
From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  1 07:32:12 2010
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] dnssec-bis-updates and the CD bit
References: <20101027203218.GW45134@shinkuro.com>
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
Date: Mon, 01 Nov 2010 14:24:55 +0000
In-Reply-To: <20101027203218.GW45134@shinkuro.com> (Andrew Sullivan's message of "Wed\, 27 Oct 2010 16\:32\:18 -0400")
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* Andrew Sullivan:

> Our minutes from Maastricht say this:
>
>           Existing item: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates
>           - small number of hums for the "roll over and die" text is not =
okay and
>           no hums for the text is okay
>           - observation: few seem to have read the draft
>           - demonstration of the "roll over and die" behaviour was given
>           - CD-bit handling: nobody objected to having a default - unlike=
 the two
>           people on the mailing list


What is a "hum"?  Does it express agreement or disagreement?

Anyway, I have no problems with the text as-is (in -11, don't know if
that's current).  Note however that the more or less explicit
recommendation to set CD by default has security implications: you no
longer profit from more stringent validation at an upstream validator.
This should be mentioned in the Security Considerations.

I think this is a very minor issue because even with the CD fixes, the
protocol more or less requires that your forwarder has a superset of
your own trust anchors.  Therefore, the situation that the forwarders
perform more stringent checks is not a relevant scenario.

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  1 08:03:46 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] XFR-ng, was New Version Notification for draft-ah-dnsext-rfc1995bis-ixfr-01 (fwd)
From: Shane Kerr <shane@isc.org>
To: Alfred =?ISO-8859-1?Q?H=F6nes?= <ah@TR-Sys.de>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Alfred,

[ I left a lot of text in here relative to my comments. Apologies but I 
  can't think of a careful way to remove text that doesn't run the risk 
  of me dropping context. ]

On Wed, 2010-10-27 at 16:47 +0200, Alfred Hönes wrote:
> > One concern is this:
> >
> >    If an IXFR server is not able or willing to send the incremental zone
> >    change information to transform the client's version (sn_o) to its
> >    newer version (sn_n), the server SHOULD, in the case of QTYPE=IXFR,
> >    fall back to AXFR (see below); however, it MAY, and in the case of
> >    QTYPE=IXFR-ONLY, it MUST respond with an appropriate error, e.g.,
> >    CannotIXFR (see below) in the case of QTYPE=IXFR-ONLY.
> >
> > I don't know that CannotIXFR should be supported for QTYPE=IXFR. Clients
> > that do not support this RCODE will get different behavior than they
> > expect. I don't think it offers much improvement, so best to leave it
> > out.
> 
> Maybe the language is not clear enough, but I think we agree perfectly:
> The clause,
> 
>              "... it MUST respond with an appropriate error,"
> 
> was intended to indicate a "reasonable" RCODE -- one that the server
> expects being understood by the client -- , and then the particular
> case:
>    "..., e.g., CannotIXFR (see below) in the case of QTYPE=IXFR-ONLY."
> 
> was intended to say that *in case of QTYPE=IXFR-ONLY*, CannotIXFR
> _is_ the appropriate error.
> 
> I hope the second paragraph in 3.2.1 is consistent with that
> interpretation.
> 
> Do you have a text suggestion for improving the above clause?
> 
> BTW, I'm not sure whether existing IXFR implementations ever consider
> responding with an error (the MAY above) or always fall back to AXFR.
> The verbiage was chosen in this manner to allow different behavior of
> server implementations to remain conformant with the new spec, and to
> encourage client implementors to do very robust encoding.

AFAIK, all existing IXFR implementations fall back to AXFR. I think it
would be confusing if some implementations started returning an error.
So I recommend that the specification leaves that "as is" (see below for
more ideas though).

> > Regarding the question of whether CannotIXFR should be an RCODE or an
> > extended RCODE, I think actually that an extended RCODE makes sense. In
> > the case of IXFR we have co-operating servers, so getting EDNS working
> > between them is probably not such a big task in the normal case.
> 
> That was the conclusion I had drawn personally as well, but I wanted
> to be neutral and leave it as an open topic for discussion.
> 
> If we adopt this version, EDNS needs to become mandatory for IXFR-ONLY
> queries, and the text in 3.1.5 and 3.2.5 needs minor tweaks as well to
> reflect this.

Okay, agreed.

> > Finally, some servers will never be used as an IXFR server, and so
> > should always be happy with condensed replies. Some servers will be used
> > as an IXFR server, and as such probably *never* want a condensed reply.
> > (How the server knows which is true is an open question. However a good
> > rule of thumb may be that if no IXFR client are authorized for a given
> > IXFR server that it will be happy with condensed replies.)
> >
> > Perhaps a way for an IXFR client to signal either a desire for condensed
> > replies or not might be useful?
> 
> Splendid observation!
> 
> The signalling could be performed with an EDNS option.
> 
> But ... thinking out loudly ...
> 
> in that case, an alternative method to request IXFR-ONLY would be
> to remain stuck with QCODE=IXFR and steer the IXFR server behavior
> with the value of a more generic, say IXFR-Qualifier EDNS option.
> The value might be an octet encoded as independent flag bits.  This
> would allow to encode nuances of the desired IXFR server behavior.
> 
> This solution seems to have the same, or even better backwards
> compatibility properties: a server that is unaware of IXFR-ONLY
> would ignore the IXFR-Qualifier EDNS option and simply behave
> as before for IXFR.  This is impossible with QCODE=IXFR-ONLY,
> and during a phased upgrade of servers for a zone the alternative
> solution thus would save one round-trip.  However, refusal of an
> unsupported IXFR-ONLY allows to switch to another server ...
> So this will be an engineering compromise to choose.
> 
> In case we'd use such "IXFR-Modifier" EDNS option, I would also want
> to define an "understand IXFR-ONLY" bit in that option, set to 0 by
> the client and set to 1 in the response by an IXFR-ONLY aware server.
> (This would allow the client to distinguish an IXFR-ONLY aware server
> from an IXFR-ONLY unaware server that blindly echoes EDNS options
> received.)
> Maybe it would also make sense then to have the server clear those
> option bits corresponding to behavior variants that the server was not
> able to perform, and let those bits set to 1 that it was able to honor.
> 
> If all that is done, sophisticated IXFR clients could "profile"
> IXFR servers and use this information (maybe subject to some kind
> of aging, to allow for changes in the deployment like software updates
> or config changes to be accommodated seemlessly) to improve their
> server selection strategy.  (All local matter!)

This was among the first ideas that came up when I was discussing this
with Ondřej Surý. However, the problem with this is that if you connect
to a server that does not understand the EDNS options, you will have one
of three possibilities:

     1. The server considers this an error, and returns an error code of
        some description to you.
     2. The server considers this an error, and drops your message on
        the floor, leading to a timeout.
     3. The server ignores the EDNS option, and cannot perform an IXFR
        so starts sending an AXFR-style response.

The first one is fine - that is what you want. However, options #2 and
#3 are both unpleasant.

If we use a separate pseudo-message number, then a server who does not
support IXFR-ONLY will only have the first two options (returning an
error code, or dropping the message). I don't think there is a way to
avoid badly-implemented servers who don't return errors to clients, so
we're stuck with #2. (Credit: it was Ondřej who came up with the idea
use of a separate pseudo-message number to avoid the problems of #3.)

But, thinking about this further... maybe the best thing to do is not to
use IXFR-ONLY as a separate pseudo-message number, but rather to create
a separate pseudo-message. Something like IXFR2, or EXFR (extensible
transfer) perhaps? This could combine the following options:

      * AXFR transfer if IXFR not allowed
      * Compressed IXFR desired, not desired, or don't care
      * zlib compressed AXFR (and IXFR?)

Yes, I just threw in that last one. Once upon a time there was something
called ZXFR which ended up being dropped. The message that references
its death even mentions making it an EDNS option:

http://www.ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/msg00554.html

In fact a custom DNS compression scheme might give even better results
both in CPU and size than a generic compression algorithm, but zlib is
an reasonable choice I think, because of the number of solid
implementations available.

There may be other possible XFR improvements, although this is all the
ones that I was thinking of. :)

--
Shane



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  1 13:48:45 2010
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Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2010 15:41:16 -0500
From: John Kristoff <jtk@cymru.com>
To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
Cc: namedroppers WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Case for EDNS0-client-subnet...
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On Mon, 1 Nov 2010 09:57:33 +1100
Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu> wrote:

> IMO, it really shows the value that EDNS0-client-subnet would have if
> deployed: OpenDNS and Google DNS provide significantly less local
> replies in many many cases.

Of course it also shows the value of a well designed local caching
infrastructures by the ISPs.  :-)  That might suggest the DNS resolver
providers should be trying to deploy their boxes within ISP networks
as well, much like Akamai has done with their gear.  I know some have
been trying to do this of course.

John


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  1 14:11:01 2010
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John Kristoff wrote:

>> IMO, it really shows the value that EDNS0-client-subnet would have if
>> deployed: OpenDNS and Google DNS provide significantly less local
>> replies in many many cases.
> 
> Of course it also shows the value of a well designed local caching
> infrastructures by the ISPs.  :-)  That might suggest the DNS resolver
> providers should be trying to deploy their boxes within ISP networks
> as well, much like Akamai has done with their gear.  I know some have
> been trying to do this of course.

Wise ISPs will soon learn to override 208.67.222.222, 208.67.220.220,
8.8.4.4 and 8.8.8.8 by their own DNS servers and the problems caused
by OpenDNS and google will go away.

						Masataka Ohta


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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Case for EDNS0-client-subnet...
From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Colm_MacC=E1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Cc: John Kristoff <jtk@cymru.com>, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>,  namedroppers WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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2010/11/1 Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>

> Wise ISPs will soon learn to override 208.67.222.222, 208.67.220.220,
> 8.8.4.4 and 8.8.8.8 by their own DNS servers and the problems caused
> by OpenDNS and google will go away.


Care to commit to a date and some numbers for that prediction?

-- 
Colm

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2010/11/1 Masataka Ohta <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mohta@necom=
830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp">mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp</a>&gt;</span><br><=
div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">Wise ISPs will soon learn to override 208.67.222.222, 208=
.67.220.220,</div>
8.8.4.4 and 8.8.8.8 by their own DNS servers and the problems caused<br>
by OpenDNS and google will go away.</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Care to=
 commit to a date and some numbers for that prediction?=A0</div></div><br>-=
- <br>Colm<br>

--0016367fadc186fae7049409105a--


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Subject: [dnsext] Re: Case for EDNS0-client-subnet...
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On Tue, Nov 02, 2010 at 06:03:55AM +0900,
 Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> wrote 
 a message of 17 lines which said:

> Wise ISPs will soon learn to override 208.67.222.222,
> 208.67.220.220, 8.8.4.4 and 8.8.8.8 by their own DNS servers

ISPs which are evil enough to provide lying DNS resolvers will
certainly have no scruple doing so. 

On the other hand, such action (announcing someone else's prefixes)
may be considered illegal in some jurisdictions. And they certainly
would be a direct attack against net neutrality.


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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Case for EDNS0-client-subnet...
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Cc: John Kristoff <jtk@cymru.com>, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>,  namedroppers WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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And when that day comes people will start deploying clients that prevent
ISPs from that type of man in the middle attack.

2010/11/1 Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>

> John Kristoff wrote:
>
> >> IMO, it really shows the value that EDNS0-client-subnet would have if
> >> deployed: OpenDNS and Google DNS provide significantly less local
> >> replies in many many cases.
> >
> > Of course it also shows the value of a well designed local caching
> > infrastructures by the ISPs.  :-)  That might suggest the DNS resolver
> > providers should be trying to deploy their boxes within ISP networks
> > as well, much like Akamai has done with their gear.  I know some have
> > been trying to do this of course.
>
> Wise ISPs will soon learn to override 208.67.222.222, 208.67.220.220,
> 8.8.4.4 and 8.8.8.8 by their own DNS servers and the problems caused
> by OpenDNS and google will go away.
>
>                                                Masataka Ohta
>
>


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e645b8e274979104941714af
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And when that day comes people will start deploying clients that prevent IS=
Ps from that type of man in the middle attack.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_q=
uote">2010/11/1 Masataka Ohta <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mohta=
@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp">mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp</a>&gt;</span=
><br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">John Kristoff wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt;&gt; IMO, it really shows the value that EDNS0-client-subnet would have=
 if<br>
&gt;&gt; deployed: OpenDNS and Google DNS provide significantly less local<=
br>
&gt;&gt; replies in many many cases.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Of course it also shows the value of a well designed local caching<br>
&gt; infrastructures by the ISPs. =A0:-) =A0That might suggest the DNS reso=
lver<br>
&gt; providers should be trying to deploy their boxes within ISP networks<b=
r>
&gt; as well, much like Akamai has done with their gear. =A0I know some hav=
e<br>
&gt; been trying to do this of course.<br>
<br>
</div>Wise ISPs will soon learn to override 208.67.222.222, 208.67.220.220,=
<br>
8.8.4.4 and 8.8.8.8 by their own DNS servers and the problems caused<br>
by OpenDNS and google will go away.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0Masataka Ohta<br>
<br>
</font></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=
=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Case for EDNS0-client-subnet...
References: <F4245B4C-2170-4106-8EF6-8153879B168E@icsi.berkeley.edu>	<20101101154116.1ccb565d@t61p>	<4CCF2B3B.3040309@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> <AANLkTi=MeVYO1+GD3qB-W6kYBmNeXrO6o8g5kRA3csoz@mail.gmail.com>
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Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> And when that day comes people will start deploying clients that prevent
> ISPs from that type of man in the middle attack.

FYI, as long as OpenDNS is autocorrecting typos of domain names
and putting advertisements for uncorrectable domain names, which
is very basic business model of OpenDNS, there is no room for
DNSSEC.

A problem is that most, if not all hopefully, ISPs are unwise.
But, less wise ISPs may still intercept all the DNS traffic.

						Masataka Ohta


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Nov  2 23:29:06 2010
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From: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
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References: <F4245B4C-2170-4106-8EF6-8153879B168E@icsi.berkeley.edu> <20101101154116.1ccb565d@t61p> <4CCF2B3B.3040309@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> <20101102133102.GA8687@nic.fr>
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Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:

>> Wise ISPs will soon learn to override 208.67.222.222,
>> 208.67.220.220, 8.8.4.4 and 8.8.8.8 by their own DNS servers

> On the other hand, such action (announcing someone else's prefixes)

Announcing someone else's prefixes??? I never say such action.

BTW, some countries, including Japan, are trying to restrict
freedom of speech by blocking sites which are declared to be
child porn sites, regardless of whether they actually are or
not with vague definition of "child porn" different country
by country, through DNS replying non-existent domain.

It means that such reply of non-existent domain can not be
authenticated by DNSSEC.

In addition, in the future in some countries, it may be considered
illegal for ISPs not to override DNS queries.

> ISPs which are evil enough to provide lying DNS resolvers will
> certainly have no scruple doing so.

Welcome to the real world where so many people have no scruples.

						Masataka Ohta


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Subject: Re: [dnsext] dnssec-bis-updates and the CD bit
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On 2010-11-01, at 10:24, Florian Weimer wrote:

> * Andrew Sullivan:
>=20
>> Our minutes from Maastricht say this:
>>=20
>>          Existing item: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates
>>          - small number of hums for the "roll over and die" text is =
not okay and
>>          no hums for the text is okay
>>          - observation: few seem to have read the draft
>>          - demonstration of the "roll over and die" behaviour was =
given
>>          - CD-bit handling: nobody objected to having a default - =
unlike the two
>>          people on the mailing list
>=20
>=20
> What is a "hum"?  Does it express agreement or disagreement?

Agreement. The implication that should be drawn from Andrew's text is =
that the room felt the text was not ok, but on the whole the number of =
people expressing an opinion was small, hence the following observation.


Joe



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Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2010 09:47:44 -0400
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] dnssec-bis-updates and the CD bit
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On Mon, Nov 01, 2010 at 02:24:55PM +0000, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Andrew Sullivan:
> 
> > Our minutes from Maastricht say this:
> >
> >           Existing item: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates
> >           - small number of hums for the "roll over and die" text is not okay and
> >           no hums for the text is okay
> >           - observation: few seem to have read the draft
> >           - demonstration of the "roll over and die" behaviour was given
> >           - CD-bit handling: nobody objected to having a default - unlike the two
> >           people on the mailing list
> 
> 
> What is a "hum"?  Does it express agreement or disagreement?

A hum indicates agreement with the proposition.  We had proposed text
(not actually in the -11, note: the draft as is says it's a
"placeholder") that was supposed to go in here.  I can't put my hands
on the proposed text at the moment, however.  Editors?

The CD bit handling says that nobody objected to having a default.
What we were planning to do was to outline the three "strategies" and
say "do always set by default".  Nobody seemed to object in the
meeting.

A
-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.


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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Case for EDNS0-client-subnet...
From: Wilmer van der Gaast <wilmer@google.com>
To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
Cc: namedroppers WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
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Everyone,

Since we're talking about this option now, here's a short update on
edns-client-subnet. We don't have a new draft ready yet, but have been
working on running code. Using a temporary option code we want to find
out if the option gets us the benefits we expect (overall lower
latency and page load times for many users), and quantify the
drawbacks (more DNS latency, lower cache hit rate, larger cache on the
resolver and higher traffic level).

Google Public DNS is using the option internally for some time now for
all queries to ns[1-4].google.com, without issues. Anyone who's
interested in trying out the option at this point (both authoritative
servers and resolvers), please contact us.

We hope to have edns-client-(ip|subnet)-02 together with some numbers
on its effectiveness ready before EoY.


Regards,

-- 
Wilmer van der Gaast, Traffic SRE/Google Public DNS team.
Google Ireland.


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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Nov  5 03:30:33 2010
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To: Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org>
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Re: need new flag bit in EDNS, "do me no favours" (DMNF)
References: <59023.1287939121@nsa.vix.com> <20101025094523.GA5187@nic.fr> <41281.1288025835@nsa.vix.com> <20101025233215.4A495606495@drugs.dv.isc.org> <72674.1288058394@nsa.vix.com> <AANLkTimwXkUrYHveahqTMZe=V8zu8LG1MJ3HtQEZAoDW@mail.gmail.com> <78766.1288064363@nsa.vix.com>
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
Date: Fri, 05 Nov 2010 10:22:52 +0000
In-Reply-To: <78766.1288064363@nsa.vix.com> (Paul Vixie's message of "Tue\, 26 Oct 2010 03\:39\:23 +0000")
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* Paul Vixie:

>> Why doesn't that belong better in HTTP? The HTTP WG is probably better
>> placed to define whatever a "web error" is.
>
> if you get an nxdomain you won't be connecting to any web server
> anywhere.

This depends on the browser and on the domain name.  Quite a few
implement search fallback, try again with "www." prepended.
Redirection to search seems important because most users do not care
about the difference between DNS-based and search-engine-based
lookups.

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Nov  5 04:46:45 2010
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To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Re: need new flag bit in EDNS, "do me no favours" (DMNF)
In-Reply-To: <8262wcm5mr.fsf@mid.bfk.de>
References: <59023.1287939121@nsa.vix.com> <20101025094523.GA5187@nic.fr> <41281.1288025835@nsa.vix.com> <20101025233215.4A495606495@drugs.dv.isc.org> <72674.1288058394@nsa.vix.com> <AANLkTimwXkUrYHveahqTMZe=V8zu8LG1MJ3HtQEZAoDW@mail.gmail.com> <78766.1288064363@nsa.vix.com> <8262wcm5mr.fsf@mid.bfk.de>
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Florian Weimer wrote:
> Redirection to search seems important because most users do not care
> about the difference between DNS-based and search-engine-based
> lookups.

