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From: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>
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To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Client-side SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO: Use it or lose it principle!
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On Apr 26, 2020, at 10:33 PM, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> =
wrote:
> Awesome!
>=20
> Yes, the idea of "global-requests-ok" is not to make the client do =
anything different. It's to reassure the server that the client won't =
violate the spec if the server sends a global request.
>=20
> The main motivating usage case is so the server can feel at liberty to =
send the global request "hostkeys-00@openssh.com =
<mailto:hostkeys-00@openssh.com>" after user authentication:
>=20
> https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?annotate=3DHEAD =
<https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?annotate=3DHEAD>
> This is essential functionality which allows clients and servers to =
change host keys without requiring administrative intervention at each =
client installation.
>=20
> Without "global-requests-ok", the server needs a database of client =
version strings to which it's safe to send the "hostkeys" global =
request. Otherwise, it can't send it because a bunch of half-baked =
clients (I'm counting 7 in our list) are borked and can't handle =
receiving a global request. Or they can handle it usually, but not when =
they're expecting a response to a channel open.

Yeah, understood. So far, I haven=E2=80=99t implemented =E2=80=9Chostkeys"=
 support in AsyncSSH. I may do that at some point, but I=E2=80=99ll =
probably just do the new host key validation in AsyncSSH but leave it up =
to the application code to decide if it actually wants to update the =
list of known_hosts or not (and if so, where). Right now, AsyncSSH will =
read from ~/.ssh/known_hosts by default if you don=E2=80=99t specify =
another source, but it never actually modifies that file. In fact, most =
of the ways of specifying known_hosts in AsyncSSH are focused on =
providing the set of hosts dynamically, or even allowing applications to =
provide their own logic to determine whether a specific host key should =
be trusted or not for a given host/port, so I=E2=80=99d want to do the =
same thing with reporting new host keys a server advertises.

Since I don=E2=80=99t have this support yet, I haven=E2=80=99t needed to =
worry about which clients can properly handle global requests or not. I =
do use global requests in both directions as part of the implementation =
of "keepalive@openssh.com <mailto:keepalive@openssh.com>=E2=80=9D, but =
so far I haven=E2=80=99t run into any issues with that. That=E2=80=99s =
disabled by default, though, so perhaps people are only enabling with =
peers that don=E2=80=99t have issues with global requests.


> Meanwhile I've received more info about the implementation that =
disconnects on receiving EXT_INFO from the client. The bug is =
unfortunately in a widely used Java SSH library. The information I =
received suggests it's going to be fixed, but I'm afraid there are =
already a fair number of deployed servers that have the issue.

Interesting. Does it fail on ANY global request being sent from a =
server, or is it only at certain points that it doesn=E2=80=99t handle =
these messages correctly?


> While I'm wishing things - I would also like the "delay-compression" =
extension to be more widely supported because it's the only =
delayed-compression mechanism that (1) does not have a race condition by =
design (zlib@openssh.com <mailto:zlib@openssh.com>), and (2) does not =
require a second key exchange after user authentication (PuTTY =
mitigation).

Is RFC 8308 the right reference for this option? Are there any =
implementations of this so far other than from Bitvise?

Also, I=E2=80=99m not familiar with the PuTTY issue around needing a =
second key exchange. Is that documented somewhere?
--=20
Ron Frederick
ronf@timeheart.net




