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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2018 17:59:00 +0000
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Subject: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/xiSrqzw4HUtfty9bSH3OwIBMKZU>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> writes:

> Eric rightly pounts out that this is a tech change made during the
> final stage of RFC editing and that it should be confirmed by the WG.
> It's about MAY accepting fewer leading zero's.
> 
> Does anyone object?
> 
>     > > The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string that
>     > > contains an octet string S (which is the output of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
>     > > and that has the same length (in octets) as the RSA modulus.  When S
>     > > contains leading zeros, there exist signers that will send a shorter
>     > > encoding of S that omits them.  A verifier MAY accept shorter
>     > > encodings of S with one or more leading zeros omitted.

Question:

If the octet string S begins with the most significant bit set, is it a
MUST or a SHOULD or a MAY to prepend a zero octet so that the number is
not considered to be negative?

Consideration:

RFC 8017 section 4.1 specifies x as a nonnegative integer to be
converted to an Octet String primitive. It is not clear if the octet
string S is to always be considered unsigned or not.

RFC4251 provides that an mpint is a multiple precision integer in two's
complement format, stored as a string, 8 bits per byte, MSB first.
Negative numbers have the value 1 as the most significant bit of the
first byte of the data partition. If the most significant bit would be
set for a positive number, the number MUST be preceded by a zero byte
[RFC4251, sectio 5, page 8.]. RFC4251 provides that a 'string'

If draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12 would like to see the
rsa_signature_blob be treated as an mpint with a leading zero-byte for
strings that otherwise would look negative, why not just change the type
in section 3 to read:

The resulting signature is encoded as follows:

    string    "rsa-sha2-256" / "rsa-sha2-512"
    mpint      rsa_signature_blob

  The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing
  S   - an octet string which is the output of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, of
  length equal to the length in octets of the RSA modulus. As with any
  mpint, there may be a leading zero octet to ensure that S is considered
  a nonnegative number.

If I have misunderstood the rationale for the change, please let me
know.

	Thank you,
	-- Mark


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2018 21:21:36 -0500
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To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Mark:

> If the octet string S begins with the most significant bit set,
> is it a MUST or a SHOULD or a MAY to prepend a zero octet
> so that the number is not considered to be negative?

In historic and current practice, for "ssh-rsa", as per RFC 4253, the
signature encoding is specified as follows:


      string    "ssh-rsa"
      string    rsa_signature_blob

   The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing
   s (which is an integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned, and in
   network byte order).



In my opinion, this is underspecified, and has led to discrepancies in
actual implementations.

The treatment of leading zeros is not clarified here. This RFC could have
specified to encode S, i.e. a concrete, well-specified RSA signature
encoding described in RFC 8017. Perhaps it meant to specify S but someone
went with "s" instead. We can't tell at this point.

"s" is the abstract equivalent to "S", i.e. it's the RSA signature with no
specified encoding. So the encoding is defined entirely in the above
language, and we know the following:

- It is an integer encoded as a string.
- It's not encoded as a mpint.
- No lengths or padding.
*- Unsigned, therefore no zero prefix if high bit is on.* (I believe this
answers the above question.)
- Network byte order.

This is ALMOST identical to "S". Except it does not clearly specify what to
do if the signature has a naturally occurring leading 0 which occurs in
1/256 of all signatures.

Therefore, implementations diverge in whether the leading 0 is sent or not.
Some implementations send it. Some do not.


My intent with "rsa-sha2-256" and "rsa-sha2-512" is not to change how the
rsa_signature_blob is encoded, it's to document it better.

I don't think it's realistic to change it. The new public key algorithms
are already implemented and widely deployed, and the practical
implementations already diverge in the choice they make about the leading
0, in the same way as "ssh-rsa" implementations diverged.

The fact that implementations diverge on this detail is not a big deal, but
there's good reason to document it. Otherwise people are prone to implement
and release software that's going to fail to validate 1/256 of signatures
sent by other SSH implementations.


> mpint     rsa_signature_blob

No no no no no no no! Wrong! Error! Please do not even mention this. :)

I marked it in red to emphasize that this is very wrong.

This is already implemented. It's already deployed. It's too late to
change. It's clear this is not an mpint, and has never been in "ssh-rsa"
either. Changing this to "mpint" now would completely divorce the spec from
actual implementations.

My intent with this late improvement to the text is to clarify actual
practice for the benefit of future implementations. Changing existing
implementations is a no-go.



On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 7:56 PM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:

> Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> writes:
>
> > Eric rightly pounts out that this is a tech change made during the
> > final stage of RFC editing and that it should be confirmed by the WG.
> > It's about MAY accepting fewer leading zero's.
> >
> > Does anyone object?
> >
> >     > > The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string that
> >     > > contains an octet string S (which is the output of
> RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
> >     > > and that has the same length (in octets) as the RSA modulus.
> When S
> >     > > contains leading zeros, there exist signers that will send a
> shorter
> >     > > encoding of S that omits them.  A verifier MAY accept shorter
> >     > > encodings of S with one or more leading zeros omitted.
>
> Question:
>
> If the octet string S begins with the most significant bit set, is it a
> MUST or a SHOULD or a MAY to prepend a zero octet so that the number is
> not considered to be negative?
>
> Consideration:
>
> RFC 8017 section 4.1 specifies x as a nonnegative integer to be
> converted to an Octet String primitive. It is not clear if the octet
> string S is to always be considered unsigned or not.
>
> RFC4251 provides that an mpint is a multiple precision integer in two's
> complement format, stored as a string, 8 bits per byte, MSB first.
> Negative numbers have the value 1 as the most significant bit of the
> first byte of the data partition. If the most significant bit would be
> set for a positive number, the number MUST be preceded by a zero byte
> [RFC4251, sectio 5, page 8.]. RFC4251 provides that a 'string'
>
> If draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12 would like to see the
> rsa_signature_blob be treated as an mpint with a leading zero-byte for
> strings that otherwise would look negative, why not just change the type
> in section 3 to read:
>
> The resulting signature is encoded as follows:
>
>     string    "rsa-sha2-256" / "rsa-sha2-512"
>     mpint      rsa_signature_blob
>
>   The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing
>   S   - an octet string which is the output of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, of
>   length equal to the length in octets of the RSA modulus. As with any
>   mpint, there may be a leading zero octet to ensure that S is considered
>   a nonnegative number.
>
> If I have misunderstood the rationale for the change, please let me
> know.
>
>         Thank you,
>         -- Mark
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>

--001a114a9bb22a4d1605672dcd97
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Mark:</div><div><br></div><div>&gt;=C2=A0<span style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-s=
tyle:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-wei=
ght:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transfo=
rm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;d=
isplay:inline">If the octet string S begins with the most significant bit s=
et,</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,s=
ans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decor=
ation-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt; is it a=C2=A0</span><sp=
an style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:smal=
l;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;=
font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(25=
5,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;floa=
t:none;display:inline">MUST or a SHOULD or a MAY to prepend a zero octet</s=
pan></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-se=
rif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-va=
riant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;te=
xt-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backg=
round-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-=
color:initial;float:none;display:inline">&gt; so that the number is=C2=A0</=
span><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps=
:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:=
0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-colo=
r:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:init=
ial;float:none;display:inline">not considered to be negative?</span><br sty=
le=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">

</div><div><br></div><div>In historic and current practice, for &quot;ssh-r=
sa&quot;, as per RFC 4253, the signature encoding is specified as follows:<=
/div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>

<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;ma=
rgin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">      string    &quot;ssh=
-rsa&quot;
      string    rsa_signature_blob

   The value for &#39;rsa_signature_blob&#39; is encoded as a string contai=
ning
   s (which is an integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned, and in
   network byte order).</pre>

<br></div><div><br></div><div>In my opinion, this is underspecified, and ha=
s led to discrepancies in actual implementations.</div><div><br></div><div>=
The treatment of leading zeros is not clarified here. This RFC could have s=
pecified to encode S, i.e. a concrete, well-specified RSA signature encodin=
g described in RFC 8017. Perhaps it meant to specify S but someone went wit=
h &quot;s&quot; instead. We can&#39;t tell at this point.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>&quot;s&quot; is the abstract equivalent to &quot;S&quot;, i.e. it&=
#39;s the RSA signature with no specified encoding. So the encoding is defi=
ned entirely in the above language, and we know the following:</div><div><b=
r></div><div>- It is an integer encoded as a string.</div><div>- It&#39;s n=
ot encoded as a mpint.</div><div>- No lengths or padding.<br></div><div><b>=
- Unsigned, therefore no zero prefix if high bit is on.</b> (I believe this=
 answers the above question.)</div><div>- Network byte order.</div><div><br=
></div><div>This is ALMOST identical to &quot;S&quot;. Except it does not c=
learly specify what to do if the signature has a naturally occurring leadin=
g 0 which occurs in 1/256 of all signatures.</div><div><br></div><div>There=
fore, implementations diverge in whether the leading 0 is sent or not. Some=
 implementations send it. Some do not.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><=
div>My intent with &quot;rsa-sha2-256&quot; and &quot;rsa-sha2-512&quot; is=
 not to change how the rsa_signature_blob is encoded, it&#39;s to document =
it better.</div><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t think it&#39;s realistic to=
 change it. The new public key algorithms are already implemented and widel=
y deployed, and the practical implementations already diverge in the choice=
 they make about the leading 0, in the same way as &quot;ssh-rsa&quot; impl=
ementations diverged.</div><div><br></div><div>The fact that implementation=
s diverge on this detail is not a big deal, but there&#39;s good reason to =
document it. Otherwise people are prone to implement and release software t=
hat&#39;s going to fail to validate 1/256 of signatures sent by other SSH i=
mplementations.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"back=
ground-color:rgb(255,0,0)">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);fon=
t-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-li=
gatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;=
word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initia=
l;float:none;display:inline">mpint=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0rsa_signature_blob</s=
pan></span><br style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;fo=
nt-size:small;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-=
caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-ind=
ent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-=
color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:=
initial">

