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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: avt@ietf.org, draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org,  draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org
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Subject: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be making
this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  However, I think
this document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to have
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go
alongside this document.

On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My major
concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  Has the
WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some sort of
recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone choose SDES in
a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.

If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to get
these both into LC soon.

Thanks,
--Richard

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:<br>I have revie=
wed this=20
draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG processing.=A0 Clearly,=20
this is not the best moment in history to be making this sort of=20
argument, given the increased focus on .=A0 However, I think this document
 makes the case pretty clearly.=A0 It helps to have=20
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go along=
side this document.<br>
<br>On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:<br>I have reviewed=20
this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG processing.=A0 One=20
question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:=A0 My major concern is that it
 seems like there&#39;s a lot of old stuff in here.=A0 Has the WG considere=
d=20
explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some sort of=20
recommendation level?=A0 I would like to avoid having someone choose SDES=
=20
in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.<br>
<br></div><div>If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should =
be able to get these both into LC soon.<br><br>Thanks,<br></div>--Richard</=
div>

--089e015376b69dbf4a04ea3aa788--

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm@tools.ietf.org, avt@ietf.org
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Subject: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm
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I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
processing.  Overall, it's in very good shape.  Just have a few minor
questions and editorial suggestions:

MINOR
-----

S5.2.1
It's a little confusing that the tag size an input to CCM, but "fixed by
the algorithm" for GCM, since in both cases (GCM/CCM), the length of the
tag is fixed by negotiated algorithm (Table 1/8).  Perhaps rephrase to
clarify that the CCM mode requires tag length to be explicitly input to the
algorithm, whereas with GCM, the tag is simply truncated.

S5.3
Why is the guidance for "MUST not decrypt before verify" different for GCM
vs. CCM?

S6
Why is this document re-defining the key streams from the GCM and CCM
specs?  Shouldn't this just say how the intial counter or counter sequence
is formed?

S13.1
In this section, _8 is SHOULD, and _12 is MAY.  What about AEAD_AES_128_GCM
itself?  Is that a MUST implement?  It seems like there should be one.
Likewise for S13.2 and CCM.



EDITORIAL
---------

S5.2.1
The document mostly uses "octet", but there are three instances of "byte",
all in the table in this section.  Probably good to use "octet" there as
well, for clarity.

S6
The code here is *almost* valid python, but not quite.  In case it's
helpful, a revised version in Python is below (since I had time on the
plane on the way to the IETF meeting :) ).

S14.1, 3rd bullet
It might be helpful to note that although the counter is reset for every
packet, IV uniqueness is ensured by the inclusion of SSRC/ROC/SEQ or SRTCP
Index in the IV (and the accompanying management of these parametesr.  This
is stated above, but if restated here, would help justify the last two
bullets.






-----BEGIN srtp-aead.py-----
#!/usr/bin/env python

from struct import pack
from Crypto.Cipher import AES
from Crypto.Util import Counter
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long

# Parameters
Plaintext = "\x00" * 48 # Must be all zeros for CTR-based validation to work
IV = "iv" * 6
Encryption_key = "sixteen byte key"


# Helper functions required by the algorithms in the draft
def AES_ENC( data="", key="" ):
    assert( len(data) == 16 )
    assert( len(key) in [16, 24, 32] )
    return AES.new(key).encrypt(data)

def TO_BYTES( counter, n ):
    return long_to_bytes(counter, n)


# For each algorithm, we generate the key stream with the algorithm
# in the draft, and compare to PyCrypto's CTR implementation.  (We
# get the key stream from the CTR mode by encrypting the all-zero
# octet string.)

# GCM
def GCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key ):
    assert( len(Plaintext)  <= (2**36) - 32 ) ## measured in octets
    key_stream = ""
    block_counter = 1
    first_key_block = AES_ENC( data = IV + TO_BYTES(block_counter,4),
                               key=Encryption_key        )
    while len(key_stream) < len(Plaintext):
        block_counter = block_counter + 1
        key_block = AES_ENC( data=IV + TO_BYTES(block_counter,4),
                             key=Encryption_key        )
        key_stream  = key_stream + key_block
    key_stream = key_stream[:len(Plaintext)]
    return (first_key_block, key_stream )

Key_stream_G = GCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key )
Key_stream_G = Key_stream_G[0] + Key_stream_G[1]
ivn = bytes_to_long( IV + ("\x00" * 4) )
ctr = Counter.new(128, initial_value = ivn+1)
Ciphertext_G = AES.new(Encryption_key, AES.MODE_CTR,
counter=ctr).encrypt(Plaintext)


# CCM
def CCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key ):
    assert( len(Plaintext) <= (2**28)-16 ) ## measured in octets
    key_stream = ""
    block_counter = 0
    first_key_block = AES_ENC( data='\x02' + IV + TO_BYTES(block_counter,3),
                               key=Encryption_key            )
    while len(key_stream)<len(Plaintext):
        block_counter = block_counter + 1
        key_block = AES_ENC( data='\x02' + IV + TO_BYTES(block_counter,3),
                             key=Encryption_key            )
        key_stream  = key_stream + key_block
    key_stream = key_stream[:len(Plaintext)]
    return (first_key_block, key_stream )

Key_stream_C = CCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key )
Key_stream_C = Key_stream_C[0] + Key_stream_C[1]
ivn = bytes_to_long( '\x02' + IV + ("\x00" * 3) )
ctr = Counter.new(128, initial_value = ivn)
Ciphertext_C = AES.new(Encryption_key, AES.MODE_CTR,
counter=ctr).encrypt(Plaintext)


# Print out results.  KSg and KSg' should match, and KSc/KSc'
print "P:    {}".format(Plaintext.encode("hex"))
print "IV:   {}".format(IV.encode("hex"))
print "K:    {}".format(Encryption_key.encode("hex"))
print "KSg:  {}".format(Key_stream_G.encode("hex"))
print "KSg': {}".format(Ciphertext_G.encode("hex"))
print "KSc:  {}".format(Key_stream_C.encode("hex"))
print "KSc': {}".format(Ciphertext_C.encode("hex"))
-----END srtp-aead.py-----

--001a11c30920b82bd204ea3aaad4
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<div dir=3D"ltr">I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Ca=
ll and IESG processing.=A0 Overall, it&#39;s in very good shape.=A0 Just ha=
ve a few minor questions and editorial suggestions:<br><br>MINOR<br>-----<b=
r><br>
S5.2.1<br>It&#39;s a little confusing that the tag size an input to CCM, bu=
t &quot;fixed by the algorithm&quot; for GCM, since in both cases (GCM/CCM)=
, the length of the tag is fixed by negotiated algorithm (Table 1/8).=A0 Pe=
rhaps rephrase to clarify that the CCM mode requires tag length to be expli=
citly input to the algorithm, whereas with GCM, the tag is simply truncated=
.=A0 <br>
<br>S5.3<br>Why is the guidance for &quot;MUST not decrypt before verify&qu=
ot; different for GCM vs. CCM?<br><br>S6<br>Why is this document re-definin=
g the key streams from the GCM and CCM specs?=A0 Shouldn&#39;t this just sa=
y how the intial counter or counter sequence is formed?=A0 <br>
<br>S13.1<br>In this section, _8 is SHOULD, and _12 is MAY.=A0 What about A=
EAD_AES_128_GCM itself?=A0 Is that a MUST implement?=A0 It seems like there=
 should be one.=A0 Likewise for S13.2 and CCM.<br><br><br><br>EDITORIAL<br>=
---------<br>
<br>S5.2.1<br>The document mostly uses &quot;octet&quot;, but there are thr=
ee instances of &quot;byte&quot;, all in the table in this section.=A0 Prob=
ably good to use &quot;octet&quot; there as well, for clarity.<br><br>S6<br=
>
The code here is *almost* valid python, but not quite.=A0 In case it&#39;s =
helpful, a revised version in Python is below (since I had time on the plan=
e on the way to the IETF meeting :) ).<br><br>S14.1, 3rd bullet<br>It might=
 be helpful to note that although the counter is reset for every packet, IV=
 uniqueness is ensured by the inclusion of SSRC/ROC/SEQ or SRTCP Index in t=
he IV (and the accompanying management of these parametesr.=A0 This is stat=
ed above, but if restated here, would help justify the last two bullets.<br=
>
<br><br><br><br><br><br>-----BEGIN srtp-aead.py-----<br>#!/usr/bin/env pyth=
on<br><br>from struct import pack<br>from Crypto.Cipher import AES<br>from =
Crypto.Util import Counter<br>from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes,=
 bytes_to_long<br>
<br># Parameters<br>Plaintext =3D &quot;\x00&quot; * 48 # Must be all zeros=
 for CTR-based validation to work<br>IV =3D &quot;iv&quot; * 6<br>Encryptio=
n_key =3D &quot;sixteen byte key&quot;<br><br><br># Helper functions requir=
ed by the algorithms in the draft<br>
def AES_ENC( data=3D&quot;&quot;, key=3D&quot;&quot; ):<br>=A0=A0=A0 assert=
( len(data) =3D=3D 16 )<br>=A0=A0=A0 assert( len(key) in [16, 24, 32] )<br>=
=A0=A0=A0 return AES.new(key).encrypt(data)<br><br>def TO_BYTES( counter, n=
 ):<br>=A0=A0=A0 return long_to_bytes(counter, n)<br>
<br><br># For each algorithm, we generate the key stream with the algorithm=
<br># in the draft, and compare to PyCrypto&#39;s CTR implementation.=A0 (W=
e <br># get the key stream from the CTR mode by encrypting the all-zero<br>
# octet string.)<br><br># GCM<br>def GCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encrypti=
on_key ):<br>=A0=A0=A0 assert( len(Plaintext)=A0 &lt;=3D (2**36) - 32 ) ## =
measured in octets<br>=A0=A0=A0 key_stream =3D &quot;&quot;<br>=A0=A0=A0 bl=
ock_counter =3D 1<br>=A0=A0=A0 first_key_block =3D AES_ENC( data =3D IV + T=
O_BYTES(block_counter,4),<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 key=3DEncryption_key=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 )<br>=A0=A0=A0 wh=
ile len(key_stream) &lt; len(Plaintext):<br>=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 block_cou=
nter =3D block_counter + 1<br>=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 key_block =3D AES_ENC( =
data=3DIV + TO_BYTES(block_counter,4),<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 key=3DEncryption_key=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 )<br>=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0 key_stream=A0 =3D key_stream + key_block<br>=A0=A0=A0 key_stream =3D ke=
y_stream[:len(Plaintext)]<br>=A0=A0=A0 return (first_key_block, key_stream =
)<br><br>Key_stream_G =3D GCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key )<br=
>
Key_stream_G =3D Key_stream_G[0] + Key_stream_G[1]<br>ivn =3D bytes_to_long=
( IV + (&quot;\x00&quot; * 4) )<br>ctr =3D Counter.new(128, initial_value =
=3D ivn+1)<br>Ciphertext_G =3D AES.new(Encryption_key, AES.MODE_CTR, counte=
r=3Dctr).encrypt(Plaintext)<br>
<br><br># CCM<br>def CCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key ):<br>=A0=
=A0=A0 assert( len(Plaintext) &lt;=3D (2**28)-16 ) ## measured in octets<br=
>=A0=A0=A0 key_stream =3D &quot;&quot;<br>=A0=A0=A0 block_counter =3D 0<br>=
=A0=A0=A0 first_key_block =3D AES_ENC( data=3D&#39;\x02&#39; + IV + TO_BYTE=
S(block_counter,3),<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 key=3DEncryption_key=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 )<br>=
=A0=A0=A0 while len(key_stream)&lt;len(Plaintext):<br>=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
 block_counter =3D block_counter + 1<br>=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 key_block =3D=
 AES_ENC( data=3D&#39;\x02&#39; + IV + TO_BYTES(block_counter,3),<br>
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0 key=3DEncryption_key=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 )<br>=A0=A0=
=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 key_stream=A0 =3D key_stream + key_block<br>=A0=A0=A0 key_s=
tream =3D key_stream[:len(Plaintext)]<br>=A0=A0=A0 return (first_key_block,=
 key_stream )<br><br>Key_stream_C =3D CCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encrypt=
ion_key )<br>
Key_stream_C =3D Key_stream_C[0] + Key_stream_C[1]<br>ivn =3D bytes_to_long=
( &#39;\x02&#39; + IV + (&quot;\x00&quot; * 3) )<br>ctr =3D Counter.new(128=
, initial_value =3D ivn)<br>Ciphertext_C =3D AES.new(Encryption_key, AES.MO=
DE_CTR, counter=3Dctr).encrypt(Plaintext)<br>
<br><br># Print out results.=A0 KSg and KSg&#39; should match, and KSc/KSc&=
#39;<br>print &quot;P:=A0=A0=A0 {}&quot;.format(Plaintext.encode(&quot;hex&=
quot;))<br>print &quot;IV:=A0=A0 {}&quot;.format(IV.encode(&quot;hex&quot;)=
)<br>print &quot;K:=A0=A0=A0 {}&quot;.format(Encryption_key.encode(&quot;he=
x&quot;))<br>
print &quot;KSg:=A0 {}&quot;.format(Key_stream_G.encode(&quot;hex&quot;))<b=
r>print &quot;KSg&#39;: {}&quot;.format(Ciphertext_G.encode(&quot;hex&quot;=
))<br>print &quot;KSc:=A0 {}&quot;.format(Key_stream_C.encode(&quot;hex&quo=
t;))<br>
print &quot;KSc&#39;: {}&quot;.format(Ciphertext_C.encode(&quot;hex&quot;))=
<br>-----END srtp-aead.py-----<br></div>

--001a11c30920b82bd204ea3aaad4--

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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
> On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG =
processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be =
making this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  However, I =
think this document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to have =
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go =
alongside this document.

Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying "strong =
security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong security is =
mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it depends on the =
context, and SRTP is not always the answer".

> On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG =
processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My major =
concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  Has =
the WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some =
sort of recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone =
choose SDES in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.

Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the scenario. =
Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security architecture =
drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC security arch, =
for example).

Colin




> If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to =
get these both into LC soon.
>=20
> Thanks,
> --Richard
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt



--=20
Colin Perkins
http://csperkins.org/




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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=iso-8859-1"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div>On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Barnes &lt;<a href="mailto:rlb@ipv.sx">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; wrote:</div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div>On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:<br>I have reviewed this 
draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG processing.&nbsp; Clearly, 
this is not the best moment in history to be making this sort of 
argument, given the increased focus on .&nbsp; However, I think this document
 makes the case pretty clearly.&nbsp; It helps to have 
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go alongside this document.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying "strong security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong security is mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it depends on the context, and SRTP is not always the answer".</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div>On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:<br>I have reviewed 
this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG processing.&nbsp; One 
question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:&nbsp; My major concern is that it
 seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.&nbsp; Has the WG considered 
explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some sort of 
recommendation level?&nbsp; I would like to avoid having someone choose SDES 
in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the scenario. Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security architecture drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC security arch, for example).</div><div><br></div><div>Colin</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div>If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to get these both into LC soon.<br><br>Thanks,<br></div>--Richard</div>
_______________________________________________<br>Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance<br><a href="mailto:avt@ietf.org">avt@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt<br></blockquote></div><br><div apple-content-edited="true">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Lucida Sans Typewriter'; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; font-size: medium; "><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-size: 9px; "><div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><br class="khtml-block-placeholder"></div><div>--&nbsp;</div><div></div><div>Colin Perkins</div><div><a href="http://csperkins.org/">http://csperkins.org/</a></div><div><br></div></span></span><br class="Apple-interchange-newline">

</div>
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org> wrote:

> On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
> processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be making
> this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  However, I think
> this document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to have
> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go
> alongside this document.
>
>
> Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying "strong
> security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong security is
> mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it depends on the context,
> and SRTP is not always the answer".
>

I agree.  It helps though, to be able to say "SRTP is not always the answer
... but something in this set of things should be."


>
> On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
> processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My major
> concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  Has the
> WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some sort of
> recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone choose SDES in
> a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.
>
>
> Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the scenario.
> Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security architecture
> drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC security arch, for
> example).
>

I agree that if you're going to make detailed recommendations, you need
more specifics.  It seems like you could provide some general guidance
though.  Could we something like the following?
-- Arrange the mechanisms in the document in an ordered list
-- "If more than one mechanism would work for your application, use the
higher-pref one"
-- Throw certain things in a NOT RECOMMENDED bucket, like ZRTP and the
legacy stuff in S3.2

Part of the advice should also be a reference to BCP 107 [1], "Guidelines
for Cryptographic Key Management".  Namely, things that provide automated
key management should be preferred over things that don't.

--Richard

[1] <http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp107>



>
> Colin
>
>
>
>
> If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to get
> these both into LC soon.
>
> Thanks,
> --Richard
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>
>
>
>
> --
> Colin Perkins
> http://csperkins.org/
>
>
>
>

--e89a8ff250e053ab7f04ea49d2cd
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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Colin Perkins <span dir=3D=
"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:csp@csperkins.org" target=3D"_blank">csp@csperk=
ins.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:b=
reak-word"><div><div class=3D"im"><div>On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Bar=
nes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div>
<blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-=
mandatory:<br>I have reviewed this=20
draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG processing.=A0 Clearly,=20
this is not the best moment in history to be making this sort of=20
argument, given the increased focus on .=A0 However, I think this document
 makes the case pretty clearly.=A0 It helps to have=20
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go along=
side this document.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>N=
ote that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying &quot;strong=
 security is not mandatory&quot;, rather it&#39;s saying that &quot;strong =
security is mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it depends on t=
he context, and SRTP is not always the answer&quot;.</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I agree.=A0 It helps though, t=
o be able to say &quot;SRTP is not always the answer ... but something in t=
his set of things should be.&quot;<br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div><div class=3D"im"><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-opti=
ons:<br>I have reviewed=20
this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG processing.=A0 One=20
question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:=A0 My major concern is that it
 seems like there&#39;s a lot of old stuff in here.=A0 Has the WG considere=
d=20
explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some sort of=20
recommendation level?=A0 I would like to avoid having someone choose SDES=
=20
in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.<br></div></div></blo=
ckquote><div><br></div></div><div>Such recommendations would be very helpfu=
l, but depend on the scenario. Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we=
 need security architecture drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like th=
e WebRTC security arch, for example).</div>
</div></div></blockquote><br><div>I agree that if you&#39;re going to make =
detailed recommendations, you need more specifics.=A0 It seems like you cou=
ld provide some general guidance though.=A0 Could we something like the fol=
lowing? <br>
</div><div>-- Arrange the mechanisms in the document in an ordered list<br>=
</div><div>-- &quot;If more than one mechanism would work for your applicat=
ion, use the higher-pref one&quot;<br></div><div>-- Throw certain things in=
 a NOT RECOMMENDED bucket, like ZRTP and the legacy stuff in S3.2<br>
</div><div><br></div><div>Part of the advice should also be a reference to =
BCP 107 [1], &quot;Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management&quot;.=A0 Na=
mely, things that provide automated key management should be preferred over=
 things that don&#39;t.<br>
<br></div><div>--Richard<br></div><div><br>[1] &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.=
ietf.org/html/bcp107">http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp107</a>&gt;<br></div><d=
iv><br>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><br></div><div>Colin</div><di=
v><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><di=
v class=3D"im"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>If the authors could follow up on that=
 one point, we should be able to get these both into LC soon.<br>
<br>Thanks,<br></div>--Richard</div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>Audio/Video Transport Co=
re Maintenance<br><a href=3D"mailto:avt@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">avt@iet=
f.org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt</a><span class=3D""><=
font color=3D"#888888"><br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><span class=3D""><font color=3D"#888888"><=
br><div>
<span style=3D"text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-variant:normal;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-weight:normal;line-height:normal;border-collapse:separ=
ate;text-transform:none;font-size:medium;white-space:normal;font-family:&#3=
9;Lucida Sans Typewriter&#39;;word-spacing:0px"><span style=3D"font-size:9p=
x"><div>
<br><br></div><div>--=A0</div><div></div><div>Colin Perkins</div><div><a hr=
ef=3D"http://csperkins.org/" target=3D"_blank">http://csperkins.org/</a></d=
iv><div><br></div></span></span><br>

</div>
<br></font></span></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--e89a8ff250e053ab7f04ea49d2cd--

From ron.even.tlv@gmail.com  Sun Nov  3 10:43:43 2013
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From: "Roni Even" <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
To: "'Richard Barnes'" <rlb@ipv.sx>, "'Colin Perkins'" <csp@csperkins.org>
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Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2013 20:40:18 +0200
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Cc: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org, avt@ietf.org, draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and	draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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Hi Richard,

I think that the purpose of the security option is as the name says to list
the options and not recommend anything leaving it to the specific deployment
like RTCweb to make recommendation. In this case if we try to recommend
order it may just cause further discussion about the order and priority
which is what we wanted to avoid in this work in the first place

Roni

 

From: avt-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Richard Barnes
Sent: 03 November, 2013 8:18 PM
To: Colin Perkins
Cc: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org; avt@ietf.org;
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options

 

On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org> wrote:

On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be making
this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  However, I think this
document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to have
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go
alongside this document.

 

Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying "strong
security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong security is
mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it depends on the context,
and SRTP is not always the answer".

 

I agree.  It helps though, to be able to say "SRTP is not always the answer
... but something in this set of things should be."

 





On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My major
concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  Has the
WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some sort of
recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone choose SDES in a
case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.

 

Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the scenario.
Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security architecture
drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC security arch, for
example).

 

I agree that if you're going to make detailed recommendations, you need more
specifics.  It seems like you could provide some general guidance though.
Could we something like the following? 

-- Arrange the mechanisms in the document in an ordered list

-- "If more than one mechanism would work for your application, use the
higher-pref one"

-- Throw certain things in a NOT RECOMMENDED bucket, like ZRTP and the
legacy stuff in S3.2

 

Part of the advice should also be a reference to BCP 107 [1], "Guidelines
for Cryptographic Key Management".  Namely, things that provide automated
key management should be preferred over things that don't.

--Richard


[1] <http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp107>


 

 

Colin

 

 

 





If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to get
these both into LC soon.

Thanks,

--Richard

_______________________________________________
Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
avt@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt

 

 

-- 

Colin Perkins

http://csperkins.org/

 

 

 

 


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style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Hi Richard,<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>I think that the purpose of the security option is as the name says =
to list the options and not recommend anything leaving it to the =
specific deployment like RTCweb to make recommendation. In this case if =
we try to recommend order it may just cause further discussion about the =
order and priority which is what we wanted to avoid in this work in the =
first place<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'>Roni<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#1F497=
D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div =
style=3D'border:none;border-right:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in =
4.0pt'><div><div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF =
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> =
avt-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of =
</b>Richard Barnes<br><b>Sent:</b> 03 November, 2013 8:18 =
PM<br><b>To:</b> Colin Perkins<br><b>Cc:</b> =
draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org; avt@ietf.org; =
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org<br><b>Subject:</b>=
 Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and =
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div>=
<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>On =
Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Colin Perkins &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:csp@csperkins.org" =
target=3D"_blank">csp@csperkins.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><div><div><blockquote =
style=3D'border:none;border-right:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Barnes &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt; =
wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D'margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:<br>I have =
reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG =
processing.&nbsp; Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be =
making this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .&nbsp; =
However, I think this document makes the case pretty clearly.&nbsp; It =
helps to have draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive =
statement to go alongside this =
document.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></blockquote><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly =
not saying &quot;strong security is not mandatory&quot;, rather it's =
saying that &quot;strong security is mandatory, but the appropriate way =
of providing it depends on the context, and SRTP is not always the =
answer&quot;.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></blockquote><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I =
agree.&nbsp; It helps though, to be able to say &quot;SRTP is not always =
the answer ... but something in this set of things should =
be.&quot;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D'border:none;border-right:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:<br>I have =
reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG =
processing.&nbsp; One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:&nbsp; =
My major concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in =
here.&nbsp; Has the WG considered explicitly marking each of the =
mechanisms with some sort of recommendation level?&nbsp; I would like to =
avoid having someone choose SDES in a case where they could use =
DTLS-SRTP, for example.<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend =
on the scenario. Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need =
security architecture drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the =
WebRTC security arch, for =
example).<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></blockquote><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>I agree =
that if you're going to make detailed recommendations, you need more =
specifics.&nbsp; It seems like you could provide some general guidance =
though.&nbsp; Could we something like the following? =
<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>-- Arrange the mechanisms =
in the document in an ordered list<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>-- &quot;If more than one mechanism would work for =
your application, use the higher-pref =
one&quot;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal>-- Throw certain =
things in a NOT RECOMMENDED bucket, like ZRTP and the legacy stuff in =
S3.2<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal =
style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>Part of the advice should also be a =
reference to BCP 107 [1], &quot;Guidelines for Cryptographic Key =
Management&quot;.&nbsp; Namely, things that provide automated key =
management should be preferred over things that =
don't.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>--Richard<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br>[1] &lt;<a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp107">http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp=
107</a>&gt;<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br>&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote =
style=3D'border:none;border-right:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in =
0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Colin<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><br><br><o:p></o:p></p><div><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>If the authors could follow up on that one point, we =
should be able to get these both into LC =
soon.<br><br>Thanks,<o:p></o:p></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>--Richard<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>_______________________________________________<br>Audi=
o/Video Transport Core Maintenance<br><a href=3D"mailto:avt@ietf.org" =
target=3D"_blank">avt@ietf.org</a><br><a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt</a><o:p></o:p=
></p></div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#888888'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p><div><div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;font-family:"Lucida Sans =
Typewriter","sans-serif";color:#888888'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div=
><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;font-family:"Lucida Sans =
Typewriter","sans-serif";color:#888888'>--&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></span></p></d=
iv><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;font-family:"Lucida Sans =
Typewriter","sans-serif";color:#888888'>Colin =
Perkins<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;font-family:"Lucida Sans =
Typewriter","sans-serif";color:#888888'><a =
href=3D"http://csperkins.org/" =
target=3D"_blank">http://csperkins.org/</a><o:p></o:p></span></p></div><d=
iv><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:7.0pt;font-family:"Lucida Sans =
Typewriter","sans-serif";color:#888888'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div=
><p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'color:#888888'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></blockquote></div><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></div></div></div></body></h=
tml>
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Subject: [AVTCORE] draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01 review
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Hi,=20

I reviewed draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01 focusing on security aspects. I h=
ave only reviewed Sections 1,2,8 yet, but these should be consistent and co=
mplete without having to read the sections on specific key management proto=
cols (3,4,5).

