmail.com> <E40CC478-BBA1-4DA9-8F6A-FE1782E0F27E@rfc1035.com> <CABcZeBMnG_HJHYrGpQD1LWWNi8zuhAm=0Uy2HNRRmhYS9PsCtg@mail.gmail.com> <06613304-C325-4BA4-AB6F-32D79DFCECA0@open-xchange.com> <CABcZeBMr6WtzbyPPA6W1Da0A9bUoowMVucbBf5K0BQgqZrNdwg@mail.gmail.com> <F66D555F-7533-4B42-A036-016345F7 65A7@open-xchange.com> <0B481BB1-5BF9-409F-B41D-2DFC4675450A@huitema.net> <245874B8-BDB9-4947-86E0-F3A739DA255F@open-xchange.com>
From: Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net>
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On 9/3/2019 9:35 AM, Neil Cook wrote:
>
>
>> On 3 Sep 2019, at 18:16, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net
>> <mailto:huitema@huitema.net>> wrote:
>>
>> =C2=A0
>>
>> On Sep 3, 2019, at 7:34 AM, Neil Cook
>> <neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org
>> <mailto:neil.cook=3D40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On 3 Sep 2019, at 15:46, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com
>>>> <mailto:ekr@rtfm.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     It=E2=80=99s not entirely =C2=A0useless. The problem it does sol=
ve is giving
>>>>     the user a better experience when a site is blocked for
>>>>     resolvers that support this extended Error Code. Currently for
>>>>     HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS connection error of some
>>>>     kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a resolver returns
>>>>     a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D response, then t=
he browser can
>>>>     tell the user that the web page was blocked with an informative
>>>>     message. Assuming this becomes the default behaviour for
>>>>     non-malicious resolvers then I think it will a good signal for
>>>>     distinguishing =C2=A0"this is malware blocking" from "this resol=
ver
>>>>     is malicious=E2=80=9D.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not following. Suppose that we add an error code that says
>>>> "this site has malware". Now, I operate a resolver which is
>>>> malicious in the sense that it wishes to block a certain form of
>>>> content (say, access to the IETF) but don't want the people whose
>>>> content I am blocking is being blocked for that reason. So, instead
>>>> I return "this site has malware".
>>>>
>>>> My point here is that a code of this type only tells you what the
>>>> resolver *asserts* the reason it blocked it is, it doesn't
>>>> necessarily tell you what the actual reason that the content was
>>>> blocked.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Ok yes I understand. The blocking reason wouldn=E2=80=99t be that use=
ful in
>>> the general case of not knowing whether a resolver was malicious.
>>> However I think the fact that the resolver is telling you that the
>>> content is blocked is still useful, no matter what the reason for
>>> the blocking is, for the reason described above. For example in your
>>> use-case, the user would see =E2=80=9Cthis site is blocked by the DNS=

>>> resolver=E2=80=9D (or whatever) rather than =E2=80=9CTLS connection e=
rror=E2=80=9D which
>>> would be the case today.
>>
>> Is there a way to explain how the message is blocked? Such as, "this
>> domain is listed as malware in RBZ malware.example.net
>> <http://malware.example.net/>." Information like that would allow the
>> client to make an informed decision.
>>
>
> The proposal as it=E2=80=99s currently specified doesn=E2=80=99t allow =
further
> granularity. Also Eric=E2=80=99s point is that you can=E2=80=99t trust =
the reason the
> resolver gives you, so this wouldn=E2=80=99t be useful. Assuming the cl=
ient
> did trust the resolver however it may be useful; =C2=A0although I=E2=80=
=99m not
> sure how the client would make an =E2=80=9Cinformed decision=E2=80=9D -=
 I mean, what
> can the client do except try a different resolver perhaps?

If the client knows why the query was rejected, then it can look a bit
further. Take my example, in which the server would announce that the
domain is marked as blocked in a specific RBZ, "malware.example.net".
The client may decides whether it trusts that specific RBZ. Does it have
a good reputation, or is it known for a trigger-happy behavior leading
to all kinds of false positive? And then, the client may want to check
whether the domain is in fact listed in that specific RBZ, or whether
the resolver is making that up. It can indeed do that by contacting
another resolver. It may or may not do that all the time, it may or may
not expose that as some kind of option. My point is that more
transparency always helps.

-- Christian Huitema



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    <p><br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 9/3/2019 9:35 AM, Neil Cook wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:245874B8-BDB9-4947-86E0-F3A739DA255F@open-xchange.com">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <br class="">
      <div><br class="">
        <blockquote type="cite" class="">
          <div class="">On 3 Sep 2019, at 18:16, Christian Huitema &lt;<a
              href="mailto:huitema@huitema.net" class=""
              moz-do-not-send="true">huitema@huitema.net</a>&gt; wrote:</div>
          <br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
          <div class="">
            <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
              charset=UTF-8" class="">
            <div dir="auto" class=""> <br class="">
              <div dir="ltr" class=""><br class="">
                On Sep 3, 2019, at 7:34 AM, Neil Cook &lt;<a
                  href="mailto:neil.cook=40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org"
                  class="" moz-do-not-send="true">neil.cook=40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;
                wrote:<br class="">
                <br class="">
              </div>
              <blockquote type="cite" class="">
                <div dir="ltr" class="">
                  <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
                    charset=UTF-8" class="">
                  <br class="">
                  <div class=""><br class="">
                    <blockquote type="cite" class="">
                      <div class="">On 3 Sep 2019, at 15:46, Eric
                        Rescorla &lt;<a href="mailto:ekr@rtfm.com"
                          class="" moz-do-not-send="true">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt;
                        wrote:</div>
                      <div class="">
                        <div dir="ltr" class="">
                          <div class="gmail_quote">
                            <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                              style="margin:0px 0px 0px
                              0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                              rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
                              <div style="overflow-wrap: break-word;"
                                class="">
                                <div class="">
                                  <div class=""><br class="">
                                  </div>
                                  <div class="">It’s not entirely
                                     useless. The problem it does solve
                                    is giving the user a better
                                    experience when a site is blocked
                                    for resolvers that support this
                                    extended Error Code. Currently for
                                    HTTPS the user will end up with a
                                    TLS connection error of some kind
                                    (or a blank page in some browsers).
                                    If a resolver returns a
                                    “blocked/censored/prohibited”
                                    response, then the browser can tell
                                    the user that the web page was
                                    blocked with an informative message.
                                    Assuming this becomes the default
                                    behaviour for non-malicious
                                    resolvers then I think it will a
                                    good signal for distinguishing
                                     "this is malware blocking" from
                                    "this resolver is malicious”.</div>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </blockquote>
                            <div class=""><br class="">
                            </div>
                            <div class="">I'm not following. Suppose
                              that we add an error code that says "this
                              site has malware". Now, I operate a
                              resolver which is malicious in the sense
                              that it wishes to block a certain form of
                              content (say, access to the IETF) but
                              don't want the people whose content I am
                              blocking is being blocked for that reason.
                              So, instead I return "this site has
                              malware".</div>
                            <div class=""><br class="">
                            </div>
                            <div class="">My point here is that a code
                              of this type only tells you what the
                              resolver *asserts* the reason it blocked
                              it is, it doesn't necessarily tell you
                              what the actual reason that the content
                              was blocked.<br class="">
                            </div>
                            <div class=""><br class="">
                            </div>
                          </div>
                        </div>
                      </div>
                    </blockquote>
                    <div class=""><br class="">
                    </div>
                    <div class="">Ok yes I understand. The blocking
                      reason wouldn’t be that useful in the general case
                      of not knowing whether a resolver was malicious.
                      However I think the fact that the resolver is
                      telling you that the content is blocked is still
                      useful, no matter what the reason for the blocking
                      is, for the reason described above. For example in
                      your use-case, the user would see “this site is
                      blocked by the DNS resolver” (or whatever) rather
                      than “TLS connection error” which would be the
                      case today.</div>
                  </div>
                </div>
              </blockquote>
              <div class=""><br class="">
              </div>
              <div class="">Is there a way to explain how the message is
                blocked? Such as, "this domain is listed as malware in
                RBZ <a href="http://malware.example.net/" class=""
                  moz-do-not-send="true">malware.example.net</a>."
                Information like that would allow the client to make an
                informed decision.</div>
              <div class=""><br class="">
              </div>
            </div>
          </div>
        </blockquote>
        <div><br class="">
        </div>
        <div>The proposal as it’s currently specified doesn’t allow
          further granularity. Also Eric’s point is that you can’t trust
          the reason the resolver gives you, so this wouldn’t be useful.
          Assuming the client did trust the resolver however it may be
          useful;  although I’m not sure how the client would make an
          “informed decision” - I mean, what can the client do except
          try a different resolver perhaps? <br>
        </div>
      </div>
    </blockquote>
    <p>If the client knows why the query was rejected, then it can look
      a bit further. Take my example, in which the server would announce
      that the domain is marked as blocked in a specific RBZ,
      "malware.example.net". The client may decides whether it trusts
      that specific RBZ. Does it have a good reputation, or is it known
      for a trigger-happy behavior leading to all kinds of false
      positive? And then, the client may want to check whether the
      domain is in fact listed in that specific RBZ, or whether the
      resolver is making that up. It can indeed do that by contacting
      another resolver. It may or may not do that all the time, it may
      or may not expose that as some kind of option. My point is that
      more transparency always helps.</p>
    <p>-- Christian Huitema<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
  </body>
</html>

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From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2019 10:39:17 -0700
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
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On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 8:42 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 6:15 AM Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> It=E2=80=99s not entirely  useless. The problem it does solve is giving =
the user
>> a better experience when a site is blocked for resolvers that support th=
is
>> extended Error Code. Currently for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS
>> connection error of some kind (or a blank page in some browsers). If a
>> resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cblocked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D respons=
e, then the browser
>> can tell the user that the web page was blocked with an informative
>> message. Assuming this becomes the default behaviour for non-malicious
>> resolvers then I think it will a good signal for distinguishing  "this i=
s
>> malware blocking" from "this resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.
>>
>
> I'm not following. Suppose that we add an error code that says "this site
> has malware". Now, I operate a resolver which is malicious in the sense
> that it wishes to block a certain form of content (say, access to the IET=
F)
> but don't want the people whose content I am blocking is being blocked fo=
r
> that reason. So, instead I return "this site has malware".
>
> My point here is that a code of this type only tells you what the resolve=
r
> *asserts* the reason it blocked it is, it doesn't necessarily tell you wh=
at
> the actual reason that the content was blocked.
>

The high-level issue is that at very least some of the blocking services or
resolvers doing blocking, are set up based on some specific trust
relationship, and that trust is essential in order to have a reason to use
the service or resolver.
Those are typically either internal (enterprise) scenarios where that trust
is basically "same company" and mandated, or a service offered with some
specific terms of service, whether it is a fee-based service or free.

Trying to overlay a different model of third-party resolver where the
client doesn't have a pre-defined trust relationship with that third party,
is where things start to go sideways.

While it might be possible to re-engineer both sides of that equation so
they are not incompatible, the basic issue is that you can't easily tell
whether a resolver currently being used is strictly giving unmodified
results or not. There is no clear signal or flag.

Going beyond assertion might be possible with re-engineering, such as
providing some fourth-party attestation (e.g. the source of the feed that
gets used by the DNS resolver also provides its own signature on individual
entries that would permit human inspection).

>From a mathematical perspective, the problem is one of classical logic
versus modern logic: saying "Every X is a Y" also require an assertion of
existence "There is one member of X", in order to guarantee that Y is not
vacuously true.
In this case, the underlying truth problem is asking a user to pick one of
N different resolvers to trust, without the user having any way to know
independently if any of those resolvers are trustworthy.
If none of the resolvers is trustworthy, then the only solution is to not
trust the resolvers. This can be done by forcing DNSSEC validation to be
done and to discard any failures.
If and only if the user is able to legitimately trust their selected
resolver, can that assertion be relied upon, and at that point the
assertion has value.

There are at least two things that I see as being problems that need to be
worked on to achieve this possibility: discovery of trustworthiness and/or
trust relationship with the existing configured resolver; and the "who
watches the watchmen" problem of persistent monitoring of allegedly
trustworthy resolver operators to determine whether a given response from a
particular resolver (including any assertion about blocking and reason) can
be trusted.

IMHO, deploying any TRR without this devolves to the "can't trust the
resolver", which means no blocking, which is a terrible result (given that
we live in a malware-infested world as well as other subjectively- and
objectively-bad stuff like child pornography).

I would prefer to actually work on these problems.

I also think it would be better for all parties if implementers not deploy
things like TRRs until the bare minimum of mechanisms is available, which
may require work not only on the applications (doing dns) but also on the
resolvers themselves.

Brian

--0000000000006c0e710591a992ae
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 8:42 AM Eric R=
escorla &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ekr@rtfm.com">ekr@rtfm.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 6:15 AM Neil Cook &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:neil.cook@open-xchange.com" target=3D"_blank">neil.cook@open-xchange=
.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1=
ex"><div><br><div><div><br></div><div>It=E2=80=99s not entirely =C2=A0usele=
ss. The problem it does solve is giving the user a better experience when a=
 site is blocked for resolvers that support this extended Error Code. Curre=
ntly for HTTPS the user will end up with a TLS connection error of some kin=
d (or a blank page in some browsers). If a resolver returns a =E2=80=9Cbloc=
ked/censored/prohibited=E2=80=9D response, then the browser can tell the us=
er that the web page was blocked with an informative message. Assuming this=
 becomes the default behaviour for non-malicious resolvers then I think it =
will a good signal for distinguishing =C2=A0&quot;this is malware blocking&=
quot; from &quot;this resolver is malicious=E2=80=9D.</div></div></div></bl=
ockquote><div><br></div><div>I&#39;m not following. Suppose that we add an =
error code that says &quot;this site has malware&quot;. Now, I operate a re=
solver which is malicious in the sense that it wishes to block a certain fo=
rm of content (say, access to the IETF) but don&#39;t want the people whose=
 content I am blocking is being blocked for that reason. So, instead I retu=
rn &quot;this site has malware&quot;.</div><div><br></div><div>My point her=
e is that a code of this type only tells you what the resolver *asserts* th=
e reason it blocked it is, it doesn&#39;t necessarily tell you what the act=
ual reason that the content was blocked.</div></div></div></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>The high-level issue is that at very least some of the bloc=
king services or resolvers doing blocking, are set up based on some specifi=
c trust relationship, and that trust is essential in order to have a reason=
 to use the service or resolver.</div><div>Those are typically either inter=
nal (enterprise) scenarios where that trust is basically &quot;same company=
&quot; and mandated, or a service offered with some specific terms of servi=
ce, whether it is a fee-based service or free.</div><div><br></div><div>Try=
ing to overlay a different model of third-party resolver where the client d=
oesn&#39;t have a pre-defined trust relationship with that third party, is =
where things start to go sideways.</div><div><br></div><div>While it might =
be possible to re-engineer both sides of that equation so they are not inco=
mpatible, the basic issue is that you can&#39;t easily tell whether a resol=
ver currently being used is strictly giving unmodified results or not. Ther=
e is no clear signal or flag.</div><div><br></div><div>Going beyond asserti=
on might be possible with re-engineering, such as providing some fourth-par=
ty attestation (e.g. the source of the feed that gets used by the DNS resol=
ver also provides its own signature on individual entries that would permit=
 human inspection).</div><div><br></div><div>From a mathematical perspectiv=
e, the problem is one of classical logic versus modern logic: saying &quot;=
Every X is a Y&quot; also require an assertion of existence &quot;There is =
one member of X&quot;, in order to guarantee that Y is not vacuously true.<=
/div><div>In this case, the underlying truth problem is asking a user to pi=
ck one of N different resolvers to trust, without the user having any way t=
o know independently if any of those resolvers are trustworthy.</div><div>I=
f none of the resolvers is trustworthy, then the only solution is to not tr=
ust the resolvers. This can be done by forcing DNSSEC validation to be done=
 and to discard any failures.</div><div>If and only if the user is able to =
legitimately trust their selected resolver, can that assertion be relied up=
on, and at that point the assertion has value.</div><div><br></div><div>The=
re are at least two things that I see as being problems that need to be wor=
ked on to achieve this possibility: discovery of trustworthiness and/or tru=
st relationship with the existing configured resolver; and the &quot;who wa=
tches the watchmen&quot; problem of persistent monitoring of allegedly trus=
tworthy resolver operators to determine whether a given response from a par=
ticular resolver (including any assertion about blocking and reason) can be=
 trusted.</div><div><br></div><div>IMHO, deploying any TRR without this dev=
olves to the &quot;can&#39;t trust the resolver&quot;, which means no block=
ing, which is a terrible result (given that we live in a malware-infested w=
orld as well as other subjectively- and objectively-bad stuff like child po=
rnography).</div><div><br></div><div>I would prefer to actually work on the=
se problems.</div><div><br></div><div>I also think it would be better for a=
ll parties if implementers not deploy things like TRRs until the bare minim=
um of mechanisms is available, which may require work not only on the appli=
cations (doing dns) but also on the resolvers themselves.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Brian</div></div></div>