</div><div><br></div><div>No no no no no no no! Wrong! Error! Please do not=
 even mention this. :)</div><div><br></div><div>I marked it in red to empha=
size that this is very wrong.</div><div><br></div><div>This is already impl=
emented. It&#39;s already deployed. It&#39;s too late to change. It&#39;s c=
lear this is not an mpint, and has never been in &quot;ssh-rsa&quot; either=
. Changing this to &quot;mpint&quot; now would completely divorce the spec =
from actual implementations.</div><div><br></div><div>My intent with this l=
ate improvement to the text is to clarify actual practice for the benefit o=
f future implementations. Changing existing implementations is a no-go.</di=
v><div><br></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 7:56 PM, Mark D. Baushke <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:mdb@juniper.net" target=3D"_blank">mdb@juniper.net</a>&gt=
;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 =
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">Salz, Ri=
ch &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; writes:=
<br>
<br>
&gt; Eric rightly pounts out that this is a tech change made during the<br>
&gt; final stage of RFC editing and that it should be confirmed by the WG.<=
br>
&gt; It&#39;s about MAY accepting fewer leading zero&#39;s.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Does anyone object?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; The value for &#39;rsa_signature_blob&#39=
; is encoded as a string that<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; contains an octet string S (which is the =
output of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; and that has the same length (in octets) =
as the RSA modulus.=C2=A0 When S<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; contains leading zeros, there exist signe=
rs that will send a shorter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; encoding of S that omits them.=C2=A0 A ve=
rifier MAY accept shorter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; encodings of S with one or more leading z=
eros omitted.<br>
<br>
</span>Question:<br>
<br>
If the octet string S begins with the most significant bit set, is it a<br>
MUST or a SHOULD or a MAY to prepend a zero octet so that the number is<br>
not considered to be negative?<br>
<br>
Consideration:<br>
<br>
RFC 8017 section 4.1 specifies x as a nonnegative integer to be<br>
converted to an Octet String primitive. It is not clear if the octet<br>
string S is to always be considered unsigned or not.<br>
<br>
RFC4251 provides that an mpint is a multiple precision integer in two&#39;s=
<br>
complement format, stored as a string, 8 bits per byte, MSB first.<br>
Negative numbers have the value 1 as the most significant bit of the<br>
first byte of the data partition. If the most significant bit would be<br>
set for a positive number, the number MUST be preceded by a zero byte<br>
[RFC4251, sectio 5, page 8.]. RFC4251 provides that a &#39;string&#39;<br>
<br>
If draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12 would like to see the<br>
rsa_signature_blob be treated as an mpint with a leading zero-byte for<br>
strings that otherwise would look negative, why not just change the type<br=
>
in section 3 to read:<br>
<br>
The resulting signature is encoded as follows:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 string=C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;rsa-sha2-256&quot; / &quot;rsa-sha2=
-512&quot;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 mpint=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 rsa_signature_blob<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 The value for &#39;rsa_signature_blob&#39; is encoded as a string co=
ntaining<br>
=C2=A0 S=C2=A0 =C2=A0- an octet string which is the output of RSASSA-PKCS1-=
v1_5, of<br>
=C2=A0 length equal to the length in octets of the RSA modulus. As with any=
<br>
=C2=A0 mpint, there may be a leading zero octet to ensure that S is conside=
red<br>
=C2=A0 a nonnegative number.<br>
<br>
If I have misunderstood the rationale for the change, please let me<br>
know.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Thank you,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- Mark<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/curdle</a><br=
>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
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Comments: In-reply-to: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> message dated "Sun, 11 Mar 2018 21:21:36 -0500."
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/zRZ52cs-ICXEy5rqxPANwgdBUAM>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Hi denis,

My question is answered.

Rich asked:

> Does anyone object?
> 
>     > > The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string that
>     > > contains an octet string S (which is the output of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
>     > > and that has the same length (in octets) as the RSA modulus.  When S
>     > > contains leading zeros, there exist signers that will send a shorter
>     > > encoding of S that omits them.  A verifier MAY accept shorter
>     > > encodings of S with one or more leading zeros omitted.

I do not object.

Given at approximately 1/256 signatures will have a naturally occurring
leading zero for which some implementations do not send it and some do,
I have no objection with the change in text.

I do wonder if the text would better read:

 A verifier SHOULD accept shorter encodings of S with one or more
 leading zeros omitted.

to encourage a stronger likelyhood that a valid, but short signature
would still be accepted. However, I will leave that to others to
determine.

	-- Mark


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 04:41:43 -0500
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To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Cc: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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--001a114886822d05d1056733f342
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

I agree with either MAY or SHOULD.

I suggested MAY on the following grounds:

1. I was speculating it could help this new text, which I knew was too
late, be accepted more easily. This hasn't panned out, but that seems for
the best. :)

2. Years in the future, there may be a time when deployed implementations
all encode "S" correctly. At that point, we may no longer want to SHOULD a
special case that's no longer relevant.

3. It weakens the claim of implementations that don't send the zeros that
they follow the spec. They can more easily make this claim if there is a
"SHOULD" to accommodate them.


However, I also see the following arguments for SHOULD:

4. It's unavoidable current practice, so it may convey the more accurate
idea to a new implementer.

5. Quantum computing will likely make RSA irrelevant much before all
implementations encode "S" correctly.


All things considered, I prefer MAY, and the main reason is 3 - not letting
implementations who don't send the zeros to claim that they're doing it
right. I'm also okay with SHOULD, but it enables the implementations that
created the problem to begin with. :)



On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 11:43 PM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:

> Hi denis,
>
> My question is answered.
>
> Rich asked:
>
> > Does anyone object?
> >
> >     > > The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string that
> >     > > contains an octet string S (which is the output of
> RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)
> >     > > and that has the same length (in octets) as the RSA modulus.
> When S
> >     > > contains leading zeros, there exist signers that will send a
> shorter
> >     > > encoding of S that omits them.  A verifier MAY accept shorter
> >     > > encodings of S with one or more leading zeros omitted.
>
> I do not object.
>
> Given at approximately 1/256 signatures will have a naturally occurring
> leading zero for which some implementations do not send it and some do,
> I have no objection with the change in text.
>
> I do wonder if the text would better read:
>
>  A verifier SHOULD accept shorter encodings of S with one or more
>  leading zeros omitted.
>
> to encourage a stronger likelyhood that a valid, but short signature
> would still be accepted. However, I will leave that to others to
> determine.
>
>         -- Mark
>

--001a114886822d05d1056733f342
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I agree with either MAY or SHOULD.<div><br></div><div>I su=
ggested MAY on the following grounds:</div><div><br></div><div>1. I was spe=
culating it could help this new text, which I knew was too late, be accepte=
d more easily. This hasn&#39;t panned out, but that seems for the best. :)<=
/div><div><br></div><div>2. Years in the future, there may be a time when d=
eployed implementations all encode &quot;S&quot; correctly. At that point, =
we may no longer want to SHOULD a special case that&#39;s no longer relevan=
t.</div><div><br></div><div>3. It weakens the claim of implementations that=
 don&#39;t send the zeros that they follow the spec. They can more easily m=
ake this claim if there is a &quot;SHOULD&quot; to accommodate them.</div><=
div><br></div><div><br></div><div>However, I also see the following argumen=
ts for SHOULD:</div><div><br></div><div>4. It&#39;s unavoidable current pra=
ctice, so it may convey the more accurate idea to a new implementer.</div><=
div><br></div><div>5. Quantum computing will likely make RSA irrelevant muc=
h before all implementations encode &quot;S&quot; correctly.</div><div><br>=
</div><div><br></div><div>All things considered, I prefer MAY, and the main=
 reason is 3 - not letting implementations who don&#39;t send the zeros to =
claim that they&#39;re doing it right. I&#39;m also okay with SHOULD, but i=
t enables the implementations that created the problem to begin with. :)</d=
iv><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sun, Mar 11, 2018 at 11:43 PM, Mark D. Baushke <sp=
an dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mdb@juniper.net" target=3D"_blank">mdb=
@juniper.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi den=
is,<br>
<br>
My question is answered.<br>
<br>
Rich asked:<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; Does anyone object?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; The value for &#39;rsa_signature_blob&#39=
; is encoded as a string that<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; contains an octet string S (which is the =
output of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5)<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; and that has the same length (in octets) =
as the RSA modulus.=C2=A0 When S<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; contains leading zeros, there exist signe=
rs that will send a shorter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; encoding of S that omits them.=C2=A0 A ve=
rifier MAY accept shorter<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; &gt; encodings of S with one or more leading z=
eros omitted.<br>
<br>
</span>I do not object.<br>
<br>
Given at approximately 1/256 signatures will have a naturally occurring<br>
leading zero for which some implementations do not send it and some do,<br>
I have no objection with the change in text.<br>
<br>
I do wonder if the text would better read:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0A verifier SHOULD accept shorter encodings of S with one or more<br>
=C2=A0leading zeros omitted.<br>
<br>
to encourage a stronger likelyhood that a valid, but short signature<br>
would still be accepted. However, I will leave that to others to<br>
determine.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- Mark<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114886822d05d1056733f342--


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To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
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Comments: In-reply-to: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> message dated "Mon, 12 Mar 2018 04:41:43 -0500."
From: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 02:59:46 -0700
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/h83-GYqTQp98x9MzkV9MOOg4SDw>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Hi denis,

Argument #3 works for me.

MAY is best. SHOULD lets broken implementations continue to be broken.

Thank you for your responses.

	Enjoy!
	-- Mark


From nobody Mon Mar 12 04:14:41 2018
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
CC: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
CC: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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From: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Agreed on MAY here instead of SHOULD.

One of the original e-mails on this thread also mentioned prepending a =
leading 0x00 byte in cases where the high-bit of the first octet is set. =
I=E2=80=99m not sure we want to ever allow that. is anyone aware of any =
existing implementations that do that today, incorrectly thinking this =
value was supposed to follow the rules for encoding an =E2=80=9Cmpint=E2=80=
=9D instead of a fixed-length octet string?

On Mar 12, 2018, at 2:59 AM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:
> Hi denis,
>=20
> Argument #3 works for me.
>=20
> MAY is best. SHOULD lets broken implementations continue to be broken.
>=20
> Thank you for your responses.
>=20
> 	Enjoy!
> 	-- Mark
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle

--=20
Ron Frederick
ronf@timeheart.net




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Yes - this was the "mpint" idea that Mark broached. In SSH, the "mpint"
type is used to encode a signed integer, and prepends the \0 byte if the
value is positive and its high bit is on. This is necessary to distinguish
the positive value from a negative one.

As far as I know, there does NOT exist any SSH implementation that would
require such an erroneous encoding for an RSA signature.

If such an implementation did exist, it would fail to validate a very large
proportion of valid signatures as currently generated by most SSH servers
and clients. Unless my assumptions about RSA are incorrect, a very large
proportion of signatures, e.g. 1/3 - or up to 1/2 depending on the modulus
- will have the high bit set.