In general I think the draft is well written and useful, but I get the feel=
ing that when parts of the draft have changed in the past, the rest of the =
document has not always been changed to reflect these changes. There are e.=
g. several sections mentioning "base authentication tag"...

I also think the draft misses to analyze the various replay attacks that ca=
n be done on the EKT layer. The draft writes that SSRC sync on the key mana=
gement layer is no longer needed, but then EKT uses SSRC for replay protect=
ion. This makes replay attacks of the Full EKT fields possible and I think =
this need to be addressed in one way or another.

Furthermore I think the draft must control how either SSRCs or SRTP master =
keys are generated, and the MKI handling needs to be described in more deta=
il.

/John


- [General]
The specified replay protection relies on encoding the SSRC in the Full EKT=
 Field and not allowing the ROC to decrease. But without SSRC sync on the k=
ey management level, there will be SSRC collisions and the document seems t=
o miss the fact that the ROC also rolls over, RFC3711 states "the sender si=
de MUST increment ROC by one, modulo 2^32". I think the following replay at=
tacks are possible:

Replay attack 1:
If the SRTP master key has changed, for example by sending a Full EKT field=
 with (SRTP master key=3D2, ROC=3DX, ISN=3DY) an attacker can replay an old=
 Full EKT field with (SRTP master key=3D1, ROC=3DX, ISN=3D0) causing the re=
ceiver to update to the old key. The receiver will not recover until a Full=
 EKT field arrives from the sender.

Replay attack 2:
If there is a SSRC collision or the same SSRC has previously been used, an =
attacker can replay a Full EKT Field with a high ROC. The receiver will upd=
ate the ROC and will not recover from this until after up to 2^48 packets.

Replay attack 3:
For extremely long sessions (over 2^48 SRTP packets), the ROC will roll ove=
r. An attacker can then replay a Full EKT Field with a high ROC (e.g. 2^32-=
1). The receiver will update the ROC and will not recover from this until a=
fter up to 2^48 packets.

While replay attacks that lead to short term disturbances may be tolerable,=
 replay attacks leading to long term denial of service with a single packet=
 is in my view not acceptable.

Suggestions:
The only solution approach I see directly (except using time stamps and syn=
chronized clocks) is to require SRTP master keys to be fresh and randomly g=
enerated, and then somehow bind the EKT layer to the current SRTP master ke=
y. But this needs further thought.

- [General]
 "With this method, SRTP entities are free to choose SSRC values as they se=
e fit, and to start up new SRTP sources with new SRTP master keys (see Sect=
ion 2.2) within a session without coordinating with other entities via sign=
aling or other external means.  This fact allows to reinstate the RTP colli=
sion detection and repair mechanism"

"EKT does not control the manner in which the SSRC and master key are gener=
ated; it is only concerned with their secure transport."

"even if those two streams are using the same SRTP master key"

It is not possible to do both these things at the same time. This leads to =
IV reuse and the potential loss of confidentiality and integrity. Furthermo=
re the SSRC collision and repair mechanism in RFC3550 only handles SSRC col=
lisions happening at the same time, SRTP needs protection also against SSRC=
 collisions happening at different times.

I think the draft must set strict requirements on the use of shared and reu=
sed keys:
"All SRTP master keys MUST be fresh and randomly generated; they MUST NOT b=
e shared or reused in any way."

- [General]
I think the draft should give recommendations or default values for how oft=
en the Full EKT Field should be sent. Not only to ease implementation, but =
also as this has effects on what an passive attacker can learn from just lo=
oking at the packets, and the effects of an active attacker replaying Full =
EKT Fields.

- [Section 1]
The term "SRTP source" seems to sometimes mean "SRTP endpoint"/"SRTP partic=
ipant" and sometimes SSRC. I suggest replacing all occurrences of "SRTP sou=
rce" with one of these terms.=20

- [Section 1]
"An SRTP endpoint using EKT can generate new keys whenever an existing SRTP=
 master key has been overused, or start up a new SRTP source to replace an =
old SRTP source that has reached the packet-count limit."

This seems to imply that both the key and the SRTP source have limits, but =
according to RFC3711 it is only the key that has a packet counter and a lim=
it. The ROC rolls over modulo 2^32 and the same SSRC can be used for infini=
ty many packets as long as the key is refreshed at least every 2^48 packet.

- [Section 1]
"EKT provides a way for an SRTP session participant, either a sender or a r=
eceiver, to securely transport its SRTP master key and current SRTP rollove=
r counter to the other participants in the session.

Should this really be "or a receiver"? The handling for a receiver sending =
EKT does not seem to be defined.

- [Section 1]
"using the KEK as the encryption key"
I think it would be best to use "EKT Key" throughout the document and then =
maybe add "using the EKT key as KEK" in Section 2.3.1.
  =20
- [Section 2.1]
"Reserved:  MUST be all zeros on transmission, and MUST be ignored on recep=
tion."

Length of Reserved field is missing in the text. Suggestion:
"Reserved:  The length of this field is fixed at 7 bits. MUST be all zeros =
on transmission, and MUST be ignored on reception."

- [Section 2.1]
The figures are not really showing "examples", they seem to show the genera=
l format. I suggest removing "Example of" and "An example of".

- [Section 2.2]
"inbound SRTCP traffic" Should probably be "inbound traffic" or inbound SRT=
P/SRTCP traffic
=09
- [Section 2.2.1]
"The creation of the EKT field MUST precede the normal SRTP or SRTCP   pack=
et processing, so that the ROC used in EKT is the same as the one   used in=
 the SRTP or SRTCP processing."

ROC is not used in SRTCP processing and I think it is better to move the "M=
UST" and write: "The ROC used in EKT MUST be the same as the one used in th=
e SRTP processing."

- [Section 2.2.1]
- "Not all SRTP or SRTCP packets need to include the EKT key, but it SHOULD=
 be included with some regularity, e.g., every second or every ten seconds,=
 though it need not be sent on a regular schedule. "

Is this left from some old version? EKT key is not sent anywhere...

- [Section 2.2.1]
"If the Short format is used, an all-zero Reserved octet"
Maybe just "all-zero octet" as only 7 bits are reserved

- [Section 2.2.2]
I suggest changing "tag" to "field" to be consistent.

- [Section 2.2.2]
I think the handling when MKI is used needs to be more well-defined.
  * Is the old or new SRTP master key used for outbound processing of the p=
acket containing the Full EKT field?
  * If the old key is used, then is should be mentioned that the normal pro=
cessing for that packet may fail.
  * Is ISN and ROC ignored when MKI is used?

The current processing does also seem to open up for attacks. Assume that S=
RTP Master Key=3D1 and MKI=3D1 is in use. As I understand it, to prepare fo=
r future key update, the sender sends a Full EKT field containing SRTP Mast=
er Key=3D2 in a packet with MKI=3D2. If an attacker just changes that MKI f=
rom 2 to 1, the receiver will begin associating SRTP Master Key=3D2 with MK=
I=3D1 and all incoming packet processing will fail at least until the sende=
r switches to MKI=3D2.

[Section 2.2.2]
"If the crypto context is not new, then the rollover counter in the context=
 MUST NOT be set to a value lower than its current value."

How does this work when the ROC rolls over and starts at 0 again?

- [Section 2.3]
"EKT uses an authenticated cipher to encrypt the SRTP master keys, ROC, and=
 ISN."
Also SSRC, I suggest "EKT uses an authenticated cipher to encrypt the EKT P=
laintext."

- [Section 2.3]
" EKT uses an authenticated cipher"
"where N is at least M"

If the cipher is authenticated then N is larger than M. I suggest either
"EKT by default uses an authenticated cipher" or "N is larger than M".=20

- [Section 2.3.1]
"which can be used with plaintexts larger than 16 bytes in length"=20
Not wrong, but why mention it, RFC5649 can be used with plaintexts as short=
 as one octet. I suggest just writing: "Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649] alg=
orithm, which is suitable for keys of any size."

- [Section 2.3.1]
"It requires a plaintext length M that is at least eight bytes"
True for RFC3394 but not RFC5649, which can be used with plaintexts as shor=
t as one octet.=20

- [Section 2.3.1]
"it returns a ciphertext with a length of N =3D M + 8 bytes"

This is true for RFC3394 but not RFC5649 (unless M is a multiple of 8). For=
 RFC5649, I think it should be "N =3D 8 * (ceil(M / 8) + 1) bytes".

- [Section 2.6]
Quite much discussion about "Base Authentication Tag", which is not defined=
 (I assume it was in an earlier version). Should be rewritten without "Base=
 Authentication Tag".

- [Section 8]
"With EKT, each SRTP sender and receiver can generate distinct SRTP master =
keys"

As you seem to recommend no SSRC sync at the key management level, I would =
say "MUST generate distinct SRTP master keys"

- [Section 8]
"EKT provides complete security, even in the absence of further out-of-band=
 coordination of SSRCs, and even when SSRC values collide."

I do not understand what is meant with "complete security"? E.g. EKT does n=
ot provide complete security against replay attacks. I would recommend remo=
ving the vague "complete security" and instead describe explicitly what EKT=
 provides.

- [Section 8]
"In order to avoid potential security issues, the SRTP authentication tag l=
ength used by the base authentication method MUST be at least ten octets."

There is no base authentication method defined. I assume there was in an ea=
rlier draft, and that there is no longer any need to put restrictions on th=
e SRTP tag length.

- [Section 8]
"The presence of the SSRC in the EKT_Plaintext ensures that an attacker can=
not substitute an EKT_Ciphertext from one SRTP stream into another SRTP str=
eam, even if those two streams are using the same SRTP master key.  This is=
 important because some applications may use the same master key for multip=
le streams."
  =20
This is not really true as you recommend to not have strict SSRC synchroniz=
ation. And if you do not then "even if those two streams are using the same=
 SRTP master key" may lead to loss of confidential and integrity.

- [Section 8]
"denail" -> "denial"   =20
  =20
- [Section 8]  =20
"An attacker learns from EKT when SRTP Master Keys change."

Maybe change to "roughly when" or something similar. And if you send the Fu=
ll EKT field with regular intervals, I think an attacker learns nothing. Ot=
herwise the attacker learns approximately when. Maybe:

"If the full EKT field is sent with regular intervals, and MKI is not used,=
 an attacker cannot learn when SRTP Master Keys change."

But I do not see this as an attack or important to mention. I would also be=
 fine with just removing the text.
  =20
- [Section 8]  =20
"The EKT Cipher MUST be at least as strong as the encryption and authentica=
tion operations used in SRTP."
  =20
The authentication (64-bit tag) in the default EKT Cipher is not as strong =
as the default SRTP authentication (80-bit tag). As not even RFC3711 requir=
es that the encryption and authentication operations used in SRTP are as st=
rong as the SRTP master key, I do not think EKT should either.=20

I suggest: "The confidentiality of the EKT Cipher MUST be at least as stron=
g as the SRTP Master Key."=20

- [Section 8]  =20
"For each randomly chosen key, the encryption and decryption functions cann=
ot be distinguished from a random permutation and its inverse with non-negl=
igible advantage."
"The advantage is defined as the difference between the probability that th=
e adversary will identify the cipher as such and the probability that the a=
dversary will identify the random permutation as the cipher, when each case=
 is equally likely.
  =20
Even the current EKT cipher fails this as it expands the plaintext ;) For t=
he encryption function you could write "the encryption function cannot be d=
istinguished from a random function", but not for the default decryption fu=
nction as it can be distinguished even from a random function (it only acce=
pts 1 of 2^-64 bitstrings of a given length).=20

Maybe it's easiest to just remove the cryptographic details, leaving only:

"An EKT cipher MUST resist attacks in which both ciphertexts and plaintexts=
 can be adaptively chosen and adversaries that can query both the encryptio=
n and decryption functions adaptively." =20


---------------------------------------------------------------------------=
---------
JOHN MATTSSON
MSc Engineering Physics, MSc Business Administration and Economics=20
Senior Researcher, Security=20

Ericsson AB
Security Research
F=E4r=F6gatan 6
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone +46 10 71 43 501
SMS/MMS +46 76 11 53 501
john.mattsson@ericsson.com
www.ericsson.com




This Communication is Confidential. We only send and receive email on the b=
asis of the terms set out at www.ericsson.com/email_disclaimer=20


From vsingh.ietf@gmail.com  Mon Nov  4 10:07:02 2013
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From: Varun Singh <vsingh.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2013 10:06:34 -0800
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Discussion on RMCAT traffic model in Vancouver (03 Nov, 1300-1500)
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Hi,

Slideset from yesterday's meeting are available at:
https://speakerdeck.com/vr000m/media-traffic-generator-discussion
Note takers, if you could send the notes to me, I can then process and
post them to the mailing lists.

Cheers,
Varun

On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Varun Singh <vsingh.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Practical details for the meeting on **RMCAT Traffic models**
>
> Date: 03.11. 2013
> Time: 12:30 to 14:30.
> Assigned Room: Regency A
>
> Cheers,
> Varun
>
> On Sun, Oct 27, 2013 at 12:57 PM, Varun Singh <vsingh.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> In RMCAT WG there has been discussion surrounding the use
>> of a media traffic generator and to facilitate discussion,
>> RMCAT is hosting a side meeting on Sunday, 03 November
>> at 1300-1500. I suppose the room details will be announced
>> shortly.
>>
>> Below is a list of questions that will help design or choose
>> an appropriate traffic generator for Interactive multimedia traffic.
>> The list is an initial set and mainly to foster discussion both
>> on the mailing list and at the meeting.
>>
>> Mirja and Lars are not available that day, hence on their behalf,
>> the meeting is hosted by Colin and I .
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Varun
>> ---
>>
>> Traffic generator: to model the intrinsic variability of video:
>>
>> - what target bit rates can be achieved? (max?, min?)
>> - how much variability in media bit rate for a given target bit rate
>> - how to model motion? capturing high motion leads to bursty video
>>   (higher than target bit rate), but by how much? can this even be done?
>>
>> Traffic generator: on responsiveness to a new target bitrate:
>>
>> - how quickly can the codec generate a lower bit rate?
>> - immediately? does this depend on the new or requested bit rate?
>> - what is immediately? is it next frame or a few frames later, until then
>>   does it generates at the current rate?
>> - if not immediately, what bitrates (and duration) will it generate before
>>   meeting the target bitrate.
>>
>>
>> - how quickly can the codec generate a higher bit rate?
>> - immediately in the next frame? does this also depend on the new
>>    or requested bit rate?
>> - not immediately but in steps of intermediate bitrates, i.e., intermediate
>>   bitrate for a short duration then an increase in step, repeating until
>>   reaching the target bit rate.
>>
>> - If the target bit rate is achieved in steps, can they be announced to the
>>   congestion controller, i.e., the congestion controller knows the ramp up
>>   curve to meet the target bit rate.
>>
>> - If the media bit rate has not yet reached the requested target bit rate and
>>   the congestion control requests a new target bit rate, how does the codec
>>   respond?
>>
>> Application design related:
>> - should the congestion control be able to change the frame rate (video) or
>>   packetization time (audio) or is this something that the application controls.
>> - should the congestion control be able to change video resolution?
>> - should error-repair: NACKs, FEC be considered part of congestion control or
>>   outside it, i.e., it is something that the application does and not
>>   congestion control
>> - If FEC is controlled by the congestion control, how quickly can the sending
>>   rate be adapted by reducing/adding redundancy (FEC)? is something link this
>>   done? Does this makes sense at all?
>> - Apart from loss and RTT, what other congestion cues are currently used by
>>   congestion control algorithms? e.g., Decoding rate/goodput, application
>>   decode error rate, ECN, PCN, etc.
>> - If the codec is data limited, i.e., producing a sending rate smaller than the
>>   one calculated by the congestion control, can the congestion control probe
>>   the bandwidth by sending additional data packets in a certain pattern (e.g.,
>>   PathChirp)? would somehting link this help?
>> - application input on prioritization: audio vs video (vs data)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> http://www.netlab.tkk.fi/~varun/
>
>
>
> --
> http://www.netlab.tkk.fi/~varun/



-- 
http://www.netlab.tkk.fi/~varun/

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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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Hi Colin,

I came across this document before and I was really wondering whether 
this is the best story the IETF can come up with.

The argument that RTP is used in a number of different environments, as 
a basis for not offering a solid security story is rather weak. The same 
could be said about many other protocols the IETF develops, even about 
TLS itself.

Have a look at TLS to see an alternative path that one could go instead. 
It mandates a certain ciphersuite and adds the following qualification:

"
Mandatory Cipher Suites

    In the absence of an application profile standard specifying
    otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the cipher
    suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (see Appendix A.5 for the
    definition).
"

If there are deployments or standardization organizations believe that 
they do not require security (because it just runs within their own 
"secure" network* or because it requires a different solution solution, 
like the 3GPP that allows lawful intercept) then that is not a good 
reason for the IETF not mandating something.

I am wondering what motivated you write the document in this specific 
style. I believe I understand the motivation for Magnus.

Ciao
Hannes

(*): As we have recently learned these assumptions may well be wrong, 
see: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html 


Am 03.11.13 17:00, schrieb Colin Perkins:
> On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx <mailto:rlb@ipv.sx>>
> wrote:
>> On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
>> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
>> processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be
>> making this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  However,
>> I think this document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to have
>> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go
>> alongside this document.
>
> Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying "strong
> security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong security is
> mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it depends on the
> context, and SRTP is not always the answer".
>
>> On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
>> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
>> processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My major
>> concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  Has
>> the WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some
>> sort of recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone
>> choose SDES in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.
>
> Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the scenario.
> Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security architecture
> drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC security arch,
> for example).
>
> Colin
>
>
>
>
>> If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to
>> get these both into LC soon.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> --Richard
>> _______________________________________________
>> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
>> avt@ietf.org <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>
>
>
> --
> Colin Perkins
> http://csperkins.org/
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>


From csp@csperkins.org  Tue Nov  5 08:02:32 2013
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Cc: perpass@ietf.org, draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org, avt@ietf.org, draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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Hannes,

The goal of the draft is not to justify a lack of strong security. It is =
to explain why SRTP is not an appropriate mechanism for providing strong =
security for all use cases of RTP, and highlight that some scenarios =
need alternative strong security mechanisms. The rtp-security-options =
draft talks about what those options might be. If there are sections in =
the draft that don't make that clear, please let me know, and we can try =
to improve the text.=20

The draft says nothing about the cipher suites to be used. Both SRTP and =
the other security options mandate strong cipher suites, and there are =
no proposals to change that.

Colin


On 5 Nov 2013, at 00:42, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net> =
wrote:
> Hi Colin,
>=20
> I came across this document before and I was really wondering whether =
this is the best story the IETF can come up with.
>=20
> The argument that RTP is used in a number of different environments, =
as a basis for not offering a solid security story is rather weak. The =
same could be said about many other protocols the IETF develops, even =
about TLS itself.
>=20
> Have a look at TLS to see an alternative path that one could go =
instead. It mandates a certain ciphersuite and adds the following =
qualification:
>=20
> "
> Mandatory Cipher Suites
>=20
>   In the absence of an application profile standard specifying
>   otherwise, a TLS-compliant application MUST implement the cipher
>   suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (see Appendix A.5 for the
>   definition).
> "
>=20
> If there are deployments or standardization organizations believe that =
they do not require security (because it just runs within their own =
"secure" network* or because it requires a different solution solution, =
like the 3GPP that allows lawful intercept) then that is not a good =
reason for the IETF not mandating something.
>=20
> I am wondering what motivated you write the document in this specific =
style. I believe I understand the motivation for Magnus.
>=20
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
> (*): As we have recently learned these assumptions may well be wrong, =
see: =
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-link=
s-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/=
e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html=20
>=20
> Am 03.11.13 17:00, schrieb Colin Perkins:
>> On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx =
<mailto:rlb@ipv.sx>>
>> wrote:
>>> On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
>>> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and =
IESG
>>> processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be
>>> making this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  =
However,
>>> I think this document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to =
have
>>> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to =
go
>>> alongside this document.
>>=20
>> Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying =
"strong
>> security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong security =
is
>> mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it depends on the
>> context, and SRTP is not always the answer".
>>=20
>>> On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
>>> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and =
IESG
>>> processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My =
major
>>> concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  =
Has
>>> the WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with =
some
>>> sort of recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone
>>> choose SDES in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.
>>=20
>> Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the =
scenario.
>> Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security =
architecture
>> drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC security =
arch,
>> for example).
>>=20
>> Colin
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>> If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able =
to
>>> get these both into LC soon.
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>> --Richard
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
>>> avt@ietf.org <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> --
>> Colin Perkins
>> http://csperkins.org/
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
>> avt@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>>=20
>=20



--=20
Colin Perkins
http://csperkins.org/




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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
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Cc: draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>, avt@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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Can we seriously not come up with some general principles here?  There are
already some in the document, e.g., in the IPsec section.

-- In general, SRTP-based solutions are preferable to things that tunnel
RTP over something else, because tunnel solutions have additional
vulnerabilities.
-- In general, mechanisms that provide automated key management are
preferable to things that don't [BCP107]

And it seems like we should clearly deprecate the legacy RTP mechanism
(S3.2), and clearly indicate that new IETF protocols should use DTLS-SRTP
instead of ZRTP (in cases where both are applicable).



