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Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 14:40:38 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] SSH/QUIC draft
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On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 09:02:50PM -0500, denis bider wrote:
> Ilari:
> 
> 
> > I presume server authentication should be done using the TLS server
> certificate.
> 
> Server authentication needs to happen using existing SSH host keys with no
> change for users. Users should be able to update to new SSH software
> versions that support SSH/QUIC and everything should work out of the box
> without the user noticing a difference. Server admins may need to open a
> UDP port in the firewall, and that's it.
[...]
> 
> > For client authentication, one probably should use SSH-layer mechanisms
> 
> For client authentication, we use the exact same mechanisms currently used
> in SSH.  Anything less than "no change for the user" does not fly.

I'd be interested in hearing what (if anything) Ilari has to say about the
potential for cross-protocol attacks when reusing ssh host and client keys
for this related-but-not-exactly-the-same protocol.  On the face of it it
seems like something that "requires careful analysis" and quickly skimming
draft-bider-ssh-quic didn't give me enough context to be able to say
anything useful.

-Ben


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Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 16:19:21 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: simon@josefsson.org, ietf@augustcellars.com, rdd@cert.org, daniel.migault@ericsson.com, rsalz@akamai.com, David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com, curdle@ietf.org, lamps@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8410 (6229)
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Adding LAMPS.

My confidence level here is not terribly high, since there is no
certificate presented with the public key whose private key signed the
X25519 certificate in question and there is some possibility of a different
edge case that allows this behavior.

That said, it seems like the smallest possible change would be to just
remove the word "PKIX" from the description of the certificate in question.

-Ben

On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 08:40:32AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410,
> "Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>
> 
> Section: 10.2
> 
> Original Text

> An example of a self-issued PKIX certificate using Ed25519 to sign an
> X25519 public key would be
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
> 
> 
> Notes
> -----
> The given example certificate is self-issued but not self-signed (which is fine because its public key cannot be used for signing).
> It includes a subjectKeyIdentifier but not an authorityKeyIdentifier.
> 
> For not self-signed certificates RFC 5280 requires in section 4.2.1.1 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1) that the authorityKeyIdentifier is present.
> 
> Thus for such an example certificate the authorityKeyIdentifier MUST be added in order to be a conforming certificate.
> Otherwise, cert chain validation will be mislead to assume that the certificate is self-signed (while usually not actually verifying this supposition).
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
> Publication Date    : August 2018
> Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG


From nobody Tue Aug  4 16:35:42 2020
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Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 16:34:37 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: simon@josefsson.org, ietf@augustcellars.com, rdd@cert.org, daniel.migault@ericsson.com, rsalz@akamai.com, David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com, curdle@ietf.org, spasm@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8410 (6229)
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On Tue, Aug 04, 2020 at 04:19:26PM -0700, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> Adding LAMPS.

This time for sure.
-Ben

> My confidence level here is not terribly high, since there is no
> certificate presented with the public key whose private key signed the
> X25519 certificate in question and there is some possibility of a different
> edge case that allows this behavior.
> 
> That said, it seems like the smallest possible change would be to just
> remove the word "PKIX" from the description of the certificate in question.
> 
> -Ben
> 
> On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 08:40:32AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
> > The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410,
> > "Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".
> > 
> > --------------------------------------
> > You may review the report below and at:
> > https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229
> > 
> > --------------------------------------
> > Type: Technical
> > Reported by: David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>
> > 
> > Section: 10.2
> > 
> > Original Text
> 
> > An example of a self-issued PKIX certificate using Ed25519 to sign an
> > X25519 public key would be
> > 
> > Corrected Text
> > --------------
> > 
> > 
> > Notes
> > -----
> > The given example certificate is self-issued but not self-signed (which is fine because its public key cannot be used for signing).
> > It includes a subjectKeyIdentifier but not an authorityKeyIdentifier.
> > 
> > For not self-signed certificates RFC 5280 requires in section 4.2.1.1 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1) that the authorityKeyIdentifier is present.
> > 
> > Thus for such an example certificate the authorityKeyIdentifier MUST be added in order to be a conforming certificate.
> > Otherwise, cert chain validation will be mislead to assume that the certificate is self-signed (while usually not actually verifying this supposition).
> > 
> > Instructions:
> > -------------
> > This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> > use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> > rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> > can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> > 
> > --------------------------------------
> > RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
> > --------------------------------------
> > Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
> > Publication Date    : August 2018
> > Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
> > Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> > Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
> > Area                : Security
> > Stream              : IETF
> > Verifying Party     : IESG


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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 22:29:25 -0500
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] SSH/QUIC draft
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Benjamin:

Security of SSH signatures, both client and server-side, hinges on the
security of the exchange hash H. The manner in which H is calculated is
specified independently by each class of SSH key exchange method, but it
generally follows the same concept in all cases.

For example, Diffie Hellman key exchange is defined here:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-8

Each version of DH key exchange specifies a hash function that's used with
it. This hash function is used to calculate H as a digest of the following:

string V_C, the client's identification string (CR and LF excluded)
string V_S, the server's identification string (CR and LF excluded)
string I_C, the payload of the client's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
string I_S, the payload of the server's SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
string K_S, the host key
mpint  e, exchange value sent by the client
mpint  f, exchange value sent by the server
mpint  K, the shared secret

For straightforward, one-roundtrip key exchanges such as DH =E2=80=93 and s=
ame for
ECC, which is similar =E2=80=93 the SSH/QUIC proposal instead replaces the
calculation of H as a digest of the following:

string Unencrypted "obfs-payload" content of SSH_QUIC_INIT
string Unencrypted "obfs-payload" content of SSH_QUIC_REPLY, excluding the
entire field "server-kex-alg-data"
The fields of "server-kex-alg-data", excluding signature field
mpint  K

https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-bider-ssh-quic-05.html#figure-9

For a cross-protocol attack, you'd want to manipulate one of these formats
to be not necessarily valid, but practically tolerated, by some reasonable
implementation, as an encoding of the other. This is a priori impossible
for implementations that meet the requirements to insert random data that
exist both in SSH (the KEXINIT cookie field) and in SSH/QUIC (section 2.6 -
Random Elements). However, let's consider an implementation that does not
meet this requirement because of resource constraints, for example software
that is running on a clothing tag.

In this case, the formats (for encoding data to calculate H) will not
collide because in SSH, the encoded blob starts like this:

00 00 00 nn 'S' 'S' 'H' '-' ...

The "nn" is the length of the SSH version string, and "SSH-" is a required
prefix of the SSH version string that will appear here.

On the other hand, in SSH/QUIC, the encoded blob starts like this:

00 00 jj kk 01 ...

The byte at offset 4 will have value 1, which is the packet number for
SSH_QUIC_INIT.

As far as I know, no SSH implementation will interoperate with one whose
version string does not start with "SSH-", and no as per the SSH/QUIC spec,
no implementation should interoperate with one that uses a value other than
specified for the SSH_QUIC_INIT packet number. Therefore the encodings are
strictly distinct.

Each side also performs the encoding of the binary blob to calculate H
separately, i.e. the encoding is not done by one side and blindly accepted
by the other. Therefore, there is no way to generate an encoding for SSH
that would also be accepted by a reasonable implementation in SSH/QUIC, or
vice versa.

While this does hinge on possibly non-obvious properties of the content
that's being encoded, these properties are fundamental enough that I don't
expect that they would be missed. If someone has concerns though, it's easy
enough to add a few non-zero bytes to the start of the SSH/QUIC encoding of
the blob to calculate H. For example, if we insert:

byte[8] "SSH/QUIC"

... before the other fields, then the distinctness of the encodings will be
even more obvious.

I will update the draft to insert that. While not strictly necessary, it's
good hygiene.

denis


On Tue, Aug 4, 2020 at 4:40 PM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 09:02:50PM -0500, denis bider wrote:
> > Ilari:
> >
> >
> > > I presume server authentication should be done using the TLS server
> > certificate.
> >
> > Server authentication needs to happen using existing SSH host keys with
> no
> > change for users. Users should be able to update to new SSH software
> > versions that support SSH/QUIC and everything should work out of the bo=
x
> > without the user noticing a difference. Server admins may need to open =
a
> > UDP port in the firewall, and that's it.
> [...]
> >
> > > For client authentication, one probably should use SSH-layer mechanis=
ms
> >
> > For client authentication, we use the exact same mechanisms currently
> used
> > in SSH.  Anything less than "no change for the user" does not fly.
>
> I'd be interested in hearing what (if anything) Ilari has to say about th=
e
> potential for cross-protocol attacks when reusing ssh host and client key=
s
> for this related-but-not-exactly-the-same protocol.  On the face of it it
> seems like something that "requires careful analysis" and quickly skimmin=
g
> draft-bider-ssh-quic didn't give me enough context to be able to say
> anything useful.
>
> -Ben
>

--00000000000033aa6e05ac18fb12
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">Benjamin:<br><br>Security of SS=
H signatures, both client and server-side, hinges on the security of the ex=
change hash H. The manner in which H is calculated is specified independent=
ly by each class of SSH key exchange method, but it generally follows the s=
ame concept in all cases.<br><br>For example, Diffie Hellman key exchange i=
s defined here:<br><br><a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#secti=
on-8">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-8</a><br><br>Each version=
 of DH key exchange specifies a hash function that&#39;s used with it. This=
 hash function is used to calculate H as a digest of the following:<br><br>=
string V_C, the client&#39;s identification string (CR and LF excluded)<br>=
string V_S, the server&#39;s identification string (CR and LF excluded)<br>=
string I_C, the payload of the client&#39;s SSH_MSG_KEXINIT<br>string I_S, =
the payload of the server&#39;s SSH_MSG_KEXINIT<br>string K_S, the host key=
<br>mpint=C2=A0 e, exchange value sent by the client<br>mpint=C2=A0 f, exch=
ange value sent by the server<br>mpint=C2=A0 K, the shared secret<br><br></=
div><div>For straightforward, one-roundtrip key exchanges such as DH =E2=80=
=93 and same for ECC, which is similar =E2=80=93 the SSH/QUIC proposal inst=
ead replaces the calculation of H as a digest of the following:<br><br>stri=
ng Unencrypted &quot;obfs-payload&quot; content of SSH_QUIC_INIT<br>string =
Unencrypted &quot;obfs-payload&quot; content of SSH_QUIC_REPLY, excluding t=
he entire field &quot;server-kex-alg-data&quot;<br>The fields of &quot;serv=
er-kex-alg-data&quot;, excluding signature field<br>mpint=C2=A0 K<br><br><a=
 href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-bider-ssh-quic-05.html#figure-9">htt=
ps://www.ietf.org/id/draft-bider-ssh-quic-05.html#figure-9</a><br><br>For a=
 cross-protocol attack, you&#39;d want to manipulate one of these formats t=
o be not necessarily valid, but practically tolerated, by some reasonable i=
mplementation, as an encoding of the other. This is a priori impossible for=
 implementations that meet the requirements to insert random data that exis=
t both in SSH (the KEXINIT cookie field) and in SSH/QUIC (section 2.6 - Ran=
dom Elements). However, let&#39;s consider an implementation that does not =
meet this requirement because of resource constraints, for example software=
 that is running on a clothing tag.<br><br>In this case, the formats (for e=
ncoding data to calculate H) will not collide because in SSH, the encoded b=
lob starts like this:<br><br>00 00 00 nn &#39;S&#39; &#39;S&#39; &#39;H&#39=
; &#39;-&#39; ...</div><div><br></div><div>The &quot;nn&quot; is the length=
 of the SSH version string, and &quot;SSH-&quot; is a required prefix of th=
e SSH version string that will appear here.</div><div><br></div><div>On the=
 other hand, in SSH/QUIC, the encoded blob starts like this:</div><div><br>=
</div><div>00 00 jj kk 01 ...<br><br>The byte at offset 4 will have value 1=
, which is the packet number for SSH_QUIC_INIT.<br><br>As far as I know, no=
 SSH implementation will interoperate with one whose version string does no=
t start with &quot;SSH-&quot;, and no as per the SSH/QUIC spec, no implemen=
tation should interoperate with one that uses a value other than specified =
for the SSH_QUIC_INIT packet number. Therefore the encodings are strictly d=
istinct.<br><br>Each side also performs the encoding of the binary blob to =
calculate H separately, i.e. the encoding is not done by one side and blind=
ly accepted by the other. Therefore, there is no way to generate an encodin=
g for SSH that would also be accepted by a reasonable implementation in SSH=
/QUIC, or vice versa.<br><br>While this does hinge on possibly non-obvious =
properties of the content that&#39;s being encoded, these properties are fu=
ndamental enough that I don&#39;t expect that they would be missed. If some=
one has concerns though, it&#39;s easy enough to add a few non-zero bytes t=
o the start of the SSH/QUIC encoding of the blob to calculate H. For exampl=
e, if we insert:<br><br>byte[8] &quot;SSH/QUIC&quot;<br><br>... before the =
other fields, then the distinctness of the encodings will be even more obvi=
ous.<br><br>I will update the draft to insert that. While not strictly nece=
ssary, it&#39;s good hygiene.<br><br>denis<br></div><div dir=3D"ltr"><b></b=
><i></i><u></u><sub></sub><sup></sup><strike></strike><br></div></div></div=
></div></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div class=3D"gmail=
_attr" dir=3D"ltr">On Tue, Aug 4, 2020 at 4:40 PM Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex;=
border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:=
solid">On Sat, Jul 11, 2020 at 09:02:50PM -0500, denis bider wrote:<br>
&gt; Ilari:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; I presume server authentication should be done using the TLS serv=
er<br>
&gt; certificate.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; Server authentication needs to happen using existing SSH host keys wit=
h no<br>
&gt; change for users. Users should be able to update to new SSH software<b=
r>
&gt; versions that support SSH/QUIC and everything should work out of the b=
ox<br>
&gt; without the user noticing a difference. Server admins may need to open=
 a<br>
&gt; UDP port in the firewall, and that&#39;s it.<br>
[...]<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; &gt; For client authentication, one probably should use SSH-layer mech=
anisms<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; For client authentication, we use the exact same mechanisms currently =
used<br>
&gt; in SSH.=C2=A0 Anything less than &quot;no change for the user&quot; do=
es not fly.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d be interested in hearing what (if anything) Ilari has to say about =
the<br>
potential for cross-protocol attacks when reusing ssh host and client keys<=
br>
for this related-but-not-exactly-the-same protocol.=C2=A0 On the face of it=
 it<br>
seems like something that &quot;requires careful analysis&quot; and quickly=
 skimming<br>
draft-bider-ssh-quic didn&#39;t give me enough context to be able to say<br=
>
anything useful.<br>
<br>
-Ben<br>
</blockquote></div>

