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Subject: [Curdle] curdle - Not having a session at IETF 109
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Rich Salz, a chair of the curdle working group, indicated that the curdle working group does not plan to hold a session at IETF 109.

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: [Curdle] Quantum Resistant SSH connections
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Hi everybody,

As it's fairly easy, and common, to configure Kerberos infrastructure to be
resistant against quantum computers, I'd like to submit a new key exchange
for SSH that leverages that quantum resistance to make quantum resistant=20
SSH
connections.

While we have gssapi key exchange methods already defined, they all use=20
FFDH
or ECDH to derive the shared secret and use gssapi/Kerberos just to
authenticate the other side, not for encrypt the transmitted keying=20
material.

This new key exchange uses gssapi to transmit keying material
and thus builds on quantum resistance of protocols like Kerberos.

Please check:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kario-gss-qr-kex-00
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kario-gss-qr-kex/
--=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic


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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Comments: In-reply-to: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> message dated "Thu, 01 Oct 2020 16:50:29 +0200."
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/curdle/hB_aijFQyfjFq3iPN46aLw1RXVY>
Subject: Re: [Curdle] Quantum Resistant SSH connections
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Hi Hubert,

Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> writes:

> Hi everybody,
>=20
> As it's fairly easy, and common, to configure Kerberos infrastructure
> to be resistant against quantum computers, I'd like to submit a new
> key exchange for SSH that leverages that quantum resistance to make
> quantum resistant SSH connections.
>=20
> While we have gssapi key exchange methods already defined, they all use
> FFDH
> or ECDH to derive the shared secret and use gssapi/Kerberos just to
> authenticate the other side, not for encrypt the transmitted keying
> material.
>=20
> This new key exchange uses gssapi to transmit keying material
> and thus builds on quantum resistance of protocols like Kerberos.
>=20
> Please check:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kario-gss-qr-kex-00
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kario-gss-qr-kex/
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic

Thank you for the pointers.

Related to Quantum-Resistant and Quantum-Safe algorithms, you may find
these pointers useful as well:

There is a github project under an MIT licesnse:

    https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs

which provides for various Quantum-Safe cryptographic algorithms.

There is also a paper published last year:

    Prototyping post-quantum and hybrid key exchange and authentication in
    TLS and SSH
    by Eric Crockett and Christian Paquin and Douglas Stebila
    URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/858

which may be of interest as a hybrid mechanism may be more acceptable as
a transition to PQ than a direct move for some implementers.

	Be safe, stay healthy,
	-- Mark


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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
To: "Mark D. Baushke" <mdb@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] Quantum Resistant SSH connections
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On Thursday, 1 October 2020 18:06:57 CEST, Mark D. Baushke wrote:
> Hi Hubert,
>
> Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> writes:
>
>> Hi everybody,
>>=20
>> As it's fairly easy, and common, to configure Kerberos infrastructure
>> to be resistant against quantum computers, I'd like to submit a new
>> key exchange for SSH that leverages that quantum resistance to make
>> quantum resistant SSH connections. ...
>
> Thank you for the pointers.
>
> Related to Quantum-Resistant and Quantum-Safe algorithms, you may find
> these pointers useful as well:
>
> There is a github project under an MIT licesnse:
>
>     https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/liboqs
>
> which provides for various Quantum-Safe cryptographic algorithms.
>
> There is also a paper published last year:
>
>     Prototyping post-quantum and hybrid key exchange and authentication i=
n
>     TLS and SSH
>     by Eric Crockett and Christian Paquin and Douglas Stebila
>     URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/858
>
> which may be of interest as a hybrid mechanism may be more acceptable as
> a transition to PQ than a direct move for some implementers.
>
> =09Be safe, stay healthy,
> =09-- Mark

Yes, I'm aware of those projects and this research.

The reason why I went with stright-up kerberos is becasue:
1. There is no single quantum safe algorithm widely agreed as the best
2. It may be good few years before we will get one
3. It may require few more years still before those algorithms become=20
acceptable
   to national or international standard bodies (FIPS, PCI-DSS, Common
   Criteria, etc.)
4. Backporting completely new cryptographic algorithms to existing=20
deployments
   is usually hard, if not impossible. Not to mention it may take years=20
before
   we have something that's secure against side-channel attacks in=20
practice.

This I-D proposes a mechanism that doesn't use any new cryptography and
requires minimal changes to a SSH implementation (and uses just two new=20
methods
from GSSAPI). Which should make it very easy to add in new deployments and
isn't very hard to backport to old deployments.