On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 10:40 AM, Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Richard,
>
> I think that the purpose of the security option is as the name says to
> list the options and not recommend anything leaving it to the specific
> deployment like RTCweb to make recommendation. In this case if we try to
> recommend order it may just cause further discussion about the order and
> priority which is what we wanted to avoid in this work in the first place
>
> Roni
>
>
>
> *From:* avt-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Richard
> Barnes
> *Sent:* 03 November, 2013 8:18 PM
> *To:* Colin Perkins
> *Cc:* draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org; avt@ietf.org;
> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and
> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
>
>
>
> On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org> wrote:
>
> On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
> processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be making
> this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  However, I think
> this document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to have
> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go
> alongside this document.
>
>
>
> Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying "strong
> security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong security is
> mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it depends on the context,
> and SRTP is not always the answer".
>
>
>
> I agree.  It helps though, to be able to say "SRTP is not always the
> answer ... but something in this set of things should be."
>
>
>
>
>
> On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
> processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My major
> concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  Has the
> WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some sort of
> recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone choose SDES in
> a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.
>
>
>
> Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the scenario.
> Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security architecture
> drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC security arch, for
> example).
>
>
>
> I agree that if you're going to make detailed recommendations, you need
> more specifics.  It seems like you could provide some general guidance
> though.  Could we something like the following?
>
> -- Arrange the mechanisms in the document in an ordered list
>
> -- "If more than one mechanism would work for your application, use the
> higher-pref one"
>
> -- Throw certain things in a NOT RECOMMENDED bucket, like ZRTP and the
> legacy stuff in S3.2
>
>
>
> Part of the advice should also be a reference to BCP 107 [1], "Guidelines
> for Cryptographic Key Management".  Namely, things that provide automated
> key management should be preferred over things that don't.
>
> --Richard
>
>
> [1] <http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp107>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Colin
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to get
> these both into LC soon.
>
> Thanks,
>
> --Richard
>
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Colin Perkins
>
> http://csperkins.org/
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

--001a11c3035028adf904ea7134c1
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>Can we seriously not come up with some gene=
ral principles here?=A0 There are already some in the document, e.g., in th=
e IPsec section.<br><br></div>-- In general, SRTP-based solutions are prefe=
rable to things that tunnel RTP over something else, because tunnel solutio=
ns have additional vulnerabilities.<br>


</div>-- In general, mechanisms that provide automated key management are p=
referable to things that don&#39;t [BCP107]<br><br></div>And it seems like =
we should clearly deprecate the legacy RTP mechanism (S3.2), and clearly in=
dicate that new IETF protocols should use DTLS-SRTP instead of ZRTP (in cas=
es where both are applicable).<br>
<div><div><div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_e=
xtra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 10:40 AM, R=
oni Even <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ron.even.tlv@gmail.com" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">ron.even.tlv@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple" lang=3D"=
EN-US"><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Hi Richard,<u=
></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">I think that the purpose =
of the security option is as the name says to list the options and not reco=
mmend anything leaving it to the specific deployment like RTCweb to make re=
commendation. In this case if we try to recommend order it may just cause f=
urther discussion about the order and priority which is what we wanted to a=
void in this work in the first place<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quot;Ca=
libri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d">Roni<u></u><u></u></span>=
</p><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:11.0pt;font-family:&quo=
t;Calibri&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#1f497d"><u></u>=A0<u></u></sp=
an></p>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-right:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in=
 4.0pt"><div><div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #b5c4df 1.0pt;paddi=
ng:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:10=
.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">From:</span></b=
><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-=
serif&quot;"> <a href=3D"mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">avt=
-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank">avt-bounces@ietf.org</a>] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Richard Barnes<b=
r>
<b>Sent:</b> 03 November, 2013 8:18 PM<br><b>To:</b> Colin Perkins<br><b>Cc=
:</b> <a href=3D"mailto:draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org" t=
arget=3D"_blank">draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org</a>; <a h=
ref=3D"mailto:avt@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">avt@ietf.org</a>; <a href=3D"=
mailto:draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org" target=3D"_b=
lank">draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory =
and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><=
/div><div><div class=3D"h5"><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><di=
v>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Colin Perkins &lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:csp@csperkins.org" target=3D"_blank">csp@csperkins.org</a>&=
gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p><div><div><blockquote style=3D"border:none;bord=
er-right:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;ma=
rgin-right:0in">
<div><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On 2 Nov 2013, at 17:12, Richard=
 Barnes &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blank">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&=
gt; wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;mar=
gin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:<br>I=
 have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG proces=
sing.=A0 Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be making this =
sort of argument, given the increased focus on .=A0 However, I think this d=
ocument makes the case pretty clearly.=A0 It helps to have draft-ietf-avtco=
re-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go alongside this docume=
nt.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div></div></blockquote><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p><=
/div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Note that the srtp-not-mandatory dra=
ft is explicitly not saying &quot;strong security is not mandatory&quot;, r=
ather it&#39;s saying that &quot;strong security is mandatory, but the appr=
opriate way of providing it depends on the context, and SRTP is not always =
the answer&quot;.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u=
></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I agree.=A0 It helps though, to be a=
ble to say &quot;SRTP is not always the answer ... but something in this se=
t of things should be.&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote st=
yle=3D"border:none;border-right:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0=
pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal=
"><br>
<br><u></u><u></u></p><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">On draft-ietf-avtcor=
e-rtp-security-options:<br>I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IE=
TF Last Call and IESG processing.=A0 One question to discuss briefly before=
 IETF LC:=A0 My major concern is that it seems like there&#39;s a lot of ol=
d stuff in here.=A0 Has the WG considered explicitly marking each of the me=
chanisms with some sort of recommendation level?=A0 I would like to avoid h=
aving someone choose SDES in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for exa=
mple.<u></u><u></u></p>
</div></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div></div><d=
iv><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Such recommendations would be very helpful, but d=
epend on the scenario. Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need se=
curity architecture drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC=
 security arch, for example).<u></u><u></u></p>
</div></div></div></blockquote><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p>=
<div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">I agree that if you&#39;re going to make detail=
ed recommendations, you need more specifics.=A0 It seems like you could pro=
vide some general guidance though.=A0 Could we something like the following=
? <u></u><u></u></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Arrange the mechanisms in the document=
 in an ordered list<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- &=
quot;If more than one mechanism would work for your application, use the hi=
gher-pref one&quot;<u></u><u></u></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">-- Throw certain things in a NOT RECOMMEN=
DED bucket, like ZRTP and the legacy stuff in S3.2<u></u><u></u></p></div><=
div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt">
Part of the advice should also be a reference to BCP 107 [1], &quot;Guideli=
nes for Cryptographic Key Management&quot;.=A0 Namely, things that provide =
automated key management should be preferred over things that don&#39;t.<u>=
</u><u></u></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p =
class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>[1] &lt;<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp10=
7" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp107</a>&gt;<u></u><u></u=
></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>=A0<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquot=
e style=3D"border:none;border-right:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in=
 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><div><p class=3D"MsoNo=
rmal">
<u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">Colin<u></u><u></u><=
/p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p cla=
ss=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u>=
</u>=A0<u></u></p>
</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br><br><u></u><u></u></p><div><div><div><p cl=
ass=3D"MsoNormal">If the authors could follow up on that one point, we shou=
ld be able to get these both into LC soon.<br><br>Thanks,<u></u><u></u></p>
</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal">--Richard<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p clas=
s=3D"MsoNormal">_______________________________________________<br>Audio/Vi=
deo Transport Core Maintenance<br><a href=3D"mailto:avt@ietf.org" target=3D=
"_blank">avt@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt</a><u></u><u></u></p></div><p class=
=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"color:#888888"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p><d=
iv><div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span style=3D"font-s=
ize:7.0pt;font-family:&quot;Lucida Sans Typewriter&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&q=
uot;;color:#888888"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p></div><div><p class=3D"MsoN=
ormal">
<span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt;font-family:&quot;Lucida Sans Typewriter&quo=
t;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#888888">--=A0<u></u><u></u></span></p></di=
v><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt;font-family:&q=
uot;Lucida Sans Typewriter&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#888888">Coli=
n Perkins<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt;font-famil=
y:&quot;Lucida Sans Typewriter&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#888888">=
<a href=3D"http://csperkins.org/" target=3D"_blank">http://csperkins.org/</=
a><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div><div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:7.0pt;font-famil=
y:&quot;Lucida Sans Typewriter&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:#888888">=
<u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p></div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"col=
or:#888888"><u></u>=A0<u></u></span></p>
</div><p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div></blockquote></div>=
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=A0<u></u></p></div></div></div></div></div><=
/div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a11c3035028adf904ea7134c1--

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Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 10:15:59 -0800
From: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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On 2013-11-05 00:42, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> 
> The argument that RTP is used in a number of different environments, as
> a basis for not offering a solid security story is rather weak. The same
> could be said about many other protocols the IETF develops, even about
> TLS itself.
> 

I strongly disagree with that. TLS is a solution you choose to apply or
not. If your RTP application is a multicast one, then we can't do
DTLS-SRTP, because it is can't function in such an environment. Similar
observations can be made about a number of different deployment cases.


> I am wondering what motivated you write the document in this specific
> style. I believe I understand the motivation for Magnus.

My motivation for writing SRTP-not-mandatory document was as WG chair to
not have to argue with the Security ADs each time an RTP document passed
the IESG about the security sections. If you are doing an RTP extensions
you need to discuss what that implies security wise and what security
requirements it has. However, it is not the appropriate place to mandate
a particular solution and key-management.

What have been missing in IETF is to write the different "This is what
you shall do, given that your RTP application class is foo". There is
clearly a need for such a document for SIP established sessions. But I
don't volunteer to write it.

If you look at draft-ietf-mmusic-rfc2326bis, that actually normatively
require anyone supporting RTP with RTSP 2.0 to implement SRTP and MIKEY
based keying because that makes sense for RTSP.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

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Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
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Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
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From magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com  Wed Nov  6 07:30:35 2013
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Subject: [AVTCORE] RTP Topologies and Taxonomy
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AVTEXT and AVTCORE
(Please respond to AVTEXT only)

In yesterdays WG session in AVTEXT it was brought up a question
regarding Section 4 of draft-ietf-avtext-rtp-grouping-taxonomy-00. This
was the question if this belongs in this draft or should be part of the
RTP Topologies.

My understanding it was put into the taxonomy draft to provide some
examples of how the entities definitions actually relate in some cases.
However, they can also be seen to duplicate quite a lot of the RTP
topologies drafts. And that draft needs an update that uses the
taxonomy, as editor I have that on my todo list. Thus we get to the
question of what should be done in the taxonomy document.

I think there are three alternatives here:

1. Remove all the topologies related discussion and at most make an
explicit reference to topologies as showing how taxonomy can be used to
describe the RTP Topologies.

2. Select a very small number (1 or 2) enlightening examples just to
show what can be done.

3. Include all the main topologies and focus on the bigger picture and
point to how RTP and signalling relate using communication and
multi-media sessions etc.

I personally are not certain between alternative 1 and 2. RTP Topologies
do have some signaling discussion, but may get more to function as good
examples for the entities concepts. Thus, I might lean slightly more
towards 2, with the purpose of focusing on how the communication and
multi-media session interacts with participants, end points and RTP
sessions.

Please provide your opinion or if you think there are additional
alternatives?

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------


From magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com  Wed Nov  6 19:13:23 2013
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Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2013 19:13:43 -0800
From: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
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To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
References: <CAL02cgRRvx8puZoDRHv39Am+2oHy44iion_x77WfiqW0hEPgxw@mail.gmail.com>	<C9DBB09E-139A-456C-B79B-062AAFA60502@csperkins.org> <CAL02cgRXKvZCzdUu8Chp2J-Y1YnEoWv3A+kUNawrkHwnHq11qQ@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org, avt@ietf.org, draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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Richard and WG,

See inline

On 2013-11-03 10:18, Richard Barnes wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org
> <mailto:csp@csperkins.org>> wrote:
> 
> 
>     Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying
>     "strong security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong
>     security is mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it
>     depends on the context, and SRTP is not always the answer".
> 
> 
> I agree.  It helps though, to be able to say "SRTP is not always the
> answer ... but something in this set of things should be."

I think you need to say, hopefully something in this set should be. It
is not certain that we actually have the security mechanism required for
a particular application context.


>  
> 
> 
>>     On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
>>     I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and
>>     IESG processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC: 
>>     My major concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff
>>     in here.  Has the WG considered explicitly marking each of the
>>     mechanisms with some sort of recommendation level?  I would like
>>     to avoid having someone choose SDES in a case where they could use
>>     DTLS-SRTP, for example.
> 
>     Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the
>     scenario. Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security
>     architecture drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC
>     security arch, for example).
> 
> 
> I agree that if you're going to make detailed recommendations, you need
> more specifics.  It seems like you could provide some general guidance
> though.  Could we something like the following?

First of all this is an informational document, it was not written as a
recommendation document. It is a survey with some general guidelines.

> -- Arrange the mechanisms in the document in an ordered list

According to which application context should that list be arranged for?

> -- "If more than one mechanism would work for your application, use the
> higher-pref one"

The issue is that one mechanism is more suitable in the context of
multicast but, maybe another is more suitable in another application
context. And there are relative ordering will vary.

> -- Throw certain things in a NOT RECOMMENDED bucket, like ZRTP and the
> legacy stuff in S3.2

Section 3.2 says:

This
   method can provide confidentiality but, as discussed in Section 9 of
   [RFC3550], it has extremely weak security properties and is not to be
   used.

Isn't this clear enough? I don't want to use RFC 2119 language in an
Informational document that is a description, and not a recommendation
document.

For ZRTP what are your grounds for issuing the NOT RECOMMENDED. I think
we accurately describes its status.
> 
> Part of the advice should also be a reference to BCP 107 [1],
> "Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management".  Namely, things that
> provide automated key management should be preferred over things that don't.

Yes, this we can add to section 4. Securing RTP Applications.


Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------


From john.mattsson@ericsson.com  Thu Nov  7 07:31:52 2013
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From: John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com>
To: "avt@ietf.org" <avt@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and	draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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>> -- Throw certain things in a NOT RECOMMENDED bucket, like ZRTP and=20
>> the legacy stuff in S3.2

>For ZRTP what are your grounds for issuing the NOT RECOMMENDED. I think=20
>we accurately describes its status.

Regarding the security aspects, I am not aware of any known weaknesses in Z=
RTP. In fact, if used in a scenario without prior e2e shared cryptographic =
secrets (which is probably the most common use case for both ZRTP and DTLS-=
SRTP) then ZRTP provides e2e authentication by using SAS, while DTLS-SRTP i=
n this scenario only provides opportunistic encryption.

/John

-----Original Message-----
From: avt-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Magnu=
s Westerlund
Sent: den 7 november 2013 04:14
To: Richard Barnes; Colin Perkins
Cc: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org; avt@ietf.org; draft-i=
etf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and dra=
ft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options

Richard and WG,

See inline

On 2013-11-03 10:18, Richard Barnes wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 8:00 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org=20
> <mailto:csp@csperkins.org>> wrote:
>=20
>=20
>     Note that the srtp-not-mandatory draft is explicitly not saying
>     "strong security is not mandatory", rather it's saying that "strong
>     security is mandatory, but the appropriate way of providing it
>     depends on the context, and SRTP is not always the answer".
>=20
>=20
> I agree.  It helps though, to be able to say "SRTP is not always the=20
> answer ... but something in this set of things should be."

I think you need to say, hopefully something in this set should be. It is n=
ot certain that we actually have the security mechanism required for a part=
icular application context.


> =20
>=20
>=20
>>     On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
>>     I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and
>>     IESG processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:=20
>>     My major concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff
>>     in here.  Has the WG considered explicitly marking each of the
>>     mechanisms with some sort of recommendation level?  I would like
>>     to avoid having someone choose SDES in a case where they could use
>>     DTLS-SRTP, for example.
>=20
>     Such recommendations would be very helpful, but depend on the
>     scenario. Section 5 gives some pointers, but really we need security
>     architecture drafts for particular use cases of RTP (like the WebRTC
>     security arch, for example).
>=20
>=20
> I agree that if you're going to make detailed recommendations, you=20
> need more specifics.  It seems like you could provide some general=20
> guidance though.  Could we something like the following?

First of all this is an informational document, it was not written as a rec=
ommendation document. It is a survey with some general guidelines.

> -- Arrange the mechanisms in the document in an ordered list

According to which application context should that list be arranged for?

> -- "If more than one mechanism would work for your application, use=20
> the higher-pref one"

The issue is that one mechanism is more suitable in the context of multicas=
t but, maybe another is more suitable in another application context. And t=
here are relative ordering will vary.

> -- Throw certain things in a NOT RECOMMENDED bucket, like ZRTP and the=20
> legacy stuff in S3.2

Section 3.2 says:

This
   method can provide confidentiality but, as discussed in Section 9 of
   [RFC3550], it has extremely weak security properties and is not to be
   used.

Isn't this clear enough? I don't want to use RFC 2119 language in an Inform=
ational document that is a description, and not a recommendation document.

For ZRTP what are your grounds for issuing the NOT RECOMMENDED. I think we =
accurately describes its status.
>=20
> Part of the advice should also be a reference to BCP 107 [1],=20
> "Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management".  Namely, things that=20
> provide automated key management should be preferred over things that don=
't.

Yes, this we can add to section 4. Securing RTP Applications.


Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
F=E4r=F6gatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------

_______________________________________________
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avt@ietf.org
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Subject: [AVTCORE] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC3611 (3795)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC3611,
"RTP Control Protocol Extended Reports (RTCP XR)".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3611&eid=3795

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: Stephen James <sjames@genband.com>

Section: 5.1

Original Text
-------------
rtcp-xr-attrib = "a=" "rtcp-xr" ":" [xr-format *(SP xr-format)] CRLF

Corrected Text
--------------
rtcp-xr-attrib = "a=" "rtcp-xr" [ ":" xr-format *(SP xr-format)] CRLF

Notes
-----
The ABNF for the attribute is causing some interoperability issues.
The text as written shows that the colon is required while the parameters are optional.
This leaves the format: "a=rtcp-xr:" the required format.  Vendors are using "a=rtcp-xr" which strictly violates the ABNF above. Moving the ':' into the optional part seems correct.

Instructions:
-------------
This errata is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC3611 (draft-ietf-avt-rtcp-report-extns-06)
--------------------------------------
Title               : RTP Control Protocol Extended Reports (RTCP XR)
Publication Date    : November 2003
Author(s)           : T. Friedman, Ed., R. Caceres, Ed., A. Clark, Ed.
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Audio/Video Transport
Area                : Real-time Applications and Infrastructure
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance Wo=
rking Group of the IETF.

	Title           : Options for Securing RTP Sessions
	Author(s)       : Magnus Westerlund
                          Colin Perkins
	Filename        : draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-09.txt
	Pages           : 35
	Date            : 2013-11-12

Abstract:
   The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is used in a large number of
   different application domains and environments.  This heterogeneity
   implies that different security mechanisms are needed to provide
   services such as confidentiality, integrity and source authentication
   of RTP/RTCP packets suitable for the various environments.  The range
   of solutions makes it difficult for RTP-based application developers
   to pick the most suitable mechanism.  This document provides an
   overview of a number of security solutions for RTP, and gives
   guidance for developers on how to choose the appropriate security
   mechanism.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-09

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-=
09


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

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From magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com  Tue Nov 12 07:11:53 2013
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Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 16:12:22 +0100
From: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
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To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, <avt@ietf.org>, <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory@tools.ietf.org>, <draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options@tools.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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Richard and WG,

We have updated the RTP Security Options document. This adds three
guidance sub-sections regarding automated key-management, tunnels vs
end-to-end security and plain text key considerations.

I also fixes a missing reference. All visible in the diff:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-09

I hope everyone can take a look at these changes and react if they are
wrong or non-acceptable.

Cheers

Magnus

On 2013-11-03 01:12, Richard Barnes wrote:
> On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
> processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be
> making this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  However, I
> think this document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to have
> draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go
> alongside this document.
> 
> On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
> processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My major
> concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  Has
> the WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some
> sort of recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone
> choose SDES in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.
> 
> If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to
> get these both into LC soon.
> 
> Thanks,
> --Richard


-- 

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------


From mpeck@mitre.org  Wed Nov 13 11:09:24 2013
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From: "Peck, Michael A" <mpeck@mitre.org>
To: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>, IETF AVTCore WG <avt@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [AVTCORE] WG last call for draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] WG last call for draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01
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Hi - I have a few minor comments:

There are several references to AES_128 throughout the document (I counted
6) including a statement that "AES_128 is the default value for the EKT
cipher."  It looks like these are leftovers from a previous draft and
should be removed, as AES_128 is no longer a defined EKT cipher.  Section
3.4.1 states that AESKW_128 is now the default cipher.

Section 2.1:
The ROC and ISN paragraphs both state "It is included in the EKT
plaintext, but does not appear on the wire."
The phrase "but does not appear on the wire" seems confusing to me - I'd
suggest removing it?
The EKT_Plaintext paragraph already states that the EKT plaintext doesn't
appear on the wire.
Besides, they sort-of do appear on the wire, but they're in ciphertext
form?

Section 2.2:
"for use in processing inbound SRTCP traffic"
Should this be "for use in processing inbound SRTCP and SRTP traffic"?

Section 2.2.2
typo: "containing and EKT" should be "containing an EKT"
typo: "Steps 2, 3, 4 5" should be "Steps 2, 3, 4, 5"

Section 3.4.1:
typo: "with in" should be "within"
Same sentence: should "SRTCP packets" be "SRTCP and SRTP packets"?

Section 3.4.2:
Should "SRTCP packets" be "SRTCP and SRTP packets"?

Section 3.5:
typo: "Section (newline) Section 3.4" should just be "Section 3.4"

Mike Peck

On 10/25/13 5:55 AM, "Magnus Westerlund" <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
wrote:

>WG,
>
>This starts a 3-week (due to the IETF meeting) WG last call of Encrypted
>Key Transport for Secure RTP with intended status Proposed Standard.
>Please provide any feedback by the 15th of November.
>
>The draft
>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt/
>
>Cheers
>
>Magnus Westerlund
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
>F=E4r=F6gatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
>SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>_______________________________________________
>Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
>avt@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt


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Subject: [AVTCORE] I-D Action: draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance Wo=
rking Group of the IETF.

	Title           : RTP and Leap Seconds
	Author(s)       : Kevin Gross
                          Ray van Brandenburg
	Filename        : draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06.txt
	Pages           : 9
	Date            : 2013-11-15

Abstract:
   This document discusses issues that arise when RTP sessions span
   Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) leap seconds.  It updates RFC 3550
   to describe how RTP senders and receivers should behave in the
   presence of leap seconds.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06

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http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06


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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] WG last call for draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01
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Hi,

This is my personal review of EKT in its WG last call.

I have to say that this is clearly not ready yet. There are a large
number of issues that needs resolution.

First the ones that doesn't have clear section references.

G1: The documents section where the connection with signalling and the
key-exchange mechanisms are specified implies that one can start an SRTP
session without EKT and later upgrade it to use EKT. I however fails to
see how this can work reliable. Especially not the alluding to that you
can wait doing this until you actually have a new master key to use.

A. Lets start with the signalled upgrade. When upgrading to EKT from
plain SRTP then you start sending SRTP and SRTCP packets that allways
have a EKT trailer, which is either a full header or the 1-byte short
header. Thus when turning on EKT this header will be added to the end of
the packet by the sender. When the receiver gets this packet it will
fail SRTP authentication, as the EKT header now displaced the
Authentication header. Thus there are failure modes for this upgrade
that isn't discussed. To my understanding given that one have received
the signalling that EKT will be used, then one can run regular mode
until an authentication failure, then try processing the failed packets
as EKT. If that works, one go to EKT mode for that SSRC. Risk, twice the
amount of authentication work for SSRC not yet switched, but for a
limited time

B. If this is EKT switch can occur at any time, then each time there is
an authentication failure one have to check if this is EKT. Thus,
bit-errors, packet mangling, all of these results in twice the amount of
authentication work before dropping the packet.

Authors please clarify what the intention is hear. Is this to be
supported, if it is, then can we please have a section defining the
procedure for how to handle it so that its cost can be appropriately judged?

G2. SRTCP compound packets and the SSRC field in the EKT. So the
processing in Section 2.2.2, bullet 4 says that the EKT SSRC field must
match the SRTP headers SSRC. This fails to discuss SRTCP, and I think
you might have a major head-ache here. An SRTCP compound packet may
actaully contain SR/RR packets from multiple SSRCs from an end-point.
See RFC3550 Section 6.1 that says:

It is RECOMMENDED that translators and mixers combine individual
      RTCP packets from the multiple sources they are forwarding into
      one compound packet whenever feasible in order to amortize the
      packet overhead (see Section 7).

This is further discussed in draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-multi-stream.

Thus I think you have an issue of how to get all these SSRCs EKT
payloads sent in SRTCP. If one takes the easy way out, and say that the
SSRC in EKT must match the first RTCP packet part of the compound, and
then round-robin among them you might have significant delay until all
the SSRCs from an end-point have sent their EKT payload even once.

This maybe, but I am uncertain be handled with above said round robin,
and instead rely on SRTP distribution of the relevant EKT. But the issue
clearly needs to be discussed.

G3. The common master salt. I realized this when reading the security
description section, that the master salt to use is actually defined by
the cipher suit. And in case of mixing GCM or CCM cipher suits with any
of the regular AES ones you actually have Master Salt mismatch between
them. GCM and CCM uses 96 bits Master Salts, why the others use 112
bits. Thus, an assumption EKT is built on can easily be made untrue by
including cipher suites in the same invite from these two sets.

G4. In general I am missing a clear explanation of how the "default"
master key produced by the key-managements are being used when combined
with EKT. This applies to all the key-management mechanism where I don't
get if or not they being used, or need to be included at all.

G5. This document totally fails to discuss the issue of MTU and the fact
that having a varying sized tag could cause issues. I would recommend
that one always assumes a full EKT header will be present and deduct
appropriately from the MTU.

