
From fluffy@cisco.com  Thu Dec  5 08:56:43 2013
Return-Path: <fluffy@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDC721AE0A7; Thu,  5 Dec 2013 08:56:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -109.502
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-109.502 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WewDLdODgau3; Thu,  5 Dec 2013 08:56:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from alln-iport-7.cisco.com (alln-iport-7.cisco.com [173.37.142.94]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DAA721AE09C; Thu,  5 Dec 2013 08:56:41 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=@cisco.com; l=2353; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1386262598; x=1387472198; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:references: in-reply-to:content-id:content-transfer-encoding: mime-version; bh=XjWpTUOTRV7O1kRq9MPZou8yQnCVWlMzAxO2XLxsttg=; b=Sps4b+SxYRRDa7GxuHyP7hhyqtEyu86tH5sDs9qagWTIi811Eiln4hVA tpXpLe/g8iguOr3XCeO3axcRdLQxz5uRBouCf8KJzZZF+a+zmfuV77jpU ecBAVt+FB6Q5kcTJRF/Y/0oSCx1Ag4n3iswBOufh8dYFOwxEcLoYwrlEE Q=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AsUFAF6voFKtJXG//2dsb2JhbABZgwc4U7htgRwWbQeCJQEBAQMBAQEBNzQLEAIBCBIkBQsnCxQDDgIEDgUbh2EGDcFXF45NMweDIIETA5gUgTCQY4FrgT6CKg
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.93,834,1378857600";  d="scan'208";a="4595743"
Received: from rcdn-core2-4.cisco.com ([173.37.113.191]) by alln-iport-7.cisco.com with ESMTP; 05 Dec 2013 16:56:38 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x12.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x12.cisco.com [173.37.183.86]) by rcdn-core2-4.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id rB5GucAA000713 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Thu, 5 Dec 2013 16:56:38 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x02.cisco.com ([169.254.5.231]) by xhc-rcd-x12.cisco.com ([173.37.183.86]) with mapi id 14.03.0123.003; Thu, 5 Dec 2013 10:56:38 -0600
From: "Cullen Jennings (fluffy)" <fluffy@cisco.com>
To: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
Thread-Index: AQHO8dr2KpmHjzBK6UeIp1AiReLDwQ==
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2013 16:56:38 +0000
Message-ID: <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
In-Reply-To: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.20.249.164]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <6DC7060D3756844B8690EDD40488D14A@emea.cisco.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2013 16:56:44 -0000

Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer think this =
document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb working group, =
I doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area either.=20

I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each different sce=
nario RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how it needs to be =
secured and for scenarios not listed such as new usages, what the requireme=
nts are. For something like SIP, having just one way to secure RTP is much =
better than having many ways.=20



On Nov 22, 2013, at 3:07 PM, The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:

>=20
> The IESG has received a request from the Audio/Video Transport Core
> Maintenance WG (avtcore) to consider the following document:
> - 'Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single
>   Media Security Solution'
>  <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> as Informational RFC
>=20
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-12-06. Exceptionally, comments may be
> sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>=20
> Abstract
>=20
>=20
>   This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia
>   sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP),
>   and the associated RTP Control Protocol (RTCP), do not mandate a
>   single media security mechanism.  Guidelines for designers and
>   reviewers of future RTP extensions are provided, to ensure that
>   appropriate security mechanisms are mandated, and that any such
>   mechanisms are specified in a manner that conforms with the RTP
>   architecture.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> The file can be obtained via
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory/
>=20
> IESG discussion can be tracked via
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory/ballot/
>=20
>=20
> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt


From ron.even.tlv@gmail.com  Thu Dec  5 15:15:49 2013
Return-Path: <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CECF71AE17E; Thu,  5 Dec 2013 15:15:49 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9,  DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qBxU2k6uyx6x; Thu,  5 Dec 2013 15:15:47 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-ee0-x231.google.com (mail-ee0-x231.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4013:c00::231]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 725A31AE11D; Thu,  5 Dec 2013 15:15:46 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-ee0-f49.google.com with SMTP id c41so3511540eek.36 for <multiple recipients>; Thu, 05 Dec 2013 15:15:42 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=from:to:cc:references:in-reply-to:subject:date:message-id :mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:thread-index :content-language; bh=aoL6pzHBKmts58ZYsFGuHg8uXO85fu6Ee+eO+5d6zGQ=; b=nPfHKmIw0Xho6WXLj+uLfJrqc5gmIM9SfQUVi3kQGOqVCuv+QGz1ZI6jfpWcmHApkg sJrQQoibdV7xXMDWfSJDpiRoL8CntqLKDiLsExdN9+OFFGtItnMQmhSd2f/1gkjoyn0a cYxwg9Hn+QCQbFyXoyPgOQnJ626h+OQFaH62hX0bbN3hHgYqVF1jRN7ROyk5dBJnOJHQ Il/XhzDETcAQ2r9V7t2YmfS8gGWLzi+xfQMVc56lp0rfAYHizi0cHNjvL0ph2oaKlz/D KWwzSOwQ+Oylw6xF0/TlnOHRerUnWFHjyWFMjtmHpumvx6jJz/iefjohNKUy5hREk+xz ZjKQ==
X-Received: by 10.14.69.200 with SMTP id n48mr226736eed.54.1386285342568; Thu, 05 Dec 2013 15:15:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from RoniE ([109.67.11.64]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id h48sm110892169eev.3.2013.12.05.15.15.38 for <multiple recipients> (version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Thu, 05 Dec 2013 15:15:41 -0800 (PST)
From: "Roni Even" <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
To: "'Cullen Jennings \(fluffy\)'" <fluffy@cisco.com>, <ietf@ietf.org>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2013 01:12:10 +0200
Message-ID: <017801cef20f$6f82aff0$4e880fd0$@gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 14.0
Thread-Index: AQIN2m3x3ejERQ3kSYuKg2EXPhgFzwOCOPRCmaxWjAA=
Content-Language: en-us
Cc: avt@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 05 Dec 2013 23:15:50 -0000

Cullen,
Let's say hypothetically that the AVTcore WG will propose and get consensus
that for RTCweb usage the security mechanism MUST use SDES for key exchange,
do you see this as a binding recommendation for RTCweb? The selection was
done by RTCweb and not by AVTcore.

The document does not say that there should be no security but says that it
is up to the usage or a for a decision. The security option document provide
the information about the different security options available and where
they are used.

Roni Even

> -----Original Message-----
> From: avt [mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Cullen Jennings
(fluffy)
> Sent: 05 December, 2013 6:57 PM
> To: ietf@ietf.org
> Cc: avt@ietf.org WG
> Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call:
<draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt>
> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single
> Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
> 
> 
> Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer think this
> document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb working group,
> I doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area either.
> 
> I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each different
scenario
> RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how it needs to be
secured and
> for scenarios not listed such as new usages, what the requirements are.
For
> something like SIP, having just one way to secure RTP is much better than
> having many ways.
> 
> 
> 
> On Nov 22, 2013, at 3:07 PM, The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> >
> > The IESG has received a request from the Audio/Video Transport Core
> > Maintenance WG (avtcore) to consider the following document:
> > - 'Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a
Single
> >   Media Security Solution'
> >  <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> as Informational RFC
> >
> > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> > final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
> > ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-12-06. Exceptionally, comments may
> > be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
> > beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
> >
> > Abstract
> >
> >
> >   This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia
> >   sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP),
> >   and the associated RTP Control Protocol (RTCP), do not mandate a
> >   single media security mechanism.  Guidelines for designers and
> >   reviewers of future RTP extensions are provided, to ensure that
> >   appropriate security mechanisms are mandated, and that any such
> >   mechanisms are specified in a manner that conforms with the RTP
> >   architecture.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > The file can be obtained via
> > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory/
> >
> > IESG discussion can be tracked via
> > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory/ball
> > ot/
> >
> >
> > No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance avt@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt


From csp@csperkins.org  Fri Dec  6 03:40:29 2013
Return-Path: <csp@csperkins.org>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 41F251ADF54; Fri,  6 Dec 2013 03:40:29 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZV_NiqvUEcAX; Fri,  6 Dec 2013 03:40:27 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balrog.mythic-beasts.com (balrog.mythic-beasts.com [IPv6:2a00:1098:0:82:1000:0:2:1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B7311ADF4E; Fri,  6 Dec 2013 03:40:27 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [130.209.247.112] (port=52111 helo=mangole.dcs.gla.ac.uk) by balrog.mythic-beasts.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from <csp@csperkins.org>) id 1Votlb-0003xB-NV; Fri, 06 Dec 2013 11:40:21 +0000
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.6 \(1510\))
From: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
In-Reply-To: <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2013 11:40:18 +0000
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com>
To: Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1510)
X-BlackCat-Spam-Score: -28
X-Mythic-Debug: Threshold =  On = 
Cc: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2013 11:40:29 -0000

Cullen,

On 5 Dec 2013, at 16:56, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com> =
wrote:
> Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer think =
this document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb working =
group, I doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area either.=20
>=20
> I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each =
different scenario RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how =
it needs to be secured and for scenarios not listed such as new usages, =
what the requirements are. For something like SIP, having just one way =
to secure RTP is much better than having many ways.=20


I'm confused about your objection, since this draft states that we need =
to do exactly as you propose.=20

