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From: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson@valimail.com>
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Subject: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter
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Hello everyone,

Together with the BoF chairs, a few of us have been discussing what a
charter for this working group might look like. We are pleased to present
the following for your consideration:

-----
Objective
DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and DNS fo=
r server
identity. The DANISH working group seeks to extend the DANE standard to
encompass client identity and message sender identity use cases. DANISH
also seeks to define a transitional mode for DANE, which will allow the
safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have not yet implemented
DNSSEC..

Problem statement
Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows authentication
across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is used instead of a
CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to bind an identity=E2=80=
=99s
name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the DNS namespace and the DNS root
zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the barrier to adoption for
multiple private PKIs participating in application deployment.

The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.
DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain
discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case. This
alternative mode will allow the use of  Web PKI to securely discover
certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE
adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of requirements. If the
application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS authentication, the
application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the zone.

Scope of work
The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the
primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH will
establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent client
identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key discovery for
object security use cases. DANISH will also define any required TLS
protocol updates to support client authentication using DANE. DANISH will
define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE
DNS record types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode from Web
PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.

While modifications to the following standards are not within the scope of
the DANISH charter, the DANISH working group will take care to ensure a
potential path for interoperability with the following standards, enabling
potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, MLS, EAP-TLS, SMIMEA (RFC 8162),
SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239), IANA email authentication
headers, and TCP proxy TLVs standardized by haproxy.

--=20

*Ash Wilson* | Technical Director
*e:* ash.wilson@valimail.com

This email and all data transmitted with it contains confidential and/or
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authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended and authorized
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hello everyone,<div><br></div><div>Together with the BoF c=
hairs, a few of us have been discussing what a charter for this working gro=
up might look like. We are pleased to present the following for your=C2=A0c=
onsideration:</div><div><br></div><div>-----</div><div>Objective<br>DANE=E2=
=80=99s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and DNS for serve=
r identity. The DANISH working group seeks to extend the DANE standard to e=
ncompass client identity and message sender identity use cases. DANISH also=
 seeks to define a transitional mode for DANE, which will allow the safe ad=
option of DANE for domain owners who have not yet implemented DNSSEC..<br><=
br>Problem statement<br>Using DANE for representing client identities safel=
y allows authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSS=
EC is used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy t=
o bind an identity=E2=80=99s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the D=
NS namespace and the DNS root zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminati=
ng the barrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs participating in appli=
cation deployment.<br><br>The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been th=
e DNSSEC requirement. DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate a=
nd trust chain discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security=
 use case. This alternative mode will allow the use of=C2=A0 Web PKI to sec=
urely discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a gr=
adual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of requirements.=
 If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS authentication,=
 the application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the zone.<br><br>Scop=
e of work<br>The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describ=
ing the primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DAN=
ISH will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent clie=
nt identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key discovery for=
 object security use cases. DANISH will also define any required TLS protoc=
ol updates to support client authentication using DANE. DANISH will define =
a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE DNS reco=
rd types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode from Web PKI to t=
he DNSSEC-based trust model.<br><br>While modifications to the following st=
andards are not within the scope of the DANISH charter, the DANISH working =
group will take care to ensure a potential path for interoperability with t=
he following standards, enabling potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2,=
 MLS, EAP-TLS, SMIMEA (RFC 8162), SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239),=
 IANA email authentication headers, and TCP proxy TLVs standardized by hapr=
oxy. <br><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_signature" d=
ata-smartmail=3D"gmail_signature"><span><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height=
:1.656;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"></p><div style=3D"text-align:left"=
><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:smal=
l;font-family:Arial"><b>Ash Wilson</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-align:=
baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"> | Technic=
al Director</span></div><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:=
pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"><div style=3D"text-align:left">=
<span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline"><b>e:</b></span><span style=3D"vert=
ical-align:baseline"> <a href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com" target=3D"=
_blank">ash.wilson@valimail.com</a> </span><span></span></div><div style=3D=
"text-align:left"><img style=3D"width:175px;height:43px" src=3D"https://hos=
ted-packages.s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/Valimail+Logo.png"></div></span><p =
dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255);line-height:1.38;mar=
gin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Arial" color=3D"#666666"><span=
 style=3D"font-size:10.6667px;white-space:pre-wrap">This email and all data=
 transmitted with it contains confidential and/or proprietary information i=
ntended solely for the use of individual(s) authorized to receive it. If yo=
u are not an intended and authorized recipient you are hereby notified of a=
ny use, disclosure, copying or distribution of the information included in =
this transmission is prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately not=
ify the sender by replying to this email and then delete it from your syste=
m.</span></font></p></span></div></div></div>

--0000000000003cd24d05c228cb32--


From nobody Wed May 12 18:48:10 2021
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Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 21:47:58 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson=40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
cc: danish@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter
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On Wed, 12 May 2021, Ash Wilson wrote:

> DANE˘s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and DNS for server identity.

Please change to "only covered authentication for the TLS server identity".

The term PKI is loaded, as DANE is a PKI that works as alternative to WebPKI,
but the DANE standard was forced to add support for WebPKI validation.

> which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have not yet implemented DNSSEC..

This is confusing. DANE stands for "DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities". There is only
one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNSSEC. I think it would be
more fair to say you are looking at two different methods, one using
authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS authentication method. That
second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish either, it has nothing to do
with DANE)

> Problem statement
> Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is
> used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to bind an identity˘s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on
> the DNS namespace and the DNS root zone˘s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the barrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs
> participating in application deployment.
> 
> The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement. DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and
> trust chain discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case.

The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avoid using DNSSEC is ever
increasing. At some point it reaches more pages than the DNSSEC
standard. With DoH and DoT, the issue of reaching a reliable DNSSEC
capable server has been largely solved.

> This alternative mode will allow the use of  Web
> PKI to securely discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the
> initial set of requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS authentication, the application owner must
> then configure DNSSEC for the zone.

This is also really confusing. What CA would the TLS client use for its
mutual TLS authentication? Either it is a private one (eg non-webpki)
that _requires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it is some semi-private but
webpki verified CA, which honestly is just WebPKI as-is.

> Scope of work
> The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the primary application components, and their interaction
> patterns. DANISH will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent client identity for TLS connections and how to
> perform public key discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will also define any required TLS protocol updates to support
> client authentication using DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record
> types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode from Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.

So you are bootstrapping webpki via unsigned DANE DNS records? That
seems dangerous. DANE was never meant to be used without DNSSEC.

Originally, I thought DANISCH was about providing identities to TLS
clients to compliment authentiation of TLS servers. But now I read
the charter as a work around for somehow adding external trust parties
to the DNS to replace or augment DNSSEC. That has me worried.

I think what really needs clarification is if you are working on mutual
authenticated TLS only, or working on some other things. If working on
mutual TLS only, I do not see the case for a DNSSEC-non-DNSSEC protocol.

Paul


From nobody Thu May 13 06:42:51 2021
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From: Jacques Latour <Jacques.Latour@cira.ca>
To: Paul Nohats <paul@nohats.ca>, Ash Wilson <ash.wilson=40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
CC: "danish@ietf.org" <danish@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [EXT] Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter
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Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 13:42:21 +0000
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References: <CAEfM=vQ_6Osx=SR8wjSs6kFereChsDH+K9MqgZPi4uDQ=eGjuA@mail.gmail.com> <c735a242-aa13-18a7-661d-471c2d3f9b38@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Danish] [EXT] Re:  Proposed DANISH charter
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I agree w/Paul, mutual TLS connection & DNSSEC enabled entities, and perhap=
s add a scope in the charter to address potential scaling of identities in =
the DNS, we should consider the impacts of having billions of IoT devices t=
hat have their identities in the DNS.


CLASSIFICATION:CONFIDENTIAL

-----Original Message-----
From: Danish <danish-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Paul Nohats
Sent: May 12, 2021 9:48 PM
To: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson=3D40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: danish@ietf.org
Subject: [EXT] Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter

On Wed, 12 May 2021, Ash Wilson wrote:

> DANE=A2s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and DNS for se=
rver identity.

Please change to "only covered authentication for the TLS server identity".

The term PKI is loaded, as DANE is a PKI that works as alternative to WebPK=
I, but the DANE standard was forced to add support for WebPKI validation.

> which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have not=
 yet implemented DNSSEC..

This is confusing. DANE stands for "DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entit=
ies". There is only one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNSSEC. I thin=
k it would be more fair to say you are looking at two different methods, on=
e using authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS authentication method. Th=
at second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish either, it has nothing to do =
with DANE)

> Problem statement
> Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows=20
> authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC=20
> is used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy=20
> to bind an identity=A2s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the DNS =
namespace and the DNS root zone=A2s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the ba=
rrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs participating in application de=
ployment.
>=20
> The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.=20
> DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain disco=
very for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case.

