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From: "Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com>
To: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>, Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
CC: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>, "Brockhaus, Hendrik" <hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com>, "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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> From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
> Sent: Donnerstag, 30. Juli 2020 18:32
=20
> Right. So the question is keep it in the document or put it into a separa=
te
> small one. The small one would allow other derivative work not to have to
> have BRSKI-AE as a normative reference, which may be better if its got
> nothing to do with BRSKI-AE.
>=20
> I guess we can delay the decision up to the point when we do see such oth=
er
> derivative work coming up, and then decide whether to separate out the
> new /brski naming from the doc. As long as there is no such additional do=
c,
> we keep things in BRSKI-AE as they are right now.

>From my perspective the endpoint naming is independent from BRSKI-AE and we=
 basically came to the discussion based on the illustrative example for the=
 discovery option in BRSKI-AE.  So keeping it in BRSKI-AE and making it ind=
ependent upon further need also works. We may reuse the text then for a sep=
arate document if necessary.
I conclude that the WG is in favor of this way.

Best regards
Steffen

>=20
> Cheers
>     Toerless
>=20
> > Eliot
> >
> > > On 30 Jul 2020, at 17:46, Fries, Steffen <steffen.fries@siemens.com>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > Based on the discussion of splitting up the voucher handling endpoint
> naming issues from BRSKI-AE today, I just wanted to ensure I got the way
> forward right.
> > > From the Etherpad discussion I understood Michael that he would not b=
e
> too happy with having a BRSKI update right after BRSKI publication as RFC=
. I
> think finalizing the discussion on the list was advised.
> > >
> > > What we discussed in the WG meeting was to have a separate short
> document, basically defining a renaming or alternatively an alias for the
> current endpoints, which allows to keep the current implementations as is=
.
> > > Hence, the draft would relate to all of the endpoints defined in sect=
ion 5
> of BRSKI for the domain registrar facing the pledge (and potentially also=
 the
> MASA), which are:
> > > /.well-known/est/requestvoucher	used by pledge to registrar but also
> from registrar to MASA
> > > /.well-known/est/voucher_status	used by pledge to registrar
> > > /.well-known/est/requestauditlog	used by registrar to MASA
> > > /.well-known/est/enrollstatus		used by pledge to registrar
> > >
> > > From Toerless I understood that he would like to not change the curre=
nt
> draft as it is already in the final state and rather provide an update as
> separate document.
> > > From Michael I understood he would not be keen on having a fast updat=
e
> for the BRSKI document. At least not for a renaming of the defined
> endpoints. Also the IESG may view this as too fast.
> > > Eliot stated that there are already implementations out there that ut=
ilize
> the /est approach. So having aliases could be one way of dealing with it,=
 but
> this would double the endpoints at least for the four stated ones above.
> > >
> > > Both approaches have there merits. Having the endpoints distinct from
> the beginning allows a clearer separation of the functionalities, for the
> pledge and for server side handling. Specifically if we later on allow fo=
r
> alternative enrollment protocols in BRSKI-AE and define the discovery
> approach, it will lead to less confusion to align the naming with the
> corresponding functionality. From that perspective, my gut feeling would =
be
> that an integration into base BRSKI may be more appropriate. On the
> contrary, it will slow down the process, but somebody stated that there a=
re
> examples that these changes have been also done in the past and could be
> done fast.
> > >
> > > What do you suggest as way forward?
> > >
> > > Best regards
> > > Steffen
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Steffen Fries
> > > Siemens AG, Corporate Technology
> > > mailto:steffen.fries@siemens.com
> > >
>=20
> --
> ---
> tte@cs.fau.de


From nobody Tue Aug  4 04:46:23 2020
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de> wrote:
    > Maybe here is a good logic:

    > The short document would not need to be an Update as long as we do not
    > want to eliminate the old /est URLs.

okay, then let's not make the change at all, it's mostly cosmetic.

    > Aliasing should be easy enough.

Aliasing on the server sides (MASA, Registrar) is trivial.
But, the alias will have to remain for all time.

Aliasing on the client, which has to make a decision and possibly a discovery
is non-trivial.  This is why I want to do this *NOW*, or not at all.

In addition, it's clear that we need a registry here!

There are four questions:

1) do we really need to rename anything?
2) do we really need to Link Discovery for the HTTP version? (CoAP version
   already does it in ace-coaps-est)
3) is this a rename or an alias?
4) do we want to do this in (a) BRSKI base document, (b) short document, (c)
   BRSKI-AE document.


My answers:
1) No, I don't want to rename anything.  Let BRSKI-AE establish a new registry.

2) I don't want to Link Discovery, and I think it's harmful if BRSKI-AE
   proposes this rather than it being in the base document.

3) I see an alias as a waste of time. It's either a rename, or don't do it.

4) If we want to do this, then do it in the base document.
   Yes, with *ALL* the delay risk that Brian Carpenter mention.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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From nobody Tue Aug  4 05:01:21 2020
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Subject: [Anima] I-D Action: draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-42.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Autonomic Networking Integrated Model and Approach WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
        Authors         : Max Pritikin
                          Michael C. Richardson
                          Toerless Eckert
                          Michael H. Behringer
                          Kent Watsen
	Filename        : draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-42.txt
	Pages           : 124
	Date            : 2020-08-04

Abstract:
   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic
   Control Plane.  To do this a Secure Key Infrastructure is
   bootstrapped.  This is done using manufacturer-installed X.509
   certificates, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing
   service, both online and offline.  We call this process the
   Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol.
   Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable address and a
   cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, or on limited/
   disconnected networks.  Support for deployment models with less
   stringent security requirements is included.  Bootstrapping is
   complete when the cryptographic identity of the new key
   infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device.  The
   established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued
   certificate to the device as well.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-42
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-42

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-42


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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Subject: [Anima] possible last minute changes to anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra (was Re: Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today))
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Hi Mark, this concerns some desired changes to /.well-known/est.

Specifically, to move the things we did in anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra out
of /.well-known/est into a new /.well-known/brski.
The WG has not concluded to do this as yet, as the above document has passed
IESG review and is in MISREF at the RFC-EDITOR.

The thread starts at:
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/jjusQdqzS3G4WbczolCxF0_YmQQ/

I have prepared sample changes which I'd like your opinion on.

1) I am now registering /.well-known/brski
2) I no longer need /.well-known/est to point to the new document.  Should I
   say this?
3) Am I creating the /.well-known/brski Registry correctly?
   I didn't see any other WK that have sub-registries.

This URL works:
  https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-41&url2=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/brski-est-rename/dtbootstrap-anima-keyinfra.txt

But, includes a few small typos which were sent to the RFC-editor.

This should be the better DIFF:
  https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-42&url2=https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/brski-est-rename/dtbootstrap-anima-keyinfra.txt

but the DT/cache refuses to believe -42 exists yet, but maybe in 30 minutes
it will be okay.


--=-=-=
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Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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Subject: Re: [Anima] [anima-wg/anima-bootstrap] Elliptic Curve Private Key apikey exposed on GitHub
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--=-=-=
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GitGuardian <security@mail.gitguardian.com> wrote:
    > [anima-wg/anima-bootstrap] Elliptic Curve Private Key apikey exposed on GitHub

    > GitGuardian security alert
    > GitGuardian has detected the following Elliptic Curve Private Key exposed within your GitHub
    > account.
    > - Secret type: Elliptic Curve Private Key
    > - Repository: anima-wg/anima-bootstrap

This is an interesting development where github tries to keep us from
uploading our private keys... in this case, the keys used for examples!

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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Hi Michael,

Thank you for your view on the discussion and the proposals.=20
=20
> Aliasing on the server sides (MASA, Registrar) is trivial.
> But, the alias will have to remain for all time.
Yes, that was the burden connected.=20

> Aliasing on the client, which has to make a decision and possibly a disco=
very is
> non-trivial.  This is why I want to do this *NOW*, or not at all.
Agreed=20

> In addition, it's clear that we need a registry here!
>=20
> There are four questions:
>=20
> 1) do we really need to rename anything?
> 2) do we really need to Link Discovery for the HTTP version? (CoAP versio=
n
>    already does it in ace-coaps-est)
> 3) is this a rename or an alias?
> 4) do we want to do this in (a) BRSKI base document, (b) short document, =
(c)
>    BRSKI-AE document.
>=20
>=20
> My answers:
> 1) No, I don't want to rename anything.  Let BRSKI-AE establish a new reg=
istry.
>=20
> 2) I don't want to Link Discovery, and I think it's harmful if BRSKI-AE
>    proposes this rather than it being in the base document.
Just to be sure I understand it right, the discovery of enrollment endpoint=
s would still be part of BRSKI-AE?=20
So what we added in section 5.3 of the latest BRSKI-AE is still necessary t=
o my understanding?

> 3) I see an alias as a waste of time. It's either a rename, or don't do i=
t.
Renaming would be the much clearer way forward in the light of multiple (di=
fferent) enrollment endpoints supported at the registrar and the connected =
processing as discussed.

> 4) If we want to do this, then do it in the base document.
>    Yes, with *ALL* the delay risk that Brian Carpenter mention.
My take from the discussion so far regarding that point was rather reluctan=
ce regarding changes in the base document due to the connected delay, but a=
s you stated, it would be the clean way.=20

Best regards
Steffen


>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-


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Subject: Re: [Anima] possible last minute changes to anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra (was Re: Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today))
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> On 4 Aug 2020, at 10:07 pm, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> =
wrote:
>=20
>=20
> Hi Mark, this concerns some desired changes to /.well-known/est.
>=20
> Specifically, to move the things we did in =
anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra out
> of /.well-known/est into a new /.well-known/brski.
> The WG has not concluded to do this as yet, as the above document has =
passed
> IESG review and is in MISREF at the RFC-EDITOR.
>=20
> The thread starts at:
>   =
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/jjusQdqzS3G4WbczolCxF0_YmQQ/
>=20
> I have prepared sample changes which I'd like your opinion on.
>=20
> 1) I am now registering /.well-known/brski

Sure, we have a process for that ;)  Easiest thing to do is to create an =
issue here:
  https://github.com/protocol-registries/well-known-uris

> 2) I no longer need /.well-known/est to point to the new document.  =
Should I
>   say this?

Yes. Best thing to do is to include it in the request above.

> 3) Am I creating the /.well-known/brski Registry correctly?
>   I didn't see any other WK that have sub-registries.

How you manage the namespace under your well-known URI is totally up to =
you. That looks reasonable to me, although if you don't think it's =
likely there will be additions for a while, you could just say 'update =
this document to register additional paths'.

Cheers,


>=20
> This URL works:
>  =
https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-41=
&url2=3Dhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/brski-e=
st-rename/dtbootstrap-anima-keyinfra.txt
>=20
> But, includes a few small typos which were sent to the RFC-editor.
>=20
> This should be the better DIFF:
>  =
https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-42=
&url2=3Dhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/brski-e=
st-rename/dtbootstrap-anima-keyinfra.txt
>=20
> but the DT/cache refuses to believe -42 exists yet, but maybe in 30 =
minutes
> it will be okay.
>=20
>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-
>=20
>=20
>=20

--
Mark Nottingham   https://www.mnot.net/


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Subject: Re: [Anima] possible last minute changes to anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra (was Re: Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today))
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Thank you for the comments.

Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> wrote:
    >> On 4 Aug 2020, at 10:07 pm, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote:
    >>
    >>
    >> Hi Mark, this concerns some desired changes to /.well-known/est.
    >>
    >> Specifically, to move the things we did in anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra out
    >> of /.well-known/est into a new /.well-known/brski.
    >> The WG has not concluded to do this as yet, as the above document has passed
    >> IESG review and is in MISREF at the RFC-EDITOR.
    >>
    >> The thread starts at:
    >> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/jjusQdqzS3G4WbczolCxF0_YmQQ/
    >>
    >> I have prepared sample changes which I'd like your opinion on.
    >>
    >> 1) I am now registering /.well-known/brski

    > Sure, we have a process for that ;)  Easiest thing to do is to create an issue here:
    > https://github.com/protocol-registries/well-known-uris

    >> 2) I no longer need /.well-known/est to point to the new document.  Should I
    >> say this?

    > Yes. Best thing to do is to include it in the request above.

    >> 3) Am I creating the /.well-known/brski Registry correctly?
    >> I didn't see any other WK that have sub-registries.

    > How you manage the namespace under your well-known URI is totally up to
    > you. That looks reasonable to me, although if you don't think it's
    > likely there will be additions for a while, you could just say 'update
    > this document to register additional paths'.

We have new drafts that we are considering adopting now.


--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect   [
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [


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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Fries, Steffen <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
    >> My answers:
    >> 1) No, I don't want to rename anything.  Let BRSKI-AE establish a new registry.
    >>
    >> 2) I don't want to Link Discovery, and I think it's harmful if BRSKI-AE
    >> proposes this rather than it being in the base document.

    > Just to be sure I understand it right, the discovery of enrollment
    > endpoints would still be part of BRSKI-AE?

I frankly don't see the point of the discovery at all.

I understand the use case with CoAP, where one wants to be able to multicast
a request to /.well-known/core to find out which devices support a particular
service.
HTTP does not have the same thing, so I don't see the point of agility in the
end points if they are all in /.well-known anyway.

    >> 3) I see an alias as a waste of time. It's either a rename, or don't
    >> do it.

    > Renaming would be the much clearer way forward in the light of multiple
    > (different) enrollment endpoints supported at the registrar and the
    > connected processing as discussed.

If there is value in renaming, then lets do it RIGHT NOW.
I DO NOT WANT to confuse the market by having an RFC come out, followed by
another one 'correcting' it six months later.
I CAN NOT live with that situation.

    >> 4) If we want to do this, then do it in the base document.
    >> Yes, with *ALL* the delay risk that Brian Carpenter mention.

    > My take from the discussion so far regarding that point was rather
    > reluctance regarding changes in the base document due to the connected
    > delay, but as you stated, it would be the clean way.

Do we agree that this rename is cosmetic?
It appeals to humans, computer code does not care in any way.
If the WG can tolerate the process risk, then it shouldn't be a problem.
If we can agree by the end of the week to do this, then the changes could be
approved in less than a week, if the ADs agree that this does not require a
new IETF LC.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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From nobody Wed Aug  5 10:45:05 2020
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From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
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Subject: [Anima] anima: please fill the IETF108 survey (if you have not done so yet)
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Will certainly help to increase chances getting anything thhart
might have troubled you @IETF108 for IETF109!

Thank you!
    Toerless

On Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 11:52:47AM -0400, Alissa Cooper wrote:
> Please share this with your working group/research group lists if you have not done so already.
> 
> Thanks,
> Alissa
> 
> > Begin forwarded message:
> > 
> > From: IETF Executive Director <exec-director@ietf.org>
> > Subject: [108all] Final reminder: IETF 108 meeting survey
> > Date: August 5, 2020 at 6:30:16 AM EDT
> > To: 108all@ietf.org
> > 
> > Thank you very much to the ~230 people who have filled in the IETF 108 meeting survey as this data is crucial to helping us plan future meetings.  We could still use another 70 or so responses and so this is a final reminder to please help us by taking a few minutes to complete the survey:
> > 
> > 		https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/T3SL7JF
> > 
> > Thanks in advance
> > 
> > -- 
> > Jay Daley
> > IETF Executive Director
> > exec-director@ietf.org
> > 
> > -- 
> > 108all mailing list
> > 108all@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/108all


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From: "Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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> From: Anima <anima-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Michael Richardson
> Fries, Steffen <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
>     >> My answers:
>     >> 1) No, I don't want to rename anything.  Let BRSKI-AE establish a =
new
> registry.
>     >>
>     >> 2) I don't want to Link Discovery, and I think it's harmful if BRS=
KI-AE
>     >> proposes this rather than it being in the base document.
>=20
>     > Just to be sure I understand it right, the discovery of enrollment
>     > endpoints would still be part of BRSKI-AE?
>=20
> I frankly don't see the point of the discovery at all.
>=20
> I understand the use case with CoAP, where one wants to be able to multic=
ast a
> request to /.well-known/core to find out which devices support a particul=
ar
> service.
> HTTP does not have the same thing, so I don't see the point of agility in=
 the end
> points if they are all in /.well-known anyway.
Agreed. As BRSKI-AE is intended to extend BRSKI and therefore uses HTTP, th=
ere is no need for a specific enhancement. The discovery using /.well-known=
 will provide all available endpoints to the pledge, which then can evaluat=
e the response. From an application perspective I would expect that the ple=
dge may not support multiple enrollment approaches and simply try whatever =
he supports. The domain registrar would be the more capable component to su=
pport multiple options.=20
For the constraint case (not contained in BRSKI), the discovery of specific=
 endpoints is more important to not overload the pledge.  =20
Based on that, I would propose to update the example in section 5.3 of BRSK=
I-AE to list only /.well-know instead of the currently stated /.well-know/b=
rski.=20

>=20
>     >> 3) I see an alias as a waste of time. It's either a rename, or don=
't
>     >> do it.
>=20
>     > Renaming would be the much clearer way forward in the light of mult=
iple
>     > (different) enrollment endpoints supported at the registrar and the
>     > connected processing as discussed.
>=20
> If there is value in renaming, then lets do it RIGHT NOW.
> I DO NOT WANT to confuse the market by having an RFC come out, followed b=
y
> another one 'correcting' it six months later.
> I CAN NOT live with that situation.
As stated before, the value from my understanding is more clarity (distinct=
 naming) regarding the provided services/endpoints.

>=20
>     >> 4) If we want to do this, then do it in the base document.
>     >> Yes, with *ALL* the delay risk that Brian Carpenter mention.
>=20
>     > My take from the discussion so far regarding that point was rather
>     > reluctance regarding changes in the base document due to the connec=
ted
>     > delay, but as you stated, it would be the clean way.
>=20
> Do we agree that this rename is cosmetic?
> It appeals to humans, computer code does not care in any way.
> If the WG can tolerate the process risk, then it shouldn't be a problem.
> If we can agree by the end of the week to do this, then the changes could=
 be
> approved in less than a week, if the ADs agree that this does not require=
 a new
> IETF LC.
As this is essentially a name change and does not change the functionality =
of BRSKI I would assume that there is no need for an new IETF LC, which wou=
ld slow down publication. With that assumption in mind, I would be in favor=
.=20

Best regards
Steffen
>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works  -=
=3D
> IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-


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Subject: [Anima] I-D Action: draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Autonomic Networking Integrated Model and Approach WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)
        Authors         : Max Pritikin
                          Michael C. Richardson
                          Toerless Eckert
                          Michael H. Behringer
                          Kent Watsen
	Filename        : draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43.txt
	Pages           : 124
	Date            : 2020-08-07

Abstract:
   This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic
   Control Plane.  To do this a Secure Key Infrastructure is
   bootstrapped.  This is done using manufacturer-installed X.509
   certificates, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing
   service, both online and offline.  We call this process the
   Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol.
   Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable address and a
   cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, or on limited/
   disconnected networks.  Support for deployment models with less
   stringent security requirements is included.  Bootstrapping is
   complete when the cryptographic identity of the new key
   infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device.  The
   established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued
   certificate to the device as well.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
    > A diff from the previous version is available at:
    > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43

This publishes the GRASP bug that Brian found a few weeks ago, which did not
mysteriously make it into -42.

Now... about that renaming.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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From nobody Mon Aug 10 11:24:47 2020
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Cc: draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org, anima-chairs@ietf.org,  anima@ietf.org, Sheng Jiang <jiangsheng@huawei.com>, jiangsheng@huawei.com
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Subject: [Anima] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28: (with COMMENT)
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Robert Wilton has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28: No Objection

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Hi,

I appreciate that this document has already gone through quite a lot of
reviews.  Just a few minor nits (for the version of the doc that was originally
on the telechat before IETF 108):

    6.1.  ACP Domain, Certificate and Network

       This document uses the term ACP in many places where the Autonomic
       Networking reference documents [RFC7575] and
       [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] use the word autonomic.  This is
       done because those reference documents consider (only) fully
       autonomic networks and nodes, but support of ACP does not require
       support for other components of autonomic networks except for relying
       on GRASP and providing security and transport for GRASP.  Therefore
       the word autonomic might be misleading to operators interested in
       only the ACP.

Should this paragraph be somewhere earlier in the document?

    6.1.2.  ACP Certificate AcpNodeName

    The acp-node-name is not
    intended for end user consumption, and there is no protection against
    someone not owning a domain name to simpy choose it.

The latter part of this sentence doesn't seem to scan particularly well.

    6.7.3.1.1.  RFC8221 (IPsec/ESP)

    AH MUST NOT be used (because it does not provide confidentiality).

Do you need AH in the terminology or define what it means?

    6.7.4.  ACP via DTLS

       We define the use of ACP via DTLS in the assumption that it is likely
       the first transport encryption supported in some classes of
       constrained devices because DTLS is already used in those devices but
       IPsec is not, and code-space may be limited.

DTLS in the assumption => DTLS, on the assumption
This paragraph could possibly do with a little more wordsmithing.

    6.10.1.  Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing

For a PE device or NID, how does it know which interfaces to run ACP over?

       o  OAM protocols do not require IPv4: The ACP may carry OAM
          protocols.  All relevant protocols (SNMP, TFTP, SSH, SCP, Radius,
          Diameter, ...) are available in IPv6.  See also [RFC8368] for how
          ACP could be made to interoperate with IPv4 only OAM.

Should this include a YANG management protocol like NETCONF?
Radius => RADIUS (in a few places)

    6.11.1.14.  Unknown Destinations

       As this requirement raises additional Data-Plane, it does not apply
       to nodes where the administrative parameter to become root
       (Section 6.11.1.12) can always only be 0b001, e.g.: the node does not
       support explicit configuration to be root, or to be ACP registrar or
       to have ACP-connect functionality.

The first sentence doesn't quite scan.

