From nobody Sun Feb 4 10:05:31 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietf.org Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29FEE1275F4; Sun, 4 Feb 2018 10:05:29 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: internet-drafts@ietf.org To: Cc: curdle@ietf.org X-Test-IDTracker: no X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.71.1 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated Precedence: bulk Message-ID: <151776752913.12219.12629288907259074665@ietfa.amsl.com> Date: Sun, 04 Feb 2018 10:05:29 -0800 Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-02.txt X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Feb 2018 18:05:29 -0000 A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption WG of the IETF. Title : Ed25519 public key algorithm for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol Authors : Ben Harris Loganaden Velvindron Filename : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-02.txt Pages : 5 Date : 2018-02-04 Abstract: This document describes the use of the Ed25519 digital signature algorithm in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519/ There are also htmlized versions available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-02 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-02 A diff from the previous version is available at: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-02 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ From nobody Mon Feb 5 05:17:29 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietf.org Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 831D612D7EB; Mon, 5 Feb 2018 05:17:23 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: internet-drafts@ietf.org To: Cc: curdle@ietf.org X-Test-IDTracker: no X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.71.1 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated Precedence: bulk Message-ID: <151783664350.5799.8443583417025350068@ietfa.amsl.com> Date: Mon, 05 Feb 2018 05:17:23 -0800 Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-00.txt X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 05 Feb 2018 13:17:24 -0000 A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption WG of the IETF. Title : Ed25519 and Ed 448 public key algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol Authors : Ben Harris Loganaden Velvindron Filename : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-00.txt Pages : 5 Date : 2018-02-04 Abstract: This document describes the use of the Ed25519 digital signature algorithm in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448/ There are also htmlized versions available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-00 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-00 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ From nobody Wed Feb 14 12:30:02 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4051712D855 for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 12:30:01 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.7 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=akamai.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6vOVKGwoXjOa for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 12:29:59 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx0a-00190b01.pphosted.com (mx0a-00190b01.pphosted.com [IPv6:2620:100:9001:583::1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A3ADA127735 for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 12:29:59 -0800 (PST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0122332.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-00190b01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w1EKSdhq028332 for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 20:29:59 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=akamai.com; h=from : to : subject : date : message-id : content-type : mime-version; s=jan2016.eng; bh=c8L+3VAa8OsWoUVIrh57JCV2JEnHPQpdjGN+GE6JDCQ=; b=LTKG99SUBvQABy+Z9oRE7lqbSIrgZ35g/kfgizbtW2WvMoYohkDEedmYa4hGgpTRQvW5 ZL1Yh6rkAUyjKRzkaOW9pB4f0nqGaQgBvFa+B8mqP0rN9KXND5dmHEXx5VxShBnHUZjV xKlyvquwqqi4djaR1IPlMtGPQJxT0nIAALV0bNm/b4naGZCfvdhPS1807MIOZaGrXuWN JTa0vyr7f3hy8hfofeLOxhl5HPS2l/8vYy8YiBTrtnLiF6oHLjQKS4pzvq8zmcEDRvW/ vkzBAwwgcUdvfnYUSRwZc133gQPQ/TEr4zPAc1EhQSyjdY88Fnolijc+eeJc04SojPqx Jw== Received: from prod-mail-ppoint3 ([96.6.114.86]) by mx0a-00190b01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2g48x02yhq-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 20:29:59 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (prod-mail-ppoint3.akamai.com [127.0.0.1]) by prod-mail-ppoint3.akamai.com (8.16.0.21/8.16.0.21) with SMTP id w1EKBZel003760 for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 15:29:58 -0500 Received: from email.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.25.32]) by prod-mail-ppoint3.akamai.com with ESMTP id 2g1vy1c33g-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 15:29:58 -0500 Received: from USTX2EX-DAG1MB1.msg.corp.akamai.com (172.27.27.101) by ustx2ex-dag1mb4.msg.corp.akamai.com (172.27.27.104) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1263.5; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 14:29:56 -0600 Received: from USTX2EX-DAG1MB1.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.6.131]) by ustx2ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.6.131]) with mapi id 15.00.1263.000; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 14:29:56 -0600 From: "Salz, Rich" To: "curdle@ietf.org" Thread-Topic: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die/ Thread-Index: AQHTpdKTCcoP4LmKFUW+h7SGDJD7HA== Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 20:29:55 +0000 Message-ID: <9B1564A4-EED9-42ED-8FBD-CBA089232320@akamai.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/10.a.0.180210 x-ms-exchange-messagesentrepresentingtype: 1 x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted x-originating-ip: [172.19.38.26] Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_9B1564A4EED942ED8FBDCBA089232320akamaicom_" MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-02-14_08:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 mlxlogscore=648 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1711220000 definitions=main-1802140236 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-02-14_08:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=591 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1711220000 definitions=main-1802140239 Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die/ X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." 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Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:15:24 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.21 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.21 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 73KCnxHIR6Bs for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:15:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.amsl.com (c8a.amsl.com [4.31.198.40]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C8FDB126DC2 for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:15:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.amsl.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by c8a.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1EB381CAE4A for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:14:51 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-it0-f44.google.com (mail-it0-f44.google.com [209.85.214.44]) by c8a.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id F116F1CAE3D for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:14:50 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-it0-f44.google.com with SMTP id b66so17346545itd.5 for ; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:15:22 -0800 (PST) X-Gm-Message-State: APf1xPCGzjxZXKfI4XuUfHI+F+Spa/Lt9VKuS97HKpOlhdpsbyn4wVEO cr+E/wgtGqd68SLlhWk6LrcoG+PGnl3mofad8sU= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x224n6k7bsApfSBzaHw9InG506atTywYfMH/JEMNW1dftzuMw2hZ5/ASh+kH0NL2RSKv33wCtFuLFiZxR/dTIL24= X-Received: by 10.36.86.203 with SMTP id o194mr1140694itb.100.1518653722154; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:15:22 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.2.1.68 with HTTP; Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:15:01 -0800 (PST) From: Glen Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2018 16:15:01 -0800 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: To: curdle@ietf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a114197d2a55d100565351fd8" Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] Possible missed messages on this list X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 00:15:24 -0000 --001a114197d2a55d100565351fd8 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Possible missed messages on this list Dear list participants - An upgrade to the IETF's custom mail processing software today resulted in some delivery failures for *some* messages to *some* recipients on this list, over the past 3 hours. We invite you to check the mail archives for this list, at: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email_list=curdle to ensure that you have received all the relevant messages for this list today. We apologize for the inconvenience. Glen -- Glen Barney IT Director AMS (IETF Secretariat) --001a114197d2a55d100565351fd8 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Possible missed messages on this list

Dear list participants -
An upgrade to the IETF's custom mail processing software today resulted i= n some delivery failures for *some* messages to *some* recipients on this list, over the past 3 hours.

