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To: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "denis bider (Bitvise)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>, Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C117F5BEFD@eusaamb107.ericsson.se> 
References: <71963A21726946C3B16A0B77F0CFF3F6@Khan> <2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C117F5BECA@eusaamb107.ericsson.se> <CACsn0c=AiBYQB-r+xH=bycqJRS420mKgxw5tvsxN9C7LYUxfLQ@mail.gmail.com> <2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C117F5BEFD@eusaamb107.ericsson.se>
Comments: In-reply-to: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com> message dated "Wed, 17 Aug 2016 14:35:40 -0000."
From: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/_RYszceyg8dedj-6D2EcDIhOGuE>
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Cc: IETF Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2
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My goal with

  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03

is to deprecate the use of diffie-hellman groups that use sha1
and promote new key exchange algorithms.

The latest draft has

Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1    RFC4419       SHOULD NOT
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256  RFC4419       MAY
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1            RFC4253       SHOULD NOT
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1           RFC4253       SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         This Draft    MAY
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         This Draft    SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         This Draft    MAY

It seems reasonable to me to provide a replacement option of a DH MODP
group that is well known (already published in another RFC) with a
SHA2-256 or SHA2-512 associated hash.

(In my view, it is nice to have an upgraded alternative in the Finite
Field Cryptography (FFC) key exchanges for the values being deprecated.
So, it is desirable to come up with a group or groups that are
acceptable alternatives.)

MODP groups have been provided in a number of RFCs. In this case, I have
tried to choose a MODP group that would drop into the existing kex that
SSH uses with only a minor table change for the g,q,p and hash
algorithm. I did not try to play games with a MODP Group with 160-bit,
224-bit or 256-bit Prime Order Subgroups like Group22, Group23, or
Group24 specified in RFC 5114 because most implementation are probably
just calculating q rather than having it in a pre-calculated table.

For simplicity, I suggested the groups listed in RFC 3526 which also
provides a rough table of security strength estimates.

I originally thought that diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 might be
reasonable to provide a 2048-bit MODP Group which is already widely
deployed along with a hash algorithm (SHA2-256) that should be used to
replace SHA1.

However, there are those who seem to think that 128 bits or more of
security would be better (more than is provided by Group14) and many
folks are already trying to get rid of 3DES which has similar security
bits to the Group14 2048-bit MODP group.

So, either the Group15 3072-bit MODP Group (~128 bits of security) or
the Group16 4096-bit MODP group (slightly more than 128 bits of
security) using either SHA2-256 or SHA2-512.

I suggest that ONE of these MODP group should be provided as a 'SHOULD'
implementation as it is hoped that it is a very simple modification to
adjust to using a new MODP kex with a new hash in any SSH
implementation.

I am happy with either SHA2-256 or SHA2-512 as the hash, or even letting
the user choose which is desired by making diffie-hellman-<group>-<hash>
let the Group/hash tuple be provided in the negotiation. Where <hash> is
one of SHA256 or SHA512 in the SHA2 family.

I personally believe the following DH MODP list is too large:

  diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
  diffie-hellman-group14-sha512
  diffie-hellman-group15-sha256
  diffie-hellman-group15-sha512
  diffie-hellman-group16-sha256
  diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
  diffie-hellman-group17-sha256
  diffie-hellman-group17-sha512
  diffie-hellman-group18-sha256
  diffie-hellman-group18-sha512

I suspect just listing one of them as a SHOULD for now and possibly a
larger one as a MAY for use in the future is sufficient.

What is the correct DH MODP Group to promote to a SHOULD for
interoperability and what should be deprecated?

For myself, I am looking forward to curve25519-sha256 as a MUST
implementation and letting the NSA/Suite B folks live with whatever
ecdh-sha2-nisp{256,284,521} they feel they want to use.

Please advise if there is any consensus as to what changes to the
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 are
needed to move the draft forward to a standard.

	Thank you,
	-- Mark


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>, Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "denis bider (Bitvise)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>, Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>,  Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2 
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Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 04:20:47 +0000
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mdb@juniper.net <mdb@juniper.net> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Please advise if there is any consensus as to what changes to the=0A=
>https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 are needed t=
o=0A=
>move the draft forward to a standard.=0A=
=0A=
As long as there's a DH-2048 + SHA-256 in there as a SHOULD or MUST, I can=
=0A=
live with it.  In the embedded world where even DH-2048 is already a pain, =
a=0A=
requirement to use any of the ludicrous-speed keys won't go down well...=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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From: Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com>
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2016 09:56:17 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [Spasm] Chunking ciphertexts
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Cross posting to Curdle as I think this is more of a general problem than
just S/MIME.

Support for chunking could be done at CMS, and would require updating
RFC5652.

I also wanted to point out that there was a similar discussion in the cfrg
earlier
<https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg08331.html> on
this topic though I don't know what the outcome was.

-Wei


On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 5:22 PM, Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org> wrote:

> Since the WG is currently considering changes to S/MIME, I'd like to
> mention the benefits of chunking ciphertexts. (Or, rather, the
> problems with not chunking them.)
>
> As I understand it, S/MIME and associated standards typically encrypt
> payloads as a single ciphertext (i.e. RFC 5084). Since the plaintexts
> might be quite large, this encourages implementations to decrypt these
> ciphertexts in a "streaming" fashion, i.e. they return plaintext
> before it's authenticated.
>
> Encouraging APIs that return unauthenticated plaintext is an ecosystem
> cost since such APIs are dangerous. One similarity is with the
> MAC-then-encrypt constructions used in TLS, which caused many problems
> by processing unauthenticated ciphertext. At a higher level, it's not
> hard to find people on the internet suggesting things like:
>
> gpg -d your_archive.tgz.gpg | tar xz
>
> because the gpg command also provides a "streaming" interface.
> (http://askubuntu.com/questions/95920/encrypt-tar-gz-file-on-create)
>
> With constructions like AES-GCM it's, of course, very easy to
> manipulate the plaintext at will if the application doesn't
> authenticate it before processing. Even if the application is careful
> not to "release" plaintext to the UI until the authenticity has been
> established, a streaming design exposes more program attack surface.
>
> By normalising large ciphertexts and thus streaming APIs, the next
> protocol that comes along is more likely to use them without realising
> the issues and thus the problem persists.
>
>
> Preferably, plaintext inputs would be chunked into reasonably large
> parts (say 16KiB) and encrypted separately. The chunks only need to be
> large enough that the overhead from the additional authenticators is
> negligible. With such a design, large messages can be incrementally
> processed without having to deal with unauthenticated plaintext, and
> AEAD APIs can be safer. (Not to mention that larger messages can be
> processed since AES-GCM, for one, has a ~64GiB limit for a single
> plaintext.)
>
> Some thought is needed to ensure that the chunks are in the correct
> order (i.e. by counting nonces), that the first chunk should be first
> (i.e. by starting the nonce at zero) and that the last chunk should be
> last (i.e. by appending an empty, terminator chunk with special
> additional data). But that's not hard.
>
>
> Even with such a design it's still the case that an attacker can cause
> the message to be detectably truncated. If you want to aim higher, an
> all-or-nothing transform can be used, although that requires two
> passes over the input and I understand if it's sufficiently
> problematic that you don't want to do that.
>
>
> Cheers
>
> AGL
>
> --
> Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org https://www.imperialviolet.org
>
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>

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<div dir="ltr">Cross posting to Curdle as I think this is more of a general problem than just S/MIME.  <div><br></div><div>Support for chunking could be done at CMS, and would require updating RFC5652.</div><div><br></div><div>I also wanted to point out that there was a similar discussion in the cfrg <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg08331.html">earlier</a> on this topic though I don&#39;t know what the outcome was.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div><br></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 5:22 PM, Adam Langley <span dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:agl@imperialviolet.org" target="_blank">agl@imperialviolet.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Since the WG is currently considering changes to S/MIME, I&#39;d like to<br>
mention the benefits of chunking ciphertexts. (Or, rather, the<br>
problems with not chunking them.)<br>
<br>
As I understand it, S/MIME and associated standards typically encrypt<br>
payloads as a single ciphertext (i.e. RFC 5084). Since the plaintexts<br>
might be quite large, this encourages implementations to decrypt these<br>
ciphertexts in a &quot;streaming&quot; fashion, i.e. they return plaintext<br>
before it&#39;s authenticated.<br>
<br>
Encouraging APIs that return unauthenticated plaintext is an ecosystem<br>
cost since such APIs are dangerous. One similarity is with the<br>
MAC-then-encrypt constructions used in TLS, which caused many problems<br>
by processing unauthenticated ciphertext. At a higher level, it&#39;s not<br>
hard to find people on the internet suggesting things like:<br>
<br>
gpg -d your_archive.tgz.gpg | tar xz<br>
<br>
because the gpg command also provides a &quot;streaming&quot; interface.<br>
(<a href="http://askubuntu.com/questions/95920/encrypt-tar-gz-file-on-create" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://askubuntu.com/<wbr>questions/95920/encrypt-tar-<wbr>gz-file-on-create</a>)<br>
<br>
With constructions like AES-GCM it&#39;s, of course, very easy to<br>
manipulate the plaintext at will if the application doesn&#39;t<br>
authenticate it before processing. Even if the application is careful<br>
not to &quot;release&quot; plaintext to the UI until the authenticity has been<br>
established, a streaming design exposes more program attack surface.<br>
<br>
By normalising large ciphertexts and thus streaming APIs, the next<br>
protocol that comes along is more likely to use them without realising<br>
the issues and thus the problem persists.<br>
<br>
<br>
Preferably, plaintext inputs would be chunked into reasonably large<br>
parts (say 16KiB) and encrypted separately. The chunks only need to be<br>
large enough that the overhead from the additional authenticators is<br>
negligible. With such a design, large messages can be incrementally<br>
processed without having to deal with unauthenticated plaintext, and<br>
AEAD APIs can be safer. (Not to mention that larger messages can be<br>
processed since AES-GCM, for one, has a ~64GiB limit for a single<br>
plaintext.)<br>
<br>
Some thought is needed to ensure that the chunks are in the correct<br>
order (i.e. by counting nonces), that the first chunk should be first<br>
(i.e. by starting the nonce at zero) and that the last chunk should be<br>
last (i.e. by appending an empty, terminator chunk with special<br>
additional data). But that&#39;s not hard.<br>
<br>
<br>
Even with such a design it&#39;s still the case that an attacker can cause<br>
the message to be detectably truncated. If you want to aim higher, an<br>
all-or-nothing transform can be used, although that requires two<br>
passes over the input and I understand if it&#39;s sufficiently<br>
problematic that you don&#39;t want to do that.<br>
<br>
<br>
Cheers<br>
<br>
AGL<br>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
--<br>
Adam Langley <a href="mailto:agl@imperialviolet.org">agl@imperialviolet.org</a> <a href="https://www.imperialviolet.org" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.imperialviolet.org</a><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Spasm mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:Spasm@ietf.org">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/spasm</a><br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a1141a31890279e053b8935a3--


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Cc: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>, SPASM <spasm@ietf.org>, curdle@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Curdle] [Spasm] Chunking ciphertexts
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As I just said on the SPASM mail list: In thinking about the problem =
that you raise, I think that a chunking would be needed at the CMS =
layer, which could then be used at the S/MIME layer.

This problem is not one that belongs in the CURDLE WG because it =
involves much more than new algorithms.

Russ


On Sep 2, 2016, at 12:56 PM, Wei Chuang <weihaw@google.com> wrote:

> Cross posting to Curdle as I think this is more of a general problem =
than just S/MIME. =20
>=20
> Support for chunking could be done at CMS, and would require updating =
RFC5652.
>=20
> I also wanted to point out that there was a similar discussion in the =
cfrg earlier on this topic though I don't know what the outcome was.
>=20
> -Wei
>=20
>=20
> On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 at 5:22 PM, Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org> =
wrote:
> Since the WG is currently considering changes to S/MIME, I'd like to
> mention the benefits of chunking ciphertexts. (Or, rather, the
> problems with not chunking them.)
>=20
> As I understand it, S/MIME and associated standards typically encrypt
> payloads as a single ciphertext (i.e. RFC 5084). Since the plaintexts
> might be quite large, this encourages implementations to decrypt these
> ciphertexts in a "streaming" fashion, i.e. they return plaintext
> before it's authenticated.
>=20
> Encouraging APIs that return unauthenticated plaintext is an ecosystem
> cost since such APIs are dangerous. One similarity is with the
> MAC-then-encrypt constructions used in TLS, which caused many problems
> by processing unauthenticated ciphertext. At a higher level, it's not
> hard to find people on the internet suggesting things like:
>=20
> gpg -d your_archive.tgz.gpg | tar xz
>=20
> because the gpg command also provides a "streaming" interface.
> (http://askubuntu.com/questions/95920/encrypt-tar-gz-file-on-create)
>=20
> With constructions like AES-GCM it's, of course, very easy to
> manipulate the plaintext at will if the application doesn't
> authenticate it before processing. Even if the application is careful
> not to "release" plaintext to the UI until the authenticity has been
> established, a streaming design exposes more program attack surface.
>=20
> By normalising large ciphertexts and thus streaming APIs, the next
> protocol that comes along is more likely to use them without realising
> the issues and thus the problem persists.
>=20
>=20
> Preferably, plaintext inputs would be chunked into reasonably large
> parts (say 16KiB) and encrypted separately. The chunks only need to be
> large enough that the overhead from the additional authenticators is
> negligible. With such a design, large messages can be incrementally
> processed without having to deal with unauthenticated plaintext, and
> AEAD APIs can be safer. (Not to mention that larger messages can be
> processed since AES-GCM, for one, has a ~64GiB limit for a single
> plaintext.)
>=20
> Some thought is needed to ensure that the chunks are in the correct
> order (i.e. by counting nonces), that the first chunk should be first
> (i.e. by starting the nonce at zero) and that the last chunk should be
> last (i.e. by appending an empty, terminator chunk with special
> additional data). But that's not hard.
>=20
>=20
> Even with such a design it's still the case that an attacker can cause
> the message to be detectably truncated. If you want to aim higher, an
> all-or-nothing transform can be used, although that requires two
> passes over the input and I understand if it's sufficiently
> problematic that you don't want to do that.
>=20
>=20
> Cheers
>=20
> AGL
>=20
> --
> Adam Langley agl@imperialviolet.org https://www.imperialviolet.org
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dus-ascii"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">As I =
just said on the SPASM mail list:&nbsp;In thinking about the problem =
that you raise, I think that a chunking would be needed at the CMS =
layer, which could then be used at the S/MIME =
layer.<div><br></div><div>This problem is not one that belongs in the =
CURDLE WG because it involves much more than new =
algorithms.</div><div><br></div><div>Russ</div><div><br></div><div><br><di=
v><div>On Sep 2, 2016, at 12:56 PM, Wei Chuang &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:weihaw@google.com">weihaw@google.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">Cross posting to Curdle as I think this =
is more of a general problem than just S/MIME. =
&nbsp;<div><br></div><div>Support for chunking could be done at CMS, and =
would require updating RFC5652.</div><div><br></div><div>I also wanted =
to point out that there was a similar discussion&nbsp;in the =
cfrg&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/openpgp/current/msg08331.htm=
l">earlier</a>&nbsp;on this topic though I don't know what the outcome =
was.</div><div><br></div><div>-Wei</div><div><br></div></div><div =
class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Sep 1, 2016 =
at 5:22 PM, Adam Langley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:agl@imperialviolet.org" =
target=3D"_blank">agl@imperialviolet.org</a>&gt;</span> =
wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Since the WG is =
currently considering changes to S/MIME, I'd like to<br>
mention the benefits of chunking ciphertexts. (Or, rather, the<br>
problems with not chunking them.)<br>
<br>
As I understand it, S/MIME and associated standards typically =
encrypt<br>
payloads as a single ciphertext (i.e. RFC 5084). Since the =
plaintexts<br>
might be quite large, this encourages implementations to decrypt =
these<br>
ciphertexts in a "streaming" fashion, i.e. they return plaintext<br>
before it's authenticated.<br>
<br>
Encouraging APIs that return unauthenticated plaintext is an =
ecosystem<br>
cost since such APIs are dangerous. One similarity is with the<br>
MAC-then-encrypt constructions used in TLS, which caused many =
problems<br>
by processing unauthenticated ciphertext. At a higher level, it's =
not<br>
hard to find people on the internet suggesting things like:<br>
<br>
gpg -d your_archive.tgz.gpg | tar xz<br>
<br>
because the gpg command also provides a "streaming" interface.<br>
(<a =
href=3D"http://askubuntu.com/questions/95920/encrypt-tar-gz-file-on-create=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">http://askubuntu.com/<wbr>questions/95920/encrypt-tar-<w=
br>gz-file-on-create</a>)<br>
<br>
With constructions like AES-GCM it's, of course, very easy to<br>
manipulate the plaintext at will if the application doesn't<br>
authenticate it before processing. Even if the application is =
careful<br>
not to "release" plaintext to the UI until the authenticity has been<br>
established, a streaming design exposes more program attack surface.<br>
<br>
By normalising large ciphertexts and thus streaming APIs, the next<br>
protocol that comes along is more likely to use them without =
realising<br>
the issues and thus the problem persists.<br>
<br>
<br>
Preferably, plaintext inputs would be chunked into reasonably large<br>
parts (say 16KiB) and encrypted separately. The chunks only need to =
be<br>
large enough that the overhead from the additional authenticators is<br>
negligible. With such a design, large messages can be incrementally<br>
processed without having to deal with unauthenticated plaintext, and<br>
AEAD APIs can be safer. (Not to mention that larger messages can be<br>
processed since AES-GCM, for one, has a ~64GiB limit for a single<br>
plaintext.)<br>
<br>
Some thought is needed to ensure that the chunks are in the correct<br>
order (i.e. by counting nonces), that the first chunk should be =
first<br>
(i.e. by starting the nonce at zero) and that the last chunk should =
be<br>
last (i.e. by appending an empty, terminator chunk with special<br>
additional data). But that's not hard.<br>
<br>
<br>
Even with such a design it's still the case that an attacker can =
cause<br>
the message to be detectably truncated. If you want to aim higher, =
an<br>
all-or-nothing transform can be used, although that requires two<br>
passes over the input and I understand if it's sufficiently<br>
problematic that you don't want to do that.<br>
<br>
<br>
Cheers<br>
<br>
AGL<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--<br>
Adam Langley <a =
href=3D"mailto:agl@imperialviolet.org">agl@imperialviolet.org</a> <a =
href=3D"https://www.imperialviolet.org/" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.imperialviolet.org</a><br>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Spasm mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Spasm@ietf.org">Spasm@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/spasm</a><br>=

</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>
_______________________________________________<br>Curdle mailing =
list<br><a =
href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br>https://www.ietf.or=
g/mailman/listinfo/curdle<br></blockquote></div><br></div></body></html>=

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From nobody Mon Sep  5 12:24:46 2016
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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: <curdle@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 12:24:31 -0700
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Subject: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
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I am going to try and summarize what I see as the main issued raised so far.

*  Should we be defining OIDs for an algorithm which has a SHOULD NOT in the
text?  The CFRG document on EdDSA says that we SHOULD NOT use the pre-hash
versions of the algorithm.  

Text from EdDSA document in section 10.5:
The Ed25519ph and Ed448ph variants are prehashed.  ... These variants SHOULD
NOT be used.

Should we instead ask that this be removed from the text of EdDSA if we are
going to assign the OIDs and recommend use.

*  Should we be defining algorithms that we immediately turn around and say
are not to be used by a set of protocols?  There has been some pushback on
the idea of saying that we are defining the pre-hash versions of the EdDSA
algorithms and then promptly saying that they are not to be used for CAs.  

*  There are size problems with pure mode EdDSA that have been brought up.
This may be a problem for other things, but the big issue is that of CRLs.
Since there are two passes over the content being signed, it cannot be
streamed pass the hash function and then the result of that signed.  This is
a known problem with some HSMs today where they want to keep all of the
content in memory and therefore have messages length restrictions (per
Erwan).  

There are also issues with saying that two modes should be allowed with a
single key and if that should be allowed.  The extremely strong
recommendation from CFRG is that the same key set should not be used for
both pure and pre-hash modes even after the changes so that the known attack
has been removed.

How do we make the statement for dealing with CRLs if we need to address
this issue?  Does this mean we need to allow pre-hash mode for Certificates
and OCSP responses or does it mean that we need to recommend that a CA have
a second key set for signing CRLs.  It may be that the usage of OCSP can be
used to finesse this problem, if the cases where HSMs are going to be used
are almost always targeted at OCSP rather than CRLs.  There have been
conflicting views about this on the list.

* What happens with PKCS#11 - we still need to get somebody who uses this to
have some type of opinion or we need to get some contacts with the OASIS
group.  Looking at the membership list there appear to be 3 people from EMC
and one from Google so that might be people we can get someone to contact
for us (Kathleen and David?).

I have thought of two different ways that this can be addressed, but my
understanding may be weak as I don't use or implement PKCS#11:

- New mechanisms can be defined that deal with these new algorithms.  This
is a bigger issue for ECDH than for EdDSA as it makes a degree of sense to
do this for the new signature structure and less sense to re-defined all of
the ECDH mechanisms that already exist.

- Define some new mechanism information flags such as
CKF_EC_BINARYPARAMETERS which would modify or signal the use of how the
public key parameters are defined/used.  This would mean either than
CKA_EC_POINT would either not exist and CKA_EC_BINARY_POINT would be used or
that CKA_EC_POINT would have a different value rather than the DER-encoding
of an ANS1 X9.62 Parameters value.  Similar changes would be made for
parameters, private key

Jim



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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, "denis bider (Bitvise)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>, Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
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References: <71963A21726946C3B16A0B77F0CFF3F6@Khan> <2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C117F5BECA@eusaamb107.ericsson.se> <CACsn0c=AiBYQB-r+xH=bycqJRS420mKgxw5tvsxN9C7LYUxfLQ@mail.gmail.com> <2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C117F5BEFD@eusaamb107.ericsson.se>, <28415.1472767053@eng-mail01.juniper.net> <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73F4D0C59E@uxcn10-5.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>
Comments: In-reply-to: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> message dated "Fri, 02 Sep 2016 04:20:47 -0000."
From: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2016 14:56:44 -0700
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/79DifSzFzckavlduHWFVgE7IveI>
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Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, IETF Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2
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Hi,

The current draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 draft expires in about a
week, so I will be publishing a new draft before this Friday. Note: I
will not be able to attend the IETF (November 13-18) in South Korea.

Here is my current sugestions for the DH entries in the table:

Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         This Draft    SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group15-sha512         This Draft    MAY
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         This Draft    SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group17-sha512         This Draft    MAY
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         This Draft    MAY

I do not see any problems with letting these kex method names be defined
and used by folks that want them.

The remaining questions are: 

  1) which DH groups are best noted as SHOULD and which ones as MAY
     (Peter wants diffie-hellman-group14-*, denis wants
     diffie-hellman-group15-*, and the OpenSSH 7.3 release will
     negotiate diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 and
     diffie-hellman-group18-sha512),

  and

  2) is the use of sha512 vs sha256 vs allowing either of the sha2
     functions to be negotiated best to use for the new DH groups?