G6. The document is very sloppy in referencing SRTP, SRTCP or both types
of packets correctly. Please review all references to packets to ensure
that this is correct.

Now comments more associated with particular sections:

1. Section 1:
   For example, if a participant joins a session that is already in
   progress, the SRTP rollover counter (ROC) of each SRTP source in the
   session needs to be provided to that participant.

I think this might not be the best start, at least failing to discuss
RFC 4771-

2. Section 1:
EKT
   securely distributes the SRTP master key and other information for
   each SRTP source, using SRTCP or SRTP to transport that information.

I think you should be more explicit when you refer to what is identifed
by a SSRC, like this:

SRTP Source (SSRC), using ..

3. Section 1:
 Section 3, Section 4, and Section 5
   define the use of EKT with SDP Security Descriptions, DTLS-SRTP, and
   MIKEY, respectively.  Section 7 provides a design rationale.
   Section 6 explains how EKT can interwork with keying in call
   signaling.

First, you have a order mismatch, secondly, I can't understand the
second sentence.


4. Section 2.1:
What is the definition of the SSRC field part of the EKT_PLAINTEXT?

5. Section 2.1:
Definition of EKT_Ciphertext:
I am missing what the requirements are on the production of this from
the plain text. What is given is that confidenitiality needs to be
equally strong on this as the SRTP. What about integrity and
authentication?

6. Section 2.1:
Together, these data elements assoicated with an instance of EKT
      are called an EKT parameter set.

What is an "instance of EKT"?

7. Section 2.2:
At any given time, each SRTP/SRTCP source has associated with it a
   single EKT parameter set.

Make clear that SSRC is the identifying factor:

At any given time, each SRTP/SRTCP source (SSRC) is associated with it a
   single EKT parameter set.


8. Section 2.2:

There
   may be other EKT parameter sets that are used by other SRTP/SRTCP
   sources in the same session.

Does the above apply also within a end-point? So when having multiple
SSRCs one can have multiple different EKT parameter sets in use?

9. Section 2.2:
All of these EKT parameter sets SHOULD
   be stored by all of the participants in an SRTP session, for use in
   processing inbound SRTCP traffic.

inbound SRTP/SRTCP traffic?

10. Section 2.2.1:
   First, the sender decides whether to use the Full or Short format.
   When sending EKT with SRTP, the Full format SHOULD be used on the
   initial SRTP packet in a session and after each rekeying event.  When
   sending EKT with SRTCP, the Full format MUST be used.  Not all SRTP
   or SRTCP packets need to include the EKT key, but it SHOULD be
   included with some regularity, e.g., every second or every ten
   seconds, though it need not be sent on a regular schedule.

Why isn't this mostly a pointer on Section 2.6? I think you should
gather the discussion of when and why to send full format in one
section. The reason I think is that Section 2.6 do need to be expanded
to both discuss when and how to make delivery of the keys reliable.

I think one can start with analyzing the cases when one knows the
receiver(s) will not have the keys. Which I think comes down to two
major cases:

1. The SSRC one transmit is new joiner of the session
2. There is new receiving endpoint in the session

A sender can easily determine 1), it can in some cases determine 2) and
act on it.

The next is how to assure reliability, and that do depend on the
receiver population and session properties. I would also note that there
are cases where one can determine that the EKT has been received. For
example RTCP reports on Extended Sequence number or explicit ACK
messages for a sequence number that one has sent with the new key, thus
determining that the reporting SSRC has been capable of setting the
right SRTP key state.

Next is the classical, put the EKT full header on key-frames,
periodically or on all until determined that reception has happened.

I think 2.6 can be structured to say this better. With concrete and good
recommendations for how to act. Probably the new receiver is the hardest
as the reasonable action will depend on group size.

In the end the text in section 2.2 can be significantly shortened to
basically say. The use of Full or Short headers SHOULD follow the
recommendation in Section 2.6.

11. Section 2.2.1
   The EKT_Ciphertext field is set to the ciphertext created by
   encrypting the EKT_Plaintext with the EKT cipher, using the KEK as
   the encryption key.

The above uses KEK without defining it.

12. Section 2.2.1:

I am missing a clear statement that each SSRC an endpoint have must
individually ensure that their Master Key, ROC and SPI is distributed in
the RTP session, even if shared with other SSRCs from the same endpoint.

13. Section 2.2.2, Bullet 2:

If multiple parameter sets have been defined for the
       SRTP session, then the one that is associated with the value of
       the SPI field in the packet is used.

What is only one SPI is defined, what is used then. Shouldn't the SPI be
matched independently?


14. Section 2.2.2, Bullet 3:
The EKT_Ciphertext is decrypted using the EKT_Key and EKT_Cipher
       in the matching parameter set,

Here the key is called EKT_Key, previously KEK?

15. Section 2.2.2, bullet 5:
If the ROC from the EKT_Plaintext is less than the ROC in the
       SRTP context, then packet processing halts.

Probably should be explicit that the SRTP context related to the SSRC
from step 4 is to be used.

16. Section 2.2.2, bullet 5:
Otherwise, the ROC
       in the SRTP context is set to the value of the ROC from the
       EKT_Plaintext, and the SRTP Master Key from the EKT_Plaintext is
       accepted as the SRTP master key corresponding to the SRTP source
       that sent the packet.

And
If there is no SRTP crypto context corresponding to
       the SSRC in the packet, then a new crypto context is created.  If
       the crypto context is not new, then the rollover counter in the
       context MUST NOT be set to a value lower than its current value.

Appears to be in the wrong order in this bullet.

17. Section 2.2.2, bullet 5:
Otherwise, the ROC
       in the SRTP context is set to the value of the ROC from the
       EKT_Plaintext, and the SRTP Master Key from the EKT_Plaintext is
       accepted as the SRTP master key corresponding to the SRTP source
       that sent the packet.

I think this is missing discussion of ISN. As the new key is not valid
for use until ISN to my understanding.

18. Section 2.2.2: Usage limiations of ISN and ROC

Due to the rules for the ROC, that any lower ROC gets update to the ROC
included in the EKT, then one can't project the key-change further into
the future, than the current ROC. So if one are at RTP Seq 65501 and
would like to put a new key into use in 100 packets, then that isn't
possible as the ISN can only point within the current ROC, i.e. no
further than 65535. I don't think this is a serious limitation, but it
should be discussed.

19. Section 2.2.2: Use of ISN and the playback issues. If one wasn't
allowed the pre-place an Master Key, ROC, SPI set, then one could accept
a EKT full header provisionally, then try to use it on the current
SRT(C)P packet and see if authenticates correctly. If it does, then one
moves the EKT from provisional to verified status. However, with the ISN
usage, and the possibility to project EKT parameters into the future,
then one can't do the immediate verification, but maybe one should also
have similar provisional status of parameter set. That way at least one
don't use a replayed EKT to overwrite a valid entry.

20. Section 2.2.2, Bullet 6:
This contain overlap procedures with bullet 5. Can you separate or merge
them to make them correct and sequential in processing.

21. Section 2.2.2,
          Implementation note: the value of the EKT Ciphertext field is
          identical in successive packets protected by the same EKT
          parameter set and the same SRTP master key and ROC.

I think the end of the sentence needs to include ISN.

I would note that the format of the EKT do require one to generate a new
EKT cipher text at minimum each time the ROC changes, i.e. every 65536
packets. I don't know if this is worth pointing out.

22. Section 2.3:
This cipher
   MUST be implemented, but another cipher that conforms to this
   interface MAY be used, in which case its use MUST be coordinated by
   external means (e.g., call signaling).

I think the above formulation, without using name of the cipher is
unclear. In fact I am uncertain which EKT cipher I am required to
support. As Section 2.3.1 doesn't identify a single one, and instead
references three labels.

I also think the "call signaling" is the wrong reference. It needs to be
coordinated in key-management.

23. Section 2.3.1
   The default EKT Cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
   [FIPS197] Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649] algorithm, which can be
   used with plaintexts larger than 16 bytes in length, and is thus
   suitable for keys of any size.  It requires a plaintext length M that
   is at least eight bytes, and it returns a ciphertext with a length of
   N = M + 8 bytes.

I find it very confusing to have one sentence saying that the KEY wrap
requires plaintext larger that 16 bytes, and the next to say it is 8
bytes required.

24. Section 2.3.1:

   When AES-128 is used in SRTP and/or SRTCP, AESKW_128 SHOULD be used
   in EKT.  In this case, the EKT Plaintext is 26 bytes long, the EKT
   Ciphertext is 40 bytes long, and the Full EKT field is 42 bytes long.

   When AES-192 is used in SRTP and/or SRTCP, AESKW_192 SHOULD be used
   in EKT.  In this case, the EKT Plaintext is 34 bytes long, the EKT
   Ciphertext is 48 bytes long, and the Full EKT field is 50 bytes long.

   When AES-256 is used in SRTP and/or SRTCP, AESKW_256 SHOULD be used
   in EKT.  In this case, the EKT Plaintext is 42 bytes long, the EKT
   Ciphertext is 56 bytes long, and the Full EKT field is 58 bytes long.

I think you should build a table to make clear which key-wrap should be
used for all the already defined SRTP crypto transforms.

I also think it is unclear to use SHOULD in the above. I think they are
MUST unless overwritten by a key-management function.

25.  Section 2.3.2:

In reference to the above. I believe it is reasonable that you propose
default EKT ciphers for all existing SRTP transforms. They are not
thousands of them, just a few different algorithms and key-lengths in use.

26. Section 2.4:
A participant in a session MAY opt to use a particular EKT key to
   protect outbound packets after it accepts that EKT key for protecting
   inbound traffic.

Are the reference to EKT_Key, actually correct, or should it refer to
EKT Parameter set?

27. Section 2.4:
An SRTP/SRTCP source SHOULD change its SRTP master key after its EKT
   key has been changed.

What are the reasonable exceptions to doing this, why isn't the SHOULD a
MAY or a MUST?

28. Section 2.4:
Rather than automatically discarding such SRTP packets, the receiver
   MAY want to provisionally place them in a jitter buffer and delay
   discarding them until playout time.

I think referring to Jitter buffer here is maybe to specific. I would
abstract this to say: buffer the packets and later discard them when
they become unusable.

29. Section 2.4:
As RTCP packets doesn't have sequence numbers, If one include a new
Master Key in an EKT packet with an ISN in the future attached to the
RTCP packet, does this key applies immediately for RTCP, or first when
the SRTP packets has been sent?

30.  Section 3:
   The SDP Security Descriptions (SDESC) [RFC4568] specification defines
   a generic framework for negotiating security parameters for media
   streams negotiated via the Session Description Protocol by use of a
   new SDP "crypto" attribute and the Offer/Answer procedures defined in
   [RFC3264].

Is really "new" appropriate to use here?

31. Section 3.1:
Suggest using ":" after hanging text in bullet list

32. Section 3.5.1:

However if it operates as
      an RTP translator, synchronized negotiation of the EKT parameter
      sets on *all* the involved SIP dialogs will be needed.

I assume the issue you are referring to is a transport translator
(relay), rather than a media translator, or?

33. Section 3.5.3:
In this case, there will be multiple EKT parameter sets;
   one for each SRTP session.

I agree this occurs between one end-point and its different peers. What
is unclear in this topology is if this truly are different RTP sessions,
or just one RTP session. It depends on the implementation.

Maybe further clarify that the concern really are between different
pairs of end-points.

34. Section 3.7:
Finally, subsequent offer/answer exchanges MUST NOT remap a given SPI
   value to a different EKT parameter set until 2^32 other mappings have
   been used within the SRTP session.

Considering that the SPI is 15 bits, this appears wrong. See also later
sentence in paragraph.

35. Section 3.9:
       a=crypto:2 F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
          inline:MTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJjZGVm|2^20|1:4;
          inline:QUJjZGVmMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5|2^20|2:4
          FEC_ORDER=FEC_SRTP EKT=AES_128|FE9C|AAE0

The EKT key appears very short (24 bits).

36. Section 4.1:
                   enum {
                    AES_128(0),
                    AESKW_128(1),
                    AESKW_192(2),
                    AESKW_256(3),
                   } ektcipher;

I don't understand why AEA_128 is listed here, can you please clarify?

37. Section 4.1:

This appears to point to an open issue not dealt with:

      Editor's note: do we need reliability for the ekt_key messages?

38. Section 4.1:

I don't understand how the SPI are bound to DTLS-SRTP parameter
agreements, and if you actually can use DTLS-SRTP to establish multiple
SPIs?

39. Section 4.1.1:

The dtls-srtp-host SDP attribute appears a bit strange. First of all, a
includer in an O/A exchange gets no confirmation that the peer received
or understands it. The second you could ensure by being explicit about
mandating support for it. However, I don't know how you plan to ensure
that it isn't removed in middlebox that doesn't understand it and thus
remove it. Shouldn't this be a slightly more elaborate parameter that
allows negotiation?

40. Section 4.1.1: ABNF:

I am missing references to all the used definitions, space, nettype,
addrtype, connection-address. I personally know they are from RFC 4566,
but you are not explicit about this in the sentence leading up to the def.

41. Section 4.1:

I fail to find the SDP attribute definition for dtls-srtp-ekt.


42. Section 4.2.2:
The presence of the dtls-srtp-host attribute
   indicates an alternate host to send the DTLS-SRTP handshake (instead
   of the host on the c/m lines).

Or what ICE indicates?

43. Section 5:
I am missing the RSA-R mode (RFC 4738) in this discussion. I don't know
if it seriously effects anything, but that mode do allow the Responder
to provide the TGK or TEK.

44. Section 5:

I missing a discussion on the multicast and broadcast usages of MIKEY.

45. Section 5.2:
I think most of what is defined here is actually not O/A specific, and
applies indpedenent of how MIKEY messages are transported. Could this be
factored out, so that it get more general applicability? After all the
usages I hear for MIKEY are not in a O/A context.

46. Section 9:

This section needs quite a lot more detail. The SDP attributes needs to
fill in the template. The Registries needs considerations for what a
registration requires. Probably the other registrations have several
formal requirements not fulfilled by this text.

47. Section 11:

I think the following references are in the wrong category:
RFC 3261, RFC 4771, RFC 6347?, RFC 3830, RFC 5649.


Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

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Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Writeup comments on draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-05
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Thank you for your comment.

1,2,4,5,7:
We'll revise the draft as your comment.

3:
We'll modify the text as following.

  Note that SRTP Protection Profiles which use AEAD algorithms do not
  specify an auth_function, auth_key_length, or auth_tag_length, since they
  do not use a separate auth_function, auth_key, or auth_tag. The
  term aead_auth_tag_length is used to emphasize that this refers to
  the authentication tag provided by the AEAD algorithm and that this
  tag is not located in the authentication tag field provided by SRTP/
  SRTCP.

6:
We add some paragraph in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3

  When [RFC6904] is in use, a separate keystream to encrypt selected
  RTP header extension elements MUST be generated in the same manner
defined in
  [I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm] except that AES-CTR is replaced by
  ARIA-CTR.

We'll upload the revised version.
Thanks.

Sincerely,
Woo-Hwan Kim

-----Original Message-----
From: Magnus Westerlund [mailto:magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com]
Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2013 11:55 PM
To: draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp@tools.ietf.org; IETF AVTCore WG
Subject: Writeup comments on draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-05

Authors, WG.

These are my comments on the ARIA draft found during my Write-up review.
These needs to be addressed prior to publication request can happen.

1. Section 6.2:
   [I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm]
              McGrew, D. and K. Igoe, "AES-GCM and AES-CCM Authenticated
              Encryption in Secure RTP (SRTP)", draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-
              aes-gcm-10 (work in progress), September 2013.

Based on the formulations in the draft, this is a normative reference.
Please move it to the right section.



2. Section 5.2:

"IANA is requested to add the below crypto suite to the ..."

Replace "crypto suite" with "protection profiles"

3. Section 5.2:

"Note that these SRTP Protection Profiles do not specify an
   auth_function, auth_key_length, or auth_tag_length because all of
   these profiles use AEAD algorithms, and thus do not use a separate
   auth_function, auth_key, or auth_tag."

Not all of the above SRTP Protection Profiles are AEDA ones, thus I suggest
changing the above sentence to:

   Note that the majority of the SRTP Protection Profiles do not specify an
   auth_function, auth_key_length, or auth_tag_length because all of
   these profiles use AEAD algorithms, and thus do not use a separate
   auth_function, auth_key, or auth_tag.

4. Section 5.3:

   "In order to allow the use of the algorithms
   defined in this document in MIKEY, IANA is requested to add the below
   crypto suites to the "MIKEY Security Protocol Parameters SRTP Type 0
   (Encryption algorithm)" and to add the below PRF to the "MIKEY
   Security Protocol Parameters SRTP Type 5 (Pseudo Random Function)"
   created by [RFC3830], at time of writing located on the following
   IANA page: http://www.iana.org/assignments/mikey-payloads/mikey-
   payloads.xml#mikey-payloads-26 [3]."

There is an issue with using "crypto suites" in the MIKEY context. What you
are registering are parameters for the ARIA SRTP transform, and then you
provide a mapping between the crypto suits to the transform parameter's
values.

Can we find another formulation here? Perhaps:

  "In order to allow the use of the algorithms
   defined in this document in MIKEY, IANA is requested to add three
encryption algorithms to the "MIKEY Security Protocol Parameters SRTP Type =
0
   (Encryption algorithm)" and to add the below PRF to the "MIKEY
   Security Protocol Parameters SRTP Type 5 (Pseudo Random Function)"
   created by [RFC3830], at time of writing located on the following
   IANA page: http://www.iana.org/assignments/mikey-payloads/mikey-
   payloads.xml#mikey-payloads-26 [3]."

To further clarify the purpose of Figure 1 and 2 maybe one should modify
this text:

   MIKEY specifies the algorithm family separately from the key length
   (which is specified by the Session Encryption key length) and the
   authentication tag length.

To something like:

   MIKEY specifies the algorithm family separately from the key length
   (which is specified by the Session Encryption key length) and the
   authentication tag length. The SDP Security Descriptions [RFC4568]
   crypto suits and corresponding DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764] protection
   profiles are mapped to MIKEY parameter sets as shown below.


5. Abstract:
This document describes the use of the ARIA block cipher algorithm

I would change "describes" to "defines"

6. Section 2.2, and Section 2.3:
While Seciton 2.1 addresses Jonathan Lennox comments regarding defining
encryption key stream for Header Extensions the GCM and and CCM fails to do
this.

Although AES-GCM document do defines this in Section 9.3, I don't think it
is clear enough which cipher shall be used with ARIA. Thus add an explicit
definition also in these sections for how it is generated.

7. Section 2.1:
ARIA counter modes are
   defined in the same manner except that each invocation of AES is
   replaced by that of ARIA, and are denoted by ARIA_128_CTR,
   ARIA_192_CTR and ARIA_256_CTR respectively, according to the key
   lengths.

I am missing the normative reference to ARIA in the above sentence, is
this: RFC5794?

IF it is please include it here and the other places for the other modes
when you define the crypto as follows:
  this procedure but replace AES with ARIA [RFC5794]

Then also RFC5794 needs to be moved to the normative list.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
F=E4r=F6gatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------

--e89a8f3bafefd934d904eb6cb530
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Thank you for your comment.</div><div><br></div><div>=
1,2,4,5,7:</div><div>We&#39;ll revise the draft as your comment.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>3:=A0</div><div>We&#39;ll modify the text as following.</div=
>
<div><br></div><div>=A0 Note that SRTP Protection Profiles which use AEAD a=
lgorithms do not</div><div>=A0 specify an auth_function, auth_key_length, o=
r auth_tag_length, since they</div><div>=A0 do not use a separate auth_func=
tion, auth_key, or auth_tag. The</div>
<div>=A0 term aead_auth_tag_length is used to emphasize that this refers to=
</div><div>=A0 the authentication tag provided by the AEAD algorithm and th=
at this</div><div>=A0 tag is not located in the authentication tag field pr=
ovided by SRTP/</div>
<div>=A0 SRTCP.</div><div><br></div><div>6:</div><div>We add some paragraph=
 in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3</div><div><br></div><div>=A0 When [RFC6904]=
 is in use, a separate keystream to encrypt selected=A0</div><div>=A0 RTP h=
eader extension elements MUST be generated in the same manner defined in<sp=
an class=3D"" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span></div>
<div>=A0 [I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm] except that AES-CTR is replaced by=
<span class=3D"" style=3D"white-space:pre">	</span> <span class=3D"" style=
=3D"white-space:pre">		</span></div><div>=A0 ARIA-CTR.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>We&#39;ll upload the revised version.</div>
<div>Thanks.</div><div><br></div><div>Sincerely,</div><div>Woo-Hwan Kim</di=
v><div><br></div><div>-----Original Message-----</div><div>From: Magnus Wes=
terlund [mailto:<a href=3D"mailto:magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com">magnus.we=
sterlund@ericsson.com</a>]=A0</div>
<div>Sent: Thursday, October 31, 2013 11:55 PM</div><div>To: <a href=3D"mai=
lto:draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp@tools.ietf.org">draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-sr=
tp@tools.ietf.org</a>; IETF AVTCore WG</div><div>Subject: Writeup comments =
on draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-05</div>
<div><br></div><div>Authors, WG.</div><div><br></div><div>These are my comm=
ents on the ARIA draft found during my Write-up review.</div><div>These nee=
ds to be addressed prior to publication request can happen.</div><div><br>
</div><div>1. Section 6.2:</div><div>=A0 =A0[I-D.ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm]=
</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 McGrew, D. and K. Igoe, &quot;AES-GC=
M and AES-CCM Authenticated</div><div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Encryptio=
n in Secure RTP (SRTP)&quot;, draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-</div>
<div>=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 aes-gcm-10 (work in progress), September 2=
013.</div><div><br></div><div>Based on the formulations in the draft, this =
is a normative reference.</div><div>Please move it to the right section.</d=
iv><div><br>
</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>2. Section 5.2:</div><div><br></di=
v><div>&quot;IANA is requested to add the below crypto suite to the ...&quo=
t;</div><div><br></div><div>Replace &quot;crypto suite&quot; with &quot;pro=
tection profiles&quot;</div>
<div><br></div><div>3. Section 5.2:</div><div><br></div><div>&quot;Note tha=
t these SRTP Protection Profiles do not specify an</div><div>=A0 =A0auth_fu=
nction, auth_key_length, or auth_tag_length because all of</div><div>=A0 =
=A0these profiles use AEAD algorithms, and thus do not use a separate</div>
<div>=A0 =A0auth_function, auth_key, or auth_tag.&quot;</div><div><br></div=
><div>Not all of the above SRTP Protection Profiles are AEDA ones, thus I s=
uggest changing the above sentence to:</div><div><br></div><div>=A0 =A0Note=
 that the majority of the SRTP Protection Profiles do not specify an</div>
<div>=A0 =A0auth_function, auth_key_length, or auth_tag_length because all =
of</div><div>=A0 =A0these profiles use AEAD algorithms, and thus do not use=
 a separate</div><div>=A0 =A0auth_function, auth_key, or auth_tag.</div><di=
v><br></div>
<div>4. Section 5.3:</div><div><br></div><div>=A0 =A0&quot;In order to allo=
w the use of the algorithms</div><div>=A0 =A0defined in this document in MI=
KEY, IANA is requested to add the below</div><div>=A0 =A0crypto suites to t=
he &quot;MIKEY Security Protocol Parameters SRTP Type 0</div>
<div>=A0 =A0(Encryption algorithm)&quot; and to add the below PRF to the &q=
uot;MIKEY</div><div>=A0 =A0Security Protocol Parameters SRTP Type 5 (Pseudo=
 Random Function)&quot;</div><div>=A0 =A0created by [RFC3830], at time of w=
riting located on the following</div>
<div>=A0 =A0IANA page: <a href=3D"http://www.iana.org/assignments/mikey-pay=
loads/mikey-">http://www.iana.org/assignments/mikey-payloads/mikey-</a></di=
v><div>=A0 =A0payloads.xml#mikey-payloads-26 [3].&quot;</div><div><br></div=
><div>
There is an issue with using &quot;crypto suites&quot; in the MIKEY context=
. What you are registering are parameters for the ARIA SRTP transform, and =
then you provide a mapping between the crypto suits to the transform parame=
ter&#39;s values.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Can we find another formulation here? Perhaps:</div><di=
v><br></div><div>=A0 &quot;In order to allow the use of the algorithms</div=
><div>=A0 =A0defined in this document in MIKEY, IANA is requested to add th=
ree encryption algorithms to the &quot;MIKEY Security Protocol Parameters S=
RTP Type 0</div>
<div>=A0 =A0(Encryption algorithm)&quot; and to add the below PRF to the &q=
uot;MIKEY</div><div>=A0 =A0Security Protocol Parameters SRTP Type 5 (Pseudo=
 Random Function)&quot;</div><div>=A0 =A0created by [RFC3830], at time of w=
riting located on the following</div>
<div>=A0 =A0IANA page: <a href=3D"http://www.iana.org/assignments/mikey-pay=
loads/mikey-">http://www.iana.org/assignments/mikey-payloads/mikey-</a></di=
v><div>=A0 =A0payloads.xml#mikey-payloads-26 [3].&quot;</div><div><br></div=
><div>
To further clarify the purpose of Figure 1 and 2 maybe one should modify th=
is text:</div><div><br></div><div>=A0 =A0MIKEY specifies the algorithm fami=
ly separately from the key length</div><div>=A0 =A0(which is specified by t=
he Session Encryption key length) and the</div>
<div>=A0 =A0authentication tag length.</div><div><br></div><div>To somethin=
g like:</div><div><br></div><div>=A0 =A0MIKEY specifies the algorithm famil=
y separately from the key length</div><div>=A0 =A0(which is specified by th=
e Session Encryption key length) and the</div>
<div>=A0 =A0authentication tag length. The SDP Security Descriptions [RFC45=
68]</div><div>=A0 =A0crypto suits and corresponding DTLS-SRTP [RFC5764] pro=
tection</div><div>=A0 =A0profiles are mapped to MIKEY parameter sets as sho=
wn below.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>5. Abstract:</div><div>This document des=
cribes the use of the ARIA block cipher algorithm</div><div><br></div><div>=
I would change &quot;describes&quot; to &quot;defines&quot;</div><div><br>
</div><div>6. Section 2.2, and Section 2.3:</div><div>While Seciton 2.1 add=
resses Jonathan Lennox comments regarding defining encryption key stream fo=
r Header Extensions the GCM and and CCM fails to do this.</div><div><br>
</div><div>Although AES-GCM document do defines this in Section 9.3, I don&=
#39;t think it is clear enough which cipher shall be used with ARIA. Thus a=
dd an explicit definition also in these sections for how it is generated.</=
div>
<div><br></div><div>7. Section 2.1:</div><div>ARIA counter modes are</div><=
div>=A0 =A0defined in the same manner except that each invocation of AES is=
</div><div>=A0 =A0replaced by that of ARIA, and are denoted by ARIA_128_CTR=
,</div>
<div>=A0 =A0ARIA_192_CTR and ARIA_256_CTR respectively, according to the ke=
y</div><div>=A0 =A0lengths.</div><div><br></div><div>I am missing the norma=
tive reference to ARIA in the above sentence, is</div><div>this: RFC5794?</=
div>
<div><br></div><div>IF it is please include it here and the other places fo=
r the other modes when you define the crypto as follows:</div><div>=A0 this=
 procedure but replace AES with ARIA [RFC5794]</div><div><br></div><div>The=
n also RFC5794 needs to be moved to the normative list.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Cheers</div><div><br></div><div>Magnus Westerlund</div>=
<div><br></div><div>-------------------------------------------------------=
---------------</div><div>Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TV=
M</div>
<div>----------------------------------------------------------------------=
</div><div>Ericsson AB =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| Phone =A0+46 10 714=
8287</div><div>F=E4r=F6gatan 6 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| Mobile +46 =
73 0949079</div><div>SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: <a href=3D"mailto=
:magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com">magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com</a></div>
<div>----------------------------------------------------------------------=
</div><div><br></div></div>

--e89a8f3bafefd934d904eb6cb530--

From magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com  Mon Nov 18 01:20:54 2013
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] I-D Action: draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06.txt
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WG,

I have now requested publication of this document. The writeup was
seeing a minor update to document the IPR verification question from the
authors.