The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avoid using DNSSEC is ever increas=
ing. At some point it reaches more pages than the DNSSEC standard. With DoH=
 and DoT, the issue of reaching a reliable DNSSEC capable server has been l=
argely solved.

> This alternative mode will allow the use of=A0 Web PKI to securely=20
> discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a=20
> gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of=20
> requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS =
authentication, the application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the zo=
ne.

This is also really confusing. What CA would the TLS client use for its mut=
ual TLS authentication? Either it is a private one (eg non-webpki) that _re=
quires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it is some semi-private but webpki verified=
 CA, which honestly is just WebPKI as-is.

> Scope of work
> The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the=20
> primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH=20
> will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent=20
> client identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key=20
> discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will also define any requ=
ired TLS protocol updates to support client authentication using DANE. DANI=
SH will define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, usin=
g DANE DNS record types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode fr=
om Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.

So you are bootstrapping webpki via unsigned DANE DNS records? That seems d=
angerous. DANE was never meant to be used without DNSSEC.

Originally, I thought DANISCH was about providing identities to TLS clients=
 to compliment authentiation of TLS servers. But now I read the charter as =
a work around for somehow adding external trust parties to the DNS to repla=
ce or augment DNSSEC. That has me worried.

I think what really needs clarification is if you are working on mutual aut=
henticated TLS only, or working on some other things. If working on mutual =
TLS only, I do not see the case for a DNSSEC-non-DNSSEC protocol.

Paul

--
Danish mailing list
Danish@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/danish


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From: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson@valimail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 13:21:30 -0700
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter
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Hey Paul,
Thanks for your feedback, responses in-line below...

On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 6:48 PM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Wed, 12 May 2021, Ash Wilson wrote:
>
> > DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and DN=
S for
> server identity.
>
> Please change to "only covered authentication for the TLS server
> identity".


> The term PKI is loaded, as DANE is a PKI that works as alternative to
> WebPKI,
> but the DANE standard was forced to add support for WebPKI validation.
>
Ok, no problem. I'll make that change.

>
> > which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have
> not yet implemented DNSSEC..
>
> This is confusing. DANE stands for "DNS-Based Authentication of Named
> Entities". There is only
> one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNSSEC. I think it would be
> more fair to say you are looking at two different methods, one using
> authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS authentication method. That
> second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish either, it has nothing to do
> with DANE)
>
For the limited set of use cases we're recommending for the transitional
mode, DNS still remains the authentication system's namespace and discovery
mechanism. The PKI used for authenticating discovered CA certificates is
Web PKI instead of DNSSEC.

>
> > Problem statement
> > Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows
> authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is
> > used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to
> bind an identity=E2=80=99s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on
> > the DNS namespace and the DNS root zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor,
> eliminating the barrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs
> > participating in application deployment.
> >
> > The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.
> DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and
> > trust chain discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging securit=
y
> use case.
>
> The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avoid using DNSSEC is ever
> increasing. At some point it reaches more pages than the DNSSEC
> standard. With DoH and DoT, the issue of reaching a reliable DNSSEC
> capable server has been largely solved.
>
I understand the frustration with the lack of DNSSEC adoption, and I agree
with you that it is easier and safer to adopt than in the past.
Unfortunately, adoption remains abysmal. We expect that by adding this
transitional mode in the adoption path for DANE, it will incentivize the
eventual adoption of DNSSEC.

>
> > This alternative mode will allow the use of  Web
> > PKI to securely discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This
> allows for a gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the
> > initial set of requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DAN=
E
> for mutual TLS authentication, the application owner must
> > then configure DNSSEC for the zone.
>
> This is also really confusing. What CA would the TLS client use for its
> mutual TLS authentication? Either it is a private one (eg non-webpki)
> that _requires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it is some semi-private but
> webpki verified CA, which honestly is just WebPKI as-is.
>
The use cases we're looking at for the transitional mode center around
discovering private PKI entity and CA certificates. The pattern we are
exploring has the entity certificate in the TLSA record and the CA
certificate discoverable via HTTPS.

>
> > Scope of work
> > The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the
> primary application components, and their interaction
> > patterns. DANISH will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records
> to represent client identity for TLS connections and how to
> > perform public key discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will
> also define any required TLS protocol updates to support
> > client authentication using DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby
> Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record
> > types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode from Web PKI to
> the DNSSEC-based trust model.
>
> So you are bootstrapping webpki via unsigned DANE DNS records? That
> seems dangerous. DANE was never meant to be used without DNSSEC.
>
> Originally, I thought DANISCH was about providing identities to TLS
> clients to compliment authentiation of TLS servers. But now I read
> the charter as a work around for somehow adding external trust parties
> to the DNS to replace or augment DNSSEC. That has me worried.
>
> I think what really needs clarification is if you are working on mutual
> authenticated TLS only, or working on some other things. If working on
> mutual TLS only, I do not see the case for a DNSSEC-non-DNSSEC protocol.
>
The transitional mode use cases for entity and CA certificate discovery
don't involve changes to the TLS library. An example use case for this mode
is the discovery of entity certificates for authenticating signed telemetry
in decoupled applications.
DANE client identity support within the TLS handshake requires DNSSEC, and
we're looking to establish that pattern via the client ID and client
certificate drafts. So if an organization wants to transition from
certificate discovery use cases to having DANE client identity support in
the TLS protocol, they'll have to take the final step and implement DNSSEC.

>
> Paul
>


--=20

*Ash Wilson* | Technical Director
*e:* ash.wilson@valimail.com

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hey Paul,</div><div>Thanks for your feedback, respons=
es in-line below...</div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 6:48 PM Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On Wed, 12 May 2021, Ash Wilson wr=
ote:<br>
<br>
&gt; DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and D=
NS for server identity.<br>
<br>
Please change to &quot;only covered authentication for the TLS server ident=
ity&quot;.=C2=A0</blockquote><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1=
ex">
<br>
The term PKI is loaded, as DANE is a PKI that works as alternative to WebPK=
I,<br>
but the DANE standard was forced to add support for WebPKI validation.<br><=
/blockquote><div>Ok, no problem. I&#39;ll make that change.=C2=A0</div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have =
not yet implemented DNSSEC..<br>
<br>
This is confusing. DANE stands for &quot;DNS-Based Authentication of Named =
Entities&quot;. There is only<br>
one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNSSEC. I think it would be<br>
more fair to say you are looking at two different methods, one using<br>
authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS authentication method. That<br>
second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish either, it has nothing to do<br>
with DANE)<br></blockquote><div>For the limited set of use cases we&#39;re =
recommending for the transitional mode, DNS still remains the authenticatio=
n system&#39;s namespace and discovery mechanism. The PKI used for authenti=
cating discovered CA certificates is Web PKI instead of DNSSEC.=C2=A0</div>=
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-=
left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; Problem statement<br>
&gt; Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows authentica=
tion across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is<br>
&gt; used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to=
 bind an identity=E2=80=99s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on<br>
&gt; the DNS namespace and the DNS root zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor,=
 eliminating the barrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs<br>
&gt; participating in application deployment.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.=
 DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and<br>
&gt; trust chain discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging securi=
ty use case.<br>
<br>
The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avoid using DNSSEC is ever<br>
increasing. At some point it reaches more pages than the DNSSEC<br>
standard. With DoH and DoT, the issue of reaching a reliable DNSSEC<br>
capable server has been largely solved.<br></blockquote><div>I understand t=
he frustration with the lack of DNSSEC adoption,=C2=A0and I agree with you =
that it is easier and safer to adopt than in the past. Unfortunately, adopt=
ion remains abysmal. We expect that by adding this transitional mode in the=
 adoption path for DANE, it will incentivize the eventual adoption of DNSSE=
C.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; This alternative mode will allow the use of=C2=A0 Web<br>
&gt; PKI to securely discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This =
allows for a gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the<br>
&gt; initial set of requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DA=
NE for mutual TLS authentication, the application owner must<br>
&gt; then configure DNSSEC for the zone.<br>
<br>
This is also really confusing. What CA would the TLS client use for its<br>
mutual TLS authentication? Either it is a private one (eg non-webpki)<br>
that _requires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it is some semi-private but<br>
webpki verified CA, which honestly is just WebPKI as-is.<br></blockquote><d=
iv>The use cases we&#39;re looking at for the transitional mode center arou=
nd discovering private PKI entity and CA certificates. The pattern we are e=
xploring has the entity certificate in the TLSA record and the CA certifica=
te discoverable via HTTPS.</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex">
<br>
&gt; Scope of work<br>
&gt; The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the =
primary application components, and their interaction<br>
&gt; patterns. DANISH will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records=
 to represent client identity for TLS connections and how to<br>
&gt; perform public key discovery for object security use cases. DANISH wil=
l also define any required TLS protocol updates to support<br>
&gt; client authentication using DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby =
Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record<br>
&gt; types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode from Web PKI to=
 the DNSSEC-based trust model.<br>
<br>
So you are bootstrapping webpki via unsigned DANE DNS records? That<br>
seems dangerous. DANE was never meant to be used without DNSSEC.<br>
<br>
Originally, I thought DANISCH was about providing identities to TLS<br>
clients to compliment authentiation of TLS servers. But now I read<br>
the charter as a work around for somehow adding external trust parties<br>
to the DNS to replace or augment DNSSEC. That has me worried.<br>
<br>
I think what really needs clarification is if you are working on mutual<br>
authenticated TLS only, or working on some other things. If working on<br>
mutual TLS only, I do not see the case for a DNSSEC-non-DNSSEC protocol.<br=
></blockquote><div></div><div>The transitional mode use cases for entity an=
d CA certificate discovery don&#39;t involve changes to the TLS library. An=
 example use case for this mode is the discovery of entity certificates for=
 authenticating signed telemetry in decoupled applications.</div><div>DANE =
client identity support within the TLS handshake requires DNSSEC, and we&#3=
9;re looking to establish that pattern via the client ID and client certifi=
cate drafts.=C2=A0So if an organization wants to transition from certificat=
e discovery use cases to having DANE client identity support in the TLS pro=
tocol, they&#39;ll have to take the final step and implement DNSSEC.</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Paul<br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><span><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.656;=
margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"></p><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span =
style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-=
family:Arial"><b>Ash Wilson</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-align:baselin=
e;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"> | Technical Dire=
ctor</span></div><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span s=
tyle=3D"vertical-align:baseline"><b>e:</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-al=
ign:baseline"> <a href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>ash.wilson@valimail.com</a> </span><span></span></div><div style=3D"text-a=
lign:left"><img style=3D"width: 175px; height: 43px;" src=3D"https://hosted=
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yle=3D"font-size:10.6667px;white-space:pre-wrap">This email and all data tr=
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In-Reply-To: <a9db0d4e014540e0879eee13c00984ad@cira.ca>
From: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson@valimail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 13:32:37 -0700
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To: Jacques Latour <Jacques.Latour@cira.ca>
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Subject: Re: [Danish] [EXT] Re:  Proposed DANISH charter
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Hi Jacques,
I'll make the change for specifying TLS server authentication. I also agree
that we should investigate the impact of placing large volumes of client
identities in DNS.
I have done some initial feasibility testing using RIPE ATLAS. However,
that research was geared toward understanding the deliverability of DNS
records containing full certificates across the world, and not necessarily
load testing for intermediate infrastructure.