As you can see, I am currently tending toward not having any of the new
DH groups be labled as MUST.

The -04 draft would therefore list curve25519-sha256 as the only MUST
kex method.

Are there any strong objections to this direction?

	Thanks,
	-- Mark


From nobody Mon Sep  5 16:16:32 2016
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Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Extension Negotiation in Secure Shell (SSH)
        Author          : Denis Bider
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01.txt
	Pages           : 9
	Date            : 2016-09-05

Abstract:
  This memo defines a mechanism for SSH clients and servers to exchange
  information about supported protocol extensions confidentially after
  completed key exchange.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Mon Sep  5 16:22:53 2016
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01.txt
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Summary of this updated version: No major changes.

This updates the EXT_INFO draft with a couple nits based on feedback.

The main useful extension currently defined by this draft is 
server-sig-algs, which is now widely deployed as described. The extension is 
needed to support rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 signatures in SSH user 
authentication.

In a previous message, I offered a prompt for feedback about other 
extensions proposed by the draft. Aside from one nit, I haven't received 
much feedback, positive or negative, so I have decided to avoid action I'm 
unsure about. I have not made changes at this time.

denis


----- Original Message -----
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
Sent: Monday, September 5, 2016 17:16
To: curdle-chairs@ietf.org ; Denis Bider ; denis bider
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01.txt


A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01.txt
has been successfully submitted by Denis Bider and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info
Revision: 01
Title: Extension Negotiation in Secure Shell (SSH)
Document date: 2016-09-05
Group: curdle
Pages: 9
URL: 
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01.txt
Status: 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info/
Htmlized: 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01
Diff: 
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01

Abstract:
  This memo defines a mechanism for SSH clients and servers to exchange
  information about supported protocol extensions confidentially after
  completed key exchange.




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat



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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2
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This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

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I support the described change intentions.

With regard to question (1) about MAY/SHOULD =E2=80=93 I don=E2=80=99t =
have a strong position. In my implementation experience, end users =
don=E2=80=99t care about these types of recommendations, and the =
recommendations do not stand the test of time. Our security conscious =
users knew they wanted to disable CBC before there was a spec about it. =
Our users now want Curve25519 and Ed25519, and they don=E2=80=99t need a =
=E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D to tell them this.

The main reason I see to impose a SHOULD / SHOULD NOT is when the spec =
can inform the implementer about something that=E2=80=99s not obvious. =
For example, if I=E2=80=99m an implementer of desktop and server =
software, it may not be obvious that I should offer a key exchange =
method that=E2=80=99s feasible for resource-constrained devices. So, for =
interoperability reasons, it=E2=80=99s good to make group14-sha256 a =
SHOULD, and also to state the reason for this recommendation: =
interoperability with resource-constrained devices.

With regard to question (2) about SHA-2 versions =E2=80=93 I would =
prefer only SHA-512 for group 15 and higher. Group 14 should use SHA-256 =
because it=E2=80=99s for interoperability with resource-constrained =
devices. Group 15 and higher need a way to be used with a 384-bit hash =
or larger to meet those irrelevant government recommendations no one =
likes to hear about. An implementation that can do 3072-bit DH can also =
do SHA-512, so I don=E2=80=99t see why not.

In summary, I think the proposal is fine.

denis


From: Mark D. Baushke=20
Sent: Monday, September 5, 2016 15:56
To: Peter Gutmann ; denis bider (Bitvise) ; Damien Miller=20
Cc: Daniel Migault ; Watson Ladd ; Paul Hoffman ; Rich Salz ; Phillip =
Hallam-Baker ; IETF Curdle ; IETF SSH=20
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2 =


Hi,

The current draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 draft expires in about a
week, so I will be publishing a new draft before this Friday. Note: I
will not be able to attend the IETF (November 13-18) in South Korea.

Here is my current sugestions for the DH entries in the table:

Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         This Draft    SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group15-sha512         This Draft    MAY
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         This Draft    SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group17-sha512         This Draft    MAY
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         This Draft    MAY

I do not see any problems with letting these kex method names be defined
and used by folks that want them.

The remaining questions are:=20

  1) which DH groups are best noted as SHOULD and which ones as MAY
     (Peter wants diffie-hellman-group14-*, denis wants
     diffie-hellman-group15-*, and the OpenSSH 7.3 release will
     negotiate diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 and
     diffie-hellman-group18-sha512),

  and

  2) is the use of sha512 vs sha256 vs allowing either of the sha2
     functions to be negotiated best to use for the new DH groups?

As you can see, I am currently tending toward not having any of the new
DH groups be labled as MUST.

The -04 draft would therefore list curve25519-sha256 as the only MUST
kex method.

Are there any strong objections to this direction?

Thanks,
-- Mark

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	charset="utf-8"
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<HTML><HEAD></HEAD>
<BODY dir=3Dltr>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>
<DIV style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial'; COLOR: #000000">
<DIV>I support the described change intentions.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>With regard to question (1) about MAY/SHOULD =E2=80=93 I =
don=E2=80=99t have a strong=20
position. In my implementation experience, end users don=E2=80=99t care =
about these=20
types of recommendations, and the recommendations do not stand the test =
of time.=20
Our security conscious users knew they wanted to disable CBC before =
there was a=20
spec about it. Our users now want Curve25519 and Ed25519, and they =
don=E2=80=99t need a=20
=E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D to tell them this.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>The main reason I see to impose a SHOULD / SHOULD NOT is when the =
spec can=20
inform the implementer about something that=E2=80=99s not obvious. For =
example, if I=E2=80=99m=20
an implementer of desktop and server software, it may not be obvious =
that I=20
should offer a key exchange method that=E2=80=99s feasible for =
resource-constrained=20
devices. So, for interoperability reasons, it=E2=80=99s good to make =
group14-sha256 a=20
SHOULD, and also to state the reason for this recommendation: =
interoperability=20
with resource-constrained devices.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>With regard to question (2) about SHA-2 versions =E2=80=93 I would =
prefer only=20
SHA-512 for group 15 and higher. Group 14 should use SHA-256 because =
it=E2=80=99s for=20
interoperability with resource-constrained devices. Group 15 and higher =
need a=20
way to be used with a 384-bit hash or larger to meet those irrelevant =
government=20
recommendations no one likes to hear about. An implementation that can =
do=20
3072-bit DH can also do SHA-512, so I don=E2=80=99t see why not.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>In summary, I think the proposal is fine.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>denis</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt tahoma">
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"BACKGROUND: #f5f5f5">
<DIV style=3D"font-color: black"><B>From:</B> <A title=3Dmdb@juniper.net =

href=3D"mailto:mdb@juniper.net">Mark D. Baushke</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Sent:</B> Monday, September 5, 2016 15:56</DIV>
<DIV><B>To:</B> <A title=3Dpgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz=20
href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">Peter Gutmann</A> ; <A=20
title=3Dietf-ssh3@denisbider.com =
href=3D"mailto:ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com">denis=20
bider (Bitvise)</A> ; <A title=3Ddjm@mindrot.org=20
href=3D"mailto:djm@mindrot.org">Damien Miller</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Cc:</B> <A title=3Ddaniel.migault@ericsson.com=20
href=3D"mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com">Daniel Migault</A> ; <A=20
title=3Dwatsonbladd@gmail.com =
href=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com">Watson Ladd</A>=20
; <A title=3Dpaul.hoffman@vpnc.org =
href=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">Paul=20
Hoffman</A> ; <A title=3Drsalz@akamai.com =
href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">Rich=20
Salz</A> ; <A title=3Dhallam@gmail.com =
href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">Phillip=20
Hallam-Baker</A> ; <A title=3Dcurdle@ietf.org =
href=3D"mailto:curdle@ietf.org">IETF=20
Curdle</A> ; <A title=3Dietf-ssh@NetBSD.org =
href=3D"mailto:ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org">IETF=20
SSH</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Subject:</B> Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in=20
draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2 </DIV></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV></DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>Hi,<BR><BR>The=20
current draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 draft expires in about =
a<BR>week, so I=20
will be publishing a new draft before this Friday. Note: I<BR>will not =
be able=20
to attend the IETF (November 13-18) in South Korea.<BR><BR>Here is my =
current=20
sugestions for the DH entries in the table:<BR><BR>Key Exchange Method=20
Name&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;=20
Reference&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
Note<BR>diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
SHOULD<BR>diffie-hellman-group15-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
MAY<BR>diffie-hellman-group16-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
SHOULD<BR>diffie-hellman-group17-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
MAY<BR>diffie-hellman-group18-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR><BR>I do not see any problems with =
letting=20
these kex method names be defined<BR>and used by folks that want=20
them.<BR><BR>The remaining questions are: <BR><BR>&nbsp; 1) which DH =
groups are=20
best noted as SHOULD and which ones as MAY<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
(Peter=20
wants diffie-hellman-group14-*, denis wants<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
diffie-hellman-group15-*, and the OpenSSH 7.3 release=20
will<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; negotiate diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 =

and<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512),<BR><BR>&nbsp;=20
and<BR><BR>&nbsp; 2) is the use of sha512 vs sha256 vs allowing either =
of the=20
sha2<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; functions to be negotiated best to use =
for the=20
new DH groups?<BR><BR>As you can see, I am currently tending toward not =
having=20
any of the new<BR>DH groups be labled as MUST.<BR><BR>The -04 draft =
would=20
therefore list curve25519-sha256 as the only MUST<BR>kex =
method.<BR><BR>Are=20
there any strong objections to this direction?<BR><BR>Thanks,<BR>--=20
Mark<BR></DIV></DIV></DIV></BODY></HTML>

------=_NextPart_000_000A_01D20798.A7F52510--



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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2
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On Mon, 5 Sep 2016, Mark D. Baushke wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> The current draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 draft expires in about a
> week, so I will be publishing a new draft before this Friday. Note: I
> will not be able to attend the IETF (November 13-18) in South Korea.
> 
> Here is my current sugestions for the DH entries in the table:
> 
> Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         This Draft    SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group15-sha512         This Draft    MAY
> diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         This Draft    SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group17-sha512         This Draft    MAY
> diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         This Draft    MAY
> 
> I do not see any problems with letting these kex method names be defined
> and used by folks that want them.
> 
> The remaining questions are: 
> 
>   1) which DH groups are best noted as SHOULD and which ones as MAY
>      (Peter wants diffie-hellman-group14-*, denis wants
>      diffie-hellman-group15-*, and the OpenSSH 7.3 release will
>      negotiate diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 and
>      diffie-hellman-group18-sha512),
> 
>   and
> 
>   2) is the use of sha512 vs sha256 vs allowing either of the sha2
>      functions to be negotiated best to use for the new DH groups?
> 
> As you can see, I am currently tending toward not having any of the new
> DH groups be labled as MUST.
> 
> The -04 draft would therefore list curve25519-sha256 as the only MUST
> kex method.
> 
> Are there any strong objections to this direction?

Sounds good to me

-d


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Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 09:06:28 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
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On Mon, Sep 05, 2016 at 12:24:31PM -0700, Jim Schaad wrote:
> I am going to try and summarize what I see as the main issued raised so far.
> 
> *  Should we be defining OIDs for an algorithm which has a SHOULD NOT in the
> text?  The CFRG document on EdDSA says that we SHOULD NOT use the pre-hash
> versions of the algorithm.  
> 
> Text from EdDSA document in section 10.5:
> The Ed25519ph and Ed448ph variants are prehashed.  ... These variants SHOULD
> NOT be used.

Maybe this is a good bit of my biases showing. But I think Ed25519ph is
trouble.
 
> Should we instead ask that this be removed from the text of EdDSA if we are
> going to assign the OIDs and recommend use.
> 
> *  Should we be defining algorithms that we immediately turn around and say
> are not to be used by a set of protocols?  There has been some pushback on
> the idea of saying that we are defining the pre-hash versions of the EdDSA
> algorithms and then promptly saying that they are not to be used for CAs.  
> 
> *  There are size problems with pure mode EdDSA that have been brought up.
> This may be a problem for other things, but the big issue is that of CRLs.
> Since there are two passes over the content being signed, it cannot be
> streamed pass the hash function and then the result of that signed.  This is
> a known problem with some HSMs today where they want to keep all of the
> content in memory and therefore have messages length restrictions (per
> Erwan).  

And modifications that would enable streaming without breaking
verification are dangerous... Especially with high-value keys like
that (get it wrong and the keys walk).

> There are also issues with saying that two modes should be allowed with a
> single key and if that should be allowed.  The extremely strong
> recommendation from CFRG is that the same key set should not be used for
> both pure and pre-hash modes even after the changes so that the known attack
> has been removed.

If you are talking about the document, that text got softened down a
lot during the latest round of changes (since there are no longer any
trivial breaks with non-neglebiliable probabilities).

> How do we make the statement for dealing with CRLs if we need to address
> this issue?  Does this mean we need to allow pre-hash mode for Certificates
> and OCSP responses or does it mean that we need to recommend that a CA have
> a second key set for signing CRLs.  It may be that the usage of OCSP can be
> used to finesse this problem, if the cases where HSMs are going to be used
> are almost always targeted at OCSP rather than CRLs.  There have been
> conflicting views about this on the list.

I would rather not have to deal with Ed25519ph for anything "important",
that is certs and OCSP. CRLs are in my view secondary.

> * What happens with PKCS#11 - we still need to get somebody who uses this to
> have some type of opinion or we need to get some contacts with the OASIS
> group.  Looking at the membership list there appear to be 3 people from EMC
> and one from Google so that might be people we can get someone to contact
> for us (Kathleen and David?).
> 
> I have thought of two different ways that this can be addressed, but my
> understanding may be weak as I don't use or implement PKCS#11:
> 
> - New mechanisms can be defined that deal with these new algorithms.  This
> is a bigger issue for ECDH than for EdDSA as it makes a degree of sense to
> do this for the new signature structure and less sense to re-defined all of
> the ECDH mechanisms that already exist.
> 
> - Define some new mechanism information flags such as
> CKF_EC_BINARYPARAMETERS which would modify or signal the use of how the
> public key parameters are defined/used.  This would mean either than
> CKA_EC_POINT would either not exist and CKA_EC_BINARY_POINT would be used or
> that CKA_EC_POINT would have a different value rather than the DER-encoding
> of an ANS1 X9.62 Parameters value.  Similar changes would be made for
> parameters, private key

The abstract way I would implement X* stuff (sorry, don't know PKCS#11,
so the terminology will be wrong):

- generate: () -> privkey_handle:handle
- pubkey: privkey_handle:handle -> point:octets
- agree: privkey_handle:handle, peerpub:octets -> result:octets

And similarly for Ed*

- generate: () -> privkey_handle:handle
- pubkey: privkey_handle:handle -> pubkey:octets
- sign: privkey_handle:handle, message:octets -> signature:octets

... I have recently worked on a TLS library, and the internal interfaces
look like that (except that agree on X* is one-use).


(I hope I don't see stuff like this for Ed*-nonph:

- init_sign: privkey_handle:handle -> sig_ctx:handle
- update_sign: sig_ctx:handle, message:octets -> ()
- finish_sign: sig_ctx:handle -> signature:octets  [USE ONCE]

... All implemented in O(1) memory, as this type of thing can only be
done in dangerous ways).


-Ilari


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
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On Mon, 2016-09-05 at 12:24 -0700, Jim Schaad wrote:
> I am going to try and summarize what I see as the main issued raised
> so far.
> 
> *  Should we be defining OIDs for an algorithm which has a SHOULD NOT
> in the
> text?  The CFRG document on EdDSA says that we SHOULD NOT use the
> pre-hash
> versions of the algorithm.  
> 
> Text from EdDSA document in section 10.5:
> The Ed25519ph and Ed448ph variants are prehashed.  ... These variants
> SHOULD
> NOT be used.
> 
> Should we instead ask that this be removed from the text of EdDSA if
> we are going to assign the OIDs and recommend use.

Yes please. There is no point for a document describing a new algorithm
to describe variants which are marked as "SHOULD NOT" use.

> *  There are size problems with pure mode EdDSA that have been
> brought up.
> This may be a problem for other things, but the big issue is that of
> CRLs.
> Since there are two passes over the content being signed, it cannot
> be
> streamed pass the hash function and then the result of that
> signed.  This is
> a known problem with some HSMs today where they want to keep all of
> the
> content in memory and therefore have messages length restrictions
> (per Erwan).  

That just means that some other signing algorithm will be used for
large data. I think that's acceptable. I only see confusion from using
a SHOULD NOT use algorithm for certain cases, while the main algorithm
for others. I cannot even think how this can be presented or explained
to end-users to use correctly.

regards,
Nikos


From nobody Tue Sep  6 07:09:51 2016
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Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>, IETF Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, "denis bider \(Bitvise\)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2
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Mark D. Baushke writes:
> The current draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 draft expires in about a
> week, so I will be publishing a new draft before this Friday. Note: I
> will not be able to attend the IETF (November 13-18) in South Korea.
> 
> Here is my current sugestions for the DH entries in the table:
> 
> Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         This Draft    SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group15-sha512         This Draft    MAY
> diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         This Draft    SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group17-sha512         This Draft    MAY
> diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         This Draft    MAY
> 
> I do not see any problems with letting these kex method names be defined
> and used by folks that want them.

I think it is bad idea to define too many KEX methods. I think there
should only be two, one with sha256 one with sha512, i.e.,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 and diffie-hellman-group16-sha512.

The reason is that these key exchange methods are negotiated in text.
We already have key exchange list in openssh saying something like:

curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1

(150 octets), and now when we add to this list new methods:

,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group15-sha512,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group17-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512

(another 150 octets), it gets to 300 octets, just to negotiate the key
exchange methods. And this string is sent in both directions during
the negotiation.

Also I do not really expect most of them to be used ever...

At least if we define all of them, how about making strings bit
shorter, something like dh-g14-sha256 instead of
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256?

When you have multiple algorithms tied together (here key exchange
method, group, and hash) it is better to avoid full combinatory
expansion, and only define those which are known to be used.

Especially if we are saying curve25519-sha256 is going to be MUST, I
see no reason to define that many MAYs. 
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


From nobody Tue Sep  6 12:18:03 2016
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From: "denis bider \(Bitvise\)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>
To: "Tero Kivinen" <kivinen@iki.fi>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 13:15:31 -0600
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2
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Tero -

I agree I would much rather see dh-g14-sha256 than =
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256. However, the ship for this has sailed a =
long time ago. As far as I know, some of these methods are already =
implemented. The benefit of shortening the names is negligible compared =
to the likely coordination issues, and it could be argued that the =
longer names are more understandable, as well.

As far as I know, the cost of making the KEXINIT messages longer is =
trivial and probably not even worth mentioning. If SSH wanted to =
optimize this to begin with, it would have gone with single-character =
names for most algorithms, omit the commas in algorithm lists when not =
necessary, etc. The original designers have, in my opinion correctly, =
decided that readability trumps conciseness, and that the savings of a =
few bytes in a message that=E2=80=99s exchanged once per connection, and =
then once per hour or per 1 GB of data, are not worth chasing.

>From a performance perspective, the algorithms that involve DH group =
exchange are much costlier than negotiating the DH group in the KEXINIT =
packet, even if you were to enumerate many more groups than we are =
currently proposing. The group exchange methods involve not only sending =
two extra messages, which are hundreds of bytes themselves, but require =
an entire additional round-trip between the client and the server, =
adding noticeable latency to the establishment of the connection, or =
completion of key re-exchange.

Compared to the group exchange methods, negotiating the DH group in =
KEXINIT is downright efficient. And if you don=E2=80=99t want to use all =
of the groups, it is fairly straightforward to simply not include them.

Our SSH Server is going to include by default only =
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 and diffie-hellman-group15-sha512. It is =
also going to be possible to enable diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, but =
it=E2=80=99s likely going to be disabled by default because it=E2=80=99s =
twice as costly as group 15 and exacerbates a denial of service vector =
for busy servers.

Our SSH Client is going to include all three of the above methods by =
default because it does not have to worry about denial of service.

We are not going to support groups higher than 16 at this time, both =
because of their cost, and because Windows CNG does not support them. I =
nevertheless welcome the definition of those groups, so that it is =
straightforward to implement them in case circumstances change so that =
this becomes desirable.

With respect to Curve25519, I think it=E2=80=99s nice and all, but =
it=E2=80=99s probably going to be the first thing broken by a quantum =
computer. Anyone concerned with forward secrecy should start using a =
hybrid key exchange method that incorporates a quantum-safe algorithm =
approximately now. It is that we should be focusing on, I think, instead =
of trying to put X25519 everywhere, cast in concrete. It=E2=80=99s going =
to bite us.

denis


From: Tero Kivinen=20
Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2016 07:11
To: Mark D. Baushke=20
Cc: Daniel Migault ; Peter Gutmann ; Watson Ladd ; Damien Miller ; IETF =
Curdle ; Paul Hoffman ; Rich Salz ; denis bider (Bitvise) ; IETF SSH ; =
Phillip Hallam-Baker=20
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2

Mark D. Baushke writes:
> The current draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 draft expires in about a
> week, so I will be publishing a new draft before this Friday. Note: I
> will not be able to attend the IETF (November 13-18) in South Korea.
>=20
> Here is my current sugestions for the DH entries in the table:
>=20
> Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         This Draft    SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group15-sha512         This Draft    MAY
> diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         This Draft    SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group17-sha512         This Draft    MAY
> diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         This Draft    MAY
>=20
> I do not see any problems with letting these kex method names be =
defined
> and used by folks that want them.

I think it is bad idea to define too many KEX methods. I think there
should only be two, one with sha256 one with sha512, i.e.,
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 and diffie-hellman-group16-sha512.

The reason is that these key exchange methods are negotiated in text.
We already have key exchange list in openssh saying something like:

curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-s=
ha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-=
sha1

(150 octets), and now when we add to this list new methods:

,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group15-sha512,diffie-hellm=
an-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group17-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sh=
a512

(another 150 octets), it gets to 300 octets, just to negotiate the key
exchange methods. And this string is sent in both directions during
the negotiation.

Also I do not really expect most of them to be used ever...

At least if we define all of them, how about making strings bit
shorter, something like dh-g14-sha256 instead of
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256?

When you have multiple algorithms tied together (here key exchange
method, group, and hash) it is better to avoid full combinatory
expansion, and only define those which are known to be used.

