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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-pkix and endianess of strings
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This discussion probably belongs on the CURDLE WG mail list ...

Note that draft-ietf-curdle-pkix has been published as RFC 8410.

When this object identifier is used:

   id-Ed25519   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { 1 3 101 112 }

the algorithm parameters are absent, so there is no opportunity to =
define the curve through parameters.

The RFC warns:

   Both [RFC7748] and [RFC8032] define the public key value as being a
   byte string.  It should be noted that the public key is computed
   differently for each of these documents; thus, the same private key
   will not produce the same public key.

The RFC could have also warned about the big-endian vs. little-endian =
encoding used in different RFCs related to elliptic curve.

Russ


> On Dec 19, 2018, at 4:13 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 9:54 PM Peter Gutmann =
<pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
>>=20
>> Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> writes:
>>=20
>>> You might consider adding a note that the byte array is written to =
the
>>> octet string with the LSB in the first position, and the MSB in the =
last
>>> position. As far as I know this draft is the only one that reverses =
the
>>> byte ordering for presentation. It will avoid confusion for future =
readers
>>> who expect network byte ordering in ASN.1 presentations.
>>=20
>> This was requested when the RFCs were written (alongside using the =
standard
>> X9.62 form that everything else uses), but nothing got done.  =
Basically the
>> encoding used for the Bernstein curves is the reverse to the way =
everything
>> else does it.  So you take the standard form used by all other =
curves, then
>> encode the values backwards.  In my code I use a shim layer that =
reverses
>> the bytes, at which point they can be handled by code that expects =
them in
>> the standard form.
>=20
> Yeah, using the little endian presentation brings up some weird use
> cases. Suppose a named curve is not used (i, e., curve25519 parameters
> are specified). The other domain parameters like prime and subgroup
> order are big endian but the keys are little endian.
>=20
> I'm fairly certain the best course of action is to make this use case
> work as expected:
>=20
> $ dumpasn1 ed25519.bin
>  0  52: SEQUENCE {
>  2   1:   INTEGER 0
>           ...
> 33  32:   OCTET STRING
>       :     6D C5 9D 3F 09 7F B2 3D 44 BA 90 79 12 81 B4 53
>       :     25 8D 69 1A 55 AF 5C E4 F1 EE 71 2F DF 91 AE 98
>       :   }
>=20
> And then something like this with Botan (or pick your favorite =
library):
>=20
>   uint8_t sb[32] =3D {0x6D, 0xC5, ... 0xAE, 0x98};
>   BigInt sk(sb, 32);
>=20
> The extra "byte reverse" needed to make things work as expected is
> non-intuitive and not documented. But maybe I am missing something or
> I don't understand the motivation.
>=20
> Jeff
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> saag mailing list
> saag@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag


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From: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2018 17:03:19 -0600
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-pkix and endianess of strings
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(Is the concern that RFC 7748 and RFC 8032 differ in endianness or that the
pair of them differ in endianness from X9.42-style EC? I'm assuming it's
the latter, because the former is not the case. RFC 7748 and RFC 8032 both
specify little-endian. They're different for other reasons.)

No objections to clarifying, but RFC 8032 (correctly) specifies Ed25519 and
X25519 algorithms as functions on byte strings and RFC 8410 (correctly)
defers to that. So probably a better question is whether RFC 8032 is clear
enough on the internal serialization.

I think the best architecture here is for byte string serialization to be
handled by your Ed25519 and X25519 implementations internally, so the ASN.1
layer doesn't need to care. (Endianness is far from the biggest distinction
between X9.42-style EC and X25519/Ed25519. They use different curve
equation shapes altogether.)

As an analogy, if you look at SHA-256's internals, a SHA-256 hash isn't 32
bytes, but eight 32-bit integers. But this is not a useful public
interface, so SHA-256 comes with a particular byte encoding of those eight
integers. It could have been big-endian, little-endian, or middle-endian
and nothing outside of low-level SHA-256 implementations would have known.