Nits:
retrieved bei neighboring nodes =>  retrieved by neighboring nodes
"serialNumber" contains usually => "serialNumber" usually contains
remotely sent IPv6 link-local => remotely send IPv6 link-local




From nobody Mon Aug 10 18:23:11 2020
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To: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
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Thread-Topic: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 01:22:22 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi Toerless!

Thanks for your detailed follow-up both in the form of the -28 and the help=
ful explanations below.  I think everything is cleaned up but the last disc=
uss, I will update my ballot so it's easier to manage.

Roman

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 11:38 AM
> To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
> Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>; draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
> plane@ietf.org; anima-chairs@ietf.org; anima@ietf.org; Sheng Jiang
> <jiangsheng@huawei.com>
> Subject: Re: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-contro=
l-
> plane-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
>=20
> Thanks a lot, Roman, very helpfull review.
>=20
> Diff:
>=20
> http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/rfcdiff.pyht?url1=3Dhttps://tools.iet=
f.org/id/draf
> t-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-
> 27.txt&url2=3Dhttps://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-contro=
l-plane-
> 28.txt
>=20
> Inline
>=20
> On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 08:03:00PM -0700, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
> wrote:
> > Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-27: Discuss
> >
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut
> > this introductory paragraph, however.)
> >
> > Please refer to
> > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>=20
> Btw: WG members asked me how to determine if reviews like your raise up t=
o
> the level of a DISCUSS or just to the level of very good editorial feedba=
ck.
>=20
> As an author, i am not interested in that meta-discussion, but with the r=
oot
> cause for the concern, which is the timely closure of the DISCUSS.
>=20
> To that end, the authors think all DISCUSS worthy points raised have been
> resolved or satisfatory answered and would therefore hope for a timely cl=
osure
> of the DISCUSS ;-))
>=20
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-pl
> > ane/
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > DISCUSS:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > ** As normative behavior is specific for BRSKI (e.g., Section 6.1.5
> > and 6.1.5.5), please make it a normative reference
>=20
> Hmmm... Right. At an earlier stage, we intentionally downgraded BRSKI fro=
m
> normative to informational, when we started to rewrite ACP so its clear h=
ow to
> implement it with non-BRSKI registrars and BRSKI became fully optional.
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> I have changed BRSKI to normative.

Thanks!
=20
> Let me know if informative wold still be corect given the optional naure =
of
> BRSKI for ACP.
>
> > ** Figure 2???s definition of acp-address is ???acp-address =3D 32HEXLC
> > | "0"???.  The following text references a 32HEXDIG but that isn???t
> > in the definition of acp-address.
> >
> > -- Section 6.1.2.  ???Nodes complying with this specification MUST be
> > able to receive their ACP address through the domain certificate, in
> > which case their own ACP domain certificate MUST have the 32HEXDIG "acp=
-
> address" field.???
> >
> > -- Section 6.1.3.  ???The candidate peer certificate's acp-node-name
> > has a non-empty acp-address field (either 32HEXDIG or 0, according to F=
igure
> 2).???
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> Thank you so much. Embarrassing inconsistant edit in -23 to move from
> 32HEXDIG to lower case 32HEXLC. Fixed.

Makes sense.  I figured it was something simple.  Thanks.

> > ** Precision in bounding the cipher selection.
> >
> > -- Section 6.7.2.  Per ???Symmetric encryption for the transmission of
> > secure channel data MUST use encryption schemes considered to be
> > security wise equal to or better than AES256???, which property of
> > AES-256 is being considered for this assessment?
>=20
> Key strength.
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> ... considered to be security wise equal to or better than 256 bit key st=
rength,
> such as AES256
>=20
> > -- Section 6.8.2.  Per ???TLS for GRASP MUST offer
> > TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and
> > TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and MUST NOT offer
> options
> > with less than 256bit AES or less than SHA384???, please state this mor=
e
> precisely.
>=20
> Also  key strength.
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> MUST NOT offer options with less than 256 bit symmetric key strength or h=
ash
> strength of less han SHA384
>=20
> > -- Is it that AES-128 shouldn???t be used or that that AES-256 has a
> > certain key strength to which to adhere to?
> >
> > -- Is it that SHA-224 or SHA256 shouldn???t be used (staying in the
> > SHA-2 family) or is it a certain number of bits of security ?
>=20
> Note:
>=20
> If my proposed text does not fix it according to what a security expert w=
ould
> write, could you be so kind and propose text ? This polishing of security
> sentences has been going on a lot, mostly because i do not get proposed b=
etter
> text but just rejections of the text i attempt to write after reading a l=
ot of
> security RFCs, and probably wastig a lot of time in the process.

The proposed edits work for me and provide the needed clarification.=20

> > ** The text specifies the need for physical controls.  Please be more
> > specific on the appropriate degree of that physical control or how
> > that decision should be made; and explicitly explain threat of concern.
> >
> > -- Section 8.1.1.  ???Thus, the ACP connect interface and NOC systems
> > connected to it needs to be physically controlled/secured.???
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> <t>Physical controlled/secured means that attackers can gain no access to=
 the
> physical device hosting the ACP Edge Node, the physical interfaces and li=
nks
> providing the ACP connect link nor the physical equipment constituing the=
 NOC
> Device. In a simple case, ACP Edge node and NOC Device are co-located in =
a
> physcially access controlled room, such as a NOC, to which attackers can =
not
> gain physical access to.</t>

Thanks.

> > -- Section 8.1.5.  ?????? the ACP connect link and the nodes connecting=
 to it
> must
> > be in a contiguous secure   environment, hence assuming there can be no
> > physical attack against the devices.???
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> Text replaced with:
>=20
> See <xref target=3D"acp-connect"/>.
>=20
> Aka: removed text,
> replaced with pointer to above enhanced text so as not to duplicate the
> explanatory text.

Thanks.

> > ** (???discuss discuss???) Section 8.1.2.  What is the normative
> > behavior being specified in this section?  Specifically, what is the
> > additional or more restrictive behavior for the circumstance is where a=
n ACP
> node is virtualized.
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> No text change, but following explanation:
>=20
> The difference is that in the case of two physcial devices conneced with =
a non-
> encrypted link, the effort of "physical security"/access-control is a
> problem/requirement that makes ACP-connect a "workaround", because the
> overhead of physical security is higher than that of a cryptographically =
secured
> channel between the ACP nodes.
>=20
> When ACP-Edge-Router and NOC-Device are just e.g.: two VMs running on the
> same device, and the ACP connect link is a virtual linux bridge link, the=
n this is
> not a workaround anymore but a good solution because:
>=20
> a) There is no need for physical security anymore (locked room, authentic=
ate
>    people who get access, etc. pp)
>=20
> b) it does not have to be set up manually (bysically create access protec=
ted
>    room, wire up two devices), but can be orchestrated automatically by
>    software.
>=20
> c) The remaining security problem of how to ensure that all the software
>    components within the systems are protected against attack, including
>    the virtual link between the NOC software component and the ACP Edge
> node
>    sotware component is no different than securing the software on any
>    ACP node.
>=20
> I was hoping the text was making this clear. If there is additional text =
you want
> to propose for the document to support this explanation, pls. do so, but =
i
> already felt the existing tex was a good, more compact representation of =
what i
> elaborated above. If that is not the case, then it is easier for someone =
like you
> (reader) than me to suggest text that could be better understood.

Ok.  Thanks for that explanation.

> > ** Section 8.2.1.  (I???m no ABNF expert ???) Per the ABNF in Figure 17=
, the
> ???//=3D???
> > notation isn???t valid.  I think you want:
> >
> > OLD
> >      method //=3D [ "DTLS",    port ]
> >
> > NEW
> >      method =3D/ [ "DTLS",    port ]
>=20
> Resolution: fixed text
>=20
> Thanks a lot. No idea how this happened. Maybe i was confused with CDDL..=
.
> Too many formal languages all slightly different *sigh*

Thanks.  I had to look-up the ABNF syntax rules just to be sure :-)

> > ** Section 10.2.1.  Per ???An attacker will not be able to join the
> > ACP unless having a valid domain certificate, also packet injection
> > and sniffing traffic will not be possible due to the security provided
> > by the encryption protocol.???, please be clearer:
> >
> > -- on path attacker =3D no packet injection
> > -- on path attacker =3D only traffic analysis when sniffing
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> Proposed fixed text:
>=20
>                        <t>Attacker will not be able to join the ACP unles=
s they have a
> valid ACP domain certificate. On-path attackers without a valid ACP domai=
n
> certificate can not inject packets into the ACP due to ACP secure channel=
s. They
> can also not decrypt ACP traffic except if they can crack the encryption.=
 They
> can attempt behavioral traffic analysis on the encrypted ACP traffic.</t>
>=20
> > -- compromised node =3D can inject traffic
>=20
> Actually, we aim higher.
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> <t>The degree to which compromised ACP nodes can impact the ACP depends
> on the implementation of the ACP nodes and their impairment. When an
> attacker has only gained administrative privileges to configure ACP nodes
> remotely, the attacker can disrupt the ACP only through one of the few
> configuration options to disable it, see <xref target=3D"enabling-acp"/>,=
 or by
> configuring of non-autonomic ACP options if those are supported on the
> impaired ACP nodes, see <xref target=3D"workarounds"/>. Injecting or ectr=
acting
> traffic into/from an impaired ACP node is only possible when an impaired =
ACP
> node supports ACP connect (see <xref target=3D"ACPconnect"/>) and the att=
acker
> can control traffic into/from one of the ACP nodes interfaces, such as by=
 having
> physical access to the ACP node.</t>
>=20
> This should be a fair assessment. Of course this is not inclusive of atta=
cks
> against aspects of the node which are outside the AP spec.
>=20
> [ Note that there are of course ideas for extension work to overcome thes=
e
> issues. ]

This works for me.  Thanks.

> > ** Section 11.  Per ???an ACP is self-protecting and there is no need
> > to apply configuration to make it secure???, if this assertion is going=
 to be
> made:
>=20
> Proposed rewrite of this paragraph:
>=20
> <t>A set of ACP nodes with ACP certificates for the same ACP domain and w=
ith
> ACP functionaliy enabled is automatically "self-building": The ACP is
> automatically established between neighboring ACP nodes. It is also "self=
-
> protecting": The ACP secure channels are authenticated and encrypted.</t>
>=20
> Aka: removed reference to registrar etc... (see explanation below), and "=
no
> configuration required".
> Primarily because "no configuration required" is somewhat duplicate from
> "automatically".
>
 >
> > -- please specify the security services/properties in a normative
> > section (not in the informative text in Section 10).
>=20
> Statements of high level security properties do IMHO not have to be norma=
tive
> text because they are an assessment, not a definition. I think this is qu=
ite
> common for security consideration sections from what i read in other RFCs=
. The
> definitions of protocol machinery and properties of data objects like cer=
tificates
> to achieve those claimed properties on the other hand have to be normativ=
e,
> and they are - in section 6.>
>=20
> >
> > -- please also be clear on what configuration is being referenced.
> >
>=20
> Much easier to remove as done above. I was thinking of the typical config=
 that
> would be required to create an ACP on a non-ACP device, e.g.:
> VRF (lite), virtual/loopback interfaces, IPv6 addressing, IPSec config, R=
PL routing
> config, but not enough value IMHO to elaborate about this here.
>=20
> Of course, not 100% the same, non-autonomic nodes would not have the new
> GRASP protocol for discovery. But for the rest, you could get pretty cloe=
 on an
> existing non-ACP capable router through config. After all thats the idea =
of
> ANIMA being in OPS - reuse what we have experience with.

The new text defines "self-protecting" which is the clarity I was (really) =
seeking.  This current text works.

> > ** Section 11.  Per the list of factors on which ACP depends, it seems
> > like the following are missing:
> >
> > -- the security properties of the enrollment protocol
> >
> > -- that the security considerations of EST and BRSKI apply (or if not,
> > why not)
>=20
> Resolution:
>=20
> No change, but the following explanations:
>=20
> The ACP is explicitly defined to be a set of nodes with ACP domain certif=
icates,
> enrollment/BRSKI is really out of scope. Normative ACP nodes start their
> existance with an ACP cert. How they got it is part of a prior life. BRSK=
I security
> properties are covered in BRSKI draft.
>=20
> I struggled long how to well define registrars given that ACP does not ma=
ndate/
> specify any specific protocol.  The solution in the document is that ther=
e is only
> a very abstract definition of the normative requirements against registra=
rs in
> 6.10.7, pretty much simple requirements against the resulting certificate=
s such
> as registrar MUST NOT assign same addresses to multiple nodes for example=
.
>=20
> Think of a registrar abstractely as this:
>=20
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/102/materials/slides-102-dinrg-dinrg=
-
> anima-toerless-eckert-00
> Slide 10
>=20
> While funny, its not far away from a possible reality of a network operat=
or
> being a registrar, provisioning ACP certificates manually into ACP nodes,=
 and
> performing all the backend operations (CA, MASA, adressing database).
>=20
> BRSKI is of course the ANIMA preferred enrollment protocol, and if it is =
used,
> an ACP node is called an ANI node (ACP+BRSKI). Section 3.2 makes the secu=
rity
> property of the ACP for any such bootstrap protocol. For example in
> communities outside of ANIMA, NetConf ZeroTouch might be preferred over
> BRSKI.
>=20
> The only mandatory ACP part of your above list is EST ONLY for renewal of
> certificates, an that of course is specified in the normative section.
>=20
> The BRSKI draft itself defines how it integrates with ACP (GRASP objectiv=
e etc.).
>=20
> Hope this answers satisfactory the concern.

I reread the Section 11 with your explanation in mind and see your perspect=
ive -- it's difficult to be specific without mandating a specific protocol.=
  However, there seems to be two concrete, normative elements of this archi=
tecture -- EST and GRASP.  The latter for bootstrapping and the formal for =
renewal.  It isn't clear then why their Sec Considerations don't apply.  Fu=
rthermore, the protocols and practices of the bootstrapping process are out=
 of scope of this document but seem like a security building block on which=
 ACP is being built.

> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > (Preliminary ballot.  Need to double check that all of ekr's discusses
> > were
> > cleared)
> >
> > The style of explaining the design choice after describing an element
> > of the protocol was informative and helpful.  Thanks.
> >
> > The this document has undergone a significant amount of security
> > review.  Thank you for incorporating all of this feedback.
>=20
> Thanks. If the feedack from the security reviewers would have included mo=
re
> proposed text it would have been faster. Maybe i wouldn't have learned as
> much about security as i did this way, but it was kinda painfull for the =
WG
> because it was lengthy.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.  It doesn???t seem appropriate to call a protocol
> ???indestructible???
> > unless you are going to enumerate the resiliency properties more precis=
ely
> ???
> > ???many inadvertent changes??? is vague.
>=20
> ACP is not a protocol. Its a system and node-wide design with the goal to=
 be
> "indestructible". Obviously, this is a name-calling to summarize a wide r=
ange of
> benefits, hence it is in parenthesis.
>=20
> Proposed text:
>=20
> <t>This section describes the components and steps to set up an ACP and
> highlights the key properties which make it "indestructible" against most
> changes to the Data-Plane, including misconfigurations of routing, addres=
sing,
> NAT, firewall or any other traffic policy filters that inadvertently or o=
therwise
> unavoidably would also impact the management plane traffic, such as the
> actual operator CLI session or controller NetConf session through which t=
he
> configuration changes to the data-plane are executed. Physical
> misconfiguration of wiring between ACP nodes will also not break the ACP =
as
> long as there is a transitive path between ACP nodes, the ACP should be a=
ble to
> recover given that it automatically operates across all interfaces of a A=
CP
> nodes. Attacks against the network via incorrect routing or addressing
> information for the data-plane will not impact the ACP. Even impaired ACP
> nodes will have a significantly reduced attack surface against malicious
> misconfiguration because only very limited ACP or interface up/down
> configuration can affect the ACP, and pending on their specific designs t=
hese
> type of attacks could also be eliminated. See more in <xref target=3D"ena=
bling-
> acp"/> and <xref target=3D"security"/>.</t>
>=20
> > ** Section 6.  Per ???An ACP node can be ??? or any other IP a capable
> > node???, should this be ???IPv6 capable node????
>=20
> Fixed.
>=20
> I was coming from practical experience, where devices are sold as IPv4 on=
ly for
> price/market differentiation. Those devices could typically easily add th=
e IPv6-
> only ACP even though the Data-Plane was IPv4 only. I hope by now those
> sales/marketing models are not possible anymore ;-)
>=20
> > ** Section 6.1.1.  Per ?????? it is beneficial to copy the device
> > identifying fields of the node's IDevID certificate into the ACP
> > domain certificate ??????, is there a ACP-recommended approach for that=
?
>=20
> No, because its part of what the registrar does, and even though ANIMA
> defines BRSKI to be the preferred registrar protocol, ACP itself and to b=
e be
> widely reuseable describes registrar behavior as abstract as possible.
>=20
> For example, IETF also has NetConf zerotouch, which could be used or any
> proprietary mechanism. Its IMHO easy in all cases given how the expectati=
on is
> that the registrar needs to knows the pledges IDevID to securely identify=
 the
> pledge, and in all protocols i have seen, the registrar is in the positio=
n to make
> sure the pledges pledges certificate has components in it that are needed=
. For
> BRSKI this is specified in BRSKI.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.1.3.1. Per ???In the absence of implementing a secured
> > mechanism, such an ACP node MAY use a current time learned in an
> > insecured fashion in the ACP domain membership check.???, please be
> > clearer on how this current time is learned in the domain membership ch=
eck.
>=20
> Proposed text:
>=20
> <t>Current time MAY for example be learned via NTP (<xref
> target=3D"RFC5905"/>) over the same link-local IPv6 addresses used for th=
e ACP
> from neighboring ACP nodes.
> ACP nodes that that do provide NTP insecure over their link-local address=
es
> SHOULD primarily run NTP across the ACP and provide NTP time across the A=
CP
> only when they have a secure time source. Details for such NTP procedures=
 are
> beyond the scope of this specification.</t>
>=20
> There is obviously a chicken&egg problem: If you have a bunch of cheap no=
-RTC
> routers waking up from total power faillure and trying to get together ag=
ain,
> the best outcome to have is to build ACP  like it is Jan 1 1970. If at le=
ast one of
> those devices does have an RTC, it would start NTP across the ACP and the
> others would sync to it.
>=20
> The details of all of this are another extension RFC to ACP, although i g=
uess it
> can become quite convoluted to describe the autoconfig and all corner cas=
es.
> Hence i tried to avoid going down this path in this doc too much.
>=20
> The text above is roughly what i've used in practice with enterprise IPse=
c VPN
> setups where alas a lot of spoke routers didn't hve RTC.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.1.5.  Per ???ACP nodes SHOULD be able to remember the
> > IPv6 locator parameters ...???, what happens if they don???t remember?
>=20
> ACP is meant to support many, even uncoordinated registrars. That is why =
the
> addressing scheme has a registrar-ID in the client addresses so that regi=
strars
> can independently of each other assign ACP addresses to clients via their=
 certs
> without conflicting with each other.
>=20
> If you only do renewal via EST then it is purely a simplification of diag=
nostic
> that you are doing renewal always with the registrar you originally got y=
our
> cert from. The renewal would easily be the same going to any other regist=
rar,
> but the logs on the registrar would then not nicely have only the info ab=
out the
> clients that they initially enrolled.
>=20
> When clients expire their certs and need to re-enroll, it gets harder to =
get the
> same ACP address again if you do not go to the same original registrar.
> There is text for that later in the doc explaining how registrars can sti=
ll attempt
> to honor the original cert ACP address, but this functionality is probabl=
y
> something we need anothre extension document for with LAMPS involved
> (registrars honoring expired certs for the purpose of renewal).
>=20
> Changing ACP address under such circumstances is fine for ACP itself, but=
 more
> work for a backend system having to track such change of addresses (havin=
g to
> keep track of e.g.: IDevID and changing LDevID/ACP-address).
>=20
> > ** Section 6.1.5.3.  Per ???The connecting ACP node SHOULD verify that
> > the CRLDP certificate used during the HTTPs connection has the same
> > ACP address as indicated in the CRLDP URL ??????, why is this not a MUS=
T?
>=20
> Unlike non-CRL setups, i have no practical deployment experience with CRL=
.
> To the best of my understanding, the content of a CRL itself is protected=
 such
> that you can have it relayed through e.g.: caches or the like.
> Hence the additional address is just another layer of security whose adde=
d
> value vs the additional limitations for deployability it may bring are un=
clear.
> Hence a SHOULD.
>=20
> Eg.: In one example, i had to build an ACP connect through IPv6/IPv4 NAT
> because some backend in customers NOC did not support IPv6.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.1.5.5.  Per ???An ACP node may determine that its ACP
> > domain certificate has expired ??? [i]n this case, the ACP node SHOULD
> > convert to a role of a re-enrolling candidate ACP node???, what is the
> > alternative if it wants to connect back to the network?  Shouldn???t th=
is be a
> MUST?
>=20
> This goes back to above mentioned IMHO more desirable, but not yet not
> documented or well enough discussed option of simply permitting renewal
> instead of re-enrollment with an expired cert. Logically the argument for=
 that is
> that the lifetime in a cert does not necessarily have to be a limiter to =
the
> registrar+CA renewal operations because that is not a normal "use" of the
> certificate, and that is whats to be imited by the lifetime.
>=20
> When i was operating an enterprise VPN headend for a while i recurringly =
had
> the eperience that long-time switched off VPN spokes where reactivated, t=
hen
> the user asked in email why his VPN router does not work, and then in the
> absence of better options i had to disable lifetime checks for this cert =
on the
> headend temporarily to get renewal working. (obviuosly, the phone call wa=
s
> the additional attestation for the node with the expired cert to be assum=
ed to
> be still "trusted").
>=20
> Re-enrollment can vary widely in complexity based on the registrar used -=
 even
> with BRSKI, there are lot of MASA options, So it can be ACP career limiti=
ng for
> specific type of registrars if this was a MUST.
>=20
> There is one specifically preferred option which would have to go into a
> followup document, which is to use BRSKI and BRSKI proxy together with th=
e
> expired cert to renew. This exactly would only involve the registrar havi=
ng to
> honor the expired cert, but not the ACP. So its not really re-enrolling (=
which
> would use the IDevID and MASA), but it would use the BRSKI enrollment inf=
ra
> (BRSKI-proxy).
>=20
> > ** Section 6.5.  It seems misplaced to describe MacSec as an option
> > for channel security even when it is not a profiled in this document.
>=20
> I disagree. It is IMHO important to provide important fundamental explana=
tions
> of the extension points of the ACP architecture, and that is most easily =
done
> through examples.
>=20
> MacSec is a highly desirable extension option because it is the most wide=
ly
> cross-platform HW-accelerated encryption option, so it is a good example =
to
> use in a sentence.
>=20
> Remember, this is an OPS area system specification where operational and
> architecture aspects are important. Also we where asked not to have a
> separate architecture document by the initial AD to the WG.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.7.2. Per ???Signaling of TA certificates may not be
> > appropriate when the deployment is relying on a security model when
> > the TA certificate content is considered confidential???, where is the
> > requirement to signal TA certificates discussed.  How would this
> > selection of signaling a TA work?  The entire paragraph prior seemed
> > to explicitly discuss that the TA doesn???t need to be shared.
>=20
> The previous paragraph to the one you are citing explicitly says:
>=20
> | Nevertheless, for use with ACP secure channel setup, there SHOULD be
> | the option to include the TA certificate in the signaling to aid
> | troubleshooting, see <xref target=3D"ta-troubleshoot"/>.
>=20
> I had exhaustive discussions about this on the ipsec mailing list to deri=
ve at the
> acceptable option, whose details are in the IPsec section of the ACP
> (aka: including the TA in the signalled IKEv2 messages without having to
> extend IKEv2, but just relying on permissible existing IKEv2 options).
>=20
> > ** Section 6.7.2.  Per ???When introducing the profile for security
> > association protocol ??????, I recommend being clearer to whom you are
> providing this advice.
> > This seems to for operators of ACP infrastructure technology (not
> > implementers/vendors of ACP technology)
>=20
> Actually it is definition of extension point requirements for implementer=
s, so i
> am sad to learn it is misreadable as an operator related text.
>=20
> Proposed fix:
>=20
> <t>When specifying additional security association protocol for ACP secur=
e
> channel use beyond those covered in this document, protocol options SHOUL=
D
> be eliminated that are not necessary to support devices that are expected=
 to be
> able to support the ACP.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.7.3.  Per ???The ACP usage of IPsec and IKEv2 mandates a
> > profile with a narrow set of options of the current standards-track usa=
ge
> guidance for
> > IPsec    [RFC8221] and IKEv2 [RFC8247]???, should there be normative
> wording use
> > (MUST) instead of a ???mandates????
>=20
> The actual normative (rfc2119) requirements of the IPsec profile are late=
r in the
> section.
> This initial text gives just the overview.
>=20
> Saying something like "you MUST comply with the normative requirements
> described later on in this text" would be only confusing and not helpfull=
.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.7.3.1.1.  Per ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305, ???[t]herefore this
> > algorithm is only recommended???, shouldn???t it read as RECOMMENDED?
>=20
> Again avoiding IMHO unhelpfull duplication of rfc2119 language. The
> normative requirement was earlier in the section:
>=20
> | ENCR_CHACHA20_POLY1305 SHOULD be supported at equal or higher
> | performance than ENCR_AES_GCM_16. If that performance is not feasible, =
it
> MAY be supported.
>=20
> The paragraph you mention is explanation of that prior normative requirem=
ent.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.7.3.1.2.  Per ???[RFC8247] provides a baseline recommendat=
ion
> for
> > mandatory to   implement ciphers, integrity checks, pseudo-random-funct=
ions
> and
> > Diffie-Hellman mechanisms.  Those recommendations, and the
> > recommendations of subsequent documents apply well to the ACP.???, it
> > seems like normative language should be used to adhered to.
>=20
> Oops. With the rewrite of this section in the last revisions, the MUST 82=
47
> actually vanished. Great catch.
>=20
> The text above is introduction, the proposed fix is after that paragraph:
>=20
> | ACP Nodes supporting IKEv2 MUST comply with <xref target=3D"RFC8247"/>
> | amended by the following requirements which constitute a policy
> | statement as permitted by <xref target=3D"RFC8247"/>.
>=20
> > ** Section 6.10.7.3.  The paragraph/sentence starting with ???ACP
> > registrars that are aware of can use ?????? doesn???t parse.  The guida=
nce
> isn???t clear as a result.
>=20
> Apologies. trash left fixing the sentence. Fixed text and added explanati=
on:
>=20
> ACP registrars that are aware of the IDevID certificate of a candidate AC=
P
> device...
>=20
> ... The PID for example could identify type of devices allowing for speci=
alized
> ASA requiring multiple addresses or non-autonomic VMs for services and th=
ose
> nodes could receive Vlong sub-address scheme ACP addresses.</t>
>=20
> > ** Section 6.10.7.3.  Per ???In a simple allocation scheme, an ACP
> > registrar remembers persistently across reboots ??????, what???s the
> > recover step if it loses that state?
>=20
> Proposed added text:
>=20
> <t>If allocated addresses can not be remembered by registrars, then it is
> necessary to either use a new value for the Register-ID field in the ACP
> addresses, or determine allocated ACP addresses from polling the ACP netw=
ork
> nodes.  Non-tracked ACP addresses can be reclaimed by revoking or not
> renewing their certificates and instead handing out new certificate with =
new
> addresses (for example with a new Registrar-ID value). Note that such
> strategies may require coordination amongst registrars.</t>
>=20
> > ** Section 6.11.1.1.2.  Not clear what ???DODAG Information Objects
> > (DIOs) SHOULD be sent 2 .. 3 times??? means ??? can ???2 .. 3??? please=
 be
> clarified.
>=20
> proposed fix:
>=20
> SHOULD be sent 2 or 3 times
>=20
> (actual value 2 or 3 left for experimentation, this seems to be a necessa=
ry and
> sufficient  range from similar protocol experiences).