Especially if we are saying curve25519-sha256 is going to be MUST, I
see no reason to define that many MAYs.=20
--=20
kivinen@iki.fi

_______________________________________________
Curdle mailing list
Curdle@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle

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<HTML><HEAD></HEAD>
<BODY dir=3Dltr>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>
<DIV style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial'; COLOR: #000000">
<DIV>Tero -</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>I agree I would much rather see dh-g14-sha256 than=20
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256. However, the ship for this has sailed a =
long time=20
ago. As far as I know, some of these methods are already implemented. =
The=20
benefit of shortening the names is negligible compared to the likely=20
coordination issues, and it could be argued that the longer names are =
more=20
understandable, as well.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>As far as I know, the cost of making the KEXINIT messages longer is =
trivial=20
and probably not even worth mentioning. If SSH wanted to optimize this =
to begin=20
with, it would have gone with single-character names for most =
algorithms, omit=20
the commas in algorithm lists when not necessary, etc. The original =
designers=20
have, in my opinion correctly, decided that readability trumps =
conciseness, and=20
that the savings of a few bytes in a message that=E2=80=99s exchanged =
once per=20
connection, and then once per hour or per 1 GB of data, are not worth=20
chasing.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>From a performance perspective, the algorithms that involve DH =
group=20
exchange are much costlier than negotiating the DH group in the KEXINIT =
packet,=20
even if you were to enumerate many more groups than we are currently =
proposing.=20
The group exchange methods involve not only sending two extra messages, =
which=20
are hundreds of bytes themselves, but require an entire additional =
round-trip=20
between the client and the server, adding noticeable latency to the=20
establishment of the connection, or completion of key re-exchange.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Compared to the group exchange methods, negotiating the DH group in =
KEXINIT=20
is downright efficient. And if you don=E2=80=99t want to use all of the =
groups, it is=20
fairly straightforward to simply not include them.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Our SSH Server is going to include by default only=20
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 and diffie-hellman-group15-sha512. It is =
also=20
going to be possible to enable diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, but =
it=E2=80=99s likely=20
going to be disabled by default because it=E2=80=99s twice as costly as =
group 15 and=20
exacerbates a denial of service vector for busy servers.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Our SSH Client is going to include all three of the above methods =
by=20
default because it does not have to worry about denial of service.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>We are not going to support groups higher than 16 at this time, =
both=20
because of their cost, and because Windows CNG does not support them. I=20
nevertheless welcome the definition of those groups, so that it is=20
straightforward to implement them in case circumstances change so that =
this=20
becomes desirable.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>With respect to Curve25519, I think it=E2=80=99s nice and all, but =
it=E2=80=99s probably=20
going to be the first thing broken by a quantum computer. Anyone =
concerned with=20
forward secrecy should start using a hybrid key exchange method that=20
incorporates a quantum-safe algorithm approximately now. It is that we =
should be=20
focusing on, I think, instead of trying to put X25519 everywhere, cast =
in=20
concrete. It=E2=80=99s going to bite us.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>denis</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt tahoma">
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"BACKGROUND: #f5f5f5">
<DIV style=3D"font-color: black"><B>From:</B> <A title=3Dkivinen@iki.fi=20
href=3D"mailto:kivinen@iki.fi">Tero Kivinen</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, September 6, 2016 07:11</DIV>
<DIV><B>To:</B> <A title=3Dmdb@juniper.net =
href=3D"mailto:mdb@juniper.net">Mark D.=20
Baushke</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Cc:</B> <A title=3Ddaniel.migault@ericsson.com=20
href=3D"mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com">Daniel Migault</A> ; <A=20
title=3Dpgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz =
href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">Peter=20
Gutmann</A> ; <A title=3Dwatsonbladd@gmail.com=20
href=3D"mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com">Watson Ladd</A> ; <A =
title=3Ddjm@mindrot.org=20
href=3D"mailto:djm@mindrot.org">Damien Miller</A> ; <A =
title=3Dcurdle@ietf.org=20
href=3D"mailto:curdle@ietf.org">IETF Curdle</A> ; <A =
title=3Dpaul.hoffman@vpnc.org=20
href=3D"mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org">Paul Hoffman</A> ; <A =
title=3Drsalz@akamai.com=20
href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">Rich Salz</A> ; <A =
title=3Dietf-ssh3@denisbider.com=20
href=3D"mailto:ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com">denis bider (Bitvise)</A> ; <A=20
title=3Dietf-ssh@NetBSD.org href=3D"mailto:ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org">IETF =
SSH</A> ; <A=20
title=3Dhallam@gmail.com href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">Phillip =
Hallam-Baker</A>=20
</DIV>
<DIV><B>Subject:</B> Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in=20
draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2</DIV></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV></DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>Mark=20
D. Baushke writes:<BR>&gt; The current draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-03 =
draft=20
expires in about a<BR>&gt; week, so I will be publishing a new draft =
before this=20
Friday. Note: I<BR>&gt; will not be able to attend the IETF (November =
13-18) in=20
South Korea.<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; Here is my current sugestions for the DH =
entries=20
in the table:<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; Key Exchange Method=20
Name&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;=20
Reference&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Note<BR>&gt;=20
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<BR>&gt;=20
diffie-hellman-group15-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR>&gt;=20
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<BR>&gt;=20
diffie-hellman-group17-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR>&gt;=20
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; I do not see any =
problems with=20
letting these kex method names be defined<BR>&gt; and used by folks that =
want=20
them.<BR><BR>I think it is bad idea to define too many KEX methods. I =
think=20
there<BR>should only be two, one with sha256 one with sha512,=20
i.e.,<BR>diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 and=20
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512.<BR><BR>The reason is that these key =
exchange=20
methods are negotiated in text.<BR>We already have key exchange list in =
openssh=20
saying something=20
like:<BR><BR>curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-ni=
stp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hel=
lman-group14-sha1<BR><BR>(150=20
octets), and now when we add to this list new=20
methods:<BR><BR>,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group15-sha=
512,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group17-sha512,diffie-he=
llman-group18-sha512<BR><BR>(another=20
150 octets), it gets to 300 octets, just to negotiate the =
key<BR>exchange=20
methods. And this string is sent in both directions during<BR>the=20
negotiation.<BR><BR>Also I do not really expect most of them to be used=20
ever...<BR><BR>At least if we define all of them, how about making =
strings=20
bit<BR>shorter, something like dh-g14-sha256 instead=20
of<BR>diffie-hellman-group14-sha256?<BR><BR>When you have multiple =
algorithms=20
tied together (here key exchange<BR>method, group, and hash) it is =
better to=20
avoid full combinatory<BR>expansion, and only define those which are =
known to be=20
used.<BR><BR>Especially if we are saying curve25519-sha256 is going to =
be MUST,=20
I<BR>see no reason to define that many MAYs. <BR>--=20
<BR>kivinen@iki.fi<BR><BR>_______________________________________________=
<BR>Curdle=20
mailing=20
list<BR>Curdle@ietf.org<BR>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle<B=
R></DIV></DIV></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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Comments: In-reply-to: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> message dated "Tue, 06 Sep 2016 16:11:48 +0300."
From: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 12:19:38 -0700
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Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>, IETF Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, "denis bider \(Bitvise\)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2
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Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> writes:

> Mark D. Baushke writes:
...elided...
> > I do not see any problems with letting these kex method names be defined
> > and used by folks that want them.
> 
> I think it is bad idea to define too many KEX methods. 
>
> I think there should only be two, one with sha256 one with sha512,
> i.e., diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 and diffie-hellman-group16-sha512.

You would be implementing the SHOULD MODP groups in this case. This
seems like a reasonable configuration choice. If possible, I would hope
you could also support curve25519-sha256, given it seems desirable for
it to be a MUST kex.

> The reason is that these key exchange methods are negotiated in text.
> We already have key exchange list in openssh saying something like:
> 
> curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
> 
> (150 octets), and now when we add to this list new methods:

Yes, but this draft RFC is moving most of those to MAY and some to
SHOULD NOT.

I would expect that after this RFC is published, a number of
implementation of the default kex proposals would only contain this
list:

curve25519-sha256,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1

which is the MUST and SHOULD entries which is only 143 octets.

> ,diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group15-sha512,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group17-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
> 
> (another 150 octets), it gets to 300 octets, just to negotiate the key
> exchange methods. And this string is sent in both directions during
> the negotiation.

Yes.

Even if everyone were to implement all of the current kex methods and
have a proposal for each of them, is this a sufficient problem for an
implementation to need to save a sixteen bytes per algorithm?

If there support from the implementors for this change, I will ammend my
draft.

> Also I do not really expect most of them to be used ever...

The hope is that there is flexibility in the implementations to allow us
to more quicly discard 'weak' entries and adopt 'strong' entries as we
move forward.

> At least if we define all of them, how about making strings bit
> shorter, something like dh-g14-sha256 instead of
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256?

I think that the implementors need to provide their inputs on what
strings should represent the algorithms to be used.

> When you have multiple algorithms tied together (here key exchange
> method, group, and hash) it is better to avoid full combinatory
> expansion, and only define those which are known to be used.

Isn't that a chicken and egg problem? None of these new kex names are
currently being used.

I would like to have at least one kex that uses sha512 given that some
cryptographic experts in the US government seem to think that sha256 is
not good enough for top secret. I don't know if they are ultra paranoid
or not, but it seems prudent to err on the side of being a bit paranoid
if it is not too expensive for the uses involved.

> Especially if we are saying curve25519-sha256 is going to be MUST, I
> see no reason to define that many MAYs. 

There are a lot of different stake-holders in this standard. I do not
pretend to be able to make the business trade-offs for everyone.

The primary goal of this RFC is to demote a number of weak key exchanges
and to promote the curve25519-sha256 kex. If there are enough
implementations that are able to move away from MODP groups, then
perhaps all of them could be deprecated. However, the diversity of the
math seems to be a compelling reason to have DH, ECDH, and EdDH methods
in place.

	-- Mark


From nobody Tue Sep  6 21:32:20 2016
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
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Jim:

Here is my view on the issues that you summarized.

> *  Should we be defining OIDs for an algorithm which has a SHOULD NOT =
in the
> text?  The CFRG document on EdDSA says that we SHOULD NOT use the =
pre-hash
> versions of the algorithm. =20
>=20
> Text from EdDSA document in section 10.5:
> The Ed25519ph and Ed448ph variants are prehashed.  ... These variants =
SHOULD
> NOT be used.
>=20
> Should we instead ask that this be removed from the text of EdDSA if =
we are
> going to assign the OIDs and recommend use.

I think that assigning an OID will enable other to use it.  Let=92s not =
do that.

> *  Should we be defining algorithms that we immediately turn around =
and say
> are not to be used by a set of protocols?  There has been some =
pushback on
> the idea of saying that we are defining the pre-hash versions of the =
EdDSA
> algorithms and then promptly saying that they are not to be used for =
CAs. =20

I=92d rather focus on signature algorithm that can be used in all of our =
protocols.

> *  There are size problems with pure mode EdDSA that have been brought =
up.
> This may be a problem for other things, but the big issue is that of =
CRLs.
> Since there are two passes over the content being signed, it cannot be
> streamed pass the hash function and then the result of that signed.  =
This is
> a known problem with some HSMs today where they want to keep all of =
the
> content in memory and therefore have messages length restrictions (per
> Erwan). =20
>=20
> There are also issues with saying that two modes should be allowed =
with a
> single key and if that should be allowed.  The extremely strong
> recommendation from CFRG is that the same key set should not be used =
for
> both pure and pre-hash modes even after the changes so that the known =
attack
> has been removed.
>=20
> How do we make the statement for dealing with CRLs if we need to =
address
> this issue?  Does this mean we need to allow pre-hash mode for =
Certificates
> and OCSP responses or does it mean that we need to recommend that a CA =
have
> a second key set for signing CRLs.  It may be that the usage of OCSP =
can be
> used to finesse this problem, if the cases where HSMs are going to be =
used
> are almost always targeted at OCSP rather than CRLs.  There have been
> conflicting views about this on the list.

This is not a new issue.  RSA, RSA-PSS, DSA, and ECDSA all compute a =
hash value, and then sign it.  I do not think we need to do anything =
different here.

> * What happens with PKCS#11 - we still need to get somebody who uses =
this to
> have some type of opinion or we need to get some contacts with the =
OASIS
> group.  Looking at the membership list there appear to be 3 people =
from EMC
> and one from Google so that might be people we can get someone to =
contact
> for us (Kathleen and David?).
>=20
> I have thought of two different ways that this can be addressed, but =
my
> understanding may be weak as I don't use or implement PKCS#11:
>=20
> - New mechanisms can be defined that deal with these new algorithms.  =
This
> is a bigger issue for ECDH than for EdDSA as it makes a degree of =
sense to
> do this for the new signature structure and less sense to re-defined =
all of
> the ECDH mechanisms that already exist.
>=20
> - Define some new mechanism information flags such as
> CKF_EC_BINARYPARAMETERS which would modify or signal the use of how =
the
> public key parameters are defined/used.  This would mean either than
> CKA_EC_POINT would either not exist and CKA_EC_BINARY_POINT would be =
used or
> that CKA_EC_POINT would have a different value rather than the =
DER-encoding
> of an ANS1 X9.62 Parameters value.  Similar changes would be made for
> parameters, private key

Someone with more PKCS#11 experience than me should tackle this one.

Russ


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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: 'Russ Housley' <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2016 9:33 PM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> Cc: curdle@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
> 
> Jim:
> 
> Here is my view on the issues that you summarized.
> 
> > *  Should we be defining OIDs for an algorithm which has a SHOULD NOT
> > in the text?  The CFRG document on EdDSA says that we SHOULD NOT use
> > the pre-hash versions of the algorithm.
> >
> > Text from EdDSA document in section 10.5:
> > The Ed25519ph and Ed448ph variants are prehashed.  ... These variants
> > SHOULD NOT be used.
> >
> > Should we instead ask that this be removed from the text of EdDSA if
> > we are going to assign the OIDs and recommend use.
> 
> I think that assigning an OID will enable other to use it.  Let's not do
that.
> 
> > *  Should we be defining algorithms that we immediately turn around
> > and say are not to be used by a set of protocols?  There has been some
> > pushback on the idea of saying that we are defining the pre-hash
> > versions of the EdDSA algorithms and then promptly saying that they are
not
> to be used for CAs.
> 
> I'd rather focus on signature algorithm that can be used in all of our
protocols.
> 
> > *  There are size problems with pure mode EdDSA that have been brought
up.
> > This may be a problem for other things, but the big issue is that of
CRLs.
> > Since there are two passes over the content being signed, it cannot be
> > streamed pass the hash function and then the result of that signed.
> > This is a known problem with some HSMs today where they want to keep
> > all of the content in memory and therefore have messages length
> > restrictions (per Erwan).
> >
> > There are also issues with saying that two modes should be allowed
> > with a single key and if that should be allowed.  The extremely strong
> > recommendation from CFRG is that the same key set should not be used
> > for both pure and pre-hash modes even after the changes so that the
> > known attack has been removed.
> >
> > How do we make the statement for dealing with CRLs if we need to
> > address this issue?  Does this mean we need to allow pre-hash mode for
> > Certificates and OCSP responses or does it mean that we need to
> > recommend that a CA have a second key set for signing CRLs.  It may be
> > that the usage of OCSP can be used to finesse this problem, if the
> > cases where HSMs are going to be used are almost always targeted at
> > OCSP rather than CRLs.  There have been conflicting views about this on
the
> list.
> 
> This is not a new issue.  RSA, RSA-PSS, DSA, and ECDSA all compute a hash
value,
> and then sign it.  I do not think we need to do anything different here.

This appears to be an opposite opinion of the first bullet item. 

The first one says - don't assign an OID for pre-hash mode because CFRG says
SHOULD NOT.
This one says - use pre-hash mode because we should be doing the compute a
hash value and then signing it.

Jim

> 
> > * What happens with PKCS#11 - we still need to get somebody who uses
> > this to have some type of opinion or we need to get some contacts with
> > the OASIS group.  Looking at the membership list there appear to be 3
> > people from EMC and one from Google so that might be people we can get
> > someone to contact for us (Kathleen and David?).
> >
> > I have thought of two different ways that this can be addressed, but
> > my understanding may be weak as I don't use or implement PKCS#11:
> >
> > - New mechanisms can be defined that deal with these new algorithms.
> > This is a bigger issue for ECDH than for EdDSA as it makes a degree of
> > sense to do this for the new signature structure and less sense to
> > re-defined all of the ECDH mechanisms that already exist.
> >
> > - Define some new mechanism information flags such as
> > CKF_EC_BINARYPARAMETERS which would modify or signal the use of how
> > the public key parameters are defined/used.  This would mean either
> > than CKA_EC_POINT would either not exist and CKA_EC_BINARY_POINT would
> > be used or that CKA_EC_POINT would have a different value rather than
> > the DER-encoding of an ANS1 X9.62 Parameters value.  Similar changes
> > would be made for parameters, private key
> 
> Someone with more PKCS#11 experience than me should tackle this one.
> 
> Russ



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From: Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 18:58:32 -1000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
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--94eb2c0b147ad81e40053be3c3da
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> - New mechanisms can be defined that deal with these new algorithms.  This
> is a bigger issue for ECDH than for EdDSA as it makes a degree of sense to
> do this for the new signature structure and less sense to re-defined all of
> the ECDH mechanisms that already exist.
>
> - Define some new mechanism information flags such as
> CKF_EC_BINARYPARAMETERS which would modify or signal the use of how the
> public key parameters are defined/used.  This would mean either than
> CKA_EC_POINT would either not exist and CKA_EC_BINARY_POINT would be used
> or
> that CKA_EC_POINT would have a different value rather than the DER-encoding
> of an ANS1 X9.62 Parameters value.  Similar changes would be made for
> parameters, private key
>

AFAICT, it is definitely possible to do something like this in PKCS#11 for
EdDSA to avoid the issues of HSMs that have limited memory. The PKCS#11
standards group would need to define new mechanisms for the new algorithms
anyway. A mechanism can be defined that outputs the hash of the entire
input that is used input to the EdDSA operation. Then, another mechanism
can be used that takes the result of the first operation as a parameter.
Signing large objects that don't fit in the token's memory would be a
two-pass process, which would be reasonable for CRLs.

Cheers,
Brian

--94eb2c0b147ad81e40053be3c3da
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">Jim =
Schaad <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf@augustcellars.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">ietf@augustcellars.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex">- New mechanisms can be defined that deal with these new =
algorithms.=C2=A0 This<br>
is a bigger issue for ECDH than for EdDSA as it makes a degree of sense to<=
br>
do this for the new signature structure and less sense to re-defined all of=
<br>
the ECDH mechanisms that already exist.<br>
<br>
- Define some new mechanism information flags such as<br>
CKF_EC_BINARYPARAMETERS which would modify or signal the use of how the<br>
public key parameters are defined/used.=C2=A0 This would mean either than<b=
r>
CKA_EC_POINT would either not exist and CKA_EC_BINARY_POINT would be used o=
r<br>
that CKA_EC_POINT would have a different value rather than the DER-encoding=
<br>
of an ANS1 X9.62 Parameters value.=C2=A0 Similar changes would be made for<=
br>
parameters, private key<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>AFAICT, it is d=
efinitely possible to do something like this in PKCS#11 for EdDSA to avoid =
the issues of HSMs that have limited memory. The PKCS#11 standards group wo=
uld need to define new mechanisms for the new algorithms anyway. A mechanis=
m can be defined that outputs the hash of the entire input that is used inp=
ut to the EdDSA operation. Then, another mechanism can be used that takes t=
he result of the first operation as a parameter. Signing large objects that=
 don&#39;t fit in the token&#39;s memory would be a two-pass process, which=
 would be reasonable for CRLs.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</div><div>B=
rian</div></div>
</div></div>

--94eb2c0b147ad81e40053be3c3da--


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
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Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

>>> *  There are size problems with pure mode EdDSA that have been =
brought up.
>>> This may be a problem for other things, but the big issue is that of =
CRLs.
>>> Since there are two passes over the content being signed, it cannot =
be
>>> streamed pass the hash function and then the result of that signed.
>>> This is a known problem with some HSMs today where they want to keep
>>> all of the content in memory and therefore have messages length
>>> restrictions (per Erwan).
>>>=20
>>> There are also issues with saying that two modes should be allowed
>>> with a single key and if that should be allowed.  The extremely =
strong
>>> recommendation from CFRG is that the same key set should not be used
>>> for both pure and pre-hash modes even after the changes so that the
>>> known attack has been removed.
>>>=20
>>> How do we make the statement for dealing with CRLs if we need to
>>> address this issue?  Does this mean we need to allow pre-hash mode =
for
>>> Certificates and OCSP responses or does it mean that we need to
>>> recommend that a CA have a second key set for signing CRLs.  It may =
be
>>> that the usage of OCSP can be used to finesse this problem, if the
>>> cases where HSMs are going to be used are almost always targeted at
>>> OCSP rather than CRLs.  There have been conflicting views about this =
on the list.
>>=20
>> This is not a new issue.  RSA, RSA-PSS, DSA, and ECDSA all compute a =
hash value,
>> and then sign it.  I do not think we need to do anything different =
here.
>=20
> This appears to be an opposite opinion of the first bullet item.=20
>=20
> The first one says - don't assign an OID for pre-hash mode because =
CFRG says
> SHOULD NOT.
> This one says - use pre-hash mode because we should be doing the =
compute a
> hash value and then signing it.

Sorry, I was not clear.  Our protocols do not impose an API on these =
primitives.  The API could do the two steps in one call, or there could =
be many calls.  I do not think we need to do the API work here.

Russ


From nobody Wed Sep  7 00:47:08 2016
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] EdDSA and CAs redux
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On Tue, Sep 06, 2016 at 06:58:32PM -1000, Brian Smith wrote:
> Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:
> 
> AFAICT, it is definitely possible to do something like this in PKCS#11 for
> EdDSA to avoid the issues of HSMs that have limited memory. The PKCS#11
> standards group would need to define new mechanisms for the new algorithms
> anyway. A mechanism can be defined that outputs the hash of the entire
> input that is used input to the EdDSA operation. Then, another mechanism
> can be used that takes the result of the first operation as a parameter.
> Signing large objects that don't fit in the token's memory would be a
> two-pass process, which would be reasonable for CRLs.

Well, one just needs to include hash of the input in returned state
and to make that state unmalleable, so one can't do crap like:

1) Request first part for M1
2) Request second part for M1
3) Request first part for M1
4) Request second part for M2 (M2!=M1)

Which would cause the private key to walk...



-Ilari


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Group 15 needed in draft-baushke-ssh-dh-group-sha2
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denis bider \(Bitvise\) writes:
> I agree I would much rather see dh-g14-sha256 than
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256. However, the ship for this has sailed =
a long
> time ago. As far as I know, some of these methods are already impleme=
nted. The
> benefit of shortening the names is negligible compared to the likely
> coordination issues, and it could be argued that the longer names are=
 more
> understandable, as well.

If they follow the rules set for the identifiers for the secure shell,
they should not use names without domain name before "IETF CONSENSUS".
If they do that is their problem. We cannot make old names to use
shorter names, but we can make the new allocations to use shorter
names. If someone implements things before it is out as RFC, they
should be able to update their implementations too when the RFCs come
out.=20

> As far as I know, the cost of making the KEXINIT messages longer is t=
rivial
> and probably not even worth mentioning. If SSH wanted to optimize thi=
s to
> begin with, it would have gone with single-character names for most
> algorithms, omit the commas in algorithm lists when not necessary, et=
c. The
> original designers have, in my opinion correctly, decided that readab=
ility
> trumps conciseness, and that the savings of a few bytes in a message =
that=E2=80=99s
> exchanged once per connection, and then once per hour or per 1 GB of =
data, are
> not worth chasing.

The idea was that there is only one or two key exchange methods at
times, there was never supposed to be dozens of them. The encryption
algorithms, mac algorithms etc used much shorter names. And I do
remember people complaing that they do not want ot use @ssh.com etc
prefix, as it makes the names longer...