In other words, I don't consider it a replacement for proper quantum-safe
kex, but a stepping stone that will tide us over until quantum-safe=20
algorithms
are widely deployed.
--=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic


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Subject: [Curdle] New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt
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Hi all,

This draft introduces post-quantum (PQ) algorithms to SSH. It includes Hybrid 
Key exchange messages for SSH and hybrid key exchange and PQ signature 
methods.

Note that we do not want to standardize anything before NIST has standardized 
the first PQ algorithms. We are following a similar approach to what the TLS 
WG is doing with https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design . 
They will not ratify the draft before NIST's PQ Round 3 has concluded (in 18 
months or so) so they can pick an algorithm.

draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh takes a different approach from 
draft-kario-gss-qr-kex which was submitted recently. Basically I feel that a 
new SSH draft would definitely not be ratified in less than 2 years, so there 
ample time to work on the details and come up with the actual SSH PQ 
identifiers after NIST has the first standardized algorithms.

Note that the industry has done experimental work with SSH performance with PQ 
algorithms (using OQS OpenSSH). Some preliminary results of ours are here 
https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-ssh-performance-pq-kem-auth and a 
conference paper will be published in December with more detailed results. So, 
we kind of know which algorithms seem more promising from NIST's Round 3 
algorithm Finalists. In other words, we can start the work now, instead of 
waiting for NIST Round 3 to conclude.

I know PQ algorithms in SSH are not in CURDLE's Charter right now, so this 
work may require re-chartering if the WG thought it is worth to pursue.

Thoughts welcome.

Rgs,
Panos



-----Original Message-----
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:57 PM
To: Douglas Stebila <dstebila@uwaterloo.ca>; Panos Kampanakis (pkampana) 
<pkampana@cisco.com>; Dimitrios Sikeridis <dsike@unm.edu>; Douglas Steblia 
<dstebila@uwaterloo.ca>; Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>; Torben Hansen 
<htorben@amazon.com>
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt


A new version of I-D, draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Panos Kampanakis and posted to the IETF 
repository.

Name:		draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh
Revision:	00
Title:		Post-quantum public key algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol
Document date:	2020-10-21
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		13
URL: 
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt
Status: 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh/
Html: 
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.html
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00


Abstract:
   This document defines hybrid key exchange methods based on classical
   ECDH key exchange and post-quantum key encapsulation schemes.  These
   methods are defined for use in the SSH Transport Layer Protocol.  It
   also defines post-quantum public key authentication methods based on
   post-quantum signature schemes.  These methods are defined for use in
   the SSH Authentication Protocol.

Note

   EDNOTE: The goal of this draft is to start the standardization of PQ
   algorithms in SSH early to mitigate the potential record-and-harvest
   later with a quantum computer attacks.  This draft is not expected to
   be finalized before the NIST PQ Project has standardized PQ
   algorithms.  After NIST has standardized then this document will
   replace TBD1, TBD3 with the appropriate algorithms and parameters
   before proceeding to ratification.

   EDNOTE: Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the IETF
   WG Mailing List or in the GitHub repository which contains the draft:
   https://github.com/csosto-pk/pq-ssh/issues .

   *Change Log* [EDNOTE: Remove befor publicaton].

   draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00
      *  Initial draft




Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission 
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

The IETF Secretariat



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Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 03:14:38 -0500
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To: "Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)" <pkampana=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: "curdle@ietf.org" <curdle@ietf.org>, Dimitrios Sikeridis <dsike@unm.edu>,  Torben Hansen <htorben@amazon.com>,  "Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)" <pkampana@cisco.com>, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>,  Douglas Stebila <dstebila@uwaterloo.ca>
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I strongly support this work being done as a standardized process, as
opposed to some implementation rushing it, possibly with issues, and
leaving others to decide whether to adopt it (issues included).

2 years to RFC would be realistic if all the information is in, and clear
answers exist to everything anyone might bring up.

When the information is not in, and clear answers do not yet exist, these 2
years are extended indefinitely. The 2 year counter doesn't really start.
When clear answers exist, THEN the counter starts, and from THAT point it
takes the 2 years.

Maybe by starting sooner you can save... half a year? Maybe?