Indeed - important enough that at least one browser is taking
defensive measures to ensure that this redirection to search
is not broken by NXDOMAIN spoofing:

  http://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/group/chromium-discuss/msg/5891e258e6015fc5

-- 
Andreas Gustafsson, gson@araneus.fi


From dnsext-archive@ietf.org  Fri Nov  5 07:51:01 2010
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Nov  5 08:37:32 2010
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From: Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org>
To: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Re: need new flag bit in EDNS, "do me no favours" (DMNF) 
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 05 Nov 2010 13:42:26 +0200." <19667.60834.801609.327061@guava.gson.org> 
References: <59023.1287939121@nsa.vix.com> <20101025094523.GA5187@nic.fr> <41281.1288025835@nsa.vix.com> <20101025233215.4A495606495@drugs.dv.isc.org> <72674.1288058394@nsa.vix.com> <AANLkTimwXkUrYHveahqTMZe=V8zu8LG1MJ3HtQEZAoDW@mail.gmail.com> <78766.1288064363@nsa.vix.com> <8262wcm5mr.fsf@mid.bfk.de>  <19667.60834.801609.327061@guava.gson.org> 
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Andreas Gustafsson <gson@araneus.fi> wrote:

> Florian Weimer wrote:
> > Redirection to search seems important because most users do not care
> > about the difference between DNS-based and search-engine-based
> > lookups.
> 
> Indeed - important enough that at least one browser is taking
> defensive measures to ensure that this redirection to search is not
> broken by NXDOMAIN spoofing:
> 
>   http://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/group/chromium-discuss/msg/5891e258e6015fc5

in the info-war over the ownership of eyeballs, we will all be collateral
victims.


From dnsext-archive@ietf.org  Fri Nov  5 08:40:20 2010
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Subject: dnsext-archive@ietf.org Rolex For You -20%
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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Fri Nov  5 11:21:38 2010
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Date: Fri, 5 Nov 2010 13:16:38 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
From: "Jeffrey A. Williams" <jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com>
Reply-To: "Jeffrey A. Williams" <jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com>
To: Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org>, IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Re: need new flag bit in EDNS, "do me no favours" (DMNF)
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Paul and all,


-----Original Message-----
>From: Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org>
>Sent: Nov 5, 2010 10:31 AM
>To: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
>Subject: Re: [dnsext] Re: need new flag bit in EDNS, "do me no favours" (DMNF) 
>
>Andreas Gustafsson <gson@araneus.fi> wrote:
>
>> Florian Weimer wrote:
>> > Redirection to search seems important because most users do not care
>> > about the difference between DNS-based and search-engine-based
>> > lookups.
>> 
>> Indeed - important enough that at least one browser is taking
>> defensive measures to ensure that this redirection to search is not
>> broken by NXDOMAIN spoofing:
>> 
>>   http://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/group/chromium-discuss/msg/5891e258e6015fc5
>
>in the info-war over the ownership of eyeballs, we will all be collateral
>victims.
>
  Indeed we will be, if we already have not been.  

Regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Phone: 214-244-4827





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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Sun Nov  7 09:00:30 2010
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Date: Sun, 7 Nov 2010 11:52:39 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: [dnsext] DNSEXT WG report from the chairs
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Dear colleagues,                                                                
                                                                                
This is the DNSEXT Working Group status report from the Chairs.  As we
did for previous meetings, we are undertaking this report on the
mailing list rather than at the meeting.  Items not addressed in this
report should be part of the DNSEXT meeting at IETF 79.
                                                                                
Please be aware that, if there are issues you want to have addressed            
at the meeting and you feel they're not being addressed in this mail,           
you should not hesitate to raise them.                                          
                                                                                
Reminder: contributions to the WG are covered by the "Note Well"
statement, which can be found at
http://www.ietf.org/about/note-well.html.

1.  DRAFTS PUBLISHED

    draft-ietf-dnsext-dns-tcp-requirements, RFC 5966

2.  DRAFTS IN OR PAST WG LAST CALL

    a.  RFC-Editor's queue

        draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-alg-allocation

    b.  IESG processing

        draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc3597-bis  
        
            The editor and the shepherd have some work to do on
            language before this is sent along.  The status is
            actually false: this was sent back to the WG.

3.  ACTIVE DRAFTS

    draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes

        - The changes that were needed were made.  There's been little
          discussion.  We plan to start WGLC on or about 2010-11-17,
          for one week.  Comments sent to the mailing list now, marked
          as "to be considered in LC", will be counted in the WGLC
          evaluation.

    draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname

        - The document is ready to go.  We think it needs to have WGLC
          along with an update of
          draft-eastlake-dnsext-xnamercode-02.txt.  The WGLC will
          start on or about 2010-11-24.  Comments sent to the mailing
          list now, marked "to be considered in LC", will be counted
          in the WGLC evaluation. 

4.  EXPIRED DRAFTS

    draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates

        - This document still needs a number of things to be
          incorporated.  Let's get that done in the available time in
          the DNSEXT session in Beijing.

    draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0

        - New editor (Joao Damas) was appointed.  The -04 did not make
          the cutoff.  It should be available soon.

5.  WG mailing list move

    The mailing list needs to move.  Unfortunately, it appears we will
    not be able to use the namedroppers name.  We presume that
    namedroppers@ops.ietf.org will continue to function, although we
    don't know.  Our current plan is to move to dnsext@ietf.org.  This
    will be discussed in the Beijing session.


Best regards,

Olafur and Andrew

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  8 01:13:26 2010
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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 04:06:41 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] DNSEXT WG report from the chairs
Message-ID: <20101108090640.GC76457@shinkuro.com>
References: <20101107165237.GA72217@shinkuro.com>
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Dear colleagues,

I neglected to include in this report a remark about the status of our
charter.  

The charter is still working its way through the IESG, but our Area
Director, Ralph Droms, tells me that it will be dealt with soon.

My apologies for the oversight.

Best regards,

Andrew

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  8 01:49:27 2010
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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 04:46:09 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: [dnsext] Scribe volunteers for DNSEXT meeting?
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Dear colleagues,

We have a meeting scheduled in Beijing at 13:00 this Wed., Nov 10.  It
would be wonderful if we had volunteers in advance for taking notes,
and for working the Jabber room.  If you are willing and able to help,
I'd appreciate it if you'd let me know in advance.  

Thanks,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.


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From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: [dnsext] I-D Action:draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04.txt
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
	Author(s)       : J. Damas, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2010-11-08

The Domain Name System's wire protocol includes a number of fixed
fields whose range has been or soon will be exhausted and does not
allow requestors to advertise their capabilities to responders.  This
document describes backward compatible mechanisms for allowing the
protocol to grow.

This document updates the EDNS0 specification (RFC2671) based on 10
years of deployment experience.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/

Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
Internet-Draft.

--NextPart
Content-Type: Message/External-body;
	name="draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04.txt";
	site="ftp.ietf.org";
	access-type="anon-ftp";
	directory="internet-drafts"

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--NextPart--


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  8 03:35:28 2010
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To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
Subject: [dnsext] Re: draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-20
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Section 5.2 paragraph 2 (below) is just plain wrong

   A server MUST ignore a dynamic update message that attempts to add a
   non-DNAME/CNAME RR at a name that already has a DNAME RR associated
   with that name.  Otherwise, replace the DNAME RR with the DNAME (or
   CNAME) update RR.  This is similar behavior to dynamic updates to an
   owner name of a CNAME RR [RFC2136].

The only additional restriction on DNAME is that is it to be treated
as a singleton.  i.e. Adding a DNAME removes the exiting DNAME.
Apart from that it should be treated like any other record as far
as UPDATE is concerned.

You can add other records so long as the rules for the other records
permit them to be added.

The above text prevents you updating the SOA and NS records for
example when a DNAME is use at the apex of a zone.

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE:	+61 2 9871 4742		         INTERNET: marka@isc.org


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  8 03:43:18 2010
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I'm afraid that i-d-announce@ietf.org is violating MIME protocol.

That is, case sensitive boundary parameter of the announcement is:

	Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="nextpart"

while the actual parameters are case insensitive and are:

--NextPart

and, worse,

--NextPart--

I have no idea on what will happen if announcement containing
a word of "nextpart" is made.

						Masataka Ohta


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  8 07:19:00 2010
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To: Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: [dnsext] Re: I-D Action:draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04.txt
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On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 08:39:37PM +0900,
 Masataka Ohta <mohta@necom830.hpcl.titech.ac.jp> wrote 
 a message of 18 lines which said:

> I'm afraid that i-d-announce@ietf.org is violating MIME protocol.

I assume that the Secretariat know about it (and this is why there was
no other I-D sent) but, just in case, I followed the proper procedure
and reported it to ietf-action@ietf.org, where it obtained ticket
number [www.ietf.org/rt #32556].

If you have details to add, send them to ietf-action@ietf.org with
[www.ietf.org/rt #32556] in the subject.


From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  8 15:23:07 2010
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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 18:15:22 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Discussion material for Beijing (was Re: [dnsext] DNSEXT WG report from the chairs)
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No hat.

On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 03:15:01PM -0400, Brian Dickson wrote:

> However, knowing that a solution exists, can be helpful in
> considering adopting the requirement for solutions of this type.

I read this as saying, "We don't have a problem statement, so I wrote
an I-D that solves a problem, and now I'd like the problem statement
to include this problem in the scope of things to solve."  I am not
sure that is the best way to proceed.  On the other hand, since we
also have some other drafts that presumably solve some problem, it is
no harm to have another one floating about.

> Accordingly, here's the link to the first (-00) version, and I've included
> below the text of the latest
> version (-01) since updates are not possible currently (standard meeting
> IETF I-D moratorium).

The updates opened up at the beginning of the meeting.  Feel free to
upload.

A


-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.


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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 15:23:10 -0400
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Subject: Re: Discussion material for Beijing (was Re: [dnsext] DNSEXT WG report from the chairs)
From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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(Sorry to resend this, but the first one went out truncated - kind of
defeats the purpose if part of the text is missing...)

On Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 3:15 PM, Brian Dickson
<brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Nov 7, 2010 at 12:52 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote=
:
>>
>> Dear colleagues,
>>
>> This is the DNSEXT Working Group status report from the Chairs. =A0As we
>> did for previous meetings, we are undertaking this report on the
>> mailing list rather than at the meeting. =A0Items not addressed in this
>> report should be part of the DNSEXT meeting at IETF 79.
>>
>> Please be aware that, if there are issues you want to have addressed
>> at the meeting and you feel they're not being addressed in this mail,
>> you should not hesitate to raise them.
>>
>
> There's also the issue of draft-yao-dnsext-identical-resolution-02.
>
> One possible outcome of the meeting and discussions on the list related t=
o this I-D,
> is the inclusion of specific requirements in the problem statement.
>
> In case there is a need to consider whether solutions exist to particular=
 problem statements,
> it may be worthwhile noting that there is an I-D waiting in the wings.
>
> It is premature to consider this I-D for the WG, since both the revised c=
harter, and the problem
> statement, need to be completed beforehand.
>
> However, knowing that a solution exists, can be helpful in considering ad=
opting the requirement
> for solutions of this type.
>
> Accordingly, here's the link to the first (-00) version, and I've include=
d below the text of the latest
> version (-01) since updates are not possible currently (standard meeting =
IETF I-D moratorium).
>
> Link:
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-dickson-dnsext-ds2-00.txt
>
> Brian
>
> (Latest text follows)
>




dnsext                                                        B. Dickson
Internet-Draft                                             Brian Dickson
Expires: April 29, 2011                                 October 26, 2010


         DNSSEC Delegation Signature with Canonical Signer Name
                      draft-dickson-dnsext-ds2-01

Abstract

   The Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Extensions introduced the DS
   resource record (RR) for authentication of zone delegations.  This
   document introduces an alternative resource record, DS2, which
   similarly provides authentication of zone delegations.  However, DS2
   provides a canonical signer name, for zones whose content may be
   duplicated with multiple owner names.  The zone is signed by the
   canonical signer, and the DS2 record allows for validation using this
   signer name.

Author's Note

   Intended Status: Proposed Standard.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  The DS2 Resource Record  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  RDATA Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.1.  The Canonical Signer Name Field  . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.2.  The Key Tag Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.3.  The Algorithm Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.4.  The Digest Type Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.5.  The Digest Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  DS2 RDATA Wire Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Presentation Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.4.  DS2 RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Authoritative Server Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Delegated (Child) Zones Beneath DS2-signed Zone Cuts . . .  8
       4.1.1.  Zone Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.1.2.  Dynamic Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Parent Zone at Zone Cut  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.1.  Zone Serving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.2.  Referrals to Signed Zones  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.3.  Responding to Queries for DS2 RRs  . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Validator Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.1.  DS responses without NSEC/NSEC3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.2.  NSEC/NSEC3 RRs with DS2 type bit set . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.3.  DS2 Signed Delegated Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       5.3.1.  RRSIG Validation Using Canonical Signer Name . . . . . 11
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Appendix A.  Constructs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.1.  Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       A.1.1.  Zone Master File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       A.1.2.  Zone Delegation (Zone Cut) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13



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       A.1.3.  $ORIGIN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       A.1.4.  $INCLUDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     A.2.  Basic Constructs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       A.2.1.  Zone Cut as a Replacement for a CNAME  . . . . . . . . 14
       A.2.2.  Zone Cut as a Replacement for a DNAME  . . . . . . . . 16
       A.2.3.  Identical Zones with Non-Identical Child Zones . . . . 18
   Appendix B.  Construction Examples, Unsigned . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     B.1.  Objective, In Lay Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     B.2.  Building a Set of 'same' Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     B.3.  Building a Two-Deep Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       B.3.1.  First Level Zone File  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       B.3.2.  Server Conf for First Level Zones  . . . . . . . . . . 22
       B.3.3.  Server Conf for Second Level Zones . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Appendix C.  Construction Examples, Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     C.1.  Signed Single Level Zones  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       C.1.1.  Create the Single Level Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       C.1.2.  Sign the zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       C.1.3.  De-canonicalize the zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       C.1.4.  Add DS2 Records to Parent Zones  . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     C.2.  Signed Two Level Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       C.2.1.  Create the Child Zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       C.2.2.  Sign the child zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.3.  De-canonicalize the child zone . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.4.  Create the Canonical First-Level Zone And Add DS2
               Records  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.5.  Sign the first-level zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.6.  De-canonicalize the first-level zone . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.7.  Add DS2 Records to Parent Zones  . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   Appendix D.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     D.1.  All the same . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     D.2.  Two (ore more) levels of sameness  . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     D.3.  Groupings of sameness with additional singletons,
           beneath identical zones  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     D.4.  All different below one or more levels of all the same . . 27
   Appendix E.  Signed Zone Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Appendix F.  Example Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28














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1.  Introduction

1.1.  Rationale

   The DNS Security Extensions included the DS RR to provide
   authenticated zone delegations.  Though the DS RR meets the
   requirements for authentication of delegations, it introduces a side-
   effect in that otherwise identical zones with different owner names
   produce non-identical cryptographic signatures.  Such zones must be
   signed repeatedly, using each unique owner name.  This property
   introduces undesired scaling effects.

   The existence of Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) creates the
   need for "equivalent" zones, whose content is identical, but whose
   owner name differs.  Among the sources of this need, are the
   existence of many-to-one mappings of symbol to canonical meaning,
   analogous to the two-to-one mapping of upper/lower to lowercase in
   ASCII.

   When the many-to-one mapping occurs once per label, the inflated
   number of zones is not unreasonable.  However, there is no such
   limitation on per-label instances, nor on the number of labels having
   this characteristic, in IDNs.  The desire or need for multiple names
   for identical zones is not limited to IDNs; in particular, identical
   names under multiple TLDs is another use case.

   The cost to cryptographically secure multiple identical zones is
   high, relative to the perceived security benefit, in certain cases:
   identical zones known by very many names, large zones, and zones
   where zone data will be updated rapidly, and any combination thereof.
   In these cases, the costs of maintaining the multitude of RRSIGs may
   be extremely high and use of the "re-usable" RRSIGs for duplicated
   zone content may be more appropriate.

   This document presents the DS2 Resource Record which can be used as
   an alternative, or even adjunct, to the DS RR to mitigate these
   issues.

1.2.  Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.3.  Terminology

   The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic DNS and DNSSEC
   concepts described in [RFC1034], [RFC1035], [RFC4033], [RFC4034],



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   [RFC4035], and subsequent RFCs that update them: [RFC2136],
   [RFC2181], and [RFC2308].

   The following terminology is used throughout this document:

   Delegation: an NS RRSet with a name different from the current zone
   apex, signifying a delegation to a child zone.

   Secure delegation: a name containing a delegation (NS RRSet) and a
   signed DS RRSet, signifying a delegation to a signed child zone.

   Insecure delegation: a name containing a delegation (NS RRSet), but
   lacking a DS RRSet, signifying a delegation to an unsigned child
   zone.


2.  Backward Compatibility

   This specification describes a protocol change that is partially
   backwards compatible with RFC 4033 [RFC4033] [RFC4033] , RFC 4034
   [RFC4034] [RFC4034] , and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] [RFC4035] .  In
   particular, security-aware resolvers that are unaware of this
   specification (DS2-unaware resolvers) may not validate the responses
   introduced by this document.  Zones delegations signed with DS2 only,
   will be interpreted as "Insecure" by DS2-unaware resolvers.

   Security-unaware resolvers are unaffected by this specification.


3.  The DS2 Resource Record

   The DS2 Resource Record (RR) is very similar to the DS RR RFC 4034
   [RFC4034] [RFC4034] .  The main distinction is that the DS2 RR
   includes an explicit Canonical Signer Name, as opposed to the
   implicit signer name of the DS RR.

   The Canonical Signer Name is used in the validation process, for both
   the corresponding DNSKEY RR, and for validation of RRSIG RRs in the
   delegated zone.

   The delegated zone is the product of signing a version of the zone,
   where the owner and signer of the zone, and parent of all RRs in the
   zone, is the Canonical Signer Name.

   The remainder of the DS2 RR is the same as that of the DS RR, where
   the DS RR was produced using the Canonical Signer Name as the owner
   name (and signer name) of the DNSKEY RR .




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   Note that the DS RR with an owner of the Canonical Signer Name MAY
   exist, but does not need to exist.

   Note also that DS and DS2 records may coexist.  This is likely to
   occur in a zone which was itself delegated via a DS2, i.e. for which
   multiple, differently-named copies of the zone exist.

   The type number for the DS2 record is {TBD}.

   The DS2 resource record is class independent.

   The DS2 RR has no special TTL requirements.

3.1.  RDATA Fields

3.1.1.  The Canonical Signer Name Field

   The Canonical Signer Name field identifies the name to be used as the
   Signer when performing validation on the delegated zone.

   The Canonical Signer Name is also used in validating the DNSKEY which
   corresponds to the DS2 record in the zone apex of the delegated zone.

   This is detailed below.

3.1.2.  The Key Tag Field

   The Key Tag field lists the key tag of the DNSKEY RR referred to by
   the DS record, in network byte order.

   The Key Tag used by the DS RR is identical to the Key Tag used by
   RRSIG RRs.  Appendix B describes how to compute a Key Tag.

3.1.3.  The Algorithm Field

   The Algorithm field lists the algorithm number of the DNSKEY RR
   referred to by the DS record.

   The algorithm number used by the DS RR is identical to the algorithm
   number used by RRSIG and DNSKEY RRs.  Appendix A.1 lists the
   algorithm number types.

3.1.4.  The Digest Type Field

   The DS RR refers to a DNSKEY RR by including a digest of that DNSKEY
   RR.  The Digest Type field identifies the algorithm used to construct
   the digest.  Appendix A.2 lists the possible digest algorithm types.




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3.1.5.  The Digest Field

   The DS record refers to a DNSKEY RR by including a digest of that
   DNSKEY RR.