--00000000000033aa6e05ac18fb12--


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Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 12:39:01 -0400
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Subject: [Curdle] Fwd: [108all] Final reminder: IETF 108 meeting survey
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Hi,

Please consider - if not already done - to fill the IETf108 survey below.

Yours,
Daniel

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: IETF Executive Director <exec-director@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, Aug 5, 2020 at 6:30 AM
Subject: [108all] Final reminder: IETF 108 meeting survey
To: <108all@ietf.org>


Thank you very much to the ~230 people who have filled in the IETF 108
meeting survey as this data is crucial to helping us plan future meetings.
We could still use another 70 or so responses and so this is a final
reminder to please help us by taking a few minutes to complete the survey:

                https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/T3SL7JF

Thanks in advance

-- 
Jay Daley
IETF Executive Director
exec-director@ietf.org

-- 
108all mailing list
108all@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/108all


-- 
Daniel Migault
Ericsson

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br>Hi,=C2=A0<div><br></div><div>Please consider - if not =
already done - to fill the IETf108 survey below.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div>=
<div>Yours,=C2=A0<br>Daniel</div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div d=
ir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">---------- Forwarded message ---------<br>F=
rom: <strong class=3D"gmail_sendername" dir=3D"auto">IETF Executive Directo=
r</strong> <span dir=3D"auto">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:exec-director@ietf.org"=
>exec-director@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span><br>Date: Wed, Aug 5, 2020 at 6:30 AM=
<br>Subject: [108all] Final reminder: IETF 108 meeting survey<br>To:  &lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:108all@ietf.org">108all@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br></div><br><br>=
Thank you very much to the ~230 people who have filled in the IETF 108 meet=
ing survey as this data is crucial to helping us plan future meetings.=C2=
=A0 We could still use another 70 or so responses and so this is a final re=
minder to please help us by taking a few minutes to complete the survey:<br=
>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <a href=3D"https://=
www.surveymonkey.com/r/T3SL7JF" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https:=
//www.surveymonkey.com/r/T3SL7JF</a><br>
<br>
Thanks in advance<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Jay Daley<br>
IETF Executive Director<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:exec-director@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">exec-director@i=
etf.org</a><br>
<br>
-- <br>
108all mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:108all@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">108all@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/108all" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/108all</a><br>
</div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gma=
il_signature" data-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Dani=
el Migault<br></div><div>Ericsson</div></div></div></div></div>

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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/i0RuHklwDK75kHI9l95Attdun9Q>
Subject: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Hi,

Before IETF-108, I uploaded a new edition of

  Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure Shell (=
SSH)
  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/

with the hope of

  a) Providing a survey of existing IANA Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
     Parameters for Key Exchange Method Names
     https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml#=
ssh-parameters-16

  b) identifying a KEX to replace the current MUST implement exchanges:

       diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
       diffie-hellman-group14-sha1

  c) the desire to be deprecate any KEX which use sha1 as the secure hash:

       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
       diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
       diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
       gss-group1-sha1-*
       gss-group14-sha1-*
       gss-gex-sha1-*
       rsa1024-sha1

  d) A desire that the IANA KEX parameters contain another column in the
     table to indicate MUST, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT, and MAY.

I have tried to indicate general guidance for the rest of the Method
Names, but many of the guidelines may be my personal opinion even though
I have tried to be objective throughout.

In my private copy, I have converted from v2 of the xmlrfc directives to
v3 and that will be part of the next revision.

I would very much like to hear any comments about the current draft.

	Be safe, stay healthy,
	-- Mark


From David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com  Sat Aug  8 06:05:56 2020
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: simon@josefsson.org, ietf@augustcellars.com, rdd@cert.org, daniel.migault@ericsson.com, rsalz@akamai.com, curdle@ietf.org, lamps@ietf.org
References: <20200712154032.8DD22F40745@rfc-editor.org> <20200804231921.GW92412@kduck.mit.edu>
From: David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8410 (6229)
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Thanks Ben for your comment.

Unfortunately I cannot find online the whole tread of this discussion,
and I can neither find how to join the LAMPS mailing list, where there
might already be further responses.
Hope that nevertheless I can contribute to the discussion this way by
email and will receive any further responses.

The cert in question is part of the OpenSSL repository at
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem

To answer first your indirect question which private key signed this cert:

As I found during the discussion on a somewhat related OpenSSL issue:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1418#issuecomment-448204709

this cert has been signed by the private key belonging to
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pem
so that cert is the issuer cert of the cert in question, ee-ed25519.pem.
BTW, it would be less confusing if the cert file had been named
ee-x25519.pem instead.

This issuing relation can be verified using the following OpenSSL command:

apps/openssl verify -trusted test/certs/root-ed25519.pem
test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem

RFC 8410 sections 10.1 and 10.2
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.1)
do not clearly state this issuing relation with the public key given in
section 10.1,
which in my view is a further thing to be improved.
The OpenSSL repository contains this public key at
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pubkey.pem

The private key corresponding to the public key given in 10.1 is given
in section 10.3
but also here the relation with the public key is implicit and should
better be made explicit.
The OpenSSL repository contains this private key at
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.privkey.pem

Normally, the issuance of ee-ed25519 would be easy to detect by the
issuer/authority key ID of the cert,
but due to the malformedness that is the very issue being discussed in
this errata entry, the AKID is missing.

I object the suggested trivial 'solution' to remove the word "PKIX" from
the description
because this does not really cure the form of the certificate.
Moreover I see not much sense to have bad examples of certs in RFCs and
other standards
unless they serve the purpose of explicitly giving as negative example
for some good reason.
Here, instead, the purpose of the example clearly is to illustrate good
use of an X25519 public key,
and this should be done in a positive, standards-compliant way, which in
this case means RFC 5280 / PKIX conformance.

- David


On 05.08.20 01:19, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> Adding LAMPS.
>
> My confidence level here is not terribly high, since there is no
> certificate presented with the public key whose private key signed the
> X25519 certificate in question and there is some possibility of a different
> edge case that allows this behavior.
>
> That said, it seems like the smallest possible change would be to just
> remove the word "PKIX" from the description of the certificate in question.
>
> -Ben
>
> On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 08:40:32AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
>> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410,
>> "Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".
>>
>> --------------------------------------
>> You may review the report below and at:
>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229
>>
>> --------------------------------------
>> Type: Technical
>> Reported by: David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>
>>
>> Section: 10.2
>>
>> Original Text
>> An example of a self-issued PKIX certificate using Ed25519 to sign an
>> X25519 public key would be
>>
>> Corrected Text
>> --------------
>>
>>
>> Notes
>> -----
>> The given example certificate is self-issued but not self-signed (which is fine because its public key cannot be used for signing).
>> It includes a subjectKeyIdentifier but not an authorityKeyIdentifier.
>>
>> For not self-signed certificates RFC 5280 requires in section 4.2.1.1 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1) that the authorityKeyIdentifier is present.
>>
>> Thus for such an example certificate the authorityKeyIdentifier MUST be added in order to be a conforming certificate.
>> Otherwise, cert chain validation will be mislead to assume that the certificate is self-signed (while usually not actually verifying this supposition).
>>
>> Instructions:
>> -------------
>> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
>> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
>>
>> --------------------------------------
>> RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
>> --------------------------------------
>> Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
>> Publication Date    : August 2018
>> Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
>> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>> Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
>> Area                : Security
>> Stream              : IETF
>> Verifying Party     : IESG

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    <p>Thanks Ben for your comment.</p>
    <p>Unfortunately I cannot find online the whole tread of this
      discussion,<br>
      and I can neither find how to join the LAMPS mailing list, where
      there might already be further responses.<br>
      Hope that nevertheless I can contribute to the discussion this way
      by email and will receive any further responses.<br>
      <br>
      The cert in question is part of the OpenSSL repository at <br>
      <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem</a></p>
    <p>To answer first your indirect question which private key signed
      this cert:</p>
    <p>As I found during the discussion on a somewhat related OpenSSL
      issue:<br>
      <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1418#issuecomment-448204709">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1418#issuecomment-448204709</a></p>
    <p>this cert has been signed by the private key belonging to<br>
      <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pem">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pem</a><br>
      so that cert is the issuer cert of the cert in question,
      ee-ed25519.pem.<br>
      BTW, it would be less confusing if the cert file had been named
      ee-x25519.pem instead.<br>
      <br>
      This issuing relation can be verified using the following OpenSSL
      command:<br>
      <br>
      <tt>apps/openssl verify -trusted test/certs/root-ed25519.pem
        test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem<br>
      </tt></p>
    <p>RFC 8410 sections 10.1 and 10.2 (<a moz-do-not-send="true"
        href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.1">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.1</a>)
      <br>
      do not clearly state this issuing relation with the public key
      given in section 10.1, <br>
      which in my view is a further thing to be improved.<br>
      The OpenSSL repository contains this public key at<br>
      <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pubkey.pem">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pubkey.pem</a><br>
    </p>
    <p>The private key corresponding to the public key given in 10.1 is
      given in section 10.3<br>
      but also here the relation with the public key is implicit and
      should better be made explicit.<br>
      The OpenSSL repository contains this private key at<br>
      <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.privkey.pem">
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.privkey.pem</a><br>
    </p>
    <p>Normally, the issuance of ee-ed25519 would be easy to detect by
      the issuer/authority key ID of the cert,<br>
      but due to the malformedness that is the very issue being
      discussed in this errata entry, the AKID is missing.<br>
    </p>
    <p>I object the suggested trivial 'solution' to remove the word
      "PKIX" from the description<br>
      because this does not really cure the form of the certificate.<br>
      Moreover I see not much sense to have bad examples of certs in
      RFCs and other standards<br>
      unless they serve the purpose of explicitly giving as negative
      example for some good reason.<br>
      Here, instead, the purpose of the example clearly is to illustrate
      good use of an X25519 public key,<br>
      and this should be done in a positive, standards-compliant way,
      which in this case means RFC 5280 / PKIX conformance.</p>
    <p>- David<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 05.08.20 01:19, Benjamin Kaduk
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:20200804231921.GW92412@kduck.mit.edu">
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Adding LAMPS.