Colin



--=20
Colin Perkins
http://csperkins.org/




From bernard_aboba@hotmail.com  Fri Dec  6 07:30:46 2013
Return-Path: <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CA9EC1ADA5D; Fri,  6 Dec 2013 07:30:46 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id RpmhG07AxGsL; Fri,  6 Dec 2013 07:30:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: from blu0-omc2-s28.blu0.hotmail.com (blu0-omc2-s28.blu0.hotmail.com [65.55.111.103]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0562F1AC863; Fri,  6 Dec 2013 07:30:44 -0800 (PST)
Received: from BLU169-W109 ([65.55.111.72]) by blu0-omc2-s28.blu0.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.4675);  Fri, 6 Dec 2013 07:30:41 -0800
X-TMN: [qA/OrMoukjn2OkIYLy57eRgwo6V1fS9T]
X-Originating-Email: [bernard_aboba@hotmail.com]
Message-ID: <BLU169-W109A0CACEE0605DA8F317F893D60@phx.gbl>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_1aaffa13-2edb-403f-975a-771f5ef3d1f3_"
From: Bernard Aboba <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
To: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>, Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2013 07:30:40 -0800
Importance: Normal
In-Reply-To: <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>, <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com>, <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Dec 2013 15:30:41.0010 (UTC) FILETIME=[1F0B2D20:01CEF298]
Cc: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2013 15:30:47 -0000

--_1aaffa13-2edb-403f-975a-771f5ef3d1f3_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Colin said:=20
> I'm confused about your objection=2C since this draft states that we need=
 to do exactly as you propose.=20

[BA] I agree with Colin.  The document is consistent with the Danvers Doctr=
ine and more recently expressed sentiments.=20
>From Section 6:=20
   Given the variability of the classes of application that use=0A=
   RTP=2C and the variety of the currently available security mechanisms=0A=
   described in [I-D.ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options]=2C no one set of=0A=
   MTI security options can realistically be specified that apply to all=0A=
   classes of RTP applications.=0A=
=0A=
   Documents that define an interoperable class of applications using=0A=
   RTP are subject to [RFC3365]=2C and so need to specify MTI security=0A=
   mechanisms.  This is because such specifications do fully specify=0A=
   interoperable applications that use RTP.  Examples of such documents=0A=
   under development in the IETF at the time of this writing are the=0A=
   RTCWEB Security Architecture [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch] and the=0A=
   Real Time Streaming Protocol 2.0 (RTSP) [I-D.ietf-mmusic-rfc2326bis].=0A=
   It is also expected that a similar document will be produced for=0A=
   voice-over-IP applications using SIP and RTP. 		 	   		  =

--_1aaffa13-2edb-403f-975a-771f5ef3d1f3_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<style><!--
.hmmessage P
{
margin:0px=3B
padding:0px
}
body.hmmessage
{
font-size: 12pt=3B
font-family:Calibri
}
--></style></head>
<body class=3D'hmmessage'><div dir=3D'ltr'><div>Colin said:&nbsp=3B</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>&gt=3B I'm confused about your objection=2C since this dr=
aft states that we need to do exactly as you propose. <br><br></div><div>[B=
A] I agree with Colin. &nbsp=3BThe document is consistent with the Danvers =
Doctrine and more recently expressed sentiments.&nbsp=3B</div><div><br></di=
v><div>From Section 6:&nbsp=3B</div><div><br></div><div><pre class=3D"newpa=
ge" style=3D"font-size: 1em=3B margin-top: 0px=3B margin-bottom: 0px=3B pag=
e-break-before: always=3B">   Given the variability of the classes of appli=
cation that use=0A=
   RTP=2C and the variety of the currently available security mechanisms=0A=
   described in [<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-=
not-mandatory-14#ref-I-D.ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options">I-D.ietf-avtcor=
e-rtp-security-options</a>]=2C no one set of=0A=
   MTI security options can realistically be specified that apply to all=0A=
   classes of RTP applications.=0A=
=0A=
   Documents that define an interoperable class of applications using=0A=
   RTP are subject to [<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3365" title=
=3D"&quot=3BStrong Security Requirements for Internet Engineering Task Forc=
e Standard Protocols&quot=3B">RFC3365</a>]=2C and so need to specify MTI se=
curity=0A=
   mechanisms.  This is because such specifications do fully specify=0A=
   interoperable applications that use RTP.  Examples of such documents=0A=
   under development in the IETF at the time of this writing are the=0A=
   RTCWEB Security Architecture [<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draf=
t-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14#ref-I-D.ietf-rtcweb-security-arch">I-D.iet=
f-rtcweb-security-arch</a>] and the=0A=
   Real Time Streaming Protocol 2.0 (RTSP) [<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.or=
g/html/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14#ref-I-D.ietf-mmusic-rfc2326bis"=
>I-D.ietf-mmusic-rfc2326bis</a>].=0A=
   It is also expected that a similar document will be produced for=0A=
   voice-over-IP applications using SIP and RTP.</pre></div> 		 	   		  </d=
iv></body>
</html>=

--_1aaffa13-2edb-403f-975a-771f5ef3d1f3_--

From fluffy@cisco.com  Mon Dec  9 14:16:21 2013
Return-Path: <fluffy@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1F89B1AE5F0; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:16:21 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -114.502
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-114.502 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ttwFyVWJXvwF; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:16:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rcdn-iport-7.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-7.cisco.com [173.37.86.78]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D802D1AE5EA; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:16:18 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=@cisco.com; l=3842; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1386627374; x=1387836974; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:references: in-reply-to:content-id:content-transfer-encoding: mime-version; bh=68RTbr/R7MHz60ZiXYbeWispemhV9pnRkv8cBWNfhRI=; b=IEHQl1h3prDAsQWCLmigG/39YOmgiPPRF1o4MzDY4nAHJahIfT45xo6i btpNbZpo+OUdXgZTiKQ7ND7GJe7qnU4BgDZVERFJCpGDcHjgzgUeMMck2 qSDG7CQIc93PzmiISoMhYvN6zwCH16iHOuLLQT3S+cD4aZ64lZaGB4//j Y=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgUFAOU/plKtJXHB/2dsb2JhbABZgwc4U7kWgTIWdIIlAQEBAwEBAQE3NAsFBwQCAQgOAwEDAQEBHgUEByEGCxQDBggCBA4FG4dVAwkGDbl1DYZnF4x9gWAzBwaDGoETA5YpgWuBMIsqhTmBa4E+gio
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.93,860,1378857600"; d="scan'208";a="290413432"
Received: from rcdn-core2-6.cisco.com ([173.37.113.193]) by rcdn-iport-7.cisco.com with ESMTP; 09 Dec 2013 22:16:13 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x12.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x12.cisco.com [173.37.183.86]) by rcdn-core2-6.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id rB9MGDFS032351 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Mon, 9 Dec 2013 22:16:13 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x02.cisco.com ([169.254.5.231]) by xhc-rcd-x12.cisco.com ([173.37.183.86]) with mapi id 14.03.0123.003; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 16:16:13 -0600
From: "Cullen Jennings (fluffy)" <fluffy@cisco.com>
To: Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
Thread-Index: AQHO9SxFEwg7OLOsskW+JDdGB07dOA==
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2013 22:16:13 +0000
Message-ID: <A22A842D-8391-467B-8DC0-17A3966DFF74@cisco.com>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <017801cef20f$6f82aff0$4e880fd0$@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <017801cef20f$6f82aff0$4e880fd0$@gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.20.249.164]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <BBF61CA5FB7FEC4E883D03B45FB9AD38@emea.cisco.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "<ietf@ietf.org>" <ietf@ietf.org>, "<avt@ietf.org>" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 22:16:21 -0000

On Dec 5, 2013, at 4:12 PM, Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com> wrote:

> Cullen,
> Let's say hypothetically that the AVTcore WG will propose and get consens=
us
> that for RTCweb usage the security mechanism MUST use SDES for key exchan=
ge,
> do you see this as a binding recommendation for RTCweb? The selection was
> done by RTCweb and not by AVTcore.

I was pushing more on the privacy / confidentiality for RTP vs the keying, =
so more SRTP than SDES.=20


>=20
> The document does not say that there should be no security but says that =
it
> is up to the usage or a for a decision. The security option document prov=
ide
> the information about the different security options available and where
> they are used.
>=20
> Roni Even
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: avt [mailto:avt-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Cullen Jennings
> (fluffy)
>> Sent: 05 December, 2013 6:57 PM
>> To: ietf@ietf.org
>> Cc: avt@ietf.org WG
>> Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call:
> <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt>
>> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single
>> Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
>>=20
>>=20
>> Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer think th=
is
>> document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb working grou=
p,
>> I doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area either.
>>=20
>> I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each different
> scenario
>> RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how it needs to be
> secured and
>> for scenarios not listed such as new usages, what the requirements are.
> For
>> something like SIP, having just one way to secure RTP is much better tha=
n
>> having many ways.
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Nov 22, 2013, at 3:07 PM, The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> wrote:
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> The IESG has received a request from the Audio/Video Transport Core
>>> Maintenance WG (avtcore) to consider the following document:
>>> - 'Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a
> Single
>>>  Media Security Solution'
>>> <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> as Informational RFC
>>>=20
>>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>>> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>>> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2013-12-06. Exceptionally, comments may
>>> be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
>>> beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>>>=20
>>> Abstract
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>  This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia
>>>  sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP),
>>>  and the associated RTP Control Protocol (RTCP), do not mandate a
>>>  single media security mechanism.  Guidelines for designers and
>>>  reviewers of future RTP extensions are provided, to ensure that
>>>  appropriate security mechanisms are mandated, and that any such
>>>  mechanisms are specified in a manner that conforms with the RTP
>>>  architecture.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> The file can be obtained via
>>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory/
>>>=20
>>> IESG discussion can be tracked via
>>> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory/ball
>>> ot/
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance avt@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
>> avt@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>=20