An implementation that would incorrectly require a signed encoding (like
"mpint") would be immediately discovered in development. I have not seen it
in practice.

What I cannot say is how many implementations might ACCEPT a signed
encoding if it is sent. If they do, I have no idea how many extra zeros
such implementations might accept. It might be that there exist
implementations (perhaps including ours!) that will accept an arbitrary
number of leading zeros. Perhaps there may be so many zeros as to fill up
to the maximum size of the SSH packet the implementation accepts.

If they do, though, I'm not aware of an attack that could be mounted based
on that, and it won't arise as a compatibility issue. So I think it's not
worthwhile to mention.


On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> wrote:

> Agreed on MAY here instead of SHOULD.
>
> One of the original e-mails on this thread also mentioned prepending a
> leading 0x00 byte in cases where the high-bit of the first octet is set.
> I=E2=80=99m not sure we want to ever allow that. is anyone aware of any e=
xisting
> implementations that do that today, incorrectly thinking this value was
> supposed to follow the rules for encoding an =E2=80=9Cmpint=E2=80=9D inst=
ead of a
> fixed-length octet string?
>
> On Mar 12, 2018, at 2:59 AM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:
> > Hi denis,
> >
> > Argument #3 works for me.
> >
> > MAY is best. SHOULD lets broken implementations continue to be broken.
> >
> > Thank you for your responses.
> >
> >       Enjoy!
> >       -- Mark
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Curdle mailing list
> > Curdle@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>
> --
> Ron Frederick
> ronf@timeheart.net
>
>
>
>

--001a114a9bb2390903056743b032
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Yes - this was the &quot;mpint&quot; idea that Mark broach=
ed. In SSH, the &quot;mpint&quot; type is used to encode a signed integer, =
and prepends the \0 byte if the value is positive and its high bit is on. T=
his is necessary to distinguish the positive value from a negative one.<div=
><br></div><div>As far as I know, there does NOT exist any SSH implementati=
on that would require such an erroneous encoding for an RSA signature.</div=
><div><br></div><div>If such an implementation did exist, it would fail to =
validate a very large proportion of valid signatures as currently generated=
 by most SSH servers and clients. Unless my assumptions about RSA are incor=
rect, a very large proportion of signatures, e.g. 1/3 - or up to 1/2 depend=
ing on the modulus - will have the high bit set.</div><div><br></div><div>A=
n implementation that would incorrectly require a signed encoding (like &qu=
ot;mpint&quot;) would be immediately discovered in development. I have not =
seen it in practice.</div><div><br></div><div>What I cannot say is how many=
 implementations might ACCEPT a signed encoding if it is sent. If they do, =
I have no idea how many extra zeros such implementations might accept. It m=
ight be that there exist implementations (perhaps including ours!) that wil=
l accept an arbitrary number of leading zeros. Perhaps there may be so many=
 zeros as to fill up to the maximum size of the SSH packet the implementati=
on accepts.</div><div><br></div><div>If they do, though, I&#39;m not aware =
of an attack that could be mounted based on that, and it won&#39;t arise as=
 a compatibility issue. So I think it&#39;s not worthwhile to mention.</div=
><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">O=
n Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 8:01 PM, Ron Frederick <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" target=3D"_blank">ronf@timeheart.net</a>&gt;=
</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Agreed on MAY here instead=
 of SHOULD.<br>
<br>
One of the original e-mails on this thread also mentioned prepending a lead=
ing 0x00 byte in cases where the high-bit of the first octet is set. I=E2=
=80=99m not sure we want to ever allow that. is anyone aware of any existin=
g implementations that do that today, incorrectly thinking this value was s=
upposed to follow the rules for encoding an =E2=80=9Cmpint=E2=80=9D instead=
 of a fixed-length octet string?<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Mar 12, 2018, at 2:59 AM, Mark D. Baushke &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mdb@juni=
per.net">mdb@juniper.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi denis,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Argument #3 works for me.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; MAY is best. SHOULD lets broken implementations continue to be broken.=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thank you for your responses.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Enjoy!<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0-- Mark<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5">&gt; __________________=
____________<wbr>_________________<br>
&gt; Curdle mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"norefe=
rrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/curdle</=
a><br>
<br>
</div></div><span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">--<br>
Ron Frederick<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net">ronf@timeheart.net</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a114a9bb2390903056743b032--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>
CC: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>What I cannot say is how many implementations might ACCEPT a signed encodi=
ng=0A=
>if it is sent. If they do, I have no idea how many extra zeros such=0A=
>implementations might accept. It might be that there exist implementations=
=0A=
>(perhaps including ours!) that will accept an arbitrary number of leading=
=0A=
>zeros.=0A=
=0A=
My read-integer code accepts leading zeroes and strips them, based on=0A=
implementations that assume e.g. a 1024-bit RSA key always produces 128 byt=
es=0A=
of output and memcpy() the result into a zero-filled 128-byte field.  I've=
=0A=
seen stuff like this in the past, in PGP code I think (the read-integer cod=
e=0A=
is shared across a range of different crypto protocols).=0A=
=0A=
I also reject anything that's supposed to be signed where the sign bit is s=
et:=0A=
=0A=
	/* If we're reading a signed integer then the sign bit can't be set =0A=
	   since this would produce a negative value.  This differs from the =0A=
	   ASN.1 code, where the incorrect setting of the sign bit is so common =
=0A=
	   that we always treat integers as unsigned */=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 02:19:11 -0500
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>,  "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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--94eb2c0d047c4055e40567461364
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

> My read-integer code accepts leading zeroes and strips them,
> based on implementations that assume e.g. a 1024-bit RSA key
> always produces 128 bytes of output

It does. :)


> and memcpy() the result into a zero-filled 128-byte field.

That's actually the correct encoding according to RFC 8017.


>  I also reject anything that's supposed to be signed where
> the sign bit is set:

That's OK, it relates to mpint fields that aren't the RSA signature though.
The RSA signature is a string, not an mpint, and is unsigned.



On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:01 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >What I cannot say is how many implementations might ACCEPT a signed
> encoding
> >if it is sent. If they do, I have no idea how many extra zeros such
> >implementations might accept. It might be that there exist implementations
> >(perhaps including ours!) that will accept an arbitrary number of leading
> >zeros.
>
> My read-integer code accepts leading zeroes and strips them, based on
> implementations that assume e.g. a 1024-bit RSA key always produces 128
> bytes
> of output and memcpy() the result into a zero-filled 128-byte field.  I've
> seen stuff like this in the past, in PGP code I think (the read-integer
> code
> is shared across a range of different crypto protocols).
>
> I also reject anything that's supposed to be signed where the sign bit is
> set:
>
>         /* If we're reading a signed integer then the sign bit can't be set
>            since this would produce a negative value.  This differs from
> the
>            ASN.1 code, where the incorrect setting of the sign bit is so
> common
>            that we always treat integers as unsigned */
>
> Peter.
>

--94eb2c0d047c4055e40567461364
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<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spac=
ing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">My read-integer code =
accepts leading zeroes and strips them,</span><div><span style=3D"font-size=
:12.8px">&gt; based on=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">impleme=
ntations that assume e.g. a 1024-bit RSA key</span></div><div><span style=
=3D"font-size:12.8px">&gt; always produces 128 bytes=C2=A0</span><span styl=
e=3D"font-size:12.8px">of output</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:=
12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">It does. :)<=
/span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><sp=
an style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-siz=
e:12.8px">&gt; and memcpy() the result into a zero-filled 128-byte field.</=
span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:12.8px">That&#39;s actually the correct encoding accor=
ding to RFC 8017.</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></s=
pan></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span=
 style=3D"font-size:12.8px">&gt;=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline">I also reject anything that&#39;s supposed to be=
 signed where</span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><spa=
n style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8p=
x;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;=
font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text=
-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(25=
5,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;floa=
t:none;display:inline">&gt; the sign bit is set:</span>

</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><s=
pan style=3D"font-size:12.8px">That&#39;s OK, it relates to mpint fields th=
at aren&#39;t the RSA signature though. The RSA signature is a string, not =
an mpint, and is unsigned.</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px=
"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar =
13, 2018 at 2:01 AM, Peter Gutmann <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&=
gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 =
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">denis =
bider &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com">denisbider.ietf@gmai=
l.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;What I cannot say is how many implementations might ACCEPT a signed enc=
oding<br>
&gt;if it is sent. If they do, I have no idea how many extra zeros such<br>
&gt;implementations might accept. It might be that there exist implementati=
ons<br>
&gt;(perhaps including ours!) that will accept an arbitrary number of leadi=
ng<br>
&gt;zeros.<br>
<br>
</span>My read-integer code accepts leading zeroes and strips them, based o=
n<br>
implementations that assume e.g. a 1024-bit RSA key always produces 128 byt=
es<br>
of output and memcpy() the result into a zero-filled 128-byte field.=C2=A0 =
I&#39;ve<br>
seen stuff like this in the past, in PGP code I think (the read-integer cod=
e<br>
is shared across a range of different crypto protocols).<br>
<br>
I also reject anything that&#39;s supposed to be signed where the sign bit =
is set:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 /* If we&#39;re reading a signed integer then t=
he sign bit can&#39;t be set<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0since this would produce a negativ=
e value.=C2=A0 This differs from the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0ASN.1 code, where the incorrect se=
tting of the sign bit is so common<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0that we always treat integers as u=
nsigned */<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--94eb2c0d047c4055e40567461364--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 07:49:35 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>> My read-integer code accepts leading zeroes and strips them,=0A=
>> based on implementations that assume e.g. a 1024-bit RSA key=0A=
>> always produces 128 bytes of output=0A=
>=0A=
>It does. :)=0A=
=0A=
No it doesn't, it can produce shorter lengths with increasingly smaller=0A=
probabilities.=0A=
=0A=
>> and memcpy() the result into a zero-filled 128-byte field.=0A=
>=0A=
>That's actually the correct encoding according to RFC 8017.=0A=
=0A=
D'you mean I2OSP?  That takes a variable length as a parameter, it's not fi=
xed=0A=
at any particular size.=0A=
=0A=
The only format I know of that requires a fixed-length field, for no known=
=0A=
reason, is X9.62 and everything derived from it, which in practice means=0A=
everything that does ECC except for Curve25519/X25519/Ed25519/etc, which do=
es=0A=
whatever it was djb felt like doing at the time.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 03:15:51 -0500
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>,  "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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--089e0822920ce56555056746dd9c
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

RFC 8017:

8.2 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#section-8.2>.  RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [...]


8.2.1 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.1>.  Signature
Generation Operation [...]

