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From: "Linn, John" <jlinn@securitydynamics.com>
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Subject: Minutes, CAT-WG Minneapolis meeting
Date: Thu, 1 Apr 1999 09:19:20 -0500 
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[CAT list members: these minutes match the draft set as sent to the list on
24 March, with an additional comment added in the summary of the
low-infrastructure minutes straw poll to note (as discussed in the session)
that it was OK for participants to support multiple options.]

Minutes, Common Authentication Technology (CAT) WG, Minneapolis IETF,
reported by John Linn (RSA Laboratories).

The CAT-WG met for one 2.25 hour session at the Minneapolis IETF, with 114
attendees. Regarding document actions, John Linn reported that the GSS-V2
and C bindings drafts have been forwarded to the IESG, with a request that
they be considered for Proposed Standard status.  Major discussion topics at
the meeting included Kerberos Public-Key Initial Authentication (PKINIT),
other Kerberos drafts, GSS Java bindings, and GSS Low-Infrastructure
mechanisms. 

Kerberos Public-Key Initial Authentication (PKINIT):

Following introductory comments by Brian Tung (ISI), Matt Hur (CyberSafe)
led discussion of the Kerberos-PKINIT document. Current draft changes and
pending issues were reviewed and discussed. Among other points, a follow-up
draft will adopt use of CMS constructs to define the request from client to
KDC as well as the KDC's response, and means for accommodating key usage
fields in certificates will be considered.

Other PKINIT issues were also discussed. John Brezak (Microsoft) had
commented that PKINIT required support for too many options, but candidate
simplifications were not indicated. Brian Tung agreed to obtain
clarification, and to inform the list. As currently specified, PKINIT error
messages collide with the space reserved for user-user authentication codes;
this will be addressed in the Kerberos-Revisions document.  There's an
ambiguity as to which error message to use if a server/KDC name in the
PKAuthenticator is wrong.  PKINIT clients must specify supported encryption
types to the KDC. It was suggested that the Kerberos enctype definition
could be changed (from its current SEQUENCE OF INTEGER), but was noted that
viable options exist which don't need changes to Kerberos-Revisions, just to
Assigned Numbers.  The working conclusion was to map the PKINIT-supported
encryption types into Kerberos enctype values without restructuring their
format.

The following changes had been incorporated in the most recent PKINIT draft:
Removed digital signature and private key storage options, modified server
response definition to incorporate CMS by reference, and added various
clarifications.  Additional planned changes include removal of references to
PKCS#6, changing "Certificate" type to "PKInitCertificate", and alignment of
wording and client-KDC request structure with CMS.  Sam Hartman
(FundsXpress) proposed that the KDC-client reply should have a CMS
EnvelopedData containing a SignedData, and plans to contribute specific text
for this proposal; as a working position, use of this approach was accepted.
A NULL method-type is to be added for the method-data structure within a
PKINIT error message, and the KDC is to return KRB_APP_ERR_MODIFIED when a
signature does not verify. 

Denis Pinkas (Bull) commented that PKINIT's introduction needs modification
to reflect Diffie-Hellman as mandatory and RSA as optional, and suggested
also including a facility for signing a users' key independently of a
certificate. He also indicated concern about the use of a single certificate
for signing and encrypting, wanting separate certificates to be used in
order to allow segregation by key usage.  There was consensus among
attendees to allow segregated support, but a specific proposal to the list
is required in order to define the approach. 

Kerberos-Revisions and related drafts:

Cliff Neuman (ISI) led discussion of various changes and issues regarding
Kerberos-Revisions (RFC-1510 successor).  He indicated his intent to send a
summary of outstanding issues and current proposals to the WG list during
the IETF week as a basis for resolution, confirmation via straw poll, and
preparation of a follow-up draft, in the hope that the follow-up draft could
be suitable for WG Last-Call. He reported that revisions were in progress on
integration of enctype specifications, numbering of error messages,
tightening definitions for optional and default values, on direction bits if
addresses are omitted, and on appropriate processing for authorization data
elements which are not understood.  Identified open issues: how to deal with
added fields in KRB-ERROR, ticket extensions, optional KRB-CRED fields,
encryption types, and the general approach for interoperability in the face
of new protocol elements. 

The concern with encryption types is that CMS usage requires the KDC to know
which algorithms a given client supports, within a potentially extensible
set.  Cliff proposed that algorithms be identified for this version within
the supported e-types of the KDC-REQ message rather than in a new pa-data
field; these types are integers (not OIDs), so Kerberos values must be
registered for algorithms which are to be used.  Regarding support for
additional or changed fields, it appeared desirable to identify all items
needing change at one time, and to require compliant implementations (as of
a certain date) to process new fields appropriately.  New fields would be
used only after a transition period, or with knowledge that the peer can
support them.  Ted Ts'o (MIT) argued that any new support requirements
should become active as of the specification's effective date, rather than
at a later point; Sam Hartman pointed out that it might be appropriate to
associate a tier of support requirements with support for new
cryptoalgorithms.  

Ted Ts'o recommended that ciphersuite constructs be incorporated, believing
that their initial omission from Kerberos has had unfortunate results. This
also affects the Kerberos GSS mechanism-2 document, and Tom Yu (MIT) is to
frame the issue within subsequent Kerberos-Revisions discussion.  Marc
Horowitz (Stonecast) solicited comments on his recent draft on
Diffie-Hellman usage in Kerberos. 

GAA-API: 

Cliff Neuman presented brief status information on the GAA-API activity;
revised drafts are planned for the Oslo IETF reflecting ongoing experience
in application of GAA constructs. ISI has been working with Xerox on
GAA-CORBA integration, and with the GLOBUS project, and seeks more groups to
work with. Work on a reference implementation has been pursued, including
integration with X.500/X.509 and SSL. Information is available at
http://gost.isi.edu/info/gaaapi, which will be updated in the next few
weeks.  Marc Horowitz (Stonecast) asked whether there was any relation
between GAA and the IETF General Area's AAA and Policy groups.  There was no
formal conclusion, but Sam Hartman noted that he intends to act as an
informal liaison to AAA's authentication group.

GSS Java Bindings:

Extended discussion took place on the GSS Java bindings, led by Mayank
Upadhyay (Sun).  The central question at issue was use of concrete classes
vs. Java interfaces.  Interfaces provide greatest power and flexibility, but
their use was considered more complex and less intuitive to some Java
programmers.  Since GSS is already considered complex in some circles, it
was considered undesirable to mandate more additional complexity than
necessary for use via JGSS.  Support for usage of multiple mechanisms within
a single invocation of an application program was considered to be an
important goal (e.g., to support applications like NFS).  The conclusion, to
be reflected in a revised draft, was to incorporate a factory approach with
Java interfaces for flexibility, but to provide a simple-to-use shim that
would instantiate classes corresponding to those interfaces.  By analogy, it
was noted that factories and interfaces are also used within JCAPI. Using
the factory approach, a given application can access multiple mechanisms
within one or more coresident JGSS implementations.  Alternately, an
application can choose to bind to a single JGSS implementation by using
CLASSPATH rather than factories.  

A separately defined service provider (SPI) layer, whose definition may be
pursued later, would enable individually developed SPI provider
implementations to be accessed through a single higher-layer JGSS
implementation. While such an SPI would be similar to JGSS, it was
recognized that it wouldn't be identical, considering, e.g., the fact that
credentials can be multi-mechanism objects. Consistent with a goal expressed
by Jeff Schiller (MIT), progress on a higher-level JGSS specification is not
to depend on an SPI definition. An SPI approach would avoid the need for
applications consuming services provided by multiple lower-layer JGSS
implementations to track the correspondence among mechanisms, their
providers, and associated objects, thereby simplifying application access to
a dynamically-variable set of available mechanisms.  