--0000000000006c0e710591a992ae--


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From: Andrew Campling <andrew.campling@419.consulting>
To: Neil Cook <neil.cook@open-xchange.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
CC: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
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Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 11:57:11 +0200 (CEST)
From: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
Reply-To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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<!doctype html>
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  <div>
   <br>
  </div>
  <blockquote type="cite">
   <div>
    Il 3 settembre 2019 19:39 Brian Dickson &lt;brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com&gt; ha scritto:
   </div>
   <div>
    <br>
   </div>
   <div dir="ltr">
    <div class="gmail_quote">
     <div>
      In this case, the underlying truth problem is asking a user to pick one of N different resolvers to trust, without the user having any way to know independently if any of those resolvers are trustworthy.
     </div>
     <div>
      If none of the resolvers is trustworthy, then the only solution is to not trust the resolvers. This can be done by forcing DNSSEC validation to be done and to discard any failures.
     </div>
    </div>
   </div>
  </blockquote>
  <div>
   This would require clients to do DNSSEC validation on the device, rather than trust the assertion of DNSSEC validation that comes from the resolver. This would be easier to implement in the "traditional" model of a stub resolver, but with DoH, each application making DNS queries would need to take care of DNSSEC validation on its own - and I don't see that happening reliably and uniformly.
  </div>
  <div>
   <br>
  </div>
  <div>
   Moreover, this model would break the cases in which the user does not trust the resolver, but the resolver still has to apply filters because they are legally mandated, or applies filters that are beneficial anyway (e.g. against malware), which however cannot be validated via DNSSEC.
   <br>
  </div>
  <div>
   <br>
  </div>
  <div>
   In the end, I think we are at a point where we need to give some thought at the general architecture of DNS resolution over the Internet, and think: where and how should it be done? For example, would it be better if full resolution happened on each individual device? I think that this would have more drawbacks than advantages. So the only alternative is to facilitate the establishment of trust in at least one resolver.
   <br>
  </div>
  <blockquote type="cite">
   <div dir="ltr">
    <div class="gmail_quote">
     <div>
      If and only if the user is able to legitimately trust their selected resolver, can that assertion be relied upon, and at that point the assertion has value.
     </div>
    </div>
   </div>
  </blockquote>
  <div>
   Agreed.
   <br>
  </div>
  <blockquote type="cite">
   <div dir="ltr">
    <div class="gmail_quote">
     <div>
      There are at least two things that I see as being problems that need to be worked on to achieve this possibility: discovery of trustworthiness and/or trust relationship with the existing configured resolver; and the "who watches the watchmen" problem of persistent monitoring of allegedly trustworthy resolver operators to determine whether a given response from a particular resolver (including any assertion about blocking and reason) can be trusted.
     </div>
    </div>
   </div>
  </blockquote>
  <div>
   In the end, I think that a general "resolver accreditation service" on a global scale - which Mozilla has the ambition to create with their TRR list - will never work due to scaling problems, unless you centralize resolution into a handful of global platforms, which IMHO would be a much bigger problem for the Internet. What could instead work is a way for the user to express and change an assertion of trust in one or more resolvers, devolving the problem to the edges of the network and letting each user define implicitly their own requirements for trust.
   <br>
  </div>
  <div>
   <br>
  </div>
  <div>
   Still, if Mozilla wants to try to make that model work, they should add into it as much value as possible for users and operators - and being able to exchange trusted communications would be good value for both.
   <br>
  </div>
  <blockquote type="cite">
   <div dir="ltr">
    <div class="gmail_quote">
     <div>
      IMHO, deploying any TRR without this devolves to the "can't trust the resolver", which means no blocking, which is a terrible result (given that we live in a malware-infested world as well as other subjectively- and objectively-bad stuff like child pornography).
     </div>
     <div>
      <br>
     </div>
     <div>
      I would prefer to actually work on these problems.
     </div>
     <div>
      <br>
     </div>
     <div>
      I also think it would be better for all parties if implementers not deploy things like TRRs until the bare minimum of mechanisms is available, which may require work not only on the applications (doing dns) but also on the resolvers themselves.
     </div>
    </div>
   </div>
  </blockquote>
  <div>
   I also agree on all these points!
   <br>
  </div>
  <div class="io-ox-signature">
   <p>-- <br class=""></p>
   <pre class="">Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy &amp; Innovation, Open-Xchange<br><a href="mailto:vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com">vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com</a> <br>Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy</pre>
  </div> 
 </body>
</html>


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Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 23:27:26 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
cc: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>,  ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
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On Thu, 5 Sep 2019, Vittorio Bertola wrote:

[ quoting might have errors as the original messages seems to have odd quoting mechanisms ]

> Moreover, this model would break the cases in which the user does not trust the resolver, but the resolver still has to apply filters
> because they are legally mandated, or applies filters that are beneficial anyway (e.g. against malware), which however cannot be
> validated via DNSSEC.

If filtered properly (eg RPZ 2.0) the censored Answer section is moved
to the Authoritatve section so that DNSSEC validation can succeed while
the answer is suppressed for the client (and those not supported this
will also see a failure, even if a DNSSEC failure, instead of an
extended error opcode DNS failure with DNSSEC proof)

> In the end, I think we are at a point where we need to give some thought at the general architecture of DNS resolution over the
> Internet, and think: where and how should it be done? For example, would it be better if full resolution happened on each individual
> device?

This has been the case for a while now. This is why I wrote RFC 7901.
This is why we wrote draft-tls-dnssec-chain.

You can still use a forwarder, and you can still get all information in
one round trip.

Trusting unsigned data from the internet from random parties is not done
for any other protocol, why allow it for DNS?

> I think that this would have more drawbacks than advantages.

Can you elaborate on why you think that is?

>  So the only alternative is to facilitate the establishment of trust
> in at least one resolver.

No because transport security provided by a resolver is not data origin
security offered by DNSSEC.

> In the end, I think that a general "resolver accreditation service" on a global scale - which Mozilla has the ambition to create with
> their TRR list - will never work due to scaling problems, unless you centralize resolution into a handful of global platforms, which
> IMHO would be a much bigger problem for the Internet. What could instead work is a way for the user to express and change an assertion
> of trust in one or more resolvers, devolving the problem to the edges of the network and letting each user define implicitly their own
> requirements for trust.

Sounds very similar to the browsers having a store of root CA's. It
didn't really work from a trust point of view, and it was patched up
with first CRLs, then OCSP and then CT. Why make the same mistake
with DNs resolvers?

> I also think it would be better for all parties if implementers not deploy things like TRRs until the bare minimum of mechanisms
> is available, which may require work not only on the applications (doing dns) but also on the resolvers themselves.

Some believe TRR's are better than random ISP DNS resolvers they happen
to be (forced to) using, such as hotel or coffee shops. For example,
I've stayed at hotels whose wifi blocked Priceline and Booking.com
using DNS. So I don't see why TRR's should not be deployed until
some mysterious future time.

Paul


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Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 16:32:18 +0200 (CEST)
From: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
Reply-To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
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> Il 6 settembre 2019 05:27 Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> ha scritto:
> 
> Trusting unsigned data from the internet from random parties is not done
> for any other protocol, why allow it for DNS?

I see your point, but one could reply: is the *content* of any web page you load signed or independently verified for integrity in any way? No, you just authenticate the source and secure the channel, and then trust any content you receive that way. So why should it be different when the content (via DoH) is a DNS response? I'm not saying that this argument is 100% right, but it's how lots of things work now.

[on-device recursor]
> > I think that this would have more drawbacks than advantages.
> 
> Can you elaborate on why you think that is?

Every time the idea comes up, the operations people complain that performance would be bad due to reduced caching, and the privacy people complain that it would become much easier to associate DNS queries to a specific individual/household. Moreover, having billions of active resolvers, rather than hundreds of thousands, would possibly make things like the root key rollover much harder, and exacerbate the problem of obsolete recursors.

However, these are not impossible problems, so it still makes sense to have the discussion.

> >  So the only alternative is to facilitate the establishment of trust
> > in at least one resolver.
> 
> No because transport security provided by a resolver is not data origin
> security offered by DNSSEC.

This is a problem only if you trust ICANN and the zone owner more than you trust your resolver. If it's the opposite, you might just conclude that the resolver must have altered the response for a good reason, and trust the resolver anyway.

> > In the end, I think that a general "resolver accreditation service" on a global scale - which Mozilla has the ambition to create with
> > their TRR list - will never work due to scaling problems, unless you centralize resolution into a handful of global platforms, which
> > IMHO would be a much bigger problem for the Internet. What could instead work is a way for the user to express and change an assertion
> > of trust in one or more resolvers, devolving the problem to the edges of the network and letting each user define implicitly their own
> > requirements for trust.
> 
> Sounds very similar to the browsers having a store of root CA's. It
> didn't really work from a trust point of view, and it was patched up
> with first CRLs, then OCSP and then CT. Why make the same mistake
> with DNs resolvers?

Mozilla's TRR model is similar to a chain of trust with them at the root. However, the user can bless a resolver (i.e., tell the device "I trust a.b.c.d as a resolver") locally, without having to involve any central authority. (And yes, the current CA system is awful.)

> Some believe TRR's are better than random ISP DNS resolvers they happen
> to be (forced to) using, such as hotel or coffee shops. For example,
> I've stayed at hotels whose wifi blocked Priceline and Booking.com
> using DNS. So I don't see why TRR's should not be deployed until
> some mysterious future time.

At the current state of the technology, browsers cannot start a blanket adoption of the TRR model without breaking substantial parts of the Internet, so they shouldn't. They could do it in specific cases where they have determined that this won't create technical, service, policy and legal issues, which AFAIK is what Mozilla is trying to do. The above could be one of those cases, as long as they don't bypass local laws together with the local resolver, and don't clash with the captive portal mechanism. Still, if you care about that problem, I'd advise you to get a proper VPN now, rather than wait for TRRs in the browser.

-- 
 
Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com 
Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy


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From: Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 16:50:32 +0100
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To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] data integrity and DNSSEC or DoH/DoT
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On Fri, 6 Sep 2019, 16:26 Vittorio Bertola, <vittorio.bertola=
40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> > Il 6 settembre 2019 05:27 Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> ha scritto:
> >
> > Trusting unsigned data from the internet from random parties is not done
> > for any other protocol, why allow it for DNS?
>
> I see your point, but one could reply: is the *content* of any web page
> you load signed or independently verified for integrity in any way? No, you
> just authenticate the source and secure the channel, and then trust any
> content you receive that way.



One could also say that what you outline as the trust model for web pages
is precisely what one would expect from a typical HTTPS URL: because a URL
literally represents "go to <source> and retreive <content> and that is
defacto what you wanted."

A URL is a Uniform Resource Locator; there's that word, "location".

Others have layered signatures and the like atop of this mechanism, but if
you are talking about content-based-addressing (which you essentially are)
then you want non-HTTP URIs, for instance "Magnet" URIs.

Whereas: DNS is a distributed database, and the goal of that is more like a
service discovery protocol (who here remembers Jini?) - where you ask the
aether "What is the address X which corresponds to site Y?" - and there is
(currently, regrettable) little/no chain of trust, nor source-integrity nor
content-integrity, in the response.

So why should it be different when the content (via DoH) is a DNS response?


Because HTTPS has a security-model of "the URL is the Key, and a chain of
trust should permit an authoritative response of the content - which need
not be fixed! - whereas DNS is essentially a search query amongst untrusted
search engines, some of which are lying for their own reasons/benefit.

That's why.

- alec





>

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Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"auto"><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" clas=
s=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, 6 Sep 2019, 16:26 Vittorio Bertola, &lt;vittorio.b=
ertola=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org">40open-xchang=
e.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
>&gt; Il 6 settembre 2019 05:27 Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@noh=
ats.ca" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; ha scri=
tto:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Trusting unsigned data from the internet from random parties is not do=
ne<br>
&gt; for any other protocol, why allow it for DNS?<br>
<br>
I see your point, but one could reply: is the *content* of any web page you=
 load signed or independently verified for integrity in any way? No, you ju=
st authenticate the source and secure the channel, and then trust any conte=
nt you receive that way.</blockquote></div></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></di=
v><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">One could also say that wha=
t you outline as the trust model for web pages is precisely what one would =
expect from a typical HTTPS URL: because a URL literally represents &quot;g=
o to &lt;source&gt; and retreive &lt;content&gt; and that is defacto what y=
ou wanted.&quot;</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">A URL i=
s a Uniform Resource Locator; there&#39;s that word, &quot;location&quot;.<=
/div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Others have layered sign=
atures and the like atop of this mechanism, but if you are talking about co=
ntent-based-addressing (which you essentially are) then you want non-HTTP U=
RIs, for instance &quot;Magnet&quot; URIs.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div=
><div dir=3D"auto">Whereas: DNS is a distributed database, and the goal of =
that is more like a service discovery protocol (who here remembers Jini?) -=
 where you ask the aether &quot;What is the address X which corresponds to =
site Y?&quot; - and there is (currently, regrettable) little/no chain of tr=
ust, nor source-integrity nor content-integrity, in the response.=C2=A0=C2=
=A0</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><div class=3D"gmail_=
quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"> So why should it be different when t=
he content (via DoH) is a DNS response? </blockquote></div></div><div dir=
=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Because HTTPS has a security-model of=
 &quot;the URL is the Key, and a chain of trust should permit an authoritat=
ive response of the content - which need not be fixed! - whereas DNS is ess=
entially a search query amongst untrusted search engines, some of which are=
 lying for their own reasons/benefit.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div=
 dir=3D"auto">That&#39;s why.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"=
auto">- alec</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><=
div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

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From: Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 16:57:07 +0100
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>
> So why should it be different when the content (via DoH) is a DNS
>> response?
>
>
> Because HTTPS has a security-model of "the URL is the Key, and a chain of
> trust should permit an authoritative response of the content - which need
> not be fixed! - whereas DNS is essentially a search query amongst untrusted
> search engines, some of which are lying for their own reasons/benefit.
>
> That's why.
>



ps: in case I did not make my point obvious enough: the whole point of DoH
is literally to remedy *some* of the risks inherent in the latter, by
layering requests on top of the former.