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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On Apr 26, 2020, at 10:33 PM, denis bider &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div=
 dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">Awesome!</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Yes, the idea of "global-requests-ok" =
is not to make the client do anything different. It's to reassure the =
server that the client won't violate the spec if the server sends a =
global request.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">The main motivating usage case is so the server can feel at =
liberty to send the global request "<a =
href=3D"mailto:hostkeys-00@openssh.com" =
class=3D"">hostkeys-00@openssh.com</a>" after user =
authentication:</div><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?annotate=3DHEA=
D" =
class=3D"">https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?annotate=3D=
HEAD</a></div><b class=3D""></b><i class=3D""></i><u class=3D""></u><sub =
class=3D""></sub><sup class=3D""></sup><strike class=3D""></strike><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">This is essential functionality which =
allows clients and servers to change host keys without requiring =
administrative intervention at each client installation.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Without =
"global-requests-ok", the server needs a database of client version =
strings to which it's safe to send the "hostkeys" global request. =
Otherwise, it can't send it because a bunch of half-baked clients (I'm =
counting 7 in our list) are borked and can't handle receiving a global =
request. Or they can handle it usually, but not when they're expecting a =
response to a channel =
open.</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br=
 class=3D""></div><div>Yeah, understood. So far, I haven=E2=80=99t =
implemented =E2=80=9Chostkeys" support in AsyncSSH. I may do that at =
some point, but I=E2=80=99ll probably just do the new host key =
validation in AsyncSSH but leave it up to the application code to decide =
if it actually wants to update the list of known_hosts or not (and if =
so, where). Right now, AsyncSSH will read from ~/.ssh/known_hosts by =
default if you don=E2=80=99t specify another source, but it never =
actually modifies that file. In fact, most of the ways of specifying =
known_hosts in AsyncSSH are focused on providing the set of hosts =
dynamically, or even allowing applications to provide their own logic to =
determine whether a specific host key should be trusted or not for a =
given host/port, so I=E2=80=99d want to do the same thing with reporting =
new host keys a server advertises.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Since I don=E2=80=99t have this support yet, I =
haven=E2=80=99t needed to worry about which clients can properly handle =
global requests or not. I do use global requests in both directions as =
part of the implementation of "<a href=3D"mailto:keepalive@openssh.com" =
style=3D"font-family: Menlo; font-size: 11px;" =
class=3D"">keepalive@openssh.com</a><font face=3D"Menlo" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size: 11px;" class=3D"">=E2=80=9D</span></font>, but so =
far I haven=E2=80=99t run into any issues with that. That=E2=80=99s =
disabled by default, though, so perhaps people are only enabling with =
peers that don=E2=80=99t have issues with global requests.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><br class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Meanwhile I've received more info about the implementation =
that disconnects on receiving EXT_INFO from the client. The bug is =
unfortunately in a widely used Java SSH library. The information I =
received suggests it's going to be fixed, but I'm afraid there are =
already a fair number of deployed servers that have the =
issue.</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><b=
r class=3D""></div><div>Interesting. Does it fail on ANY global request =
being sent from a server, or is it only at certain points that it =
doesn=E2=80=99t handle these messages correctly?</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">While I'm wishing things - I =
would also like the "delay-compression" extension to be more widely =
supported because it's the only delayed-compression mechanism that (1) =
does not have a race condition by design (<a =
href=3D"mailto:zlib@openssh.com" class=3D"">zlib@openssh.com</a>), and =
(2) does not require a second key exchange after user authentication =
(PuTTY =
mitigation).</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><b=
r class=3D""></div><div>Is RFC 8308 the right reference for this option? =
Are there any implementations of this so far other than from =
Bitvise?</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>Also, I=E2=80=99m not =
familiar with the PuTTY issue around needing a second key exchange. Is =
that documented somewhere?</div></div><div class=3D"">
--&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Ron Frederick<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" class=3D"">ronf@timeheart.net</a><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D"">

</div>
<br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 3 May 2020 18:11:26 -0500
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To: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>
Cc: curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, ietf-ssh@netbsd.org
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Client-side SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO: Use it or lose it principle!
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

> I do use global requests in both directions as part of the implementation
> of "keepalive@openssh.com=E2=80=9D, but so far I haven=E2=80=99t run into=
 any issues with
that.
> That=E2=80=99s disabled by default, though, so perhaps people are only en=
abling
> with peers that don=E2=80=99t have issues with global requests.

Features that are disabled by default end up being used in a small fraction
of connections in practice - I think it's not wrong to guess 1%. Problems
with them are further unlikely to be reported because the user assumes the
problem they experience is why the feature is disabled anyway.

I think the "hostkeys-00@openssh.com" mechanism is highly valuable. I would
like to see it more widely supported and enabled by default. Last I
checked, it was disabled by default, no doubt due to cherished clients that
disconnect when they receive it.