We invite you to check the mail archiv= es for this list, at:

https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/search/?email= _list=3Dcurdle

to ensure that you have received all the relevant= messages for this list today.

We apologize for the inconvenience.
Glen
--
Glen Barney
IT Director
AMS (IETF Secretariat)
--001a114197d2a55d100565351fd8-- From nobody Thu Feb 15 17:09:10 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05DA9126CF9 for ; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:09:09 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.699 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.699 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id nyf0PL72HA52 for ; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:09:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-qk0-x229.google.com (mail-qk0-x229.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:400d:c09::229]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A12A7124235 for ; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:09:06 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-qk0-x229.google.com with SMTP id c128so2023809qkb.4 for ; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:09:06 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=HJbyhHGOJTht+KziW2TQzSB6ncWOU3/e7aLay03GjmE=; b=UI+dsEdI4not8vso38OCeMYHfVqbrPqVGtcWpANis7ENwcRm42EsbouDBbIKrw4gyf dV3L+XDqRd7y+E5yi2IFGzhjBaBK+7PRzbvjFv/gTrsgVwtQo1N5KSO47oI+2R5tKA02 emz3rakV7wPyQ8QgQ3vXJNjBxs4ryMzIAvOUnRAt1iBgqHJRUjeIteD19kdjytE2RwUQ FAMv8S14ClABYjS//Qe058nunN3tblKbJNu9386LjwA4C9XLxSewL0mai5K0uOrsWoo1 ZF7RUrW1mmIvQZWnfOnraMm99ySZw/mvfsDt/3NGSuKreOFH5lky/Y62iIbP4xsGAguH d9Lw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=HJbyhHGOJTht+KziW2TQzSB6ncWOU3/e7aLay03GjmE=; b=SJPMjYJ9+xy0djEFKL4G1VH/KzFm8oc1eK3J6IDRloH4btt6eQcdU13vuMVb/PFBoJ 3eQCp7uK3bpyp0dYcM5BaUzmVv75fBpIspeSPWSe4NcVLfxotaS9F8mkqa48Xs3/4A9m Y8vE5sYVOSbFAepemTU73YX/L5pwwCsgRlogs+6OuWTMu3PC79+REC7P6rXMjJPFe5h8 fkQLzzoLfAf6HU6b3HrDkoIrGpl2bikCmTxroaHetPV+/u52OKzQI59+ZiqiPBTLgxdf wv4+EKhfxpXSjWo4zxePq8GcWh1xKYS9aYNDvwu45kYpUAY3QcAzLf+Ma8tbPXJPS8kV WhpA== X-Gm-Message-State: APf1xPCIM9aOUHYKYiAs4QtWzz9GAuaofIC+EL9xMvomlmKZxil0yjXs 78QSOxt+gnLw2tz39h/PvwtfBnDrvTXH8UdyEk5vwA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x224jhhqlc3c101eu5NlO3abcRcDsURRwIEMh9m0HJFtl15ykNnko2rJDow4hQ+ytu3kEbkGV0kgY8/kIimCXf9E= X-Received: by 10.55.26.69 with SMTP id a66mr7506403qka.146.1518743345641; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:09:05 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.12.136.92 with HTTP; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:09:05 -0800 (PST) From: denis bider Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 19:09:05 -0600 Message-ID: To: curdle Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a1147a6549f3dc1056549fd25" Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] Advice on SFTP toward RFC? X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 01:09:09 -0000 --001a1147a6549f3dc1056549fd25 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hey everyone, I understand this is not covered by Curdle's charter, but we've made some progress with SSH here, and I would like to seek any advice folks might have about the SFTP situation. I would be happy to receive any responses privately since prolonged discussion would not be relevant to the group. SFTP is a widely used internet protocol that exists in two main versions: SFTP v3 with OpenSSH extensions, and SFTP v6. SFTP v4 is also widely supported, but most v4 implementations now seem to also include v6. The schism happened over a decade ago when OpenSSH refused to adopt protocol enhancements to support non-Unix platforms. They argued SFTP v3 has everything it needs, which it does on Unix. But from a non-Unix perspective, everyone else thought it's not good enough, and better support for other platforms is needed. Because of this, there wasn't consensus, and SFTP did not become an RFC. Now, the result is that SFTP is a major internet protocol, and anyone who wants to implement it needs to follow this: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02 ... for SFTP version 3, and this: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-13 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-galb-filexfer-extensions-00 ... for SFTP version 6. In addition, a number of details are unclear and not documented fully. For example, OpenSSH encodes some packets differently than SFTP v3 prescribes, and implementations of check-file extensions are not compatible in practice due to different restrictions on their usage. I would think it worthwhile for SFTP to receive better treatment, and I think practical use justifies documenting both version 3 and version 6. Since both are widely used, I think it would be reasonable for this to be Standards track, not Informational. However, if I write a draft - or perhaps two drafts - I'm not sure who to turn to. I'm not sure there's a working group that this could be made part of. Is it possible to pursue Standards track as an individual submission? Should we create a working group with the purpose to document existing practice? denis --001a1147a6549f3dc1056549fd25 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hey everyone,

I understand this is not = covered by Curdle's charter, but we've made some progress with SSH = here, and I would like to seek any advice folks might have about the SFTP s= ituation. I would be happy to receive any responses privately since prolong= ed discussion would not be relevant to the group.

= SFTP is a widely used internet protocol that exists in two main versions: S= FTP v3 with OpenSSH extensions, and SFTP v6. SFTP v4 is also widely support= ed, but most v4 implementations now seem to also include v6.

=
The schism happened over a decade ago when OpenSSH refused to ad= opt protocol enhancements to support non-Unix platforms. They argued SFTP v= 3 has everything it needs, which it does on Unix. But from a non-Unix persp= ective, everyone else thought it's not good enough, and better support = for other platforms is needed. Because of this, there wasn't consensus,= and SFTP did not become an RFC.