Nevertheless, there is a strong benefit to starting early and making it
KNOWN that a process has started. It would discourage individual
implementations from rushing it. So I support starting the process.

denis


On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 1:50 PM Panos Kampanakis (pkampana) <pkampana=
40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> This draft introduces post-quantum (PQ) algorithms to SSH. It includes
> Hybrid
> Key exchange messages for SSH and hybrid key exchange and PQ signature
> methods.
>
> Note that we do not want to standardize anything before NIST has
> standardized
> the first PQ algorithms. We are following a similar approach to what the
> TLS
> WG is doing with https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design
> .
> They will not ratify the draft before NIST's PQ Round 3 has concluded (in
> 18
> months or so) so they can pick an algorithm.
>
> draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh takes a different approach from
> draft-kario-gss-qr-kex which was submitted recently. Basically I feel that
> a
> new SSH draft would definitely not be ratified in less than 2 years, so
> there
> ample time to work on the details and come up with the actual SSH PQ
> identifiers after NIST has the first standardized algorithms.
>
> Note that the industry has done experimental work with SSH performance
> with PQ
> algorithms (using OQS OpenSSH). Some preliminary results of ours are here
> https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-ssh-performance-pq-kem-auth and a
> conference paper will be published in December with more detailed results.
> So,
> we kind of know which algorithms seem more promising from NIST's Round 3
> algorithm Finalists. In other words, we can start the work now, instead of
> waiting for NIST Round 3 to conclude.
>
> I know PQ algorithms in SSH are not in CURDLE's Charter right now, so this
> work may require re-chartering if the WG thought it is worth to pursue.
>
> Thoughts welcome.
>
> Rgs,
> Panos
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:57 PM
> To: Douglas Stebila <dstebila@uwaterloo.ca>; Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)
> <pkampana@cisco.com>; Dimitrios Sikeridis <dsike@unm.edu>; Douglas
> Steblia
> <dstebila@uwaterloo.ca>; Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>; Torben
> Hansen
> <htorben@amazon.com>
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Panos Kampanakis and posted to the IETF
> repository.
>
> Name:           draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh
> Revision:       00
> Title:          Post-quantum public key algorithms for the Secure Shell
> (SSH) protocol
> Document date:  2020-10-21
> Group:          Individual Submission
> Pages:          13
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt
> Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh/
> Html:
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.html
> Htmlized:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00
>
>
> Abstract:
>    This document defines hybrid key exchange methods based on classical
>    ECDH key exchange and post-quantum key encapsulation schemes.  These
>    methods are defined for use in the SSH Transport Layer Protocol.  It
>    also defines post-quantum public key authentication methods based on
>    post-quantum signature schemes.  These methods are defined for use in
>    the SSH Authentication Protocol.
>
> Note
>
>    EDNOTE: The goal of this draft is to start the standardization of PQ
>    algorithms in SSH early to mitigate the potential record-and-harvest
>    later with a quantum computer attacks.  This draft is not expected to
>    be finalized before the NIST PQ Project has standardized PQ
>    algorithms.  After NIST has standardized then this document will
>    replace TBD1, TBD3 with the appropriate algorithms and parameters
>    before proceeding to ratification.
>
>    EDNOTE: Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the IETF
>    WG Mailing List or in the GitHub repository which contains the draft:
>    https://github.com/csosto-pk/pq-ssh/issues .
>
>    *Change Log* [EDNOTE: Remove befor publicaton].
>
>    draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00
>       *  Initial draft
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Curdle mailing list
> Curdle@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>