A specific issue arises for use of applets.  An applet developer may wish to
access a custom JGSS implementation via standard ("org.ietf.JGSS") class
names, but an existing JGSS implementation on the applet's platform would be
accessed instead.  As an interim approach to this problem, Mayank proposed
that the applet could invoke the custom implementation via another name,
which the applet's code would import. Eventually, a custom implementation
could be layered under SPI, downloaded, and accessed through the browser
platform's SPI-layered JGSS. 

Mayank and Jack Kabat (ValiCert) will continue working on the base JGSS
document, but will not also be working on an SPI definition.  It was noted
that Sun had donated C language GSS-SPI code to MIT, but Ted Ts'o reported
that he found the code unreliable and hasn't been working actively with it.
It's included in the Kerberos V5 distribution but is currently disabled;
absent inclusion of another mechanism besides Kerberos, the motivation to
debug its use was limited.  The C GSS-SPI is also included in Solaris,
enabling selection between Kerberos and a dummy mechanism. 

GSS Low-Infrastructure Mechanisms:

Extended discussion took place on the topic of low-infrastructure GSS
mechanisms. Concern was expressed about possible duplication with SASL-level
mechanisms, and John Myers (Netscape) is to send a draft concerning GSS
integration under SASL for consideration by the CAT-WG. It appears that
different communities and types of applications wish to consume services via
GSS or via SASL, even though underlying mechanisms may overlap.  It was
recognized that more communication is needed between SASL and GSS
proponents, and some SASL concerns (e.g., lack of defined service interface)
were briefly cited.  Within the session, two specific GSS mechanism
proposals, GSS-Easy and LIPKEY, were discussed. 

Denis Pinkas (Bull) led discussion about the GSS-Easy proposal, which about
10 attendees indicated that they had read. The GSS-Easy mechanism requires
no public-key infrastructure, and performs passphrase-derived exchanges
using one-way functions (OWFs); a Passkey is derived through N iterations of
an OWF, where a large N provides bandwidth limiting against guessing
attacks. A passphrase change facility is included.  Unilateral and mutual
authentication are supported. Loosely synchronized clocks are assumed
between initiator and target. Per the draft, GSS-Easy's proposed message
protection approach is OWF-based rather than being layered on existing
symmetric algorithms. This approach was controversial: while OWF-based
encryption may comprise a valuable topic for research, the sense of
discussion opposed pursuing it at this time as a basis for standardization.
Sam Hartman indicated concern about dependencies on hash algorithm
properties, observing in particular that it wasn't clear whether SHA had
been analyzed for correct properties if used within an encryption function.
Paul Leach (Microsoft) suggested that at least 2 ciphersuites be
incorporated.  Per list discussion, Denis plans to remove ASN.1 framing
around the confounder.  More generally, use of direct octet encoding was
preferred to ASN.1 representation (by an approximately 2:1 margin), but most
proponents of direct encoding would not reject an approach on the basis of
ASN usage. 

Mike Eisler (of Sun's NFS group) led discussion on the Low-Infrastructure
Public-Key (LIPKEY) proposal. About 5 attendees indicated that they had read
the draft. The LIPKEY mechanism adapts SPKM's SPKM-1 unilateral mode for an
environment where servers are registered with public-key certificates, but
where client users authenticate with passwords.  Mike cited several LIPKEY
priorities. Familiarity breeds acceptance (people will adopt what they
understand and are used to). Server authentication in Internet environments
was considered more important than client authentication. Reduced client
impact is important since there are more clients than servers. Almost all
OSs have some form of native password support, and this can and should be
leveraged without user reregistration.  LIPKEY's form is like TLS with
passwords, so uses a level of infrastructure that has achieved a status of
common practice. As a result, it may be more easily grasped and accepted
than Kerberos, though can be suitable for application protocols (e.g.,
UDP-based applications, RPC) that cannot or will not use TLS.  LIPKEY's
usage of the SPKM context establishment request varies from RFC-2025, since
certificate acquisition is assumed to take place in-band; it may be
appropriate to describe this variant usage as a new SPKM-3 mode. Mike noted
his neutrality about the general issue of encoding conventions, but does not
propose to redefine SPKM's existing ASN.1 structures to use different
encoding.  It was noted that LIPKEY usage requires that a user's password be
obtained and accessible via a user's credentials. 

At the end of the session, a straw poll of attendees was taken to determine
interest in pursuing standardization of various low-infrastructure GSS-API
alternatives.  Attendees were allowed to express support for multiple
options. Greatest interest was apparent in LIPKEY (19 attendees recorded),
followed by GSS-Easy (12 attendees), and various forms of digest
authentication (10 attendees).  One attendee indicated interest in pursuing
EKE/SPEKE/SRP methods.  No attendees indicated opposition to pursuing
standardization of one or more low-infrastructure mechanism candidates
within the GSS framework.

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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr  1 16:24:49 1999
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From: Denis Pinkas <Denis.Pinkas@bull.net>
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Subject: Proposal for PK-INIT
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(stuff deleted)

> Denis Pinkas (Bull) commented that PKINIT's introduction needs modification
> to reflect Diffie-Hellman as mandatory and RSA as optional, and suggested
> also including a facility for signing a users' key independently of a
> certificate. He also indicated concern about the use of a single certificate
> for signing and encrypting, wanting separate certificates to be used in
> order to allow segregation by key usage.  There was consensus among
> attendees to allow segregated support, but a specific proposal to the list
> is required in order to define the approach.

The proposed change is the following: in the AuthPack structure (from the
section 3.3) the clientPublicKeyValue is changed into:

ClientPublicKeyValue ::= CHOICE {
   subjectPublicKeyInfo    SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL
    -- when client is using Diffie-Hellman
   encryptioncertificate    CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL
    -- when client is using RSA
}

The intent remains to be able to use two different certificates.

Denis


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From: "Williams,Ronald B" <Ronald.B.Williams@kp.org>
To: "'Rich Salz'" <salzr@certco.com>,
        RL Bob Morgan <rlmorgan@cac.washington.edu>
Cc: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU,
        "'Ian Robertson'" <i.robertson@opengroup.org>
Subject: RE: Open Group Authorization Service API work?
Date: Fri, 2 Apr 1999 11:05:36 -0800 
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Dean Adams is no longer with the Open Group. Ian Robertson is now the
Open Group coordinator for the Security Program. He can be reached at
i.robertsion@opengroup.com.


Ronald Becker Williams    e-mail:ronald.b.williams@kp.org
*  Security Management and User Administration/Tivoli
*  EASM/ KP*IT National Operations   vox:(626) 564-7680
*  Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. fax:(626) 564-7219
*  A7F9 C855 24A9 DB72 55E4  B678 F51E 225E 2988 6F00



- -----Original Message-----
From: Rich Salz [mailto:salzr@certco.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 1999 4:46 PM
To: RL Bob Morgan
Cc: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
Subject: Re: Open Group Authorization Service API work?


> I note that DASCOM has submitted its IntraVerse AuthAPI as a proposed
> Authorization Service API via the Open Group Fast Track process.  See
> http://www.dascom.com/new/nr-api.html for their press release on this.
   

OG Fast Track means that only editorial changes are allowed.
Also note that The Open Group has followed IETF standards where they
exist.
It might make sense for someone to tell TOG that the IETF is working
on this area. I'd suggest that someone involved with AAS drop a line to
Dean Adams, d.adams@opengroup.org (tell him I sent you :).

Hope this helps.
	/r$, OSF and Open Group alumnus


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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Sun Apr  4 05:53:08 1999
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At 11:41 AM 3/31/99 -0800, "Jack Kabat" <jackk@valicert.com> wrote:
>Hello Everyone,
>
>
>As a result of the recent discussions of JGSS bindings, Mayank and I are
>planning to modify the Java GSS bindings in the following manner:
>
>Addition of interfaces to the specification:
>Our plan is to start with the addition of 3 interfaces, one for each of
>GSSName, GSSCredential, and GSSContext. These should be sufficient to
>encapsulate all the mechanism specific functionality.  

