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From: "Rose, Scott" <scott.rose@nist.gov>
To: dane WG list <dane@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Enterprise email security reqs breakdown: REQ7 (signing/encryption certs)
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Subject: [dane] Enterprise email security reqs breakdown: REQ7 (signing/encryption certs)
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This and following email will be an attempt to break down the requirements =
in draft-osterweil-dane-ent-email-reqs-00 into separate threads in an attem=
pt to make it manageable and keep issues separate.  Each thread will handle=
 one (or two if similar) requirements and may include some strawman text to=
 start discussion.  Most of the text and reqs deal with S/MIME as the targe=
t technology but if it applies or could apply to other technologies, they s=
hould be included. =20

I'm going to start using earlier text as the starting point.  The resulting=
 text can either be incorporated into the existing SMIMEA draft, or a new d=
raft if it looks like that is the direction the WG wants to go towards.

REQ 7: The protocol MUST allow for separate management, publication,
           and learning of keys that are used for signing versus
           encryption.

Strawman text using naming convention:

Domain names are prepared for requests in the following manner.

   1.  The left-most label is the function specific label
       segment.  It is selected based on the S/MIME function the MUA is
       performing.  Values are:

          "_encr" for obtaining or validating a certificate or public
          key to be used to encrypt a message.

          "_sign" for certificate validation data to verify a digital
          signature.

      The function specific
       label SHOULD be consistent with the Key Usage field (defined in
       section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280]) of the associated certificate. This fu=
ction
       specific label allows for clients to query for a particular certific=
ate and
       keep the DNS response minimal.  Having this the left-most label allo=
ws=20
       for the use of wildcards if only one certificate is used for both di=
gital=20
       signing and encryption if that is the policy of the organization.

  1.  The second left-most label is the user name (the "left-hand side" of =
the=20
	email address, called
       the "local-part" in the mail message format definition [RFC5322]
       and the "local part" in the specification for internationalized
       email [RFC6530]), as a SHA-224 hash.  This does not include the=20
      "@" character that separates the left and right sides
       of the email address.

  3.  The string "_smimecert" becomes the third left-most label in the
       prepared domain.  The function specific label segment is separate
       to enable delegation of a single _smimecert zone cut.

   4.  The domain name (the "right-hand side" of the email address,
       called the "domain" in [RFC5322]) is appended to the result of
       step 3 to complete the prepared domain name.




Questions:

1. is this requirement reasonable? =20

2.  (if reasonable): Is the strawman text adequate?  Should another method =
be used other than a naming convention such as a different RRTYPE or usage =
field?


Scott

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Scott Rose
NIST
scott.rose@nist.gov
+1 301-975-8439
Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
http://www.dnsops.gov/
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D


From nobody Thu Sep  4 13:21:42 2014
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Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 20:21:37 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: dane@ietf.org
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Subject: [dane]  DNSSEC debug advice (TLSA lookup problem).
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Postfix with DANE enabled is unable to deliver mail to mailboxes
in the "clarion-hotels.cz" domain (validating recursive resolvers
SERVFAIL TLSA lookups).  The domain is DNSSEC signed:

    $ dig +ad +noall +comment +ans -t mx clarion-hotels.cz
    ;; Got answer:
    ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 25470
    ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0

    ;; ANSWER SECTION:
    clarion-hotels.cz.      1799    IN      MX      10 mail.clarion-hotels.cz.
    clarion-hotels.cz.      1799    IN      MX      20 mail2.clarion-hotels.cz.

However, it also sports a wildcard CNAME:

    $ dig +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t CNAME "*.clarion-hotels.cz." @ns.forpsi.cz
    ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0rc1 <<>> +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t CNAME *.clarion-hotels.cz. @ns.forpsi.cz
    ;; global options: +cmd
    ;; Got answer:
    ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 17866
    ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 8

    ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
    ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
    ;; QUESTION SECTION:
    ;*.clarion-hotels.cz.		IN	CNAME

    ;; ANSWER SECTION:
    *.clarion-hotels.cz.	1800	IN	CNAME	clarion-hotels.cz.
    *.clarion-hotels.cz.	1800	IN	RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYFLAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRokqjQow eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=

    ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
    clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	NS	ns.forpsi.net.
    clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	NS	ns.forpsi.it.
    clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	NS	ns.forpsi.cz.
    clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	RRSIG	NS 5 2 3600 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. E+Cj1pVvA9v/VP0b2AaOZpENNYiHScIVbXt+h5bpkkl6/iivoTxtORS3 xFCM+mcqkmgQf3xxo9eB0AwbKdf1Mjk4MB4GMn0m2XicWmdRPzHld57Y qr3vorVvOx1OKigLz3LHhYNzp4nC4qIZ1xqhTstgovnlr8I8QB6fhhnu wB4=
    *.clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	NSEC	mail.clarion-hotels.cz. CNAME RRSIG NSEC
    *.clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	RRSIG	NSEC 5 2 3600 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. jlZzNSRlMVDZ2YFPwJJLy7ba37h4w35+C3ge7iikVx03zIQWiBweU3hJ agqn/eCW8LnKGoDBvTUakvEenPnf9P4PUdOCL3/2trHLyLMv4NCafLaT n3d8OSbj6VWCKR1LWNSIcp3es3FbAsdWJtmcXe4oAKSP4i2dBmSEPq/F nS8=

    ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
    ns.forpsi.net.		1800	IN	A	81.2.194.130
    ns.forpsi.net.		1800	IN	AAAA	2001:15e8:101:1::c282
    ns.forpsi.it.		1800	IN	A	62.149.230.87
    ns.forpsi.cz.		1800	IN	A	81.2.209.185
    ns.forpsi.cz.		1800	IN	RRSIG	A 5 3 1800 20141004100806 20140904100806 27135 forpsi.cz. Nzo4Ma5iB8QFY6IERC3KLLRPkxsSQgBJgFMQHLl8AGuhaNwEeDLUaYz/ ZPjfiH2Rqchc5VV+nWV63gYhVGa4UB2fFLoFFn3L8Y6uTcBe3c7m3AaP ltUcrI2Wi7lR6Pf8DkncvtLLaumkRQ6FNkpYjyC/jkbVOMyP1r87TYXZ L78=
    ns.forpsi.cz.		1800	IN	AAAA	2001:15e8:201:1::d1b9
    ns.forpsi.cz.		1800	IN	RRSIG	AAAA 5 3 1800 20141004100806 20140904100806 27135 forpsi.cz. TF1AWJD3Wcun92QwS1+ZBy29Zi2qIkBWlYqUeFHGxyQhSlcSAWEt+oOr aTyqk79M38mH7TkFzrCBof+TAc6nM9JSOjm9RfmFQ0FVyM1cpmDxD79W coBeQcGStVofuvdKeuhZG2oiMyBKrbyUFZw1mgI0bupVs1daIy+zzdcQ 43c=

    ;; Query time: 104 msec
    ;; SERVER: 2001:15e8:201:1::d1b9#53(2001:15e8:201:1::d1b9)
    ;; WHEN: Thu Sep  4 19:57:58 2014
    ;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 1156

I think the DNS servers in question don't correctly handle CNAMEs
and DNSSEC and this impacts TLSA queries for non-existent records
(SERVFAIL with many validating resolvers).  The response does not
include the "*.clarion-hotels.cz" RR and RRSIG).  Instead we have,
just the requested query name with an RRSIGS as below:

    _25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 \
	20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. \
	M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYFLAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb \
	C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRokqjQow \
	eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=

    _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 \
	20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. \
	M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYFLAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb \
	C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRokqjQow \
	eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=

The suprising thing is that for two different qnames the RRSIG is
the same, and in fact the same as for the wildcard qname!  If RRSIGs
depended only on the RDATA and not on the qname, surely there'd be
serious integrity issues with DNSSEC.  So I think that the
authoritative servers for this domain are busted, is that correct?

More complete server responses below (left out the authority and
additional sections to avoid needless clutter):

    $ dig +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t tlsa "_25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz." @ns.forpsi.cz
    ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0rc1 <<>> +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. @ns.forpsi.cz
    ;; global options: +cmd
    ;; Got answer:
    ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 33941
    ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1

    ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
    ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
    ;; QUESTION SECTION:
    ;_25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. IN	TLSA

    ;; ANSWER SECTION:
    _25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN CNAME	clarion-hotels.cz.
    _25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYFLAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRokqjQow eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=


    $ dig +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t tlsa "_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz." @ns.forpsi.cz
    ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0rc1 <<>> +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. @ns.forpsi.cz
    ;; global options: +cmd
    ;; Got answer:
    ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 44567
    ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1

    ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
    ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
    ;; QUESTION SECTION:
    ;_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. IN	TLSA

    ;; ANSWER SECTION:
    _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN CNAME	clarion-hotels.cz.
    _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYFLAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRokqjQow eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Thu Sep  4 14:00:27 2014
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To: dane@ietf.org
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <20140904202137.GD26920@mournblade.imrryr.org>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 04 Sep 2014 20:21:37 +0000." <20140904202137.GD26920@mournblade.imrryr.org>
Date: Fri, 05 Sep 2014 07:00:16 +1000
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dane/xTvPgTAbonk4BdgVhd1QVhapRsk
Subject: Re: [dane] DNSSEC debug advice (TLSA lookup problem).
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Just go and read how the DNS works first.  This will tell you what
rules DNSSEC has to prove were met for each answer.