It is unfortunate that ECDSA got this wrong and saddled us with a mess of
different serializations, wasting time and complexity. RFCs 8032 and 8410
happily did not repeat this mistake, and we should keep this up.

To that end, the quoted text talks about using curve parameters explicitly
rather than a non-named curve. RFC 8410 doesn't specify such a thing. I
would have made a lot of noise if it had. :-) Which encoding is this
referring to?

David

On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:03 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

> This discussion probably belongs on the CURDLE WG mail list ...
>
> Note that draft-ietf-curdle-pkix has been published as RFC 8410.
>
> When this object identifier is used:
>
>    id-Ed25519   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 }
>
> the algorithm parameters are absent, so there is no opportunity to define
> the curve through parameters.
>
> The RFC warns:
>
>    Both [RFC7748] and [RFC8032] define the public key value as being a
>    byte string.  It should be noted that the public key is computed
>    differently for each of these documents; thus, the same private key
>    will not produce the same public key.
>
> The RFC could have also warned about the big-endian vs. little-endian
> encoding used in different RFCs related to elliptic curve.
>
> Russ
>
>
> > On Dec 19, 2018, at 4:13 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 9:54 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> writes:
> >>
> >>> You might consider adding a note that the byte array is written to the
> >>> octet string with the LSB in the first position, and the MSB in the
> last
> >>> position. As far as I know this draft is the only one that reverses the
> >>> byte ordering for presentation. It will avoid confusion for future
> readers
> >>> who expect network byte ordering in ASN.1 presentations.
> >>
> >> This was requested when the RFCs were written (alongside using the
> standard
> >> X9.62 form that everything else uses), but nothing got done.  Basically
> the
> >> encoding used for the Bernstein curves is the reverse to the way
> everything
> >> else does it.  So you take the standard form used by all other curves,
> then
> >> encode the values backwards.  In my code I use a shim layer that
> reverses
> >> the bytes, at which point they can be handled by code that expects them
> in
> >> the standard form.
> >
> > Yeah, using the little endian presentation brings up some weird use
> > cases. Suppose a named curve is not used (i, e., curve25519 parameters
> > are specified). The other domain parameters like prime and subgroup
> > order are big endian but the keys are little endian.
> >
> > I'm fairly certain the best course of action is to make this use case
> > work as expected:
> >
> > $ dumpasn1 ed25519.bin
> >  0  52: SEQUENCE {
> >  2   1:   INTEGER 0
> >           ...
> > 33  32:   OCTET STRING
> >       :     6D C5 9D 3F 09 7F B2 3D 44 BA 90 79 12 81 B4 53
> >       :     25 8D 69 1A 55 AF 5C E4 F1 EE 71 2F DF 91 AE 98
> >       :   }
> >
> > And then something like this with Botan (or pick your favorite library):
> >
> >   uint8_t sb[32] = {0x6D, 0xC5, ... 0xAE, 0x98};
> >   BigInt sk(sb, 32);
> >
> > The extra "byte reverse" needed to make things work as expected is
> > non-intuitive and not documented. But maybe I am missing something or
> > I don't understand the motivation.
> >
> > Jeff
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > saag mailing list
> > saag@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>
>