I would very much like it to be enabled by default, especially if the
client sends the "global-requests-ok" extension. Bitvise SSH Server enables
"hostkeys" if the client does this. If not, then we use built-in
compatibility rules based on the SSH version string to guess if it's safe
to send global requests.


> Does it fail on ANY global request being sent from a server, or is it onl=
y
> at certain points that it doesn=E2=80=99t handle these messages correctly=
?

The bug I was discussing here is that when operating as a server, the
Maverick implementation (and therefore servers that use it) has a bug where
it crashes if the client sends SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO. There is only one point in
the connection where the client is permitted to send SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO. This
is immediately after the client's first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.

Perhaps you mean to ask about clients which fail upon receiving global
requests from SSH servers? These fall mainly into two types:

(1) Clients that disconnect on receipt of ANY global request at any time.
These are outright negligent implementations: RFC 4254 requires the global
requests to be handled and responded to if "want reply" is true. You can't
send an active keep-alive to this kind of client.

(2) Clients that disconnect when in a special state, specifically when
expecting a channel open confirmation from the server. These are oversights
that were generally fixed in later versions of the software, but people
still use earlier versions that had the bug. When dealing with this type of
client, it's almost-safe to send an active keep-alive (very low chance of
client being in the crash-susceptible state). However, if the server is
sending the "hostkeys" global request, that usually happens at the same
time as the client is opening its first channel. Therefore, client-side
crash becomes very likely.


> Is RFC 8308 the right reference for this option? Are there
> any implementations of this so far other than from Bitvise?

Yes, RFC 8308 is the authoritative spec for the "delay-compression"
extension. Bitvise SSH Server and Client can be considered reference
implementations. As of right now I haven't been informed of others.


> Also, I=E2=80=99m not familiar with the PuTTY issue around needing a
> second key exchange. Is that documented somewhere?

The race condition is inherent in the zlib@openssh.com algorithm. PuTTY
identified this issue and addressed it with a strategy based on key
re-exchange. Bitvise SSH Client also uses the key re-exchange strategy if
the server advertises zlib@openssh.com but not the "delay-compression"
extension.

PuTTY project source on this issue:

https://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/wishlist/zlib-openssh.ht=
ml

denis


On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 1:14 AM Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> wrote:

> On Apr 26, 2020, at 10:33 PM, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Awesome!
>
> Yes, the idea of "global-requests-ok" is not to make the client do
> anything different. It's to reassure the server that the client won't
> violate the spec if the server sends a global request.
>
> The main motivating usage case is so the server can feel at liberty to
> send the global request "hostkeys-00@openssh.com" after user
> authentication:
>
> https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?annotate=3DHEAD
>
> This is essential functionality which allows clients and servers to chang=
e
> host keys without requiring administrative intervention at each client
> installation.
>
> Without "global-requests-ok", the server needs a database of client
> version strings to which it's safe to send the "hostkeys" global request.
> Otherwise, it can't send it because a bunch of half-baked clients (I'm
> counting 7 in our list) are borked and can't handle receiving a global
> request. Or they can handle it usually, but not when they're expecting a
> response to a channel open.
>
>
> Yeah, understood. So far, I haven=E2=80=99t implemented =E2=80=9Chostkeys=
" support in
> AsyncSSH. I may do that at some point, but I=E2=80=99ll probably just do =
the new
> host key validation in AsyncSSH but leave it up to the application code t=
o
> decide if it actually wants to update the list of known_hosts or not (and
> if so, where). Right now, AsyncSSH will read from ~/.ssh/known_hosts by
> default if you don=E2=80=99t specify another source, but it never actuall=
y modifies
> that file. In fact, most of the ways of specifying known_hosts in AsyncSS=
H
> are focused on providing the set of hosts dynamically, or even allowing
> applications to provide their own logic to determine whether a specific
> host key should be trusted or not for a given host/port, so I=E2=80=99d w=
ant to do
> the same thing with reporting new host keys a server advertises.
>
> Since I don=E2=80=99t have this support yet, I haven=E2=80=99t needed to =
worry about which
> clients can properly handle global requests or not. I do use global
> requests in both directions as part of the implementation of "
> keepalive@openssh.com=E2=80=9D, but so far I haven=E2=80=99t run into any=
 issues with
> that. That=E2=80=99s disabled by default, though, so perhaps people are o=
nly
> enabling with peers that don=E2=80=99t have issues with global requests.
>
>
> Meanwhile I've received more info about the implementation that
> disconnects on receiving EXT_INFO from the client. The bug is unfortunate=
ly
> in a widely used Java SSH library. The information I received suggests it=
's
> going to be fixed, but I'm afraid there are already a fair number of
> deployed servers that have the issue.
>
>
> Interesting. Does it fail on ANY global request being sent from a server,
> or is it only at certain points that it doesn=E2=80=99t handle these mess=
ages
> correctly?
>
>
> While I'm wishing things - I would also like the "delay-compression"
> extension to be more widely supported because it's the only
> delayed-compression mechanism that (1) does not have a race condition by
> design (zlib@openssh.com), and (2) does not require a second key exchange
> after user authentication (PuTTY mitigation).
>
>
> Is RFC 8308 the right reference for this option? Are there any
> implementations of this so far other than from Bitvise?
>
> Also, I=E2=80=99m not familiar with the PuTTY issue around needing a seco=
nd key
> exchange. Is that documented somewhere?
> --
> Ron Frederick
> ronf@timeheart.net
>
>
>
>