My confidence level here is not terribly high, since there is no
certificate presented with the public key whose private key signed the
X25519 certificate in question and there is some possibility of a different
edge case that allows this behavior.

That said, it seems like the smallest possible change would be to just
remove the word "PKIX" from the description of the certificate in question.

-Ben

On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 08:40:32AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410,
"Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229">https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229</a>

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: David von Oheimb <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com">&lt;David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com&gt;</a>

Section: 10.2

Original Text
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">An example of a self-issued PKIX certificate using Ed25519 to sign an
X25519 public key would be

Corrected Text
--------------


Notes
-----
The given example certificate is self-issued but not self-signed (which is fine because its public key cannot be used for signing).
It includes a subjectKeyIdentifier but not an authorityKeyIdentifier.

For not self-signed certificates RFC 5280 requires in section 4.2.1.1 (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1</a>) that the authorityKeyIdentifier is present.

Thus for such an example certificate the authorityKeyIdentifier MUST be added in order to be a conforming certificate.
Otherwise, cert chain validation will be mislead to assume that the certificate is self-signed (while usually not actually verifying this supposition).

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Publication Date    : August 2018
Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG
</pre>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

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From: David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: simon@josefsson.org, ietf@augustcellars.com, rdd@cert.org, daniel.migault@ericsson.com, rsalz@akamai.com, curdle@ietf.org, spasm@ietf.org
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To make things more constructive, I suggest here a replacement for the
non-conforming cert.
It has basically the same contents as the original one, but in addition
a suitable AKID extension.

Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            0d:b3:b2:03:05:cd:67:9a:c3:db:8f:09:0e:42:7e:ec:09:e5:3d:44
        Signature Algorithm: ED25519
        Issuer: CN = IETF Test Demo
        Validity
            Not Before: Aug  8 14:18:35 2020 GMT
            Not After : Dec 31 14:18:35 2040 GMT
        Subject: CN = IETF Test Demo
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: X25519
                X25519 Public-Key:
                pub:
                    85:20:f0:09:89:30:a7:54:74:8b:7d:dc:b4:3e:f7:
                    5a:0d:bf:3a:0d:26:38:1a:f4:eb:a4:a9:8e:aa:9b:
                    4e:6a
        X509v3 extensions:
            X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                CA:FALSE
            X509v3 Key Usage:
                Key Agreement
            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
                CA:9A:B8:EB:0C:9B:BD:CC:73:2C:15:F8:7B:0A:0C:F0:78:B9:CC:04
            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                A2:8C:C1:F8:6E:59:60:D3:E0:3A:E7:5C:96:2C:97:A8:D4:48:29:3C
    Signature Algorithm: ED25519
    Signature Value:
        4b:6a:01:60:ec:9b:c1:d4:b1:82:3c:7b:7e:7d:ca:87:51:52:
        db:0b:8c:a6:6d:53:89:d8:86:e9:67:39:a0:8b:c4:0d:fa:8c:
        c5:91:c6:9b:e1:6f:a1:51:ad:59:87:fb:c1:21:69:d4:10:9f:
        c4:ee:de:25:57:bb:6b:af:35:06


-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBTjCCAQCgAwIBAgIUDbOyAwXNZ5rD248JDkJ+7AnlPUQwBQYDK2VwMBkxFzAV
BgNVBAMMDklFVEYgVGVzdCBEZW1vMB4XDTIwMDgwODE0MTgzNVoXDTQwMTIzMTE0
MTgzNVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOSUVURiBUZXN0IERlbW8wKjAFBgMrZW4DIQCFIPAJ
iTCnVHSLfdy0PvdaDb86DSY4GvTrpKmOqptOaqNaMFgwCQYDVR0TBAIwADALBgNV
HQ8EBAMCAwgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMqauOsMm73McywV+HsKDPB4ucwEMB8GA1UdIwQY
MBaAFKKMwfhuWWDT4DrnXJYsl6jUSCk8MAUGAytlcANBAEtqAWDsm8HUsYI8e359
yodRUtsLjKZtU4nYhulnOaCLxA36jMWRxpvhb6FRrVmH+8EhadQQn8Tu3iVXu2uv
NQY=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----


On 08.08.20 15:05, David von Oheimb wrote:
>
> Thanks Ben for your comment.
>
> Unfortunately I cannot find online the whole tread of this discussion,
> and I can neither find how to join the LAMPS mailing list, where there
> might already be further responses.
> Hope that nevertheless I can contribute to the discussion this way by
> email and will receive any further responses.
>
> The cert in question is part of the OpenSSL repository at
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem
>
> To answer first your indirect question which private key signed this cert:
>
> As I found during the discussion on a somewhat related OpenSSL issue:
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1418#issuecomment-448204709
>
> this cert has been signed by the private key belonging to
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pem
> so that cert is the issuer cert of the cert in question, ee-ed25519.pem.
> BTW, it would be less confusing if the cert file had been named
> ee-x25519.pem instead.
>
> This issuing relation can be verified using the following OpenSSL command:
>
> apps/openssl verify -trusted test/certs/root-ed25519.pem
> test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem
>
> RFC 8410 sections 10.1 and 10.2
> (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.1)
> do not clearly state this issuing relation with the public key given
> in section 10.1,
> which in my view is a further thing to be improved.
> The OpenSSL repository contains this public key at
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pubkey.pem
>
> The private key corresponding to the public key given in 10.1 is given
> in section 10.3
> but also here the relation with the public key is implicit and should
> better be made explicit.
> The OpenSSL repository contains this private key at
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.privkey.pem
>
> Normally, the issuance of ee-ed25519 would be easy to detect by the
> issuer/authority key ID of the cert,
> but due to the malformedness that is the very issue being discussed in
> this errata entry, the AKID is missing.
>
> I object the suggested trivial 'solution' to remove the word "PKIX"
> from the description
> because this does not really cure the form of the certificate.
> Moreover I see not much sense to have bad examples of certs in RFCs
> and other standards
> unless they serve the purpose of explicitly giving as negative example
> for some good reason.
> Here, instead, the purpose of the example clearly is to illustrate
> good use of an X25519 public key,
> and this should be done in a positive, standards-compliant way, which
> in this case means RFC 5280 / PKIX conformance.
>
> - David
>
>
> On 05.08.20 01:19, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
>> Adding LAMPS.
>>
>> My confidence level here is not terribly high, since there is no
>> certificate presented with the public key whose private key signed the
>> X25519 certificate in question and there is some possibility of a different
>> edge case that allows this behavior.
>>
>> That said, it seems like the smallest possible change would be to just
>> remove the word "PKIX" from the description of the certificate in question.
>>
>> -Ben
>>
>> On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 08:40:32AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
>>> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410,
>>> "Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> You may review the report below and at:
>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> Type: Technical
>>> Reported by: David von Oheimb <David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com>
>>>
>>> Section: 10.2
>>>
>>> Original Text
>>> An example of a self-issued PKIX certificate using Ed25519 to sign an
>>> X25519 public key would be
>>>
>>> Corrected Text
>>> --------------
>>>
>>>
>>> Notes
>>> -----
>>> The given example certificate is self-issued but not self-signed (which is fine because its public key cannot be used for signing).
>>> It includes a subjectKeyIdentifier but not an authorityKeyIdentifier.
>>>
>>> For not self-signed certificates RFC 5280 requires in section 4.2.1.1 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1) that the authorityKeyIdentifier is present.
>>>
>>> Thus for such an example certificate the authorityKeyIdentifier MUST be added in order to be a conforming certificate.
>>> Otherwise, cert chain validation will be mislead to assume that the certificate is self-signed (while usually not actually verifying this supposition).
>>>
>>> Instructions:
>>> -------------
>>> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>>> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>>> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
>>> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
>>>
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
>>> --------------------------------------
>>> Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
>>> Publication Date    : August 2018
>>> Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
>>> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>>> Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
>>> Area                : Security
>>> Stream              : IETF
>>> Verifying Party     : IESG

--------------5608F70DD90621469CC91297
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

<html>
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
  </head>
  <body>
    <p>To make things more constructive, I suggest here a replacement
      for the non-conforming cert.<br>
      It has basically the same contents as the original one, but in
      addition a suitable AKID extension.<br>
    </p>
    <p>Certificate:<br>
          Data:<br>
              Version: 3 (0x2)<br>
              Serial Number:<br>
                 
      0d:b3:b2:03:05:cd:67:9a:c3:db:8f:09:0e:42:7e:ec:09:e5:3d:44<br>
              Signature Algorithm: ED25519<br>
              Issuer: CN = IETF Test Demo<br>
              Validity<br>
                  Not Before: Aug  8 14:18:35 2020 GMT<br>
                  Not After : Dec 31 14:18:35 2040 GMT<br>
              Subject: CN = IETF Test Demo<br>
              Subject Public Key Info:<br>
                  Public Key Algorithm: X25519<br>
                      X25519 Public-Key:<br>
                      pub:<br>
                          85:20:f0:09:89:30:a7:54:74:8b:7d:dc:b4:3e:f7:<br>
                          5a:0d:bf:3a:0d:26:38:1a:f4:eb:a4:a9:8e:aa:9b:<br>
                          4e:6a<br>
              X509v3 extensions:<br>
                  X509v3 Basic Constraints: <br>
                      CA:FALSE<br>
                  X509v3 Key Usage: <br>
                      Key Agreement<br>
                  X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: <br>
                     
      CA:9A:B8:EB:0C:9B:BD:CC:73:2C:15:F8:7B:0A:0C:F0:78:B9:CC:04<br>
                  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: <br>
                     