We seem to have returned here to a confusion (conflation?) which 
plagued this discussion at an earlier stage -- namely that between
an "implementation" and a "mechanism". The point of specifying
JGSS as a set of Java interfaces is not to provide mechanism 
independence -- the abstract semantics of GSS itself, after considerable
effort in this WG, does that -- but to provide implementation 
independence. An implementation, as has been observed previously, 
may contain one or many mechanisms, depending on local requirements. 


>The interfaces will utilize some of the existing concrete classes such as
>Oid, MessageProp, ChannelBindings, and GSSException. 

This seems half-hearted. One of the virtues of interfaces (as opposed
to classes) is that they provide for multiple inheritance. This advantage
is lost if implementers have to extend the concrete classes 
(MessageProp, ChannelBinding, etc.) My impression of the Minneapolis
consensus was that the whole API should be specified as interfaces; 
why do it halfway? 


>A question that arises is, for an implementation to be conformant to the
>specification, does it need to implement both concrete classes and
>interfaces? I think the answer should be yes, it needs to implement both.

This point might usefully be elaborated a bit further -- at least I 
don't quite understand it. An interface clearly needs to be implemented
before it's any use -- so far, so good -- but a concrete class
_is_ an implementation, in the sense that there's real code behind
it. Unless Jack means that the concrete classes would, in effect, 
just have no-op methods and that any real implementation would 
have to extend these in order to provide any actual functionality?
In which case there seems to be no point in having concrete classes 
at all; the flexibility of interfaces is lost, without any offsetting
gain in functionality. A lose-lose situation. But perhaps I've 
misunderstood the idea here? 


--Michael Smith
  ms@gf.org

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From: Mayank Upadhyay <mdu@Eng.Sun.COM>
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To: Michael Smith <ms@gf.org>
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Subject: Re: Some technical issues on Java binding
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Hi Michael,

Here is my response to some of the issues you raised. Jack Kabat will also
be sending mail in response to some of the other issues. Hope this helps.

Regards,
Mayank

On Fri, 26 Mar 1999, Michael Smith wrote:


> 1) Mapping things with output parameters is always
> a little untidy in Java. Jack and I adopted slightly 
> different approaches to the problem of multiple 
> outputs from per-message calls (wrap/unwrap, 
> get/verify MIC). His proposal requires the caller 
> of these functions to get an instance of the class 
> MessageProp, setting the QOP and the privacy-requested 
> flag in the constructor, and then pass this as a 
> parameter to the per-message calls. Inside these 
> calls, other member values of the MessageProp object
> are set (e.g. actual QOP, privacy, token-related
> flags, etc.). When the call returns, the caller can 
> then read these values from the MessageProp object. 

The return value from wrap/unwrap/getMIC is the output buffer.  We did not
want to stick that payload into a return structure. If you do that then
the output buffer field in it becomes redundant in the case where the user
specifies streams for input and output. 

Moreover, the user can just allocate one MessageProp object and use that
all the time to pass in and get back QOP, privacy, and other information,
so its not big deal. 

> 2) As far as I can tell, Jack's functions only 
> return major and minor status when an exception is 
> thrown; otherwise, "no news is good news". We took 
> the approach of breaking out major and minor status, 
> as well as token flags, and output byte arrays for 
> tokens, into a separate interface, GSSStatus; our 
> GSSException contains one of these, a good many 
> functions have it as their return type, and the 
> PerMessageCallResult (alluded to above) extends it. 
> 
> It seemed to us that "status" of the call is 
> conceptually separate from exceptionality, and 
> potentially useful even where there is nothing 
> "exceptional"; hence the distinction. (Also, of 
> course, our status carries output tokens too, and 
> thus has significant freight even when all the
> status lights are green.)  
> 

The major status codes that GSS-API returns are nicely grouped by the RFC
into FATAL and INFORMATORY categories in Table 1 of
draft-ietf-cat-rfc2078bis-08.txt. 

In light of the fact that Java has an "Exception" mechanism in place I
would like to keep all fatal error codes in exceptions only. As a Java
programmer, I would expect to catch an exception if a fatal error occurs. 
The exception contains both the major and the minor status code.

Leaving GSS_S_COMPLETE and GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED aside for the moment,
getting an informatory status code during context establishment will also
result in an exception because they are fatal when returned from
GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context. 

That leaves the informatory status codes from GSS_Unwrap() and
GSS_VerifyMIC(). The equivalent of the informatory major code is returned
in the MessageProp object for the caller to query. However, I realize that
in this case there is no way to indicate a minor status code. That could
easliy be added to MessageProp. 

As for GSS_S_COMPLETE and GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the former is implicit
when no exception is thrown, and the latter is part of the state of the
context, not the individual unwrap/verifyMIC calls. (RFC page 65:
GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED should be returned only by GSS_Init_sec_context() 
and GSS_Accept_sec_context()). This state of the context is returned by
Context.isEstablished() in the Java bindings. 



> 3) We have two different classes, GSSMechName   
> (corresponding to "name for mechanism") and GSSname
> (corresponding to plain old name). The former
> extends the latter, and adds the method export()
> (which is only valid for a "name for mechanism").
> GSSName has a method which takes a mechanism OID  
> as a parameter and disgorges a GSSMechName
> (the method is canonicalize(), which of course 
> represents the mapping of GSS_Canonicalize_name).
> Jack's approach is not to have different classes;
> he has a single class, GSSName, an instance of
> which may either correspond to a "name for
> mechanism" or not. If so, then export() is
> valid; if not, not (and export() presumably
> throws an exception if called). A GSSName is
> a "name for mechanism," in Jack's mapping, if   
> its constructor was called with a mechoid
> parameter, or if the method "canonicalize" was
> called subsequent to the object's creation;


The GSSName constructor is equivalent to GSS_Import_name(). It takes an
OID to indicate which nametype the object belongs to. Sometimes the
nametype is GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME in which case the resulting name object
has to be an MN. If not, you can call canonicalize() on this name with a
mechanism OID. That's pretty straightforward, not roundabout. 

> that is, canonicalize(), in Jack's approach, 
> operates "in place". I presume the way one 

GSSName.canonicalize() returns a name object that is an MN. It's not "in
place", if that bothers you.

The draft also has a utility constructor that will take a mechanism OID in
addition to the nametype OID and do the GSS_Import_name and
GSS_Canonicalize_name in one shot for you to create an MN. 

As for subclassing GSSName for MN's like you suggested, the problem is
that your GSSName constructor which is the equivalent of GSS_Import_name() 
cannot then take GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME as a nametype OID and expect to
morph the GSSName object it creates into a GSSMechName subclass object.
What you can do is use comnpisition where the GSSName might contain one or
more GSSMechNames, and if the constructor gets a nametype OID of
GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME, then the resulting GSSName object contains only one
GSSMechName object inside it. But such a GSSMechname class then goes into
the SPI realm that is a different document.

FYI, the GSSName class might need a isMN() method that return true if it
is an MN and has only one element inside it. 

> 5) Very minor: it isn't obvious to me why there are 
> two versions of equals() in Jack's GSSName. One of them
> takes a GSSName parameter and the other takes an
> Object and throws an exception if the two can't 
> be compared. I imagine there's some reason for this, 
> but it would be useful to have that stated. 

The one that takes Object as parameter overrides the equals() method
inherited from the Object class to make it work correctly for GSSName. The
one that takes GSSName as parameter is the obvious one which all
programmers will gravitate to.

---



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From: "Jack Kabat" <jackk@valicert.com>
To: "Michael Smith" <ms@gf.org>
Cc: <cat-ietf@mit.edu>
Subject: RE: Some technical issues on Java binding
Date: Tue, 6 Apr 1999 16:13:14 -0700
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Hello Michael,


My comments to the issues you raise are listed below. These add to the
comments already sent by Mayank.


