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From: John Heidemann <johnh@isi.edu>
To: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>, =?utf-8?Q?Matth=C3=A4us?= Wander <matthaeus.wander@uni-due.de>, "dnsop\@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Int-area@ietf.org, dns-privacy@ietf.org
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Subject: [dns-privacy] [DNSOP] deployment requirements for dns channel privacy [was: various approaches to dns channel secrecy]
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[I added dns-privacy to the cc list, since that seems like a relevant
forum for this discussion.]

On Mon, 07 Jul 2014 11:04:56 -0700, Paul Vixie wrote:=20
>Matth=C3=A4us Wander wrote:
>
>    ...
>=20=20=20=20
>    I didn't mean to imply that a DTLS solution can be universally deploye=
d.
>
>
>because the dns is a map to the territory known as the internet, and
>because most internet packet flows begin with a dns transaction, i'm
>dismissing out of hand anything that will almost universally not work
>for some class of user, such as those in hotel room wireless networks,
>or behind CPE that either can't pass new protocols or would require
>above-average skill to configure for such.
>
>
>in my own configuration i'd set EDNS to be the primary protocol, and
>add HTTPS as the first fallback to be tried, so that the fallback to
>plain DNS on UDP/53 can be as rare as possible. this may even be a
>reasonable default.
>
>but we can't spend any of our time pretending that the internet
>architecture isn't a hostage to a billion poorly built CPE devices, no
>matter how hopeful we are as to the future, and no matter how many
>personal counter-examples we can cite.

These comments bring out a very important question that has been lurking,
somewhat unstated:

What IS the consensus about the completeness of deployment required to
declare "success" for DNS channel privacy?


Focusing on middleboxes for now (although deployability applies to
servers and users, too):

Paul "dismisses out of hand anything that is not almost universal,
including hotel rooms and behind broken CPE", because (A) there
widespread broken CPE devices and (B) we must protect the Internet
architecture from and the global DNS namespace.  (To paraphrase.)

With those assumptions, arrival at DNS-over-HTTPS [* footnote 1] makes
some sense, since HTTPS is the least protocol least-molested by CPE to
date [* footnote 2].


But I'm not sure those are the best assumptions to start with.  We're
talking about *adding privacy* to the existing DNS infrastructure.
What's important is that privacy is a *new feature*.

Thinking about things this way suggests two observations:

1. One can separate requiring privacy from providing a global namespace.
Since the Internet has survived without privacy DNS queries until now,
surely it won't melt if some queries continue to lack protection from
eavesdropping.

About the assumptions: if you accept fallback to current DNS, then new priv=
acy
methods that don't reach 99% deployment do NOT break global naming---we
can reject assertion (B) if we allow fallback.

2. Because privacy is a new feature, (a) users or companies interested
in that feature *can advocate* for it, (b) they *have motivation* to fix
it because privacy can be a potential differentiator of what is today
commodity service, and (c) some have the *ability* to fix it.

Some people will care about DNS privacy and some not.  But for those
that care, users can replace their CPE, or can request their ISP upgrade
their CPE, or switch ISPs.  While many users may not do this (many will
not care), they all can.  As proof, consider reaction to bufferbloat,
where publicity has raised awareness.  Some users have switched
hardware, and I hope new CPE is being more reasonably configured.

(Or consider DNSsec.  Yes, there have been a couple publicized failures,
but one can look for domain providers that advertise DNSsec or not
today.  And end-users can generally use it, or fall back if they don't
care.)

This approach can generalize to ISPs or governments, too.  If, say,
there were a mandate that all DNS users in a state must use DNS privacy,
then that state's government could identify local ISPs with broken CPE,
and either ask them to estimate the cost of hardware upgrade or software
reconfiguration, or estimate the lifecycle of natural CPE turnover.

About the assumptions: because users (or ISPs) that care often have some
control over CPE, we can sometimes reject assertion (A).

In fact, given enough time, all the hardware will turn over.  I believe
the Internet no longer has any active Fuzzball routers. :-) More
seriously, telecos seem to be agressively moving people off DSL now, so
perhaps 10 years is plausible EOL for 90% of hardware.  We can reject
assertion (A) for most hardware if we allow enough time to pass.



If you accept that some people will continue with current DNS while
others have improved privacy, then we can think about a 10 year rollout
and accept that some stragglers with old CPE will continue without
privacy for DNS.

For users who have strong privacy requirements and refuse to fallback to
current DNS---replace your CPE for US$50 OR walk down the block to an
open wifi that isn't broken.

Some users will stick with old stuff until it dies.  See (for example)
the lingering installs of Windows XP.  That's OK---they know what
they're not getting, and they make a choice about benefit vs. cost of
upgrading.


It seems to me that assumption that "must work for 99% of users, right
now, in spite of today's broken hardware, OR it's not acceptable" is a
false dichotomy.  I hope we consider the several possible designs (some
of which may not work for 10% of today's users), not discard them
out-of-hand.

It may be that fast deployment trumps alternative designs in the end,
but let's have that discussion and not cut it off.


Back to the question: "what completeness of deployment
required to declare success for DNS channel privacy?":

My assumptions and a suggested answer:  I assume software upgrades to
the (a) interested clients and (b) servers.  (c) I assume the servers
are reasonably current hardware.  I assume (c) most CPE doesn't
interference, and (d) some interfering CPE can be fixed with a software
upgrade.  I think success would be (e) 80% of users *can* use DNS
privacy (possibly with software installation) in 5 years, and (f) 60% of
people *do* use DNS privacy in 10 years.  Those are just guesses to put
a stake in the ground, and (f) is probably optimistic.  But to me
"immediate and near universal" is not a requirement for success.


