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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 12:15:10 -0500
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Subject: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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Hey everyone,

I notice the following draft has not moved forward:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/

This seems to be an important draft which would standardize the current use
of key exchange algorithms in SSH. However, it looks like no changes have
been made in 2.5 years?

Did I miss some event where this draft morphed into something else so that
I'm not seeing the right information about progress?

Otherwise, what seems to be the current obstacle with making progress on
this?

denis

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hey everyone,</div><div><br></div><div>I notice the f=
ollowing draft has not moved forward:</div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div =
dir=3D"ltr"><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-s=
sh-kex-sha2/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sh=
a2/</a></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div>This seems to be an important =
draft which would standardize the current use of key exchange algorithms in=
 SSH. However, it looks like no changes have been made in 2.5 years?</div><=
div dir=3D"ltr"><br></div><div>Did I miss some event where this draft morph=
ed into something else so that I&#39;m not seeing the right information abo=
ut progress?</div><div><br></div><div>Otherwise, what seems to be the curre=
nt obstacle with making progress on this?</div><div><br></div><div>denis</d=
iv><div><br></div></div>

--00000000000036d8b105aa2d9a1e--


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 12:50:09 -0500
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Subject: [Curdle] SSH/QUIC draft
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Hey everyone,

I noticed that QUIC - a secure, multi-stream replacement for TLS over TCP -
is close to standardization at the IETF.

For at least 7 years now, I've been pondering that TCP is a poor transport
for SSH and should be replaced by UDP. However, it has always looked like a
lot of work.

Now, most of the work seems to have been done by QUIC. There's also a nifty
implementation by Cloudflare which has a liberal BSD license and seems very
suitable to adaptation for SSH. It nicely separates the TLS handshake so it
can be pulled out while the TLS cipher suites are kept: this makes it easy
to replace the TLS handshake with an SSH-friendly key exchange.

With this inspiration, I wrote an SSH/QUIC spec which fixes all of the
architectural problems I can think of in SSH from experience over the years:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bider-ssh-quic/

The HTML version of the draft has the most reader-friendly presentation - I
suggest using that one.

I wonder if anyone is interested in implementing this. I'm seriously
considering it, probably based on Quiche. I've forked it already, but I
haven't yet done real work:

https://github.com/denisbider/QuiSSH

denis

--00000000000058a20a05aa2e17ae
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>He=
y everyone,</div><div><br></div><div>I noticed that QUIC - a secure, multi-=
stream replacement for TLS over TCP - is close to standardization at the IE=
TF.<br><br>For at least 7 years now, I&#39;ve been pondering that TCP is a =
poor transport for SSH and should be replaced by UDP. However, it has alway=
s looked like a lot of work.</div><div><br></div><div>Now, most of the work=
 seems to have been done by QUIC. There&#39;s also a nifty implementation b=
y Cloudflare which has a liberal BSD license and seems very suitable to ada=
ptation for SSH. It nicely separates the TLS handshake so it can be pulled =
out while the TLS cipher suites are kept: this makes it easy to replace the=
 TLS handshake with an SSH-friendly key exchange.</div><div><br></div><div>=
With this inspiration, I wrote an SSH/QUIC spec which fixes all of the arch=
itectural problems I can think of in SSH from experience over the years:</d=
iv><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bi=
der-ssh-quic/">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bider-ssh-quic/</a></=
div><div><br></div><div>The HTML version of the draft has the most reader-f=
riendly presentation - I suggest using that one.</div><div><br></div><div>I=
 wonder if anyone is interested in implementing this. I&#39;m seriously con=
sidering it, probably based on Quiche. I&#39;ve forked it already, but I ha=
ven&#39;t yet done real work:<br><br><a href=3D"https://github.com/denisbid=
er/QuiSSH">https://github.com/denisbider/QuiSSH</a><br><br>denis<br></div><=
div><br></div></div></div></div></div>

--00000000000058a20a05aa2e17ae--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, curdle-chairs <curdle-chairs@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
Thread-Index: AQHWV6bgpwQBtcqBFky+EC4tQ/Oyp6kCxtAA
Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 18:39:58 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, curdle-chairs <curdle-chairs@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 18:40:51 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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From nobody Sat Jul 11 12:35:34 2020
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Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 22:35:24 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: curdle <curdle@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <20200711193524.GA239102@LK-Perkele-VII>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] SSH/QUIC draft
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On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 12:50:09PM -0500, denis bider wrote:
> Hey everyone,
> 
> With this inspiration, I wrote an SSH/QUIC spec which fixes all of the
> architectural problems I can think of in SSH from experience over the years:
> 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bider-ssh-quic/

Some comments:

- Section 2.1 just seems odd. Either one should run SSH over QUIC on
  separate port, or use ALPN to demultiplex it from other QUIC
  traffic.
- I do not see what would prevent attacker from passively listening
  for legimate connection and then mounting dictionary attack
  against obfustication code to discover it.
- I think HTTP/3 uses 1200 bytes instead of 1400 bytes as padding
  target (which is within IPv6 MinMTU, but considerably above IPv4
  MinMTU).
- Why is there key exchange stuff? One should have TLS do the key
  exchange and then extract any needed keys.
- Then the overall session ID should be also extracted from TLS.
- I presume server authentication should be done using the TLS
  server certificate. All of RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448)
  keys (including raw) are supported.
- For client authentication, one probably should use SSH-layer
  mechanisms, due to some limitations of TLS-layer ones (extract nonces
  or shared secrets from TLS if you need them).
- For server multiplexing to work (and no server multiplexing is the
  single biggest complaint I have with all of SSH!), active migration
  MUST be disabled. As far as I can tell, handing NAT rebindings is
  still possible even with active migration off.
  * The hacks people do to deal with this are ugly to say the least.
  * Seriously, I would much rather lose NAT rebind handling than
   server multiplexing.


Looking at QUIC specifications and trying to figure out what
QUIC looks from above:

The basic data transport primitive is streams:

- Each stream can be unidirectional or bidirectional.
- Stream is of arbitrary length.
- Each stream is reliable ordered at byte granularity.
- All streams are independent.
- Stream can be opened by either peer.
- Aborts are directional (not undirectional like in TCP)!
  * Makes it possible for one side to close TX and abort RX. This is
    NOT possible in TCP.

Flow control:

- There are three flow controllers.
  * One operates on connection level, and limits the amount of aggerate
    data that can be sent on all streams together.
  * One operates on stream level, and limits data that can be sent
    on that stream.
  * One limits the number of streams that can be open at once.
  * All are independent in both directions.

Encryption:

- For selecting endpoint, there server name (nice for server
  multiplexing) and application layer protocol name fields.
- QUIC always does its own key exchange.
- QUIC always encrypts all application data streams.
- Server authentication with certificate or raw key is mandatory.
  RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) are all supported.
- Client authentication is optional.
  * The negotiation is really limited here!
- QUIC uses TLS, which can provode nonces and shares secrets for
  application use.



-Ilari


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Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 21:02:50 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] SSH/QUIC draft
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Ilari:

> Section 2.1 just seems odd. Either one should run SSH over QUIC on separate
port, or use ALPN to demultiplex it from other QUIC traffic.

I do not understand this comment. SSH/QUIC is a protocol which is neither
SSH nor QUIC, it is SSH/QUIC. Section 2.1 explains how to tell SSH over UDP
key exchange packets apart from QUIC packets. This is doable,
straightforward, it makes sense, and is much preferable to asking users to
configure two separate ports for one protocol.


> I do not see what would prevent attacker from passively listening for
legimate connection and then mounting dictionary attack against
obfustication code to discover it.

The fact that the attacker against whom obfuscation is effective is in
China or Russia and no legitimate connection is from there.

People will use trivial obfuscation keywords, or just leave it empty. The
key feature here is that you can easily make it so that BEFORE the attacker
can even start guessing passwords, they have to guess another password.

I thought of using Argon2 to derive the obfuscation encryption key from the
keyword, but it seems to introduce WAY too much complexity for an optional,
nice-to-have feature. Folks whose SSH implementations run on RFID chips
embedded in clothing tags will not want to implement that. This feature
specifically defends against complete strangers who are not on the network
route between legitimate clients and servers, and incidentally that's by
far the most common type of attacks on SSH servers.


> I think HTTP/3 uses 1200 bytes instead of 1400 bytes as padding target
(which is within IPv6 MinMTU, but considerably above IPv4 MinMTU).

Useful to know, thank you!

SSH_QUIC_INIT is inspired by SSH_MSG_KEXINIT, which tends to be long in
practical use of SSH. However, the current SSH_QUIC_INIT has many fewer
elaborately long algorithm negotiation fields, so 1200 could also work as a
target.


> Why is there key exchange stuff? One should have TLS do the key exchange
and then extract any needed keys.

It needs to work with existing SSH configurations which use SSH host keys.
SSH key exchange methods are already specified, known to SSH implementers,
and do not have glaring problems.


> I presume server authentication should be done using the TLS server
certificate.

Server authentication needs to happen using existing SSH host keys with no
change for users. Users should be able to update to new SSH software
versions that support SSH/QUIC and everything should work out of the box
without the user noticing a difference. Server admins may need to open a
UDP port in the firewall, and that's it.


> All of RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) keys (including raw) are
supported.

That would work, but then I can't put obfuscation and trusted fingerprints
in it. In practical use of SSH, these have turned out to be important
missing features.

Looking at it from the other perspective, I don't see what's gained from
using the TLS key exchange. Instead SSH would relinquish flexibility which
it currently has. For example, the current draft does not specify
multi-step key exchange which does not involve host keys, such as the
GSSAPI key exchange methods which allow server authentication using
Kerberos. But future drafts could allow that, or the extension fields could
be used to allow that.

SSH key exchanges are equally as robust as TLS. What does TLS bring? A
strait-jacket? A requirement to implement ASN.1? Those are things we
dislike.


> For client authentication, one probably should use SSH-layer mechanisms

For client authentication, we use the exact same mechanisms currently used
in SSH.  Anything less than "no change for the user" does not fly.


> For server multiplexing to work (and no server multiplexing is the single
biggest complaint I have with all of SSH!)

Can you explain this in more detail?

As someone who has been working on an SSH server for literally 20 years, I
have not seen the term "server multiplexing" used by a customer, ever. But
perhaps this is because none of the people who would want that are our
users.

Do you mean the ability to route the connection differently depending on,
for example, the host name that was entered by the user to connect?

If yes, that sounds very useful to add. I'll add a "server name indication"
field to SSH_QUIC_INIT in the next draft version.

With an SNI-like field, you should be able to dispatch SSH_QUIC_INIT to the
correct back-end server, and then dispatch subsequent packets appropriately
using the QUIC Destination Connection ID.


> Makes it possible for one side to close TX and abort RX. This is NOT
possible in TCP.

Fair point, maybe the draft should address whether aborting RX should be
done and what should happen in that case.


Thank you for your comments!

denis


On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 2:35 PM Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
wrote:

> On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 12:50:09PM -0500, denis bider wrote:
> > Hey everyone,
> >
> > With this inspiration, I wrote an SSH/QUIC spec which fixes all of the
> > architectural problems I can think of in SSH from experience over the
> years:
> >
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bider-ssh-quic/
>
> Some comments:
>
> - Section 2.1 just seems odd. Either one should run SSH over QUIC on
>   separate port, or use ALPN to demultiplex it from other QUIC
>   traffic.
> - I do not see what would prevent attacker from passively listening
>   for legimate connection and then mounting dictionary attack
>   against obfustication code to discover it.
> - I think HTTP/3 uses 1200 bytes instead of 1400 bytes as padding
>   target (which is within IPv6 MinMTU, but considerably above IPv4
>   MinMTU).
> - Why is there key exchange stuff? One should have TLS do the key
>   exchange and then extract any needed keys.
> - Then the overall session ID should be also extracted from TLS.
> - I presume server authentication should be done using the TLS
>   server certificate. All of RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448)
>   keys (including raw) are supported.
> - For client authentication, one probably should use SSH-layer
>   mechanisms, due to some limitations of TLS-layer ones (extract nonces
>   or shared secrets from TLS if you need them).
> - For server multiplexing to work (and no server multiplexing is the
>   single biggest complaint I have with all of SSH!), active migration
>   MUST be disabled. As far as I can tell, handing NAT rebindings is
>   still possible even with active migration off.
>   * The hacks people do to deal with this are ugly to say the least.
>   * Seriously, I would much rather lose NAT rebind handling than
>    server multiplexing.
>
>
> Looking at QUIC specifications and trying to figure out what
> QUIC looks from above:
>
> The basic data transport primitive is streams:
>
> - Each stream can be unidirectional or bidirectional.
> - Stream is of arbitrary length.
> - Each stream is reliable ordered at byte granularity.
> - All streams are independent.
> - Stream can be opened by either peer.
> - Aborts are directional (not undirectional like in TCP)!
>   * Makes it possible for one side to close TX and abort RX. This is
>     NOT possible in TCP.
>
> Flow control:
>
> - There are three flow controllers.
>   * One operates on connection level, and limits the amount of aggerate
>     data that can be sent on all streams together.
>   * One operates on stream level, and limits data that can be sent
>     on that stream.
>   * One limits the number of streams that can be open at once.
>   * All are independent in both directions.
>
> Encryption:
>
> - For selecting endpoint, there server name (nice for server
>   multiplexing) and application layer protocol name fields.
> - QUIC always does its own key exchange.
> - QUIC always encrypts all application data streams.
> - Server authentication with certificate or raw key is mandatory.
>   RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) are all supported.
> - Client authentication is optional.
>   * The negotiation is really limited here!
> - QUIC uses TLS, which can provode nonces and shares secrets for
>   application use.
>
>
>
> -Ilari
>