From fluffy@cisco.com  Mon Dec  9 14:24:47 2013
Return-Path: <fluffy@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BD561AE604; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:24:47 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -109.502
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-109.502 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8mwDoP3FcSsM; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:24:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: from alln-iport-1.cisco.com (alln-iport-1.cisco.com [173.37.142.88]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2EA971AE5FF; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:24:45 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=@cisco.com; l=1796; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1386627880; x=1387837480; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:references: in-reply-to:content-id:content-transfer-encoding: mime-version; bh=p5ISARUnOzAWhF65Nvul+6nJXHtj18gQ8t0CQqVF7D8=; b=CvbN6TY9dHeTU+0QUNS6loDe4/fohnrKgRn0CZ1L2ZGqigU1S9xGrI41 ZsGozpe/z/GsPS1ZjuoSM3c1lIISv6dFoivpwhjJwFDLHB40AQRst/yG3 9GIrgM83f7udBO6OsdjDynR8VUkBIxxjPl7NWkZe+DYHLJ8Mnea5QCTzn 4=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgMFAEFCplKtJV2a/2dsb2JhbABZgwc4U7kWgSwWdIIlAQEBAwE6PwULAgEIDgoeBQsyJQIEDgUbh2EGwGgXjl0zB4MggRMDmBSBMJBjgWuBPoIq
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.93,860,1378857600";  d="scan'208";a="5515765"
Received: from rcdn-core-3.cisco.com ([173.37.93.154]) by alln-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 09 Dec 2013 22:24:40 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x04.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x04.cisco.com [173.37.183.78]) by rcdn-core-3.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id rB9MOdMK027399 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Mon, 9 Dec 2013 22:24:39 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x02.cisco.com ([169.254.5.231]) by xhc-rcd-x04.cisco.com ([fe80::200:5efe:173.37.183.34%12]) with mapi id 14.03.0123.003; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 16:24:39 -0600
From: "Cullen Jennings (fluffy)" <fluffy@cisco.com>
To: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
Thread-Topic: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
Thread-Index: AQHO9S1ySUG4BAsTeEei4eh9gjkuXA==
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2013 22:24:38 +0000
Message-ID: <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org>
In-Reply-To: <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.20.249.164]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <5551CA97ED187F4791C7F16D91202FDD@emea.cisco.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 22:24:47 -0000

This document says RTP does not need to specify a security mechanisms and t=
hat's OK. Note this document could says you must do A or B depending on the=
 situation but it does not. It just says it is ok not to specify anything. =
My read of the consensus at last plenary was that the IETF had decided it w=
as going to stop doing that. I don't care about if this draft is published =
as it or not as I think this draft will have zero impact to what is deploye=
d. I do think it is worth us being consistent on what security we expect to=
 have in RFC going forward.

All I am asking is the IESG be consistent about how they judge consensus on=
 this and if they decide to publish it, provide some guidance on when they =
think it is fine to not have security and when they think it is not fine.=20



On Dec 6, 2013, at 4:40 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org> wrote:

> Cullen,
>=20
> On 5 Dec 2013, at 16:56, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com> wrot=
e:
>> Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer think th=
is document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb working grou=
p, I doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area either.=20
>>=20
>> I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each different =
scenario RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how it needs to =
be secured and for scenarios not listed such as new usages, what the requir=
ements are. For something like SIP, having just one way to secure RTP is mu=
ch better than having many ways.=20
>=20
>=20
> I'm confused about your objection, since this draft states that we need t=
o do exactly as you propose.=20
>=20
> Colin
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Colin Perkins
> http://csperkins.org/
>=20
>=20
>=20


From martin.thomson@gmail.com  Mon Dec  9 14:55:24 2013
Return-Path: <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 01B6A1A1F61; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:55:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9,  DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9SEvCbKm2INd; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:55:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-wi0-x22e.google.com (mail-wi0-x22e.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c05::22e]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E6731A1F06; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:55:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-wi0-f174.google.com with SMTP id z2so4582805wiv.13 for <multiple recipients>; Mon, 09 Dec 2013 14:55:16 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=jyhKvsMCSPx4mDW74bbZHIAcVMc3NtmWzx7p/8LqqG8=; b=ay7ADVuQd3uMhrSBtp1Ar5ugObiQnRmxZVXAthOGAUEeE9HOny6Zk1x8tvGmeoG+jb uRXKHnSScX/JhkEDgbkTFEFOSyFnamJEBwg2AmOepyd7GMt7ZN9QUGQhpB6tnSFi6196 pSmWSQeMkpcQLsW3PGk2+VOamhhF2IFevFFYCUpqYfx27AW4v3EHwDSczAxu2VRGA75h mhsbXhWwOh21J3M6JmXpz6FvEe0YJaaQnPuShfKM0yu2Vz2sycAdbIw94Cwl+2QLXgvw XObFkoqZk6Auh/s5QMK5edCMe43r2QEYzGeixxbiezrGw3JlOGvyg5PPqIL4SmoZRlYX LXUw==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.180.188.175 with SMTP id gb15mr11303452wic.50.1386629716926;  Mon, 09 Dec 2013 14:55:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.227.134.195 with HTTP; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 14:55:16 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <A22A842D-8391-467B-8DC0-17A3966DFF74@cisco.com>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <017801cef20f$6f82aff0$4e880fd0$@gmail.com> <A22A842D-8391-467B-8DC0-17A3966DFF74@cisco.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2013 14:55:16 -0800
Message-ID: <CABkgnnWvaH1VKCdNPvVdWSj=J0kBq6x1Dof7Fnx=PhdQE2qLjw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: "Cullen Jennings (fluffy)" <fluffy@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Cc: "<ietf@ietf.org>" <ietf@ietf.org>, "<avt@ietf.org>" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 22:55:24 -0000

On 9 December 2013 14:16, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com> wrote:
> I was pushing more on the privacy / confidentiality for RTP vs the keying, so more SRTP than SDES.

I don't think that you get anything meaningful without tackling key
agreement.  Even then, we're not done until we've got systems in place
for doing authentication.  Good thing we're doing something about that
with WebRTC.

From csp@csperkins.org  Mon Dec  9 14:59:10 2013
Return-Path: <csp@csperkins.org>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04B8A1A8028; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:59:10 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Rlr7R6tShXrr; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:59:07 -0800 (PST)
Received: from haggis.mythic-beasts.com (haggis.mythic-beasts.com [IPv6:2a00:1098:0:86:1000:0:2:1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9FF821A1F3F; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 14:59:07 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [87.213.41.162] (port=60746 helo=[10.71.0.165]) by haggis.mythic-beasts.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from <csp@csperkins.org>) id 1Vq9n3-0000e8-52; Mon, 09 Dec 2013 22:59:02 +0000
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.6 \(1510\))
From: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
In-Reply-To: <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2013 23:59:00 +0100
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <0FA6EC2C-3FAB-4E72-882E-13640108C328@csperkins.org>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org> <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com>
To: Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1510)
X-BlackCat-Spam-Score: -28
X-Mythic-Debug: Threshold =  On = 
Cc: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 22:59:10 -0000

Cullen,

That is absolutely not the intent of the document. =46rom the =
Introduction, 2nd paragraph:

   The IETF policy on Strong Security Requirements for IETF Standard
   Protocols [RFC3365] (the so-called "Danvers Doctrine") states that
   "we MUST implement strong security in all protocols to provide for
   the all too frequent day when the protocol comes into widespread use
   in the global Internet".  The security mechanisms defined for use
   with RTP allow these requirements to be met.  However, since RTP is a
   protocol framework that is suitable for a wide variety of use cases,
   there is no single security mechanism that is suitable for every
   scenario.  This memo outlines why this is the case, and discusses how
   users of RTP can meet the requirement for strong security.

You will note that last sentence "This memo...discusses how users of RTP =
can meet the requirement for strong security". Experience has shown that =
just saying "use SRTP" is not sufficient: SRTP is not suitable to secure =
all uses of RTP, and the keying mechanisms needed are wildly different =
across different use domains. The draft explains in more detail why this =
is the case, and makes the case that we need -- as you suggest -- drafts =
explaining how to secure each class of applications using RTP =
(telephony, WebRTC, IPTV, etc.). It doesn't actually specify security, =
that it true. Rather is references to =
draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options (also in IETF last call) which =
describes the available security options, and refers to the drafts that =
do define mandatory-to-implement security for different application =
domains (e.g., the WebRTC security architecture).