Which perhaps raises the question: how often will CPE actually interfere
with whatever we try?  I don't know, but the closest data I know of is
from Netalyzr in 2011 (see "Implications of Netalyzr's DNS Measurements"
by Weaver et al, SATIN).  They say:  88% of their sessions are behind
NATs, and 73% of these hit a DNS proxy---so there's a lot of CPE in the
way by default.  BUT they estimate that about 1.4% of sessions are
"proxied or modified by the network" when they try to directly talk past
the CPE, so it may be that most CPE will get out of the way if one
choses to bypass it.  So sure, we can use DNS-over-HTTPS to bypass the
CPE.  But this data suggests we could also use DNS-over-TLS or -DTLS to
do the same.


I'll cut off this long note here, just focusing on deployment CPE.  But
similar questions come up around deployment in the client itself and in
the servers (recursive and authoritative).  It's been suggested that
solutions must work on old server hardware.  That too seems like an
overly strong constraint to me.  (And, by they way, a constraint that is
completely incompatible with standing up a bunch of new webservers to
run DNS-over-HTTPS.)  That's a related but hopefully separable
discussion.


[* footnote 1: DNS-over-HTTPS: the Bortzmeyer JSON encoding was
mentioned, and XML has been proposed and I-D'ed before.]

[* footnote 2: I'm not sure I believe the assumption is that HTTPS is
nppever interferened with.  Some companies put up TLS-intercepting
middleboxes to snoop TLS to "protect their employees", so even HTTPS is
no longer free from interference and assumptions.]


   -John


From nobody Mon Jul 14 21:47:14 2014
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To: dns-privacy@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org
From: John Heidemann <johnh@isi.edu>
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Subject: [dns-privacy] updated tech report about DNS-over-TCP and DNS-over-TLS
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In Feb. 2014, Zi Hu posted about a study about DNS performance over TCP
and TLS.  The context was a proposal to allow DNS to use TLS over TCP,
described in
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns-01

We got a lot of input we got from the community (particularly those at
OARC in Warsaw).  We've updated our technical report about DNS-over-TCP
and -TLS based on new work stemming from this feedback.

The new tech report is at
http://www.isi.edu/publications/trpublic/files/tr-693.pdf

This tech report (ISI-TR-2014-693) is a major revision of the prior
technical report (ISI-TR-2014-688). Since that work we have improved our
understanding of the availability of TCP fast open and TLS resumption,
and we have tightened our estimates on memory based on external reports
(section 5.2). This additional information has allowed us to conduct
additional experiments, improve our modeling, and provide a more
accurate view of what is possible today; our estimates of latency and
memory consumption are both lower than in our prior technical report as
a result. We have also added additional information about packet size
limitations (Figure 2), experiments evaluating DNSCrypt/DNSCurve
(section 6.1), analysis of DTLS, and covered a broader range of RTTs in
our experiments. We believe these additions strengthen our central
claims: that connectionless DNS causes multiple problems and that T-DNS
addresses those problems with modest increase in latency and memory
suitable for current hardware.

Discussion with the community and feedback from reviewers raised a
number of associated issues.  These issues were and are summarized in
the body of the paper, but we have placed detailed discussion in
appendices so the body may focus on our our central claims in a moderate
amount of space.  Important additional topics include a detailed
discussion of deployment (Appendix H), an evaluation of TCP-specific
threats and their applicability to T-DNS (Appendix I), a detailed
comparison of the relationship between T-DNS with TLS to DTLS (Appendix
J), and details about supporting experiments.


Here's the abstract of the new technical report for folks who
are unfamiliar with this work:

    DNS is the canonical protocol for connectionless UDP. Yet DNS today
    is challenged by eavesdropping that compromises privacy,
    source-address spoofing that results in denial-of-service (DoS)
    attacks on the server and third parties, injection attacks that
    exploit fragmentation, and size limitations that constrain policy
    and operational choices. We propose T-DNS to address these
    problems. It uses TCP to smoothly support large payloads and to
    mitigate spoofing and amplification for DoS. T-DNS uses
    transport-layer security (TLS) to provide privacy from users to
    their DNS resolvers and optionally to authoritative
    servers. Expectations about DNS suggest connections will balloon
    client latency and overwhelm server with state, but our evaluation
    shows costs are modest: end-to-end latency from TLS to the recursive
    resolver is only about 9% slower when UDP is used to the
    authoritative server, and 22% slower with TCP to the
    authoritative. With diverse traces we show that frequent connection
    reuse is possible (60-95% for stub and recursive resolvers, although
    half that for authoritative servers), and after connection
    establishment, we show TCP and TLS latency is equivalent to
    UDP. With conservative timeouts (20 s at authoritative servers and
    60 s elsewhere) and conservative estimates of connection state
    memory requirements, we show that server memory requirements match
    current hardware: a large recursive resolver may have 24k active
    connections requiring about 3.6 GB additional RAM. We identify the
    key design and implementation decisions needed to minimize overhead:
    query pipelining, out-of-order responses, TLS connection resumption,
    and plausible timeouts.

As before, we are interested in feedback about the work.  We got a
number of questions about deployment issues, and we've tried to speak to
them all.

   -John