Regards,

Jack

>-----Original Message-----
>
>I've been going over Jack Kabat's Internet-Draft
>and comparing it with the prototype Java binding
>we did here in my atelier. (For Javadoc and some
>observations, see <http://www.panix.com/~jlefevre/GSS>).
>Modulo the interface/concrete class issue (I did
>interfaces, Jack did classes), there is a strong
>family resemblance between the two. There are some
>areas of divergence which seem to me to raise some
>interesting, if minor, technical issues:
>
>1) Mapping things with output parameters is always
>a little untidy in Java. Jack and I adopted slightly
>different approaches to the problem of multiple
>outputs from per-message calls (wrap/unwrap,
>get/verify MIC). His proposal requires the caller
>of these functions to get an instance of the class
>MessageProp, setting the QOP and the privacy-requested
>flag in the constructor, and then pass this as a
>parameter to the per-message calls. Inside these
>calls, other member values of the MessageProp object
>are set (e.g. actual QOP, privacy, token-related
>flags, etc.). When the call returns, the caller can
>then read these values from the MessageProp object.
>
>Our approach, on the other hand, is to have the
>per-message calls create and return an instance of
>a thing with the (admittedly unwieldy) name of
>GSSPerMessageCallResult, which has members with the
>actual QOP, privacy, token flags etc., as well as
>major and minor status and the actual output of the
>function (wrapped or unwrapped data, MIC, etc.).
>Our per-message calls take requested QOP and
>privacy as direct parameters (rather than as
>preset elements of the MessageProp object, as in
>Jack's scheme).
>
>It seems to me that our approach has the advantage of
>being simpler for the application programmer.
>

There is very little difference in both approaches. The MessageProp object
is just a data container. One possibility is for wrap to take QOP and
confidentiality as parameters and return messageProg:
public Messageprop Wrap(byte inbuf[], int offset, int len, Bool conf, int
qop);

All the application programmer has to do is to create an object with the
appropriate values new MessageProp(1, true). I don't think this is a big
complication.


>2) As far as I can tell, Jack's functions only
>return major and minor status when an exception is
>thrown; otherwise, "no news is good news". We took
>the approach of breaking out major and minor status,
>as well as token flags, and output byte arrays for
>tokens, into a separate interface, GSSStatus; our
>GSSException contains one of these, a good many
>functions have it as their return type, and the
>PerMessageCallResult (alluded to above) extends it.
>
>It seemed to us that "status" of the call is
>conceptually separate from exceptionality, and
>potentially useful even where there is nothing
>"exceptional"; hence the distinction. (Also, of

Example? GSS specification returns only errors or success. A handful of
context calls also return informatory values. We followed the traditional
Java approach and used exceptions to signal errors. We also indicate
informatory values through the usage of MessageProp in the per-message
calls. This covers all the error reporting modes specified in RFC 2078 so I
don't see any reason to include other return values. Did you have specific
examples in mind that we are not capturing?


>course, our status carries output tokens too, and
>thus has significant freight even when all the
>status lights are green.)
>
>3) We have two different classes, GSSMechName
>(corresponding to "name for mechanism") and GSSname
>(corresponding to plain old name). The former
>extends the latter, and adds the method export()
>(which is only valid for a "name for mechanism").
>GSSName has a method which takes a mechanism OID
>as a parameter and disgorges a GSSMechName
>(the method is canonicalize(), which of course
>represents the mapping of GSS_Canonicalize_name).
>Jack's approach is not to have different classes;
>he has a single class, GSSName, an instance of
>which may either correspond to a "name for
>mechanism" or not. If so, then export() is
>valid; if not, not (and export() presumably
>throws an exception if called). A GSSName is
>a "name for mechanism," in Jack's mapping, if
>its constructor was called with a mechoid
>parameter, or if the method "canonicalize" was
>called subsequent to the object's creation;
>that is, canonicalize(), in Jack's approach,
>operates "in place". I presume the way one
>gets a "name for mechanism" and still retains
>the non-mechanism-specific name is to call
>clone() on a non-mech-specific name, and then
>canonicalize() on the clone.
>
>This seems a little roundabout to us; also, of
>course, it seems that objects with different
>sets of methods ought to be in different classes.

On the other hand, you probably would not want to create a new class because
of one new method? We tried having exactly what you suggest in our
prototype, but found it an over kill for this one difference. Also several
issues arose from having a constructor that may need to create one or the
other object (MN or generic name) based on the parameter passed in. Which
one would you return? Some implementations may also want to differ the
creation of the name until they are actually used (i.e. if I specify generic
name information in the constructor, I may not be able to create a MN at
that point, but once that name is passed into a call in which the mechanism
can be determined, then the underlying implementation can create the MN).


>
>4) GSS has two methods for adding mechanisms to
>credentials: add and add-in-place. Add creates a
>new credential with the added mechanism included;
>add in place doesn't create the new credential, but
>just folds the new mechanism into the existing
>credential. We replicated this arrangement in our
>implementation; our GSSCredential interface defines
>a method addCredential(), which returns a new instance
>of GSSCredential, and another method
>addCredentialInPlace(), which returns void and operates
>on the existing credential. Jack's approach, in
>effect, has only the add-in-place version; if you
>want a new credential, you add in place and then
>clone(), or vice-versa.

Again, I don't see this as a problem but a feature :-)
Clone is a standard Java method used to create a duplicate of an object.
This is something that Java programmers would be used to and expect to have
in a class. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent of this in C.

>
>5) Very minor: it isn't obvious to me why there are
>two versions of equals() in Jack's GSSName. One of them
>takes a GSSName parameter and the other takes an
>Object and throws an exception if the two can't
>be compared. I imagine there's some reason for this,
>but it would be useful to have that stated.
>
>6) Also minor: there's a method of GSSName called
>isAnonymous(), which doesn't, as far as I can see,
>correspond to anything in the GSS spec. What's this
>for?

GSS treats anonymous name with special behavior (see gss_compare_name). We
thought it would be useful to allow callers to determine a name of this
type. Gss_accept_sec_context returns the target name as one of its
parameters. This name may be anonymous. This methods provides an easy way of
determining this.

>
>7) Similar to above: there's a method, getDefaultMech,
>returning a mechoid, in GSSManager. Again this doesn't
>seem to correspond to anything in GSS, as far as I can
>see.
>
>8) Jack has a GSS-specific Channel Binding class and
>we don't; but I think this is a good idea and ought to
>be there.
>
>9) Similarly, his Oid class is richer in functionality
>than ours, in ways that I think make good sense.
>
>10) As the result of an extended discussion some months
>ago, Jack's and my specifications both contain versions
>of the per-message and token-establishment calls that use
>input and output streams rather than byte arrays for the
>tokens. This technique was originally devised as another
>way around the lack of output parameters in Java, but
>I'd like to hear some feedback from other people:
>is this a good idea, or not? If memory serves, Jack
>and I agreed in correspondence that the calls which take
>streams as parameters should not block on reading or
>writing these streams; this implies (inter alia) that the
>caller needs to ensure that at least an entire token is
>present in the input stream before calling the method.

The streams are controlled by the caller. The caller is free to decide the
appropriate behavior of the stream he/she chose to use. I don't think we
should specify the behavior of these objects in this specification. It is
entirely up to the caller to what he/she wishes to use. One of my reasons
for adding stream support, is that usage of an object instead of primitive
(byte array) gives the caller much more flexibility and control. I think of
a stream as an object managing some kind of data storage. This can be
anything from a socket, memory array, file, to an encoder which encodes the
written bytes into application specific format, before storing them.