Then read how DNSSEC works.  No. It doesn't just depend on the
signature on the wildcard CNAME.  That just proves the wildcard
CNAME record itself was not tampered with.  You also need to look
at the NSEC/NSEC3 records to see if a CNAME match is valid or not.

mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1788	IN	NSEC	clarion-hotels.cz. A RRSIG NSEC

_tcp.clarion-hotels.cz. falls between mail2.clarion-hotels.cz and
clarion-hotels.cz and it proves that there are names with records
in that range once you verify its signature.

The RRSIG for _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz says it was generated
from a wildcard record which the validator proved by retaining the
correct number of labels to form the suffix of the wildcard record
and adding a '*' label.  This gives the name of the record that was
signed.  The number of labels is also part of the data that is
hashed to form the RRSIG.

The following response has everything required to prove that there
isn't a TLSA record for _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz.  Firstly
it has a CNAME which can be proved is generated from *.clarion-hotels.cz.
Next it has a NSEC which says the wildcard response is valid.  Next
there is a NSEC which says that there isn't a TLSA record at the
target of the CNAME which only has these records: A NS SOA MX RRSIG
NSEC DNSKEY.  The SOA record says for how long to cache the negative
response.

; <<>> DiG 9.11.0pre-alpha <<>> _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz tlsa +dnssec
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 52644
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. IN	TLSA

;; ANSWER SECTION:
_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1773 IN CNAME	clarion-hotels.cz.
_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1773 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYFLAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRokqjQow eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1773	IN	NSEC	clarion-hotels.cz. A RRSIG NSEC
mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1773	IN	RRSIG	NSEC 5 3 3600 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. WlUUsb1EqhP5mUfJ5DXpxvVs7Tw4h5802WCwXy4B2NByTbj3SfurhbV7 HBxPFA/I5OR4VkbWsFr7LlOpb93xRmEXt98afdrzzrKIgMIoNHu4oHDe ykeuV/7epjuHOxpZUKtfhe48ktKZ0NRievAyCUxiJA8evpgifR7AKKqS yGA=
clarion-hotels.cz.	3574	IN	SOA	ns.forpsi.net. admin.forpsi.com. 2014082501 3600 1800 2592000 3600
clarion-hotels.cz.	3574	IN	RRSIG	SOA 5 2 3600 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. F5DurWWNlg9zQrvFMQrdNNjH58Zv/TTVBQSOtslMYlwXWp3ZcJGCC1Ra veDuerwFv5dQUsBQIJpQc5eZmyXXH8YA5rOLBK1x19ej0hl1T3yi3pG6 4SJFCrzSIIFVKzX7nKDtfnFK/Zq3X6db7oh9I+gpNnyojuDCccuQNwov kQw=
clarion-hotels.cz.	3574	IN	RRSIG	NSEC 5 2 3600 20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. OOeXzp0449w2dXf6zdvnidH69d27+9kPH6fJP9CK+coXuMiZ7WwheIn8 qZrhqYPu9xrnpgmYYkOeuaWDq2b+7rxKzzJTw/0hAjjO8vKRMr2sPyNi CpM2btBTM2FrKZvFJZegMYafo37QH05cg47hXAjEiyEYCMlJfNmMx+AN le8=
clarion-hotels.cz.	3574	IN	NSEC	*.clarion-hotels.cz. A NS SOA MX RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY

;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1)
;; WHEN: Fri Sep 05 06:45:10 EST 2014
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 929

Now can we please stop second guessing whether DNSSEC actually
works.  It does.

Mark


In message <20140904202137.GD26920@mournblade.imrryr.org>, Viktor Dukhovni writ
es:
> Postfix with DANE enabled is unable to deliver mail to mailboxes
> in the "clarion-hotels.cz" domain (validating recursive resolvers
> SERVFAIL TLSA lookups).  The domain is DNSSEC signed:
> 
>     $ dig +ad +noall +comment +ans -t mx clarion-hotels.cz
>     ;; Got answer:
>     ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 25470
>     ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
> 
>     ;; ANSWER SECTION:
>     clarion-hotels.cz.      1799    IN      MX      10 mail.clarion-hotels.cz
> .
>     clarion-hotels.cz.      1799    IN      MX      20 mail2.clarion-hotels.c
> z.
> 
> However, it also sports a wildcard CNAME:
> 
>     $ dig +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t CNAME "*.clarion-hotels.cz." @ns.forpsi
> .cz
>     ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0rc1 <<>> +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t CNAME *.clarion-hote
> ls.cz. @ns.forpsi.cz
>     ;; global options: +cmd
>     ;; Got answer:
>     ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 17866
>     ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 8
> 
>     ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
>     ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
>     ;; QUESTION SECTION:
>     ;*.clarion-hotels.cz.		IN	CNAME
> 
>     ;; ANSWER SECTION:
>     *.clarion-hotels.cz.	1800	IN	CNAME	clarion-hotels.cz.
>     *.clarion-hotels.cz.	1800	IN	RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 20140924
> 121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYF
> LAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRo
> kqjQow eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=
> 
>     ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
>     clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	NS	ns.forpsi.net.
>     clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	NS	ns.forpsi.it.
>     clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	NS	ns.forpsi.cz.
>     clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	RRSIG	NS 5 2 3600 20140924121
> 306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. E+Cj1pVvA9v/VP0b2AaOZpENNYiHScIVb
> Xt+h5bpkkl6/iivoTxtORS3 xFCM+mcqkmgQf3xxo9eB0AwbKdf1Mjk4MB4GMn0m2XicWmdRPzHld
> 57Y qr3vorVvOx1OKigLz3LHhYNzp4nC4qIZ1xqhTstgovnlr8I8QB6fhhnu wB4=
>     *.clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	NSEC	mail.clarion-hotels.cz.
>  CNAME RRSIG NSEC
>     *.clarion-hotels.cz.	3600	IN	RRSIG	NSEC 5 2 3600 201409241
> 21306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. jlZzNSRlMVDZ2YFPwJJLy7ba37h4w35
> +C3ge7iikVx03zIQWiBweU3hJ agqn/eCW8LnKGoDBvTUakvEenPnf9P4PUdOCL3/2trHLyLMv4NC
> afLaT n3d8OSbj6VWCKR1LWNSIcp3es3FbAsdWJtmcXe4oAKSP4i2dBmSEPq/F nS8=
> 
>     ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
>     ns.forpsi.net.		1800	IN	A	81.2.194.130
>     ns.forpsi.net.		1800	IN	AAAA	2001:15e8:101:1::c282
>     ns.forpsi.it.		1800	IN	A	62.149.230.87
>     ns.forpsi.cz.		1800	IN	A	81.2.209.185
>     ns.forpsi.cz.		1800	IN	RRSIG	A 5 3 1800 201410041008
> 06 20140904100806 27135 forpsi.cz. Nzo4Ma5iB8QFY6IERC3KLLRPkxsSQgBJgFMQHLl8AG
> uhaNwEeDLUaYz/ ZPjfiH2Rqchc5VV+nWV63gYhVGa4UB2fFLoFFn3L8Y6uTcBe3c7m3AaP ltUcr
> I2Wi7lR6Pf8DkncvtLLaumkRQ6FNkpYjyC/jkbVOMyP1r87TYXZ L78=
>     ns.forpsi.cz.		1800	IN	AAAA	2001:15e8:201:1::d1b9
>     ns.forpsi.cz.		1800	IN	RRSIG	AAAA 5 3 1800 201410041
> 00806 20140904100806 27135 forpsi.cz. TF1AWJD3Wcun92QwS1+ZBy29Zi2qIkBWlYqUeFH
> GxyQhSlcSAWEt+oOr aTyqk79M38mH7TkFzrCBof+TAc6nM9JSOjm9RfmFQ0FVyM1cpmDxD79W co
> BeQcGStVofuvdKeuhZG2oiMyBKrbyUFZw1mgI0bupVs1daIy+zzdcQ 43c=
> 
>     ;; Query time: 104 msec
>     ;; SERVER: 2001:15e8:201:1::d1b9#53(2001:15e8:201:1::d1b9)
>     ;; WHEN: Thu Sep  4 19:57:58 2014
>     ;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 1156
> 
> I think the DNS servers in question don't correctly handle CNAMEs
> and DNSSEC and this impacts TLSA queries for non-existent records
> (SERVFAIL with many validating resolvers).  The response does not
> include the "*.clarion-hotels.cz" RR and RRSIG).  Instead we have,
> just the requested query name with an RRSIGS as below:
> 
>     _25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 \
> 	20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. \
> 	M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYFLAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb \
> 	C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRokqjQow \
> 	eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=
> 
>     _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 \
> 	20140924121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. \
> 	M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYFLAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb \
> 	C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRokqjQow \
> 	eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=
> 
> The suprising thing is that for two different qnames the RRSIG is
> the same, and in fact the same as for the wildcard qname!  If RRSIGs
> depended only on the RDATA and not on the qname, surely there'd be
> serious integrity issues with DNSSEC.  So I think that the
> authoritative servers for this domain are busted, is that correct?
> 
> More complete server responses below (left out the authority and
> additional sections to avoid needless clutter):
> 
>     $ dig +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t tlsa "_25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz."
>  @ns.forpsi.cz
>     ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0rc1 <<>> +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail.c
> larion-hotels.cz. @ns.forpsi.cz
>     ;; global options: +cmd
>     ;; Got answer:
>     ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 33941
>     ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1
> 
>     ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
>     ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
>     ;; QUESTION SECTION:
>     ;_25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. IN	TLSA
> 
>     ;; ANSWER SECTION:
>     _25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN CNAME	clarion-hotels.cz.
>     _25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 20140924
> 121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYF
> LAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRo
> kqjQow eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=
> 
> 
>     $ dig +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t tlsa "_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz.
> " @ns.forpsi.cz
>     ; <<>> DiG 9.8.0rc1 <<>> +cd +norecur +dnssec +vc -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail2.
> clarion-hotels.cz. @ns.forpsi.cz
>     ;; global options: +cmd
>     ;; Got answer:
>     ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 44567
>     ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1
> 
>     ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
>     ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
>     ;; QUESTION SECTION:
>     ;_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. IN	TLSA
> 
>     ;; ANSWER SECTION:
>     _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN CNAME	clarion-hotels.cz.
>     _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 1800 IN RRSIG	CNAME 5 2 1800 20140924
> 121306 20140825121306 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. M8OQ5fcnOYPX2XXvV9Cgefkjv2AHYF
> LAMeDfUpBuSk1PBFG6s/4tMSLb C/0r72TOjZupOHe5vizyzamAcE6m7dA4tlXGlWkTapf95lKFRo
> kqjQow eRESgmZSS/b43jgxLv/+FRsu3rYnz77j3cC413qBn0PDDKLbepk0YEZC yTk=
> 
> -- 
> 	Viktor.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dane mailing list
> dane@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