On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 6:42 AM Jacques Latour <Jacques.Latour@cira.ca>
wrote:

> I agree w/Paul, mutual TLS connection & DNSSEC enabled entities, and
> perhaps add a scope in the charter to address potential scaling of
> identities in the DNS, we should consider the impacts of having billions =
of
> IoT devices that have their identities in the DNS.
>
>
> CLASSIFICATION:CONFIDENTIAL
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Danish <danish-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Paul Nohats
> Sent: May 12, 2021 9:48 PM
> To: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson=3D40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
> Cc: danish@ietf.org
> Subject: [EXT] Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter
>
> On Wed, 12 May 2021, Ash Wilson wrote:
>
> > DANE=C2=A2s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and DNS f=
or
> server identity.
>
> Please change to "only covered authentication for the TLS server identity=
".
>
> The term PKI is loaded, as DANE is a PKI that works as alternative to
> WebPKI, but the DANE standard was forced to add support for WebPKI
> validation.
>
> > which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have
> not yet implemented DNSSEC..
>
> This is confusing. DANE stands for "DNS-Based Authentication of Named
> Entities". There is only one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNSSEC.=
 I
> think it would be more fair to say you are looking at two different
> methods, one using authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS authenticati=
on
> method. That second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish either, it has
> nothing to do with DANE)
>
> > Problem statement
> > Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows
> > authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC
> > is used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy
> > to bind an identity=C2=A2s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the=
 DNS
> namespace and the DNS root zone=C2=A2s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating t=
he
> barrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs participating in applicatio=
n
> deployment.
> >
> > The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.
> > DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain
> discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case.
>
> The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avoid using DNSSEC is ever
> increasing. At some point it reaches more pages than the DNSSEC standard.
> With DoH and DoT, the issue of reaching a reliable DNSSEC capable server
> has been largely solved.
>
> > This alternative mode will allow the use of  Web PKI to securely
> > discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a
> > gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of
> > requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TL=
S
> authentication, the application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the
> zone.
>
> This is also really confusing. What CA would the TLS client use for its
> mutual TLS authentication? Either it is a private one (eg non-webpki) tha=
t
> _requires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it is some semi-private but webpki
> verified CA, which honestly is just WebPKI as-is.
>
> > Scope of work
> > The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the
> > primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH
> > will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent
> > client identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key
> > discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will also define any
> required TLS protocol updates to support client authentication using DANE=
.
> DANISH will define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC=
,
> using DANE DNS record types under specific use cases, as a transitional
> mode from Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.
>
> So you are bootstrapping webpki via unsigned DANE DNS records? That seems
> dangerous. DANE was never meant to be used without DNSSEC.
>
> Originally, I thought DANISCH was about providing identities to TLS
> clients to compliment authentiation of TLS servers. But now I read the
> charter as a work around for somehow adding external trust parties to the
> DNS to replace or augment DNSSEC. That has me worried.
>
> I think what really needs clarification is if you are working on mutual
> authenticated TLS only, or working on some other things. If working on
> mutual TLS only, I do not see the case for a DNSSEC-non-DNSSEC protocol.
>
> Paul
>
> --
> Danish mailing list
> Danish@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/danish
>


--=20

*Ash Wilson* | Technical Director
*e:* ash.wilson@valimail.com

This email and all data transmitted with it contains confidential and/or
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authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended and authorized
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Jacques,<div>I&#39;ll make the change for specifying TL=
S server authentication. I also agree that we should investigate the impact=
 of placing large volumes of client identities in DNS.=C2=A0</div><div>I ha=
ve done some initial feasibility testing using RIPE ATLAS. However, that re=
search was geared toward understanding the deliverability of DNS records co=
ntaining full certificates across the world, and not necessarily load testi=
ng for intermediate infrastructure.</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 6:42 AM Ja=
cques Latour &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Jacques.Latour@cira.ca">Jacques.Latour@c=
ira.ca</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex">I agree w/Paul, mutual TLS connection &amp; DNSSEC enabled entities, =
and perhaps add a scope in the charter to address potential scaling of iden=
tities in the DNS, we should consider the impacts of having billions of IoT=
 devices that have their identities in the DNS.<br>
<br>
<br>
CLASSIFICATION:CONFIDENTIAL<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Danish &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:danish-bounces@ietf.org" target=3D"_blan=
k">danish-bounces@ietf.org</a>&gt; On Behalf Of Paul Nohats<br>
Sent: May 12, 2021 9:48 PM<br>
To: Ash Wilson &lt;ash.wilson=3D<a href=3D"mailto:40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf=
.org" target=3D"_blank">40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt;<br>
Cc: <a href=3D"mailto:danish@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">danish@ietf.org</a=
><br>
Subject: [EXT] Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter<br>
<br>
On Wed, 12 May 2021, Ash Wilson wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; DANE=C2=A2s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and DNS =
for server identity.<br>
<br>
Please change to &quot;only covered authentication for the TLS server ident=
ity&quot;.<br>
<br>
The term PKI is loaded, as DANE is a PKI that works as alternative to WebPK=
I, but the DANE standard was forced to add support for WebPKI validation.<b=
r>
<br>
&gt; which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have =
not yet implemented DNSSEC..<br>
<br>
This is confusing. DANE stands for &quot;DNS-Based Authentication of Named =
Entities&quot;. There is only one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNSS=
EC. I think it would be more fair to say you are looking at two different m=
ethods, one using authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS authentication =
method. That second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish either, it has noth=
ing to do with DANE)<br>
<br>
&gt; Problem statement<br>
&gt; Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows <br>
&gt; authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC <=
br>
&gt; is used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy=
 <br>
&gt; to bind an identity=C2=A2s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on th=
e DNS namespace and the DNS root zone=C2=A2s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminati=
ng the barrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs participating in appli=
cation deployment.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.=
 <br>
&gt; DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain di=
scovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case.<br>
<br>
The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avoid using DNSSEC is ever increas=
ing. At some point it reaches more pages than the DNSSEC standard. With DoH=
 and DoT, the issue of reaching a reliable DNSSEC capable server has been l=
argely solved.<br>
<br>
&gt; This alternative mode will allow the use of=C2=A0 Web PKI to securely =
<br>
&gt; discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a <br=
>
&gt; gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of <br>
&gt; requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual T=
LS authentication, the application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the=
 zone.<br>
<br>
This is also really confusing. What CA would the TLS client use for its mut=
ual TLS authentication? Either it is a private one (eg non-webpki) that _re=
quires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it is some semi-private but webpki verified=
 CA, which honestly is just WebPKI as-is.<br>
<br>
&gt; Scope of work<br>
&gt; The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the =
<br>
&gt; primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH=
 <br>
&gt; will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent <br=
>
&gt; client identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key <br>
&gt; discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will also define any r=
equired TLS protocol updates to support client authentication using DANE. D=
ANISH will define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, u=
sing DANE DNS record types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode=
 from Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.<br>
<br>
So you are bootstrapping webpki via unsigned DANE DNS records? That seems d=
angerous. DANE was never meant to be used without DNSSEC.<br>
<br>
Originally, I thought DANISCH was about providing identities to TLS clients=
 to compliment authentiation of TLS servers. But now I read the charter as =
a work around for somehow adding external trust parties to the DNS to repla=
ce or augment DNSSEC. That has me worried.<br>
<br>
I think what really needs clarification is if you are working on mutual aut=
henticated TLS only, or working on some other things. If working on mutual =
TLS only, I do not see the case for a DNSSEC-non-DNSSEC protocol.<br>
<br>
Paul<br>
<br>
--<br>
Danish mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:Danish@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">Danish@ietf.org</a><br=
>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/danish" rel=3D"noreferrer"=
 target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/danish</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><span><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.656;=
margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"></p><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span =
style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-=
family:Arial"><b>Ash Wilson</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-align:baselin=
e;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"> | Technical Dire=
ctor</span></div><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span s=
tyle=3D"vertical-align:baseline"><b>e:</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-al=
ign:baseline"> <a href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>ash.wilson@valimail.com</a> </span><span></span></div><div style=3D"text-a=
lign:left"><img style=3D"width: 175px; height: 43px;" src=3D"https://hosted=
-packages.s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/Valimail+Logo.png"></div></span><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255);line-height:1.38;margin=
-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Arial" color=3D"#666666"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:10.6667px;white-space:pre-wrap">This email and all data tr=
ansmitted with it contains confidential and/or proprietary information inte=
nded solely for the use of individual(s) authorized to receive it. If you a=
re not an intended and authorized recipient you are hereby notified of any =
use, disclosure, copying or distribution of the information included in thi=
s transmission is prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately notify=
 the sender by replying to this email and then delete it from your system.<=
/span></font></p></span></div>