>(And what does the method do if there isn't a complete
>token on the input stream, or it can't write the output
>stream -- rewind it and/or throw an exception? If the
>latter, with what major status? If not, with what output?)
>
>I wonder if this  "feature" isn't more trouble
>than it's worth, although Jack did convince me that it
>was kind of cool when we were exchanging e-mails about
>it.
>
>

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Date: Wed, 07 Apr 1999 11:54:37 -0400
To: Mayank Upadhyay <mdu@Eng.Sun.COM>
From: Michael Smith <ms@gf.org>
Subject: Java binding issues (response to Mayank)
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At 11:12 AM 4/6/99 -0700, Mayank Upadhyay <mdu@eng.sun.com> wrote:

>The return value from wrap/unwrap/getMIC is the output buffer.  We did not
>want to stick that payload into a return structure. If you do that then
>the output buffer field in it becomes redundant in the case where the user
>specifies streams for input and output. 

One could regard it as a redundancy, or as an option for the 
application programmer. Even qua redundancy, it seems harmless; 
if the application programmer has no use for it, he or she can 
just ignore it. 

Incidentally, I can't shake my reservations about the streams 
versions of the context calls. I'll try to articulate these 
reservations better in a response to Jack's note, which discusses
them in more detail. 

>Moreover, the user can just allocate one MessageProp object and use that
>all the time to pass in and get back QOP, privacy, and other information,
>so its not big deal. 

I agree that it's not a "big deal" in any case, but much was made, 
both at Minneapolis and on the list, of the importance of simplicity; 
a saving on "setup" costs for a call seems like a particularly 
nice increment of simplicity. 

>In light of the fact that Java has an "Exception" mechanism in place I
>would like to keep all fatal error codes in exceptions only. As a Java
>programmer, I would expect to catch an exception if a fatal error occurs. 
>The exception contains both the major and the minor status code.

No argument here; any fatal error should throw an exception. 

>Leaving GSS_S_COMPLETE and GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED aside for the moment,
>getting an informatory status code during context establishment will also
>result in an exception because they are fatal when returned from
>GSS_Init_sec_context() and GSS_Accept_sec_context. 
>
>That leaves the informatory status codes from GSS_Unwrap() and
>GSS_VerifyMIC(). The equivalent of the informatory major code is returned
>in the MessageProp object for the caller to query. However, I realize that
>in this case there is no way to indicate a minor status code. That could
>easliy be added to MessageProp. 

Which is, essentially, part of what we did in our version. We went a bit
further, however, by assigning major and minor and informatory statuses 
to an object which keeps them together in an explicit way,
which seems to be the GSS style. GSS statuses, like New York cops, always
travel in pairs, so we gave them a patrol car and called it GSSStatus.
Since both context calls and per-message calls result in two of 
these officers showing up, we provided for a return of that portmanteau
object from both. Jack and Mayank's scheme provides no way for a minor status
to be returned on a successful context call, as mandated by GSS.
Mayank's suggestion of adding a minor status to MessageProp solves this 
problem (in a somewhat ad hoc way) for per-message 
calls but leaves it unaddressed for context calls. No doubt a different
solution could be devised for the context calls, but I think the 
GSS characteristic consistent design pattern of major and minor status 
and output token, common to per-message and context calls, ought to 
be preserved if possible, and find a reflection in the object 
architecture of the language binding; this is what we tried 
to do with our version. 

Also, I've just noticed that there doesn't seem to be any way, 
in Jack and Mayank's scheme, that the byte array flavor of 
context calls that fail (and throw an exception) can nevertheless 
return a token, as GSS states may occur. Have I overlooked 
something? In our scheme, of course, the output token, like the 
major and minor status, lives in GSSStatus, which is available 
as the function's return value on successful completion, or as 
part of the GSSException on failure. 

>As for GSS_S_COMPLETE and GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, the former is implicit
>when no exception is thrown, and the latter is part of the state of the
>context, not the individual unwrap/verifyMIC calls. (RFC page 65:
>GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED should be returned only by GSS_Init_sec_context() 
>and GSS_Accept_sec_context()). This state of the context is returned by
>Context.isEstablished() in the Java bindings. 

Here again, then, it seems that semantics which GSS assigns to a value 
in the status field has been broken out as a separate special-purpose
method. Actually, we did this too, as a convenience to the programmer -- 
we have a getContinueNeeded method in GSSStatus. But we also provide the 
whole major status field, along with its bit mappings a la GSS, for 
programmers who prefer that idiom. 

I might observe, parenthetically, that the general difference between 
our approach on the one hand, and Jack and Mayank's on the other, 
might be characterized by saying that they have rearranged GSS more 
than we have in order to align it more with their sense of what is 
idiomatically Java-ish, while we have been a bit more conservative. 
It would be interesting to hear from other WG members where the sweet 
spot on this axis is thought to lie. 
 
>The GSSName constructor is equivalent to GSS_Import_name(). It takes an
>OID to indicate which nametype the object belongs to. Sometimes the
>nametype is GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME in which case the resulting name object
>has to be an MN. If not, you can call canonicalize() on this name with a
>mechanism OID. That's pretty straightforward, not roundabout. 

Of course we had no constructors, because we specified 
interfaces rather than concrete classes, and interfaces don't 
have constructors. We have a method of the interface 
GSSImplementation, which simply maps GSS_Import_name in a very 
literal way. Presumably Mayank and Jack will have to do 
something similar when they convert to interfaces, but of 
course this doesn't answer the question whether the GSS 
notion of a Mechanism Name ought to map to a subclass of 
GSSName, or (on the other hand) to an instance of GSSName 
with some more or less hidden state. I think the former is 
preferable, since some GSS calls are specified to require or 
return Mechanism Names, and the obvious Java way to reflect 
this requirement is in the typing of the parameters or the 
return value. 

>As for subclassing GSSName for MN's like you suggested, the problem is
>that your GSSName constructor which is the equivalent of GSS_Import_name() 
>cannot then take GSS_C_NT_EXPORT_NAME as a nametype OID and expect to
>morph the GSSName object it creates into a GSSMechName subclass object.

Ah, but again: we have interfaces not classes, so no constructors. 
The way we get a GSSMechName is simply a ploddingly literal 
Javafication of the GSS calls: we either do an import() and a 
canonicalize(), or an import() of an output from a previous export(). 
The return value type of import is of course GSSName, so returning a 
subclass (GSSMechName) is entirely kosher. We would, of course, have 
the same problem Jack and Mayank had if we had tried to map import() 
using constructors, as they did, and I see now that this must be the 
reason they didn't want to sublass GSSName to get a Mechanism Name; 
but we were serendipitously saved from that pitfall by using the 
interface rather than class approach. The decision for an interface 
approach would seem to make this a non-problem, so the question 
to subclass, or not to subclass, can be answered without reference
to the issue of constructors. 

--Michael Smith
  ms@gf.org

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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Wed Apr  7 14:13:45 1999
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Date: Wed, 07 Apr 1999 12:48:38 -0400
To: Jack Kabat<jackk@valicert.com>
From: Michael Smith <ms@gf.org>
Subject: Java binding issues (response to Jack)
Cc: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
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I think I covered many of Jack's points as well as I 
could in an earlier response to Mayank. A few 
extra topics:

At 11:16 AM 4/7/99 -0400, Jack Kabat<jackk@valicert.com> wrote:

>>4) GSS has two methods for adding mechanisms to
>>credentials: add and add-in-place.[....] Jack's approach, in
>>effect, has only the add-in-place version; if you
>>want a new credential, you add in place and then
>>clone(), or vice-versa.
>
>Again, I don't see this as a problem but a feature :-)
>Clone is a standard Java method used to create a duplicate of an object.
>This is something that Java programmers would be used to and expect to have
>in a class. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent of this in C.

Yes; I could be convinced on this point. As I noted in 
replying to Mayank, our approach was more conservative
and arguably less idiomatic to Java; Jack's strove more
for native fluency. But this is a case where following
the usual Java approach seems to impose no visible cost, 
so why not? 

>GSS treats anonymous name with special behavior (see gss_compare_name). We
>thought it would be useful to allow callers to determine a name of this
>type. Gss_accept_sec_context returns the target name as one of its
>parameters. This name may be anonymous. This methods provides an easy way of
>determining this.