  Output:

  S   signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the
      length in octets of the RSA modulus n


  [...]

  c.  Convert the signature representative s to a signature S of
      length k octets (see Section 4.1
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#section-4.1>):

      S = I2OSP (s, k).


S is fixed size. It is exactly the size of the modulus.



On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:49 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >> My read-integer code accepts leading zeroes and strips them,
> >> based on implementations that assume e.g. a 1024-bit RSA key
> >> always produces 128 bytes of output
> >
> >It does. :)
>
> No it doesn't, it can produce shorter lengths with increasingly smaller
> probabilities.
>
> >> and memcpy() the result into a zero-filled 128-byte field.
> >
> >That's actually the correct encoding according to RFC 8017.
>
> D'you mean I2OSP?  That takes a variable length as a parameter, it's not
> fixed
> at any particular size.
>
> The only format I know of that requires a fixed-length field, for no known
> reason, is X9.62 and everything derived from it, which in practice means
> everything that does ECC except for Curve25519/X25519/Ed25519/etc, which
> does
> whatever it was djb felt like doing at the time.
>
> Peter.
>

--089e0822920ce56555056746dd9c
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">RFC 8017:<div><br></div><div>

<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;ma=
rgin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span class=3D"gmail-h3" =
style=3D"line-height:0pt;display:inline;white-space:pre;font-family:monospa=
ce;font-size:1em;font-weight:bold"><h3 style=3D"line-height:0pt;display:inl=
ine;white-space:pre;font-family:monospace;font-size:1em;font-weight:bold"><=
a class=3D"gmail-selflink" name=3D"section-8.2" href=3D"https://tools.ietf.=
org/html/rfc8017#section-8.2" style=3D"color:black;text-decoration:none">8.=
2</a>.  RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 </h3></span>[...]</pre></div><div><br></div><div>

<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;ma=
rgin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span class=3D"gmail-h4" =
style=3D"line-height:0pt;display:inline;white-space:pre;font-family:monospa=
ce;font-size:1em;font-weight:bold"><h4 style=3D"line-height:0pt;display:inl=
ine;white-space:pre;font-family:monospace;font-size:1em;font-weight:bold"><=
a class=3D"gmail-selflink" name=3D"section-8.2.1" href=3D"https://tools.iet=
f.org/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.1" style=3D"color:black;text-decoration:none=
">8.2.1</a>.  Signature Generation Operation </h4></span>[...]</pre><pre cl=
ass=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bo=
ttom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-st=
yle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" sty=
le=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)=
;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-=
transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decorati=
on-color:initial">  Output:

  S   signature, an octet string of length k, where k is the
      length in octets of the RSA modulus n</pre><pre class=3D"gmail-newpag=
e" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(=
0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:no=
rmal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px=
;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-de=
coration-color:initial"><br></pre><pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"fon=
t-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-sty=
le:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weigh=
t:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform=
:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:=
initial">  [...]</pre>
<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;ma=
rgin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">  c.  Convert the signatu=
re representative s to a signature S of
      length k octets (see <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017#s=
ection-4.1">Section 4.1</a>):

      S =3D I2OSP (s, k).
</pre><br class=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-newline"><font face=3D"arial, he=
lvetica, sans-serif">
S is fixed size. It is exactly the size of the modulus.</font></pre><pre cl=
ass=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-bo=
ttom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;f=
ont-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:st=
art;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-st=
yle:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><br></pre></div></div><div class=
=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 2:4=
9 AM, Peter Gutmann <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auck=
land.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrot=
e:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">denis bider &lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; w=
rites:<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; My read-integer code accepts leading zeroes and strips them,<br>
&gt;&gt; based on implementations that assume e.g. a 1024-bit RSA key<br>
&gt;&gt; always produces 128 bytes of output<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;It does. :)<br>
<br>
</span>No it doesn&#39;t, it can produce shorter lengths with increasingly =
smaller<br>
probabilities.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;&gt; and memcpy() the result into a zero-filled 128-byte field.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;That&#39;s actually the correct encoding according to RFC 8017.<br>
<br>
</span>D&#39;you mean I2OSP?=C2=A0 That takes a variable length as a parame=
ter, it&#39;s not fixed<br>
at any particular size.<br>
<br>
The only format I know of that requires a fixed-length field, for no known<=
br>
reason, is X9.62 and everything derived from it, which in practice means<br=
>
everything that does ECC except for Curve25519/X25519/Ed25519/etc, which do=
es<br>
whatever it was djb felt like doing at the time.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--089e0822920ce56555056746dd9c--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 08:39:25 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>S is fixed size. It is exactly the size of the modulus.=0A=
=0A=
Ah, I'd never noticed that (the original PKCS #1 hides that detail a lot=0A=
better).  However for the most common use, certificates and similar, this=
=0A=
would conflict with the ASN.1 DER requirements, which trump the PKCS #1 one=
s.=0A=
=0A=
Does anything non-ASN.1 do the fixed-length encoding?  My test code include=
s=0A=
special-case tests for RSA data blocks shorter than the modulus to make sur=
e=0A=
it can handle these cases, I know that there are at least some implementati=
ons=0A=
out there that do this because when I accidentally broke the variable-lengt=
h=0A=
handling I got complaints and included the self-test checks to make sure it=
=0A=
wouldn't happen again.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 04:07:54 -0500
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>,  "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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--94eb2c0d047c1776c1056747988b
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

>  Does anything non-ASN.1 do the fixed-length encoding?

Yes, SSH. :)


RFC 4253:

6.6 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-6.6>.  Public Key Algorithms


   Signing and verifying using this key format is performed according to
   the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme in [RFC3447
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447>] using the SHA-1 hash.

   The resulting signature is encoded as follows:

      string    "ssh-rsa"
      string    rsa_signature_blob

   The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing
   s (which is an integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned, and in
   network byte order).



The problem with this phrasing is that it doesn't say:

encode "S" as specified in RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5

It instead says:

- "according to the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme" (which produces "S" as output)

- "a string containing s (which is an integer, without lengths or padding,
unsigned, and in network byte order)"


... which sure seems to be strongly hinting that we're encoding "S", but it
is *just* shy of saying that. It specifies the exact same encoding as "S" -
but it does not say what to do with the occasional naturally occurring
leading 0.

Because of this ambiguity, the spec for "rsa-sha2-256" and "rsa-sha2-512" -
which is the subject of present discussion - comes out and says explicitly:
though shalt encode "S". Which is fixed-length.

It has been like that since the first version if the draft, in November
2015, which you reviewed. :)




On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 3:39 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >S is fixed size. It is exactly the size of the modulus.
>
> Ah, I'd never noticed that (the original PKCS #1 hides that detail a lot
> better).  However for the most common use, certificates and similar, this
> would conflict with the ASN.1 DER requirements, which trump the PKCS #1
> ones.
>
> Does anything non-ASN.1 do the fixed-length encoding?  My test code
> includes
> special-case tests for RSA data blocks shorter than the modulus to make
> sure
> it can handle these cases, I know that there are at least some
> implementations
> out there that do this because when I accidentally broke the
> variable-length
> handling I got complaints and included the self-test checks to make sure it
> wouldn't happen again.
>
> Peter.

--94eb2c0d047c1776c1056747988b
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline">Does anything non-ASN.1 do the fixed-length enco=
ding?</span>

<div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-cap=
s:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent=
:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:ini=
tial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:=
rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:norm=
al;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;l=
etter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;w=
hite-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-d=
ecoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:in=
line">Yes, SSH. :)</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font=
-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-li=
gatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;=
word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:in=
itial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span><=
/div><div><br></div><div>RFC 4253:</div><div><br></div><div>

<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;ma=
rgin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span class=3D"gmail-h3" =
style=3D"line-height:0pt;display:inline;white-space:pre;font-family:monospa=
ce;font-size:1em;font-weight:bold"><h3 style=3D"line-height:0pt;display:inl=
ine;white-space:pre;font-family:monospace;font-size:1em;font-weight:bold"><=
a class=3D"gmail-selflink" name=3D"section-6.6" href=3D"https://tools.ietf.=
org/html/rfc4253#section-6.6" style=3D"color:black;text-decoration:none">6.=
6</a>.  Public Key Algorithms</h3></span></pre>

<br></div><div>

<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;ma=
rgin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decora=
tion-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">   Signing and verifying =
using this key format is performed according to
   the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme in [<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/=
rfc3447" title=3D"&quot;Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cr=
yptography Specifications Version 2.1&quot;">RFC3447</a>] using the SHA-1 h=
ash.

   The resulting signature is encoded as follows:

      string    &quot;ssh-rsa&quot;
      string    rsa_signature_blob

   The value for &#39;rsa_signature_blob&#39; is encoded as a string contai=
ning
   s (which is an integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned, and in
   network byte order).
</pre><br class=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-newline">

<br></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">The problem with this phras=
ing is that it doesn&#39;t say:</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:1=
2.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">encode &quot;=
S&quot; as specified in RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5</span></div><div><span style=3D"f=
ont-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">It =
instead says:</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span>=
</div><div>- &quot;according to the

<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:1=
2.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:nor=
mal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;=
text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;=
float:none;display:inline">RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme&quot; (which produces &=
quot;S&quot; as output)</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-varia=
nt-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:no=
rmal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-sty=
le:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></s=
pan></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-se=
rif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-v=
ariant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;t=
ext-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;back=
ground-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration=
-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">- &quot;a string containing s=C2=
=A0(which is an integer, without lengths or padding, unsigned, and in netwo=
rk byte order)&quot;<pre class=3D"gmail-newpage" style=3D"font-style:normal=
;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;wor=
d-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initi=
al;text-decoration-color:initial;font-size:13.3333px;margin-top:0px;margin-=
bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)"></pre></span></div>

<div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:sm=
all;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:norma=
l;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;te=
xt-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style=
:initial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><b=
r></span></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-ser=
if;font-size:small;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;f=
ont-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-=
transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:in=
itial;text-decoration-color:initial"><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">... w=
hich sure seems to be strongly hinting that we&#39;re encoding &quot;S&quot=
;, but it is <i>just</i> shy of saying that. It specifies the exact same en=
coding as &quot;S&quot; - but it does not say what to do with the occasiona=
l naturally occurring leading 0.</span></div><div><br></div>Because of this=
 ambiguity, the spec for &quot;rsa-sha2-256&quot; and &quot;rsa-sha2-512&qu=
ot; - which is the subject of present discussion - comes out and says expli=
citly: though shalt encode &quot;S&quot;. Which is fixed-length.<div><br></=
div><div>It has been like that since the first version if the draft, in Nov=
ember 2015, which you reviewed. :)</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=
<div>