If some part of the draft is unclear about this, and can possibly be =
interpreted to allow insecure use of RTP, please explain what, and we =
will fix it.=20

Colin


On 9 Dec 2013, at 23:24, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com> =
wrote:
> This document says RTP does not need to specify a security mechanisms =
and that's OK. Note this document could says you must do A or B =
depending on the situation but it does not. It just says it is ok not to =
specify anything.
>=20
> My read of the consensus at last plenary was that the IETF had decided =
it was going to stop doing that. I don't care about if this draft is =
published as it or not as I think this draft will have zero impact to =
what is deployed. I do think it is worth us being consistent on what =
security we expect to have in RFC going forward.
>=20
> All I am asking is the IESG be consistent about how they judge =
consensus on this and if they decide to publish it, provide some =
guidance on when they think it is fine to not have security and when =
they think it is not fine.=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Dec 6, 2013, at 4:40 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org> wrote:
>=20
>> Cullen,
>>=20
>> On 5 Dec 2013, at 16:56, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com> =
wrote:
>>> Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer =
think this document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb =
working group, I doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area =
either.=20
>>>=20
>>> I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each =
different scenario RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how =
it needs to be secured and for scenarios not listed such as new usages, =
what the requirements are. For something like SIP, having just one way =
to secure RTP is much better than having many ways.=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> I'm confused about your objection, since this draft states that we =
need to do exactly as you propose.=20
>>=20
>> Colin
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> --=20
>> Colin Perkins
>> http://csperkins.org/
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt


From martin.thomson@gmail.com  Mon Dec  9 15:13:24 2013
Return-Path: <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 125241AD948; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 15:13:24 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9,  DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id MaJcsmXGkDI2; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 15:13:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-wi0-x22f.google.com (mail-wi0-x22f.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c05::22f]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3E9671A8028; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 15:13:22 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-wi0-f175.google.com with SMTP id hi5so4596969wib.14 for <multiple recipients>; Mon, 09 Dec 2013 15:13:16 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=agShKYkumjwHoGBtwIRAyj6LaaQIwp8e+Jtqu8+loag=; b=e7Q8kLBvx/j4Rhe+zbB9ucST7c/UlDV4rE8TMb1z3agNnALucQ9KooSp1Pu7tHORiH FgfxMG6EVt/9tmYf7rTXldemw9qUgsQ6BQbyq1+CLSBV/9d7JtOdWHO9Le2YBzEaHDub 9qYH9EnZExP+pGeczPz2U0ltd6stbLAXKkAHrAAVjdSy6tlB7W5OJkQdbl7ZUjy3P82R r4IBjLK0wEaYwNRPyy+c6qb5kX+qKL41qEqn0B7Y3fvIPhXcukgPUdTgMK/gmzOrZ8WE SwFnqJcOwkS5c2NgfkIZqm55pBOHjLzWdcsQTfirr79NQ0/8eh5ZlzHWyMhEzrL38crE ZPXQ==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.195.13.164 with SMTP id ez4mr18458737wjd.11.1386630796907; Mon, 09 Dec 2013 15:13:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.227.134.195 with HTTP; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 15:13:16 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <0FA6EC2C-3FAB-4E72-882E-13640108C328@csperkins.org>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org> <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com> <0FA6EC2C-3FAB-4E72-882E-13640108C328@csperkins.org>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2013 15:13:16 -0800
Message-ID: <CABkgnnXzoG_ib5wccySOXK1EZ-12v9PEysy2YYnYTOvnSgz6=A@mail.gmail.com>
From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Cc: Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 23:13:24 -0000

On 9 December 2013 14:59, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org> wrote:
> If some part of the draft is unclear about this, and can possibly be interpreted to allow insecure use of RTP, please explain what, and we will fix it.

Let me theorize a little: the draft name
(draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory) might generate some false
reactions.  Thankfully, that's not going to appear in an RFC.

From fluffy@cisco.com  Mon Dec  9 15:56:09 2013
Return-Path: <fluffy@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D3B21ADF97; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 15:56:09 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -114.502
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-114.502 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oAt3ByMX-0j0; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 15:56:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rcdn-iport-1.cisco.com (rcdn-iport-1.cisco.com [173.37.86.72]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAEE41ADF6D; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 15:56:02 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=cisco.com; i=@cisco.com; l=5221; q=dns/txt; s=iport; t=1386633358; x=1387842958; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:references: in-reply-to:content-id:content-transfer-encoding: mime-version; bh=OxLpFomaFtG3wpM4vDpd3JMQXMmZ3K5wuvvP22nW1yo=; b=b7j7CShNGaFACZlf6xCC1Zv6sxMRQbq7rmgfZ6wcB1PaS/oCwa8IHbxw RaJZ0Ru+EG99Gn/H7sCoe8VA9pES/4fmgip3/Tz/I++3L7/jGzGBsQbJ4 0eTH4pE7peEuyfinPEdrbKFwM9OQfgkneNFPsVXdWWTDIiV4mFAV+N+N7 c=;
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AgQFAEpYplKtJV2Y/2dsb2JhbABZgwc4U7kWgSoWdIIlAQEBAwEBAQE3PwULAgEIDgQGHgULJwsXDgIEDgUbh2EGDcBmF45dMweDIIETA5gUgTCQY4FrgT6CKg
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.93,861,1378857600"; d="scan'208";a="290257334"
Received: from rcdn-core-1.cisco.com ([173.37.93.152]) by rcdn-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 09 Dec 2013 23:55:45 +0000
Received: from xhc-rcd-x11.cisco.com (xhc-rcd-x11.cisco.com [173.37.183.85]) by rcdn-core-1.cisco.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id rB9NtjVM022093 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=FAIL); Mon, 9 Dec 2013 23:55:45 GMT
Received: from xmb-aln-x02.cisco.com ([169.254.5.231]) by xhc-rcd-x11.cisco.com ([173.37.183.85]) with mapi id 14.03.0123.003; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 17:55:45 -0600
From: "Cullen Jennings (fluffy)" <fluffy@cisco.com>
To: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
Thread-Topic: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
Thread-Index: AQHO9TI/4zL5yzK36kiDXTnTRhbU4JpM7oiA
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2013 23:55:44 +0000
Message-ID: <5B0CCCC0-9E65-467B-A9C8-799CBBB85AA6@cisco.com>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org> <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com> <0FA6EC2C-3FAB-4E72-882E-13640108C328@csperkins.org>
In-Reply-To: <0FA6EC2C-3FAB-4E72-882E-13640108C328@csperkins.org>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.20.249.164]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-ID: <AA8F64E8FF25D44E882A7CFD8E6D1F7F@emea.cisco.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Cc: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2013 23:56:09 -0000

WebRTC is a framework. HTTP is a framework. SIP is a framework. All of thes=
e can be used in very different ways with different deployments. I don't se=
e RTP being a somehow special relative to many other protocols the IETF dev=
elops from the point of view of not having a minimal interoperable way of s=
ecuring it.=20

So lets be blunt here - this document is about justifying that RTP will not=
 have any MTI security. I will note that rtp-security-options also does not=
 add any MTI security requirements to RTP.  I'm OK with that. All I am rais=
ing is that was  that I don't believe that has IETF consensus based on the =
question at the last plenary.  If you think it does, now would be a great t=
ime to outline that argument.=20

Lets just keep in perspective here that what we are talking about is the pr=
otocol use for transporting people voice when the PSTN is replaced in the U=
S and the position of this RFC, and presumable the IETF if it is published,=
 is that the IETF is not going to mandate a way to secure this.=20

=20

On Dec 9, 2013, at 3:59 PM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
 wrote:

> Cullen,
>=20
> That is absolutely not the intent of the document. From the Introduction,=
 2nd paragraph:
>=20
>   The IETF policy on Strong Security Requirements for IETF Standard
>   Protocols [RFC3365] (the so-called "Danvers Doctrine") states that
>   "we MUST implement strong security in all protocols to provide for
>   the all too frequent day when the protocol comes into widespread use
>   in the global Internet".  The security mechanisms defined for use
>   with RTP allow these requirements to be met.  However, since RTP is a
>   protocol framework that is suitable for a wide variety of use cases,
>   there is no single security mechanism that is suitable for every
>   scenario.  This memo outlines why this is the case, and discusses how
>   users of RTP can meet the requirement for strong security.
>=20
> You will note that last sentence "This memo...discusses how users of RTP =
can meet the requirement for strong security". Experience has shown that ju=
st saying "use SRTP" is not sufficient: SRTP is not suitable to secure all =
uses of RTP, and the keying mechanisms needed are wildly different across d=
ifferent use domains. The draft explains in more detail why this is the cas=
e, and makes the case that we need -- as you suggest -- drafts explaining h=
ow to secure each class of applications using RTP (telephony, WebRTC, IPTV,=
 etc.). It doesn't actually specify security, that it true. Rather is refer=
ences to draft-ietf-avtcore-rtp-security-options (also in IETF last call) w=
hich describes the available security options, and refers to the drafts tha=
t do define mandatory-to-implement security for different application domai=
ns (e.g., the WebRTC security architecture).
>=20
> If some part of the draft is unclear about this, and can possibly be inte=
rpreted to allow insecure use of RTP, please explain what, and we will fix =
it.=20
>=20
> Colin
>=20
>=20
> On 9 Dec 2013, at 23:24, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com> wrot=
e:
>> This document says RTP does not need to specify a security mechanisms an=
d that's OK. Note this document could says you must do A or B depending on =
the situation but it does not. It just says it is ok not to specify anythin=
g.
>>=20
>> My read of the consensus at last plenary was that the IETF had decided i=
t was going to stop doing that. I don't care about if this draft is publish=
ed as it or not as I think this draft will have zero impact to what is depl=
oyed. I do think it is worth us being consistent on what security we expect=
 to have in RFC going forward.
>>=20
>> All I am asking is the IESG be consistent about how they judge consensus=
 on this and if they decide to publish it, provide some guidance on when th=
ey think it is fine to not have security and when they think it is not fine=
.=20
>>=20
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Dec 6, 2013, at 4:40 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org> wrote:
>>=20
>>> Cullen,
>>>=20
>>> On 5 Dec 2013, at 16:56, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com> wr=
ote:
>>>> Given the hum in the IETF plenary at the last IETF, I no longer think =
this document represents IETF consensus. Given the hum in RTCWeb working gr=
oup, I doubt this represents the consensus of the RAI area either.=20
>>>>=20
>>>> I think I would be tempted to resolve this by saying for each differen=
t scenario RTP is used in (SIP, RTSP, Mulitcast etc) exactly how it needs t=
o be secured and for scenarios not listed such as new usages, what the requ=
irements are. For something like SIP, having just one way to secure RTP is =
much better than having many ways.=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> I'm confused about your objection, since this draft states that we need=
 to do exactly as you propose.=20
>>>=20
>>> Colin
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> --=20
>>> Colin Perkins
>>> http://csperkins.org/
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
>> avt@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>=20