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Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 17:52:31 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson@valimail.com>
cc: danish@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter
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On Tue, 18 May 2021, Ash Wilson wrote:

> Ok, no problem. I'll make that change.Â 

Thanks.

>       > which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have not yet implemented DNSSEC..
>
>       This is confusing. DANE stands for "DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities". There is only
>       one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNSSEC. I think it would be
>       more fair to say you are looking at two different methods, one using
>       authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS authentication method. That
>       second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish either, it has nothing to do
>       with DANE)
> 
> For the limited set of use cases we're recommending for the transitional mode, DNS still remains the authentication
> system's namespace and discovery mechanism. The PKI used for authenticating discovered CA certificates is Web PKI
> instead of DNSSEC.Â 

If you are authenticating "discovered CA certificates" with webpki, you
must have a preloaded list of webpki acceptable CA certificates ? So if
you have that, can't a TLS client with EEcert signed by a "discovered CA
cert" already connect with the current protcols and technologies? What
use case is currently not covered that you want DANISH to cover?

>       The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avoid using DNSSEC is ever
>       increasing. At some point it reaches more pages than the DNSSEC
>       standard. With DoH and DoT, the issue of reaching a reliable DNSSEC
>       capable server has been largely solved.
> 
> I understand the frustration with the lack of DNSSEC adoption,Â and I agree with you that it is easier and safer to adopt
> than in the past. Unfortunately, adoption remains abysmal. We expect that by adding this transitional mode in the
> adoption path for DANE, it will incentivize the eventual adoption of DNSSEC.

I'm not sure why DANISH wouldn't be treated equally to DANE and be
ignored. Any "transitional" mode that offers webpki will be the final
mode, with CT or something else bolted on top.

>       > This alternative mode will allow the use ofÂ  Web
>       > PKI to securely discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE adoption
>       where DNSSEC is not in the
>       > initial set of requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS authentication,
>       the application owner must
>       > then configure DNSSEC for the zone.
>
>       This is also really confusing. What CA would the TLS client use for its
>       mutual TLS authentication? Either it is a private one (eg non-webpki)
>       that _requires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it is some semi-private but
>       webpki verified CA, which honestly is just WebPKI as-is.
> 
> The use cases we're looking at for the transitional mode center around discovering private PKI entity and CA
> certificates. The pattern we are exploring has the entity certificate in the TLSA record and the CA certificate
> discoverable via HTTPS.

Hmm. So you are thinking of somehow using TLSA records, without DNSSEC
protection, to publish CA certs, that will then need to somehow link
back to webpki. I don't think the HTTPS servers are going to do any
kind of DNS lookup (let alone DNSSEC lookups) and will just have the
CA's allowed hardcoded.

> The transitional mode use cases for entity and CA certificate discovery don't involve changes to the TLS library. An
> example use case for this mode is the discovery of entity certificates for authenticating signed telemetry in decoupled
> applications.
> DANE client identity support within the TLS handshake requires DNSSEC, and we're looking to establish that pattern via
> the client ID and client certificate drafts.Â So if an organization wants to transition from certificate discovery use
> cases to having DANE client identity support in the TLS protocol, they'll have to take the final step and implement
> DNSSEC.

Okay. Thanks for the clarification. I do wish you look with this moving
DNSSEC deployment forward, but I don't see this based on the charter
text or your explanations. But I also wouldn't stand in your way of
trying.

I do think it would be better for the IETF to take a stance on DNSSEC
and make it mandatory to implement, so we can phase out unsigned DNS.
If I see the amount of data currently in DNS (eg do a dig txt cnn.com)
and with things like the proposed SVCB records, and any linking of
pubkey materials in hiding/encrypting the SNI using DNS, it is proper
for the IETF to state that DNSSEC is just a mandatory part of DNS. But
that's not a problem for DANISH to solve.

Paul


From nobody Tue May 18 18:44:48 2021
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In-Reply-To: <4ec8863-a27e-f25b-7fcc-6a2466c650ff@nohats.ca>
From: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson@valimail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 18:44:26 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter
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Hey Paul,

Thanks for your input here. I hope you'll keep the feedback coming as we
dig into the drafts as well.
Responses in-line below...

On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 2:52 PM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Tue, 18 May 2021, Ash Wilson wrote:
>
> > Ok, no problem. I'll make that change.
>
> Thanks.
>
> >       > which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who
> have not yet implemented DNSSEC..
> >
> >       This is confusing. DANE stands for "DNS-Based Authentication of
> Named Entities". There is only
> >       one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNSSEC. I think it would
> be
> >       more fair to say you are looking at two different methods, one
> using
> >       authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS authentication method.
> That
> >       second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish either, it has nothing
> to do
> >       with DANE)
> >
> > For the limited set of use cases we're recommending for the transitional
> mode, DNS still remains the authentication
> > system's namespace and discovery mechanism. The PKI used for
> authenticating discovered CA certificates is Web PKI
> > instead of DNSSEC.
>
> If you are authenticating "discovered CA certificates" with webpki, you
> must have a preloaded list of webpki acceptable CA certificates ? So if
> you have that, can't a TLS client with EEcert signed by a "discovered CA
> cert" already connect with the current protcols and technologies? What
> use case is currently not covered that you want DANISH to cover?
>

IoT devices shouldn't necessarily present browser-trusted certificates.
Also, getting certificates that validate to the WebPKI are typically more
expensive... Letsencrypt being an exception to that rule, but with some
challenges for bootstrapping IoT device identity.
We want organizations to be able to use private PKI and lessen the
associated interoperability challenges. If you look at the proposed naming
pattern (device123._device.organization.example), we have an underscore in
the identity type label that makes the devices' DNS name ineligible for
WebPKI, and that's intentional. The root of trust for transitional mode is
in the browser bundle, which authenticates the TLS connection used for
discovering private PKI CA certificates (this will probably end up being
something like
https://device.organization.example/.well-known/ca/${authorityKeyID}.pem).
The private CA certificates are then used to validate the entity
certificates discovered via TLSA records.