> From a performance perspective, the algorithms that involve DH group =
exchange
> are much costlier than negotiating the DH group in the KEXINIT packet=
, even if
> you were to enumerate many more groups than we are currently proposin=
g. The
> group exchange methods involve not only sending two extra messages, w=
hich are
> hundreds of bytes themselves, but require an entire additional round-=
trip
> between the client and the server, adding noticeable latency to the
> establishment of the connection, or completion of key re-exchange.

There is no need to really negotiate DH group in the KEXINIT packet,
you need to agree on common one. For example IKEv2 uses a method,
where the initiator proposes all groups it will allow, and picks one
of them and sends KE payload for it. The responder will then either
accept the selected group if it acceptable for him. If it is not
acceptable for responder, it will send notification back, saying that
your group was not acceptable, but this group is, so then the
initiator retries with the same list of allowed groups, but different
group in KE payload.

This allows agreement of common group in case there is one, and also
most of the times both ends have same group allowed, thus the initial
selection is suitable for both ends too. This is how the DH group
agreement should have been done in secure shell too, but unfortunately
it was not done in this way, and now is too late to change that.

> Compared to the group exchange methods, negotiating the DH group in
> KEXINIT is downright efficient. And if you don=E2=80=99t want to use =
all of
> the groups, it is fairly straightforward to simply not include them.

If i remember right the secure shell DH group negotation sends the
full group information, and I think that is bad idea. Verifying the
group takes long time (full primatlity checks etc), thus you should
not accept random groups sent by other end. On the other hand if you
always require both ends to configure same set of groups to both ends
before they can be used, then you might as well give names for them.

Yes, I agree that using predefined groups is much better than using
groups sent inline the exchange.=20

> Our SSH Server is going to include by default only
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 and diffie-hellman-group15-sha512. It i=
s also
> going to be possible to enable diffie-hellman-group16-sha512, but it=E2=
=80=99s likely
> going to be disabled by default because it=E2=80=99s twice as costly =
as group 15 and
> exacerbates a denial of service vector for busy servers.

Ok, so you would like to define three. That would still be ok, and it
is better than the five there is now, but I still think two should be
enough.

> With respect to Curve25519, I think it=E2=80=99s nice and all, but it=
=E2=80=99s
> probably going to be the first thing broken by a quantum computer.
> Anyone concerned with forward secrecy should start using a hybrid
> key exchange method that incorporates a quantum-safe algorithm
> approximately now. It is that we should be focusing on, I think,
> instead of trying to put X25519 everywhere, cast in concrete. It=E2=80=
=99s
> going to bite us.

We are working on that in the IPsecME for the ESP. I.e., a way to make
ESP quantum computer resistant. I.e., the main goal is to make so that
even if you store all ESP traffic now, you cannot decrypt them when
you get the quantum computers, unless you also know the shared secret
between hosts.

Something like that might also work with secure shell, but situation
is bit different there, as in IKE/ESP both the client and server will
have connection related configuration, thus having one more
pairwise configurable thing there is not that hard, while in secure
shell it might be.
--=20
kivinen@iki.fi


From nobody Wed Sep  7 08:34:20 2016
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Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure Shell (SSH)
        Author          : Mark D.     Baushke
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2016-09-07

Abstract:
   This document adds recommendations for adoption of ssh-curves from
   the [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves], adds some new Modular Exponential
   (MODP) Groups, and deprecates some previously specified Key Exchange
   Method algorithm names for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol.  It also
   updates [RFC4253], [RFC4419], [RFC4462], and [RFC5656] by specifying
   the set key exchange algorithms that currently exist and which ones
   MUST, SHOULD, MAY, and SHOULD NOT be implemented.  New key exchange
   methods use the SHA-2 family of hashes.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
        Author          : Russell Housley
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2016-09-07

Abstract:
   This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305
   Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
   ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a construction of the ChaCha stream cipher and
   Poly1305 authenticator.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Wed Sep  7 13:54:53 2016
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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All of the changes were editorial.  I believe this document is ready for =
WG Last Call.

If someone is in a hurry to implement, then the SEC ADs could request =
early assignment of the object identifiers.

Russ



On Sep 7, 2016, at 4:52 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Russell Housley and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>=20
> Name:		draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305
> Revision:	01
> Title:		Using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption =
in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
> Document date:	2016-09-07
> Group:		curdle
> Pages:		8
> URL:            =
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly13=
05-01.txt
> Status:         =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305/
> Htmlized:       =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01
> Diff:           =
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly130=
5-01
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305
>   Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
>   ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a construction of the ChaCha stream cipher and
>   Poly1305 authenticator.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat
>=20


From nobody Thu Sep  8 02:25:28 2016
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Subject: [Curdle] Comments to draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04.txt
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internet-drafts@ietf.org writes:
>       Title           : Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure Shell (SSH)
>       Author          : Mark D.     Baushke
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04.txt

I decided to make quick look at this document after the discussion on
the list. Here is my comments for it.

First general comment. In the IPsec protocol we splitted the algorithm
description documents and their requirement levels documents to
separate documents. This mostly does this, except it will still define
some new algorithms. Which means that next time the algoritms are
updated we cannot obsolete this, as this is only document describing
how those new algorithms are used.

Because of this I would suggest splitting this document in two. I.e.
the first document would define the new key exchange methods, and
nothing else.

The second document would just define the mandatory to implement
algorithms for secure shell, and make it so that it can be obsoleted
when new recommendations come out. 

Then some other comments:

--

In section 1 this document incorrectly claims that
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 would be using Oakley group 1 (a 768-bit
MODP group), when it actually uses first group for shell, but Oakley
group 2, i.e. the 1024-bit MODP group. See section 8.1. of RFC 4253.

--

I think the IANA considerations section is wrong. It should only list
the updates and changes to IANA considerations section, and in here it
also specifies the requirement levels for the algorithms. Are IANA
really supposed to add the Note field to the Key Exchnage Method table
and store the requirement levels in the IANA registry? We have not
usually done that.

I would recommend to change IANA considerations sections so it only
lists the actions IANA is supposed to do, i.e. say that IANA is
supposed to add following entries

   Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
   ------------------------		 ---------     ----
   diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         This Draft    Section 3
   diffie-hellman-group15-sha512         This Draft    Section 3
   diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         This Draft    Section 3
   diffie-hellman-group17-sha512         This Draft    Section 3
   diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         This Draft    Section 3

to the "Key Exchange Method Names" registry of the "Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Parameters".

Then if the requirement levels are kept in this document, it is better
to move them to separate section and define them there, as those are
NOT IANA actions. Better option would be to move them to separate
document, which would include all requirement levels, also for other
algorithms (encryption, MAC etc). See example of that in
draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis. 
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


From nobody Thu Sep  8 07:44:15 2016
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Use of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellamn Key Agreement Algorithm with X25519 and X448 in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
        Author          : Russ Housley
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves-01.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2016-09-08

Abstract:
   This document describes the conventions for using Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellamn (ECDH) key agreement algorithm using curve25519 and
   curve448 in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves-01


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From nobody Thu Sep  8 07:47:59 2016
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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These updates were made to align with draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.  Please =
review.

Russ


On Sep 8, 2016, at 10:44 AM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more =
Encryption of the IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : Use of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellamn Key =
Agreement Algorithm with X25519 and X448 in the Cryptographic Message =
Syntax (CMS)
>        Author          : Russ Housley
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves-01.txt
> 	Pages           : 13
> 	Date            : 2016-09-08
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document describes the conventions for using Elliptic Curve
>   Diffie-Hellamn (ECDH) key agreement algorithm using curve25519 and
>   curve448 in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves-01
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> =
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves-=
01
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Thu Sep  8 10:24:50 2016
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
Thread-Index: AQHSCUm+CpsGdFpmPUGm5elBVaQF16BuxLWAgAEUYiA=
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 17:24:43 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
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Does anyone disagree?  Please speak up by Tuesday, otherwise we will enter =
WGLC.

-- =20
Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
IM: richsalz@jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 07, 2016 4:55 PM
> To: curdle@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Curdle] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-curdle-cms-
> chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
>=20
> All of the changes were editorial.  I believe this document is ready for =
WG
> Last Call.
>=20
> If someone is in a hurry to implement, then the SEC ADs could request ear=
ly
> assignment of the object identifiers.
>=20
> Russ
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Sep 7, 2016, at 4:52 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>=20
> >
> > A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
> > has been successfully submitted by Russell Housley and posted to the
> > IETF repository.
> >
> > Name:		draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305
> > Revision:	01
> > Title:		Using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption in the
> Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
> > Document date:	2016-09-07
> > Group:		curdle
> > Pages:		8
> > URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-curdle-=
cms-
> chacha20-poly1305-01.txt
> > Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-
> chacha20-poly1305/
> > Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chach=
a20-
> poly1305-01
> > Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-c=
ms-
> chacha20-poly1305-01
> >
> > Abstract:
> >   This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305
> >   Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
> >   ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a construction of the ChaCha stream cipher and
> >   Poly1305 authenticator.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> > submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.i=
etf.org.
> >
> > The IETF Secretariat
> >
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle


From nobody Thu Sep  8 11:10:01 2016
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Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-00.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Use of EdDSA Signatures in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
        Author          : Russ Housley
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-00.txt
	Pages           : 5
	Date            : 2016-09-08

Abstract:
   This document describes the conventions for using Edwards-curve
   Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) in the Cryptographic Message
   Syntax (CMS).  The conventions for Ed25519 and Ed448 are described,
   but Ed25519ph and Ed448ph are not used with the CMS.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Thu Sep  8 11:14:04 2016
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] New Version Notification for draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-00.txt
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Now that draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01 has been posted, I was able to make =
the updates to previously discussed the individual draft to produce the =
-00 of the WG draft.  Please review.

Russ


On Sep 8, 2016, at 2:10 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

>=20
> A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Russ Housley and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>=20
> Name:		draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures
> Revision:	00
> Title:		Use of EdDSA Signatures in the Cryptographic =
Message Syntax (CMS)
> Document date:	2016-09-08
> Group:		curdle
> Pages:		5
> URL:            =
https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signature=
s-00.txt
> Status:         =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures/
> Htmlized:       =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-00
>=20
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document describes the conventions for using Edwards-curve
>   Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) in the Cryptographic Message
>   Syntax (CMS).  The conventions for Ed25519 and Ed448 are described,
>   but Ed25519ph and Ed448ph are not used with the CMS.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> The IETF Secretariat
>=20


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Subject: [Curdle] [SSH] GSS key exchange methods
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Hello Curdle, and the old SSH list:

I forward parts of a correspondence with Mike discussing the need to =
address GSSAPI key exchange methods in the ssh-kex-sha2 draft:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04

- denis:

"RFC 4462 defines the following key exchange methods, which our SSH =
Client and Server implement. I am aware also of other implementations by =
other vendors, and we hear from users who use them:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4462

The exchange methods parallel the DH key exchange methods, and are =
currently:

gss-group1-sha1-*
gss-group14-sha1-*
gss-gex-sha1-*

The current version of the ssh-kex-sha2 draft mentions these, but only =
to deprecate gss-gex-sha1-* and gss-group1-sha1-*. The draft allows =
gss-group14-sha1-* as a MAY, but does not define any new versions of =
these methods to parallel the new DH methods.

These key exchange methods serve a valuable role in environments where =
it is possible to authenticate using Kerberos, which is in Unix realms =
and Windows domains. The existing trust relationship between the client =
and the server can be used in this case, and allows for host =
authentication without having to set up or verify a host key on the =
client. This substantially improves security and usability in these =
environments, since lack of proper host key verification procedures is a =
big security risk, but their presence is a big pain point for =
administration. These key exchange methods avoid that problem in =
environments that already have an existing trust network to begin with."

- Mike:

"You make a really good point, I did leave out the GSS-API updates and =
only deprecated the -sha1-* entries.

I suspect that the same reasons we defined groups 15, 16, 17, and 18 to =
use sha512 would hold for gss-group* kex methods. so, adding:

Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
gss-group14-sha256-*                  This Draft    MAY
gss-group15-sha512-*                  This Draft    MAY
gss-group16-sha512-*                  This Draft    MAY
gss-group17-sha512-*                  This Draft    MAY
gss-group18-sha512-*                  This Draft    MAY

would make sense."

-snip-

My proposal also included a suggestion to update the gss-gex- method. =
Since it seems unlikely that the GSS methods will be implemented by =
resource-constrained devices - in order to use this, a device would have =
to be part of a Unix realm or a Windows domain - I suggested =
gss-gex-sha512-* to provide a hash that meets the security level of any =
DH group.

Mike is currently unsure about updating gss-gex-. I don't feel strongly =
about this, because the DH group exchange methods are a bit of a can of =
worms (FIPS requires group validation that fails with deployed ephemeral =
groups). The main priority is that GSS methods serve a unique function, =
and it would provide value to maintain them.

For the same reasons we define the DH groups, I think it makes sense to =
define the above groups. However, if I needed to pick only one, my =
priority would be gss-group15-sha512. This is for the same reasons I =
prefer diffie-hellman-group15-sha512. It meets all security =
recommendations, both in terms of DH group size and hash size, and it is =
2x faster than group 16, which has performance characteristics that =
begin to close the gap between denial of service and normal rate of =
connections on busy servers.

Does anyone else second these suggestions?

Defining this will not affect servers and clients that do not have a use =
for key exchange and host authentication using Kerberos. Only folks who =
want to use this will be affected.

I am aware of other implementations of these key exchange methods =
besides ours, including patches for popular open source software. =
I=E2=80=99m not sure if PuTTY implements them; I think it might just =
implement the user authentication method gssapi-with-mic. For the people =
who do implement this, I=E2=80=99m not sure if they have representation =
or awareness of this list.

denis

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<HTML><HEAD></HEAD>
<BODY dir=3Dltr>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>
<DIV style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial'; COLOR: #000000">
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>
<DIV style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial'; COLOR: #000000">
<DIV>Hello Curdle, and the old SSH list:</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>I forward parts of a correspondence with Mike discussing the need =
to=20
address GSSAPI key exchange methods in the ssh-kex-sha2 draft:</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><A=20
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04">ht=
tps://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04</A></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>- denis:</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>"RFC 4462 defines the following key exchange methods, which our SSH =
Client=20
and Server implement. I am aware also of other implementations by other =
vendors,=20
and we hear from users who use them:</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><A=20
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4462">https://tools.ietf.org/html/=
rfc4462</A></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>The exchange methods parallel the DH key exchange methods, and are=20
currently:</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>gss-group1-sha1-*</DIV>
<DIV>gss-group14-sha1-*</DIV>
<DIV>gss-gex-sha1-*</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>The current version of the ssh-kex-sha2 draft mentions these, but =
only to=20
deprecate gss-gex-sha1-* and gss-group1-sha1-*. The draft allows=20
gss-group14-sha1-* as a MAY, but does not define any new versions of =
these=20
methods to parallel the new DH methods.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>These key exchange methods serve a valuable role in environments =
where it=20
is possible to authenticate using Kerberos, which is in Unix realms and =
Windows=20
domains. The existing trust relationship between the client and the =
server can=20
be used in this case, and allows for host authentication without having =
to set=20
up or verify a host key on the client. This substantially improves =
security and=20
usability in these environments, since lack of proper host key =
verification=20
procedures is a big security risk, but their presence is a big pain =
point for=20
administration. These key exchange methods avoid that problem in =
environments=20
that already have an existing trust network to begin with."</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>- Mike:</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>"You make a really good point, I did leave out the GSS-API updates =
and only=20
deprecated the -sha1-* entries.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>I suspect that the same reasons we defined groups 15, 16, 17, and =
18 to use=20
sha512 would hold for gss-group* kex methods. so, adding:</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Key Exchange Method=20
Name&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;=20
Reference&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Note</DIV>
<DIV>gss-group14-sha256-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY</DIV>
<DIV>gss-group15-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY</DIV>
<DIV>gss-group16-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY</DIV>
<DIV>gss-group17-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY</DIV>
<DIV>gss-group18-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>would make sense."</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>-snip-</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>My proposal also included a suggestion to update the gss-gex- =
method. Since=20
it seems unlikely that the GSS methods will be implemented by=20
resource-constrained devices - in order to use this, a device would have =
to be=20
part of a Unix realm or a Windows domain - I suggested gss-gex-sha512-* =
to=20
provide a hash that meets the security level of any DH group.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Mike is currently unsure about updating gss-gex-. I don't feel =
strongly=20
about this, because the DH group exchange methods are a bit of a can of =
worms=20
(FIPS requires group validation that fails with deployed ephemeral =
groups). The=20
main priority is that GSS methods serve a unique function, and it would =
provide=20
value to maintain them.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>For the same reasons we define the DH groups, I think it makes =
sense to=20
define the above groups. However, if I needed to pick only one, my =
priority=20
would be gss-group15-sha512. This is for the same reasons I prefer=20
diffie-hellman-group15-sha512. It meets all security recommendations, =
both in=20
terms of DH group size and hash size, and it is 2x faster than group 16, =
which=20
has performance characteristics that begin to close the gap between =
denial of=20
service and normal rate of connections on busy servers.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Does anyone else second these suggestions?</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Defining this will not affect servers and clients that do not have =
a use=20
for key exchange and host authentication using Kerberos. Only folks who =
want to=20
use this will be affected.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>I am aware of other implementations of these key exchange methods =
besides=20
ours, including patches for popular open source software. I=E2=80=99m =
not sure if PuTTY=20
implements them; I think it might just implement the user authentication =
method=20
gssapi-with-mic. For the people who do implement this, I=E2=80=99m not =
sure if they have=20
representation or awareness of this list.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>denis</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV></DIV></BODY></HTML>

------=_NextPart_000_012A_01D20AFB.4AA8A100--



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Date: Sat, 10 Sep 2016 13:48:10 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: "denis bider (Bitvise)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>
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Cc: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, gss-openssh@MIT.EDU, ietf-ssh@netbsd.org, asedeno@MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: [Curdle] [SSH] GSS key exchange methods
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On Sat, 10 Sep 2016, denis bider (Bitvise) wrote:

> Hello Curdle, and the old SSH list:
> =C2=A0
> I forward parts of a correspondence with Mike discussing the need to addr=
ess
> GSSAPI key exchange methods in the ssh-kex-sha2 draft:
> =C2=A0
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04
> =C2=A0
> - denis:
> =C2=A0
> "RFC 4462 defines the following key exchange methods, which our SSH Clien=
t and
> Server implement. I am aware also of other implementations by other vendo=
rs, and
> we hear from users who use them:
> =C2=A0
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4462
> =C2=A0
> The exchange methods parallel the DH key exchange methods, and are curren=
tly:
> =C2=A0
> gss-group1-sha1-*
> gss-group14-sha1-*
> gss-gex-sha1-*
> =C2=A0
> The current version of the ssh-kex-sha2 draft mentions these, but only to
> deprecate gss-gex-sha1-* and gss-group1-sha1-*. The draft allows
> gss-group14-sha1-* as a MAY, but does not define any new versions of thes=
e
> methods to parallel the new DH methods.
> =C2=A0
> These key exchange methods serve a valuable role in environments where it=
 is
> possible to authenticate using Kerberos, which is in Unix realms and Wind=
ows
> domains. The existing trust relationship between the client and the serve=
r can be

[Obligatory note that the GSS-API is truly *generic*, in that I know of
sites that use a GSS mechanism that backends to X.509 certificates instead
of Kerberos.  I'm willing to ignore the GSS NTLM variants, though :) ]

> used in this case, and allows for host authentication without having to s=
et up or
> verify a host key on the client. This substantially improves security and
> usability in these environments, since lack of proper host key verificati=
on
> procedures is a big security risk, but their presence is a big pain point=
 for
> administration. These key exchange methods avoid that problem in environm=
ents
> that already have an existing trust network to begin with."

It is quite useful in those environments, yes, but is not risk-free.  The
most glaring risk is when GSS is using Kerberos, Kerberos is using DNS
lookups (without DNSSEC) to expand the hostname in the host-based service
principal, and both GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPIDelegateCredentials are in
use (to use the openssh spellings).  In this case, an attacker that can
spoof DNS responses to point the user at an attacker-controlled machine
that has valid Kerberos credentials, can obtain a valid TGT of that user,
granting near-full privilege to act as that user!  For this reason, we
disable GSSAPIKeyExchange in environments where users are likely to use
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials, as the risk is too large.

> - Mike:
> =C2=A0
> "You make a really good point, I did leave out the GSS-API updates and on=
ly
> deprecated the -sha1-* entries.
> =C2=A0
> I suspect that the same reasons we defined groups 15, 16, 17, and 18 to u=
se
> sha512 would hold for gss-group* kex methods. so, adding:
> =C2=A0
> Key Exchange Method Name=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Reference=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Note
> gss-group14-sha256-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This Draft=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 MAY
> gss-group15-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This Draft=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 MAY
> gss-group16-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This Draft=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 MAY
> gss-group17-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This Draft=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 MAY
> gss-group18-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This Draft=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 MAY
> =C2=A0
> would make sense."
> =C2=A0
> -snip-
> =C2=A0
> My proposal also included a suggestion to update the gss-gex- method. Sin=
ce it
> seems unlikely that the GSS methods will be implemented by resource-const=
rained
> devices - in order to use this, a device would have to be part of a Unix =
realm or
> a Windows domain - I suggested gss-gex-sha512-* to provide a hash that me=
ets the
> security level of any DH group.
> =C2=A0
> Mike is currently unsure about updating gss-gex-. I don't feel strongly a=
bout
> this, because the DH group exchange methods are a bit of a can of worms (=
FIPS
> requires group validation that fails with deployed ephemeral groups). The=
 main
> priority is that GSS methods serve a unique function, and it would provid=
e value
> to maintain them.
> =C2=A0
> For the same reasons we define the DH groups, I think it makes sense to d=
efine
> the above groups. However, if I needed to pick only one, my priority woul=
d be
> gss-group15-sha512. This is for the same reasons I prefer
> diffie-hellman-group15-sha512. It meets all security recommendations, bot=
h in
> terms of DH group size and hash size, and it is 2x faster than group 16, =
which
> has performance characteristics that begin to close the gap between denia=
l of
> service and normal rate of connections on busy servers.
> =C2=A0
> Does anyone else second these suggestions?

Sure; I'd like to see them.

> Defining this will not affect servers and clients that do not have a use =
for key
> exchange and host authentication using Kerberos. Only folks who want to u=
se this
> will be affected.
> =C2=A0
> I am aware of other implementations of these key exchange methods besides=
 ours,
> including patches for popular open source software. I=E2=80=99m not sure =
if PuTTY
> implements them; I think it might just implement the user authentication =
method
> gssapi-with-mic. For the people who do implement this, I=E2=80=99m not su=
re if they have
> representation or awareness of this list.

I believe the PuTTY patches were maintained out of tree for a while but
did eventually make it in.  I'll add a few more CCs that are or used to be
in the business of maintaining patches for GSS SSH support.