From presnick@qti.qualcomm.com  Mon Dec  9 16:39:35 2013
Return-Path: <presnick@qti.qualcomm.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7329B1AD944; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 16:39:35 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.002
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.002 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sbcAdi1G-sF2; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 16:39:33 -0800 (PST)
Received: from sabertooth01.qualcomm.com (sabertooth01.qualcomm.com [65.197.215.72]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7D0A61ADFD5; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 16:39:33 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=qti.qualcomm.com; i=@qti.qualcomm.com; q=dns/txt; s=qcdkim; t=1386635968; x=1418171968; h=message-id:date:from:mime-version:to:cc:subject: references:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ZHT2bwQh+30yhxmPc0WPi0ULjL2KgSRTaYBRnT9AbvM=; b=LCKOiLYkeGqCWt9zRhaZBUIcLFs3VxQxsyIdAxa9QPTT8PAPpj4jV2WQ eyTpY2BfrZOe+VQT4ziEItS2FGLrOi77vUVIOKYzSBJNqUN0nTy0gshb+ KIbLwZX8WZPv9ePECOmWpU/GXS6i8fyvtmbMQyG3B7Wqp9GVhc6tDhPQD w=;
X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="5400,1158,7284"; a="56307895"
Received: from ironmsg02-lv.qualcomm.com ([10.47.202.183]) by sabertooth01.qualcomm.com with ESMTP; 09 Dec 2013 16:39:28 -0800
X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="5400,1158,7284"; a="23827385"
Received: from nasanexhc07.na.qualcomm.com ([172.30.39.190]) by ironmsg02-lv.qualcomm.com with ESMTP/TLS/RC4-SHA; 09 Dec 2013 16:39:27 -0800
Received: from resnick2.qualcomm.com (172.30.39.5) by qcmail1.qualcomm.com (172.30.39.190) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.158.1; Mon, 9 Dec 2013 16:39:26 -0800
Message-ID: <52A662BC.6060802@qti.qualcomm.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2013 18:39:24 -0600
From: Pete Resnick <presnick@qti.qualcomm.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.7; en-US; rv:1.9.1.9) Gecko/20100630 Eudora/3.0.4
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: "Cullen Jennings (fluffy)" <fluffy@cisco.com>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org> <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com>
In-Reply-To: <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Originating-IP: [172.30.39.5]
Cc: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 00:39:35 -0000

On 12/9/13 4:24 PM, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) wrote:
> My read of the consensus at last plenary was that the IETF had decided it was going to stop doing that.
> [...]
> All I am asking is the IESG be consistent about how they judge consensus on this and if they decide to publish it, provide some guidance on when they think it is fine to not have security and when they think it is not fine.

A poorly constructed hum taken by the IAB Chair at an IAB plenary 
meeting does not constitute IETF consensus. The IESG has not judged 
consensus on the topics brought up at that plenary.

You will note that there is an Internet Draft 
(draft-farrell-perpass-attack) currently in Last Call for Best Current 
Practice that is being discussed on the IETF list. Some of the 
discussion indicates that the IETF does not have consensus on all of the 
issues. That's being worked through now. The outcome of that Last Call 
*will* be a case of the IESG judging consensus on those topics.

If you have an opinion on the draft in Last Call, how it will affect the 
judgment on the AVT draft, and whether it needs clarification in order 
to be useful, I'm sure your input would be appreciated.

pr

-- 
Pete Resnick<http://www.qualcomm.com/~presnick/>
Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. - +1 (858)651-4478


From csp@csperkins.org  Mon Dec  9 22:53:17 2013
Return-Path: <csp@csperkins.org>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CE69A1AE04D; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 22:53:17 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id V6hu2XDvBBYH; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 22:53:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from balrog.mythic-beasts.com (balrog.mythic-beasts.com [IPv6:2a00:1098:0:82:1000:0:2:1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 070781AD8D8; Mon,  9 Dec 2013 22:53:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [87.213.41.162] (port=62661 helo=[10.71.0.165]) by balrog.mythic-beasts.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.72) (envelope-from <csp@csperkins.org>) id 1VqHBt-0003vy-7q; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 06:53:09 +0000
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.6 \(1510\))
From: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
In-Reply-To: <5B0CCCC0-9E65-467B-A9C8-799CBBB85AA6@cisco.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 07:53:08 +0100
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <A7AB59BA-3DE4-4F0A-8745-087D2D9DF93E@csperkins.org>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org> <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com> <0FA6EC2C-3FAB-4E72-882E-13640108C328@csperkins.org> <5B0CCCC0-9E65-467B-A9C8-799CBBB85AA6@cisco.com>
To: Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1510)
X-BlackCat-Spam-Score: -28
X-Mythic-Debug: Threshold =  On = 
Cc: "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 06:53:18 -0000

On 10 Dec 2013, at 00:55, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com> =
wrote:
> WebRTC is a framework. HTTP is a framework. SIP is a framework. All of =
these can be used in very different ways with different deployments.

So is RTP. That is the point of writing this draft.

> I don't see RTP being a somehow special relative to many other =
protocols the IETF develops from the point of view of not having a =
minimal interoperable way of securing it.=20

What would that be? SRTP does not make sense for many deployments, and =
even if it did, doesn't address keying.

> So lets be blunt here - this document is about justifying that RTP =
will not have any MTI security.

Absolutely not. It's about saying that the appropriate MTI security =
depends on the class of applications. What makes sense for telephony =
doesn't necessarily make sense for IPTV, etc.

> I will note that rtp-security-options also does not add any MTI =
security requirements to RTP. =20

No, but it references documents that describe the MTI security for some =
particular scenarios where RTP is used (e.g., the WebRTC security arch).=20=


> I'm OK with that. All I am raising is that was  that I don't believe =
that has IETF consensus based on the question at the last plenary.  If =
you think it does, now would be a great time to outline that argument.=20=


I believe there is IETF consensus that RTP needs strong security. This =
draft discusses how to achieve that.

> Lets just keep in perspective here that what we are talking about is =
the protocol use for transporting people voice when the PSTN is replaced =
in the US and the position of this RFC, and presumable the IETF if it is =
published, is that the IETF is not going to mandate a way to secure =
this.=20

That's kind-of the point: RTP is not *just* the protocol that transports =
voice when the PSTN is replaced; it's used in a myriad of other =
scenarios that are outlined in the draft. If RTP were just used for =
telephony, this problem would be straight-forward, and we'd have a draft =
specifying MTI security. As RTP is used much more widely, the =
requirements are more complex. This draft outlines some of the issues, =
it doesn't claim to provide the solution to RTP security.

Again, if there is specific text in the draft that makes this unclear, =
let us know and we will fix this.

Colin=

From rlb@ipv.sx  Tue Dec 10 06:50:06 2013
Return-Path: <rlb@ipv.sx>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 69EFF1AE054 for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 06:50:06 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.977
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.977 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id pcLNxHHQ8-r3 for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 06:50:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-ob0-f181.google.com (mail-ob0-f181.google.com [209.85.214.181]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29A4E1AE034 for <avt@ietf.org>; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 06:50:04 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-ob0-f181.google.com with SMTP id uy5so5276412obc.26 for <avt@ietf.org>; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 06:49:58 -0800 (PST)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=5OFzVOfPJCEqjfVjeXc4+R0QCJ1L40WlRrPfHRL7ttM=; b=aA4B9HMQMHJ/YTwbVyWIsfZj3odulKKlthuyo0Bx0CwB/ix8N+8zvsZPTvwrJoCOYB 8h2ha4UErfuLsm20chC4AQSVreL0EB3zgY2LdwOLlNnG/y2oR1qUasMsiB1osOQb/tnn 0nMt1GMf7n7b6XQE681jVz7cxr06AN+/2iXVpRHFQLrjKqoUQTI+K5hC5oLVvFpDY3Z1 7ahIXUPxoJWDaFwo9Mc05y4ul5g5TXRNLbAMHzasSx8/VYK2rEJhgxwr043vjBPSkT8Z uc1yvdcf9heQMplaNBGWrag+ofLmBFneX9AAp4pWSAv3sz4E8m4UWeuSPn9FLqkEi+qu TsJA==
X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQlM0vbqW6+B9aaAh2op4YjwcV91V6oPDfZf9HnCbEQ/1N/n0X50Q8MyUt2AlbgXr25n4mOT
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.182.78.68 with SMTP id z4mr6320504obw.29.1386686998767; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 06:49:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.60.31.74 with HTTP; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 06:49:58 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <A7AB59BA-3DE4-4F0A-8745-087D2D9DF93E@csperkins.org>
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org> <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com> <0FA6EC2C-3FAB-4E72-882E-13640108C328@csperkins.org> <5B0CCCC0-9E65-467B-A9C8-799CBBB85AA6@cisco.com> <A7AB59BA-3DE4-4F0A-8745-087D2D9DF93E@csperkins.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 09:49:58 -0500
Message-ID: <CAL02cgRDio0MQStaCvu4FF5ZVLBMJa6a9cxhPBm+iGyn2C4zQA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b2e4d52f9fd2c04ed2f39e0
Cc: Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 14:50:06 -0000

--047d7b2e4d52f9fd2c04ed2f39e0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 1:53 AM, Colin Perkins <csp@csperkins.org> wrote:

> On 10 Dec 2013, at 00:55, Cullen Jennings (fluffy) <fluffy@cisco.com>
> wrote:
> > WebRTC is a framework. HTTP is a framework. SIP is a framework. All of
> these can be used in very different ways with different deployments.
>
> So is RTP. That is the point of writing this draft.