Writeup:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second/shepherdwriteup/

Cheers

Magnus

On 2013-11-15 16:23, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>  This draft is a work item of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> 	Title           : RTP and Leap Seconds
> 	Author(s)       : Kevin Gross
>                           Ray van Brandenburg
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06.txt
> 	Pages           : 9
> 	Date            : 2013-11-15
> 
> Abstract:
>    This document discusses issues that arise when RTP sessions span
>    Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) leap seconds.  It updates RFC 3550
>    to describe how RTP senders and receivers should behave in the
>    presence of leap seconds.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second
> 
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> _______________________________________________
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> 
> 


-- 

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------


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________________________________________
From: wgchairs-bounces@ietf.org [wgchairs-bounces@ietf.org] on behalf of No=
mCom Chair 2013 [nomcom-chair-2013@ietf.org]
Sent: Saturday, November 16, 2013 9:21 PM
To: IETF Announcement List
Cc: wgchairs@ietf.org
Subject: NOMCOM - final call for feedback, nominee list

Help the Nomcom:  this is the last call for general feedback on
nominees. This email includes the willing nominee list for your
convenience, as per RFC 5680. WG chairs, please forward this
email to your WGs.

WARNING - DO NOT reply to this email with feedback - the
announcement tool provides an unpredictable Reply-To field.
You may send mail to nomcom13, but please do continue
reading for additional info.

The deadline is midnight (any timezone) Wed Nov 20.

Enter your feedback into the encrypted nomcom tool at:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/nomcom/2013/feedback/

All feedback is confidential.

Select individual nominees, or select an area (e.g. INT Multiple) if you
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reset the password on an existing account:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/accounts/

As we announced last week, we are sharing the names of the willing
nominees in this email, as part of our use of RFC 5680 Open List in this
nomcom cycle.  These names (appearing at the end of the email)
have been available within the datatracker since our first call for
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Again, your feedback is absolutely confidential, however delivered.

Thanks very much from all of us for your time and for helping the
Nomcom to do the best possible job.  Also enormous thanks to the
willing nominees.

Names below.

Allison for the Nomcom

APP
Joe Hildebrand
Barry Leiba (incumbent)
Yoshiro Yoneya

INT
Donald Eastlake
Wesley George
Brian Haberman (incumbent)
Ole Troan

OPS
Benoit Claise (incumbent)
Linda Dunbar
Victor Kuarsingh
Bill Manning

RAI
Ben Campbell
Alissa Cooper
Keith Drage
Dan Romascanu

RTG
Loa Andersson
Alia Atlas
Deborah Brungard
Stewart Bryant (incumbent)
Donald Eastlake
Susan Hares
Keyur Patel

SEC
Derek Atkins
Donald Eastlake
Jeff Hodges
Leif Johansson
Alexey Melnikov
Kathleen Moriarty
Eric Rescorla

TSV
Martin Stiemerling (incumbent)
Dave Taht

IAB
Bernard Aboba (incumbent)
Loa Andersson
Alias Atlas
Mary Barnes
Marc Blanchet (incumbent)
Ross Callon (incumbent)
Hago Dafalla
Linda Dunbar
Roni Even
Jim Gettys
Ted Hardie
Susan Hares
Joe Hildebrand
Sheng Jiang
Eliot Lear (incumbent)
Larry Masinter
S. Moonesamy
Kathleen Moriarty
Kaveh Ranjbar
Robert Sparks
Tina Tsou
Brian Trammell

IAOC/IETF Trust
Glenn Deen
Tobias Gondrom
Chris Griffiths (incumbent)
John Levine
Tina Tsou=

From magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com  Tue Nov 19 04:59:29 2013
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Cc: draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] WG last call for draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01
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WG,

The WG last call has concluded. I notice that there has been a number of
significant issues raised. I find it likely that we will have to do
another complete WG last call when these issues has been addressed.

If you have some feedback and haven't provided it yet, please do so.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund
AVTCORE WG chair

On 2013-10-25 11:55, Magnus Westerlund wrote:
> WG,
> 
> This starts a 3-week (due to the IETF meeting) WG last call of Encrypted
> Key Transport for Secure RTP with intended status Proposed Standard.
> Please provide any feedback by the 15th of November.
> 
> The draft
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt/
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Magnus Westerlund
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
> Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
> SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
> 
> 


-- 

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------


From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Tue Nov 19 15:58:28 2013
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Cc: avt@ietf.org
Subject: [AVTCORE] I-D Action: draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance Wo=
rking Group of the IETF.

	Title           : The ARIA Algorithm and Its Use with the Secure Real-time=
 Transport Protocol(SRTP)
	Author(s)       : Woo-Hwan Kim
                          Jungkeun Lee
                          Dong-Chan Kim
                          Je-Hong Park
                          Daesung Kwon
	Filename        : draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt
	Pages           : 32
	Date            : 2013-11-19

Abstract:
   This document defines the use of the ARIA block cipher algorithm
   within the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) for providing
   confidentiality for the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) traffic
   and for the control traffic for RTP, the RTP Control Protocol (RTCP).
   It details three modes of operation (CTR, CCM, GCM) and a SRTP Key
   Derivation Function for ARIA.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com  Wed Nov 20 04:35:56 2013
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] I-D Action: draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt
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Hi,

I have now requested publication for the ARIA cipher in SRTP.

Authors, thanks for the diligent work in resolving the issues.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund



On 2013-11-20 00:58, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> 
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>  This draft is a work item of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance Working Group of the IETF.
> 
> 	Title           : The ARIA Algorithm and Its Use with the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol(SRTP)
> 	Author(s)       : Woo-Hwan Kim
>                           Jungkeun Lee
>                           Dong-Chan Kim
>                           Je-Hong Park
>                           Daesung Kwon
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06.txt
> 	Pages           : 32
> 	Date            : 2013-11-19
> 
> Abstract:
>    This document defines the use of the ARIA block cipher algorithm
>    within the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) for providing
>    confidentiality for the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) traffic
>    and for the control traffic for RTP, the RTP Control Protocol (RTCP).
>    It details three modes of operation (CTR, CCM, GCM) and a SRTP Key
>    Derivation Function for ARIA.
> 
> 
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp
> 
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06
> 
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp-06
> 
> 
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> 
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
> 
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
> or ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt
> 
> 


-- 

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------


From ietf-secretariat-reply@ietf.org  Thu Nov 21 06:56:38 2013
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Subject: [AVTCORE] Milestones changed for avtcore WG
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Changed milestone "Submit Update to the RTP Specification (RFC3550)
regarding Sending Multiple Media Streams in a Single RTP Session as
proposed standard", set state to active from review, accepting new
milestone.

Changed milestone "Submit Update to the RTP Specification (RFC3550)
regarding Sending Multiple Media Streams in a Single RTP Session:
Grouping RTCP Reception Statistics and Other Feedback as proposed
standard", set state to active from review, accepting new milestone.

URL: http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/avtcore/charter/

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Subject: [AVTCORE] Milestones changed for avtcore WG
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Changed milestone "Submit Specification for Inter-destination Media
Playout Synchronization in RTP to IESG for publication as Proposed
Standard", added draft-ietf-avtcore-idms to milestone.

Changed milestone "Submit an Overview of RTP Security Solutions as
Informational", resolved as "Done".

Changed milestone "RTP and Leap Seconds as proposed standard",
resolved as "Done".

Changed milestone "Submit SRTP Cryptographic Transform(s) on the ARIA
algorithm and corresponding key-management profiles for Security
Descriptions, MIKEY and DTLS-SRTP for publication as proposed
standard", resolved as "Done".

URL: http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/avtcore/charter/

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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Milestones changed for avtcore WG
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WG,

So this and the previous message on the AVTCORE Milestones are in
regards to the following.

1) The below is marking some milestones as done for items we have
requested publication for.

2) Added the IDMS draft to the milestone as it still in the draft
section of the data tracker, thus correctly  indicating which milestone
it is related to.

The previous email was the AD approving our milestone suggestions for
the different parts of the multiple SSRCs in the same RTP sessions.
Creating explicit milestones for the basic multiple SSRCs and the report
group optimization.

Cheers

Magnus

On 2013-11-22 11:10, IETF Secretariat wrote:
> Changed milestone "Submit Specification for Inter-destination Media
> Playout Synchronization in RTP to IESG for publication as Proposed
> Standard", added draft-ietf-avtcore-idms to milestone.
> 
> Changed milestone "Submit an Overview of RTP Security Solutions as
> Informational", resolved as "Done".
> 
> Changed milestone "RTP and Leap Seconds as proposed standard",
> resolved as "Done".
> 
> Changed milestone "Submit SRTP Cryptographic Transform(s) on the ARIA
> algorithm and corresponding key-management profiles for Security
> Descriptions, MIKEY and DTLS-SRTP for publication as proposed
> standard", resolved as "Done".
> 
> URL: http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/avtcore/charter/
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
> 
> 


-- 

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------


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Subject: [AVTCORE] Minutes for AVTCORE at IETF 88
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WG,

The minutes are now available for our session in Vancouver.

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/88/minutes/minutes-88-avtcore

Please send any corrections to the list.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory and draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options
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--001a11c308e08dee9804ebcb2153
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Hey Magnus,

That looks much better.  Thanks for the text.  I will put this out to LC
along with -srtp-not-mandatory.

--Richard


On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 10:12 AM, Magnus Westerlund <
magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com> wrote:

> Richard and WG,
>
> We have updated the RTP Security Options document. This adds three
> guidance sub-sections regarding automated key-management, tunnels vs
> end-to-end security and plain text key considerations.
>
> I also fixes a missing reference. All visible in the diff:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-option=
s-09
>
> I hope everyone can take a look at these changes and react if they are
> wrong or non-acceptable.
>
> Cheers
>
> Magnus
>
> On 2013-11-03 01:12, Richard Barnes wrote:
> > On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:
> > I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
> > processing.  Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be
> > making this sort of argument, given the increased focus on .  However, =
I
> > think this document makes the case pretty clearly.  It helps to have
> > draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go
> > alongside this document.
> >
> > On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:
> > I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG
> > processing.  One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC:  My major
> > concern is that it seems like there's a lot of old stuff in here.  Has
> > the WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some
> > sort of recommendation level?  I would like to avoid having someone
> > choose SDES in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.
> >
> > If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to
> > get these both into LC soon.
> >
> > Thanks,
> > --Richard
>
>
> --
>
> Magnus Westerlund
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
> F=E4r=F6gatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
> SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>

--001a11c308e08dee9804ebcb2153
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>Hey Magnus,<br><br></div>That looks much better.=
=A0 Thanks for the text.=A0 I will put this out to LC along with -srtp-not-=
mandatory.<br><br></div>--Richard<br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">
On Tue, Nov 12, 2013 at 10:12 AM, Magnus Westerlund <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com" target=3D"_blank">magnus.w=
esterlund@ericsson.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex">
Richard and WG,<br>
<br>
We have updated the RTP Security Options document. This adds three<br>
guidance sub-sections regarding automated key-management, tunnels vs<br>
end-to-end security and plain text key considerations.<br>
<br>
I also fixes a missing reference. All visible in the diff:<br>
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-securi=
ty-options-09" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-i=
etf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-09</a><br>
<br>
I hope everyone can take a look at these changes and react if they are<br>
wrong or non-acceptable.<br>
<br>
Cheers<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Magnus<br>
</font></span><div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On 2013-11-03 01:12, Richard Barnes wrote:<br>
&gt; On draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory:<br>
&gt; I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG<=
br>
&gt; processing. =A0Clearly, this is not the best moment in history to be<b=
r>
&gt; making this sort of argument, given the increased focus on . =A0Howeve=
r, I<br>
&gt; think this document makes the case pretty clearly. =A0It helps to have=
<br>
&gt; draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options as a positive statement to go<=
br>
&gt; alongside this document.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options:<br>
&gt; I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF Last Call and IESG<=
br>
&gt; processing. =A0One question to discuss briefly before IETF LC: =A0My m=
ajor<br>
&gt; concern is that it seems like there&#39;s a lot of old stuff in here. =
=A0Has<br>
&gt; the WG considered explicitly marking each of the mechanisms with some<=
br>
&gt; sort of recommendation level? =A0I would like to avoid having someone<=
br>
&gt; choose SDES in a case where they could use DTLS-SRTP, for example.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If the authors could follow up on that one point, we should be able to=
<br>
&gt; get these both into LC soon.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt; --Richard<br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div>--<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
Magnus Westerlund<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
Ericsson AB =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| Phone =A0<a href=3D"tel:%2B46%=
2010%207148287" value=3D"+46107148287">+46 10 7148287</a><br>
F=E4r=F6gatan 6 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0| Mobile <a href=3D"tel:%2B4=
6%2073%200949079" value=3D"+46730949079">+46 73 0949079</a><br>
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: <a href=3D"mailto:magnus.westerlund@er=
icsson.com">magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com</a><br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a11c308e08dee9804ebcb2153--

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Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2013 14:06:25 -0800
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Subject: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-09.txt> (Options for Securing RTP Sessions) to Informational RFC
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The IESG has received a request from the Audio/Video Transport Core
Maintenance WG (avtcore) to consider the following document:
- 'Options for Securing RTP Sessions'
  <draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options-09.txt> as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-12-06. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is used in a large number of
   different application domains and environments.  This heterogeneity
   implies that different security mechanisms are needed to provide
   services such as confidentiality, integrity and source authentication
   of RTP/RTCP packets suitable for the various environments.  The range
   of solutions makes it difficult for RTP-based application developers
   to pick the most suitable mechanism.  This document provides an
   overview of a number of security solutions for RTP, and gives
   guidance for developers on how to choose the appropriate security
   mechanism.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.



From iesg-secretary@ietf.org  Fri Nov 22 14:07:54 2013
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Subject: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
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The IESG has received a request from the Audio/Video Transport Core
Maintenance WG (avtcore) to consider the following document:
- 'Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single
   Media Security Solution'
  <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-12-06. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia
   sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP),
   and the associated RTP Control Protocol (RTCP), do not mandate a
   single media security mechanism.  Guidelines for designers and
   reviewers of future RTP extensions are provided, to ensure that
   appropriate security mechanisms are mandated, and that any such
   mechanisms are specified in a manner that conforms with the RTP
   architecture.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.



From rlb@ipv.sx  Sun Nov 24 12:07:29 2013
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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second@tools.ietf.org, avt@ietf.org,  "avtcore-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <avtcore-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
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Subject: [AVTCORE] AD review of draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second
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--001a11c2e22471546e04ebf1cb4d
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I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF LC, and think it looks
good to go.

One thing the authors might keep in mind while doing any LC or DISCUSS
edits is that it may not be immediately clear to the reader how suppressing
or ignoring SRs (Section 5.1) is helpful with this problem.   There's a
line in Section 5 that explains this ("generating or using NTP timestamps
... SHOULD be avoided"), but it would be helpful to tie the two ideas
together.  Perhaps something like this at the beginning of Section 5.1:
NEW: "In order to avoid generating or using NTP timestamps during periods
where confusion might arise (see above), RTP senders and receivers need to
avoid using RTCP Sender Reports (SRs) to synchronize their clocks during
this window, instead relying on their internal clocks to maintain sync in
the vicinity of a leap second."

Editorial nit: In Section 5,
OLD: "the timestamp ambiguity, positive leap seconds"
NEW: "the timestamp ambiguity that positive leap seconds"

Thanks,
--Richard

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>I have reviewed this draft in preparation f=
or IETF LC, and think it looks good to go.=A0 <br><br>One thing the authors=
 might keep in mind while doing any LC or DISCUSS edits is that it may not =
be immediately clear to the reader how suppressing or ignoring SRs (Section=
 5.1) is helpful with this problem. =A0 There&#39;s a line in Section 5 tha=
t explains this (&quot;generating or using NTP timestamps ... SHOULD be avo=
ided&quot;), but it would be helpful to tie the two ideas together.=A0 Perh=
aps something like this at the beginning of Section 5.1:<br>
</div><div>NEW: &quot;In order to avoid generating or using NTP timestamps =
during periods where confusion might arise (see above), RTP senders and rec=
eivers need to avoid using RTCP Sender Reports (SRs) to synchronize their c=
locks during this window, instead relying on their internal clocks to maint=
ain sync in the vicinity of a leap second.&quot;<br>
<br></div>Editorial nit: In Section 5, <br>OLD: &quot;the timestamp ambigui=
ty, positive leap seconds&quot; <br></div>NEW: &quot;the timestamp ambiguit=
y that positive leap seconds&quot;<br><br>Thanks,<br></div>--Richard<br>
</div>

--001a11c2e22471546e04ebf1cb4d--

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp@tools.ietf.org,  "avtcore-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <avtcore-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, avt@ietf.org
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Subject: [AVTCORE] AD review of draft-ietf-avtcore-aria-srtp
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--001a11c2e22440d32404ebf20a93
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I have reviewed this document in preparation for IETF LC, and think it
looks OK.  I'm going to hold of issuing the IETF LC, however, until it can
be done together with draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm.   That way, any
edits made to that draft in response to recent comments can be reflected in
this draft, and the two can go to LC together.

One other note: I'm not sure that HMAC-SHA1 is still something that we want
new specifications to refer to (as opposed to, say, HMAC-SHA256).  But I
will defer to the SECDIR reviewers on this question.

Thanks,
--Richard

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div>I have reviewed this document in preparation for=
 IETF LC, and think it looks OK.=A0 I&#39;m going to hold of issuing the IE=
TF LC, however, until it can be done together with draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-=
aes-gcm. =A0 That way, any edits made to that draft in response to recent c=
omments can be reflected in this draft, and the two can go to LC together.<=
br>
<br></div>One other note: I&#39;m not sure that HMAC-SHA1 is still somethin=
g that we want new specifications to refer to (as opposed to, say, HMAC-SHA=
256).=A0 But I will defer to the SECDIR reviewers on this question.<br><br>
Thanks,<br></div>--Richard<br></div>

--001a11c2e22440d32404ebf20a93--

From iesg-secretary@ietf.org  Mon Nov 25 09:20:26 2013
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Subject: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06.txt> (RTP and Leap Seconds) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the Audio/Video Transport Core
Maintenance WG (avtcore) to consider the following document:
- 'RTP and Leap Seconds'
  <draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-06.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-12-09. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document discusses issues that arise when RTP sessions span
   Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) leap seconds.  It updates RFC 3550
   to describe how RTP senders and receivers should behave in the
   presence of leap seconds.




The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.



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From: Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] WG last call for draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01
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Thanks for your comments, Michael.  I incorporated all those changes for =
-02.

-d

On Nov 13, 2013, at 11:09 AM, "Peck, Michael A" <mpeck@mitre.org> wrote:

> Hi - I have a few minor comments:
>=20
> There are several references to AES_128 throughout the document (I =
counted
> 6) including a statement that "AES_128 is the default value for the =
EKT
> cipher."  It looks like these are leftovers from a previous draft and
> should be removed, as AES_128 is no longer a defined EKT cipher.  =
Section
> 3.4.1 states that AESKW_128 is now the default cipher.
>=20
> Section 2.1:
> The ROC and ISN paragraphs both state "It is included in the EKT
> plaintext, but does not appear on the wire."
> The phrase "but does not appear on the wire" seems confusing to me - =
I'd
> suggest removing it?
> The EKT_Plaintext paragraph already states that the EKT plaintext =
doesn't
> appear on the wire.
> Besides, they sort-of do appear on the wire, but they're in ciphertext
> form?
>=20
> Section 2.2:
> "for use in processing inbound SRTCP traffic"
> Should this be "for use in processing inbound SRTCP and SRTP traffic"?
>=20
> Section 2.2.2
> typo: "containing and EKT" should be "containing an EKT"
> typo: "Steps 2, 3, 4 5" should be "Steps 2, 3, 4, 5"
>=20
> Section 3.4.1:
> typo: "with in" should be "within"
> Same sentence: should "SRTCP packets" be "SRTCP and SRTP packets"?
>=20
> Section 3.4.2:
> Should "SRTCP packets" be "SRTCP and SRTP packets"?
>=20
> Section 3.5:
> typo: "Section (newline) Section 3.4" should just be "Section 3.4"
>=20
> Mike Peck
>=20
> On 10/25/13 5:55 AM, "Magnus Westerlund" =
<magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
> wrote:
>=20
>> WG,
>>=20
>> This starts a 3-week (due to the IETF meeting) WG last call of =
Encrypted
>> Key Transport for Secure RTP with intended status Proposed Standard.
>> Please provide any feedback by the 15th of November.
>>=20
>> The draft
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt/
>>=20
>> Cheers
>>=20
>> Magnus Westerlund
>>=20
>> =
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
>> =
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
>> F=E4r=F6gatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
>> SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
>> =
----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>=20
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>> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
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>=20


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On Nov 15, 2013, at 8:23 AM, Magnus Westerlund =
<magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>=20
> This is my personal review of EKT in its WG last call.
>=20
> I have to say that this is clearly not ready yet. There are a large
> number of issues that needs resolution.

Thanks for your detailed review.