All of the above proposed changes makes sense.  Thank you for them.  Also, =
where no changes were made, I appreciated the explanaition.

> > ** Section 6.11.1.1.2.  A mechanism for failed ACP detected using a
> > secure channel protocol is noted for IPSec (with IKEv2 Dead Peer
> > Detection).  What is the equivalent for DTLS?
>=20
> Good question. If you know someone who could suggest an equivalent, pleas=
e
> bring her in. Given how this is a performance optimization, i don't think=
 we
> need to bother too much. I hope we can learn from
> implementation/deployment experience (i only hve that for IPsec) and then
> write update text later with such refinements.

Sorry, I too don't have citable reference.  Let's leave it as is.

> > ** Section 9.  The section notes that Section 9.1 is ???derived from
> > diagnostic of a commercially available ACP implementation???.  The
> > shepherd report from
> > 03/2019 notes that there are no implementations of ACP.  If this is
> > documented somewhere, it would be very compelling to cite it.
>=20
> I have deleted that sentence again.  This was not appropriate for the RFC=
, we
> can discuss this on the list or offline.
>=20
> > ** Section 9.1. Per ???The basic diagnostics [sic] is support of
> > (yang) data models representing the complete (auto-)configuration and
> > operational state of all components ??????, are these YANG models defin=
ed?
> Are there references?
>=20
> Changed to:
>=20
> Basic standardized diagnostics would require support for (yang) models ..=
.
>=20
> Wrt to the question: The existing components used by ACP should have YANG
> models given how long they have been in use, but they don't necessarily s=
eem
> to have them.
> Eg there as some IPSECME targeted draft like draft-tran-ipsecme-yang-01.t=
xt,
> not sure why that died, one could maybe use rfc8049 to represent the VRF =
for
> ACP (not sure), there is an initial dradt for RPL (draft-ietf-roll-mpl-ya=
ng-02).
> From talking to Kent Watson, the situation for certificates looks better,=
 e.g.:
> draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors.
>=20
> Once we have these ACP/GRASP/BRSKI specification RFCs out, we'll be looki=
ng
> for interested Yang geeks to help with ACP/GRASP yang models. The existin=
g
> spec intends to be an informal starting point towards such future  yang w=
ork,
> but there will no more detailling of what is or is not available in IETF =
yang
> world.
> Thts a job by itself best done fofr an acp yang rfc. I have some work i s=
tarted
> from 3 years ago lying around...
>=20
> > ** Section 9.3.1.  Per ???Whenever this document refers to enabling an
> > interface for ACP ??? it only requires to permit [sic] the interface
> > ??????, this seems like normative behavior in an informative section.
>=20
> What is the purpose of the [sic] notation ?
>=20
> IETF does not allow to raise normative requirements against informal oper=
ator
> interface decription, which is what this section is. I guess that would r=
equire a
> formal CLI model which we don't have.  Hence the normative requirements
> could only come from a YANG model.
>=20
> Hence this section is informational. It is also good to not formalize a n=
ormative
> operator interface without first having enough experience collected IMHO.
>=20
> > ** Section 9.3.2.  That this is an information section is noted.  It
> > would benefit from describing what precisely can and cannot be done in
> > the three states proposed ??? up, down and admin down.
>=20
> Hmm... i think it says everything it can say, except... see your followin=
g point.
>=20
> > ** Section 9.3.2.1.  What is the proposed threat that using admin down
> > is intended to mitigate?  Under what circumstance should it be invoked?
>=20
> Great. I remember we went several times through this text especially with
> routing directorate, but nobody noticed that the simple core example was =
not
> explicitly written down. Instead we had good discuss about the proposed h=
ow
> (separartion of down insto adin-down/physcial down). Which is a good reas=
on
> too not to have this section normative yet. But i digress.
>=20
> I added the following paragraph to the section. The configuration summary
> section actually already summarizes this core reason as well, but it real=
ly needs
> to be in this section.
>=20
> <t>One of the common problems of remote management is for the operator or
> SDN controller to cut its own connectivity to the remote node by a
> configuration impacting its own management connection into the node. The
> ACP itself should have no dedicated configuration other than aforemention=
ed
> enablement of the ACP on brownfield ACP nodes. This leaves configuration =
that
> can not distinguish between ACP and Data-Plane as sources of configuratio=
n
> mistakes as these commands will impact the ACP even though they should on=
ly
> impact the Data-Plane. The one ubiquitous type of commands that do this o=
n
> many type of routers are interface "down" commands/configurations. When
> such a command applied on the interface through which the ACP provides
> access for remote management it would cut the remote management
> connection through the ACP because (as outlined above), the "down"
> commands typically impact the physical layer too and not only the Data-Pl=
ane
> services.</t>
>=20
> <t>To provide ACP/ANI resilience against such operator misconfiguration, =
...

Thanks for this clarifying text.  I lacked the history.

> > ** Section 9.3.2.1.  Per ???"Admin down" state as described above
> > provides also a high level of security because it only permits ACP/ANI
> > operations which are both well secured???, to what is the ???both???
> > referring? I suspect this is editorial (but just in case, noting here).
>=20
> Added sentence in before for more missing explanation:
>=20
> <t>An example of non-ACP but ANI traffic that should be permitted to pass
> even in "admin-down" state is BRSKI enrollment traffic between BRSKI pled=
ge
> and a BRSKI proxy.</t>
>=20
> Now the answer to your question is that the "both" in the sentence you as=
k
> about refers to ACP/ANI (both ACP and ANI).  If this is not good english,=
 pls. let
> me know.

Works for me.

> > ** Section 10.2.2.  Per ???For example, management plane functions
> > (transport
> > ports) should only be reachable from the ACP but not the
> > Data-Plane???, this seems like good guidance.  Is there a reason not
> > to upgrade this informative statement and put it the Security Considera=
tions
> as normative guidance?
>=20
> Give it time. We're in round 1:
>=20
> Existing router management plane host stacks may have severe issues
> separating out access by VRF context. I remember some of the per-VRF SMI
> work.
>=20
> Enterprise operators may have severe issues with this short-term. For exa=
mple,
> the typical solution would be for network admins to have to VPN back into
> some headend from where the ACP is accessible. That is a lot of pain espe=
cially
> when you are trying to troubleshoot locally and the headend is remote.
>=20
> To make future network admin staff work not more convoluted because of
> ACP, but actually more secure AND easier, we need some easily useable ACP=
-
> access method for e.g. network admin notebooks. Given how i at times had =
4
> VPNs on my notebook and at most 2 VPN would work at the same time, i am
> not sure if this documents IPsec spec would be good for operator notebook=
s.
> But maybe an ACP acces method via 802.1x... TBD.
>=20
> > ** Section 10.2.2.  Per ???Protection across all potential attack
> > vectors is typically easier to do in devices whose software is
> > designed from the ground up with security in mind than with legacy
> > software based systems where the ACP is added on as another
> > feature???, no argument on the general principle.  However, as it relat=
es to
> ACP:
>=20
> Changed text "security in mind" -> "ACP in mind".
>=20
> I think there a initiatives looking at secure devices, but thats not the =
same as
> stricter isolation between ACP and the rest of the system.
>=20
> > --what???s an example of the legacy software?
>=20
> I had a presentation about designs for ACP a few years back in an IEEE
> conference touching those aspects.
>=20
> To me, legacy is probably most router software infra today, where you wou=
ld
> need to implement ACP as one of many VRFs that the software may already
> already support as part of e.g.: L3VPN or similar services.
>=20
> Non-legacy is something where the router is actually a VM or container ru=
nning
> on a hypervisor. And ACP would be part of the hypervisor (e.g.: linux). O=
r where
> ACP does not even run on the same CPU/FPE as the router, but on e.g.: BMC
> HW/software (OpenBoot etc..). Lots of interesting design choices possible=
.
>=20
> > -- as noted in the shepherd report from 03/2019, there are no
> > implementations, so is there reason to believe that this is going to pu=
t on
> ???legacy??? platforms?
>=20
> Lets use different mail threads to discuss this.
>=20
> > ** Section 10.2.2.  Per ???As explained above, traffic across the ACP
> > SHOULD still ??????, is RFC2119 language really intended in this inform=
ative
> section?
>=20
> Fixed to lower case. Thanks.
>=20
> > ** Section 11.  Per ???Security can be compromised by implementation
> > errors (bugs), as in all products???, given the generic nature of this
> > statement, couldn???t it also be a configuration error in the product t=
oo?
>=20
> ;-) Not really because the claim of ACP is that all the core parts of ACP=
 have no
> configuration. See section 9.5.

Short of some formally verified systems, this statement seems true of almos=
t every system.  I didn't consider it actionable and would have removed it =
(again just editorial feedback in this case).

> Given how more than 50% of the whole document to me feel like talking abo=
ut
> security, i do have a hard time figuring out a mandatory logic of what be=
longs
> into section 11. My solution  was that it is a mixture of important summa=
ries
> and then tidbits that didn't have a better place to be explained.
>=20
> Given how the topic of configuration and misconfiguration of ACP was
> exhaustively discussed in prior sections, i didn't feel the need to add i=
t here
> again.
>=20
> But always happy to consider proposed text.
>=20
> > ** Section 11.  Per ???Higher layer service built using ACP domain
> > certificates should not rely on undifferentiated group security ??????
> > is there a reason not to make this a normative SHOULD?
>=20
> section 11 is not normative, and actual normative requirements for new st=
uff
> across the ACP is something that was not in charter when we defined this
> document,
> aka: i wouldn't have a logical place in this doc for this beside as a gen=
eral
> security considerartion.
>=20
> Writing normative about ASA IMHO just became possible after recharter of =
WG
> last year, so i would want to put normative requirements about this proba=
bly
> into ASA docs we are starting to write.
>=20
> > ** Editorial
> >
> > -- Recommend being consistent on either ???ACP domain certificates???
> > or ???ACP certificates???
>=20
> ACP certificates.
>=20
> > -- Section 1.  Editorially.  The two sentences ???Section 7 defines
> > normative how to ?????? and ???Section 8 explain normative how ??????
> > don???t parse as the adjective normative needs a noun to modify.
>=20
> Fixed by putting (normative) at the end of the sentences.
>=20
> > -- Section 6.1.4.  Editorial.  s/These requirements can be achieved by
> > using TA private/These requirements can be achieved by using a TA
> > private/
>=20
> fixed
>=20
> > -- Section 6.2.  Editorial. s/does intentionally not/intentionally
> > does not/
>=20
> fixed
>=20
> > -- Section 6.5.  Editorial.  Per ???Note that MacSec is not required
> > by any profiles of the ACP in this specification but just mentioned as
> > a likely next interesting secure channel protocol.???, does not parse.
>=20
> Fixed by separating sentences: Instead, MacSec is mentioned as ...
> >
> > -- Section 6.10.7.  Per ???ACP registrars are responsible to enroll
> > candidate ACP nodes with ACP domain certificates and associated trust
> point(s)???, is a trust
> > point the same thing as a trust anchor?    If so, I recommend being con=
sistent.
> >  If not, then please define it.
>=20
> Oops. how did that slip through. Thought i had fied all points to be anch=
ors.
> Fixed now.
>=20
> > -- Section 6.11.1.  Please make draft-ietf-roll-applicability-template
> > a reference.
>=20
> Already in -27.
>=20
> > -- Section 6.11.1.5.  Editorially.  It might be worth framing the path
> > metric in the form of sentence.
>=20
> Fixed to:
> Use Hopcount according to xref target=3D"RFC6551"
> >
> > -- Section 11. s/enemy plegdes/rogue pledges/
>=20
> Was already fixed in -27 to "malicious registrar"
> (on prior reviewer suggestion i think)
>=20
> > -- Section 11. Per ???Fundamentally, security depends on avoid
> > operator and network automation mistakes ??????, this paragraph is not
> > actionable.  Recommend removal.
>=20
> Fixed with proposed replacement paragraph:
>=20
> <t>Operators and provisioning software developers need to be aware of how
> the provisioning/configuration of network devices impacts the ability of =
the
> operator / provisioning software to remotely access the network nodes. By
> using the ACP, most of the issues  of configuration/provisioning caused l=
oss of
> connectivity for remote provisioning/configuration will be eliminated, se=
e <xref
> target=3D"self-creation"/>. Only few exceptions such as explicit physical=
 interface
> down configuration will be left <xref target=3D"admin-down"/>.</t>
>=20
> First sentence should now be actionable to operators/developers.
> Second summarizes benefits of ACP. Third gives example of limitations.
>=20
> Core value proposition of ACP hence useful to not just eliminate in secur=
ity
> section (assuming certain readers will primarily read security section).
>=20
> This answers the actionable point. whether or not misconfiguration that m=
akes
> a network become unmanage is a security issue, i can't judge, because i a=
m not
> sure i know a precise definition of "security"
>=20
>=20
> > ** Typos
> > Section 1.  Typo. s/parth/path/
> > Section 1.  Typo. s/seperately/separately/ Section 1.  Typo.
> > s/automaticically/ automatically/ Section 1.  Typo. s/managemenet/
> > management/ Section 1.  Typo. s/absene/absence/ Section 1.1.  Typo.
> > s/solution:/solution/ Section 2.  Typo. s/netork/network/ Section 2.
> > Typo. s/physcially/physically/ Section 5.  Typo. s/(see (see/(see/
> > Section 5. Typo. s/loopack/loopback/ Section 6.1.1.  Typo.
> > s/e.g.:signing/e.g., signing/ Section 6.1.1.  Typo.
> > s/signalled/signaled/g Section 6.1.1.  Typo. s/bei/by/ Section 6.1.2.
> > Typo. s/simpy/simply/ Section 6.1.2.  Typo. s/readible/readable/
> > Section 6.1.2.  Typo. s/Adresses/Addresses/ Section 6.1.2.  Typo.
> > s/manadatory/mandatory/ Section 6.1.2. Typo.
> > s/inapproprite/inappropriate/ Section 6.1.3.1.  Typo. s/as as/as/
> > Section 6.1.3.1.  Typo. /insecured/insecure/ Section 6.1.3.1.  Typo.
> > s/likley/likely/ Section 6.2. Typo. s/IKEv2 has am/IKEv2 has an/
> > Section 6.7.2.  Typo. s/successfull/successful/ Section 6.7.3.1.1.
> > Typo.  s/superceed/superseded/ (I stopped documenting spelling errors
> > at Section 6.7.3.1.1.  Please run a spell checker before handing this
> > off to the RFC Editor)
>=20
> Sorry for this editorial trouble. I was hoping that you would not spend t=
ime on
> this. Yes, of course i will do a more thorough check before RFC editor. M=
y
> excuse for not doing it on every rev is quite lame, but i have not found =
a spell
> checker that remembers all the non-standard words correctly, so a few cha=
nges
> in a 160 page document is terrible each time...
>=20
> Thanks so much for the excellent review! Please consider removing the dis=
cuss.
>=20
> Cheers
>     Toerless


From nobody Mon Aug 10 19:11:48 2020
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To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
Cc: "anima-chairs@ietf.org" <anima-chairs@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>, Sheng Jiang <jiangsheng@huawei.com>
References: <159478218035.5567.5331512017107084574@ietfa.amsl.com> <20200728153739.GI1772@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de> <96a6eb7f4f2c4cd0907a0f2a19900fe6@cert.org>
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <346fff69-093f-60a7-c480-bdae39267e48@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 14:11:33 +1200
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On 11-Aug-20 13:22, Roman Danyliw wrote:
> Hi Toerless!
> 
> Thanks for your detailed follow-up both in the form of the -28 and the helpful explanations below.  I think everything is cleaned up but the last discuss, I will update my ballot so it's easier to manage.
> 
> Roman
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
>> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 11:38 AM
>> To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
>> Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>; draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
>> plane@ietf.org; anima-chairs@ietf.org; anima@ietf.org; Sheng Jiang
>> <jiangsheng@huawei.com>
>> Subject: Re: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-
>> plane-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

...