   The digest is calculated by concatenating the canonical form of the
   fully qualified owner name of the DNSKEY RR with the DNSKEY RDATA,
   and then applying the digest algorithm.

   digest =3D digest_algorithm( DNSKEY owner name | DNSKEY RDATA);

   "|" denotes concatenation

   DNSKEY RDATA =3D Flags | Protocol | Algorithm | Public Key.

   The size of the digest may vary depending on the digest algorithm and
   DNSKEY RR size.  As of the time of this writing, the only defined
   digest algorithm is SHA-1, which produces a 20 octet digest.

3.2.  DS2 RDATA Wire Format

   The RDATA for a DS RR consists of a Canonical Signer Name (domain
   name), a 2 octet Key Tag field, a 1 octet Algorithm field, a 1 octet
   Digest Type field, and a Digest field.


                           1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /                                                               /
      /                   Canonical Signer Name                       /
      /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |           Key Tag             |  Algorithm    |  Digest Type  |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /                                                               /
      /                            Digest                             /
      /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


3.3.  Presentation Format

   The presentation format of the RDATA portion is as follows:

   The Canonical Signer Name field is represented as a domain name.

   The Key Tag field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal integer.



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   The Algorithm field MUST be represented either as an unsigned decimal
   integer or as an algorithm mnemonic specified in Appendix A.1.

   The Digest Type field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal
   integer.

   The Digest MUST be represented as a sequence of case-insensitive
   hexadecimal digits.  Whitespace is allowed within the hexadecimal
   text.

3.4.  DS2 RR Example

   The following example shows a DNSKEY RR and its corresponding DS2 RR.


   dskey.example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ( AQOeiiR0GOMYkDshWoSKz
                                             9XzfwJr1AYtsmx3TGkJaNXVb
                                             fi/2pHm822aJ5iI9BMzNXxeY
                                             CmZDRD99WYwYqUSdjMmmAphX
                                             dvxegXd/M5+X7OrzKBaMbCVd
                                             FLUUh6DhweJBjEVv5f2wwjM9
                                             XzcnOf+EPbtG9DMBmADjFDc2
                                             w/rljwvFw=3D=3D
                                             ) ;  key id =3D 60485

   dskey.example.com. 86400 IN DS2 dskey.example.com. 60485 5 1 ( 2BB183
                                             AF5F22588179A53B0A98631FAD
                                             1A292118 )

   The first four text fields specify the name, TTL, Class, and RR type
   (DS2).  The name "dskey.example.com." is the Canonical Signer Name,
   which in this case is the same as the owner name.  Value 60485 is the
   key tag for the corresponding "dskey.example.com."  DNSKEY RR, and
   value 5 denotes the algorithm used by this "dskey.example.com."
   DNSKEY RR.  The value 1 is the algorithm used to construct the
   digest, and the rest of the RDATA text is the digest in hexadecimal.


4.  Authoritative Server Considerations

4.1.  Delegated (Child) Zones Beneath DS2-signed Zone Cuts

   The DS2 signature is designed to permit zones signed by another
   Signer Name, to be authenticated.

   While the motivation for this is enabling duplicated zone content
   under different owner names, this is not a requirement.




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   Child zones are always unique from the perspective of resolvers.  All
   delegations are normal delegations.  It is only the delegation
   signatures (DS or DS2) that get special treatment.

   The Canonical Signer Name (CSN) is ONLY to be used for signature
   validation.  No relationship between zones sharing CSNs is implied or
   should be inferred.

   In particular, the "strong linking" of child zones (on the authority
   server(s)) is not required.  Even if two child zones started off
   identical, they would be permitted to subsequently diverge,
   regardless of SOA Serial Numbers.

4.1.1.  Zone Signing

   The Child zone below a DS2-signed zone cut, are signed as follows:
      The rightmost portion of the owner name matching the zone name, is
      replaced with the Canonical Signer Name.
      The Signer Name used is the Canonical Signer Name.
      The RRsets are signed with the above changes, but otherwise as
      usual.

   The normal usage of DS2, is that a "canonical" version of a zone,
   with owner name of the Canonical Signer Name, is signed normally per
   RFC 4035.  Then, the entire zone, including signatures, is used
   verbatim, except for changing the rightmost portion of the owner
   names.

   This "copy" of the zone exists for the purpose of having the same
   zone known by multiple names, e.g. aliasing, such as for IDN usage.
   The DS2 ensures that the delegation is secure, and that the existing
   signatures validate properly.

   Copying the zone is not the only means by which such a zone may be
   created or used.

4.1.2.  Dynamic Update

   In addition to the existing issues for Dynamic Updates for DNSSEC-
   signed zones, a new problem is introduced by this specification.

   When a dynamic update needs to be applied to a DS2-signed delegated
   zone, might incorrectly be presumed that it needs to be applied to
   all "copies" of the zone.

   The correct behaviour is specified by the Dynamic Update
   specification, RFC 2181.  Only the Primary Master Server is able to
   know, and respond appropriately, if zones are in fact "copies".



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   The specific mechanism by which this occurs is beyond the scope of
   this document.

   However, implementors intending to enable "copies", are encouraged to
   consider methods which do not duplicate data, but rather maintain a
   single instance of the zone data.  This methodology implies that
   dynamic updates to the zone, by any of its names, result in the zone
   being updated for all names by which the zone is known.

4.2.  Parent Zone at Zone Cut

4.2.1.  Zone Serving

   This specification modifies DNSSEC-enabled DNS responses generated by
   authoritative servers.  In particular, when a signed delegation is
   returned, whether it includes a DS, DS2, or both, it is also
   necessary to return the corresponding NSEC/NSEC3 record showing the
   covered RR types.

4.2.2.  Referrals to Signed Zones

   At a zone cut, it is possible for both DS and DS2 RRs to exist for
   the same owner name.  The new rule applies in all circumstances,
   whether only DS, only DS2, or both, exist to sign the delegation.

   The rule is: always return the corresponding NSEC/NSEC3 record
   matching the owner (or owner hash).

   The reason for this is, that receiving validator will need to know
   which RR types are expected, in the answer.

   A DS2-unaware receiving validator will need the NSEC/NSEC3 in
   particular, if a DS2 RR exists but no DS RR exists.  In that case,
   the zone will validate as "Insecure", since no DS exists and has been
   proven by the NSEC/NSEC RR (and its RRSIG).

4.2.3.  Responding to Queries for DS2 RRs

   This is the same circumstance as section 3.1.4.1 of RFC 4034,
   "Responding to Queries for DS RRs".  The same rules as DS RRs, apply
   to DS2 RRs.


5.  Validator Considerations

   In RFC 5155, the Validator Considerations referencing DS, must be
   presumed to now read "DS or DS2" (or in the negative sense, "neither
   DS nor DS2").



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   Validators MUST use the original Owner Name for any necessary queries
   for DS, DS2, DNSKEY, and RRSIG resource records.  This is because
   there is no explicit or implicit relationship between the Canonical
   Signer Name, and a zone whose name corresponds to the Canonical
   Signer Name (which might not even exist).

5.1.  DS responses without NSEC/NSEC3

   If a response is received which includes a DS RR, but does not
   include the corresponding NSEC/NSEC3 RR, the validator MUST attempt
   to retrieve the NSEC/NSEC RR, and subsequently attempt to retrieve
   the corresponding DS2 record if the DS2 type bit is set in the NSEC/
   NSEC3 type bit map.

   Intermediate caches or middleboxes may not be DS2-aware, and may not
   include DS2 records when QTYPE is not DS2.  If the middlebox is DS2-
   unaware, the middleboxes SHOULD still allow responses for exact
   matches to unknown types, such as DS2.

5.2.  NSEC/NSEC3 RRs with DS2 type bit set

   If a DS2-aware validator receives a response with an NSEC/NSEC3 RR
   with the DS2 type bit set, but had not also received the DS2 RR, the
   validator MUST attempt to retrieve the DS2 RRset.

   An intermediate cache or middlebox may have filtered out, or not
   cached, the DS2 RR.  Explicit querying for the DS2 RR may return the
   missing DS2 RR.

5.3.  DS2 Signed Delegated Zones

   Zones whose delegation is signed by a DS2 RR, and which DS2 RR
   successfully validates, MUST be validated using the Canonical Signer
   Name (or Names, if multiple DS/DS2 RRs are present).

   More specifically, RRSIG RRs in the delegated zone, MUST be validated
   with Canonical Signer Names (CSN) whose DS2 RR is itself validated.
   For purposes of this process, every DS RR can be treated as a DS2 RR
   with the Canonical Signer Name of the DS2 RR's owner name, and MUST
   be included in the set of CSNs.

5.3.1.  RRSIG Validation Using Canonical Signer Name

   The procedure for validating an RRSIG is modified as follows:
      The RRSIG Signer Name MUST match the Canonical Signer Name.  No
      comparison is made between the Owner Name and either the Canonical
      Signer Name or the Signer Name of the RRSIG.




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      The number of labels in the RRset Owner name, minus the numer of
      labels in the Zone Name, plus the number of labels in the
      Canonical Signer Name, MUST be greater than or equal to the value
      in the RRSIG RR's Labels field.
      The RRSIG RR's Algorithm, and Key Tag fields MUST match the
      algorithm, and key tag for some DNSKEY RR in the zone's apex
      DNSKEY RRset.


6.  Security Considerations

   Further work on DS/DS2 security issues may be necessary.  In
   particular, it is unclear whether the implicit signalling of use of
   NSEC/NSEC3 may be vulnerable to downgrade attacks.


7.  IANA Considerations

   This document updates the IANA registry "DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
   PARAMETERS" (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters) in sub-
   registry "TYPES", by defining one new type.  Section 3 defines the
   DS2 RR type {TBD}.


8.  Acknowledgements

   The problems related to aliasing, as discussed on the DNSEXT WG
   mailing list, provided helpful direction in limiting what changes
   could or should be made to DNS, and DNSSEC in particular.


9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1033]  Lottor, M., "Domain administrators operations guide",
              RFC 1033, November 1987.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, April 1997.




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   [RFC2181]  Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
              Specification", RFC 2181, July 1997.

   [RFC2308]  Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
              NCACHE)", RFC 2308, March 1998.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.


Appendix A.  Constructs

A.1.  Elements

   The following DNS elements are used in the constructs discussed here.

A.1.1.  Zone Master File

   The term "zone master file" has the meaning established in RFC 1035.
   It is the file containing all the resource records and directives for
   the zone.

A.1.2.  Zone Delegation (Zone Cut)

   The terms "zone delegation" and "zone cut" may generally be used
   interchangeably.

   A zone delegation is the act of putting in NS records in a zone at a
   place other than the apex.




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   The zone delegation is the parent side of a zone cut.

   A zone cut creates a new zone.  The apex of the new zone has the same
   owner name as the zone delegation.

A.1.3.  $ORIGIN

   Most DNS authority servers include the ability to directly refer to a
   zone master file, with an implied $ORIGIN.  For those, no $ORIGIN
   needs to be used.

   For completeness, zone master files with explicit $ORIGIN are also
   used in examples.  This is in keeping with RFC 1035.

A.1.4.  $INCLUDE

   In the instances where $ORIGIN use is needed, it is also necessary to
   include common content via the $INCLUDE directive.  This is also RFC
   1035 compliant.

A.2.  Basic Constructs

   The following examples show ways to replace CNAME/DNAME usage with
   other existing DNS items.  Rationale for usage, and differences from
   CNAME/DNAME are explained for each.

A.2.1.  Zone Cut as a Replacement for a CNAME

   The following example shows a simple CNAME, where the CNAME target
   (for convenience) is a sibling of the CNAME itself.

       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias  CNAME real.example.com
       real   TXT "This is real data, maintained in a single location."


   Querying for type TXT at alias.example.com, will return the CNAME RR
   plus the TXT RR for real.example.com (the CNAME target).

   The following example shows the use of a zone cut, and the inclusion
   of data from a single location, as an alternative.





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       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias NS ns1.example.com ; all zones are served by ns1
       real  NS ns1.example.com ; normally there are multiple NS's

       server configuration (with implicit $ORIGIN of zone.name):
       zone alias.example.com { master; file=3D"czone-data.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com { master; file=3D"czone-data.example.com";};




       Or, server configuration (without implicit $ORIGIN):
       zone alias.example.com { master; file=3D"alias.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com { master; file=3D"real.example.com";};

       zone file for alias.example.com:

       $ORIGIN alias.example.com.
       $INCLUDE "czone-data.example.com"

       zone file for real.example.com:

       $ORIGIN real.example.com.
       $INCLUDE "czone-data.example.com"

       file czone-data.example.com:

   @         SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster ( 42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
             NS ns1.example.com
             TXT "This is real data, maintained in a single location."


   Querying for the TXT record for either alias.example.com, or
   real.example.com, requires first following the delegation, and then
   gets a response which does not include any CNAME.

   The main difference here is, that the DNS node "alias.example.com" is
   a real, first-class entry, which can be used interchangeably with
   "real.example.com".  E.g., it can be used as an MX target.

   The other important difference is, as the data is all authoritative
   and self-contained, it is not possible to have a broken CNAME.  If
   the necessary linkage is incorrect, the zone file will not load.



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   This means that maintaining aliased data in this way, returns values
   in a consistent manner, in a deterministic path and timeframe.  Data
   kept this way can be validated, via zone loading and zone checking
   functions included with most modern DNS authority servers.

A.2.2.  Zone Cut as a Replacement for a DNAME

   The following example shows a simple DNAME, where the DNAME target
   (for convenience) is a sibling of the DNAME itself.

       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias  DNAME real.example.com
       content.real   TXT "This is real data, kept only here."


   Querying for type TXT at alias.example.com, will return the CNAME RR
   plus the TXT RR for real.example.com (the CNAME target).

   The following example shows the use of a zone cut, and the inclusion
   of data from a single location, as an alternative.


























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       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias NS ns1.example.com ; all zones are served by ns1
       real  NS ns1.example.com ; normally there are multiple NS's

       server configuration (with implicit $ORIGIN of zone.name):
       zone alias.example.com { master; file=3D"dzone.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com { master; file=3D"dzone.example.com";};

       Or, server configuration (without implicit $ORIGIN):
       zone alias.example.com { master; file=3D"alias.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com { master; file=3D"real.example.com";};

       zone file for alias.example.com:

       $ORIGIN alias.example.com.
       $INCLUDE "dzone.example.com"

       zone file for real.example.com:

       $ORIGIN real.example.com.
       $INCLUDE "dzone.example.com"

       file dzone.example.com:

   @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster ( 42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
   content  TXT "This is real data, maintained in a single location."


   Querying for the TXT record for either content.alias.example.com, or
   content.real.example.com, requires first following the delegation,
   and then gets a response which does not include any DNAME or
   synthesized CNAME.

   The main difference here is, that the DNS node
   "content.alias.example.com" is a real, first-class entry, which can
   be used interchangeably with "content.real.example.com".  E.g., it
   can be used as an MX target.

   The other important difference is, as the data is all authoritative
   and self-contained, it is not possible to have a broken DNAME.  If
   the necessary linkage is incorrect, the zone file will not load.




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   This means that maintaining aliased data in this way, returns values
   in a consistent manner, in a deterministic path and timeframe.  Data
   kept this way can be validated, via zone loading and zone checking
   functions included with most modern DNS authority servers.

A.2.3.  Identical Zones with Non-Identical Child Zones

   This example demonstrates identical zones, where there are child
   zones (of all identical parents) whose content differ.  The owner
   name of the child zones, relative to the parent apex name, is
   identical.

   Note Well: The following example is not possible with CNAME or DNAME
   usage.

   The query re-writing that occurs in CNAME/DNAME obscures zone cuts as
   a distinction for any portion of the DNS tree below the CNAME/DNAME.


































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       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias NS ns1.example.com ; all zones are served by NS1
       real  NS ns1.example.com ; normally there are multiple NS's

       server configuration (with implicit $ORIGIN of zone.name):
       zone alias.example.com {
         master; file=3D"has-a-child.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com {
         master; file=3D"has-a-child.example.com";};
       zone child.alias.example.com {
         master; file=3D"child.alias.example.com";};
       zone child.real.example.com {
         master; file=3D"child.real.example.com";};

       (Non-implicit $ORIGIN may be used, similar to previous examples.)

       file has-a-child.example.com:

   @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
   content  TXT "identical"
   ; this zone cut exists in all aliased zones
   child    NS ns1.example.com

       file child.alias.example.com:

   @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
            TXT "divergent"

       file child.real.example.com:

   @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
            TXT "unique"


   TXT Queries for content.alias.example.com and
   content.real.example.com, both return "identical" results.




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   TXT Queries for child.alias.example.com, and child.real.example.com,
   return "divergent" and "unique" results respectively, which come from
   their respective zones.

   If real.example.com were a very large zone, with very few members
   whose values needed to differ from alias.example.com, this mechanism
   would be quite useful for maintaining the data.


Appendix B.  Construction Examples, Unsigned

   The following examples show how to construct a hierarchy of zones,
   with all zones at a given depth being identical.

   The zones are unsigned, and can be implemented using existing DNS
   elements.  No DS2 is required.

B.1.  Objective, In Lay Terms

   In these example, we are using the constructs available, to build DNS
   zones with specific characteristics.

   What we want, is for all the zones (under consideration) to be "the
   same".

   What we mean by "the same" is that:
      Every node in any zone, is in every zone;
      Every combination of class and type, at each node, exists at that
      node in all the zones;
      The value of each tuple (name,class,type) in each zone is
      identical.

   In addition, whenever we use zone names (or placeholders for names),
   like Ai.Bj, we mean all combinations of the members of set {A} and
   the set {B}, combined, as {A}.{B}.  The members of set {A} are A1,
   A2, A3, etc., and the members of set {B} are B1, B2, B3., etc.  The
   letters "i" and "j" simply indicate that there is no relationship
   between the number of members in sets {A} and {B}.

   Additionally, A1, A2, etc., are placeholder names for what might be
   actual names.  For instance, A1 could be "foo.example.com.", and A2
   could be "bar.example.net."

B.2.  Building a Set of 'same' Zones

   First, we need the zone content that will be used to populate the
   zones.  Let's say we have a single existing zone, that we want to
   turn into a set of 'same' zones.



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       Zone file for "myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext.myzone.example.com.        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer.myzone.example.com.      A 127.0.0.1
       www.myzone.example.com.           A 127.0.0.2
       radius.myzone.example.com.        A 127.0.0.3


   First we de-canonicalize the labels within the zone:

       Zone file for "myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer      A 127.0.0.1
       www           A 127.0.0.2
       radius        A 127.0.0.3


   Then we turn the zone name itself into a reference to the $ORIGIN,
   which itself will be supplied when the zone is loaded:

       Zone file  for "myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       @   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer      A 127.0.0.1
       www           A 127.0.0.2
       radius        A 127.0.0.3


   Finally, we modify the configuation file to use this file for both
   myzone.example.com., and any other zones we want to have be the same:

       Configuration file (named.conf, for BIND) elements needed
       for myzone.example.com and additional zones:

       zone "myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "other.example.org."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};




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   Each time a zone file is loaded, it does so with an implicit $ORIGIN
   of the zone name.  This causes all the zones that have @ as the zone
   name (SOA owner) to be identical, if they are read from the same
   file.

B.3.  Building a Two-Deep Example

   For this example, we will build several zones with the same content,
   by re-using the same file.  For this example, we will save some steps
   by using the same zone file as before, 'mysone.zone'.

   Since the zones will be two deep, we need another set of zones above
   those, i.e. one deep, who exist only to contain the two-deep zones.

   In DNS parlance, these would, if inside a single zone, be considered
   "empty non-terminals".  However, they are not inside a single zone,
   but rather are delegation-only zones.  The "real" data is in their
   children, and the parent zones contain no other data besides that
   needed for the delegations (i.e.  NS records and possibly glue
   records).