<hat type="none"/>

I think there is a salient distinction here.  HTTP, SIP, WebRTC all
describe fairly specific patterns of interaction, onto which security
interactions can be mapped.  They also operate with very little
pre-configuration, so it makes sense to have security
configuration/negotiation tied in with the other configuration/negotiation
that the protocol is already doing.

RTP, by contrast, is essentially impotent by itself.  If I send you an RTP
packet, you have no idea how to use it unless you have engaged in some
separate, out of band negotiation mechanism.  And those negotiations can
set up all sorts of different interaction models (as discussed in the
document).  So it seems entirely sensible for the protocol that does the
negotiation/configuration to also do the security
negotiation/configuration.  It's that protocol (SIP, RTSP, etc.) that knows
the right overall interaction model that the security needs to secure.  And
that protocol is separate from RTP.

Asking for a standard RTP security model is like asking for a standard
security model for UDP -- the semantics that you want to secure are simply
not well enough defined to build a security mechanism around.

I am very much in favor of moving toward more interoperable security.  I
pushed back some on the -security-options draft because I thought it needed
to be more prescriptive ("in situation X, do Y", e.g., "for point-to-point,
use DTLS-SRTP").  I think we could standardize on a suite of mechanisms to
cover different RTP use cases.  But it's not going to be one.

--Richard



> > I don't see RTP being a somehow special relative to many other protocols
> the IETF develops from the point of view of not having a minimal
> interoperable way of securing it.
>
> What would that be? SRTP does not make sense for many deployments, and
> even if it did, doesn't address keying.
>
> > So lets be blunt here - this document is about justifying that RTP will
> not have any MTI security.
>
> Absolutely not. It's about saying that the appropriate MTI security
> depends on the class of applications. What makes sense for telephony
> doesn't necessarily make sense for IPTV, etc.
>
> > I will note that rtp-security-options also does not add any MTI security
> requirements to RTP.
>
> No, but it references documents that describe the MTI security for some
> particular scenarios where RTP is used (e.g., the WebRTC security arch).
>
> > I'm OK with that. All I am raising is that was  that I don't believe
> that has IETF consensus based on the question at the last plenary.  If you
> think it does, now would be a great time to outline that argument.
>
> I believe there is IETF consensus that RTP needs strong security. This
> draft discusses how to achieve that.
>
> > Lets just keep in perspective here that what we are talking about is the
> protocol use for transporting people voice when the PSTN is replaced in the
> US and the position of this RFC, and presumable the IETF if it is
> published, is that the IETF is not going to mandate a way to secure this.
>
> That's kind-of the point: RTP is not *just* the protocol that transports
> voice when the PSTN is replaced; it's used in a myriad of other scenarios
> that are outlined in the draft. If RTP were just used for telephony, this
> problem would be straight-forward, and we'd have a draft specifying MTI
> security. As RTP is used much more widely, the requirements are more
> complex. This draft outlines some of the issues, it doesn't claim to
> provide the solution to RTP security.
>
> Again, if there is specific text in the draft that makes this unclear, let
> us know and we will fix this.
>
> Colin

--047d7b2e4d52f9fd2c04ed2f39e0
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On T=
ue, Dec 10, 2013 at 1:53 AM, Colin Perkins <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D=
"mailto:csp@csperkins.org" target=3D"_blank">csp@csperkins.org</a>&gt;</spa=
n> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im">On 10 Dec 2013, at 00:55, =
Cullen Jennings (fluffy) &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:fluffy@cisco.com">fluffy@cis=
co.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>

&gt; WebRTC is a framework. HTTP is a framework. SIP is a framework. All of=
 these can be used in very different ways with different deployments.<br>
<br>
</div>So is RTP. That is the point of writing this draft.</blockquote><div>=
<br></div><div>&lt;hat type=3D&quot;none&quot;/&gt;</div><div><br></div><di=
v>I think there is a salient distinction here. =A0HTTP, SIP, WebRTC all des=
cribe fairly specific patterns of interaction, onto which security interact=
ions can be mapped. =A0They also operate with very little pre-configuration=
, so it makes sense to have security configuration/negotiation tied in with=
 the other configuration/negotiation that the protocol is already doing.</d=
iv>
<div><br></div><div>RTP, by contrast, is essentially impotent by itself. =
=A0If I send you an RTP packet, you have no idea how to use it unless you h=
ave engaged in some separate, out of band negotiation mechanism. =A0And tho=
se negotiations can set up all sorts of different interaction models (as di=
scussed in the document). =A0So it seems entirely sensible for the protocol=
 that does the negotiation/configuration to also do the security negotiatio=
n/configuration. =A0It&#39;s that protocol (SIP, RTSP, etc.) that knows the=
 right overall interaction model that the security needs to secure. =A0And =
that protocol is separate from RTP.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Asking for a standard RTP security model is like asking=
 for a standard security model for UDP -- the semantics that you want to se=
cure are simply not well enough defined to build a security mechanism aroun=
d.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I am very much in favor of moving toward more interoper=
able security. =A0I pushed back some on the -security-options draft because=
 I thought it needed to be more prescriptive (&quot;in situation X, do Y&qu=
ot;, e.g., &quot;for point-to-point, use DTLS-SRTP&quot;). =A0I think we co=
uld standardize on a suite of mechanisms to cover different RTP use cases. =
=A0But it&#39;s not going to be one.</div>
<div><br></div><div>--Richard</div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex"><div class=3D"im">
&gt; I don&#39;t see RTP being a somehow special relative to many other pro=
tocols the IETF develops from the point of view of not having a minimal int=
eroperable way of securing it.<br>
<br>
</div>What would that be? SRTP does not make sense for many deployments, an=
d even if it did, doesn&#39;t address keying.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; So lets be blunt here - this document is about justifying that RTP wil=
l not have any MTI security.<br>
<br>
</div>Absolutely not. It&#39;s about saying that the appropriate MTI securi=
ty depends on the class of applications. What makes sense for telephony doe=
sn&#39;t necessarily make sense for IPTV, etc.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; I will note that rtp-security-options also does not add any MTI securi=
ty requirements to RTP.<br>
<br>
</div>No, but it references documents that describe the MTI security for so=
me particular scenarios where RTP is used (e.g., the WebRTC security arch).=
<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; I&#39;m OK with that. All I am raising is that was =A0that I don&#39;t=
 believe that has IETF consensus based on the question at the last plenary.=
 =A0If you think it does, now would be a great time to outline that argumen=
t.<br>

<br>
</div>I believe there is IETF consensus that RTP needs strong security. Thi=
s draft discusses how to achieve that.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; Lets just keep in perspective here that what we are talking about is t=
he protocol use for transporting people voice when the PSTN is replaced in =
the US and the position of this RFC, and presumable the IETF if it is publi=
shed, is that the IETF is not going to mandate a way to secure this.<br>

<br>
</div>That&#39;s kind-of the point: RTP is not *just* the protocol that tra=
nsports voice when the PSTN is replaced; it&#39;s used in a myriad of other=
 scenarios that are outlined in the draft. If RTP were just used for teleph=
ony, this problem would be straight-forward, and we&#39;d have a draft spec=
ifying MTI security. As RTP is used much more widely, the requirements are =
more complex. This draft outlines some of the issues, it doesn&#39;t claim =
to provide the solution to RTP security.<br>

<br>
Again, if there is specific text in the draft that makes this unclear, let =
us know and we will fix this.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Colin</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--047d7b2e4d52f9fd2c04ed2f39e0--

From worley@shell01.TheWorld.com  Tue Dec 10 11:16:20 2013
Return-Path: <worley@shell01.TheWorld.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA4CF1AE042 for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 11:16:19 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.601
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.601 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id yqEWEeYSIseQ for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 11:16:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from TheWorld.com (pcls6.std.com [192.74.137.146]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA3E41AE1B1 for <avt@ietf.org>; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 11:16:06 -0800 (PST)
Received: from shell.TheWorld.com (root@shell01.theworld.com [192.74.137.71]) by TheWorld.com (8.14.5/8.14.5) with ESMTP id rBAJFDf9030863; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 14:15:16 -0500
Received: from shell01.TheWorld.com (localhost.theworld.com [127.0.0.1]) by shell.TheWorld.com (8.13.6/8.12.8) with ESMTP id rBAJBsZD571819; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 14:11:54 -0500 (EST)
Received: (from worley@localhost) by shell01.TheWorld.com (8.13.6/8.13.6/Submit) id rBAJBsGL571409; Tue, 10 Dec 2013 14:11:54 -0500 (EST)
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 14:11:54 -0500 (EST)
Message-Id: <201312101911.rBAJBsGL571409@shell01.TheWorld.com>
From: worley@ariadne.com (Dale R. Worley)
Sender: worley@ariadne.com (Dale R. Worley)
To: ietf@ietf.org, avt@ietf.org
In-reply-to: <5B0CCCC0-9E65-467B-A9C8-799CBBB85AA6@cisco.com> (fluffy@cisco.com)
References: <20131122220752.31098.83432.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <1286562B-6C43-4ADC-8999-C70CA356F587@cisco.com> <89E376B0-5555-40D8-A59E-0286CABC856C@csperkins.org> <BC503965-42C2-4E02-B7C2-70550EBB11C1@cisco.com> <0FA6EC2C-3FAB-4E72-882E-13640108C328@csperkins.org> <5B0CCCC0-9E65-467B-A9C8-799CBBB85AA6@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] Last Call: <draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt> (Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single Media Security Solution) to Informational RFC
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 19:16:20 -0000

> From: "Cullen Jennings (fluffy)" <fluffy@cisco.com>

> So lets be blunt here - this document is about justifying that RTP
> will not have any MTI security. I will note that
> rtp-security-options also does not add any MTI security requirements
> to RTP.