Right again, I think; GSS itself has a reserved name type for
anonymous name, and one can get the name type from a name, 
so Jack is not giving anything away here that isn't already
in GSS. 

>>there's a method, getDefaultMech,
>>returning a mechoid, in GSSManager. Again this doesn't
>>seem to correspond to anything in GSS, as far as I can
>>see.

Jack didn't comment on this one, but I'm repeating it 
in the hope that somebody can enlighten me about why some 
such functionality is _not_ in abstract GSS. Was there 
thought to be some sort of security issue? 

>>10) As the result of an extended discussion some months
>>ago, Jack's and my specifications both contain versions
>>of the per-message and token-establishment calls that use
>>input and output streams rather than byte arrays for the
>>tokens. [....] the calls which take
>>streams as parameters should not block on reading or
>>writing these streams; this implies (inter alia) that the
>>caller needs to ensure that at least an entire token is
>>present in the input stream before calling the method.
[....]
>>(And what does the method do if there isn't a complete
>>token on the input stream, or it can't write the output
>>stream -- rewind it and/or throw an exception? If the
>>latter, with what major status? If not, with what output?)

>The streams are controlled by the caller. The caller is free to decide the
>appropriate behavior of the stream he/she chose to use. 

Well, fair enough, but that's not the problem I'm alluding to here. 
Surely the GSS binding spec needs to specify the behavior of GSS 
implementations with respect to the various combinations
of conditions the implementation may find on the streams, and it also
needs to specify in what state the GSS implementation leaves the streams
after the call, both on normal terminations and on errors.
The problem is that this is a pretty big combinatorial
space, and the existing spec doesn't begin to cover it.
So I wonder if it really buys us enough to justify this amount
of trouble. Perhaps a concrete example of an application that 
would benefit significantly from this approach would be 
helpful. 

--Michael Smith
  ms@gf.org

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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr  8 09:32:23 1999
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From: "Linn, John" <jlinn@securitydynamics.com>
To: "'Michael Smith'" <ms@gf.org>, Jack Kabat <jackk@valicert.com>
Cc: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
Subject: RE: Java binding issues (response to Jack)
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Michael wrote, excerpting:

>>>there's a method, getDefaultMech,
>>>returning a mechoid, in GSSManager. Again this doesn't
>>>seem to correspond to anything in GSS, as far as I can
>>>see.
>
>Jack didn't comment on this one, but I'm repeating it 
>in the hope that somebody can enlighten me about why some 
>such functionality is _not_ in abstract GSS. Was there 
>thought to be some sort of security issue? 

There's no security issue that I can recall.  In general, though, the
operation to determine what concrete mechanism a GSS request for "default"
will map to can be deferred until context establishment time.  This allows
an implementation to take advantage of other information then available
(e.g., initiator identity, contents of presented credentials, target of
context request) to apply local policy and resolve "default" accordingly.
Given, therefore, that the value resolved for "default" may differ for
different prospective contexts, is there clear need to indicate the "what
would be" result to an application outside an actual context establishment?

--jl

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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr  8 14:57:41 1999
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From: "Jack Kabat" <jackk@valicert.com>
To: "Linn, John" <jlinn@securitydynamics.com>, "Michael Smith" <ms@gf.org>
Cc: <cat-ietf@mit.edu>
Subject: RE: Java binding issues (response to Jack)
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John and Michael,


Our motivation for adding the extra method was to provide information about
the default mechanism to the GSS-API callers. The prototype we had allowed
to be configured to run with different mechanism so the default mechanism
would change dynamically and would be something that could be configured.

However, if we assume that the default mechanism can differ based on the
information presented to the context establishment call, then our new method
will prevent this.

Sounds like it should be removed.


Regards,

jack


>-----Original Message-----
>From: owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
>[mailto:owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU]On Behalf Of Linn, John
>Sent: Thursday, April 08, 1999 5:40 AM
>To: 'Michael Smith'; Jack Kabat
>Cc: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
>Subject: RE: Java binding issues (response to Jack)
>
>
>Michael wrote, excerpting:
>
>>>>there's a method, getDefaultMech,
>>>>returning a mechoid, in GSSManager. Again this doesn't
>>>>seem to correspond to anything in GSS, as far as I can
>>>>see.
>>
>>Jack didn't comment on this one, but I'm repeating it
>>in the hope that somebody can enlighten me about why some
>>such functionality is _not_ in abstract GSS. Was there
>>thought to be some sort of security issue?
>
>There's no security issue that I can recall.  In general, though, the
>operation to determine what concrete mechanism a GSS request for "default"
>will map to can be deferred until context establishment time.  This allows
>an implementation to take advantage of other information then available
>(e.g., initiator identity, contents of presented credentials, target of
>context request) to apply local policy and resolve "default" accordingly.
>Given, therefore, that the value resolved for "default" may differ for
>different prospective contexts, is there clear need to indicate the "what
>would be" result to an application outside an actual context establishment?
>
>--jl
>
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr  8 15:28:46 1999
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Dear Colleague, 

This mail is to remind you of the upcomming, extended deadline
for submissions to the Fourth International Workshop on Enterprise
Security, to be held as a part of IEEE WET-ICE '99 on June 16-18, 
1999 at Stanford University, California, USA. 

Extended deadline for paper submissions is April 12, 1999.

Electronic submissions are accepted. Please see the workshop web
page http://www.ida.liu.se/conferences/WETICE/SECWK/ for the full
Call For Papers and further details.

Please accept my apologies if you receive this message more than once.

Sincerely,

Nahid Shahmehri
Program Co-Chair

Dept. of Computer and Information Science 
Linköping University 
SE-581 83 Linköping
Sweden 








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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Fri Apr  9 18:05:52 1999
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To: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
Subject: Proposal for Kerberos hostname->realm mapping
X-Face: "Evs"_GpJ]],xS)b$T2#V&{KfP_i2`TlPrY$Iv9+TQ!6+`~+l)#7I)0xr1>4hfd{#0B4
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Date: Fri, 09 Apr 1999 17:07:03 -0400
From: Ken Hornstein <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
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As some people may or may not remember, we sorta agreed on using DNS
SRV records in the form:

_kerberos._udp.realm

For looking up Kerberos servers via DNS.

Along the same vein, I suggest doing the following for mapping hosts to
realms via DNS:

_kerberos.hostname	IN	TXT	"YOUR.REALM.HERE"
_kerberos.domain	IN	TXT	"YOUR.REALM.HERE"

The idea is that you'd do a TXT record lookup first on a specific
hostname, and if that failed you'd try the domain.

Of course, you'd want to check any local configuration files first.

Comments?

--Ken
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Sat Apr 10 16:37:00 1999
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Subject: Re: Proposal for Kerberos hostname->realm mapping
References: <199904092107.RAA04089@ginger.cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
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Ken Hornstein <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil> writes:

> Of course, you'd want to check any local configuration files first.

We do this in Heimdal, but choose to use krb5-realm.domain instead,
but that is no big deal.

I think this is more common practice, than something you'd want to
standardise.

/Johan
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Sat Apr 10 23:43:20 1999
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To: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
Subject: Re: Proposal for Kerberos hostname->realm mapping 
In-reply-to: Your message of "10 Apr 1999 21:55:41 +0200."
             <xofn20gmerm.fsf@blubb.pdc.kth.se> 
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Date: Sat, 10 Apr 1999 23:04:09 -0400
From: Ken Hornstein <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
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>We do this in Heimdal, but choose to use krb5-realm.domain instead,
>but that is no big deal.
>
>I think this is more common practice, than something you'd want to
>standardise.

Forgive me if I seem dumb, but are you saying "krb5-realm.domain" is
the more standard practice, or that we shouldn't standardize on
something at all?