--00000000000059574a05aa34f9ae
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Ilari:</d=
iv><div><br></div><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transfo=
rm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spa=
cing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stret=
ch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Section 2.1 just se=
ems odd. Either one should run SSH over QUIC on </span><span style=3D"font:=
small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);te=
xt-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:non=
e;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;=
font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">separate =
port, or use ALPN to demultiplex it from other QUIC </span><span style=3D"f=
ont:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34=
);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration=
:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:n=
one;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">traff=
ic.</span></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvet=
ica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text=
-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;dis=
play:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;fl=
oat:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span sty=
le=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(3=
4,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-dec=
oration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-a=
djust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
">I do not understand this comment. SSH/QUIC is a protocol which is neither=
 SSH nor QUIC, it is SSH/QUIC. Section 2.1 explains how to tell SSH over UD=
P key exchange packets apart from QUIC packets. This is doable, straightfor=
ward, it makes sense, and is much preferable to asking users to configure t=
wo separate ports for one protocol.</span></div><div><span style=3D"font:sm=
all/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text=
-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;=
word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;fo=
nt-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span>=
</div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-al=
ign:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-spac=
e:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 A=
rial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transfor=
m:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spac=
ing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretc=
h:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">&gt; <span style=3D"=
font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoratio=
n:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:=
none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">I do=
 not see what would prevent attacker from passively listening </span><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-siz=
e-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)">for legimate connection and then mounting dictionary attack </span><sp=
an style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color=
:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;te=
xt-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-=
size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255)">against obfustication code to discover it.</span></span></div><div>=
<br></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;tex=
t-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter=
-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-=
space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgroun=
d-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,san=
s-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent=
:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:in=
line;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:non=
e;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">The fact that the attacker against who=
m obfuscation is effective is in China or Russia and no legitimate connecti=
on is from there.</span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Ari=
al,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:=
none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacin=
g:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:=
normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:sm=
all/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text=
-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;=
word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;fo=
nt-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span>=
</span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whi=
te-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">People will use trivial obfuscation=
 keywords, or just leave it empty. The key feature here is that you can eas=
ily make it so that BEFORE the attacker can even start guessing passwords, =
they have to guess another password.</span></span></div><div><span style=3D=
"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,=
34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decorati=
on:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust=
:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><sp=
an style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color=
:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;te=
xt-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-=
size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255)"><br></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,He=
lvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;=
text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px=
;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:norma=
l;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1=
.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tran=
sform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-=
spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">I thought of usi=
ng Argon2 to derive the obfuscation encryption key from the keyword, but it=
 seems to introduce WAY too much complexity for an optional, nice-to-have f=
eature. Folks whose SSH implementations run on RFID chips embedded in cloth=
ing tags will not want to implement that. This feature specifically defends=
 against complete strangers who are not on the network route between legiti=
mate clients and servers, and incidentally that&#39;s by far the most commo=
n type of attacks on SSH servers.</span></span></div><div><span style=3D"fo=
nt:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:=
none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:no=
ne;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-siz=
e-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)"><br></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helve=
tica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;tex=
t-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;di=
splay:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;f=
loat:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transfo=
rm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spa=
cing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stret=
ch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span><=
/div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-ali=
gn:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spac=
ing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space=
:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-ser=
if;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;=
letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;=
white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;bac=
kground-color:rgb(255,255,255)">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Ari=
al,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:=
none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacin=
g:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:=
normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">I think HTTP/3 uses 12=
00 bytes instead of 1400 bytes as padding </span><span style=3D"font:small/=
1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tra=
nsform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word=
-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-s=
tretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">target (which i=
s within IPv6 MinMTU, but considerably above IPv4 </span><span style=3D"fon=
t:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);=
text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:n=
one;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:non=
e;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">MinMTU)=
.</span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvet=
ica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text=
-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;dis=
play:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;fl=
oat:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 A=
rial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transfor=
m:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spac=
ing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretc=
h:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:=
small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);te=
xt-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:non=
e;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;=
font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></spa=
n></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sa=
ns-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-inden=
t:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:i=
nline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:no=
ne;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,H=
elvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none=
;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0p=
x;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:norm=
al;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/=
1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tra=
nsform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word=
-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-s=
tretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Useful to know,=
 thank you!</span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Ar=
ial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform=
:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spaci=
ng:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch=
:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:s=
mall/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);tex=
t-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none=
;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;f=
ont-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span styl=
e=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34=
,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-deco=
ration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-ad=
just:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"=
><br></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,He=
lvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;=
text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px=
;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:norma=
l;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1=
.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tran=
sform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-=
spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"f=
ont:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34=
);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration=
:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:n=
one;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">SSH_Q=
UIC_INIT is inspired by SSH_MSG_KEXINIT, which tends to be long in practica=
l use of SSH. However, the current SSH_QUIC_INIT has many fewer elaborately=
 long algorithm negotiation fields, so 1200 could also work as a target.</s=
pan></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial=
,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:no=
ne;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:=
0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:no=
rmal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:smal=
l/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-t=
ransform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;wo=
rd-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font=
-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></=
span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0p=
x;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inlin=
e;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;b=
ackground-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helve=
tica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;tex=
t-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;di=
splay:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;f=
loat:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transfo=
rm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spa=
cing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stret=
ch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span><=
/span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;t=
ext-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whit=
e-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,s=
ans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-inde=
nt:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:=
inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:n=
one;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,=
Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:non=
e;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0=
px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:nor=
mal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">&gt; <span style=3D"font:=
small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);te=
xt-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:non=
e;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;=
font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Why is th=
ere key exchange stuff? One should have TLS do the key </span><span style=
=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,=
34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decor=
ation:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adj=
ust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
exchange and then extract any needed keys.</span></span></span></span></div=
><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:l=
eft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:=
normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:nor=
mal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;t=
ext-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whit=
e-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,s=
ans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-inde=
nt:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:=
inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:n=
one;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,=
Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:non=
e;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0=
px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:nor=
mal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span>=
</span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whi=
te-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial=
,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:no=
ne;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:=
0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:no=
rmal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:smal=
l/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-t=
ransform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;wo=
rd-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font=
-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">It needs to w=
ork with existing SSH configurations which use SSH host keys. SSH key excha=
nge methods are already specified, known to SSH implementers, and do not ha=
ve glaring problems.</span></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"f=
ont:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34=
);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration=
:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:n=
one;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span=
 style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:r=
gb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text=
-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-si=
ze-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:l=
eft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:=
normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:nor=
mal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;t=
ext-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whit=
e-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></span></div><div><spa=
n style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:=
rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;tex=
t-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-s=
ize-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255=
,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:=
left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:no=
rmal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whi=
te-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></span></d=
iv><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align=
:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacin=
g:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:n=
ormal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif=
;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;le=
tter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;wh=
ite-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backg=
round-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica=
,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-in=
dent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;displa=
y:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float=
:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Aria=
l,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:n=
one;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing=
:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:n=
ormal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">&gt;=C2=A0<span style=
=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,=
34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decor=
ation:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adj=
ust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
I presume server authentication should be done using the TLS </span><span s=
tyle=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb=
(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-d=
ecoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size=
-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5)">server certificate.</span></span></span></span></span></div><div><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-siz=
e-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:le=
ft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:n=
ormal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:norm=
al;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;te=
xt-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white=
-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sa=
ns-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-inden=
t:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:i=
nline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:no=
ne;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,H=
elvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none=
;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0p=
x;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:norm=
al;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span><=
/span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-=
serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0=
px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inli=
ne;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;=
background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helv=
etica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;te=
xt-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;d=
isplay:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;=
float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5=
 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-sp=
acing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stre=
tch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"fon=
t:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);=
text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:n=
one;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:non=
e;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span s=
tyle=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb=
(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-d=
ecoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size=
-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5)">Server authentication needs to happen using existing SSH host keys with=
 no change for users. Users should be able to update to new SSH software ve=
rsions that support SSH/QUIC and everything should work out of the box with=
out the user noticing a difference. Server admins may need to open a UDP po=
rt in the firewall, and that&#39;s it.</span></span></span></span></span></=
div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-alig=
n:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spaci=
ng:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:=
normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-colo=
r:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-seri=
f;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;l=
etter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;w=
hite-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;back=
ground-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetic=
a,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-i=
ndent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;displ=
ay:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;floa=
t:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Ari=
al,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:=
none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacin=
g:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:=
normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:sm=
all/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text=
-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;=
word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;fo=
nt-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span>=
</span></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,=
Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:non=
e;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0=
px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:nor=
mal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small=
/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tr=
ansform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;wor=
d-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-=
stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D=
"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,=
34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decorati=
on:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust=
:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><sp=
an style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color=
:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;te=
xt-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-=
size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align=
:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacin=
g:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:n=
ormal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></span></span></div><div><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-siz=
e-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:le=
ft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:n=
ormal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:norm=
al;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;te=
xt-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white=
-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sa=
ns-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-inden=
t:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:i=
nline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:no=
ne;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,H=
elvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none=
;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0p=
x;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:norm=
al;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">&gt; All of RSA, ECDSA and=
 EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) </span><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica=
,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-in=
dent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;displa=
y:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float=
:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">keys (including raw) are supported=
.</span></span></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.=
5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-trans=
form:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-str=
etch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><b></b><i></i><u>=
</u><sub></sub><sup></sup><strike></strike><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub>=
<sup></sup><strike></strike><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup><str=
ike></strike><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup><strike></strike><b=
r></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-seri=
f;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;l=
etter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;w=
hite-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;back=
ground-color:rgb(255,255,255)">That would work, but then I can&#39;t put ob=
fuscation and trusted fingerprints in it. In practical use of SSH, these ha=
ve turned out to be important missing features.</span></div><div><br></div>=
<div>Looking at it from the other perspective, I don&#39;t see what&#39;s g=
ained from using the TLS key exchange. Instead SSH would relinquish flexibi=
lity which it currently has. For example, the current draft does not specif=
y multi-step key exchange which does not involve host keys, such as the GSS=
API key exchange methods which allow server authentication using Kerberos. =
But future drafts could allow that, or the extension fields could be used t=
o allow that.</div><div><br></div><div>SSH key exchanges are equally as rob=
ust as TLS. What does TLS bring? A strait-jacket? A requirement to implemen=
t ASN.1? Those are things we dislike.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><d=
iv>&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-=
align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-s=
pacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-sp=
ace:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-=
color:rgb(255,255,255)">For client authentication, one probably should use =
SSH-layer </span><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;t=
ext-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whit=
e-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255)">mechanisms</span></div><div><span style=3D"font=
:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);t=
ext-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:no=
ne;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none=
;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></sp=
an></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text=
-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-=
spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-s=
pace:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background=
-color:rgb(255,255,255)">For client authentication, we use the exact same m=
echanisms currently used in SSH.=C2=A0 </span><span style=3D"font:small/1.5=
 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-sp=
acing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stre=
tch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Anything less than=
 &quot;no change for the user&quot; does not fly.</span></div><div><span st=
yle=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(=
34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-de=
coration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-=
adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255=
)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans=
-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:=
0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inl=
ine;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"fo=
nt:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:=
none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:no=
ne;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">&gt;=
=C2=A0<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:l=
eft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:=
normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:nor=
mal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255)">For server multiplexing to work (and no server multiplexin=
g is the </span><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;te=
xt-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white=
-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255)">single biggest complaint I have with all of SSH!=
)</span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,san=
s-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent=
:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:in=
line;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:non=
e;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,He=
lvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;=
text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px=
;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:norma=
l;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></div><di=
v>Can you explain this in more detail?</div><div><br></div><div>As someone =
who has been working on an SSH server for literally 20 years, I have not se=
en the term &quot;server multiplexing&quot; used by a customer, ever. But p=
erhaps this is because none of the people who would want that are our users=
.</div><div><br></div><div>Do you mean the ability to route the connection =
differently depending on, for example, the host name that was entered by th=
e user to connect?</div><div><br></div><div>If yes, that sounds very useful=
 to add. I&#39;ll add a &quot;server name indication&quot; field to SSH_QUI=
C_INIT in the next draft version.</div><div><br></div><div>With an SNI-like=
 field, you should be able to dispatch SSH_QUIC_INIT to the correct back-en=
d server, and then dispatch subsequent packets appropriately using the QUIC=
 Destination Connection ID.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt;=C2=
=A0<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left=
;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:nor=
mal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal=
;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(=
255,255,255)">Makes it possible for one side to close TX and abort RX. This=
 is </span><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-al=
ign:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-spac=
e:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255)">NOT possible in TCP.</span></div><div><span style=3D"=
font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,3=
4);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoratio=
n:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:=
none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br>=
</span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whi=
te-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Fair point, maybe the draft should address whe=
ther aborting RX should be done and what should happen in that case.</span>=
</div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-al=
ign:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-spac=
e:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 A=
rial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transfor=
m:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spac=
ing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretc=
h:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><di=
v><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;=
color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;=
font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255)">Thank you for your comments!</span></div><div><span style=3D"f=
ont:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34=
);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration=
:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:n=
one;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br><=
/span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;t=
ext-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whit=
e-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255)">denis</span></div><div></div><div></div><div><s=
pan style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;colo=
r:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;t=
ext-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font=
-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,2=
55,255)"><br></span></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Sat,=
 Jul 11, 2020 at 2:35 PM Ilari Liusvaara &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ilariliusvaa=
ra@welho.com">ilariliusvaara@welho.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;bo=
rder-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:so=
lid">On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 12:50:09PM -0500, denis bider wrote:<br>
&gt; Hey everyone,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; With this inspiration, I wrote an SSH/QUIC spec which fixes all of the=
<br>
&gt; architectural problems I can think of in SSH from experience over the =
years:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bider-ssh-quic/" tar=
get=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bi=
der-ssh-quic/</a><br>
<br>
Some comments:<br>
<br>
- Section 2.1 just seems odd. Either one should run SSH over QUIC on<br>
=C2=A0 separate port, or use ALPN to demultiplex it from other QUIC<br>
=C2=A0 traffic.<br>
- I do not see what would prevent attacker from passively listening<br>
=C2=A0 for legimate connection and then mounting dictionary attack<br>
=C2=A0 against obfustication code to discover it.<br>
- I think HTTP/3 uses 1200 bytes instead of 1400 bytes as padding<br>
=C2=A0 target (which is within IPv6 MinMTU, but considerably above IPv4<br>
=C2=A0 MinMTU).<br>
- Why is there key exchange stuff? One should have TLS do the key<br>
=C2=A0 exchange and then extract any needed keys.<br>
- Then the overall session ID should be also extracted from TLS.<br>
- I presume server authentication should be done using the TLS<br>
=C2=A0 server certificate. All of RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448)<br>
=C2=A0 keys (including raw) are supported.<br>
- For client authentication, one probably should use SSH-layer<br>
=C2=A0 mechanisms, due to some limitations of TLS-layer ones (extract nonce=
s<br>
=C2=A0 or shared secrets from TLS if you need them).<br>
- For server multiplexing to work (and no server multiplexing is the<br>
=C2=A0 single biggest complaint I have with all of SSH!), active migration<=
br>
=C2=A0 MUST be disabled. As far as I can tell, handing NAT rebindings is<br=
>
=C2=A0 still possible even with active migration off.<br>
=C2=A0 * The hacks people do to deal with this are ugly to say the least.<b=
r>
=C2=A0 * Seriously, I would much rather lose NAT rebind handling than<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server multiplexing.<br>
<br>
<br>
Looking at QUIC specifications and trying to figure out what<br>
QUIC looks from above:<br>
<br>
The basic data transport primitive is streams:<br>
<br>
- Each stream can be unidirectional or bidirectional.<br>
- Stream is of arbitrary length.<br>
- Each stream is reliable ordered at byte granularity.<br>
- All streams are independent.<br>
- Stream can be opened by either peer.<br>
- Aborts are directional (not undirectional like in TCP)!<br>
=C2=A0 * Makes it possible for one side to close TX and abort RX. This is<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 NOT possible in TCP.<br>
<br>
Flow control:<br>
<br>
- There are three flow controllers.<br>
=C2=A0 * One operates on connection level, and limits the amount of aggerat=
e<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 data that can be sent on all streams together.<br>
=C2=A0 * One operates on stream level, and limits data that can be sent<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 on that stream.<br>
=C2=A0 * One limits the number of streams that can be open at once.<br>
=C2=A0 * All are independent in both directions.<br>
<br>
Encryption:<br>
<br>
- For selecting endpoint, there server name (nice for server<br>
=C2=A0 multiplexing) and application layer protocol name fields.<br>
- QUIC always does its own key exchange.<br>
- QUIC always encrypts all application data streams.<br>
- Server authentication with certificate or raw key is mandatory.<br>
=C2=A0 RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA (Ed25519/Ed448) are all supported.<br>
- Client authentication is optional.<br>
=C2=A0 * The negotiation is really limited here!<br>
- QUIC uses TLS, which can provode nonces and shares secrets for<br>
=C2=A0 application use.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-Ilari<br>
</blockquote></div>