Now, the result i= s that SFTP is a major internet protocol, and anyone who wants to implement= it needs to follow this:


... for SFTP ve= rsion 3, and this:



...= for SFTP version 6.

In addition, a number of deta= ils are unclear and not documented fully. For example, OpenSSH encodes some= packets differently than SFTP v3 prescribes, and implementations of check-= file extensions are not compatible in practice due to different restriction= s on their usage.

I would think it worthwhile for = SFTP to receive better treatment, and I think practical use justifies docum= enting both version 3 and version 6. Since both are widely used, I think it= would be reasonable for this to be Standards track, not Informational.

However, if I write a draft - or perhaps two drafts -= I'm not sure who to turn to. I'm not sure there's a working gr= oup that this could be made part of. Is it possible to pursue Standards tra= ck as an individual submission? Should we create a working group with the p= urpose to document existing practice?

denis
<= div>

--001a1147a6549f3dc1056549fd25-- From nobody Thu Feb 15 17:11:23 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9BC0E126DED for ; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:11:20 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.211 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.211 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id N55WBua7yLmK for ; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:11:19 -0800 (PST) Received: from dmz-mailsec-scanner-4.mit.edu (dmz-mailsec-scanner-4.mit.edu [18.9.25.15]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 27E5B124235 for ; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 17:11:19 -0800 (PST) X-AuditID: 1209190f-c59ff70000007195-0d-5a862fb50913 Received: from mailhub-auth-2.mit.edu ( [18.7.62.36]) (using TLS with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by dmz-mailsec-scanner-4.mit.edu (Symantec Messaging Gateway) with SMTP id 4C.4B.29077.5BF268A5; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 20:11:18 -0500 (EST) Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (OUTGOING-AUTH-1.MIT.EDU [18.9.28.11]) by mailhub-auth-2.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.9.2) with ESMTP id w1G1BDx0020660; Thu, 15 Feb 2018 20:11:15 -0500 Received: from mit.edu (24-107-191-124.dhcp.stls.mo.charter.com [24.107.191.124]) (authenticated bits=56) (User authenticated as kaduk@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.12.4) with ESMTP id w1G1BATM022317 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 15 Feb 2018 20:11:12 -0500 Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 19:11:10 -0600 From: Benjamin Kaduk To: denis bider Cc: curdle Message-ID: <20180216011110.GS12363@mit.edu> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.1 (2017-09-22) X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFvrLIsWRmVeSWpSXmKPExsUixG6nortNvy3K4PQnDoutC2cxWxw/N5fZ gclj56y77B5LlvxkCmCK4rJJSc3JLEst0rdL4Mo482s2U0E/S8WMCYfZGxgXMncxcnJICJhI TP33gb2LkYtDSGAxk8TMxj+sEM5GRonlG3axQThnmSR+zNzECNLCIqAq8XHnYlYQm01ARaKh +zLYKBEBbYlV/4+A2cwCMhJ/X+8GqxcWMJDYf+4sE4jNK6AjcW3RYbBeIYEAicVzpjBDxAUl Ts58wgLRqyVx499LoHoOIFtaYvk/DpAwp0CgRP+HZ2CtogLKEnv7DrFPYBSYhaR7FpLuWQjd CxiZVzHKpuRW6eYmZuYUpybrFicn5uWlFuma6OVmluilppRuYgSFKack/w7GOQ3ehxgFOBiV eHg39LZGCbEmlhVX5h5ilORgUhLlzToPFOJLyk+pzEgszogvKs1JLT7EKMHBrCTCe+s1UI43 JbGyKrUoHyYlzcGiJM7rbqIdJSSQnliSmp2aWpBaBJOV4eBQkuA1AMajkGBRanpqRVpmTglC momDE2Q4D9DwDj2gGt7igsTc4sx0iPwpRmOOtpVP2pg5brx43cYsxJKXn5cqJc67HaRUAKQ0 ozQPbhoo1Uhk7695xSgO9Jww72mQKh5gmoKb9wpoFRPQKl4lkD+KSxIRUlINjGvuv+T96675 n3f7Cp/OlZ4nlywXbUt2PPqhZPe/R5MzTrx+57MlcNeKhJpJuzP9dl+NKdtxaU1xcEDN9e3p jGyh+xX9zv77GFX2uqZQ+Ziuqu+GHvfXMZVWkYL6aQv7t/680bbl4+qFBmvDr9z6x1G06OOl xNQDmQmX2t9rP+tzLmu/8ndyjrcSS3FGoqEWc1FxIgDHEW3YEAMAAA== Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Curdle] Advice on SFTP toward RFC? X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 01:11:20 -0000 On Thu, Feb 15, 2018 at 07:09:05PM -0600, denis bider wrote: > However, if I write a draft - or perhaps two drafts - I'm not sure who to > turn to. I'm not sure there's a working group that this could be made part > of. Is it possible to pursue Standards track as an individual submission? > Should we create a working group with the purpose to document existing > practice? This sounds like an excellent question to ask the SECDISPATCH working group that will (hopefully) meet for the first time at London. -Ben From nobody Fri Feb 16 07:24:13 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 79753126579 for ; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 07:22:52 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.601 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.601 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id JfJ_sG5uFdWu for ; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 07:22:50 -0800 (PST) Received: from mout.gmx.net (mout.gmx.net [212.227.17.21]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F3F6B120454 for ; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 07:22:49 -0800 (PST) Received: from [10.44.44.118] ([78.94.186.204]) by mail.gmx.com (mrgmx103 [212.227.17.168]) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0M24Vr-1eWpci3HyN-00u1S3 for ; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 16:22:47 +0100 From: Steffen Jaeckel To: curdle@ietf.org Message-ID: <588bbde5-988c-7883-f70c-279863f25334@gmx.de> Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 16:22:45 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="yYuT5igmKvjGGR3KI7C1ZZl9ToTYL1BfM" X-Provags-ID: V03:K0:FCFovczg80ypuo9Aklqt8xtCJuj6BlaDcdSEOJhXshysTK+7XQj CMydN792Aw6PGTwJQkssNvWriYtZE+6KxCh182F2zSbm4AtEWOPrPx5ChvRP0ioPlRAuqGg G3ozBifcnCHcXSa/A8fYxen0TEqlrStUt7qZpAwNrt9hDtbNWLbq1HzQkXgI7zWZs9OJpK5 AqJO0MnSmOdeNoURbhXrw== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V01:K0:nidsTww1dH4=:bjRwP+pK2nT0b/QE+slwns 2m9+EzPPziZYEWhpc6V9X+xd1EcMIPNhkQbPyq76xv6D/qwfOy3H+HrvGoAvTSYiEh2EUYvyF tr7ULVN5TOp1GWGtZsqWz/nEwjCwsMPHH8Vs7wPZKIMJ8F1DsuiidWFr5s6Mu+KqPLy/l3lg0 Hs6CVg7J+UdGuDjOJG/10RAO9fZjENEctZLioiTUxhLERlq5UBk423QTJvmApvNg5ge6jA83V A+PkTt5cYi+W1gnsbP2/PG5vos36Uc/zVTpGJn8F2EF/Sh0M1lgnVtn7o8Em8tPVvxf1Z9fC4 itW7S7hhtdopsLBozHuLUVQ2cjPXF0n0XcJTRPvM02SjMCsibs8IFbFygrtbLOSMXCkmGO5qY 6q82YQdSA6epn3WC0S63VGdNTt2TQ5NghH4lx3bM40FjAlpLEAoKlYGzBmdEmkLAPdL7IEsqP mp0UgMZTvDRy7z0BMoLM0a5LJg+iIEjBP6FOjISttWVUCK+M752mbvabsgjhW19x/3CWbsurK detUC466sCcDYZ/fdBJm41dEoYpDNDFW1SQxrsJtnUplSBojL7vlTWTPN40bc3vEfuS9nFY8Y 7zosGCQVI8fJupaux8J6yJwaD0x7eMVko3UiHEzycyABq1T1j4VM79ELG7d04KIJvsIgjIN+A uxOGSMVKDxSRcYgi0vpQs/366TzGI5lMaoHF1ptsX3V72u9zi59muAVienGXvIfRISiE1B3Rf