<div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-cap=
s:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent=
:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:ini=
tial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div></div></div></div><div cla=
ss=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 3=
:39 AM, Peter Gutmann <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.au=
ckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wr=
ote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border=
-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">denis bider &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;=
 writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;S is fixed size. It is exactly the size of the modulus.<br>
<br>
</span>Ah, I&#39;d never noticed that (the original PKCS #1 hides that deta=
il a lot<br>
better).=C2=A0 However for the most common use, certificates and similar, t=
his<br>
would conflict with the ASN.1 DER requirements, which trump the PKCS #1 one=
s.<br>
<br>
Does anything non-ASN.1 do the fixed-length encoding?=C2=A0 My test code in=
cludes<br>
special-case tests for RSA data blocks shorter than the modulus to make sur=
e<br>
it can handle these cases, I know that there are at least some implementati=
ons<br>
out there that do this because when I accidentally broke the variable-lengt=
h<br>
handling I got complaints and included the self-test checks to make sure it=
<br>
wouldn&#39;t happen again.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--94eb2c0d047c1776c1056747988b--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:18:39 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>The problem with this phrasing is that it doesn't say:=0A=
>=0A=
>encode "S" as specified in RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5=0A=
>=0A=
>It instead says:=0A=
>=0A=
>[...]=0A=
>=0A=
>- "a string containing s (which is an integer, without lengths or padding,=
=0A=
>unsigned, and in network byte order)"=0A=
=0A=
By saying "without lengths or padding" it seems to be saying that you=0A=
shouldn't zero-pad.  Or at least that's how I interpreted it.=0A=
=0A=
>Because of this ambiguity, the spec for "rsa-sha2-256" and "rsa-sha2-512" =
-=0A=
>which is the subject of present discussion - comes out and says explicitly=
:=0A=
>though shalt encode "S". Which is fixed-length.=0A=
=0A=
Given that this has been ambiguous for untold years, it might be a good ide=
a=0A=
to mention that you shouldn't expect to find this fixed-length zero-padded=
=0A=
encoding but may get a form, uh "without lengths or padding".  I don't care=
=0A=
either way since my code will handle both forms, but there are I-don't-know=
-=0A=
how-many different SSH implementations out there where we can't easily tell=
=0A=
what they do.=0A=
=0A=
>It has been like that since the first version if the draft, in November 20=
15,=0A=
>which you reviewed. :)=0A=
=0A=
Well, yeah, but that text says different things to different people :-).=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 05:20:56 -0500
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>,  "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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Well, to me, "without padding" means "don't add ornamentation to S". It
does not mean "trim leading zeros from S", since the spec says we're using
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, and the output of that is S with a fixed-length
encoding. :)

But yes:

> Given that this has been ambiguous for untold years,
> it might be a good idea to mention that you shouldn't
> expect to find this fixed-length zero-padded encoding
> but may get a form, uh "without lengths or padding".

That is what we're doing. :) The reason for this discussion is that I
requested a sentence added (to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2) to clarify that
both S and leading-zero-trimmed-S are acceptable.

denis



On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 4:18 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >The problem with this phrasing is that it doesn't say:
> >
> >encode "S" as specified in RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
> >
> >It instead says:
> >
> >[...]
> >
> >- "a string containing s (which is an integer, without lengths or padding,
> >unsigned, and in network byte order)"
>
> By saying "without lengths or padding" it seems to be saying that you
> shouldn't zero-pad.  Or at least that's how I interpreted it.
>
> >Because of this ambiguity, the spec for "rsa-sha2-256" and "rsa-sha2-512"
> -
> >which is the subject of present discussion - comes out and says
> explicitly:
> >though shalt encode "S". Which is fixed-length.
>
> Given that this has been ambiguous for untold years, it might be a good
> idea
> to mention that you shouldn't expect to find this fixed-length zero-padded
> encoding but may get a form, uh "without lengths or padding".  I don't care
> either way since my code will handle both forms, but there are
> I-don't-know-
> how-many different SSH implementations out there where we can't easily tell
> what they do.
>
> >It has been like that since the first version if the draft, in November
> 2015,
> >which you reviewed. :)
>
> Well, yeah, but that text says different things to different people :-).
>
> Peter.
>

--001a114873f240331c0567489d5c
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Well, to me, &quot;without padding&quot; means &quot;don&#=
39;t add ornamentation to S&quot;. It does not mean &quot;trim leading zero=
s from S&quot;, since the spec says we&#39;re using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, and =
the output of that is S with a fixed-length encoding. :)<div><br></div><div=
>But yes:</div><div><br></div><div>&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34=
,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-v=
ariant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-spac=
e:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration=
-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">Giv=
en that this has been ambiguous for untold years,</span></div><div><span st=
yle=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;fo=
nt-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font=
-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-tra=
nsform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:no=
ne;display:inline">&gt; it might be a good idea=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"=
color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight=
:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:=
none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);=
text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;disp=
lay:inline">to mention that you shouldn&#39;t</span></div><div><span style=
=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-=
style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-we=
ight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transf=
orm:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;=
display:inline">&gt; expect to find this fixed-length zero-padded=C2=A0</sp=
an><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:=
normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initi=
al;float:none;display:inline">encoding</span></div><div><span style=3D"colo=
r:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:no=
rmal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400=
;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none=
;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text=
-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:=
inline">&gt; but may get a form, uh &quot;without lengths or padding&quot;.=
</span>

</div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;=
font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-varia=
nt-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-=
indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-col=
or:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"=
color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight=
:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:=
none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);=
text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;disp=
lay:inline">That is what we&#39;re doing. :) The reason for this discussion=
 is that I requested a sentence added (to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2) to cl=
arify that both S and leading-zero-trimmed-S are acceptable.</span></div><d=
iv><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:=
normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0=
px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initi=
al;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rg=
b(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal=
;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whi=
te-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-dec=
oration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inli=
ne">denis</span></div><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spac=
ing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div><div=
><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:=
12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:no=
rmal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px=
;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial=
;float:none;display:inline"><br></span></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extr=
a"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 4:18 AM, Peter Gu=
tmann <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockqu=
ote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc s=
olid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">denis bider &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:d=
enisbider.ietf@gmail.com">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;The problem with this phrasing is that it doesn&#39;t say:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;encode &quot;S&quot; as specified in RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;It instead says:<br>
&gt;<br>
</span>&gt;[...]<br>
<span class=3D"">&gt;<br>
&gt;- &quot;a string containing s (which is an integer, without lengths or =
padding,<br>
&gt;unsigned, and in network byte order)&quot;<br>
<br>
</span>By saying &quot;without lengths or padding&quot; it seems to be sayi=
ng that you<br>
shouldn&#39;t zero-pad.=C2=A0 Or at least that&#39;s how I interpreted it.<=
br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;Because of this ambiguity, the spec for &quot;rsa-sha2-256&quot; and &q=
uot;rsa-sha2-512&quot; -<br>
&gt;which is the subject of present discussion - comes out and says explici=
tly:<br>
&gt;though shalt encode &quot;S&quot;. Which is fixed-length.<br>
<br>
</span>Given that this has been ambiguous for untold years, it might be a g=
ood idea<br>
to mention that you shouldn&#39;t expect to find this fixed-length zero-pad=
ded<br>
encoding but may get a form, uh &quot;without lengths or padding&quot;.=C2=
=A0 I don&#39;t care<br>
either way since my code will handle both forms, but there are I-don&#39;t-=
know-<br>
how-many different SSH implementations out there where we can&#39;t easily =
tell<br>
what they do.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;It has been like that since the first version if the draft, in November=
 2015,<br>
&gt;which you reviewed. :)<br>
<br>
</span>Well, yeah, but that text says different things to different people =
:-).<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

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To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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On Mar 12, 2018, at 9:28 PM, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> =
wrote:
> Yes - this was the "mpint" idea that Mark broached. In SSH, the =
"mpint" type is used to encode a signed integer, and prepends the \0 =
byte if the value is positive and its high bit is on. This is necessary =
to distinguish the positive value from a negative one.
>=20
> As far as I know, there does NOT exist any SSH implementation that =
would require such an erroneous encoding for an RSA signature.
>=20
> If such an implementation did exist, it would fail to validate a very =
large proportion of valid signatures as currently generated by most SSH =
servers and clients. Unless my assumptions about RSA are incorrect, a =
very large proportion of signatures, e.g. 1/3 - or up to 1/2 depending =
on the modulus - will have the high bit set.
>=20
> An implementation that would incorrectly require a signed encoding =
(like "mpint") would be immediately discovered in development. I have =
not seen it in practice.

If an implementation did a byte-wise compare of the signature, I agree =
that this would be discovered very quickly. However, a byte-wise compare =
would also trigger interoperability failures with implementations which =
strip leading zeroes. If there are implementations stripping leading =
zeroes in some cases without triggering interoperability failures, I =
don=E2=80=99t see why adding zeroes would would be any less likely, =
especially if code such as the =E2=80=9Cmpint=E2=80=9D conversion was =
improperly reused. If the bytes are converted back to an integer before =
being compared, the comparison would succeed in either of these cases, =
while if they were compared as byte strings, both would fail.

> What I cannot say is how many implementations might ACCEPT a signed =
encoding if it is sent. If they do, I have no idea how many extra zeros =
such implementations might accept. It might be that there exist =
implementations (perhaps including ours!) that will accept an arbitrary =
number of leading zeros. Perhaps there may be so many zeros as to fill =
up to the maximum size of the SSH packet the implementation accepts.
>=20
> If they do, though, I'm not aware of an attack that could be mounted =
based on that, and it won't arise as a compatibility issue. So I think =
it's not worthwhile to mention.