-Ben
---559023410-739092933-1473529690=:5272--


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To: "Benjamin Kaduk" <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
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Cc: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, gss-openssh@MIT.EDU, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>, asedeno@MIT.EDU
Subject: Re: [Curdle] [SSH] GSS key exchange methods
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Apologies to Mark for failing to remember his name in my previous =
message. That is embarrassing... :)

Benjamin =E2=80=93 with regard to this:

> The most glaring risk is when GSS is using Kerberos,
> Kerberos is using DNS lookups (without DNSSEC) to expand the
> hostname in the host-based service principal, and both
> GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPIDelegateCredentials are in
> use (to use the openssh spellings).=20

It seems the crucial problem here is the client somehow putting critical =
trust in an untrustable DNS lookup. Are there situations where the =
client application can do this unknowingly, by accident?

I was under the impression that Kerberos authentication is tied to the =
Service Principal Name. In our implementation, this is explicitly =
entered by the user, either directly as the SPN, or our Client prepends =
=E2=80=9Chost/=E2=80=9D to the target host name.

Since this is the security principal the client is verifying, the server =
should be proving its identity with respect to this principal, not =
another principal that is looked up somehow from DNS.

Did I misunderstand? Can you point me to any information where I can =
learn more about this DNS backdoor?

denis



From: Benjamin Kaduk=20
Sent: Saturday, September 10, 2016 11:48
To: denis bider (Bitvise)=20
Cc: Curdle ; gss-openssh@MIT.EDU ; ietf-ssh@netbsd.org ; asedeno@MIT.EDU =

Subject: Re: [Curdle] [SSH] GSS key exchange methods

On Sat, 10 Sep 2016, denis bider (Bitvise) wrote:

> Hello Curdle, and the old SSH list:
> =20
> I forward parts of a correspondence with Mike discussing the need to =
address
> GSSAPI key exchange methods in the ssh-kex-sha2 draft:
> =20
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04
> =20
> - denis:
> =20
> "RFC 4462 defines the following key exchange methods, which our SSH =
Client and
> Server implement. I am aware also of other implementations by other =
vendors, and
> we hear from users who use them:
> =20
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4462
> =20
> The exchange methods parallel the DH key exchange methods, and are =
currently:
> =20
> gss-group1-sha1-*
> gss-group14-sha1-*
> gss-gex-sha1-*
> =20
> The current version of the ssh-kex-sha2 draft mentions these, but only =
to
> deprecate gss-gex-sha1-* and gss-group1-sha1-*. The draft allows
> gss-group14-sha1-* as a MAY, but does not define any new versions of =
these
> methods to parallel the new DH methods.
> =20
> These key exchange methods serve a valuable role in environments where =
it is
> possible to authenticate using Kerberos, which is in Unix realms and =
Windows
> domains. The existing trust relationship between the client and the =
server can be

[Obligatory note that the GSS-API is truly *generic*, in that I know of
sites that use a GSS mechanism that backends to X.509 certificates =
instead
of Kerberos.  I'm willing to ignore the GSS NTLM variants, though :) ]

> used in this case, and allows for host authentication without having =
to set up or
> verify a host key on the client. This substantially improves security =
and
> usability in these environments, since lack of proper host key =
verification
> procedures is a big security risk, but their presence is a big pain =
point for
> administration. These key exchange methods avoid that problem in =
environments
> that already have an existing trust network to begin with."

It is quite useful in those environments, yes, but is not risk-free.  =
The
most glaring risk is when GSS is using Kerberos, Kerberos is using DNS
lookups (without DNSSEC) to expand the hostname in the host-based =
service
principal, and both GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPIDelegateCredentials are =
in
use (to use the openssh spellings).  In this case, an attacker that can
spoof DNS responses to point the user at an attacker-controlled machine
that has valid Kerberos credentials, can obtain a valid TGT of that =
user,
granting near-full privilege to act as that user!  For this reason, we
disable GSSAPIKeyExchange in environments where users are likely to use
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials, as the risk is too large.

> - Mike:
> =20
> "You make a really good point, I did leave out the GSS-API updates and =
only
> deprecated the -sha1-* entries.
> =20
> I suspect that the same reasons we defined groups 15, 16, 17, and 18 =
to use
> sha512 would hold for gss-group* kex methods. so, adding:
> =20
> Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
> gss-group14-sha256-*                  This Draft    MAY
> gss-group15-sha512-*                  This Draft    MAY
> gss-group16-sha512-*                  This Draft    MAY
> gss-group17-sha512-*                  This Draft    MAY
> gss-group18-sha512-*                  This Draft    MAY
> =20
> would make sense."
> =20
> -snip-
> =20
> My proposal also included a suggestion to update the gss-gex- method. =
Since it
> seems unlikely that the GSS methods will be implemented by =
resource-constrained
> devices - in order to use this, a device would have to be part of a =
Unix realm or
> a Windows domain - I suggested gss-gex-sha512-* to provide a hash that =
meets the
> security level of any DH group.
> =20
> Mike is currently unsure about updating gss-gex-. I don't feel =
strongly about
> this, because the DH group exchange methods are a bit of a can of =
worms (FIPS
> requires group validation that fails with deployed ephemeral groups). =
The main
> priority is that GSS methods serve a unique function, and it would =
provide value
> to maintain them.
> =20
> For the same reasons we define the DH groups, I think it makes sense =
to define
> the above groups. However, if I needed to pick only one, my priority =
would be
> gss-group15-sha512. This is for the same reasons I prefer
> diffie-hellman-group15-sha512. It meets all security recommendations, =
both in
> terms of DH group size and hash size, and it is 2x faster than group =
16, which
> has performance characteristics that begin to close the gap between =
denial of
> service and normal rate of connections on busy servers.
> =20
> Does anyone else second these suggestions?

Sure; I'd like to see them.

> Defining this will not affect servers and clients that do not have a =
use for key
> exchange and host authentication using Kerberos. Only folks who want =
to use this
> will be affected.
> =20
> I am aware of other implementations of these key exchange methods =
besides ours,
> including patches for popular open source software. I=E2=80=99m not =
sure if PuTTY
> implements them; I think it might just implement the user =
authentication method
> gssapi-with-mic. For the people who do implement this, I=E2=80=99m not =
sure if they have
> representation or awareness of this list.

I believe the PuTTY patches were maintained out of tree for a while but
did eventually make it in.  I'll add a few more CCs that are or used to =
be
in the business of maintaining patches for GSS SSH support.

-Ben=20


-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-------
_______________________________________________
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Curdle@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle

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<HTML><HEAD></HEAD>
<BODY dir=3Dltr>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>
<DIV style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial'; COLOR: #000000">
<DIV>Apologies to Mark for failing to remember his name in my previous =
message.=20
That is embarrassing... :)</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Benjamin =E2=80=93 with regard to this:</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>&gt; <FONT face=3DCalibri><FONT style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">The most =
glaring risk=20
is when GSS is using Kerberos,</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><FONT style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&gt; Kerberos =
is using DNS=20
lookups (without DNSSEC) to expand the</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><FONT style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&gt; hostname =
in the=20
host-based service principal, and both</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DCalibri><FONT style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt">&gt; =
GSSAPIKeyExchange and=20
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials are in<BR>&gt; use (to use the openssh =
spellings).=20
</FONT></FONT></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>It seems the crucial problem here is the client somehow putting =
critical=20
trust in an untrustable DNS lookup. Are there situations where the =
client=20
application can do this unknowingly, by accident?</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>I was under the impression that Kerberos authentication is tied to =
the=20
Service Principal Name. In our implementation, this is explicitly =
entered by the=20
user, either directly as the SPN, or our Client prepends =
=E2=80=9Chost/=E2=80=9D to the target=20
host name.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Since this is the security principal the client is verifying, the =
server=20
should be proving its identity with respect to this principal, not =
another=20
principal that is looked up somehow from DNS.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Did I misunderstand? Can you point me to any information where I =
can learn=20
more about this DNS backdoor?</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>denis</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt tahoma">
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"BACKGROUND: #f5f5f5">
<DIV style=3D"font-color: black"><B>From:</B> <A title=3Dkaduk@MIT.EDU=20
href=3D"mailto:kaduk@MIT.EDU">Benjamin Kaduk</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Sent:</B> Saturday, September 10, 2016 11:48</DIV>
<DIV><B>To:</B> <A title=3Dietf-ssh3@denisbider.com=20
href=3D"mailto:ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com">denis bider (Bitvise)</A> =
</DIV>
<DIV><B>Cc:</B> <A title=3Dcurdle@ietf.org=20
href=3D"mailto:curdle@ietf.org">Curdle</A> ; <A =
title=3Dgss-openssh@MIT.EDU=20
href=3D"mailto:gss-openssh@MIT.EDU">gss-openssh@MIT.EDU</A> ; <A=20
title=3Dietf-ssh@netbsd.org=20
href=3D"mailto:ietf-ssh@netbsd.org">ietf-ssh@netbsd.org</A> ; <A=20
title=3Dasedeno@MIT.EDU =
href=3D"mailto:asedeno@MIT.EDU">asedeno@MIT.EDU</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Subject:</B> Re: [Curdle] [SSH] GSS key exchange=20
methods</DIV></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV></DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>On=20
Sat, 10 Sep 2016, denis bider (Bitvise) wrote:<BR><BR>&gt; Hello Curdle, =
and the=20
old SSH list:<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; I forward parts of a correspondence =
with=20
Mike discussing the need to address<BR>&gt; GSSAPI key exchange methods =
in the=20
ssh-kex-sha2 draft:<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt;=20
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04<BR>&gt;&nbs=
p;=20
<BR>&gt; - denis:<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; "RFC 4462 defines the following =
key=20
exchange methods, which our SSH Client and<BR>&gt; Server implement. I =
am aware=20
also of other implementations by other vendors, and<BR>&gt; we hear from =
users=20
who use them:<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt;=20
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4462<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; The exchange =
methods=20
parallel the DH key exchange methods, and are currently:<BR>&gt;&nbsp; =
<BR>&gt;=20
gss-group1-sha1-*<BR>&gt; gss-group14-sha1-*<BR>&gt;=20
gss-gex-sha1-*<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; The current version of the =
ssh-kex-sha2=20
draft mentions these, but only to<BR>&gt; deprecate gss-gex-sha1-* and=20
gss-group1-sha1-*. The draft allows<BR>&gt; gss-group14-sha1-* as a MAY, =
but=20
does not define any new versions of these<BR>&gt; methods to parallel =
the new DH=20
methods.<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; These key exchange methods serve a =
valuable role=20
in environments where it is<BR>&gt; possible to authenticate using =
Kerberos,=20
which is in Unix realms and Windows<BR>&gt; domains. The existing trust=20
relationship between the client and the server can be<BR><BR>[Obligatory =
note=20
that the GSS-API is truly *generic*, in that I know of<BR>sites that use =
a GSS=20
mechanism that backends to X.509 certificates instead<BR>of =
Kerberos.&nbsp; I'm=20
willing to ignore the GSS NTLM variants, though :) ]<BR><BR>&gt; used in =
this=20
case, and allows for host authentication without having to set up =
or<BR>&gt;=20
verify a host key on the client. This substantially improves security=20
and<BR>&gt; usability in these environments, since lack of proper host =
key=20
verification<BR>&gt; procedures is a big security risk, but their =
presence is a=20
big pain point for<BR>&gt; administration. These key exchange methods =
avoid that=20
problem in environments<BR>&gt; that already have an existing trust =
network to=20
begin with."<BR><BR>It is quite useful in those environments, yes, but =
is not=20
risk-free.&nbsp; The<BR>most glaring risk is when GSS is using Kerberos, =

Kerberos is using DNS<BR>lookups (without DNSSEC) to expand the hostname =
in the=20
host-based service<BR>principal, and both GSSAPIKeyExchange and=20
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials are in<BR>use (to use the openssh =
spellings).&nbsp; In=20
this case, an attacker that can<BR>spoof DNS responses to point the user =
at an=20
attacker-controlled machine<BR>that has valid Kerberos credentials, can =
obtain a=20
valid TGT of that user,<BR>granting near-full privilege to act as that=20
user!&nbsp; For this reason, we<BR>disable GSSAPIKeyExchange in =
environments=20
where users are likely to use<BR>GSSAPIDelegateCredentials, as the risk =
is too=20
large.<BR><BR>&gt; - Mike:<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; "You make a really =
good point,=20
I did leave out the GSS-API updates and only<BR>&gt; deprecated the =
-sha1-*=20
entries.<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; I suspect that the same reasons we =
defined=20
groups 15, 16, 17, and 18 to use<BR>&gt; sha512 would hold for =
gss-group* kex=20
methods. so, adding:<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; Key Exchange Method=20
Name&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;=20
Reference&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Note<BR>&gt;=20
gss-group14-sha256-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR>&gt;=20
gss-group15-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR>&gt;=20
gss-group16-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR>&gt;=20
gss-group17-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR>&gt;=20
gss-group18-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
This Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; would make=20
sense."<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; -snip-<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; My proposal =
also=20
included a suggestion to update the gss-gex- method. Since it<BR>&gt; =
seems=20
unlikely that the GSS methods will be implemented by=20
resource-constrained<BR>&gt; devices - in order to use this, a device =
would have=20
to be part of a Unix realm or<BR>&gt; a Windows domain - I suggested=20
gss-gex-sha512-* to provide a hash that meets the<BR>&gt; security level =
of any=20
DH group.<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; Mike is currently unsure about updating =

gss-gex-. I don't feel strongly about<BR>&gt; this, because the DH group =

exchange methods are a bit of a can of worms (FIPS<BR>&gt; requires =
group=20
validation that fails with deployed ephemeral groups). The main<BR>&gt; =
priority=20
is that GSS methods serve a unique function, and it would provide =
value<BR>&gt;=20
to maintain them.<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; For the same reasons we define =
the DH=20
groups, I think it makes sense to define<BR>&gt; the above groups. =
However, if I=20
needed to pick only one, my priority would be<BR>&gt; =
gss-group15-sha512. This=20
is for the same reasons I prefer<BR>&gt; diffie-hellman-group15-sha512. =
It meets=20
all security recommendations, both in<BR>&gt; terms of DH group size and =
hash=20
size, and it is 2x faster than group 16, which<BR>&gt; has performance=20
characteristics that begin to close the gap between denial of<BR>&gt; =
service=20
and normal rate of connections on busy servers.<BR>&gt;&nbsp; <BR>&gt; =
Does=20
anyone else second these suggestions?<BR><BR>Sure; I'd like to see=20
them.<BR><BR>&gt; Defining this will not affect servers and clients that =
do not=20
have a use for key<BR>&gt; exchange and host authentication using =
Kerberos. Only=20
folks who want to use this<BR>&gt; will be affected.<BR>&gt;&nbsp; =
<BR>&gt; I am=20
aware of other implementations of these key exchange methods besides=20
ours,<BR>&gt; including patches for popular open source software. =
I=E2=80=99m not sure=20
if PuTTY<BR>&gt; implements them; I think it might just implement the =
user=20
authentication method<BR>&gt; gssapi-with-mic. For the people who do =
implement=20
this, I=E2=80=99m not sure if they have<BR>&gt; representation or =
awareness of this=20
list.<BR><BR>I believe the PuTTY patches were maintained out of tree for =
a while=20
but<BR>did eventually make it in.&nbsp; I'll add a few more CCs that are =
or used=20
to be<BR>in the business of maintaining patches for GSS SSH =
support.<BR><BR>-Ben=20

<P>
<HR>
_______________________________________________<BR>Curdle mailing=20
list<BR>Curdle@ietf.org<BR>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle<B=
R></DIV></DIV></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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From nobody Sat Sep 10 18:17:24 2016
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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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I would agree that the document is ready for WGLC.  That said I have some
comments.

1. The second sentence in the abstract feels like it got truncated to me.  I
feel like it should finish with something along the lines of " that provides
an Authenticated Encryption algorithm."

2.  Traditionally, these documents have a section on S/MIME capabilities and
this document does not have one.

3.  I do not know what the limit is on the Poly1305 authentication tag.
Does this affect the maximum length as presented in paragraph 3 of section
5?

s/one algorithm identifiers/one algorithm identifier/
s/likely ot be/likely to be/


jim



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From: "Basney, Jim" <jbasney@illinois.edu>
To: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] [SSH] GSS key exchange methods
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [SSH] GSS key exchange methods
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On 9/10/16, 1:35 AM, denis bider (Bitvise) wrote:
>Does anyone else second these suggestions?

I do. Science projects like ligo.org and xsede.org rely on RFC 4462 SSH
GSS-API Key Exchange using multiple GSS mechanisms including X.509 [1],
SAML [2], and EAP [3]. We use patches [4] that add GSS-API Key Exchange
support to OpenSSH, and we'd update the patches to support new GSS-API Key
Exchange methods.

Regards,
Jim

[1] https://github.com/globus/gsi-openssh
[2] https://github.com/fedushare/mech_saml_ec
[3] https://wiki.moonshot.ja.net/display/Moonshot/Source+Access
[4] http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)
        Author          : Mark D.     Baushke
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2-00.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2016-09-11

Abstract:
   This document defines added Modular Exponential (MODP) Groups for the
   Secure Shell (SSH) protocol using SHA-2 hashes.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2-00


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
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On Sat, 10 Sep 2016, denis bider (Bitvise) wrote:

> Apologies to Mark for failing to remember his name in my previous message=
=2E That is embarrassing... :)
>
> Benjamin =E2=80=93 with regard to this:
>
> > The most glaring risk is when GSS is using Kerberos,
> > Kerberos is using DNS lookups (without DNSSEC) to expand the
> > hostname in the host-based service principal, and both
> > GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPIDelegateCredentials are in
> > use (to use the openssh spellings).
>
> It seems the crucial problem here is the client somehow putting critical
> trust in an untrustable DNS lookup. Are there situations where the

Yes, that is basically the crux of the problem.

> client application can do this unknowingly, by accident?

MIT krb5 has alwyas done a DNS lookup for service principal name
canonicalization
(http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-latest/doc/admin/princ_dns.html); it is
currently possible to disable the reverse lookup, but not the forward
lookup.  (Disabling the forward lookup by default would cause a breaking
behavior change for some users; IIRC 'ssh hostname' would break vs. 'ssh
hostname.fqdn', though it would still be useful to have an option even if
it must remain off by default.)  I believe that Heimdal krb5 also does a
similar type of DNS lookup, though I cannot speak authoritatively about
Heimdal.  My understanding is that Windows Kerberos has an alternate
(AD-specific) mechanism for determining host principal names and is not
subject to this sort of issue.

> I was under the impression that Kerberos authentication is tied to the
> Service Principal Name. In our implementation, this is explicitly
> entered by the user, either directly as the SPN, or our Client prepends
> =E2=80=9Chost/=E2=80=9D to the target host name.

(Remind me which implementation is yours?)  My understanding is that even
when given an explicit principal name for the remote service, libkrb5 will
still do the hostname resolution for name canonicalization, which may
result in a different name than the user input.

> Since this is the security principal the client is verifying, the server
> should be proving its identity with respect to this principal, not
> another principal that is looked up somehow from DNS.

I am not sure this is a good description of kerberos-based mutual
authentication.  In brief (skipping details like initiator/acceptor
subkeys), the kerberos client (i.e., libkrb5) determines what service name
they wish to authenticate to, requests a service ticket for the principal
with that service name from the KDC, and transmits the service ticket to
the remote peer.  The KDC generated a session key for the service ticket,
one copy of which is encrypted to the service principal in the encrypted
portion of the service ticket, and another copy of which was given to the
client in the KDC's reply.  For successful authentication, both parties
have the same session key and send a key confirmation message to the other
party [in modern systems, in a non-replayable way], and since only the two
intended parties and the KDC can know the session key, the key
confirmation suffices to authenticate the peers.

[The above description does not actually match the precise protocol
messages, but should give an accurate conceptual description of the moving
pieces.]

Note that the client is not authenticating the server directly, but is
instead trusting that the KDC has generated the proper cryptographic
messages based on the *name* that the client sent to the KDC.  The problem
at hand comes when the client is convinced to send a different name to the
KDC than the user typed in; there is no verification that the service
principal name of the service ticket matches what the user typed in.

> Did I misunderstand? Can you point me to any information where I can
> learn more about this DNS backdoor?

Well, even at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4120#section-1.3 there is
some discussion; current libkrb5 violates a MUST NOT, and there is an
implementation note stating that many (then-) current implementations do
not comply to that same MUST NOT.

The specific krb5+GSSAPI+OpenSSH case is described (briefly) at
http://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/kerberos/2013-January/018602.html

-Ben
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [SSH] GSS key exchange methods
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On Sun, 11 Sep 2016, Basney, Jim wrote:

> On 9/10/16, 1:35 AM, denis bider (Bitvise) wrote:
> >Does anyone else second these suggestions?
>
> I do. Science projects like ligo.org and xsede.org rely on RFC 4462 SSH
> GSS-API Key Exchange using multiple GSS mechanisms including X.509 [1],
> SAML [2], and EAP [3]. We use patches [4] that add GSS-API Key Exchange
> support to OpenSSH, and we'd update the patches to support new GSS-API Key
> Exchange methods.

Do note that Simon is no longer actively maintaining those patchsets; I
believe the best place to send updates is a pull request to
https://github.com/gss-openssh/openssh-portable (which is itself a bit
under-loved), though I would be happy to hear that there is an alternate
home for such patches.

-Ben

> Regards,
> Jim
>
> [1] https://github.com/globus/gsi-openssh
> [2] https://github.com/fedushare/mech_saml_ec
> [3] https://wiki.moonshot.ja.net/display/Moonshot/Source+Access
> [4] http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>


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From: "Basney, Jim" <jbasney@illinois.edu>
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On 9/11/16, 1:42 PM, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>On Sun, 11 Sep 2016, Basney, Jim wrote:
>
>> On 9/10/16, 1:35 AM, denis bider (Bitvise) wrote:
>> >Does anyone else second these suggestions?
>>
>> I do. Science projects like ligo.org and xsede.org rely on RFC 4462 SSH
>> GSS-API Key Exchange using multiple GSS mechanisms including X.509 [1],
>> SAML [2], and EAP [3]. We use patches [4] that add GSS-API Key Exchange
>> support to OpenSSH, and we'd update the patches to support new GSS-API
>>Key Exchange methods.
>
>Do note that Simon is no longer actively maintaining those patchsets; I
>believe the best place to send updates is a pull request to
>https://github.com/gss-openssh/openssh-portable (which is itself a bit
>under-loved), though I would be happy to hear that there is an alternate
>home for such patches.

Yes, I have previously submitted a pull request to that repo.
Our offer to assist with maintaining that repo still stands.
Our current, actively-maintained sources reside at [1].

Thanks,
Jim

>> [1] https://github.com/globus/gsi-openssh
>> [2] https://github.com/fedushare/mech_saml_ec
>> [3] https://wiki.moonshot.ja.net/display/Moonshot/Source+Access
>> [4] http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305
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Jim:

Thanks for the review.

for the improved Abstract I propose:

   This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305
   Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
   ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an authenticated encryption algorithm
   constructed of the ChaCha stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator.

An object identifier needs to be assigned to add the SMimeCapabilities.  =
I can add a TBD, or I can wait for that assignment.

