Subject: [core] #312: Discuss spoofing ACKs

From: "core issue tracker" <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2013 15:48:52 -0000

#312: Discuss spoofing ACKs

 Stephen Farrell notes (msg04285c):

 Section 11.4

 (3) 4.2, last para: this creates an attack that can work from off-path -
 just send loads of faked ACKs with guessed Tokens and some of 'em will be
 accepted with probability depending on Token-length and perhaps the
 quality of the RNG used by the sender of the CON. That could cause all
 sorts of "interesting" application layer behaviour. Why is that ok? (Or
 put another way - was this considered and with what conclusion?)

 Carsten says:

 Actually, the ACK would be matched on the Message ID (or I could simply
 point to the penultimate paragraph of 5.3.1).  This is a relatively
 powerful attack that could be added to the list in 11.4.

 (See also #311)

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 Reporter:               |      Owner:  [email-masked]
  [email-masked]           |     Status:  new
     Type:  editorial    |  Milestone:  post-IESG-1
 Priority:  minor        |    Version:  coap-15
Component:  coap         |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Submitted    |
  WG Document            |
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Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/core/trac/ticket/312>
core <http://tools.ietf.org/core/>