      A2:8C:C1:F8:6E:59:60:D3:E0:3A:E7:5C:96:2C:97:A8:D4:48:29:3C<br>
          Signature Algorithm: ED25519<br>
          Signature Value:<br>
              4b:6a:01:60:ec:9b:c1:d4:b1:82:3c:7b:7e:7d:ca:87:51:52:<br>
              db:0b:8c:a6:6d:53:89:d8:86:e9:67:39:a0:8b:c4:0d:fa:8c:<br>
              c5:91:c6:9b:e1:6f:a1:51:ad:59:87:fb:c1:21:69:d4:10:9f:<br>
              c4:ee:de:25:57:bb:6b:af:35:06<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----<br>
      MIIBTjCCAQCgAwIBAgIUDbOyAwXNZ5rD248JDkJ+7AnlPUQwBQYDK2VwMBkxFzAV<br>
      BgNVBAMMDklFVEYgVGVzdCBEZW1vMB4XDTIwMDgwODE0MTgzNVoXDTQwMTIzMTE0<br>
      MTgzNVowGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOSUVURiBUZXN0IERlbW8wKjAFBgMrZW4DIQCFIPAJ<br>
      iTCnVHSLfdy0PvdaDb86DSY4GvTrpKmOqptOaqNaMFgwCQYDVR0TBAIwADALBgNV<br>
      HQ8EBAMCAwgwHQYDVR0OBBYEFMqauOsMm73McywV+HsKDPB4ucwEMB8GA1UdIwQY<br>
      MBaAFKKMwfhuWWDT4DrnXJYsl6jUSCk8MAUGAytlcANBAEtqAWDsm8HUsYI8e359<br>
      yodRUtsLjKZtU4nYhulnOaCLxA36jMWRxpvhb6FRrVmH+8EhadQQn8Tu3iVXu2uv<br>
      NQY=<br>
      -----END CERTIFICATE-----<br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 08.08.20 15:05, David von Oheimb
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
      cite="mid:58c7feda-4216-4e80-5149-efffc0812bdd@siemens.com">
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
      <p>Thanks Ben for your comment.</p>
      <p>Unfortunately I cannot find online the whole tread of this
        discussion,<br>
        and I can neither find how to join the LAMPS mailing list, where
        there might already be further responses.<br>
        Hope that nevertheless I can contribute to the discussion this
        way by email and will receive any further responses.<br>
        <br>
        The cert in question is part of the OpenSSL repository at <br>
        <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem</a></p>
      <p>To answer first your indirect question which private key signed
        this cert:</p>
      <p>As I found during the discussion on a somewhat related OpenSSL
        issue:<br>
        <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1418#issuecomment-448204709">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/1418#issuecomment-448204709</a></p>
      <p>this cert has been signed by the private key belonging to<br>
        <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pem">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pem</a><br>
        so that cert is the issuer cert of the cert in question,
        ee-ed25519.pem.<br>
        BTW, it would be less confusing if the cert file had been named
        ee-x25519.pem instead.<br>
        <br>
        This issuing relation can be verified using the following
        OpenSSL command:<br>
        <br>
        <tt>apps/openssl verify -trusted test/certs/root-ed25519.pem
          test/certs/ee-ed25519.pem<br>
        </tt></p>
      <p>RFC 8410 sections 10.1 and 10.2 (<a moz-do-not-send="true"
          href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.1">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.1</a>)
        <br>
        do not clearly state this issuing relation with the public key
        given in section 10.1, <br>
        which in my view is a further thing to be improved.<br>
        The OpenSSL repository contains this public key at<br>
        <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pubkey.pem">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.pubkey.pem</a><br>
      </p>
      <p>The private key corresponding to the public key given in 10.1
        is given in section 10.3<br>
        but also here the relation with the public key is implicit and
        should better be made explicit.<br>
        The OpenSSL repository contains this private key at<br>
        <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.privkey.pem">https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/test/certs/root-ed25519.privkey.pem</a><br>
      </p>
      <p>Normally, the issuance of ee-ed25519 would be easy to detect by
        the issuer/authority key ID of the cert,<br>
        but due to the malformedness that is the very issue being
        discussed in this errata entry, the AKID is missing.<br>
      </p>
      <p>I object the suggested trivial 'solution' to remove the word
        "PKIX" from the description<br>
        because this does not really cure the form of the certificate.<br>
        Moreover I see not much sense to have bad examples of certs in
        RFCs and other standards<br>
        unless they serve the purpose of explicitly giving as negative
        example for some good reason.<br>
        Here, instead, the purpose of the example clearly is to
        illustrate good use of an X25519 public key,<br>
        and this should be done in a positive, standards-compliant way,
        which in this case means RFC 5280 / PKIX conformance.</p>
      <p>- David<br>
      </p>
      <p><br>
      </p>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 05.08.20 01:19, Benjamin Kaduk
        wrote:<br>
      </div>
      <blockquote type="cite"
        cite="mid:20200804231921.GW92412@kduck.mit.edu">
        <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Adding LAMPS.

My confidence level here is not terribly high, since there is no
certificate presented with the public key whose private key signed the
X25519 certificate in question and there is some possibility of a different
edge case that allows this behavior.

That said, it seems like the smallest possible change would be to just
remove the word "PKIX" from the description of the certificate in question.

-Ben

On Sun, Jul 12, 2020 at 08:40:32AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
</pre>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410,
"Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6229</a>

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: David von Oheimb <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com" moz-do-not-send="true">&lt;David.von.Oheimb@siemens.com&gt;</a>

Section: 10.2

Original Text
</pre>
        </blockquote>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">An example of a self-issued PKIX certificate using Ed25519 to sign an
X25519 public key would be

Corrected Text
--------------


Notes
-----
The given example certificate is self-issued but not self-signed (which is fine because its public key cannot be used for signing).
It includes a subjectKeyIdentifier but not an authorityKeyIdentifier.

For not self-signed certificates RFC 5280 requires in section 4.2.1.1 (<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1" moz-do-not-send="true">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.1</a>) that the authorityKeyIdentifier is present.

Thus for such an example certificate the authorityKeyIdentifier MUST be added in order to be a conforming certificate.
Otherwise, cert chain validation will be mislead to assume that the certificate is self-signed (while usually not actually verifying this supposition).

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Publication Date    : August 2018
Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG
</pre>
        </blockquote>
      </blockquote>
    </blockquote>
  </body>
</html>

--------------5608F70DD90621469CC91297--


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Hi Mark,

On Aug 5, 2020, at 9:57 AM, Mark D. Baushke =
<mdb=3D40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> Before IETF-108, I uploaded a new edition of
>=20
>  Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure =
Shell (SSH)
>  https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2/
>=20
> with the hope of
>=20
>  a) Providing a survey of existing IANA Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
>     Parameters for Key Exchange Method Names
>     =
https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xhtml#ssh-p=
arameters-16
>=20
>  b) identifying a KEX to replace the current MUST implement exchanges:
>=20
>       diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
>       diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
>=20
>  c) the desire to be deprecate any KEX which use sha1 as the secure =
hash:
>=20
>       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
>       diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
>       diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
>       gss-group1-sha1-*
>       gss-group14-sha1-*
>       gss-gex-sha1-*
>       rsa1024-sha1
>=20
>  d) A desire that the IANA KEX parameters contain another column in =
the
>     table to indicate MUST, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT, and MAY.
>=20
> I have tried to indicate general guidance for the rest of the Method
> Names, but many of the guidelines may be my personal opinion even =
though
> I have tried to be objective throughout.

This generally looks good to me. Here are a few more detailed comments:

- Sections 3.14 and 3.15 list the ext-info values as SHOULD (which I =
agree with). However, your table in section 5 has them marked as MAY.

- I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST to =
SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=99d still like to =
see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think this is probably =
the safest candidate for that.

- I=E2=80=99m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a =
good candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m not sure =
we have consensus on that.

- I agree with the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from =
SHOULD to MAY.

- Regarding possible ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1 curve =
as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it was implemented by =
Bitvise. I don=E2=80=99t know if it is worth mentioning here explicitly, =
but it=E2=80=99s one real-world example of an ecdh-sha2-* algorithm not =
explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The =E2=80=98endsa-sha2=E2=80=99 =
algorithm with this curve is also supported.
--=20
Ron Frederick
ronf@timeheart.net




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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> writes:

> This generally looks good to me.

I am still going back over some of the comments that ekr provided...

> Here are a few more detailed comments:
>=20
> - Sections 3.14 and 3.15 list the ext-info values as SHOULD (which I
>   agree with). However, your table in section 5 has them marked as
>   MAY.

Updated in my copy.

> - I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST
>   to SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=99d still like=
 to
>   see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think this is
>   probably the safest candidate for that.

How long is a 2048-bit prime, even with such a large q-ordered subgroup
likely to remain viable?

1024-bits for:

  a) IFC RSA,=20
  b) FFC DSA, and=20
  c) FFC DH,
  d) as well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)

are all considered too weak now.

3DES with 112-bits of security is being phased out as of January 1, 2024.

When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also nominally has only
112-bits of security as does 2048-bit DSA become retired?

To me, it looks like the better bet would be the 3072-bit MODP prime of
group15, but I do not see it being adopted by most implementations.

I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has many
implementations.

That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to
show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC
and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.

I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they
would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.

> - I=E2=80=99m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a good
>   candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m not sure we h=
ave
>   consensus on that.

Yup, I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.

Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a
MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish
as long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... though
I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps
not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 is a will formed subgroup. When it is
not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the
key value.

> - I agree with the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from
>   SHOULD to MAY.

Okay.

> - Regarding possible ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1
>   curve as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it was

I think you mean ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 here?

>   implemented by Bitvise. I don=E2=80=99t know if it is worth mentioning =
here
>   explicitly, but it=E2=80=99s one real-world example of an ecdh-sha2-*
>   algorithm not explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The =E2=80=98endsa-s=
ha2=E2=80=99
>   algorithm with this curve is also supported.

The reserved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1 or
ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be better...
depending on what Bitvise uses.

I think you might as well use the name, the Koblitz curve names are
present in RFC 4492.

    b'1.3.132.0.10': (ec.SECP256K1, SHA256),
    b'1.3.132.0.34': (ec.secp384r1, SHA384),
    b'1.3.132.0.35': (ec.secp521r1, SHA512),

For that matter, as long as you are going to use vanity curve for Bitcoin;

Why not use the RFC 7027 ECC Brainpool curves too?

    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7':  (ec.brainpoolP256r1, SHA256),
    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11': (ec.brainpoolP384r1, SHA384),
    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13': (ec.brainpoolP512r1, SHA512),
=20=20
That said, given that they are named in RFC 7027, using their names may
be better too.

Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool names or
OIDs to this IETF draft?

	Be safe, stay healthy,
	-- Mark

> --
> Ron Frederick
> ronf@timeheart.net


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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On Aug 17, 2020, at 3:34 PM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:
> Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> writes:
>> - I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST
>>  to SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=99d still =
like to
>>  see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think this is
>>  probably the safest candidate for that.
>=20
> How long is a 2048-bit prime, even with such a large q-ordered =
subgroup
> likely to remain viable?
>=20
> 1024-bits for:
>=20
>  a) IFC RSA,=20
>  b) FFC DSA, and=20
>  c) FFC DH,
>  d) as well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)
>=20
> are all considered too weak now.
>=20
> 3DES with 112-bits of security is being phased out as of January 1, =
2024.
>=20
> When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also nominally has =
only
> 112-bits of security as does 2048-bit DSA become retired?

I=E2=80=99m no expert when it comes to key strength, but I would expect =
a 2048-bit RSA key to last at least as long as 3DES, since both are =
considered to have 112 bits of security. The applies to DH keys as well. =
According to Wikipedia, RSA claimed back in 2003 that 2048-bit keys =
should be good until 2030, and even now the largest RSA key known to be =
cracked was a key with 829 bits. So, it seems like we=E2=80=99ve got =
another 5-10 years probably before we=E2=80=99d have to worry about =
phasing these keys out.


> To me, it looks like the better bet would be the 3072-bit MODP prime =
of
> group15, but I do not see it being adopted by most implementations.

As I noted below, I can definitely get behind this as a SHOULD, and =
perhaps that could position it to become a MUST later when it comes time =
to retire 2048-bit keys.


> I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has many
> implementations.

I=E2=80=99m definitely a big fan of curve25519/Ed25519, and indeed =
curve25519-sha256 is the most preferred key exchange algorithm in =
AsyncSSH right now. However, when it comes to choosing which algorithm =
to make a MUST, I figured that going with one of the plain DH algorithms =
might be less of a burden on implementers, as it=E2=80=99s much easier =
to change the key size than it would be to add ECC support to an =
implementation that doesn=E2=80=99t yet have it.


> That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to
> show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC
> and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.
>=20
> I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they
> would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.

That=E2=80=99s interesting - I hadn=E2=80=99t read that. I was aware of =
concerns about potential compromises in the nistp curves, but not =
specifically about Quantum attacks against ECC.


> - I=E2=80=99m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a =
good
>>  candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m not sure =
we have
>>  consensus on that.
>=20
> Yup, I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.
>=20
> Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a
> MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they =
wish
> as long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... =
though
> I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps
> not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 is a will formed subgroup. When =
it is
> not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of =
the
> key value.