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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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I do believe the other documents have been published now? So maybe it's
time for this draft?

On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 1:40 PM Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:

> See also
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/Bmt_100BMUuVyUhNyNzVPVyGvlY/
>
>
>
> *From: *Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
> *Date: *Saturday, July 11, 2020 at 2:40 PM
>
>
>
>    - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/
>    <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__datatracker.ie=
tf.org_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dcurdle-2Dssh-2Dkex-2Dsha2_&d=3DDwMGaQ&c=3D96ZbZZc=
aMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=3Dkjk-1wS-Ba-rq_gcvu8q7wovDKLr=
zWDAVRonYiTwXlE&s=3Djf8FE6xiVFlcTnjy75cR7kGwVzruFFQrlh3g3LWJo7Q&e=3D>
>
>
>
>    - This seems to be an important draft which would standardize the
>    current use of key exchange algorithms in SSH. However, it looks like =
no
>    changes have been made in 2.5 years?
>
>
>
> Looks like there was some AD feedback that was never addressed; see
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/kf-iCb-o3yyxKLvH_pnGsxq7FVo/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__mailarchive.ietf.=
org_arch_msg_curdle_kf-2DiCb-2Do3yyxKLvH-5FpnGsxq7FVo_&d=3DDwMGaQ&c=3D96ZbZ=
ZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&m=3Dkjk-1wS-Ba-rq_gcvu8q7wovDK=
LrzWDAVRonYiTwXlE&s=3DfM_bC5zY2gVxjSNwflusaIOqfzgI6yUlPiGeN3R_e0w&e=3D>
>
> (roughly a year ago).  I guess the chairs (myself included) let this fall
> through the cracks.
>
>
>

--00000000000060fdf105aa35f432
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>I do believe the other documents have been published n=
ow? So maybe it&#39;s time for this draft?</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te"><div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 1:40 PM S=
alz, Rich &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-wi=
dth:1px;border-left-style:solid">





<div lang=3D"EN-US">
<div class=3D"gmail-m_7568506023201701803WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">See also <a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arc=
h/msg/curdle/Bmt_100BMUuVyUhNyNzVPVyGvlY/" target=3D"_blank">
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/Bmt_100BMUuVyUhNyNzVPVyGvlY/</=
a><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></p>
<div style=3D"border-width:1pt medium medium;border-style:solid none none;b=
order-color:rgb(181,196,223) currentColor currentColor;padding:3pt 0in 0in"=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"color:black;font-size:12pt">From: =
</span></b><span style=3D"color:black;font-size:12pt">Rich Salz &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:rsalz@akamai.com" target=3D"_blank">rsalz@akamai.com</a>&gt;<br>
<b>Date: </b>Saturday, July 11, 2020 at 2:40 PM<br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><u></u>=C2=A0<u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-top:0in">
<li class=3D"gmail-m_7568506023201701803MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0in"><a href=3D"https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__=
datatracker.ietf.org_doc_draft-2Dietf-2Dcurdle-2Dssh-2Dkex-2Dsha2_&amp;d=3D=
DwMGaQ&amp;c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&amp;r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&amp;m=
=3Dkjk-1wS-Ba-rq_gcvu8q7wovDKLrzWDAVRonYiTwXlE&amp;s=3Djf8FE6xiVFlcTnjy75cR=
7kGwVzruFFQrlh3g3LWJo7Q&amp;e=3D" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.iet=
f.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/</a><u></u><u></u></li></ul>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
<div>
<ul type=3D"disc" style=3D"margin-top:0in">
<li class=3D"gmail-m_7568506023201701803MsoListParagraph" style=3D"margin-l=
eft:0in">This seems to be an important draft which would standardize the cu=
rrent use of key exchange algorithms in SSH. However, it looks like no chan=
ges have been made in 2.5 years?<u></u><u></u></li></ul>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Looks like there was some AD feedback that was never=
 addressed; see
<a href=3D"https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=3Dhttps-3A__mailarchi=
ve.ietf.org_arch_msg_curdle_kf-2DiCb-2Do3yyxKLvH-5FpnGsxq7FVo_&amp;d=3DDwMG=
aQ&amp;c=3D96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&amp;r=3D4LM0GbR0h9Fvx86FtsKI-w&amp;m=3Dkj=
k-1wS-Ba-rq_gcvu8q7wovDKLrzWDAVRonYiTwXlE&amp;s=3DfM_bC5zY2gVxjSNwflusaIOqf=
zgI6yUlPiGeN3R_e0w&amp;e=3D" target=3D"_blank">
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/kf-iCb-o3yyxKLvH_pnGsxq7FVo/</=
a><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">(roughly a year ago).=C2=A0 I guess the chairs (myse=
lf included) let this fall through the cracks.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">=C2=A0<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>

</blockquote></div>

--00000000000060fdf105aa35f432--


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From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, "ietf-ssh@netbsd.org" <ietf-ssh@netbsd.org>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] SSH/QUIC draft
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Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2020 03:23:33 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] SSH/QUIC draft
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denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:=0A=
=0A=
>For at least 7 years now, I've been pondering that TCP is a poor transport=
=0A=
>for SSH and should be replaced by UDP.=0A=
=0A=
The problem isn't TCP, it's SSH, specifically SSH's terrible flow control=
=0A=
a.k.a. the SSH performance handbrake, which (for SFTP) layers TCP over TCP=
=0A=
over TCP.  The solution isn't to run it over a protocol that hides one laye=
r=0A=
of the handbrake but to fix SSH's flow control problems.=0A=
=0A=
And yes, I know that in theory a fix is possible if every implementation=0A=
everywhere is very carefully implemented and tuned to perform exactly the s=
ame=0A=
precise dance to avoid the handbrake, but better would be to fix the=0A=
underlying problem.=0A=
=0A=
In my case for example I just ignore the flow control/handbrake, a.k.a. "no=
-=0A=
flow-control" if you can find anything that supports that, and get pretty m=
uch=0A=
line speed on data transfers.  OK, this is a bit antisocial, but it avoids=
=0A=
having to answer "why do I get an order-of-magnitude performance drop with =
SSH=0A=
vs.TLS when the same algorithms are used" questions.=0A=
=0A=
Peter.=0A=


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2020 22:43:49 -0500
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] SSH/QUIC draft
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--00000000000080959605aa36620d
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

That's one of the problems and it's solved in SSH/TCP for single-channel
connections by implementing "no-flow-control", as you note. It's not solved
for multi-channel connections, and it leaves several other problems of
SSH/TCP unsolved.

The SSH/QUIC draft solves the flow control problem in the general case, for
multi-channel connections, and solves the other several problems of
SSH/TCP. :)

I have just uploaded a new version (-04) with improvements inspired by
feedback from Ilari.

denis


On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 10:23 PM Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >For at least 7 years now, I've been pondering that TCP is a poor transport
> >for SSH and should be replaced by UDP.
>
> The problem isn't TCP, it's SSH, specifically SSH's terrible flow control
> a.k.a. the SSH performance handbrake, which (for SFTP) layers TCP over TCP
> over TCP.  The solution isn't to run it over a protocol that hides one
> layer
> of the handbrake but to fix SSH's flow control problems.
>
> And yes, I know that in theory a fix is possible if every implementation
> everywhere is very carefully implemented and tuned to perform exactly the
> same
> precise dance to avoid the handbrake, but better would be to fix the
> underlying problem.
>
> In my case for example I just ignore the flow control/handbrake, a.k.a.
> "no-
> flow-control" if you can find anything that supports that, and get pretty
> much
> line speed on data transfers.  OK, this is a bit antisocial, but it avoids
> having to answer "why do I get an order-of-magnitude performance drop with
> SSH
> vs.TLS when the same algorithms are used" questions.
>
> Peter.
>

--00000000000080959605aa36620d
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>That&#39;s one of the problems and it&#39;s solved in=
 SSH/TCP for single-channel connections by implementing &quot;no-flow-contr=
ol&quot;, as you note. It&#39;s not solved for multi-channel connections, a=
nd it leaves several other problems of SSH/TCP unsolved.</div><div><br></di=
v><div>The SSH/QUIC draft solves the flow control problem in the general ca=
se, for multi-channel connections, and solves the other several problems of=
 SSH/TCP. :)</div><div><br></div><div>I have just uploaded a new version (-=
04) with improvements inspired by feedback from Ilari.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>denis</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 10:23 PM Peter Gutma=
nn &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.=
nz</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);bor=
der-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid">denis bider &lt;<a href=3D"mail=
to:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</=
a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt;For at least 7 years now, I&#39;ve been pondering that TCP is a poor tr=
ansport<br>
&gt;for SSH and should be replaced by UDP.<br>
<br>
The problem isn&#39;t TCP, it&#39;s SSH, specifically SSH&#39;s terrible fl=
ow control<br>
a.k.a. the SSH performance handbrake, which (for SFTP) layers TCP over TCP<=
br>
over TCP.=C2=A0 The solution isn&#39;t to run it over a protocol that hides=
 one layer<br>
of the handbrake but to fix SSH&#39;s flow control problems.<br>
<br>
And yes, I know that in theory a fix is possible if every implementation<br=
>
everywhere is very carefully implemented and tuned to perform exactly the s=
ame<br>
precise dance to avoid the handbrake, but better would be to fix the<br>
underlying problem.<br>
<br>
In my case for example I just ignore the flow control/handbrake, a.k.a. &qu=
ot;no-<br>
flow-control&quot; if you can find anything that supports that, and get pre=
tty much<br>
line speed on data transfers.=C2=A0 OK, this is a bit antisocial, but it av=
oids<br>
having to answer &quot;why do I get an order-of-magnitude performance drop =
with SSH<br>
vs.TLS when the same algorithms are used&quot; questions.<br>
<br>
Peter.<br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000080959605aa36620d--


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Comments: In-reply-to: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> message dated "Sat, 11 Jul 2020 12:15:10 -0500."
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/SELOXZPKhJ67arNd14b8QGWpv_Y>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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Hi denis,

denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:

> Hey everyone,
> =

> I notice the following draft has not moved forward:
> =

> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/
> =

> This seems to be an important draft which would standardize the
> current use of key exchange algorithms in SSH. However, it looks like
> no changes have been made in 2.5 years?