>
> >       The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avoid using DNSSEC is ever
> >       increasing. At some point it reaches more pages than the DNSSEC
> >       standard. With DoH and DoT, the issue of reaching a reliable DNSSEC
> >       capable server has been largely solved.
> >
> > I understand the frustration with the lack of DNSSEC adoption, and I
> agree with you that it is easier and safer to adopt
> > than in the past. Unfortunately, adoption remains abysmal. We expect
> that by adding this transitional mode in the
> > adoption path for DANE, it will incentivize the eventual adoption of
> DNSSEC.
>
> I'm not sure why DANISH wouldn't be treated equally to DANE and be
> ignored. Any "transitional" mode that offers webpki will be the final
> mode, with CT or something else bolted on top.
>
You make a good point, and there's really not anything preventing anyone
from implementing this against our guidance right now.
I think that if we hold on to the DNSSEC requirement for any updates to how
the TLS handshake works, that will offer some measure of safety.

>
> >       > This alternative mode will allow the use of  Web
> >       > PKI to securely discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC.
> This allows for a gradual DANE adoption
> >       where DNSSEC is not in the
> >       > initial set of requirements. If the application owner wishes to
> use DANE for mutual TLS authentication,
> >       the application owner must
> >       > then configure DNSSEC for the zone.
> >
> >       This is also really confusing. What CA would the TLS client use
> for its
> >       mutual TLS authentication? Either it is a private one (eg
> non-webpki)
> >       that _requires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it is some semi-private but
> >       webpki verified CA, which honestly is just WebPKI as-is.
> >
> > The use cases we're looking at for the transitional mode center around
> discovering private PKI entity and CA
> > certificates. The pattern we are exploring has the entity certificate in
> the TLSA record and the CA certificate
> > discoverable via HTTPS.
>
> Hmm. So you are thinking of somehow using TLSA records, without DNSSEC
> protection, to publish CA certs, that will then need to somehow link
> back to webpki. I don't think the HTTPS servers are going to do any
> kind of DNS lookup (let alone DNSSEC lookups) and will just have the
> CA's allowed hardcoded.
>
Nope, let me clarify: The private PKI CA certificates are discovered via
HTTPS, which is server-authenticated using Web PKI. Entity certificates are
discovered via TLSA records, and authenticated using the discovered private
PKI CA certificates.
Keep in mind that we aren't recommending the implementation of transitional
mode in the TLS handshake. Transitional mode is only for discovering entity
and CA certificates outside the context of a TLS handshake.

>
> > The transitional mode use cases for entity and CA certificate discovery
> don't involve changes to the TLS library. An
> > example use case for this mode is the discovery of entity certificates
> for authenticating signed telemetry in decoupled
> > applications.
> > DANE client identity support within the TLS handshake requires DNSSEC,
> and we're looking to establish that pattern via
> > the client ID and client certificate drafts. So if an organization wants
> to transition from certificate discovery use
> > cases to having DANE client identity support in the TLS protocol,
> they'll have to take the final step and implement
> > DNSSEC.
>
> Okay. Thanks for the clarification. I do wish you look with this moving
> DNSSEC deployment forward, but I don't see this based on the charter
> text or your explanations. But I also wouldn't stand in your way of
> trying.
>
Yeah, we were trying to keep the charter as succinct as possible, and leave
the implementation details to the drafts themselves. How would you prefer
we update/clarify the charter?

>
> I do think it would be better for the IETF to take a stance on DNSSEC
> and make it mandatory to implement, so we can phase out unsigned DNS.
> If I see the amount of data currently in DNS (eg do a dig txt cnn.com)
> and with things like the proposed SVCB records, and any linking of
> pubkey materials in hiding/encrypting the SNI using DNS, it is proper
> for the IETF to state that DNSSEC is just a mandatory part of DNS. But
> that's not a problem for DANISH to solve.
>
> Paul
>


-- 

*Ash Wilson* | Technical Director
*e:* ash.wilson@valimail.com

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--0000000000002a36a205c2a4f8df
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hey Paul,=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks for y=
our input here. I hope you&#39;ll keep the feedback coming as we dig into t=
he drafts as well.</div>Responses in-line below...<div><br><div class=3D"gm=
ail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 2:=
52 PM Paul Wouters &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:paul@nohats.ca">paul@nohats.ca</a>=
&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">On T=
ue, 18 May 2021, Ash Wilson wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Ok, no problem. I&#39;ll make that change.=C2=A0<br>
<br>
Thanks.<br>
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; which will allow the safe adoption of D=
ANE for domain owners who have not yet implemented DNSSEC..<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0This is confusing. DANE stands for &quot;DNS=
-Based Authentication of Named Entities&quot;. There is only<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0one DNS-Based Authentication and that is DNS=
SEC. I think it would be<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0more fair to say you are looking at two diff=
erent methods, one using<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0authenticated DNS and one using a non-DNS au=
thentication method. That<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0second matter is not DANE (and not DANEish e=
ither, it has nothing to do<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0with DANE)<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; For the limited set of use cases we&#39;re recommending for the transi=
tional mode, DNS still remains the authentication<br>
&gt; system&#39;s namespace and discovery mechanism. The PKI used for authe=
nticating discovered CA certificates is Web PKI<br>
&gt; instead of DNSSEC.=C2=A0<br>
<br>
If you are authenticating &quot;discovered CA certificates&quot; with webpk=
i, you<br>
must have a preloaded list of webpki acceptable CA certificates ? So if<br>
you have that, can&#39;t a TLS client with EEcert signed by a &quot;discove=
red CA<br>
cert&quot; already connect with the current protcols and technologies? What=
<br>
use case is currently not covered that you want DANISH to cover?<br></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>IoT devices shouldn&#39;t necessarily present bro=
wser-trusted certificates. Also, getting certificates that validate to the =
WebPKI are typically more expensive... Letsencrypt being an exception to th=
at rule,=C2=A0but with some challenges for bootstrapping IoT device identit=
y.=C2=A0</div><div>We want organizations to be able to use private PKI and =
lessen the associated=C2=A0interoperability challenges. If you look at the =
proposed naming pattern (device123._device.organization.example), we have a=
n underscore in the identity type label that makes the devices&#39; DNS nam=
e ineligible for WebPKI, and that&#39;s intentional. The root of trust for =
transitional mode is in the browser bundle, which authenticates the TLS con=
nection used for discovering private PKI CA certificates (this will probabl=
y end up being something like <a href=3D"https://device.organization.exampl=
e/.well-known/ca/${authorityKeyID}.pem">https://device.organization.example=
/.well-known/ca/${authorityKeyID}.pem</a>). The private CA certificates are=
 then used to validate the entity certificates discovered via TLSA records.=
</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;b=
order-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0The amount of draft/RFC pages written to avo=
id using DNSSEC is ever<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0increasing. At some point it reaches more pa=
ges than the DNSSEC<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0standard. With DoH and DoT, the issue of rea=
ching a reliable DNSSEC<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0capable server has been largely solved.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; I understand the frustration with the lack of DNSSEC adoption,=C2=A0an=
d I agree with you that it is easier and safer to adopt<br>
&gt; than in the past. Unfortunately, adoption remains abysmal. We expect t=
hat by adding this transitional mode in the<br>
&gt; adoption path for DANE, it will incentivize the eventual adoption of D=
NSSEC.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not sure why DANISH wouldn&#39;t be treated equally to DANE and be<=
br>
ignored. Any &quot;transitional&quot; mode that offers webpki will be the f=
inal<br>
mode, with CT or something else bolted on top.<br></blockquote><div>You mak=
e a good point, and there&#39;s really not anything preventing anyone from =
implementing this against our guidance right now.=C2=A0</div><div>I think t=
hat if we hold on to the DNSSEC requirement for any updates to how the TLS =
handshake works, that will offer some measure of safety.</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px soli=
d rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; This alternative mode will allow the us=
e of=C2=A0 Web<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; PKI to securely discover certificates, =
in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE adoption<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0where DNSSEC is not in the<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; initial set of requirements. If the app=
lication owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS authentication,<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the application owner must<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&gt; then configure DNSSEC for the zone.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0This is also really confusing. What CA would=
 the TLS client use for its<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0mutual TLS authentication? Either it is a pr=
ivate one (eg non-webpki)<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0that _requires_ anchoring in DNSSEC, or it i=
s some semi-private but<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0webpki verified CA, which honestly is just W=
ebPKI as-is.<br>
&gt; <br>
&gt; The use cases we&#39;re looking at for the transitional mode center ar=
ound discovering private PKI entity and CA<br>
&gt; certificates. The pattern we are exploring has the entity certificate =
in the TLSA record and the CA certificate<br>
&gt; discoverable via HTTPS.<br>
<br>
Hmm. So you are thinking of somehow using TLSA records, without DNSSEC<br>
protection, to publish CA certs, that will then need to somehow link<br>
back to webpki. I don&#39;t think the HTTPS servers are going to do any<br>
kind of DNS lookup (let alone DNSSEC lookups) and will just have the<br>
CA&#39;s allowed hardcoded.<br></blockquote><div>Nope, let me clarify: The =
private PKI CA certificates are discovered via HTTPS, which is server-authe=
nticated using Web PKI. Entity certificates are discovered via TLSA records=
, and authenticated using the discovered private PKI CA certificates.</div>=
<div>Keep in mind that we aren&#39;t recommending the implementation of tra=
nsitional mode in the TLS handshake. Transitional mode is only for discover=
ing entity and CA certificates outside the context of a TLS handshake.</div=
><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border=
-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
&gt; The transitional mode use cases for entity and CA certificate discover=
y don&#39;t involve changes to the TLS library. An<br>
&gt; example use case for this mode is the discovery of entity certificates=
 for authenticating signed telemetry in decoupled<br>
&gt; applications.<br>
&gt; DANE client identity support within the TLS handshake requires DNSSEC,=
 and we&#39;re looking to establish that pattern via<br>
&gt; the client ID and client certificate drafts.=C2=A0So if an organizatio=
n wants to transition from certificate discovery use<br>
&gt; cases to having DANE client identity support in the TLS protocol, they=
&#39;ll have to take the final step and implement<br>
&gt; DNSSEC.<br>
<br>
Okay. Thanks for the clarification. I do wish you look with this moving<br>
DNSSEC deployment forward, but I don&#39;t see this based on the charter<br=
>
text or your explanations. But I also wouldn&#39;t stand in your way of<br>
trying.<br></blockquote><div>Yeah, we were trying to keep the charter as su=
ccinct as possible, and leave the implementation details to the drafts them=
selves. How would you prefer we update/clarify the charter?=C2=A0</div><blo=
ckquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left=
:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
I do think it would be better for the IETF to take a stance on DNSSEC<br>
and make it mandatory to implement, so we can phase out unsigned DNS.<br>
If I see the amount of data currently in DNS (eg do a dig txt <a href=3D"ht=
tp://cnn.com" rel=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">cnn.com</a>)<br>
and with things like the proposed SVCB records, and any linking of<br>
pubkey materials in hiding/encrypting the SNI using DNS, it is proper<br>
for the IETF to state that DNSSEC is just a mandatory part of DNS. But<br>
that&#39;s not a problem for DANISH to solve.<br>
<br>
Paul<br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><span><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.656;=
margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"></p><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span =
style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-=
family:Arial"><b>Ash Wilson</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-align:baselin=
e;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"> | Technical Dire=
ctor</span></div><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span s=
tyle=3D"vertical-align:baseline"><b>e:</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-al=
ign:baseline"> <a href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>ash.wilson@valimail.com</a> </span><span></span></div><div style=3D"text-a=
lign:left"><img style=3D"width: 175px; height: 43px;" src=3D"https://hosted=
-packages.s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/Valimail+Logo.png"></div></span><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255);line-height:1.38;margin=
-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Arial" color=3D"#666666"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:10.6667px;white-space:pre-wrap">This email and all data tr=
ansmitted with it contains confidential and/or proprietary information inte=
nded solely for the use of individual(s) authorized to receive it. If you a=
re not an intended and authorized recipient you are hereby notified of any =
use, disclosure, copying or distribution of the information included in thi=
s transmission is prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately notify=
 the sender by replying to this email and then delete it from your system.<=
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From: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson@valimail.com>
Date: Thu, 20 May 2021 22:23:41 -0700
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--000000000000f73e1e05c2d04335
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
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Hi everyone,
I've updated the text stating DANE's original purpose, according to
recommendations from Paul and Jacques.

Any other comments or suggestions for clarification? We've had some
dialogue and I want to make sure that anything that's not sufficiently
clear for a charter-level doc is appropriately addressed.

-----
Objective
DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered authentication for the TLS ser=
ver
identity. The DANISH working group seeks to extend the DANE standard to
encompass client identity and message sender identity use cases. DANISH
also seeks to define a transitional mode for DANE, which will allow the
safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have not yet implemented
DNSSEC..

Problem statement
Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows authentication
across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is used instead of a
CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to bind an identity=E2=80=
=99s
name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the DNS namespace and the DNS root
zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the barrier to adoption for
multiple private PKIs participating in application deployment.

The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.
DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain
discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case. This
alternative mode will allow the use of  Web PKI to securely discover
certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE
adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of requirements. If the
application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS authentication, the
application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the zone.

Scope of work
The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the
primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH will
establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent client
identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key discovery for
object security use cases. DANISH will also define any required TLS
protocol updates to support client authentication using DANE. DANISH will
define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE
DNS record types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode from Web
PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.

While modifications to the following standards are not within the scope of
the DANISH charter, the DANISH working group will take care to ensure a
potential path for interoperability with the following standards, enabling
potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, MLS, EAP-TLS, SMIMEA (RFC 8162),
SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239), IANA email authentication
headers, and TCP proxy TLVs standardized by haproxy.

On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 2:35 PM Ash Wilson <ash.wilson@valimail.com> wrote:

> Hello everyone,
>
> Together with the BoF chairs, a few of us have been discussing what a
> charter for this working group might look like. We are pleased to present
> the following for your consideration:
>
> -----
> Objective
> DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and DNS =
for
> server identity. The DANISH working group seeks to extend the DANE standa=
rd
> to encompass client identity and message sender identity use cases. DANIS=
H
> also seeks to define a transitional mode for DANE, which will allow the
> safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have not yet implemented
> DNSSEC..
>
> Problem statement
> Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows authenticatio=
n
> across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is used instead of =
a
> CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to bind an identity=E2=
=80=99s
> name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the DNS namespace and the DNS ro=
ot
> zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the barrier to adoption f=
or
> multiple private PKIs participating in application deployment.
>
> The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.
> DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain
> discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case. Th=
is
> alternative mode will allow the use of  Web PKI to securely discover
> certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE
> adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of requirements. If the
> application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS authentication, the
> application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the zone.
>
> Scope of work
> The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the
> primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH wi=
ll
> establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent client
> identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key discovery for
> object security use cases. DANISH will also define any required TLS
> protocol updates to support client authentication using DANE. DANISH will
> define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE
> DNS record types under specific use cases, as a transitional mode from We=
b
> PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.
>
> While modifications to the following standards are not within the scope o=
f
> the DANISH charter, the DANISH working group will take care to ensure a
> potential path for interoperability with the following standards, enablin=
g
> potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, MLS, EAP-TLS, SMIMEA (RFC 8162=
),
> SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239), IANA email authentication
> headers, and TCP proxy TLVs standardized by haproxy.
>
> --
>
> *Ash Wilson* | Technical Director
> *e:* ash.wilson@valimail.com
>
> This email and all data transmitted with it contains confidential and/or
> proprietary information intended solely for the use of individual(s)
> authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended and authorized
> recipient you are hereby notified of any use, disclosure, copying or
> distribution of the information included in this transmission is prohibit=
ed
> and may be unlawful. Please immediately notify the sender by replying to
> this email and then delete it from your system.
>


--=20

*Ash Wilson* | Technical Director
*e:* ash.wilson@valimail.com

This email and all data transmitted with it contains confidential and/or
proprietary information intended solely for the use of individual(s)
authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended and authorized
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--000000000000f73e1e05c2d04335
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi everyone,<div>I&#39;ve updated the text stating DANE&#3=
9;s original purpose, according to recommendations from Paul and Jacques.</=
div><div><br></div><div>Any other comments or suggestions for clarification=
? We&#39;ve had some dialogue and I want to make sure that anything that&#3=
9;s not sufficiently clear for a charter-level doc is appropriately address=
ed.</div><div><br></div><div>-----<br>Objective<br>DANE=E2=80=99s original =
purpose only covered authentication for the TLS server identity. The DANISH=
 working group seeks to extend the DANE standard to encompass client identi=
ty and message sender identity use cases. DANISH also seeks to define a tra=
nsitional mode for DANE, which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for dom=
ain owners who have not yet implemented DNSSEC..<br><br>Problem statement<b=
r>Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows authenticatio=
n across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is used instead of =
a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to bind an identity=E2=
=80=99s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the DNS namespace and the =
DNS root zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the barrier to ado=
ption for multiple private PKIs participating in application deployment.<br=
><br>The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement.=
 DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain discov=
ery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case. This alter=
native mode will allow the use of =C2=A0Web PKI to securely discover certif=
icates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE adoption w=
here DNSSEC is not in the initial set of requirements. If the application o=
wner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS authentication, the application owne=
r must then configure DNSSEC for the zone.<br><br>Scope of work<br>The DANI=
SH group will produce an architecture document describing the primary appli=
cation components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH will establish us=
age conventions for DANE DNS records to represent client identity for TLS c=
onnections and how to perform public key discovery for object security use =
cases. DANISH will also define any required TLS protocol updates to support=
 client authentication using DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby Web =
PKI may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record types under specif=
ic use cases, as a transitional mode from Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust=
 model.<br><br>While modifications to the following standards are not withi=
n the scope of the DANISH charter, the DANISH working group will take care =
to ensure a potential path for interoperability with the following standard=
s, enabling potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, MLS, EAP-TLS, SMIMEA=
 (RFC 8162), SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239), IANA email authentic=
ation headers, and TCP proxy TLVs standardized by haproxy.<br></div></div><=
br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed,=
 May 12, 2021 at 2:35 PM Ash Wilson &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valima=
il.com">ash.wilson@valimail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr">Hello everyone,<div><br><=
/div><div>Together with the BoF chairs, a few of us have been discussing wh=
at a charter for this working group might look like. We are pleased to pres=
ent the following for your=C2=A0consideration:</div><div><br></div><div>---=
--</div><div>Objective<br>DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered the =
coupling of PKI and DNS for server identity. The DANISH working group seeks=
 to extend the DANE standard to encompass client identity and message sende=
r identity use cases. DANISH also seeks to define a transitional mode for D=
ANE, which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have =
not yet implemented DNSSEC..<br><br>Problem statement<br>Using DANE for rep=
resenting client identities safely allows authentication across CAs and pre=
vents impersonation, because DNSSEC is used instead of a CA certificate and=
 its associated trust hierarchy to bind an identity=E2=80=99s name to a pub=
lic key. Everyone agrees on the DNS namespace and the DNS root zone=E2=80=
=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the barrier to adoption for multiple =
private PKIs participating in application deployment.<br><br>The greatest b=
arrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement. DANISH will seek t=
o provide a method of certificate and trust chain discovery for private PKI=
s, to enable the messaging security use case. This alternative mode will al=
low the use of=C2=A0 Web PKI to securely discover certificates, in the abse=
nce of DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not =
in the initial set of requirements. If the application owner wishes to use =
DANE for mutual TLS authentication, the application owner must then configu=
re DNSSEC for the zone.<br><br>Scope of work<br>The DANISH group will produ=
ce an architecture document describing the primary application components, =
and their interaction patterns. DANISH will establish usage conventions for=
 DANE DNS records to represent client identity for TLS connections and how =
to perform public key discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will =
also define any required TLS protocol updates to support client authenticat=
ion using DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in =
lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record types under specific use cases, as a =
transitional mode from Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.<br><br>Whil=
e modifications to the following standards are not within the scope of the =
DANISH charter, the DANISH working group will take care to ensure a potenti=
al path for interoperability with the following standards, enabling potenti=
al future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, MLS, EAP-TLS, SMIMEA (RFC 8162), SIP (R=
FC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239), IANA email authentication headers, and =
TCP proxy TLVs standardized by haproxy. <br><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=
=3D"ltr"><span><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.656;margin-top:0pt;mar=
gin-bottom:0pt"></p><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span style=3D"vertical-=
align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"><b>A=
sh Wilson</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-=
wrap;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"> | Technical Director</span></div><=
span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;=
font-family:Arial"><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span style=3D"vertical-a=
lign:baseline"><b>e:</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline"> <a =
href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com" target=3D"_blank">ash.wilson@valima=
il.com</a> </span><span></span></div><div style=3D"text-align:left"><img st=
yle=3D"width: 175px; height: 43px;" src=3D"https://hosted-packages.s3-us-we=
st-1.amazonaws.com/Valimail+Logo.png"></div></span><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"=
background-color:rgb(255,255,255);line-height:1.38;margin-top:0pt;margin-bo=
ttom:0pt"><font face=3D"Arial" color=3D"#666666"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
0.6667px;white-space:pre-wrap">This email and all data transmitted with it =
contains confidential and/or proprietary information intended solely for th=
e use of individual(s) authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended=
 and authorized recipient you are hereby notified of any use, disclosure, c=
opying or distribution of the information included in this transmission is =
prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately notify the sender by rep=
lying to this email and then delete it from your system.</span></font></p><=
/span></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><span><p dir=3D"ltr" style=3D"line-height:1.656;=
margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"></p><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span =
style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-=
family:Arial"><b>Ash Wilson</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-align:baselin=
e;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"> | Technical Dire=
ctor</span></div><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wra=
p;font-size:small;font-family:Arial"><div style=3D"text-align:left"><span s=
tyle=3D"vertical-align:baseline"><b>e:</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-al=
ign:baseline"> <a href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com" target=3D"_blank"=
>ash.wilson@valimail.com</a> </span><span></span></div><div style=3D"text-a=
lign:left"><img style=3D"width: 175px; height: 43px;" src=3D"https://hosted=
-packages.s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/Valimail+Logo.png"></div></span><p dir=
=3D"ltr" style=3D"background-color:rgb(255,255,255);line-height:1.38;margin=
-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt"><font face=3D"Arial" color=3D"#666666"><span st=
yle=3D"font-size:10.6667px;white-space:pre-wrap">This email and all data tr=
ansmitted with it contains confidential and/or proprietary information inte=
nded solely for the use of individual(s) authorized to receive it. If you a=
re not an intended and authorized recipient you are hereby notified of any =
use, disclosure, copying or distribution of the information included in thi=
s transmission is prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately notify=
 the sender by replying to this email and then delete it from your system.<=
/span></font></p></span></div>

--000000000000f73e1e05c2d04335--


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To: Ash Wilson <ash.wilson=40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Danish] Proposed DANISH charter
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	charset=utf-8



> On 21 May 2021, at 07:23, Ash Wilson =
<ash.wilson=3D40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>=20
> Hi everyone,
> I've updated the text stating DANE's original purpose, according to =
recommendations from Paul and Jacques.
>=20
> Any other comments or suggestions for clarification? We've had some =
dialogue and I want to make sure that anything that's not sufficiently =
clear for a charter-level doc is appropriately addressed.
>=20
> -----
> Objective
> DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered authentication for the =
TLS server identity. The DANISH working group seeks to extend the DANE =
standard to encompass client identity and message sender identity use =
cases. DANISH also seeks to define a transitional mode for DANE, which =
will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have not yet =
implemented DNSSEC..
>=20
> Problem statement
> Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows =
authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is =
used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to =
bind an identity=E2=80=99s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the =
DNS namespace and the DNS root zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, =
eliminating the barrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs =
participating in application deployment.
>=20
> The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement. =
DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain =
discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case. =
This alternative mode will allow the use of  Web PKI to securely =
discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a =
gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of =
requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS =
authentication, the application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the =
zone.
>=20
> Scope of work
> The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the =
primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH =
will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent =
client identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key =
discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will also define any =
required TLS protocol updates to support client authentication using =
DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of =
DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record types under specific use cases, as a =
transitional mode from Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.
>=20
> While modifications to the following standards are not within the =
scope of the DANISH charter, the DANISH working group will take care to =
ensure a potential path for interoperability with the following =
standards, enabling potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, MLS, =
EAP-TLS, SMIMEA (RFC 8162), SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239), =
IANA email authentication headers, and TCP proxy TLVs standardized by =
haproxy.

Sounds good to me!
+1

/O
>=20
> On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 2:35 PM Ash Wilson <ash.wilson@valimail.com =
<mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com>> wrote:
> Hello everyone,
>=20
> Together with the BoF chairs, a few of us have been discussing what a =
charter for this working group might look like. We are pleased to =
present the following for your consideration:
>=20
> -----
> Objective
> DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered the coupling of PKI and =
DNS for server identity. The DANISH working group seeks to extend the =
DANE standard to encompass client identity and message sender identity =
use cases. DANISH also seeks to define a transitional mode for DANE, =
which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who have =
not yet implemented DNSSEC..
>=20
> Problem statement
> Using DANE for representing client identities safely allows =
authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, because DNSSEC is =
used instead of a CA certificate and its associated trust hierarchy to =
bind an identity=E2=80=99s name to a public key. Everyone agrees on the =
DNS namespace and the DNS root zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, =
eliminating the barrier to adoption for multiple private PKIs =
participating in application deployment.
>=20
> The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC requirement. =
DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and trust chain =
discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security use case. =
This alternative mode will allow the use of  Web PKI to securely =
discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows for a =
gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of =
requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS =
authentication, the application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the =
zone.
>=20
> Scope of work
> The DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the =
primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH =
will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent =
client identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key =
discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will also define any =
required TLS protocol updates to support client authentication using =
DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of =
DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record types under specific use cases, as a =
transitional mode from Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.
>=20
> While modifications to the following standards are not within the =
scope of the DANISH charter, the DANISH working group will take care to =
ensure a potential path for interoperability with the following =
standards, enabling potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, MLS, =
EAP-TLS, SMIMEA (RFC 8162), SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239), =
IANA email authentication headers, and TCP proxy TLVs standardized by =
haproxy.=20
>=20
> --=20
> Ash Wilson | Technical Director
> e: ash.wilson@valimail.com <mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com>=20
>=20
> This email and all data transmitted with it contains confidential =
and/or proprietary information intended solely for the use of =
individual(s) authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended and =
authorized recipient you are hereby notified of any use, disclosure, =
copying or distribution of the information included in this transmission =
is prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately notify the sender =
by replying to this email and then delete it from your system.
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Ash Wilson | Technical Director
> e: ash.wilson@valimail.com <mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com>=20
>=20
> This email and all data transmitted with it contains confidential =
and/or proprietary information intended solely for the use of =
individual(s) authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended and =
authorized recipient you are hereby notified of any use, disclosure, =
copying or distribution of the information included in this transmission =
is prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately notify the sender =
by replying to this email and then delete it from your system.
> --=20
> Danish mailing list
> Danish@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/danish


--Apple-Mail=_3ACFCCD2-DC1C-4D9E-BA6A-FE06E49FC0DE
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">On 21 May 2021, at 07:23, Ash Wilson &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson=3D40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org" =
class=3D"">ash.wilson=3D40valimail.com@dmarc.ietf.org</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div =
dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Hi everyone,<div class=3D"">I've updated the text =
stating DANE's original purpose, according to recommendations from Paul =
and Jacques.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Any=
 other comments or suggestions for clarification? We've had some =
dialogue and I want to make sure that anything that's not sufficiently =
clear for a charter-level doc is appropriately addressed.</div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">-----<br =
class=3D"">Objective<br class=3D"">DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only =
covered authentication for the TLS server identity. The DANISH working =
group seeks to extend the DANE standard to encompass client identity and =
message sender identity use cases. DANISH also seeks to define a =
transitional mode for DANE, which will allow the safe adoption of DANE =
for domain owners who have not yet implemented DNSSEC..<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Problem statement<br class=3D"">Using DANE for representing =
client identities safely allows authentication across CAs and prevents =
impersonation, because DNSSEC is used instead of a CA certificate and =
its associated trust hierarchy to bind an identity=E2=80=99s name to a =
public key. Everyone agrees on the DNS namespace and the DNS root =
zone=E2=80=99s DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the barrier to adoption =
for multiple private PKIs participating in application deployment.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been =
the DNSSEC requirement. DANISH will seek to provide a method of =
certificate and trust chain discovery for private PKIs, to enable the =
messaging security use case. This alternative mode will allow the use of =
&nbsp;Web PKI to securely discover certificates, in the absence of =
DNSSEC. This allows for a gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in =
the initial set of requirements. If the application owner wishes to use =
DANE for mutual TLS authentication, the application owner must then =
configure DNSSEC for the zone.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Scope of =
work<br class=3D"">The DANISH group will produce an architecture =
document describing the primary application components, and their =
interaction patterns. DANISH will establish usage conventions for DANE =
DNS records to represent client identity for TLS connections and how to =
perform public key discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will =
also define any required TLS protocol updates to support client =
authentication using DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby Web PKI =
may be used in lieu of DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record types under =
specific use cases, as a transitional mode from Web PKI to the =
DNSSEC-based trust model.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">While =
modifications to the following standards are not within the scope of the =
DANISH charter, the DANISH working group will take care to ensure a =
potential path for interoperability with the following standards, =
enabling potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, MLS, EAP-TLS, SMIMEA =
(RFC 8162), SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC 7239), IANA email =
authentication headers, and TCP proxy TLVs standardized by haproxy.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>Sounds=
 good to me!</div><div>+1</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>/O<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 2:35 PM Ash Wilson &lt;<a =
href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com" =
class=3D"">ash.wilson@valimail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px =
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid =
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"">Hello =
everyone,<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Together =
with the BoF chairs, a few of us have been discussing what a charter for =
this working group might look like. We are pleased to present the =
following for your&nbsp;consideration:</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">-----</div><div class=3D"">Objective<br =
class=3D"">DANE=E2=80=99s original purpose only covered the coupling of =
PKI and DNS for server identity. The DANISH working group seeks to =
extend the DANE standard to encompass client identity and message sender =
identity use cases. DANISH also seeks to define a transitional mode for =
DANE, which will allow the safe adoption of DANE for domain owners who =
have not yet implemented DNSSEC..<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Problem =
statement<br class=3D"">Using DANE for representing client identities =
safely allows authentication across CAs and prevents impersonation, =
because DNSSEC is used instead of a CA certificate and its associated =
trust hierarchy to bind an identity=E2=80=99s name to a public key. =
Everyone agrees on the DNS namespace and the DNS root zone=E2=80=99s =
DNSSEC trust anchor, eliminating the barrier to adoption for multiple =
private PKIs participating in application deployment.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">The greatest barrier to DANE adoption has been the DNSSEC =
requirement. DANISH will seek to provide a method of certificate and =
trust chain discovery for private PKIs, to enable the messaging security =
use case. This alternative mode will allow the use of&nbsp; Web PKI to =
securely discover certificates, in the absence of DNSSEC. This allows =
for a gradual DANE adoption where DNSSEC is not in the initial set of =
requirements. If the application owner wishes to use DANE for mutual TLS =
authentication, the application owner must then configure DNSSEC for the =
zone.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Scope of work<br class=3D"">The =
DANISH group will produce an architecture document describing the =
primary application components, and their interaction patterns. DANISH =
will establish usage conventions for DANE DNS records to represent =
client identity for TLS connections and how to perform public key =
discovery for object security use cases. DANISH will also define any =
required TLS protocol updates to support client authentication using =
DANE. DANISH will define a method whereby Web PKI may be used in lieu of =
DNSSEC, using DANE DNS record types under specific use cases, as a =
transitional mode from Web PKI to the DNSSEC-based trust model.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">While modifications to the following standards =
are not within the scope of the DANISH charter, the DANISH working group =
will take care to ensure a potential path for interoperability with the =
following standards, enabling potential future work: JOSE, COSE, Oauth2, =
MLS, EAP-TLS, SMIMEA (RFC 8162), SIP (RFC 5922), Proxy headers (RFC =
7239), IANA email authentication headers, and TCP proxy TLVs =
standardized by haproxy. <br class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div>-- <br class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D""><span =
class=3D""><p dir=3D"ltr" =
style=3D"line-height:1.656;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" =
class=3D""></p><div style=3D"text-align:left" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font=
-family:Arial" class=3D""><b class=3D"">Ash Wilson</b></span><span =
style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font=
-family:Arial" class=3D""> | Technical Director</span></div><span =
style=3D"vertical-align:baseline;white-space:pre-wrap;font-size:small;font=
-family:Arial" class=3D""><div style=3D"text-align:left" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"vertical-align:baseline" class=3D""><b =
class=3D"">e:</b></span><span style=3D"vertical-align:baseline" =
class=3D""> <a href=3D"mailto:ash.wilson@valimail.com" target=3D"_blank" =
class=3D"">ash.wilson@valimail.com</a> </span><span =
class=3D""></span></div><div style=3D"text-align:left" class=3D""><img =
style=3D"width: 175px; height: 43px;" =
src=3D"https://hosted-packages.s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/Valimail+Logo.pn=
g" class=3D""></div></span><div style=3D"background-color: rgb(255, 255, =
255); line-height: 1.38; margin-top: 0pt; margin-bottom: 0pt;" =
class=3D""><font face=3D"Arial" color=3D"#666666" class=3D""><span =
style=3D"font-size:10.6667px;white-space:pre-wrap" class=3D"">This email =
and all data transmitted with it contains confidential and/or =
proprietary information intended solely for the use of individual(s) =
authorized to receive it. If you are not an intended and authorized =
recipient you are hereby notified of any use, disclosure, copying or =
distribution of the information included in this transmission is =
prohibited and may be unlawful. Please immediately notify the sender by =
replying to this email and then delete it from your =
system.</span></font></div></span></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all" class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div>-- <br class=3D""><div dir=3D"ltr" =
class=3D"gmail_signature"><span class=3D""><p dir=3D"ltr" =
style=3D"line-height:1.656;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt" =
class=3D""></p><div style=3D"text-align:left" class=3D""><span =
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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Comments: In-reply-to IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org> message dated "Wed, 26 May 2021 13:58:57 +0300."
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/danish/AfFbeCo5xECgCHzxANnTxawHzh0>
Subject: Re: [Danish] Reminder: IETF 111 Birds of a Feather (BOF) proposals requested by 28 May
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IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org> wrote:
    > This is a friendly follow-up reminder that preliminary proposals for
    > Birds-of-a-Feather (BOF) sessions during the upcoming IETF 111 meeting
    > are requested by 28 May 2021.

    > The intention is to allow the IESG and IAB more time to work with BOF
    > proponents to clarify and refine proposals ahead of the IETF 111 BOF
    > proposal deadline on 11 June 2021.

I think that DANISH should ask for a second BOF.
If it turns out that the IESG has chartered the WG, then it could be a WG
meeting.

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]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh network=
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]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect=
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