I think the important thing here is to make sure the text is very clear =
that the _correct_ encoding is an unsigned fixed-length byte string with =
a length matching that of the RSA modulus n, as described in RFC 3447 =
section 8.2. On the verification side, I would actually be ok with =
removing the =E2=80=9CMAY=E2=80=9D (and the sentence prior to it) =
entirely, but if we do keep it I=E2=80=99m not sure why the text should =
limit things to only shorter encodings.
--=20
Ron Frederick
ronf@timeheart.net




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References: <4C40F019-21FB-46AC-95D3-CC94BB976AAB@akamai.com> <12087.1520816187@eng-mail01.juniper.net> <CADPMZDCwRN-GHXhAe=-xPFHMnUBN39UWmENGNUeLbFkneEAgcA@mail.gmail.com> <17856.1520829824@eng-mail01.juniper.net> <CADPMZDBnG1hv5D74vLv2bXqxZjceJgHQ9oYrufKHskLdV7nRSQ@mail.gmail.com> <28093.1520848786@eng-mail01.juniper.net> <40465B0B-FED4-4C16-A5C3-7E2C04E1B666@timeheart.net> <CADPMZDDXi_h1uXzWJy37HXMrogQxJ5+Sd-G7ZZzfZJX_s390TA@mail.gmail.com> <E223CA3D-EED6-42E8-A013-BAD2A0490C2C@timeheart.net>
From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 05:55:55 -0500
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To: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>
Cc: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>, "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>,  "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/3-bVRAGvgOwCnfG6eisZNrv8Bl0>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Confirming a change to draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12
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--94eb2c0d047c32e2a405675d380c
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

> If there are implementations stripping leading zeroes in some cases
> without triggering interoperability failures, I don=E2=80=99t see why add=
ing
> zeroes would would be any less likely

I have a high degree of confidence that no such implementations exist.

The reason for this high degree of confidence is that certain older
versions of our software - some of which are still in use, despite our
attempts to get people to upgrade - had a bug which would be triggered by
overlong signatures. The bug is such that if it was ever triggered, it
would certainly be brought to us.

We have never received news of this bug being triggered.


> I=E2=80=99m not sure why the text should limit things to only shorter enc=
odings.

Because the text is to warn implementers of existing practice, not
non-existent practice. :) As explained above, I have a high degree of
confidence that there are no implementations that send overlong signatures.



On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:17 AM, Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> wrote:

> On Mar 12, 2018, at 9:28 PM, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > Yes - this was the "mpint" idea that Mark broached. In SSH, the "mpint"
> type is used to encode a signed integer, and prepends the \0 byte if the
> value is positive and its high bit is on. This is necessary to distinguis=
h
> the positive value from a negative one.
> >
> > As far as I know, there does NOT exist any SSH implementation that woul=
d
> require such an erroneous encoding for an RSA signature.
> >
> > If such an implementation did exist, it would fail to validate a very
> large proportion of valid signatures as currently generated by most SSH
> servers and clients. Unless my assumptions about RSA are incorrect, a ver=
y
> large proportion of signatures, e.g. 1/3 - or up to 1/2 depending on the
> modulus - will have the high bit set.
> >
> > An implementation that would incorrectly require a signed encoding (lik=
e
> "mpint") would be immediately discovered in development. I have not seen =
it
> in practice.
>
> If an implementation did a byte-wise compare of the signature, I agree
> that this would be discovered very quickly. However, a byte-wise compare
> would also trigger interoperability failures with implementations which
> strip leading zeroes. If there are implementations stripping leading zero=
es
> in some cases without triggering interoperability failures, I don=E2=80=
=99t see why
> adding zeroes would would be any less likely, especially if code such as
> the =E2=80=9Cmpint=E2=80=9D conversion was improperly reused. If the byte=
s are converted
> back to an integer before being compared, the comparison would succeed in
> either of these cases, while if they were compared as byte strings, both
> would fail.
>
> > What I cannot say is how many implementations might ACCEPT a signed
> encoding if it is sent. If they do, I have no idea how many extra zeros
> such implementations might accept. It might be that there exist
> implementations (perhaps including ours!) that will accept an arbitrary
> number of leading zeros. Perhaps there may be so many zeros as to fill up
> to the maximum size of the SSH packet the implementation accepts.
> >
> > If they do, though, I'm not aware of an attack that could be mounted
> based on that, and it won't arise as a compatibility issue. So I think it=
's
> not worthwhile to mention.
>
> I think the important thing here is to make sure the text is very clear
> that the _correct_ encoding is an unsigned fixed-length byte string with =
a
> length matching that of the RSA modulus n, as described in RFC 3447 secti=
on
> 8.2. On the verification side, I would actually be ok with removing the
> =E2=80=9CMAY=E2=80=9D (and the sentence prior to it) entirely, but if we =
do keep it I=E2=80=99m not
> sure why the text should limit things to only shorter encodings.
> --
> Ron Frederick
> ronf@timeheart.net
>
>
>
>

--94eb2c0d047c32e2a405675d380c
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:a=
rial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:n=
ormal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-a=
lign:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;word-spac=
ing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;tex=
t-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">If there are implemen=
tations stripping leading zeroes in some cases</span><div><span style=3D"co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:=
normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:4=
00;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:no=
ne;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);te=
xt-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;displa=
y:inline">&gt; without=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">trigger=
ing interoperability failures, I don=E2=80=99t see why adding</span></div><=
div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">&gt; zeroes would would be any less li=
kely</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><di=
v><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">I have a high degree of confidence that =
no such implementations exist.</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12=
.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">The reason for=
 this high degree of confidence is that certain older versions of our softw=
are - some of which are still in use, despite our attempts to get people to=
 upgrade - had a bug which would be triggered by overlong signatures. The b=
ug is such that if it was ever triggered, it would certainly be brought to =
us.</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div=
><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px">We have never received news of this bug b=
eing triggered.</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></spa=
n></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span s=
tyle=3D"font-size:12.8px">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font=
-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;font-variant-li=
gatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;white-space:normal;=
word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:in=
itial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inline">I=E2=80=99m =
not sure why the text should limit things to only shorter encodings.</span>

</span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><span style=3D"color:rgb=
(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-style:normal;=
font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;whit=
e-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-deco=
ration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;display:inlin=
e"><br></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><span styl=
e=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font=
-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-w=
eight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-trans=
form:none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none=
;display:inline">Because the text is to warn implementers of existing pract=
ice, not non-existent practice. :) As explained above,=C2=A0<span style=3D"=
color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif;font-size:12.8px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight=
:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:=
none;white-space:normal;word-spacing:0px;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);=
text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;float:none;disp=
lay:inline">I have a high degree of confidence that there are no implementa=
tions that send overlong signatures.</span>

</span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div>=
<div><span style=3D"font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div></div><div class=3D"=
gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:17 A=
M, Ron Frederick <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net=
" target=3D"_blank">ronf@timeheart.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote=
 class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc soli=
d;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">On Mar 12, 2018, at 9:28 PM, denis bid=
er &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com">denisbider.ietf@gmail.c=
om</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Yes - this was the &quot;mpint&quot; idea that Mark broached. In SSH, =
the &quot;mpint&quot; type is used to encode a signed integer, and prepends=
 the \0 byte if the value is positive and its high bit is on. This is neces=
sary to distinguish the positive value from a negative one.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; As far as I know, there does NOT exist any SSH implementation that wou=
ld require such an erroneous encoding for an RSA signature.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If such an implementation did exist, it would fail to validate a very =
large proportion of valid signatures as currently generated by most SSH ser=
vers and clients. Unless my assumptions about RSA are incorrect, a very lar=
ge proportion of signatures, e.g. 1/3 - or up to 1/2 depending on the modul=
us - will have the high bit set.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; An implementation that would incorrectly require a signed encoding (li=
ke &quot;mpint&quot;) would be immediately discovered in development. I hav=
e not seen it in practice.<br>
<br>
</span>If an implementation did a byte-wise compare of the signature, I agr=
ee that this would be discovered very quickly. However, a byte-wise compare=
 would also trigger interoperability failures with implementations which st=
rip leading zeroes. If there are implementations stripping leading zeroes i=
n some cases without triggering interoperability failures, I don=E2=80=99t =
see why adding zeroes would would be any less likely, especially if code su=
ch as the =E2=80=9Cmpint=E2=80=9D conversion was improperly reused. If the =
bytes are converted back to an integer before being compared, the compariso=
n would succeed in either of these cases, while if they were compared as by=
te strings, both would fail.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; What I cannot say is how many implementations might ACCEPT a signed en=
coding if it is sent. If they do, I have no idea how many extra zeros such =
implementations might accept. It might be that there exist implementations =
(perhaps including ours!) that will accept an arbitrary number of leading z=
eros. Perhaps there may be so many zeros as to fill up to the maximum size =
of the SSH packet the implementation accepts.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; If they do, though, I&#39;m not aware of an attack that could be mount=
ed based on that, and it won&#39;t arise as a compatibility issue. So I thi=
nk it&#39;s not worthwhile to mention.<br>
<br>
</span>I think the important thing here is to make sure the text is very cl=
ear that the _correct_ encoding is an unsigned fixed-length byte string wit=
h a length matching that of the RSA modulus n, as described in RFC 3447 sec=
tion 8.2. On the verification side, I would actually be ok with removing th=
e =E2=80=9CMAY=E2=80=9D (and the sentence prior to it) entirely, but if we =
do keep it I=E2=80=99m not sure why the text should limit things to only sh=
orter encodings.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888">--<br>
Ron Frederick<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net">ronf@timeheart.net</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--94eb2c0d047c32e2a405675d380c--


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Subject: [Curdle] =?utf-8?q?RFC_8308_on_Extension_Negotiation_in_the_Secur?= =?utf-8?q?e_Shell_=28SSH=29_Protocol?=
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 8308

        Title:      Extension Negotiation in the 
                    Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol 
        Author:     D. Bider
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       March 2018
        Mailbox:    ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com
        Pages:      14
        Characters: 29204
        Updates:    RFC 4251, RFC 4252, RFC 4253, RFC 4254

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-15.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8308

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC8308

This memo updates RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, and 4254 by defining a
mechanism for Secure Shell (SSH) clients and servers to exchange
information about supported protocol extensions confidentially after
SSH key exchange.

This document is a product of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official
Internet Protocol Standards (https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards) for the 
standardization state and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this 
memo is unlimited.

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The RFC Editor Team
Association Management Solutions, LLC



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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 8332

        Title:      Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 
                    in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol 
        Author:     D. Bider
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       March 2018
        Mailbox:    ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com
        Pages:      9
        Characters: 17873
        Updates:    RFC 4252, RFC 4253

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8332

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC8332

This memo updates RFCs 4252 and 4253 to define new public key
algorithms for use of RSA keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 for server
and client authentication in SSH connections.

This document is a product of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official
Internet Protocol Standards (https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards) for the 
standardization state and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this 
memo is unlimited.

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specifically noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for
unlimited distribution.