--0000000000004e6f1705a4c689d8
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"text-a=
lign:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-sp=
acing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-=
style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-=
spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255)">I do use global requests in both directions as part of the=
 implementation<br>&gt; of &quot;</span><a style=3D"text-align:left;color:r=
gb(17,85,204);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;fon=
t-family:Menlo;font-size:11px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-we=
ight:400;text-decoration:underline;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal" hre=
f=3D"mailto:keepalive@openssh.com" target=3D"_blank">keepalive@openssh.com<=
/a><font face=3D"Menlo" style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-t=
ransform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Menlo;font-=
size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-dec=
oration:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal"><span style=3D"font-size:=
11px">=E2=80=9D</span></font><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34=
,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:=
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant=
:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inlin=
e;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">, but so=
 far I haven=E2=80=99t run into any issues with that.<br>&gt; That=E2=80=99=
s disabled by default, though, so perhaps people are only enabling<br>&gt; =
with peers that don=E2=80=99t have issues with global requests.</span></div=
><div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-t=
ransform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helve=
tica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;fon=
t-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-spa=
ce:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><d=
iv><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;t=
ext-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif=
;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;te=
xt-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float=
:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Features that are disabled by defa=
ult end up being used in a small fraction of connections in practice - I th=
ink it&#39;s not wrong to guess 1%. Problems with them are further unlikely=
 to be reported because the user assumes the problem they experience is why=
 the feature is disabled anyway.</span></div><div><span style=3D"text-align=
:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacin=
g:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-styl=
e:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spac=
ing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb=
(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-f=
amily:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-v=
ariant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">I =
think the=C2=A0&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:hostkeys-00@openssh.com">hostkeys-00=
@openssh.com</a>&quot; mechanism is highly valuable. I would like to see it=
 more widely supported and enabled by default. Last I checked, it was disab=
led by default, no doubt due to cherished clients that disconnect when they=
 receive it.</span></div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,3=
4,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family=
:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-varian=
t:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inli=
ne;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></s=
pan></div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tran=
sform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetic=
a,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-w=
eight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:=
normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">I would very much like=
 it to be enabled by default, especially if the client sends the &quot;glob=
al-requests-ok&quot; extension. Bitvise SSH Server enables &quot;hostkeys&q=
uot; if the client does this. If not, then we use built-in compatibility ru=
les based on the SSH version string to guess if it&#39;s safe to send globa=
l requests.</span></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"t=
ext-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lett=
er-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;=
font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;=
word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255)">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34=
,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-fami=
ly:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-vari=
ant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:in=
line;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Does =
it fail on ANY global request being sent from a server, or is it only<br>&g=
t; at certain points that it doesn=E2=80=99t handle these messages correctl=
y?</span></span></div><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal=
;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal=
;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;=
display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)"><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none=
;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-ser=
if;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;=
text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;flo=
at:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">The bug I was discussing here is=
 that when operating as a server, the Maverick implementation (and therefor=
e servers that use it) has a bug where it crashes if the client sends SSH_M=
SG_EXT_INFO. There is only one point in the connection where the client is =
permitted to send SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO. This is immediately after the client&#3=
