Subject: Re: [dispatch] [Modern] CNIT and Modern Charter

From: Richard Shockey <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2015 16:00:48 -0400

Excellent point you’re absolutely right. Its a perfectly valid use case.

On 3/10/15, 3:42 PM, "Gorman, Pierce A [CTO]" <[email-masked]>
wrote:

>Why?  A common scam is to get someone to call, text, e-mail, browse, to a
>location of bad actions.  If there was someway to authenticate that the
>caller hasn't actually reached the "real" Bank of America, or whatever,
>there is some value to the consumer.  Just a thought.  TLS includes a nod
>to mutual authentication.  I was just trying to think more about "trust
>models" and what they can/should look like.
>
>Best regards,
>
>
>Pierce Gorman
>Voice Architecture
>Core Planning/Sprint
>913-439-4368 (Desk)
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Richard Shockey [mailto:[email-masked]]
>Sent: March 10, 2015 2:37 PM
>To: Gorman, Pierce A [CTO]; Cullen Jennings; [email-masked];
>[email-masked]; [email-masked]
>Subject: Re: [dispatch] CNIT and Modern Charter
>
>
>As a matter of principal I wouldn’t rule anything like this out but there
>could be some philshing issues.
>
>My question would be why?  Sort of like the old out of band STIR idea
>that I’m convinced is going no where.
>
>I’d like to fix one simple problem reasonably quickly.
>
>
>
>On 3/10/15, 2:58 PM, "Gorman, Pierce A [CTO]" <[email-masked]>
>wrote:
>
>>Should there be mutual authentication?  Should the calling party
>>receive a called party identity?
>>
>>Best regards,
>>
>>
>>Pierce Gorman
>>Voice Architecture
>>Core Planning/Sprint
>>913-439-4368 (Desk)
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: Richard Shockey [mailto:[email-masked]]
>>Sent: March 10, 2015 1:53 PM
>>To: Gorman, Pierce A [CTO]; Cullen Jennings; [email-masked];
>>[email-masked]; [email-masked]
>>Subject: Re: [dispatch] CNIT and Modern Charter
>>
>>
>>Exactly… studying the trust models are perfectly appropriate.
>>Obviously the calling party data can come from different sources though
>>I suspect in its earliest models it comes from the originating service
>>provider through the SIP signaling mechanism to the terminating CUA.
>>Especially in the VoLTE case.
>>
>>Enterprise to Enterprise would clearly be different.  Certainly 3rd
>>party databases could be involved in some way.
>>
>>I would remind folks that the rationale for this is consumers and
>>National Regulators are NOT HAPPY AT ALL with the current state of how
>>calling party data is presented to the consumer. STIR in and of itself
>>is not enough.  This is ultimately a consumer protection issue.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>On 3/9/15, 6:25 PM, "Gorman, Pierce A [CTO]" <[email-masked]>
>>wrote:
>>
>>>I don't have any useful charter text.
>>>I agree that the IETF should not propose business models, but it seems
>>>important to consider trust model(s) to see if it/they drive protocol
>>>considerations.
>>>We could start with listing assumptions.  I'll start by listing two.
>>>     1) I assume there would be multiple authorities and multiple
>>>levels of trust.
>>>     2) I assume there are international tradename, and trademark and
>>>the aforementioned UTF-8 international character code spoofing
>>>considerations.
>>>
>>>
>>>Best regards,
>>>
>>>
>>>Pierce Gorman
>>>Voice Architecture
>>>Core Planning/Sprint
>>>913-439-4368 (Desk)
>>>
>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>From: Modern [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of Richard
>>>Shockey
>>>Sent: March 09, 2015 2:18 PM
>>>To: Cullen Jennings; [email-masked]; [email-masked]; [email-masked]
>>>Subject: Re: [Modern] [dispatch] CNIT and Modern Charter
>>>
>>>
>>>The first order issue is properly defining what this looks like in SIP
>>>and where in the headers it should reside. There is ample evidence
>>>that any number of other SDO are looking at this and without some
>>>proper standardization there will be no interoperability at all
>>>especially even for STIR validation data at the CUA and IMHO doing
>>>nothing is not a viable option. The basic FROM and PAI usage is not
>>>helpful.
>>>
>>>We are all aware of how smart phones work. This is principally about
>>>sessions that would originate outside a select number of phone book
>>>entries and some display of whether that information has been
>>>validated though we don¹t have to define policy at this stage and
>>>frankly I don¹t think the IETF should try any more than it could try
>>>and establish the business model for how this would deploy.
>>>
>>>The purpose here is simply adding more information about who
>>>originated the session so the called party has more information than
>>>they currently have.  We already have enough bad actors as it is
>>>impersonating tax authorities, banks, health care professionals and
>>>other governmental entities. The purpose is to try and bound those
>>>problems to a manageable level.  There is no silver bullet here.
>>>
>>>I would appreciate any suggestions on charter text if you have them.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>‹