> 
>>> ** Section 11.  Per the list of factors on which ACP depends, it seems
>>> like the following are missing:
>>>
>>> -- the security properties of the enrollment protocol
>>>
>>> -- that the security considerations of EST and BRSKI apply (or if not,
>>> why not)
>>
>> Resolution:
>>
>> No change, but the following explanations:
>>
>> The ACP is explicitly defined to be a set of nodes with ACP domain certificates,
>> enrollment/BRSKI is really out of scope. Normative ACP nodes start their
>> existance with an ACP cert. How they got it is part of a prior life. BRSKI security
>> properties are covered in BRSKI draft.
>>
>> I struggled long how to well define registrars given that ACP does not mandate/
>> specify any specific protocol.  The solution in the document is that there is only
>> a very abstract definition of the normative requirements against registrars in
>> 6.10.7, pretty much simple requirements against the resulting certificates such
>> as registrar MUST NOT assign same addresses to multiple nodes for example.
>>
>> Think of a registrar abstractely as this:
>>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/102/materials/slides-102-dinrg-dinrg-
>> anima-toerless-eckert-00
>> Slide 10
>>
>> While funny, its not far away from a possible reality of a network operator
>> being a registrar, provisioning ACP certificates manually into ACP nodes, and
>> performing all the backend operations (CA, MASA, adressing database).
>>
>> BRSKI is of course the ANIMA preferred enrollment protocol, and if it is used,
>> an ACP node is called an ANI node (ACP+BRSKI). Section 3.2 makes the security
>> property of the ACP for any such bootstrap protocol. For example in
>> communities outside of ANIMA, NetConf ZeroTouch might be preferred over
>> BRSKI.
>>
>> The only mandatory ACP part of your above list is EST ONLY for renewal of
>> certificates, an that of course is specified in the normative section.
>>
>> The BRSKI draft itself defines how it integrates with ACP (GRASP objective etc.).
>>
>> Hope this answers satisfactory the concern.
> 
> I reread the Section 11 with your explanation in mind and see your perspective -- it's difficult to be specific without mandating a specific protocol.  However, there seems to be two concrete, normative elements of this architecture -- EST and GRASP.  The latter for bootstrapping and the formal for renewal.  It isn't clear then why their Sec Considerations don't apply.  Furthermore, the protocols and practices of the bootstrapping process are out of scope of this document but seem like a security building block on which ACP is being built.

The use of GRASP for adding a node to the ACP must not rely on the ACP for security, but in "normal life" GRASP must rely on the ACP for security. Although GRASP has been sitting in the RFC queue for >2 years, I think it does cover this fairly clearly:

     2.5.  GRASP Protocol Basic Properties and Mechanisms  . . . . .  12
       2.5.1.  Required External Security Mechanism  . . . . . . . .  12 [that's the ACP]
       2.5.2.  Discovery Unsolicited Link-Local (DULL) GRASP . . . .  13 [that's for booting the ACP]

In other words, GRASP section 2.5.1 depends on ACP security, and ACP security depends on GRASP section 2.5.2. Would a cross reference from ACP to GRASP in the last paragraph of ACP section 11 help?

Also, three paragraphs above, there is this:

   In combination with BRSKI, ACP enables a resilient, fully zero-touch
   network solution...

Would another reference to draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra there help?

The three documents (ACP, BRSKI, GRASP) really do chase each other's tails.

Regards
   Brian


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From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>, Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
CC: "anima-chairs@ietf.org" <anima-chairs@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>, Sheng Jiang <jiangsheng@huawei.com>
Thread-Topic: [Anima] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-27: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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References: <159478218035.5567.5331512017107084574@ietfa.amsl.com> <20200728153739.GI1772@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de> <96a6eb7f4f2c4cd0907a0f2a19900fe6@cert.org> <346fff69-093f-60a7-c480-bdae39267e48@gmail.com>
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I still have more to review here -- I'm about ⅓ of the way through -- but I
wanted to get this in sooner, rather than waiting.

This DISCUSS should be easy to resolve: it's mostly that I find the text in
Section 6.5 related to Bob and Alice to be confusing and unclear.  I see that
EKR also found it so and asked for the step-by-step diagram, which does help. 
But I find the whole Bob/Alice thing to be messy and wish you could instead use
some functionally descriptive terms for the roles, rather than using arbitrary
names that aren't meaningful and lead the reader to say, "Wait, which one is
Bob now?"

Specifically:

— Section 6.5 —

      The node with the
      lower Node-ID in the ACP address of its ACP certificate becomes
      Bob, the one with the higher Node-ID in the certificate Alice.  A
      peer with an empty ACP address field in its ACP certificate
      becomes Bob (this specification does not define such peers, only
      the interoperability with them).

What’s with “becomes Bob” and “Alice” here?  Without any introduction I don’t
know what’s going on.  Do you mean something like, ‘One node has a lower
Node-ID in the ACP address of its ACP certificate than the other.  For this
discussion, we will call that node “Bob”, and the other “Alice”.’ ?  Or do you
mean something else?  And then what does the next sentence mean?

   For example, originally Bob could have been the initiator of one ACP
   secure channel protocol that Bob prefers and the security association
   succeeded.  The roles of Bob and Alice are then assigned and the
   connection setup is completed.

Again I’m confused: you’re talking about Bob doing something, and *then* the
role of Bob is assigned?  What does that mean?  How can we talk about Bob doing
something before we know who Bob is?

And are there no more descriptive terms to use here, as opposed to “Bob” and
“Alice”?  Something like “initiator” and “responder”, or whatever, which might
be easier to follow?

I also have an easy-to-address issue here:

— Section 6.7.3.1.2 —

   The IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange group 19 (256-bit random ECP),
   listed as a SHOULD, is to be configured, along with the 2048-bit MODP
   (group 14).

I don’t understand the requirement level here, because I’m not sure what “is to
be configured” means.  You mention “SHOULD”, but then “is to be configured”
seems to say that it has to be supported.  And you seem to be saying that he
same requirement, whatever it is, applies to both group 19 and group 14... but
I’m not certain about that.  Can you please rephrase this to make the
requirements clearer?


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

We have to use “virtual out-of-band” more often, because “VOOB” is a great
acronym.

— Section 1 —

   is therefore intended to combine as good as possible the resilience

Nit: this needs an adverb rather than an adjective, “as well as possible”.

   the ACPs functions instead of implementing them seperately for each

Nit: “separately”.  In the list that follows you should also put a comma after
“traffic” to make it clear what the third list item is, as there are five
“and”s in there.

— Section 1.1 —

   Infrastructure (PKI) code for the ACP certificate, the GRASP
   protocol, UDP, TCP and TLS 1.2 ([RFC5246], for security and

Why specifically TLS 1.2?  Probably this should say “TLS” without a version,
and reference the now-current TLS 1.3 spec (8446), but it shouldn’t be tied to
a specific TLS version.

Similarly, mentions of DTLS shouldn’t be tied to the version number.

Alternatively for both, they could say “version 1.2 or greater”.  I do see that
some places in the document mention 1.2 as a minimum, so I'm just looking for a
little clean-up here to make sure it's clear that we don't want to use <1.2,
but anything from 1.2 on is fine.

   Plane itself would not need to change, it could continue to be IPv4
   only.  For such IPv4 only devices, the IPv6 protocol itself would be
   additional implementation footprint only used for the ACP.

Nit: this is a comma splice.  Either change the comma to a semicolon or change
“, it” to “and”.  Also, “IPv4-only” should be hyphenated when it’s a modifier,
as it is in the second case (but not the first).

I don’t understand “would be additional implementation footprint only used for
the ACP.”  I think “that is only used” would help, but I also don’t think
“footprint” is the right word here.

   The ACP design can be applicable to (cpu, memory) constrained devices
   and (bitrate, reliability) constrained networks

This is an odd use of parentheses, and it threw me at first, before I realized
it’s an attempt at grouping and shorthand.  Better to avoid it, as you also
need some hyphens anyway:

NEW1
   The ACP design can be applicable to cpu- and memory-constrained devices
   and to bitrate- and reliability- constrained networks
END

Or if you find the hyphens awkward, maybe reword to avoid using modifiers:

NEW2
   The ACP design can be applicable to devices constrained with respect
   to cpu and memory, and to networks constrained with respect to bitrate
   and reliability.
END

(And I really don’t think the rest of the sentence (“but this document...”)
adds anything, and I’d just skip it.)

— Section 2 —

   Normative sections are labelled "(Normative)" and use
   [RFC2119]/[RFC8174] keywords.

A small thing you can ignore if you like, but I would skip the citations here
and just say, “and use BCP 14 key words.”  You’ll have the proper citations
with the boilerplate later.

      A CA uses its private key to sign the certificates
      it issues, relying parties use the public key in the CA
      certificate to validate the signature.

Comma splice; please split the sentences.

      This signing certificate
      can be considered to be an identifier of the CA, so the term CA is
      also loosely used to refer to the certificate used by the CA for
      signing.

Really?  I’ve never seen a signing cert called a “CA”.  In any case, I wouldn’t
like to see that usage encouraged.  Does this really need to be here?

— Section 4 —

   ACP5:  The ACP must provide security: Messages coming through the ACP
          must be authenticated to be from a trusted node, and should
          (very strong should) be encrypted.

That last bit feels odd; I suggest instead, “and it is very strongly
recommended that they be encrypted.”

   written ASA could potentially all communicate exclusively via GRASP

Nit: “ASAs”

— Section 6.1 —

   The LDevID certificate is called the ACP certificate, the TA is the
   Certification Authority (CA) root certificate of the ACP domain.

Comma splice.




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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

(1) §6: "An ACP node... Initially, it MUST have...an (empty) ACP Adjacency
Table..."  Is "empty" a requirement?  I'm wondering because §6.2 says that the
adjacency table can also contain configured information, which I assume would
be present before neighbor discovery starts.

(2) As far as I understand, events happen in this order:  The ACP Adjacency
Table (§6.2) is populated with information from DULL GRASP (§6.3).  Based on
that information, a candidate set of neighbors is selected (§6.4).  Is that
correct?

§6.4 (Candidate ACP Neighbor Selection) says that the "ACP is established
exclusively between nodes in the same domain".  However, the domain membership
check is not performed until later (§6.6).

How are the candidate nodes selected in §6.4?  Some nodes may not be chosen,
right?  How can it be verified that the candidate nodes are in the same domain
without performing the domain membership check first?

§6.6 says that "the connection attempt is aborted" if the domain membership
check fails -- but there is no mention about considering other candidates.  It
seems to me as if it may be possible for some selected candidates to not pass
the domain membership check...  What am I missing?

(3) §6.11.1.8 (Multicast): s/Not used yet but possible because of the selected
mode of operations./Not used but possible if the selected MOP is 3.

(4) [nits]

s/explanation how ACP acts/explanation of how ACP acts

s/nodes ACP certificate/node's ACP certificate/g

s/nodes ACP address/node's ACP address




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----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

(pruned down to the remaining issue)

** Section 11.  Per the list of factors on which ACP depends, it seems like the
following are missing:

-- the security properties of the enrollment protocol

-- that the security considerations of EST and BRSKI apply (or if not, why not)


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The style of explaining the design choice after describing an element of the
protocol was informative and helpful.  Thanks.

This document has undergone a significant amount of security review.  Thank you
for incorporating all of this feedback.

Thanks for resolving my previous DISCUSS and COMMENTs.

** Section 6.8.2.1. Editorial.
OLD
The compromised ACP node would
   simply announce the objective as well, potentially filter the
   original objective in GRASP when it is a MITM and act as an
   application level proxy.

NEW
The compromised ACP node would simply announce the objective as well,
potentially filter the original objective in GRASP when it is in-path and
acting as an application level proxy.

** 10.2.2.  Editorial.
OLD
This minimizes man in the middle
   attacks by compromised ACP group members

NEW
This minimizes attacks by compromised ACP group members who are on-path.

** In reviewing the ballot position of my predecessor (ekr)

> Section 6.10.2.
>    o  When creating a new routing-subdomain for an existing autonomic
>       network, it MUST be ensured, that rsub is selected so the
>       resulting hash of the routing-subdomain does not collide with the
>       hash of any pre-existing routing-subdomains of the autonomic
>       network.  This ensures that ACP addresses created by registrars
>       for different routing subdomains do not collide with each others.

[ekr] You need to lay out the security assumptions here. It's not difficult
to create a new domain with the same 40bit hash. If you have a private
CA, this probably isn't an issue, but if you are sharing a public CA,
it would allow me to produce a domain with other people's addresses.

[Roman] If the domain uses a "public CA" as a trust anchor, is there a risk of
it might also be used by some other autonomic domain?




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----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I found significant parts of this document tough to follow, particularly
because there are many deployment variations for almost every element of the
architecture. But I trust that the Security ADs will catch any remaining
security issues.

I appreciate that this effort appears, refreshingly, to have security baked in
from the start.

Sec 6.1.1
"it is beneficial to
   copy the device identifying fields of the node's IDevID certificate
   into the ACP certificate,... and
   the "serialNumber" contains usually device type information that may
   help to faster determine working exploits/attacks against the device."

I am not certain the 'beneficial' assertion is supportable, if the benefit is
some diagnostic help but the drawback is a security vulnerability.

sec 6.5. If both nodes have empty ACP address fields, they are both Bob. What
happens then?

sec 6.11.1.14. "As this requirement raises additional Data-Plane,..."
I am not sure what this clause means to say.




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----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Hopefully just a couple easy ones...

I made a pass over Ekr's ballot comments (nominally on the -16, though
some of the quoted text doesn't seem to match up with that version).
We're generally in good shape there, but I wanted to check on the point
regarding a "downgrade defense on the meta-negotiation between the
protocols", which in theory would allow an attacker to force the use of
IPsec or DTLS or whatever other protocol has a weakness.  It seems like
there may have been some confusion about DULL vs ACP GRASP in play here,
especially with respect to when there might be the possibility of
multiple secure channels.  My current understanding is that there is not
a major issue here, but let's confirm that: DULL GRASP runs only over a
local link (using link-local addresses), and as currently defined has
the option of flooding advertisements that use either DTLS or IKEv2 to
establish the ACP secure channel.  DULL GRASP has no cryptographic
protections at all, so if there is somehow (e.g., on a multi-access
link) an attacker on the link, they could drop or rewrite some
announcements to force either DTLS or IKEv2 to be used for secure
channel establishment even if the other would normally have been
preferred.  On directly-connected wired links, such tampering may be
unlikely (but not beyond the capabilities of, e.g., a nation-state or
well-funded attacker, especially for, e.g., long fiber runs.)  By
itself, this is not useful, since both DTLS and IKEv2+ESP are believed
to be secure, but if some future vulnerability is discovered the
downgrade might allow for the vulnerability to be exploited in cases it
would not otherwise have been usable.  Countermeasures to allow
detection of this kind of tampering are possible -- include as part of
the DTLS or IKEv2 exchange (or the first operation after it) a
preference-ordered list of supported secure channel mechanisms, and bail
out if the mechanism being used is not the most-preferred shared
mechanism -- but will still fail if the vulnerability in question is
sufficiently severe to allow handshake forgery.
ACP GRASP is different, in that it (1) runs over the ACP, so any on-path
attack to drop/rewrite GRASP would have as a prerequisite an attacker in
the ACP, and (2) unicast GRASP is protected end-to-end by TLS.  However,
it seems like broadcast/flooded ACP GRASP objectives will only have the
hop-by-hop ACP protection and so would in theory also be subject to a
downgrade attack if there was an in-ACP on-path attacker.  It also seems
like there's a general expectation that ACP services will run over TLS,
and the option of "TLS *or* DTLS (or something else)" is not expected to
be common, so the existence of a downgrade to a different protocol is
rare as well.
While I would like to be able to defend against downgrade attacks by an
in-ACP on-path attacker, I recognize that it's a defensible position to
take that we assume all entities in the ACP to remain secure and just
accept the corresponding risks in the case of compromise.  Similarly,
for "big iron" router deployments, physical links are the norm and the
DULL GRASP downgrade attack may not be a practical concern; I would
again like to have the mechanisms in place to be able to detect
downgrade if, for example, deployments broaden to the use of radio
technologies, but the absence of such a mechanism does not seem like a
critical flaw at this time.  So, to be clear, the DISCUSS here is just
to be sure that we're all on the same page as to what point Ekr was
making and the current state of affairs; given my current understanding,
I'm not holding a DISCUSS point for "add the downgrade-detection
mechanism" (though I do encourage it).

It looks like Section 6.1.3 is missing a "rule 6: verify that the
acp-address/prefix in the certificate matches the address being used to
talk to the peer", if I'm reading between the lines properly.  (If not,
and this is just skew introduced by editing, my comments about
references to a non-existent rule 6 apply, see COMMENT.)


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thank you for the extensive efforts you put in to respond to the
previous rounds of feedback; I'm happy to say that my discuss points on
the -19 have all been resolved.  I especially appreciate that you were
able to continue discussions with Russ and Barry (and others) even when
I myself was not being particularly responsive due to other pressing
issues.

I'd also like to express appreciation for the care that went into the
various "sweeping changes" (renames/etc.); there was very little fallout
that needed further fixup.

I note that I started off reviewing the diff from -19 to -27 and then
made a follow-up pass looking at the diff from -27 to -28, so there's
some risk I comment on something that I saw in the -27 but is already
fixed.

Section 1

   This document describes a modular design for a self-forming, self-
   managing and self-protecting ACP, which is a virtual out-of-band
   network designed to be as independent as possible of configuration,
   addressing and routing and similar self-dependency problems in
   current IP networks, but which is still operating in-band on the same
   physical network that it is controlling and managing.  The ACP design

nit: the antecedent for "similar self-dependency problems" seems to be
intended to be the issues with in-band OAM/control-plane that were
discussed a couple paragraphs prior, but grammatically we have to look
for a local binding within the same list.  So probably we want something
more like "avoiding the self-dependency problems of current IP
networks".

   In a fully autonomic network node without legacy control or
   management functions/protocols, the Data-Plane would be for example
   just a forwarding plane for "Data" IPv6 packets, aka: packets that
   are not forwarded by the ACP itself such as control or management
   plane packets.  In such networks/nodes, there would be no non-

nit: I suggest rewording to "packets other than the control and
management plane packets that are forwarded by the ACP itself" to avoid
ambiguity about whether the "such as" matches "forwarded by the ACP
itself" or "data packets".

Section 1.1

   The implementation footprint of the ACP consists of Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) code for the ACP certificate, the GRASP
   protocol, UDP, TCP and TLS 1.2 ([RFC5246], for security and

I agree with Barry that it's best to just say "TLS".  Referencing both
8446 and 5246 is okay, but 8446 needs to be there.

Section 5

   4.  For each entry in the candidate adjacency list, the node
       negotiates a secure tunnel using the candidate channel types.
       See Section 6.5.

Somewhere in this procedure (not necessarily exactly here), we might
want to say something about how failed
authentication/negotiation/authorization/etc. means that the candidate
peer adjacency is not accepted into the ACP, rejected, discarded, or
something of that nature.  Having the main focus be on the success case
rather than the detailed error handling makes sense for an overview, but
if we are listing only "candidate" adjacencies we probably ought to
acknowledge that not all candidates succeed.

Section 6.1.1

   ACP nodes MUST NOT support certificates with RSA public keys of less
   than 2048 bit modulus or curves with group order of less than 256
   bit.  They MUST support certificates with RSA public keys with 2048
   bit modulus and MAY support longer RSA keys.  They MUST support
   certificates with ECC public keys using NIST P-256 curves and SHOULD
   support P-384 and P-521 curves.

We probably can nail this down a bit more, particularly on the ECC side
as being ECDSA signatures (but RSA as well to be signatures vs.
encryption).  Maybe something like:

% ACP nodes MUST NOT support certificates with RSA public keys whose
% modulus is less than 2048 bits, or certificates whose ECC public keys
% are in groups whose order is less than 256 bits.  RSA signing
% certificates with 2048-bit public keys MUST be supported, and such
% certificates with longer public keys MAY be supported.  ECDSA
% certificates using the NIST P-256 curve MUST be supported, and such
% certificates using the P-384 and P-521 curves SHOULD be supported.

Also, 2048-bit RSA is starting to look shaky; note that
draft-cooley-cnsa-dtls-tls-profile insists on 3072-bit or larger at this
point, which would be my own personal recommendation as well.

   ACP nodes MUST support SHA-256 and SHOULD support SHA-384, SHA-512
   signatures for certificates with RSA key and the same RSA signatures
   plus ECDSA signatures for certificates with ECC key.

We should probably reword this to be clearer that we're talking about
the signature on the certificate, not the signatures made by the
certificate.  Perhaps:

% ACP nodes MUST support RSA certificates that are signed by RSA
% signatures over the SHA-256 digest of the contents, and SHOULD
% additionally support SHA-384 and SHA-512 digests in such signatures.
% The same requirements for certificate signatures apply to ECDSA
% certificates, and additionally, ACP nodes MUST support ECDSA
% signatures on ECDSA certificates.

   The ACP certificate SHOULD use an RSA key and an RSA signature when
   the ACP certificate is intended to be used not only for ACP
   authentication but also for other purposes.  The ACP certificate MAY
   use an ECC key and an ECDSA signature if the ACP certificate is only
   used for ACP and ANI authentication and authorization.

There may be a mismatch in the normative guidance here: we have MUST
baseline guidance earlier for 2048-bit RSA and P-256, but SHOULD
(stronger than MAY) for P-384/P-521 and only MAY for >2048-bit-RSA.  But
here, it's SHOULD use RSA and only MAY ECC, which is reversed.  I know
that the flexibility-of-strength question is not exactly the same as
what-to-use-externally, so maybe it's fine, but I wanted to check.

   Any secure channel protocols used for the ACP as specified in this
   document or extensions of this document MUST therefore support
   authentication (e.g.:signing) starting with these type of
   certificates.  See [RFC4492] for more information.

Do they all have to support both RSA and ECDSA certs, or is it okay to
only support one?