> First the ones that doesn't have clear section references.
>=20
> G1: The documents section where the connection with signalling and the
> key-exchange mechanisms are specified implies that one can start an =
SRTP
> session without EKT and later upgrade it to use EKT. I however fails =
to
> see how this can work reliable. Especially not the alluding to that =
you
> can wait doing this until you actually have a new master key to use.
>=20
> A. Lets start with the signalled upgrade. When upgrading to EKT from
> plain SRTP then you start sending SRTP and SRTCP packets that allways
> have a EKT trailer, which is either a full header or the 1-byte short
> header. Thus when turning on EKT this header will be added to the end =
of
> the packet by the sender. When the receiver gets this packet it will
> fail SRTP authentication, as the EKT header now displaced the
> Authentication header. Thus there are failure modes for this upgrade
> that isn't discussed. To my understanding given that one have received
> the signalling that EKT will be used, then one can run regular mode
> until an authentication failure, then try processing the failed =
packets
> as EKT. If that works, one go to EKT mode for that SSRC. Risk, twice =
the
> amount of authentication work for SSRC not yet switched, but for a
> limited time
>=20
> B. If this is EKT switch can occur at any time, then each time there =
is
> an authentication failure one have to check if this is EKT. Thus,
> bit-errors, packet mangling, all of these results in twice the amount =
of
> authentication work before dropping the packet.
>=20
> Authors please clarify what the intention is hear. Is this to be
> supported, if it is, then can we please have a section defining the
> procedure for how to handle it so that its cost can be appropriately =
judged?

We expect EKT to be negotiated, and I added the following to Section =
2.4, "Synchronizing Operation",

OLD:
       When joining an SRTP session, SRTP packets may be received before
        any EKT over SRTCP packets, which implies the crypto context has =
not
        been established, unless other external signaling mechanism has =
done
        so. Rather than automatically discarding such SRTP packets, the
        receiver MAY want to provisionally place them in a jitter buffer =
and
        delay discarding them until playout time.
NEW:
       The use of EKT MUST be negotiated during call setup (e.g.,
using DTLS-SRTP, Security Descriptions, MIKEY, or similar).  When
joining a session it is likely that SRTP or SRTCP packets might be
received before the EKT Full Field is received.  Thus, to avoid
doubling the authentication effort, an implementation joining an EKT
session SHOULD queue received SRTP and SRTCP packets until it receives
the Full EKT Field packet and use the information in that packet to =
authenticate
and decrypt the received SRTP/SRTCP packet.


>=20
> G2. SRTCP compound packets and the SSRC field in the EKT. So the
> processing in Section 2.2.2, bullet 4 says that the EKT SSRC field =
must
> match the SRTP headers SSRC. This fails to discuss SRTCP, and I think
> you might have a major head-ache here. An SRTCP compound packet may
> actaully contain SR/RR packets from multiple SSRCs from an end-point.
> See RFC3550 Section 6.1 that says:
>=20
> It is RECOMMENDED that translators and mixers combine individual
>      RTCP packets from the multiple sources they are forwarding into
>      one compound packet whenever feasible in order to amortize the
>      packet overhead (see Section 7).
>=20
> This is further discussed in draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-multi-stream.
>=20
> Thus I think you have an issue of how to get all these SSRCs EKT
> payloads sent in SRTCP. If one takes the easy way out, and say that =
the
> SSRC in EKT must match the first RTCP packet part of the compound, and
> then round-robin among them you might have significant delay until all
> the SSRCs from an end-point have sent their EKT payload even once.
>=20
> This maybe, but I am uncertain be handled with above said round robin,
> and instead rely on SRTP distribution of the relevant EKT. But the =
issue
> clearly needs to be discussed.

We will propose changing EKT to only work over SRTP, and remove text for =
EKT over SRTCP.  See the other email "changes planned for EKT" where =
this major change is called out.


> G3. The common master salt. I realized this when reading the security
> description section, that the master salt to use is actually defined =
by
> the cipher suit. And in case of mixing GCM or CCM cipher suits with =
any
> of the regular AES ones you actually have Master Salt mismatch between
> them. GCM and CCM uses 96 bits Master Salts, why the others use 112
> bits. Thus, an assumption EKT is built on can easily be made untrue by
> including cipher suites in the same invite from these two sets.

We can resolve this by requiring the same crypto suite to be in an offer =
-- which makes sense because we can't have half the participants =
successfully using AES and another half successfully using GCM.

"The master salt length for the offered cipher suites MUST be the
same.  In practice the easiest way to achieve this is by offering	=
the
same crypto suite."


> G4. In general I am missing a clear explanation of how the "default"
> master key produced by the key-managements are being used when =
combined
> with EKT. This applies to all the key-management mechanism where I =
don't
> get if or not they being used, or need to be included at all.

I believe by "default master key" you are referring to the SRTP key =
established by MIKEY, DTLS-SRTP, Security Descriptions, etc., which =
differs from the SRTP key established by EKT.  If so, this is similar to =
your G2 comment, above, and I believe the change described for G2 =
answers this.  If this comment is for something else, let us know.


> G5. This document totally fails to discuss the issue of MTU and the =
fact
> that having a varying sized tag could cause issues. I would recommend
> that one always assumes a full EKT header will be present and deduct
> appropriately from the MTU.

Added:

        "The Full EKT Field is appended to the SRTP (or SRTCP)
payload and is 42, 50, or 58 octets long for AES-128, AES-192, or
AES-192, respectively.  When EKT is sent over SRTP, this length
impacts the maximum payload size of the SRTP packet itself.  To remain
below the network path MTU, senders SHOULD constain the SRTP payload
size by this length of the Full EKT Field."


> G6. The document is very sloppy in referencing SRTP, SRTCP or both =
types
> of packets correctly. Please review all references to packets to =
ensure
> that this is correct.

Thanks.  We will review that pending a resolution on keeping or =
discarding EKT-over-SRTCP, considering the problem you highlighted =
earlier about SRTCP compound packets.  Abandoning EKT-over-SRTCP is =
discussed in the thread I started on major EKT changes.


> Now comments more associated with particular sections:
>=20
> 1. Section 1:
>   For example, if a participant joins a session that is already in
>   progress, the SRTP rollover counter (ROC) of each SRTP source in the
>   session needs to be provided to that participant.
>=20
> I think this might not be the best start, at least failing to discuss
> RFC 4771-

Reworded to:

      For example, if a participant joins a session that is
      already in progress, that participant needs to be told the SRTP
      keys (and SSRC, ROC and other details) of the other SRTP
      sources.



> 2. Section 1:
> EKT
>   securely distributes the SRTP master key and other information for
>   each SRTP source, using SRTCP or SRTP to transport that information.
>=20
> I think you should be more explicit when you refer to what is =
identifed
> by a SSRC, like this:
>=20
> SRTP Source (SSRC), using ..

Ok.  I made several edits to improve that clarity there and elsewhere =
throughout the document.


> 3. Section 1:
> Section 3, Section 4, and Section 5
>   define the use of EKT with SDP Security Descriptions, DTLS-SRTP, and
>   MIKEY, respectively.  Section 7 provides a design rationale.
>   Section 6 explains how EKT can interwork with keying in call
>   signaling.
>=20
> First, you have a order mismatch, secondly, I can't understand the
> second sentence.

I removed that paragraph; the table of contents seems sufficient.


> 4. Section 2.1:
> What is the definition of the SSRC field part of the EKT_PLAINTEXT?

Added SSRC (and also SRTP_Master_Key which was also missing):

   SRTP_Master_Key:  On the sender side, the SRTP
   Master Key associated with the indicated SSRC.  The length
   of this field depends on the cipher suite negotiated during
   call setup for SRTP or SRTCP.

   SSRC: On the sender side, this field is	the
   SSRC for this SRTP source.  The length of this field is
   fixed at 32 bits.



> 5. Section 2.1:
> Definition of EKT_Ciphertext:
> I am missing what the requirements are on the production of this from
> the plain text. What is given is that confidenitiality needs to be
> equally strong on this as the SRTP. What about integrity and
> authentication?

Security Considerations currently says:
   The EKT Cipher MUST be at least as strong as the encryption and
   authentication operations used in SRTP.
which I combined with John Mattsson's suggestion to now read:
   "The confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of the EKT cipher =
MUST be at least as strong as the SRTP cipher."


> 6. Section 2.1:
> Together, these data elements assoicated with an instance of EKT
>      are called an EKT parameter set.
>=20
> What is an "instance of EKT"?

Now reads:
"Together, these data elements are called an EKT parameter set. "


> 7. Section 2.2:
> At any given time, each SRTP/SRTCP source has associated with it a
>   single EKT parameter set.
>=20
> Make clear that SSRC is the identifying factor:
>=20
> At any given time, each SRTP/SRTCP source (SSRC) is associated with it =
a
>   single EKT parameter set.

Thanks, fixed.


> 8. Section 2.2:
>=20
> There
>   may be other EKT parameter sets that are used by other SRTP/SRTCP
>   sources in the same session.
>=20
> Does the above apply also within a end-point? So when having multiple
> SSRCs one can have multiple different EKT parameter sets in use?

Yes.  Edited to read:

        There may be other EKT parameter sets
        that are used by other SRTP/SRTCP sources in the same session,
        including other SRTP/SRTCP sources on the same endpoint (e.g.,
        one endpoint with voice and video might have two EKT parameter
        sets, or there might be multiple video sources on an endpoint
        each with their own EKT parameter set).=20


> 9. Section 2.2:
> All of these EKT parameter sets SHOULD
>   be stored by all of the participants in an SRTP session, for use in
>   processing inbound SRTCP traffic.
>=20
> inbound SRTP/SRTCP traffic?

Fixed to read "inbound SRTP or SRTCP traffic", thanks.


> 10. Section 2.2.1:
>   First, the sender decides whether to use the Full or Short format.
>   When sending EKT with SRTP, the Full format SHOULD be used on the
>   initial SRTP packet in a session and after each rekeying event.  =
When
>   sending EKT with SRTCP, the Full format MUST be used.  Not all SRTP
>   or SRTCP packets need to include the EKT key, but it SHOULD be
>   included with some regularity, e.g., every second or every ten
>   seconds, though it need not be sent on a regular schedule.
>=20
> Why isn't this mostly a pointer on Section 2.6? I think you should
> gather the discussion of when and why to send full format in one
> section. The reason I think is that Section 2.6 do need to be expanded
> to both discuss when and how to make delivery of the keys reliable.
>=20
> I think one can start with analyzing the cases when one knows the
> receiver(s) will not have the keys. Which I think comes down to two
> major cases:
>=20
> 1. The SSRC one transmit is new joiner of the session
> 2. There is new receiving endpoint in the session
>=20
> A sender can easily determine 1), it can in some cases determine 2) =
and
> act on it.
>=20
> The next is how to assure reliability, and that do depend on the
> receiver population and session properties. I would also note that =
there
> are cases where one can determine that the EKT has been received. For
> example RTCP reports on Extended Sequence number or explicit ACK
> messages for a sequence number that one has sent with the new key, =
thus
> determining that the reporting SSRC has been capable of setting the
> right SRTP key state.
>=20
> Next is the classical, put the EKT full header on key-frames,
> periodically or on all until determined that reception has happened.
>=20
> I think 2.6 can be structured to say this better. With concrete and =
good
> recommendations for how to act. Probably the new receiver is the =
hardest
> as the reasonable action will depend on group size.
>=20
> In the end the text in section 2.2 can be significantly shortened to
> basically say. The use of Full or Short headers SHOULD follow the
> recommendation in Section 2.6.

I reworked section 2.6.  It now reads:

   2.6.  Timing and Reliability Consideration

   A system using EKT has the SRTP keys distributed with EKT, rather
   than with call signaling.  This means a receiver cannot authenticate
   or decrypt the SRTP or SRTCP packets without the EKT key, which has
   direct harm on the user-visible delay to session establishment.  This
   section describes how to reliably and expediently deliver EKT keys to
   receivers.

   There are three cases to consider.  The first case is a new sender
   joining a session which needs to communicate its key to all the
   receivers.  The second case is a sender changing its key which needs
   to be communicated to all the receivers.  The third case is a new
   receiver joining a session already in progress which needs to know
   the sender's key.

   New sender: A new sender SHOULD send a packet containing the Full EKT
   Field as soon as possible, always before or coincident with sending
   its initial SRTP packet.  It is RECOMMENDED that a packet containing
   the Full EKT Field be transmitted 3 times (to accomodate packet
   loss).  The sender can determine a receiver has received the new EKT
   key by receipt of RTCP receiver report or explicit ACK for a sequence
   number with the new key, and this MAY be used to cease re-
   transmitting the Full EKT Field if all receivers have received the
   EKT key.

   Rekey: When an SRTP source using EKT over SRTCP performs a rekeying
   operation, there is a race between the actual rekeying signaled via
   SRTCP and the SRTP packets secured by the new keying material.  If
   the SRTP packets are received first, they will fail authentication;
   alternatively, if authentication is not being used, they will decrypt
   to unintelligible random-looking plaintext.  (Note, however, that
   [RFC3711] says that SRTP "SHOULD NOT be used without message
   authentication".)  In order to address this problem, the rekeying
   event can be sent before packets using the new SRTP master key are
   sent (by use of the ISN field).  As with the new sender case, above,
   the sender can determine a receiver has received the new EKT key by
   receipt of an RTCP receiver report or explicit ACK for a sequence
   number with the new key, and this MAY be used to cease re-
   transmitting the Full EKT Field if all receivers have received the
   EKT key.  Another solution involves using an MKI at the expense of
   added overhead in each SRTP packet.  Alternatively, receivers MAY
   want to delay discarding packets from known SSRCs that fail
   authentication in anticipation of receiving a rekeying event via EKT
   (SRTCP) shortly.  Another approach is to send the Full EKT Field over
   SRTP, to share fate with the SRTP packet itself.

   New receiver: When a new receiver joins a session it does not need to
   communicate its sending key (because it is a receiver).  If it
   anticipates becoming a sender, it SHOULD communicate its key as soon
   as practical.  When a new receiver joins a session the sender is
   generally unaware of the receiver joining the session.  Thus, senders
   SHOULD periodically transmit the Full EKT Field.  That interval
   depends on how frequently new receivers join the session, the
   acceptable delay before those receivers can start processing SRTP
   packets, and the acceptable overhead of sending the Full EKT Field.
   The RECOMMENDED frequency is with every key frame if sending video
   and using EKT over SRTP, or as often as allowed by the RTCP profile
   timing rules, or every 5 seconds otherwise.

   For all three cases above, if SRTCP is used to send EKT, the timing
   rules associated with the negotiated profile MUST be obeyed (e.g.,
   RTP/SAVP or RTP/SAVPF).  Note that per Section 6.2 of [RFC3550], it
   is permissible to send a compound RTCP packet immediately after
   joining a unicast session (but not a multicast session).

   EKT can be transported over SRTCP, but some of the information that
   it conveys is used for SRTP processing; some elements of the EKT
   parameter set apply to both SRTP and SRTCP.  Furthermore, SRTCP
   packets can be lost and both SRTP and SRTCP packets may be delivered
   out of order.  This can lead to various race conditions if EKT is
   transported over SRTCP but not SRTP, which we review below.

   The ROC signaled via EKT over SRTCP may be off by one when it is
   received by the other party(ies) in the session.  In order to deal
   with this, receivers should simply follow the SRTP packet index
   estimation procedures defined in Section 3.3.1 [RFC3711].



> 11. Section 2.2.1
>   The EKT_Ciphertext field is set to the ciphertext created by
>   encrypting the EKT_Plaintext with the EKT cipher, using the KEK as
>   the encryption key.
>=20
> The above uses KEK without defining it.

Fixed, thanks.


> 12. Section 2.2.1:
>=20
> I am missing a clear statement that each SSRC an endpoint have must
> individually ensure that their Master Key, ROC and SPI is distributed =
in
> the RTP session, even if shared with other SSRCs from the same =
endpoint.

This should be resolved by the addition of this text to Section 2.2, =
"Packet Processing and State Machine",
  "All SRTP master keys MUST be fresh and randomly generated;
          they MUST NOT be shared in any way."


> 13. Section 2.2.2, Bullet 2:
>=20
> If multiple parameter sets have been defined for the
>       SRTP session, then the one that is associated with the value of
>       the SPI field in the packet is used.
>=20
> What is only one SPI is defined, what is used then. Shouldn't the SPI =
be
> matched independently?

Section 2.2.2 is for inbound processing, so the SPI of that incoming =
packet is used.  Is your question perhaps about how the SPI is chosen =
for outbound processing?



> 14. Section 2.2.2, Bullet 3:
> The EKT_Ciphertext is decrypted using the EKT_Key and EKT_Cipher
>       in the matching parameter set,
>=20
> Here the key is called EKT_Key, previously KEK?

KEK was used only once in the entire document; I have removed it from =
the work-in-progress -02 version.  EKT Key is the right term.


> 15. Section 2.2.2, bullet 5:
> If the ROC from the EKT_Plaintext is less than the ROC in the
>       SRTP context, then packet processing halts.
>=20
> Probably should be explicit that the SRTP context related to the SSRC
> from step 4 is to be used.

Thanks, fixed.


>=20
> 16. Section 2.2.2, bullet 5:
> Otherwise, the ROC
>       in the SRTP context is set to the value of the ROC from the
>       EKT_Plaintext, and the SRTP Master Key from the EKT_Plaintext is
>       accepted as the SRTP master key corresponding to the SRTP source
>       that sent the packet.
>=20
> And
> If there is no SRTP crypto context corresponding to
>       the SSRC in the packet, then a new crypto context is created.  =
If
>       the crypto context is not new, then the rollover counter in the
>       context MUST NOT be set to a value lower than its current value.
>=20
> Appears to be in the wrong order in this bullet.

Thanks.  Bullet 5 in Section 2.2.2 now reads:
                If an SRTP context already exists and the ROC from the
                EKT_Plaintext is less than the ROC in the SRTP
                context, then EKT processing halts (as this is a
                replay).  Otherwise, the ROC in the SRTP context is
                set to the value of the ROC from the EKT_Plaintext,
                and the SRTP Master Key from the EKT_Plaintext is
                accepted as the SRTP master key corresponding to the
                SSRC indicated in the EKT_Plaintext.  If an MKI is
                present in the packet, then the master key corresponds
                to the particular SSRC and MKI combination. </t>


>=20
> 17. Section 2.2.2, bullet 5:
> Otherwise, the ROC
>       in the SRTP context is set to the value of the ROC from the
>       EKT_Plaintext, and the SRTP Master Key from the EKT_Plaintext is
>       accepted as the SRTP master key corresponding to the SRTP source
>       that sent the packet.
>=20
> I think this is missing discussion of ISN. As the new key is not valid
> for use until ISN to my understanding.

Ok, I added a forward pointer to the ROC processing,
  "beginning at the sequence number indicated by the ISN (see next =
step)."


> 18. Section 2.2.2: Usage limiations of ISN and ROC
>=20
> Due to the rules for the ROC, that any lower ROC gets update to the =
ROC
> included in the EKT, then one can't project the key-change further =
into
> the future, than the current ROC. So if one are at RTP Seq 65501 and
> would like to put a new key into use in 100 packets, then that isn't
> possible as the ISN can only point within the current ROC, i.e. no
> further than 65535. I don't think this is a serious limitation, but it
> should be discussed.

Added a sentence to the discussion to Outbound Processing which alluded =
to that limitation but was not terribly clear.  It now reads:=20

          "... The
          rekeying event MUST NOT change the value of ROC (otherwise,
          the current value of the ROC would not be known to late
          joiners of existing sessions).  This means rekeying near
          the end of sequence number space (e.g., 100 packets past
          sequence number 65501) is not possible because
          ROC needs to roll over)."


> 19. Section 2.2.2: Use of ISN and the playback issues. If one wasn't
> allowed the pre-place an Master Key, ROC, SPI set, then one could =
accept
> a EKT full header provisionally, then try to use it on the current
> SRT(C)P packet and see if authenticates correctly. If it does, then =
one
> moves the EKT from provisional to verified status. However, with the =
ISN
> usage, and the possibility to project EKT parameters into the future,
> then one can't do the immediate verification, but maybe one should =
also
> have similar provisional status of parameter set. That way at least =
one
> don't use a replayed EKT to overwrite a valid entry.

David and I discussed this, and I think we have this covered.  The ROC =
cannot roll over and ekt-01 already had text saying the ROC had to be =
same or higher of existing crypto context, and we added the following =
text to the ISN processing based on John Mattsson's review:

   6.  If the ISN from the EKT_Plaintext is less than the RTP sequence
       number of an authenticated received SRTP packet, then EKT
       processing halts (as this is a replay).=20

With that change, do you feel doing a provisional/verified step is still =
necessary?  (I expect you may want to see all of -02 before answering =
that particular question.)



> 20. Section 2.2.2, Bullet 6:
> This contain overlap procedures with bullet 5. Can you separate or =
merge
> them to make them correct and sequential in processing.

Bullet 5 discusses the ROC field processing and Bullet 6 discusses the =
ISN field processing.  I am reluctant to combine them.  In my =
work-in-progress version of -02, they currently read like this:

   5.  If an SRTP context associated with the SSRC in the previous step
       already exists and the ROC from the EKT_Plaintext is less than
       the ROC in the SRTP context, then EKT processing halts (as this
       is a replay).  Otherwise, the ROC in the SRTP context is set to
       the value of the ROC from the EKT_Plaintext, and the SRTP Master
       Key from the EKT_Plaintext is accepted as the SRTP master key
       corresponding to the SSRC indicated in the EKT_Plaintext,
       beginning at the sequence number indicated by the ISN (see next
       step).  If an MKI is present in the packet, then the master key
       corresponds to the particular SSRC and MKI combination.

   6.  If the ISN from the EKT_Plaintext is less than the RTP sequence
       number of an authenticated received SRTP packet, then EKT
       processing halts (as this is a replay).  If the Initial Sequence
       Number field is nonzero, then the initial sequence number for the
       SRTP master key is set to the packet index created by appending
       that field to the current rollover counter and treating the
       result as a 48-bit unsigned integer.  The initial sequence number
       for the master key is equivalent to the "From" value of the
       <From, To> pair of indices (Section 8.1.1 of [RFC3711]) that can
       be associated with a master key.


>=20
> 21. Section 2.2.2,
>          Implementation note: the value of the EKT Ciphertext field is
>          identical in successive packets protected by the same EKT
>          parameter set and the same SRTP master key and ROC.
>=20
> I think the end of the sentence needs to include ISN.

Added.


> I would note that the format of the EKT do require one to generate a =
new
> EKT cipher text at minimum each time the ROC changes, i.e. every 65536
> packets. I don't know if this is worth pointing out.

ROC changes every 2^32 packets (not every 65536).

Added the following to Outbound processing:
        Implementation note:	Because of the format of the Full EKT =
Field, a
packet containing the Full EKT Field MUST be sent when the ROC changes
(i.e., every 2^32 packets).


> 22. Section 2.3:
> This cipher
>   MUST be implemented, but another cipher that conforms to this
>   interface MAY be used, in which case its use MUST be coordinated by
>   external means (e.g., call signaling).
>=20
> I think the above formulation, without using name of the cipher is
> unclear. In fact I am uncertain which EKT cipher I am required to
> support. As Section 2.3.1 doesn't identify a single one, and instead
> references three labels.

Adjusted to read:
  The default cipher described in Section 2.3.1 MUST be
  implemented, but another cipher that conforms to this interface MAY be
  used, in which case its use MUST be coordinated by external means
  (e.g., key management).

and 2.3.1 now says that AESKW_128 is MUST because AES-128 is the =
must-implement AES length in SRTP itself (RFC3711).  The others (192 and =
256 bit) remain with their existing text.


> I also think the "call signaling" is the wrong reference. It needs to =
be
> coordinated in key-management.

Fixed, thanks.


> 23. Section 2.3.1
>   The default EKT Cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
>   [FIPS197] Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649] algorithm, which can be
>   used with plaintexts larger than 16 bytes in length, and is thus
>   suitable for keys of any size.  It requires a plaintext length M =
that
>   is at least eight bytes, and it returns a ciphertext with a length =
of
>   N =3D M + 8 bytes.
>=20
> I find it very confusing to have one sentence saying that the KEY wrap
> requires plaintext larger that 16 bytes, and the next to say it is 8
> bytes required.

I reviewed RFC5649, and revised the text to now read:

            The default EKT Cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard
            (AES) [FIPS197] Key Wrap with Padding [RFC5649]
            algorithm.  It requires a plaintext
            length M that is at least one octet, and it returns
            a ciphertext with a length of N =3D M + 8 octets.