That=E2=80=99s an interesting thought. Are there =E2=80=9Cbest =
practices=E2=80=9D which could be followed in generating/validating  =
these values that could avoid such a weakness?

For now, my implementation of the =E2=80=9Cgroup-exchange=E2=80=9D =
algorithms has been to only let them select from a table of previously =
generated groups (basically the same group14-18 values that can be named =
directly). I haven=E2=80=99t looked into what it would take to construct =
new MODP groups.


> - I agree with the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from
>>  SHOULD to MAY.
>=20
> Okay.
>=20
>> - Regarding possible ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1
>>  curve as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it was
>=20
> I think you mean ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 here?

Whoops, yes. Looks like my cost/paste swallowed the preceding dash.

>>  implemented by Bitvise. I don=E2=80=99t know if it is worth =
mentioning here
>>  explicitly, but it=E2=80=99s one real-world example of an =
ecdh-sha2-*
>>  algorithm not explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The =
=E2=80=98endsa-sha2=E2=80=99
>>  algorithm with this curve is also supported.
>=20
> The reserved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1 or
> ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be =
better...
> depending on what Bitvise uses.

They use ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 and so do I, following the guidance in =
RFC 5656 section 6.3 which states:

   This section specifies identifiers encoding named elliptic curve
   domain parameters.  These identifiers are used in this document to
   identify the curve used in the SSH ECC public key format, the ECDSA
   signature blob, and the ECDH method name.

   For the REQUIRED elliptic curves nistp256, nistp384, and nistp521,
   the elliptic curve domain parameter identifiers are the strings
   "nistp256", "nistp384", and "nistp521".

   For all other elliptic curves, including all other NIST curves and
   all other RECOMMENDED curves, the elliptic curve domain parameter
   identifier is the ASCII period-separated decimal representation of
   the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [ASN1] Object Identifier
   (OID) of the named curve domain parameters that are associated with
   the server's ECC host keys.  This identifier is defined provided that
   the concatenation of the public key format identifier and the
   elliptic curve domain parameter identifier (or the method name and
   the elliptic curve domain parameter identifier) does not exceed the
   maximum specified by the SSH protocol architecture [RFC4251], namely
   64 characters; otherwise, the identifier for that curve is undefined,
   and the curve is not supported by this specification.

   A list of the REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED curves and their OIDs can be
   found in Section 10.

   Note that implementations MUST use the string identifiers for the
   three REQUIRED NIST curves, even when an OID exists for that curve.


So, with the exception of the REQUIRED curves, it looks like it would =
violate the RFC to use names even when they exist (e.g. =
ecdh-sha2-secp256k1). So, until there is a new SSH-specific RFC which =
updates RFC 5656, I think only OIDs should be used.


> I think you might as well use the name, the Koblitz curve names are
> present in RFC 4492.
>=20
>    b'1.3.132.0.10': (ec.SECP256K1, SHA256),
>    b'1.3.132.0.34': (ec.secp384r1, SHA384),
>    b'1.3.132.0.35': (ec.secp521r1, SHA512),
>=20
> For that matter, as long as you are going to use vanity curve for =
Bitcoin;
>=20
> Why not use the RFC 7027 ECC Brainpool curves too?
>=20
>    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7':  (ec.brainpoolP256r1, SHA256),
>    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11': (ec.brainpoolP384r1, SHA384),
>    b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13': (ec.brainpoolP512r1, SHA512),
>=20
> That said, given that they are named in RFC 7027, using their names =
may
> be better too.
>=20
> Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool names =
or
> OIDs to this IETF draft?

My rule on adding new curves (and algorithms in general) is that I want =
at least one other independent implementation of that support that I can =
do interoperability testing against before I=E2=80=99ll consider adding =
something. For now, I=E2=80=99m not aware of any SSH implementations =
that support any other curves, but if anyone knows of any, I=E2=80=99d =
love a pointer to them.

As for adding new named curves to this draft, I would recommend you =
focus only on implementations currently out there and not introduce =
anything new. I like the fact that this draft focuses on being a catalog =
of existing algorithms in actual use, and recommendations for which ones =
should be prioritized. If someone wanted to recommend new curves, I =
think that should probably be its own separate draft, and it can then =
decide whether to recommend using the OID format required by RFC 5656 or =
updating it to introduce additional non-OID algorithm names.
--=20
Ron Frederick
ronf@timeheart.net


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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Aug 17, 2020, at 3:34 PM, Mark D. Baushke &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mdb@juniper.net" class=3D"">mdb@juniper.net</a>&gt; =
wrote:<div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Ron Frederick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" =
class=3D"">ronf@timeheart.net</a>&gt; writes:<br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D"">- I noticed you dropped =
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST<br class=3D""> &nbsp;to =
SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=99d still like =
to<br class=3D""> &nbsp;see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, =
and think this is<br class=3D""> &nbsp;probably the safest candidate for =
that.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">How long is a 2048-bit =
prime, even with such a large q-ordered subgroup<br class=3D"">likely to =
remain viable?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">1024-bits for:<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""> &nbsp;a) IFC RSA, <br class=3D""> &nbsp;b) =
FFC DSA, and <br class=3D""> &nbsp;c) FFC DH,<br class=3D""> &nbsp;d) as =
well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">are all =
considered too weak now.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">3DES with 112-bits =
of security is being phased out as of January 1, 2024.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also =
nominally has only<br class=3D"">112-bits of security as does 2048-bit =
DSA become retired?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>I=E2=80=99m no expert when it comes to key =
strength, but I would expect a 2048-bit RSA key to last at least as long =
as 3DES, since both are considered to have 112 bits of security. The =
applies to DH keys as well. According to Wikipedia, RSA claimed back in =
2003 that 2048-bit keys should be good until 2030, and even now the =
largest RSA key known to be cracked was a key with 829 bits. So, it =
seems like we=E2=80=99ve got another 5-10 years probably before we=E2=80=99=
d have to worry about phasing these keys out.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">To me, it looks like the better bet would be =
the 3072-bit MODP prime of<br class=3D"">group15, but I do not see it =
being adopted by most implementations.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>As I =
noted below, I can definitely get behind this as a SHOULD, and perhaps =
that could position it to become a MUST later when it comes time to =
retire 2048-bit keys.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has =
many<br class=3D"">implementations.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>I=E2=80=
=99m definitely a big fan of curve25519/Ed25519, and indeed =
curve25519-sha256 is the most preferred key exchange algorithm in =
AsyncSSH right now. However, when it comes to choosing which algorithm =
to make a MUST, I figured that going with one of the plain DH algorithms =
might be less of a burden on implementers, as it=E2=80=99s much easier =
to change the key size than it would be to add ECC support to an =
implementation that doesn=E2=80=99t yet have it.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">That said, there are many who have been doing =
research which seems to<br class=3D"">show that ECC is easier to break =
with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC<br class=3D"">and are NOT =
interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have =
said they<br class=3D"">would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH =
implementations.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>That=E2=80=99s interesting - I hadn=E2=80=99t read =
that. I was aware of concerns about potential compromises in the nistp =
curves, but not specifically about Quantum attacks against =
ECC.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">- I=E2=80=99m =
also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a good<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""> &nbsp;candidate for a =
SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m not sure we have<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;consensus on that.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Yup, =
I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Perhaps we should opt to make =
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a<br class=3D"">MUST? This allows =
implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish<br class=3D"">as =
long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... =
though<br class=3D"">I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g =
is created perhaps<br class=3D"">not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 =
is a will formed subgroup. When it is<br class=3D"">not a well-formed =
subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the<br class=3D"">key =
value.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>That=E2=80=99s an interesting thought. Are there =
=E2=80=9Cbest practices=E2=80=9D which could be followed in =
generating/validating &nbsp;these values that could avoid such a =
weakness?</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>For now, my implementation =
of the =E2=80=9Cgroup-exchange=E2=80=9D algorithms has been to only let =
them select from a table of previously generated groups (basically the =
same group14-18 values that can be named directly). I haven=E2=80=99t =
looked into what it would take to construct new MODP =
groups.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">- I agree with =
the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""> &nbsp;SHOULD to MAY.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">Okay.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D"">- Regarding possible =
ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1<br class=3D""> &nbsp;curve =
as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it was<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">I think you mean =
ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 here?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>Whoops, =
yes. Looks like my cost/paste swallowed the preceding =
dash.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;implemented by Bitvise. I don=E2=80=99t know if it is =
worth mentioning here<br class=3D""> &nbsp;explicitly, but it=E2=80=99s =
one real-world example of an ecdh-sha2-*<br class=3D""> &nbsp;algorithm =
not explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The =E2=80=98endsa-sha2=E2=80=99<=
br class=3D""> &nbsp;algorithm with this curve is also supported.<br =
class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">The reserved name is for =
ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1 or<br =
class=3D"">ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be =
better...<br class=3D"">depending on what Bitvise uses.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>They =
use&nbsp;ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 and so do I, following the guidance in =
RFC 5656 section 6.3 which states:</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp; &nbsp;This section specifies identifiers encoding =
named elliptic curve</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; domain =
parameters.&nbsp; These identifiers are used in this document =
to</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; identify the curve used in the SSH ECC public =
key format, the ECDSA</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; signature blob, =
and the ECDH method name.</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; min-height: 13px;" =
class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures" =
class=3D""></span><br class=3D""></font></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; For the REQUIRED =
elliptic curves nistp256, nistp384, and =
nistp521,</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: =
normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; the elliptic =
curve domain parameter identifiers are the =
strings</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: =
normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; "nistp256", =
"nistp384", and "nistp521".</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0px; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; min-height: 13px;" =
class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures" =
class=3D""></span><br class=3D""></font></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; For all other =
elliptic curves, including all other NIST curves =
and</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; all other RECOMMENDED curves, the elliptic curve =
domain parameter</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; identifier is =
the ASCII period-separated decimal representation =
of</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [ASN1] =
Object Identifier</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; (OID) of the =
named curve domain parameters that are associated =
with</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; the server's ECC host keys.&nbsp; This =
identifier is defined provided that</font></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" =
class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; =
the concatenation of the public key format identifier and =
the</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; elliptic curve domain parameter identifier (or =
the method name and</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; the elliptic =
curve domain parameter identifier) does not exceed =
the</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; maximum specified by the SSH protocol =
architecture [RFC4251], namely</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: =
0px; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; 64 characters; =
otherwise, the identifier for that curve is =
undefined,</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: =
normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; and the curve is =
not supported by this specification.</font></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; =
min-height: 13px;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures" =
class=3D""></span><br class=3D""></font></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; A list of the =
REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED curves and their OIDs can =
be</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; found in Section 10.</font></span></div><div =
style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; =
min-height: 13px;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures" =
class=3D""></span><br class=3D""></font></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; =
font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font =
face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; Note that =
implementations MUST use the string identifiers for =
the</font></span></div><div style=3D"margin: 0px; font-stretch: normal; =
line-height: normal;" class=3D""><span style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: =
no-common-ligatures;" class=3D""><font face=3D"Courier New" size=3D"2" =
class=3D"">&nbsp;&nbsp; three REQUIRED NIST curves, even when an OID =
exists for that curve.</font></span></div><div class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-variant-ligatures: no-common-ligatures" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></span></div></div><div><br class=3D""></div>So, with the =
exception of the REQUIRED curves, it looks like it would violate the RFC =
to use names even when they exist (e.g. ecdh-sha2-secp256k1). So, until =
there is a new SSH-specific RFC which updates RFC 5656, I think only =
OIDs should be used.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D"">I think you might as well use the name, the =
Koblitz curve names are<br class=3D"">present in RFC 4492.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b'1.3.132.0.10': =
(ec.SECP256K1, SHA256),<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b'1.3.132.0.34': (ec.secp384r1, SHA384),<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b'1.3.132.0.35': (ec.secp521r1, SHA512),<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">For that matter, as long as you are going to =
use vanity curve for Bitcoin;<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Why not use =
the RFC 7027 ECC Brainpool curves too?<br class=3D""><br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7': &nbsp;(ec.brainpoolP256r1, =
SHA256),<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11': =
(ec.brainpoolP384r1, SHA384),<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13': (ec.brainpoolP512r1, =
SHA512),<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">That said, given that they are =
named in RFC 7027, using their names may<br class=3D"">be better too.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">Does anyone else want me to add either the =
Koblitz or Brainpool names or<br class=3D"">OIDs to this IETF draft?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>My =
rule on adding new curves (and algorithms in general) is that I want at =
least one other independent implementation of that support that I can do =
interoperability testing against before I=E2=80=99ll consider adding =
something. For now, I=E2=80=99m not aware of any SSH implementations =
that support any other curves, but if anyone knows of any, I=E2=80=99d =
love a pointer to them.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>As for =
adding new named curves to this draft, I would recommend you focus only =
on implementations currently out there and not introduce anything new. I =
like the fact that this draft focuses on being a catalog of existing =
algorithms in actual use, and recommendations for which ones should be =
prioritized. If someone wanted to recommend new curves, I think that =
should probably be its own separate draft, and it can then decide =
whether to recommend using the OID format required by RFC 5656 or =
updating it to introduce additional non-OID algorithm =
names.</div></div><div class=3D"">
--&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Ron Frederick<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" class=3D"">ronf@timeheart.net</a><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></body></html>=