   The ACP certificate SHOULD be used for any authentication between
   nodes with ACP domain certificates (ACP nodes and NOC nodes) where
   the required authorization condition is ACP domain membership, such

I suggest s/the required authorization condition/a required
authorization condition/, since even if there is more fine-grained
authorization needed, you still need an ACP certificate to prove you're
part of the domain.

   In support of ECDH key establishment, ACP certificates with ECC keys
   MUST indicate to be Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman capable (ECDH) if
   X.509 v3 keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage are included in the
   certificate.

nit: "if X.509 v3 keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage are included" sounds
like both need to be present, but I don't think that's really what's
needed.  AFAICT only the non-extended keyUsage is relevant, so we would
just say "if the X.509v3 keyUsage extension is present, the keyAgreement
bit MUST be set".

   Any other field of the ACP domain certificate is to be populated as
   required by [RFC5280] or desired by the operator of the ACP domain
   ACP registrars/CA and required by other purposes that the ACP domain
   certificate is intended to be used for.

This sentence is a bit hard to parse; it has three clauses and it's not
entirely clear how they're intended to relate to each other ("populated
as required by RFC5280", "desired by the operator of the ACP domain",
"required by other purposes that the ACP domain certificate is intended
to be used for").

   certificate information can be retrieved bei neighboring nodes

s/bei/by/

   For diagnostic and other operational purposes, it is beneficial to
   copy the device identifying fields of the node's IDevID certificate
   into the ACP domain certificate, such as the "serialNumber" (see
   [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] section 2.3.1).  This can be

I suggest noting that this "serialNumber" is the X520SerialNumber name
attribute, not the CertificateSerialNumber (IIUC this is the first usage
of "serialNumber" in this document).  IMO the quotes, while helpful to
set it apart, are not enough to indicate that this is not the normal
certificate serial number (of "issuer and serial number" that is
supposed to uniquely identify a certificate).

   Note that there is no intention to constrain authorization within the
   ACP or autonomic networks using the ACP to just the ACP domain
   membership check as defined in this document.  It can be extended or
   modified with future requirements.  Such future authorizations can
   use and require additional elements in certificates or policies or
   even additional certificates.  For an example, see Appendix A.10.5.

It might be worth noting that we already have the id-kp-cmcRA check for
EST servers, in addition to the "domain membership" check.

Section 6.1.2

     HEXLC = DIGIT / "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"
             ; DIGIT as of RFC5234 section B.1

Note that (if I remember my ABNF right), this is not restricted to just
"lower case" hex digits, since matching is case-insensitive.  (Of
course, "LC" could stand for something else...)  In order to get the
case sensitivity, the %s"a" construction from RFC 7405 (or bare %x61)
would be needed.

     extension = ; future standard definition.
                 ; Must fit RFC5322 simple dot-atom format.

I think there's a different convention than "empty definition" for
extensibility points and am hoping that my colleagues will chime in
about it.

     acp-node-name      = fd89b714F3db00000200000064000000
                          +area51.research@acp.example.com

[has upper-case hex digit, if that ends up mattering]

   Nodes complying with this specification MUST also be able to
   authenticate nodes as ACP domain members or ACP secure channel peers
   when they have a 0-value acp-address field and as ACP domain members
   (but not as ACP secure channel peers) when they have an empty acp-
   address field.  See Section 6.1.3.

An "empty acp-address field" would seem to mean "", the empty string,
which is not allowed by the ABNF.  It is, however, allowed to omit the
acp-address, so I think that it's better to talk about the acp-address
field being "absent" rather than "empty" (and there are many subsequent
mentions of an "empty acp-address" in the document; I tried to point out
most of them as they occur.

   To keep the encoding simple, there is no consideration for
   internationalized acp-domain-names.  The acp-node-name is not
   intended for end user consumption, and there is no protection against
   someone not owning a domain name to simpy choose it.  Instead, it

We should presumably say somewhere (not necessarily here) that if
someone does maliciously try to choose a domain name they don't own as
the acp-domain-name, they won't be able to pass a domain-membership test
unless it's signed by the real domain's CA, and the CA should know
enough to not issue such certs to unauthorized entities.
In other words, the combination of acp-domain-name and root CA identify
the domain, so collisions of acp-domain-name are not fatal (which is
good, since they're trivial to produce).

       1.2  If "acp-address" is empty, and "rsub" is empty too, the
            "local-part" will have the format ":++extension(s)".  The
            two plus characters are necessary so the node can

nit: there's no ":" in the ABNF.

       2.4  Addresses of the form <local><@domain> have become the

nit(?): is the '@' intended to be outside the angle brackets?

       3.1  It should be possible to use the ACP certificate as an
            LDevID certificate on the system for other uses beside the
            ACP.  Therefore, the information element required for the
            ACP should be encoded so that it minimizes the possibility
            of creating incompatibilities with such other uses.  The
            subjectName is for example often used as an entity
            identifier in non-ACP uses of a the ACP certificate.

There's not a "subjectName" field in a PKIX certificate, and I'm not
sure if this is intended to refer to subjectAltName (so as to say that
the ACP name can be used for non-ACP uses) or to some other field
(commonName?) (so as to say that we are leaving that field unoccupied
for other uses).  In light of the surrounding context, I'd guess the
former, but please clarify.

Section 6.1.3

   3:   If the node certificate indicates a Certificate Revocation List
      (CRL) Distribution Point (CRLDP) ([RFC5280], section 4.2.1.13) or
      Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder ([RFC5280],
      section 4.2.2.1), then the peer's certificate MUST be valid
      according to those mechanisms when they are available: An OCSP
      check for the peer's certificate across the ACP must succeed or
      the peer certificate must not be listed in the CRL retrieved from
      the CRLDP.  These mechanisms are not available when the node has

IIUC, the "node certificate" in the first line is the same as the
"peer's certificate" thereafter; we should probably use "peer node's
certificate" the first time as well, for consistency.

      peer if there are multiple.  The ACP secure channel connection
      MUST be retried periodically to support the case that the neighbor
      acquires a new, valid certificate.

(I forget if we already give guidance somewhere about the order of
magnitude for "periodically"; if not, we might want some here.)

   5:   The candidate peer certificate's acp-node-name has a non-empty
      acp-address field (either 32HEXLC or 0, according to Figure 2).

nit: per the ABNF, we should probably refer to the acp-address field
being absent rather than being empty.

      Steps 1...4 do not include verification of any pre-existing form
      of non-public-key-only based identity elements of a certificate
      such as a web servers domain name prefix often encoded in
      certificate common name.  Steps 5 and 6 are the equivalent steps.

I think we only have a step 5 (no 6) now?

      Steps 1...5 authorize to build any secure connection between
      members of the same ACP domain except for ACP secure channels.

      Step 6 is the additional verification of the presence of an ACP
      address.

      Steps 1...6 authorize to build an ACP secure channel.

(ditto)

Section 6.1.3.1

   node SHOULD obtain the current time in a secured fashion

I note with excitement that draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp is in the
RFC Editor's queue!

Section 6.1.5.3

   A CRLDP can be reachable across the ACP either by running it on a
   node with ACP or by connecting its node via an ACP connect interface
   (see Section 8.1).  The CRLDP SHOULD use an ACP certificate for its
   HTTPs connections.  The connecting ACP node SHOULD verify that the
   CRLDP certificate used during the HTTPs connection has the same ACP
   address as indicated in the CRLDP URL of the node's ACP certificate
   if the CRLDP URL uses an IPv6 address.

CRLDPs typically run over HTTP, not HTTPS, so this SHOULD is surprising.
That said, if there is to be a certificate check, why SHOULD vs MUST
verify that the IPv6 address matches?

Section 6.1.5.5

   Maintaining existing TA information is especially important when
   enrollment mechanisms are used that unlike BRSKI do not leverage a
   voucher mechanism to authenticate the ACP registrar and where
   therefore the injection of certificate failures could otherwise make
   the ACP node easily attackable remotely.

We should probably not say that you SHOULD immediatelly fall back to
forgetting the remembered TAs on the first TLS failure.  Some kind of
retry mechanism would give a bit more resilience against this attack.

Section 6.3

   Note that the use of the IPv6 link-local multicast address
   (ALL_GRASP_NEIGHBORS) implies the need to use Multicast Listener
   Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2, see [RFC3810]) to announce the desire to
   receive packets for that address.  Otherwise DULL GRASP could fail to
   operate correctly in the presence of MLD snooping, non-ACP enabled L2
   switches ([RFC4541]) - because those would stop forwarding DULL GRASP
   packets.  Switches not supporting MLD snooping simply need to operate

nit: I suggest putting the 4541 reference right after "MLD snooping"
(i.e., before "non-ACP-enabled L2 switches").

Section 6.7.3.1.1

It's a bit surprising to see ENCR_AES_CCM_8 as a "MAY", since the 8-byte
authentication tag may be significantly weaker than the strength of the
other primitives being used for ACP secure channels.

If ENCR_AES_CBC is listed, we probably want to say something about the
ESP Authentication Algorithm used with it (the AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128
that's a MUST in 8221 would be fine).

   o  There is no MTI requirement against support of ENCR_AES_CBC
      because ENCR_AES_GCM_16 is assumed to be feasible with less cost/
      higher performance in modern devices hardware accelerated
      implementations compared to ENCR-AES_CBC.

I'm not sure what "against support of ENCR_AES_CBC" is intended to mean.
It sounds like it's saying "we don't forbid AES-CBC" but the rest of the
sentence doesn't really support that.

Section 6.7.3.1.2

   ACP nodes SHOULD set up IKEv2 to only use the ACP certificate and TA
   when acting as an IKEv2 responder on the IPv6 link local address and
   port number indicated in the AN_ACP DULL GRASP announcements (see
   Section 6.3).

There's a subtlety of English here -- "to only use <X> when <Y>" means
that the only time X is used is when Y, whereas "to use only <X> when
<Y>" means that X is the only thing that is used when Y, which I think
is the intent of this statement.  (But I could be wrong!)

   In IKEv2, ACP nodes are identified by their ACP address.  The
   ID_IPv6_ADDR IKEv2 identification payload MUST be used and MUST
   convey the ACP address.  If the peer's ACP certificate includes a
   32HEXLC ACP address in the acp-node-name (not "0" or empty), the

[another case of "empty" vs "absent" for acp-address]

Section 6.7.4

nit: s/negoting/negotiating/

   An ACP node announces its ability to support DTLS v1.2 compliant with
   the requirements defined in this document as an ACP secure channel
   protocol in GRASP through the "DTLS" objective-value in the "AN_ACP"
   objective.

   To run ACP via UDP and DTLS v1.2 [RFC6347], a locally assigned UDP
   [...]

As previously, we probably want the "DTLS" objective value to be
version-agnostic; the 1.2 minimum/MTI can be specified in the following
paragraphs.

   Unlike for IPsec, no attempts are made to simplify the requirements
   of the BCP 195 recommendations because the expectation is that DTLS
   would be using software-only implementations where the ability to
   reuse of widely adopted implementations is more important than
   minizing the complexity of a hardware accelerated implementation
   which is known to be important for IPsec.

(side note: hardware TLS support is becoming more common these days,
though only for the record encryption and not the handshake protocol, as
I understand it.  Analogous to supporting ESP but not IKEv2 in hardware,
basically.)

Section 6.8.2

   TLS for GRASP MUST offer TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and
   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and MUST NOT offer options
   with less than 256 bit symmetric key strength or hash strength of
   less han SHA384.  [...]

Those are TLS 1.2 ciphers; do you want to also say "when TLS 1.3 is
supported, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 MUST be offered and
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 MAY be offered"?

   less han SHA384.  TLS for GRASP MUST also include the "Supported
   Elliptic Curves" extension, it MUST support support the NIST P-256
   (secp256r1) and P-384 (secp384r1(24)) curves [RFC4492].  In addition,
   GRASP TLS clients SHOULD send an ec_point_formats extension with a
   single element, "uncompressed".  For further interoperability
   recommendations, GRASP TLS implementations SHOULD follow [RFC7525].

Note that RFC 8446 retconned "Supported Elliptic Curves" to being
"Supported Groups".  (It also obviated the need for "ec_point_formats",
but since ACP mandates ability to use TLS 1.2, you still have to send
that one.)

Section 6.10.2

   o  When creating a new routing-subdomain for an existing autonomic
      network, it MUST be ensured, that rsub is selected so the
      resulting hash of the routing-subdomain does not collide with the
      hash of any pre-existing routing-subdomains of the autonomic
      network.  This ensures that ACP addresses created by registrars
      for different routing subdomains do not collide with each others.

Ensured by whom?  What if the domain uses a "public CA" as a trust
anchor that might also be used by some other autonomic domain -- does
the CA also need to be checking?

Section 6.10.3

   o  Node-Number: Number to make the Node-ID unique.  This can be
      sequentially assigned by the ACP Registrar owning the Registrar-
      ID.

I see "can be sequentially assigned" and immediately think of
draft-gont-numeric-identifiers-sec-considerations, which I'm
AD-sponsoring for publication.  I don't have an obvious attack handy
against sequential assignment, but it may be worth a closer look.

Section 6.10.7.1

   Any protocols or mechanisms may be used as ACP registrars, as long as
   the resulting ACP certificate and TA certificate(s) allow to perform

nit(?): the ACP registrar is a PKI registration authority, i.e., a
specific entity that plays a role in certificate issuance.  I don't see
how a "protocol or mechanism" can fulfil that role.  Is s/as/by/ (or
similar) intended?

Section 6.10.7.3

   The choice of addressing sub-scheme and prefix-length in the Vlong
   address sub-scheme is subject to ACP registrar policy.  It could be
   an ACP domain wide policy, or a per ACP node or per ACP node type
   policy.  For example, in BRSKI, the ACP registrar is aware of the
   IDevID certificate of the candidate ACP node, which contains a
   "serialNnumber" that is typically indicating the node's vendor and
   [...]
   address scheme for ACP nodes based on the "serialNumber" of the
   IDevID certificate, for example by the PID (Product Identifier) part
   which identifies the product type, or the complete "serialNumber".
   The PID for example could identify nodes that allow for specialized
   ASA requiring multiple addresses or non-autonomic VMs for services
   and those nodes could receive Vlong sub-address scheme ACP addresses.

[same "serialNumber" comment as in Section 6.1.1, also s/Nn/N/]

Section 6.11.1.7

   When using ACP multi-access virtual interfaces, local repair can be
   directly by peer breakage, see Section 6.12.5.2.2.

nit: is there a missing word like "triggered" in here (e.g., "can be
triggered directly by peer breakage")?

Section 6.11.1.14

   As this requirement raises additional Data-Plane, it does not apply
   to nodes where the administrative parameter to become root
   (Section 6.11.1.12) can always only be 0b001, e.g.: the node does not
   support explicit configuration to be root, or to be ACP registrar or
   to have ACP-connect functionality.  If an ACP network is degraded to
   the point where there are no nodes that could be configured roots,
   ACP registrars or ACP-connect nodes, traffic to unknown destinations
   could not be diagnosed, but in the absence of any intelligent nodes
   supporting other than 0b001 administrative preference, there is
   likely also no diagnostic function possible.

Some nits here.  Maybe:

% As this requirement places additional constraints on the Data-Plane
% functionality of the RPL root, it does not apply to "normal" nodes
% that are not configured to have special functionality (i.e., the
% adminstrative parameter from Section 6.11.1.12 has value 0b001).  If
% the ACP network is degraded to the point where there are no nodes that
% could be configured as root, registrar, or ACP-connect nodes, it is
% possible that the RPL root ( and thus the ACP as a whole) would be
% unable to detect traffic to unknown destinations.  However, in the
% absence of nodes with administrative preference other than 0b001,
% there is also unlikely to be a way to get diagnostic information out
% of the ACP, so detection of traffic to unknown destinations would not
% be actionable anyway.

Section 6.12.5.1

   8.  Using global scope addresses for subnets between nodes is
       unnecessary if those subnets only connect routers, such as ACP
       secure channels because they can communicate to remote nodes via

nit: comma after "such as ACP secure channels".

Section 6.12.5.2

   Note that all the considerations described here are assuming point-
   to-point secure channel associations.  Mapping multi-party secure
   channel associations such as [RFC6407] is out of scope (but would be
   easy to add).

Let's drop the "but would be easy to add" parenthetical, please.

Section 7.2

   This is sufficient when p2p ACP virtual interfaces are established to
   every ACP peer.  When it is desired to create multi-access ACP
   virtual interfaces (see Section 6.12.5.2.2), it is REQIURED not to
   coalesce all the ACP secure channels on the same L3 VLAN interface,
   but only all those on the same L2 port.

This requirement that ACP devices know whether multi-access virtual
interfaces are expected or not is a bit hidden here, and might benefit
from being more prominent in an overall requirements list.

Section 8.1.1

   "ACP connect" is an interface level configured workaround for
   connection of trusted non-ACP nodes to the ACP.  The ACP node on
   which ACP connect is configured is called an "ACP edge node".  With
   ACP connect, the ACP is accessible from those non-ACP nodes (such as
   NOC systems) on such an interface without those non-ACP nodes having
   to support any ACP discovery or ACP channel setup.  This is also
   called "native" access to the ACP because to those NOC systems the
   interface looks like a normal network interface (without any
   encryption/novel-signaling).

It's "native access" (and I see later that there's discussion of how the
NMS routes into the ACP and of RPF filtering, and much later about the
ability of ACP connect channels to participate in ACP GRASP), but what
kind of services are accessible and how?  Do we need to make TLS
connections to ACP addresses, or is it at some other layer?  (If TLS,
are those services going to let us do anything with no client
authentication?)

   ACP Edge nodes SHOULD have a configurable option to filter packets
   with RPI headers (xsee Section 6.11.1.13 across an ACP connect
   interface.  These headers are outside the scope of the RPL profile in
   this specification but may be used in future extensions of this
   specification.

Does "filter" just mean "drop anything with an RPI" or something more
fine-grained?  (Also, s/xsee/see/.)

Section 8.2.2

I think we want to require (or at least strongly suggest) that the
tunnel used to produce a "L2 adjacent" interface provide some sort of
cryptographic protection, as otherwise the security properties that we
expect from the L2-adjacent nature can be violated by an attacker on the
path of the tunnel.

Section 9.1.1

   Another example case is the intended or accidental re-activation of
   equipment whose TA certificate has long expired, such as redundant
   gear taken from storage after years.  Potentially without following
   the correct process set up for such cases.

nit: sentence fragment.

Section 9.2.2

      Policies if candidate ACP nodes should receive a domain
      certificate or not, for example based on the devices IDevID
      certificate as in BRSKI.  The ACP registrar may have a whitelist
      or blacklist of devices "serialNumbers" from their IDevID
      certificate.

[Same comment about serialNumber as Section 6.1.1]

Section 9.2.5

      Which candidate ACP node is permitted or not permitted into an ACP
      domain.  This may not be a decision to be taken upfront, so that a
      per-"serialNumber" policy can be loaded into every ACP registrar.
      Instead, it may better be decided in real-time including
      potentially a human decision in a NOC.

(ditto)

Section 9.3.5.1

   Automatically setting "ANI enable" on brownfield nodes where the
   operator is unaware of BRSKI and MASA operations could also be an
   unlikely but then critical security issue.  If an attacker could
   impersonate the operator and register as the operator at the MASA or
   otherwise get hold of vouchers and can get enough physical access to
   the network so pledges would register to an attacking registrar, then
   the attacker could gain access to the network through the ACP that
   the attacker then has access to.

nit(?): this last bit ("gain access ... then has access to") is easy to
read as being a tautology.  Maybe "attacker could gain access to the
ACP, and through the ACP gain access to the data plane"?

Section 9.3.5.2

   Attempts for BRSKI pledge operations in greenfield state should
   terminate automatically when another method of configuring the node
   is used.  Methods that indicate some form of physical possession of
   the device such as configuration via the serial console port could
   lead to immediate termination of BRSKI, while other parallel auto
   configuration methods subject to remote attacks might lead to BRSKI
   termination only after they were successful.  Details of this may
   vary widely over different type of nodes.  [...]

Most of this seems appropriate for, and (IIRC) already in, BRSKI itself
and may not need repetition here.

Section 9.4

   Note that the non-autonomous ACP-Core VPN would require additional
   extensions to propagate GRASP messages when GRASP discovery is
   desired across the zones.  For example, one could set up on each Zone
   edge router remote ACP tunnel to an appplication level implemented
   GRASP hub running in the networks NOC that is generating GRASP
   announcements for NOC services into the ACP Zones or propagating them
   between ACP Zones.

There's enough nits here that I've lost the intended meaning.  Is it:

% For example, one could set up on each Zone edge router a remote ACP
% tunnel to a GRASP hub, implemented at the application level, that runs
% in the NOC for the network and serves to propagage GRASP announcements
% between ACP Zones and/or generate GRASP announcements for NOC services

Section 10.1

   Merging two networks with different TA requires the ACP nodes to
   trust the union of TA.  As long as the routing-subdomain hashes are
   different, the addressing will not overlap, which only happens in the
   unlikely event of a 40-bit hash collision in SHA256 (see
   Section 6.10).  Note that the complete mechanisms to merge networks
   is out of scope of this specification.

Maybe "only happens accidentally"?  40 bits of work is not terribly hard
if you're trying to make a collision...

Section 10.2.1

nit: s/ectracting/extracting/

Using RFC 3596 ("DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6") as the sole
reference for "DNS" seems surprising.

Section 15.2

Usually we put RFC 2119 as normative as well as 8174; the two together
comprise BCP 14, after all.

We seem to say that you MUST offer the TLS elliptic curve ciphers from
RFC 4492, which would make it a normative reference.  (It's also been
obsoleted by RFC 8422 at this point...)

Appendix A.7

   Note that RPL scales very well.  It is not necessary to use multiple
   routing subdomains to scale ACP domains in a way it would be possible
   if other routing protocols where used.  They exist only as options
   for the above mentioned reasons.

nit(?) s/it would be possible/that would be required/?