--000000000000cac09605b23e0e95
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">I strongly support this work being done as a standardized =
process, as opposed to some implementation rushing it, possibly with issues=
, and leaving others to decide whether to adopt it (issues included).<div><=
br></div><div>2 years to RFC would be realistic if all the information is i=
n, and clear answers exist to everything anyone might bring up.</div><div><=
br></div><div>When the information is not in, and clear answers do not yet =
exist, these 2 years are extended indefinitely. The 2 year counter doesn&#3=
9;t really start. When clear answers exist, THEN the counter starts, and fr=
om THAT point it takes the 2 years.</div><div><br></div><div>Maybe by start=
ing sooner you can save... half a year? Maybe?</div><div><br></div><div>Nev=
ertheless, there is a strong benefit to starting early and making it KNOWN =
that a process has started. It would discourage individual implementations =
from rushing it. So I support starting the process.</div><div><br></div><di=
v>denis</div><div><br></div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=
=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 1:50 PM Panos Kampana=
kis (pkampana) &lt;pkampana=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org"=
>40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gm=
ail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,=
204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
This draft introduces post-quantum (PQ) algorithms to SSH. It includes Hybr=
id <br>
Key exchange messages for SSH and hybrid key exchange and PQ signature <br>
methods.<br>
<br>
Note that we do not want to standardize anything before NIST has standardiz=
ed <br>
the first PQ algorithms. We are following a similar approach to what the TL=
S <br>
WG is doing with <a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-hybr=
id-design" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://tools.ietf.org/html=
/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design</a> . <br>
They will not ratify the draft before NIST&#39;s PQ Round 3 has concluded (=
in 18 <br>
months or so) so they can pick an algorithm.<br>
<br>
draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh takes a different approach from <br>
draft-kario-gss-qr-kex which was submitted recently. Basically I feel that =
a <br>
new SSH draft would definitely not be ratified in less than 2 years, so the=
re <br>
ample time to work on the details and come up with the actual SSH PQ <br>
identifiers after NIST has the first standardized algorithms.<br>
<br>
Note that the industry has done experimental work with SSH performance with=
 PQ <br>
algorithms (using OQS OpenSSH). Some preliminary results of ours are here <=
br>
<a href=3D"https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-ssh-performance-pq-kem-auth=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls=
-ssh-performance-pq-kem-auth</a> and a <br>
conference paper will be published in December with more detailed results. =
So, <br>
we kind of know which algorithms seem more promising from NIST&#39;s Round =
3 <br>
algorithm Finalists. In other words, we can start the work now, instead of =
<br>
waiting for NIST Round 3 to conclude.<br>
<br>
I know PQ algorithms in SSH are not in CURDLE&#39;s Charter right now, so t=
his <br>
work may require re-chartering if the WG thought it is worth to pursue.<br>
<br>
Thoughts welcome.<br>
<br>
Rgs,<br>
Panos<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">interne=
t-drafts@ietf.org</a> &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org" targe=
t=3D"_blank">internet-drafts@ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:57 PM<br>
To: Douglas Stebila &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dstebila@uwaterloo.ca" target=3D"=
_blank">dstebila@uwaterloo.ca</a>&gt;; Panos Kampanakis (pkampana) <br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:pkampana@cisco.com" target=3D"_blank">pkampana@cisco.=
com</a>&gt;; Dimitrios Sikeridis &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dsike@unm.edu" targe=
t=3D"_blank">dsike@unm.edu</a>&gt;; Douglas Steblia <br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dstebila@uwaterloo.ca" target=3D"_blank">dstebila@uwa=
terloo.ca</a>&gt;; Markus Friedl &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:markus@openbsd.org" =
target=3D"_blank">markus@openbsd.org</a>&gt;; Torben Hansen <br>
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:htorben@amazon.com" target=3D"_blank">htorben@amazon.=
com</a>&gt;<br>
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt=
<br>
<br>
<br>
A new version of I-D, draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt<br>
has been successfully submitted by Panos Kampanakis and posted to the IETF =
<br>
repository.<br>
<br>
Name:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ss=
h<br>
Revision:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A000<br>
Title:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Post-quantum public key algorithms=
 for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol<br>
Document date:=C2=A0 2020-10-21<br>
Group:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Individual Submission<br>
Pages:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 13<br>
URL: <br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-0=
0.txt" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/archive/id=
/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt</a><br>
Status: <br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh/=
" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/dra=
ft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh/</a><br>
Html: <br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-0=
0.html" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/archive/i=
d/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.html</a><br>
Htmlized:=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">htt=
ps://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00</a><br>
<br>
<br>
Abstract:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This document defines hybrid key exchange methods based on cla=
ssical<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0ECDH key exchange and post-quantum key encapsulation schemes.=
=C2=A0 These<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0methods are defined for use in the SSH Transport Layer Protoco=
l.=C2=A0 It<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0also defines post-quantum public key authentication methods ba=
sed on<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0post-quantum signature schemes.=C2=A0 These methods are define=
d for use in<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the SSH Authentication Protocol.<br>
<br>
Note<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0EDNOTE: The goal of this draft is to start the standardization=
 of PQ<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithms in SSH early to mitigate the potential record-and-h=
arvest<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0later with a quantum computer attacks.=C2=A0 This draft is not=
 expected to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0be finalized before the NIST PQ Project has standardized PQ<br=
>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0algorithms.=C2=A0 After NIST has standardized then this docume=
nt will<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0replace TBD1, TBD3 with the appropriate algorithms and paramet=
ers<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0before proceeding to ratification.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0EDNOTE: Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the=
 IETF<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0WG Mailing List or in the GitHub repository which contains the=
 draft:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0<a href=3D"https://github.com/csosto-pk/pq-ssh/issues" rel=3D"=
noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/csosto-pk/pq-ssh/issues</a=
> .<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0*Change Log* [EDNOTE: Remove befor publicaton].<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 *=C2=A0 Initial draft<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submissio=
n <br>
until the htmlized version and diff are available at <a href=3D"http://tool=
s.ietf.org" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">tools.ietf.org</a>.<br>
<br>
The IETF Secretariat<br>
<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
Curdle mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Curdle@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Curdle@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle</a><br>
</blockquote></div>