The RFC Editor Team
Association Management Solutions, LLC



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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
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CC: "drafts-update-ref@iana.org" <drafts-update-ref@iana.org>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] RFC 8332 on Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] RFC 8332 on Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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Thank you all for your effort and congratulation Denis!
Yours,=20
Daniel

-----Original Message-----
From: Curdle [mailto:curdle-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of rfc-editor@rfc-e=
ditor.org
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2018 10:23 PM
To: ietf-announce@ietf.org; rfc-dist@rfc-editor.org
Cc: drafts-update-ref@iana.org; curdle@ietf.org; rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: [Curdle] RFC 8332 on Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in t=
he Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

       =20
        RFC 8332

        Title:      Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512=20
                    in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol=20
        Author:     D. Bider
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       March 2018
        Mailbox:    ietf-ssh3@denisbider.com
        Pages:      9
        Characters: 17873
        Updates:    RFC 4252, RFC 4253

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-12.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8332

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC8332

This memo updates RFCs 4252 and 4253 to define new public key algorithms fo=
r use of RSA keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 for server and client authentica=
tion in SSH connections.

This document is a product of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Enc=
ryption Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track protoc=
ol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for =
improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Official Internet=
 Protocol Standards (https://www.rfc-editor.org/standards) for the standard=
ization state and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is un=
limited.

This announcement is sent to the IETF-Announce and rfc-dist lists.
To subscribe or unsubscribe, see
  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce
  https://mailman.rfc-editor.org/mailman/listinfo/rfc-dist

For searching the RFC series, see https://www.rfc-editor.org/search For dow=
nloading RFCs, see https://www.rfc-editor.org/retrieve/bulk

Requests for special distribution should be addressed to either the author =
of the RFC in question, or to rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org.  Unless specifical=
ly noted otherwise on the RFC itself, all RFCs are for unlimited distributi=
on.


The RFC Editor Team
Association Management Solutions, LLC


_______________________________________________
Curdle mailing list
Curdle@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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Curdle <curdle-bounces@ietf.org> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>        RFC 8308=0A=
>=0A=
>      Title:      Extension Negotiation in the=0A=
>                    Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol=0A=
=0A=
Are there any publicly-accessible servers running this that can be used for=
 interop testing?=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


From nobody Tue Mar 20 04:52:27 2018
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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 19:14:44 -0500
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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That depends - which extensions do you have in mind to test? In what way in
particular would you like to test them?

If you are looking for "server-sig-algs", this is by now fairly widely
implemented in e.g. the latest versions of OpenSSH, and Bitvise SSH Server
and Client versions 7.xx.

If you are looking for "delay-compression", "no-flow-control" and
"elevation", these are implemented in the current Bitvise SSH Server
development version which we plan to release as version 8.xx. I can make
this available if you would like to test one of these extensions.

denis



On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 4:40 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Curdle <curdle-bounces@ietf.org> writes:
>
> >        RFC 8308
> >
> >      Title:      Extension Negotiation in the
> >                    Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
>
> Are there any publicly-accessible servers running this that can be used
> for interop testing?
>
> Peter.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">That depends - which extensions do you have in mind to tes=
t? In what way in particular would you like to test them?<div><br></div><di=
v>If you are looking for &quot;server-sig-algs&quot;, this is by now fairly=
 widely implemented in e.g. the latest versions of OpenSSH, and Bitvise SSH=
 Server and Client versions 7.xx.</div><div><br></div><div>If you are looki=
ng for &quot;delay-compression&quot;, &quot;no-flow-control&quot; and &quot=
;elevation&quot;, these are implemented in the current Bitvise SSH Server d=
evelopment version which we plan to release as version 8.xx. I can make thi=
s available if you would like to test one of these extensions.</div><div><b=
r></div><div>denis</div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"g=
mail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 4:40 AM,=
 Peter Gutmann <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.=
ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1=
px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">Curdle &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:curdle-bounces@ietf.org">curdle-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC 8308<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Title:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Extension Negotiation i=
n the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 S=
ecure Shell (SSH) Protocol<br>
<br>
</span>Are there any publicly-accessible servers running this that can be u=
sed for interop testing?<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.<br>
</font></span><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br>
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>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114a9bb20b57400567e11471--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2018 05:48:57 +0000
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References: <20180319222314.9400DB810E0@rfc-editor.org> <1521538833144.57449@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, <CADPMZDAaJkjwhW8NnSgn=a82VKEdf0uhTbNHcWyqWUjEXFvzKw@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>That depends - which extensions do you have in mind to test? In what way i=
n=0A=
>particular would you like to test them?=0A=
=0A=
It was actually meant for both of the new RFCs, the RSA one to regression-t=
est=0A=
that nothing has broken since versions based on the drafts were written (e.=
g.=0A=
in regard to fixed- vs variable-length RSA blocks :-), the extension one ju=
st=0A=
to check that extensions sent and received are correctly handled without=0A=
anything choking.  The actual extension doesn't matter, just the message fl=
ow=0A=
handling.=0A=
=0A=
>If you are looking for "server-sig-algs", this is by now fairly widely=0A=
>implemented in e.g. the latest versions of OpenSSH, and Bitvise SSH Server=
=0A=
>and Client versions 7.xx.=0A=
=0A=
OK, I'll see if I can set up a recent OpenSSH to bounce some messages off. =
 I=0A=
just want to make sure that both RSA and extension messages are handled=0A=
correctly.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 04:03:15 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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--001a1141af38034f400567fc94bb
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

EXT_INFO with the "server-sig-algs" extension is widely deployed. It's well
tested with rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 signatures, and I have no
concerns about it. As far as I know, there are no compatibility issues to
be experienced by an implementation that follows the just-published spec.

Where I'm less comfortable is the hinges that are not yet widely deployed.
As long as a hinge is not in common use, it is in danger of rusting. These
hinges include:

- EXT_INFO sent by client (only server sends it for "server-sig-algs").

- Extensions with binary extension-value (for example "delay-compression").

Both of these hinges will be exercised in our next SSH Server and Client
versions (8.xx). However, our implementation has presence on only one
platform, so I would love to see "delay-compression" implemented more
widely so that these hinges do not rust.

This hinge did already rust in the initial implementation by OpenSSH
(binary extension-value caused disconnect until version 7.5).

"delay-compression" involves both client-side EXT_INFO and a binary
extension-value, so it is the single most effective thing to implement to
avoid rust.



On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 12:48 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >That depends - which extensions do you have in mind to test? In what way
> in
> >particular would you like to test them?
>
> It was actually meant for both of the new RFCs, the RSA one to
> regression-test
> that nothing has broken since versions based on the drafts were written
> (e.g.
> in regard to fixed- vs variable-length RSA blocks :-), the extension one
> just
> to check that extensions sent and received are correctly handled without
> anything choking.  The actual extension doesn't matter, just the message
> flow
> handling.
>
> >If you are looking for "server-sig-algs", this is by now fairly widely
> >implemented in e.g. the latest versions of OpenSSH, and Bitvise SSH Server
> >and Client versions 7.xx.
>
> OK, I'll see if I can set up a recent OpenSSH to bounce some messages
> off.  I
> just want to make sure that both RSA and extension messages are handled
> correctly.
>
> Peter.

--001a1141af38034f400567fc94bb
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">EXT_INFO with the &quot;server-sig-algs&quot; extension is=
 widely deployed. It&#39;s well tested with rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 s=
ignatures, and I have no concerns about it. As far as I know, there are no =
compatibility issues to be experienced by an implementation that follows th=
e just-published spec.<div><br></div><div>Where I&#39;m less comfortable is=
 the hinges that are not yet widely deployed. As long as a hinge is not in =
common use, it is in danger of rusting. These hinges include:</div><div><br=
></div><div>- EXT_INFO sent by client (only server sends it for &quot;serve=
r-sig-algs&quot;).</div><div><br></div><div>- Extensions with binary extens=
ion-value (for example &quot;delay-compression&quot;).</div><div><br></div>=
<div>Both of these hinges will be exercised in our next SSH Server and Clie=
nt versions (8.xx). However, our implementation has presence on only one pl=
atform, so I would love to see &quot;delay-compression&quot; implemented mo=
re widely so that these hinges do not rust.</div><div><br></div><div>This h=
inge did already rust in the initial implementation by OpenSSH (binary exte=
nsion-value caused disconnect until version 7.5).</div><div><br></div><div>=
&quot;delay-compression&quot; involves both client-side EXT_INFO and a bina=
ry extension-value, so it is the single most effective thing to implement t=
o avoid rust.<br><br class=3D"gmail-Apple-interchange-newline">

</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gma=
il_quote">On Wed, Mar 21, 2018 at 12:48 AM, Peter Gutmann <span dir=3D"ltr"=
>&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001=
@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<span class=3D"">denis bider &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.co=
m">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;That depends - which extensions do you have in mind to test? In what wa=
y in<br>
&gt;particular would you like to test them?<br>
<br>
</span>It was actually meant for both of the new RFCs, the RSA one to regre=
ssion-test<br>
that nothing has broken since versions based on the drafts were written (e.=
g.<br>
in regard to fixed- vs variable-length RSA blocks :-), the extension one ju=
st<br>
to check that extensions sent and received are correctly handled without<br=
>
anything choking.=C2=A0 The actual extension doesn&#39;t matter, just the m=
essage flow<br>
handling.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;If you are looking for &quot;server-sig-algs&quot;, this is by now fair=
ly widely<br>
&gt;implemented in e.g. the latest versions of OpenSSH, and Bitvise SSH Ser=
ver<br>
&gt;and Client versions 7.xx.<br>
<br>
</span>OK, I&#39;ll see if I can set up a recent OpenSSH to bounce some mes=
sages off.=C2=A0 I<br>
just want to make sure that both RSA and extension messages are handled<br>
correctly.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a1141af38034f400567fc94bb--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 10:13:40 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>Where I'm less comfortable is the hinges that are not yet widely deployed.=
 As=0A=
>long as a hinge is not in common use, it is in danger of rusting. These hi=
nges=0A=
>include:=0A=
>=0A=
>- EXT_INFO sent by client (only server sends it for "server-sig-algs").=0A=
>- Extensions with binary extension-value (for example "delay-compression")=
.=0A=
=0A=
I was going to try sending in extensions with undefined values, and binary=
=0A=
data embdded in them, to see what happens.  If it's the same as previous, i=
n=0A=
some instances inadvertent, cases of sending unexpected data values then I=
=0A=
expect all sorts of fireworks.=0A=
=0A=
>EXT_INFO with the "server-sig-algs" extension is widely deployed. It's wel=
l=0A=
>tested with rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 signatures, and I have no concer=
ns=0A=
>about it. As far as I know, there are no compatibility issues to be=0A=
>experienced by an implementation that follows the just-published spec.=0A=
=0A=
OK, that's good to know.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 06:55:14 -0500
Message-ID: <CADPMZDBHGJrn+-pgyKnLmVjA06nE_jm841aYQbwZ6nRew6X0tw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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--001a114ab6f60f4cd10567fefbb8
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Those sound like good ideas. I would like more people to try that. :)

If you want to test with Bitvise SSH Server, you can download it free of
charge from our website. It's easy to set up if you have a Windows
computer. You can also access it already set up here:

Host: experiment.bitvise.com
Port: 10739
User: test
Pass: test

If you want to test RSA authentication, the server will provide
instructions in the SSH authentication banner, or you can find them in
Welcome.txt after you are logged in.