- a

--000000000000fed3520591e47d45
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<div dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"auto"><div class=3D"gmail_quote" dir=3D"auto"=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"auto"><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0=
 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">So why should it be diff=
erent when the content (via DoH) is a DNS response? </blockquote></div></di=
v><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Because HTTPS has a securit=
y-model of &quot;the URL is the Key, and a chain of trust should permit an =
authoritative response of the content - which need not be fixed! - whereas =
DNS is essentially a search query amongst untrusted search engines, some of=
 which are lying for their own reasons/benefit.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br>=
</div><div dir=3D"auto">That&#39;s why.</div></div></blockquote></div></div=
><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">=
</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">ps: in case I did not m=
ake my point obvious enough: the whole point of DoH is literally to remedy =
*some* of the risks inherent in the latter, by layering requests on top of =
the former.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">- a</div><di=
v dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br>=
</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"a=
uto"><div class=3D"gmail_quote" dir=3D"auto"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quo=
te" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"=
>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2019 14:24:08 -0700
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Subject: [Add] Firefox: Cloudflare DoH by default in the US, starting in September 2019
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Hi,

Interesting to see that at least 70k users already have DoH turned on.

FYI:

https://blog.mozilla.org/futurereleases/2019/09/06/whats-next-in-making-dns-over-https-the-default/

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,<br></div><div><br></div><div>Interesting to see t=
hat at least 70k users already have DoH turned on.</div><div><br></div><div=
>FYI:</div><div><br></div><a href=3D"https://blog.mozilla.org/futurerelease=
s/2019/09/06/whats-next-in-making-dns-over-https-the-default/">https://blog=
.mozilla.org/futurereleases/2019/09/06/whats-next-in-making-dns-over-https-=
the-default/</a><br><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div></div>

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Just making sure people here have seen this.

https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-d=
ns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module

Bret=20

Sent from my Commodore 128D

PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto">Just making sure people here have seen this=
.<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight=
/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation=
-module">https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using=
-google-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module</a></div><div><=
br></div><div>Bret&nbsp;<br><br><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature" dir=3D"ltr"><=
span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">Sent from my Commod=
ore 128D</span><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);=
"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255,=
 0);"><font class=3D"" style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant=
-position: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-alternates: no=
rmal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; line-height: normal;">PGP Fingerprint=
:&nbsp;</font><span class=3D"" style=3D"text-align: -webkit-auto;"><font cla=
ss=3D"">63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050</font></span=
></span></div></div></div></body></html>=

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Paul Vixie spoke at vBSDCon 2019 last week about DoH. Some of the highlights=
 are available at:

https://twitter.com/DLangille/status/1169962162854514688

Bret=20

Sent from my Commodore 128D

PGP Fingerprint: 63B4 FC53 680A 6B7D 1447  F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050=

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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 2=
55, 255, 0);">Paul Vixie spoke at vBSDCon 2019 last week about DoH. Some of t=
he highlights are available at:</span><div class=3D""><span style=3D"backgro=
und-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D=
""><font color=3D"#000000" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-co=
lor: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/DLangille/statu=
s/1169962162854514688" class=3D"" style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); backgr=
ound-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">https://twitter.com/DLangille/status/11=
69962162854514688</a></font></div><div class=3D""><br></div><div class=3D"">=
Bret&nbsp;</div><br><div id=3D"AppleMailSignature" dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D=
"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">Sent from my Commodore 128D</spa=
n><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><br></span>=
</div><div><span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);"><font c=
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rmal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-va=
riant-east-asian: normal; line-height: normal;">PGP Fingerprint:&nbsp;</font=
><span class=3D"" style=3D"text-align: -webkit-auto;"><font class=3D"">63B4 =
FC53 680A 6B7D 1447 &nbsp;F2C0 74F8 ACAE 7415 0050</font></span></span></div=
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"We=E2=80=99re banding together to globally adopt encrypted DNS."

https://www.encrypted-dns.org/participants

That logo is quite something. But, happy to see more efforts in this space.
It's better than clear text.

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr">&quot;We=E2=80=99re banding together to globally adopt enc=
rypted DNS.&quot;<br><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.encrypted-d=
ns.org/participants">https://www.encrypted-dns.org/participants</a><br></di=
v><div><br></div><div>That logo is quite something. But, happy to see more =
efforts in this space. It&#39;s better than clear text.</div><div><br></div=
><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div></div>

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Hello,

Was the source code behind this study published?

It seems like it shouldn't be too much effort. After all, the study is
already published, so the code can't be changed.

thanks,
Rob


On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 10:42 PM Kevin Borgolte <kevin@iseclab.org> wrote:

>
> > This paper looks interesting. Is the software used in the paper
> published?
>
> Thanks! The code isn=E2=80=99t open source yet, but we will make it publi=
c
> alongside the Docker setup we used for running it. Not sure when that is
> going to happen exactly though.
>
> > Or, at least, is the test page set published? I haven't read the whole
> thing yet, but it seems like the page set would be relevant if the paper
> tests page load time.
>
> The list of websites is attached. It is extracted from the top 1,000 and
> 99,000 to 100,000 of a Tranco list.
>
> Best,
> Kevin
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hello,<div><br></div><div>Was the source code behind this =
study published?</div><div><br></div><div>It seems like it shouldn&#39;t be=
 too much effort. After all, the study is already published, so the code ca=
n&#39;t be changed.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div><di=
v><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"=
gmail_attr">On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 10:42 PM Kevin Borgolte &lt;<a href=3D"=
mailto:kevin@iseclab.org">kevin@iseclab.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1p=
x solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><br>
&gt; This paper looks interesting. Is the software used in the paper publis=
hed?<br>
<br>
Thanks! The code isn=E2=80=99t open source yet, but we will make it public =
alongside the Docker setup we used for running it. Not sure when that is go=
ing to happen exactly though.<br>
<br>
&gt; Or, at least, is the test page set published? I haven&#39;t read the w=
hole thing yet, but it seems like the page set would be relevant if the pap=
er tests page load time.<br>
<br>
The list of websites is attached. It is extracted from the top 1,000 and 99=
,000 to 100,000 of a Tranco list.<br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Kevin<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div>

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On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:16 Bret Jordan, <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Just making sure people here have seen this..
>
>
> https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module
>


One can only wonder how rapidly they adopted HTTPS to evade the "content
fingerprinting" of anti-malware in the late 90s and early 2000s, and how
the adoption curves compare?

Similarly for adopting Tor, also, of course.

And WebRTC and Skype.

Not to mention those clever malware authors who hardcode IP addresses -
that was a tremendous innovation in cyber badware.

Or were you suggesting that "innovation happens and bad people adopt it as
well as good" somehow constitutes and argument towards some end?

-a





>

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<div dir=3D"auto"><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D=
"gmail_attr">On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:16 Bret Jordan, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:j=
ordan.ietf@gmail.com">jordan.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockq=
uote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc =
solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto">Just making sure people here have=
 seen this..<div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/th=
reat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-=
sexploitation-module" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://www.proo=
fpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-a=
nd-possible-new-sexploitation-module</a></div><div></div></div></blockquote=
></div></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div d=
ir=3D"auto">One can only wonder how rapidly they adopted HTTPS to evade the=
 &quot;content fingerprinting&quot; of anti-malware in the late 90s and ear=
ly 2000s, and how the adoption curves compare?</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br><=
/div><div dir=3D"auto">Similarly for adopting Tor, also, of course.=C2=A0</=
div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">And WebRTC and Skype.</di=
v><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Not to mention those clever=
 malware authors who hardcode IP addresses - that was a tremendous innovati=
on in cyber badware.</div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">Or =
were you suggesting that &quot;innovation happens and bad people adopt it a=
s well as good&quot; somehow constitutes and argument towards some end?</di=
v><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto">-a</div><div dir=3D"auto"><=
br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=
=3D"auto"><br></div><div dir=3D"auto"><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div>

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2019 12:44:21 -0700
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Subject: [Add] Trust-DNS
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Hi,

I found this library today:
https://github.com/bluejekyll/trust-dns

It implements a number of DNS standards, including DoH and DoT. It doesn't
use any of the OS resolution facilities, and is implemented entirely in
Rust.

It contains default resolver configurations for Google, Cloudflare, and
Quad9.

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<br><div><br></div><div>I found this library today:</di=
v><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/bluejekyll/trust-dns">https://github.c=
om/bluejekyll/trust-dns</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>It implements a nu=
mber of DNS standards, including DoH and DoT. It doesn&#39;t use any of the=
 OS resolution facilities, and is implemented entirely in Rust.</div><div><=
br></div><div>It contains default resolver configurations for Google, Cloud=
flare, and Quad9.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div></div=
>

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To: "Dixon, Hugh" <Hugh.Dixon=40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re:  Malware adopting DoH
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A question you might ask is, =E2=80=9Chow do we know that this malware is us=
ing DoH?=E2=80=9D  Also, now that it is doing DoH, what new opportunities ex=
ist for stopping it?  Is it easier or harder to trick it?

It=E2=80=99s all very well and good to point out that it=E2=80=99s using DoH=
 and that this blocks certain mitigation strategies, but eg if Google can mi=
tigate it centrally we might be better off, not worse off, as a whole.=20

> On Sep 12, 2019, at 11:46, Dixon, Hugh <Hugh.Dixon=3D40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.o=
rg> wrote:
>=20
> =EF=BB=BF
> While tis true that there have always been other methods than Do53 for Mal=
ware C&C and exfil, the thing is that the existence of DoH services from Goo=
gle (and other very large-scale internet entities) is (IMHO) quite a distinc=
t change in the availability of
> *the combination of* :
> Conventionally-encrypted (as opposed to stick-out-like-a-sore-thumb custom=
/obscure)
> Unauthenticated but via =E2=80=9Cpublic=E2=80=9D infrastructure
> Globally anycast-by-design (i.e. not trivially IP-detected-and-blocked lik=
e static IPs)
> A wide spread of steady-flow =E2=80=9Cgenuine=E2=80=9D traffic (e.g. 24h p=
eak-to-mean of ~ 2 for example for DNS) in which to hide
> =20
> And possibly other things.
> =20
> That doesn=E2=80=99t mean DoH isn=E2=80=99t a good thing as a DNS-on-the-w=
ire-privacy and recursor-authentication protocol (as of course all these fea=
tures are also what make it a great protocol for attempting to prevent downg=
rade attacks by what The Internet would call bad (network/nation-state) acto=
rs).  However, it does beg the question of (all) operators of DoH infrastruc=
ture as to whether they are delivering =E2=80=9Ca better internet=E2=80=9D i=
f they ignore the assistance to criminals that they offer if they don=E2=80=99=
t actively take a role against them.
> Of course there=E2=80=99s an argument that a crook-enabling DoH server is b=
etter than an NXDOMAIN-hacking ISP DNS. And a lot of ISPs don=E2=80=99t do a=
ny actively-bad stuff with DNS data/responses but do apply malware mitigatio=
n.
> =20
> To address the question, perhaps the =E2=80=9Cwhat can we do about mitigat=
ing the opportunities for harm generated through innovation?=E2=80=9D is the=
 better end point?
> H
> =20
> On 10/09/2019, 16:14, "Add on behalf of Alec Muffett" <add-bounces@ietf.or=
g on behalf of alec.muffett@gmail.com> wrote:
> =20
> On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:16 Bret Jordan, <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Just making sure people here have seen this..
> =20
> https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google=
-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module
> =20
> =20
> One can only wonder how rapidly they adopted HTTPS to evade the "content f=
ingerprinting" of anti-malware in the late 90s and early 2000s, and how the a=
doption curves compare?
> =20
> Similarly for adopting Tor, also, of course.=20
> =20
> And WebRTC and Skype.
> =20
> Not to mention those clever malware authors who hardcode IP addresses - th=
at was a tremendous innovation in cyber badware.
> =20
> Or were you suggesting that "innovation happens and bad people adopt it as=
 well as good" somehow constitutes and argument towards some end?
> =20
> -a
> =20
> =20
> =20
> =20
> =20
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
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> --------------------------------------------------------------------
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> Information in this email including any attachments may be privileged, con=
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u have received it in error, please notify the sender by return e-mail and d=
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>=20
> Sky UK Limited (Registration No. 2906991), Sky-In-Home Service Limited (Re=
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s mentioned in this paragraph are incorporated in England and Wales and shar=
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> Add mailing list
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"content-type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3D=
utf-8"></head><body dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr">A question you might ask i=
s, =E2=80=9Chow do we know that this malware is using DoH?=E2=80=9D &nbsp;Al=
so, now that it is doing DoH, what new opportunities exist for stopping it? &=
nbsp;Is it easier or harder to trick it?</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><di=
v dir=3D"ltr">It=E2=80=99s all very well and good to point out that it=E2=80=
=99s using DoH and that this blocks certain mitigation strategies, but eg if=
 Google can mitigate it centrally we might be better off, not worse off, as a=
 whole.&nbsp;</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On Sep 12,=
 2019, at 11:46, Dixon, Hugh &lt;Hugh.Dixon=3D40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org&gt; wr=
ote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">=EF=
=BB=BF