B.3.1.  First Level Zone File

   This is a "thin" zone file, containing only the labels by which the
   second level zones are to be known.

       Zone file for first level zones, "first-level.zone":

       @   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
               42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       red    NS ns1.example.com
       green  NS ns1.example.com
       blue   NS ns1.example.com

B.3.2.  Server Conf for First Level Zones

   This establishes the parent names for the first level zones, from
   which the delegations to the second level occur:

       Zone conf file elements for the first level zones:

       zone "myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"first-level.zone";};
       zone "myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"first-level.zone";};
       zone "other.example.org."{master; file=3D"first-level.zone";};






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B.3.3.  Server Conf for Second Level Zones

   This establishes the fully qualified zone names for the second level
   zones, in all permutations and combinations:

       Zone conf file elements for the first level zones:

       zone "red.myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "red.myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "red.other.example.org."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "green.myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "green.myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "green.other.example.org."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "blue.myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "blue.myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "blue.other.example.org."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};


   While this requires setting up all the zones, there is only one zone
   file to maintain, and all the zones inherit the common contents.


Appendix C.  Construction Examples, Signed

   The following examples are exactly the same as the examples above,
   except that they are signed.

   The zone files are identical, and require the use of DS2 signatures.

C.1.  Signed Single Level Zones

   The procedure here is:
      Create the first-instance zone, fully qualified.
      Sign the zone, and capture the DS record.
      De-canonicalize the zone file, and use the DS as a basis for the
      DS2 records.
   The DS2 records will need to be signed by their respective parent
   zones.  The signatures are omitted for clarity.

C.1.1.  Create the Single Level Zone

   We need to use the Canonical Signer Name for the zone name.









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       Zone file for "myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext.myzone.example.com.        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer.myzone.example.com.      A 127.0.0.1
       www.myzone.example.com.           A 127.0.0.2
       radius.myzone.example.com.        A 127.0.0.3

C.1.2.  Sign the zone

C.1.3.  De-canonicalize the zone

C.1.4.  Add DS2 Records to Parent Zones

C.2.  Signed Two Level Zones

   The procedure here is:
      Create the first-instance child zone, fully qualified.
      Sign the child zone, and capture the DS record.
      De-canonicalize the child zone file, and use the DS as a basis for
      the DS2 records on the child delegations.
      Create the first-instance parent zone, fully qualified, and
      include the DS2 records.
      Sign the parent zone, and capture the DS record.
      De-canonicalize the parent zone file, and use the DS as a basis
      for the DS2 records in the parent zones.
   The parents' DS2 records will need to be signed by their respective
   parent zones.  Those signatures are omitted for clarity.

C.2.1.  Create the Child Zone

   We need to use the Canonical Signer Name for the zone name.

       Zone file for "red.myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       red.myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext.red.myzone.example.com.        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer.red.myzone.example.com.      A 127.0.0.1
       www.red.myzone.example.com.           A 127.0.0.2
       radius.red.myzone.example.com.        A 127.0.0.3







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C.2.2.  Sign the child zone

C.2.3.  De-canonicalize the child zone

C.2.4.  Create the Canonical First-Level Zone And Add DS2 Records


       Zone file for "myzone.example.com.", "first-level.zone":

       myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
               42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       red.myzone.example.com.    NS ns1.example.com
                         DS2 red.myzone.example.com. (
       ; rest of DS record contents go here
                         )
       green.myzone.example.com.  NS ns1.example.com
                         DS2 red.myzone.example.com. (
       ; rest of DS record contents go here
                         )
       blue.myzone.example.com.   NS ns1.example.com
                         DS2 red.myzone.example.com. (
       ; rest of DS record contents go here
                         )

C.2.5.  Sign the first-level zone

C.2.6.  De-canonicalize the first-level zone

C.2.7.  Add DS2 Records to Parent Zones


Appendix D.  Use Cases

D.1.  All the same

   Use Case: identical zone content, where zones have more than one
   name.

   Example:


       colors.example.com
       colours.example.com







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D.2.  Two (ore more) levels of sameness

   Use Case: identical zone content, where the zones owner names contain
   two or more labels with equivalent labels (synonyms/homonyms/IDNs).

   Example:


       colours.iso-with-accents.example.com
       colors.iso-with-accents.example.com
       colours.iso-without-accents.example.com
       colors.iso-without-accents.example.com
       colours.ascii.example.com
       colors.ascii.example.com

D.3.  Groupings of sameness with additional singletons, beneath
      identical zones

   Use Case: Clusters of content where the content of each cluster is
   identical, beneath zones which are identical.

   Example: Language-specific content, grouped by country, underneath
   aliases for some company's zones.

   [NB - Better examples of sameness and singletons are needed - same
   name, different content]

























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       Zone Name                           CSN
       ---------                           ---
       (Parents)
       big-company.example.com             big-company.example.com
       trade-mark.example.com              big-company.example.com
       product-name.example.com            big-company.example.com

       (Children)
       en.big-company.example.com          en.big-company.example.com
       en.trade-mark.example.com...      ..en.big-company.example.com
       en.product-name.example.com.       .en.big-company.example.com
       canada-en.big-company.example.com   en.big-company.example.com
       usa.big-company.example.com         en.big-company.example.com
       uk.big-company.example.com          en.big-company.example.com
       fr.big-company.example.com          fr.big-company.example.com
       canada-fr.big-company.example.com   fr.big-company.example.com
       france.big-company.example.com      fr.big-company.example.com
       sw.big-company.example.com          sw.big-company.example.com
       (etc)

       (Grandchildren)
       secure-server.en.big-company.example.com
       secure-server.en.trade-mark.example.com
       (etc...)
       [Delegations are made to unique zones when unique values for
        arbitrary-depth labels are required.]
       [E.g. for SSL certificates, unique IP addresses, and such.]

   In the above table, each of the delegations to the children is signed
   by the CSN.

   Each zone uses a master zone file corresponding to the CSN on a 1:1
   basis.

   If two zones have the same CSN, they are loaded from the same master
   zone file.

D.4.  All different below one or more levels of all the same

   Use Case: Two large zones, whose content is identical except for one
   node in the zone.

   Use Case detail: The "exception" node is isolated via a zone cut, and
   all the grandchildren zones are unique.

   The children zones are identical, and signed once with delegations
   signed by DS2 RRs.  The grandchildren zones are unique, signed by
   their respective owner names.  The delegations from the (identical)



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   parents of the grandchildren, require multiple DS RRs, one for each
   grandchild's signature.

   Note Well: The grandchildren in this case, MUST be served by the same
   set of nameservers, since the NS records at the zone cut are
   identical.


       bigzone.iso-with-accents.example.com
       bigzone.ascii.example.com
       unique-node.bigzone.iso-with-accents.example.com
       unique-node.bigzone.ascii.example.com


Appendix E.  Signed Zone Examples


Appendix F.  Example Responses


Author's Address

   Brian Dickson
   Brian Dickson
   6261 Lawrence St,
   Halifax, NS  B3L 1J8
   Canada

   Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com






















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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Mon Nov  8 15:23:28 2010
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To: namedroppers <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 15:15:01 -0400
Message-ID: <AANLkTikA+F-Jhystrv-uZTNQ3qNDAqoYes0fs--ZEPPq@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Discussion material for Beijing (was Re: [dnsext] DNSEXT WG report from the chairs)
From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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On Sun, Nov 7, 2010 at 12:52 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
>
> This is the DNSEXT Working Group status report from the Chairs.  As we
> did for previous meetings, we are undertaking this report on the
> mailing list rather than at the meeting.  Items not addressed in this
> report should be part of the DNSEXT meeting at IETF 79.
>
> Please be aware that, if there are issues you want to have addressed
> at the meeting and you feel they're not being addressed in this mail,
> you should not hesitate to raise them.
>
>
There's also the issue of draft-yao-dnsext-identical-resolution-02.

One possible outcome of the meeting and discussions on the list related to
this I-D,
is the inclusion of specific requirements in the problem statement.

In case there is a need to consider whether solutions exist to particular
problem statements,
it may be worthwhile noting that there is an I-D waiting in the wings.

It is premature to consider this I-D for the WG, since both the revised
charter, and the problem
statement, need to be completed beforehand.

However, knowing that a solution exists, can be helpful in considering
adopting the requirement
for solutions of this type.

Accordingly, here's the link to the first (-00) version, and I've included
below the text of the latest
version (-01) since updates are not possible currently (standard meeting
IETF I-D moratorium).

Link:

http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-dickson-dnsext-ds2-00.txt

Brian

(Latest text follows)




dnsext                                                        B. Dickson
Internet-Draft                                             Brian Dickson
Expires: April 29, 2011                                 October 26, 2010


         DNSSEC Delegation Signature with Canonical Signer Name
                      draft-dickson-dnsext-ds2-01

Abstract

   The Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Extensions introduced the DS
   resource record (RR) for authentication of zone delegations.  This
   document introduces an alternative resource record, DS2, which
   similarly provides authentication of zone delegations.  However, DS2
   provides a canonical signer name, for zones whose content may be
   duplicated with multiple owner names.  The zone is signed by the
   canonical signer, and the DS2 record allows for validation using this
   signer name.

Author's Note

   Intended Status: Proposed Standard.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.3.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  The DS2 Resource Record  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  RDATA Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.1.  The Canonical Signer Name Field  . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.2.  The Key Tag Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.3.  The Algorithm Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.4.  The Digest Type Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.5.  The Digest Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  DS2 RDATA Wire Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.3.  Presentation Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.4.  DS2 RR Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Authoritative Server Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.1.  Delegated (Child) Zones Beneath DS2-signed Zone Cuts . . .  8
       4.1.1.  Zone Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       4.1.2.  Dynamic Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Parent Zone at Zone Cut  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.1.  Zone Serving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.2.  Referrals to Signed Zones  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.3.  Responding to Queries for DS2 RRs  . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Validator Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.1.  DS responses without NSEC/NSEC3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.2.  NSEC/NSEC3 RRs with DS2 type bit set . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.3.  DS2 Signed Delegated Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       5.3.1.  RRSIG Validation Using Canonical Signer Name . . . . . 11
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Appendix A.  Constructs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.1.  Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       A.1.1.  Zone Master File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       A.1.2.  Zone Delegation (Zone Cut) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13



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       A.1.3.  $ORIGIN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       A.1.4.  $INCLUDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     A.2.  Basic Constructs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       A.2.1.  Zone Cut as a Replacement for a CNAME  . . . . . . . . 14
       A.2.2.  Zone Cut as a Replacement for a DNAME  . . . . . . . . 16
       A.2.3.  Identical Zones with Non-Identical Child Zones . . . . 18
   Appendix B.  Construction Examples, Unsigned . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     B.1.  Objective, In Lay Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     B.2.  Building a Set of 'same' Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     B.3.  Building a Two-Deep Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       B.3.1.  First Level Zone File  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       B.3.2.  Server Conf for First Level Zones  . . . . . . . . . . 22
       B.3.3.  Server Conf for Second Level Zones . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Appendix C.  Construction Examples, Signed . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     C.1.  Signed Single Level Zones  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       C.1.1.  Create the Single Level Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       C.1.2.  Sign the zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       C.1.3.  De-canonicalize the zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       C.1.4.  Add DS2 Records to Parent Zones  . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     C.2.  Signed Two Level Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       C.2.1.  Create the Child Zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       C.2.2.  Sign the child zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.3.  De-canonicalize the child zone . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.4.  Create the Canonical First-Level Zone And Add DS2
               Records  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.5.  Sign the first-level zone  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.6.  De-canonicalize the first-level zone . . . . . . . . . 25
       C.2.7.  Add DS2 Records to Parent Zones  . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   Appendix D.  Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     D.1.  All the same . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     D.2.  Two (ore more) levels of sameness  . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     D.3.  Groupings of sameness with additional singletons,
           beneath identical zones  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     D.4.  All different below one or more levels of all the same . . 27
   Appendix E.  Signed Zone Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Appendix F.  Example Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28














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1.  Introduction

1.1.  Rationale

   The DNS Security Extensions included the DS RR to provide
   authenticated zone delegations.  Though the DS RR meets the
   requirements for authentication of delegations, it introduces a side-
   effect in that otherwise identical zones with different owner names
   produce non-identical cryptographic signatures.  Such zones must be
   signed repeatedly, using each unique owner name.  This property
   introduces undesired scaling effects.

   The existence of Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) creates the
   need for "equivalent" zones, whose content is identical, but whose
   owner name differs.  Among the sources of this need, are the
   existence of many-to-one mappings of symbol to canonical meaning,
   analogous to the two-to-one mapping of upper/lower to lowercase in
   ASCII.

   When the many-to-one mapping occurs once per label, the inflated
   number of zones is not unreasonable.  However, there is no such
   limitation on per-label instances, nor on the number of labels having
   this characteristic, in IDNs.  The desire or need for multiple names
   for identical zones is not limited to IDNs; in particular, identical
   names under multiple TLDs is another use case.

   The cost to cryptographically secure multiple identical zones is
   high, relative to the perceived security benefit, in certain cases:
   identical zones known by very many names, large zones, and zones
   where zone data will be updated rapidly, and any combination thereof.
   In these cases, the costs of maintaining the multitude of RRSIGs may
   be extremely high and use of the "re-usable" RRSIGs for duplicated
   zone content may be more appropriate.

   This document presents the DS2 Resource Record which can be used as
   an alternative, or even adjunct, to the DS RR to mitigate these
   issues.

1.2.  Requirements

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.3.  Terminology

   The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic DNS and DNSSEC
   concepts described in [RFC1034], [RFC1035], [RFC4033], [RFC4034],



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   [RFC4035], and subsequent RFCs that update them: [RFC2136],
   [RFC2181], and [RFC2308].

   The following terminology is used throughout this document:

   Delegation: an NS RRSet with a name different from the current zone
   apex, signifying a delegation to a child zone.

   Secure delegation: a name containing a delegation (NS RRSet) and a
   signed DS RRSet, signifying a delegation to a signed child zone.

   Insecure delegation: a name containing a delegation (NS RRSet), but
   lacking a DS RRSet, signifying a delegation to an unsigned child
   zone.


2.  Backward Compatibility

   This specification describes a protocol change that is partially
   backwards compatible with RFC 4033 [RFC4033] [RFC4033] , RFC 4034
   [RFC4034] [RFC4034] , and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] [RFC4035] .  In
   particular, security-aware resolvers that are unaware of this
   specification (DS2-unaware resolvers) may not validate the responses
   introduced by this document.  Zones delegations signed with DS2 only,
   will be interpreted as "Insecure" by DS2-unaware resolvers.

   Security-unaware resolvers are unaffected by this specification.


3.  The DS2 Resource Record

   The DS2 Resource Record (RR) is very similar to the DS RR RFC 4034
   [RFC4034] [RFC4034] .  The main distinction is that the DS2 RR
   includes an explicit Canonical Signer Name, as opposed to the
   implicit signer name of the DS RR.

   The Canonical Signer Name is used in the validation process, for both
   the corresponding DNSKEY RR, and for validation of RRSIG RRs in the
   delegated zone.

   The delegated zone is the product of signing a version of the zone,
   where the owner and signer of the zone, and parent of all RRs in the
   zone, is the Canonical Signer Name.

   The remainder of the DS2 RR is the same as that of the DS RR, where
   the DS RR was produced using the Canonical Signer Name as the owner
   name (and signer name) of the DNSKEY RR .




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   Note that the DS RR with an owner of the Canonical Signer Name MAY
   exist, but does not need to exist.

   Note also that DS and DS2 records may coexist.  This is likely to
   occur in a zone which was itself delegated via a DS2, i.e. for which
   multiple, differently-named copies of the zone exist.

   The type number for the DS2 record is {TBD}.

   The DS2 resource record is class independent.

   The DS2 RR has no special TTL requirements.

3.1.  RDATA Fields

3.1.1.  The Canonical Signer Name Field

   The Canonical Signer Name field identifies the name to be used as the
   Signer when performing validation on the delegated zone.

   The Canonical Signer Name is also used in validating the DNSKEY which
   corresponds to the DS2 record in the zone apex of the delegated zone.

   This is detailed below.

3.1.2.  The Key Tag Field

   The Key Tag field lists the key tag of the DNSKEY RR referred to by
   the DS record, in network byte order.

   The Key Tag used by the DS RR is identical to the Key Tag used by
   RRSIG RRs.  Appendix B describes how to compute a Key Tag.

3.1.3.  The Algorithm Field

   The Algorithm field lists the algorithm number of the DNSKEY RR
   referred to by the DS record.

   The algorithm number used by the DS RR is identical to the algorithm
   number used by RRSIG and DNSKEY RRs.  Appendix A.1 lists the
   algorithm number types.

3.1.4.  The Digest Type Field

   The DS RR refers to a DNSKEY RR by including a digest of that DNSKEY
   RR.  The Digest Type field identifies the algorithm used to construct
   the digest.  Appendix A.2 lists the possible digest algorithm types.




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3.1.5.  The Digest Field

   The DS record refers to a DNSKEY RR by including a digest of that
   DNSKEY RR.

   The digest is calculated by concatenating the canonical form of the
   fully qualified owner name of the DNSKEY RR with the DNSKEY RDATA,
   and then applying the digest algorithm.

   digest =3D digest_algorithm( DNSKEY owner name | DNSKEY RDATA);

   "|" denotes concatenation

   DNSKEY RDATA =3D Flags | Protocol | Algorithm | Public Key.

   The size of the digest may vary depending on the digest algorithm and
   DNSKEY RR size.  As of the time of this writing, the only defined
   digest algorithm is SHA-1, which produces a 20 octet digest.

3.2.  DS2 RDATA Wire Format

   The RDATA for a DS RR consists of a Canonical Signer Name (domain
   name), a 2 octet Key Tag field, a 1 octet Algorithm field, a 1 octet
   Digest Type field, and a Digest field.


                           1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /                                                               /
      /                   Canonical Signer Name                       /
      /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |           Key Tag             |  Algorithm    |  Digest Type  |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /                                                               /
      /                            Digest                             /
      /                                                               /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


3.3.  Presentation Format

   The presentation format of the RDATA portion is as follows:

   The Canonical Signer Name field is represented as a domain name.

   The Key Tag field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal integer.



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   The Algorithm field MUST be represented either as an unsigned decimal
   integer or as an algorithm mnemonic specified in Appendix A.1.

   The Digest Type field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal
   integer.

   The Digest MUST be represented as a sequence of case-insensitive
   hexadecimal digits.  Whitespace is allowed within the hexadecimal
   text.

3.4.  DS2 RR Example

   The following example shows a DNSKEY RR and its corresponding DS2 RR.


   dskey.example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ( AQOeiiR0GOMYkDshWoSKz
                                             9XzfwJr1AYtsmx3TGkJaNXVb
                                             fi/2pHm822aJ5iI9BMzNXxeY
                                             CmZDRD99WYwYqUSdjMmmAphX
                                             dvxegXd/M5+X7OrzKBaMbCVd
                                             FLUUh6DhweJBjEVv5f2wwjM9
                                             XzcnOf+EPbtG9DMBmADjFDc2
                                             w/rljwvFw=3D=3D
                                             ) ;  key id =3D 60485

   dskey.example.com. 86400 IN DS2 dskey.example.com. 60485 5 1 ( 2BB183
                                             AF5F22588179A53B0A98631FAD
                                             1A292118 )

   The first four text fields specify the name, TTL, Class, and RR type
   (DS2).  The name "dskey.example.com." is the Canonical Signer Name,
   which in this case is the same as the owner name.  Value 60485 is the
   key tag for the corresponding "dskey.example.com."  DNSKEY RR, and
   value 5 denotes the algorithm used by this "dskey.example.com."
   DNSKEY RR.  The value 1 is the algorithm used to construct the
   digest, and the rest of the RDATA text is the digest in hexadecimal.