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Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 21:37:31 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: dane@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dane] DNSSEC debug advice (TLSA lookup problem).
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On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 07:00:16AM +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:

> Just go and read how the DNS works first.  This will tell you what
> rules DNSSEC has to prove were met for each answer.

Yes, in fact between posting and reading your answer, I went off
and did some reading.  The problem as I now understand it seems to
be that:

	1.   *.clarion-hotels.cz IN CNAME 	exists.
	2.   mail2.clarion-hotels.cz		exists.
	3.   _tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz	does not exist.

and finally, the nameservers for clarion-hotels.cz incorrectly
apply the wildcard CNAME to a child of an existing sibling node
(mail2).  This is detected as an error by various validating
resolvers.

Is this right?

> The RRSIG for _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz says it was generated
> from a wildcard record which the validator proved by retaining the
> correct number of labels to form the suffix of the wildcard record
> and adding a '*' label.  This gives the name of the record that was
> signed.  The number of labels is also part of the data that is
> hashed to form the RRSIG.

Right, so along with this there needs to be a non-existence proof
for the labels replaced with the wildcard, but there is no such
proof, because "mail2" exists.

> Now can we please stop second guessing whether DNSSEC actually
> works.  It does.

Sorry, I was just surprised by the RRSIG values being the same for
multiple qnames, but did not know about the RRSIG label count field.
So my guess was way off, but it was a guess, and I did ask for
advice from folks who actually know how this works.

So now I need to figure out what manner of broken name servers are:

    ns.forpsi.cz
    ns.forpsi.it
    ns.forpsi.net

-- 
	Viktor.


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In message <20140904213730.GE26920@mournblade.imrryr.org>, Viktor Dukhovni writ
es:
> On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 07:00:16AM +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:
> 
> > Just go and read how the DNS works first.  This will tell you what
> > rules DNSSEC has to prove were met for each answer.
> 
> Yes, in fact between posting and reading your answer, I went off
> and did some reading.  The problem as I now understand it seems to
> be that:
> 
> 	1.   *.clarion-hotels.cz IN CNAME 	exists.
> 	2.   mail2.clarion-hotels.cz		exists.
> 	3.   _tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz	does not exist.
> 
> and finally, the nameservers for clarion-hotels.cz incorrectly
> apply the wildcard CNAME to a child of an existing sibling node
> (mail2).  This is detected as an error by various validating
> resolvers.
>
> Is this right?

Yes.
 
> > The RRSIG for _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz says it was generated
> > from a wildcard record which the validator proved by retaining the
> > correct number of labels to form the suffix of the wildcard record
> > and adding a '*' label.  This gives the name of the record that was
> > signed.  The number of labels is also part of the data that is
> > hashed to form the RRSIG.
> 
> Right, so along with this there needs to be a non-existence proof
> for the labels replaced with the wildcard, but there is no such
> proof, because "mail2" exists.
> 
> > Now can we please stop second guessing whether DNSSEC actually
> > works.  It does.
> 
> Sorry, I was just surprised by the RRSIG values being the same for
> multiple qnames, but did not know about the RRSIG label count field.
> So my guess was way off, but it was a guess, and I did ask for
> advice from folks who actually know how this works.

Ok.  Sorry if I came on a bit strong.
 
> So now I need to figure out what manner of broken name servers are:
> 
>     ns.forpsi.cz
>     ns.forpsi.it
>     ns.forpsi.net
> 
> -- 
> 	Viktor.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dane mailing list
> dane@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


From nobody Fri Sep  5 02:30:18 2014
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Date: Fri, 05 Sep 2014 11:30:06 +0200
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Subject: Re: [dane] DNSSEC debug advice (TLSA lookup problem).
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When testing avoid to use Google Public DNS resolvers as they have a bug 
in wildcard resolution 
(https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/public-dns-discuss/M982l7Lz9uA).


Am 2014-09-05 01:05, schrieb Mark Andrews:
> In message <20140904213730.GE26920@mournblade.imrryr.org>, Viktor 
> Dukhovni writ
> es:
>> On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 07:00:16AM +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:
>> 
>> > Just go and read how the DNS works first.  This will tell you what
>> > rules DNSSEC has to prove were met for each answer.
>> 
>> Yes, in fact between posting and reading your answer, I went off
>> and did some reading.  The problem as I now understand it seems to
>> be that:
>> 
>> 	1.   *.clarion-hotels.cz IN CNAME 	exists.
>> 	2.   mail2.clarion-hotels.cz		exists.
>> 	3.   _tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz	does not exist.
>> 
>> and finally, the nameservers for clarion-hotels.cz incorrectly
>> apply the wildcard CNAME to a child of an existing sibling node
>> (mail2).  This is detected as an error by various validating
>> resolvers.
>> 
>> Is this right?
> 
> Yes.
> 
>> > The RRSIG for _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz says it was generated
>> > from a wildcard record which the validator proved by retaining the
>> > correct number of labels to form the suffix of the wildcard record
>> > and adding a '*' label.  This gives the name of the record that was
>> > signed.  The number of labels is also part of the data that is
>> > hashed to form the RRSIG.
>> 
>> Right, so along with this there needs to be a non-existence proof
>> for the labels replaced with the wildcard, but there is no such
>> proof, because "mail2" exists.
>> 
>> > Now can we please stop second guessing whether DNSSEC actually
>> > works.  It does.
>> 
>> Sorry, I was just surprised by the RRSIG values being the same for
>> multiple qnames, but did not know about the RRSIG label count field.
>> So my guess was way off, but it was a guess, and I did ask for
>> advice from folks who actually know how this works.
> 
> Ok.  Sorry if I came on a bit strong.
> 
>> So now I need to figure out what manner of broken name servers are:
>> 
>>     ns.forpsi.cz
>>     ns.forpsi.it
>>     ns.forpsi.net
>> 
>> --
>> 	Viktor.
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> dane mailing list
>> dane@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane

-- 
Best regards,

Rene Bartsch, B. Sc. Informatics


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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 09:05:33AM +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:

> > Yes, in fact between posting and reading your answer, I went off
> > and did some reading.  The problem as I now understand it seems to
> > be that:
> > 
> > 	1.   *.clarion-hotels.cz IN CNAME 	exists.
> > 	2.   mail2.clarion-hotels.cz		exists.
> > 	3.   _tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz	does not exist.
> > 
> > and finally, the nameservers for clarion-hotels.cz incorrectly
> > apply the wildcard CNAME to a child of an existing sibling node
> > (mail2).  This is detected as an error by various validating
> > resolvers.
> >
> > Is this right?
> 
> Yes.