<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dutf-8">
<meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Microsoft Word 15 (filtered medium)">
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<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">While tis t=
rue that there have always been other methods than Do53 for Malware C&amp;C a=
nd exfil, the thing is that the existence of DoH services from Google (and o=
ther very large-scale internet entities)
 is (IMHO) quite a distinct change in the availability of <o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><i><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">*<b>the=
 combination of</b>* :<o:p></o:p></span></i></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Convention=
ally-encrypted (as opposed to stick-out-like-a-sore-thumb custom/obscure)<o:=
p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Unauthenti=
cated but via =E2=80=9Cpublic=E2=80=9D infrastructure<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Globally a=
nycast-by-design (i.e. not trivially IP-detected-and-blocked like static IPs=
)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">A wide spr=
ead of steady-flow =E2=80=9Cgenuine=E2=80=9D traffic (e.g. 24h peak-to-mean o=
f ~ 2 for example for DNS) in which to hide<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">And possib=
ly other things.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">That doesn=
=E2=80=99t mean DoH isn=E2=80=99t a good thing as a DNS-on-the-wire-privacy a=
nd recursor-authentication protocol (as of course all these features are als=
o what make it a great protocol for attempting to
 prevent downgrade attacks by what The Internet would call bad (network/nati=
on-state) actors).&nbsp; However, it does beg the question of (all) operator=
s of DoH infrastructure as to whether they are delivering =E2=80=9Ca better i=
nternet=E2=80=9D if they ignore the assistance to
 criminals that they offer if they don=E2=80=99t actively take a role agains=
t them.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Of course t=
here=E2=80=99s an argument that a crook-enabling DoH server is better than a=
n NXDOMAIN-hacking ISP DNS. And a lot of ISPs don=E2=80=99t do any actively-=
bad stuff with DNS data/responses but do apply malware
 mitigation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">To address=
 the question, perhaps the =E2=80=9Cwhat can we do about mitigating the oppo=
rtunities for harm generated through innovation?=E2=80=9D is the better end p=
oint?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">H<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp=
;</o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">On 10/09/2019, 16:14, "A=
dd on behalf of Alec Muffett" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:add-bounces@ietf.org">ad=
d-bounces@ietf.org</a> on behalf of
<a href=3D"mailto:alec.muffett@gmail.com">alec.muffett@gmail.com</a>&gt; wro=
te:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:1=
6 Bret Jordan, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jordan.ietf@gmail.com">jordan.ietf@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0cm=
 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">Just making sure people h=
ere have seen this..
<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><a href=3D"https://eur01=
.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.proofpoint.com%2Fu=
s%2Fthreat-insight%2Fpost%2Fpsixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-poss=
ible-new-sexploitation-module&amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Chugh.dixon%40sky.uk%7Cbe8=
42998fe8f4078b46908d73601822c%7C68b865d5cf184b2b82a4a4eddb9c5237%7C0%7C0%7C6=
37037252427909693&amp;sdata=3D7V5bD7OSaLMqCAAqiL8oBg8F4HNgU8Qb2FnND9lWw9g%3D=
&amp;reserved=3D0" target=3D"_blank">https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-in=
sight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploit=
ation-module</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">One can only wonder how r=
apidly they adopted HTTPS to evade the "content fingerprinting" of anti-malw=
are in the late 90s and early 2000s, and how the adoption curves compare?<o:=
p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">Similarly for adopting T=
or, also, of course.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">And WebRTC and Skype.<o:=
p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">Not to mention those cle=
ver malware authors who hardcode IP addresses - that was a tremendous innova=
tion in cyber badware.<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">Or were you suggesting t=
hat "innovation happens and bad people adopt it as well as good" somehow con=
stitutes and argument towards some end?<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">-a<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0cm=
 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso=
-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:36.0pt;text-align:center">
<b><span style=3D"color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">----------------=
----------------------------------------------------</span></b><o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso=
-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:36.0pt;text-align:center">
<b><span style=3D"color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">This email is fr=
om an external source. Please do not open attachments or click links from an=
 unknown or suspicious origin. Phishing attempts can be reported by sending t=
hem to phishing@sky.uk as attachments.
 Thank you</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" align=3D"center" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso=
-margin-bottom-alt:auto;margin-left:36.0pt;text-align:center">
<b><span style=3D"color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">----------------=
----------------------------------------------------</span></b><o:p></o:p></=
p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-margin-bottom-al=
t:auto;margin-left:36.0pt">
&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
Information in this email including any attachments may be privileged, confi=
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From: Andrew Campling <andrew.campling@419.consulting>
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There's been a lot of coverage of Firefox and DoH of late, I thought it wou=
ld be useful to highlight some of the recent information and commentary cov=
ering Chrome and DoH in case it has been missed:

*       Chrome same-provide DoH upgrade blog<https://blog.chromium.org/2019=
/09/experimenting-with-same-provider-dns.html>
*       Chrome DoH Setting (Public)<https://docs.google.com/document/d/15Ss=
0OaJeb-T3g2RMwgikHvsC0CPKd-MLeGeetv1wYY4/edit>
*       Enabling DoH in Chrome<https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-to-enable-=
dns-over-https-doh-in-google-chrome/>
*       Some comments on DoH on both Chrome and Firefox<https://www.bleepin=
gcomputer.com/news/technology/google-unveils-dns-over-https-doh-plan-mozill=
as-faces-criticism/>


Andrew


Regards

Andrew Campling  MBA  MSc  DipM  FRSA  MCIM  MIoD  Liveryman
Director | 419 Consulting Ltd | Tel: +44 (0) 7710 303010 | E: Andrew.Campli=
ng@419.Consulting<mailto:Andrew.Campling@BT.Com>| t: @Andrew_Campling

This email contains information from 419 Consulting Ltd that might be privi=
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<font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"3"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;">
<div>There&#8217;s been a lot of coverage of Firefox and DoH of late, I tho=
ught it would be useful to highlight some of the recent information and com=
mentary covering Chrome and DoH in case it has been missed:</div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font><=
/div>
<ul style=3D"margin:0;padding-left:18pt;">
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">
<li><a href=3D"https://blog.chromium.org/2019/09/experimenting-with-same-pr=
ovider-dns.html"><font size=3D"3" color=3D"#0563C1"><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:12pt;"><u>Chrome same-provide DoH upgrade blog</u></span></font></a></li>=
<li><a href=3D"https://docs.google.com/document/d/15Ss0OaJeb-T3g2RMwgikHvsC=
0CPKd-MLeGeetv1wYY4/edit"><font size=3D"3" color=3D"#0563C1"><span style=3D=
"font-size:12pt;"><u>Chrome Do</u></span></font><font size=3D"3" color=3D"#=
0563C1"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;"><u>H Setting
(Public)</u></span></font></a></li><li><a href=3D"https://www.zdnet.com/art=
icle/how-to-enable-dns-over-https-doh-in-google-chrome/"><font size=3D"3" c=
olor=3D"#0563C1"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;"><u>Enabling DoH in Chrome<=
/u></span></font></a></li><li><a href=3D"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/n=
ews/technology/google-unveils-dns-over-https-doh-plan-mozillas-faces-critic=
ism/"><font size=3D"3" color=3D"#0563C1"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;"><u=
>Some comments on DoH on both Chrome and Firefox</u></span></font></a><font=
 size=3D"3"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;">
</span></font></li></span></font>
</ul>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font><=
/div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font><=
/div>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri"><b>Andrew</b></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" color=3D"#201F1E"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nb=
sp;</span></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" color=3D"#201F1E"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nb=
sp;</span></font></div>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"2" color=3D"#201F1E"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:10pt;">Regards</span></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" color=3D"navy"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;=
</span></font></div>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"2" color=3D"navy"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:10pt;"><b>Andrew Campling&nbsp; MBA&nbsp; MSc&nbsp; DipM&nbsp; FRSA&nbs=
p; MCIM&nbsp; MIoD&nbsp; Liveryman<br>

</b>Director | 419 Consulting Ltd | Tel: &#43;44 (0) 7710 303010 | E: <a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:Andrew.Campling@BT.Com"><font color=3D"#0563C1"><u>Andrew.Camp=
ling@419.Consulting</u></font></a>| t: <font color=3D"blue">@Andrew_Camplin=
g</font></span></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" color=3D"navy"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;">&nbsp;=
</span></font></div>
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must have sent it to you by mistake. Please email us to let us know, and do=
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<div><font size=3D"1" color=3D"#333333"><span style=3D"font-size:7pt;"><b>&=
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To: "Dixon, Hugh" <Hugh.Dixon@sky.uk>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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From: Allison Mankin <allison.mankin@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 19:39:34 -0400
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

The author, Benjamin Fry, is likely going to speak about the code at DNS
OARC 31 in Austin TX (and streaming) at the end of October.

On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 11:45 AM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I found this library today:
> https://github.com/bluejekyll/trust-dns
>
> It implements a number of DNS standards, including DoH and DoT. It doesn't
> use any of the OS resolution facilities, and is implemented entirely in
> Rust.
>
> It contains default resolver configurations for Google, Cloudflare, and
> Quad9.
>
> thanks,
> Rob
> --
> Add mailing list
> Add@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add
>

--00000000000000eeb2059263a7c3
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<div><div dir=3D"auto">The author, Benjamin Fry, is likely going to speak a=
bout the code at DNS OARC 31 in Austin TX (and streaming) at the end of Oct=
ober.</div></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, Sep 12, 2019 at 11:45 AM Rob Sayre &lt;<a href=3D"m=
ailto:sayrer@gmail.com">sayrer@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc sol=
id;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<br><div><br></div><div>I found th=
is library today:</div><div><a href=3D"https://github.com/bluejekyll/trust-=
dns" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/bluejekyll/trust-dns</a><br></div=
><div><br></div><div>It implements a number of DNS standards, including DoH=
 and DoT. It doesn&#39;t use any of the OS resolution facilities, and is im=
plemented entirely in Rust.</div><div><br></div><div>It contains default re=
solver configurations for Google, Cloudflare, and Quad9.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div></div>
-- <br>
Add mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Add@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Add@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add" rel=3D"noreferrer" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re:  Malware adopting DoH
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> On 12 Sep 2019, at 17:03, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
>=20
> It=E2=80=99s all very well and good to point out that it=E2=80=99s =
using DoH and that this blocks certain mitigation strategies, but eg if =
Google can mitigate it centrally we might be better off, not worse off, =
as a whole.=20

Perhaps not. If there are only a couple of dominant DoH resolver =
operators and they can control the price and quality of that service... =
Or lock out the competition... Or...


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From: "Ralf Weber" <dns@fl1ger.de>
To: "Ted Lemon" <mellon@fugue.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re:  Malware adopting DoH
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Moin!

On 12 Sep 2019, at 12:03, Ted Lemon wrote:

> A question you might ask is, “how do we know that this malware is 
> using DoH?”  Also, now that it is doing DoH, what new opportunities 
> exist for stopping it?  Is it easier or harder to trick it?
>
> It’s all very well and good to point out that it’s using DoH and 
> that this blocks certain mitigation strategies, but eg if Google can 
> mitigate it centrally we might be better off, not worse off, as a 
> whole.
I disagree. It would be nice if Google would mitigate these threats or 
follow local law when it comes to DNS answers. But having it all go to 
Google would still be centralisation with all the associated problems, 
which IMHO is a bigger problem.

The current name resolution architecture being de centralised with a lot 
of security happening in the edge is far better and we should try to 
keep that architecture and work on encrypting/securing the last missing 
pieces without changing the architecture.

We should also deploy public DoH services in a way that for security 
sensitive environments like enterprises it is possible to block them, so 
that these malware threats can not use them.

So long
-Ralf
—--
Ralf Weber


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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re:  Malware adopting DoH
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On Sep 13, 2019, at 09:20, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
> On 12 Sep 2019, at 17:03, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> It=E2=80=99s all very well and good to point out that it=E2=80=99s using D=
oH and that this blocks certain mitigation strategies, but eg if Google can m=
itigate it centrally we might be better off, not worse off, as a whole.=20
>=20
> Perhaps not. If there are only a couple of dominant DoH resolver operators=
 and they can control the price and quality of that service... Or lock out t=
he competition... Or...

Jim, this is just a non sequitur.   For the case of blocking malware, if the=
 malware has fewer choices, it is easier, not harder, to block.=20


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From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re:  Malware adopting DoH
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> On 13 Sep 2019, at 15:53, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
>=20
> Jim, this is just a non sequitur.   For the case of blocking malware, =
if the malware has fewer choices, it is easier, not harder, to block.

I=E2=80=99m not so sure it is a non-sequitur Ted. Aside from the =
competition/consolidation concerns which may well be out of scope for =
the IETF, centralisation is bad engineering because it introduces =
avoidable single points of failure. And control.

If malware has fewer =E2=80=9Cgatekeepers=E2=80=9D to evade, surely that =
makes it easier for those developing and distributing that stuff? Or to =
use an analogy, would virus writers have an easier or harder time of it =
if there was just one company providing anti-virus protection?

If you think the issue I raised is a non-sequitur, we can just agree to =
disagree.


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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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On Sep 13, 2019, at 10:58, Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
>> On 13 Sep 2019, at 15:53, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
>>=20
>> Jim, this is just a non sequitur.   For the case of blocking malware, if t=
he malware has fewer choices, it is easier, not harder, to block.
>=20
> I=E2=80=99m not so sure it is a non-sequitur Ted. Aside from the competiti=
on/consolidation concerns which may well be out of scope for the IETF, centr=
alisation is bad engineering because it introduces avoidable single points o=
f failure. And control.
>=20

Yes. That=E2=80=99s why malware using centralized services is good: because i=
t=E2=80=99s bad engineering. It makes them vulnerable.=20

I suspect that on the long run this will turn out to be a mistake on the mal=
ware authors=E2=80=99 part.=20=


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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, "Dixon, Hugh" <Hugh.Dixon=40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re:  Malware adopting DoH
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On Sep 13, 2019, at 2:51 PM, Andrew Campling =
<andrew.campling@419.consulting> wrote:
> If the centralisation potential of DoH takes effect as some =
anticipate, this would leave Google (and Cloudflare and other resolvers =
to a lesser extent) with significant control of the cybersecurity =
=E2=80=9Cmarket=E2=80=9D, both in terms of protection capability and =
also cyber intelligence gathering, crowding out specialist provision.  =
Much as I respect people in Google, from an antitrust perspective, as =
well as when considering innovation etc, I would urge people to be =
careful what they wish for!  =20

Again, we are talking specifically about malware using DoH.  It will =
probably use whatever DoH servers can be counted on.  This is entirely =
out of Google=E2=80=99s control.  The original point was that there is a =
problem with DoH and malware because Google.  My response was merely to =
point out that if such a problem exists, there is a mitigation strategy =
that could be very effective.

This is entirely orthogonal to any other operational issues that may =
come up as a result of the availability of DoH.   The fact that malware =
is using DoH is not a clear indication that the sky is falling, and may =
turn out quite differently than the author(s) of that malware intended.


--Apple-Mail=_3F7F92EA-C0A1-4DAB-BA5F-AB59F8019F5D
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Sep 13, 2019, at 2:51 PM, Andrew Campling &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:andrew.campling@419.consulting" =
class=3D"">andrew.campling@419.consulting</a>&gt; wrote:<div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: =
14.666666984558105px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none; float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">If the =
centralisation potential of DoH takes effect as some anticipate, this =
would leave Google (and Cloudflare and other resolvers to a lesser =
extent) with significant control of the cybersecurity =E2=80=9Cmarket=E2=80=
=9D, both in terms of protection capability and also cyber intelligence =
gathering, crowding out specialist provision.&nbsp; Much as I respect =
people in Google, from an antitrust perspective, as well as when =
considering innovation etc, I would urge people to be careful what they =
wish for!&nbsp; &nbsp;</span></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Again, we are talking specifically about malware using DoH. =
&nbsp;It will probably use whatever DoH servers can be counted on. =
&nbsp;This is entirely out of Google=E2=80=99s control. &nbsp;The =
original point was that there is a problem with DoH and malware because =
Google. &nbsp;My response was merely to point out that <i =
class=3D"">if</i><span style=3D"font-style: normal;" class=3D"">&nbsp;such=
 a problem exists, there is a mitigation strategy that could be =
</span><i class=3D"">very</i><span style=3D"font-style: normal;" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;effective.</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-style: normal;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-style: normal;" class=3D"">This is =
entirely orthogonal to any other operational issues that may come up as =
a result of the availability of DoH. &nbsp; The fact that malware is =
using DoH is not a clear indication that the sky is falling, and may =
turn out quite differently than the author(s) of that malware =
intended.</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"font-style: =
normal;" class=3D""><br class=3D""></span></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_3F7F92EA-C0A1-4DAB-BA5F-AB59F8019F5D--


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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: Malware adopting DoH
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If google or any other TRR DoH provider start blocking malware by default s=
urely that is filtering DNS which is the very problem that DoH is claiming =
to be solving? I'm not saying that filtering out malware is a bad thing - b=
ut if one of the core arguments for DoH is that filtering is bad and must n=
ever be done - then if they start filtering DNS is rather undermines what's=
 meant to be the entire point of the initiative. As the claim then becomes =
"Filtering DNS is bad except when we do it".