4.  Authoritative Server Considerations

4.1.  Delegated (Child) Zones Beneath DS2-signed Zone Cuts

   The DS2 signature is designed to permit zones signed by another
   Signer Name, to be authenticated.

   While the motivation for this is enabling duplicated zone content
   under different owner names, this is not a requirement.




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   Child zones are always unique from the perspective of resolvers.  All
   delegations are normal delegations.  It is only the delegation
   signatures (DS or DS2) that get special treatment.

   The Canonical Signer Name (CSN) is ONLY to be used for signature
   validation.  No relationship between zones sharing CSNs is implied or
   should be inferred.

   In particular, the "strong linking" of child zones (on the authority
   server(s)) is not required.  Even if two child zones started off
   identical, they would be permitted to subsequently diverge,
   regardless of SOA Serial Numbers.

4.1.1.  Zone Signing

   The Child zone below a DS2-signed zone cut, are signed as follows:
      The rightmost portion of the owner name matching the zone name, is
      replaced with the Canonical Signer Name.
      The Signer Name used is the Canonical Signer Name.
      The RRsets are signed with the above changes, but otherwise as
      usual.

   The normal usage of DS2, is that a "canonical" version of a zone,
   with owner name of the Canonical Signer Name, is signed normally per
   RFC 4035.  Then, the entire zone, including signatures, is used
   verbatim, except for changing the rightmost portion of the owner
   names.

   This "copy" of the zone exists for the purpose of having the same
   zone known by multiple names, e.g. aliasing, such as for IDN usage.
   The DS2 ensures that the delegation is secure, and that the existing
   signatures validate properly.

   Copying the zone is not the only means by which such a zone may be
   created or used.

4.1.2.  Dynamic Update

   In addition to the existing issues for Dynamic Updates for DNSSEC-
   signed zones, a new problem is introduced by this specification.

   When a dynamic update needs to be applied to a DS2-signed delegated
   zone, might incorrectly be presumed that it needs to be applied to
   all "copies" of the zone.

   The correct behaviour is specified by the Dynamic Update
   specification, RFC 2181.  Only the Primary Master Server is able to
   know, and respond appropriately, if zones are in fact "copies".



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   The specific mechanism by which this occurs is beyond the scope of
   this document.

   However, implementors intending to enable "copies", are encouraged to
   consider methods which do not duplicate data, but rather maintain a
   single instance of the zone data.  This methodology implies that
   dynamic updates to the zone, by any of its names, result in the zone
   being updated for all names by which the zone is known.

4.2.  Parent Zone at Zone Cut

4.2.1.  Zone Serving

   This specification modifies DNSSEC-enabled DNS responses generated by
   authoritative servers.  In particular, when a signed delegation is
   returned, whether it includes a DS, DS2, or both, it is also
   necessary to return the corresponding NSEC/NSEC3 record showing the
   covered RR types.

4.2.2.  Referrals to Signed Zones

   At a zone cut, it is possible for both DS and DS2 RRs to exist for
   the same owner name.  The new rule applies in all circumstances,
   whether only DS, only DS2, or both, exist to sign the delegation.

   The rule is: always return the corresponding NSEC/NSEC3 record
   matching the owner (or owner hash).

   The reason for this is, that receiving validator will need to know
   which RR types are expected, in the answer.

   A DS2-unaware receiving validator will need the NSEC/NSEC3 in
   particular, if a DS2 RR exists but no DS RR exists.  In that case,
   the zone will validate as "Insecure", since no DS exists and has been
   proven by the NSEC/NSEC RR (and its RRSIG).

4.2.3.  Responding to Queries for DS2 RRs

   This is the same circumstance as section 3.1.4.1 of RFC 4034,
   "Responding to Queries for DS RRs".  The same rules as DS RRs, apply
   to DS2 RRs.


5.  Validator Considerations

   In RFC 5155, the Validator Considerations referencing DS, must be
   presumed to now read "DS or DS2" (or in the negative sense, "neither
   DS nor DS2").



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   Validators MUST use the original Owner Name for any necessary queries
   for DS, DS2, DNSKEY, and RRSIG resource records.  This is because
   there is no explicit or implicit relationship between the Canonical
   Signer Name, and a zone whose name corresponds to the Canonical
   Signer Name (which might not even exist).

5.1.  DS responses without NSEC/NSEC3

   If a response is received which includes a DS RR, but does not
   include the corresponding NSEC/NSEC3 RR, the validator MUST attempt
   to retrieve the NSEC/NSEC RR, and subsequently attempt to retrieve
   the corresponding DS2 record if the DS2 type bit is set in the NSEC/
   NSEC3 type bit map.

   Intermediate caches or middleboxes may not be DS2-aware, and may not
   include DS2 records when QTYPE is not DS2.  If the middlebox is DS2-
   unaware, the middleboxes SHOULD still allow responses for exact
   matches to unknown types, such as DS2.

5.2.  NSEC/NSEC3 RRs with DS2 type bit set

   If a DS2-aware validator receives a response with an NSEC/NSEC3 RR
   with the DS2 type bit set, but had not also received the DS2 RR, the
   validator MUST attempt to retrieve the DS2 RRset.

   An intermediate cache or middlebox may have filtered out, or not
   cached, the DS2 RR.  Explicit querying for the DS2 RR may return the
   missing DS2 RR.

5.3.  DS2 Signed Delegated Zones

   Zones whose delegation is signed by a DS2 RR, and which DS2 RR
   successfully validates, MUST be validated using the Canonical Signer
   Name (or Names, if multiple DS/DS2 RRs are present).

   More specifically, RRSIG RRs in the delegated zone, MUST be validated
   with Canonical Signer Names (CSN) whose DS2 RR is itself validated.
   For purposes of this process, every DS RR can be treated as a DS2 RR
   with the Canonical Signer Name of the DS2 RR's owner name, and MUST
   be included in the set of CSNs.

5.3.1.  RRSIG Validation Using Canonical Signer Name

   The procedure for validating an RRSIG is modified as follows:
      The RRSIG Signer Name MUST match the Canonical Signer Name.  No
      comparison is made between the Owner Name and either the Canonical
      Signer Name or the Signer Name of the RRSIG.




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      The number of labels in the RRset Owner name, minus the numer of
      labels in the Zone Name, plus the number of labels in the
      Canonical Signer Name, MUST be greater than or equal to the value
      in the RRSIG RR's Labels field.
      The RRSIG RR's Algorithm, and Key Tag fields MUST match the
      algorithm, and key tag for some DNSKEY RR in the zone's apex
      DNSKEY RRset.


6.  Security Considerations

   Further work on DS/DS2 security issues may be necessary.  In
   particular, it is unclear whether the implicit signalling of use of
   NSEC/NSEC3 may be vulnerable to downgrade attacks.


7.  IANA Considerations

   This document updates the IANA registry "DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
   PARAMETERS" (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters) in sub-
   registry "TYPES", by defining one new type.  Section 3 defines the
   DS2 RR type {TBD}.


8.  Acknowledgements

   The problems related to aliasing, as discussed on the DNSEXT WG
   mailing list, provided helpful direction in limiting what changes
   could or should be made to DNS, and DNSSEC in particular.


9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1033]  Lottor, M., "Domain administrators operations guide",
              RFC 1033, November 1987.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, April 1997.




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   [RFC2181]  Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
              Specification", RFC 2181, July 1997.

   [RFC2308]  Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
              NCACHE)", RFC 2308, March 1998.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.


Appendix A.  Constructs

A.1.  Elements

   The following DNS elements are used in the constructs discussed here.

A.1.1.  Zone Master File

   The term "zone master file" has the meaning established in RFC 1035.
   It is the file containing all the resource records and directives for
   the zone.

A.1.2.  Zone Delegation (Zone Cut)

   The terms "zone delegation" and "zone cut" may generally be used
   interchangeably.

   A zone delegation is the act of putting in NS records in a zone at a
   place other than the apex.




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   The zone delegation is the parent side of a zone cut.

   A zone cut creates a new zone.  The apex of the new zone has the same
   owner name as the zone delegation.

A.1.3.  $ORIGIN

   Most DNS authority servers include the ability to directly refer to a
   zone master file, with an implied $ORIGIN.  For those, no $ORIGIN
   needs to be used.

   For completeness, zone master files with explicit $ORIGIN are also
   used in examples.  This is in keeping with RFC 1035.

A.1.4.  $INCLUDE

   In the instances where $ORIGIN use is needed, it is also necessary to
   include common content via the $INCLUDE directive.  This is also RFC
   1035 compliant.

A.2.  Basic Constructs

   The following examples show ways to replace CNAME/DNAME usage with
   other existing DNS items.  Rationale for usage, and differences from
   CNAME/DNAME are explained for each.

A.2.1.  Zone Cut as a Replacement for a CNAME

   The following example shows a simple CNAME, where the CNAME target
   (for convenience) is a sibling of the CNAME itself.

       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias  CNAME real.example.com
       real   TXT "This is real data, maintained in a single location."


   Querying for type TXT at alias.example.com, will return the CNAME RR
   plus the TXT RR for real.example.com (the CNAME target).

   The following example shows the use of a zone cut, and the inclusion
   of data from a single location, as an alternative.





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       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias NS ns1.example.com ; all zones are served by ns1
       real  NS ns1.example.com ; normally there are multiple NS's

       server configuration (with implicit $ORIGIN of zone.name):
       zone alias.example.com { master; file=3D"czone-data.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com { master; file=3D"czone-data.example.com";};




       Or, server configuration (without implicit $ORIGIN):
       zone alias.example.com { master; file=3D"alias.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com { master; file=3D"real.example.com";};

       zone file for alias.example.com:

       $ORIGIN alias.example.com.
       $INCLUDE "czone-data.example.com"

       zone file for real.example.com:

       $ORIGIN real.example.com.
       $INCLUDE "czone-data.example.com"

       file czone-data.example.com:

   @         SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster ( 42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
             NS ns1.example.com
             TXT "This is real data, maintained in a single location."


   Querying for the TXT record for either alias.example.com, or
   real.example.com, requires first following the delegation, and then
   gets a response which does not include any CNAME.

   The main difference here is, that the DNS node "alias.example.com" is
   a real, first-class entry, which can be used interchangeably with
   "real.example.com".  E.g., it can be used as an MX target.

   The other important difference is, as the data is all authoritative
   and self-contained, it is not possible to have a broken CNAME.  If
   the necessary linkage is incorrect, the zone file will not load.



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   This means that maintaining aliased data in this way, returns values
   in a consistent manner, in a deterministic path and timeframe.  Data
   kept this way can be validated, via zone loading and zone checking
   functions included with most modern DNS authority servers.

A.2.2.  Zone Cut as a Replacement for a DNAME

   The following example shows a simple DNAME, where the DNAME target
   (for convenience) is a sibling of the DNAME itself.

       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias  DNAME real.example.com
       content.real   TXT "This is real data, kept only here."


   Querying for type TXT at alias.example.com, will return the CNAME RR
   plus the TXT RR for real.example.com (the CNAME target).

   The following example shows the use of a zone cut, and the inclusion
   of data from a single location, as an alternative.


























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       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias NS ns1.example.com ; all zones are served by ns1
       real  NS ns1.example.com ; normally there are multiple NS's

       server configuration (with implicit $ORIGIN of zone.name):
       zone alias.example.com { master; file=3D"dzone.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com { master; file=3D"dzone.example.com";};

       Or, server configuration (without implicit $ORIGIN):
       zone alias.example.com { master; file=3D"alias.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com { master; file=3D"real.example.com";};

       zone file for alias.example.com:

       $ORIGIN alias.example.com.
       $INCLUDE "dzone.example.com"

       zone file for real.example.com:

       $ORIGIN real.example.com.
       $INCLUDE "dzone.example.com"

       file dzone.example.com:

   @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster ( 42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
   content  TXT "This is real data, maintained in a single location."


   Querying for the TXT record for either content.alias.example.com, or
   content.real.example.com, requires first following the delegation,
   and then gets a response which does not include any DNAME or
   synthesized CNAME.

   The main difference here is, that the DNS node
   "content.alias.example.com" is a real, first-class entry, which can
   be used interchangeably with "content.real.example.com".  E.g., it
   can be used as an MX target.

   The other important difference is, as the data is all authoritative
   and self-contained, it is not possible to have a broken DNAME.  If
   the necessary linkage is incorrect, the zone file will not load.




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   This means that maintaining aliased data in this way, returns values
   in a consistent manner, in a deterministic path and timeframe.  Data
   kept this way can be validated, via zone loading and zone checking
   functions included with most modern DNS authority servers.

A.2.3.  Identical Zones with Non-Identical Child Zones

   This example demonstrates identical zones, where there are child
   zones (of all identical parents) whose content differ.  The owner
   name of the child zones, relative to the parent apex name, is
   identical.

   Note Well: The following example is not possible with CNAME or DNAME
   usage.

   The query re-writing that occurs in CNAME/DNAME obscures zone cuts as
   a distinction for any portion of the DNS tree below the CNAME/DNAME.


































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       zone file for example.com:

       $ORIGIN example.com.
       @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       alias NS ns1.example.com ; all zones are served by NS1
       real  NS ns1.example.com ; normally there are multiple NS's

       server configuration (with implicit $ORIGIN of zone.name):
       zone alias.example.com {
         master; file=3D"has-a-child.example.com";};
       zone real.example.com {
         master; file=3D"has-a-child.example.com";};
       zone child.alias.example.com {
         master; file=3D"child.alias.example.com";};
       zone child.real.example.com {
         master; file=3D"child.real.example.com";};

       (Non-implicit $ORIGIN may be used, similar to previous examples.)

       file has-a-child.example.com:

   @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
   content  TXT "identical"
   ; this zone cut exists in all aliased zones
   child    NS ns1.example.com

       file child.alias.example.com:

   @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
            TXT "divergent"

       file child.real.example.com:

   @        SOA ns1.example.com. postmaster (
                          42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
            TXT "unique"


   TXT Queries for content.alias.example.com and
   content.real.example.com, both return "identical" results.




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   TXT Queries for child.alias.example.com, and child.real.example.com,
   return "divergent" and "unique" results respectively, which come from
   their respective zones.

   If real.example.com were a very large zone, with very few members
   whose values needed to differ from alias.example.com, this mechanism
   would be quite useful for maintaining the data.


Appendix B.  Construction Examples, Unsigned

   The following examples show how to construct a hierarchy of zones,
   with all zones at a given depth being identical.

   The zones are unsigned, and can be implemented using existing DNS
   elements.  No DS2 is required.

B.1.  Objective, In Lay Terms

   In these example, we are using the constructs available, to build DNS
   zones with specific characteristics.

   What we want, is for all the zones (under consideration) to be "the
   same".

   What we mean by "the same" is that:
      Every node in any zone, is in every zone;
      Every combination of class and type, at each node, exists at that
      node in all the zones;
      The value of each tuple (name,class,type) in each zone is
      identical.

   In addition, whenever we use zone names (or placeholders for names),
   like Ai.Bj, we mean all combinations of the members of set {A} and
   the set {B}, combined, as {A}.{B}.  The members of set {A} are A1,
   A2, A3, etc., and the members of set {B} are B1, B2, B3., etc.  The
   letters "i" and "j" simply indicate that there is no relationship
   between the number of members in sets {A} and {B}.

   Additionally, A1, A2, etc., are placeholder names for what might be
   actual names.  For instance, A1 could be "foo.example.com.", and A2
   could be "bar.example.net."

B.2.  Building a Set of 'same' Zones

   First, we need the zone content that will be used to populate the
   zones.  Let's say we have a single existing zone, that we want to
   turn into a set of 'same' zones.



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       Zone file for "myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext.myzone.example.com.        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer.myzone.example.com.      A 127.0.0.1
       www.myzone.example.com.           A 127.0.0.2
       radius.myzone.example.com.        A 127.0.0.3


   First we de-canonicalize the labels within the zone:

       Zone file for "myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer      A 127.0.0.1
       www           A 127.0.0.2
       radius        A 127.0.0.3


   Then we turn the zone name itself into a reference to the $ORIGIN,
   which itself will be supplied when the zone is loaded:

       Zone file  for "myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       @   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer      A 127.0.0.1
       www           A 127.0.0.2
       radius        A 127.0.0.3


   Finally, we modify the configuation file to use this file for both
   myzone.example.com., and any other zones we want to have be the same:

       Configuration file (named.conf, for BIND) elements needed
       for myzone.example.com and additional zones:

       zone "myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "other.example.org."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};




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   Each time a zone file is loaded, it does so with an implicit $ORIGIN
   of the zone name.  This causes all the zones that have @ as the zone
   name (SOA owner) to be identical, if they are read from the same
   file.

B.3.  Building a Two-Deep Example

   For this example, we will build several zones with the same content,
   by re-using the same file.  For this example, we will save some steps
   by using the same zone file as before, 'mysone.zone'.

   Since the zones will be two deep, we need another set of zones above
   those, i.e. one deep, who exist only to contain the two-deep zones.

   In DNS parlance, these would, if inside a single zone, be considered
   "empty non-terminals".  However, they are not inside a single zone,
   but rather are delegation-only zones.  The "real" data is in their
   children, and the parent zones contain no other data besides that
   needed for the delegations (i.e.  NS records and possibly glue
   records).

B.3.1.  First Level Zone File

   This is a "thin" zone file, containing only the labels by which the
   second level zones are to be known.

       Zone file for first level zones, "first-level.zone":

       @   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
               42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       red    NS ns1.example.com
       green  NS ns1.example.com
       blue   NS ns1.example.com

B.3.2.  Server Conf for First Level Zones

   This establishes the parent names for the first level zones, from
   which the delegations to the second level occur:

       Zone conf file elements for the first level zones:

       zone "myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"first-level.zone";};
       zone "myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"first-level.zone";};
       zone "other.example.org."{master; file=3D"first-level.zone";};






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B.3.3.  Server Conf for Second Level Zones

   This establishes the fully qualified zone names for the second level
   zones, in all permutations and combinations:

       Zone conf file elements for the first level zones:

       zone "red.myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "red.myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "red.other.example.org."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "green.myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "green.myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "green.other.example.org."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "blue.myzone.example.com."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "blue.myzone.example.net."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};
       zone "blue.other.example.org."{master; file=3D"myzone.zone";};


   While this requires setting up all the zones, there is only one zone
   file to maintain, and all the zones inherit the common contents.


Appendix C.  Construction Examples, Signed

   The following examples are exactly the same as the examples above,
   except that they are signed.

   The zone files are identical, and require the use of DS2 signatures.

C.1.  Signed Single Level Zones

   The procedure here is:
      Create the first-instance zone, fully qualified.
      Sign the zone, and capture the DS record.
      De-canonicalize the zone file, and use the DS as a basis for the
      DS2 records.
   The DS2 records will need to be signed by their respective parent
   zones.  The signatures are omitted for clarity.

C.1.1.  Create the Single Level Zone

   We need to use the Canonical Signer Name for the zone name.









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       Zone file for "myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext.myzone.example.com.        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer.myzone.example.com.      A 127.0.0.1
       www.myzone.example.com.           A 127.0.0.2
       radius.myzone.example.com.        A 127.0.0.3

C.1.2.  Sign the zone

C.1.3.  De-canonicalize the zone

C.1.4.  Add DS2 Records to Parent Zones

C.2.  Signed Two Level Zones

   The procedure here is:
      Create the first-instance child zone, fully qualified.
      Sign the child zone, and capture the DS record.
      De-canonicalize the child zone file, and use the DS as a basis for
      the DS2 records on the child delegations.
      Create the first-instance parent zone, fully qualified, and
      include the DS2 records.
      Sign the parent zone, and capture the DS record.
      De-canonicalize the parent zone file, and use the DS as a basis
      for the DS2 records in the parent zones.
   The parents' DS2 records will need to be signed by their respective
   parent zones.  Those signatures are omitted for clarity.