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To: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>
CC: <curdle@ietf.org>
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Comments: In-reply-to: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> message dated "Mon, 17 Aug 2020 22:42:40 -0700."
From: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/cUst3M2B0FRzvbaD80k7RxLTa_k>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> writes:

> On Aug 17, 2020, at 3:34 PM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net<mailto:mdb@=
juniper.net>> wrote:
> Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net<mailto:ronf@timeheart.net>> writes:
> - I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST
>  to SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=99d still like =
to
>  see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think this is
>  probably the safest candidate for that.
>=20

MDB wrote:
> How long is a 2048-bit prime, even with such a large q-ordered
> subgroup likely to remain viable?
>=20
> 1024-bits for:
>=20
>  a) IFC RSA,
>  b) FFC DSA, and
>  c) FFC DH,
>  d) as well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)
>=20
> are all considered too weak now.
>=20
> 3DES with 112-bits of security is being phased out as of January 1, 2024.

> When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also nominally has only
> 112-bits of security as does 2048-bit DSA become retired?


Ron wrote:
> I=E2=80=99m no expert when it comes to key strength, but I would expect a
> 2048-bit RSA key to last at least as long as 3DES, since both are
> considered to have 112 bits of security.

MDB: Note this is in NIST SP 800-131Ar2

URL: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131A=
r2.pdf

Table 1.

    Three-key TDEA Encryption Deprecated through 2023
                              Disallowed after 2023

Ron wrote:
> The applies to DH keys as well. According to Wikipedia, RSA claimed
> back in 2003 that 2048-bit keys should be good until 2030, and even
> now the largest RSA key known to be cracked was a key with 829 bits.
> So, it seems like we=E2=80=99ve got another 5-10 years probably before we=
=E2=80=99d
> have to worry about phasing these keys out.
>=20
>=20
...elided...

MDB wrote:
> I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has many
> implementations.

Ron wrote:
> I=E2=80=99m definitely a big fan of curve25519/Ed25519, and indeed
> curve25519-sha256 is the most preferred key exchange algorithm in
> AsyncSSH right now. However, when it comes to choosing which algorithm
> to make a MUST, I figured that going with one of the plain DH
> algorithms might be less of a burden on implementers, as it=E2=80=99s much
> easier to change the key size than it would be to add ECC support to
> an implementation that doesn=E2=80=99t yet have it.


MDB wrote:
> That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to
> show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC
> and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.
>=20
> I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they
> would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.

Ron wrote:
> That=E2=80=99s interesting - I hadn=E2=80=99t read that. I was aware of c=
oncerns about
> potential compromises in the nistp curves, but not specifically about
> Quantum attacks against ECC.

MDB:

I found the article. It was in Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017.

 Quantum Resource Estimates for Computing Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms
 by Martin Roetteler, Michael Naehrig, Krysta M. Svore, and Kristin Lauter
 November 2017, 24 Pages

URL:=20

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/1706.06=
752.pdf

It compares ECC with RSA (IFC) rather than really comparing against FFC DSA.

...elided...

MDB wrote:
> Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a
> MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish
> as long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... though
> I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps
> not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 is a will formed subgroup. When it =
is
> not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the
> key value.
>=20

Ron wrote:
> That=E2=80=99s an interesting thought. Are there =E2=80=9Cbest practices=
=E2=80=9D which could
> be followed in generating/validating these values that could avoid
> such a weakness?
>=20
> For now, my implementation of the =E2=80=9Cgroup-exchange=E2=80=9D algori=
thms has been
> to only let them select from a table of previously generated groups
> (basically the same group14-18 values that can be named directly). I
> haven=E2=80=99t looked into what it would take to construct new MODP grou=
ps.

It is not a difficult program to write, I just find that RFC 4419 is not
very good at given instructions. Basically, after you have a candidate
generator g, you need to ensure that g^q mod P =3D=3D 1, then you have a
generator able to generate a proper q-orded subgroup. This is different
than RFC 4419 which just suggests forcing a congruence to 2 or 5 in
section 6.1. This method works about one quarter of the time. The rest
of the time the g value does NOT generate a proper q-ordered subgroup.

There are faster ways to generate p,q,g set of non-safe prime DH
parameters than the method outlined in RFC 4419, but then you won't
maximize the q =3D (p-1)/2 for the largest possible q-ordered subgroup...
and as SSH does only sends g,p, the client needs to assume it can
generate q if it needs to make any FIPS tests to make governments
happy... which includes doing a g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 to ensure that any x
generated is a q-ordered subgroup.

...elided...
> They use ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 and so do I, following the guidance in
> RFC 5656 section 6.3 which states:

MDB: Ah.. Yes, I forgot about that detail. Thank you or the pointer.

Ron wrote:
> My rule on adding new curves (and algorithms in general) is that I
> want at least one other independent implementation of that support
> that I can do interoperability testing against before I=E2=80=99ll consid=
er
> adding something. For now, I=E2=80=99m not aware of any SSH implementatio=
ns
> that support any other curves, but if anyone knows of any, I=E2=80=99d lo=
ve a
> pointer to them.

MDB: Me too.

> As for adding new named curves to this draft, I would recommend you
> focus only on implementations currently out there and not introduce
> anything new. I like the fact that this draft focuses on being a
> catalog of existing algorithms in actual use, and recommendations for
> which ones should be prioritized. If someone wanted to recommend new
> curves, I think that should probably be its own separate draft, and it
> can then decide whether to recommend using the OID format required by
> RFC 5656 or updating it to introduce additional non-OID algorithm
> names.

MDB: Fair enough.

	Be safe, stay healthy,
	-- Mark


From nobody Tue Aug 18 17:21:46 2020
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From: denis bider <denisbider.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 19:21:30 -0500
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To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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> Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
> a MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups
> they wish

I think this is unwise for reasons mentioned earlier: implementations
generate their own DH groups which fail FIPS tests and are incompatible
with FIPS implementations. In the interest of compatibility, FIPS
implementations then have to avoid this algorithm.


> To me, it looks like the better bet would be the 3072-bit MODP prime
> of group15, but I do not see it being adopted by most implementations.

The main problem here is that OpenSSH does not implement it. Last time I
checked, their stated reasoning was that 3072 bits was "too much
granularity". They like either 2048 or 4096. But on constrained devices,
4096 is super expensive.

I agree here that 3072-bit DH and RSA are a sweet spot for a fair amount of
future security with acceptable performance. If it was up to me with no
other considerations involved, I would declare this the conservative
"MUST". If everyone else decides this and declares it so, then perhaps
OpenSSH might reluctantly support it. However, it's also quite possible
they might not.

And even if they do, it's not CURRENTLY offered by any existing OpenSSH
version.

For now, I think we're left with either group14 as the only widely
acceptable MUST, or no MUST key exchange algorithm at all.

The NIST post-quantum crypto fest is also slowly unfolding, and we may have
a post-quantum standard in a few years. I think that will be the next major
event that changes the algorithm preference landscape, more so than great
classic progress in breaking larger RSA or DH. If there is surprising
progress in breaking RSA or DH, chances are it will be quantum rather than
classic, in which case the new standard will need to be the winner of the
post-quantum contest, which we currently don't have.