9;s first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS.</span></span></div><div><br></div><div>Perhaps y=
ou mean to ask about clients which fail upon receiving global requests from=
 SSH servers? These fall mainly into two types:</div><div><br></div><div>(1=
) Clients that disconnect on receipt of ANY global request at any time. The=
se are outright negligent implementations: RFC 4254 requires the global req=
uests to be handled and responded to if &quot;want reply&quot; is true. You=
 can&#39;t send an active keep-alive to this kind of client.</div><div><br>=
</div><div>(2) Clients that disconnect when in a special state, specificall=
y when expecting a channel open confirmation from the server. These are ove=
rsights that were generally fixed in later versions of the software, but pe=
ople still use earlier versions that had the bug. When dealing with this ty=
pe of client, it&#39;s almost-safe to send an active keep-alive (very low c=
hance of client being in the crash-susceptible state). However, if the serv=
er is sending the &quot;hostkeys&quot; global request, that usually happens=
 at the same time as the client is opening its first channel. Therefore, cl=
ient-side crash becomes very likely.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><di=
v>&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transfo=
rm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,s=
ans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weig=
ht:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:nor=
mal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Is RFC 8308 the right ref=
erence for this option? Are there<br>&gt; any implementations of this so fa=
r other than from Bitvise?</span></div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;=
color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:norm=
al;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:norm=
al;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0p=
x;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255=
,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34=
,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:=
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant=
:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inlin=
e;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Yes, RFC=
 8308 is the authoritative spec for the &quot;delay-compression&quot; exten=
sion. Bitvise SSH Server and Client can be considered reference implementat=
ions. As of right now I haven&#39;t been informed of others.</span></div><d=
iv><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;t=
ext-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif=
;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;te=
xt-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float=
:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=
=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px=
;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.=
33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:=
none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div>&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"t=
ext-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lett=
er-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;=
font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;=
word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255)">Also, I=E2=80=99m not familiar with the PuTTY issue a=
round needing a<br>&gt; second key exchange. Is that documented somewhere?<=
/span></div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tr=
ansform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvet=
ica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font=
-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-spac=
e:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><di=
v><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;te=
xt-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;tex=
t-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">The race condition is inherent in t=
he <a href=3D"mailto:zlib@openssh.com">zlib@openssh.com</a> algorithm. PuTT=
Y identified this issue and addressed it with a strategy based on key re-ex=
change. Bitvise SSH Client also uses the key re-exchange strategy if the se=
rver advertises <a href=3D"mailto:zlib@openssh.com">zlib@openssh.com</a> bu=
t not the &quot;delay-compression&quot; extension.</span></div><div><span s=
tyle=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent=
:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size=
:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decorat=
ion:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;back=
ground-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"text-al=
ign:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spa=
cing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-s=
tyle:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255)">PuTTY project source on this issue:</span></div><div><br></=
div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:=
none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans=
-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:=
400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal=
;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><a href=3D"https://www.chiar=
k.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/wishlist/zlib-openssh.html">https://www.c=
hiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/wishlist/zlib-openssh.html</a></span>=
</div><div><span style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transfor=
m:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sa=
ns-serif;font-size:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weigh=
t:400;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:norm=
al;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><spa=
n style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-s=
ize:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-deco=
ration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;b=