I am well aware that this is an argument with the implementation and not th=
e protocol but the "avoiding filtering" has been a core argument for the pr=
otocol as well=C2=A0 so now saying "actually filtering might be needed" is =
a bit of a bait and switch - especially when proponents of DoH have been cl=
aiming that such strategies aren't effective.

--=C2=A0
Robm
873
=C2=A0 "Ask not what I can do for the stupid,=C2=A0
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0but what the stupid can do for me" - Grae=
me Garden
On 13/09/2019 15:07:56, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
A question you might ask is, =E2=80=9Chow do we know that this malware is u=
sing DoH?=E2=80=9D =C2=A0Also, now that it is doing DoH, what new opportuni=
ties exist for stopping it? =C2=A0Is it easier or harder to trick it?

It=E2=80=99s all very well and good to point out that it=E2=80=99s using Do=
H and that this blocks certain mitigation strategies, but eg if Google can =
mitigate it centrally we might be better off, not worse off, as a whole.=C2=
=A0

On Sep 12, 2019, at 11:46, Dixon, Hugh <Hugh.Dixon=3D40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.or=
g> wrote:


=EF=BB=BF
While tis true that there have always been other methods than Do53 for Malw=
are C&C and exfil, the thing is that the existence of DoH services from Goo=
gle (and other very large-scale internet entities) is (IMHO) quite a distin=
ct change in the availability of
*the combination of* :
Conventionally-encrypted (as opposed to stick-out-like-a-sore-thumb custom/=
obscure)
Unauthenticated but via =E2=80=9Cpublic=E2=80=9D infrastructure
Globally anycast-by-design (i.e. not trivially IP-detected-and-blocked like=
 static IPs)
A wide spread of steady-flow =E2=80=9Cgenuine=E2=80=9D traffic (e.g. 24h pe=
ak-to-mean of ~ 2 for example for DNS) in which to hide
=C2=A0
And possibly other things.
=C2=A0
That doesn=E2=80=99t mean DoH isn=E2=80=99t a good thing as a DNS-on-the-wi=
re-privacy and recursor-authentication protocol (as of course all these fea=
tures are also what make it a great protocol for attempting to prevent down=
grade attacks by what The Internet would call bad (network/nation-state) ac=
tors).=C2=A0 However, it does beg the question of (all) operators of DoH in=
frastructure as to whether they are delivering =E2=80=9Ca better internet=
=E2=80=9D if they ignore the assistance to criminals that they offer if the=
y don=E2=80=99t actively take a role against them.
Of course there=E2=80=99s an argument that a crook-enabling DoH server is b=
etter than an NXDOMAIN-hacking ISP DNS. And a lot of ISPs don=E2=80=99t do =
any actively-bad stuff with DNS data/responses but do apply malware mitigat=
ion.
=C2=A0
To address the question, perhaps the =E2=80=9Cwhat can we do about mitigati=
ng the opportunities for harm generated through innovation?=E2=80=9D is the=
 better end point?
H
=C2=A0
On 10/09/2019, 16:14, "Add on behalf of Alec Muffett" <add-bounces@ietf.org=
 [mailto:add-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of alec.muffett@gmail.com [mailto:=
alec.muffett@gmail.com]> wrote:
=C2=A0
On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:16 Bret Jordan, <jordan.ietf@gmail.com [mailto:jorda=
n.ietf@gmail.com]> wrote:
Just making sure people here have seen this..
=C2=A0
https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-=
dns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module [https://eur01..safeli=
nks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.proofpoint.com%2Fus%2Ft=
hreat-insight%2Fpost%2Fpsixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-possible=
-new-sexploitation-module&amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Chugh.dixon%40sky.uk%7Cbe8429=
98fe8f4078b46908d73601822c%7C68b865d5cf184b2b82a4a4eddb9c5237%7C0%7C0%7C637=
037252427909693&amp;sdata=3D7V5bD7OSaLMqCAAqiL8oBg8F4HNgU8Qb2FnND9lWw9g%3D&=
amp;reserved=3D0]
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
One can only wonder how rapidly they adopted HTTPS to evade the "content fi=
ngerprinting" of anti-malware in the late 90s and early 2000s, and how the =
adoption curves compare?
=C2=A0
Similarly for adopting Tor, also, of course.=C2=A0
=C2=A0
And WebRTC and Skype.
=C2=A0
Not to mention those clever malware authors who hardcode IP addresses - tha=
t was a tremendous innovation in cyber badware.
=C2=A0
Or were you suggesting that "innovation happens and bad people adopt it as =
well as good" somehow constitutes and argument towards some end?
=C2=A0
-a
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
=C2=A0
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<div id=3D"__MailbirdStyleContent" style=3D"font-size: 10pt;font-family: Ta=
homa;color: #000000">=0A                                        =0A        =
                                =0A                                        =
    =0A                                        =0A                         =
               =0A                                        If google or any =
other TRR DoH provider start blocking malware by default surely that is fil=
tering DNS which is the very problem that DoH is claiming to be solving? I'=
m not saying that filtering out malware is a bad thing - but if one of the =
core arguments for DoH is that filtering is bad and must never be done - th=
en if they start filtering DNS is rather undermines what's meant to be the =
entire point of the initiative. As the claim then becomes "Filtering DNS is=
 bad except when we do it".<br><div><br></div><div>I am well aware that thi=
s is an argument with the implementation and not the protocol but the "avoi=
ding filtering" has been a core argument for the protocol as well&nbsp; so =
now saying "actually filtering might be needed" is a bit of a bait and swit=
ch - especially when proponents of DoH have been claiming that such strateg=
ies aren't effective.</div><div><br></div><div class=3D"mb_sig">--&nbsp;<di=
v><div>Robm</div><div>873</div><div>&nbsp; "Ask not what I can do for the s=
tupid,&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;but what the stupi=
d can do for me" - Graeme Garden</div></div></div><blockquote class=3D"hist=
ory_container" type=3D"cite" style=3D"border-left-style:solid;border-width:=
1px; margin-top:20px; margin-left:0px;padding-left:10px;">=0A              =
          <p style=3D"color: #AAAAAA; margin-top: 10px;">On 13/09/2019 15:0=
7:56, Ted Lemon &lt;mellon@fugue.com&gt; wrote:</p><div style=3D"font-famil=
y:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif"><div dir=3D"ltr">A question you might ask is,=
 =E2=80=9Chow do we know that this malware is using DoH?=E2=80=9D &nbsp;Als=
o, now that it is doing DoH, what new opportunities exist for stopping it? =
&nbsp;Is it easier or harder to trick it?</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><=
div dir=3D"ltr">It=E2=80=99s all very well and good to point out that it=E2=
=80=99s using DoH and that this blocks certain mitigation strategies, but e=
g if Google can mitigate it centrally we might be better off, not worse off=
, as a whole.&nbsp;</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote type=3D"cite">On =
Sep 12, 2019, at 11:46, Dixon, Hugh &lt;Hugh.Dixon=3D40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.or=
g&gt; wrote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=
=3D"ltr">=EF=BB=BF=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A=0A<div class=3D"WordSection1">=0A<p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">While tis true=
 that there have always been other methods than Do53 for Malware C&amp;C an=
d exfil, the thing is that the existence of DoH services from Google (and o=
ther very large-scale internet entities)=0A is (IMHO) quite a distinct chan=
ge in the availability of <o:p></o:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><=
i><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">*<b>the combination of</b>* :<=
o:p></o:p></span></i></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-farea=
st-language:EN-US">Conventionally-encrypted (as opposed to stick-out-like-a=
-sore-thumb custom/obscure)<o:p></o:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=
<span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Unauthenticated but via =E2=80=
=9Cpublic=E2=80=9D infrastructure<o:p></o:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Globally anycast-by-design=
 (i.e. not trivially IP-detected-and-blocked like static IPs)<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US=
">A wide spread of steady-flow =E2=80=9Cgenuine=E2=80=9D traffic (e.g. 24h =
peak-to-mean of ~ 2 for example for DNS) in which to hide<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o=
:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fare=
ast-language:EN-US">And possibly other things.<o:p></o:p></span></p>=0A<p c=
lass=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</=
o:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-languag=
e:EN-US">That doesn=E2=80=99t mean DoH isn=E2=80=99t a good thing as a DNS-=
on-the-wire-privacy and recursor-authentication protocol (as of course all =
these features are also what make it a great protocol for attempting to=0A =
prevent downgrade attacks by what The Internet would call bad (network/nati=
on-state) actors).&nbsp; However, it does beg the question of (all) operato=
rs of DoH infrastructure as to whether they are delivering =E2=80=9Ca bette=
r internet=E2=80=9D if they ignore the assistance to=0A criminals that they=
 offer if they don=E2=80=99t actively take a role against them.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-=
US">Of course there=E2=80=99s an argument that a crook-enabling DoH server =
is better than an NXDOMAIN-hacking ISP DNS. And a lot of ISPs don=E2=80=99t=
 do any actively-bad stuff with DNS data/responses but do apply malware=0A =
mitigation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"m=
so-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language:EN-US">To address the question, p=
erhaps the =E2=80=9Cwhat can we do about mitigating the opportunities for h=
arm generated through innovation?=E2=80=9D is the better end point?<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso-fareast-language=
:EN-US">H<o:p></o:p></span></p>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"mso=
-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>=0A<div>=0A<div>=0A<p =
class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">On 10/09/2019, 16:14, "Add=
 on behalf of Alec Muffett" &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:add-bounces@ietf.org">add=
-bounces@ietf.org</a> on behalf of=0A<a href=3D"mailto:alec.muffett@gmail.c=
om">alec.muffett@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A</div>=
=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<div>=0A<div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal"=
 style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:16 Bret Jordan, &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:jordan.ietf@gmail.com">jordan.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:=
<o:p></o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<blockquote style=3D"border:none;border-left:sol=
id #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0=
cm">=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">Just mak=
ing sure people here have seen this..=0A<o:p></o:p></p>=0A<div>=0A<p class=
=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=0A</div>=
=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><a href=3D"h=
ttps://eur01..safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.pro=
ofpoint.com%2Fus%2Fthreat-insight%2Fpost%2Fpsixbot-now-using-google-dns-ove=
r-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module&amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Chugh.dix=
on%40sky.uk%7Cbe842998fe8f4078b46908d73601822c%7C68b865d5cf184b2b82a4a4eddb=
9c5237%7C0%7C0%7C637037252427909693&amp;sdata=3D7V5bD7OSaLMqCAAqiL8oBg8F4HN=
gU8Qb2FnND9lWw9g%3D&amp;reserved=3D0" target=3D"_blank">https://www.proofpo=
int.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-=
possible-new-sexploitation-module</a><o:p></o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A</div>=0A</=
blockquote>=0A</div>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mar=
gin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=
=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">One can only wonder =
how rapidly they adopted HTTPS to evade the "content fingerprinting" of ant=
i-malware in the late 90s and early 2000s, and how the adoption curves comp=
are?<o:p></o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"marg=
in-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNor=
mal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">Similarly for adopting Tor, also, of cour=
se.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D=
"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"M=
soNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt">And WebRTC and Skype.<o:p></o:p></p>=
=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><o:=
p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margi=
n-left:36.0pt">Not to mention those clever malware authors who hardcode IP =
addresses - that was a tremendous innovation in cyber badware.<o:p></o:p></=
p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36.0pt"><=
o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mar=
gin-left:36.0pt">Or were you suggesting that "innovation happens and bad pe=
ople adopt it as well as good" somehow constitutes and argument towards som=
e end?<o:p></o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"ma=
rgin-left:36.0pt"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>=0A</div>=0A<div>=0A<p class=3D"MsoN=
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On Sep 14, 2019, at 5:16 AM, Robert Mortimer =
<robm=3D40scramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> If google or any other TRR DoH provider start blocking malware by =
default surely that is filtering DNS which is the very problem that DoH =
is claiming to be solving?

The argument for DoH is that you can=20
reliably know who operates the resolver you are talking to
know what the terms of service are
choose your provider based on their terms of service
not be forced to accept whatever terms service provider through which =
you are connecting at the moment insists upon, possibly with out telling =
you



--Apple-Mail=_2E42F70D-A3DF-428D-99C8-8EC2587618D6
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Sep 14, 2019, at 5:16 AM, Robert Mortimer &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:robm=3D40scramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org" =
class=3D"">robm=3D40scramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:<div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Tahoma; font-size: =
13.333333015441895px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; =
font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; =
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: =
none; float: none; display: inline !important;" class=3D"">If google or =
any other TRR DoH provider start blocking malware by default surely that =
is filtering DNS which is the very problem that DoH is claiming to be =
solving?</span></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">The=
 argument for DoH is that you can&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><ul =
class=3D"MailOutline"><li class=3D"">reliably know who operates the =
resolver you are talking to</li><li class=3D"">know what the terms of =
service are</li><li class=3D"">choose your provider based on their terms =
of service</li><li class=3D"">not be forced to accept whatever terms =
service provider through which you are connecting at the moment insists =
upon, possibly with out telling you</li></ul><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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From: "Robert Mortimer" <robm@scramworks.net>
To: "Ted Lemon" <mellon@fugue.com>, "" <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: Malware adopting DoH
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------=_NextPart_59257122.179571700182
Content-Type: text/plain;
 charset="utf-8"
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No that's an argument for making an informed decision about what DNS servic=
e provider you use and possibly for being able to avoid limitations being i=
mposed by the network you happen to be using at the time.

Using a VPN to access your DNS provider would achieve the same thing, as wo=
uld using DoT or in many cases simply not using DHCP to decide your DNS pro=
vider.

If my an application is deciding which DNS service to use without my inform=
ed consent then even if it's using DoH it achieves none of the things you l=
ist.

Your list merely describes informed choice of DNS provider not any benefit =
uniquely inherent to DoH


--=C2=A0
Robm
873
=C2=A0 "Ask not what I can do for the stupid,=C2=A0
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0but what the stupid can do for me" - Grae=
me Garden
On 14/09/2019 17:16:14, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
On Sep 14, 2019, at 5:16 AM, Robert Mortimer <robm=3D40scramworks.net@dmarc=
.ietf.org [mailto:robm=3D40scramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org]> wrote:
If google or any other TRR DoH provider start blocking malware by default s=
urely that is filtering DNS which is the very problem that DoH is claiming =
to be solving?