I believe that people are confusing two similar questions:

1. Is there a single mandatory-to-implement security system for *all*
   RTP uses?

2. Are all RTP uses required to specify mandatory-to-implement
   security (although different RTP use situations may mandate
   different security systems)?

As far as I can see, draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-14.txt says
that the answer to question 1 is "No".  As far as I can see, Cullen is
arguing that the answer to question 2 is "Yes".  These are not
contradictory positions.

There is, of course, an implementation cost if we do not mandate the
same security solution for all RTP uses.

Dale

From kevin.gross@avanw.com  Sat Dec 14 16:29:03 2013
Return-Path: <kevin.gross@avanw.com>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E8E091ADF6D for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 14 Dec 2013 16:29:01 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.498
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.498 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_NEUTRAL=0.779] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id FWSUwEP9xC5H for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 14 Dec 2013 16:28:59 -0800 (PST)
Received: from qmta15.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net (qmta15.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net [IPv6:2001:558:fe14:44:76:96:59:228]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 558AC1ADF65 for <avt@ietf.org>; Sat, 14 Dec 2013 16:28:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from omta01.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.62.11]) by qmta15.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id 1b751n0030EZKEL5FcUr75; Sun, 15 Dec 2013 00:28:51 +0000
Received: from mail-we0-f177.google.com ([74.125.82.177]) by omta01.westchester.pa.mail.comcast.net with comcast id 1cSq1n00Q3pZ1Te3McSr0s; Sun, 15 Dec 2013 00:26:51 +0000
Received: by mail-we0-f177.google.com with SMTP id u56so3245606wes.22 for <avt@ietf.org>; Sat, 14 Dec 2013 16:26:50 -0800 (PST)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=Zk29ut7gzVFlmxakw6XZBVsTD4Zx4CvCd7KK3Qsab4A=; b=RF6Nk4rpuTbkmj0FmTkmc3/1PHyHlT1hRqsXiIoa0yFTUN96SrgH5UZ/G0i8t0vonM wcQXWaEezmIAttp6SfdqeNBSuNApExMDCiDxgHU5KgybZj0m3vQXK7T8M+fQzNfFTsVq rGpQlaSJjrMopUYyLGpeLjiR2EM2pzJvPi869M8OrTqoMthxjiCYX13Uaj2di/AXsG2t ZK0gaZvS41b9gxa7jAVTH+hcEfUyqXPuzpXYPJmNdQwsR6Cjx3YqrQaS9ufWzJbo5IVr dmRjmciquoqzMxiU44rEfw2VOBElDHXDblRY6ftPkysHDnpG4sEMFxaIGeK/OaHgaEPL 5hPA==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.180.94.7 with SMTP id cy7mr8118330wib.21.1387067210135; Sat, 14 Dec 2013 16:26:50 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.217.124.136 with HTTP; Sat, 14 Dec 2013 16:26:50 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <CAL02cgSLAPvaAZfdKrky53cVpB+Nqqhgj=RqMbYobOnWT3vwgw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAL02cgSLAPvaAZfdKrky53cVpB+Nqqhgj=RqMbYobOnWT3vwgw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 2013 17:26:50 -0700
Message-ID: <CALw1_Q3JvOLhYCnUPcfyeZhtphJk9_+vK1ozdQcicZ6nGGBq7w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Kevin Gross <kevin.gross@avanw.com>
To: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d0444037257015704ed87c00f
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=comcast.net; s=q20121106; t=1387067331; bh=Zk29ut7gzVFlmxakw6XZBVsTD4Zx4CvCd7KK3Qsab4A=; h=Received:Received:Received:MIME-Version:Received:Date:Message-ID: Subject:From:To:Content-Type; b=iioBdnawFhl4g/jw2nO5k8n/4esYMu5PAJSvgMNFi0CAAgtuLelW/kKzlniyLmT+Y uxWhgNKKHjMtpy0fYhT2ziZ5gRKUJhfSa81XmOjAmOzyF+bXCQAxZn8DglPFYTizxx jVsBeA6zhWWk8dnRGpPE8vY+gbH0GDaluCf8FlEabvwUxykV2N4wIiBv8+utXF2cnK D8UJv9PEnfgrkTWa52aanbCmGUWPbDkf9aFfYlOvpM9M0fZghWUa5eOQthM3/m+3S0 GavvlkvuiApOcvTIg9dgM0DxK/gQpHrfn7YD0L4QyNPBjDksQAmiCH4VdVec9ue+sf R7idsWx4PlNRw==
Cc: "avtcore-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <avtcore-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second@tools.ietf.org, "avt@ietf.org" <avt@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] AD review of draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 15 Dec 2013 00:29:03 -0000

--f46d0444037257015704ed87c00f
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Thanks for the suggestion Richard. I propose to insert the following
paragraph at the beginning of section 5.1:

"In order to avoid generating or using NTP timestamps during positive leap
seconds, RTP senders and receivers need to avoid sending or using sender
reports to synchronize their clocks in the vicinity of a leap second and
instead rely on their internal clocks to maintain sync until the leap
second has passed."

I will also fix the editorial nit as you suggest.

Kevin Gross
+1-303-447-0517
Media Network Consultant
AVA Networks - www.AVAnw.com <http://www.avanw.com/>


On Sun, Nov 24, 2013 at 1:07 PM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

> I have reviewed this draft in preparation for IETF LC, and think it looks
> good to go.
>
> One thing the authors might keep in mind while doing any LC or DISCUSS
> edits is that it may not be immediately clear to the reader how suppressing
> or ignoring SRs (Section 5.1) is helpful with this problem.   There's a
> line in Section 5 that explains this ("generating or using NTP timestamps
> ... SHOULD be avoided"), but it would be helpful to tie the two ideas
> together.  Perhaps something like this at the beginning of Section 5.1:
> NEW: "In order to avoid generating or using NTP timestamps during periods
> where confusion might arise (see above), RTP senders and receivers need to
> avoid using RTCP Sender Reports (SRs) to synchronize their clocks during
> this window, instead relying on their internal clocks to maintain sync in
> the vicinity of a leap second."
>
> Editorial nit: In Section 5,
> OLD: "the timestamp ambiguity, positive leap seconds"
> NEW: "the timestamp ambiguity that positive leap seconds"
>
> Thanks,
> --Richard
>
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>
>

--f46d0444037257015704ed87c00f
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for the suggestion Richard. I propose to insert the=
 following paragraph at the beginning of section 5.1:<div><br></div><div><d=
iv>&quot;In order to avoid generating or using NTP timestamps during positi=
ve leap seconds, RTP senders and receivers need to avoid sending or using s=
ender reports to synchronize their clocks in the vicinity of a leap second =
and instead rely on their internal clocks to maintain sync until the leap s=
econd has passed.&quot;</div>
<div><br></div><div>I will also fix the editorial nit as you suggest.</div>=
<div><span class=3D"" style=3D"white-space:pre">				</span></div></div><div=
 class=3D"gmail_extra"><br clear=3D"all"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">Kevin Gross<=
br><div>
+1-303-447-0517</div><div>Media Network Consultant<br><div>AVA Networks -=
=A0<a href=3D"http://www.avanw.com/" target=3D"_blank">www.AVAnw.com</a></d=
iv></div></div></div>
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sun, Nov 24, 2013 at 1:07 PM, Richard=
 Barnes <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rlb@ipv.sx" target=3D"_blan=
k">rlb@ipv.sx</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div>I have reviewed this draft in preparation f=
or IETF LC, and think it looks good to go.=A0 <br><br>One thing the authors=
 might keep in mind while doing any LC or DISCUSS edits is that it may not =
be immediately clear to the reader how suppressing or ignoring SRs (Section=
 5.1) is helpful with this problem. =A0 There&#39;s a line in Section 5 tha=
t explains this (&quot;generating or using NTP timestamps ... SHOULD be avo=
ided&quot;), but it would be helpful to tie the two ideas together.=A0 Perh=
aps something like this at the beginning of Section 5.1:<br>

</div><div>NEW: &quot;In order to avoid generating or using NTP timestamps =
during periods where confusion might arise (see above), RTP senders and rec=
eivers need to avoid using RTCP Sender Reports (SRs) to synchronize their c=
locks during this window, instead relying on their internal clocks to maint=
ain sync in the vicinity of a leap second.&quot;<br>

<br></div>Editorial nit: In Section 5, <br>OLD: &quot;the timestamp ambigui=
ty, positive leap seconds&quot; <br></div>NEW: &quot;the timestamp ambiguit=
y that positive leap seconds&quot;<br><br>Thanks,<br></div>--Richard<br>

</div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:avt@ietf.org">avt@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--f46d0444037257015704ed87c00f--

From internet-drafts@ietf.org  Fri Dec 27 20:43:35 2013
Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6A4A1AF01B; Fri, 27 Dec 2013 20:43:35 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fNscYoObc4ZV; Fri, 27 Dec 2013 20:43:34 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C6261AF015; Fri, 27 Dec 2013 20:43:34 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 4.90
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Message-ID: <20131228044334.1147.33038.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Dec 2013 20:43:34 -0800
Cc: avt@ietf.org
Subject: [AVTCORE] I-D Action: draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07.txt
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2013 04:43:35 -0000

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.
 This draft is a work item of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance Wo=
rking Group of the IETF.