If you want to test Bitvise SSH Client, you can also download it free of
charge from our website. It can be used free of cost in any environment.
You just need a Windows installation.

The real juice however would be in testing other implementations. I would
suggest setting up and trying the latest OpenSSH versions, both server and
client.


On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 5:13 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >Where I'm less comfortable is the hinges that are not yet widely
> deployed. As
> >long as a hinge is not in common use, it is in danger of rusting. These
> hinges
> >include:
> >
> >- EXT_INFO sent by client (only server sends it for "server-sig-algs").
> >- Extensions with binary extension-value (for example
> "delay-compression").
>
> I was going to try sending in extensions with undefined values, and binary
> data embdded in them, to see what happens.  If it's the same as previous,
> in
> some instances inadvertent, cases of sending unexpected data values then I
> expect all sorts of fireworks.
>
> >EXT_INFO with the "server-sig-algs" extension is widely deployed. It's
> well
> >tested with rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 signatures, and I have no
> concerns
> >about it. As far as I know, there are no compatibility issues to be
> >experienced by an implementation that follows the just-published spec.
>
> OK, that's good to know.
>
> Peter.
>

--001a114ab6f60f4cd10567fefbb8
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Those sound like good ideas. I would like more people to t=
ry that. :)<div><br></div><div>If you want to test with Bitvise SSH Server,=
 you can download it free of charge from our website. It&#39;s easy to set =
up if you have a Windows computer. You can also access it already set up he=
re:</div><div><br></div><div>Host: <a href=3D"http://experiment.bitvise.com=
">experiment.bitvise.com</a></div><div>Port: 10739</div><div>User: test</di=
v><div>Pass: test</div><div><br></div><div>If you want to test RSA authenti=
cation, the server will provide instructions in the SSH authentication bann=
er, or you can find them in Welcome.txt after you are logged in.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>If you want to test Bitvise SSH Client, you can also downloa=
d it free of charge from our website. It can be used free of cost in any en=
vironment. You just need a Windows installation.</div><div><br></div><div>T=
he real juice however would be in testing other implementations. I would su=
ggest setting up and trying the latest OpenSSH versions, both server and cl=
ient.</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=
=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 5:13 AM, Peter Gutmann <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank"=
>pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex"><span class=3D"">denis bider &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@=
gmail.com">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;Where I&#39;m less comfortable is the hinges that are not yet widely de=
ployed. As<br>
&gt;long as a hinge is not in common use, it is in danger of rusting. These=
 hinges<br>
&gt;include:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;- EXT_INFO sent by client (only server sends it for &quot;server-sig-al=
gs&quot;).<br>
&gt;- Extensions with binary extension-value (for example &quot;delay-compr=
ession&quot;).<br>
<br>
</span>I was going to try sending in extensions with undefined values, and =
binary<br>
data embdded in them, to see what happens.=C2=A0 If it&#39;s the same as pr=
evious, in<br>
some instances inadvertent, cases of sending unexpected data values then I<=
br>
expect all sorts of fireworks.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;EXT_INFO with the &quot;server-sig-algs&quot; extension is widely deplo=
yed. It&#39;s well<br>
&gt;tested with rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 signatures, and I have no con=
cerns<br>
&gt;about it. As far as I know, there are no compatibility issues to be<br>
&gt;experienced by an implementation that follows the just-published spec.<=
br>
<br>
</span>OK, that&#39;s good to know.<br>
<span class=3D"HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>

--001a114ab6f60f4cd10567fefbb8--


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 06:58:44 -0500
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Cc: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] RFC 8308 on Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
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To be sure, the latest OpenSSH version is 7.6. I know that versions up to
7.5 will disconnect on receiving binary extension-values. Fortunately
OpenSSH makes it easy to identify itself, so we have a workaround for that
(not sending "delay-compression" to OpenSSH 7.5 and older, which does not
support "delay-compression" anyway).

On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 6:55 AM, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Those sound like good ideas. I would like more people to try that. :)
>
> If you want to test with Bitvise SSH Server, you can download it free of
> charge from our website. It's easy to set up if you have a Windows
> computer. You can also access it already set up here:
>
> Host: experiment.bitvise.com
> Port: 10739
> User: test
> Pass: test
>
> If you want to test RSA authentication, the server will provide
> instructions in the SSH authentication banner, or you can find them in
> Welcome.txt after you are logged in.
>
> If you want to test Bitvise SSH Client, you can also download it free of
> charge from our website. It can be used free of cost in any environment.
> You just need a Windows installation.
>
> The real juice however would be in testing other implementations. I would
> suggest setting up and trying the latest OpenSSH versions, both server and
> client.
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 5:13 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
> wrote:
>
>> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>>
>> >Where I'm less comfortable is the hinges that are not yet widely
>> deployed. As
>> >long as a hinge is not in common use, it is in danger of rusting. These
>> hinges
>> >include:
>> >
>> >- EXT_INFO sent by client (only server sends it for "server-sig-algs").
>> >- Extensions with binary extension-value (for example
>> "delay-compression").
>>
>> I was going to try sending in extensions with undefined values, and binary
>> data embdded in them, to see what happens.  If it's the same as previous,
>> in
>> some instances inadvertent, cases of sending unexpected data values then I
>> expect all sorts of fireworks.
>>
>> >EXT_INFO with the "server-sig-algs" extension is widely deployed. It's
>> well
>> >tested with rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 signatures, and I have no
>> concerns
>> >about it. As far as I know, there are no compatibility issues to be
>> >experienced by an implementation that follows the just-published spec.
>>
>> OK, that's good to know.
>>
>> Peter.
>>
>
>

--089e0822920c8c2a820567ff07e4
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
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<div dir=3D"ltr">To be sure, the latest OpenSSH version is 7.6. I know that=
 versions up to 7.5 will disconnect on receiving binary extension-values. F=
ortunately OpenSSH makes it easy to identify itself, so we have a workaroun=
d for that (not sending &quot;delay-compression&quot; to OpenSSH 7.5 and ol=
der, which does not support &quot;delay-compression&quot; anyway).</div><di=
v class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 22, 2018=
 at 6:55 AM, denis bider <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisbider=
.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>=
 wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;bor=
der-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Those sound like=
 good ideas. I would like more people to try that. :)<div><br></div><div>If=
 you want to test with Bitvise SSH Server, you can download it free of char=
ge from our website. It&#39;s easy to set up if you have a Windows computer=
. You can also access it already set up here:</div><div><br></div><div>Host=
: <a href=3D"http://experiment.bitvise.com" target=3D"_blank">experiment.bi=
tvise.com</a></div><div>Port: 10739</div><div>User: test</div><div>Pass: te=
st</div><div><br></div><div>If you want to test RSA authentication, the ser=
ver will provide instructions in the SSH authentication banner, or you can =
find them in Welcome.txt after you are logged in.</div><div><br></div><div>=
If you want to test Bitvise SSH Client, you can also download it free of ch=
arge from our website. It can be used free of cost in any environment. You =
just need a Windows installation.</div><div><br></div><div>The real juice h=
owever would be in testing other implementations. I would suggest setting u=
p and trying the latest OpenSSH versions, both server and client.</div><div=
><br></div></div><div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><div class=3D"gmai=
l_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 5:13 AM, Pe=
ter Gutmann <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.=
nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><b=
lockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px =
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>denis bider &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisb=
ider.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wr=
ites:<br>
<br>
&gt;Where I&#39;m less comfortable is the hinges that are not yet widely de=
ployed. As<br>
&gt;long as a hinge is not in common use, it is in danger of rusting. These=
 hinges<br>
&gt;include:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;- EXT_INFO sent by client (only server sends it for &quot;server-sig-al=
gs&quot;).<br>
&gt;- Extensions with binary extension-value (for example &quot;delay-compr=
ession&quot;).<br>
<br>
</span>I was going to try sending in extensions with undefined values, and =
binary<br>
data embdded in them, to see what happens.=C2=A0 If it&#39;s the same as pr=
evious, in<br>
some instances inadvertent, cases of sending unexpected data values then I<=
br>
expect all sorts of fireworks.<br>
<span><br>
&gt;EXT_INFO with the &quot;server-sig-algs&quot; extension is widely deplo=
yed. It&#39;s well<br>
&gt;tested with rsa-sha2-256 and rsa-sha2-512 signatures, and I have no con=
cerns<br>
&gt;about it. As far as I know, there are no compatibility issues to be<br>
&gt;experienced by an implementation that follows the just-published spec.<=
br>
<br>
</span>OK, that&#39;s good to know.<br>
<span class=3D"m_6079993787887195656HOEnZb"><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Peter.<br>
</font></span></blockquote></div><br></div>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--089e0822920c8c2a820567ff07e4--


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Subject: [Curdle] Last Call: <draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die-05.txt> (Deprecate 3DES and RC4 in Kerberos) to Best Current Practice
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The IESG has received a request from the CURves, Deprecating and a Little
more Encryption WG (curdle) to consider the following document: - 'Deprecate
3DES and RC4 in Kerberos'
  <draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die-05.txt> as Best Current Practice

The Last Call for the document draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die is related to 
the status change document, also in Last Call, for status-change-kerberos-3des-rc4-to-historic.

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2018-04-24. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   The 3DES and RC4 encryption types are steadily weakening in
   cryptographic strength, and the deprecation process should be begun
   for their use in Kerberos.  Accordingly, RFC 4757 is moved to
   Historic status, as none of the encryption types it specifies should
   be used, and RFC 3961 is updated to note the deprecation of the
   triple-DES encryption types.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-des-des-des-die-die-die/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.


The document contains these normative downward references.
See RFC 3967 for additional information: 
    rfc3961: Encryption and Checksum Specifications for Kerberos 5 (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)
    rfc4120: The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5) (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)