The argument for DoH is that you can=C2=A0
* reliably know who operates the resolver you are talking to
* know what the terms of service are
* choose your provider based on their terms of service
* not be forced to accept whatever terms service provider through which you=
 are connecting at the moment insists upon, possibly with out telling you


------=_NextPart_59257122.179571700182
Content-Type: text/html;
 charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div id=3D"__MailbirdStyleContent" style=3D"font-size: 10pt;font-family: Ta=
homa;color: #000000">=0A                                        =0A        =
                                =0A                                        =
    =0A                                        =0A                         =
               =0A                                        No that's an argu=
ment for making an informed decision about what DNS service provider you us=
e and possibly for being able to avoid limitations being imposed by the net=
work you happen to be using at the time.<div><br></div><div>Using a VPN to =
access your DNS provider would achieve the same thing, as would using DoT o=
r in many cases simply not using DHCP to decide your DNS provider.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>If my an application is deciding which DNS service to use =
without my informed consent then even if it's using DoH it achieves none of=
 the things you list.</div><div><br></div><div>Your list merely describes i=
nformed choice of DNS provider not any benefit uniquely inherent to DoH<br>=
<div><br></div><div class=3D"mb_sig">--&nbsp;<div><div>Robm</div><div>873</=
div><div>&nbsp; "Ask not what I can do for the stupid,&nbsp;</div><div>&nbs=
p; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;but what the stupid can do for me" - Graeme G=
arden</div></div></div><blockquote class=3D"history_container" type=3D"cite=
" style=3D"border-left-style:solid;border-width:1px; margin-top:20px; margi=
n-left:0px;padding-left:10px;">=0A                        <p style=3D"color=
: #AAAAAA; margin-top: 10px;">On 14/09/2019 17:16:14, Ted Lemon &lt;mellon@=
fugue.com&gt; wrote:</p><div style=3D"font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-seri=
f">On Sep 14, 2019, at 5:16 AM, Robert Mortimer &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:robm=
=3D40scramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org" class=3D"">robm=3D40scramworks.net@dmar=
c.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div cla=
ss=3D""><span style=3D"caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-family: Tahoma;font-s=
ize: 13.333333015441895px;font-style: normal;font-variant-caps: normal;font=
-weight: normal;letter-spacing: normal;text-align: start;text-indent: 0px;t=
ext-transform: none;white-space: normal;word-spacing: 0px;-webkit-text-stro=
ke-width: 0px;text-decoration: none;float: none;display: inline !important"=
 class=3D"">If google or any other TRR DoH provider start blocking malware =
by default surely that is filtering DNS which is the very problem that DoH =
is claiming to be solving?</span></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><d=
iv class=3D"">The argument for DoH is that you can&nbsp;</div><div class=3D=
""><ul class=3D"MailOutline"><li class=3D"">reliably know who operates the =
resolver you are talking to</li><li class=3D"">know what the terms of servi=
ce are</li><li class=3D"">choose your provider based on their terms of serv=
ice</li><li class=3D"">not be forced to accept whatever terms service provi=
der through which you are connecting at the moment insists upon, possibly w=
ith out telling you</li></ul><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div><di=
v class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote>=0A                   =
                     =0A                                        </div></div>
------=_NextPart_59257122.179571700182--


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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2019 08:28:49 -0500
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To: Robert Mortimer <robm=40scramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: Malware adopting DoH
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Hi,

Here's some data on this point:

https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/intro#google_public_dns_what_it_is_and_isnt

"Google Public DNS is not... A malware-blocking service. Google Public DNS
rarely performs blocking or filtering, though it may if we believe this is
necessary to protect our users from security threats. In such extraordinary
cases, it simply fails to answer; it does not create modified results."

Google and other browser makers do perform malware blocking, in a sense.
They just generally don't use DNS to do it. See:
https://safebrowsing.google.com

It seems to me that DoH provides the typical benefits of encryption over
the wire. On the "informed consent" argument: there are many divergent
opinions. Some people on this list seem to think DNS is special in some
way, but I don't think there is an IETF document that states anything like
that. As we have seen, there are many libraries, applications, and products
that connect to DNS servers without informing the user.

thanks,
Rob

On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:44 AM Robert Mortimer <robm=
40scramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> No that's an argument for making an informed decision about what DNS
> service provider you use and possibly for being able to avoid limitations
> being imposed by the network you happen to be using at the time.
>
> Using a VPN to access your DNS provider would achieve the same thing, as
> would using DoT or in many cases simply not using DHCP to decide your DNS
> provider.
>
> If my an application is deciding which DNS service to use without my
> informed consent then even if it's using DoH it achieves none of the things
> you list.
>
> Your list merely describes informed choice of DNS provider not any benefit
> uniquely inherent to DoH
>

--0000000000005f66ad0592977833
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>Here&#39;s some data on =
this point:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://developers.google.c=
om/speed/public-dns/docs/intro#google_public_dns_what_it_is_and_isnt">https=
://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/intro#google_public_dns_what=
_it_is_and_isnt</a><br><br></div><div>&quot;Google Public DNS is not... A m=
alware-blocking service. Google Public DNS rarely performs blocking or filt=
ering, though it may if we believe this is necessary to protect our users f=
rom security threats. In such extraordinary cases, it simply fails to answe=
r; it does not create modified results.&quot;<br><br></div><div>Google and =
other browser makers do perform malware blocking, in a sense. They just gen=
erally don&#39;t use DNS to do it. See: <a href=3D"https://safebrowsing.goo=
gle.com">https://safebrowsing.google.com</a>=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div=
></div>It seems to me that DoH provides the typical benefits of encryption =
over the wire. On the &quot;informed consent&quot; argument: there are many=
 divergent opinions. Some people on this list seem to think DNS is special =
in some way, but I don&#39;t think there is an IETF document that states an=
ything like that. As we have seen, there are many libraries, applications, =
and products that connect to DNS servers without informing the user.<div><b=
r></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob<br><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 7:44 AM Robert=
 Mortimer &lt;robm=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40scramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org">40s=
cramworks.net@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204=
,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div id=3D"gmail-m_-9076702748125116980__Mailbi=
rdStyleContent" style=3D"font-size:10pt;font-family:Tahoma;color:rgb(0,0,0)=
">
                                       =20
                                       =20
                                           =20
                                       =20
                                       =20
                                        No that&#39;s an argument for makin=
g an informed decision about what DNS service provider you use and possibly=
 for being able to avoid limitations being imposed by the network you happe=
n to be using at the time.<div><br></div><div>Using a VPN to access your DN=
S provider would achieve the same thing, as would using DoT or in many case=
s simply not using DHCP to decide your DNS provider.</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>If my an application is deciding which DNS service to use without my inf=
ormed consent then even if it&#39;s using DoH it achieves none of the thing=
s you list.</div><div><br></div><div>Your list merely describes informed ch=
oice of DNS provider not any benefit uniquely inherent to DoH</div></div>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div>

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Thread-Topic: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: Malware adopting DoH
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From: Kenji Baheux <kenjibaheux@google.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2019 19:52:50 +0900
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To: Andrew Campling <andrew.campling@419.consulting>
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On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 11:07 PM Andrew Campling
<andrew.campling@419.consulting> wrote:

> There=E2=80=99s been a lot of coverage of Firefox and DoH of late, I thou=
ght it
> would be useful to highlight some of the recent information and commentar=
y
> covering Chrome and DoH in case it has been missed:
>
>
>    - *Chrome same-provide DoH upgrade blog*
>    <https://blog.chromium.org/2019/09/experimenting-with-same-provider-dn=
s.html>
>    - *Chrome Do**H Setting (Public)*
>    <https://docs.google.com/document/d/15Ss0OaJeb-T3g2RMwgikHvsC0CPKd-MLe=
Geetv1wYY4/edit>
>    - *Enabling DoH in Chrome*
>    <https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-to-enable-dns-over-https-doh-in-goo=
gle-chrome/>
>
>
Note: we don't recommend anyone to follow these instructions. In M78, the
command line flags have changed. Command line flags are only meant for
testing purposes and may drop without any notice in a future milestone.




>
>    - *Some comments on DoH on both Chrome and Firefox*
>    <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/technology/google-unveils-dns-o=
ver-https-doh-plan-mozillas-faces-criticism/>
>
>
>
> *Andrew*
>
>
> Regards
>
>
> *Andrew Campling  MBA  MSc  DipM  FRSA  MCIM  MIoD  Liveryman *Director |
> 419 Consulting Ltd | Tel: +44 (0) 7710 303010 <+44%207710%20303010> | E:
> *Andrew.Campling@419.Consulting* <Andrew.Campling@BT.Com>| t:
> @Andrew_Campling
>
> *This email contains information from 419 Consulting Ltd that might be
> privileged or confidential. And it's only meant for the person above. If
> that's not you, we're sorry - we must have sent it to you by mistake.
> Please email us to let us know, and don't copy or forward it to anyone
> else. Thanks.*
>
>
>
> *We monitor our email systems and may record all our emails. 419
> Consulting Ltd Registered in England: No 11944258*
>
>
>
>
> --
> Add mailing list
> Add@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add
>


--=20
Kenji BAHEUX
Product Manager - Chrome
Google Japan

--00000000000061dd950592a9687f
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">=
<div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 11:07 PM Andr=
ew Campling &lt;andrew.campling@419.consulting&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px=
 solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">






<div>
<font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"3"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">
<div>There=E2=80=99s been a lot of coverage of Firefox and DoH of late, I t=
hought it would be useful to highlight some of the recent information and c=
ommentary covering Chrome and DoH in case it has been missed:</div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">=C2=A0</span></font></=
div>
<ul style=3D"margin:0px;padding-left:18pt">
<font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">
<li><a href=3D"https://blog.chromium.org/2019/09/experimenting-with-same-pr=
ovider-dns.html" target=3D"_blank"><font size=3D"3" color=3D"#0563C1"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u>Chrome same-provide DoH upgrade blog</u></span=
></font></a></li><li><a href=3D"https://docs.google.com/document/d/15Ss0OaJ=
eb-T3g2RMwgikHvsC0CPKd-MLeGeetv1wYY4/edit" target=3D"_blank"><font size=3D"=
3" color=3D"#0563C1"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u>Chrome Do</u></span>=
</font><font size=3D"3" color=3D"#0563C1"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u=
>H Setting
(Public)</u></span></font></a></li><li><a href=3D"https://www.zdnet.com/art=
icle/how-to-enable-dns-over-https-doh-in-google-chrome/" target=3D"_blank">=
<font size=3D"3" color=3D"#0563C1"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u>Enabli=
ng DoH in Chrome</u></span></font></a></li></span></font></ul></span></font=
></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Note: we don&#39;t recommend anyone=
 to follow these instructions. In M78, the command line flags have changed.=
 Command line flags are only meant for testing purposes and may drop withou=
t any notice in a future milestone.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div=
>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px =
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><font f=
ace=3D"Calibri" size=3D"3"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><ul style=3D"marg=
in:0px;padding-left:18pt"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt"><=
li><a href=3D"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/technology/google-unvei=
ls-dns-over-https-doh-plan-mozillas-faces-criticism/" target=3D"_blank"><fo=
nt size=3D"3" color=3D"#0563C1"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt"><u>Some comm=
ents on DoH on both Chrome and Firefox</u></span></font></a><font size=3D"3=
"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt">
</span></font></li></span></font>
</ul>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">=C2=A0</span></font></=
div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">=C2=A0</span></font></=
div>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri"><b>Andrew</b></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" color=3D"#201F1E"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">=C2=
=A0</span></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" color=3D"#201F1E"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">=C2=
=A0</span></font></div>
<div><font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"2" color=3D"#201F1E"><span style=3D"fon=
t-size:10pt">Regards</span></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" color=3D"navy"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt">=C2=A0<=
/span></font></div>
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419 Consulting Ltd<br>

Registered in England: No 11944258</b></span></font></div>
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On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 10:46 AM Dixon, Hugh <Hugh.Dixon=3D
40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Type 2 Malware mitigation is what we=E2=80=99re talking about in this thr=
ead =E2=80=93
> post-infection malware operation-prevention largely independent of any
> other specific application.
>
>
>
> Is the =E2=80=9CAll filtering is bad, mmkay=E2=80=9D ethos really so stro=
ng that the idea
> of interdicting criminal operations is not an option?
>

I don't think that's the case. Here's a list of DoH servers:
https://github.com/curl/curl/wiki/DNS-over-HTTPS ...They make many
different filtering choices.

However, there is another way to look at this problem, well-summarized by:
https://twitter.com/FiloSottile/status/1170848059493892096

"There's a pattern in resistance to Internet privacy improvements:
organizations that somehow manage their fleet's network but not its
configuration.
I'm not sure what control they thought they had, but it's equivalent to a
network attacker's, so yeah it's going away."

I'm glad ISPs are looking at rolling out DoH/DoT. Sometimes, people claim
that these encrypted queries must be made to whatever address DHCP returns.
I am not sure that makes sense, as dictating an endpoint in the clear can
subvert encryption as well (such as when a home router is compromised).

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 10:46 AM Dixon, H=
ugh &lt;Hugh.Dixon=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org">40sky.uk@dm=
arc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:=C2=A0<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><bloc=
kquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:=
1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang=3D"EN-GB"><div class=
=3D"gmail-m_7790369781114980780WordSection1"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Type 2 Malware mitigation is what we=E2=80=99re talk=
ing about in this thread =E2=80=93 post-infection malware operation-prevent=
ion largely independent of any other specific application.<u></u><u></u></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Is the =E2=80=9CAll filtering is bad, mmkay=E2=80=9D=
 ethos really so strong that the idea of interdicting criminal operations i=
s not an option?</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;=
t think that&#39;s the case. Here&#39;s a list of DoH servers: <a href=3D"h=
ttps://github.com/curl/curl/wiki/DNS-over-HTTPS">https://github.com/curl/cu=
rl/wiki/DNS-over-HTTPS</a> ...They make many different filtering choices.</=
div><div><br></div><div>However, there is another way to look at this probl=
em, well-summarized by: <a href=3D"https://twitter.com/FiloSottile/status/1=
170848059493892096">https://twitter.com/FiloSottile/status/1170848059493892=
096</a></div><div><br></div><div>&quot;There&#39;s a pattern in resistance =
to Internet privacy improvements: organizations that somehow manage their f=
leet&#39;s network but not its configuration.</div>I&#39;m not sure what co=
ntrol they thought they had, but it&#39;s equivalent to a network attacker&=
#39;s, so yeah it&#39;s going away.&quot;</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">I&#39;m glad ISPs are looking at rollin=
g out DoH/DoT. Sometimes, people claim that these encrypted queries must be=
 made to whatever address DHCP returns. I am not sure that makes sense, as =
dictating an endpoint in the clear can subvert encryption as well (such as =
when a home router is compromised).=C2=A0</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">thanks,</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"=
>Rob</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><=
br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><br></div></div>

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From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 12:22:29 -0700
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Cc: "Dixon, Hugh" <Hugh.Dixon=40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Sorry for being late to this thread. It seems to have gone into the weeds,
but it started in a pretty decent place, so I'll do a "Billy Martin" and go
back there to join in.

