Subject: Re: [core] #166: Security re-focus on public keys

From: "core issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 11:42:07 -0000

#166: Security re-focus on public keys

Changes (by zach@…):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed

Comment:

 The following section was added to the draft.

 10.3.4.  IP Address Spoofing Attacks

    Due to the non-reliability of UDP (and to some extent to the
    duplicate message processing strategy), a rogue endpoint which is
    free to read and write messages carried by the constrained network
    (i.e.  NoSec or PreSharedKey deployments with nodes/key ratio > 1:1),
    may easily attack a single endpoint, a group of endpoints, as well as
    the whole network e.g. by:

    1.  spoofing RST in response to a CON message, thus making an
        endpoint "deaf"; or

    2.  spoofing the entire response with forged payload/options (this
        has different levels of impact: from single response disruption,
        to much bolder attacks on the supporting infrastructure, e.g.
        poisoning proxy caches, or tricking validation / lookup
        interfaces in resource directories and, more generally, any
        component that stores global network state and uses CoAP as the
        messaging facility to handle state set/update's is a potential
        target.); or

    3.  spoofing a multicast request for a target node which may result
        in both network congestion/collapse and victim DoS'ing / forced
        wakeup from sleeping; or

    4.  spoofing observe messages, etc.

    In principle, spoofing can be detected by CoAP only in case CON
    semantics is used, because of unexpected ACK/RSTs coming from the
    deceived endpoint.  But this imposes keeping track of the used MIDs
    which is not always possible, and moreover detection becomes
    available usually after the damage is already done.  This kind of
    attack can be prevented using PreSharedKey (with a 1:1 node/key
    ratio) or Certificate security modes.

-- 
----------------------------------+---------------------
 Reporter:  zach@…                |       Owner:  zach@…
     Type:  protocol enhancement  |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major                 |   Milestone:
Component:  coap                  |     Version:
 Severity:  -                     |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                        |
----------------------------------+---------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/ticket/166#comment:1>
core <http://tools.ietf.org/core/>

---

From: "core issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 11:44:32 -0000

Changes (by zach@…):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>

Comment:

 Wrong ticket, re-opened.

-- 
----------------------------------+-----------------------
 Reporter:  zach@…                |       Owner:  zach@…
     Type:  protocol enhancement  |      Status:  reopened
 Priority:  major                 |   Milestone:
Component:  coap                  |     Version:
 Severity:  -                     |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                        |
----------------------------------+-----------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/ticket/166#comment:2>
core <http://tools.ietf.org/core/>