c93WwRsjMtDFMaPpSfO/nfA5SZ0lcT2n9Gei2HOu8LMwshcpmb63QlfpvR8t6IAan4TdZQlu4 mOzNdQnHJ+TvK5yMcoypRnKZvYoPw== Archived-At: X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 07:24:12 -0800 Subject: [Curdle] Comments regarding draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-07 X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 15:22:52 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --yYuT5igmKvjGGR3KI7C1ZZl9ToTYL1BfM Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="s5tAuQ2o6rtmHRrOrR9t0gtN9TYKRYg93"; protected-headers="v1" From: Steffen Jaeckel To: curdle@ietf.org Message-ID: <588bbde5-988c-7883-f70c-279863f25334@gmx.de> Subject: Comments regarding draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-07 --s5tAuQ2o6rtmHRrOrR9t0gtN9TYKRYg93 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, I'm currently adding curve25519 support to libtomcrypt. That's why I've just read through https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-07 and I've got some questions/comments: # why don't you use the same public/private key throughout the examples? that would make life easier to recognize what is where in which format # why is there no ASN.1 dump of example 10.1? # why are the examples in 10.3 not formatted the same way? first example is like: > 12 04 34: OCTET STRING > : 04 20 D4 ... second example is like: > 12 34: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { > 14 32: OCTET STRING D4 ... # why is the private key an OCTET STRING in an OCTET STRING? I already got pointed to https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/curdle/current/msg00572.html ff. which also discusses this and I follow the opinion of Nikos to not carry technical debt in the standard if it's already found before final standardization. It shouldn't be the problem of later implementors that there were some early adopters who implemented a non-standard version. # a correction proposal to Ch. 8: > When the curve is known, use the more specific string of X25519 or > X448. should be > When the curve is known, use the more specific string of "X25519" or > "X448". Cheers, Steffen --=20 Steffen Jaeckel - s_jaeckel@gmx.de GnuPG fingerprint: C438 6A23 7ED4 3A47 5541 B942 7B2C D0DD 4BCF F59B My OTR key has changed on 30. Sept. 2015! jabber: jaeckel@jabber.ccc.de F052DE29 4FA9A02D 44A794E5 AE5AC0FB C5865C6= 4 --s5tAuQ2o6rtmHRrOrR9t0gtN9TYKRYg93-- --yYuT5igmKvjGGR3KI7C1ZZl9ToTYL1BfM Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 Comment: Gnu Privacy Tools iF4EAREIAAYFAlqG90UACgkQrwyxdiHtrXKDPAD/foY05bRtfgIdJzYdVBl3T6lL 6roZ0rgumYKcyO3CAoEA/A0xXTfdQsvYI6Wca4d0cPmLH5EzhtemjKcOE899d2d6 =M6p5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --yYuT5igmKvjGGR3KI7C1ZZl9ToTYL1BfM-- From nobody Fri Feb 16 09:41:33 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37523127876 for ; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 09:41:31 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.3 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.3 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=ericsson.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9mleLwnKvVSZ for ; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 09:41:29 -0800 (PST) Received: from usplmg21.ericsson.net (usplmg21.ericsson.net [198.24.6.65]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7DD18126CB6 for ; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 09:41:29 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=ericsson.com; s=mailgw201801; c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; i=@ericsson.com; t=1518802888; h=From:Sender:Reply-To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:To:Cc:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From: Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References:List-Id: List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:List-Subscribe:List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=2V3/FZZhOpIDqDztYun13vDZHgs/G+cgYr9/GMNt/yM=; b=fuFy7/mV7CI36h+mIHMigkzlD5/UQw59D5yrMHVNo2zToxywCyJeRIReBM5wBf9q x4M4yfqNSYkb8G+VO+G3ZeTUQ9F+Ax8VFi7U4Zo6d0NyXe3ZVVgokqhU1FUX+Um+ WDoFh005TM/55tDmajEi8LVB+2oLzhFBzCZ3yDZIisE=; X-AuditID: c6180641-835ff70000007a40-05-5a8717c85157 Received: from EUSAAHC005.ericsson.se (Unknown_Domain [147.117.188.87]) by usplmg21.ericsson.net (Symantec Mail Security) with SMTP id 89.08.31296.8C7178A5; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 18:41:28 +0100 (CET) Received: from EUSAAMB107.ericsson.se ([147.117.188.124]) by EUSAAHC005.ericsson.se ([147.117.188.87]) with mapi id 14.03.0352.000; Fri, 16 Feb 2018 12:41:27 -0500 From: Daniel Migault To: "curdle@ietf.org" Thread-Topic: draft-ietf-gss-keyex-sha2 - shepherd writeup Thread-Index: AdOnTV51JLSDm23rRxC1pfeoFfe+rQ== Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 17:41:27 +0000 Message-ID: <2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C118D53302@eusaamb107.ericsson.se> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [147.117.188.12] Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C118D53302eusaamb107erics_" MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFrrJLMWRmVeSWpSXmKPExsUyuXRPuO4J8fYog7ntehZbF85idmD0WLLk J1MAYxSXTUpqTmZZapG+XQJXxp/O2cwFNyUrtuy9z9rA+Eusi5GTQ0LARGLltb9MXYxcHEIC RxglNh1qY4RwljNKPDx1jx2kik3ASKLtUD+YLSKgLnHi0A5WEFtYwFTiw9Fe5i5GDqC4lcT/ XUYQJXoSxz50MYHYLAKqEke6PoPZvAK+En8enWMDsRkFxCS+n1oDFmcWEJe49WQ+E8RBAhJL 9pxnhrBFJV4+/scKYStJzHl9jRmiPl/iYccvZoiZghInZz5hmcAoOAvJqFlIymYhKYOI60gs 2P2JDcLWlli28DUzjH3mwGMmZPEFjOyrGDlKiwtyctONDDcxAgP8mASb4w7Gvb2ehxgFOBiV eHgZuNujhFgTy4orcw8xSnAwK4nwPn/cFiXEm5JYWZValB9fVJqTWnyIUZqDRUmc95wnb5SQ QHpiSWp2ampBahFMlomDU6qB0WfqcYMfPLbz/heZtn68+F1h8Skxtr1bl8RPVGqdIRfAWGzk FLfxLf/qFKvF0q81Fn/6ucot4ejCXd56Mrw6mYXrl7M7Mwmuvmn/qTHgqP1vJh2XHxPXzWN8 ftZ7I7vd9Nv33zDWWeo1CV5ySbjgVrp835NUKTGOlRXuk+VbLibPu3f9KVv3LSWW4oxEQy3m ouJEAHG07M5sAgAA Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] draft-ietf-gss-keyex-sha2 - shepherd writeup X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 17:41:31 -0000 --_000_2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C118D53302eusaamb107erics_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, The shepherd write up for [1] for draft-ietf-gss-keyex-sha2 [2] is almost c= omplete and draft-ietf-gss-keyex-sha2 is expected to be sent to the IESG so= on. Fell free to provide your comments. Yours, Daniel [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2/sheph= erdwriteup/ [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-04 --_000_2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C118D53302eusaamb107erics_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi,