C.2.1.  Create the Child Zone

   We need to use the Canonical Signer Name for the zone name.

       Zone file for "red.myzone.example.com.", the file myzone.zone:

       red.myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
                     42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
                     NS ns1.example.com
       mytext.red.myzone.example.com.        TXT "Example Text"
       mymailer.red.myzone.example.com.      A 127.0.0.1
       www.red.myzone.example.com.           A 127.0.0.2
       radius.red.myzone.example.com.        A 127.0.0.3







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C.2.2.  Sign the child zone

C.2.3.  De-canonicalize the child zone

C.2.4.  Create the Canonical First-Level Zone And Add DS2 Records


       Zone file for "myzone.example.com.", "first-level.zone":

       myzone.example.com.   SOA ns1.example.com postmaster (
               42 7200 600 3600000 60 )
            NS ns1.example.com
       red.myzone.example.com.    NS ns1.example.com
                         DS2 red.myzone.example.com. (
       ; rest of DS record contents go here
                         )
       green.myzone.example.com.  NS ns1.example.com
                         DS2 red.myzone.example.com. (
       ; rest of DS record contents go here
                         )
       blue.myzone.example.com.   NS ns1.example.com
                         DS2 red.myzone.example.com. (
       ; rest of DS record contents go here
                         )

C.2.5.  Sign the first-level zone

C.2.6.  De-canonicalize the first-level zone

C.2.7.  Add DS2 Records to Parent Zones


Appendix D.  Use Cases

D.1.  All the same

   Use Case: identical zone content, where zones have more than one
   name.

   Example:


       colors.example.com
       colours.example.com







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D.2.  Two (ore more) levels of sameness

   Use Case: identical zone content, where the zones owner names contain
   two or more labels with equivalent labels (synonyms/homonyms/IDNs).

   Example:


       colours.iso-with-accents.example.com
       colors.iso-with-accents.example.com
       colours.iso-without-accents.example.com
       colors.iso-without-accents.example.com
       colours.ascii.example.com
       colors.ascii.example.com

D.3.  Groupings of sameness with additional singletons, beneath
      identical zones

   Use Case: Clusters of content where the content of each cluster is
   identical, beneath zones which are identical.

   Example: Language-specific content, grouped by country, underneath
   aliases for some company's zones.

   [NB - Better examples of sameness and singletons are needed - same
   name, different content]

























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       Zone Name                           CSN
       ---------                           ---
       (Parents)
       big-company.example.com             big-company.example.com
       trade-mark.example.com              big-company.example.com
       product-name.example.com            big-company.example.com

       (Children)
       en.big-company.example.com          en.big-company.example.com
       en.trade-mark.example.com...      ..en.big-company.example.com
       en.product-name.example.com.       .en.big-company.example.com
       canada-en.big-company.example.com   en.big-company.example.com
       usa.big-company.example.com         en.big-company.example.com
       uk.big-company.example.com          en.big-company.example.com
       fr.big-company.example.com          fr.big-company.example.com
       canada-fr.big-company.example.com   fr.big-company.example.com
       france.big-company.example.com      fr.big-company.example.com
       sw.big-company.example.com          sw.big-company.example.com
       (etc)

       (Grandchildren)
       secure-server.en.big-company.example.com
       secure-server.en.trade-mark.example.com
       (etc...)
       [Delegations are made to unique zones when unique values for
        arbitrary-depth labels are required.]
       [E.g. for SSL certificates, unique IP addresses, and such.]

   In the above table, each of the delegations to the children is signed
   by the CSN.

   Each zone uses a master zone file corresponding to the CSN on a 1:1
   basis.

   If two zones have the same CSN, they are loaded from the same master
   zone file.

D.4.  All different below one or more levels of all the same

   Use Case: Two large zones, whose content is identical except for one
   node in the zone.

   Use Case detail: The "exception" node is isolated via a zone cut, and
   all the grandchildren zones are unique.

   The children zones are identical, and signed once with delegations
   signed by DS2 RRs.  The grandchildren zones are unique, signed by
   their respective owner names.  The delegations from the (identical)



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   parents of the grandchildren, require multiple DS RRs, one for each
   grandchild's signature.

   Note Well: The grandchildren in this case, MUST be served by the same
   set of nameservers, since the NS records at the zone cut are
   identical.


       bigzone.iso-with-accents.example.com
       bigzone.ascii.example.com
       unique-node.bigzone.iso-with-accents.example.com
       unique-node.bigzone.ascii.example.com


Appendix E.  Signed Zone Examples


Appendix F.  Example Responses


Author's Address

   Brian Dickson
   Brian Dickson
   6261 Lawrence St,
   Halifax, NS  B3L 1J8
   Canada

   Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com






















Dickson                  Expires April 29, 2011                [Page 28]


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Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 20:30:41 -0400
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Subject: [dnsext] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-dickson-dnsext-ds2-01
From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
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Updated version of the DS2 I-D is now online.

Thanks,

Brian


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: IETF I-D Submission Tool <idsubmission@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 8:28 PM
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-dickson-dnsext-ds2-01
To: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com



A new version of I-D, draft-dickson-dnsext-ds2-01.txt has been
successfully submitted by Brian Dickson and posted to the IETF
repository.

Filename: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0draft-dickson-dnsext-ds2
Revision: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A001
Title: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 DNSSEC Delegation Signature with Canonical Signe=
r Name
Creation_date: =A0 2010-11-08
WG ID: =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 Independent Submission
Number_of_pages: 28

Abstract:
The Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Extensions introduced the DS
resource record (RR) for authentication of zone delegations. =A0This
document introduces an alternative resource record, DS2, which
similarly provides authentication of zone delegations. =A0However, DS2
provides a canonical signer name, for zones whose content may be
duplicated with multiple owner names. =A0The zone is signed by the
canonical signer, and the DS2 record allows for validation using this
signer name.

Author's Note



The IETF Secretariat.


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Subject: Re: Discussion material for Beijing (was Re: [dnsext] DNSEXT WG report from the chairs)
From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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On Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 7:15 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote:
> No hat.
>
> On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 03:15:01PM -0400, Brian Dickson wrote:
>
>> However, knowing that a solution exists, can be helpful in
>> considering adopting the requirement for solutions of this type.
>
> I read this as saying, "We don't have a problem statement, so I wrote
> an I-D that solves a problem, and now I'd like the problem statement
> to include this problem in the scope of things to solve." =A0I am not
> sure that is the best way to proceed. =A0On the other hand, since we
> also have some other drafts that presumably solve some problem, it is
> no harm to have another one floating about.

Yes, it occurred to me that it might have this kind of appearance. ;-)

I've contributed material to Suzanne Woolf for the problem statement,
mostly analysis and some requirements that comes out of the analysis.
It is much more difficult to solve several problems at once, but that
was the intent, i.e. all the issues uncovered related to the problem
statement.

I was concerned that the end result, in terms of requirements
statement, might be a bit troublesome if there weren't any guarantee
of *a* solution.
If it were not the case, I would have just left the draft until after
the problem statement is settled. My philosophy is to not commit to
something until
it is known to be achievable, and it is in this spirit that providing
evidence that it is possible to meet those requirements, before asking
them to be
included in the problem statement.

As for I-Ds, my position is, it doesn't matter to me which solution
gets uptake, so long as it (or they, if more than one) meets the full
set of requirements.
(And, in particular, DNAME, and any other *NAME that behaves like
DNAME in descending below zone cuts, don't meet those requirements,
IMNSHO.)

I regret not being able to attend, as it would probably have been
easier to convey some of this in person, or via a presentation.

And, as you point out, that until the problem is well defined, any
solution is premature, including this one.
As for post-requirements-adoption, it may be advisable to have more
than one draft adopted, for different purposes, e.g. SHADOW for places
that need dynamic update support.

>> Accordingly, here's the link to the first (-00) version, and I've includ=
ed
>> below the text of the latest
>> version (-01) since updates are not possible currently (standard meeting
>> IETF I-D moratorium).
>
> The updates opened up at the beginning of the meeting. =A0Feel free to
> upload.

Thanks, I guess I mis-remembered the date or misinterpreted it when I
saw it to be after the meeting.
(I'm a bit new to sending updates coincidental with meetings.)

It's up now.

Brian


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From: Suzanne Woolf <woolf@isc.org>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
Cc: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: Re: Discussion material for Beijing (was Re: [dnsext] DNSEXT WG report from the chairs)
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On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 08:52:51PM -0400, Brian Dickson wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 7:15 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 03:15:01PM -0400, Brian Dickson wrote:
> >> However, knowing that a solution exists, can be helpful in
> >> considering adopting the requirement for solutions of this type.
> >
> > I read this as saying, "We don't have a problem statement, so I wrote
> > an I-D that solves a problem, and now I'd like the problem statement
> > to include this problem in the scope of things to solve." ?I am not
> > sure that is the best way to proceed. ?On the other hand, since we
> > also have some other drafts that presumably solve some problem, it is
> > no harm to have another one floating about.
> 
> Yes, it occurred to me that it might have this kind of appearance. ;-)
> 
> I've contributed material to Suzanne Woolf for the problem statement,
> mostly analysis and some requirements that comes out of the analysis.
> It is much more difficult to solve several problems at once, but that
> was the intent, i.e. all the issues uncovered related to the problem
> statement.

(For the record, I've received some lengthy and thoughtful comments
from Brian in the last week, which means they've been gratefully noted
but I haven't had a chance to integrate them into the draft.)

> I was concerned that the end result, in terms of requirements
> statement, might be a bit troublesome if there weren't any guarantee
> of *a* solution.

Let's be very clear about this, because I have a strong viewpoint on
it that's a big part of why I agreed to edit this document. 

At least in this particular case, it's a non-goal to define a problem
one attribute of which is that we're sure it's somehow solvable. I can
assure you that while defining a problem that we can't commit to
solving is "troublesome," it's nowhere near as troublesome as defining
the wrong problem and then going happily off to solve it.

In other words: if there are real-world requirements we can't meet, we
have to include them anyway, so people will know to stop asking us for
those things and go ask for something else, such as DNS-ng or protocol
refinements further up the stack or for certain philosophical problems
to suddenly be solvable after all.

The DNS is a pretty small part of the landscape here. Pointing people
at other courses of action that might meet their needs better than
anything this WG can do would in fact be a service.

(If it helps, the word "requirement" seems to be part of the problem
here; I've been using it as plain English rather than software
development jargon, and that may not be helping this conversation.
Think of what we're trying to get at as "needs" perhaps instead, or
your favorite word in your preferred language that means roughly
"thing that it seems important to have if I'm to consider a problem
solved, without pre-supposition that the problem is solvable.")

> My philosophy is to not commit to something until it is known to be
> achievable, and it is in this spirit that providing evidence that it
> is possible to meet those requirements, before asking them to be
> included in the problem statement.

I could not disagree with this principle more strongly for this
document. It will be successful if it results in documenting
requirements we can meet. It will also be successful if it results in
documenting requirements we can't meet. The only way it can completely
fail is to purport to be one thing-- a description of a problem
space-- when it's really another thing-- a description of the aspects
of a problem space we think we can meet with solutions. 

The reason why that would be a failure is that not including things in
the document doesn't make them go away, it just means we're refusing
to address them one way or another.

> As for I-Ds, my position is, it doesn't matter to me which solution
> gets uptake, so long as it (or they, if more than one) meets the full
> set of requirements.

It's entirely possible that some people in the world have some
"requirements" for the property we've been calling "sameness" or
"aliases" that are impossible to meet, or that are possible to meet
only at significant cost for all users of the DNS. I think refusing to
solve any problem unless we can solve all is probably not the best
path forward. I'm quite sure it's contrary to the nature of this
particular problem space, in which some issues that arise can be
solved today with what we've been calling "provisioning tricks" and
others can't. 

> (And, in particular, DNAME, and any other *NAME that behaves like
> DNAME in descending below zone cuts, don't meet those requirements,
> IMNSHO.)

It may not solve any problem you have, or believe other people have.
But to me that doesn't support the conclusion that it doesn't solve
any problem we should care about here.

> And, as you point out, that until the problem is well defined, any
> solution is premature, including this one.
> As for post-requirements-adoption, it may be advisable to have more
> than one draft adopted, for different purposes, e.g. SHADOW for places
> that need dynamic update support.

No disagreement on this at all. I think the interim WG meeting in
February came to this conclusion.

thanks,
Suzanne


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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)
	Author(s)       : J. Damas, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04.txt
	Pages           : 13
	Date            : 2010-11-08

The Domain Name System's wire protocol includes a number of fixed
fields whose range has been or soon will be exhausted and does not
allow requestors to advertise their capabilities to responders.  This
document describes backward compatible mechanisms for allowing the
protocol to grow.

This document updates the EDNS0 specification (RFC2671) based on 10
years of deployment experience.

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Subject: Re: Discussion material for Beijing (was Re: [dnsext] DNSEXT WG report from the chairs)
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On Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 9:45 PM, Suzanne Woolf <woolf@isc.org> wrote:

> On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 08:52:51PM -0400, Brian Dickson wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 7:15 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
> wrote:
> > > On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 03:15:01PM -0400, Brian Dickson wrote:
> > >> However, knowing that a solution exists, can be helpful in
> > >> considering adopting the requirement for solutions of this type.
> > >
> > > I read this as saying, "We don't have a problem statement, so I wrote
> > > an I-D that solves a problem, and now I'd like the problem statement
> > > to include this problem in the scope of things to solve." ?I am not
> > > sure that is the best way to proceed. ?On the other hand, since we
> > > also have some other drafts that presumably solve some problem, it is
> > > no harm to have another one floating about.
> >
> > Yes, it occurred to me that it might have this kind of appearance. ;-)
> >
> > I've contributed material to Suzanne Woolf for the problem statement,
> > mostly analysis and some requirements that comes out of the analysis.
> > It is much more difficult to solve several problems at once, but that
> > was the intent, i.e. all the issues uncovered related to the problem
> > statement.
>
> (For the record, I've received some lengthy and thoughtful comments
> from Brian in the last week, which means they've been gratefully noted
> but I haven't had a chance to integrate them into the draft.)
>
> > I was concerned that the end result, in terms of requirements
> > statement, might be a bit troublesome if there weren't any guarantee
> > of *a* solution.
>
> Let's be very clear about this, because I have a strong viewpoint on
> it that's a big part of why I agreed to edit this document.
>
> At least in this particular case, it's a non-goal to define a problem
> one attribute of which is that we're sure it's somehow solvable. I can
> assure you that while defining a problem that we can't commit to
> solving is "troublesome," it's nowhere near as troublesome as defining
> the wrong problem and then going happily off to solve it.
>
> In other words: if there are real-world requirements we can't meet, we
> have to include them anyway, so people will know to stop asking us for
> those things and go ask for something else, such as DNS-ng or protocol
> refinements further up the stack or for certain philosophical problems
> to suddenly be solvable after all.
>
>

Ah, I think what we have here is "pronoun trouble" (apologies to Bugs Bunny
et al.) :-)

So, there are two scopes for the problem statement, that Suzanne is working
on.
Everything real-world, and within that, smaller scoped DNS.

What I was trying to answer was issues regarding DNS-scoped problem
statements.

I.e., it is possible that some of the problem statement can be addressed
within DNS scope.
And, in that instance, that component of the problem statement may have an
easier time of it,
in terms of adoption by the WG as a new problem to include in the WG
charter, if it is a problem
for which *some* solution(s) exist. Adopting the problem does not (ever)
imply adoption of a specific
I-D as the solution to the problem. They are independent issues.

And, the one other reason for bringing up my I-D at all, at this time, was
for its examples.
They may be helpful in pointing out real-world issues which might have
escaped the non-DNS and/or
non-technical community, as far as the interaction between policies and
implementation using current
tools and/or proposed methods. Understanding the limitations, and
interactions between parties, can
put some necessary concrete perspective on things.


> The DNS is a pretty small part of the landscape here. Pointing people
> at other courses of action that might meet their needs better than
> anything this WG can do would in fact be a service.
>
> (If it helps, the word "requirement" seems to be part of the problem
> here; I've been using it as plain English rather than software
> development jargon, and that may not be helping this conversation.
> Think of what we're trying to get at as "needs" perhaps instead, or
> your favorite word in your preferred language that means roughly
> "thing that it seems important to have if I'm to consider a problem
> solved, without pre-supposition that the problem is solvable.")
>
> > My philosophy is to not commit to something until it is known to be
> > achievable, and it is in this spirit that providing evidence that it
> > is possible to meet those requirements, before asking them to be
> > included in the problem statement.
>
> I could not disagree with this principle more strongly for this
> document. It will be successful if it results in documenting
> requirements we can meet. It will also be successful if it results in
> documenting requirements we can't meet. The only way it can completely
> fail is to purport to be one thing-- a description of a problem
> space-- when it's really another thing-- a description of the aspects
> of a problem space we think we can meet with solutions.
>
> The reason why that would be a failure is that not including things in
> the document doesn't make them go away, it just means we're refusing
> to address them one way or another.
>
>
Thanks for clarifying this. I agree, actually. Again, I was putting the cart
before the horse, if only to point out that the need for the horse is
contingent
on the need for the cart. :-)

It is a case of, "If some element of the larger problem statement seems to
fit
into the DNS-shaped hole, it is potentially helpful to know there is a
DNS-shaped
peg in the waiting that can fill the need."


> > As for I-Ds, my position is, it doesn't matter to me which solution
> > gets uptake, so long as it (or they, if more than one) meets the full
> > set of requirements.
>
> It's entirely possible that some people in the world have some
> "requirements" for the property we've been calling "sameness" or
> "aliases" that are impossible to meet, or that are possible to meet
> only at significant cost for all users of the DNS. I think refusing to
> solve any problem unless we can solve all is probably not the best
> path forward. I'm quite sure it's contrary to the nature of this
> particular problem space, in which some issues that arise can be
> solved today with what we've been calling "provisioning tricks" and
> others can't.
>
> > (And, in particular, DNAME, and any other *NAME that behaves like
> > DNAME in descending below zone cuts, don't meet those requirements,
> > IMNSHO.)
>
> It may not solve any problem you have, or believe other people have.
> But to me that doesn't support the conclusion that it doesn't solve
> any problem we should care about here.
>
> > And, as you point out, that until the problem is well defined, any
> > solution is premature, including this one.
> > As for post-requirements-adoption, it may be advisable to have more
> > than one draft adopted, for different purposes, e.g. SHADOW for places
> > that need dynamic update support.
>
> No disagreement on this at all. I think the interim WG meeting in
> February came to this conclusion.
>
> thanks,
> Suzanne
>

Thanks, and especially thank you for your efforts on this  WG item, Suzanne,

Brian

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<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 9:45 PM, Suzanne =
Woolf <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:woolf@isc.org">woolf@isc.org<=
/a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:=
 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left=
: 1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 08:52:51PM -0400, Brian Dickson w=
rote:<br>
&gt; On Mon, Nov 8, 2010 at 7:15 PM, Andrew Sullivan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
ajs@shinkuro.com">ajs@shinkuro.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
</div><div class=3D"im">&gt; &gt; On Mon, Nov 08, 2010 at 03:15:01PM -0400,=
 Brian Dickson wrote:<br>
&gt; &gt;&gt; However, knowing that a solution exists, can be helpful in<br=
>
&gt; &gt;&gt; considering adopting the requirement for solutions of this ty=
pe.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I read this as saying, &quot;We don&#39;t have a problem statemen=
t, so I wrote<br>
&gt; &gt; an I-D that solves a problem, and now I&#39;d like the problem st=
atement<br>
&gt; &gt; to include this problem in the scope of things to solve.&quot; ?I=
 am not<br>
&gt; &gt; sure that is the best way to proceed. ?On the other hand, since w=
e<br>
&gt; &gt; also have some other drafts that presumably solve some problem, i=
t is<br>
&gt; &gt; no harm to have another one floating about.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Yes, it occurred to me that it might have this kind of appearance. ;-)=
<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;ve contributed material to Suzanne Woolf for the problem stateme=
nt,<br>
&gt; mostly analysis and some requirements that comes out of the analysis.<=
br>
&gt; It is much more difficult to solve several problems at once, but that<=
br>
&gt; was the intent, i.e. all the issues uncovered related to the problem<b=
r>
&gt; statement.<br>
<br>
</div>(For the record, I&#39;ve received some lengthy and thoughtful commen=
ts<br>
from Brian in the last week, which means they&#39;ve been gratefully noted<=
br>
but I haven&#39;t had a chance to integrate them into the draft.)<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; I was concerned that the end result, in terms of requirements<br>
&gt; statement, might be a bit troublesome if there weren&#39;t any guarant=
ee<br>
&gt; of *a* solution.<br>
<br>
</div>Let&#39;s be very clear about this, because I have a strong viewpoint=
 on<br>
it that&#39;s a big part of why I agreed to edit this document.<br>
<br>
At least in this particular case, it&#39;s a non-goal to define a problem<b=
r>
one attribute of which is that we&#39;re sure it&#39;s somehow solvable. I =
can<br>
assure you that while defining a problem that we can&#39;t commit to<br>
solving is &quot;troublesome,&quot; it&#39;s nowhere near as troublesome as=
 defining<br>
the wrong problem and then going happily off to solve it.<br>
<br>
In other words: if there are real-world requirements we can&#39;t meet, we<=
br>
have to include them anyway, so people will know to stop asking us for<br>
those things and go ask for something else, such as DNS-ng or protocol<br>
refinements further up the stack or for certain philosophical problems<br>
to suddenly be solvable after all.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br><br>Ah, I think what we have here is &quot;pronou=
n trouble&quot; (apologies to Bugs Bunny et al.) :-)<br><br>So, there are t=
wo scopes for the problem statement, that Suzanne is working on.<br>Everyth=
ing real-world, and within that, smaller scoped DNS.<br>
<br>What I was trying to answer was issues regarding DNS-scoped problem sta=
tements.<br><br>I.e., it is possible that some of the problem statement can=
 be addressed within DNS scope.<br>And, in that instance, that component of=
 the problem statement may have an easier time of it,<br>
in terms of adoption by the WG as a new problem to include in the WG charte=
r, if it is a problem<br>for which *some* solution(s) exist. Adopting the p=
roblem does not (ever) imply adoption of a specific<br>I-D as the solution =
to the problem. They are independent issues.<br>
<br>And, the one other reason for bringing up my I-D at all, at this time, =
was for its examples.<br>They may be helpful in pointing out real-world iss=
ues which might have escaped the non-DNS and/or<br>non-technical community,=
 as far as the interaction between policies and implementation using curren=
t<br>
tools and/or proposed methods. Understanding the limitations, and interacti=
ons between parties, can<br>put some necessary concrete perspective on thin=
gs.<br>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0pt 0pt =
0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">

The DNS is a pretty small part of the landscape here. Pointing people<br>
at other courses of action that might meet their needs better than<br>
anything this WG can do would in fact be a service.<br>
<br>
(If it helps, the word &quot;requirement&quot; seems to be part of the prob=
lem<br>
here; I&#39;ve been using it as plain English rather than software<br>
development jargon, and that may not be helping this conversation.<br>
Think of what we&#39;re trying to get at as &quot;needs&quot; perhaps inste=
ad, or<br>
your favorite word in your preferred language that means roughly<br>
&quot;thing that it seems important to have if I&#39;m to consider a proble=
m<br>
solved, without pre-supposition that the problem is solvable.&quot;)<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; My philosophy is to not commit to something until it is known to be<br=
>
&gt; achievable, and it is in this spirit that providing evidence that it<b=
r>
&gt; is possible to meet those requirements, before asking them to be<br>
&gt; included in the problem statement.<br>
<br>
</div>I could not disagree with this principle more strongly for this<br>
document. It will be successful if it results in documenting<br>
requirements we can meet. It will also be successful if it results in<br>
documenting requirements we can&#39;t meet. The only way it can completely<=
br>
fail is to purport to be one thing-- a description of a problem<br>
space-- when it&#39;s really another thing-- a description of the aspects<b=
r>
of a problem space we think we can meet with solutions.<br>
<br>
The reason why that would be a failure is that not including things in<br>
the document doesn&#39;t make them go away, it just means we&#39;re refusin=
g<br>
to address them one way or another.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br></div></blockquote><div><br>Thanks for clarifying thi=
s. I agree, actually. Again, I was putting the cart<br>before the horse, if=
 only to point out that the need for the horse is contingent<br>on the need=
 for the cart. :-)<br>
<br>It is a case of, &quot;If some element of the larger problem statement =
seems to fit<br>into the DNS-shaped hole, it is potentially helpful to know=
 there is a DNS-shaped<br>peg in the waiting that can fill the need.&quot;<=
br>
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8=
ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;"><div cla=
ss=3D"im">
&gt; As for I-Ds, my position is, it doesn&#39;t matter to me which solutio=
n<br>
&gt; gets uptake, so long as it (or they, if more than one) meets the full<=
br>
&gt; set of requirements.<br>
<br>
</div>It&#39;s entirely possible that some people in the world have some<br=
>
&quot;requirements&quot; for the property we&#39;ve been calling &quot;same=
ness&quot; or<br>
&quot;aliases&quot; that are impossible to meet, or that are possible to me=
et<br>
only at significant cost for all users of the DNS. I think refusing to<br>
solve any problem unless we can solve all is probably not the best<br>
path forward. I&#39;m quite sure it&#39;s contrary to the nature of this<br=
>
particular problem space, in which some issues that arise can be<br>
solved today with what we&#39;ve been calling &quot;provisioning tricks&quo=
t; and<br>
others can&#39;t.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; (And, in particular, DNAME, and any other *NAME that behaves like<br>
&gt; DNAME in descending below zone cuts, don&#39;t meet those requirements=
,<br>
&gt; IMNSHO.)<br>
<br>
</div>It may not solve any problem you have, or believe other people have.<=
br>
But to me that doesn&#39;t support the conclusion that it doesn&#39;t solve=
<br>
any problem we should care about here.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; And, as you point out, that until the problem is well defined, any<br>
&gt; solution is premature, including this one.<br>
&gt; As for post-requirements-adoption, it may be advisable to have more<br=
>
&gt; than one draft adopted, for different purposes, e.g. SHADOW for places=
<br>
&gt; that need dynamic update support.<br>
<br>
</div>No disagreement on this at all. I think the interim WG meeting in<br>
February came to this conclusion.<br>
<br>
thanks,<br>
<font color=3D"#888888">Suzanne<br></font></blockquote><div><br>Thanks, and=
 especially thank you for your efforts on this=A0 WG item, Suzanne,<br><br>=
Brian <br></div></div><br><div style=3D"visibility: hidden; left: -5000px;"=
 id=3D"avg_ls_inline_popup">
</div><style type=3D"text/css">#avg_ls_inline_popup{position: absolute;z-in=
dex: 9999;padding: 0px 0px;margin-left: 0px;margin-top: 0px;overflow: hidde=
n;word-wrap: break-word;color: black;font-size: 10px;text-align: left;line-=
height: 130%;}</style>

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Subject: [dnsext] Philosophy: On the question of "sameness" in the DNS
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This is a piece I wrote some time ago, with the intent of getting my own 
thoughts clear on the question of DNS "sameness".
Others might find it interesting to read. Apologies for the formatting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DNS is a system that, among other things, maps sequences of strings 
onto data elements; the most visible version is where a domain name 
(www.example.com) gets mapped to an IP address (123.45.67.89).

This mapping is used by higher level protocols, such as HTTP, which 
again supports the World Wide Web and other applications. This section 
will use WWW as an example, because many readers will be familiar with 
it, but similar considerations exist for many other protocols.

For the World Wide Web, the question of "sameness" has a reasonably 
straightforward answer: If an user hands two different strings to a Web 
browser, in the form of URLs, and get back what appears to the user to 
be exactly the same Web page, and the functions that are reachable from 
that Web page behave exactly the same way, the user is likely to 
consider that the two URLs "are the same".

The resolution of a Web page is a multistep process:

    * First, the hostname is extracted from the URL and presented to the
      DNS for lookup.
    * After the normal processing of a DNS lookup, including the
      traversal of NS records, CNAMEs, DNAMEs and other types of
      records, an A (or AAAA) record is produced.
    * The client's browser (or a proxy acting on behalf of the client's
      browser) then uses the address from that record to contact a Web
      server using TCP.
    * The client's browser then presents a query to the Web server,
      presenting the domain name he extracted from the URL again, this
      time as a Host: header.
    * The server then performs some appropriate action in response,
      which may include "302 redirects" to some other URL, an error
      response, or return of some Web page content.



>From the above, it should be clear that "sameness", as defined earlier, 
cannot be achieved without the active cooperation of the Web server's 
operator. If the Web server's operator wishes two hostnames to resolve 
to different pages, no mechanism in the DNS can prevent him.

However, there are a number of ways in which a site operator can be 
*prevented* from achieving "sameness". The most obvious one is that one 
of the string for which the operator desires "sameness" is either 
delegated to another operator, or not delegated at all.

The question of "sameness using DNS mechanisms" should therefore be 
focused on this question:

Given that some (non-DNS) entity has declared that two domain names 
should always be available to an operator in order for the operator to 
be able to configure "sameness" if he so desires, what are the 
appropriate DNS mechanisms to support that desire?

--------------080305070501030105000200
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>

<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#ffffff">
<span class="Apple-style-span"
 style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: 'Times New Roman'; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; font-size: medium;">
<div style="margin: 0px; background-color: transparent;"><span
 id="internal-source-marker_0.416789184557274"
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">This
is a piece I wrote some time ago, with the intent of getting my own
thoughts clear on the question of DNS "sameness".<br>
Others might find it interesting to read. Apologies for the formatting.<br>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
The DNS is a system that, among other things, maps sequences of strings
onto data elements; the most visible version is where a domain name
(<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.example.com">www.example.com</a>) gets mapped to an IP address (123.45.67.89).</span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"></span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">This
mapping is used by higher level protocols, such as HTTP, which again
supports the World Wide Web and other applications. This section will
use WWW as an example, because many readers will be familiar with it,
but similar considerations exist for many other protocols.</span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"></span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">For
the World Wide Web, the question of &#8220;sameness&#8221; has a reasonably
straightforward answer: If an user hands two different strings to a Web
browser, in the form of URLs, and get back what appears to the user to
be exactly the same Web page, and the functions that are reachable from
that Web page behave exactly the same way, the user is likely to
consider that the two URLs &#8220;are the same&#8221;.</span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"></span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">The
resolution of a Web page is a multistep process:</span>
<ul>
  <li
 style="list-style-type: disc; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">First,
the hostname is extracted from the URL and presented to the DNS for
lookup.</span></li>
  <li
 style="list-style-type: disc; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">After
the normal processing of a DNS lookup, including the traversal of NS
records, CNAMEs, DNAMEs and other types of records, an A (or AAAA)
record is produced.</span></li>
  <li
 style="list-style-type: disc; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">The
client&#8217;s browser (or a proxy acting on behalf of the client&#8217;s browser)
then uses the address from that record to contact a Web server using
TCP.</span></li>
  <li
 style="list-style-type: disc; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">The
client&#8217;s browser then presents a query to the Web server, presenting
the domain name he extracted from the URL again, this time as a Host:
header.</span></li>
  <li
 style="list-style-type: disc; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline;"><span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">The
server then performs some appropriate action in response, which may
include &#8220;302 redirects&#8221; to some other URL, an error response, or return
of some Web page content.</span></li>
</ul>
<br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"></span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">From
the above, it should be clear that &#8220;sameness&#8221;, as defined earlier,
cannot be achieved without the active cooperation of the Web server&#8217;s
operator. If the Web server&#8217;s operator wishes two hostnames to resolve
to different pages, no mechanism in the DNS can prevent him.</span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"></span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">However,
there are a number of ways in which a site operator can be *prevented*
from achieving &#8220;sameness&#8221;. The most obvious one is that one of the
string for which the operator desires &#8220;sameness&#8221; is either delegated to
another operator, or not delegated at all.</span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"></span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">The
question of &#8220;sameness using DNS mechanisms&#8221; should therefore be focused
on this question:</span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;"></span><br>
<span
 style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Arial; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: transparent; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal; text-decoration: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: pre-wrap;">Given
that some (non-DNS) entity has declared that two domain names should
always be available to an operator in order for the operator to be able
to configure &#8220;sameness&#8221; if he so desires, what are the appropriate DNS
mechanisms to support that desire?</span></div>
</span>
</body>
</html>

--------------080305070501030105000200--


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From: Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan@acmepacket.com>
To: "namedroppers@ops.ietf.org" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
CC: "Robert H. Walter" <rwalter@netnumber.com>, "Pierce A [NTK] Gorman" <pierce.gorman@sprint.com>, Manjul Maharishi <mmaharishi@tnsi.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2010 10:24:41 -0500
Subject: [dnsext] draft-kaplan-dnsext-enum-sip-source-ref-opt-code-01.txt
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Howdy,
We've submitted a draft to ask for an EDNS Option-code to be reserved for a=
 private use-case involving SIP/PSTN call traffic in closed networks, but w=
here there are multiple vendors involved in the private network and thus ne=
ed a known option-code number, and which will not collide with others.  We'=
ve been delaying officially asking for this for a couple of years, as it's =
not appropriate for the public Internet... but there're more than just a co=
uple vendors implementing this now, so we'd really like an option-code rese=
rved.

The details of how to use the mechanism are documented separately in draft-=
kaplan-enum-sip-routing-01 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-si=
p-routing-01).
The link below is for the draft asking to register the option-code.

Any comments/flames/feedback appreciated, of course.

-hadriel


A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts director=
ies.

	Title           : EDNS Option Code for SIP and PSTN Source Reference Info
	Author(s)       : H. Kaplan, et al.
	Filename        : draft-kaplan-dnsext-enum-sip-source-ref-opt-code-01.txt
	Pages           : 5
	Date            : 2010-11-07

This document requests an IANA allocation for an EDNS0 Option-Code,=20
per [RFC2671], for a UTF-8 encoded string field containing a URI for=20
private use.  The intended use of this field is for providing SIP=20
and PSTN-type source information for ENUM-resolution DNS queries, in=20
private DNS server environments such as Private ENUM.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kaplan-dnsext-enum-sip-source-ref=
-opt-code-01.txt

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Nov  9 07:38:55 2010
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From: Hadriel Kaplan <HKaplan@acmepacket.com>
To: "namedroppers@ops.ietf.org" <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>
CC: "Robert H. Walter" <rwalter@netnumber.com>, "Pierce A [NTK] Gorman" <pierce.gorman@sprint.com>, Manjul Maharishi <mmaharishi@tnsi.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2010 10:35:12 -0500
Subject: [dnsext] Re: draft-kaplan-dnsext-enum-sip-source-ref-opt-code-01.txt
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Ugh, wrong version typo - I mean the details of how to use it are documente=
d in draft-kaplan-enum-sip-routing-02:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-sip-routing-02

-hadriel

On Nov 9, 2010, at 10:24 AM, Hadriel Kaplan wrote:

> Howdy,
> We've submitted a draft to ask for an EDNS Option-code to be reserved for=
 a private use-case involving SIP/PSTN call traffic in closed networks, but=
 where there are multiple vendors involved in the private network and thus =
need a known option-code number, and which will not collide with others.  W=
e've been delaying officially asking for this for a couple of years, as it'=
s not appropriate for the public Internet... but there're more than just a =
couple vendors implementing this now, so we'd really like an option-code re=
served.
>=20
> The details of how to use the mechanism are documented separately in draf=
t-kaplan-enum-sip-routing-01 (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kaplan-enum-=
sip-routing-01).
> The link below is for the draft asking to register the option-code.
>=20
> Any comments/flames/feedback appreciated, of course.
>=20
> -hadriel
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
>=20
> 	Title           : EDNS Option Code for SIP and PSTN Source Reference Inf=
o
> 	Author(s)       : H. Kaplan, et al.
> 	Filename        : draft-kaplan-dnsext-enum-sip-source-ref-opt-code-01.tx=
t
> 	Pages           : 5
> 	Date            : 2010-11-07
>=20
> This document requests an IANA allocation for an EDNS0 Option-Code,=20
> per [RFC2671], for a UTF-8 encoded string field containing a URI for=20
> private use.  The intended use of this field is for providing SIP=20
> and PSTN-type source information for ENUM-resolution DNS queries, in=20
> private DNS server environments such as Private ENUM.
>=20
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-kaplan-dnsext-enum-sip-source-r=
ef-opt-code-01.txt
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20



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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Signaling Cryptographic Algorithm Understanding in DNSSEC
	Author(s)       : S. Crocker, S. Rose
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-00.txt
	Pages           : 8
	Date            : 2010-11-09

The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were developed to provide origin
authentication and integrity protection for DNS data by using digital
signatures.  These digital signatures can be generated using
different algorithms.  This draft sets out to specify a way for
validating end-system resolvers to signal to a server which
cryptographic algorithms they support.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-algo-signal-00.txt

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From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Tue Nov  9 23:24:37 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] dnssec-bis-updates and the CD bit
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Based on today's DNSEXT meeting, I have updated the draft.  Two 
changes have been made:

1) The placeholder text describing the rollover and die problem has 
been removed.  The recommendation to use a BAD cache remains, though 
without much explanation.  If you don't like this, send text.

2) The previous weak recommendation about setting the CD bit has been 
changed to a SHOULD.

-- Sam, doc editor


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis
	Author(s)       : S. Weiler, D. Blacka
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12.txt
	Pages           : 14
	Date            : 2010-11-09

This document is a collection of technical clarifications to the
DNSSECbis document set.  It is meant to serve as a resource to
implementors as well as a repository of DNSSECbis errata.

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http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-12.txt

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Subject: [dnsext] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC5395 (2618)
From: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: ogud@ogud.com, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5395,
"Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=5395&eid=2618

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>

Section: 3.1.1

Original Text
-------------
 1. A complete template as specified in Appendix A has been posted for

      three weeks to the namedroppers@ops.ietf.org mailing list before

      the Expert Review decision.



....and later on...



No less than three weeks and no more than six weeks after a completed

   template has been formally posted to namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, the

   selected Expert shall post a message, explicitly accepting or

   rejecting the application, to IANA, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, and



Corrected Text
--------------
 1. A complete template as specified in Appendix A has been posted for

      three weeks to the dnsext@ietf.org mailing list before

      the Expert Review decision



......and later on ...



No less than three weeks and no more than six weeks after a completed

   template has been formally posted to dnsext@ietf.org, the

   selected Expert shall post a message, explicitly accepting or

   rejecting the application, to IANA, dnsext@ops.ietf.org, and

Notes
-----
The DNSEXT working group has changed mailing lists to the dnsext@ietf.org.

There is also occurance of the  mailing list address in section 3.1.2 paragraph 1,

and in section 5 paragraph 3 these also should refer to the new list dnsext@ietf.org.

Instructions:
-------------
This errata is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC5395 (draft-ietf-dnsext-2929bis-07)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations
Publication Date    : November 2008
Author(s)           : D. Eastlake 3rd
Category            : BEST CURRENT PRACTICE
Source              : DNS Extensions
Area                : Internet
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG


From ajs@shinkuro.com  Wed Nov 10 01:27:32 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 04:27:54 -0500
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Dear colleagues,

We hereby announce the opening of the new DNSEXT mailing list,
dnsext@ietf.org.  All Working Group business for the DNS Extensions
Working Group at the IETF should be sent to that address.  The
namedroppers@ops.ietf.org address should no longer be used for WG
business.