> 24. Section 2.3.1:
>=20
>   When AES-128 is used in SRTP and/or SRTCP, AESKW_128 SHOULD be used
>   in EKT.  In this case, the EKT Plaintext is 26 bytes long, the EKT
>   Ciphertext is 40 bytes long, and the Full EKT field is 42 bytes =
long.
>=20
>   When AES-192 is used in SRTP and/or SRTCP, AESKW_192 SHOULD be used
>   in EKT.  In this case, the EKT Plaintext is 34 bytes long, the EKT
>   Ciphertext is 48 bytes long, and the Full EKT field is 50 bytes =
long.
>=20
>   When AES-256 is used in SRTP and/or SRTCP, AESKW_256 SHOULD be used
>   in EKT.  In this case, the EKT Plaintext is 42 bytes long, the EKT
>   Ciphertext is 56 bytes long, and the Full EKT field is 58 bytes =
long.
>=20
> I think you should build a table to make clear which key-wrap should =
be
> used for all the already defined SRTP crypto transforms.

Added a table (see a few lines below).


> I also think it is unclear to use SHOULD in the above. I think they =
are
> MUST unless overwritten by a key-management function.

I believe they should all be MUST, because elsewhere we point out that =
EKT protection needs to be at least as strong as SRTP's protection.=20

I went with this:


                                length of  length of
         SRTP         EKT          EKT        EKT        length of
       transform   transform    plaintext  ciphertext  Full EKT Field
       ---------  ------------  ---------  ----------  --------------
       AES-128    AESKW_128 (m)    26          40            42
       AES-192    AESKW_192        34          48            50
       AES-256    AESKW_256        42          56            58
       F8-128     AESKW_128        26          40            42
       SEED-128   AESKW_128        26          40            42

                           Figure 4: AESKW Table

   The mandatory to implement transform is AESKW_128, indicated by (m).

   As AES-128 is the mandatory to implement transform in SRTP [RFC3711],
   AESKW_128 MUST be implemented for EKT.

   For all the SRTP transforms listed in the table, the corresponding
   EKT transform MUST be used, unless a stronger EKT transform is
   negotiated by key management.


>=20
> 25.  Section 2.3.2:
>=20
> In reference to the above. I believe it is reasonable that you propose
> default EKT ciphers for all existing SRTP transforms. They are not
> thousands of them, just a few different algorithms and key-lengths in =
use.

Ok, I guess you wanted F8 and SEED added.  I put those in the table, =
using AESKW for both because I don't have RFC5649 equivalencies for F8 =
or SEED to my knowledge.


> 26. Section 2.4:
> A participant in a session MAY opt to use a particular EKT key to
>   protect outbound packets after it accepts that EKT key for =
protecting
>   inbound traffic.
>=20
> Are the reference to EKT_Key, actually correct, or should it refer to
> EKT Parameter set?

Should be to EKT Parameter set.  Fixed.  Thanks.


> 27. Section 2.4:
> An SRTP/SRTCP source SHOULD change its SRTP master key after its EKT
>   key has been changed.
>=20
> What are the reasonable exceptions to doing this, why isn't the SHOULD =
a
> MAY or a MUST?

The full paragraph has two sentences,

   An SRTP/SRTCP source SHOULD change its SRTP master key after its EKT
   key has been changed.  This will ensure that the set of participants
   able to decrypt the traffic will be limited to those who know the
   current EKT key.

I will rephrase to:

	"If a source has its EKT key changed (by key management), it
MUST also change its SRTP master key, which will cause it to send out
a new Full EKT Field.  This ensures that if key	management thought the
EKT key	needs changing (due to a participant leaving or	joining) and
communicated that in key management to a source, the source will also
change its SRTP	master key, so that traffic can	be decrypted only by
those who know the current EKT key."


>=20
> 28. Section 2.4:
> Rather than automatically discarding such SRTP packets, the receiver
>   MAY want to provisionally place them in a jitter buffer and delay
>   discarding them until playout time.
>=20
> I think referring to Jitter buffer here is maybe to specific. I would
> abstract this to say: buffer the packets and later discard them when
> they become unusable.

Ok.  This has been consolidated into 2.6, "Timing and Reliability".


> 29. Section 2.4:
> As RTCP packets doesn't have sequence numbers, If one include a new
> Master Key in an EKT packet with an ISN in the future attached to the
> RTCP packet, does this key applies immediately for RTCP, or first when
> the SRTP packets has been sent?

Good question.  We haven't figured out a reasonable resolution to this =
question.  I think SRTP's <From,to> suffers the same problem.  But =
because we are considering removing EKT-over-SRTCP (see other email with =
subject "changes planned for EKT"), I'd like to table this question for =
the moment.

(thinking out loud:  It can't apply immediately, because we need to send =
the SRTCP packet a few times (to accommodate packet loss) and if we =
change to use the new key after that first transmission, but that first =
transmission is lost in the network, the receiver can't authenticate the =
2nd and 3rd transmissions of the new key.  This feels all very awkward.  =
Perhaps we could apply the new key when an SRTCP Receiver Report is =
generated with the 'extended highest sequence number received' of that =
ISN, but that gets yuckie because we need to generate an SRTCP RR at an =
awkward interval (when the key changes, instead of using normal RTCP =
processing rules for generating RTCP packet).  That awkward feeling is =
not improving.)


> 30.  Section 3:
>   The SDP Security Descriptions (SDESC) [RFC4568] specification =
defines
>   a generic framework for negotiating security parameters for media
>   streams negotiated via the Session Description Protocol by use of a
>   new SDP "crypto" attribute and the Offer/Answer procedures defined =
in
>   [RFC3264].
>=20
> Is really "new" appropriate to use here?

Fixed.


> 31. Section 3.1:
> Suggest using ":" after hanging text in bullet list

Fixed.


> 32. Section 3.5.1:
>=20
> However if it operates as
>      an RTP translator, synchronized negotiation of the EKT parameter
>      sets on *all* the involved SIP dialogs will be needed.
>=20
> I assume the issue you are referring to is a transport translator
> (relay), rather than a media translator, or?

Yes.  Now reads:

  However, if it operates as a transport translator (relay)
  then synchronized negotiation of the EKT parameter sets on *all* the
  involved SIP dialogs will be needed.=20



> 33. Section 3.5.3:
> In this case, there will be multiple EKT parameter sets;
>   one for each SRTP session.
>=20
> I agree this occurs between one end-point and its different peers. =
What
> is unclear in this topology is if this truly are different RTP =
sessions,
> or just one RTP session. It depends on the implementation.
>=20
> Maybe further clarify that the concern really are between different
> pairs of end-points.

On this comment #33, can you suggest text?  We aren't sure what to do =
here.  I am not even confident on my mind's definition of "RTP session", =
so I worry my changes would be pretty lousy.


> 34. Section 3.7:
> Finally, subsequent offer/answer exchanges MUST NOT remap a given SPI
>   value to a different EKT parameter set until 2^32 other mappings =
have
>   been used within the SRTP session.
>=20
> Considering that the SPI is 15 bits, this appears wrong. See also =
later
> sentence in paragraph.

Thanks.  Fixed both to 2^15.


> 35. Section 3.9:
>       a=3Dcrypto:2 F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
>          inline:MTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJjZGVm|2^20|1:4;
>          inline:QUJjZGVmMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5|2^20|2:4
>          FEC_ORDER=3DFEC_SRTP EKT=3DAES_128|FE9C|AAE0
>=20
> The EKT key appears very short (24 bits).

Fixed, now reads like this, and I removed all the text about adjusting =
the base64 padding.  A 128 bit EKT key=20

a=3Dcrypto:1 AES_CM_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
  inline:WVNfX19zZW1jdGwgKCkgewkyMjA7fQp9CnVubGVz|2^20|1:4
  FEC_ORDER=3DFEC_SRTP EKT=3DAESKW_128|WWVzQUxvdmVseUVLVGtleQ=3D=3D|AAE0
a=3Dcrypto:2 F8_128_HMAC_SHA1_80
  inline:MTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJjZGVm|2^20|1:4;
  inline:QUJjZGVmMTIzNDU2Nzg5QUJDREUwMTIzNDU2Nzg5|2^20|2:4
  FEC_ORDER=3DFEC_SRTP EKT=3DAESKW_128|VHdvTG92ZWx5RUtUa2V5cw=3D=3D|AAE0



> 36. Section 4.1:
>                   enum {
>                    AES_128(0),
>                    AESKW_128(1),
>                    AESKW_192(2),
>                    AESKW_256(3),
>                   } ektcipher;
>=20
> I don't understand why AEA_128 is listed here, can you please clarify?

It was a holdover from earlier version of EKT, sorry.  It is now changed =
in my work-in-progress document to RESERVED, so that we don't encounter =
conflicts with pre-RFC implementations.


>=20
> 37. Section 4.1:
>=20
> This appears to point to an open issue not dealt with:
>=20
>      Editor's note: do we need reliability for the ekt_key messages?

Fixed by adding text

   4.2.4.  Sending DTLS EKT Key Reliably
   In the absence of a round trip time estimate, the DTLS ekt_key
   message is sent using an exponential backoff of 250ms, so that if the
   first message is sent at time 0, the next transmissions are at 250ms,
   500ms, 1000ms, and so on.  If a recent round trip time estimate is
   available, the DTLS ekt_key message should be re-transmitted at 1.5
   times the round trip time estimate.  In either case, re-transmission
   stops when ekt_key_ack or ekt_key_error message is received for the
   matching message_seq.




> 38. Section 4.1:
>=20
> I don't understand how the SPI are bound to DTLS-SRTP parameter
> agreements, and if you actually can use DTLS-SRTP to establish =
multiple
> SPIs?

Yes, DTLS-SRTP could establish multiple SPI, such as for changing the =
EKT key itself (same as we could do with Security Descriptions or MIKEY =
by sending an updated offer with a new EKT key).



> 39. Section 4.1.1:
>=20
> The dtls-srtp-host SDP attribute appears a bit strange. First of all, =
a
> includer in an O/A exchange gets no confirmation that the peer =
received
> or understands it. The second you could ensure by being explicit about
> mandating support for it. However, I don't know how you plan to ensure
> that it isn't removed in middlebox that doesn't understand it and thus
> remove it. Shouldn't this be a slightly more elaborate parameter that
> allows negotiation?

This functionality is intended to help with large groups where the =
sender cannot deal with the quantity of incoming DTLS-SRTP traffic and =
DTLS ekt_key messages for large groups.  I was considering pulling it =
several years ago but was encouraged to leave it in based on Romain =
Biehlmann's (romain.biehlmann@gmail.com) post in May 2010, =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/current/msg13044.html.  I =
emailed him last Friday to see if he still needs or uses that attribute, =
but have not yet heard back.  I am happy to remove it, or improve it.  =
However, improving it may be difficult as I don't have good technical =
solutions to accomplish your concerns in #39 -- as you know we can't =
force implementations to support the a=3Ddtls-srtp-host attribute and we =
can't force B2BUAs or SBCs or other middleboxes to preserve the =
a=3Ddtls-srtp-host attribute.  If it isn't supported or is removed, the =
DTLS-SRTP handshake and ekt_key messages are sent to the host on the m/c =
lines or what ICE decided (as with normal DTLS-SRTP handshake).  Perhaps =
if it is deemed important but difficult it can be moved to a separate =
specification so the rest of EKT can be published?


> 40. Section 4.1.1: ABNF:
>=20
> I am missing references to all the used definitions, space, nettype,
> addrtype, connection-address. I personally know they are from RFC =
4566,
> but you are not explicit about this in the sentence leading up to the =
def.

Thanks, fixed.


> 41. Section 4.1:
>=20
> I fail to find the SDP attribute definition for dtls-srtp-ekt.

Added, thanks.


>=20
> 42. Section 4.2.2:
> The presence of the dtls-srtp-host attribute
>   indicates an alternate host to send the DTLS-SRTP handshake (instead
>   of the host on the c/m lines).
>=20
> Or what ICE indicates?

Right.  Related to your comment #39, above.  Let's see if we keep =
dtls-srtp-host attribute at all.



>=20
> 43. Section 5:
> I am missing the RSA-R mode (RFC 4738) in this discussion. I don't =
know
> if it seriously effects anything, but that mode do allow the Responder
> to provide the TGK or TEK.
>=20
> 44. Section 5:
>=20
> I missing a discussion on the multicast and broadcast usages of MIKEY.
>=20
> 45. Section 5.2:
> I think most of what is defined here is actually not O/A specific, and
> applies indpedenent of how MIKEY messages are transported. Could this =
be
> factored out, so that it get more general applicability? After all the
> usages I hear for MIKEY are not in a O/A context.

The MIKEY section was written by Kai Fischer (Siemens), who has asked to =
be removed from the authors list and is no longer active in AVTCORE (or =
EKT, as far as I know).  The remaining authors have insufficient =
background to improve the MIKEY section.  We welcome suggestions from =
you, others, or the WG chairs how to best proceed with your 3 comments.


> 46. Section 9:
>=20
> This section needs quite a lot more detail. The SDP attributes needs =
to
> fill in the template.

Added, thanks.


> The Registries needs considerations for what a
> registration requires. Probably the other registrations have several
> formal requirements not fulfilled by this text.

MIKEY seems okay, from my review of RFC6309 (which relaxed to allow IESG =
approval) and RFC3830 (which has no IANA template registration =
requirements that I could find).

We also meet requirements for SDP Security Descriptions's Session =
Parameter registration =
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4568#section-10.3.2.2).

I think it's good for IANA stuff now.



> 47. Section 11:
>=20
> I think the following references are in the wrong category:
> RFC 3261, RFC 4771,

Agreed those should be moved to Informative references.

> RFC 6347?, RFC 3830,=20

RFC6347 is DTLS, RFC3830 is MIKEY -- we are extending both of those, so =
I believe they need to remain Normative references.

> RFC 5649.


Needs to remain normative, because it defines AES Key Wrap (AESKW) which =
we are using as the basis for EKT.


Thanks again for your detailed review!

-d



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On Nov 4, 2013, at 7:23 AM, John Mattsson <john.mattsson@ericsson.com> =
wrote:

> Hi,=20
>=20
> I reviewed draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01 focusing on security =
aspects. I have only reviewed Sections 1,2,8 yet, but these should be =
consistent and complete without having to read the sections on specific =
key management protocols (3,4,5).
>=20
> In general I think the draft is well written and useful, but I get the =
feeling that when parts of the draft have changed in the past, the rest =
of the document has not always been changed to reflect these changes.

Thanks for your detailed review and for summarizing the major points at =
the top.  I believe our edits will resolve your points, and will respond =
to each below.  There is a separate email on some of the major points =
(subject=3D"changes planned for EKT") you should see shortly.


> There are e.g. several sections mentioning "base authentication =
tag"...

Fixed.

> I also think the draft misses to analyze the various replay attacks =
that can be done on the EKT layer. The draft writes that SSRC sync on =
the key management layer is no longer needed, but then EKT uses SSRC for =
replay protection. This makes replay attacks of the Full EKT fields =
possible and I think this need to be addressed in one way or another.

Your review described replay attacks in more detail below so I will =
comment on them below.

> Furthermore I think the draft must control how either SSRCs or SRTP =
master keys are generated, and the MKI handling needs to be described in =
more detail.

One thing we plan to change based on your review (details below) is that =
SRTP master keys cannot be re-used at all.  This is discussed in more =
detail, below.


>=20
> /John
>=20
>=20
> - [General]
> The specified replay protection relies on encoding the SSRC in the =
Full EKT Field and not allowing the ROC to decrease. But without SSRC =
sync on the key management level, there will be SSRC collisions and the =
document seems to miss the fact that the ROC also rolls over, RFC3711 =
states "the sender side MUST increment ROC by one, modulo 2^32".

David McGrew found RFC3711 is unclear what should happen after 2^48 =
packets are sent and the ROC needs to roll over.  RFC3711 says:

   As the rollover counter is 32 bits long and the sequence number is 16
   bits long, the maximum number of packets belonging to a given SRTP
   stream that can be secured with the same key is 2^48 using the pre-
   defined transforms.  After that number of SRTP packets have been sent
   with a given (master or session) key, the sender MUST NOT send any
   more packets with that key.  (There exists a similar limit for SRTCP,
   which in practice may be more restrictive, see Section 9.2.)  This
   limitation enforces a security benefit by providing an upper bound on
   the amount of traffic that can pass before cryptographic keys are
   changed.  Re-keying (see Section 8.1) MUST be triggered, before this
   amount of traffic, and MAY be triggered earlier, e.g., for increased
   security and access control to media.  Recurring key derivation by
   means of a non-zero key_derivation_rate (see Section 4.3), also gives
   stronger security but does not change the above absolute maximum
   value.

Our interpretation is that when ROC rolls over, new keys need to be =
established using DTLS-SRTP, MIKEY, Security Descriptions -- not by EKT. =
 EKT does not provide for ROC rollover, just as RFC3711 does not provide =
for ROC rollover.  We aren't worried about ROC rollover because the ROC =
space is large.  Assuming my math is correct, 100,000 packets per second =
(which is well in excess of what I have heard any RTP system utilize), =
the ROC space is consumed in 89 years (2^48/100000/86400/365=3D89 =
years).

Added to the Security Considerations section:
   EKT can rekey an SRTP stream until the SRTP rollover counter (ROC)
   needs to roll over.  EKT does not extend SRTP's rollover counter
   (ROC), and like SRTP itself EKT cannot properly handle a ROC
   rollover.  Thus even if using EKT, new (master or session) keys need
   to be established after 2^48 packets are retransmitted in a single
   SRTP stream as described in Section 3.3.1 of [RFC3711].  Due to the
   relatively low packet rates of typical RTP sessions, this is not
   expected to be a burden.



> I think the following replay attacks are possible:
>=20
> Replay attack 1:
> If the SRTP master key has changed, for example by sending a Full EKT =
field with (SRTP master key=3D2, ROC=3DX, ISN=3DY) an attacker can =
replay an old Full EKT field with (SRTP master key=3D1, ROC=3DX, ISN=3D0) =
causing the receiver to update to the old key. The receiver will not =
recover until a Full EKT field arrives from the sender.

David and I discussed a few mitigations, but the existing ISN and ROC =
communicated in the Full EKT Field can prevent such an attack if we add =
text to require a receiver to ignore a Full EKT Field if the receiver =
has authenticated an SRTP packet with an RTP sequence number and ROC =
greater than the Full EKT Field.  With that in mind, I added the =
following to Inbound processing:

                If the ISN from the EKT_Plaintext is less than the RTP
                sequence number of an authenticated received SRTP =
packet,
                then EKT processing halts.

with that change, an attacker would only be successful at replaying an =
old Full EKT Field if the receiver had not received SRTP packets since =
the earlier legitimate transmission of that Full EKT Field.  Is that =
sufficient mitigation?


> Replay attack 2:
> If there is a SSRC collision or the same SSRC has previously been =
used, an attacker can replay a Full EKT Field with a high ROC. The =
receiver will update the ROC and will not recover from this until after =
up to 2^48 packets.

Here is our understanding of Replay Attack 2:  There are two senders =
using the same SSRC, let's call them Alice and Bob who happen to use the =
same SSRC.  Alice has been transmitting for a while and her Full EKT =
Field indicates with SSRC=3DA with a high ROC and her SRTP master key.  =
Bob joins and sends his Full EKT Field with his same SSRC=3DA, ROC=3D0 =
(because new senders have a ROC=3D0) and his SRTP master key.  In a =
desire to DoS traffic from Bob, the attacker injects Alice's Full EKT =
Field.  This same sequence could happen in the absence of an attacker if =
Alice or Bob are ignorant of their SSRC collision and they just happily =
send their Full EKT Field.

We disagree this attack is possible, because the first step of step 5 of =
Section 2.2.2:

 " 5.  If the ROC from the EKT_Plaintext is less than the ROC in the
       SRTP context, then packet processing halts. "



> Replay attack 3:
> For extremely long sessions (over 2^48 SRTP packets), the ROC will =
roll over. An attacker can then replay a Full EKT Field with a high ROC =
(e.g. 2^32-1). The receiver will update the ROC and will not recover =
from this until after up to 2^48 packets.

We do not intend for EKT to extend SRTP's rollover counter.


> While replay attacks that lead to short term disturbances may be =
tolerable, replay attacks leading to long term denial of service with a =
single packet is in my view not acceptable.
>=20
> Suggestions:
> The only solution approach I see directly (except using time stamps =
and synchronized clocks) is to require SRTP master keys to be fresh and =
randomly generated, and then somehow bind the EKT layer to the current =
SRTP master key. But this needs further thought.

For another attack you described below, we agree fresh SRTP master keys =
are useful.  See below.

If we follow SRTP's lead and don't allow ROC to roll over, we believe =
binding EKT layer to the SRTP master key won't be necessary to thwart =
the above three replay attacks.



>=20
> - [General]
> "With this method, SRTP entities are free to choose SSRC values as =
they see fit, and to start up new SRTP sources with new SRTP master keys =
(see Section 2.2) within a session without coordinating with other =
entities via signaling or other external means.  This fact allows to =
reinstate the RTP collision detection and repair mechanism"
>=20
> "EKT does not control the manner in which the SSRC and master key are =
generated; it is only concerned with their secure transport."
>=20
> "even if those two streams are using the same SRTP master key"
>=20
> It is not possible to do both these things at the same time. This =
leads to IV reuse and the potential loss of confidentiality and =
integrity. Furthermore the SSRC collision and repair mechanism in =
RFC3550 only handles SSRC collisions happening at the same time, SRTP =
needs protection also against SSRC collisions happening at different =
times.
>=20
> I think the draft must set strict requirements on the use of shared =
and reused keys:
> "All SRTP master keys MUST be fresh and randomly generated; they MUST =
NOT be shared or reused in any way."

Agreed, added to Section 2.2, Packet Processing and State Machine.


> - [General]
> I think the draft should give recommendations or default values for =
how often the Full EKT Field should be sent.

Magnus had a similar observation in his review.  I re-worked Section 2.6 =
to now read:

   2.6.  Timing and Reliability Consideration

   A system using EKT has the SRTP keys distributed with EKT, rather
   than with call signaling.  This means a receiver cannot authenticate
   or decrypt the SRTP or SRTCP packets without the EKT key, which has
   direct harm on the user-visible delay to session establishment.  This
   section describes how to reliably and expediently deliver EKT keys to
   receivers.

   There are three cases to consider.  The first case is a new sender
   joining a session which needs to communicate its key to all the
   receivers.  The second case is a sender changing its key which needs
   to be communicated to all the receivers.  The third case is a new
   receiver joining a session already in progress which needs to know
   the sender's key.

   New sender: A new sender SHOULD send a packet containing the Full EKT
   Field as soon as possible, always before or coincident with sending
   its initial SRTP packet.  It is RECOMMENDED that a packet containing
   the Full EKT Field be transmitted 3 times (to accomodate packet
   loss).  The sender can determine a receiver has received the new EKT
   key by receipt of RTCP receiver report or explicit ACK for a sequence
   number with the new key, and this MAY be used to cease re-
   transmitting the Full EKT Field if all receivers have received the
   EKT key.

   Rekey: When an SRTP source using EKT over SRTCP performs a rekeying
   operation, there is a race between the actual rekeying signaled via
   SRTCP and the SRTP packets secured by the new keying material.  If
   the SRTP packets are received first, they will fail authentication;
   alternatively, if authentication is not being used, they will decrypt
   to unintelligible random-looking plaintext.  (Note, however, that
   [RFC3711] says that SRTP "SHOULD NOT be used without message
   authentication".)  In order to address this problem, the rekeying
   event can be sent before packets using the new SRTP master key are
   sent (by use of the ISN field).  As with the new sender case, above,
   the sender can determine a receiver has received the new EKT key by
   receipt of an RTCP receiver report or explicit ACK for a sequence
   number with the new key, and this MAY be used to cease re-
   transmitting the Full EKT Field if all receivers have received the
   EKT key.  Another solution involves using an MKI at the expense of
   added overhead in each SRTP packet.  Alternatively, receivers MAY
   want to delay discarding packets from known SSRCs that fail
   authentication in anticipation of receiving a rekeying event via EKT
   (SRTCP) shortly.  Another approach is to send the Full EKT Field over
   SRTP, to share fate with the SRTP packet itself.

   New receiver: When a new receiver joins a session it does not need to
   communicate its sending key (because it is a receiver).  If it
   anticipates becoming a sender, it SHOULD communicate its key as soon
   as practical.  When a new receiver joins a session the sender is
   generally unaware of the receiver joining the session.  Thus, senders
   SHOULD periodically transmit the Full EKT Field.  That interval
   depends on how frequently new receivers join the session, the
   acceptable delay before those receivers can start processing SRTP
   packets, and the acceptable overhead of sending the Full EKT Field.
   The RECOMMENDED frequency is with every key frame if sending video
   and using EKT over SRTP, or as often as allowed by the RTCP profile
   timing rules, or every 5 seconds otherwise.