Thanks.  I wrote to the operators of the DNS servers, and they are
planning to fix the bug, but implemented a short-term work-around,
where the wildcard CNAME was replaced by wildcard A record.  However
the work-around is not working to the satisfaction of my resolver,
any idea why?

    $ dig +dnssec +norecur -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz @ns.forpsi.net
    ; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> +dnssec +norecur -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz @ns.forpsi.net
    ;; global options: +cmd
    ;; Got answer:
    ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 31810
    ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1

    ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
    ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
    ;; QUESTION SECTION:
    ;_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. IN   TLSA

    ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
    clarion-hotels.cz.      3600    IN      SOA     ns.forpsi.net. admin.forpsi.com. 2014090502 3600 1800 2592000 3600
    clarion-hotels.cz.      3600    IN      RRSIG   SOA 5 2 3600 20141005113302 20140905113302 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. Y4JCzy6U/fMI2tz+pLfQ1mFD2h1jxRMJ7nUwXS0cxlE9xcN8QFibwC75 BBivVbf3Xb2oPXJTRTvkkUAXR1wziOCy/qvK4LyNFX2ENn2aKGn3i93H LrHM/5u1IoeG4niXbS22Tue3FEgYKcSX7UA5PDDQAQs2o+jX9IbwYawC teM=
    *.clarion-hotels.cz.    3600    IN      NSEC    mail.clarion-hotels.cz. A RRSIG NSEC
    *.clarion-hotels.cz.    3600    IN      RRSIG   NSEC 5 2 3600 20141005113302 20140905113302 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. lSf+ySQxo+sXxtuEZEIy7YghFeQnFlDd7vkZA8XO/ahgAzgxHZkAsQXk RjoJVCLd3E3FgX55Pu0RA6IQVn1ynZFYp3l1P24bC93+l3vszNsnMKnD qqjNIIzeYanNfkI34kdPpj5C1HhtrC1ZUhRwryphsKXX9KYFB/B4i+47 U2E=
    mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 3600   IN      NSEC    clarion-hotels.cz. A RRSIG NSEC
    mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 3600   IN      RRSIG   NSEC 5 3 3600 20141005113302 20140905113302 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. lX8m4n9dL8/055WYsv5LW/D9L7257lzOv9QAynpBlJiShQkYRFsAc9rT ZFdrCeahWXg01/jGVrUNoxwJUUxUobt8GFcTiXHvI/w5ej6rsc80tUVT BCnW9WsJBNiz7hDN8Ac3V8gKE77Td2TZxJpPtRdAOTW4mc6E04XsLIL7 XmQ=

    ;; Query time: 130 msec
    ;; SERVER: 81.2.194.130#53(81.2.194.130)
    ;; WHEN: Fri Sep  5 11:04:38 2014
    ;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 742

This time there is no erroneous wildcard CNAME response, just
ANSWER:0, and some NSEC records in the authority section.  In
particular there is an NSEC record that should prove absense of
anything after "mail2", thus denying "_tcp.mail2"...

What's wrong now?  Oddly enough when I ask for "mail3.<etc> IN TLSA
?" the resolver is happy with a "NODATA" response, containing
exactly the same records.  So these records constitute proof that
"mail3" does not exist, but somehow fail to prove that "_tcp.mail2"
does not?

-- 
	Viktor.


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On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 03:11:49PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

>     $ dig +dnssec +norecur -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz @ns.forpsi.net
>     ...
>     *.clarion-hotels.cz.    3600    IN      NSEC    mail.clarion-hotels.cz. A RRSIG NSEC
>     *.clarion-hotels.cz.    3600    IN      RRSIG   NSEC 5 2 3600 20141005113302 20140905113302 13077 clarion-hotels.cz. lSf+ySQxo+sXxtuEZEIy7YghFeQnFlDd7vkZA8XO/ahgAzgxHZkAsQXk RjoJVCLd3E3FgX55Pu0RA6IQVn1ynZFYp3l1P24bC93+l3vszNsnMKnD qqjNIIzeYanNfkI34kdPpj5C1HhtrC1ZUhRwryphsKXX9KYFB/B4i+47 U2E=

The only slightly odd thing I see is the RRSIG above.  Instead of
binding all three labels of the wildcard, it binds only the last
two.  Is that how it should be?

Anyone have better insight?

-- 
	Viktor.


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On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 03:11:49PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

> Thanks.  I wrote to the operators of the DNS servers, and they are
> planning to fix the bug, but implemented a short-term work-around,
> where the wildcard CNAME was replaced by wildcard A record.  However
> the work-around is not working to the satisfaction of my resolver,
> any idea why?

OK, now I understand.  The response is "NODATA", but is should be
"NXDOMAIN".  All that the change did was prevent the wildcard CNAME
being returned incorrectly, but the wildcard record is still
incorrectly processed for the query in question, and incorrectly
returns "NODATA", rather than "NXDOMAIN".

So the work-around is not sufficient.  The real fix is to get the
nameserver to not apply wildcards to subdomains of existent siblings.

I'll try to find out what nameserer software this is, and if
something mainstream, try to let operators know to avoid it.

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Fri Sep  5 14:39:44 2014
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To: dane@ietf.org
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 05 Sep 2014 15:11:49 +0000." <20140905151149.GO26920@mournblade.imrryr.org>
Date: Sat, 06 Sep 2014 07:39:34 +1000
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Subject: Re: [dane] DNSSEC debug advice (TLSA lookup problem).
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In message <20140905151149.GO26920@mournblade.imrryr.org>, Viktor Dukhovni writes:
> On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 09:05:33AM +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:
> 
> > > Yes, in fact between posting and reading your answer, I went off
> > > and did some reading.  The problem as I now understand it seems to
> > > be that:
> > > 
> > > 	1.   *.clarion-hotels.cz IN CNAME 	exists.
> > > 	2.   mail2.clarion-hotels.cz		exists.
> > > 	3.   _tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz	does not exist.
> > > 
> > > and finally, the nameservers for clarion-hotels.cz incorrectly
> > > apply the wildcard CNAME to a child of an existing sibling node
> > > (mail2).  This is detected as an error by various validating
> > > resolvers.
> > >
> > > Is this right?
> > 
> > Yes.
> 
> Thanks.  I wrote to the operators of the DNS servers, and they are
> planning to fix the bug, but implemented a short-term work-around,
> where the wildcard CNAME was replaced by wildcard A record.  However
> the work-around is not working to the satisfaction of my resolver,
> any idea why?

The problem is the wildcard and the broken wildcard processing, not
the CNAME.  The rcode is wrong as a result, NOERROR != NXDOMAIN.
Getting rid of the wild card and adding explict address records for
every name the http server is configured fore plus anything else
depending on the wildcard will work.

Alternatively adding a non TLSA records at the expected TLSA names
should work as it should prevent the attempted wilcard lookup in
the server and the resulting mis-match.

_tlsa._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz TXT "-"
_tlsa._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz TXT "-"

Alternatively they could configure the MTAs to support STARTTLS
and add TLSA records.

Mark

>     $ dig +dnssec +norecur -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz @ns.forpsi.net
>     ; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> +dnssec +norecur -t tlsa _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz @ns.forpsi.net
>     ;; global options: +cmd
>     ;; Got answer:
>     ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 31810
>     ;; flags: qr aa; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1
> 
>     ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
>     ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
>     ;; QUESTION SECTION:
>     ;_25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. IN   TLSA
> 
>     ;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
>     clarion-hotels.cz.      3600    IN      SOA     ns.forpsi.net. admin.forpsi.com. 2014090502 3600 1800 2592000 3600
>     clarion-hotels.cz.      3600    IN      RRSIG   SOA 5 2 3600 20141005113302 20140905113302 13077 clarion-hotels.cz.
>  Y4JCzy6U/fMI2tz+pLfQ1mFD2h1jxRMJ7nUwXS0cxlE9xcN8QFibwC75 BBivVbf3Xb2oPXJTRTvkkUAXR1wziOCy/qvK4LyNFX2ENn2aKGn3i93H LrHM
> /5u1IoeG4niXbS22Tue3FEgYKcSX7UA5PDDQAQs2o+jX9IbwYawC teM=
>     *.clarion-hotels.cz.    3600    IN      NSEC    mail.clarion-hotels.cz. A RRSIG NSEC
>     *.clarion-hotels.cz.    3600    IN      RRSIG   NSEC 5 2 3600 20141005113302 20140905113302 13077 clarion-hotels.cz
> . lSf+ySQxo+sXxtuEZEIy7YghFeQnFlDd7vkZA8XO/ahgAzgxHZkAsQXk RjoJVCLd3E3FgX55Pu0RA6IQVn1ynZFYp3l1P24bC93+l3vszNsnMKnD qqj
> NIIzeYanNfkI34kdPpj5C1HhtrC1ZUhRwryphsKXX9KYFB/B4i+47 U2E=
>     mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 3600   IN      NSEC    clarion-hotels.cz. A RRSIG NSEC
>     mail2.clarion-hotels.cz. 3600   IN      RRSIG   NSEC 5 3 3600 20141005113302 20140905113302 13077 clarion-hotels.cz
> . lX8m4n9dL8/055WYsv5LW/D9L7257lzOv9QAynpBlJiShQkYRFsAc9rT ZFdrCeahWXg01/jGVrUNoxwJUUxUobt8GFcTiXHvI/w5ej6rsc80tUVT BCn
> W9WsJBNiz7hDN8Ac3V8gKE77Td2TZxJpPtRdAOTW4mc6E04XsLIL7 XmQ=
> 
>     ;; Query time: 130 msec
>     ;; SERVER: 81.2.194.130#53(81.2.194.130)
>     ;; WHEN: Fri Sep  5 11:04:38 2014
>     ;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 742
> 
> This time there is no erroneous wildcard CNAME response, just
> ANSWER:0, and some NSEC records in the authority section.  In
> particular there is an NSEC record that should prove absense of
> anything after "mail2", thus denying "_tcp.mail2"...
> 
> What's wrong now?  Oddly enough when I ask for "mail3.<etc> IN TLSA
> ?" the resolver is happy with a "NODATA" response, containing
> exactly the same records.  So these records constitute proof that
> "mail3" does not exist, but somehow fail to prove that "_tcp.mail2"
> does not?
> 
> -- 
> 	Viktor.
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dane mailing list
> dane@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


From nobody Fri Sep  5 14:55:52 2014
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: dane@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dane] DNSSEC debug advice (TLSA lookup problem).
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On Sat, Sep 06, 2014 at 07:39:34AM +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:

> The problem is the wildcard and the broken wildcard processing, not
> the CNAME.  The rcode is wrong as a result, NOERROR != NXDOMAIN.

Yes, that's it, as I eventually also figured out...

> Alternatively adding a non TLSA records at the expected TLSA names
> should work as it should prevent the attempted wilcard lookup in
> the server and the resulting mis-match.
> 
> _tlsa._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz TXT "-"
> _tlsa._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz TXT "-"

Right, indeed:

    _25._tcp.mail.clarion-hotels.cz  IN TXT "No TLSA RRs here yet"
    _25._tcp.mail2.clarion-hotels.cz IN TXT "No TLSA RRs here yet"

should do the job.  Thanks, I'll suggest this to them as a better
interim solution.

-- 
	Viktor.


From nobody Mon Sep  8 06:38:17 2014
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: dane@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dane] DNSSEC debug advice (TLSA lookup problem).
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On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 09:55:45PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:

> On Sat, Sep 06, 2014 at 07:39:34AM +1000, Mark Andrews wrote:
> 
> > The problem is the wildcard and the broken wildcard processing, not
> > the CNAME.  The rcode is wrong as a result, NOERROR != NXDOMAIN.
> 
> Yes, that's it, as I eventually also figured out...

The DNS server in question is djbdns.  Corrected wildcard processing
may be available at <http://www.tinydnssec.org/>, but I've not tested
that software or looked at it in any detail beyond the claim in the
list of improvements that the issue is resolved:

    The interpretation of wildcard records now matches the description
    in RFC-1034 section 4.3.3. Specifically, if there's a wildcard
    *.x and a record for a.x, then a query for y.a.x will not be
    answered using the wildcard (for a label 'a' and series of
    labels 'x' and 'y').  This change is required for signed domains,
    because authentication of negative responses requires a common
    understanding between client and server about the meaning of
    wildcards.

There is an important note about running that software as a secondary:

    Be careful with publishing signed zones as a secondary nameserver:
    the modified tinydns/axfrdns require certain helper RRs in the
    database to simplify locating NSEC3 records. Without these
    helpers, tinydns cannot generate valid negative response nor
    valid wildcard responses.

-- 
	Viktor.


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From: "Osterweil, Eric" <eosterweil@verisign.com>
To: "Rose, Scott" <scott.rose@nist.gov>
Thread-Topic: [dane] Enterprise email security reqs breakdown: REQ7 (signing/encryption certs)
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On Sep 3, 2014, at 2:05 PM, "Rose, Scott" <scott.rose@nist.gov> wrote:

<snip>

> Questions:
>=20
> 1. is this requirement reasonable? =20

I believe it is.

> 2.  (if reasonable): Is the strawman text adequate?  Should another =
method be used other than a naming convention such as a different RRTYPE =
or usage field?

We have found this quite useful in our coding, fwiw.

Eric=

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From nobody Fri Sep 26 17:52:19 2014
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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
To: "<dane@ietf.org>" <dane@ietf.org>
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Subject: [dane] Meeting in Hawaii?
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Dear DANE,

We have requested a 2 hour slot for Hawaii, however, we have not seen
much activity since Toronto, and so are thinking of handing the time
back.

Please let us know if you'd really like to meet, and open issues on
documents that need discussing. Also, if you have a doc, we'd like it
revised *soon*.

Remember, IETF meeting time is a precious resource.
W

-- 
I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
of pants.
   ---maf


From nobody Mon Sep 29 04:44:38 2014
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From: "Osterweil, Eric" <eosterweil@verisign.com>
To: dane WG list <dane@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: SMIMEA prototyping
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Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 11:44:31 +0000
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Hey everyone,

A few of us at Verisign (actually, that would be Lynch Davis) have been =
working on a prototype for the SMIMEA draft.  We have written a general =
library+API, we have integrated it into Thunderbird, and have begun =
integrating into Mail.app.  Our plans are to publish this as open source =
at some point after the DANE workshop that will be taking place at ICANN =
51 (where we will be demo'ing it).  We ran into numerous interesting =
wrinkles and made some specific design choices, but at a high level the =
S/MIME prototype:
- can sign
- can encrypt
- can decrypt (without writing clear text to disk)
- can verify
- and supports several features that are enabled through suggested =
additions.

With the foresight that zones may need to be delegated to accommodate =
churn and scale, some certificates may need to be selectively =
authenticated or deauthenticated (perhaps on a per-user basis), and the =
locations of certificate information may need to be managed in different =
places (some in the DNS, some in external locations), etc. we have made =
some operational choices to modify elements of the draft in our =
prototype.  We intend to detail these in a follow-on email.

We're hoping to show this off at the upcoming IETF too.

Eric

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From nobody Mon Sep 29 05:26:37 2014
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From: "Osterweil, Eric" <eosterweil@verisign.com>
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Hey everyone,

Based on our implementation experience we would like to suggest that the =
following text (taken from Scott Rose's email: =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06180.html ) be =
incorporated into the current version of the draft-ietf-dane-smime =
document.  We are sending text (below), but at a high-level, the text =
outlines a few useful additions:

1 - Usage #4 (reject) is likely to be very important.  This could either =
emphasize the difference between saying, ``don't use this cert for this =
operation,'' and ``this cert is universally revoked'' or be used to =
selectively override an organization-wide TA for certain employees that =
have left the organization.

2 - The certificate access field (Section 2.1.4) would enable alternate =
discovery mechanisms that could help aid incremental deployment and =
transition schemes.  For example, while cutting over to a DANE solution, =
some enterprises may want to transition users from (say) AD to DANE, and =
this field would enable that.

3 - The ``_encr'' and ``_sign'' labels are excellent additions to the =
management of zone sizes and lookup sizes.  Rather than querying for all =
keys and then locally selecting from them, I (as an RP) likely already =
know which of these I want, and I should be able to look them up =
separately in DANE (and owners should be able to manage them separately =
in DANE).

If anyone objects, please let us know.

Thanks,

Eric

-------

...