According to RFC 7539, the Poly1305 algorithm produces a 16-byte =
authentication tag.

Russ


On Sep 10, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> I would agree that the document is ready for WGLC.  That said I have =
some
> comments.
>=20
> 1. The second sentence in the abstract feels like it got truncated to =
me.  I
> feel like it should finish with something along the lines of " that =
provides
> an Authenticated Encryption algorithm."
>=20
> 2.  Traditionally, these documents have a section on S/MIME =
capabilities and
> this document does not have one.
>=20
> 3.  I do not know what the limit is on the Poly1305 authentication =
tag.
> Does this affect the maximum length as presented in paragraph 3 of =
section
> 5?
>=20
> s/one algorithm identifiers/one algorithm identifier/
> s/likely ot be/likely to be/
>=20
>=20
> jim
>=20
>=20


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To: 'Russ Housley' <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: Sunday, September 11, 2016 12:23 PM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> Cc: curdle@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305
> 
> Jim:
> 
> Thanks for the review.
> 
> for the improved Abstract I propose:
> 
>    This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305
>    Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
>    ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an authenticated encryption algorithm
>    constructed of the ChaCha stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator.
> 
> An object identifier needs to be assigned to add the SMimeCapabilities.  I
can
> add a TBD, or I can wait for that assignment.

I expect to see a section or a paragraph describing the SMIME capabilities
defined in the document.  I don't care about what the actual OID is.

> 
> According to RFC 7539, the Poly1305 algorithm produces a 16-byte
> authentication tag.

And is or is not a limitation problem for the length of the text to be
encrypted?

Jim

> 
> Russ
> 
> 
> On Sep 10, 2016, at 9:16 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:
> 
> > I would agree that the document is ready for WGLC.  That said I have
> > some comments.
> >
> > 1. The second sentence in the abstract feels like it got truncated to
> > me.  I feel like it should finish with something along the lines of "
> > that provides an Authenticated Encryption algorithm."
> >
> > 2.  Traditionally, these documents have a section on S/MIME
> > capabilities and this document does not have one.
> >
> > 3.  I do not know what the limit is on the Poly1305 authentication tag.
> > Does this affect the maximum length as presented in paragraph 3 of
> > section 5?
> >
> > s/one algorithm identifiers/one algorithm identifier/ s/likely ot
> > be/likely to be/
> >
> >
> > jim
> >
> >



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On Sep 11, 2016, at 3:52 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

>=20
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
>> Sent: Sunday, September 11, 2016 12:23 PM
>> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
>> Cc: curdle@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305
>>=20
>> Jim:
>>=20
>> Thanks for the review.
>>=20
>> for the improved Abstract I propose:
>>=20
>>   This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305
>>   Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
>>   ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an authenticated encryption algorithm
>>   constructed of the ChaCha stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator.
>>=20
>> An object identifier needs to be assigned to add the =
SMimeCapabilities.  I
> can
>> add a TBD, or I can wait for that assignment.
>=20
> I expect to see a section or a paragraph describing the SMIME =
capabilities
> defined in the document.  I don't care about what the actual OID is.

Okay.


>>=20
>> According to RFC 7539, the Poly1305 algorithm produces a 16-byte
>> authentication tag.
>=20
> And is or is not a limitation problem for the length of the text to be
> encrypted?

RFC 7539 says:

   The Poly1305 authenticator is designed to ensure that forged messages
   are rejected with a probability of 1-(n/(2^102)) for a 16n-byte
   message, even after sending 2^64 legitimate messages

So, the Poly1305 authenticator does not seem to be part of the reason =
for the limits in the Security Considerations.

Russ


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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
To: <draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves@etf.org>
Date: Sun, 11 Sep 2016 20:30:18 -0700
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Subject: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves-01
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Russ,

Looks like this draft still needs some work.

1.  There is a static-static draft that was written for ECDH (RFC 6278).  I
assume that these use cases are still valid and it would be good to document
them for the new curves.  Should they be in this document or should it be a
separate document?

2.  In section 2.2 paragraph 4 - this paragraph messed me in terms of
thinking that this was different for the HKDF version of KDF than for the
X9.63-KDF version of the KDF.  There is not really a difference, it just
depends on if you are using bits or bytes for the truncation point.  I think
that this may need to be clarified.

3.  Section 3.2 - look like you forgot to update this section with the new
document.

4.  Section 6 - looks like you forgot to update this section with the new
document

5.  Section 7 - should there be a hint here about the location of these
algorithm identifiers for the X9.3 kdf versions?  I am assuming that you
believe they should be usable given that the KDF function was previously
described.

6.  Section 8 - is there a need to duplicate the S/MIME caps for the X9.3
kdf functions given that you did not duplicate the info in section 7?

Jim




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I have split out a new draft draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 [1]
(called "new-modp" in the Reference table below) forked from the
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04 draft. It specifies the new MOD DH KEX
Groups that use SHA-2 hashes. This edition specifies both the new
diffie-hellman-group* names of the -04 revision as well as adding the
gss-group* names.

Before I update draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-05 to point to it, I
would like to take a straw poll of which algorithms (if any) should be
defined as a MUST to implement. My personal preference was just
curve25519-sha256. However, at least a few implementors have said that
they were not planning to do any ECDH implementations. So, I am guessing
that "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" may be the only one that everyone
might be able to agree is a MUST to implement.

Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
curve25519-sha256                     ssh-curves    MUST
curve448-sha512                       ssh-curves    MAY
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1    RFC4419       SHOULD NOT
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256  RFC4419       MAY
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1            RFC4253       SHOULD NOT
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1           RFC4253       SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         new-modp      MUST
diffie-hellman-group15-sha512         new-modp      MAY
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         new-modp      SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group17-sha512         new-modp      MAY
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         new-modp      MAY
ecdh-sha2-nistp256                    RFC5656       SHOULD
ecdh-sha2-nistp384                    RFC5656       SHOULD
ecdh-sha2-nistp521                    RFC5656       SHOULD
ecdh-sha2-*                           RFC5656       MAY
ecmqv-sha2                            RFC5656       MAY
gss-gex-sha1-*                        RFC4462       SHOULD NOT
gss-group1-sha1-*                     RFC4462       SHOULD NOT
gss-group14-sha1-*                    RFC4462       SHOULD
gss-group14-sha256-*                  new-modp      SHOULD
gss-group15-sha512-*                  new-modp      MAY
gss-group16-sha512-*                  new-modp      SHOULD
gss-group17-sha512-*                  new-modp      MAY
gss-group18-sha512-*                  new-modp      MAY
gss-*                                 RFC4462       MAY
rsa1024-sha1                          RFC4432       SHOULD NOT
rsa2048-sha256                        RFC4432       MAY

I plan to post the above table in the new
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-05 draft
after 05:00 UTC on 12 September 2016.

Of course, everyone can still lobby for changes with the Curdle group, I
just don't want to generate a huge number of revisions if possible.

	Thank you,
	-- Mark

URL: [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2-00


From nobody Mon Sep 12 06:09:04 2016
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Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 16:08:58 +0300
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Mark D. Baushke writes:
> Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
> curve25519-sha256                     ssh-curves    MUST
> diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1    RFC4419       SHOULD NOT
> diffie-hellman-group1-sha1            RFC4253       SHOULD NOT
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha1           RFC4253       SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         new-modp      MUST
> diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         new-modp      SHOULD
> ecdh-sha2-nistp256                    RFC5656       SHOULD
> ecdh-sha2-nistp384                    RFC5656       SHOULD
> ecdh-sha2-nistp521                    RFC5656       SHOULD
> gss-gex-sha1-*                        RFC4462       SHOULD NOT
> gss-group1-sha1-*                     RFC4462       SHOULD NOT
> gss-group14-sha1-*                    RFC4462       SHOULD
> gss-group14-sha256-*                  new-modp      SHOULD
> gss-group16-sha512-*                  new-modp      SHOULD
> rsa1024-sha1                          RFC4432       SHOULD NOT

(I remove algorithms with status of MAY, to make it shorter).

That looks mostly ok. Most of the sha1 -> SHOULD NOT, with exception
to the diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and gss-group-14-sha1-*, which are
still kept as SHOULD for backwards compatible reasons.

The MUSTs are good, but there seems to be quite a lot of SHOULD
versions. Is there really need for that many SHOULD algoritms. For
example is there reason to keep ecdh-sha2-* as SHOULD when
curve25519-sha256 will be MUST?

Also, is there need to update other algorithms, i.e. encryption
algorithms, MAC algorithms, Public key names, comperssion algorithms
etc? Are the implementation requirements for them up to date (I do not
know, as I have no idea which of them are now mandatory to implement,
and which are not). 
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> writes:

> That looks mostly ok. Most of the sha1 -> SHOULD NOT, with exception
> to the diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and gss-group-14-sha1-*, which are
> still kept as SHOULD for backwards compatible reasons.

Yes.

> The MUSTs are good, but there seems to be quite a lot of SHOULD
> versions. Is there really need for that many SHOULD algoritms. For
> example is there reason to keep ecdh-sha2-* as SHOULD when
> curve25519-sha256 will be MUST?

I will move ecdh-sha2-* to MAY. The RFC5656 Section 4 said that every
SSH ECC implementation MUST implement ECDH key exchange. So, I was
transitioning all of those MUST to SHOULD requirements.

It is not clear to me if the curve25519 and curve448 KEX method
would fall into the RFC 5656 MUST requirements or not.

> Also, is there need to update other algorithms, i.e. encryption
> algorithms, MAC algorithms, Public key names, comperssion algorithms
> etc? Are the implementation requirements for them up to date (I do not
> know, as I have no idea which of them are now mandatory to implement,
> and which are not).

Good question. I am not sure if they are all being managed by the Curdle
Group or not.... I am not sure that they all belong in one document or
not. It seems like it might be better for each section to have its own
document specifying the MUST/SHOULD/MAY/SHOULD NOT advise...

The current IANA SSH Parameters are provided in:
  http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml

1) Encryption algorithms

We have a new one comding in Curdle:
  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305/
  but I do not see any drafts for SSH yet. 

I suspect that one or more of these encryption ciphers should be avoided
(des-cbc and the arcfour* algorithms). I am not sure of the state of all
of them.

The SSH Encryption Algorithm Name list has the following IANA table:

Encryption Algorithm Name       Reference       Note
3des-cbc                        [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
blowfish-cbc                    [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish256-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish-cbc                     [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish192-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish128-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes256-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes192-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes128-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent256-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent192-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent128-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
arcfour                         [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
idea-cbc                        [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
cast128-cbc                     [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
none                            [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
des-cbc                         [FIPS-46-3]     HISTORIC, See page 4
arcfour128                      [RFC4345]
arcfour256                      [RFC4345]
aes128-ctr                      [RFC4344]
aes192-ctr                      [RFC4344]
aes256-ctr                      [RFC4344]
3des-ctr                        [RFC4344]
blowfish-ctr                    [RFC4344]
twofish128-ctr                  [RFC4344]
twofish192-ctr                  [RFC4344]
twofish256-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent128-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent192-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent256-ctr                  [RFC4344]
idea-ctr                        [RFC4344]
cast128-ctr                     [RFC4344]
AEAD_AES_128_GCM                [RFC5647]       Section 6.1
AEAD_AES_256_GCM                [RFC5647]       Section 6.2


2) MAC Algorithm Names has the following IANA table:

MAC Algorithm Name      Reference       Note
hmac-sha1               [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-sha1-96            [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-md5                [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-md5-96             [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
none                    [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
AEAD_AES_128_GCM        [RFC5647]       Section 6.1
AEAD_AES_256_GCM        [RFC5647]       Section 6.2
hmac-sha2-256           [RFC6668]       Section 2
hmac-sha2-512           [RFC6668]       Section 2

Of the above, I believe that hmac-sha1-96, hmac-md5-96, and hmac-md5 are
considered insecure by some parties. As RFC 5647 was informational
rather than standard track and does not play well with SSH negotiation
of Cipher+MAC, I am not sure how to count it. Unless someone wants to
play with SHA-3 (FIPS PUB 202), or revise RFC 5647, I do not see any
real changes needed.

3) Public Key Algorithm Names

Public Key Algorithm Name 	Reference 	Note 
ssh-dss		[RFC4253]	Section 6.6
ssh-rsa		[RFC4253]	Section 6.6
spki-sign-rsa	[RFC4253]	Section 6.6
spki-sign-dss	[RFC4253]	Section 6.6
pgp-sign-rsa	[RFC4253]	Section 6.6
pgp-sign-dss	[RFC4253]	Section 6.6
null		[RFC4462]	Section 5
ecdsa-sha2-*	[RFC5656]	
x509v3-ssh-dss	[RFC6187]	
x509v3-ssh-rsa	[RFC6187]	
x509v3-rsa2048-sha256	[RFC6187]	
x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-*	[RFC6187]




4) Compression Algorithms

> --
> kivinen@iki.fi


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To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
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References: <41049.1473653352@eng-mail01.juniper.net> <22486.43242.802279.610275@fireball.acr.fi>
Comments: In-reply-to: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> message dated "Mon, 12 Sep 2016 16:08:58 +0300."
From: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Cc: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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[Regretfully an incomplete draft of this escaped prematurely, pardon
the repetition. -- Mark]

Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> writes:

> That looks mostly ok. Most of the sha1 -> SHOULD NOT, with exception
> to the diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and gss-group-14-sha1-*, which are
> still kept as SHOULD for backwards compatible reasons.

Yes.

> The MUSTs are good, but there seems to be quite a lot of SHOULD
> versions. Is there really need for that many SHOULD algoritms. For
> example is there reason to keep ecdh-sha2-* as SHOULD when
> curve25519-sha256 will be MUST?

I will move ecdh-sha2-* to MAY. The RFC5656 Section 4 said that every
SSH ECC implementation MUST implement ECDH key exchange. So, I was
moving all of those MUST to SHOULD requirements.

It is not clear to me if the curve25519 and curve448 KEX method
would fall into the RFC 5656 MUST requirements or not.

> Also, is there need to update other algorithms, i.e. encryption
> algorithms, MAC algorithms, Public key names, comperssion algorithms
> etc? Are the implementation requirements for them up to date (I do not
> know, as I have no idea which of them are now mandatory to implement,
> and which are not).

Good question. I am not sure if they are all being managed by the Curdle
Group or not.... I am not sure that they all belong in one document or
not. It seems like it might be better for each section to have its own
document specifying the MUST/SHOULD/MAY/SHOULD NOT advise...

The current IANA SSH Parameters are provided in:
  http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml

1) Encryption algorithms

We have a new one algorithm in Curdle:
  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305/
but I do not see any drafts for SSH yet to use it yet. I would favor
seeing chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com become chacha20-poly1305 if
someone wants to write a draft for it.

I suspect that one or more of these encryption ciphers should be avoided
(des-cbc and the arcfour* algorithms). I am not sure of the state of all
of them.

The SSH Encryption Algorithm Name list has the following IANA table:

Encryption Algorithm Name       Reference       Note
3des-cbc                        [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
blowfish-cbc                    [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish256-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish-cbc                     [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish192-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish128-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes256-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes192-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes128-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent256-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent192-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent128-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
arcfour                         [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
idea-cbc                        [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
cast128-cbc                     [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
none                            [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
des-cbc                         [FIPS-46-3]     HISTORIC, See page 4
arcfour128                      [RFC4345]
arcfour256                      [RFC4345]
aes128-ctr                      [RFC4344]
aes192-ctr                      [RFC4344]
aes256-ctr                      [RFC4344]
3des-ctr                        [RFC4344]
blowfish-ctr                    [RFC4344]
twofish128-ctr                  [RFC4344]
twofish192-ctr                  [RFC4344]
twofish256-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent128-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent192-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent256-ctr                  [RFC4344]
idea-ctr                        [RFC4344]
cast128-ctr                     [RFC4344]
AEAD_AES_128_GCM                [RFC5647]       Section 6.1
AEAD_AES_256_GCM                [RFC5647]       Section 6.2


2) MAC Algorithm Names has the following IANA table:

MAC Algorithm Name      Reference       Note
hmac-sha1               [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-sha1-96            [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-md5                [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-md5-96             [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
none                    [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
AEAD_AES_128_GCM        [RFC5647]       Section 6.1
AEAD_AES_256_GCM        [RFC5647]       Section 6.2
hmac-sha2-256           [RFC6668]       Section 2
hmac-sha2-512           [RFC6668]       Section 2

Of the above, I believe that hmac-sha1-96, hmac-md5-96, and hmac-md5 are
considered insecure by some parties. As RFC 5647 was informational
rather than standard track and does not play well with SSH negotiation
of Cipher+MAC, I am not sure how to count it. Unless someone wants to
play with SHA-3 (FIPS PUB 202), or revise RFC 5647, I do not see any
real changes needed.

3) Public Key Algorithm Names

Changes in flight are:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2/

Public Key Algorithm Name       Reference       Note
ssh-dss                         [RFC4253]       Section 6.6
ssh-rsa                         [RFC4253]       Section 6.6
spki-sign-rsa                   [RFC4253]       Section 6.6
spki-sign-dss                   [RFC4253]       Section 6.6
pgp-sign-rsa                    [RFC4253]       Section 6.6
pgp-sign-dss                    [RFC4253]       Section 6.6
null                            [RFC4462]       Section 5
ecdsa-sha2-*                    [RFC5656]
x509v3-ssh-dss                  [RFC6187]
x509v3-ssh-rsa                  [RFC6187]
x509v3-rsa2048-sha256           [RFC6187]
x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-*             [RFC6187]

The ssh-dss and ssh-rsa algorithms use SHA-1 and the ssh-dss for
values less than 2048-bits seems unlikely to be very secure today.

4) Compression Algorithms

I don't see a need to update these...

Compression Algorithm Name      Reference       Note
none                            [RFC4253]       Section 6.2
zlib                            [RFC4253]       Section 6.2

There are other SSH Parameters, I am not sure if any others need to be
deprecated at this time.

	-- Mark


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From: "denis bider \(Bitvise\)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>
To: "Tero Kivinen" <kivinen@iki.fi>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
References: <41049.1473653352@eng-mail01.juniper.net> <22486.43242.802279.610275@fireball.acr.fi> <53468.1473704115@eng-mail01.juniper.net>
In-Reply-To: <53468.1473704115@eng-mail01.juniper.net>
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:56:56 -0600
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Cc: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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> As RFC 5647 was informational rather than standard track
> and does not play well with SSH negotiation of Cipher+MAC,
> I am not sure how to count it.

Yeah. :( These algorithms (AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM) really 
ought to be considered SHOULD NOT. The real SHOULD versions are 
aes128-gcm@openssh.com and aes256-gcm@openssh.com, which currently do not 
have a formal spec, but are defined as "what RFC 5647 says, but with 
reasonable rules for algorithm negotiation".

We ought to make this formal by specifying new algorithm names aes128-gcm 
and aes256-gcm, and defining this in roughly the same way (what RFC 5647 
says, but with reasonable negotiation rules). It should be identical to the 
@openssh.com versions, except with formally adopted names.

If we want to do this, I can write up this spec.


> 3) Public Key Algorithm Names
> Public Key Algorithm Name     Reference     Note
> ssh-dss        [RFC4253]    Section 6.6
> ssh-rsa        [RFC4253]    Section 6.6

This table should be expanded with another column, Signature Algorithm Name. 
For most algorithms, it's just a copy of the value in Public Key Algorithm 
Name. For ssh-rsa, however, there need to be two additional lines, for three 
total:

ssh-rsa   ssh-rsa        [RFC4253]       Section 6.6
ssh-rsa   rsa-sha2-256   (other draft)   Section 2
ssh-rsa   rsa-sha2-512   (other draft)   Section 2

The "other draft" in this case is the rsa-sha2 draft.

I should modify that draft to update this table in this way. The current 
version of the draft does not suggest adding the extra column, but instead 
adds the new signature algorithm names in the existing Public Key Algorithm 
Name column, which is not fully correct (and may mislead implementers).

denis


----- Original Message -----
From: Mark D. Baushke
Sent: Monday, September 12, 2016 12:15
To: Tero Kivinen
Cc: Curdle ; IETF SSH
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & 
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2

Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> writes:

> That looks mostly ok. Most of the sha1 -> SHOULD NOT, with exception
> to the diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and gss-group-14-sha1-*, which are
> still kept as SHOULD for backwards compatible reasons.

Yes.

> The MUSTs are good, but there seems to be quite a lot of SHOULD
> versions. Is there really need for that many SHOULD algoritms. For
> example is there reason to keep ecdh-sha2-* as SHOULD when
> curve25519-sha256 will be MUST?

I will move ecdh-sha2-* to MAY. The RFC5656 Section 4 said that every
SSH ECC implementation MUST implement ECDH key exchange. So, I was
transitioning all of those MUST to SHOULD requirements.

It is not clear to me if the curve25519 and curve448 KEX method
would fall into the RFC 5656 MUST requirements or not.

> Also, is there need to update other algorithms, i.e. encryption
> algorithms, MAC algorithms, Public key names, comperssion algorithms
> etc? Are the implementation requirements for them up to date (I do not
> know, as I have no idea which of them are now mandatory to implement,
> and which are not).

Good question. I am not sure if they are all being managed by the Curdle
Group or not.... I am not sure that they all belong in one document or
not. It seems like it might be better for each section to have its own
document specifying the MUST/SHOULD/MAY/SHOULD NOT advise...

The current IANA SSH Parameters are provided in:
  http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml

1) Encryption algorithms

We have a new one comding in Curdle:
  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305/
  but I do not see any drafts for SSH yet.

I suspect that one or more of these encryption ciphers should be avoided
(des-cbc and the arcfour* algorithms). I am not sure of the state of all
of them.

The SSH Encryption Algorithm Name list has the following IANA table:

Encryption Algorithm Name       Reference       Note
3des-cbc                        [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
blowfish-cbc                    [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish256-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish-cbc                     [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish192-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
twofish128-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes256-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes192-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
aes128-cbc                      [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent256-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent192-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
serpent128-cbc                  [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
arcfour                         [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
idea-cbc                        [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
cast128-cbc                     [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
none                            [RFC4253]       Section 6.3
des-cbc                         [FIPS-46-3]     HISTORIC, See page 4
arcfour128                      [RFC4345]
arcfour256                      [RFC4345]
aes128-ctr                      [RFC4344]
aes192-ctr                      [RFC4344]
aes256-ctr                      [RFC4344]
3des-ctr                        [RFC4344]
blowfish-ctr                    [RFC4344]
twofish128-ctr                  [RFC4344]
twofish192-ctr                  [RFC4344]
twofish256-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent128-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent192-ctr                  [RFC4344]
serpent256-ctr                  [RFC4344]
idea-ctr                        [RFC4344]
cast128-ctr                     [RFC4344]
AEAD_AES_128_GCM                [RFC5647]       Section 6.1
AEAD_AES_256_GCM                [RFC5647]       Section 6.2


2) MAC Algorithm Names has the following IANA table:

MAC Algorithm Name      Reference       Note
hmac-sha1               [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-sha1-96            [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-md5                [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
hmac-md5-96             [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
none                    [RFC4253]       Section 6.4
AEAD_AES_128_GCM        [RFC5647]       Section 6.1
AEAD_AES_256_GCM        [RFC5647]       Section 6.2
hmac-sha2-256           [RFC6668]       Section 2
hmac-sha2-512           [RFC6668]       Section 2

Of the above, I believe that hmac-sha1-96, hmac-md5-96, and hmac-md5 are
considered insecure by some parties. As RFC 5647 was informational
rather than standard track and does not play well with SSH negotiation
of Cipher+MAC, I am not sure how to count it. Unless someone wants to
play with SHA-3 (FIPS PUB 202), or revise RFC 5647, I do not see any
real changes needed.