denis


On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 5:34 PM Mark D. Baushke <mdb=3D
40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> writes:
>
> > This generally looks good to me.
>
> I am still going back over some of the comments that ekr provided...
>
> > Here are a few more detailed comments:
> >
> > - Sections 3.14 and 3.15 list the ext-info values as SHOULD (which I
> >   agree with). However, your table in section 5 has them marked as
> >   MAY.
>
> Updated in my copy.
>
> > - I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST
> >   to SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=99d still li=
ke to
> >   see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think this is
> >   probably the safest candidate for that.
>
> How long is a 2048-bit prime, even with such a large q-ordered subgroup
> likely to remain viable?
>
> 1024-bits for:
>
>   a) IFC RSA,
>   b) FFC DSA, and
>   c) FFC DH,
>   d) as well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)
>
> are all considered too weak now.
>
> 3DES with 112-bits of security is being phased out as of January 1, 2024.
>
> When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also nominally has only
> 112-bits of security as does 2048-bit DSA become retired?
>
> To me, it looks like the better bet would be the 3072-bit MODP prime of
> group15, but I do not see it being adopted by most implementations.
>
> I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has many
> implementations.
>
> That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to
> show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC
> and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.
>
> I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they
> would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.
>
> > - I=E2=80=99m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a go=
od
> >   candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m not sure we=
 have
> >   consensus on that.
>
> Yup, I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.
>
> Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a
> MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish
> as long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... though
> I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps
> not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 is a will formed subgroup. When it =
is
> not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the
> key value.
>
> > - I agree with the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from
> >   SHOULD to MAY.
>
> Okay.
>
> > - Regarding possible ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1
> >   curve as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it was
>
> I think you mean ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 here?
>
> >   implemented by Bitvise. I don=E2=80=99t know if it is worth mentionin=
g here
> >   explicitly, but it=E2=80=99s one real-world example of an ecdh-sha2-*
> >   algorithm not explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The =E2=80=98endsa=
-sha2=E2=80=99
> >   algorithm with this curve is also supported.
>
> The reserved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1 or
> ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be better...
> depending on what Bitvise uses.
>
> I think you might as well use the name, the Koblitz curve names are
> present in RFC 4492.
>
>     b'1.3.132.0.10': (ec.SECP256K1, SHA256),
>     b'1.3.132.0.34': (ec.secp384r1, SHA384),
>     b'1.3.132.0.35': (ec.secp521r1, SHA512),
>
> For that matter, as long as you are going to use vanity curve for Bitcoin=
;
>
> Why not use the RFC 7027 ECC Brainpool curves too?
>
>     b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7':  (ec.brainpoolP256r1, SHA256),
>     b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11': (ec.brainpoolP384r1, SHA384),
>     b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13': (ec.brainpoolP512r1, SHA512),
>
> That said, given that they are named in RFC 7027, using their names may
> be better too.
>
> Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool names or
> OIDs to this IETF draft?
>
>         Be safe, stay healthy,
>         -- Mark
>
> > --
> > Ron Frederick
> > ronf@timeheart.net
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt; Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellma=
n-group-exchange-sha256</div><div dir=3D"ltr">&gt; a MUST? This allows impl=
ementors to put in whatever MODP groups<br>&gt; they wish</div><div dir=3D"=
ltr"><br></div><div>I think this=C2=A0is unwise for reasons mentioned earli=
er: implementations generate their own DH groups which fail FIPS tests and =
are incompatible with FIPS implementations. In the interest of compatibilit=
y,=C2=A0FIPS implementations then have to avoid this algorithm.</div><div><=
br></div><div><br></div><div>&gt; To me, it looks like the better bet would=
 be the 3072-bit MODP prime</div><div>&gt; of group15, but I do not see it =
being adopted by most implementations.</div><div><br></div><div>The main pr=
oblem here is that OpenSSH does not implement it. Last time I checked, thei=
r stated reasoning was that 3072 bits was &quot;too much granularity&quot;.=
 They like either 2048 or 4096. But on constrained devices, 4096 is super e=
xpensive.</div><div><br></div><div>I agree here that 3072-bit DH and RSA ar=
e a sweet spot for a fair amount of future security with=C2=A0acceptable pe=
rformance. If it was up to me with no other considerations involved, I woul=
d declare this the conservative &quot;MUST&quot;. If everyone else decides =
this and declares it so, then perhaps OpenSSH might reluctantly support it.=
 However, it&#39;s also quite possible they might not.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>And even if they do, it&#39;s not CURRENTLY offered by any existing Op=
enSSH version.</div><div><br></div><div>For now, I think we&#39;re left wit=
h either group14 as the only widely acceptable MUST, or no MUST key exchang=
e algorithm at all.</div><div><br></div><div>The NIST post-quantum crypto f=
est is also slowly unfolding, and we may have a post-quantum standard in a =
few years. I think that will be the next major event that changes the algor=
ithm preference landscape, more so than great classic progress in breaking =
larger RSA or DH. If there is surprising progress in breaking RSA or DH, ch=
ances are it will be quantum rather than classic, in which case the new sta=
ndard will need to be the winner of the post-quantum contest, which we curr=
ently don&#39;t have.</div><div><br></div><div>denis</div><div><br></div></=
div><div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=
=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 5:34 PM Mark D. Baushke &lt;mdb=3D<=
a href=3D"mailto:40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org">40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org=
</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">=
Ron Frederick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" target=3D"_blank">r=
onf@timeheart.net</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt; This generally looks good to me.<br>
<br>
I am still going back over some of the comments that ekr provided...<br>
<br>
&gt; Here are a few more detailed comments:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; - Sections 3.14 and 3.15 list the ext-info values as SHOULD (which I<b=
r>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0agree with). However, your table in section 5 has them mar=
ked as<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0MAY.<br>
<br>
Updated in my copy.<br>
<br>
&gt; - I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST<b=
r>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0to SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=
=99d still like to<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think th=
is is<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0probably the safest candidate for that.<br>
<br>
How long is a 2048-bit prime, even with such a large q-ordered subgroup<br>
likely to remain viable?<br>
<br>
1024-bits for:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 a) IFC RSA, <br>
=C2=A0 b) FFC DSA, and <br>
=C2=A0 c) FFC DH,<br>
=C2=A0 d) as well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)<br>
<br>
are all considered too weak now.<br>
<br>
3DES with 112-bits of security is being phased out as of January 1, 2024.<b=
r>
<br>
When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also nominally has only<br=
>
112-bits of security as does 2048-bit DSA become retired?<br>
<br>
To me, it looks like the better bet would be the 3072-bit MODP prime of<br>
group15, but I do not see it being adopted by most implementations.<br>
<br>
I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has many<br>
implementations.<br>
<br>
That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to<br>
show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC<br>
and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.<br>
<br>
I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they<br>
would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.<br>
<br>
&gt; - I=E2=80=99m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a g=
ood<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m =
not sure we have<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0consensus on that.<br>
<br>
Yup, I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.<br>
<br>
Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a<br>
MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish<br>
as long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... though<b=
r>
I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps<br>
not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 is a will formed subgroup. When it is=
<br>
not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the<br=
>
key value.<br>
<br>
&gt; - I agree with the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0SHOULD to MAY.<br>
<br>
Okay.<br>
<br>
&gt; - Regarding possible ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0curve as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it=
 was<br>
<br>
I think you mean ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 here?<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0implemented by Bitvise. I don=E2=80=99t know if it is wort=
h mentioning here<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0explicitly, but it=E2=80=99s one real-world example of an =
ecdh-sha2-*<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithm not explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The =E2=
=80=98endsa-sha2=E2=80=99<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithm with this curve is also supported.<br>
<br>
The reserved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1 or<br>
ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be better...<br>
depending on what Bitvise uses.<br>
<br>
I think you might as well use the name, the Koblitz curve names are<br>
present in RFC 4492.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.132.0.10&#39;: (ec.SECP256K1, SHA256),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.132.0.34&#39;: (ec.secp384r1, SHA384),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.132.0.35&#39;: (ec.secp521r1, SHA512),<br>
<br>
For that matter, as long as you are going to use vanity curve for Bitcoin;<=
br>
<br>
Why not use the RFC 7027 ECC Brainpool curves too?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7&#39;:=C2=A0 (ec.brainpoolP256r1, S=
HA256),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11&#39;: (ec.brainpoolP384r1, SHA384=
),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13&#39;: (ec.brainpoolP512r1, SHA512=
),<br>
<br>
That said, given that they are named in RFC 7027, using their names may<br>
be better too.<br>
<br>
Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool names or<br=
>
OIDs to this IETF draft?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Be safe, stay healthy,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- Mark<br>
<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; Ron Frederick<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" target=3D"_blank">ronf@timeheart=
.net</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle</a><br>
</blockquote></div></div></div></div></div></div>

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Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2020 21:01:20 -0500
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To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb=40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net>, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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About ECDH/secp256k1:

> The reserved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1
> or ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be
> better... depending on what Bitvise uses.

RFC 5656 is clear about this and provides an example:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5656#section-6.3

"For example, the method name for ECDH key exchange with ephemeral
generated on the sect409k1 curve is "ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.36"."

secp256k1 is not among the curves explicitly named in RFC 5656, therefore
it uses the OID form (unfortunately).

Bitvise SSH Server, SSH Client and FlowSsh (the library) use the following
for ECDSA and ECDH over secp256k1:

ecdsa-sha2-1.3.132.0.10
ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10

I'm not sure if ECDH over secp256k1 needs to be mentioned in the draft. If
so, the reason would be to acknowledge its practical usage. In this case,
the disposition should be "MAY" and there ought to be some remark to
indicate this is secp256k1.


> Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool
> names or OIDs to this IETF draft?

In theory, we could add all the possible curves that have OID assignments.
I would not add them unless there exist practical implementations that are
in use.

denis


On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 5:34 PM Mark D. Baushke <mdb=3D
40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> writes:
>
> > This generally looks good to me.
>
> I am still going back over some of the comments that ekr provided...
>
> > Here are a few more detailed comments:
> >
> > - Sections 3.14 and 3.15 list the ext-info values as SHOULD (which I
> >   agree with). However, your table in section 5 has them marked as
> >   MAY.
>
> Updated in my copy.
>
> > - I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST
> >   to SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=99d still li=
ke to
> >   see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think this is
> >   probably the safest candidate for that.
>
> How long is a 2048-bit prime, even with such a large q-ordered subgroup
> likely to remain viable?
>
> 1024-bits for:
>
>   a) IFC RSA,
>   b) FFC DSA, and
>   c) FFC DH,
>   d) as well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)
>
> are all considered too weak now.
>
> 3DES with 112-bits of security is being phased out as of January 1, 2024.
>
> When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also nominally has only
> 112-bits of security as does 2048-bit DSA become retired?
>
> To me, it looks like the better bet would be the 3072-bit MODP prime of
> group15, but I do not see it being adopted by most implementations.
>
> I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has many
> implementations.
>
> That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to
> show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC
> and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.
>
> I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they
> would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.
>
> > - I=E2=80=99m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a go=
od
> >   candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m not sure we=
 have
> >   consensus on that.
>
> Yup, I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.
>
> Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a
> MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish
> as long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... though
> I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps
> not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 is a will formed subgroup. When it =
is
> not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the
> key value.
>
> > - I agree with the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from
> >   SHOULD to MAY.
>
> Okay.
>
> > - Regarding possible ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1
> >   curve as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it was
>
> I think you mean ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 here?
>
> >   implemented by Bitvise. I don=E2=80=99t know if it is worth mentionin=
g here
> >   explicitly, but it=E2=80=99s one real-world example of an ecdh-sha2-*
> >   algorithm not explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The =E2=80=98endsa=
-sha2=E2=80=99
> >   algorithm with this curve is also supported.
>
> The reserved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1 or
> ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be better...
> depending on what Bitvise uses.
>
> I think you might as well use the name, the Koblitz curve names are
> present in RFC 4492.
>
>     b'1.3.132.0.10': (ec.SECP256K1, SHA256),
>     b'1.3.132.0.34': (ec.secp384r1, SHA384),
>     b'1.3.132.0.35': (ec.secp521r1, SHA512),
>
> For that matter, as long as you are going to use vanity curve for Bitcoin=
;
>
> Why not use the RFC 7027 ECC Brainpool curves too?
>
>     b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7':  (ec.brainpoolP256r1, SHA256),
>     b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11': (ec.brainpoolP384r1, SHA384),
>     b'1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13': (ec.brainpoolP512r1, SHA512),
>
> That said, given that they are named in RFC 7027, using their names may
> be better too.
>
> Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool names or
> OIDs to this IETF draft?
>
>         Be safe, stay healthy,
>         -- Mark
>
> > --
> > Ron Frederick
> > ronf@timeheart.net
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><div dir=3D"ltr">About ECDH/secp256k1:<div><br></div><div>&gt; The reser=
ved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1</div><div>&gt; or ec=
dh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be</div><div>&gt; =
better... depending on what Bitvise uses.</div><div><br></div><div>RFC 5656=
 is clear about this and provides an example:</div><div><br></div><div><a h=
ref=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5656#section-6.3">https://tools.ietf.=
org/html/rfc5656#section-6.3</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>&quot;For exa=
mple, the method name for ECDH key exchange with ephemeral generated on the=
 sect409k1 curve is &quot;ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.36&quot;.&quot;</div><div><br=
></div><div>secp256k1 is not among the curves explicitly named in RFC 5656,=
 therefore it uses the OID form (unfortunately).</div><div><br></div><div>B=
itvise SSH Server, SSH Client and FlowSsh (the library) use the following f=
or ECDSA and ECDH over secp256k1:</div><div><br></div><div>ecdsa-sha2-1.3.1=
32.0.10<br></div><div>ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10<br></div><div><br></div><div>I=
&#39;m not sure if ECDH over secp256k1 needs to be mentioned in the draft. =
If so, the reason would be to acknowledge its practical usage. In this case=
, the disposition should be &quot;MAY&quot; and there ought to be some rema=
rk to indicate this is secp256k1.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&=
gt; Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool</div><d=
iv>&gt; names or OIDs to this IETF draft?</div><div><br></div><div>In theor=
y, we could add all the possible curves that have OID assignments. I would =
not add them unless there exist practical implementations that are in use.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>denis</div><div><br></div></div></div></div></div>=
</div></div></div></div></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 5:34 PM Mark D. Baush=
ke &lt;mdb=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40juniper.net@dmarc.ietf.org">40juniper.net@=
dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">Ron Frederick &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" targe=
t=3D"_blank">ronf@timeheart.net</a>&gt; writes:<br>
<br>
&gt; This generally looks good to me.<br>
<br>
I am still going back over some of the comments that ekr provided...<br>
<br>
&gt; Here are a few more detailed comments:<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; - Sections 3.14 and 3.15 list the ext-info values as SHOULD (which I<b=
r>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0agree with). However, your table in section 5 has them mar=
ked as<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0MAY.<br>
<br>
Updated in my copy.<br>
<br>
&gt; - I noticed you dropped diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 back from MUST<b=
r>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0to SHOULD, leaving no algorithms listed as MUST. I=E2=80=
=99d still like to<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0see at least one algorithm be listed as MUST, and think th=
is is<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0probably the safest candidate for that.<br>
<br>
How long is a 2048-bit prime, even with such a large q-ordered subgroup<br>
likely to remain viable?<br>
<br>
1024-bits for:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 a) IFC RSA, <br>
=C2=A0 b) FFC DSA, and <br>
=C2=A0 c) FFC DH,<br>
=C2=A0 d) as well as FFC DH group5 (1536-bits)<br>
<br>
are all considered too weak now.<br>
<br>
3DES with 112-bits of security is being phased out as of January 1, 2024.<b=
r>
<br>
When should we expect to see 2048-bit RSA, which also nominally has only<br=
>
112-bits of security as does 2048-bit DSA become retired?<br>
<br>
To me, it looks like the better bet would be the 3072-bit MODP prime of<br>
group15, but I do not see it being adopted by most implementations.<br>
<br>
I might suggest Curve25519, as it is pretty fast and has many<br>
implementations.<br>
<br>
That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to<br>
show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC<br>
and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.<br>
<br>
I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they<br>
would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.<br>
<br>
&gt; - I=E2=80=99m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a g=
ood<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m =
not sure we have<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0consensus on that.<br>
<br>
Yup, I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.<br>
<br>
Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a<br>
MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish<br>
as long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... though<b=
r>
I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps<br>
not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 is a will formed subgroup. When it is=
<br>
not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the<br=
>
key value.<br>
<br>
&gt; - I agree with the downgrade of diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 from<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0SHOULD to MAY.<br>
<br>
Okay.<br>
<br>
&gt; - Regarding possible ECDSA algorithms, I implemented the secp256k1<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0curve as ecdh-sha21.3.132.0.10 in AsyncSSH after seeing it=
 was<br>
<br>
I think you mean ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 here?<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0implemented by Bitvise. I don=E2=80=99t know if it is wort=
h mentioning here<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0explicitly, but it=E2=80=99s one real-world example of an =
ecdh-sha2-*<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithm not explicitly given a name in RFC 5656. The =E2=
=80=98endsa-sha2=E2=80=99<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithm with this curve is also supported.<br>
<br>
The reserved name is for ecdh-sha2-* ... so ecdh-sha2-secp256k1 or<br>
ecdh-sha2-1.3.132.0.10 or ecdh-sha2-oid-1.3.132.0.10 would be better...<br>
depending on what Bitvise uses.<br>
<br>
I think you might as well use the name, the Koblitz curve names are<br>
present in RFC 4492.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.132.0.10&#39;: (ec.SECP256K1, SHA256),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.132.0.34&#39;: (ec.secp384r1, SHA384),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.132.0.35&#39;: (ec.secp521r1, SHA512),<br>
<br>
For that matter, as long as you are going to use vanity curve for Bitcoin;<=
br>
<br>
Why not use the RFC 7027 ECC Brainpool curves too?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7&#39;:=C2=A0 (ec.brainpoolP256r1, S=
HA256),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11&#39;: (ec.brainpoolP384r1, SHA384=
),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 b&#39;1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13&#39;: (ec.brainpoolP512r1, SHA512=
),<br>
<br>
That said, given that they are named in RFC 7027, using their names may<br>
be better too.<br>
<br>
Does anyone else want me to add either the Koblitz or Brainpool names or<br=
>
OIDs to this IETF draft?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Be safe, stay healthy,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 -- Mark<br>
<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; Ron Frederick<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" target=3D"_blank">ronf@timeheart=
.net</a><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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On Aug 17, 2020, at 11:37 PM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:
> Ron wrote:
>> I=E2=80=99m no expert when it comes to key strength, but I would =
expect a
>> 2048-bit RSA key to last at least as long as 3DES, since both are
>> considered to have 112 bits of security.
>=20
> MDB: Note this is in NIST SP 800-131Ar2
>=20
> URL: =
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.p=
df =
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2.=
pdf>
> Table 1.
>=20
>    Three-key TDEA Encryption Deprecated through 2023
>                              Disallowed after 2023