Correct.

> Did I miss some event where this draft morphed into something else so
> that I'm not seeing the right information about progress?

I have not progressed the draft, mostly due to private email received
over two years ago...

A number of people told me to not move it forward until after all of the
RFCs for draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves (now RFC 8731) and
draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2 (now RFC 8732) were adopted. Also, many
people were unhappy with the characterizations of the existing
algorithms and my scoring of MUST, SHOULD, and MAY

In addition, there was a general dislike for the references of the NSA
documents provided or the CNSA document reference.

> Otherwise, what seems to be the current obstacle with making progress
> on this?

I think that work on the document is desirable. Does anyone wish to be a
co-author with me?

I would like to see more opinions on the list about which algorithms are
to be 'SHOULD NOT' and which are to be 'MUST' ... in general, I would
like to see this document as a KEX refernce that may be updated every
few years as we learn more about which KEX algorithms are best to use.

My opinion for Section 5 as I write this email today is:

      Key Exchange Method Name             Reference  Implement
      ------------------------------------ ---------- ----------
      curve25519-sha256                    RFC8731    SHOULD
      curve448-sha512                      RFC8731    MAY
      diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1   RFC4419    SHOULD NOT
      diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 RFC4419    MAY
      diffie-hellman-group1-sha1           RFC4253    SHOULD NOT
      diffie-hellman-group14-sha1          RFC4253    SHOULD NOT
      diffie-hellman-group14-sha256        RFC8268    SHOULD
      diffie-hellman-group15-sha256        RFC8268    MAY
      diffie-hellman-group16-sha512        RFC8268    MUST
      diffie-hellman-group17-sha512        RFC8268    MAY
      diffie-hellman-group18-sha512        RFC8268    MAY
      ecdh-sha2-*                          RFC5656    MAY
      ecdh-sha2-nistp256                   RFC5656    SHOULD
      ecdh-sha2-nistp384                   RFC5656    SHOULD
      ecmqv-sha2                           RFC5656    MAY
      ext-info-c                           RFC8308    SHOULD
      ext-info-s                           RFC8308    SHOULD
      gss-*                                RFC4462    MAY
      gss-curve25519-sha256-*              RFC8732    SHOULD
      gss-curve448-sha512-*                RFC8732    MAY
      gss-gex-sha1-*                       RFC4462    SHOULD NOT
      gss-group1-sha1-*                    RFC4462    SHOULD NOT
      gss-group14-sha256-*                 RFC8732    SHOULD
      gss-group15-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
      gss-group16-sha512-*                 RFC8732    SHOULD
      gss-group17-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
      gss-group18-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
      gss-nistp256-sha256-*                RFC8732    SHOULD
      gss-nistp384-sha384-*                RFC8732    MAY
      gss-nistp521-sha512-*                RFC8732    MAY
      rsa1024-sha1                         RFC4432    MUST NOT
      rsa2048-sha256                       RFC4432    MAY

The above list of KEX algorithms comes from the IANA ssh-parameters list
URL:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-p=
arameters-16

Please let me know if I have missed any of the KEX algorithms in the
list.

Of these, I am not sure if rsa2048-sha256 has support for a 'MAY' or if
its lack of use would drive it to a 'SHOULD NOT' in the table.

To be honest, I am really not sure which KEX algorithms should be listed
as Mandatory To Implement (MTI) for key exchanges going forward.

Which diffie-hellman FFC group should be listed as MTI? group14-sha256
or group16-sha512? (I tentatively selected this one). Is that wise?
Should any FFC Diffie-Hellman group size be MTI?

I would like to hear if others on this list believe that
curve25519-sha256 should be a MUST or a SHOULD.

I also do not know if the expired draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
document should bother to give opinions on any of the KEX options other
than those being deprecated or thrust into MTI. Opinions please?

It seems clear to me that removing the *-sha1* KEX algorithms is a good
idea. I would love to move diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, but I honestly
suspect that some hardware is deployed for which it is the only KEX
algorithm that may still need to be supported... which is the only
reason it is a 'SHOULD' on my list instead of a 'SHOULD NOT' ...

        Be safe, stay healthy,
        -- Mark


From nobody Sun Jul 12 05:05:29 2020
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References: <CADPMZDB8oXAg0g0oJvZmkK1XPhb28SQPnxwRmL9umzFXkH0ogQ@mail.gmail.com> <2306.1594546601@eng-mail01.juniper.net>
In-Reply-To: <2306.1594546601@eng-mail01.juniper.net>
From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2020 07:05:10 -0500
Message-ID: <CADPMZDDBEY1tXOPrNxcxG07ceHShvcSqztG3omgFV8zvo8fV4A@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
Cc: curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, curdle-chairs <curdle-chairs@ietf.org>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/CGAdlyKDCkTvLL53ic0AC2MCbrk>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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Hey Mark!

It looks like I found the key thing I missed: Google did not show me RFC
8268 when I searched for "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256". It finds it now
when I search for "rfc diffie-hellman-group14-sha256".

I could have found it in the IANA registry but I trusted the lack of Google
results in my first search. Alas.

That resolves the key concern for me: that names like
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
are authoritatively defined. I was looking for this reference for the SSH
QUIC draft.

With regard to MUST / MAY / SHOULD / etc assignments, I agree with all of
these:

> curve25519-sha256                     SHOULD
> curve448-sha512                       MAY
> diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1    SHOULD NOT
> diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256  MAY
> diffie-hellman-group1-sha1            SHOULD NOT
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha1           SHOULD NOT
> diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         SHOULD
> diffie-hellman-group15-sha256         MAY

I do not agree with this one:

> diffie-hellman-group16-sha512   MUST

I find this too computationally expensive to justify "MUST" for servers.
Last time I checked, this costs about 100 ms in server CPU time, more on
weaker CPUs, and makes it trivial to DoS a resource-constrained server - no
DDoS needed.

I agree with all of these:

> diffie-hellman-group17-sha512  MAY
> diffie-hellman-group18-sha512  MAY
> ecdh-sha2-*                    MAY
> ecdh-sha2-nistp256             SHOULD
> ecdh-sha2-nistp384             SHOULD
> ecmqv-sha2                     MAY
> ext-info-c                     SHOULD
> ext-info-s                     SHOULD
> gss-*                          MAY

I conditionally agree on these:

> gss-curve25519-sha256-*  SHOULD
> gss-curve448-sha512-*    MAY
> gss-gex-sha1-*           SHOULD NOT
> gss-group1-sha1-*        SHOULD NOT
> gss-group14-sha256-*     SHOULD
> gss-group15-sha512-*     MAY
> gss-group16-sha512-*     SHOULD
> gss-group17-sha512-*     MAY
> gss-group18-sha512-*     MAY
> gss-nistp256-sha256-*    SHOULD
> gss-nistp384-sha384-*    MAY
> gss-nistp521-sha512-*    MAY

The condition is that the reader understands that "SHOULD" for these
methods applies only if you implement any GSS-API key exchange methods at
all. In other words, the whole category of GSS-API needs to be "MAY", but
within the category the above SHOULDs are appropriate as long as the
decision is made to implement any of the GSS-API key exchange methods in
the first place.

I agree with these:

> rsa1024-sha1             MUST NOT
> rsa2048-sha256           MAY

In summary - my main complaint is that "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" is
too expensive to be a MUST. If that leaves no key exchange method that is a
"MUST", I'm fine with it.

If there needs to be a method that's a "MUST", I vote for either
"curve25519-sha256" or "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" as meeting security
requirements while being the most widely compatible.

Now that I've found RFC 8268, I'm also fine if we can't get consensus on
this draft, though it would be a nice to have.

denis


On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 4:38 AM Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:

> Hi denis,
>
> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> > Hey everyone,
> >
> > I notice the following draft has not moved forward:
> >
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/
> >
> > This seems to be an important draft which would standardize the
> > current use of key exchange algorithms in SSH. However, it looks like
> > no changes have been made in 2.5 years?
>
> Correct.
>
> > Did I miss some event where this draft morphed into something else so
> > that I'm not seeing the right information about progress?
>
> I have not progressed the draft, mostly due to private email received
> over two years ago...
>
> A number of people told me to not move it forward until after all of the
> RFCs for draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves (now RFC 8731) and
> draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2 (now RFC 8732) were adopted. Also, many
> people were unhappy with the characterizations of the existing
> algorithms and my scoring of MUST, SHOULD, and MAY
>
> In addition, there was a general dislike for the references of the NSA
> documents provided or the CNSA document reference.
>
> > Otherwise, what seems to be the current obstacle with making progress
> > on this?
>
> I think that work on the document is desirable. Does anyone wish to be a
> co-author with me?
>
> I would like to see more opinions on the list about which algorithms are
> to be 'SHOULD NOT' and which are to be 'MUST' ... in general, I would
> like to see this document as a KEX refernce that may be updated every
> few years as we learn more about which KEX algorithms are best to use.
>
> My opinion for Section 5 as I write this email today is:
>
>       Key Exchange Method Name             Reference  Implement
>       ------------------------------------ ---------- ----------
>       curve25519-sha256                    RFC8731    SHOULD
>       curve448-sha512                      RFC8731    MAY
>       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1   RFC4419    SHOULD NOT
>       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 RFC4419    MAY
>       diffie-hellman-group1-sha1           RFC4253    SHOULD NOT
>       diffie-hellman-group14-sha1          RFC4253    SHOULD NOT
>       diffie-hellman-group14-sha256        RFC8268    SHOULD
>       diffie-hellman-group15-sha256        RFC8268    MAY
>       diffie-hellman-group16-sha512        RFC8268    MUST
>       diffie-hellman-group17-sha512        RFC8268    MAY
>       diffie-hellman-group18-sha512        RFC8268    MAY
>       ecdh-sha2-*                          RFC5656    MAY
>       ecdh-sha2-nistp256                   RFC5656    SHOULD
>       ecdh-sha2-nistp384                   RFC5656    SHOULD
>       ecmqv-sha2                           RFC5656    MAY
>       ext-info-c                           RFC8308    SHOULD
>       ext-info-s                           RFC8308    SHOULD
>       gss-*                                RFC4462    MAY
>       gss-curve25519-sha256-*              RFC8732    SHOULD
>       gss-curve448-sha512-*                RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-gex-sha1-*                       RFC4462    SHOULD NOT
>       gss-group1-sha1-*                    RFC4462    SHOULD NOT
>       gss-group14-sha256-*                 RFC8732    SHOULD
>       gss-group15-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-group16-sha512-*                 RFC8732    SHOULD
>       gss-group17-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-group18-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-nistp256-sha256-*                RFC8732    SHOULD
>       gss-nistp384-sha384-*                RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-nistp521-sha512-*                RFC8732    MAY
>       rsa1024-sha1                         RFC4432    MUST NOT
>       rsa2048-sha256                       RFC4432    MAY
>
> The above list of KEX algorithms comes from the IANA ssh-parameters list
> URL:
>
> https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-16
>
> Please let me know if I have missed any of the KEX algorithms in the
> list.
>
> Of these, I am not sure if rsa2048-sha256 has support for a 'MAY' or if
> its lack of use would drive it to a 'SHOULD NOT' in the table.
>
> To be honest, I am really not sure which KEX algorithms should be listed
> as Mandatory To Implement (MTI) for key exchanges going forward.
>
> Which diffie-hellman FFC group should be listed as MTI? group14-sha256
> or group16-sha512? (I tentatively selected this one). Is that wise?
> Should any FFC Diffie-Hellman group size be MTI?
>
> I would like to hear if others on this list believe that
> curve25519-sha256 should be a MUST or a SHOULD.
>
> I also do not know if the expired draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
> document should bother to give opinions on any of the KEX options other
> than those being deprecated or thrust into MTI. Opinions please?
>
> It seems clear to me that removing the *-sha1* KEX algorithms is a good
> idea. I would love to move diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, but I honestly
> suspect that some hardware is deployed for which it is the only KEX
> algorithm that may still need to be supported... which is the only
> reason it is a 'SHOULD' on my list instead of a 'SHOULD NOT' ...
>
>         Be safe, stay healthy,
>         -- Mark
>