2.1.  SMIMEA RDATA Fields

 The RDATA for the SMIMEA RR consists of a one-octet certificate usage
 field, a one-octet selector field, a one-octet matching type field, a
 one-octet certificate access field, and the certificate association
 data field.

                         1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |  Cert. Usage  |   Selector    | Matching Type | Cert. Access  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    /                                                               /
    /                 Certificate Association Data                  /
    /                                                               /
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+




2.1.1.  The Certificate Usage Field

 A one-octet value, called "certificate usage", specifies the provided
 association that will be used to validate the certificate.  This
 value will be defined in a new IANA registry in order to make it
 easier to add additional certificate usages in the future.  Four of
 the initial usages defined in this document are similar to the first
 four TLSA [RFC6698] certificate usages.  The certificate usage values
 are:

    0 or PKIX-CA -- PKIX-CA is used to specify a CA certificate, or
    the public key of such a certificate, that MUST be found in any of
    the PKIX certification paths for the user.  This certificate usage
    is sometimes referred to as "CA constraint" because it limits
    which CA can be used to issue certificates for a given user.  The
    presented certificate MUST pass PKIX certification path
    validation, and a CA certificate that matches the SMIMEA record
    MUST be included as part of a valid certification path.  Because
    this certificate usage allows both trust anchors and CA
    certificates, the certificate might or might not have the
    basicConstraints extension present.

    1 or PKIX-EE -- PKIX-EE is used to specify an end entity
    certificate, or the public key of such a certificate, that MUST be
    matched with the end entity certificate for the SMIME user.  This
    certificate usage is sometimes referred to as "user certificate
    constraint" because it limits which end entity certificate can be
    used by a given user.  The target user certificate MUST pass PKIX
    certification path validation and MUST match the SMIMEA record.

    2 or DANE-TA -- DANE-TA is used to specify a certificate, or the
    public key of such a certificate, that MUST be used as the trust
    anchor when validating the SMIME user certificate.  This
    certificate usage is sometimes referred to as "trust anchor
    assertion" and allows a domain name administrator to specify a new
    trust anchor -- for example, if the domain issues its own
    certificates under its own CA that is not expected to be in the
    end users' collection of trust anchors.  The target user
    certificate MUST pass PKIX certification path validation, with any
    certificate matching the SMIMEA record considered to be a trust
    anchor for this certification path validation.

    3 or DANE-EE -- DANE-EE is used to specify a certificate, or the
    public key of such a certificate, that MUST match the SMIME user's
    certificate.  This certificate usage is sometimes referred to as
    "domain-issued certificate" because it allows for a domain name
    administrator to issue certificates for a domain without involving
    a third-party CA.  The target user certificate MUST match the
    SMIMEA record.  The difference between certificate usage 1 and
    certificate usage 3 is that certificate usage 1 requires that the
    certificate pass PKIX validation, but PKIX validation is not
    tested for certificate usage 3.

    4 or REJECT -- REJECT is used by the domain owner to assert that
    this user's certificate MUST be considered invalid for the
    requested function (i.e. signature or encryption).  This is a
    stronger assertion than a failed certificate validation check.
    Possible usage scenarios include unrecognized user names and
    revoked user certificates.  Values in all other RDATA fields MAY
    be ignored but all fields MUST be populated to comply with SMIMEA
    RDATA parsing requirements.

 The certificate usages defined in this document explicitly only apply
 to PKIX-formatted certificates in DER encoding [ITU.X690.2002].  If
 SMIME allows other formats later, or if extensions to this RR type
 are made that accept other formats for certificates, those
 certificates will need their own certificate usage values.

2.1.2.  The Selector Field

 A one-octet value, called "selector", specifies which part of the
 SMIME certificate presented by the server will be matched against the
 association data.  This value will be defined in a new IANA registry.
 The selectors defined in this document are:

    0 or CERT -- Full certificate: the Certificate binary structure as
    defined in [RFC5280].

    1 or SPKI -- SubjectPublicKeyInfo: DER-encoded binary structure as
    defined in [RFC5280].

 (Note that the use of "selector" in this document is completely
 unrelated to the use of "selector" in DomainKeys Identified Mail
 (DKIM) [RFC6376].)

2.1.3.  The Matching Type Field

 A one-octet value, called "matching type", specifies how the
 certificate association is presented.  This value will be defined in
 a new IANA registry.  The types defined in this document are:

    0 or Full -- Exact match on selected content

    1 or SHA2-256 -- SHA-256 hash of selected content [RFC6234]

    2 or SHA2-512 -- SHA-512 hash of selected content [RFC6234]

 If the SMIMEA record's matching type is a hash, having the record use
 the same hash algorithm that was used in the signature in the
 certificate (if possible) will assist clients that support a small
 number of hash algorithms.

2.1.4.  Certificate Access Field

 This one octet value indicates an alternative method for certificate
 discovery.  Some domain owners may not want to publish user
 certificates via DNS but may want to use the DNS to advertise the
 means to access them.  If full user certificates are not included in
 the Certificate Association Data this field MAY be used to indicate
 how the user's certificate can be obtained.  The RDATA certificate
 association data MUST be used to validate certificates obtained by
 the alternative method.

    0 or NO: No alternative method advertised.

    1 or NAPTR : NAPTR record available.  The same domain name used
    for this SMIMEA request MAY be used again with type NAPTR
    [RFC3403] to retrieve the URI for certificate access.

    2 or WF: X.509 certificates available in WebFinger [RFC7033].

2.1.5.  The Certificate Association Data Field

 This field specifies the "certificate association data" to be
 matched.  These bytes are either raw data (that is, the full
 certificate or its SubjectPublicKeyInfo, depending on the selector)
 for matching type Full (0), or the hash of the raw data for matching
 types SHA2-256 (1) and SHA2-512 (2).  The data refers to the
 certificate in the association, not to the ASN.1 Certificate object.
 For certificate usage type REJECT (4) at least one byte of data is
 REQUIRED but the value MUST be ignored.

2.2.  SMIMEA RR Presentation Format

 The presentation format of the RDATA portion (as defined in
 [RFC1035]) is as follows:

 o  The certificate usage field MUST be represented either as a
    certificate usage mnemonic or an 8-bit unsigned integer.

 o  The selector field MUST be represented either as a selector field
    mnemonic or an 8-bit unsigned integer.

 o  The matching type field MUST be represented either as a matching
    type mnemonic or an 8-bit unsigned integer.

 o  The certificate access field MUST be represented either as a
    certificate access mnemonic or an 8-bit unsigned integer.

 o  The certificate association data field MUST be represented as a
    string of hexadecimal characters.  Whitespace is allowed within
    the string of hexadecimal characters, as described in [RFC1035].

 Where practical, the mnemonic form SHOULD be used in order to provide
 clarity.

2.3.  SMIMEA RR Examples

 In the following examples, the domain name is formed using the rules
 in Section 3.

 An example of a hashed (SHA2-256) association of a Full PKIX-CA
 certificate in the PKIX validation path of a certificate used to
 validate a signed S/MIME message.  No alternative certificate access
 is advertised.

    =
1c190a039a9c355fba9eb653eb52cd64e2fbe76db2588fc5a2b5c5d4._sign._smimecert.=
example.com. IN SMIMEA (
       0 0 1 0 d2abde240d7cd3ee6b4b28c54df034b9
               7983a1d16e8a410e4561cb106618e971 )

  Alternatively

    =
1c190a039a9c355fba9eb653eb52cd64e2fbe76db2588fc5a2b5c5d4._sign._smimecert.=
example.com. IN SMIMEA (
       PKIX-CA FULL SHA2-256 NO d2abde240d7cd3ee6b4b28c54df034b9
                                7983a1d16e8a410e4561cb106618e971 )

 An example resource record providing Full self-signed encryption
 certificate:

    =
1c190a039a9c355fba9eb653eb52cd64e2fbe76db2588fc5a2b5c5d4._encr._smimecert.=
example.com. IN SMIMEA (
       DANE-EE Cert Full NO 30820307308201efa003020102020... )

 An example of resource record invalidating all digital signatures by
 identified user:

    =
1c190a039a9c355fba9eb653eb52cd64e2fbe76db2588fc5a2b5c5d4._sign._smimecert.=
example.com. IN SMIMEA (
                          REJECT Cert Full NO 00 )

...

3.  Domain Names for S/MIME Certificate Associations

 SMIMEA domain names include function and user labels.  The purpose is
 to identify the function specific certificate if a user has multiple
 certificates.  Alias MAY be used if a user has a common certificate
 for both functions

...


3.1.  Domain Name Preparation

 Domain names are prepared for requests in the following manner.

 1.  The user name (the "left-hand side" of the email address, called
     the "local-part" in the mail message format definition [RFC5322]
     and the "local part" in the specification for internationalized
     email [RFC6530]), is encoded with Base32 [RFC4648], to become the
     left-most label in the prepared domain name.  This does not
     include the "@" character that separates the left and right sides
     of the email address.

 2.  The second left-most label is the function specific label
     segment.  It is selected based on the S/MIME function the MUA is
     performing.  Values are:

        "_encr" for obtaining or validating a certificate or public
        key to be used to encrypt a message.

        "_sign" for certificate validation data to verify a digital
        signature.

     For certificate use cases XXXX-EE (1 and 3) the function specific
     label SHOULD be consistent with the Key Usage field (defined in
     section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280]) of the associated certificate.

 3.  The string "_smimecert" becomes the third left-most label in the
     prepared domain.  The function specific label segment is separate
     to enable delegation of a single _smimecert zone cut.

 4.  The domain name (the "right-hand side" of the email address,
     called the "domain" in [RFC5322]) is appended to the result of
     step 3 to complete the prepared domain name.

...

3.2.  Domain Name Examples

 Example 1.  Signature certificate verification: to request an SMIMEA
 resource record to verify a signature certificate for a user whose
 address is "alice@example.com", you would use:

          =
"df7f0c341e185f1073a2caef0d37a8b6a11fac62f46beaf459532bb0._sign._smimecert=
.example.com"

 Example 2.  Encryption key discovery: to request an SMIMEA resource
 record for encrypting an email to user "bob@example.com" you would
 use:

          =
"550c233eeabd0f03bb42b99956efa56cdadaef7d346a04e351ac1b7a._encr._smimecert=
.example.com"

4.  Use of SMIMEA Records in SMIME

 SMIMEA records are used to publish user certificates or validate user
 certificates acquired by other means.  Typically these use cases are
 associated with message encryption and signature validation processes
 respectively.  Section 2.1 of this document defines the mandatory
 matching rules for the data.  Where possible, consistency with
 [RFC6698] is maintained.

4.1.  Usable Certificate Associations

 An implementation of this protocol makes a DNS query for SMIMEA
 records, validates these records using DNSSEC, and uses the resulting
 SMIMEA records and validation to modify S/MIME message processing
 behavior.

 Determining whether an SMIMEA RRSet can be used MUST be based on the
 DNSSEC validation state (as defined in [RFC4035]).

 o  An SMIMEA RRSet whose DNSSEC validation state is secure MUST be
    used as a certificate association for S/MIME unless a local policy
    would prohibit the use of the specific certificate association in
    the secure SMIMEA RRSet.

 o  If the DNSSEC validation state on the response to the request for
    the SMIMEA RRSet is bogus then the RRSet MUST be disregarded and
    considered unusable.  Additional SMIMEA queries may be initiated.

 o  If the DNSSEC validation state is indeterminate or insecure then
    the SMIMEA RRSet MUST be disregarded and considered unusable.

 MUAs that rely on another entity to perform the DNSSEC signature
 validation SHOULD use a secure mechanism between themselves and the
 validator.  Examples of secure transports to other hosts include TSIG
 [RFC2845], SIG(0) [RFC2931], and IPsec [RFC6071].  Note that it is
 not sufficient to use secure transport to a DNS resolver that does
 not do DNSSEC signature validation.

 If a certificate association contains a certificate usage, selector,
 or matching type that is not understood by the MUA, that certificate
 association MUST be considered unusable.  If the comparison data for
 a certificate is malformed, the certificate association MUST be
 considered unusable.

 If a certificate association contains a matching type or certificate
 association data that uses a cryptographic algorithm that is
 considered too weak for the MUA's local policy, the certificate
 association MUST be considered unusable.

 If a MUA receives zero usable certificate associations from a DNS
 request or from its cache, it processes S/MIME requests in the normal
 fashion without any input from the SMIMEA records.

 If a MUA performing certificate validation receives one or more
 usable certificate associations then it MUST attempt to match each
 certificate association with the user's certificate until a
 successful match is found.  If no certificate associations match then
 the certificate MUST be considered invalid.

 If a MUA makes an SMIMEA request for an encryption certificate and
 the response includes more than one valid certificate, the
 certificate with the most recent "Not Before" data SHOULD be
 selected. [ Are there better criteria? ]

...

6.  IANA Considerations

6.1.  SMIMEA RRtype

 This document uses a new DNS RR type, SMIMEA, whose value will be
 allocated by IANA from the Resource Record (RR) TYPEs subregistry of
 the Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters registry.

6.2.  SMIMEA Certificate Usage Registry

 This document creates a new registry, "SMIMEA Certificate Usages".
 The registry policy is "RFC Required".  The initial entries in the
 registry are:

   +-------+----------+--------------------------------+-------------+
   | Value | Mnemonic | Short Description              | Reference   |
   +-------+----------+--------------------------------+-------------+
   |   0   | PKIX-CA  | CA      constraint             | [this doc]  |
   |   1   | PKIX-EE  | Service certificate constraint | [this doc]  |
   |   2   | DANE-TA  | Trust anchor assertion         | [this doc]  |
   |   3   | DANE-EE  | Domain-issued certificate      | [this doc]  |
   |   4   | REJECT   | Invalid Certificate or User    | [this doc]  |
   | 5-254 |          | Unassigned                     |             |
   |  255  | PrivCert | Reserved for Private Use       | [this doc]  |
   +-------+----------+--------------------------------+-------------+


 Applications to the registry can request specific values that have
 yet to be assigned.

6.3.  SMIMEA Selectors

 This document creates a new registry, "TLSA Selectors".  The registry
 policy is "Specification Required".  The initial entries in the
 registry are:

        +-------+----------+--------------------------+-------------+
        | Value | Mnemonic | Short Description        | Reference   |
        +-------+----------+--------------------------+-------------+
        |   0   | Cert     | Full certificate         | [this doc]  |
        |   1   | SPKI     | SubjectPublicKeyInfo     | [this doc]  |
        | 2-254 |          | Unassigned               |             |
        |  255  | PrivSel  | Reserved for Private Use | [this doc]  |
        +-------+----------+--------------------------+-------------+


 Applications to the registry can request specific values that have
 yet to be assigned.

6.4.  SMIMEA Matching Types

 This document creates a new registry, "SMIMEA Matching Types".  The
 registry policy is "Specification Required".  The initial entries in
 the registry are:

       +-------+-----------+--------------------------+-------------+
       | Value | Mnemonic  | Short Description        | Reference   |
       +-------+-----------+--------------------------+-------------+
       |   0   | Full      | No hash used             | [this doc]  |
       |   1   | SHA2-256  | 256 bit hash by SHA2     | [this doc]  |
       |   2   | SHA2-512  | 512 bit hash by SHA2     | [this doc]  |
       | 3-254 |           | Unassigned               |             |
       |  255  | PrivMatch | Reserved for Private Use | [this doc]  |
       +-------+-----------+--------------------------+-------------+


 Applications to the registry can request specific values that have
 yet to be assigned.

6.5.  Certificate Access Field

 This document creates a new registry, "SMIMEA Certificate Access".
 The registry policy is "Specification Required".  The initial entries
 in the registry are:

       +-------+-----------+---------------------------+-------------+
       | Value | Mnemonic  | Short Description         | Reference   |
       +-------+-----------+---------------------------+-------------+
       |   0   | NO        | No Alternative Advertised | [this doc]  |
       |   1   | NAPTR     | NAPTR                     | [this doc]  |
       |   2   | WF        | WebFinger                 | [this doc]  |
       | 3-254 |           | Unassigned                |             |
       |  255  | PrivUse   | Reserved for Private Use  | [this doc]  |
       +-------+-----------+---------------------------+-------------+


 Applications to the registry can request specific values that have
 yet to be assigned.



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From nobody Mon Sep 29 13:10:54 2014
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Subject: Re: [dane] Meeting in Hawaii?
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On 27 sep 2014, at 02:52, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:

> We have requested a 2 hour slot for Hawaii, however, we have not seen
> much activity since Toronto, and so are thinking of handing the time
> back.
>=20
> Please let us know if you'd really like to meet, and open issues on
> documents that need discussing. Also, if you have a doc, we'd like it
> revised *soon*.

All the authors of the various drafts on DANE for email (S/MIME and =
OpenPGP) will be there, and we will have discussions on the list =
beforehand. Given this, I for one, hope we can meet and flesh out any =
details left on this topic.