3) Public Key Algorithm Names

Public Key Algorithm Name Reference Note
ssh-dss [RFC4253] Section 6.6
ssh-rsa [RFC4253] Section 6.6
spki-sign-rsa [RFC4253] Section 6.6
spki-sign-dss [RFC4253] Section 6.6
pgp-sign-rsa [RFC4253] Section 6.6
pgp-sign-dss [RFC4253] Section 6.6
null [RFC4462] Section 5
ecdsa-sha2-* [RFC5656]
x509v3-ssh-dss [RFC6187]
x509v3-ssh-rsa [RFC6187]
x509v3-rsa2048-sha256 [RFC6187]
x509v3-ecdsa-sha2-* [RFC6187]




4) Compression Algorithms

> --
> kivinen@iki.fi

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Comments: In-reply-to: "denis bider (Bitvise)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com> message dated "Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:56:56 -0600."
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Cc: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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denis bider (Bitvise) <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com> writes:

> Yeah. :( These algorithms (AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM)
> really ought to be considered SHOULD NOT. The real SHOULD versions are
> aes128-gcm@openssh.com and aes256-gcm@openssh.com, which currently do
> not have a formal spec, but are defined as "what RFC 5647 says, but
> with reasonable rules for algorithm negotiation".

I admit I like the OpenSSH specification better myself.

> We ought to make this formal by specifying new algorithm names
> aes128-gcm and aes256-gcm, and defining this in roughly the same way
> (what RFC 5647 says, but with reasonable negotiation rules). It should
> be identical to the @openssh.com versions, except with formally
> adopted names.
> 
> If we want to do this, I can write up this spec.

I think the only reason I have seen folks list AEAD_AES_nnn_GCM in
requirements documents is to appease the either Common Criteria or FIPS
standards.

Things got odd when the NIST SP 800-38D references were put into the
FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance in section A.5 in March 2009. It
changed last year, but it is still not entirely clear how this section
impacts SSH. The section provides techniques for generation an IV that
are acceptable for the purpose of FIPS 140-2 validations, but only list
TLS-v1.2 and IPsec-v3.

Folks who want to read the current details can look in
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf
Section A.5 was last modified on August 7, 2015.

The NIST SP 800-38D should be found at this URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D

(it redirects to
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38D.pdf).
The 8.2.1 Deterministic Construction alternative seems to be the only
one that still meets the FIPS 140-2 guidance.

> > 3) Public Key Algorithm Names
> This table should be expanded with another column, Signature Algorithm
> Name. For most algorithms, it's just a copy of the value in Public Key
> Algorithm Name. For ssh-rsa, however, there need to be two additional
> lines, for three total:
> 
> ssh-rsa   ssh-rsa        [RFC4253]       Section 6.6
> ssh-rsa   rsa-sha2-256   (other draft)   Section 2
> ssh-rsa   rsa-sha2-512   (other draft)   Section 2
> 
> The "other draft" in this case is the rsa-sha2 draft.
> 
> I should modify that draft to update this table in this way. The
> current version of the draft does not suggest adding the extra column,
> but instead adds the new signature algorithm names in the existing
> Public Key Algorithm Name column, which is not fully correct (and may
> mislead implementers).

That sounds like a good plan to me.

	-- Mark


From nobody Mon Sep 12 20:13:43 2016
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Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Use of RSA Keys with SHA-2 256 and 512 in Secure Shell (SSH)
        Author          : Denis Bider
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2016-09-12

Abstract:
  This memo defines an algorithm name, public key format, and signature
  format for use of RSA keys with SHA-2 512 for server and client
  authentication in SSH connections.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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This is to improve requested changes to the =E2=80=9CPublic Key =
Algorithm Names=E2=80=9D table by adding a =E2=80=9CSignature Algorithm =
Name=E2=80=9D column. This is intended to improve clarity by not =
ambiguously listing =E2=80=9Crsa-sha2-256=E2=80=9D and =
=E2=80=9Crsa-sha2-512=E2=80=9D in the column =E2=80=9CPublic Key =
Algorithm Name=E2=80=9D.

I have also downgraded the DMARC policy on my personal domain to =
p=3Dnone (from p=3Dreject previously). This should reduce the incidence =
of relayed messages from me landing in spam or outright bouncing. =
However, it is unfortunate that the systems we are using to communicate =
are not compatible with a strict DMARC policy. (A domain must allow =
other mail servers to originate and potentially forge messages on its =
behalf in order to participate in mailing lists.)


From: internet-drafts@ietf.org=20
Sent: Monday, September 12, 2016 21:13
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org=20
Cc: curdle@ietf.org=20
Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02.txt


A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more =
Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Use of RSA Keys with SHA-2 256 and 512 in =
Secure Shell (SSH)
        Author          : Denis Bider
Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02.txt
Pages           : 6
Date            : 2016-09-12

Abstract:
  This memo defines an algorithm name, public key format, and signature
  format for use of RSA keys with SHA-2 512 for server and client
  authentication in SSH connections.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

_______________________________________________
Curdle mailing list
Curdle@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle

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<HTML><HEAD></HEAD>
<BODY dir=3Dltr>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>
<DIV style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial'; COLOR: #000000">
<DIV>This is to improve requested changes to the =E2=80=9CPublic Key =
Algorithm Names=E2=80=9D=20
table by adding a =E2=80=9CSignature Algorithm Name=E2=80=9D column. =
This is intended to improve=20
clarity by not ambiguously listing =E2=80=9Crsa-sha2-256=E2=80=9D and =
=E2=80=9Crsa-sha2-512=E2=80=9D in the=20
column =E2=80=9CPublic Key Algorithm Name=E2=80=9D.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>I have also downgraded the DMARC policy on my personal domain to =
p=3Dnone=20
(from p=3Dreject previously). This should reduce the incidence of =
relayed messages=20
from me landing in spam or outright bouncing. However, it is unfortunate =
that=20
the systems we are using to communicate are not compatible with a strict =
DMARC=20
policy. (A domain must allow other mail servers to originate and =
potentially=20
forge messages on its behalf in order to participate in mailing =
lists.)</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt tahoma">
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"BACKGROUND: #f5f5f5">
<DIV style=3D"font-color: black"><B>From:</B> <A =
title=3Dinternet-drafts@ietf.org=20
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</A> =
</DIV>
<DIV><B>Sent:</B> Monday, September 12, 2016 21:13</DIV>
<DIV><B>To:</B> <A title=3Di-d-announce@ietf.org=20
href=3D"mailto:i-d-announce@ietf.org">i-d-announce@ietf.org</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Cc:</B> <A title=3Dcurdle@ietf.org=20
href=3D"mailto:curdle@ietf.org">curdle@ietf.org</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Subject:</B> [Curdle] I-D Action:=20
draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02.txt</DIV></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV></DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'><BR>A=20
New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts=20
directories.<BR>This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and =
a=20
Little more Encryption of the=20
IETF.<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
Title&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; : Use =
of RSA=20
Keys with SHA-2 256 and 512 in Secure Shell=20
(SSH)<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
Author&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; : Denis=20
Bider<BR>Filename&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; :=20
draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02.txt<BR>Pages&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
: =
6<BR>Date&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; :=20
2016-09-12<BR><BR>Abstract:<BR>&nbsp; This memo defines an algorithm =
name,=20
public key format, and signature<BR>&nbsp; format for use of RSA keys =
with SHA-2=20
512 for server and client<BR>&nbsp; authentication in SSH=20
connections.<BR><BR><BR>The IETF datatracker status page for this draft=20
is:<BR>https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2/<BR><B=
R>There's=20
also a htmlized version available=20
at:<BR>https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02<BR><BR>A=
 diff=20
from the previous version is available=20
at:<BR>https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02<=
BR><BR><BR>Please=20
note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission<BR>until=20
the htmlized version and diff are available at=20
tools.ietf.org.<BR><BR>Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous =
FTP=20
at:<BR>ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/<BR><BR>_______________________=
________________________<BR>Curdle=20
mailing=20
list<BR>Curdle@ietf.org<BR>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle<B=
R></DIV></DIV></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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From nobody Tue Sep 13 03:53:27 2016
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Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 13:53:18 +0300
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Mark D. Baushke writes:
> > Also, is there need to update other algorithms, i.e. encryption
> > algorithms, MAC algorithms, Public key names, comperssion algorithms
> > etc? Are the implementation requirements for them up to date (I do not
> > know, as I have no idea which of them are now mandatory to implement,
> > and which are not).
> 
> Good question. I am not sure if they are all being managed by the Curdle
> Group or not....

Curdle charter says:

CURDLE - CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption

The CURDLE working group is chartered to add a small set of
cryptographic mechanisms to some IETF protocols, and to make
implementation requirements including deprecation of old algorithms
where there is IETF consensus to do so. ...
...
The protocols the WG intends to work on are Secure Shell (SSH), ...
...
The CURDLE working group will be handling changes to protocols and
registries some of which include what are now considered outdated
algorithm options, and may propose deprecation of such algorithms. ... 
...

so it seems to fit well to curdle charter, if we deprecate and collect
mandatory to implement ciphers to one document. 

> I am not sure that they all belong in one document or not. It seems
> like it might be better for each section to have its own document
> specifying the MUST/SHOULD/MAY/SHOULD NOT advise...

In IPsecME we did collect all IKEv2 related requirements to one
document, and all ESP/AH related requirements to another document. The
reason we have two documents is, because the requirements are
different. In IKEv2 it is ok to specify ENCR_AES_CBC as MUST, as it is
low speed link and performance is not primary goal. In ESP we also
make ENCR_AES_GCM_16 as MUST as it is needed for high performance
gateways.

I would suggest we collect all "Algorithm Implementation Requirements
and Usage Guidance for ssh" in one document here too.

In draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-12 for IKEv2 we even specified the
mandatory to implement authentication methods, and recommended key
lengths (see section 4.1.1). We also provide little bit of background
reasoning for the MUST/SHOULD/MUST NOT/SHOULD NOT algorithms.
-- 
kivinen@iki.fi


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Comments: In-reply-to: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> message dated "Tue, 13 Sep 2016 13:53:18 +0300."
From: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/utTykjB07Ig55zthQtnSIR7SGK4>
Cc: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> writes:

> Mark D. Baushke writes:
> > > Also, is there need to update other algorithms, i.e. encryption
> > > algorithms, MAC algorithms, Public key names, comperssion algorithms
> > > etc? Are the implementation requirements for them up to date (I do not
> > > know, as I have no idea which of them are now mandatory to implement,
> > > and which are not).
> > 
> > Good question. I am not sure if they are all being managed by the Curdle
> > Group or not....
> 
> Curdle charter says:
> 
> CURDLE - CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
> 
...elided...
> so it seems to fit well to curdle charter, if we deprecate and collect
> mandatory to implement ciphers to one document. 

I agree.

> > I am not sure that they all belong in one document or not. It seems
> > like it might be better for each section to have its own document
> > specifying the MUST/SHOULD/MAY/SHOULD NOT advise...
>
> I would suggest we collect all "Algorithm Implementation Requirements
> and Usage Guidance for ssh" in one document here too.

Are we going to adopt all of the SSH changes at one IETF?

Right now, I am the author of two related drafts:

  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2

they deal with updates to Key Exchange Algorithm Methods.

Of the current CURDLE documents
https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/curdle/documents/

the only SSH drafts are:

  draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-02 
  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-00
  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-01
  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2

and the rest are:

  draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-01 
  draft-ietf-curdle-cms-ecdh-new-curves-01 
  draft-ietf-curdle-cms-eddsa-signatures-00
  draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa-00 
  draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01

I just realized that the

  draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves-00

draft has expired on September 9, 2016 and not been resubmitted, so
there is no ed25519-sha256 or curve448-sha512 KEX currently in an active
draft.

To the best of my understanding, no draft to add chacha20-poly1305 to
SSH similar to what has been added to OpenSSH has been written.

To the best of my understanding, no draft to fix the AEAD_AES_128_GCM
and AEAD_AES_256_GCM to negotiate in a way similar to OpenSSH have been
written.

Given the current drafts, they appear to impact only:

Key Exchange Method Names:
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/
ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-16

Public Key Algorithm Names:
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/
ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-19

Are there any other documents I have missed?

> In draft-ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis-12 for IKEv2 we even specified the
> mandatory to implement authentication methods, and recommended key
> lengths (see section 4.1.1). We also provide little bit of background
> reasoning for the MUST/SHOULD/MUST NOT/SHOULD NOT algorithms.

Okay.

	-- Mark


From nobody Tue Sep 13 10:47:28 2016
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Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 03:47:20 +1000 (AEST)
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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On Sun, 11 Sep 2016, Mark D. Baushke wrote:

> I have split out a new draft draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 [1]
> (called "new-modp" in the Reference table below) forked from the
> draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04 draft. It specifies the new MOD DH KEX
> Groups that use SHA-2 hashes. This edition specifies both the new
> diffie-hellman-group* names of the -04 revision as well as adding the
> gss-group* names.
> 
> Before I update draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-05 to point to it, I
> would like to take a straw poll of which algorithms (if any) should be
> defined as a MUST to implement. My personal preference was just
> curve25519-sha256. However, at least a few implementors have said that
> they were not planning to do any ECDH implementations. So, I am guessing
> that "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" may be the only one that everyone
> might be able to agree is a MUST to implement.

I agree with your choice in MUST. Two other nits:

> Key Exchange Method Name              Reference     Note
> curve25519-sha256                     ssh-curves    MUST
> curve448-sha512                       ssh-curves    MAY
> diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1    RFC4419       SHOULD NOT
> diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256  RFC4419       MAY
> diffie-hellman-group1-sha1            RFC4253       SHOULD NOT
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha1           RFC4253       SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         new-modp      MUST
> diffie-hellman-group15-sha512         new-modp      MAY
> diffie-hellman-group16-sha512         new-modp      SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group17-sha512         new-modp      MAY
> diffie-hellman-group18-sha512         new-modp      MAY
> ecdh-sha2-nistp256                    RFC5656       SHOULD
> ecdh-sha2-nistp384                    RFC5656       SHOULD
> ecdh-sha2-nistp521                    RFC5656       SHOULD
> ecdh-sha2-*                           RFC5656       MAY
> ecmqv-sha2                            RFC5656       MAY

Has anyone ever implemented this? AFAIK the motivation for this was
MQV being included in NSA Suite B at the time, but it was subsequently
dropped. IMO if nobody is using it then it should be recommended
against. I.e. SHOULD NOT

> gss-group14-sha1-*                    RFC4462       SHOULD
> gss-group14-sha256-*                  new-modp      SHOULD

IMO these two should be MAY. Most implementations don't support
GSSAPI key exchange at all.

Thanks for your patience in wrangling this.

-d


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell (SSH)
        Author          : Mark D.     Baushke
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2-01.txt
	Pages           : 6
	Date            : 2016-09-13

Abstract:
   This document defines added Modular Exponential (MODP) Groups for the
   Secure Shell (SSH) protocol using SHA-2 hashes.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2-01

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2-01


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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Cc: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Damien writes:

> Has anyone ever implemented this? AFAIK the motivation for this was
> MQV being included in NSA Suite B at the time, but it was subsequently
> dropped. IMO if nobody is using it then it should be recommended
> against. I.e. SHOULD NOT

Hmmm... ecmqv-sha2 is mentioned in defined in RFC 5656 and mentioned in
RFC 6187. I see a JIRA request to add it to MINA SSHD, but I am unaware of
any implementations of it. 

I have no problems moving ecmqv-sha2 to SHOULD NOT if no one has
implemented it. However, I guess I should ask that of the ietf-ssh list
first.

> > gss-group14-sha1-*                    RFC4462       SHOULD
> > gss-group14-sha256-*                  new-modp      SHOULD
> 
> IMO these two should be MAY. Most implementations don't support
> GSSAPI key exchange at all.

Perhaps I need a paragraph like this one:

     If GSS-API methods are available, then the RFC4462 REQUIRED
     gss-group14-sha1-* method SHOULD be retained for compatibility
     with older Secure Shell implementations and the
     gss-groups14-sha256-* method SHOULD be added as for "sha1".

	-- Mark


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From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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On Tue, 13 Sep 2016, Mark D. Baushke wrote:

> > IMO these two should be MAY. Most implementations don't support
> > GSSAPI key exchange at all.
> 
> Perhaps I need a paragraph like this one:
> 
>      If GSS-API methods are available, then the RFC4462 REQUIRED
>      gss-group14-sha1-* method SHOULD be retained for compatibility
>      with older Secure Shell implementations and the
>      gss-groups14-sha256-* method SHOULD be added as for "sha1".

Sounds good, and maybe with an asterisk or footnote marker next
to the SHOULD in the main list.

-d


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From: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
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Subject: [Curdle] PKCS#11 solution
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------=_NextPart_000_002C_01D20DC5.E7EF1710
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I have written up a set of proposed edits that I think would address PKCS#11
for them to look at.  I plan to send this end at the end of the week, but
wanted to give anybody on the list who might want to comment to have a
chance to do so.  I could only improve what I am suggesting.

Jim


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From: "denis bider \(Bitvise\)" <ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com>
To: "Damien Miller" <djm@mindrot.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
References: <41049.1473653352@eng-mail01.juniper.net> <alpine.BSO.2.20.1609140340320.58455@natsu.mindrot.org> <38090.1473794513@eng-mail01.juniper.net>
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Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 20:18:49 -0600
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/k8dtqUlp8WNzfRHtCzW8IHnRRIA>
Cc: Curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF SSH <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>, Max Horn <postbox@quendi.de>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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According to this page (great work by Max Horn):

http://ssh-comparison.quendi.de/comparison/kex.html

ecmqv-sha2 is listed with zero known implementations.

Note that this might be inaccurate =E2=80=93 ext-info-s is also listed =
as having no implementations, whereas it has at least ours (Bitvise SSH =
Server 7.xx). But this is a new development (first released a few months =
ago), whereas RFC 5656 dates back to 2009. It might be safe to say that =
any implementations of ecmqv-sha2 are indeed very secretive.

denis


From: Mark D. Baushke=20
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2016 13:21
To: Damien Miller=20
Cc: Curdle ; IETF SSH=20
Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 & =
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2

Damien writes:

> Has anyone ever implemented this? AFAIK the motivation for this was
> MQV being included in NSA Suite B at the time, but it was subsequently
> dropped. IMO if nobody is using it then it should be recommended
> against. I.e. SHOULD NOT

Hmmm... ecmqv-sha2 is mentioned in defined in RFC 5656 and mentioned in
RFC 6187. I see a JIRA request to add it to MINA SSHD, but I am unaware =
of
any implementations of it.=20

I have no problems moving ecmqv-sha2 to SHOULD NOT if no one has
implemented it. However, I guess I should ask that of the ietf-ssh list
first.

> > gss-group14-sha1-*                    RFC4462       SHOULD
> > gss-group14-sha256-*                  new-modp      SHOULD
>=20
> IMO these two should be MAY. Most implementations don't support
> GSSAPI key exchange at all.

Perhaps I need a paragraph like this one:

     If GSS-API methods are available, then the RFC4462 REQUIRED
     gss-group14-sha1-* method SHOULD be retained for compatibility
     with older Secure Shell implementations and the
     gss-groups14-sha256-* method SHOULD be added as for "sha1".

-- Mark

_______________________________________________
Curdle mailing list
Curdle@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle

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<HTML><HEAD></HEAD>
<BODY dir=3Dltr>
<DIV dir=3Dltr>
<DIV style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; FONT-FAMILY: 'Arial'; COLOR: #000000">
<DIV>According to this page (great work by Max Horn):</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><A title=3Dhttp://ssh-comparison.quendi.de/comparison/kex.html=20
href=3D"http://ssh-comparison.quendi.de/comparison/kex.html">http://ssh-c=
omparison.quendi.de/comparison/kex.html</A></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>ecmqv-sha2 is listed with zero known implementations.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>Note that this might be inaccurate =E2=80=93 ext-info-s is also =
listed as having no=20
implementations, whereas it has at least ours (Bitvise SSH Server 7.xx). =
But=20
this is a new development (first released a few months ago), whereas RFC =
5656=20
dates back to 2009. It might be safe to say that any implementations of=20
ecmqv-sha2 are indeed very secretive.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>denis</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>
<DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt tahoma">
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV style=3D"BACKGROUND: #f5f5f5">
<DIV style=3D"font-color: black"><B>From:</B> <A title=3Dmdb@juniper.net =

href=3D"mailto:mdb@juniper.net">Mark D. Baushke</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Sent:</B> Tuesday, September 13, 2016 13:21</DIV>
<DIV><B>To:</B> <A title=3Ddjm@mindrot.org =
href=3D"mailto:djm@mindrot.org">Damien=20
Miller</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Cc:</B> <A title=3Dcurdle@ietf.org=20
href=3D"mailto:curdle@ietf.org">Curdle</A> ; <A =
title=3Dietf-ssh@NetBSD.org=20
href=3D"mailto:ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org">IETF SSH</A> </DIV>
<DIV><B>Subject:</B> Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2 =
&amp;=20
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2</DIV></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV></DIV>
<DIV=20
style=3D'FONT-SIZE: small; TEXT-DECORATION: none; FONT-FAMILY: =
"Calibri"; FONT-WEIGHT: normal; COLOR: #000000; FONT-STYLE: normal; =
DISPLAY: inline'>Damien=20
writes:<BR><BR>&gt; Has anyone ever implemented this? AFAIK the =
motivation for=20
this was<BR>&gt; MQV being included in NSA Suite B at the time, but it =
was=20
subsequently<BR>&gt; dropped. IMO if nobody is using it then it should =
be=20
recommended<BR>&gt; against. I.e. SHOULD NOT<BR><BR>Hmmm... ecmqv-sha2 =
is=20
mentioned in defined in RFC 5656 and mentioned in<BR>RFC 6187. I see a =
JIRA=20
request to add it to MINA SSHD, but I am unaware of<BR>any =
implementations of=20
it. <BR><BR>I have no problems moving ecmqv-sha2 to SHOULD NOT if no one =

has<BR>implemented it. However, I guess I should ask that of the =
ietf-ssh=20
list<BR>first.<BR><BR>&gt; &gt;=20
gss-group14-sha1-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
RFC4462&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<BR>&gt; &gt;=20
gss-group14-sha256-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=20
new-modp&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<BR>&gt; <BR>&gt; IMO these =
two=20
should be MAY. Most implementations don't support<BR>&gt; GSSAPI key =
exchange at=20
all.<BR><BR>Perhaps I need a paragraph like this=20
one:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If GSS-API methods are available, =
then the=20
RFC4462 REQUIRED<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; gss-group14-sha1-* method =
SHOULD be=20
retained for compatibility<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; with older Secure =
Shell=20
implementations and the<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
gss-groups14-sha256-* method=20
SHOULD be added as for "sha1".<BR><BR>--=20
Mark<BR><BR>_______________________________________________<BR>Curdle =
mailing=20
list<BR>Curdle@ietf.org<BR>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle<B=
R></DIV></DIV></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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On Sep 13, 2016, at 4:51 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:

> I have written up a set of proposed edits that I think would address =
PKCS#11
> for them to look at.  I plan to send this end at the end of the week, =
but
> wanted to give anybody on the list who might want to comment to have a
> chance to do so.  I could only improve what I am suggesting.
>=20
> Jim
>=20
> <pkcs11.docx>

Jim:

With ECDH, how do you pick between ANSI-X9.63-KDF and HKDF for =
derivation of the KEK?