ackground-color:rgb(255,255,255)">denis</span></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><span =
style=3D"text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-inden=
t:0px;letter-spacing:normal;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-siz=
e:13.33px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:400;text-decora=
tion:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;float:none;bac=
kground-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup>=
<strike></strike><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup><strike></strik=
e><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup><strike></strike><br></span></=
div></div></div></div></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div=
 class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 1:14 AM Ron Freder=
ick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net">ronf@timeheart.net</a>&gt; wr=
ote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-widt=
h:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div style=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;"><d=
iv>On Apr 26, 2020, at 10:33 PM, denis bider &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisbid=
er.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrot=
e:</div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
>Awesome!</div><div><br></div><div>Yes, the idea of &quot;global-requests-o=
k&quot; is not to make the client do anything different. It&#39;s to reassu=
re the server that the client won&#39;t violate the spec if the server send=
s a global request.</div><div><br></div><div>The main motivating usage case=
 is so the server can feel at liberty to send the global request &quot;<a h=
ref=3D"mailto:hostkeys-00@openssh.com" target=3D"_blank">hostkeys-00@openss=
h.com</a>&quot; after user authentication:</div><div><div><br></div><div><a=
 href=3D"https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?annotate=3DHEA=
D" target=3D"_blank">https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?an=
notate=3DHEAD</a></div><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup><strike><=
/strike><br></div><div>This is essential functionality which allows clients=
 and servers to change host keys without requiring administrative intervent=
ion at each client installation.</div><div><br></div><div>Without &quot;glo=
bal-requests-ok&quot;, the server needs a database of client version string=
s to which it&#39;s safe to send the &quot;hostkeys&quot; global request. O=
therwise, it can&#39;t send it because a bunch of half-baked clients (I&#39=
;m counting 7 in our list) are borked and can&#39;t handle receiving a glob=
al request. Or they can handle it usually, but not when they&#39;re expecti=
ng a response to a channel open.</div></div></div></div></div></div></div><=
/div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yeah, understood. So far, I haven=E2=
=80=99t implemented =E2=80=9Chostkeys&quot; support in AsyncSSH. I may do t=
hat at some point, but I=E2=80=99ll probably just do the new host key valid=
ation in AsyncSSH but leave it up to the application code to decide if it a=
ctually wants to update the list of known_hosts or not (and if so, where). =
Right now, AsyncSSH will read from ~/.ssh/known_hosts by default if you don=
=E2=80=99t specify another source, but it never actually modifies that file=
. In fact, most of the ways of specifying known_hosts in AsyncSSH are focus=
ed on providing the set of hosts dynamically, or even allowing applications=
 to provide their own logic to determine whether a specific host key should=
 be trusted or not for a given host/port, so I=E2=80=99d want to do the sam=
e thing with reporting new host keys a server advertises.</div><div><br></d=
iv><div>Since I don=E2=80=99t have this support yet, I haven=E2=80=99t need=
ed to worry about which clients can properly handle global requests or not.=
 I do use global requests in both directions as part of the implementation =
of &quot;<a style=3D"font-family:Menlo;font-size:11px" href=3D"mailto:keepa=
live@openssh.com" target=3D"_blank">keepalive@openssh.com</a><font face=3D"=
Menlo"><span style=3D"font-size:11px">=E2=80=9D</span></font>, but so far I=
 haven=E2=80=99t run into any issues with that. That=E2=80=99s disabled by =
default, though, so perhaps people are only enabling with peers that don=E2=
=80=99t have issues with global requests.</div><div><br></div><div><br></di=
v><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Meanwhile =
I&#39;ve received more info about the implementation that disconnects on re=
ceiving EXT_INFO from the client. The bug is unfortunately in a widely used=
 Java SSH library. The information I received suggests it&#39;s going to be=
 fixed, but I&#39;m afraid there are already a fair number of deployed serv=
ers that have the issue.</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>Interesting. Does it fail on ANY global reque=
st being sent from a server, or is it only at certain points that it doesn=
=E2=80=99t handle these messages correctly?</div><div><br></div><br><blockq=
uote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>While I&#39;m wishing th=
ings - I would also like the &quot;delay-compression&quot; extension to be =
more widely supported because it&#39;s the only delayed-compression mechani=
sm that (1) does not have a race condition by design (<a href=3D"mailto:zli=
b@openssh.com" target=3D"_blank">zlib@openssh.com</a>), and (2) does not re=
quire a second key exchange after user authentication (PuTTY mitigation).</=
div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Is=
 RFC 8308 the right reference for this option? Are there any implementation=
s of this so far other than from Bitvise?</div><div><br></div><div>Also, I=
=E2=80=99m not familiar with the PuTTY issue around needing a second key ex=
change. Is that documented somewhere?</div></div><div>
--=C2=A0<br>Ron Frederick<br><a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" target=
=3D"_blank">ronf@timeheart.net</a><br><br><br>