I'm not sure we need 2 hours though - 1,5 hours should be enough.


	jakob


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On 9/29/14, 1:10 PM, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
> On 27 sep 2014, at 02:52, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>
>> We have requested a 2 hour slot for Hawaii, however, we have not seen
>> much activity since Toronto, and so are thinking of handing the time
>> back.
>>
>> Please let us know if you'd really like to meet, and open issues on
>> documents that need discussing. Also, if you have a doc, we'd like it
>> revised *soon*.
>
> All the authors of the various drafts on DANE for email (S/MIME and OpenPGP) will be there, and we will have discussions on the list beforehand. Given this, I for one, hope we can meet and flesh out any details left on this topic.

Matt Miller and I plan to meet IRL soon to close a few remaining issues 
with the dane-srv spec. Hopefully that won't require further discussion 
in Hawaii, but if so it ought to be brief (IMHO).

Peter



From nobody Tue Sep 30 11:36:21 2014
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From: Richard Lamb <richard.lamb@icann.org>
To: "Osterweil, Eric" <eosterweil@verisign.com>, dane WG list <dane@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: SMIMEA prototyping
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Very cool.   Ive been waiting for the "killer app" and something better than
Kaminsky's Outlook+DNSSEC/phreebird demo of 2008.  I assume you mean DNSSEC
Workshop @ ICANN 51 usually on Wed.  Is a separate DANE workshop?

Looking forward to seeing the demo...
Rick

-----Original Message-----
From: dane [mailto:dane-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Osterweil, Eric
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2014 4:45 AM
To: dane WG list
Subject: [dane] SMIMEA prototyping

Hey everyone,

A few of us at Verisign (actually, that would be Lynch Davis) have been
working on a prototype for the SMIMEA draft.  We have written a general
library+API, we have integrated it into Thunderbird, and have begun
integrating into Mail.app.  Our plans are to publish this as open source at
some point after the DANE workshop that will be taking place at ICANN 51
(where we will be demo'ing it).  We ran into numerous interesting wrinkles
and made some specific design choices, but at a high level the S/MIME
prototype:
- can sign
- can encrypt
- can decrypt (without writing clear text to disk)
- can verify
- and supports several features that are enabled through suggested
additions.

With the foresight that zones may need to be delegated to accommodate churn
and scale, some certificates may need to be selectively authenticated or
deauthenticated (perhaps on a per-user basis), and the locations of
certificate information may need to be managed in different places (some in
the DNS, some in external locations), etc. we have made some operational
choices to modify elements of the draft in our prototype.  We intend to
detail these in a follow-on email.

We're hoping to show this off at the upcoming IETF too.

Eric

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From nobody Tue Sep 30 11:50:04 2014
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To: "Osterweil, Eric" <eosterweil@verisign.com>
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Subject: Re: [dane] SMIMEA prototyping
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This sounds interesting...

Thanks

--Alain
On Sep 29, 2014, at 11:44 AM, Osterweil, Eric wrote:

> Hey everyone,
>=20
> A few of us at Verisign (actually, that would be Lynch Davis) have =
been working on a prototype for the SMIMEA draft.  We have written a =
general library+API, we have integrated it into Thunderbird, and have =
begun integrating into Mail.app.  Our plans are to publish this as open =
source at some point after the DANE workshop that will be taking place =
at ICANN 51 (where we will be demo'ing it).  We ran into numerous =
interesting wrinkles and made some specific design choices, but at a =
high level the S/MIME prototype:
> - can sign
> - can encrypt
> - can decrypt (without writing clear text to disk)
> - can verify
> - and supports several features that are enabled through suggested =
additions.
>=20
> With the foresight that zones may need to be delegated to accommodate =
churn and scale, some certificates may need to be selectively =
authenticated or deauthenticated (perhaps on a per-user basis), and the =
locations of certificate information may need to be managed in different =
places (some in the DNS, some in external locations), etc. we have made =
some operational choices to modify elements of the draft in our =
prototype.  We intend to detail these in a follow-on email.
>=20
> We're hoping to show this off at the upcoming IETF too.
>=20
> Eric
> _______________________________________________
> dane mailing list
> dane@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dane


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From: "Osterweil, Eric" <eosterweil@verisign.com>
To: Richard Lamb <richard.lamb@icann.org>
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On Sep 30, 2014, at 2:36 PM, Richard Lamb <richard.lamb@icann.org> =
wrote:

> Very cool.   Ive been waiting for the "killer app" and something =
better than
> Kaminsky's Outlook+DNSSEC/phreebird demo of 2008.  I assume you mean =
DNSSEC
> Workshop @ ICANN 51 usually on Wed.

Yup, that's the one!

>  Is a separate DANE workshop?
>=20
> Looking forward to seeing the demo=85

Great!

Eric


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Subject: Re: [dane] draft-ietf-dane-smime
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On Sep 29, 2014, at 5:26 AM, Osterweil, Eric <eosterweil@verisign.com> =
wrote:

> Based on our implementation experience we would like to suggest that =
the following text (taken from Scott Rose's email: =
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dane/current/msg06180.html ) be =
incorporated into the current version of the draft-ietf-dane-smime =
document.  We are sending text (below), but at a high-level, the text =
outlines a few useful additions:
>=20
> 1 - Usage #4 (reject) is likely to be very important.  This could =
either emphasize the difference between saying, ``don't use this cert =
for this operation,'' and ``this cert is universally revoked'' or be =
used to selectively override an organization-wide TA for certain =
employees that have left the organization.
>=20
> 2 - The certificate access field (Section 2.1.4) would enable =
alternate discovery mechanisms that could help aid incremental =
deployment and transition schemes.  For example, while cutting over to a =
DANE solution, some enterprises may want to transition users from (say) =
AD to DANE, and this field would enable that.
>=20
> 3 - The ``_encr'' and ``_sign'' labels are excellent additions to the =
management of zone sizes and lookup sizes.  Rather than querying for all =
keys and then locally selecting from them, I (as an RP) likely already =
know which of these I want, and I should be able to look them up =
separately in DANE (and owners should be able to manage them separately =
in DANE).
>=20
> If anyone objects, please let us know.

Jakob and I think that the three additions are unneeded here, and make =
the draft diverge quite far from the TLSA format without significant =
value. In specific:

1) This usage type is at least as applicable to TLS as it is to S/MIME. =
We haven't seen anything indicating much use of certificate revocation =
anywhere and, where we have seen it, it is much more common in TLS. If =
the authors really want this feature, it should be an update to TLSA, =
which SMIMEA could then adopt.

2) Making the record format for SMIMEA different than that of TLSA for =
this feature seems like a bad idea. Alternate discovery mechanisms might =
be important, but they will be just as important for TLS as they are for =
S/MIME. The functionality that the authors want could be added to TLSA =
by adding new Matching Type fields such as "Hash and NAPTR", "Hash and =
URI", and so on. The latter is part of IKEv2 (although the feature is =
generally considered not useful). If the authors really want this =
feature, it should be an update to TLSA, which SMIMEA could then adopt.

3) There is absolutely no indication that zone size or response size is =
important to SMIMEA, certainly not relative to the added complexity for =
clients, servers, and operators. Currently, the RSA certs for SMIME from =
common CAs are for both signing and encrypting, so this added complexity =
won't buy current users anything. In the future when we are all =
(hopefully) using elliptic curve keys, the zone size and response size =
will be so much smaller than they are now that this change will appear =
as an over-optimization that adds complexity.

When these ideas were brought to the WG earlier this year, we didn't =
hear any significant support. Given that both of us feel that the =
proposed changes make the document harder to implement, we would want to =
see much wider support before we adopt them.

--Paul Hoffman and Jakob Schlyter

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Subject: [dane] IPR Disclosure: Paul Hoffman's Statement about IPR related to draft-ietf-dane-smime-07 and Many other RFCs and drafts belonging to Verisign, Inc.
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Dear Paul E. Hoffman, Jakob Schlyter:

 An IPR disclosure that pertains to your Internet-Draft entitled "Using Secure
DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain Names For S/MIME" (draft-ietf-dane-
smime) was submitted to the IETF Secretariat on 2014-09-30 and has been posted
on the "IETF Page of Intellectual Property Rights Disclosures"
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2446/). The title of the IPR disclosure is
"Paul Hoffman's Statement about IPR related to draft-ietf-dane-smime-07 and Many
other RFCs and drafts belonging to Verisign, Inc.."");

The IETF Secretariat


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Dear Paul E. Hoffman, Jakob Schlyter:

 An IPR disclosure that pertains to your Internet-Draft entitled "Using Secure
DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain Names For S/MIME" (draft-ietf-dane-
smime) was submitted to the IETF Secretariat on 2014-09-30 and has been posted
on the "IETF Page of Intellectual Property Rights Disclosures"
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2446/). The title of the IPR disclosure is
"Paul Hoffman's Statement about IPR belonging to Verisign, Inc. related to
draft-ietf-dane-smime-07 and many other RFCs and drafts."");

The IETF Secretariat