Russ



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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:19:55 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] PKCS#11 solution
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On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
>
> On Sep 13, 2016, at 4:51 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:
>
>> I have written up a set of proposed edits that I think would address PKCS#11
>> for them to look at.  I plan to send this end at the end of the week, but
>> wanted to give anybody on the list who might want to comment to have a
>> chance to do so.  I could only improve what I am suggesting.

Do you mean to send to OASIS?

Thanks,
Kathleen

>>
>> Jim
>>
>> <pkcs11.docx>
>
> Jim:
>
> With ECDH, how do you pick between ANSI-X9.63-KDF and HKDF for derivation of the KEK?
>
> Russ
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen


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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kathleen Moriarty [mailto:kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 8:20 AM
> To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
> Cc: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>; curdle@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Curdle] PKCS#11 solution
> 
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Sep 13, 2016, at 4:51 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:
> >
> >> I have written up a set of proposed edits that I think would address
> >> PKCS#11 for them to look at.  I plan to send this end at the end of
> >> the week, but wanted to give anybody on the list who might want to
> >> comment to have a chance to do so.  I could only improve what I am
> suggesting.
> 
> Do you mean to send to OASIS?

Yes that is where I plan to send this at the end of the week.

Jim

> 
> Thanks,
> Kathleen
> 
> >>
> >> Jim
> >>
> >> <pkcs11.docx>
> >
> > Jim:
> >
> > With ECDH, how do you pick between ANSI-X9.63-KDF and HKDF for derivation
> of the KEK?
> >
> > Russ
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Curdle mailing list
> > Curdle@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
> 
> 
> 
> --
> 
> Best regards,
> Kathleen


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To: 'Russ Housley' <housley@vigilsec.com>
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My first response is that this falls under the "not my problem" cloaking
device.  I was focusing on the issues dealing with how things work with the
draft that I am co-authoring and nothing else.

The real answer is that there needs to be some additional KDF functions
defined in section 2.3.8 of the current mechanism document for the new KDF
functions.  I will note this in the document.

Jim


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley@vigilsec.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2016 6:27 AM
> To: Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com>
> Cc: curdle@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Curdle] PKCS#11 solution
> 
> 
> On Sep 13, 2016, at 4:51 PM, Jim Schaad <ietf@augustcellars.com> wrote:
> 
> > I have written up a set of proposed edits that I think would address
> > PKCS#11 for them to look at.  I plan to send this end at the end of
> > the week, but wanted to give anybody on the list who might want to
> > comment to have a chance to do so.  I could only improve what I am
> suggesting.
> >
> > Jim
> >
> > <pkcs11.docx>
> 
> Jim:
> 
> With ECDH, how do you pick between ANSI-X9.63-KDF and HKDF for derivation
> of the KEK?
> 
> Russ
> 



From nobody Tue Sep 20 08:48:42 2016
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Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-05.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure Shell (SSH)
        Author          : Mark D.     Baushke
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-05.txt
	Pages           : 9
	Date            : 2016-09-20

Abstract:
   This document adds recommendations for adoption of ssh-curves from
   the [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves] and new-modp from the
   [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2], and deprecates some previously
   specified Key Exchange Method algorithm names for the Secure Shell
   (SSH) protocol.  It also updates [RFC4253], [RFC4419], [RFC4462], and
   [RFC5656] by specifying the set key exchange algorithms that
   currently exist and which ones MUST, SHOULD, MAY, and SHOULD NOT be
   implemented.  New key exchange methods use the SHA-2 family of
   hashes.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-05


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Thu Sep 22 07:26:31 2016
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Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 07:26:23 -0700
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Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-02.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption of the IETF.

        Title           : Using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
        Author          : Russell Housley
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-02.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2016-09-22

Abstract:
   This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305
   Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
   ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an authenticated encryption algorithm
   constructed of the ChaCha stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-02

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-02


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Thu Sep 22 07:49:48 2016
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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-02.txt
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This update addresses the comments from Jim Schaad.

I believe that this document is ready for WG Last Call.

Russ


On Sep 22, 2016, at 10:26 AM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:

>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more =
Encryption of the IETF.
>=20
>        Title           : Using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated =
Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
>        Author          : Russell Housley
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-02.txt
> 	Pages           : 8
> 	Date            : 2016-09-22
>=20
> Abstract:
>   This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305
>   Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).
>   ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an authenticated encryption algorithm
>   constructed of the ChaCha stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> =
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-02
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> =
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly130=
5-02
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Thu Sep 22 08:59:27 2016
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-02.txt
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> This update addresses the comments from Jim Schaad.
>=20
> I believe that this document is ready for WG Last Call.

Looking through the archives, I believe all open issues have been addressed=
.

We'll now being a two-week WG last call, before passing it along to the IES=
G.

	/r$, co-chair


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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/ws8PfosY6uMbc2WxBlxm8RuLAT4>
Cc: frg@irtf.org
Subject: [Curdle] DH Group Exchange in SSH (RFC 4419) - Avoiding Backsdoors
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X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 14:47:36 -0000

Hi,

Question:

Should RFC 4419 - "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell
(SSH) Transport Layer Protocol" be deprecated?

Background:

The paper "How to Backdoor Diffie-Hellman" by David Wong
https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644.pdf describes two ways
of creating a Nobody-But-Us (NOBUS) Diffie-Hellman backdoor:

  * a composite modulus with a hidden subgroup (CMHS) and

  * a composite modulus with a smooth order

To the best of my understanding, the only place that the SSH protocol
could be impacted by the attacks suggested in this paper today are in
the use of the RFC 4419 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" and
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" key exchanges.

The mitigation for this kind of attack would seem to be to use safe
primes of the form 2q + 1 with q prime and ensure that the generator g
has a q-ordered subgroup (g^q = 1 mod p) (c.f. FIPS 186-4 A.2.2
Assurance of the Validity of the Generator g). The checks for Attacks on
Prime Order Subgroups is also discussed in the "Security Issues in the
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol" by Jean-Francois Raymond and
Anton Stiglic of Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc., IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory 22-January-2002 (google shows a few URLs for this one
including: http://instantlogic.net/publications/DiffieHellman.pdf )

However, with RFC 4419, only p,g are sent over the wire. So, any
attempts to prove that the Diffie Hellman pramaeters are non-trivial, or
make assumptions that q and p are computationally related.

Indeed, if someone is generating a Lim-Lee prime p (which is a very
efficient way to generate a composite prime), then q is unrelated to p
and would be unavailable to validate the generator g.

I am wondering if David Wong's paper is enough to recommend against
using the RFC 4419 ephemeral DH parameters entirely? Or, is there some
useful way to quickly validate that the server DH parameters are valid
from the client?

I would appreciate any feedback you may have on this matter.

-- 
Mark D. Baushke
mdb@juniper.net


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Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 03:28:54 +1000 (AEST)
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] DH Group Exchange in SSH (RFC 4419) - Avoiding Backsdoors
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On Thu, 29 Sep 2016, Mark D. Baushke wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> Question:
> 
> Should RFC 4419 - "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell
> (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol" be deprecated?
> 
> Background:
> 
> The paper "How to Backdoor Diffie-Hellman" by David Wong
> https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644.pdf describes two ways
> of creating a Nobody-But-Us (NOBUS) Diffie-Hellman backdoor:

NOBUS backdoors aren't the only concern; another motivation was
logjam-style precomputation attacks.

-d


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Cc: curdle@ietf.org, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org, frg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Curdle] DH Group Exchange in SSH (RFC 4419) - Avoiding Backsdoors
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Hi Damien,

Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> writes:

> On Thu, 29 Sep 2016, Mark D. Baushke wrote:

> > Question:
> > 
> > Should RFC 4419 - "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell
> > (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol" be deprecated?
> > 
> > Background:
> > 
> > The paper "How to Backdoor Diffie-Hellman" by David Wong
> > https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644.pdf describes two ways
> > of creating a Nobody-But-Us (NOBUS) Diffie-Hellman backdoor:
> 
> NOBUS backdoors aren't the only concern; another motivation was
> logjam-style precomputation attacks.

Yes, the creation of a new set of DH parameters allows us to avoid
logjam precomputation attacks against a well known set of DH groups.

That said, with NOBUS, how is an SSH client able to identify improper
ephemeral DH parameters that have been intesionally weakened?

Had RFC4419 sent all three of p,q,g to the client, then the client would
may have been able to do more validity checks.

However, RFC 4419 does NOT send q AND the methods to select g as given
in the RFC is not always going to generate a q-orded subgroup of p. 

If g is not able to generate a proper q-ordered subgroup value, then
concerns of NOBUS arise and in turn means that an attacker may be able
to learn the parity of the secret (thus losing only) one bit of
security. However, a misconfigured g could also be an indication that
there is a NOBUS DH backdoor in the server connection.

Moving to the MODP group16 for DH key exchange reduces the ability for a
full precomputation logjam type attack.

So, I am asking if it is time to deprecate the RFC 4419 kex methods.

Failing that, what may be done to enhance a RFC4419bis to handle both
logjam and NOBUS attack vectors?

	Thanks,
	-- Mark


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Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 15:41:27 +1000 (AEST)
From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Cc: curdle@ietf.org, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org, frg@irtf.org
Subject: Re: [Curdle] DH Group Exchange in SSH (RFC 4419) - Avoiding Backsdoors
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On Thu, 29 Sep 2016, Mark D. Baushke wrote:

> > NOBUS backdoors aren't the only concern; another motivation was
> > logjam-style precomputation attacks.
>
> Yes, the creation of a new set of DH parameters allows us to avoid
> logjam precomputation attacks against a well known set of DH groups.
>
> That said, with NOBUS, how is an SSH client able to identify improper
> ephemeral DH parameters that have been intesionally weakened?

I think there's little point - a peer that wants to leak has myraid
ways to do so. E.g. it could leak keys via nonces, random padding, DH
public values, optional packet padding, etc.

Leaking by backdooring DH groups is possibly the worst way to do it -
the only reason they can't be properly tested by a client is that its
too expensive to do so at connection time. That doesn't mean that it
couldn't be done post-hoc or even passively, since the values are sent
in the clear (at least for the inital KEX).

That's not the case with the other leak paths. E.g. leaking a PRNG
seed by encrypting it with a public key and putting it in the KEXINIT
nonce is undetectable on the wire and NOBUS as far as you trust your PK
crypto.

-d


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>, "ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org" <ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] DH Group Exchange in SSH (RFC 4419) - Avoiding Backsdoors
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Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 06:38:59 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] DH Group Exchange in SSH (RFC 4419) - Avoiding Backsdoors
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Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Should RFC 4419 - "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH=
)=0A=
>Transport Layer Protocol" be deprecated?=0A=
=0A=
No.=0A=
=0A=
If you're worried about a malicious server then you'd really have to deprec=
ate=0A=
RFCs 4251 to 4253, since only that will protect you from one.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt
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--001a1142239c6ccdf6053dbd7d61
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

Nit:

>  This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats
for Elliptical Curve constructs...

'Elliptical' is not commonly used, 'elliptic' is more normative. 'Elliptic'
is used 7 times in the draft, this is the only usage of 'elliptical'.


On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 8:30 AM <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:

>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more
> Encryption of the IETF.
>
>         Title           : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed25519ph,
> Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X448 for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key
> Infrastructure
>         Authors         : Simon Josefsson
>                           Jim Schaad
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt
>         Pages           : 15
>         Date            : 2016-08-15
>
> Abstract:
>    This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding
>    formats for Elliptical Curve constructs using the Curve25519 and
>    Curve448 curves.  The signature algorithms covered are Ed25519,
>    Ed25519ph, Ed448 and Ed448ph.  The key agreement algorithm covered
>    are X25519 and X448.  The Encoding for Public Key, Private Key and
>    EdDSA digital signature structures is provided.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>

--001a1142239c6ccdf6053dbd7d61
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Nit:=C2=A0<div><br><div>&gt; =C2=A0This document specify a=
lgorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for Elliptical Curve constr=
ucts...</div><div><br></div><div>&#39;Elliptical&#39; is not commonly used,=
 &#39;elliptic&#39; is more normative. &#39;Elliptic&#39; is used 7 times i=
n the draft, this is the only usage of &#39;elliptical&#39;.</div><div><br>=
</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Aug 19, =
2016 at 8:30 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-dr=
afts@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encr=
yption of the IETF.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X=
448 for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authors=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Simo=
n Josefsson<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Jim Schaad<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Filename=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : draft-iet=
f-curdle-pkix-01.txt<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Pages=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 15<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 :=
 2016-08-15<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0formats for Elliptical Curve constructs using the Curve25519 a=
nd<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Curve448 curves.=C2=A0 The signature algorithms covered are Ed=
25519,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Ed25519ph, Ed448 and Ed448ph.=C2=A0 The key agreement algorith=
m covered<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are X25519 and X448.=C2=A0 The Encoding for Public Key, Privat=
e Key and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0EdDSA digital signature structures is provided.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-=
curdle-pkix/</a><br>
<br>
There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-p=
kix-01</a><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddra=
ft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
<a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div>

--001a1142239c6ccdf6053dbd7d61--


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From: Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 18:16:09 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt
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--001a113982fa4bb7c5053dbd97fb
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Another nit:

> This document specify algorithm identifiers

s/specify/specifies/

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 2:08 PM Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Nit:
>
> >  This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats
> for Elliptical Curve constructs...
>
> 'Elliptical' is not commonly used, 'elliptic' is more normative.
> 'Elliptic' is used 7 times in the draft, this is the only usage of
> 'elliptical'.
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 8:30 AM <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>> directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more
>> Encryption of the IETF.
>>
>>         Title           : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed25519ph,
>> Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X448 for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key
>> Infrastructure
>>         Authors         : Simon Josefsson
>>                           Jim Schaad
>>         Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt
>>         Pages           : 15
>>         Date            : 2016-08-15
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding
>>    formats for Elliptical Curve constructs using the Curve25519 and
>>    Curve448 curves.  The signature algorithms covered are Ed25519,
>>    Ed25519ph, Ed448 and Ed448ph.  The key agreement algorithm covered
>>    are X25519 and X448.  The Encoding for Public Key, Private Key and
>>    EdDSA digital signature structures is provided.
>>
>>
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/
>>
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01
>>
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>> submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Curdle mailing list
>> Curdle@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>>
>

--001a113982fa4bb7c5053dbd97fb
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Another nit:<div><br></div>&gt; This document specify algo=
rithm identifiers<div><br></div><div>s/specify/specifies/</div></div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 2:08 PM D=
eirdre Connolly &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:durumcrustulum@gmail.com">durumcrustu=
lum@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr">Nit:=C2=A0<div><br><div>&gt; =C2=A0This document specify algorit=
hm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for Elliptical Curve constructs..=
.</div><div><br></div><div>&#39;Elliptical&#39; is not commonly used, &#39;=
elliptic&#39; is more normative. &#39;Elliptic&#39; is used 7 times in the =
draft, this is the only usage of &#39;elliptical&#39;.</div></div></div><di=
v dir=3D"ltr"><div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div =
dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 8:30 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-=
drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<=
br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encr=
yption of the IETF.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X=
448 for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authors=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Simo=
n Josefsson<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Jim Schaad<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Filename=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : draft-iet=
f-curdle-pkix-01.txt<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Pages=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 15<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 :=
 2016-08-15<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0formats for Elliptical Curve constructs using the Curve25519 a=
nd<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Curve448 curves.=C2=A0 The signature algorithms covered are Ed=
25519,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Ed25519ph, Ed448 and Ed448ph.=C2=A0 The key agreement algorith=
m covered<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are X25519 and X448.=C2=A0 The Encoding for Public Key, Privat=
e Key and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0EdDSA digital signature structures is provided.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-=
curdle-pkix/</a><br>
<br>
There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-p=
kix-01</a><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddra=
ft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
<a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div>

--001a113982fa4bb7c5053dbd97fb--


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt
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Thanks for catching that mistake.  I=92ll correct it.

Russ


On Sep 30, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com> =
wrote:

> Nit:=20
>=20
> >  This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding =
formats for Elliptical Curve constructs...
>=20
> 'Elliptical' is not commonly used, 'elliptic' is more normative. =
'Elliptic' is used 7 times in the draft, this is the only usage of =
'elliptical'.
>=20
>=20
> On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 8:30 AM <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.
> This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more =
Encryption of the IETF.
>=20
>         Title           : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, =
Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X448 for use in the Internet X.509 =
Public Key Infrastructure
>         Authors         : Simon Josefsson
>                           Jim Schaad
>         Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt
>         Pages           : 15
>         Date            : 2016-08-15
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding
>    formats for Elliptical Curve constructs using the Curve25519 and
>    Curve448 curves.  The signature algorithms covered are Ed25519,
>    Ed25519ph, Ed448 and Ed448ph.  The key agreement algorithm covered
>    are X25519 and X448.  The Encoding for Public Key, Private Key and
>    EdDSA digital signature structures is provided.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Thanks =
for catching that mistake. &nbsp;I=92ll correct =
it.<div><br></div><div>Russ</div><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On =
Sep 30, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Deirdre Connolly &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:durumcrustulum@gmail.com">durumcrustulum@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">Nit:&nbsp;<div><br><div>&gt; &nbsp;This =
document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for =
Elliptical Curve constructs...</div><div><br></div><div>'Elliptical' is =
not commonly used, 'elliptic' is more normative. 'Elliptic' is used 7 =
times in the draft, this is the only usage of =
'elliptical'.</div><div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 8:30 AM &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.<br>
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more =
Encryption of the IETF.<br>
<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Title&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp;: Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph, =
X25519 and X448 for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key =
Infrastructure<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Authors&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;: =
Simon Josefsson<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Jim Schaad<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Filename&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; : =
draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Pages&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp;: 15<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Date&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; =
&nbsp; : 2016-08-15<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp;This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 =
encoding<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp;formats for Elliptical Curve constructs using the =
Curve25519 and<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp;Curve448 curves.&nbsp; The signature algorithms covered are =
Ed25519,<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp;Ed25519ph, Ed448 and Ed448ph.&nbsp; The key agreement =
algorithm covered<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp;are X25519 and X448.&nbsp; The Encoding for Public Key, =
Private Key and<br>
&nbsp; &nbsp;EdDSA digital signature structures is provided.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/=
</a><br>
<br>
There's also a htmlized version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01</a=
><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01" =
rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-pk=
ix-01</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a =
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
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From: Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 19:01:07 +0000
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To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt
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Thanks!

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 2:24 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> Thanks for catching that mistake.  I=E2=80=99ll correct it.
>
> Russ
>
>
> On Sep 30, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Deirdre Connolly <durumcrustulum@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Nit:
>
> >  This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats
> for Elliptical Curve constructs...
>
> 'Elliptical' is not commonly used, 'elliptic' is more normative.
> 'Elliptic' is used 7 times in the draft, this is the only usage of
> 'elliptical'.
>
>
> On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 8:30 AM <internet-drafts@ietf.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>> directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more
>> Encryption of the IETF.
>>
>>         Title           : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed25519ph,
>> Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X448 for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key
>> Infrastructure
>>         Authors         : Simon Josefsson
>>                           Jim Schaad
>>         Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01.txt
>>         Pages           : 15
>>         Date            : 2016-08-15
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding
>>    formats for Elliptical Curve constructs using the Curve25519 and
>>    Curve448 curves.  The signature algorithms covered are Ed25519,
>>    Ed25519ph, Ed448 and Ed448ph.  The key agreement algorithm covered
>>    are X25519 and X448.  The Encoding for Public Key, Private Key and
>>    EdDSA digital signature structures is provided.
>>
>>
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/
>>
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01
>>
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>> submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Curdle mailing list
>> Curdle@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks!</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"lt=
r">On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 2:24 PM Russ Housley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:housl=
ey@vigilsec.com">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;=
padding-left:1ex"><div style=3D"word-wrap:break-word">Thanks for catching t=
hat mistake.=C2=A0 I=E2=80=99ll correct it.</div><div style=3D"word-wrap:br=
eak-word"><div><br></div><div>Russ</div></div><div style=3D"word-wrap:break=
-word"><div><br></div><div><br><div><div>On Sep 30, 2016, at 2:08 PM, Deird=
re Connolly &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:durumcrustulum@gmail.com" target=3D"_blan=
k">durumcrustulum@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:</div><br><blockquote type=3D"cit=
e"><div dir=3D"ltr">Nit:=C2=A0<div><br><div>&gt; =C2=A0This document specif=
y algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding formats for Elliptical Curve con=
structs...</div><div><br></div><div>&#39;Elliptical&#39; is not commonly us=
ed, &#39;elliptic&#39; is more normative. &#39;Elliptic&#39; is used 7 time=
s in the draft, this is the only usage of &#39;elliptical&#39;.</div><div><=
br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Fri, Aug 1=
9, 2016 at 8:30 AM &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=
=3D"_blank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote cl=
ass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;p=
adding-left:1ex"><br>
A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.<br>
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encr=
yption of the IETF.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X=
448 for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Authors=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0: Simo=
n Josefsson<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Jim Schaad<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Filename=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 : draft-iet=
f-curdle-pkix-01.txt<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Pages=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=
 15<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Date=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 :=
 2016-08-15<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document specify algorithm identifiers and ASN.1 encoding=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0formats for Elliptical Curve constructs using the Curve25519 a=
nd<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Curve448 curves.=C2=A0 The signature algorithms covered are Ed=
25519,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Ed25519ph, Ed448 and Ed448ph.=C2=A0 The key agreement algorith=
m covered<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are X25519 and X448.=C2=A0 The Encoding for Public Key, Privat=
e Key and<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0EdDSA digital signature structures is provided.<br>
<br>
<br>
The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix/" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-=
curdle-pkix/</a><br>
<br>
There&#39;s also a htmlized version available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-p=
kix-01</a><br>
<br>
A diff from the previous version is available at:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01" r=
el=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddra=
ft-ietf-curdle-pkix-01</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n<br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:<br>
<a href=3D"ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=
=3D"_blank">ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div>
_______________________________________________<br>Curdle mailing list<br><=
a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br>=
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle</a><br></blockquote></div><br>=
</div></div></blockquote></div>

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