All of the following snippets have been selected to reinforce one point,
hiding in plain sight (a deliberate choice of words):

The real problem with malware is detecting it in the first place. Once you
know the domains/URL(s)/IPs it is using, there are numerous ways to take
action, be it on the browser, on the network, via DNS, or via routing
(black-holing).

Public DoH resolvers do several things to make things worse than they were:

   - They make it possible for malware to do resolution over DoH
   - They provide lots of traffic to those DoH resolvers in which the
   malware's traffic can effectively hide
   - They prevent correlation between DNS lookups and subsequent HTTPS
   traffic, where an absence of visible DNS lookups prior to HTTPS traffic
   would be a "signal" that detection systems could use

Malware using public DoH resolvers is the lowest hanging fruit for malware
authors.
The incremental effort needed to deploy a DoH endpoint (e.g. proxy) on some
random HTTPS server is extremely small, and has all of the same benefits to
a malware author that using Google or Cloudflare or Quad9 does, while
bypassing any malware filtering those resolvers may do.

In other words, it isn't the centralization and availability that is of
greatest value to malware authors.
Blocking on centralized resolvers would trigger the next step in the arms
race between malware authors and everyone else -- a step that creates the
biggest problem for detection.

If only malware used DoH, and everything else used DoT, a variety of
policies would be possible that preserve privacy, enable malware detection,
and enable enforcement of network-enforced policies (as an optional
benefit, not a requirement).
Networks who are happy for well-known DoT public resolvers to be used,
would be able to white-list those, and black list all other DoT endpoints.
This prevents the malware use of "random" DoT servers (unlike the DoH
scenario, where this isn't possible to do.)
If those DoT public resolvers filter malware-related DNS entries, the
network would not need to see the DNS queries. This presumes the
malware-filtering DNS has other sources for detecting which DNS entries
correspond to malware.
If the network wanted to inspect DNS traffic to correlate DNS to HTTPS
traffic, it could block DoT traffic to any resolver other than its own
specific inspection system. This is an independent model, rather than the
public DoT malware blocking via DNS, which is very dependent on the DoT
service.

Use of DoT for DNS, with local DoT resolvers and DNS-before-HTTPS would
also be useful for detecting use of DoH. It would not necessarily be 100%
foolproof, but it doesn't need to be, to be of value.

The DoH ecosystem is very much like the illegal narcotics trade. The
suppliers (DoH public resolvers) only spring up due to demand from the
buyers (the browsers). If it is possible to convince the browsers to enter
into a diversion program (switch from plans to use DoH to planning to use
DoT), it won't be necessary to consider a "War On Drugs" (war on DoH), and
the longer term effect would be the reduction or elimination of DoH
services being offered.

So, TL;DR: the problem isn't that malware can use DoH offered by public
resolvers; it is that DoH being used widely provides cover for malware
using DoH to any destination (public or otherwise), impacting malware
detection mechanisms.

Brian


On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 7:06 AM Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:

> A question you might ask is, =E2=80=9Chow do we know that this malware is=
 using
> DoH?=E2=80=9D  Also, now that it is doing DoH, what new opportunities exi=
st for
> stopping it?  Is it easier or harder to trick it?
>
> It=E2=80=99s all very well and good to point out that it=E2=80=99s using =
DoH and that this
> blocks certain mitigation strategies, but eg if Google can mitigate it
> centrally we might be better off, not worse off, as a whole.
>
> On Sep 12, 2019, at 11:46, Dixon, Hugh <Hugh.Dixon=3D40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.=
org>
> wrote:
>
> =EF=BB=BF
>
> While tis true that there have always been other methods than Do53 for
> Malware C&C and exfil, the thing is that the existence of DoH services fr=
om
> Google (and other very large-scale internet entities) is (IMHO) quite a
> distinct change in the availability of
>
>
> A wide spread of steady-flow =E2=80=9Cgenuine=E2=80=9D traffic (e.g. 24h =
peak-to-mean of ~
> 2 for example for DNS) in which to hide
>
>
>
> However, it does beg the question of (all) operators of DoH infrastructur=
e
> as to whether they are delivering =E2=80=9Ca better internet=E2=80=9D if =
they ignore the
> assistance to criminals that they offer if they don=E2=80=99t actively ta=
ke a role
> against them.
>
>
>
> To address the question, perhaps the =E2=80=9Cwhat can we do about mitiga=
ting the
> opportunities for harm generated through innovation?=E2=80=9D is the bett=
er end
> point?
>
> H
>
>
>
> On 10/09/2019, 16:14, "Add on behalf of Alec Muffett" <
> add-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of alec.muffett@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:16 Bret Jordan, <jordan.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Just making sure people here have seen this..
>
>
>
>
> https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-googl=
e-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module
> <https://eur01..safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww=
.proofpoint.com%2Fus%2Fthreat-insight%2Fpost%2Fpsixbot-now-using-google-dns=
-over-https-and-possible-new-sexploitation-module&data=3D02%7C01%7Chugh.dix=
on%40sky.uk%7Cbe842998fe8f4078b46908d73601822c%7C68b865d5cf184b2b82a4a4eddb=
9c5237%7C0%7C0%7C637037252427909693&sdata=3D7V5bD7OSaLMqCAAqiL8oBg8F4HNgU8Q=
b2FnND9lWw9g%3D&reserved=3D0>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Sorry for being late to this thread. It seems to have=
 gone into the weeds, but it started in a pretty decent place, so I&#39;ll =
do a &quot;Billy Martin&quot; and go back there to join in.</div><div><br><=
/div><div>All of the following snippets have been selected to reinforce one=
 point, hiding in plain sight (a deliberate choice of words):</div><div><br=
></div><div>The real problem with malware is detecting it in the first plac=
e. Once you know the domains/URL(s)/IPs it is using, there are numerous way=
s to take action, be it on the browser, on the network, via DNS, or via rou=
ting (black-holing).</div><div><br></div><div>Public DoH resolvers do sever=
al things to make things worse than they were:</div><div><ul><li>They make =
it possible for malware to do resolution over DoH</li><li>They provide lots=
 of traffic to those DoH resolvers in which the malware&#39;s traffic can e=
ffectively hide</li><li>They prevent correlation between DNS lookups and su=
bsequent HTTPS traffic, where an absence of visible DNS lookups prior to HT=
TPS traffic would be a &quot;signal&quot; that detection systems could use<=
/li></ul><div>Malware using public DoH resolvers is the lowest hanging frui=
t for malware authors.</div><div>The incremental effort needed to deploy a =
DoH endpoint (e.g. proxy) on some random HTTPS server is extremely small, a=
nd has all of the same benefits to a malware author that using Google or Cl=
oudflare or Quad9 does, while bypassing any malware filtering those resolve=
rs may do.</div><div><br></div><div>In other words, it isn&#39;t the centra=
lization and availability that is of greatest value to malware authors.</di=
v><div>Blocking on centralized resolvers would trigger the next step in the=
 arms race between malware authors and everyone else -- a step that creates=
 the biggest problem for detection.</div><div><br></div><div>If only malwar=
e used DoH, and everything else used DoT, a variety of policies would be po=
ssible that preserve privacy, enable malware detection, and enable enforcem=
ent of network-enforced policies (as an optional benefit, not a requirement=
).</div><div>Networks who are happy for well-known DoT public resolvers to =
be used, would be able to white-list those, and black list all other DoT en=
dpoints. This prevents the malware use of &quot;random&quot; DoT servers (u=
nlike the DoH scenario, where this isn&#39;t possible to do.)</div><div>If =
those DoT public resolvers filter malware-related DNS entries, the network =
would not need to see the DNS queries. This presumes the malware-filtering =
DNS has other sources for detecting which DNS entries correspond to malware=
.</div><div>If the network wanted to inspect DNS traffic to correlate DNS t=
o HTTPS traffic, it could block DoT traffic to any resolver other than its =
own specific inspection system. This is an independent model, rather than t=
he public DoT malware blocking via DNS, which is very dependent on the DoT =
service.</div><div><br></div><div>Use of DoT for DNS, with local DoT resolv=
ers and DNS-before-HTTPS would also be useful for detecting use of DoH. It =
would not necessarily be 100% foolproof, but it doesn&#39;t need to be, to =
be of value.</div><div><br></div><div>The DoH ecosystem is very much like t=
he illegal narcotics trade. The suppliers (DoH public resolvers) only sprin=
g up due to demand from the buyers (the browsers). If it is possible to con=
vince the browsers to enter into a diversion program (switch from plans to =
use DoH to planning to use DoT), it won&#39;t be necessary to consider a &q=
uot;War On Drugs&quot; (war on DoH), and the longer term effect would be th=
e reduction or elimination of DoH services being offered.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>So, TL;DR: the problem isn&#39;t that malware can use DoH offered b=
y public resolvers; it is that DoH being used widely provides cover for mal=
ware using DoH to any destination (public or otherwise), impacting malware =
detection mechanisms.</div><div><br></div><div>Brian</div><div><br></div></=
div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On=
 Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 7:06 AM Ted Lemon &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mellon@fugue.=
com">mellon@fugue.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"auto"><div dir=3D"ltr">A question you migh=
t ask is, =E2=80=9Chow do we know that this malware is using DoH?=E2=80=9D =
=C2=A0Also, now that it is doing DoH, what new opportunities exist for stop=
ping it?=C2=A0 Is it easier or harder to trick it?</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><b=
r></div><div dir=3D"ltr">It=E2=80=99s all very well and good to point out t=
hat it=E2=80=99s using DoH and that this blocks certain mitigation strategi=
es, but eg if Google can mitigate it centrally we might be better off, not =
worse off, as a whole.=C2=A0</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><blockquote type=3D"=
cite">On Sep 12, 2019, at 11:46, Dixon, Hugh &lt;Hugh.Dixon=3D<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">40sky.uk@dmarc.ietf.org</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br><br></blockquote></div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D=
"ltr">=EF=BB=BF






<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>While tis true that there have always been oth=
er methods than Do53 for Malware C&amp;C and exfil, the thing is that the e=
xistence of DoH services from Google (and other very large-scale internet e=
ntities)
 is (IMHO) quite a distinct change in the availability of <u></u><u></u></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>A wide spread of steady-flow =E2=80=9Cgenuine=
=E2=80=9D traffic (e.g. 24h peak-to-mean of ~ 2 for example for DNS) in whi=
ch to hide<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">However, it does beg the question of (all) operators=
 of DoH infrastructure as to whether they are delivering =E2=80=9Ca better =
internet=E2=80=9D if they ignore the assistance to
 criminals that they offer if they don=E2=80=99t actively take a role again=
st them.</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>To address the question, perhaps the =E2=80=9C=
what can we do about mitigating the opportunities for harm generated throug=
h innovation?=E2=80=9D is the better end point?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span>H<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36pt">On 10/09/2019, 16:14, &qu=
ot;Add on behalf of Alec Muffett&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:add-bounces@ie=
tf.org" target=3D"_blank">add-bounces@ietf.org</a> on behalf of
<a href=3D"mailto:alec.muffett@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">alec.muffett@gm=
ail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36pt">On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, 22:16=
 Bret Jordan, &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jordan.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank=
">jordan.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<blockquote style=3D"border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;b=
order-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 6pt;margin-left:4=
.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36pt">Just making sure people h=
ere have seen this..
<u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36pt"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-left:36pt"><a href=3D"https://eur01.=
.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.proofpoint.com%2=
Fus%2Fthreat-insight%2Fpost%2Fpsixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-p=
ossible-new-sexploitation-module&amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Chugh.dixon%40sky.uk%7=
Cbe842998fe8f4078b46908d73601822c%7C68b865d5cf184b2b82a4a4eddb9c5237%7C0%7C=
0%7C637037252427909693&amp;sdata=3D7V5bD7OSaLMqCAAqiL8oBg8F4HNgU8Qb2FnND9lW=
w9g%3D&amp;reserved=3D0" target=3D"_blank">https://www.proofpoint.com/us/th=
reat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-possible-new-=
sexploitation-module</a></p></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></di=
v></div></blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div></div>

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Steve Miller (@stvemillertime) put out some interesting comments via Twitte=
r last week on DoH and Malware that may be useful to some on here - here's =
some of the notable posts:

<https://twitter.com/stvemillertime>
            Steve Miller @stvemillertime
            DNS-over-HTTPS (#DoH<https://twitter.com/hashtag/DoH?src=3Dhash=
tag_click>): currently 40+ public DoH servers (github.com/curl/curl/wiki/DN=
S-over-HTTPS#publicly-available-servers...<https://t.co/V39mnwSAby?amp=3D1>=
) and quite a few POCs/tools for using DoH. I know of two named malware fam=
ilies, a couple of likely malware tests using DoH. Why haven't more malware=
 developers adopted it?
            9:12 PM * Sep 18, 2019*Twitter Web App<https://help.twitter.com=
/using-twitter/how-to-tweet>

<https://twitter.com/stvemillertime>
            Steve Miller @stvemillertime
            There are technical implications for using #DoH<https://twitter=
.com/hashtag/DoH?src=3Dhashtag_click> for FULL DNS C2, so I understand why =
this may not be a great route. But are there hurdles to using DoH for simpl=
e DNS resolution in malware?
            9:27 PM * Sep 18, 2019*Twitter Web App<https://help.twitter.com=
/using-twitter/how-to-tweet>
<https://twitter.com/stvemillertime>
<https://twitter.com/r0wdy_>
            The Cyber@r0wdy_ Replying to @stvemillertime<https://twitter.co=
m/stvemillertime>
            Have you posted about the families using it, or still under wra=
ps?
            9:17 PM * Sep 18, 2019*Twitter Web App<https://help.twitter.com=
/using-twitter/how-to-tweet>

<https://twitter.com/stvemillertime>
            Steve Miller @stvemillertime Replying to @r0wdy_<https://twitte=
r.com/r0wdy_>
            Afaik public ones are GODLUA (blog.netlab.360.com/an-analysis-o=
f-godlua-backdoor-en/...<https://t.co/Vk23Xe2y23?amp=3D1>) and PSIXBOT (pro=
ofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-=
and-possible-new-sexploitation-module...<https://t.co/lxFViiZFbG?amp=3D1>).=
..Outside of that I've only seen what I think are "tests" of things but not=
 really fully formed mal fams. We've seen some evidence of other activity b=
ut unfortunately didn't get bytes...
            9:20 PM * Sep 18, 2019*Twitter Web App<https://help.twitter.com=
/using-twitter/how-to-tweet>


Andrew


Regards

Andrew Campling  MBA  MSc  DipM  FRSA  MCIM  MIoD  Liveryman
Director | 419 Consulting Ltd | Tel: +44 (0) 7710 303010 | E: Andrew.Campli=
ng@419.Consulting<mailto:Andrew.Campling@BT.Com>| t: @Andrew_Campling