--000000000000d4370a057d680567
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>(Is the concern that RFC 7748 and RFC 8032 differ in =
endianness or that the pair of them differ in endianness from X9.42-style E=
C? I&#39;m assuming it&#39;s the latter, because the former is not the case=
. RFC 7748 and RFC 8032 both specify little-endian. They&#39;re different f=
or other reasons.)</div><div><br></div>No objections to clarifying, but RFC=
 8032 (correctly) specifies Ed25519 and X25519 algorithms as functions on b=
yte strings and RFC 8410 (correctly) defers to that. So probably a better q=
uestion is whether RFC 8032 is clear enough on the internal serialization.<=
div><br></div><div>I think the best architecture here is for byte string se=
rialization to be handled by your Ed25519 and X25519 implementations intern=
ally, so the ASN.1 layer doesn&#39;t need to care. (Endianness is far from =
the biggest distinction between X9.42-style EC and X25519/Ed25519. They use=
 different curve equation shapes altogether.)<div><div><br></div><div>As an=
 analogy, if you look at SHA-256&#39;s internals, a SHA-256 hash isn&#39;t =
32 bytes, but eight 32-bit integers. But this is not a useful public interf=
ace, so SHA-256 comes with a particular byte encoding of those eight intege=
rs. It could have been big-endian, little-endian, or middle-endian and noth=
ing outside of low-level SHA-256 implementations would have known.</div><di=
v><br></div><div>It is unfortunate that ECDSA got this wrong and saddled us=
 with a mess of different serializations, wasting time and complexity. RFCs=
 8032 and 8410 happily did not repeat this mistake, and we should keep this=
 up.</div><div><br></div><div>To that end, the quoted text talks about usin=
g curve parameters explicitly rather than a non-named curve. RFC 8410 doesn=
&#39;t specify such a thing. I would have made a lot of noise if it had. :-=
) Which encoding is this referring to?</div><div><br></div><div>David</div>=
<div><div><div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Wed,=
 Dec 19, 2018 at 4:03 PM Russ Housley &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:housley@vigilse=
c.com">housley@vigilsec.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex">This discussion probably belongs on the CURDLE WG mail list ...<br>
<br>
Note that draft-ietf-curdle-pkix has been published as RFC 8410.<br>
<br>
When this object identifier is used:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0id-Ed25519=C2=A0 =C2=A0OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=3D { 1 3 101 112 }=
<br>
<br>
the algorithm parameters are absent, so there is no opportunity to define t=
he curve through parameters.<br>
<br>
The RFC warns:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Both [RFC7748] and [RFC8032] define the public key value as be=
ing a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0byte string.=C2=A0 It should be noted that the public key is c=
omputed<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0differently for each of these documents; thus, the same privat=
e key<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0will not produce the same public key.<br>
<br>
The RFC could have also warned about the big-endian vs. little-endian encod=
ing used in different RFCs related to elliptic curve.<br>
<br>
Russ<br>
<br>
<br>
&gt; On Dec 19, 2018, at 4:13 PM, Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:nolo=
ader@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 9:54 PM Peter Gutmann &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pg=
ut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz" target=3D"_blank">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt=
; wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; Jeffrey Walton &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:noloader@gmail.com" target=3D=
"_blank">noloader@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; You might consider adding a note that the byte array is writte=
n to the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; octet string with the LSB in the first position, and the MSB i=
n the last<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; position. As far as I know this draft is the only one that rev=
erses the<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; byte ordering for presentation. It will avoid confusion for fu=
ture readers<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; who expect network byte ordering in ASN.1 presentations.<br>
&gt;&gt; <br>
&gt;&gt; This was requested when the RFCs were written (alongside using the=
 standard<br>
&gt;&gt; X9.62 form that everything else uses), but nothing got done.=C2=A0=
 Basically the<br>
&gt;&gt; encoding used for the Bernstein curves is the reverse to the way e=
verything<br>
&gt;&gt; else does it.=C2=A0 So you take the standard form used by all othe=
r curves, then<br>
&gt;&gt; encode the values backwards.=C2=A0 In my code I use a shim layer t=
hat reverses<br>
&gt;&gt; the bytes, at which point they can be handled by code that expects=
 them in<br>
&gt;&gt; the standard form.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Yeah, using the little endian presentation brings up some weird use<br=
>
&gt; cases. Suppose a named curve is not used (i, e., curve25519 parameters=
<br>
&gt; are specified). The other domain parameters like prime and subgroup<br=
>
&gt; order are big endian but the keys are little endian.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I&#39;m fairly certain the best course of action is to make this use c=
ase<br>
&gt; work as expected:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; $ dumpasn1 ed25519.bin<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 0=C2=A0 52: SEQUENCE {<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 2=C2=A0 =C2=A01:=C2=A0 =C2=A0INTEGER 0<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0...<br>
&gt; 33=C2=A0 32:=C2=A0 =C2=A0OCTET STRING<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A06D C5 9D 3F 09 7F B2 3D=
 44 BA 90 79 12 81 B4 53<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A025 8D 69 1A 55 AF 5C E4=
 F1 EE 71 2F DF 91 AE 98<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0:=C2=A0 =C2=A0}<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; And then something like this with Botan (or pick your favorite library=
):<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint8_t sb[32] =3D {0x6D, 0xC5, ... 0xAE, 0x98};<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0BigInt sk(sb, 32);<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The extra &quot;byte reverse&quot; needed to make things work as expec=
ted is<br>
&gt; non-intuitive and not documented. But maybe I am missing something or<=
br>
&gt; I don&#39;t understand the motivation.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Jeff<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; saag mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:saag@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">saag@ietf.org</a><b=
r>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag" rel=3D"noreferr=
er" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle<br></a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>