        Title           : RTP and Leap Seconds
        Authors         : Kevin Gross
                          Ray van Brandenburg
	Filename        : draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07.txt
	Pages           : 9
	Date            : 2013-12-27

Abstract:
   This document discusses issues that arise when RTP sessions span
   Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) leap seconds.  It updates RFC 3550
   to describe how RTP senders and receivers should behave in the
   presence of leap seconds.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From rlb@ipv.sx  Sat Dec 28 16:51:44 2013
Return-Path: <rlb@ipv.sx>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34FC31AE448 for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 16:51:44 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.977
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.977 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7] autolearn=unavailable
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id S0wK2AMW8LK4 for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 16:51:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-oa0-f47.google.com (mail-oa0-f47.google.com [209.85.219.47]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A56F1AE446 for <avt@ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 16:51:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-oa0-f47.google.com with SMTP id k1so10866400oag.20 for <avt@ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 16:51:36 -0800 (PST)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=C5YG8zecfaTAkmikuui2qbidMSWil6XGohiutKjWl9M=; b=l1hvS3h3EtwKpJKhrTSCKAPNnEkItH1ZOttEMyhXFv/e+7sy7p3bfVZ2br6HJChF4s B0TM8j31jPKnKT3s7xT7Kkk4SD7gSvORHJC4LKVEkoQ4LSL25ywqYkfKPzakGCB5AjjE XAIgYiboe+J9KqG2z4j46jjQQaUtgEwOaPp/dI68/ek1nKbEbEYQIq69VXNKTz2CnEtx /WFgGEhCeDV+lK2UYnd/2+n68aUB+ODbxWBJM3RTDDeFqGg1qZcknln8lncAEAm+qCKw iv0uN860pCQIN4F+gL1J0/6Qed8Fv16cxNYXvQn7MEAIXMVNKv4YM0bE+cHcwKoXX1b6 uu0A==
X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQksYOL4BzIg57w+myAUkBq50R7K5AiICIw6R55GPbub6hETARaab0FoUP6GHC0dzd5uXYh7
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.60.56.70 with SMTP id y6mr39281791oep.32.1388278296086; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 16:51:36 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.60.54.65 with HTTP; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 16:51:36 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <20131228044334.1147.33038.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
References: <20131228044334.1147.33038.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2013 19:51:36 -0500
Message-ID: <CAL02cgRzu79bkbr1hU4j-CQWratrnPRVQRa0Pwha6jD_++J1Ug@mail.gmail.com>
From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: internet-drafts@ietf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c25380b0226f04eea1ba37
Cc: "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>, i-d-announce@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [AVTCORE] I-D Action: draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07.txt
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 29 Dec 2013 00:51:44 -0000

--001a11c25380b0226f04eea1ba37
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Thanks to the authors for these updates.  I have scheduled this for the
next IESG telechat.

--Richard


On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:43 PM, <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
>  This draft is a work item of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> Working Group of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : RTP and Leap Seconds
>         Authors         : Kevin Gross
>                           Ray van Brandenburg
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07.txt
>         Pages           : 9
>         Date            : 2013-12-27
>
> Abstract:
>    This document discusses issues that arise when RTP sessions span
>    Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) leap seconds.  It updates RFC 3550
>    to describe how RTP senders and receivers should behave in the
>    presence of leap seconds.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance
> avt@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt
>

--001a11c25380b0226f04eea1ba37
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Thanks to the authors for these updates.=A0 I have sc=
heduled this for the next IESG telechat.<br><br></div>--Richard<br></div><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Dec 27,=
 2013 at 11:43 PM,  <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts=
@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:=
<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
=A0This draft is a work item of the Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance =
Working Group of the IETF.<br>
<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : RTP and Leap Seconds<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Authors =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Kevin Gross<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Ray van Brandenburg<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07=
.txt<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : 9<br>
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2013-12-27<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=A0 =A0This document discusses issues that arise when RTP sessions span<br>
=A0 =A0Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) leap seconds. =A0It updates RFC 355=
0<br>
=A0 =A0to describe how RTP senders and receivers should behave in the<br>
=A0 =A0presence of leap seconds.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second/=
" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-avtcore-lea=
p-second/</a><br>
<br>
There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-07" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-leap-second-0=
7</a><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-avtcore-leap-secon=
d-07" target=3D"_blank">http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-avtco=
re-leap-second-07</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
<a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" target=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp=
.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:avt@ietf.org">avt@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a11c25380b0226f04eea1ba37--

From rlb@ipv.sx  Sat Dec 28 17:25:47 2013
Return-Path: <rlb@ipv.sx>
X-Original-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: avt@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1077F1AE459 for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 17:25:47 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.977
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.977 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uAccrKd4xhp6 for <avt@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 17:25:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-ob0-f180.google.com (mail-ob0-f180.google.com [209.85.214.180]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 82CEC1AE446 for <avt@ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 17:25:45 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-ob0-f180.google.com with SMTP id wo20so10413681obc.25 for <avt@ietf.org>; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 17:25:40 -0800 (PST)
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; bh=E4Yr9k3sehqQvXfc6JHPzpgAOkBBmm0mQ+6/c3jemK8=; b=l6nzN/WgEXB0Ar/WmUSBLSEUc27AYv0HwauQVcawTW1Meu+EKddXhsOBOHivv6XcFU pE3wW9dtBCJwfS8pUYPetbIjLzEtHyutVo53lxgBW2z9+bC29uNrCU99LTxWAoiekplK Wm5bt1Z5y+rx9QiKHxZ2e6OF/xlm/57bmnvJWGg/sxFZzBzQHH8OFxAD4EftZAPI7jIc aJAr7OjeB+fVybtMV3eySNK1F21XtYei4jpdX8r0qT9L9rijQHKU9BJpicJ06mV78W2a Z1HlFyZi68I1scCH5wiYQm2XHqPVXdDGTW+qfRvzbljRmyAof8mSdohbHC564xOKypyz ZZZQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkFjLMYZiyjUjwGEq3WOtf8lsmrnTSYKQu8/QrOwdIIYKuZOW8xPPXxUt+Jnxb1T4/ObuOM
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.182.28.35 with SMTP id y3mr11249939obg.55.1388280340057; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 17:25:40 -0800 (PST)
Received: by 10.60.54.65 with HTTP; Sat, 28 Dec 2013 17:25:39 -0800 (PST)
Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2013 20:25:39 -0500
Message-ID: <CAL02cgT1=miDLUj3Rt7YT3owFEnzsw2RBiFaau6F6=yB9N=ymw@mail.gmail.com>
From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
To: "avt@ietf.org WG" <avt@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e015388f684a71e04eea2343e
Subject: [AVTCORE] AD review: draft-ietf-avtcore-clksrc-09
X-BeenThere: avt@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Audio/Video Transport Core Maintenance <avt.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/avt/>
List-Post: <mailto:avt@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/avt>, <mailto:avt-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 29 Dec 2013 01:25:47 -0000

--089e015388f684a71e04eea2343e
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

I have reviewed this document in preparation for IETF LC.  Overall, it
reads quite well.  Thanks!   I have requested a LC.

A couple of comments that you can consider with LC comments:

-- It seems like a reader familiar with
draft-ietf-avtext-rtp-grouping-taxonomy might be surprised by these terms.
Given that that document is still in development, I don't expect you to be
able to use the terms there.  However, it might be helpful to add a note
saying that you are not attempting to align with their terminology.

-- GLONASS?

-- Behavior with traceable clocks seems underspecified to me.  Section 4.7
should say explicitly that traceable clocks are marked with the
":traceable" suffix or the "/traceable/" identifier.  With regard to
NTP/PTP servers, how does the user of the clock know that the server is
traceable?  Is this indicated in-band to those protocols?  Would it not be
useful to be able to indicate that those servers provide traceable time?

--Richard

--089e015388f684a71e04eea2343e
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><div><div><div><div><div>I have reviewed this do=
cument in preparation for IETF LC.=A0 Overall, it reads quite well.=A0 Than=
ks!=A0=A0 I have requested a LC.<br><br></div>A couple of comments that you=
 can consider with LC comments:<br>
<br></div>-- It seems like a reader familiar with draft-ietf-avtext-rtp-gro=
uping-taxonomy might be surprised by these terms.=A0 Given that that docume=
nt is still in development, I don&#39;t expect you to be able to use the te=
rms there.=A0 However, it might be helpful to add a note saying that you ar=
e not attempting to align with their terminology.<br>
<br></div><div>-- GLONASS?<br></div><div><br></div>-- Behavior with traceab=
le clocks seems underspecified to me.=A0 Section 4.7 should say explicitly =
that traceable clocks are marked with the &quot;:traceable&quot; suffix or =
the &quot;/traceable/&quot; identifier.=A0 With regard to NTP/PTP servers, =
how does the user of the clock know that the server is traceable?=A0 Is thi=
s indicated in-band to those protocols?=A0 Would it not be useful to be abl=
e to indicate that those servers provide traceable time?=A0 <br>
</div></div></div><br></div>--Richard<br></div>

--089e015388f684a71e04eea2343e--
