Subject: [dns-dir] DNS Early Warn: draft-dolmatov-dnsext-dnssec-gost-00.txt

From: Olafur_DNS_EARLY_WARNING <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2009 14:30:01 -0400

Count:       33 DNS Extensions working group                               V.Dolmatov, Ed.  
Internet-Draft                                             Cryptocom Ltd.    
Intended status: Standards Track                           April 8, 2009
Expires: December 31, 2009                                 

 Use of GOST signature algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
                               for DNSSEC
                 draft-dolmatov-dnsext-dnssec-gost-00

 Abstract
   This document describes how to produce GOST signature and hash algorithms
   DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System
   Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035).

---

From: Olafur Gudmundsson <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2009 10:17:24 -0400

This is an "interesting" document that is asking DNSEXT to adopt it.
Right now I can not find a full description of the algorithms specified,
         a ecliptic curve
         a hash algorithm

Does anyone on DNS-dir know, any more about these algorithms to give 
me (and Andrew)
background on these to lead intelligent discussion on this proposal.

         Olafur

At 14:30 09/04/2009, Olafur_DNS_EARLY_WARNING wrote:
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>dns-dir mailing list
>[email-masked]
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-dir

---

From: Roy Arends <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2009 17:16:59 +0200

> background on these to lead intelligent discussion on this proposal.

I understand there is literature about the cryptanalysis of GOST-R  
34.10-2001 and 34.11-94 (see mendel et al [1]). I am no expert in this  
realm, but I do want to point out that we've 'updated' DNSSEC to avoid  
the use of hash algorithms that needs less rounds than brute-force to  
produce a pre-image (MD5, SHA1) or a collision. I think we need to  
leave this one for the security directorate. I am not comfortable to  
have the DNS-DIR advice the AD's [for|against] adoption without a  
clear reference.

What I also would be interested in, but that is a lower priority for  
me, is a technical reason why RSA-SHA256 does not suffice. I  
understand there are political reasons against using RSA-SHAX. If we  
allow ourself to work with arguments outside our techno-policy  
mandate, we have a wholelotta work waiting for us.

As said, not for or against adoption, but maybe just not our call.

Kind regards,

Roy.

[1] http://wiki.uni.lu/esc/docs/mendel_gost.pdf

(also see:
http://www.google.com/search?q=GOST+R+34.11-94+cryptanalysis
http://www.google.com/search?q=GOST+R+34.10-2001+cryptanalysis
)