Subject: [anonsec] feedback on draft-williams-btns-00.txt

From: touch at ISI.EDU (Joe Touch)
Date: Wed, 05 Oct 2005 22:40:49 -0700

Hi, Nico (et al.),

Here's some comments on the draft. Overall, mostly editorial or
clarification.

Joe

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sec 1:

It seems like "MITM" might be more generally "on-path" attacks, of which
MITM is a subset (where the attacker can remove messages, as well as
read and inject them)

If 2401bis is strictly required (vs. 2401), it might be useful to adjust
the title (not sure, though). I'd prefer if there were a way to refer to
2401 processing, even if in an appendix, though I don't know if that's
feasible.

'opportunistic' might be replaced with 'fallback', since 'opportunistic
IPsec' has another meaning (proactive keying).

FWIW, fallback isn't mentioned in the P&AS - should it be?

sec 2:

is 'coerce' common terminology? I didn't see it in the IKE or IKEv2
docs; I'm not sure what process is implied. it might be useful to
explain this to be more specific.

why must the cert payloads be generated for the purpose of being used
this way? unless I'm misreading it, it seems like this means we can't
have a server that some endpoints can validate and others cannot, which
uses a single key (I don't know why that would matter - if it does, it'd
be useful to explain, and if not, it'd be useful to avoid the restriction)

s/assymentric/asymmetric/

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