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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2018 18:34:23 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-pkix and endianess of strings
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On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:03 PM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:
> ...
> Note that draft-ietf-curdle-pkix has been published as RFC 8410.

Thanks Russ.

Off-topic, my Google search for curve OIDs and encodings lead me to
draft-ietf-curdle-pkix . I plugged in
https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix.txt and got version
10 of the document.

The document does not state there is an RFC available. Here's the
relevant preamble:

Network Working Group                                       S. Josefsson
Internet-Draft                                                    SJD AB
Intended status: Standards Track                               J. Schaad
Expires: November 9, 2018                                 August Cellars
                                                             May 8, 2018

>From an outsider's view, all we know is the IETF is working on it. The
doc has expired but it is the latest available.

When NIST supersedes a document they serve pages like...

FIPS 186-3 search:
* https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/186/3/archive/2009-06-25

SP800-53A Rev 1 search:
* https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-53a/rev-1/archive/2010-06-29

NIST makes it harder to use the wrong document for the typical use case.

Jeff


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Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2018 19:37:28 -0500
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To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-pkix and endianess of strings
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On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:03 PM David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:
> ...
> To that end, the quoted text talks about using curve parameters explicitly rather than a non-named curve. RFC 8410 doesn't specify such a thing. I would have made a lot of noise if it had. :-) Which encoding is this referring to?

Thanks David.

I have this test program handy for interop testing. I believe it is
using the EC key format from RFC 5480. This is what everyone has been
using in the void before the latest IETF deliverables.

In the program below the OID is new, but previous to getting Thawte's
OID we used GNU's old OID for curve25519. In between new (Thawte) and
old (GNU) we could use the OID's draft-josefsson-pkix-newcurves. Many
folks have to support 8 or 10 OIDs for the curves.

EC domain parameters (instead of a named curve) was going to be my
next test case to ensure we interop or work as expected.

I guess the point is, just because the latest RFC does not specify it,
it does not mean it is not going to happen. In fact, it has been
happening for years now because of the information void. RFC 5480
(with a mashup of OIDs) was enough to keep us going.

Jeff

$ cat x25519.c
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>

int main (int argc, char* argv)
{
    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_X25519, NULL);
    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx);
    EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey);
    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
    PEM_write_PrivateKey(stdout, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
    return 0;
}

And then compile it. In the example below, OpenSSL was configured with
--prefix=/opt/openssl-1.1.1.