 

The shepherd write up for [1] for draft-ietf-gss-key= ex-sha2 [2] is almost complete and draft-ietf-gss-keyex-sha2 is expected to= be sent to the IESG soon. Fell free to provide your comments.

 

Yours,

Daniel

 

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2/shepherdw= riteup/

[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-gs= s-keyex-sha2-04

--_000_2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C118D53302eusaamb107erics_-- From nobody Thu Feb 22 08:45:25 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietf.org Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D486012D873; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 08:45:18 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: internet-drafts@ietf.org To: Cc: curdle@ietf.org X-Test-IDTracker: no X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.72.2 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated Precedence: bulk Message-ID: <151931791882.8224.7322730029978269905@ietfa.amsl.com> Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 08:45:18 -0800 Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05.txt X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 16:45:19 -0000 A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption WG of the IETF. Title : GSS-API Key Exchange with SHA2 Authors : Simo Sorce Hubert Kario Filename : draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05.txt Pages : 16 Date : 2018-02-22 Abstract: This document specifies additions and amendments to RFC4462. It defines a new key exchange method that uses SHA-2 for integrity and deprecates weak DH groups. The purpose of this specification is to modernize the cryptographic primitives used by GSS Key Exchanges. The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2/ There are also htmlized versions available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05 A diff from the previous version is available at: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ From nobody Thu Feb 22 08:54:27 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A580124B17 for ; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 08:54:24 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -6.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01, T_SPF_HELO_PERMERROR=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id w5avuIU9mYhL for ; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 08:54:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from mx1.redhat.com (mx1.redhat.com [209.132.183.28]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 544A012D7F6 for ; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 08:54:22 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx01.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB2606149B; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 16:54:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ovpn-116-70.phx2.redhat.com (ovpn-116-70.phx2.redhat.com [10.3.116.70]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9CEF7600D5; Thu, 22 Feb 2018 16:54:21 +0000 (UTC) Message-ID: <1519318460.3161.118.camel@redhat.com> From: Simo Sorce To: Daniel Migault Cc: curdle@ietf.org Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 11:54:20 -0500 In-Reply-To: <151931791882.8224.7322730029978269905@ietfa.amsl.com> References: <151931791882.8224.7322730029978269905@ietfa.amsl.com> Organization: Red Hat, Inc. Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.11 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.39]); Thu, 22 Feb 2018 16:54:21 +0000 (UTC) Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05.txt X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 16:54:24 -0000 This revision addresses comment's pending from latest Review from Daniel, plus a very minor clarification nit. Here is the diff from -04: https://github.com/simo5/ietf/compare/b2b4c6478167143a683c76815045a631e a9dbbdc...cbb10832e376e3abab3164f9bb7d2e759c2bea0b Simo. On Thu, 2018-02-22 at 08:45 -0800, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote: > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. > This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption WG of the IETF. > > Title : GSS-API Key Exchange with SHA2 > Authors : Simo Sorce > Hubert Kario > Filename : draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05.txt > Pages : 16 > Date : 2018-02-22 > > Abstract: > This document specifies additions and amendments to RFC4462. It > defines a new key exchange method that uses SHA-2 for integrity and > deprecates weak DH groups. The purpose of this specification is to > modernize the cryptographic primitives used by GSS Key Exchanges. > > > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2/ > > There are also htmlized versions available at: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05 > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05 > > A diff from the previous version is available at: > https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05 > > > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. > > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ > > _______________________________________________ > Curdle mailing list > Curdle@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle -- Simo Sorce Sr. Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc From nobody Fri Feb 23 06:52:06 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CEDF712E87D for ; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 06:52:04 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -4.301 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.301 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=ericsson.