[Ron] Thanks for the pointer. I was familiar with an earlier version of =
that doc, but didn=E2=80=99t know there was a 2019 update. The =
deprecation of TDEA seems to be a special case, though, and not =
something which it is applying to all algorithms with 112 bits of =
security. For the others, it still seems to be sticking by the previous =
recommendation that 112 bits will be ok until 2030. For DH in =
particular, we don=E2=80=99t need to worry about the lifetime of the =
=E2=80=9Cprotected data=E2=80=9D, as the session keys negotiated by the =
SSH key exchange typically don=E2=80=99t last very long. The main issue =
for DH seems to be whether it complies with SP 800-56A or not =
(https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3 =
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>), and I think we=E2=80=99re =
ok on that here, at least for the predefined safe primes.


> I found the article. It was in Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT =
2017.
>=20
> Quantum Resource Estimates for Computing Elliptic Curve Discrete =
Logarithms
> by Martin Roetteler, Michael Naehrig, Krysta M. Svore, and Kristin =
Lauter
> November 2017, 24 Pages
>=20
> URL:=20
>=20
> =
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/1706.0=
6752.pdf =
<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/1706.=
06752.pdf>

[Ron] Thanks - I=E2=80=99ll check it out!
--=20
Ron Frederick
ronf@timeheart.net




--Apple-Mail=_D986F874-C54B-40BB-A205-79198A5875FC
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">On =
Aug 17, 2020, at 11:37 PM, Mark D. Baushke &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:mdb@juniper.net" class=3D"">mdb@juniper.net</a>&gt; =
wrote:<div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Ron wrote:<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D"">I=E2=80=99m no expert when it comes to key strength, but I =
would expect a<br class=3D"">2048-bit RSA key to last at least as long =
as 3DES, since both are<br class=3D"">considered to have 112 bits of =
security.<br class=3D""></blockquote><br class=3D"">MDB: Note this is in =
NIST SP 800-131Ar2<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">URL: <a =
href=3D"https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-=
131Ar2.pdf" =
class=3D"">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.8=
00-131Ar2.pdf</a></div></div></blockquote><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">Table 1.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Three-key TDEA Encryption =
Deprecated through 2023<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Disallowed after 2023<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div><div>[Ron] =
Thanks for the pointer. I was familiar with an earlier version of that =
doc, but didn=E2=80=99t know there was a 2019 update. The deprecation of =
TDEA seems to be a special case, though, and not something which it is =
applying to all algorithms with 112 bits of security. For the others, it =
still seems to be sticking by the previous recommendation that 112 bits =
will be ok until 2030. For DH in particular, we don=E2=80=99t need to =
worry about the lifetime of the =E2=80=9Cprotected data=E2=80=9D, as the =
session keys negotiated by the SSH key exchange typically don=E2=80=99t =
last very long. The main issue for DH seems to be whether it complies =
with SP 800-56A or not (<a =
href=3D"https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3" =
class=3D"">https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3</a>), and I think =
we=E2=80=99re ok on that here, at least for the predefined safe =
primes.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">I found the =
article. It was in Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""> Quantum Resource Estimates for Computing =
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms<br class=3D""> by Martin Roetteler, =
Michael Naehrig, Krysta M. Svore, and Kristin Lauter<br class=3D""> =
November 2017, 24 Pages<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">URL: <br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/0=
9/1706.06752.pdf" =
class=3D"">https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/201=
7/09/1706.06752.pdf</a><br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Ron] Thanks - I=E2=80=99ll check it =
out!</div></div><div class=3D"">
--&nbsp;<br class=3D"">Ron Frederick<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:ronf@timeheart.net" class=3D"">ronf@timeheart.net</a><br =
class=3D""><br class=3D""><br class=3D"">

</div>
<br class=3D""></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_D986F874-C54B-40BB-A205-79198A5875FC--


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Subject: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8410 (6263)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410,
"Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6263

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: David Ireland <ietf104729@di-mgt.com.au>

Section: 7

Original Text
-------------
NOTE: There exist some private key import functions that have not picked up the new ASN.1 structure OneAsymmetricKey that is defined in [RFC7748].

Corrected Text
--------------
NOTE: There exist some private key import functions that have not picked up the new ASN.1 structure OneAsymmetricKey that is defined in [RFC5958].

Notes
-----
RFC7748 does not define or even mention OneAsymmetricKey. The correct reference should be RFC5958 "Asymmetric Key Packages"

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Publication Date    : August 2018
Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8410 (6263)
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Yes this is correct.

-----Original Message-----
From: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>=20
Sent: Monday, August 24, 2020 12:35 AM
To: simon@josefsson.org; ietf@augustcellars.com; rdd@cert.org; =
kaduk@mit.edu; daniel.migault@ericsson.com; rsalz@akamai.com
Cc: ietf104729@di-mgt.com.au; curdle@ietf.org; rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Subject: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8410 (6263)

The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8410, "Algorithm =
Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, and X448 for Use in the Internet =
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6263

--------------------------------------
Type: Technical
Reported by: David Ireland <ietf104729@di-mgt.com.au>

Section: 7

Original Text
-------------
NOTE: There exist some private key import functions that have not picked =
up the new ASN.1 structure OneAsymmetricKey that is defined in =
[RFC7748].

Corrected Text
--------------
NOTE: There exist some private key import functions that have not picked =
up the new ASN.1 structure OneAsymmetricKey that is defined in =
[RFC5958].

Notes
-----
RFC7748 does not define or even mention OneAsymmetricKey. The correct =
reference should be RFC5958 "Asymmetric Key Packages"

Instructions:
-------------
This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please use =
"Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a =
decision is reached, the verifying party can log in to change the status =
and edit the report, if necessary.=20

--------------------------------------
RFC8410 (draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-10)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, =
and X448 for Use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Publication Date    : August 2018
Author(s)           : S. Josefsson, J. Schaad
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Looking for comments on draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2
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On Tuesday, 18 August 2020 07:42:40 CEST, Ron Frederick wrote:
> On Aug 17, 2020, at 3:34 PM, Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> wrote:
>> Ron Frederick <ronf@timeheart.net> writes: ...
>> That said, there are many who have been doing research which seems to
>> show that ECC is easier to break with Quantum Crypto systems than FFC
>> and are NOT interested in implementating ANY ECC algorithms.
>>=20
>> I believe I have seen some text from implementers who have said they
>> would NOT adopt ECC for their SSH implementations.
>
> That=E2=80=99s interesting - I hadn=E2=80=99t read that. I was aware of=
=20
> concerns about potential compromises in the nistp curves, but=20
> not specifically about Quantum attacks against ECC.

basically it boils down to the size of the field, with 256 bit field you
need 384 qbit QC, with 2048 bit field you need 3072 qbit QC to break it

so ECC will be broken before RSA/DH/DSA of similar classical level of=20
security

the open question is how much time RSA/DH will have over ECC

>> - I=E2=80=99m also thinking diffie-hellman-group15-sha512 might be a goo=
d
>>>  candidate for a SHOULD rather than a MAY, but I=E2=80=99m not sure we =
have
>>>  consensus on that.
>>=20
>> Yup, I have not seen any consensus on this issue as yet.
>>=20
>> Perhaps we should opt to make diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 a
>> MUST? This allows implementors to put in whatever MODP groups they wish
>> as long as q =3D (p-1)/2 ... so, a maximized q-ordered subgroup... thoug=
h
>> I o worry a bit about the way that the generator g is created perhaps
>> not providing that g^q mod p =3D=3D 1 is a will formed subgroup. When it=
 is
>> not a well-formed subgroup, then it will be leaking the first bit of the
>> key value.
>
> That=E2=80=99s an interesting thought. Are there =E2=80=9Cbest practices=
=E2=80=9D which=20
> could be followed in generating/validating  these values that=20
> could avoid such a weakness?

if the p is a safe prime, then "a bad" generator can leak one bit of the=20
private
key, but it can leak at most one bit of private key; you can guess that bit
with a 50% chance of being right anyway, that does not translate to an=20
attack

--=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic

