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To: "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>
From: Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2016 13:15:11 -0300
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Subject: [dns-privacy] Jabber Scribes and note takes for DPRIVE
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All

We don't have a long agenda, but we could use a jabber scribe(s) and 
note takes for DPRIVE Wednesday morning @10am.

Please drop us a note if you are able to assist and we would be grateful


thanks
tim


From nobody Mon Apr  4 21:51:17 2016
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Subject: [dns-privacy] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS PRIVate Exchange of the IETF.

        Title           : DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
        Authors         : Tirumaleswar Reddy
                          Dan Wing
                          Prashanth Patil
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06.txt
	Pages           : 11
	Date            : 2016-04-04

Abstract:
   DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path
   between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
   can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
   protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
   misdirection of the subsequent connection.

   To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
   proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS,
   to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
   DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
   reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The proposed
   mechanism runs over port 853.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Mon Apr  4 21:55:37 2016
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From: "Tirumaleswar Reddy (tireddy)" <tireddy@cisco.com>
To: "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [dns-privacy] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06.txt
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This revision addresses comments from Stephane.

-Tiru

> -----Original Message-----
> From: dns-privacy [mailto:dns-privacy-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Sent: Tuesday, April 05, 2016 10:21 AM
> To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Cc: dns-privacy@ietf.org
> Subject: [dns-privacy] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06.txt
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
> This draft is a work item of the DNS PRIVate Exchange of the IETF.
>=20
>         Title           : DNS over DTLS (DNSoD)
>         Authors         : Tirumaleswar Reddy
>                           Dan Wing
>                           Prashanth Patil
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06.txt
> 	Pages           : 11
> 	Date            : 2016-04-04
>=20
> Abstract:
>    DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path
>    between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses
>    can contain privacy-sensitive information which is valuable to
>    protect.  An active attacker can send bogus responses causing
>    misdirection of the subsequent connection.
>=20
>    To counter passive listening and active attacks, this document
>    proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS,
>    to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks.  As
>    DNS needs to remain fast, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to
>    reduce DTLS round trips and reduce DTLS handshake size.  The proposed
>    mechanism runs over port 853.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls/
>=20
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-dprive-dnsodtls-06
>=20
>=20
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submiss=
ion
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> dns-privacy mailing list
> dns-privacy@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy


From nobody Tue Apr  5 10:07:37 2016
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To: "dns-privacy@ietf.org" <dns-privacy@ietf.org>
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Subject: [dns-privacy] DNS + 0-RTT
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As many of you are aware, with the TLS1.3 spec, there is some security 
concerns around DNS+TLS1.3 0-RTT.  dkg put together some threat models 
and instead of forwarding some long thread, I figure I would put this 
out there and let Mr. Gilmor lay out his theories.

Daniel, you're it.

tim


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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Stephen Farrell's Yes on draft-ietf-dprive-edns0-padding-02: (with COMMENT)
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On Tue, Mar 01, 2016 at 02:07:05AM -0800,
 Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote 
 a message of 43 lines which said:

>    [1] http://kpdyer.com/publications/oakland2012-peekaboo.pdf
>    [2] http://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.2087v2.pdf

And besides these two papers (I liked the first one, I highly
recommend it), I suggest also:

CLASSIFICATION OF ENCRYPTED WEB TRAFFIC USING MACHINE
LEARNING ALGORITHMS
THESIS
William Charles Barto

http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA585816


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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] DNS + 0-RTT
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On Tue 2016-04-05 14:07:27 -0300, Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> As many of you are aware, with the TLS1.3 spec, there is some security=20
> concerns around DNS+TLS1.3 0-RTT.  dkg put together some threat models=20
> and instead of forwarding some long thread, I figure I would put this=20
> out there and let Mr. Gilmor lay out his theories.

Thanks for the nudge, Tim!

There are several different subtle security considerations with 0-RTT:

 a) no client authentication
 b) limited forward secrecy
 c) no replay protection
 d) client linkability

I assume we're not talking about DTLS here, so i'm going to omit any
concerns about:

 e) UDP-style spoofing/flooding/reflection attacks

Have i missed anything?

Also, i might be confused below about the state of 0-RTT and how it
relates to PSK and session-resumption, though i'm more confident in my
understanding based on the TLS WG discussion yesterday.  But please
correct me if i'm confused!

client auth
=2D----------

For standard DNS traffic, i think we don't care about property (a).
that's good!

forward secrecy
=2D--------------

IIUC for (b), the failing forward secrecy window is constrained by the
duration of the PSK/session resumption ticket.  That's doesn't seem
particularly worrisome to me for DNS.

replay protection
=2D----------------

For DNS we don't particularly care about replay attacks initially, but
replayable traffic might have some privacy implications.

For example, if Mallory can monitor the traffic to and from the DNS
resolver, and a TLS-wrapped DNS request is made that is answered from
the cache, then the attacker has no additional information about what
the answer is.

But if the request is replayable, Mallory can capture it, and replay it
at different intervals (when parts of the cache might be expired) to try
to coax the recursor to call out to the authoritative resolvers, which
might provide more information about the original query.

This is a minor leak, but probably not something to completely ignore.

client linkability
=2D-----------------

(this is in some sense the inverse of "no client authentication": we're
worried that the protocol might allow the server (or others) to identify
clients with greater precision than the client wants)

The TLS client doing 0-RTT can be linked by the server to their previous
session. If the client constrains itself to using each resumption ticket
exactly once, then it limits its linkability exposure to the DNS server.
If the client reuses the resumption ticket, then its sessions are
linkable by any network monitor.

Note that persistent TLS sessions that carry multiple DNS queries of
course have the same "linkability exposure" for queries within a single
TLS session, so it's not *just* a problem for 0-RTT.  and non-0-RTT
session resumption has exactly the same linkability exposure as 0-RTT,
aiui.  So this concern isn't specific to 0-RTT, but if a client wants to
limit its linkability exposure i think it will by definition limit its
use of 0-RTT.

What are the privacy risks of linkability?

 * The DNS server can establish a profile of a given user and their
   interests, even distinguishing between different users behind a LAN
   (or on a shared host with separate resolver sessions)

 * the DNS server (or network observer, in the case of reused session
   tickets) can track a given user as they move across the network,
   unless the client flushes its resumption cache upon network change.

Sadly, this linkability exposure risk is a net loss compared to
cleartext DNS, even compared with cleartext DNS with EDNS0 cookies :/

=2D--------------

So, in conclusion, i think that DNS+TLS-1.3+0-RTT is not too scary.

That said, i'm not convinced that the savings of one round trip time is
particularly significant for the stub-to-resolver use case.  If the
connection is a long-standing connection that stays open (as we expect
for stub-to-resolver), the extra 1-RTT is amortized across lots of
queries; so it's not clear that connection setup speed is as important
in this case.

If we could have a story about how to mitigate the replay attack
concerns (which are already pretty minor), then the linkability concerns
are the only thing that remain, and those can be mitigated by
client-side policy about session ticket reuse (which would basically
extend to policy about when to use 0-RTT and when not to)

I'd be curious to think through how this all relates to TCP Fast Open if
anyone wants to brainstorm it with me.

       --dkg

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Date: Wed, 6 Apr 2016 07:08:55 -0700
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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Colm_MacC=C3=A1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] DNS + 0-RTT
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On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 6:03 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
wrote:
>
> forward secrecy
> ---------------
>
> IIUC for (b), the failing forward secrecy window is constrained by the
> duration of the PSK/session resumption ticket.  That's doesn't seem
> particularly worrisome to me for DNS.
>

I'd expect many operators to re-use ticket encryption keys for far too
long, as we see with HTTPS today, so the effect is that a dns server bug
may unlock years of 0RTT data. For DNS, the query is always likely to fit
in there.


> replay protection
> -----------------
>
> For DNS we don't particularly care about replay attacks initially, but
> replayable traffic might have some privacy implications.
>
> For example, if Mallory can monitor the traffic to and from the DNS
> resolver, and a TLS-wrapped DNS request is made that is answered from
> the cache, then the attacker has no additional information about what
> the answer is.
>
> But if the request is replayable, Mallory can capture it, and replay it
> at different intervals (when parts of the cache might be expired) to try
> to coax the recursor to call out to the authoritative resolvers, which
> might provide more information about the original query.
>

There's a simpler attack too; if the RRSet contains multiple RRs, it's
common for resolvers to rotate the order of the RRs in a fixed and
predictable order. So you can query a name you suspect was queried, then
replay the target query, then query the name again, and confirm your
suspicion. This requires only a copy of the target 0RTT section, and access
to query the resolver, so a typical wifi scenario would do. Multi-RR
responses are very common these days too.

-- 
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 6:03 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <span dir=3D"ltr">&=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net" target=3D"_blank">dkg@fifthhors=
eman.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
forward secrecy<br>
---------------<br>
<br>
IIUC for (b), the failing forward secrecy window is constrained by the<br>
duration of the PSK/session resumption ticket.=C2=A0 That&#39;s doesn&#39;t=
 seem<br>
particularly worrisome to me for DNS.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I=
&#39;d expect many operators to re-use ticket encryption keys for far too l=
ong, as we see with HTTPS today, so the effect is that a dns server bug may=
 unlock years of 0RTT data. For DNS, the query is always likely to fit in t=
here.=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" sty=
le=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
replay protection<br>
-----------------<br>
<br>
For DNS we don&#39;t particularly care about replay attacks initially, but<=
br>
replayable traffic might have some privacy implications.<br>
<br>
For example, if Mallory can monitor the traffic to and from the DNS<br>
resolver, and a TLS-wrapped DNS request is made that is answered from<br>
the cache, then the attacker has no additional information about what<br>
the answer is.<br>
<br>
But if the request is replayable, Mallory can capture it, and replay it<br>
at different intervals (when parts of the cache might be expired) to try<br=
>
to coax the recursor to call out to the authoritative resolvers, which<br>
might provide more information about the original query.<br></blockquote><d=
iv><br></div><div>There&#39;s a simpler attack too; if the RRSet contains m=
ultiple RRs, it&#39;s common for resolvers to rotate the order of the RRs i=
n a fixed and predictable order. So you can query a name you suspect was qu=
eried, then replay the target query, then query the name again, and confirm=
 your suspicion. This requires only a copy of the target 0RTT section, and =
access to query the resolver, so a typical wifi scenario would do. Multi-RR=
 responses are very common these days too.</div><div>=C2=A0</div></div>-- <=
br><div class=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</div></div>

--001a1147cc749de5e8052fd18055--


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Hi all,

Big thanks to Shane for taking minutes.
Please let the chairs know if anything you said was accidentally
misrepresented and we'll correct it.

W

--001a113fca64c9eb32052fd76210
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<div dir="ltr">Hi all,<div><br></div><div>Big thanks to Shane for taking minutes.</div><div>Please let the chairs know if anything you said was accidentally misrepresented and we&#39;ll correct it.</div><div><br></div><div>W</div></div>

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From nobody Sat Apr  9 11:32:47 2016
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] DNS + 0-RTT
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On Wed 2016-04-06 11:08:55 -0300, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote:
>  On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 6:03 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
>
>  > forward secrecy
>  > ---------------
>  >
>  > IIUC for (b), the failing forward secrecy window is constrained by the
>  > duration of the PSK/session resumption ticket.  That's doesn't seem
>  > particularly worrisome to me for DNS.
>
>  I'd expect many operators to re-use ticket encryption keys for far too
>  long, as we see with HTTPS today, so the effect is that a dns server bug
>  may unlock years of 0RTT data. For DNS, the query is always likely to fit
>  in there.

This would be a good argument against doing any sort of session
resumption, i think, not just 0-RTT.

>  > replay protection
>  > -----------------
>  >
>  > For DNS we don't particularly care about replay attacks initially, but
>  > replayable traffic might have some privacy implications.
>  >
>  > For example, if Mallory can monitor the traffic to and from the DNS
>  > resolver, and a TLS-wrapped DNS request is made that is answered from
>  > the cache, then the attacker has no additional information about what
>  > the answer is.
>  >
>  > But if the request is replayable, Mallory can capture it, and replay it
>  > at different intervals (when parts of the cache might be expired) to try
>  > to coax the recursor to call out to the authoritative resolvers, which
>  > might provide more information about the original query.
>
>  There's a simpler attack too; if the RRSet contains multiple RRs, it's
>  common for resolvers to rotate the order of the RRs in a fixed and
>  predictable order. So you can query a name you suspect was queried, then
>  replay the target query, then query the name again, and confirm your
>  suspicion.

Just to make sure i understand this attack: suppose the rotation of two
RRs returned for a given response goes:

  A,B
  B,A
  A,B
  ...

Then the attacker would query, note the order, replay, then query again.
if the order received each time was the same, it's strongly suggestive
that it was the correct guess.  Is that the proposed attack?

>  This requires only a copy of the target 0RTT section, and access
>  to query the resolver, so a typical wifi scenario would do. Multi-RR
>  responses are very common these days too.

It strikes me that we should discourage privacy-sensitive resolvers from
employing this pattern. though i'm not sure where that documentation
would go or how to write it.  Is there a term for this kind of stateful
response history leakage?

thanks for pointing it out.

         --dkg


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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] DNS + 0-RTT
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8

On Sat, Apr 9, 2016 at 2:58 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
wrote:
>
> >  I'd expect many operators to re-use ticket encryption keys for far too
> >  long, as we see with HTTPS today, so the effect is that a dns server bug
> >  may unlock years of 0RTT data. For DNS, the query is always likely to
> fit
> >  in there.
>
> This would be a good argument against doing any sort of session
> resumption, i think, not just 0-RTT.
>

I intend more as an argument against the kind of session resumption that is
in TLS. Elsewhere the protocol has all sorts of reasonable limits on key
re-use, and they're enforced with decent mechanisms. But there's a gigantic
out in that ticket encryption keys are "outside" of  the protocols own
scope and so frequently they end up being a very weak point in the chain.
We should do something about that. I don't mean that session resumption as
a concept is a bad one.  I do mean that folks will hard-code those keys,
not rotate them nearly frequently enough, and that since DNS queries fit in
the 0RTT data the reality will be that a single key compromise could
uncover years of queries. Seems like a pretty big deal.

>  There's a simpler attack too; if the RRSet contains multiple RRs, it's
> >  common for resolvers to rotate the order of the RRs in a fixed and
> >  predictable order. So you can query a name you suspect was queried, then
> >  replay the target query, then query the name again, and confirm your
> >  suspicion.
>
> Just to make sure i understand this attack: suppose the rotation of two
> RRs returned for a given response goes:
>
>   A,B
>   B,A
>   A,B
>   ...
>
> Then the attacker would query, note the order, replay, then query again.
> if the order received each time was the same, it's strongly suggestive
> that it was the correct guess.  Is that the proposed attack?
>

Yep - you have it. It's easier too when there are more RRs, since the
signal is stronger, but an attacker can repeat the attack as many times as
necessary to gain confidence that they've identified the query.


> >  This requires only a copy of the target 0RTT section, and access
> >  to query the resolver, so a typical wifi scenario would do. Multi-RR
> >  responses are very common these days too.
>
> It strikes me that we should discourage privacy-sensitive resolvers from
> employing this pattern. though i'm not sure where that documentation
> would go or how to write it.  Is there a term for this kind of stateful
> response history leakage?
>

Bind9 calls it "cyclic" rrset-order:

https://www.safaribooksonline.com/library/view/dns-bind/0596004109/ch03s19.html

but I'm not sure if it comes from a recommendation in any RFC - I couldn't
find one from a quick search.


-- 
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Sat, Apr 9, 2016 at 2:58 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <span dir=3D"ltr">&=
lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net" target=3D"_blank">dkg@fifthhors=
eman.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,=
204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt;=C2=A0 I&#39;d expect many operators to re-use ticket encryption keys f=
or far too<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 long, as we see with HTTPS today, so the effect is that a dns se=
rver bug<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 may unlock years of 0RTT data. For DNS, the query is always like=
ly to fit<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 in there.<br>
<br>
</span>This would be a good argument against doing any sort of session<br>
resumption, i think, not just 0-RTT.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I =
intend more as an argument against the kind of session resumption that is i=
n TLS. Elsewhere the protocol has all sorts of reasonable limits on key re-=
use, and they&#39;re enforced with decent mechanisms. But there&#39;s a gig=
antic out in that ticket encryption keys are &quot;outside&quot; of =C2=A0t=
he protocols own scope and so frequently they end up being a very weak poin=
t in the chain. We should do something about that. I don&#39;t mean that se=
ssion resumption as a concept is a bad one.=C2=A0 I do mean that folks will=
 hard-code those keys, not rotate them nearly frequently enough, and that s=
ince DNS queries fit in the 0RTT data the reality will be that a single key=
 compromise could uncover years of queries. Seems like a pretty big deal.=
=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204=
);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt;=C2=A0 There&#39;s a simpler attack too; if the RRSet contains multiple=
 RRs, it&#39;s<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 common for resolvers to rotate the order of the RRs in a fixed a=
nd<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 predictable order. So you can query a name you suspect was queri=
ed, then<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 replay the target query, then query the name again, and confirm =
your<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 suspicion.<br>
<br>
</span>Just to make sure i understand this attack: suppose the rotation of =
two<br>
RRs returned for a given response goes:<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 A,B<br>
=C2=A0 B,A<br>
=C2=A0 A,B<br>
=C2=A0 ...<br>
<br>
Then the attacker would query, note the order, replay, then query again.<br=
>
if the order received each time was the same, it&#39;s strongly suggestive<=
br>
that it was the correct guess.=C2=A0 Is that the proposed attack?<br></bloc=
kquote><div><br></div><div>Yep - you have it. It&#39;s easier too when ther=
e are more RRs, since the signal is stronger, but an attacker can repeat th=
e attack as many times as necessary to gain confidence that they&#39;ve ide=
ntified the query.=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-c=
olor:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=
=3D"">
&gt;=C2=A0 This requires only a copy of the target 0RTT section, and access=
<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 to query the resolver, so a typical wifi scenario would do. Mult=
i-RR<br>
&gt;=C2=A0 responses are very common these days too.<br>
<br>
</span>It strikes me that we should discourage privacy-sensitive resolvers =
from<br>
employing this pattern. though i&#39;m not sure where that documentation<br=
>
would go or how to write it.=C2=A0 Is there a term for this kind of statefu=
l<br>
response history leakage?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Bind9 calls i=
t &quot;cyclic&quot; rrset-order:</div><div><br></div><div><a href=3D"https=
://www.safaribooksonline.com/library/view/dns-bind/0596004109/ch03s19.html"=
>https://www.safaribooksonline.com/library/view/dns-bind/0596004109/ch03s19=
.html</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>but I&#39;m not sure if it comes fro=
m a recommendation in any RFC - I couldn&#39;t find one from a quick search=
.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div></div><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail=
_signature">Colm</div>
</div></div>

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From nobody Mon Apr 11 05:52:57 2016
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Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2016 14:52:44 +0200
From: Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org>
To: Colm =?UTF-8?B?TWFjQ8OhcnRoYWlnaA==?= <colm@allcosts.net>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] DNS + 0-RTT
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Colm,

At 2016-04-09 14:58:43 -0700
Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> wrote:
> > >  This requires only a copy of the target 0RTT section, and access
> > >  to query the resolver, so a typical wifi scenario would do. Multi-RR
> > >  responses are very common these days too. =20
> >
> > It strikes me that we should discourage privacy-sensitive resolvers from
> > employing this pattern. though i'm not sure where that documentation
> > would go or how to write it.  Is there a term for this kind of stateful
> > response history leakage?
> > =20
>=20
> Bind9 calls it "cyclic" rrset-order:
>=20
> https://www.safaribooksonline.com/library/view/dns-bind/0596004109/ch03s1=
9.html
>=20
> but I'm not sure if it comes from a recommendation in any RFC - I couldn't
> find one from a quick search.

People who know more can correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding
is that this sort of RRset rotation is intended to work around clients
that would always pick use first RR from an RRset. Back in the day,
that meant that one gopher server would take all the load. ;)

Obviously a DNS server would prefer not to have to do the work of
ordering queries. If you use cyclic order, then you have to maintain
state about the last answer. If you randomize it, then you need some
source of entropy.

I haven't done a full search, but here's a quick look at support.

On the authoritative side, BIND 9 of course offers any option (fixed
order, round-robin, or ranomized), whereas NSD and I believe Knot are
fixed.

On the recursive side, BIND 9 again offers any response, whereas
Unbound is fixed (PowerDNS has a feature request for round-robin, but
is currently also fixed (*)).

Like most of DNS, privacy was not considered when developing this
capability.

My own recommendation would be that a fixed order be used in all
on-the-wire communication, and that we rely on client-side libraries to
either understand that multiple answers may appear to a question or at
alternatively to randomize the one answer they use. (Note that this is
independent of the privacy concerns, as it results in simpler code and
more deterministic behavior all around.) :)

Cheers,

--
Shane

(*) https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns/issues/2521

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From nobody Mon Apr 11 06:33:50 2016
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] DNS + 0-RTT
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On Mon 2016-04-11 08:52:44 -0400, Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org> wrote:
> People who know more can correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding
> is that this sort of RRset rotation is intended to work around clients
> that would always pick use first RR from an RRset. Back in the day,
> that meant that one gopher server would take all the load. ;)
>
> Obviously a DNS server would prefer not to have to do the work of
> ordering queries. If you use cyclic order, then you have to maintain
> state about the last answer. If you randomize it, then you need some
> source of entropy.

randomized doesn't require a lot of entropy -- it just requires some
small chunk at system startup to seed a CSRPNG that you can use
indefinitely.

> My own recommendation would be that a fixed order be used in all
> on-the-wire communication, and that we rely on client-side libraries
> to either understand that multiple answers may appear to a question or
> at alternatively to randomize the one answer they use. (Note that this
> is independent of the privacy concerns, as it results in simpler code
> and more deterministic behavior all around.) :)

I do like the simplicity and clarity of your proposal, but relying on
client-side libraries to be fixed seems like a non-starter,
unfortunately.  This is the classic IETF problem for any protocol with a
deployed base; the folks who have the incentive and capacity to fix some
endpoints aren't necessarily the folks who control the "right" endpoints
to fix :/

   --dkg


From nobody Mon Apr 11 10:35:09 2016
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On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 6:33 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
wrote:

> I do like the simplicity and clarity of your proposal, but relying on
> client-side libraries to be fixed seems like a non-starter,
> unfortunately.  This is the classic IETF problem for any protocol with a
> deployed base; the folks who have the incentive and capacity to fix some
> endpoints aren't necessarily the folks who control the "right" endpoints
> to fix :/
>

Based on my reading of the charter, I think it's within the remit of this
WG to have a short I-D recommending random shuffling of RRs, permitting
fixed order, but "MUST NOT" for cyclic. For both recursive, and
authoritative servers. Happy to do it if folks don't think it's crazy.

-- 
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 6:33 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <span=
 dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dkg@fifthhorseman.net" target=3D"_blank"=
>dkg@fifthhorseman.net</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div class=3D"gmail_extra">=
<div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margi=
n:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">I do like the sim=
plicity and clarity of your proposal, but relying on<br>
client-side libraries to be fixed seems like a non-starter,<br>
unfortunately.=C2=A0 This is the classic IETF problem for any protocol with=
 a<br>
deployed base; the folks who have the incentive and capacity to fix some<br=
>
endpoints aren&#39;t necessarily the folks who control the &quot;right&quot=
; endpoints<br>
to fix :/<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Based on my reading of the ch=
arter, I think it&#39;s within the remit of this WG to have a short I-D rec=
ommending random shuffling of RRs, permitting fixed order, but &quot;MUST N=
OT&quot; for cyclic. For both recursive, and authoritative servers. Happy t=
o do it if folks don&#39;t think it&#39;s crazy.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div>=
</div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</div></div>

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From nobody Mon Apr 11 10:54:04 2016
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Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2016 13:54:01 -0400
From: Robert Edmonds <edmonds@mycre.ws>
To: Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org>
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] DNS + 0-RTT
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Shane Kerr wrote:
> Obviously a DNS server would prefer not to have to do the work of
> ordering queries. If you use cyclic order, then you have to maintain
> state about the last answer. If you randomize it, then you need some
> source of entropy.
> 
> I haven't done a full search, but here's a quick look at support.
> 
> On the authoritative side, BIND 9 of course offers any option (fixed
> order, round-robin, or ranomized), whereas NSD and I believe Knot are
> fixed.
> 
> On the recursive side, BIND 9 again offers any response, whereas
> Unbound is fixed (PowerDNS has a feature request for round-robin, but
> is currently also fixed (*)).

Unbound actually does support both fixed and randomized, and the entropy
is taken from an interesting place: the ID field from the query.

-- 
Robert Edmonds


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On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Robert Edmonds <edmonds@mycre.ws> wrote:

> Unbound actually does support both fixed and randomized, and the entropy
> is taken from an interesting place: the ID field from the query.
>

I think if there are more than 8 RRs, that won't be enough entropy to
generate all possible permutations.

-- 
Colm

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<div dir=3D"ltr">On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Robert Edmonds <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:edmonds@mycre.ws" target=3D"_blank">edmonds@=
mycre.ws</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmai=
l_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Unbound actually does support both =
fixed and randomized, and the entropy<br>
is taken from an interesting place: the ID field from the query.<br></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>I think if there are more than 8 RRs, that won&#3=
9;t be enough entropy to generate all possible permutations.=C2=A0</div></d=
iv><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_signature">Colm</div>
</div></div>

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From nobody Wed Apr 13 05:09:09 2016
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Colm,

At 2016-04-11 10:59:02 -0700
Colm MacC=C3=A1rthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> wrote:

> On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 10:54 AM, Robert Edmonds <edmonds@mycre.ws> wrote:
>=20
> > Unbound actually does support both fixed and randomized, and the entropy
> > is taken from an interesting place: the ID field from the query.
>=20
> I think if there are more than 8 RRs, that won't be enough entropy to
> generate all possible permutations.

At first I thought this was shocking. SHOCKING.

But if the goal is merely to mix up the answers a bit so that software
that uses the first RR does not always get the same answer, then it is
Good Enough(tm). Even with a fully-predictable QID this is fine.

It's only when you consider the order of the RR private that this
becomes a concern.

I admit I don't fully understand how information leakage is supposed to
happen. But if it is a valid concern then probably a cryptographically
secure random number generation is needed, and needs to be documented.

Cheers,

--
Shane

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From nobody Mon Apr 25 13:51:52 2016
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A new meeting session request has just been submitted by Tim Wicinski, a Chair of the dprive working group.


---------------------------------------------------------
Working Group Name: DNS PRIVate Exchange
Area Name: Internet Area
Session Requester: Tim Wicinski

Number of Sessions: 1
Length of Session(s):  1.5 Hours
Number of Attendees: 140
Conflicts to Avoid: 
 First Priority: homenet dnssd dane opsawg dnsop capport
 Second Priority: ipsecme



Special Requests:
  
---------------------------------------------------------