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On Wednesday, 21 October 2020 20:49:50 CEST, Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)=20
wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> This draft introduces post-quantum (PQ) algorithms to SSH. It=20
> includes Hybrid=20
> Key exchange messages for SSH and hybrid key exchange and PQ signature=20
> methods.
>
> Note that we do not want to standardize anything before NIST=20
> has standardized=20
> the first PQ algorithms. We are following a similar approach to=20
> what the TLS=20
> WG is doing with https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design=
 .=20
> They will not ratify the draft before NIST's PQ Round 3 has=20
> concluded (in 18=20
> months or so) so they can pick an algorithm.
>
> draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh takes a different approach from=20
> draft-kario-gss-qr-kex which was submitted recently. Basically=20

Like I said in my follow-up email, I don't consider my proposal to "be all
end all", but rather something that we can quickly throw together and be
reasonably certain it will stand the test of time.

For one, the use of GSS-API in my proposal imposes serious limitations on
deployability.

At the same time, we will need a GSS-API counterpart once we have a=20
community
accepted PQ kex.

> I feel that a=20
> new SSH draft would definitely not be ratified in less than 2=20
> years, so there=20
> ample time to work on the details and come up with the actual SSH PQ=20
> identifiers after NIST has the first standardized algorithms.
>
> Note that the industry has done experimental work with SSH=20
> performance with PQ=20
> algorithms (using OQS OpenSSH). Some preliminary results of ours are here=
=20
> https://blogs.cisco.com/security/tls-ssh-performance-pq-kem-auth and a=20
> conference paper will be published in December with more=20
> detailed results. So,=20
> we kind of know which algorithms seem more promising from NIST's Round 3=
=20
> algorithm Finalists. In other words, we can start the work now, instead o=
f=20
> waiting for NIST Round 3 to conclude.
>
> I know PQ algorithms in SSH are not in CURDLE's Charter right now, so thi=
s=20
> work may require re-chartering if the WG thought it is worth to pursue.

One of problems is that I don't think we have a clear frontrunner in the
NIST competition (that makes interoperability tests more complex for one).

that being said, I'm for having a draft like this published exactly for=20
reasons
voiced by Denis Bider

> Thoughts welcome.
>
> Rgs,
> Panos
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 1:57 PM
> To: Douglas Stebila <dstebila@uwaterloo.ca>; Panos Kampanakis (pkampana)=
=20
> <pkampana@cisco.com>; Dimitrios Sikeridis <dsike@unm.edu>; Douglas Stebli=
a=20
> <dstebila@uwaterloo.ca>; Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>; Torben Hanse=
n=20
> <htorben@amazon.com>
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.t=
xt
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Panos Kampanakis and posted to the IET=
F=20
> repository.
>
> Name:=09=09draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh
> Revision:=0900
> Title:=09=09Post-quantum public key algorithms for the Secure Shell=20
> (SSH) protocol
> Document date:=092020-10-21
> Group:=09=09Individual Submission
> Pages:=09=0913
> URL:=20
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.txt
> Status:=20
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh/
> Html:=20
> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00.html
> Htmlized:      =20
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00
>
>
> Abstract:
>    This document defines hybrid key exchange methods based on classical
>    ECDH key exchange and post-quantum key encapsulation schemes.  These
>    methods are defined for use in the SSH Transport Layer Protocol.  It
>    also defines post-quantum public key authentication methods based on
>    post-quantum signature schemes.  These methods are defined for use in
>    the SSH Authentication Protocol.
>
> Note
>
>    EDNOTE: The goal of this draft is to start the standardization of PQ
>    algorithms in SSH early to mitigate the potential record-and-harvest
>    later with a quantum computer attacks.  This draft is not expected to
>    be finalized before the NIST PQ Project has standardized PQ
>    algorithms.  After NIST has standardized then this document will
>    replace TBD1, TBD3 with the appropriate algorithms and parameters
>    before proceeding to ratification.
>
>    EDNOTE: Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the IETF
>    WG Mailing List or in the GitHub repository which contains the draft:
>    https://github.com/csosto-pk/pq-ssh/issues .
>
>    *Change Log* [EDNOTE: Remove befor publicaton].
>
>    draft-kampanakis-curdle-pq-ssh-00
>       *  Initial draft
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time=20
> of submission=20
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>
>

--=20
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky=C5=88ova 115, 612 00  Brno, Czech Republic