</div>
<br></div></blockquote></div>

--0000000000004e6f1705a4c689d8--


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From: Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 14:15:38 -0400
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/LCMGWHLgNc54CRFoekxoVmhE2Ek>
Subject: [Curdle] Fwd: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF meetings
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--0000000000004578dd05a4d6850b
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi,

The IETF Executive Director and leadership need community input on how to
handle virtual meetings. Please feel free to complete the  survey.


Thanks,
Daniel

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: IETF Executive Director <exec-director@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, May 4, 2020 at 3:04 AM
Subject: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF meetings
To: IETF Announcement List <ietf-announce@ietf.org>


This is a reminder that we need the IETF community to help us plan for the
possibility that one or more upcoming IETF meetings in 2020 and possibly
2021 may not be able to go ahead in person.  You can help us with this by
filling out the following survey:

        https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/5328FFJ

So far we have 114 responses and we would ideally like 500 or more.

The survey contains the following pages and will take 15-20 minutes to
complete:

1. Welcome
2. Online IETF 107 and the subsequent virtual interims
3. Replacing a cancelled in-person meeting
4. Online meeting format and timezone
5. Replicating humming
6. Replicating the hallway environment
7. Fees
8. Thanks and anything else

We run the survey in anonymous mode which means that we only see data that
you explicitly provide.

Thank you in advance for your help.

-- 
Alissa Cooper, IETF Chair
Jay Daley, IETF Executive Director
Colin Perkins, IRTF Chair

_______________________________________________
IETF-Announce mailing list
IETF-Announce@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce


-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

--0000000000004578dd05a4d6850b
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi,=C2=A0<div><br></div><div><div>The IETF Executive Direc=
tor and leadership need community input on how to handle virtual meetings. =
Please feel free to complete the=C2=A0 survey.</div><div><br></div><div><br=
></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>Daniel</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><d=
iv dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">---------- Forwarded message ---------<=
br>From: <strong class=3D"gmail_sendername" dir=3D"auto">IETF Executive Dir=
ector</strong> <span dir=3D"auto">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:exec-director@ietf.=
org">exec-director@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span><br>Date: Mon, May 4, 2020 at 3:0=
4 AM<br>Subject: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF meet=
ings<br>To: IETF Announcement List &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-announce@ietf=
.org">ietf-announce@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br></div><br><br>This is a reminder th=
at we need the IETF community to help us plan for the possibility that one =
or more upcoming IETF meetings in 2020 and possibly 2021 may not be able to=
 go ahead in person.=C2=A0 You can help us with this by filling out the fol=
lowing survey: <br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/5328F=
FJ" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/532=
8FFJ</a><br>
<br>
So far we have 114 responses and we would ideally like 500 or more.<br>
<br>
The survey contains the following pages and will take 15-20 minutes to comp=
lete:<br>
<br>
1. Welcome<br>
2. Online IETF 107 and the subsequent virtual interims<br>
3. Replacing a cancelled in-person meeting<br>
4. Online meeting format and timezone<br>
5. Replicating humming<br>
6. Replicating the hallway environment<br>
7. Fees<br>
8. Thanks and anything else<br>
<br>
We run the survey in anonymous mode which means that we only see data that =
you explicitly provide.<br>
<br>
Thank you in advance for your help.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Alissa Cooper, IETF Chair<br>
Jay Daley, IETF Executive Director<br>
Colin Perkins, IRTF Chair<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
IETF-Announce mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:IETF-Announce@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">IETF-Announce@i=
etf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce" rel=3D"nore=
ferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announ=
ce</a><br>
</div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gma=
il_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Dani=
el Migault<br></div><div>Ericsson</div></div></div></div></div>

--0000000000004578dd05a4d6850b--


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Subject: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8709 (6164)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8709,
"Ed25519 and Ed448 Public Key Algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6164

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>

Section: 6

Original Text
-------------
6.  Signature Format

   The "ssh-ed25519" key format has the following encoding:

   string  "ssh-ed25519"

   string  signature

   Here, 'signature' is the 64-octet signature produced in accordance
   with [RFC8032], Section 5.1.6.