>>>Richard Shockey
>>>Shockey Consulting LLC
>>>Chairman of the Board SIP Forum
>>>www.shockey.us
>>>www.sipforum.org
>>>richard<at>shockey.us
>>>Skype-Linkedin-Facebook rshockey101
>>>PSTN +1 703-593-2683
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>On 3/9/15, 11:10 AM, "Cullen Jennings" <[email-masked]> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>On the particular CNAM like topic ...
>>>>
>>>>I'm not keen on moving forward with something like this unless we can
>>>>show the trust and human factors issues is an engineering problem not
>>>>a research problem. We have seen the difficulty with human readable
>>>>names in SPAM. Particularly when using UTF-8, how do we stop bad
>>>>actor getting names that look the same as someone they wish to
>>>>impersonate?
>>>>Who will validate the names and issue some sort of trust token that
>>>>says I can use "Cullen Jennings" or whatever. Who else can use that
>>>>name and what about names visually similar to it.
>>>>
>>>>On the flip side we are seeing most smart phones take the incoming
>>>>phone number, and look it up the personal address book of the user
>>>>and display the name that the user of the smartphone assigned. We are
>>>>seeing enterprise phones that do a similar things using the users
>>>>social networks as well as personal address book.
>>>>
>>>>What would be bad is phone display a display name that some how
>>>>claimed to be trustable but was not. That would be worse that the
>>>>current situation. Perhaps people have a good way to solve this in
>>>>mind but I'm not seeing that that is.
>>>>
>>>>Cullen (with my individual contribute hat on of course)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Feb 25, 2015, at 10:05 AM, Richard Shockey <[email-masked]>
>>>>>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks Martin .. This is my very raw first cut at a charter. Its
>>>>>hopefully simple and straight forward.
>>>>>
>>>>> Send me any edits etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> *****
>>>>>
>>>>> CNIT Charter [Calling Name Identity Trust]
>>>>>
>>>>> WG Chairs TBD:
>>>>>
>>>>> Calling Name Delivery [CNAM] is a string of up to 15 ASCII
>>>>>Characters of information associated with a specific E.164 calling
>>>>>party number in the Public Switched Telephone Network [PSTN].  In
>>>>>the PSTN this data is sent by the originating network only at the
>>>>>specific request of the terminating network via a SS7 Transaction
>>>>>Application Part [TCAP] response message.  In the Session Initiation
>>>>>Protocol [SIP] this information can be inserted into the FROM: part
>>>>>of the originating INVITE message or by other means.
>>>>>
>>>>> As with the originating source telephone number, this data can be
>>>>>altered in transit creating a variety of malicious abuses similar to
>>>>>the ones identified by the IETF STIR working group.
>>>>>
>>>>> The purpose of the CNIT working group will be to define a data
>>>>>structure, a new SIP header or repurpose an existing SIP header to
>>>>>carry an advanced form of CNAM as well as information from a STIR
>>>>>Validation Authority.  The purpose of this work is to present to the
>>>>>SIP called party trusted information from the calling party in order
>>>>>that the called party make a more reasoned and informed judgment on
>>>>>whether to accept the INVITE or not.
>>>>>
>>>>> The working group will not invalidate any existing SIP mechanism
>>>>>for anonymous calling.
>>>>>
>>>>> The working group will, to the best of its ability, reuse existing
>>>>>IETF protocols.
>>>>>
>>>>> Full Internationalization of the Calling Name Identity Trust data
>>>>>object(s) is a requirement.
>>>>>
>>>>> The working group will closely work with the IETF STIR working
>>>>> group
>>>>>
>>>>> The working group will immediately liaison with 3GPP SA-1 in order
>>>>>to coordinate efforts.
>>>>>
>>>>> The working group will coordinate with National Numbering
>>>>>Authorities and National Regulatory Authorities as needed.
>>>>>
>>>>> The working group will deliver the flowing.
>>>>>
>>>>> €A problem statement and requirements detailing the current
>>>>>deployment environment and situations that motivate work on Calling
>>>>>Name Identity Trust.
>>>>> €Define either a new SIP header or document a repurpose of an SIP
>>>>>existing header for Calling Name Identify Trust data  €Define a data
>>>>>model for the Calling Name Identity Trust object (s) which may
>>>>>include various forms of multimedia data  €Deliver an analysis of
>>>>>privacy implications of the proposed Calling Name Identity Trust
>>>>>mechanism.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Milestones:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ‹
>>>>> Richard Shockey
>>>>> Shockey Consulting LLC
>>>>> Chairman of the Board SIP Forum
>>>>> www.shockey.us
>>>>> www.sipforum.org
>>>>> richard<at>shockey.us
>>>>> Skype-Linkedin-Facebook rshockey101 PSTN +1 703-593-2683
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: "DOLLY, MARTIN C" <[email-masked]>
>>>>> Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 at 9:02 PM
>>>>> To: Richard Shockey <[email-masked]>
>>>>> Cc: "Holmes, David W [CTO]" <[email-masked]>,
>>>>>"[email-masked]" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]"
>>>>><[email-masked]>, "Peterson, Jon" <[email-masked]>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [Modern] [dispatch] draft charter
>>>>>
>>>>> I support Richard on this
>>>>>
>>>>> Martin Dolly
>>>>> Lead Member of Technical Staff
>>>>> Core & Gov't/Regulatory Standards
>>>>> AT&T Standards and
>>>>> Industry Alliances
>>>>> +1-609-903-3390
>>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>>
>>>>> On Feb 24, 2015, at 6:36 PM, Richard Shockey <[email-masked]>
>>>>>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Excellent points David.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My concern here is charter overreach. I really want to keep
>>>>>>CNAM+/CNIT out of this.  IMHO that is a very separate and highly
>>>>>>focused effort to define both the modification of the SIP headers
>>>>>>necessary to support some enhanced calling party identification and
>>>>>>a very limited effort to define the object and or the STIR validation
>>>>>>data.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I¹m violently opposed to ³end world hunger² WG¹s.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If registries can be used fine but I certainly want to see how this
>>>>>>can be accomplished in bi lateral agreements between consenting
>>>>>>service providers and work with CUA vendors on how the data is
>>>>>>displayed aka Apple, Samsung, Microsoft in the context of a formal
>>>>>>liaison with 3GPP.
>>>>>> Certainly the relevance of CNAM+/CNIT in enterprise and residential
>>>>>>access markets is important but we all know ³Money is the answer
>>>>>>what is the  question ..²
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I¹ve asked for time in Dispatch to look at the CNAM/CNIT issue and
>>>>>>report on the JTF on NNI. As you well know we have made considerable
>>>>>>progress.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Last week I gave a talk on this to a panel that included many of
>>>>>>our friends among the national regulators.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=60001033217
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: "Holmes, David W [CTO]" <[email-masked]>
>>>>>> Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 at 5:06 PM
>>>>>> To: "Peterson, Jon" <[email-masked]>, "[email-masked]"
>>>>>><[email-masked]>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [Modern] draft charter
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thank you for the work in assembling this draft of the charter for
>>>>>>MODERN.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We would like to suggest some minor clarifications to the bullets
>>>>>>describing the deliverables, to align them with the statement
>>>>>>regarding flexibility to support the needs of different regulatory
>>>>>>regimes, & thus to ensure that if quoted alone they are not taken
>>>>>>out of context; i.e. the group product will be the protocols to
>>>>>>support the allocation etc. activities, & it would not attempt to
>>>>>>define the allocation processes.  We also would like the charter to
>>>>>>note the relevant work that has already been performed by both IETF
>>>>>>& the ATIS/SIP Forum JTF, & incorporate that into the output from the
>>>>>>MODERN WG as appropriate.
>>>>>>These changes/additions are have been added to your text inline
>>>>>>below.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We are hoping that the MODERN session at IETF#92 will have remote
>>>>>>access, to allow participation by those of us that cannot attend in
>>>>>>person due to other commitments that week.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> David/Sprint
>>>>>>
>>>>>>____________________________________________________________________
>>>>>>___
>>>>>>_
>>>>>>______
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Modern [mailto:[email-masked]] On Behalf Of
>>>>>>Peterson, Jon
>>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 9:19 AM
>>>>>> To: [email-masked]
>>>>>> Subject: [Modern] draft charter
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At the Dallas IETF meeting in March, we'd like to get together and
>>>>>>talk about what a working group for MODERN might look like. As an
>>>>>>initial input to the discussion, a few of us have put together a
>>>>>>proposed charter. While the TeRQ work was positively evaluated in
>>>>>>the DISPATCH process, we feel this is broader enough in scope to
>>>>>>warrant its own BoF.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Comments are welcome, this is just a starting point.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ------
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Modern charter text:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The MODERN working group will define a set of Internet-based
>>>>>>mechanisms for the purposes of managing and resolving telephone
>>>>>>numbers
>>>>>>(TNs) in an IP environment.  Existing mechanisms for these purposes
>>>>>>face obsolescence as the voice communications infrastructure evolves
>>>>>>to IP technology and new applications for TNs become possible.  The
>>>>>>traditional model of a TN having an association to a single service
>>>>>>provider and a single application is breaking down.  Its use as a
>>>>>>network locator is going away, but its use as an identifier for an
>>>>>>individual or an organization will remain for some time. Devices,
>>>>>>applications, and network tools increasingly need to manage TNs,
>>>>>>including requesting and acquiring TN delegations from authorities.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The working group will define a framework for the roles and
>>>>>>functions involved in managing and resolving TNs in an IP
>>>>>>environment. This includes a protocol mechanism for acquiring TNs,
>>>>>>which will provide an enrollment process for the individuals and
>>>>>>entities that use and manage TNs. TNs may either be managed in a
>>>>>>hierarchical tree, or in a distributed peer-to-peer architecture.
>>>>>>Privacy of the enrollment data and security of the resource will be
>>>>>>primary considerations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Additionally, the working group will deliver a protocol mechanism
>>>>>>for resolving TNs which will allow entities such as service
>>>>>>providers, devices, and applications to access data related to TNs,
>>>>>>possibly including caller name data (CNAM).  Maintaining
>>>>>>reliability, real time application performance, security and privacy
>>>>>>are primary considerations.  The working group will take into
>>>>>>consideration existing IETF work including ENUM, SPEERMINT, STIR, and
>>>>>>DRINKS.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The work of this group is limited to specifying a solution for TNs
>>>>>>and covers any service that can be addressed using a TN.  Expanding
>>>>>>the work to other identifiers is out of scope.  Solutions and
>>>>>>mechanisms created by the working group will be flexible enough to
>>>>>>accommodate different policies, e.g., by different regulatory
>>>>>>agencies.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The work group will deliver the following:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -          An architecture overview document that includes high
>>>>>>level
>>>>>>requirements and security/privacy considerationsbuilt on the work of
>>>>>>IETF & the ATIS/SIP Forum JTF, that included:
>>>>>> o   Call routing architecture
>>>>>> o   Inter-carrier NNI
>>>>>> o   Cryptographically-enabled Anti-spoofing (STIR)
>>>>>> o   Enhanced Calling Name (CNIT/CNAM)
>>>>>> -          A document describing the protocols to support enrollment
>>>>>>processes for existing and new TNs including any modifications to
>>>>>>metadata related to those TNs
>>>>>> -          A document describing protocol mechanisms for accessing
>>>>>>contact information associated with enrollments
>>>>>> -          A document describing protocol mechanisms for resolving
>>>>>>information related to TNs
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This e-mail may contain Sprint proprietary information intended for
>>>>>>the sole use of the recipient(s). Any use by others is prohibited.
>>>>>>If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and
>>>>>>delete all copies of the message.
>>>>>> _______________________________________________ Modern mailing list
>>>>>>[email-masked] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/modern
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> dispatch mailing list
>>>>>> [email-masked]
>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dispatch
>>>>> _______________________________________________ Modern mailing list
>>>>>[email-masked]
>>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/modern_________________________
>>>>>___
>>>>>_
>>>>>__________________
>>>>> dispatch mailing list
>>>>> [email-masked]
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dispatch
>>>>
>>>>_______________________________________________
>>>>dispatch mailing list
>>>>[email-masked]
>>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dispatch
>>>
>>>
>>>_______________________________________________
>>>Modern mailing list
>>>[email-masked]
>>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/modern
>>>
>>>________________________________
>>>
>>>This e-mail may contain Sprint proprietary information intended for the
>>>sole use of the recipient(s). Any use by others is prohibited. If you
>>>are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete
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>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>This e-mail may contain Sprint proprietary information intended for the
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>>not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all
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>
>
>
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>
>This e-mail may contain Sprint proprietary information intended for the
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---

From: Richard Shockey <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2015 12:43:15 -0400

That was certainly my initial idea. URI in the Call-Info header at the
very least. Something useful.

On 3/11/15, 12:25 PM, "Henning Schulzrinne" <[email-masked]>
wrote:

>Would a simple vCard (RFC 7095) model work?
>
>________________________________________
>From: Modern [[email-masked]] on behalf of Chris Wendt
>[[email-masked]]
>Sent: Tuesday, March 10, 2015 2:37 PM
>To: Richard Shockey
>Cc: Cullen Jennings; [email-masked]; [email-masked]; [email-masked]
>I agree that this would be useful just from the standpoint that if
>service providers are going to implement in-band signing of caller-id,
>would quite make sense to provide a better payload for delivering
>additional and/or more useful calling party information along with
>signing it as well.
>
>-Chris
>
>
>cnit mailing list
>[email-masked]
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cnit

---

From: Eric Burger <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2015 08:38:19 -0400

Do we need more than EV certificates? Knowing that a call from [email-masked] is from Bank of America might be sufficient, and the best we can really hope for. 

Sent from my mobile device. Thanks be to LEMONADE: http://www.standardstrack.com/ietf/lemonade

<div>-------- Original message --------</div><div>From: Henning Schulzrinne <[email-masked]> </div><div>Date:03/16/2015  8:10 AM  (GMT-05:00) </div><div>To: Eric Burger <[email-masked]> </div><div>Cc: [email-masked],[email-masked],[email-masked] </div><div>Subject: Re: [dispatch] [Modern] CNIT and Modern Charter </div><div>
</div>My general approach is not to make the problem more difficult than it has to be. Otherwise, positing problems that are hypothetical corner cases prevent the solution of the real problem.

Almost all (legitimate) business calls that most people receive are either from their own country or a country they are familiar with (e.g., because they are first or second generation immigrants). Thus, how Nigeria classifies or regulates financial institutions is of little concern to me since I don't expect to receive a call from a Nigerian bank or "bank". Also, there is very little legitimate cold-calling from businesses; most cold-calling falls into the illegal side of the TCPA (the US law governing telemarketing). The goal is to be able to tell that if I get a call from the IRS or Bank of America, that they are indeed who they claim to be, without having to remember what phone numbers they use.

Henning

On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 7:12 AM, Eric Burger <[email-masked]> wrote:
In principle this makes sense. However, if we cannot get the world to agree on countries (e.g., Tibet, Taiwan, etc.), how are we going to get an agreed list of enterprise types? We could go the ITU route and define the protocol machinery and leave the enterprise definitions a local matter. However, that does not foster global interoperability. Moreover, your state-sponsored source of foreign currency might look to me to be a criminal enterprise. Would it be a registered bank or a registered 'trading' company?

--
Sent from a mobile device. Sorry for typos or weird auto-correct. Thank IETF LEMONADE for mobile email! See <http://www.standardstrack.com/ietf/lemonade/>

On Mar 15, 2015, at 9:52 PM, Henning Schulzrinne <[email-masked]> wrote:

This seems like a separable problem, i.e., where the mechanism of preventing IDN impersonation is left to the certifying entity. Unlike for web pages, these entities are likely to be domestic so that a callee is likely to be suspicious if it receives a Russian-certified caller that kind of looks like Citibank. But you illustrate a good reason why certifying the type of entity (e.g., FDIC-insured bank, registered medical provider) may be more important than relying on a name alone.

Henning

On Sun, Mar 15, 2015 at 9:26 PM, Eric Burger <[email-masked]> wrote:
This is IDN all over again. On the one hand, we need to be aware that some bad people will try to ρηιςη instead of φισ, because the former looks like phish. On the other hand, last I looked, this is the IETF, and a US-centric or Roman-script-centric solution is not going to be internationally acceptable.

Sincerely,
柏尔立

P.S., while we are expanding the charter to encompass the ocean, can I specify “Eric Burger” for domestic calls and "柏尔立” for calls to China? ;-)