   For all three cases above, if SRTCP is used to send EKT, the timing
   rules associated with the negotiated profile MUST be obeyed (e.g.,
   RTP/SAVP or RTP/SAVPF).  Note that per Section 6.2 of [RFC3550], it
   is permissible to send a compound RTCP packet immediately after
   joining a unicast session (but not a multicast session).

   EKT can be transported over SRTCP, but some of the information that
   it conveys is used for SRTP processing; some elements of the EKT
   parameter set apply to both SRTP and SRTCP.  Furthermore, SRTCP
   packets can be lost and both SRTP and SRTCP packets may be delivered
   out of order.  This can lead to various race conditions if EKT is
   transported over SRTCP but not SRTP, which we review below.

   The ROC signaled via EKT over SRTCP may be off by one when it is
   received by the other party(ies) in the session.  In order to deal
   with this, receivers should simply follow the SRTP packet index
   estimation procedures defined in Section 3.3.1 [RFC3711].



> Not only to ease implementation, but also as this has effects on what =
an passive attacker can learn from just looking at the packets, and the =
effects of an active attacker replaying Full EKT Fields.

> - [Section 1]
> The term "SRTP source" seems to sometimes mean "SRTP endpoint"/"SRTP =
participant" and sometimes SSRC. I suggest replacing all occurrences of =
"SRTP source" with one of these terms.=20

Magnus had suggested using "SRTP source (SSRC)" to be clearer that it is =
per-SSRC; I'll try that edit and see how it works.

>=20
> - [Section 1]
> "An SRTP endpoint using EKT can generate new keys whenever an existing =
SRTP master key has been overused, or start up a new SRTP source to =
replace an old SRTP source that has reached the packet-count limit."
>=20
> This seems to imply that both the key and the SRTP source have limits, =
but according to RFC3711 it is only the key that has a packet counter =
and a limit. The ROC rolls over modulo 2^32 and the same SSRC can be =
used for infinity many packets as long as the key is refreshed at least =
every 2^48 packet.

When the ROC needs to roll over we intend the key to be refreshed =
outside of EKT (using SDescriptions, MIKEY, DTLS-SRTP etc.).  I added =
some text in the introduction to hopefully cover that.


> - [Section 1]
> "EKT provides a way for an SRTP session participant, either a sender =
or a receiver, to securely transport its SRTP master key and current =
SRTP rollover counter to the other participants in the session.
>=20
> Should this really be "or a receiver"? The handling for a receiver =
sending EKT does not seem to be defined.

When using EKT over SRTCP, an endpoint might be receive-only (while =
listening to a group session) and notice an SSRC collision and change =
its SSRC and signal its new SSRC by sending an Full EKT Field packet =
over RTCP.

(However, based on Magnus' review, we are considering pulling support =
for EKT over RTCP.  That is discussed in a different email.)



> - [Section 1]
> "using the KEK as the encryption key"
> I think it would be best to use "EKT Key" throughout the document and =
then maybe add "using the EKT key as KEK" in Section 2.3.1.

I removed that sole use of "KEK", but I was not sure of the addition you =
are proposing for Section 2.3.1.



> - [Section 2.1]
> "Reserved:  MUST be all zeros on transmission, and MUST be ignored on =
reception."
>=20
> Length of Reserved field is missing in the text. Suggestion:
> "Reserved:  The length of this field is fixed at 7 bits. MUST be all =
zeros on transmission, and MUST be ignored on reception."

Done.

> - [Section 2.1]
> The figures are not really showing "examples", they seem to show the =
general format. I suggest removing "Example of" and "An example of".

Done.

> - [Section 2.2]
> "inbound SRTCP traffic" Should probably be "inbound traffic" or =
inbound SRTP/SRTCP traffic

Done.

> =09
> - [Section 2.2.1]
> "The creation of the EKT field MUST precede the normal SRTP or SRTCP   =
packet processing, so that the ROC used in EKT is the same as the one   =
used in the SRTP or SRTCP processing."
>=20
> ROC is not used in SRTCP processing and I think it is better to move =
the "MUST" and write: "The ROC used in EKT MUST be the same as the one =
used in the SRTP processing."

Added.  I left the "... MUST precede..." sentence, because EKT process =
does need to precede both normal SRTP and normal SRTCP packet =
processing.


> - [Section 2.2.1]
> - "Not all SRTP or SRTCP packets need to include the EKT key, but it =
SHOULD be included with some regularity, e.g., every second or every ten =
seconds, though it need not be sent on a regular schedule. "
>=20
> Is this left from some old version? EKT key is not sent anywhere...

Should have been Full EKT Field, and I changed it accordingly in the =
upcoming version.


> - [Section 2.2.1]
> "If the Short format is used, an all-zero Reserved octet"
> Maybe just "all-zero octet" as only 7 bits are reserved

Thanks, fixed.


> - [Section 2.2.2]
> I suggest changing "tag" to "field" to be consistent.

Thanks, fixed.  I found some other occurrences which of "Short EKT Tag" =
or "Full EKT Tag" which I also changed to "[Short|Full] EKT Field" for =
consistency.


> - [Section 2.2.2]
> I think the handling when MKI is used needs to be more well-defined.
>  * Is the old or new SRTP master key used for outbound processing of =
the packet containing the Full EKT field?
>  * If the old key is used, then is should be mentioned that the normal =
processing for that packet may fail.
>  * Is ISN and ROC ignored when MKI is used?
>=20
> The current processing does also seem to open up for attacks. Assume =
that SRTP Master Key=3D1 and MKI=3D1 is in use. As I understand it, to =
prepare for future key update, the sender sends a Full EKT field =
containing SRTP Master Key=3D2 in a packet with MKI=3D2. If an attacker =
just changes that MKI from 2 to 1, the receiver will begin associating =
SRTP Master Key=3D2 with MKI=3D1 and all incoming packet processing will =
fail at least until the sender switches to MKI=3D2.

David and I discussed the interaction of ISN and MKI at length.  We =
would like to pull MKI from EKT entirely.  See a separate email, =
subject=3D"changes considered for draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-02" for =
details.

>=20
> [Section 2.2.2]
> "If the crypto context is not new, then the rollover counter in the =
context MUST NOT be set to a value lower than its current value."
>=20
> How does this work when the ROC rolls over and starts at 0 again?

It can't; if ROC rolls over fresh MIKEY/SDESC/DTLS-SRTP keying needs to =
occur.


>=20
> - [Section 2.3]
> "EKT uses an authenticated cipher to encrypt the SRTP master keys, =
ROC, and ISN."
> Also SSRC, I suggest "EKT uses an authenticated cipher to encrypt the =
EKT Plaintext."
>=20
> - [Section 2.3]
> " EKT uses an authenticated cipher"
> "where N is at least M"

> If the cipher is authenticated then N is larger than M. I suggest =
either
> "EKT by default uses an authenticated cipher" or "N is larger than M".=20=


We are updating this section of text, but I neglected to understand part =
of the edits from David McGrew.  A few more cycles and I'll have it, and =
will include that change in -02 and I will reply to this thread with =
that change.



> - [Section 2.3.1]
> "which can be used with plaintexts larger than 16 bytes in length"=20
> Not wrong, but why mention it, RFC5649 can be used with plaintexts as =
short as one octet. I suggest just writing: "Key Wrap with Padding =
[RFC5649] algorithm, which is suitable for keys of any size."
>=20
> - [Section 2.3.1]
> "It requires a plaintext length M that is at least eight bytes"
> True for RFC3394 but not RFC5649, which can be used with plaintexts as =
short as one octet.=20
>=20
> - [Section 2.3.1]
> "it returns a ciphertext with a length of N =3D M + 8 bytes"
>=20
> This is true for RFC3394 but not RFC5649 (unless M is a multiple of =
8). For RFC5649, I think it should be "N =3D 8 * (ceil(M / 8) + 1) =
bytes".

Similarly as above, I am having David McGrew help with these changes to =
ensure everything is aligned properly.




> - [Section 2.6]
> Quite much discussion about "Base Authentication Tag", which is not =
defined (I assume it was in an earlier version). Should be rewritten =
without "Base Authentication Tag".

Fixed, thanks.  Is now Full EKT Field.


>=20
> - [Section 8]
> "With EKT, each SRTP sender and receiver can generate distinct SRTP =
master keys"
>=20
> As you seem to recommend no SSRC sync at the key management level, I =
would say "MUST generate distinct SRTP master keys"

Done.


> - [Section 8]
> "EKT provides complete security, even in the absence of further =
out-of-band coordination of SSRCs, and even when SSRC values collide."
>=20
> I do not understand what is meant with "complete security"? E.g. EKT =
does not provide complete security against replay attacks. I would =
recommend removing the vague "complete security" and instead describe =
explicitly what EKT provides.

Done.


> - [Section 8]
> "In order to avoid potential security issues, the SRTP authentication =
tag length used by the base authentication method MUST be at least ten =
octets."
>=20
> There is no base authentication method defined. I assume there was in =
an earlier draft, and that there is no longer any need to put =
restrictions on the SRTP tag length.

Yes, thanks.  Removed.


> - [Section 8]
> "The presence of the SSRC in the EKT_Plaintext ensures that an =
attacker cannot substitute an EKT_Ciphertext from one SRTP stream into =
another SRTP stream, even if those two streams are using the same SRTP =
master key.  This is important because some applications may use the =
same master key for multiple streams."
>=20
> This is not really true as you recommend to not have strict SSRC =
synchronization. And if you do not then "even if those two streams are =
using the same SRTP master key" may lead to loss of confidential and =
integrity.

Thanks.   Removed.


> - [Section 8]
> "denail" -> "denial"   =20

Thanks, fixed.


> - [Section 8]  =20
> "An attacker learns from EKT when SRTP Master Keys change."
>=20
> Maybe change to "roughly when" or something similar. And if you send =
the Full EKT field with regular intervals, I think an attacker learns =
nothing. Otherwise the attacker learns approximately when. Maybe:
>=20
> "If the full EKT field is sent with regular intervals, and MKI is not =
used, an attacker cannot learn when SRTP Master Keys change."
>=20
> But I do not see this as an attack or important to mention. I would =
also be fine with just removing the text.

Agreed.  Removed.


>=20
> - [Section 8]  =20
> "The EKT Cipher MUST be at least as strong as the encryption and =
authentication operations used in SRTP."
>=20
> The authentication (64-bit tag) in the default EKT Cipher is not as =
strong as the default SRTP authentication (80-bit tag). As not even =
RFC3711 requires that the encryption and authentication operations used =
in SRTP are as strong as the SRTP master key, I do not think EKT should =
either.=20
>=20
> I suggest: "The confidentiality of the EKT Cipher MUST be at least as =
strong as the SRTP Master Key."=20

Combined with Magnus' suggestion to read:
  "The confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of the EKT cipher =
MUST be at least as strong as the SRTP cipher."


> - [Section 8]  =20
> "For each randomly chosen key, the encryption and decryption functions =
cannot be distinguished from a random permutation and its inverse with =
non-negligible advantage."
> "The advantage is defined as the difference between the probability =
that the adversary will identify the cipher as such and the probability =
that the adversary will identify the random permutation as the cipher, =
when each case is equally likely.
>=20
> Even the current EKT cipher fails this as it expands the plaintext ;) =
For the encryption function you could write "the encryption function =
cannot be distinguished from a random function", but not for the default =
decryption function as it can be distinguished even from a random =
function (it only accepts 1 of 2^-64 bitstrings of a given length).=20
>=20
> Maybe it's easiest to just remove the cryptographic details, leaving =
only:
>=20
> "An EKT cipher MUST resist attacks in which both ciphertexts and =
plaintexts can be adaptively chosen and adversaries that can query both =
the encryption and decryption functions adaptively." =20

Adopted your text, thank you.


Thanks again for your detailed review!

-d


>=20
>=20
> =
--------------------------------------------------------------------------=
----------
> JOHN MATTSSON
> MSc Engineering Physics, MSc Business Administration and Economics=20
> Senior Researcher, Security=20
>=20
> Ericsson AB
> Security Research
> F=E4r=F6gatan 6
> SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden
> Phone +46 10 71 43 501
> SMS/MMS +46 76 11 53 501
> john.mattsson@ericsson.com
> www.ericsson.com
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> This Communication is Confidential. We only send and receive email on =
the basis of the terms set out at www.ericsson.com/email_disclaimer=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt


From dwing@cisco.com  Mon Nov 25 22:17:22 2013
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Subject: [AVTCORE] changes planned for EKT
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We received detailed reviews from Michael Peck, John Mattsson, and =
Magnus Westerlund (URLs for their reviews below).  I am replying in =
separate emails to each of Michael, John, and Magnus' reviews and CC'ing =
AVTCORE.


As a result of those reviews, we are considering some changes to EKT, as =
follows:

1. Only use EKT over SRTP, and remove the ability to send EKT over =
SRTCP.  As you may recall, EKT originally worked only over SRTCP, then =
added support for both SRTP and SRTCP.  Our desire to abandon SRTCP is =
because of several deficiencies with carrying EKT over SRTCP compared to =
carrying EKT over SRTP, specifically:
 - SRTCP compound packet problem described in Magnus' review (his point =
"G2").  See URL to his review below.
 - lack of fate sharing between SRTCP (signaling the new SRTP master =
key) and SRTP (using the new SRTP master key).
 - RTCP rate limits for AVP and AVPF profiles, which prevent sending EKT =
in SRTCP as aggressively as one might like when rekeying or when joining =
a session as a new sender.
 - unsure how we might handle ISN (initial sequence number) for the key =
protecting SRTCP (immediately or later), because RTCP does not have a =
sequence number.
 - implementations would have to support EKT over RTP and RTCP.


2. require SRTP master keys to always be randomly generated and never =
shared between sessions, ever.


3. Remove MKI support from EKT, as they are duplicative functions.  As a =
reminder, MKI (master key index) is defined in SRTP (RFC3711) and allows =
to pre-stage a key using call setup key signaling (e.g., Security =
Descriptions, MIKEY, DTLS-SRTP, etc.), whereas EKT has its own mechanism =
to perform a similar function (ISN, initial sequence number, which is =
when a pre-staged key will be used).  Currently the EKT draft has a weak =
discussion of how these interact, and instead of improving this text and =
imposing the implementation burden for MKI support on EKT endpoints, we =
would like to declare MKI with EKT as unsupported and out of scope. =20


4. Require EKT to be negotiated during call setup, and require endpoints =
to wait until receiving the EKT Full Field packet (containing the =
decryption key) before attempting to authenticate packets (to avoid =
doubling authentication effort).  This avoids new joiners attempting to =
authenticate two packets when they join an EKT session (the first =
attempt using the SRTP master key from normal key-management (MIKEY, =
SDESC, DTLS-SRTP, whatever) and if that fails the second attempt from =
the EKT-provided SRTP master key).


We would really like to hear WG feedback on the above proposed changes =
before we publish -02 of draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt.  If you are =
adventurous, the work-in-progress -02 is at =
https://svn.tools.ietf.org/svn/wg/avtcore/draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt/draf=
t-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-02.txt, and side-by-side diffs are at =
http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-01.txt&ur=
l2=3Dhttps://svn.tools.ietf.org/svn/wg/avtcore/draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt=
/draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-ekt-02.txt -- but this is my work-in-progress =
version of -02, and does not yet have any of the proposed changes 1 =
through 4 (above) included in that text, until we receive feedback from =
the working group.


Review URLs:
 Magnus Westerlund review, =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/current/msg16109.html
 Michael Peck review, =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/current/msg16107.html
 John Mattsson review, =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/current/msg16095.html

-d


From magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com  Fri Nov 29 04:21:50 2013
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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] changes planned for EKT
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On 2013-11-26 07:17, Dan Wing wrote:
> We received detailed reviews from Michael Peck, John Mattsson, and
> Magnus Westerlund (URLs for their reviews below).  I am replying in
> separate emails to each of Michael, John, and Magnus' reviews and
> CC'ing AVTCORE.
> 
> 
> As a result of those reviews, we are considering some changes to EKT,
> as follows:
> 
> 1. Only use EKT over SRTP, and remove the ability to send EKT over
> SRTCP.  As you may recall, EKT originally worked only over SRTCP,
> then added support for both SRTP and SRTCP.  Our desire to abandon
> SRTCP is because of several deficiencies with carrying EKT over SRTCP
> compared to carrying EKT over SRTP, specifically: - SRTCP compound
> packet problem described in Magnus' review (his point "G2").  See URL
> to his review below. - lack of fate sharing between SRTCP (signaling
> the new SRTP master key) and SRTP (using the new SRTP master key). -
> RTCP rate limits for AVP and AVPF profiles, which prevent sending EKT
> in SRTCP as aggressively as one might like when rekeying or when
> joining a session as a new sender. - unsure how we might handle ISN
> (initial sequence number) for the key protecting SRTCP (immediately
> or later), because RTCP does not have a sequence number. -
> implementations would have to support EKT over RTP and RTCP.

I wonder if this really works in reality. The issues I directly can see are:

1. In an RTP session where RTP is one way only, the receiver's RTCP
reports will be unable to change their key when they have over used any
initially generated key.

2. Still have synchronization issues with the keys. In this case rather
with RTCP, because of reorder or packet loss, an RTCP packet using a new
key can arrive prior to the key and thus fail to be decrypted.
This might be a minor issue, but still needs consideration.

I think 1) above is the real significant issue here.

2) I assume can be solved by procedures or possible using some type of
MKI field to point at which key is used.



> 
> 
> 2. require SRTP master keys to always be randomly generated and never
> shared between sessions, ever.

I think this is fine.

> 
> 
> 3. Remove MKI support from EKT, as they are duplicative functions.
> As a reminder, MKI (master key index) is defined in SRTP (RFC3711)
> and allows to pre-stage a key using call setup key signaling (e.g.,
> Security Descriptions, MIKEY, DTLS-SRTP, etc.), whereas EKT has its
> own mechanism to perform a similar function (ISN, initial sequence
> number, which is when a pre-staged key will be used).  Currently the
> EKT draft has a weak discussion of how these interact, and instead of
> improving this text and imposing the implementation burden for MKI
> support on EKT endpoints, we would like to declare MKI with EKT as
> unsupported and out of scope.
> 

Considering issue 2) for the above, I wonder if using the MKI might be a
better solution?

> 
> 4. Require EKT to be negotiated during call setup, and require
> endpoints to wait until receiving the EKT Full Field packet
> (containing the decryption key) before attempting to authenticate
> packets (to avoid doubling authentication effort).  This avoids new
> joiners attempting to authenticate two packets when they join an EKT
> session (the first attempt using the SRTP master key from normal
> key-management (MIKEY, SDESC, DTLS-SRTP, whatever) and if that fails
> the second attempt from the EKT-provided SRTP master key).

I think it is good to consider and be more explicit about how the normal
key-management keys functions in the presence of EKT.

I am uncertain what issues, if any, your proposal will result. I do
encourage additional persons to consider this and provide feedback.

Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
Färögatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
----------------------------------------------------------------------


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Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] changes planned for EKT
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On Nov 29, 2013, at 4:21 AM, Magnus Westerlund =
<magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com> wrote:

> On 2013-11-26 07:17, Dan Wing wrote:
>> We received detailed reviews from Michael Peck, John Mattsson, and
>> Magnus Westerlund (URLs for their reviews below).  I am replying in
>> separate emails to each of Michael, John, and Magnus' reviews and
>> CC'ing AVTCORE.
>>=20
>>=20
>> As a result of those reviews, we are considering some changes to EKT,
>> as follows:
>>=20
>> 1. Only use EKT over SRTP, and remove the ability to send EKT over
>> SRTCP.  As you may recall, EKT originally worked only over SRTCP,
>> then added support for both SRTP and SRTCP.  Our desire to abandon
>> SRTCP is because of several deficiencies with carrying EKT over SRTCP
>> compared to carrying EKT over SRTP, specifically: - SRTCP compound
>> packet problem described in Magnus' review (his point "G2").  See URL
>> to his review below. - lack of fate sharing between SRTCP (signaling
>> the new SRTP master key) and SRTP (using the new SRTP master key). -
>> RTCP rate limits for AVP and AVPF profiles, which prevent sending EKT
>> in SRTCP as aggressively as one might like when rekeying or when
>> joining a session as a new sender. - unsure how we might handle ISN
>> (initial sequence number) for the key protecting SRTCP (immediately
>> or later), because RTCP does not have a sequence number. -
>> implementations would have to support EKT over RTP and RTCP.
>=20
> I wonder if this really works in reality. The issues I directly can =
see are:
>=20
> 1. In an RTP session where RTP is one way only, the receiver's RTCP
> reports will be unable to change their key when they have over used =
any
> initially generated key.

I don't envision a key exhaustion problem with SRTCP.

> 2. Still have synchronization issues with the keys. In this case =
rather
> with RTCP, because of reorder or packet loss, an RTCP packet using a =
new
> key can arrive prior to the key and thus fail to be decrypted.
> This might be a minor issue, but still needs consideration.

> I think 1) above is the real significant issue here.
>=20
> 2) I assume can be solved by procedures or possible using some type of
> MKI field to point at which key is used.

Are you thinking of adding an MKI field to the SRTCP packet?  As you had =
pointed out previously, we don't have an RTCP sequence number and there  =
isn't much else to work from in the SRTCP payload format.

A variation on existing wording might be all that is necessary if we =
add:

   Due to packet loss and reordering, an SRTCP packet can be received
   using a new key before the EKT packet has been received.  SRTCP=20
   receivers MAY want to delay discarding SRTCP packets from known=20
   SSRCs that fail authentication in anticipation of receiving=20
   a rekeying event via EKT shortly.


>> 2. require SRTP master keys to always be randomly generated and never
>> shared between sessions, ever.
>=20
> I think this is fine.
>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> 3. Remove MKI support from EKT, as they are duplicative functions.
>> As a reminder, MKI (master key index) is defined in SRTP (RFC3711)
>> and allows to pre-stage a key using call setup key signaling (e.g.,
>> Security Descriptions, MIKEY, DTLS-SRTP, etc.), whereas EKT has its
>> own mechanism to perform a similar function (ISN, initial sequence
>> number, which is when a pre-staged key will be used).  Currently the
>> EKT draft has a weak discussion of how these interact, and instead of
>> improving this text and imposing the implementation burden for MKI
>> support on EKT endpoints, we would like to declare MKI with EKT as
>> unsupported and out of scope.
>>=20
>=20
> Considering issue 2) for the above, I wonder if using the MKI might be =
a
> better solution?
>=20
>>=20
>> 4. Require EKT to be negotiated during call setup, and require
>> endpoints to wait until receiving the EKT Full Field packet
>> (containing the decryption key) before attempting to authenticate
>> packets (to avoid doubling authentication effort).  This avoids new
>> joiners attempting to authenticate two packets when they join an EKT
>> session (the first attempt using the SRTP master key from normal
>> key-management (MIKEY, SDESC, DTLS-SRTP, whatever) and if that fails
>> the second attempt from the EKT-provided SRTP master key).
>=20
> I think it is good to consider and be more explicit about how the =
normal
> key-management keys functions in the presence of EKT.

Some history:  Initially, when EKT was only spec'd to work over SRTCP, =
our product teams had a lot of concern with call setup delay to wait for =
the EKT packets for the common 'new sender' case.  Honoring the AVP/AVPF =
profiles for RTCP transmission made this even worse so the product =
ignored the RTCP profile rules (which is not good).  For that reason and =
to share fate with the SRTP packet itself, we added support for EKT over =
SRTP.  With those changes, EKT does not harm call setup delay (because =
the SRTP packet contains the EKT key).=20

When a new receiver joins an existing session, the receiver has to =
necessarily wait for EKT (to understand received packets) and there is =
no value or benefit for the new receiver to send SRTCP packets into that =
existing session using its key-management key (because all the other =
receivers don't know [or care] about that particular receiver's unique =
key-management key).


> I am uncertain what issues, if any, your proposal will result. I do
> encourage additional persons to consider this and provide feedback.

Yes, I am hoping to hear from more people before making changes.

-d


> Cheers
>=20
> Magnus Westerlund
>=20
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Multimedia Technologies, Ericsson Research EAB/TVM
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Ericsson AB                | Phone  +46 10 7148287
> F=E4r=F6gatan 6                | Mobile +46 73 0949079
> SE-164 80 Stockholm, Sweden| mailto: magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>=20