$ gcc -I /opt/openssl-1.1.1/include/ -L /opt/openssl-1.1.1/lib
x25519.c -o x25519.exe -l:libcrypto.a -lpthread -ldl$

And finally:

$ ./x25519.exe
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VuBCIEIMBio4/nGHPiJzCUDifuMl7zg6Me2XlI5jAKCyPRlW5R
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----

$ echo MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VuBCIEIMBio4/nGHPiJzCUDifuMl7zg6Me2XlI5jAKCyPRlW5R
| base64 -d > x25519.bin

$ dumpasn1 x25519.bin
  0  46: SEQUENCE {
  2   1:   INTEGER 0
  5   5:   SEQUENCE {
  7   3:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER curveX25519 (1 3 101 110)
       :     }
 12  34:   OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
 14  32:     OCTET STRING
       :       C0 62 A3 8F E7 18 73 E2 27 30 94 0E 27 EE 32 5E
       :       F3 83 A3 1E D9 79 48 E6 30 0A 0B 23 D1 95 6E 51
       :     }
       :   }

0 warnings, 0 errors.


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The IESG has received a request from the CURves, Deprecating and a Little
more Encryption WG (curdle) to consider the following document: - 'Ed25519
and Ed448 public key algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH)
   protocol'
  <draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-07.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-01-04. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document describes the use of the Ed25519 and Ed448 digital
   signature algorithm in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.





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--000000000000c6dc80057dcbf43f
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Thanks for addressing my comments.

IMPORTANT
S 3.
>      received public keys are not the expected lengths, or if the derived
>      shared secret only consists of zero bits.  No further validation is
>      required beyond what is discussed in [RFC7748].  The derived shared
>      secret is 32 bytes when Curve25519 is used and 56 bytes when Curve448
>      is used.  The encodings of all values are defined in [RFC7748].  The
>      hash used is SHA-256 for Curve25519 and SHA-512 for Curve448.

This is true if you use the 7748 algorithm, but not necessarily
otherwise.

Here is some OK language (from tcpcrypt)

 Key-agreement schemes ECDHE-Curve25519 and ECDHE-Curve448 perform the
   Diffie-Helman protocol using the functions X25519 and X448,
   respectively.  Implementations SHOULD compute these functions using
   the algorithms described in [RFC7748].  When they do so,
   implementations MUST check whether the computed Diffie-Hellman
shared
   secret is the all-zero value and abort if so, as described in
   Section 6 of [RFC7748].  Alternative implementations of these
   functions SHOULD abort when either input forces the shared secret
to
   one of a small set of values, as discussed in Section 7 of
[RFC7748].
COMMENTS
S 1.
>      key exchange protocol described in [RFC4253] supports an extensible
>      set of methods.  [RFC5656] describes how elliptic curves are
>      integrated in SSH, and this document reuses those protocol messages.
>
>      This document describes how to implement key exchange based on
>      Curve25519 and Ed448-Goldilocks [RFC7748] in SSH.  For Curve25519

7748 calls this Curve448 and you do so later, so please be consistent.

--000000000000c6dc80057dcbf43f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for addressing my comments.</div><=
div dir=3D"ltr"><br>IMPORTANT<br>S 3.<br>&gt;=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
 received public keys are not the expected lengths, or if the derived<br>&g=
t;=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 shared secret only consists of zero bits.=
=C2=A0 No further validation is<br>&gt;=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 requi=
red beyond what is discussed in [RFC7748].=C2=A0 The derived shared<br>&gt;=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 secret is 32 bytes when Curve25519 is used a=
nd 56 bytes when Curve448<br>&gt;=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 is used.=C2=
=A0 The encodings of all values are defined in [RFC7748].=C2=A0 The<br>&gt;=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 hash used is SHA-256 for Curve25519 and SHA-=
512 for Curve448.<br><br>This is true if you use the 7748 algorithm, but no=
t necessarily<br>otherwise.<br><br>Here is some OK language (from tcpcrypt)=
<br><br>=C2=A0Key-agreement schemes ECDHE-Curve25519 and ECDHE-Curve448 per=
form the<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0 Diffie-Helman protocol using the functions X25519 =
and X448,<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0 respectively.=C2=A0 Implementations SHOULD comput=
e these functions using<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0 the algorithms described in [RFC774=
8].=C2=A0 When they do so,<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0 implementations MUST check wheth=
er the computed Diffie-Hellman<br>shared<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0 secret is the all-=
zero value and abort if so, as described in<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0 Section 6 of [R=
FC7748].=C2=A0 Alternative implementations of these<br>=C2=A0=C2=A0 functio=
ns SHOULD abort when either input forces the shared secret<br>to<br>=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 one of a small set of values, as discussed in Section 7 of<br>[RFC77=
48].<br>COMMENTS<br>S 1.<br>&gt;=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 key exchange=
 protocol described in [RFC4253] supports an extensible<br>&gt;=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 set of methods.=C2=A0 [RFC5656] describes how elliptic c=
urves are<br>&gt;=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 integrated in SSH, and this=
 document reuses those protocol messages.<br>&gt;=C2=A0=C2=A0 <br>&gt;=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 This document describes how to implement key ex=
change based on<br>&gt;=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 Curve25519 and Ed448-=
Goldilocks [RFC7748] in SSH.=C2=A0 For Curve25519<br><br>7748 calls this Cu=
rve448 and you do so later, so please be consistent.<br><br></div></div>