--00000000000085c75605aa3d63e4
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hey Mark!</div><=
div><br></div><div>It looks like I found the key thing I missed: Google did=
 not show me RFC 8268 when I searched for &quot;<span style=3D"font:small/1=
.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tran=
sform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-=
spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">diffie-hellman-g=
roup14-sha256&quot;. It finds it now when I search for &quot;rfc <span styl=
e=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34=
,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-deco=
ration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-ad=
just:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"=
>diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&quot;.</span></span></div><div><span style=
=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,=
34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decor=
ation:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adj=
ust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal=
;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;fo=
nt-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255=
,255,255)"><br></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial=
,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:no=
ne;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:=
0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:no=
rmal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:smal=
l/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-t=
ransform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;wo=
rd-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font=
-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">I could have =
found it in the IANA registry but I trusted the lack of Google results in m=
y first search. Alas.</span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5=
 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-sp=
acing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stre=
tch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"fon=
t:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);=
text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:n=
one;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:non=
e;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></s=
pan></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-se=
rif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px=
;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline=
;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;ba=
ckground-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvet=
ica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text=
-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;dis=
play:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;fl=
oat:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">That resolves the key concern f=
or me: that names like &quot;<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&quot;=
 are authoritatively defined. I was looking for this reference for the SSH =
QUIC draft.</span></span></span></div><div><br></div><div><span style=3D"fo=
nt:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:=
none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:no=
ne;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-siz=
e-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:le=
ft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:n=
ormal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:norm=
al;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255)">With regard to MUST / MAY / SHOULD / etc assignments, I agr=
ee with all of these:</span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:sm=
all/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text=
-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;=
word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;fo=
nt-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=
=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,=
34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decor=
ation:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adj=
ust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal=
;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;fo=
nt-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255=
,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.=
5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-trans=
form:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-str=
etch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"fo=
nt:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:=
none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:no=
ne;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-siz=
e-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)">&gt; curve25519-sha256=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SH=
OULD<br>&gt; curve448-sha512=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256=C2=A0 MAY<br>&g=
t; diffie-hellman-group1-sha1=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; diffie-hellman-group14-sha1=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; d=
iffie-hellman-group14-sha256=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0 SHOULD<br><div>&gt; diffie-hellman-group15-sha256=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY</div><div><br></div><div>I do not agree wit=
h this one:</div><div><br></div><div>&gt;=C2=A0<span style=3D"font:small/1.=
5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-trans=
form:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-str=
etch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">diffie-hellman-gr=
oup16-sha512 =C2=A0 MUST</span></div></span></span></span></div><div><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-siz=
e-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:le=
ft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:n=
ormal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:norm=
al;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;te=
xt-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white=
-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup><stri=
ke></strike><br></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1=
.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tran=
sform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-=
spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"f=
ont:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34=
);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration=
:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:n=
one;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span=
 style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:r=
gb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text=
-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-si=
ze-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,=
255)">I find this too computationally expensive to justify &quot;MUST&quot;=
 for servers. Last time I checked, this costs about 100 ms in server CPU ti=
me, more on weaker CPUs, and makes it trivial to DoS a resource-constrained=
 server - no DDoS needed.</span></span></span><span style=3D"font:small/1.5=
 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-sp=
acing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stre=
tch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"fon=
t:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);=
text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:n=
one;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:non=
e;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span s=
tyle=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb=
(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-d=
ecoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size=
-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,25=
5)"><br></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial=
,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:no=
ne;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:=
0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:no=
rmal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:smal=
l/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-t=
ransform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;wo=
rd-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font=
-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=
=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,=
34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decor=
ation:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adj=
ust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
<br></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Hel=
vetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;t=
ext-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;=
display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal=
;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.=
5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-trans=
form:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-str=
etch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"fo=
nt:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:=
none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:no=
ne;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">I agre=
e with all of these:</span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:sma=
ll/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-=
transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;w=
ord-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;fon=
t-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=
=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,=
34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decor=
ation:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adj=
ust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;co=
lor:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal=
;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;fo=
nt-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255=
,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.=
5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-trans=
form:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-str=
etch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"fo=
nt:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:=
none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:no=
ne;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rg=
b(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-=
decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-siz=
e-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,2=
55)">&gt; diffie-hellman-group17-sha512=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; diffie-hellman-gr=
oup18-sha512=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; ecdh-sha2-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; ecdh-sha2-nistp256=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; ecdh-sha2-nistp384=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOUL=
D<br>&gt; ecmqv-sha2=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&=
gt; ext-info-c=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt;=
 ext-info-s=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; gs=
s-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0 MAY<br><div><br></div><div>I conditionally agree on these:</div><div><b=
r></div><div>&gt; gss-curve25519-sha256-*=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; gss-curve448=
-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; gss-gex-sha1-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; gss-group1-sha1-=
*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; gss-group14-=
sha256-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; gss-group15-sha512-*=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; gss-group16-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
 SHOULD<br>&gt; gss-group17-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; gs=
s-group18-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; gss-nistp256-sha256-=
*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; gss-nistp384-sha384-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 =
MAY<br>&gt; gss-nistp521-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br><br></div><div>T=
he condition is that the reader understands that &quot;SHOULD&quot; for the=
se methods applies only if you implement any GSS-API key exchange methods a=
t all. In other words, the whole category of GSS-API needs to be &quot;MAY&=
quot;, but within the category the above SHOULDs are appropriate as long as=
 the decision is made to implement any of the GSS-API key exchange methods =
in the first place.</div><div><br></div><div>I agree with these:</div><div>=
<br></div><div>&gt; rsa1024-sha1=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MUST NOT<br>&gt; rsa2048-sha256=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br><br></div><div>In s=
ummary - my main complaint is that &quot;<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Aria=
l,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:n=
one;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing=
:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:n=
ormal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">diffie-hellman-group16-=
sha512&quot; is too expensive to be a MUST. If that leaves no key exchange =
method that is a &quot;MUST&quot;, I&#39;m fine with it.</span></div><div><=
span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;=
text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;fon=
t-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,=
255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helveti=
ca,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-=
indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;disp=
lay:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;flo=
at:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">If there needs to be a method th=
at&#39;s a &quot;MUST&quot;, I vote for either &quot;curve25519-sha256&quot=
; or &quot;<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-al=
ign:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spa=
cing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-spac=
e:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-co=
lor:rgb(255,255,255)">diffie-hellman-</span>group14-sha256&quot; as meeting=
 security requirements while being the most widely compatible.</span></div>=
<div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:le=
ft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:n=
ormal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:norm=
al;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,H=
elvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none=
;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0p=
x;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:norm=
al;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">Now that I&#39;ve found=C2=
=A0RFC 8268, I&#39;m also fine if we can&#39;t get consensus on this draft,=
 though it would be a nice to have.</span></div><div><b></b><i></i><u></u><=
sub></sub><sup></sup><strike></strike><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup>=
</sup><strike></strike><br></div><div>denis</div></span></span></span></div=
><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:l=
eft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:=
normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:nor=
mal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;t=
ext-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lett=
er-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whit=
e-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgro=
und-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,s=
ans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-inde=
nt:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:=
inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:n=
one;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></div></div=
></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, Jul 12=
, 2020 at 4:38 AM Mark D. Baushke &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mdb@juniper.net">md=
b@juniper.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,2=
04,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid">Hi denis,<br>
<br>
denis bider &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_bla=
nk">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt; Hey everyone,<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I notice the following draft has not moved forward:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-=
sha2/" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://datatracker.ietf.org/do=
c/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/</a><br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; This seems to be an important draft which would standardize the<br>
&gt; current use of key exchange algorithms in SSH. However, it looks like<=
br>
&gt; no changes have been made in 2.5 years?<br>
<br>
Correct.<br>
<br>
&gt; Did I miss some event where this draft morphed into something else so<=
br>
&gt; that I&#39;m not seeing the right information about progress?<br>
<br>
I have not progressed the draft, mostly due to private email received<br>
over two years ago...<br>
<br>
A number of people told me to not move it forward until after all of the<br=
>
RFCs for draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves (now RFC 8731) and<br>
draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2 (now RFC 8732) were adopted. Also, many<br=
>
people were unhappy with the characterizations of the existing<br>
algorithms and my scoring of MUST, SHOULD, and MAY<br>
<br>
In addition, there was a general dislike for the references of the NSA<br>
documents provided or the CNSA document reference.<br>
<br>
&gt; Otherwise, what seems to be the current obstacle with making progress<=
br>
&gt; on this?<br>
<br>
I think that work on the document is desirable. Does anyone wish to be a<br=
>
co-author with me?<br>
<br>
I would like to see more opinions on the list about which algorithms are<br=
>
to be &#39;SHOULD NOT&#39; and which are to be &#39;MUST&#39; ... in genera=
l, I would<br>
like to see this document as a KEX refernce that may be updated every<br>
few years as we learn more about which KEX algorithms are best to use.<br>
<br>
My opinion for Section 5 as I write this email today is:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Key Exchange Method Name=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Reference=C2=A0 Implement<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ------------------------------------ ---------- ------=
----<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 curve25519-sha256=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC8731=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 curve448-sha512=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC8731=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1=C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC4419=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 RFC4419=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group1-sha1=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC4253=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group14-sha1=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 RFC4253=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group14-sha256=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 RFC8268=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group15-sha256=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 RFC8268=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group16-sha512=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 RFC8268=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MUST<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group17-sha512=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 RFC8268=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 diffie-hellman-group18-sha512=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 RFC8268=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ecdh-sha2-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC5656=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ecdh-sha2-nistp256=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC5656=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ecdh-sha2-nistp384=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC5656=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ecmqv-sha2=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC5656=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ext-info-c=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC8308=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 ext-info-s=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC8308=C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC4462=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-curve25519-sha256-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-curve448-sha512-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-gex-sha1-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC4462=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD NO=
T<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-group1-sha1-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC4462=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-group14-sha256-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-group15-sha512-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-group16-sha512-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-group17-sha512-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-group18-sha512-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0=
 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-nistp256-sha256-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 SHOULD<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-nistp384-sha384-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 gss-nistp521-sha512-*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 RFC8732=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 rsa1024-sha1=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC4432=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MUST N=
OT<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 rsa2048-sha256=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0RFC4432=C2=A0 =C2=A0 MAY<br>
<br>
The above list of KEX algorithms comes from the IANA ssh-parameters list<br=
>
URL:<br>
<a href=3D"https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.x=
html#ssh-parameters-16" target=3D"_blank" rel=3D"noreferrer">https://www.ia=
na.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-16</a=
><br>
<br>
Please let me know if I have missed any of the KEX algorithms in the<br>
list.<br>
<br>
Of these, I am not sure if rsa2048-sha256 has support for a &#39;MAY&#39; o=
r if<br>
its lack of use would drive it to a &#39;SHOULD NOT&#39; in the table.<br>
<br>
To be honest, I am really not sure which KEX algorithms should be listed<br=
>
as Mandatory To Implement (MTI) for key exchanges going forward.<br>
<br>
Which diffie-hellman FFC group should be listed as MTI? group14-sha256<br>
or group16-sha512? (I tentatively selected this one). Is that wise?<br>
Should any FFC Diffie-Hellman group size be MTI?<br>
<br>
I would like to hear if others on this list believe that<br>
curve25519-sha256 should be a MUST or a SHOULD.<br>
<br>
I also do not know if the expired draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2<br>
document should bother to give opinions on any of the KEX options other<br>
than those being deprecated or thrust into MTI. Opinions please?<br>
<br>
It seems clear to me that removing the *-sha1* KEX algorithms is a good<br>
idea. I would love to move diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, but I honestly<br>
suspect that some hardware is deployed for which it is the only KEX<br>
algorithm that may still need to be supported... which is the only<br>
reason it is a &#39;SHOULD&#39; on my list instead of a &#39;SHOULD NOT&#39=
; ...<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Be safe, stay healthy,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- Mark<br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000085c75605aa3d63e4--


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Subject: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8410 (6229)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410,
"Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>

Section: 10.2

Original Text
-------------
An example of a self-issued PKIX certificate using Ed25519 to sign an
X25519 public key would be

Corrected Text
--------------


Notes
-----
The given example certificate is self-issued but not self-signed (which is fine because its public key cannot be used for signing).
It includes a subjectKeyIdentifier but not an authorityKeyIdentifier.

For not self-signed certificates RFC 5280 requires in section 4.2.1.1 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1) that the authorityKeyIdentifier is present.

Thus for such an example certificate the authorityKeyIdentifier MUST be added in order to be a conforming certificate.
Otherwise, cert chain validation will be mislead to assume that the certificate is self-signed (while usually not actually verifying this supposition).