My only reason for suggesting _kerberos.domain is to try to avoid name
collision (that's the reason for using _ in SRV records).  I'm willing
to listen to other ideas, of course.

--Ken
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Sun Apr 11 08:55:28 1999
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To: Ken Hornstein <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
Cc: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
Subject: Re: Proposal for Kerberos hostname->realm mapping
References: <199904110304.XAA07944@ginger.cmf.nrl.navy.mil>
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From: joda@pdc.kth.se (Johan Danielsson)
Date: 11 Apr 1999 13:56:13 +0200
In-Reply-To: Ken Hornstein's message of "Sat, 10 Apr 1999 23:04:09 -0400"
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Ken Hornstein <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil> writes:

> Forgive me if I seem dumb, but are you saying "krb5-realm.domain" is
> the more standard practice, or that we shouldn't standardize on
> something at all?

Well, no. I only said we used it, but that the choise was pretty much
random. If people like _kerberos, fine by me. :-)

Does 1510 say anything about how to find a KDC, or how to figure out
what realm a service belongs to? I think it would be a good idea to
write down common practice, but I'm just not sure it has to be in
1510++.

You also have the hair-ball of the, not completely undocumented, MIT
krb5 API. A revised subset of the API docs would be a great thing.

/Johan
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Mon Apr 12 04:37:32 1999
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Mon Apr 12 17:08:16 1999
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Subject: Re: Proposal for Kerberos hostname->realm mapping 
In-reply-to: Your message of "11 Apr 1999 13:56:13 +0200."
             <xofg167mkv6.fsf@blubb.pdc.kth.se> 
X-Face: "Evs"_GpJ]],xS)b$T2#V&{KfP_i2`TlPrY$Iv9+TQ!6+`~+l)#7I)0xr1>4hfd{#0B4
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>Well, no. I only said we used it, but that the choise was pretty much
>random. If people like _kerberos, fine by me. :-)

Just trying to figure out the best way to do this :-)  What do other
people think?

>Does 1510 say anything about how to find a KDC, or how to figure out
>what realm a service belongs to? I think it would be a good idea to
>write down common practice, but I'm just not sure it has to be in
>1510++.

Hmmmm ... I have mixed feelings about this.  Maybe an informational
RFC on common Kerberos practices would be the right thing.  Cliff,
do _you_ think this should be in 1510++?

>You also have the hair-ball of the, not completely undocumented, MIT
>krb5 API. A revised subset of the API docs would be a great thing.

Hey, one problem at a time :-)

--Ken
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Wed Apr 14 13:26:11 1999
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
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	Title		: A Service Provider API for GSS mechanisms in Java
	Author(s)	: M. Smith
	Filename	: draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-javabind-spi-00.txt
	Pages		: 11
	Date		: 13-Apr-99
	
This document specifies a 'provider API' by which GSS mechanisms
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr 15 17:52:52 1999
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From: Booker Bense <bbense@networking.stanford.edu>
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- I haven't put any effort into archiving this list 
because I thought it was already being archived
elsewhere (i.e. at cat-ietf-archive@bitsy.mit.edu 
and maybe at <ietf-archive@cnri.reston.va.us> )

- Are these public archives, if so what are the URL's? 

-thanks, 

- Booker C. Bense



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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Fri Apr 16 01:39:22 1999
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   Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 13:23:56 -0700 (PDT)
   From: Booker Bense <bbense@networking.stanford.edu>

   - I haven't put any effort into archiving this list 
   because I thought it was already being archived
   elsewhere (i.e. at cat-ietf-archive@bitsy.mit.edu 
   and maybe at <ietf-archive@cnri.reston.va.us> )

   - Are these public archives, if so what are the URL's? 

You can find the archives at ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/cat-ietf/archive

They haven't been updated in a while (since we separated bitsy and the
net-dist machine), and our illustrious chair has been prodding me for a
while to get this fixed.  Mea culpa; mea maxima culpa.  In any case,
I've updated things so that recent archives are now available on
cat-ietf-archive.

That being said, the IETF secretariat does offer an archiving service,
and it would probably be a great idea to transition the archiving so
that they could assume responsibilty for it, since they can almost
certainly do a better job than I have time to provide at the moment.

							- Ted
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr 22 07:24:11 1999
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr 22 10:31:00 1999
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Common Authentication Technology Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Generic Security Service API Version 2 : Java bindings
	Author(s)	: J. Kabat
	Filename	: draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-javabind-01.txt
	Pages		: 80
	Date		: 21-Apr-99
	
The Generic Security Services Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
offers application programmers uniform access to security services
atop a variety of underlying cryptographic mechanisms. This document
specifies the Java bindings for GSS-API which is described at a
language independent conceptual level in RFC 2078 [GSSAPIv2].
 
The GSS-API allows a caller application to authenticate a principal
identity, to delegate rights to a peer, and to apply security
services such as confidentiality and integrity on a per-message
basis. Examples of security mechanisms defined for GSS-API are The
Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism [SPKM] and The Kerberos Version 5
GSS-API Mechanism [KERBV5].

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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr 22 13:50:52 1999
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Just got a note on the list that Jack has posted 
an update of his Java bindings spec. This came in just as
I was in the process of sending an I-D for my interfaces 
approach, which I expect to show up in the next day or
so (I expect it'll be called 
<draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-javabind-ifs-00.txt>). 

I've also sent a revision to my "service provider interface"
which corrects some errors in the earlier version. 
The new one ought to be 
<draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-javabind-spi-01.txt>. 

I look forward to reading Jack's document and to 
what I hope will be a lively ensuing discussion. 


--Michael Smith
  ms@gf.org

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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Thu Apr 22 15:34:34 1999
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From: "Jack Kabat" <jackk@valicert.com>
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Hello,


Please note that this version of the JGSS spec was the one submitted shortly
after the last meeting as an update to the expired GSS-API Java bindings.
The submitted document contains no API changes. It was submitted to cycle
the timer pending resolution of the current discussions. The content changes
are limited to the addition of Mayank Upadhyay as a co-author and update to
my contact information.


Regards,

Jack


-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
[mailto:owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU] On Behalf Of
Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
Sent: Thursday, April 22, 1999 6:18 AM
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Cc: cat-ietf@mit.edu
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-javabind-01.txt


A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.
This draft is a work item of the Common Authentication Technology Working
Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Generic Security Service API Version 2 : Java bindings
	Author(s)	: J. Kabat
	Filename	: draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-javabind-01.txt
	Pages		: 80
	Date		: 21-Apr-99

The Generic Security Services Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
offers application programmers uniform access to security services
atop a variety of underlying cryptographic mechanisms. This document
specifies the Java bindings for GSS-API which is described at a
language independent conceptual level in RFC 2078 [GSSAPIv2].

The GSS-API allows a caller application to authenticate a principal
identity, to delegate rights to a peer, and to apply security
services such as confidentiality and integrity on a per-message
basis. Examples of security mechanisms defined for GSS-API are The
Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism [SPKM] and The Kerberos Version 5
GSS-API Mechanism [KERBV5].

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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Fri Apr 23 09:13:32 1999
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
directories.  This draft is a work item of the Common Authentication
Technology Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Common Authentication technology WG
	Author(s)	: M. Smith
	Filename	: draft-ietf-cat-gssv2-javabind-ifs-00.txt
	Pages		: 27
	Date		: 22-Apr-99
	
This document specifies a set of Java interfaces representing the
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Fri Apr 23 11:11:09 1999
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Date: Fri, 23 Apr 1999 15:01:16 +0100
From: "Detlef =?iso-8859-1?Q?H=FChnlein?=" <huehnlein@secunet.de>
Organization: Secunet GmbH - The Trust Company
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Subject: Final Call for Papers - CQRE [Secure] networking
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Hallo!

Please accept my sincere appologies, if you receive this 
Final Call for Papers multiple times.

The mail is just to remind you that there are only !!! THREE !!! 
more weeks until the deadline for submission of extended 
abstracts on May 14th, 1999.