   The "ssh-ed448" key format has the following encoding:

   string  "ssh-ed448"

   string  signature

   Here, 'signature' is the 114-octet signature produced in accordance
   with [RFC8032], Section 5.2.6.

Corrected Text
--------------
6.  Signature Format

   The "ssh-ed25519" signature format has the following encoding:

   string  "ssh-ed25519"

   string  signature

   Here, 'signature' is the 64-octet signature produced in accordance
   with [RFC8032], Section 5.1.6.

   The "ssh-ed448" signature format has the following encoding:

   string  "ssh-ed448"

   string  signature

   Here, 'signature' is the 114-octet signature produced in accordance
   with [RFC8032], Section 5.2.6.

Notes
-----
s/key format/signature format/

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC8709 (draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-11)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Ed25519 and Ed448 Public Key Algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
Publication Date    : February 2020
Author(s)           : B. Harris, L. Velvindron
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Subject: [Curdle] [Errata Verified] RFC8709 (6164)
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The following errata report has been verified for RFC8709,
"Ed25519 and Ed448 Public Key Algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol". 

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6164

--------------------------------------
Status: Verified
Type: Editorial

Reported by: HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org>
Date Reported: 2020-05-11
Verified by: Benjamin Kaduk (IESG)

Section: 6

Original Text
-------------
6.  Signature Format

   The "ssh-ed25519" key format has the following encoding:

   string  "ssh-ed25519"

   string  signature

   Here, 'signature' is the 64-octet signature produced in accordance
   with [RFC8032], Section 5.1.6.

   The "ssh-ed448" key format has the following encoding:

   string  "ssh-ed448"

   string  signature

   Here, 'signature' is the 114-octet signature produced in accordance
   with [RFC8032], Section 5.2.6.

Corrected Text
--------------
6.  Signature Format

   The "ssh-ed25519" signature format has the following encoding:

   string  "ssh-ed25519"

   string  signature

   Here, 'signature' is the 64-octet signature produced in accordance
   with [RFC8032], Section 5.1.6.

   The "ssh-ed448" signature format has the following encoding:

   string  "ssh-ed448"

   string  signature

   Here, 'signature' is the 114-octet signature produced in accordance
   with [RFC8032], Section 5.2.6.

Notes
-----
s/key format/signature format/

--------------------------------------
RFC8709 (draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448-11)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Ed25519 and Ed448 Public Key Algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
Publication Date    : February 2020
Author(s)           : B. Harris, L. Velvindron
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


From nobody Mon May 25 19:45:12 2020
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Subject: [Curdle] curdle - Not having a session at IETF 108
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Daniel Migault, a chair of the curdle working group, indicated that the curdle working group does not plan to hold a session at IETF 108.

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Date: Tue, 26 May 2020 22:55:04 +0300
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Subject: [Curdle] Looking for contemporary CMS samples (X25519/Ed25519/AES-GCM)
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Hello,

While working on CMS support, it was noticed that there are no known
public CMS test vectors covering recent (or not so recent) additions.
In particular we were looking for X25519/Ed25519 and AES-GCM/AES-CCM
examples. Do you have any known-good samples that can be used in open
source projects?

Thank you!

--
With best wishes
Dmitry


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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [lamps] Looking for contemporary CMS samples (X25519/Ed25519/AES-GCM)
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RFC 8591 has an example of authEnvelopedData with RSA and AES-GCM.

Russ


> On May 26, 2020, at 3:55 PM, Dmitry Baryshkov <dbaryshkov@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> While working on CMS support, it was noticed that there are no known
> public CMS test vectors covering recent (or not so recent) additions.
> In particular we were looking for X25519/Ed25519 and AES-GCM/AES-CCM
> examples. Do you have any known-good samples that can be used in open
> source projects?
> 
> Thank you!
> 
> --
> With best wishes
> Dmitry
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Spasm mailing list
> Spasm@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm