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Publication Date    : August 2018
Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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On Jul 12, 2020, at 5:05 AM, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> =
wrote:
> It looks like I found the key thing I missed: Google did not show me =
RFC 8268 when I searched for "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256". It finds =
it now when I search for "rfc diffie-hellman-group14-sha256".
>=20
> I could have found it in the IANA registry but I trusted the lack of =
Google results in my first search. Alas.
>=20
> That resolves the key concern for me: that names like =
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" are authoritatively defined. I was =
looking for this reference for the SSH QUIC draft.
>=20
> With regard to MUST / MAY / SHOULD / etc assignments, I agree with all =
of these:
>=20
> > curve25519-sha256                     SHOULD
> > curve448-sha512                       MAY
> > diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1    SHOULD NOT
> > diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256  MAY
> > diffie-hellman-group1-sha1            SHOULD NOT
> > diffie-hellman-group14-sha1           SHOULD NOT
> > diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         SHOULD
> > diffie-hellman-group15-sha256         MAY
>=20
> I do not agree with this one:
>=20
> > diffie-hellman-group16-sha512   MUST
>=20
> I find this too computationally expensive to justify "MUST" for =
servers. Last time I checked, this costs about 100 ms in server CPU =
time, more on weaker CPUs, and makes it trivial to DoS a =
resource-constrained server - no DDoS needed.

I=E2=80=99m good with group16-sha512 remaining a =E2=80=9CMAY=E2=80=9D =
along with group17-sha512 and group18-sha512, What about group15-sha256, =
though? Should that perhaps be a =E2=80=9CSHOULD=E2=80=9D, and also =
group14-sha256 changed to a =E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D? I think we want at =
least one DH algorithm to be listed as a =E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D.



> I agree with all of these:
>=20
> > diffie-hellman-group17-sha512  MAY
> > diffie-hellman-group18-sha512  MAY
> > ecdh-sha2-*                    MAY
> > ecdh-sha2-nistp256             SHOULD
> > ecdh-sha2-nistp384             SHOULD
> > ecmqv-sha2                     MAY
> > ext-info-c                     SHOULD
> > ext-info-s                     SHOULD
> > gss-*                          MAY
>=20
> I conditionally agree on these:
>=20
> > gss-curve25519-sha256-*  SHOULD
> > gss-curve448-sha512-*    MAY
> > gss-gex-sha1-*           SHOULD NOT
> > gss-group1-sha1-*        SHOULD NOT
> > gss-group14-sha256-*     SHOULD
> > gss-group15-sha512-*     MAY
> > gss-group16-sha512-*     SHOULD
> > gss-group17-sha512-*     MAY
> > gss-group18-sha512-*     MAY
> > gss-nistp256-sha256-*    SHOULD
> > gss-nistp384-sha384-*    MAY
> > gss-nistp521-sha512-*    MAY
>=20
> The condition is that the reader understands that "SHOULD" for these =
methods applies only if you implement any GSS-API key exchange methods =
at all. In other words, the whole category of GSS-API needs to be "MAY", =
but within the category the above SHOULDs are appropriate as long as the =
decision is made to implement any of the GSS-API key exchange methods in =
the first place.

With that condition in mind, I think all of these should match their =
non-GSS equivalents in terms of MAY/SHOULD/MUST. So, if changes are made =
to group14/15/16, they should be reflected here as well.


> I agree with these:
>=20
> > rsa1024-sha1             MUST NOT
> > rsa2048-sha256           MAY
>=20
> In summary - my main complaint is that "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" =
is too expensive to be a MUST. If that leaves no key exchange method =
that is a "MUST", I'm fine with it.
>=20
> If there needs to be a method that's a "MUST", I vote for either =
"curve25519-sha256" or "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" as meeting =
security requirements while being the most widely compatible.

I like having curve25519-sha256 as a strongly encouraged SHOULD, but I =
think it might be better to stick with group14-sha256 as the MUST.
--=20
Ron Frederick
ronf@timeheart.net




--Apple-Mail=_6DBAD129-847A-436F-88CE-FA8D1D9F9F99
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div>On Jul 12, 2020, at 5:05 AM, denis bider &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com" =
class=3D"">denisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D"">It looks like I =
found the key thing I missed: Google did not show me RFC 8268 when I =
searched for "<span class=3D"" style=3D"color: rgb(34, 34, 34); display: =
inline; font-stretch: normal; float: none; background-color: rgb(255, =
255, 255);">diffie-hellman-group14-sha256". It finds it now when I =
search for "rfc <span style=3D"font-size: small; line-height: 1.5; =
font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; display: inline; =
font-stretch: normal; float: none;" =
class=3D"">diffie-hellman-group14-sha256".</span></span></div><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D"">I =
could have found it in the IANA registry but I trusted the lack of =
Google results in my first search. Alas.</span></span></div><div =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D"">That=
 resolves the key concern for me: that names like "<span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D"">diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" are authoritatively defined. I =
was looking for this reference for the SSH QUIC =
draft.</span></span></span></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div=
 class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D"">With=
 regard to MUST / MAY / SHOULD / etc assignments, I agree with all of =
these:</span></span></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></span></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D"">&gt;=
 =
curve25519-sha256&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
SHOULD<br class=3D"">&gt; =
curve448-sha512&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
MAY<br class=3D"">&gt; =
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD NOT<br =
class=3D"">&gt; diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256&nbsp; MAY<br =
class=3D"">&gt; =
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD NOT<br class=3D"">&gt; =
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD NOT<br class=3D"">&gt; =
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; SHOULD<br class=3D""><div class=3D"">&gt; =
diffie-hellman-group15-sha256&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp; MAY</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I do =
not agree with this one:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">&gt;&nbsp;<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D"">diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 &nbsp; =
MUST</span></div></span></span></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D""><b =
class=3D""></b><i class=3D""></i><u class=3D""></u><sub =
class=3D""></sub><sup class=3D""></sup><strike class=3D""></strike><br =
class=3D""></span></span></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font:small/1..5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D"">I =
find this too computationally expensive to justify "MUST" for servers. =
Last time I checked, this costs about 100 ms in server CPU time, more on =
weaker CPUs, and makes it trivial to DoS a resource-constrained server - =
no DDoS needed.</span></span></span><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></span></span></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>=
</div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>I=E2=80=99m good with group16-sha512 remaining a =
=E2=80=9CMAY=E2=80=9D along with group17-sha512 and group18-sha512, What =
about group15-sha256, though? Should that perhaps be a =E2=80=9CSHOULD=E2=80=
=9D, and also group14-sha256 changed to a =E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D? I =
think we want at least one DH algorithm to be listed as a =
=E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"color: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: Arial, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; font-size: small; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" =
class=3D"">I agree with all of these:</span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></span></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D"">&gt;=
 diffie-hellman-group17-sha512&nbsp; MAY<br class=3D"">&gt; =
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512&nbsp; MAY<br class=3D"">&gt; =
ecdh-sha2-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<br class=3D"">&gt;=
 =
ecdh-sha2-nistp256&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<br class=3D"">&gt; =
ecdh-sha2-nistp384&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<br class=3D"">&gt; =
ecmqv-sha2&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<br =
class=3D"">&gt; =
ext-info-c&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<br =
class=3D"">&gt; =
ext-info-s&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<br =
class=3D"">&gt; =
gss-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp; MAY<br class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">I conditionally agree on these:</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&gt; gss-curve25519-sha256-*&nbsp; =
SHOULD<br class=3D"">&gt; gss-curve448-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<br =
class=3D"">&gt; =
gss-gex-sha1-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 SHOULD NOT<br class=3D"">&gt; =
gss-group1-sha1-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD =
NOT<br class=3D"">&gt; gss-group14-sha256-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
SHOULD<br class=3D"">&gt; gss-group15-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
MAY<br class=3D"">&gt; gss-group16-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
SHOULD<br class=3D"">&gt; gss-group17-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
MAY<br class=3D"">&gt; gss-group18-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
MAY<br class=3D"">&gt; gss-nistp256-sha256-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SHOULD<br =
class=3D"">&gt; gss-nistp384-sha384-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<br =
class=3D"">&gt; gss-nistp521-sha512-*&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; MAY<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">The condition is that =
the reader understands that "SHOULD" for these methods applies only if =
you implement any GSS-API key exchange methods at all. In other words, =
the whole category of GSS-API needs to be "MAY", but within the category =
the above SHOULDs are appropriate as long as the decision is made to =
implement any of the GSS-API key exchange methods in the first =
place.</div></span></span></span></div></div></div></div></div></div></div=
></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>With that condition in mind, I think all of these =
should match their non-GSS equivalents in terms of MAY/SHOULD/MUST. So, =
if changes are made to group14/15/16, they should be reflected here as =
well.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D""><div=
 class=3D"">I agree with these:</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">&gt; =
rsa1024-sha1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp; MUST NOT<br class=3D"">&gt; =
rsa2048-sha256&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 MAY<br class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">In summary - my =
main complaint is that "<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D"">diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" is too expensive to be a MUST. =
If that leaves no key exchange method that is a "MUST", I'm fine with =
it.</span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div><div class=3D""><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=3D"">If =
there needs to be a method that's a "MUST", I vote for either =
"curve25519-sha256" or "<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 =
Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transf=
orm:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-st=
retch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" =
class=3D"">diffie-hellman-</span>group14-sha256" as meeting security =
requirements while being the most widely =
compatible.</span></div></span></span></span></div></div></div></div></div=
></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>I like having curve25519-sha256 as a strongly =
encouraged SHOULD, but I think it might be better to stick with =
group14-sha256 as the MUST.</div></div><div class=3D"">
--&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Ron Frederick<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" class=3D"">ronf@timeheart.net</a><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D"">

</div>
<br class=3D""></body></html>=

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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2020 12:04:11 -0500
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To: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>
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I think Ron's suggestions are all reasonable.

On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 11:17 AM Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> wrote:

>
> On Jul 12, 2020, at 5:05 AM, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> It looks like I found the key thing I missed: Google did not show me RFC
> 8268 when I searched for "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256". It finds it now
> when I search for "rfc diffie-hellman-group14-sha256".
>
> I could have found it in the IANA registry but I trusted the lack of
> Google results in my first search. Alas.
>
> That resolves the key concern for me: that names like "diffie-hellman-gro=
up14-sha256"
> are authoritatively defined. I was looking for this reference for the SSH
> QUIC draft.
>
> With regard to MUST / MAY / SHOULD / etc assignments, I agree with all of
> these:
>
> > curve25519-sha256                     SHOULD
> > curve448-sha512                       MAY
> > diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1    SHOULD NOT
> > diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256  MAY
> > diffie-hellman-group1-sha1            SHOULD NOT
> > diffie-hellman-group14-sha1           SHOULD NOT
> > diffie-hellman-group14-sha256         SHOULD
> > diffie-hellman-group15-sha256         MAY
>
> I do not agree with this one:
>
> > diffie-hellman-group16-sha512   MUST
>
> I find this too computationally expensive to justify "MUST" for servers.
> Last time I checked, this costs about 100 ms in server CPU time, more on
> weaker CPUs, and makes it trivial to DoS a resource-constrained server - =
no
> DDoS needed.
>
>
> I=E2=80=99m good with group16-sha512 remaining a =E2=80=9CMAY=E2=80=9D al=
ong with group17-sha512
> and group18-sha512, What about group15-sha256, though? Should that perhap=
s
> be a =E2=80=9CSHOULD=E2=80=9D, and also group14-sha256 changed to a =E2=
=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D? I think we want
> at least one DH algorithm to be listed as a =E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D.
>
>
>
> I agree with all of these:
>
> > diffie-hellman-group17-sha512  MAY
> > diffie-hellman-group18-sha512  MAY
> > ecdh-sha2-*                    MAY
> > ecdh-sha2-nistp256             SHOULD
> > ecdh-sha2-nistp384             SHOULD
> > ecmqv-sha2                     MAY
> > ext-info-c                     SHOULD
> > ext-info-s                     SHOULD
> > gss-*                          MAY
>
> I conditionally agree on these:
>
> > gss-curve25519-sha256-*  SHOULD
> > gss-curve448-sha512-*    MAY
> > gss-gex-sha1-*           SHOULD NOT
> > gss-group1-sha1-*        SHOULD NOT
> > gss-group14-sha256-*     SHOULD
> > gss-group15-sha512-*     MAY
> > gss-group16-sha512-*     SHOULD
> > gss-group17-sha512-*     MAY
> > gss-group18-sha512-*     MAY
> > gss-nistp256-sha256-*    SHOULD
> > gss-nistp384-sha384-*    MAY
> > gss-nistp521-sha512-*    MAY
>
> The condition is that the reader understands that "SHOULD" for these
> methods applies only if you implement any GSS-API key exchange methods at
> all. In other words, the whole category of GSS-API needs to be "MAY", but
> within the category the above SHOULDs are appropriate as long as the
> decision is made to implement any of the GSS-API key exchange methods in
> the first place.
>
>
> With that condition in mind, I think all of these should match their
> non-GSS equivalents in terms of MAY/SHOULD/MUST. So, if changes are made =
to
> group14/15/16, they should be reflected here as well.
>
>
> I agree with these:
>
> > rsa1024-sha1             MUST NOT
> > rsa2048-sha256           MAY
>
> In summary - my main complaint is that "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" is
> too expensive to be a MUST. If that leaves no key exchange method that is=
 a
> "MUST", I'm fine with it.
>
> If there needs to be a method that's a "MUST", I vote for either
> "curve25519-sha256" or "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" as meeting
> security requirements while being the most widely compatible.
>
>
> I like having curve25519-sha256 as a strongly encouraged SHOULD, but I
> think it might be better to stick with group14-sha256 as the MUST.
> --
> Ron Frederick
> ronf@timeheart.net
>
>
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">I think Ron&#39;s suggestions are all reasonable.</div><br=
><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"gmail_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Sun, J=
ul 12, 2020 at 11:17 AM Ron Frederick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.=
net">ronf@timeheart.net</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color=
:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid"><div style=
=3D"overflow-wrap: break-word;"><br><div>On Jul 12, 2020, at 5:05 AM, denis=
 bider &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:denisbider.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">d=
enisbider.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"l=
tr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><di=
v dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>It looks like I found =
the key thing I missed: Google did not show me RFC 8268 when I searched for=
 &quot;<span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34);display:inline;font-stretch:norma=
l;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">diffie-hellman-group14-sha2=
56&quot;. It finds it now when I search for &quot;rfc <span style=3D"line-h=
eight:1.5;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;display:in=
line;font-stretch:normal;float:none">diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&quot;.</=
span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0p=
x;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inlin=
e;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;b=
ackground-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helve=
tica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;tex=
t-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;di=
splay:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;f=
loat:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></div><div><=
span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;col=
or:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;=
text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;fon=
t-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,=
255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-ali=
gn:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spac=
ing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space=
:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-col=
or:rgb(255,255,255)">I could have found it in the IANA registry but I trust=
ed the lack of Google results in my first search. Alas.</span></span></div>=
<div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:le=
ft;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:n=
ormal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:norm=
al;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rg=
b(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;te=
xt-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white=
-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font=
:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);t=
ext-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:no=
ne;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none=
;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span st=
yle=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(=
34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-de=
coration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-=
adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255=
)">That resolves the key concern for me: that names like &quot;<span style=
=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,=
34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decor=
ation:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adj=
ust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">=
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&quot; are authoritatively defined. I was look=
ing for this reference for the SSH QUIC draft.</span></span></span></div><d=
iv><br></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whi=
te-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial=
,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:no=
ne;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:=
0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:no=
rmal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">With regard to MUST / MA=
Y / SHOULD / etc assignments, I agree with all of these:</span></span></spa=
n></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-=
align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-s=
pacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-sp=
ace:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-=
color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-=
serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0=
px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inli=
ne;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;=
background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helv=
etica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;te=
xt-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;d=
isplay:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;=
float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></di=
v><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:=
left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:no=
rmal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;=
text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;let=
ter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;whi=
te-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgr=
ound-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">&gt; curve25519-sha256=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; curve448-sha512=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; diffie-hellman=
-group-exchange-sha1=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; diffie-hellman-gr=
oup-exchange-sha256=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; diffie-hellman-group1-sha1=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt=
; diffie-hellman-group14-sha1=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; diffie-hellman-group14-sha256=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br><div>&gt; diffie-hellman-=
group15-sha256=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY</div><di=
v><br></div><div>I do not agree with this one:</div><div><br></div><div>&gt=
;=C2=A0<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:=
left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing=
:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:no=
rmal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:=
rgb(255,255,255)">diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 =C2=A0 MUST</span></div></s=
pan></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,=
sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-ind=
ent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display=
:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:=
none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial=
,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:no=
ne;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:=
0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:no=
rmal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:smal=
l/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-t=
ransform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;wo=
rd-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font=
-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><b></b><i></i=
><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup><strike></strike><br></span></span></span></d=
iv><div><span><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text=
-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-=
spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-s=
pace:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background=
-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans=
-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:=
0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inl=
ine;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">I find this too computationally expensi=
ve to justify &quot;MUST&quot; for servers. Last time I checked, this costs=
 about 100 ms in server CPU time, more on weaker CPUs, and makes it trivial=
 to DoS a resource-constrained server - no DDoS needed.</span></span></span=
><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;c=
olor:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:norma=
l;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;f=
ont-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(25=
5,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-a=
lign:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-sp=
acing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-spa=
ce:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-c=
olor:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-s=
erif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0p=
x;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inlin=
e;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;b=
ackground-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></div></div></di=
v></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>=
<div><br></div><div>I=E2=80=99m good with group16-sha512 remaining a =E2=80=
=9CMAY=E2=80=9D along with group17-sha512 and group18-sha512, What about gr=
oup15-sha256, though? Should that perhaps be a =E2=80=9CSHOULD=E2=80=9D, an=
d also group14-sha256 changed to a =E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D? I think we want =
at least one DH algorithm to be listed as a =E2=80=9CMUST=E2=80=9D.</div><d=
iv><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span style=3D"color:rgb(34,34,34=
);font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;background-color:r=
gb(255,255,255)">I agree with all of these:</span></div><div><span style=3D=
"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,=
34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decorati=
on:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust=
:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><sp=
an style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color=
:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;te=
xt-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-=
size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,25=
5,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align=
:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacin=
g:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:n=
ormal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color=
:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></span></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:=
small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);te=
xt-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:non=
e;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;=
font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span sty=
le=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(3=
4,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-dec=
oration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-a=
djust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)=
"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;=
color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:norm=
al;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;=
font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(2=
55,255,255)">&gt; diffie-hellman-group17-sha512=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; diffie-he=
llman-group18-sha512=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; ecdh-sha2-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; ecdh-sha2-nistp256=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; ecdh-sha2-nist=
p384=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; ecmqv-sha2=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
 MAY<br>&gt; ext-info-c=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOUL=
D<br>&gt; ext-info-s=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<b=
r>&gt; gss-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br><div><br></div><div>I conditionally agree on these:</di=
v><div><br></div><div>&gt; gss-curve25519-sha256-*=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; gss=
-curve448-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; gss-gex-sha1-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; gss-gro=
up1-sha1-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD NOT<br>&gt; gss=
-group14-sha256-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; gss-group15-sha512=
-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; gss-group16-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; gss-group17-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<b=
r>&gt; gss-group18-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; gss-nistp25=
6-sha256-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 SHOULD<br>&gt; gss-nistp384-sha384-*=C2=A0=C2=
=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br>&gt; gss-nistp521-sha512-*=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br><br></=
div><div>The condition is that the reader understands that &quot;SHOULD&quo=
t; for these methods applies only if you implement any GSS-API key exchange=
 methods at all. In other words, the whole category of GSS-API needs to be =
&quot;MAY&quot;, but within the category the above SHOULDs are appropriate =
as long as the decision is made to implement any of the GSS-API key exchang=
e methods in the first place.</div></span></span></span></div></div></div><=
/div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>With that condition in mind, I think all of these should m=
atch their non-GSS equivalents in terms of MAY/SHOULD/MUST. So, if changes =
are made to group14/15/16, they should be reflected here as well.</div><div=
><br></div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">=
<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans=
-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:=
0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inl=
ine;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none=
;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Hel=
vetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;t=
ext-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;=
display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal=
;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><span style=3D"font:small/1.=
5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-trans=
form:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-s=
pacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-str=
etch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><div>I agree with=
 these:</div><div><br></div><div>&gt; rsa1024-sha1=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=
=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MUST NOT<br>&gt; rsa2048-s=
ha256=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 MAY<br><b=
r></div><div>In summary - my main complaint is that &quot;<span style=3D"fo=
nt:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34)=
;text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:=
none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:no=
ne;font-stretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">diffie=
-hellman-group16-sha512&quot; is too expensive to be a MUST. If that leaves=
 no key exchange method that is a &quot;MUST&quot;, I&#39;m fine with it.</=
span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;te=
xt-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-indent:0px;lette=
r-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:inline;white=
-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:none;backgrou=
nd-color:rgb(255,255,255)"><br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font:small/=
1.5 Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-tra=
nsform:none;text-indent:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word=
-spacing:0px;display:inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-s=
tretch:normal;float:none;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">If there needs =
to be a method that&#39;s a &quot;MUST&quot;, I vote for either &quot;curve=
25519-sha256&quot; or &quot;<span style=3D"font:small/1.5 Arial,Helvetica,s=
ans-serif;text-align:left;color:rgb(34,34,34);text-transform:none;text-inde=
nt:0px;letter-spacing:normal;text-decoration:none;word-spacing:0px;display:=
inline;white-space:normal;font-size-adjust:none;font-stretch:normal;float:n=
one;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)">diffie-hellman-</span>group14-sha256=
&quot; as meeting security requirements while being the most widely compati=
ble.</span></div></span></span></span></div></div></div></div></div></div><=
/div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I=
 like having curve25519-sha256 as a strongly encouraged SHOULD, but I think=
 it might be better to stick with group14-sha256 as the MUST.</div></div><d=
iv>
--=C2=A0<br>Ron Frederick<br><a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" target=
=3D"_blank">ronf@timeheart.net</a><br><br><br>

</div>
<br></div></blockquote></div>

--000000000000ca50a505aa419039--


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From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 00:23:56 +0400
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To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>,  curdle-chairs <curdle-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 1:38 PM Mark D. Baushke
<mdb=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> Hi denis,
>
> denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> writes:
>
> > Hey everyone,
> >
> > I notice the following draft has not moved forward:
> >
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/
> >
> > This seems to be an important draft which would standardize the
> > current use of key exchange algorithms in SSH. However, it looks like
> > no changes have been made in 2.5 years?
>
> Correct.
>
> > Did I miss some event where this draft morphed into something else so
> > that I'm not seeing the right information about progress?
>
> I have not progressed the draft, mostly due to private email received
> over two years ago...
>
> A number of people told me to not move it forward until after all of the
> RFCs for draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-curves (now RFC 8731) and
> draft-ietf-curdle-gss-keyex-sha2 (now RFC 8732) were adopted. Also, many
> people were unhappy with the characterizations of the existing
> algorithms and my scoring of MUST, SHOULD, and MAY
>
> In addition, there was a general dislike for the references of the NSA
> documents provided or the CNSA document reference.
>
> > Otherwise, what seems to be the current obstacle with making progress
> > on this?
>
> I think that work on the document is desirable. Does anyone wish to be a
> co-author with me?
>
> I would like to see more opinions on the list about which algorithms are
> to be 'SHOULD NOT' and which are to be 'MUST' ... in general, I would
> like to see this document as a KEX refernce that may be updated every
> few years as we learn more about which KEX algorithms are best to use.
>
> My opinion for Section 5 as I write this email today is:
>
>       Key Exchange Method Name             Reference  Implement
>       ------------------------------------ ---------- ----------
>       curve25519-sha256                    RFC8731    SHOULD
>       curve448-sha512                      RFC8731    MAY
>       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1   RFC4419    SHOULD NOT
>       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 RFC4419    MAY
>       diffie-hellman-group1-sha1           RFC4253    SHOULD NOT
>       diffie-hellman-group14-sha1          RFC4253    SHOULD NOT
>       diffie-hellman-group14-sha256        RFC8268    SHOULD
>       diffie-hellman-group15-sha256        RFC8268    MAY
>       diffie-hellman-group16-sha512        RFC8268    MUST
>       diffie-hellman-group17-sha512        RFC8268    MAY
>       diffie-hellman-group18-sha512        RFC8268    MAY
>       ecdh-sha2-*                          RFC5656    MAY
>       ecdh-sha2-nistp256                   RFC5656    SHOULD
>       ecdh-sha2-nistp384                   RFC5656    SHOULD
>       ecmqv-sha2                           RFC5656    MAY
>       ext-info-c                           RFC8308    SHOULD
>       ext-info-s                           RFC8308    SHOULD
>       gss-*                                RFC4462    MAY
>       gss-curve25519-sha256-*              RFC8732    SHOULD
>       gss-curve448-sha512-*                RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-gex-sha1-*                       RFC4462    SHOULD NOT
>       gss-group1-sha1-*                    RFC4462    SHOULD NOT
>       gss-group14-sha256-*                 RFC8732    SHOULD
>       gss-group15-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-group16-sha512-*                 RFC8732    SHOULD
>       gss-group17-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-group18-sha512-*                 RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-nistp256-sha256-*                RFC8732    SHOULD
>       gss-nistp384-sha384-*                RFC8732    MAY
>       gss-nistp521-sha512-*                RFC8732    MAY
>       rsa1024-sha1                         RFC4432    MUST NOT
>       rsa2048-sha256                       RFC4432    MAY
>
> The above list of KEX algorithms comes from the IANA ssh-parameters list
> URL:
> https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-16
>
> Please let me know if I have missed any of the KEX algorithms in the
> list.
>
> Of these, I am not sure if rsa2048-sha256 has support for a 'MAY' or if
> its lack of use would drive it to a 'SHOULD NOT' in the table.
>
> To be honest, I am really not sure which KEX algorithms should be listed
> as Mandatory To Implement (MTI) for key exchanges going forward.
>
> Which diffie-hellman FFC group should be listed as MTI? group14-sha256
> or group16-sha512? (I tentatively selected this one). Is that wise?
> Should any FFC Diffie-Hellman group size be MTI?
>
> I would like to hear if others on this list believe that
> curve25519-sha256 should be a MUST or a SHOULD.
>
Personally, I think that it should be a MUST or at least a strong
SHOULD (SHOULD + ?)




> I also do not know if the expired draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
> document should bother to give opinions on any of the KEX options other
> than those being deprecated or thrust into MTI. Opinions please?
>
> It seems clear to me that removing the *-sha1* KEX algorithms is a good
> idea. I would love to move diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, but I honestly
> suspect that some hardware is deployed for which it is the only KEX
> algorithm that may still need to be supported... which is the only
> reason it is a 'SHOULD' on my list instead of a 'SHOULD NOT' ...
>
>         Be safe, stay healthy,
>         -- Mark
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle


From nobody Mon Jul 13 11:38:28 2020
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Subject: [Curdle] I-D Action: draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-11.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure Shell (SSH)
        Author          : Mark D. Baushke
	Filename        : draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-11.txt
	Pages           : 18
	Date            : 2020-07-13

Abstract:
   This document is intended to update the recommended set of key
   exchange methods for use in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol to meet
   evolving needs for stronger security.  This document updates RFC
   4250.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-11
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-11

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-11


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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CC: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, curdle-chairs <curdle-chairs@ietf.org>, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, "Ron Frederick" <ronf@timeheart.net>, Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
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Comments: In-reply-to: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com> message dated "Mon, 13 Jul 2020 00:23:56 +0400."
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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Hi Folks,

I have updated a new revision of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-11 for
your review which gives a survey of the Key Exchange Algorithms for
Secure Shell.

The current revision does NOT have any 'MUST' implement algorithms, but
does provide 'SHOULD NOT' for most of the algorithms using sha1.

As I understand it, the following are candidates for MUST:

  * diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
    [It is not clear to me how much longer 2048-bits will be considered
     strong enough.]

  * curve25519-sha256

  * ecdh-sha2-nistp256
    [Some folks are not happy with the current ECDH curves.]

I would look for discussion on the list about which Key Exchange
Algorithms are Mandatory to Implement going forward.

Fwiw: I will be attending the IETF 108 virtual conference, I believe
there will not be an IETF Curdle meeting.

	Be safe, stay healthy,
	-- Mark


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, IETF curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF ssh <ietf-ssh@netbsd.org>
CC: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>, curdle-chairs <curdle-chairs@ietf.org>, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, "Ron Frederick" <ronf@timeheart.net>
Thread-Topic: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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From: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>
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Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 13:28:04 -0700
Cc: IETF curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF ssh <ietf-ssh@netbsd.org>, "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org>, curdle-chairs <curdle-chairs@ietf.org>, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>, Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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On Jul 13, 2020, at 11:52 AM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:
> As I understand it, the following are candidates for MUST:
>=20
>  * diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
>    [It is not clear to me how much longer 2048-bits will be considered
>     strong enough.]
>=20
>  * curve25519-sha256
>=20
>  * ecdh-sha2-nistp256
>    [Some folks are not happy with the current ECDH curves.]
>=20
> I would look for discussion on the list about which Key Exchange
> Algorithms are Mandatory to Implement going forward.


Given the concerns about the NIST EC curves, I=E2=80=99d lean toward the =
current NIST ecdh-sha2-nist* curves being only SHOULD and not MUST.

I=E2=80=99m torn about curve25519 in this regard. I think it=E2=80=99s a =
good option, but I don=E2=80=99t know if we want to go as far as saying =
all compliant implementations must support it. For historical reasons, =
I=E2=80=99d lean toward doing that only with DH algorithms with an =
appropriate amount of strength, since it should be easier for existing =
implementations that support only DH today to move to those stronger key =
sizes & hashes.
--=20
Ron Frederick
ronf@timeheart.net




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To: IETF curdle <curdle@ietf.org>, IETF ssh <ietf-ssh@netbsd.org>
CC: Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG>
In-Reply-To: <202007131952.PAA23582@Stone.Rodents-Montreal.ORG>
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Comments: In-reply-to: Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG> message dated "Mon, 13 Jul 2020 15:52:01 -0400."
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/e06hJ9CYZamIKcVFK5J-m79TAxk>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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Hi Mouse,

Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG> writes:

> >   * diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
> >     [It is not clear to me how much longer 2048-bits will be considered
> >      strong enough.]
> 
> Surely it wouldn't be that big a deal to generate a prime of, say, 4k
> bits, or whatever size gives people suitably warm fuzzies, to replace
> the current group-14 prime?

It is not hard to generate FFC DH parameter sets.

The issue is that many folks are paranoid that someone will create a DH
Backdoor

    How to Backdoor Diffie-Hellman
    https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644
    See also URL:
    https://github.com/mimoo/Diffie-Hellman_Backdoor

The RFC4419 code in fact provides for a method to help SSH by giving us
as many different ephemeral parameter sets as a server may wish to
generate.

> I'd be happy to do the crucnhing for it, and I can't be the only
> person with RNG hardware and enough spare cycles to invest in whatever
> level of primality assurance keeps people happy.

We already have a number of alternatives for larger sizes we could use
taken from RFC 3526 (group15, group16, group17, group18) which are based
on the ration of a cirlce's circumference to its diamete ("pi").

I suppose we could also adopt RFC 7919 based on natural logarithm ("e").

Someone could also generate a new set of safe primes based on some other
transcendental number (square root of "2" or some other number).

My question is if we should literally require all SSH implementations to
have a Mandatory To Implement (MTI) DH parameter set now which may need
to be deprecated in a 'short' (for some value of the word short) period
of time.

Personally, I like FFC DH. I would not mind seeing

  Diffie-Hellman-group16-sha512 (a 4096-bit prime) 

as an MTI for SSH.

However, denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> I do not agree with this one:
>
> > diffie-hellman-group16-sha512   MUST
> 
> I find this too computationally expensive to justify "MUST" for
> servers. Last time I checked, this costs about 100 ms in server CPU
> time, more on weaker CPUs, and makes it trivial to DoS a
> resource-constrained server - no DDoS needed.

	Be safe, stay healthy,
	-- Mark


From nobody Mon Jul 13 14:58:21 2020
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Comments: In-reply-to: Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG> message dated "Mon, 13 Jul 2020 17:40:53 -0400."
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/RZVI4zvcVgyCQYXRazzCVrXLLRM>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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[CC- Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG>] Moue's mail bounces my direct
email.

Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG> writes:

> > Someone could also generate a new set of safe primes based on some
> > other transcendental number (square root of "2" or some other
> > number).
> 
> The square root of 2 is not transcendental; it's irrational, yes, but
> it's algebraeic.

True enough, somehow the "2 raised to the power of" phrase got
accidentally deleted from my post. In otherwords, I meant the
Gelfond-Schneider constant or Hilbert number.

> > My question is if we should literally require all SSH implementations
> > to have a Mandatory To Implement (MTI) DH parameter set now which may
> > need to be deprecated in a 'short' (for some value of the word short)
> > period of time.
> 
> The only reason I see to have any MUSTs (rather than SHOULDs) is
> interoperability.

Yes.

	Be safe, stay healthy,
	-- Mark


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
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--0000000000004392e205aa6d51bf
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

(Replying to Curdle - the message I forward below was posted only on the
ole' ietf-ssh@netbsd.org)

I'm pretty sure all the feedback so far suggests that
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" is the only key exchange method that has
consensus as a MUST right now.

With regard to group15 - if memory serves, the OpenSSH guys were
complaining about too much granularity in that regard, they preferred
group16+.

group16 and larger have my protest as a MUST because too expensive.

DH group exchange methods are not interoperable: implementations that
generate their own groups fail to interoperate with FIPS implementations
half of the time.

ECDH has protestations from some niche implementers. Curve25519 apparently
isn't coming soon to SSH clients that run on clothing tags.

That leaves "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256", which is sensible for MUST,
even though in no way ambitious.

(Note the lowercase "diffie-hellman-group14-...". I've seen someone
capitalize it in this thread. Per RFC 4251, SSH algorithm names are case
sensitive.)

In the SSH/QUIC draft, I opted for the following language:

"The requirement to implement any particular QUIC protocol version or TLS
cipher suite expires on the 5-year anniversary of the publishing of this
memo. At that point, implementers SHOULD consult any new standards
documents if available, or survey the practical use of SSH/QUIC for
implementation guidance."

Perhaps we could put in something like that, given that the only candidate
for MUST is the lowest common denominator that still meets current security
requirements.

denis



-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2?
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 04:10:18 +0000
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG>, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org
<ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org>

Mouse <mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG> writes:

As an implementor, it is highly unlikely I will support anything elliptic
curve in the foreseeable future.


I support it but it's disabled by default because I can't think of a
commonly-
used cryptosystem more riddled with side-channels than (EC)DSA, and most of
them end up leaking the private key (that's ECDSA, not 25519 which is too
novel/nonstandard to be usable with anything I work with). In fact a recent
paper on yet another set of side-channel attacks (either "Minerva: The Curse
of ECDSA Nonces" or "Big Numbers - Big Troubles") mentions that this is
merely
the latest set of side-channels that need patching, and more are expected in
the future. And that's after several years of patching ECDSA side-channels
already.

At least with RSA you can just blind and be mostly done with it, you don't
have to deal with a mechanism where there's a linear relation between the
signing nonce and the private key, with everything around that tied up in
side-channels.

Peter.

--0000000000004392e205aa6d51bf
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><p>(Replying to Curdle - the message I forward b=
elow was posted only on the ole&#39; <a href=3D"mailto:ietf-ssh@netbsd.org"=
>ietf-ssh@netbsd.org</a>)</p><p>I&#39;m pretty sure all the feedback so far=
 suggests that &quot;diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&quot; is the only key ex=
change method that has consensus as a MUST right now.</p><p>With regard to =
group15 - if memory serves, the OpenSSH guys were complaining about too muc=
h granularity in that regard, they preferred group16+.</p><p>group16 and la=
rger have my protest as a MUST because too expensive.</p><p>DH group exchan=
ge methods are not interoperable: implementations that generate their own g=
roups fail to interoperate with FIPS implementations half of the time.</p><=
p>ECDH has protestations from some niche implementers. Curve25519 apparentl=
y isn&#39;t coming soon to SSH clients that run on clothing tags.</p><p>Tha=
t leaves &quot;diffie-hellman-group14-sha256&quot;, which is sensible for M=
UST, even though in no way ambitious.</p><p>(Note the lowercase &quot;diffi=
e-hellman-group14-...&quot;. I&#39;ve seen someone capitalize it in this th=
read. Per RFC 4251, SSH algorithm names are case sensitive.)</p><p>In the S=
SH/QUIC draft, I opted for the following language:</p><p>&quot;The requirem=
ent to implement any particular QUIC protocol version or TLS cipher suite e=
xpires on the 5-year anniversary of the publishing of this memo. At that po=
int, implementers SHOULD consult any new standards documents if available, =
or survey the practical use of SSH/QUIC for implementation guidance.&quot;<=
/p><p>Perhaps we could put in something like that, given that the only cand=
idate for MUST is the lowest common denominator that still meets current se=
curity requirements.</p><p>denis<br></p><p>
</p><div class=3D"gmail-moz-forward-container"><br><br>-------- Forwarded M=
essage --------<table class=3D"gmail-moz-email-headers-table" border=3D"0" =
cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0"><tbody><tr><th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap v=
align=3D"BASELINE">Subject: </th><td>Re: [Curdle] State of draft-ietf-curdl=
e-ssh-kex-sha2?</td></tr><tr><th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE"=
>Date: </th><td>Tue, 14 Jul 2020 04:10:18 +0000</td></tr><tr><th align=3D"R=
IGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE">From: </th><td>Peter Gutmann &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz">pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz</a>&gt;</td=
></tr><tr><th align=3D"RIGHT" nowrap valign=3D"BASELINE">To: </th><td>Mouse=
 &lt;mouse@Rodents-Montreal.ORG&gt;, ietf-ssh@NetBSD.org &lt;ietf-ssh@NetBS=
D.org&gt;</td></tr></tbody></table><br><br>Mouse &lt;mouse@Rodents-Montreal=
.ORG&gt; writes:<br><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><pre class=3D"gmail-moz-q=
uote-pre">As an implementor, it is highly unlikely I will support anything =
elliptic<br>curve in the foreseeable future.<br></pre></blockquote><br>I su=
pport it but it&#39;s disabled by default because I can&#39;t think of a co=
mmonly-<br>used cryptosystem more riddled with side-channels than (EC)DSA, =
and most of<br>them end up leaking the private key (that&#39;s ECDSA, not 2=
5519 which is too<br>novel/nonstandard to be usable with anything I work wi=
th).  In fact a recent<br>paper on yet another set of side-channel attacks =
(either &quot;Minerva: The Curse<br>of ECDSA Nonces&quot; or &quot;Big Numb=
ers - Big Troubles&quot;) mentions that this is merely<br>the latest set of=
 side-channels that need patching, and more are expected in<br>the future. =
 And that&#39;s after several years of patching ECDSA side-channels<br>alre=
ady.<br><br>At least with RSA you can just blind and be mostly done with it=
, you don&#39;t<br>have to deal with a mechanism where there&#39;s a linear=
 relation between the<br>signing nonce and the private key, with everything=
 around that tied up in<br>side-channels.<br><br>Peter.<br><br></div><p>
</p>
<div class=3D"gmail-moz-forward-container"><b></b><i></i><u></u><sub></sub>=
<sup></sup><strike></strike><br></div></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;paddi=
ng-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border=
-left-style:solid">
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div>

--0000000000004392e205aa6d51bf--


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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "acme@ietf.org" <acme@ietf.org>, "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: NomCom office hours
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Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 20:38:54 +0000
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Subject: [Curdle] FW: NomCom office hours
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