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ALYziyj2WY9p for ; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 06:52:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from usplmg21.ericsson.net (usplmg21.ericsson.net [198.24.6.65]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 01C4D12E876 for ; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 06:51:59 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=ericsson.com; s=mailgw201801; c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; i=@ericsson.com; t=1519397519; h=From:Sender:Reply-To:Subject:Date:Message-ID:To:CC:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date:Resent-From: Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References:List-Id: List-Help:List-Unsubscribe:List-Subscribe:List-Post:List-Owner:List-Archive; bh=rIBaTghbEcqWRQ3FyY9916L0iNdjJAasNkxvKJlfj40=; b=NrkyJUdyfb0b6US/Q4EShfUdB4G7aGLBI+LE5AO2E+csasNaVqs/38LE5bSaYfZl 91YxwzDZCRc59SbV6ayVX7n6szX6Nf2lqXETeJj0PpXQvnowBELJq9JzPqjiGIJc WG6VKxJe3Aj8+iqZRvEfM6s63a4uQH8nasHIM07bAao=; X-AuditID: c6180641-81dff70000007a40-f8-5a902a8e541e Received: from EUSAAHC005.ericsson.se (Unknown_Domain [147.117.188.87]) by usplmg21.ericsson.net (Symantec Mail Security) with SMTP id 06.1C.31296.E8A209A5; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 15:51:59 +0100 (CET) Received: from EUSAAMB107.ericsson.se ([147.117.188.124]) by EUSAAHC005.ericsson.se ([147.117.188.87]) with mapi id 14.03.0352.000; Fri, 23 Feb 2018 09:51:58 -0500 From: Daniel Migault To: Simo Sorce CC: "curdle@ietf.org" Thread-Topic: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05.txt Thread-Index: AQHTq/yWDE8U0v39sU2MrakMzfQ5M6Ow92kAgAER83A= Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 14:51:57 +0000 Message-ID: <2DD56D786E600F45AC6BDE7DA4E8A8C118D545B6@eusaamb107.ericsson.se> References: <151931791882.8224.7322730029978269905@ietfa.amsl.com> <1519318460.3161.118.camel@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <1519318460.3161.118.camel@redhat.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [147.117.188.221] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFnrDLMWRmVeSWpSXmKPExsUyuXRPuG6/1oQog83ruCy2LpzFbPFj7iJW ByaPJUt+Mnm833eVLYApissmJTUnsyy1SN8ugSujf8NPxoJXkhWHHnxgaWCcItnFyMkhIWAi cWnGMtYuRi4OIYEjjBIr9j5mg3CWM0q0X2phBqliEzCSaDvUzw5iiwgoSCzov8MCYjMLqEt8 6+kAquHgEBbwlJi4QBGixEviVO8tZgjbSuLU6e1g5SwCqhKTLr9iBLF5BXwlHj3cxATSKiSQ LbF6TR5ImFPAWOLkrU9gmxgFxCS+n1rDBLFJXOLWk/lMEDcLSCzZc54ZwhaVePn4HyuErSxx fdUVFpCRzAKaEut36UO0KkpM6X7IDrFVUOLkzCcsExhFZyGZOguhYxaSjllIOhYwsqxi5Cgt LsjJTTcy3MQIjINjEmyOOxj39noeYhTgYFTi4b0hMiFKiDWxrLgy9xCjBAezkghv2fP+KCHe lMTKqtSi/Pii0pzU4kOM0hwsSuK85zx5o4QE0hNLUrNTUwtSi2CyTBycUg2MtcJrPuZtt77M taEr93tk/6qbvYKf4z+Y1+kzbJIwjw4y5P+UcKY6aDHzPWa9e/Fv+vIueLBxqhk9fOd46Ruv kWuDcJLDiu8cGu2iTY3Bm3sydu+xvtJ5/OKEHIbw4pt/Y8QcnZna5z99GFbqeqrq170/CpZv DENEXt08bMu88GmabM7+1zeVWIozEg21mIuKEwFPwcHufwIAAA== Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05.txt X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." 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List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 14:52:51 -0000 Daniel Migault has requested publication of draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-05 as Proposed Standard on behalf of the CURDLE working group. Please verify the document's state at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2/ From nobody Sat Feb 24 13:29:05 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0B143124B18 for ; Sat, 24 Feb 2018 13:29:04 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.598 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.598 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OwTgZUeZqhkq for ; Sat, 24 Feb 2018 13:29:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail-qk0-x22f.google.com (mail-qk0-x22f.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:400d:c09::22f]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5907D1241F5 for ; Sat, 24 Feb 2018 13:29:01 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-qk0-x22f.google.com with SMTP id l206so14949510qke.1 for ; Sat, 24 Feb 2018 13:29:01 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=rtfm-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=QLMaxJH0Vx1p+xsaIyab/JJ5Z1NpnOvul31QO9ydimY=; b=dITPx8Byox9HD1XUN1zpjQ7SSR59a2gVJ4vbNcSN6o8+vahgena597k7GDlM6b6a4r XMXEVdxFdt5aNcOWErFAWqbtXUJAVljLZtuGNVIMl0xlejP9C6ou1cYcr8ikB5O9fUH2 zdYIAK+vJik5YfNe72XEsWKpcOZzWUhUb4Z9rMDD5yve6LEko2+V6A7pj5Jy7o8kcmhj U7ufbfFX3dK4AuzB7jJTjW8dcXrOGFOF99tCyPYDKf2EAsjQ08FCnwRL/KypAlPq2o/l 2tAjgHSysDVwzLUKB4xVIaCnvXuNyge7HgltrmkCSQxdoEtwxJcw3xKvybeHJlxLY3+B oJJg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=QLMaxJH0Vx1p+xsaIyab/JJ5Z1NpnOvul31QO9ydimY=; b=OEV6YZyOu3/KApgqzPl0926VJaj5tXZjcFWVNCAQs/sGt4k/5nE495MdeeYtFF7Z9w EV7c5coa+C+HUqBfNdN8tSphx0DOMAthzuH1o+3c2USpIcXKnlWEVqiWnU63TDvdAz7r k+ycIlDSytyEL7P3NzYgID3RUXVSXq6tRaBJBKComoC5JuXduKixDhchwSm6ddRpjSIF hhAKqXfJIro+HBWUQ7iRt+41Ug0zAI/sWaz675dhDwZERdhvf3m5KzjfO5I7KF2vinOh 51ATLzck5HoE3jxw5TiqTYxwVf3GFjbBuSEQNCCENL9LotD/7SjQ0nNFox6+0ZlsC+SF 6zTQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APf1xPBgiNPqK7kh+QCx4ssFbzPumDks30dFw86FiA+qLrms5Lrgnlwu CN0uNER04Z/svDFcaoNgd3MnbATTLnQWYQ9E77LIgjfjU+0= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AG47ELsqY5SkxhcqkpCYVFO13u7BF/VucGFp0rehReTrFws2Aq1QtxxJSQgkwZbfCKuuIZXOFEPsAUubd2YYi6xsS9k= X-Received: by 10.55.103.1 with SMTP id b1mr9712272qkc.98.1519507739939; Sat, 24 Feb 2018 13:28:59 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.200.37.176 with HTTP; Sat, 24 Feb 2018 13:28:19 -0800 (PST) From: Eric Rescorla Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2018 13:28:19 -0800 Message-ID: To: curdle Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="94eb2c0571b812a6870565fbf715" Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] AD Review of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-09 X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 Precedence: list List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 24 Feb 2018 21:29:04 -0000 --94eb2c0571b812a6870565fbf715 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" See https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D4046 for the review in context. I have two high-level concerns about this document. The presentation is very confusing, with a lot of duplication and not much in the way of general principles until we get to the Security Considerations section. You should start by laying out your principles (FFDH >= 2048, > SHA-1, ECC >= 256, etc.) and then have less text for each of the suites unless there's something unobvious in one of them (e.g., we're keeping it around for compatibility). Second, I am concerned about the appropriateness of embedding the NSA's judgements about what algorithms are suitable for various classification levels in an IETF RFC. First, the IETF is not a US ogranization. Second, we are just now deprecating the suite B RFCs because NSA changed its mind about how to structure things. I think we should largely confine our comments to the IETF's judgements about what is or is not secure. *INLINE COMMENTS* View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:100 Method Names that MUST be implemented. Over time, what was once considered secure, is no longer considered secure. The purpose of this RFC is to recommend that some published key exchanges be Nit: no comma here. View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:107 Methods which MUST, SHOULD, MAY, SHOULD NOT, and MUST NOT be implemented. New key exchange methods will use the SHA-2 family of hashes found in [RFC6234] and are drawn from these ssh-curves from Isn't this sentence duplicative of the previous sentence? View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:128 implementation of MUST, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, and MUST NOT. Any method not explicitly listed, MAY be implemented. Spurious comma here. View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:137 be secure with wide enough adoption to upgrade their recommendation from MAY to SHOULD or MUST. This is not a sentence. View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:141 The Curve25519 provides strong security and is efficient on a wide range of architectures with properties that allow better I would strike "The " View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:149 Method has multiple implementations and SHOULD be implemented in any SSH interested in using elliptic curve based key exchanges. "in any SSH implementation" View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:153 The Curve448 provides very strong security. It uses SHA2-512 (also known as SHA-256) defined in [RFC6234] for integrity. It is probably I would strike "The ". Also, I'm not sure characterizing 256 as "strong" and 448 as "very strong" is that helpful. Isn't the general consensus that 256 bits of real security is fine unless there are quantum computers, in which case all bets are off. View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:155 known as SHA-256) defined in [RFC6234] for integrity. It is probably stronger and more work than is currently needed. This Key Exchange Method is described in [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves] and is similar to This also seems unnecessary. View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:162 This set of ephemerally generated key exchange groups uses SHA-1 as defined in [RFC4419]. However, SHA-1 has security concerns provided The groups aren't ephemeral. The keys are. View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:185 still need to use this key exchange, it should be removed from server implementations as quickly as possible. ; instead of , View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:195 method will transition to SHOULD NOT when SHA-2 alternatives are more generally available. It would be useful to explain why SHA-1 is a concern here. Perhaps a sentence about how SHA-1 is used? View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:215 additional head room over the 2048-bit group14 FFC DH and the predominate open source implementations are not adopting it. This method MAY be implemented. Why do you say it doesn't provide much security over 2048? View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:226 This modulus (4096-bit) is larger than that required by [CNSA-SUITE] and should be sufficient to inter-operate with more paranoid nation- states. This method SHOULD be implemented. interoperate does not have a hyphen View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:252 curve may not be as useful and strong as desired for handling TOP SECRET information for some applications. The SSH development community is divided on this and many implementations do exist. If TOP SECRET seems like a very national-state specific term. Perhaps some other term is appropriate. Is there a particular reason we are basing our assessments on what USG likes. View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:272 mean that this algorithm will need to be downgraded in the future along the other ECDSA nistp curves. how does this cipher suite use ECDSA? You don't say. Isn't it basically the same as ecdh-sh2-nistp256 View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:282 hash could mean that as many as nine bits of this key could be at risk of leaking if appropriate padding measures are not taken. This method MAY be implemented, but is not recommended. Can you explain how this happens? View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:290 security concerns [RFC6194]. It is recommended that these key exchange groups NOT be used. This key exchange SHOULD NOT be used. It is intended that it move to MUST NOT as soon as the majority of These two sentences are duplicative. View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:310 This key exchange method is defined in [RFC4462]. This generated key exchange groups uses SHA-1 which has security concerns [RFC6194]. If What's a "generated key exchange group" View Inline draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:563 DH groups to avoid pre-calculation attacks that are provably not backdoored. This sentence doesn't make any sense: it's not attacks that are backdoored. More generally, are there in fact concerns that the FFDH groups were maliciously generated, or just that they are too weak against pre-calculation --94eb2c0571b812a6870565fbf715 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
See=C2=A0https://mozphab-ietf.devsvcdev.mozaws.net/D4046 for the revi= ew in context.

I have two high-level concerns ab= out this document.

The presentation is very confusing, with a lot of = duplication and not much in the way of general principles until we get to t= he Security Considerations section. You should start by laying out your pri= nciples (FFDH >=3D 2048, > SHA-1, ECC >=3D 256, etc.) and then hav= e less text for each of the suites unless there's something unobvious i= n one of them (e.g., we're keeping it around for compatibility).

= Second, I am concerned about the appropriateness of embedding the NSA's= judgements about what algorithms are suitable for various classification l= evels in an IETF RFC. First, the IETF is not a US ogranization. Second, we = are just now deprecating the suite B RFCs because NSA changed its mind abou= t how to structure things. I think we should largely confine our comments t= o the IETF's judgements about what is or is not secure.

=
<= div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.= 8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norma= l;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;te= xt-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(= 255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><= strong>INLINE COMMENTS
View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:100
=
Method Names that MUST be implemented. Over time, what was once
considered secure, is no longer considered secure. The purpo= se of
this RFC is to recommend that some published key exchanges be

Nit: no comma here.


View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:107
Methods which MUST, SHOULD, MAY, SHOULD NOT, and MUST NOT be
implemented. New key exchange methods will use the SHA-2 fam= ily of
hashes found in [RFC6234] and are drawn from these ssh-curves= from

Isn't this sentence duplicative of the prev= ious sentence?



View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:137
<= div style=3D"padding:0px 8px;margin:0px 4px;background:rgba(152,207,235,0.3= 5)"> be secure with wide enough adoption to upgrade their recommendation
from MAY to SHOULD or MUST.

This is not a sentence.


View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:141
=
The Curve25519 provides strong security and is efficient on a wid= e
range of architectures with properties that allow better

I would strike "The "

=
View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:149=
Method has multiple implementations and SHOULD be implement= ed in any
SSH interested in using elliptic curve based key exchanges.

"in any SSH implementation"

=
View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:153<= /span>
The Curve448 provides very strong security. It uses = SHA2-512 (also
known as SHA-256) defined in [RFC6234] for integrity. It is = probably

I would strike "The ". Also, I'm = not sure characterizing 256 as "strong" and 448 as "very str= ong" is that helpful. Isn't the general consensus that 256 bits of= real security is fine unless there are quantum computers, in which case al= l bets are off.


View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:162
This set of ephemerally generated key exchange groups uses SHA= -1 as
defined in [RFC4419]. However, SHA-1 has security concerns p= rovided

The groups aren't ephemeral. The keys are.<= /p>


View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sh= a2.txt:185
still need to use this key exchange, it sh= ould be removed from server
implementations as quickly as possible.

; instead of ,


View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:195
= method will transition to SHOULD NOT when SHA-2 alternatives are more
generally available.

It would be useful to explain why SHA-1 is a co= ncern here. Perhaps a sentence about how SHA-1 is used?


=
View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:215
additional head room over the 2048-bit group14 FFC DH and the
predominate open source implementations are not adopting it. = This
method MAY be implemented.

Why do you say it doesn't provide much secu= rity over 2048?



=
View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:252
curve may not be as useful and strong as desired for ha= ndling TOP
SECRET information for some applications. The SSH developmen= t
community is divided on this and many implementations do exis= t. If

TOP SECRET seems like a very national-state spe= cific term. Perhaps some other term is appropriate. Is there a particular r= eason we are basing our assessments on what USG likes.


<= div style=3D"border:1px solid rgb(199,204,217);border-radius:3px">
View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:272
mean that this algorithm will need to be downgraded in the futur= e
along the other ECDSA nistp curves.

how does this cipher suite use ECDSA? You don&#= 39;t say. Isn't it basically the same as ecdh-sh2-nistp256


<= div style=3D"padding:0px;background:rgb(247,247,247);border-color:rgb(227,2= 28,232);border-style:solid;border-width:0px 0px 1px;margin:0px">
View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:282
hash could mean that as many as nine bits of this key c= ould be at
risk of leaking if appropriate padding measures are not taken= . This
method MAY be implemented, but is not recommended.

Can you explain how this happens?


View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:290
security concerns [RFC6194]. It is recommended that th= ese key
exchange groups NOT be used. This key exchange SHOULD NOT be= used.
It is intended that it move to MUST NOT as soon as the majori= ty of

These two sentences are duplicative.

<= /div>
View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2.txt:310
This key exchange method is defined in [RFC4462]. Thi= s generated key
exchange groups uses SHA-1 which has security concerns [RFC61= 94]. If

What's a "generated key exchange group= "


View Inlinedraft-ietf-curdle-ssh-k= ex-sha2.txt:563
DH groups to avoid pre-calculation at= tacks that are provably not
backdoored.

This sentence doesn't make any sense: it= 9;s not attacks that are backdoored. More generally, are there in fact conc= erns that the FFDH groups were maliciously generated, or just that they are= too weak against pre-calculation


--94eb2c0571b812a6870565fbf715-- From nobody Mon Feb 26 08:32:53 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: curdle@ietf.org Delivered-To: curdle@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 70FD912D876; Mon, 26 Feb 2018 08:32:43 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: The IESG To: "IETF-Announce" X-Test-IDTracker: no X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.72.4 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated Precedence: bulk Cc: The IESG , ekr@rtfm.com, Daniel Migault , curdle-chairs@ietf.org, curdle@ietf.org, daniel.migault@ericsson.com, draft-schaad-curdle-oid-registry@ietf.org, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <151966276345.31378.12192610937580554238.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 08:32:43 -0800 Archived-At: Subject: [Curdle] Document Action: 'IANA Registration for new Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range' to Informational RFC (draft-schaad-curdle-oid-registry-03.txt) X-BeenThere: curdle@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22 List-Id: "List for discussion of potential new security area wg." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 16:32:43 -0000 The IESG has approved the following document: - 'IANA Registration for new Cryptographic Algorithm Object Identifier Range' (draft-schaad-curdle-oid-registry-03.txt) as Informational RFC This document is the product of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Kathleen Moriarty and Eric Rescorla. A URL of this Internet Draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schaad-curdle-oid-registry/ Technical Summary When the Curdle Security Working Group was chartered, a range of object identifiers was donated by Symantec Website Security for the purpose of registering the Edwards Elliptic Curve key agreement and signature algorithms. This donated set of OIDs allowed for shorter values than would be possible using the existing S/MIME or PKIX arcs. This document describes the range of identifiers that were assigned in that donated range, transfers control of that range to IANA, and establishes IANA allocation policies for any future assignments within that range. Working Group Summary I am not aware of any controversy. Document Quality N/A Personnel Daniel Migault is the document shepherd and Eric Rescorla is the responsible Area Director.