Recent news:
* best paper award at CQRE
* publication of proceedings in Springer's LNCS
* first invited speakers: 
   - Stephen Kent     (GTE)
   - Bruce Schneier   (Counterpane)
   - Helena Handschuh (Gemplus/ENST)

Best regards
    Detlef Huehnlein

***************************************************************
                  Final Call for Papers
            CQRE [Secure] Congress & Exhibition
        Duesseldorf, Germany, Nov. 30 - Dec. 2 1999
---------------------------------------------------------------
provides a new international forum covering most aspects of
information security with a special focus to the role of
information security in the context of rapidly evolving 
economic processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Deadline for submission of extended abstracts: May 14, 1999
CQRE - website: http://www.cqre.net (under construction)
CfP - at:       http://www.secunet.de/forum/cqre.html
mailing-list:   send mailto:cqre@secunet.de
(where the subject is "subscribe" without paranthesis)
***************************************************************
The "CQRE [Secure] networking" provides a new international 
forum giving a close-up view on information security in the 
context of rapidly evolving economic processes. The 
unprecedented reliance on computer technology transformed 
the previous technical side-issue "information security" to 
a management problem requiring decisions of strategic
importance. Hence, the targeted audience represents decision 
makers from government, industry, commercial, and academic 
communities.

If you are developing solutions to problems relating to the 
protection of your country´s information infrastructure or 
a commercial enterprise, consider submitting a paper to the 
"CQRE [Secure] networking" conference.

We are looking for papers and panel discussions covering:

* electronic commerce
  - new business processes
  - secure business transactions
  - online merchandising
  - electronic payment / banking
  - innovative applications
* network security
  - virtual private networks
  - security aspects in internet utilization
  - security aspects in multimedia applications
  - intrusion detection systems
* legal aspects
  - digital signatures acts
  - privacy and anonymity
  - crypto regulation
  - liability
* corporate security
  - access control
  - secure teleworking
  - enterprise key management
  - IT-audit
  - risk / disaster management
  - security awareness and training
  - implementation, accreditation, and operation of secure systems
    in a government, business, or industry environment
* security technology
  - cryptography
  - public key infrastructures
  - chip card technology
  - biometrics
* trust management
  - evaluation of products and systems
  - international harmonization of security evaluation criterias
* standardization
* future perspectives

Any other contribution addressing the involvement of IT security 
in economic processes will be welcome.

Authors are invited to submit an extended abstract of their 
contribution to the program chair. The submissions should be 
original research results, survey articles or "high quality" 
case studies and position papers. Product advertisements are 
welcome for presentation, but will not be considered for the
proceedings. Manuscripts must be in English, and should not be 
more than 2.000 words. The extended abstracts should be in a 
form suitable for anonymous review, with no author names,
affiliations, acknowledgements or obvious references. 
Contributions must not be submitted in parallel to any conference 
or workshop that has proceedings. Separately, an abstract of 
the paper with no more than 200 words and with title, name and 
addresses (incl. an E-mail address) of the authors shall be 
submitted. In the case of multiple authors the contacting 
author must be clearly identified. We strongly encourage
electronic submission in Postscript format. The submissions 
must be in 11 pt format, use standard fonts or include the 
necessary fonts. Proposals for panel discussions should also be
sent to the program chair. Panels of interest include those that
present alternative/controversial viewpoints or those that 
encourage lively discussions of relevant issues. Panels that
are collections of unrefereed papers will not be considered.

Panel proposals should be a minimum of one page describing the 
subject matter, the appropriateness of the panel for this 
conference and should identify participants and their respective
viewpoints.

best paper award:
This award will be presented at CQRE to the authors of the best
paper to be selected by the program committee.

mailing list/ web-site:
If you want to receive emails with up to date information, please
send a brief mail to cqre@secunet.de. You will find this call for 
papers and further information at http://www.secunet.de/forum/cqre.html.

publication:
The proceedings will be published by Springer-Verlag in the Lecture
Notes of Computer Science (LNCS) Series. The final papers must be
prepared as described in http://www.springer.de/comp/lncs/authors.html.

important dates:
deadline for submission of extended abstracts  May 14,  1999
deadline for submission of panel proposals     June 1,  1999
notification of acceptance                     June 25, 1999
deadline for submission of complete papers     July 30, 1999



program committee:
Johannes Buchmann  (TU Darmstadt)
Dirk Fox           (Secorvo)
Walter Fumy        (Siemens)
Ruediger Grimm     (GMD)
Helena Handschuh   (ENST/Gemplus)
Thomas Hoeren      (Uni Muenster)
Pil Joong Lee      (POSTECH)
Alfred Menezes     (U.o.Waterloo/Certicom)
David Naccache     (Gemplus)
Clifford Neumann   (USC)
Joachim Posegga    (German Telekom)
Mike Reiter        (Bell Labs)
Matt Robshaw       (RSA)
Richard Schlechter (EU-comm.)
Bruce Schneier     (Counterpane)
Tsuyoshi Takagi    (NTT)
Yiannis Tsiounis   (GTE Labs)
Michael Waidner    (IBM)
Moti Yung          (CERTCO)
Robert Zuccherato  (Entrust)

program chair:
Rainer Baumgart
secunet - Security Networks GmbH
Weidenauer Str. 223 - 225
57076 Siegen
Germany

Tel.: +49-271-48950-15
Fax: +49-271-48950-50
R.Baumgart@secunet.de
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Fri Apr 23 19:04:28 1999
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From: Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>
To: "'Ken Hornstein'" <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil>, ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
Subject: RE: Proposal for Kerberos hostname->realm mapping 
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 1999 15:19:54 -0700
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ken Hornstein [mailto:kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil]
> Sent: Saturday, April 10, 1999 8:04 PM
> To: ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
> Subject: Re: Proposal for Kerberos hostname->realm mapping 
> 
> My only reason for suggesting _kerberos.domain is to try to avoid name
> collision (that's the reason for using _ in SRV records).  I'm willing
> to listen to other ideas, of course.

I believe that avoiding name conflicts is the reason for the "_" in "_udp".
It is not common practice to put an underscore in the service name, nor is
it needed, since service names have the whole scope of "_udp.domain" to play
with.

Paul
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From owner-ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU  Fri Apr 23 19:27:35 1999
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From: Paul Leach <paulle@microsoft.com>
To: "'Ken Hornstein'" <kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil>, ietf-cat-wg@lists.Stanford.EDU
Subject: RE: Proposal for Kerberos hostname->realm mapping 
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 1999 15:52:28 -0700
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Leach [mailto:paulle@microsoft.com]
> Sent: Friday, April 23, 1999 3:20 PM
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Ken Hornstein [mailto:kenh@cmf.nrl.navy.mil]
> > Sent: Saturday, April 10, 1999 8:04 PM

> I believe that avoiding name conflicts is the reason for the 
> "_" in "_udp".
> It is not common practice to put an underscore in the service 
> name, nor is
> it needed, since service names have the whole scope of 
> "_udp.domain" to play
> with.

A correction: I just checked the latest DNS SRV record draft, and it indeed
specifies putting an "_" in front of the service name ("kerberos" in this
case).

I misremembered the change that the DNSIND WG had made. Apologies for the
randomization.

Paul
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From: Steen Oluf Karlsen <sok@uhc.dk>
To: ietf-cat-wg-owner@lists.Stanford.EDU
Subject: Q.813 STASE-ROSE
Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1999 19:48:59 +0200
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I seek comments and opinions on
ITU Q.813 STASE-ROSE and its
encapsulation of the rfc 2078 GSS-API.

The use is OSI-Management.

Steen O. Karlsen
Tel +45 97 97 72 72
email sok@post4.tele.dk

uh communications
Telegrafvej 5
DK-2750 Ballerup

Home office:
Soeholtvej 6
Vester Vandet
DK-7700 Thisted

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