--000000000000c6dc80057dcbf43f--


From nobody Tue Dec 25 07:09:04 2018
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Subject: [Curdle] Last Call: <draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-07.txt> (GSS-API Key Exchange with SHA2) to Proposed Standard
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The IESG has received a request from the CURves, Deprecating and a Little
more Encryption WG (curdle) to consider the following document: - 'GSS-API
Key Exchange with SHA2'
  <draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2-07.txt> as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-01-08. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document specifies additions and amendments to RFC4462.  It
   defines a new key exchange method that uses SHA-2 for integrity and
   deprecates weak DH groups.  The purpose of this specification is to
   modernize the cryptographic primitives used by GSS Key Exchanges.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.


The document contains these normative downward references.
See RFC 3967 for additional information: 
    rfc7546: Structure of the Generic Security Service (GSS) Negotiation Loop (Informational - IETF stream)




From nobody Tue Dec 25 22:55:00 2018
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Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-14.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Deprecating RC4 in Secure Shell (SSH)
        Authors         : Luis Camara
                          Loganaden Velvindron
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-14.txt
	Pages           : 5
	Date            : 2018-12-25

Abstract:
   This document deprecates RC4 in Secure Shell (SSH).  Therefore, this
   document formally obsoletes and moves to Historic RFC4345.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-14
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-14

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-14


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


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The IESG has received a request from the CURves, Deprecating and a Little
more Encryption WG (curdle) to consider the following document: -
'Deprecating RC4 in Secure Shell (SSH)'
  <draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die-14.txt> as Best Current Practice

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2019-01-09. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document deprecates RC4 in Secure Shell (SSH).  Therefore, this
   document formally obsoletes and moves to Historic RFC4345.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-rc4-die-die-die/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.





From nobody Fri Dec 28 09:35:42 2018
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Reviewer: Catherine Meadows
Review result: Has Nits

This draft specifies the use of the digital signature algorithms Ed25519 and
Ed448 in the SSH protocol.  Most of this,  except for syntactic features such
as formats and names, can be found in other RFC’s, and the appropriate
references are given.  The Security Considerations are also given by reference
to RFC4241 (security considerations for SSH) and RFC8032 and RFC7479 (for
Ed25519 and Ed448).  These security considerations sections are very thorough
and I don’t see any need for any additions.

A nit:
The paragraph

This document describes the method implemented by OpenSSH and others,
 and formalizes its use of the name "ssh-ed25519". Additionally, it
 also describes the use of Ed448 and formalizes its use of the name
 "ssh-ed448".

Would be clearer as

This document describes the Ed25519 method implemented by OpenSSH and others,
 and formalizes its use of the name "ssh-ed25519". Additionally, it
 also describes the use of Ed448 and formalizes its use of the name
 "ssh-ed448”.


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From: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>
To: Catherine Meadows <catherine.meadows@nrl.navy.mil>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
CC: "draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448.all@ietf.org>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-07
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-07
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