Subject: Re: [dispatch] New Version of draft-vanelburg-dispatch-private-network-ind

From: Mary Barnes <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 09:11:33 -0500

In reviewing the document in preparation for the PROTO write-up, I have a
few comments (minor and nits) that should be addressed prior to the
document being progressed.

Regards,
Mary.

Comments:
---------------

- General: domains used in this document must use a reserved domain such as
"example.com" and must not use real domains. Thus, all occurrences of
ericsson.com need to be changed to example.com

- Section 1.5.  Bulleted list, first bullet. I would suggest you just leave
out the mention of LI.  Emergency services should be a sufficient example.

- Section 1.5, last numbered list, item 2.  I had a hard time groking this
sentence and had to read several times. I would suggest rewording something
like (if I've properly interpreted the intent):
OLD:

       Different nodes spanning over different networks may need to be
       able to act differently on type of traffic, when implicit schemes
       are used, it would require distribution of such enterprise
       specific logic over multiple nodes in multiple operators.  That
       is clearly not a manageable architecture and solution.

NEW:

       Nodes spanning multiple networks often need to have different

       behavior depending upon the type of traffic.  When this is done
using implicit

       schemes, enterprise specific logic must be distributed across multiple

       nodes in multiple operator's networks.

       That is clearly not a manageable architecture and solution.

- Section 1.5, last sentence.  I don't think that statement is sufficient
for what this document is doing. I would suggest you change that sentence
to something like the following:
OLD:

   Given the above background this document will formulate requirements
   for SIP to support an explicit private network indication.

NEW:

   Based on the background provided, this document formulates requirements
   for SIP to support an explicit private network indication and defines

   a P-header, P-Private-Network-Indication, to support those requirements.

- Section 3, next to last paragraph.  I'm not sure what is meant by "the
filling out a Spec(T)". I don't see "filling" used as a concept in RFC
3324.  Perhaps, "specifying a Spec(T)" is more consistent with terminology
in RFC 3324.

- Section 5.  In general, the requirements are not specific consistently -
i.e., some use 2119 language and others not and there is not consistent
capitalization.  I would suggest the following changes.
R2:   "The indication from R1 can be inserted by a SIP proxy" -> "The
indication from R1 MAY be inserted by a SIP proxy"
R3: "The indication from R1 can be removed by a SIP proxy" -> "The
indication from R1 MAY be removed by a SIP proxy"
R6: "must" -> "MUST"

- Section 6, 2nd paragraph. The "can" in the first sentence should be a
"MAY" and the sentence needs to be split into two:
OLD:

   A proxy server which handles a message can insert such a P-Private-
   Network-Indication header field into the message based on
   authentication of the source of a message, configuration or local
   policy, and forward it to other proxies in the same administrative
   domain or proxies in trusted domain to be handled as private network
   traffic.

NEW:

   A proxy server which handles a message MAY insert such a P-Private-
   Network-Indication header field into the message based on
   authentication of the source of a message, configuration or local
   policy.  A proxy server MAY forward the message to other proxies in the

   same administrative domain or proxies in a trusted

   domain to be handled as private network traffic.

Section 9.  You should be explicit about the header name in this section.
 The text in the first paragraph needs some work.  At a minimum you need to
change the "not supposed to" to something more definitive as all security
issues arise because someone does something they're not supposed to.   I
would suggest at least making the following change:
OLD:

   The private network indication defined in this document is to be used
   in an environment where elements are trusted and where attackers are
   not supposed to have access to the protocol messages between those
   elements.  Traffic protection between network elements is sometimes
   achieved by using IPsec and sometimes by physical protection of the
   network.  In any case, the environment where the private network
   indication will be used ensures the integrity and the confidentiality
   of the contents of this header field.

NEW:

   The private network indication defined in this document MUST only be used
   in an environment where elements are trusted and where attackers are
   do not have access to the protocol messages between those
   elements.  Traffic protection between network elements can be
   achieved by using IPsec and sometimes by physical protection of the
   network.  In any case, the environment where the private network
   indication will be used ensures the integrity and the confidentiality
   of the contents of this header field.

Nits:
------
- Section 1.1:  "3rd-Generqation" -> 3rd-Generation
- The terms "break-in" and "break-out" traffic are used several places in
the document, but this term is never defined.  These terms should be
defined in Section 3.
- Figures should have Titles for readability

On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 9:19 PM, Mayumi Ohsugi
<[email-masked]>wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I have submitted the following draft:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-**drafts/draft-vanelburg-**
> dispatch-private-network-ind-**03.txt<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-vanelburg-dispatch-private-network-ind-03.txt>
>
> The draft reflects all the comments discussed in DISPATCH list.
>
> The major changes are as follows:
>
> - corrected the abstract
> - corrected the term "common domain" to "pre-arranged domain"
> - added 7.1.4 "P-Private-Network-Indication verification"
> - editorial changes
>
>         Regards,
> Mayumi
> ______________________________**_________________
> dispatch mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/dispatch<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dispatch>
>

---

From: Paul Kyzivat <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 10:31:45 -0400

A couple of additional nits.

On 10/29/13 10:11 AM, Mary Barnes wrote:

> - General: domains used in this document must use a reserved domain such
> as "example.com <http://example.com>" and must not use real domains.
> Thus, all occurrences of ericsson.com <http://ericsson.com> need to be
> changed to example.com <http://example.com>

Or foo.example.com

>     in an environment where elements are trusted and where attackers are

delete the last "are"

>     of the contents of this header field.

	Thanks,
	Paul

---

From: Shida Schubert <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 00:08:22 -0700

Hi Mary;

 Thanks for the thorough reviews and suggestions. 

 I will prepare a revised draft reflecting the suggestions and 
comments. 

 Many Thanks
  Shida

On Oct 29, 2013, at 7:11 AM, Mary Barnes <[email-masked]> wrote:

> In reviewing the document in preparation for the PROTO write-up, I have a few comments (minor and nits) that should be addressed prior to the document being progressed.
> 
> Regards,
> Mary.
> 
> Comments:
> ---------------
> 
> - General: domains used in this document must use a reserved domain such as "example.com" and must not use real domains. Thus, all occurrences of ericsson.com need to be changed to example.com
> 
> - Section 1.5.  Bulleted list, first bullet. I would suggest you just leave out the mention of LI.  Emergency services should be a sufficient example.  
> 
> - Section 1.5, last numbered list, item 2.  I had a hard time groking this sentence and had to read several times. I would suggest rewording something like (if I've properly interpreted the intent):
> OLD:
>        behavior depending upon the type of traffic.  When this is done using implicit
> - Section 1.5, last sentence.  I don't think that statement is sufficient for what this document is doing. I would suggest you change that sentence to something like the following:
> OLD:
> - Section 3, next to last paragraph.  I'm not sure what is meant by "the filling out a Spec(T)". I don't see "filling" used as a concept in RFC 3324.  Perhaps, "specifying a Spec(T)" is more consistent with terminology in RFC 3324. 
> 
> - Section 5.  In general, the requirements are not specific consistently - i.e., some use 2119 language and others not and there is not consistent capitalization.  I would suggest the following changes.
> R2:   "The indication from R1 can be inserted by a SIP proxy" -> "The indication from R1 MAY be inserted by a SIP proxy"   
> R3: "The indication from R1 can be removed by a SIP proxy" -> "The indication from R1 MAY be removed by a SIP proxy"
> R6: "must" -> "MUST"
> 
> - Section 6, 2nd paragraph. The "can" in the first sentence should be a "MAY" and the sentence needs to be split into two:
> OLD:
> Section 9.  You should be explicit about the header name in this section.  The text in the first paragraph needs some work.  At a minimum you need to change the "not supposed to" to something more definitive as all security issues arise because someone does something they're not supposed to.   I would suggest at least making the following change:
> OLD:
> - The terms "break-in" and "break-out" traffic are used several places in the document, but this term is never defined.  These terms should be defined in Section 3. 
> On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 9:19 PM, Mayumi Ohsugi <[email-masked]> wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-vanelburg-dispatch-private-network-ind-03.txt
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dispatch mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dispatch
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dispatch mailing list
> [email-masked]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dispatch

---

From: Shida Schubert <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 08:12:27 -0700

Hi Mary;

 I will prepare a revised draft before and submit the 
draft after the blackout period is cleared  reflecting 
the suggestions and comments you and Paul provided. 

 Many Thanks
  Shida