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<font face=3D"Calibri" size=3D"3"><span style=3D"font-size:12pt;">
<div>Steve Miller (@stvemillertime) put out some interesting comments via T=
witter last week on DoH and Malware that may be useful to some on here &#82=
11; here&#8217;s some of the notable posts:</div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font><=
/div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11pt;"><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/stvemillertime"></a></span></font></=
div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot" color=3D"blue"><=
b>Steve Mille</b><b>r</b><b> </b>@stvemillertime</font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot">DNS-over-HTTPS (=
<a href=3D"https://twitter.com/hashtag/DoH?src=3Dhashtag_click"><font color=
=3D"#0563C1">#DoH</font></a>): currently 40&#43; public DoH servers (<a hre=
f=3D"https://t.co/V39mnwSAby?amp=3D1"><font color=3D"#0563C1">github.com/cu=
rl/curl/wik</font><font color=3D"#0563C1">i</font><font color=3D"blue">/DNS=
-over-HTTPS#publicly-available-server</font><font color=3D"blue">s</font><f=
ont color=3D"blue">&#8230;</font></a>)
and quite a few POCs/tools for using DoH. I know of two named malware famil=
ies, a couple of likely malware tests using DoH. Why haven't more malware d=
evelopers adopted it?</font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot" size=3D"2"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:10pt;">9:12 PM &middot; Sep 18, 2019&middot;<a href=3D"=
https://help.twitter.com/using-twitter/how-to-tweet"><font size=3D"1" color=
=3D"blue"><span style=3D"font-size:8pt;">Twitter Web Ap</span></font><font =
size=3D"1" color=3D"blue"><span style=3D"font-size:8pt;">p</span></font></a=
></span></font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11pt;"><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/stvemillertime"></a></span></font></=
div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot" color=3D"blue"><=
b>Steve Mille</b><b>r</b><b> </b>@stvemillertime</font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot">There are techni=
cal implications for using <a href=3D"https://twitter.com/hashtag/DoH?src=
=3Dhashtag_click"><font color=3D"#0563C1">#DoH</font></a> for FULL DNS C2, =
so I understand why this may not be a great route.
But are there hurdles to using DoH for simple DNS resolution in malware?</f=
ont></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot" size=3D"2"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:10pt;">9:27 PM &middot; Sep 18, 2019&middot;<a href=3D"=
https://help.twitter.com/using-twitter/how-to-tweet"><font color=3D"blue">T=
witter Web Ap</font><font color=3D"blue">p</font></a></span></font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11pt;"><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/stvemillertime"></a></span></font></=
div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11pt;"><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/r0wdy_"></a></span></font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot" color=3D"blue"><=
b><u>The Cybe</u></b><b><u>r</u></b>@r0wdy_ <font color=3D"black">Replying =
to </font><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/stvemillertime">@stvemillertime</a=
></font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot">Have you posted =
about the families using it, or still under wraps?</font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot" size=3D"2"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:10pt;">9:17 PM &middot; Sep 18, 2019&middot;<a href=3D"=
https://help.twitter.com/using-twitter/how-to-tweet"><font color=3D"blue">T=
witter Web Ap</font><font color=3D"blue">p</font></a></span></font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11pt;"><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/stvemillertime"></a></span></font></=
div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot" color=3D"blue"><=
b>Steve Mille</b><b>r</b><b> </b>@stvemillertime <font color=3D"black">Repl=
ying to </font><a href=3D"https://twitter.com/r0wdy_">@r0wdy_</a></font></d=
iv>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot">Afaik public one=
s are GODLUA (<a href=3D"https://t.co/Vk23Xe2y23?amp=3D1"><font color=3D"#0=
563C1">blog.netlab.360.com/an-analysis-o</font><font color=3D"#0563C1">f</f=
ont><font color=3D"blue">-godlua-backdoor-en</font><font color=3D"blue">/</=
font><font color=3D"blue">&#8230;</font></a>)
and PSIXBOT (<a href=3D"https://t.co/lxFViiZFbG?amp=3D1"><font color=3D"#05=
63C1">proofpoint.com/us/threat-ins</font><font color=3D"#0563C1">i</font><f=
ont color=3D"blue">ght/post/psixbot-now-using-google-dns-over-https-and-pos=
sible-new-sexploitation-modul</font><font color=3D"blue">e</font><font colo=
r=3D"blue">&#8230;</font></a>)...Outside
of that I've only seen what I think are &quot;tests&quot; of things but not=
 really fully formed mal fams. We've seen some evidence of other activity b=
ut unfortunately didn't get bytes...</font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font face=3D"&amp;quot" size=3D"2"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:10pt;">9:20 PM &middot; Sep 18, 2019&middot;<a href=3D"=
https://help.twitter.com/using-twitter/how-to-tweet"><font color=3D"blue">T=
witter Web Ap</font><font color=3D"blue">p</font></a></span></font></div>
<div style=3D"padding-left:72pt;"><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size=
:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2"><span style=3D"font-size:11pt;">&nbsp;</span></font><=
/div>
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Hi,

This seems like a pretty simple guide to setting up your own DoH proxy:
https://dohproxy.com/

There are some comments here:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21054436

thanks,
Rob

--000000000000a323f405934303c1
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,<div><br></div><div>This seems like a pretty simple gui=
de to setting up your own DoH proxy:</div><div><a href=3D"https://dohproxy.=
com/">https://dohproxy.com/</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>There are some=
 comments here:</div><div><a href=3D"https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=
=3D21054436">https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3D21054436</a></div><div>=
<br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div></div>

--000000000000a323f405934303c1--


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For reference: Very similar behavior can be achieved with DNS-over-TLS with Knot Resolver >= 4.2.0:

https://knot-resolver.readthedocs.io/en/stable/modules.html#forwarding-to-multiple-targets

The difference is that Knot Resolver distributes domains using Public Suffix List instead of round robin, which should make statistical analysis somewhat harder (we hope).

Petr Špaček  @  CZ.NIC


On 24. 09. 19 4:08, Rob Sayre wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> This seems like a pretty simple guide to setting up your own DoH proxy:
> https://dohproxy.com/
> 
> There are some comments here:
> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21054436
> 
> thanks,
> Rob


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From: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
To: ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Sep 2019 14:12:34 -0700
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Subject: [Add] thinking in new directions -- draft-hardaker-dprive-add-doh-dnsop-filter-request
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I spent some time trying to see what else we could do to better support
all parties in an ADD world.  I wrote up the following in an effort to
spur thinking in new directions.  You'll probably hate it :-)

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardaker-dprive-add-doh-dnsop-filter-request/


-- 
Wes Hardaker
USC/ISI


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Subject: Re: [Add] thinking in new directions -- draft-hardaker-dprive-add-doh-dnsop-filter-request
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wjhns1> I spent some time trying to see what else we could do to better
wjhns1> support all parties in an ADD world.  I wrote up the following
wjhns1> in an effort to spur thinking in new directions.  You'll
wjhns1> probably hate it :-)

I don't hate it but I think it's the tail wagging the dog.

Expecting individual device users to be network admins and security
experts is never going to scale. It's why real informed consent is so
hard (if not a myth).

Individuals don't design blueprints for their own houses, build their
own cars, perform surgery on themselves or act as their own lawyers
(hopefull). At some point, we choose to "trust" an expert to do
complicated things or make complicated decisions for us.

One of the key things we keep bumping into here and other places
discussing DoH is who those experts making default choices are and to at
least give users the chance to pick that expert (or alert the user that
the app is choosing something different so they get some chance to
object).


From nobody Sun Sep 29 12:28:21 2019
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From: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>
To: Paul Ebersman <list-add@dragon.net>
Cc: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>,  ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] thinking in new directions -- draft-hardaker-dprive-add-doh-dnsop-filter-request
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Paul Ebersman <list-add@dragon.net> writes:

> wjhns1> I spent some time trying to see what else we could do to better
> wjhns1> support all parties in an ADD world.  I wrote up the following
> wjhns1> in an effort to spur thinking in new directions.  You'll
> wjhns1> probably hate it :-)
> 
> I don't hate it but I think it's the tail wagging the dog.
> 
> Expecting individual device users to be network admins and security
> experts is never going to scale. It's why real informed consent is so
> hard (if not a myth).

I actually think that it's more likely users will get their policy
bundled with some other software.  IE, they install an anti-virus
package and one of the things it does is configure the local OS policy
to request the anti-virus black list in outgoing DNS requests.

So yes, we need to handle the case where people
won't/can't/don't-understand the details, but they do understand
companies they trust and have *choices* about what company they want to
trust to make their privacy decisions.

> One of the key things we keep bumping into here and other places
> discussing DoH is who those experts making default choices are and to at
> least give users the chance to pick that expert (or alert the user that
> the app is choosing something different so they get some chance to
> object).

Note that multiple TRR selections would already let users pick a TRR
with the right policy.  The point of my suggestion was to try and stop
tying part of the "trusted" with the "resolver" and separate the
functionality.

-- 
Wes Hardaker
USC/ISI


From nobody Sun Sep 29 12:28:42 2019
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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2019 17:33:49 +0700
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Subject: [Add] NIST: Zero Trust Architecture
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--0000000000005258ee0593aea87e
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi,

I've found a couple references concerning "Zero Trust Architecture" that
seem relevant to the level of trust clients and servers might give to
intermediaries. There's this one from NIST, which I think was published
about 5 days ago:

"ZTA focuses on protecting resources, not network segments, as the network
location is no longer seen as the prime component to the security posture
of the resource."
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/draft

One prominent example of this architecture is Google's BeyondCorp:
https://www.beyondcorp.com/

I also found some related earlier debate on the TLS ESNI extension. This
thread seems similar to some threads on this list:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/LoBSl36ytZhu0TuxLfIyDGnT92Q

thanks,
Rob

--0000000000005258ee0593aea87e
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>I&#39;ve found a couple =
references concerning &quot;Zero Trust Architecture&quot; that seem relevan=
t to the level of trust clients and servers might give to intermediaries. T=
here&#39;s this one from NIST, which I think was published about 5 days ago=
:</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;ZTA focuses on protecting resources, not n=
etwork segments, as the network location is no longer seen as the prime com=
ponent to the security posture of the resource.&quot;</div><a href=3D"https=
://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-207/draft">https://csrc.nist.go=
v/publications/detail/sp/800-207/draft</a><br><div><br></div><div>One promi=
nent example of this architecture is Google&#39;s BeyondCorp:</div><div><a =
href=3D"https://www.beyondcorp.com/">https://www.beyondcorp.com/</a><br></d=
iv><div><br></div><div>I also found some related earlier debate on the TLS =
ESNI extension. This thread seems similar to some threads on this list:</di=
v><div><a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/LoBSl36ytZhu0Tu=
xLfIyDGnT92Q">https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/LoBSl36ytZhu0TuxLfI=
yDGnT92Q</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</div></div>

--0000000000005258ee0593aea87e--


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From: Will Hawkins <whh8b@obs.cr>
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2019 20:57:19 -0400
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Subject: [Add] US Congress to investigate Chrome's use of DoT
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I thought this might be of interest to people in this WG:

https://tech.slashdot.org/story/19/09/29/2033247/googles-dns-over-tls-plans-scrutinized-by-us-congress

Will


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Subject: Re: [Add] thinking in new directions -- draft-hardaker-dprive-add-doh-dnsop-filter-request
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On Sun, Sep 29, 2019 at 3:28 PM Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net> wrote:
>
> Paul Ebersman <list-add@dragon.net> writes:
>
> > wjhns1> I spent some time trying to see what else we could do to better
> > wjhns1> support all parties in an ADD world.  I wrote up the following
> > wjhns1> in an effort to spur thinking in new directions.  You'll
> > wjhns1> probably hate it :-)
> >
> > I don't hate it but I think it's the tail wagging the dog.
> >
> > Expecting individual device users to be network admins and security
> > experts is never going to scale. It's why real informed consent is so
> > hard (if not a myth).
>
> I actually think that it's more likely users will get their policy
> bundled with some other software.  IE, they install an anti-virus
> package and one of the things it does is configure the local OS policy
> to request the anti-virus black list in outgoing DNS requests.
>
> So yes, we need to handle the case where people
> won't/can't/don't-understand the details, but they do understand
> companies they trust and have *choices* about what company they want to
> trust to make their privacy decisions.


I agree with you both: users may not necessarily want to (or be able
to) configure their resolver to use lists like this but the software
that those users trust (e.g., AV software, as Mr. Hardaker said) may
do so.

Would a potential compromise make sense: In addition to offering this
option as a way to point to filter lists, this option can be used to
point to locations that will, in turn, set the filter lists? The
benefit may be that the feature is easier for the end user to
configure *and* the delegate organization can maintain an up-to-date
list of filter lists on behalf of its users.

Just a thought ... I'm sure that's is stupid, has shortcomings or has
already been discussed.

>
> > One of the key things we keep bumping into here and other places
> > discussing DoH is who those experts making default choices are and to at
> > least give users the chance to pick that expert (or alert the user that
> > the app is choosing something different so they get some chance to
> > object).
>
> Note that multiple TRR selections would already let users pick a TRR
> with the right policy.  The point of my suggestion was to try and stop
> tying part of the "trusted" with the "resolver" and separate the
> functionality.
>
> --
> Wes Hardaker
> USC/ISI
>
> --
> Add mailing list
> Add@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/add


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Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 14:34:54 +0200 (CEST)
From: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
Reply-To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
To: Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Add] thinking in new directions -- draft-hardaker-dprive-add-doh-dnsop-filter-request
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> Il 27 settembre 2019 23:12 Wes Hardaker <wjhns1@hardakers.net> ha scritto:
> 
>  
> I spent some time trying to see what else we could do to better support
> all parties in an ADD world.  I wrote up the following in an effort to
> spur thinking in new directions.  You'll probably hate it :-)
> 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardaker-dprive-add-doh-dnsop-filter-request/

Thanks for daring to do this :-)

My feeling is also that standardization work in the field of expressing, communicating and implementing DNS filtering lists would help many use cases (by the way, there already is a de-facto standard for a good part of this, i.e. RPZ, so it should be part of the picture). However, we also know that some people here believe that DNS filtering is always wrong, even when requested by the user. We could still have a standard for those that want to use it, though.

Also, you'd possibly need to flesh out a relatively complex architecture. For example, there are cases in which the compiler of the filtering list does not want to make it accessible to everyone, and there could be attacks based on forging/spoofing legitimate lists, so you would want to have authentication, channel security and access control. 

Then, there is the issue of which filters should be applied, which is a policy and regulatory one; resolver operators could honor the user's request for a given filter, but at the same time they might want to do their own malware filtering on top of it, or they might be required by law to block yet other stuff. So the communication of active filtering frameworks could go in both directions.

-- 
 
Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com 
Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy


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From: Michael Sinatra <michael@brokendns.net>
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Subject: [Add] DoH/DoT subject of antitrust inquiry
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The original article is in the WSJ, so it's probably paywalled.  Here's
a free one, but it's just based on the WSJ article:

https://gizmodo.com/house-antitrust-investigators-now-scrutinizing-googles-1838601830

I am not sure where to start in terms of all the ways in which I
disagree with the antitrust approach...

michael