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Barry Leiba has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28: Discuss

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

This DISCUSS should be easy to resolve: it's mostly that I find the text in
Section 6.5 related to Bob and Alice to be confusing and unclear.  I see that
EKR also found it so and asked for the step-by-step diagram, which does help. 
But I find the whole Bob/Alice thing to be messy and wish you could instead use
some functionally descriptive terms for the roles, rather than using arbitrary
names that aren't meaningful and lead the reader to say, "Wait, which one is
Bob now?"

Specifically:

— Section 6.5 —

      The node with the
      lower Node-ID in the ACP address of its ACP certificate becomes
      Bob, the one with the higher Node-ID in the certificate Alice.  A
      peer with an empty ACP address field in its ACP certificate
      becomes Bob (this specification does not define such peers, only
      the interoperability with them).

What’s with “becomes Bob” and “Alice” here?  Without any introduction I don’t
know what’s going on.  Do you mean something like, ‘One node has a lower
Node-ID in the ACP address of its ACP certificate than the other.  For this
discussion, we will call that node “Bob”, and the other “Alice”.’ ?  Or do you
mean something else?  And then what does the next sentence mean?

   For example, originally Bob could have been the initiator of one ACP
   secure channel protocol that Bob prefers and the security association
   succeeded.  The roles of Bob and Alice are then assigned and the
   connection setup is completed.

Again I’m confused: you’re talking about Bob doing something, and *then* the
role of Bob is assigned?  What does that mean?  How can we talk about Bob doing
something before we know who Bob is?

And are there no more descriptive terms to use here, as opposed to “Bob” and
“Alice”?  Something like “initiator” and “responder”, or whatever, which might
be easier to follow?

I also have a few easy-to-address issues here:

— Section 6.7.3.1.2 —

   The IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange group 19 (256-bit random ECP),
   listed as a SHOULD, is to be configured, along with the 2048-bit MODP
   (group 14).

I don’t understand the requirement level here, because I’m not sure what “is to
be configured” means.  You mention “SHOULD”, but then “is to be configured”
seems to say that it has to be supported.  And you seem to be saying that he
same requirement, whatever it is, applies to both group 19 and group 14... but
I’m not certain about that.  Can you please rephrase this to make the
requirements clearer?

— Section 6.7.5 —

   A baseline ACP node MUST support IPsec natively and MAY support IPsec
   via GRE.  If GRE is supported, it MAY be preferred over native IPec.

But Section 6.7.3.2 says:

   If IKEv2 initiator and responder support IPsec over GRE, it has to be
   preferred over native IPsec.

Which is it?  “MAY” be preferred?  Or “has to be preferred”?

— Section 6.10.6 —

   IANA is asked need to assign a new "type" for each new addressing
   sub-scheme.  With the current allocations, only 2 more schemes are
   possible, so the last addressing scheme MUST provide further
   extensions (e.g., by reserving bits from it for further extensions).

I don’t understand the first sentence.  It doesn’t parse, for one thing, so
please fix that.  And it would be better to clearly match it with the
corresponding request in the IANA Considerations section.

For the second sentence (the DISCUSS part), I’m very skeptical that this is the
right approach: if you’re already acknowledging that “only” 2 schemes are
possible now, it seems time *now* to prepare the way for additional ones,
rather than waiting.  What’s the reasoning for putting in a warning rather than
just doing it, especially as you’re setting up a new registry anyway?


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

We have to use “virtual out-of-band” more often, because “VOOB” is a great
acronym.

— Section 1 —

   is therefore intended to combine as good as possible the resilience

Nit: this needs an adverb rather than an adjective, “as well as possible”.

   the ACPs functions instead of implementing them seperately for each

Nit: “separately”.  In the list that follows you should also put a comma after
“traffic” to make it clear what the third list item is, as there are five
“and”s in there.

— Section 1.1 —

   Infrastructure (PKI) code for the ACP certificate, the GRASP
   protocol, UDP, TCP and TLS 1.2 ([RFC5246], for security and

Why specifically TLS 1.2?  Probably this should say “TLS” without a version,
and reference the now-current TLS 1.3 spec (8446), but it shouldn’t be tied to
a specific TLS version.

Similarly, mentions of DTLS shouldn’t be tied to the version number.

Alternatively for both, they could say “version 1.2 or greater”.  I do see that
some places in the document mention 1.2 as a minimum, so I'm just looking for a
little clean-up here to make sure it's clear that we don't want to use <1.2,
but anything from 1.2 on is fine.

   Plane itself would not need to change, it could continue to be IPv4
   only.  For such IPv4 only devices, the IPv6 protocol itself would be
   additional implementation footprint only used for the ACP.

Nit: this is a comma splice.  Either change the comma to a semicolon or change
“, it” to “and”.  Also, “IPv4-only” should be hyphenated when it’s a modifier,
as it is in the second case (but not the first).

I don’t understand “would be additional implementation footprint only used for
the ACP.”  I think “that is only used” would help, but I also don’t think
“footprint” is the right word here.

   The ACP design can be applicable to (cpu, memory) constrained devices
   and (bitrate, reliability) constrained networks

This is an odd use of parentheses, and it threw me at first, before I realized
it’s an attempt at grouping and shorthand.  Better to avoid it, as you also
need some hyphens anyway:

NEW1
   The ACP design can be applicable to cpu- and memory-constrained devices
   and to bitrate- and reliability- constrained networks
END

Or if you find the hyphens awkward, maybe reword to avoid using modifiers:

NEW2
   The ACP design can be applicable to devices constrained with respect
   to cpu and memory, and to networks constrained with respect to bitrate
   and reliability.
END

(And I really don’t think the rest of the sentence (“but this document...”)
adds anything, and I’d just skip it.)

— Section 2 —

   Normative sections are labelled "(Normative)" and use
   [RFC2119]/[RFC8174] keywords.

A small thing you can ignore if you like, but I would skip the citations here
and just say, “and use BCP 14 key words.”  You’ll have the proper citations
with the boilerplate later.

      A CA uses its private key to sign the certificates
      it issues, relying parties use the public key in the CA
      certificate to validate the signature.

Comma splice; please split the sentences.

      This signing certificate
      can be considered to be an identifier of the CA, so the term CA is
      also loosely used to refer to the certificate used by the CA for
      signing.

Really?  I’ve never seen a signing cert called a “CA”.  In any case, I wouldn’t
like to see that usage encouraged.  Does this really need to be here?

— Section 4 —

   ACP5:  The ACP must provide security: Messages coming through the ACP
          must be authenticated to be from a trusted node, and should
          (very strong should) be encrypted.

That last bit feels odd; I suggest instead, “and it is very strongly
recommended that they be encrypted.”

   written ASA could potentially all communicate exclusively via GRASP

Nit: “ASAs”

— Section 6.1 —

   The LDevID certificate is called the ACP certificate, the TA is the
   Certification Authority (CA) root certificate of the ACP domain.

Comma splice.

— Section 6.8.2 —

   GRASP unicast messages inside the ACP are transported
   via TLS which MUST comply with [RFC7525] execept that only TLS 1.2
   ([RFC5246]) is REQUIRED and TLS 1.3 ([RFC8446] is RECOMMENDED.

This ties into my earlier comment about text that seems to tie this to the TLS
version.  I strongly recommend that you say early on (not here in 6.8.2) what’s
here in the quoted text and elsewhere: that, for TLS and DTLS, 1.2 is REQUIRED,
1.3 is RECOMMENDED, and 1.1 and earlier MUST NOT be used.  Include text “up
there” about backward compatibility and making sure 1.2-only situations can be
accommodated via negotiation.  Possibly add a sentence about supporting
post-1.3 versions when they are developed.  And then don’t say anything about
versions elsewhere in the document.

— Section 6.10.1 —

   o  Addresses in the ACP are not considered sensitive on privacy
      grounds because ACP nodes are not expected to be end-user host.

Is there something missing here?  This looks like an incomplete sentence.  Or
should it just be “end user hosts”?  If that’s it, I suggest wording it as
“...not expected to host end users.”  It might also help to say, “ACP nodes are
part of the data center infrastructure [or some such] and are not expected...”

— Section 6.11.1.7 —

   Global Repair: we assume stable links and ranks (metrics), so no need
   to periodically rebuild DODAG.  DODAG version only incremented under
   catastrophic events (e.g., administrative action).

This is one of the most egregious of the poor-grammar issues in the document. 
I’m generally not happy with expecting the RPC to turn text like this into
proper English, and wish that working groups would be more careful about it. 
Something like this, in this case, perhaps?:

NEW
   Global Repair: we assume stable links and ranks (metrics), so there is
   no need to periodically rebuild the DODAG.  The DODAG version is only
   incremented under catastrophic events (e.g., administrative action).
END

And is administrative action really an example of a catastrophic event?  It
would seem that administrative action would be a *response* to such an event. 
What’s an example of an event itself?  Or is it “catastrophic” that’s the wrong
word, maybe?

(The “Local Repair” paragraph also has some incomplete sentences and missing
articles.)

— Section 6.12.5.1 —

   2.  IPv6 implementations do commonly not allow to assign the same

A common English usage issue: “allow to assign” (in general, “allow
<infinitive>”) doesn’t work in English, because the infinitive needs a subject
(“allow <some entity> to assign”).  If you don’t have a subject to put there,
you can say, “IPv6 implementations commonly do not allow assignment of the
same...” (which also fixes the issue that “commonly” shouldn’t split “do not”).

— Section 8.1.1 —

   interface looks like a normal network interface (without any
   encryption/novel-signaling).

What is “novel-signaling”?

   This is sometimes called "RPF filtering".  This MAY be changed
   through administrative measures.

Two things here:  One is that this feels like a “may” (or “might” or “can”... a
statement, not a directive) rather than a BCP 14 key word.  The other is that I
don’t follow what it is that may be changed: what does “this” refer to in the
second sentence?




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Erik Kline has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28: Discuss

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

[ section 2 ]

* "It is the approximate IPv6 counterpart of the IPv4 private address
  ([RFC1918])."

  I understand the intent but I don't think this statement is complete. I
  think we shouldn't let this sentence out into the wild as is since it could
  be read without any context nor even any pretense of interest in nuance.

  May I suggest:

  "It is often thought of as the approximate IPv6 counterpart of the IPv4
  private address space ([RFC1918]), though it is in fact meaningfully
  different in important and subtle ways [and upon which this document relies]."

[ section 6.10.2 ]

* Please clarify the table at the end of this section.  It looks like only
  two Types are listed, but should all 4 bit values be present?  Where are the
  Z, F, and V bits in the address?

  I realize these are defined in the following sections, so it probably
  suffices to say something like "The Z, F, and V bits are allocated from
  within the sub-scheme portion of the address according to the following
  sections..." or something.

  Unassigned/unused Type values should maybe be listed in the table as
  "Reserved"?

[ section 8.1.3 ]

* Why is an RIO for ::/0 with a lifetime of 0 required?  Doesn't it suffice
  it set the default router lifetime to 0?  Separately, are all nodes required
  to be Type C?


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

[ section 1 ]

* "as good as possible" might be "as well as possible", but I'm unsure if I
  have any grammatical basis for this (adverbial phrase vs adjectival phrase?).

* "ACPs functions" -> "ACP's functions"?

* "overview how" perhaps: "overview of how"

* "propriety extensions" -> "proprietary extensions"

[ section 2 ]

* "On virtual nodes their equivalent." isn't really a complete sentence.  I
  think if you just join it to the previous sentence with ";" it works
  grammatically.

[ section 6.1.1 ]

* s/devices "serialNumber"/device's "serialNumber"/

[ section 6.1.2 ]

* The example "fd89b714F3db00000200000064000000" contains an uppercase "F"
  and therefore doesn't conform to 32HEXLC, I believe.

* 2. 2.1, "a nodes ACP" -> "a node's ACP" (it is correct in the immediately
  preceding sentence).

[ section 6.1.3 ]

* The rsub field, even if deliberately not pertinent, is a bit conspicuous by
  its absence from this section I think. It might good to state so explicitly
  (at least I, as a reader, was expecting to see some mention of it).

[ section 6.1.5.1 ]

* I think the 32 hex lowercase IPv6 addresses in the examples are each missing
  a single hex character (31 instead of 32)?  Or maybe that's not what these
  fields are (or I've miscounted)?

[ section 6.3 ]

* "does not include ACP nodes ACP certificate" perhaps -> "does not include
  the ACP node's ACP certificate"

* With respect to DULL GRASP message fragmentation due to certificate
  inclusion: is it of any value to include the fingerprint of the ACP cert,
  for diagnostics...?

[ section 6.5 ]

* s/to easier distinguish/to more easily distinguish/

[ section 6.6 ]

* Feel free to phrase the backoff implementation in reference to RFC 8415
  section 15 semantics (I think: IRT = 10 seconds, MRT = 640 seconds).

[ section 6.7.3.2 ]

* Should Responder-IPv6-ACP-LL-addr be in the TSr set?

[ section 6.10.1 ]

* "not expected to be end-user host." --> "... hosts."

[ section 6.11.1.11 ]

* What does a manual configuration (6.10.4) advertise?  Just its /128?

* Where does the /96 come from?

[ section 6.12.3 ]

* "meant to be prioritize reliability" -> "meant to prioritize reliability"

[ section 6.12.5.1 ]

* s/adddress/address/

* (see Figure 15 --> (see Figure 15)

* on other type -> on other types

[ section 6.12.5.2.2 ]

* "ACP nodes MAY reduce the amount of link-local IPv6 multicast packets
   from ND by learning the IPv6 link-local neighbor address to ACP
   secure channel mapping from other messages such as the source address
   of IPv6 link-local multicast RPL messages - and therefore forego the
   need to send Neighbor Solicitation messages."

   Isn't this only true on links with configurations such that a node can trust
   that the source link layer address of the received RPL message is guaranteed
   to be that of the original sender?

[ Appendix A.1 ]

* Yeah, I gotta say I didn't understand why the acp-address scheme wouldn't
  support giving each ACP loopback its own /64 from the start.  That's
  14-16 bits of /64s in a single rsub ULA's /48 which would seem pretty simple
  to implement (a /64 per router in some deployments).




From nobody Thu Aug 13 05:33:48 2020
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From: Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 08:33:28 -0400
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Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, anima-chairs@ietf.org,  draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org, anima@ietf.org,  Sheng Jiang <jiangsheng@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Erik Kline's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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> [ section 6.1.2 ]
>
> * The example "fd89b714F3db00000200000064000000" contains an uppercase "F"
>   and therefore doesn't conform to 32HEXLC, I believe.

     HEXLC = DIGIT / "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"

ABNF [RFC5234] is case-insensitive, so "f" in the grammar allows both
"f" and "F" in practice.  So the example does conform to the grammar.
That said, it's probably best to make the example internally
consistent and use all lower case letters, even though mixing them is
legit.

Barry


From nobody Thu Aug 13 07:17:11 2020
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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 16:16:59 +0200
From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
To: Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
Cc: Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, anima-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org, anima@ietf.org, Sheng Jiang <jiangsheng@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Erik Kline's Discuss on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Arghh... thats what an author like me deserves to get for not reading every bloody
formal language RFC line by line *sigh*.

Meaning i will remove the definition HEXLC and just use RFC5234 HEXDIG even though i
will keep lower case. Add a comment about preference to encode lower case but
need to absorb any case mix.

Thanks, Barry!

Toerless

On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 08:33:28AM -0400, Barry Leiba wrote:
> > [ section 6.1.2 ]
> >
> > * The example "fd89b714F3db00000200000064000000" contains an uppercase "F"
> >   and therefore doesn't conform to 32HEXLC, I believe.
> 
>      HEXLC = DIGIT / "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f"
> 
> ABNF [RFC5234] is case-insensitive, so "f" in the grammar allows both
> "f" and "F" in practice.  So the example does conform to the grammar.
> That said, it's probably best to make the example internally
> consistent and use all lower case letters, even though mixing them is
> legit.
> 
> Barry

-- 
---
tte@cs.fau.de


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On Tue, Aug 11, 2020 at 01:22:22AM +0000, Roman Danyliw wrote:
> > 
> > > ** Section 6.11.1.1.2.  A mechanism for failed ACP detected using a
> > > secure channel protocol is noted for IPSec (with IKEv2 Dead Peer
> > > Detection).  What is the equivalent for DTLS?
> > 
> > Good question. If you know someone who could suggest an equivalent, please
> > bring her in. Given how this is a performance optimization, i don't think we
> > need to bother too much. I hope we can learn from
> > implementation/deployment experience (i only hve that for IPsec) and then
> > write update text later with such refinements.
> 
> Sorry, I too don't have citable reference.  Let's leave it as is.

DTLS heartbeats (RFC 6520) would probably be the closest thing to IKE dead
peer detection, but it's not a perfect match.
(Also, openssl removed all support for heartbeats recently-ish, even for
DTLS; I guess heartbleed left too many painful memories.)

-Ben


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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Fries, Steffen <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
    >> I understand the use case with CoAP, where one wants to be able to multicast a
    >> request to /.well-known/core to find out which devices support a particular
    >> service.
    >> HTTP does not have the same thing, so I don't see the point of agility in the end
    >> points if they are all in /.well-known anyway.

    > Agreed. As BRSKI-AE is intended to extend BRSKI and therefore uses
    > HTTP, there is no need for a specific enhancement. The discovery using
    > /.well-known will provide all available endpoints to the pledge, which
    > then can evaluate the response. From an application perspective I would
    > expect that the pledge may not support multiple enrollment approaches
    > and simply try whatever he supports. The domain registrar would be the
    > more capable component to support multiple options.

Can you explain to me why the discovery via /.well-known/brski is useful?
This is on the *REGISTRAR*.

In reading BRSKI-AE, I seem to be missing any place where the PUSH mechanism
is described.  In a PUSH use case, what protocol would the pledge expose to
the pledge-agent and/or commissioner?
As far as I can tell, in the PULL case, when CMP (or another mechanism) will
be used, there is still a voucher exchange first.  The Registrar can express
it's preference in the (parboiled) voucher-request from Registrar to MASA.

The MASA, if the pledge supports the desired enrollment protocol, could
include the hint.  In fact, the MASA could include an entire URL with
meta-data about the protocol to use.

This would jive very nicely with the brski-cloud mechanism!!!

    > For the constraint case (not contained in BRSKI), the discovery of
    > specific endpoints is more important to not overload the pledge.

I don't understand this at all.  What do you mean, overload the pledge?
Are you talking about network or code space or what?

    >> If there is value in renaming, then lets do it RIGHT NOW.
    >> I DO NOT WANT to confuse the market by having an RFC come out, followed by
    >> another one 'correcting' it six months later.
    >> I CAN NOT live with that situation.

    > As stated before, the value from my understanding is more clarity
    > (distinct naming) regarding the provided services/endpoints.

yes, but that's a cosmetic issue.
it appeals to humans, but it makes no technical difference.
Nevertheless, if we can do this quickly, then let's do it.
I've provided proposed text in the form of a diff, the ADs have agreed to a
process, the chairs , just need to run it.

I hope that your(Siemens) Thomas Werner will comment.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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From: "Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
CC: "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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> From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
> Fries, Steffen <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
>     >> I understand the use case with CoAP, where one wants to be able to
> multicast a
>     >> request to /.well-known/core to find out which devices support a
> particular
>     >> service.
>     >> HTTP does not have the same thing, so I don't see the point of agi=
lity in
> the end
>     >> points if they are all in /.well-known anyway.
>=20
>     > Agreed. As BRSKI-AE is intended to extend BRSKI and therefore uses
>     > HTTP, there is no need for a specific enhancement. The discovery us=
ing
>     > /.well-known will provide all available endpoints to the pledge, wh=
ich
>     > then can evaluate the response. From an application perspective I w=
ould
>     > expect that the pledge may not support multiple enrollment approach=
es
>     > and simply try whatever he supports. The domain registrar would be =
the
>     > more capable component to support multiple options.
>=20
> Can you explain to me why the discovery via /.well-known/brski is useful?
> This is on the *REGISTRAR*.
The intention was to let the pledge or the pledge-agent know in advance wha=
t enrollment options are available at the registrar side allowing the pledg=
e to fail fast if it does not have a matching enrollment protocol. For the =
original BRSKI, this is not the case, as both sides support the same featur=
e set. In BRSKI-AE allowing alternative enrollment protocols, the registrar=
 may support multiple different ways. To avoid make support for specific pr=
otocols mandatory on the registrar side, discovery of supported options was=
 intended. Based on the discussion we had after the last meeting I think th=
e discovery of /.well-known/ would be sufficient.

> In reading BRSKI-AE, I seem to be missing any place where the PUSH
> mechanism is described.  In a PUSH use case, what protocol would the
> pledge expose to the pledge-agent and/or commissioner?
This is currently left outside in terms of the protocol. The intention was =
to only specify the necessary (signature wrapped) data objects to be exchan=
ged, to be open regarding the underlying transport between the pledge and t=
he pledge-agent. This also would allow to use an arbitrary pledge-agent, bu=
t this is up for discussion. I'm currently thinking about the necessity to =
be able to authenticate the pledge-agent using an LDevID, if we solely rely=
 on the objects. Authentication could also be done using HTTP authenticatio=
n merely to authorize the pledge-agent to act as proxy between the pledge a=
nd the registrar.=20

> As far as I can tell, in the PULL case, when CMP (or another mechanism) w=
ill
> be used, there is still a voucher exchange first.  The Registrar can expr=
ess it's
> preference in the (parboiled) voucher-request from Registrar to MASA.
PULL was meant to describe the behavior of the pledge to start the onboardi=
ng while PUSH was more the trigger from the pledge-agent.
As the enrollment is between the pledge, the registrar, and the CA, I would=
 not see a need to include this information in the voucher. This should be =
done as outlined in BRSKI.=20
>=20
> The MASA, if the pledge supports the desired enrollment protocol, could
> include the hint.  In fact, the MASA could include an entire URL with met=
a-
> data about the protocol to use.
>=20
> This would jive very nicely with the brski-cloud mechanism!!!
Hm, haven't though about this. In case of standard BRSKI I would not see a =
need, as it would be handled by the domain registrar, but in case of the cl=
oud registrar, it would provide the option to point to the right domain reg=
istrar supporting the enrollment.=20

>=20
>     > For the constraint case (not contained in BRSKI), the discovery of
>     > specific endpoints is more important to not overload the pledge.
>=20
> I don't understand this at all.  What do you mean, overload the pledge?
> Are you talking about network or code space or what?
I was referring to the discovery of specific endpoints. In case of /.well-k=
nown the registrar would deliver all endpoints including their options supp=
orted, while in case of asking for a specific endpoint only delivers the sp=
ecific options of that endpoint. What I meant to say was that the pledge on=
ly gets the necessary information about the endpoints he needs not all. So =
it would relate to the processing on the pledge.=20

>=20
>     >> If there is value in renaming, then lets do it RIGHT NOW.
>     >> I DO NOT WANT to confuse the market by having an RFC come out,
> followed by
>     >> another one 'correcting' it six months later.
>     >> I CAN NOT live with that situation.
>=20
>     > As stated before, the value from my understanding is more clarity
>     > (distinct naming) regarding the provided services/endpoints.
>=20
> yes, but that's a cosmetic issue.
> it appeals to humans, but it makes no technical difference.
> Nevertheless, if we can do this quickly, then let's do it.
> I've provided proposed text in the form of a diff, the ADs have agreed to=
 a
> process, the chairs , just need to run it.
It may be cosmetic, but it would be consistent regarding the functionality =
provided by the specific endpoint if alternative enrollment options are use=
d. =20

>=20
> I hope that your(Siemens) Thomas Werner will comment.
I will give him a trigger ;-)

Best regards
Steffen
>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-


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From: "Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
CC: "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Hi Michael,
> > As far as I can tell, in the PULL case, when CMP (or another
> > mechanism) will be used, there is still a voucher exchange first.  The
> > Registrar can express it's preference in the (parboiled) voucher-reques=
t
> from Registrar to MASA.
> PULL was meant to describe the behavior of the pledge to start the
> onboarding while PUSH was more the trigger from the pledge-agent.
> As the enrollment is between the pledge, the registrar, and the CA, I wou=
ld
> not see a need to include this information in the voucher. This should be
> done as outlined in BRSKI.
> >
> > The MASA, if the pledge supports the desired enrollment protocol,
> > could include the hint.  In fact, the MASA could include an entire URL
> > with meta- data about the protocol to use.
> >
> > This would jive very nicely with the brski-cloud mechanism!!!
> Hm, haven't though about this. In case of standard BRSKI I would not see =
a
> need, as it would be handled by the domain registrar, but in case of the =
cloud
> registrar, it would provide the option to point to the right domain regis=
trar
> supporting the enrollment.
I had some further thought on this. I think it would fit to the cloud regis=
trar to the described option 3 in the current draft. If the voucher definit=
ion is enhanced with the local RA info, the enrollment options could be pro=
vided as well, allowing the pledge to pick the supported one and perform th=
e enrollment.=20

If the hint about the protocol support would be included by the MASA to inf=
orm the registrar, it may be limited to the  MASA as defined in BRSKI. I'm =
not sure how this would work with the delegated voucher approach, as the DA=
SA may not know the device capabilities.=20
If the voucher definition would be enhanced in case of the cloud registrar,=
 it may also be possible to enhance the voucher request definition, to allo=
w the registrar to populate the information from the domain registrar to th=
e MASA and repeat all options or suitable enrollment options in the voucher=
 (response) provided to the pledge. =20

Best regards
Steffen


From nobody Sun Aug 23 14:39:20 2020
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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Robert Wilton <rwilton@cisco.com>
cc: "The IESG" <iesg@ietf.org>, anima-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org, anima@ietf.org, jiangsheng@huawei.com
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28: (with COMMENT)
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Robert Wilton via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
    > 6.10.1.  Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing

    > For a PE device or NID, how does it know which interfaces to run ACP
    > over?

I think that "PE" here means "Provider Edge"?
The answer is that it runs the GRASP DULL on *ALL* interfaces, because it the
device may have no idea it is a Provider Edge device on that Interface.

A Provider might want to turn this off, and they could well do that once the
device has joined the ACP and gotten management control.  But, the risk of
doing that is that the cables will get plugged in wrong, and the operator
will lose access to the device.

In this case, I think that ANIMA's ACP prefers connectivity over the small
amount of privacy lost by indicating that an IKEv2 is listening on an IPv6
Link-Local address.  There is no security breach possible because the IKEv2
(or DTLS) connection will not complete without the right trust anchors present.

A smart heuristic might be to include some kind of dead-man's switch.
The management interface might turn the DULL off on some interfaces for a
period of time, and if the management interface is lost, then the interfaces
would stop being suppressed.  This falls into the quality of implementation
category at this point.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, Robert Wilton <rwilton@cisco.com>
Cc: anima-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane@ietf.org,  The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, anima@ietf.org, jiangsheng@huawei.com
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From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Robert Wilton's No Objection on draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane-28: (with COMMENT)
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On 24-Aug-20 09:39, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Robert Wilton via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>     > 6.10.1.  Fundamental Concepts of Autonomic Addressing
> 
>     > For a PE device or NID, how does it know which interfaces to run ACP
>     > over?
> 
> I think that "PE" here means "Provider Edge"?
> The answer is that it runs the GRASP DULL on *ALL* interfaces, because it the
> device may have no idea it is a Provider Edge device on that Interface.

That's correct, and it's safe as Michael indicates.

The ANIMA model does not include an explicit mechanism for defining
domain membership. It's implicitly the set of interfaces that
successfully join the ACP, which also means that the nodes have
successfully performed BRSKI.

IMNSHO there's a big chunk of future work here (see section 6 of
RFC8799), but the current ACP definition doesn't depend on it.

   Brian

> 
> A Provider might want to turn this off, and they could well do that once the
> device has joined the ACP and gotten management control.  But, the risk of
> doing that is that the cables will get plugged in wrong, and the operator
> will lose access to the device.
> 
> In this case, I think that ANIMA's ACP prefers connectivity over the small
> amount of privacy lost by indicating that an IKEv2 is listening on an IPv6
> Link-Local address.  There is no security breach possible because the IKEv2
> (or DTLS) connection will not complete without the right trust anchors present.
> 
> A smart heuristic might be to include some kind of dead-man's switch.
> The management interface might turn the DULL off on some interfaces for a
> period of time, and if the management interface is lost, then the interfaces
> would stop being suppressed.  This falls into the quality of implementation
> category at this point.
> 
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
>  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Anima mailing list
> Anima@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
> 


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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Hi Michael,

as already stated the renaming of the endpoints is just a cosmetic issue, m=
achines would not care about.
Nevertheless as this came up now, I think the proposed changes are fine and=
 should be included as you already outlined:
- https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-4=
2&url2=3Dhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/brski-e=
st-rename/dtbootstrap-anima-keyinfra.txt=20
- https://ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-4=
1&url2=3Dhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/anima-wg/anima-bootstrap/brski-e=
st-rename/dtbootstrap-anima-keyinfra.txt=20

Summary for renaming:
1) /.well-known/est/requestvoucher    [used by pledge to registrar but also=
 from registrar to MASA]
    --> /.well-known/brski/requestvoucher
2) /.well-known/est/voucher_status    [used by pledge to registrar]
  --> /.well-known/brski/voucher_status
3) /.well-known/est/requestauditlog   [used by registrar to MASA]
  --> /.well-known/brski/requestauditlog
4) /.well-known/est/enrollstatus          [used by pledge to registrar]
  --> /.well-known/brski/enrollstatus

Note:=20
This changes should be also adopted by: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-i=
etf-anima-constrained-voucher-08=20
With the result of two more characters "/est/" --> "brski", maybe the draft=
-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher should shrink this part to something like  =
"/br/", "/brs/", "bki"?


Best regards
Thomas



-----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
Von: Anima <anima-bounces@ietf.org> Im Auftrag von [ext] Fries, Steffen
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 19. August 2020 15:29
An: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: anima@ietf.org
Betreff: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discuss=
ion today)

> From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Fries, Steffen=20
> <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
>     >> I understand the use case with CoAP, where one wants to be able=20
> to multicast a
>     >> request to /.well-known/core to find out which devices support=20
> a particular
>     >> service.
>     >> HTTP does not have the same thing, so I don't see the point of=20
> agility in the end
>     >> points if they are all in /.well-known anyway.
>=20
>     > Agreed. As BRSKI-AE is intended to extend BRSKI and therefore uses
>     > HTTP, there is no need for a specific enhancement. The discovery us=
ing
>     > /.well-known will provide all available endpoints to the pledge, wh=
ich
>     > then can evaluate the response. From an application perspective I w=
ould
>     > expect that the pledge may not support multiple enrollment approach=
es
>     > and simply try whatever he supports. The domain registrar would be =
the
>     > more capable component to support multiple options.
>=20
> Can you explain to me why the discovery via /.well-known/brski is useful?
> This is on the *REGISTRAR*.
The intention was to let the pledge or the pledge-agent know in advance wha=
t enrollment options are available at the registrar side allowing the pledg=
e to fail fast if it does not have a matching enrollment protocol. For the =
original BRSKI, this is not the case, as both sides support the same featur=
e set. In BRSKI-AE allowing alternative enrollment protocols, the registrar=
 may support multiple different ways. To avoid make support for specific pr=
otocols mandatory on the registrar side, discovery of supported options was=
 intended. Based on the discussion we had after the last meeting I think th=
e discovery of /.well-known/ would be sufficient.

> In reading BRSKI-AE, I seem to be missing any place where the PUSH=20
> mechanism is described.  In a PUSH use case, what protocol would the=20
> pledge expose to the pledge-agent and/or commissioner?
This is currently left outside in terms of the protocol. The intention was =
to only specify the necessary (signature wrapped) data objects to be exchan=
ged, to be open regarding the underlying transport between the pledge and t=
he pledge-agent. This also would allow to use an arbitrary pledge-agent, bu=
t this is up for discussion. I'm currently thinking about the necessity to =
be able to authenticate the pledge-agent using an LDevID, if we solely rely=
 on the objects. Authentication could also be done using HTTP authenticatio=
n merely to authorize the pledge-agent to act as proxy between the pledge a=
nd the registrar.=20

> As far as I can tell, in the PULL case, when CMP (or another=20
> mechanism) will be used, there is still a voucher exchange first.  The=20
> Registrar can express it's preference in the (parboiled) voucher-request =
from Registrar to MASA.
PULL was meant to describe the behavior of the pledge to start the onboardi=
ng while PUSH was more the trigger from the pledge-agent.
As the enrollment is between the pledge, the registrar, and the CA, I would=
 not see a need to include this information in the voucher. This should be =
done as outlined in BRSKI.=20
>=20
> The MASA, if the pledge supports the desired enrollment protocol,=20
> could include the hint.  In fact, the MASA could include an entire URL=20
> with meta- data about the protocol to use.
>=20
> This would jive very nicely with the brski-cloud mechanism!!!
Hm, haven't though about this. In case of standard BRSKI I would not see a =
need, as it would be handled by the domain registrar, but in case of the cl=
oud registrar, it would provide the option to point to the right domain reg=
istrar supporting the enrollment.=20

>=20
>     > For the constraint case (not contained in BRSKI), the discovery of
>     > specific endpoints is more important to not overload the pledge.
>=20
> I don't understand this at all.  What do you mean, overload the pledge?
> Are you talking about network or code space or what?
I was referring to the discovery of specific endpoints. In case of /.well-k=
nown the registrar would deliver all endpoints including their options supp=
orted, while in case of asking for a specific endpoint only delivers the sp=
ecific options of that endpoint. What I meant to say was that the pledge on=
ly gets the necessary information about the endpoints he needs not all. So =
it would relate to the processing on the pledge.=20

>=20
>     >> If there is value in renaming, then lets do it RIGHT NOW.
>     >> I DO NOT WANT to confuse the market by having an RFC come out,=20
> followed by
>     >> another one 'correcting' it six months later.
>     >> I CAN NOT live with that situation.
>=20
>     > As stated before, the value from my understanding is more clarity
>     > (distinct naming) regarding the provided services/endpoints.
>=20
> yes, but that's a cosmetic issue.
> it appeals to humans, but it makes no technical difference.
> Nevertheless, if we can do this quickly, then let's do it.
> I've provided proposed text in the form of a diff, the ADs have agreed=20
> to a process, the chairs , just need to run it.
It may be cosmetic, but it would be consistent regarding the functionality =
provided by the specific endpoint if alternative enrollment options are use=
d. =20

>=20
> I hope that your(Siemens) Thomas Werner will comment.
I will give him a trigger ;-)

Best regards
Steffen
>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works=20
> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-

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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Werner, Thomas <thomas-werner@siemens.com> wrote:
    > as already stated the renaming of the endpoints is just a cosmetic
    > issue, machines would not care about.  Nevertheless as this came up
    > now, I think the proposed changes are fine and should be included as
    > you already outlined: -

okay.

    > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-08
    > With the result of two more characters "/est/" --> "brski", maybe the
    > draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher should shrink this part to
    > something like "/br/", "/brs/", "bki"?

yes, something like that, I agree.


--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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--=-=-=--


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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Fries, Steffen <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
    >> Can you explain to me why the discovery via /.well-known/brski is
    >> useful?  This is on the *REGISTRAR*.

    > The intention was to let the pledge or the pledge-agent know in advance
    > what enrollment options are available at the registrar side allowing
    > the pledge to fail fast if it does not have a matching enrollment
    > protocol.

I understand this need, but it seems that we are making the pledge more
complex in order to keep the registrar simpler.  That makes no sense to me:
the pledge should be minimal, while the registrar can remain complex.

    >> In reading BRSKI-AE, I seem to be missing any place where the PUSH
    >> mechanism is described.  In a PUSH use case, what protocol would the
    >> pledge expose to the pledge-agent and/or commissioner?

    > This is currently left outside in terms of the protocol. The intention
    > was to only specify the necessary (signature wrapped) data objects to

I'd really like to have the PUSH part in scope.
I thought that it was just not done yet, but it seems to me that without the
PUSH part, that the protocol isn't async at all.  It is just BRSKI-CMP.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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From: "Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
> Sent: Mittwoch, 26. August 2020 21:43
>=20
> Fries, Steffen <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
>     >> Can you explain to me why the discovery via /.well-known/brski is
>     >> useful?  This is on the *REGISTRAR*.
>=20
>     > The intention was to let the pledge or the pledge-agent know in adv=
ance
>     > what enrollment options are available at the registrar side allowin=
g
>     > the pledge to fail fast if it does not have a matching enrollment
>     > protocol.
>=20
> I understand this need, but it seems that we are making the pledge more
> complex in order to keep the registrar simpler.  That makes no sense to m=
e:
> the pledge should be minimal, while the registrar can remain complex.
Maybe I phrased it wrong. The intention is not to make the pledge more comp=
lex. The goal should be to keep the pledge simple and enhance the registrar=
 to handle also other situations like unavailability of certain connections=
. The registrar should be the more capable component. The discovery was int=
ended in situations, in which the registrar supports multipole options, but=
 not all may be mandatory supported. In this case the discovery would help.=
 Otherwise the pledge may do trial and error.

=20
>     >> In reading BRSKI-AE, I seem to be missing any place where the PUSH
>     >> mechanism is described.  In a PUSH use case, what protocol would t=
he
>     >> pledge expose to the pledge-agent and/or commissioner?
>=20
>     > This is currently left outside in terms of the protocol. The intent=
ion
>     > was to only specify the necessary (signature wrapped) data objects =
to
>=20
> I'd really like to have the PUSH part in scope.
> I thought that it was just not done yet, but it seems to me that without =
the
> PUSH part, that the protocol isn't async at all.  It is just BRSKI-CMP.
Async was meant that connectivity to certain components is not available at=
 the time of the onboarding. For use case 1 it would be the issuing PKI and=
 in use case 2 the registrar. To handle this signature wrapped objects were=
 introduced. One way of addressing this during enrollment is using protocol=
s supporting signature wrapped objects like CMP or EST with fullcmc as outl=
ined. The goal is to be protocol agnostic. This was also a reason for the d=
iscovery option.=20
Regarding PUSH. As outlined in BRSKI-AE section 5.2.4 the pledge would be q=
ueried by the pledge-agent for certain objects. It was intended to have it =
in the current document. The current description assumes that it would be s=
ufficient to define just the signature wrapped objects to be exchanged betw=
een the pledge-agent and the pledge and not the transport of these objects =
to be open regarding the underlying media. This would allow to use the func=
tionality of the domain registrar via the pledge-agent, even of the pledge =
utilizes a different network stack. But maybe this is to far fetched and it=
 is easier to concentrate on the currently assumed pledge capabilities (in =
BRSKI) to do HTTP as a starting point. I think that this needs further disc=
ussion. Do you have a concrete use case in mind, which should be addressed?

Best regards
Steffen

>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-


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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Fries, Steffen <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:
    >> > The intention was to let the pledge or the pledge-agent know in advance
    >> > what enrollment options are available at the registrar side allowing
    >> > the pledge to fail fast if it does not have a matching enrollment
    >> > protocol.
    >>
    >> I understand this need, but it seems that we are making the pledge more
    >> complex in order to keep the registrar simpler.  That makes no sense to me:
    >> the pledge should be minimal, while the registrar can remain complex.

    > Maybe I phrased it wrong. The intention is not to make the pledge more
    > complex. The goal should be to keep the pledge simple and enhance the
    > registrar to handle also other situations like unavailability of
    > certain connections. The registrar should be the more capable
    > component. The discovery was intended in situations, in which the
    > registrar supports multipole options, but not all may be mandatory
    > supported. In this case the discovery would help. Otherwise the pledge
    > may do trial and error.

While I appreciate the idea of having the pledge fail faster, and go onto to
the next possible registrar, I think that the pledge should support one and
only one mechanism, and it's up to the registrars to keep up.

If we are doing proper ACP ANIMA, then we can include the enrollment options
for the Registrar into the GRASP DULL announcement, and this can inform the
pledge's decision as to which Registrar to pick.

    >> I'd really like to have the PUSH part in scope.
    >> I thought that it was just not done yet, but it seems to me that without the
    >> PUSH part, that the protocol isn't async at all.  It is just
    >> BRSKI-CMP.

    > Async was meant that connectivity to certain components is not
    > available at the time of the onboarding. For use case 1 it would be the
    > issuing PKI and in use case 2 the registrar. To handle this signature
    > wrapped objects were introduced. One way of addressing this during
    > enrollment is using protocols supporting signature wrapped objects like
    > CMP or EST with fullcmc as outlined. The goal is to be protocol
    > agnostic.

I don't yet understand how the voucher-request is done in async BRSKI.
I thought that was what we were doing.. I have many ideas about this.

    > This was also a reason for the discovery option.

I don't think it helps.

    > Regarding PUSH. As outlined in BRSKI-AE section 5.2.4 the pledge would
    > be queried by the pledge-agent for certain objects. It was intended to

But, how is it queried?

    > have it in the current document. The current description assumes that
    > it would be sufficient to define just the signature wrapped objects to
    > be exchanged between the pledge-agent and the pledge and not the
    > transport of these objects to be open regarding the underlying
    > media. This would allow to use the functionality of the domain

okay, so I'm very interested in helping define this well enough to be used.

    > registrar via the pledge-agent, even of the pledge utilizes a different
    > network stack. But maybe this is to far fetched and it is easier to
    > concentrate on the currently assumed pledge capabilities (in BRSKI) to
    > do HTTP as a starting point. I think that this needs further
    > discussion. Do you have a concrete use case in mind, which should be
    > addressed?

Well, I thought that the furnace in the basement where there is no
connectivity was a really good use case.
The furnace installer has a smartphone or dedicated comissioning device.

As for HTTP: I would tend to suggest that we should use CoAP.
This works over WIFI as well as other technologies, and convergence here
would be good.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-




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Subject: Re: [Anima] Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE discussion today)
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Hi Michael,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
> Sent: Freitag, 28. August 2020 20:32
>     > Maybe I phrased it wrong. The intention is not to make the pledge m=
ore
>     > complex. The goal should be to keep the pledge simple and enhance t=
he
>     > registrar to handle also other situations like unavailability of
>     > certain connections. The registrar should be the more capable
>     > component. The discovery was intended in situations, in which the
>     > registrar supports multipole options, but not all may be mandatory
>     > supported. In this case the discovery would help. Otherwise the ple=
dge
>     > may do trial and error.
>=20
> While I appreciate the idea of having the pledge fail faster, and go onto=
 to
> the next possible registrar, I think that the pledge should support one a=
nd
> only one mechanism, and it's up to the registrars to keep up.
Yes, this keeps the pledge simple, but would require the registrar to imple=
ment the other options mandatorily.

>=20
> If we are doing proper ACP ANIMA, then we can include the enrollment
> options for the Registrar into the GRASP DULL announcement, and this can
> inform the pledge's decision as to which Registrar to pick.
This would also be an option for a  discovery, but I have to dig deeper int=
o GRASP.

>=20
>     >> I'd really like to have the PUSH part in scope.
>     >> I thought that it was just not done yet, but it seems to me that w=
ithout
> the
>     >> PUSH part, that the protocol isn't async at all.  It is just
>     >> BRSKI-CMP.
>=20
>     > Async was meant that connectivity to certain components is not
>     > available at the time of the onboarding. For use case 1 it would be=
 the
>     > issuing PKI and in use case 2 the registrar. To handle this signatu=
re
>     > wrapped objects were introduced. One way of addressing this during
>     > enrollment is using protocols supporting signature wrapped objects =
like
>     > CMP or EST with fullcmc as outlined. The goal is to be protocol
>     > agnostic.
>=20
> I don't yet understand how the voucher-request is done in async BRSKI.
I realize more an more that a pure "request-object" without considering the=
 transport is probably too abstract. Implementing requires also the transpo=
rt.=20
> I thought that was what we were doing.. I have many ideas about this.
Yes, voucher-request and also certification-request would be collected by t=
he pledge-agent. Good to hear you have ideas here, as we need to define the=
 approach more precisely.=20

>=20
>     > This was also a reason for the discovery option.
>=20
> I don't think it helps.
>=20
>     > Regarding PUSH. As outlined in BRSKI-AE section 5.2.4 the pledge wo=
uld
>     > be queried by the pledge-agent for certain objects. It was intended=
 to
>=20
> But, how is it queried?
The pledge essentially must be able to listen for the request. In industria=
l environments the embedded device is most often in a server role waiting f=
or requests. This would have to be leveraged also for the PUSH interaction.=
=20

>=20
>     > have it in the current document. The current description assumes th=
at
>     > it would be sufficient to define just the signature wrapped objects=
 to
>     > be exchanged between the pledge-agent and the pledge and not the
>     > transport of these objects to be open regarding the underlying
>     > media. This would allow to use the functionality of the domain
>=20
> okay, so I'm very interested in helping define this well enough to be use=
d.
That sounds great. Your support is greatly appreciated here..=20
>=20
>     > registrar via the pledge-agent, even of the pledge utilizes a diffe=
rent
>     > network stack. But maybe this is to far fetched and it is easier to
>     > concentrate on the currently assumed pledge capabilities (in BRSKI)=
 to
>     > do HTTP as a starting point. I think that this needs further
>     > discussion. Do you have a concrete use case in mind, which should b=
e
>     > addressed?
>=20
> Well, I thought that the furnace in the basement where there is no
> connectivity was a really good use case.
> The furnace installer has a smartphone or dedicated comissioning device.
This was one of the point I concluded form the last meeting. The trust assu=
mptions about the pledge and pledge-agent interaction is one of the points =
to be discussed further.=20

>=20
> As for HTTP: I would tend to suggest that we should use CoAP.
> This works over WIFI as well as other technologies, and convergence here
> would be good.
Which may bring it closer to the constraint voucher than BRSKI. I was looki=
ng for the latter, hence HTTP as proposal. But this is open for discussion.

Best regards
Steffen


>=20
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
> -=3D IPv6 IoT consulting =3D-
>=20
>=20


From nobody Mon Aug 31 13:00:42 2020
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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: anima@ietf.org
CC: "Werner\, Thomas" <thomas-werner@siemens.com>
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Subject: Re: [Anima] BRSKI#43, Figure 5 YANG Tree diagram for Voucher-Request
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--=-=-=
Content-Type: text/plain


Thomas has pointed out that the "pinned-domain-cert" and "last-renewal-date"
fields which are defined in RFC8366 are not clearly specified for the
voucher-request.

Neither are needed or appropriate in a voucher-request.
I have edited the YANG to include:

      refine "voucher/pinned-domain-cert" {
        mandatory false;
        description "A voucher-request field
                     is not valid in a voucher request, and
                     any occurrence MUST be ignored";
      }

      refine "voucher/last-renewal-date" {
        description "A last-renewal-date field
                     is not valid in a voucher request, and
                     any occurrence MUST be ignored";
      }

This is, I think, an editorial change.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

--=-=-=
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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 17:01:53 -0400
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Subject: [Anima] Status of renaming endpoint path?
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Hi all,

Back in late July Steffan sent:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/jjusQdqzS3G4WbczolCxF0_YmQQ/
regarding renaming "Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE
discussion today)".

Michael has a document ready to do this:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00

Brian was concerned that this might add an unknown additional delay:
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/3Ov2s8XxQ6pnQMp6PTd9_yDc-D0/

Luckily, if the WG does want to do this, we should be able to make it
happen without adding any delay (but we are running out of time...).

If the chairs kick off a consensus call, asking for objections **on
this change only**, then I can do a 2 week IETF LC, also asking for
objections **on this change only**.

I've already (mid-August) confirmed that the IESG is OK with this
process, so it would take [however long the Chairs choose to do the WG
consensus call for (1 week? 2 weeks?) ]  + [2 weeks IETF consensus
call] +[a few days of slop] = ~5 weeks...

This document is gated on (at least)
draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane (which will take some time to
wind its way through the RFC Ed process) so if this were to occur
soon, there would be no added delay...

Just FYI...
W

-- 
I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
of pants.
   ---maf


From nobody Mon Aug 31 18:59:16 2020
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Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2020 03:59:06 +0200
From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
To: Anima WG <anima@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Anima] ANIMA: WG call for consensus BRSKI "endpoint path" modification (was: Re: Status of renaming endpoint path?)
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Dear ANIMA WG

This email starts a 2 week call for consensus to modify draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra
such that new well-known URIs introduced by BRSKI will use a /.well-known/brski
prefix instead of the pre-existing /.well-known/est prefix.

The proposed change can be seen at the following rfcdiff URL:

https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00

This consensus call will end on September 14, 23:59 UTC
This consensus call is ONLY for said change and not for any other aspects of BRSKI.

If you have any objections to this change, please explain them by replying to
this email during this period. If you agree with these changes please say so as well.

FYI: What would happen afterwards ?

a) If ANIMA does not have consensus, nothing more would happen, BRSKI would continue
   stay unchanged in RFC editor queue waiting to be released by ACP draft 

b) If ANIMA WG has rough consensus on this change:

- Warren Kumari or Robert Wilton would start a 2 week IETF consensus call on the subject.
- When not successful, see a)

-  When successful:

- BRSKI authors would rev' the BRSKI document with the proposed text change,
- the responsible AD (Warren) would update the YES on the document
- Mark Nottingham as the responsible expert for the impacted IANA registry would
  have to agree on the proposed registry change (which according to prior emails
  he seems to be)
- IESG would approve the change, the rev'ed version of BRSKI would go into RFC Editor queue

According to Warrens prior emails (see below), this whole process should take ca. 5 weeks,
which is shorter than the current queue length of RFC-editor, and that is still
predicating that ACP draft is approved quickly by IESG (see below)

Hopefully i did no misrepresent any of the FYI steps.

Thank you very much
    Toerless (for the ANIMA WG chairs).

P.S.: appended Warrens prior summary.

P.S.2.: Warren: I didn't send this mail earlier because from your writeup below it sounded
as if my top priority should still be to work through 1922 lines of "this should be easy to fix"
DISCUSS/COMMENTS from IESG against ACP to shorten the time BRSKI would have to wait in RFC
editor queue - with or without this modification. But the increasing grouching level on
the mailing list about this subject told me that this priorization was wrong. I apologize.

In-Reply-To: <CAHw9_iJDGhn9W0TaJ6kKQi-RTtuCvFh7UVN-jb_MbP3BbP4z2g@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 05:01:53PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> Back in late July Steffan sent:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/jjusQdqzS3G4WbczolCxF0_YmQQ/
> regarding renaming "Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE
> discussion today)".
> 
> Michael has a document ready to do this:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
> 
> Brian was concerned that this might add an unknown additional delay:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/3Ov2s8XxQ6pnQMp6PTd9_yDc-D0/
> 
> Luckily, if the WG does want to do this, we should be able to make it
> happen without adding any delay (but we are running out of time...).
> 
> If the chairs kick off a consensus call, asking for objections **on
> this change only**, then I can do a 2 week IETF LC, also asking for
> objections **on this change only**.
> 
> I've already (mid-August) confirmed that the IESG is OK with this
> process, so it would take [however long the Chairs choose to do the WG
> consensus call for (1 week? 2 weeks?) ]  + [2 weeks IETF consensus
> call] +[a few days of slop] = ~5 weeks...
> 
> This document is gated on (at least)
> draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane (which will take some time to
> wind its way through the RFC Ed process) so if this were to occur
> soon, there would be no added delay...
> 
> Just FYI...
> W
> 
> -- 
> I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
> idea in the first place.
> This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
> regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
> of pants.
>    ---maf
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Anima mailing list
> Anima@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima

-- 
---
tte@cs.fau.de


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To: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>, Anima WG <anima@ietf.org>
Cc: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
References: <20200901015906.GA20765@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <a2f35897-41a8-6fe2-8efb-81d55819936f@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2020 14:02:42 +1200
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/J_LzCN8813YImLi1Cqwbgr0gvro>
Subject: Re: [Anima] ANIMA: WG call for consensus BRSKI "endpoint path" modification (was: Re: Status of renaming endpoint path?)
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I support the proposed change.

Regards
   Brian Carpenter

On 01-Sep-20 13:59, Toerless Eckert wrote:
> Dear ANIMA WG
> 
> This email starts a 2 week call for consensus to modify draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra
> such that new well-known URIs introduced by BRSKI will use a /.well-known/brski
> prefix instead of the pre-existing /.well-known/est prefix.
> 
> The proposed change can be seen at the following rfcdiff URL:
> 
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
> 
> This consensus call will end on September 14, 23:59 UTC
> This consensus call is ONLY for said change and not for any other aspects of BRSKI.
> 
> If you have any objections to this change, please explain them by replying to
> this email during this period. If you agree with these changes please say so as well.
> 
> FYI: What would happen afterwards ?
> 
> a) If ANIMA does not have consensus, nothing more would happen, BRSKI would continue
>    stay unchanged in RFC editor queue waiting to be released by ACP draft 
> 
> b) If ANIMA WG has rough consensus on this change:
> 
> - Warren Kumari or Robert Wilton would start a 2 week IETF consensus call on the subject.
> - When not successful, see a)
> 
> -  When successful:
> 
> - BRSKI authors would rev' the BRSKI document with the proposed text change,
> - the responsible AD (Warren) would update the YES on the document
> - Mark Nottingham as the responsible expert for the impacted IANA registry would
>   have to agree on the proposed registry change (which according to prior emails
>   he seems to be)
> - IESG would approve the change, the rev'ed version of BRSKI would go into RFC Editor queue
> 
> According to Warrens prior emails (see below), this whole process should take ca. 5 weeks,
> which is shorter than the current queue length of RFC-editor, and that is still
> predicating that ACP draft is approved quickly by IESG (see below)
> 
> Hopefully i did no misrepresent any of the FYI steps.
> 
> Thank you very much
>     Toerless (for the ANIMA WG chairs).
> 
> P.S.: appended Warrens prior summary.
> 
> P.S.2.: Warren: I didn't send this mail earlier because from your writeup below it sounded
> as if my top priority should still be to work through 1922 lines of "this should be easy to fix"
> DISCUSS/COMMENTS from IESG against ACP to shorten the time BRSKI would have to wait in RFC
> editor queue - with or without this modification. But the increasing grouching level on
> the mailing list about this subject told me that this priorization was wrong. I apologize.
> 
> In-Reply-To: <CAHw9_iJDGhn9W0TaJ6kKQi-RTtuCvFh7UVN-jb_MbP3BbP4z2g@mail.gmail.com>
> 
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 05:01:53PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> Back in late July Steffan sent:
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/jjusQdqzS3G4WbczolCxF0_YmQQ/
>> regarding renaming "Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE
>> discussion today)".
>>
>> Michael has a document ready to do this:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
>>
>> Brian was concerned that this might add an unknown additional delay:
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/3Ov2s8XxQ6pnQMp6PTd9_yDc-D0/
>>
>> Luckily, if the WG does want to do this, we should be able to make it
>> happen without adding any delay (but we are running out of time...).
>>
>> If the chairs kick off a consensus call, asking for objections **on
>> this change only**, then I can do a 2 week IETF LC, also asking for
>> objections **on this change only**.
>>
>> I've already (mid-August) confirmed that the IESG is OK with this
>> process, so it would take [however long the Chairs choose to do the WG
>> consensus call for (1 week? 2 weeks?) ]  + [2 weeks IETF consensus
>> call] +[a few days of slop] = ~5 weeks...
>>
>> This document is gated on (at least)
>> draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane (which will take some time to
>> wind its way through the RFC Ed process) so if this were to occur
>> soon, there would be no added delay...
>>
>> Just FYI...
>> W
>>
>> -- 
>> I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
>> idea in the first place.
>> This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
>> regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
>> of pants.
>>    ---maf
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Anima mailing list
>> Anima@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
> 


From nobody Mon Aug 31 19:07:35 2020
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Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2020 04:07:26 +0200
From: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>
To: Anima WG <anima@ietf.org>
Cc: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
Message-ID: <20200901020726.GB20765@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
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Subject: Re: [Anima] ANIMA: WG call for consensus BRSKI "endpoint path" modification (was: Re: Status of renaming endpoint path?)
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+1

As contributor i hereby state that i support the change:

The proposed change would allow to better decouple further evolution of EST without
BRSKI (not having to bothre about what BRSKI added when you do not use it), and vice versa.
For example Registrar/MASA being a pure BRSKI/Voucher channel would not be impacted by
EST legacy anymore.

The change could also help to simplify implementations, although it not clear to
me how big the simplifications would be. To the best of my (limited) implementation
experience, if EST and BRSKi where to be implemented separately, the URL routing
to those two implementations could be simpler, by routing all /.well-known/est 
URLs to BRSKI instead of having to enumerate the BRSKI URLs under /.well-known/est
explicitly.

To the best of my understanding, BRSKI implementations so far are still experimental,
so this change would not have a relevant negative impact on products.

I therefore can see no technical downside.

Thanks
    Toerless

On Tue, Sep 01, 2020 at 03:59:06AM +0200, Toerless Eckert wrote:
> Dear ANIMA WG
> 
> This email starts a 2 week call for consensus to modify draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra
> such that new well-known URIs introduced by BRSKI will use a /.well-known/brski
> prefix instead of the pre-existing /.well-known/est prefix.
> 
> The proposed change can be seen at the following rfcdiff URL:
> 
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
> 
> This consensus call will end on September 14, 23:59 UTC
> This consensus call is ONLY for said change and not for any other aspects of BRSKI.
> 
> If you have any objections to this change, please explain them by replying to
> this email during this period. If you agree with these changes please say so as well.
> 
> FYI: What would happen afterwards ?
> 
> a) If ANIMA does not have consensus, nothing more would happen, BRSKI would continue
>    stay unchanged in RFC editor queue waiting to be released by ACP draft 
> 
> b) If ANIMA WG has rough consensus on this change:
> 
> - Warren Kumari or Robert Wilton would start a 2 week IETF consensus call on the subject.
> - When not successful, see a)
> 
> -  When successful:
> 
> - BRSKI authors would rev' the BRSKI document with the proposed text change,
> - the responsible AD (Warren) would update the YES on the document
> - Mark Nottingham as the responsible expert for the impacted IANA registry would
>   have to agree on the proposed registry change (which according to prior emails
>   he seems to be)
> - IESG would approve the change, the rev'ed version of BRSKI would go into RFC Editor queue
> 
> According to Warrens prior emails (see below), this whole process should take ca. 5 weeks,
> which is shorter than the current queue length of RFC-editor, and that is still
> predicating that ACP draft is approved quickly by IESG (see below)
> 
> Hopefully i did no misrepresent any of the FYI steps.
> 
> Thank you very much
>     Toerless (for the ANIMA WG chairs).
> 
> P.S.: appended Warrens prior summary.
> 
> P.S.2.: Warren: I didn't send this mail earlier because from your writeup below it sounded
> as if my top priority should still be to work through 1922 lines of "this should be easy to fix"
> DISCUSS/COMMENTS from IESG against ACP to shorten the time BRSKI would have to wait in RFC
> editor queue - with or without this modification. But the increasing grouching level on
> the mailing list about this subject told me that this priorization was wrong. I apologize.
> 
> In-Reply-To: <CAHw9_iJDGhn9W0TaJ6kKQi-RTtuCvFh7UVN-jb_MbP3BbP4z2g@mail.gmail.com>
> 
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 05:01:53PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote:
> > Hi all,
> > 
> > Back in late July Steffan sent:
> > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/jjusQdqzS3G4WbczolCxF0_YmQQ/
> > regarding renaming "Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE
> > discussion today)".
> > 
> > Michael has a document ready to do this:
> > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
> > 
> > Brian was concerned that this might add an unknown additional delay:
> > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/3Ov2s8XxQ6pnQMp6PTd9_yDc-D0/
> > 
> > Luckily, if the WG does want to do this, we should be able to make it
> > happen without adding any delay (but we are running out of time...).
> > 
> > If the chairs kick off a consensus call, asking for objections **on
> > this change only**, then I can do a 2 week IETF LC, also asking for
> > objections **on this change only**.
> > 
> > I've already (mid-August) confirmed that the IESG is OK with this
> > process, so it would take [however long the Chairs choose to do the WG
> > consensus call for (1 week? 2 weeks?) ]  + [2 weeks IETF consensus
> > call] +[a few days of slop] = ~5 weeks...
> > 
> > This document is gated on (at least)
> > draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane (which will take some time to
> > wind its way through the RFC Ed process) so if this were to occur
> > soon, there would be no added delay...
> > 
> > Just FYI...
> > W
> > 
> > -- 
> > I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
> > idea in the first place.
> > This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
> > regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
> > of pants.
> >    ---maf
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Anima mailing list
> > Anima@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
> 
> -- 
> ---
> tte@cs.fau.de
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Anima mailing list
> Anima@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima

-- 
---
tte@cs.fau.de


From nobody Mon Aug 31 19:24:59 2020
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To: Toerless Eckert <tte@cs.fau.de>, Anima WG <anima@ietf.org>
CC: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
References: <20200901015906.GA20765@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
From: William Atwood <william.atwood@concordia.ca>
Organization: Concordia University
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/g3FYDJi43qxZ_ey0B8lrZwX0puE>
Subject: Re: [Anima] ANIMA: WG call for consensus BRSKI "endpoint path" modification (was: Re: Status of renaming endpoint path?)
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I support the proposed change.

  Bill Atwood

On 2020-08-31 9:59 p.m., Toerless Eckert wrote:
> Attention This email originates from outside the concordia.ca domain. // Ce courriel provient de l'exterieur du domaine de concordia.ca
> Dear ANIMA WG
> 
> This email starts a 2 week call for consensus to modify draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra
> such that new well-known URIs introduced by BRSKI will use a /.well-known/brski
> prefix instead of the pre-existing /.well-known/est prefix.
> 
> The proposed change can be seen at the following rfcdiff URL:
> 
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
> 
> This consensus call will end on September 14, 23:59 UTC
> This consensus call is ONLY for said change and not for any other aspects of BRSKI.
> 
> If you have any objections to this change, please explain them by replying to
> this email during this period. If you agree with these changes please say so as well.
> 
> FYI: What would happen afterwards ?
> 
> a) If ANIMA does not have consensus, nothing more would happen, BRSKI would continue
>    stay unchanged in RFC editor queue waiting to be released by ACP draft 
> 
> b) If ANIMA WG has rough consensus on this change:
> 
> - Warren Kumari or Robert Wilton would start a 2 week IETF consensus call on the subject.
> - When not successful, see a)
> 
> -  When successful:
> 
> - BRSKI authors would rev' the BRSKI document with the proposed text change,
> - the responsible AD (Warren) would update the YES on the document
> - Mark Nottingham as the responsible expert for the impacted IANA registry would
>   have to agree on the proposed registry change (which according to prior emails
>   he seems to be)
> - IESG would approve the change, the rev'ed version of BRSKI would go into RFC Editor queue
> 
> According to Warrens prior emails (see below), this whole process should take ca. 5 weeks,
> which is shorter than the current queue length of RFC-editor, and that is still
> predicating that ACP draft is approved quickly by IESG (see below)
> 
> Hopefully i did no misrepresent any of the FYI steps.
> 
> Thank you very much
>     Toerless (for the ANIMA WG chairs).
> 
> P.S.: appended Warrens prior summary.
> 
> P.S.2.: Warren: I didn't send this mail earlier because from your writeup below it sounded
> as if my top priority should still be to work through 1922 lines of "this should be easy to fix"
> DISCUSS/COMMENTS from IESG against ACP to shorten the time BRSKI would have to wait in RFC
> editor queue - with or without this modification. But the increasing grouching level on
> the mailing list about this subject told me that this priorization was wrong. I apologize.
> 
> In-Reply-To: <CAHw9_iJDGhn9W0TaJ6kKQi-RTtuCvFh7UVN-jb_MbP3BbP4z2g@mail.gmail.com>
> 
> On Mon, Aug 31, 2020 at 05:01:53PM -0400, Warren Kumari wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> Back in late July Steffan sent:
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/jjusQdqzS3G4WbczolCxF0_YmQQ/
>> regarding renaming "Handling of endpoint path names (from BRSKI-AE
>> discussion today)".
>>
>> Michael has a document ready to do this:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-43&url2=draft-richardson-anima-brski-renamed-00
>>
>> Brian was concerned that this might add an unknown additional delay:
>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/anima/3Ov2s8XxQ6pnQMp6PTd9_yDc-D0/
>>
>> Luckily, if the WG does want to do this, we should be able to make it
>> happen without adding any delay (but we are running out of time...).
>>
>> If the chairs kick off a consensus call, asking for objections **on
>> this change only**, then I can do a 2 week IETF LC, also asking for
>> objections **on this change only**.
>>
>> I've already (mid-August) confirmed that the IESG is OK with this
>> process, so it would take [however long the Chairs choose to do the WG
>> consensus call for (1 week? 2 weeks?) ]  + [2 weeks IETF consensus
>> call] +[a few days of slop] = ~5 weeks...
>>
>> This document is gated on (at least)
>> draft-ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane (which will take some time to
>> wind its way through the RFC Ed process) so if this were to occur
>> soon, there would be no added delay...
>>
>> Just FYI...
>> W
>>
>> -- 
>> I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
>> idea in the first place.
>> This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
>> regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
>> of pants.
>>    ---maf
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Anima mailing list
>> Anima@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima
> 

-- 
Dr. J.W. Atwood, Eng.             tel:   +1 (514) 848-2424 x3046
Distinguished Professor Emeritus  fax:   +1 (514) 848-2830
Department of Computer Science
   and Software Engineering
Concordia University EV 3.185     email:william.atwood@concordia.ca
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. West    http://users.encs.concordia.ca/~bill
Montreal, Quebec Canada H3G 1M8