Best regards,

Andrew and Olafur

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From dnsext-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Nov 10 01:27:34 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 04:27:54 -0500
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Dear colleagues,

We hereby announce the opening of the new DNSEXT mailing list,
dnsext@ietf.org.  All Working Group business for the DNS Extensions
Working Group at the IETF should be sent to that address.  The
namedroppers@ops.ietf.org address should no longer be used for WG
business.

Best regards,

Andrew and Olafur

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.
_______________________________________________
dnsext mailing list
dnsext@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Nov 10 01:36:24 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 04:32:33 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: [dnsext] DNSEXT Mailing list has moved
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Dear colleagues,

We hereby announce the opening of the new DNSEXT mailing list,
dnsext@ietf.org.  All working group business for the DNS Extensions
Working Group at the IETF should henceforth be sent to that address.
The address namedroppers@ops.ietf.org should no longer be used for WG
business.

To the extent we remain able, the DNSEXT Chairs will continue to
monitor the namedroppers@ops.ietf.org list for items that should be
sent to the DNSEXT list instead.  We will not forward the mail
directly, however, and we will not be able to put a forwarding rule in
place on the namedroppers@ops.ietf.org list server.

We attempted to subscribe everyone we knew about on namedroppers to
the new DNSEXT list.  If you have not received a message from
dnsext@ietf.org telling you that you are subscribed, you can subscribe
to the new list yourself.  Please visit
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext to do so.

Please update your filters and your address books accordingly.

Thanks,

Andrew and Olafur (DNSEXT Chairs)

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.


From ajs@shinkuro.com  Wed Nov 10 02:01:07 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 05:01:28 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Dear colleagues,

I've been alerted that the subscribe message to list members may have
been munged by the list manager.  I think this is due to a setting I
had turned on when we thought we were going to have an alias to
another list.  

People on this list therefore may not have seen the message below:

--%<--cut here-->%--

You are being subscribed to this list because you were subscribed to the
namedroppers@ops.ietf.org mailing list on 2010-10-13, or because the chairs             
of the IETF DNSEXT mailing list saw that you subscribed to that list since              
that date.  This action is part of the previously announced migration of                
the DNS Extensions Working Group's mail list from                                       
namedroppers@ops.ietf.org.                                                              
                                                                                        
--%<--cut here-->%--

Note that if you do not wish to subscribe to this list, you can
unsubscribe yourself by visiting
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext.

Thanks and best regards,

Andrew

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From dnsext-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Nov 10 02:01:08 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 05:01:28 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Dear colleagues,

I've been alerted that the subscribe message to list members may have
been munged by the list manager.  I think this is due to a setting I
had turned on when we thought we were going to have an alias to
another list.  

People on this list therefore may not have seen the message below:

--%<--cut here-->%--

You are being subscribed to this list because you were subscribed to the
namedroppers@ops.ietf.org mailing list on 2010-10-13, or because the chairs             
of the IETF DNSEXT mailing list saw that you subscribed to that list since              
that date.  This action is part of the previously announced migration of                
the DNS Extensions Working Group's mail list from                                       
namedroppers@ops.ietf.org.                                                              
                                                                                        
--%<--cut here-->%--

Note that if you do not wish to subscribe to this list, you can
unsubscribe yourself by visiting
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext.

Thanks and best regards,

Andrew

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.
_______________________________________________
dnsext mailing list
dnsext@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

From wouter@nlnetlabs.nl  Wed Nov 10 03:07:37 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 12:07:36 +0100
From: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-20
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Hi Mark,

Let's use this empty new mailing list :-)

On 11/08/2010 12:30 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> Section 5.2 paragraph 2 (below) is just plain wrong
> 
>    A server MUST ignore a dynamic update message that attempts to add a
>    non-DNAME/CNAME RR at a name that already has a DNAME RR associated
>    with that name.  Otherwise, replace the DNAME RR with the DNAME (or
>    CNAME) update RR.  This is similar behavior to dynamic updates to an
>    owner name of a CNAME RR [RFC2136].
> 
> The only additional restriction on DNAME is that is it to be treated
> as a singleton.  i.e. Adding a DNAME removes the exiting DNAME.
> Apart from that it should be treated like any other record as far
> as UPDATE is concerned.

yes, but also no CNAME+DNAME and a zone transfer might break
interoperability with a secondary if such an update is accepted.

> You can add other records so long as the rules for the other records
> permit them to be added.
> 
> The above text prevents you updating the SOA and NS records for
> example when a DNAME is use at the apex of a zone.

That was not the intent.  Here is a new 5.2 paragraph 2:

If a dynamic update message attempts to add a DNAME but a CNAME is
associated with that name, then the server MUST ignore the DNAME.  If a
DNAME is associated with that name, then it is replaced with the new
DNAME.  Otherwise, add the DNAME.  If a CNAME is added but a DNAME is
associated with that name, then the CNAME MUST be ignored.  This is
similar behavior to dynamic updates to an owner name of a CNAME RR
[RFC2136].

Best regards,
   Wouter
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Hi Mark,

Let's use this empty new mailing list :-)

On 11/08/2010 12:30 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> Section 5.2 paragraph 2 (below) is just plain wrong
> 
>    A server MUST ignore a dynamic update message that attempts to add a
>    non-DNAME/CNAME RR at a name that already has a DNAME RR associated
>    with that name.  Otherwise, replace the DNAME RR with the DNAME (or
>    CNAME) update RR.  This is similar behavior to dynamic updates to an
>    owner name of a CNAME RR [RFC2136].
> 
> The only additional restriction on DNAME is that is it to be treated
> as a singleton.  i.e. Adding a DNAME removes the exiting DNAME.
> Apart from that it should be treated like any other record as far
> as UPDATE is concerned.

yes, but also no CNAME+DNAME and a zone transfer might break
interoperability with a secondary if such an update is accepted.

> You can add other records so long as the rules for the other records
> permit them to be added.
> 
> The above text prevents you updating the SOA and NS records for
> example when a DNAME is use at the apex of a zone.

That was not the intent.  Here is a new 5.2 paragraph 2:

If a dynamic update message attempts to add a DNAME but a CNAME is
associated with that name, then the server MUST ignore the DNAME.  If a
DNAME is associated with that name, then it is replaced with the new
DNAME.  Otherwise, add the DNAME.  If a CNAME is added but a DNAME is
associated with that name, then the CNAME MUST be ignored.  This is
similar behavior to dynamic updates to an owner name of a CNAME RR
[RFC2136].

Best regards,
   Wouter
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From hallam@gmail.com  Wed Nov 10 12:11:02 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] Enhanced Discovery and Optimization
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Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI
proposal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminating the
need for dual A/AAAA lookups.

I suggest that these two issues are actually linked and that it is
counterproductive to try to unlink them. Most engineering tasks are best
approached by reduction and modular approaches. Security and optimization
are the exceptions. If you want efficiency you have to consider the whole
system.


I think that what we need to do is to get the discovery system understood
first and then look at how to optimize. In particular we need to consider
what the API presented to the applications is going to look like.

The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyname and then plug the
IP address returned into the open () call.

A much better approach in my view is to start by looking at an object
oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would use in that
context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data needed to
service that query to a DNS 'super-request'.

At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in which I have an
'InternetClient' object that exposes the following options for starting a
connection:

Open (string domain, integer port)
Open (string domain, string service)
Open (string domain, string service, integer port)
Retry ()

So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:

Open ("example.com", "_http._tcp", 80)

If (and it is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between the
client and the resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell the
resolver what the parameters it was presented with were and then have the
resolver perform however many queries were required to perform discovery.

Some important design constraints that flow from this approach are:

1) The discovery process must be standard across all protocols.
2) The discovery process cannot involve processing of regular expressions or
other matching rules.


Amongst the issues raised on the URI draft were:

1) What about the problems of using prefixes (CNAME, wildcards)
2) How does it relate to other discovery schemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR etc.)
3) Should it use the same prefix registry?
4) Web services use HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discovery,
which governs?

Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as ESRV allows all of these
issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.

The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record. At the end of that
first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a canonical name and can
use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing and/or wildcards.

The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta discovery information
we need or tell us the range extended discovery options that are supported.

So for example, the maps service at example.com might be configured as
follows:


$ORIGIN example.com
maps       CNAME example.com
.          ESRV disc prefix
_maps._ws  ESRV disc srv
_maps._ws  ESRV disc uri
_maps._ws  ESRV tls required
_maps._ws  SRV  1 1 443 host1.example.com
_maps._ws  SRV  1 1 443 host2.example.com
_maps._ws  URI  1 1 443 https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
_maps._ws  URI  1 1 443 https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
host1      A  10.1.1.1
host2      A  10.1.1.2
host2      AAAA .....


Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equivalent means of
discovering the maps service. The application can choose to use either SRV
or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The result will also be
the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resolve for
example.com or www.example.com.

I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, the client does not
want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL in the URI method.
These should be canonical just like every other right hand side in a DNS
file.

It is also clear from this example that the prefix space should apply to all
extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. It should be one space
and belong to the ESRV level.


Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider how we might tweak
this at the resolver level.

Without some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver is
doing the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more
significantly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy a
clever new discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation in the
resolver.

If on the other hand, the client could ask something like

MESRV  _maps._ws.example.com

The resolver can break the query down according to decidable rules and
collect up all the information that the client requires in one big answer.

OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the real payoff, the real
advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce support for extended
discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could have discovery that
takes geographic location into account or directs account based services
according to the account.

This is only possible if the resolver is not required to keep track of which
protocol uses which discovery mechanism.


This approach also plays nice with administration considerations. If I have
a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web services, I can authorize
individual Web services to update their specific domain name and no other.

The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver detail at
progressive levels of granularity - domain - service - service-host.

This need not cause excessive numbers of queries however since all the
records at the service and service-host level can be presumed to be
relevant. So the client can ask for all the records at the node rather than
specific RR types.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e6509d0416deab0494b876bd
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI propo=
sal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminating the need=
 for dual A/AAAA lookups.<div><br></div><div>I suggest that these two issue=
s are actually linked and that it is counterproductive to try to unlink the=
m. Most engineering tasks are best approached by reduction and modular appr=
oaches. Security and optimization are the exceptions. If you want efficienc=
y you have to consider the whole system.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I think that what we need to do is to ge=
t the discovery system understood first and then look at how to optimize. I=
n particular we need to consider what the API presented to the applications=
 is going to look like.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyn=
ame and then plug the IP address returned into the open () call.=A0</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>A much better approach in my view is to start by looking =
at an object oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would =
use in that context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data =
needed to service that query to a DNS &#39;super-request&#39;.</div>
<div><br></div><div>At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in whic=
h I have an &#39;InternetClient&#39; object that exposes the following opti=
ons for starting a connection:</div><div><br></div><div>Open (string domain=
, integer port)</div>
<div>Open (string domain, string service)</div><div><meta charset=3D"utf-8"=
>Open (string domain, string service, integer port)</div><div>Retry ()</div=
><div><br></div><div>So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:<=
/div>
<div><br></div><div>Open (&quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com<=
/a>&quot;, &quot;_http._tcp&quot;, 80)</div><div><br></div><div>If (and it =
is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between the client and t=
he resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell the resolver what =
the parameters it was presented with were and then have the resolver perfor=
m however many queries were required to perform discovery.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Some important design constraints that flow from this a=
pproach are:</div><div><br></div><div>1) The discovery process must be stan=
dard across all protocols.</div><div>2) The discovery process cannot involv=
e processing of regular expressions or other matching rules.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Amongst the issues raised on the URI dra=
ft were:</div><div><br></div><div>1) What about the problems of using prefi=
xes (CNAME, wildcards)</div><div>2) How does it relate to other discovery s=
chemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR etc.)</div>
<div>3) Should it use the same prefix registry?</div><div>4) Web services u=
se HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discovery, which governs?<br c=
lear=3D"all"><br></div><div>Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as =
ESRV allows all of these issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.</di=
v>
<div><br></div><div>The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record=
. At the end of that first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a ca=
nonical name and can use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing a=
nd/or wildcards.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta d=
iscovery information we need or tell us the range extended discovery option=
s that are supported.=A0</div><div><br></div><div>So for example, the maps =
service at <a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a> might be configur=
ed as follows:</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D=
"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">$ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com">e=
xample.com</a></font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#=
39;courier new&#39;, monospace">maps =A0 =A0 =A0 CNAME <a href=3D"http://ex=
ample.com">example.com</a></font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace"><meta charset=3D"utf-8">. =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0ESRV disc prefix</font></=
div><meta charset=3D"utf-8"><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&=
#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">_maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc srv</font></div>
<meta charset=3D"utf-8"><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;=
courier new&#39;, monospace">_maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc uri</font></div><div>=
<font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">=
_maps._ws =A0ESRV tls required</font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace"><meta charset=3D"utf-8">_maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0</font><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace; "><a href=3D"http://host1.example.com">host1.example.com</a></span></d=
iv>
<div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;courier ne=
w&#39;, monospace; "><meta charset=3D"utf-8"><span class=3D"Apple-style-spa=
n" style=3D"font-family: arial; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"=
&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">_maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0</font><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;courier new&#39;, m=
onospace; "><a href=3D"http://host2.example.com">host2.example.com</a></spa=
n></span></span></div>
<meta charset=3D"utf-8"><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;=
courier new&#39;, monospace">_maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 <a href=3D"https:/=
/host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/">https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_map=
s/</a></font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace"><meta charset=3D"utf-8">_maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 <a href=3D"https:/=
/host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/">https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_map=
s/</a></font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace">host1 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.1</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-s=
tyle-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">host2 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A0=
10.1.1.2</font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace">host2 =A0 =A0 =A0AAAA .....</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-styl=
e-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace"><br></font></div><div><fo=
nt class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace"><br=
>
</font></div><div>Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equ=
ivalent means of discovering the maps service. The application can choose t=
o use either SRV or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The resu=
lt will also be the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resol=
ve for <a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a> or <a href=3D"http://=
www.example.com">www.example.com</a>.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, t=
he client does not want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL =
in the URI method. These should be canonical just like every other right ha=
nd side in a DNS file.</div>
<div><br></div><div>It is also clear from this example that the prefix spac=
e should apply to all extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. =
It should be one space and belong to the ESRV level.</div><div><br></div>
<div><br></div><div>Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider=
 how we might tweak this at the resolver level.</div><div><br></div><div>Wi=
thout some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver is doin=
g the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more signific=
antly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy a clever new=
 discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation in the resolver.=
</div>
<div><br></div><div>If on the other hand, the client could ask something li=
ke</div><div><br></div><div>MESRV =A0_maps._<a href=3D"http://ws.example.co=
m">ws.example.com</a></div><div><br></div><div>The resolver can break the q=
uery down according to decidable rules and collect up all the information t=
hat the client requires in one big answer.</div>
<div><br></div><div>OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the r=
eal payoff, the real advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce su=
pport for extended discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could hav=
e discovery that takes geographic location into account or directs account =
based services according to the account.</div>
<div><br></div><div>This is only possible if the resolver is not required t=
o keep track of which protocol uses which discovery mechanism.=A0</div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><div>This approach also plays nice with administr=
ation considerations. If I have a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web=
 services, I can authorize individual Web services to update their specific=
 domain name and no other.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver=
 detail at progressive levels of=A0granularity=A0- domain - service - servi=
ce-host.</div><div><br></div><div>This need not cause excessive numbers of =
queries however since all the records at the service and service-host level=
 can be presumed to be relevant. So the client can ask for all the records =
at the node rather than specific RR types.</div>
<div><br></div><div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">htt=
p://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e6509d0416deab0494b876bd--

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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 15:11:22 -0500
Message-ID: <AANLkTi=Hp8WJnH9+Tj=fF+wmRU=MeaE9V8WUewLBg=GM@mail.gmail.com>
From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: [dnsext] Enhanced Discovery and Optimization
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Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI
proposal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminating the
need for dual A/AAAA lookups.

I suggest that these two issues are actually linked and that it is
counterproductive to try to unlink them. Most engineering tasks are best
approached by reduction and modular approaches. Security and optimization
are the exceptions. If you want efficiency you have to consider the whole
system.


I think that what we need to do is to get the discovery system understood
first and then look at how to optimize. In particular we need to consider
what the API presented to the applications is going to look like.

The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyname and then plug the
IP address returned into the open () call.

A much better approach in my view is to start by looking at an object
oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would use in that
context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data needed to
service that query to a DNS 'super-request'.

At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in which I have an
'InternetClient' object that exposes the following options for starting a
connection:

Open (string domain, integer port)
Open (string domain, string service)
Open (string domain, string service, integer port)
Retry ()

So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:

Open ("example.com", "_http._tcp", 80)

If (and it is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between the
client and the resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell the
resolver what the parameters it was presented with were and then have the
resolver perform however many queries were required to perform discovery.

Some important design constraints that flow from this approach are:

1) The discovery process must be standard across all protocols.
2) The discovery process cannot involve processing of regular expressions or
other matching rules.


Amongst the issues raised on the URI draft were:

1) What about the problems of using prefixes (CNAME, wildcards)
2) How does it relate to other discovery schemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR etc.)
3) Should it use the same prefix registry?
4) Web services use HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discovery,
which governs?

Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as ESRV allows all of these
issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.

The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record. At the end of that
first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a canonical name and can
use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing and/or wildcards.

The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta discovery information
we need or tell us the range extended discovery options that are supported.

So for example, the maps service at example.com might be configured as
follows:


$ORIGIN example.com
maps       CNAME example.com
.          ESRV disc prefix
_maps._ws  ESRV disc srv
_maps._ws  ESRV disc uri
_maps._ws  ESRV tls required
_maps._ws  SRV  1 1 443 host1.example.com
_maps._ws  SRV  1 1 443 host2.example.com
_maps._ws  URI  1 1 443 https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
_maps._ws  URI  1 1 443 https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
host1      A  10.1.1.1
host2      A  10.1.1.2
host2      AAAA .....


Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equivalent means of
discovering the maps service. The application can choose to use either SRV
or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The result will also be
the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resolve for
example.com or www.example.com.

I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, the client does not
want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL in the URI method.
These should be canonical just like every other right hand side in a DNS
file.

It is also clear from this example that the prefix space should apply to all
extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. It should be one space
and belong to the ESRV level.


Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider how we might tweak
this at the resolver level.

Without some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver is
doing the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more
significantly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy a
clever new discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation in the
resolver.

If on the other hand, the client could ask something like

MESRV  _maps._ws.example.com

The resolver can break the query down according to decidable rules and
collect up all the information that the client requires in one big answer.

OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the real payoff, the real
advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce support for extended
discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could have discovery that
takes geographic location into account or directs account based services
according to the account.

This is only possible if the resolver is not required to keep track of which
protocol uses which discovery mechanism.


This approach also plays nice with administration considerations. If I have
a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web services, I can authorize
individual Web services to update their specific domain name and no other.

The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver detail at
progressive levels of granularity - domain - service - service-host.

This need not cause excessive numbers of queries however since all the
records at the service and service-host level can be presumed to be
relevant. So the client can ask for all the records at the node rather than
specific RR types.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e6509d0416deab0494b876bd
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI propo=
sal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminating the need=
 for dual A/AAAA lookups.<div><br></div><div>I suggest that these two issue=
s are actually linked and that it is counterproductive to try to unlink the=
m. Most engineering tasks are best approached by reduction and modular appr=
oaches. Security and optimization are the exceptions. If you want efficienc=
y you have to consider the whole system.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I think that what we need to do is to ge=
t the discovery system understood first and then look at how to optimize. I=
n particular we need to consider what the API presented to the applications=
 is going to look like.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyn=
ame and then plug the IP address returned into the open () call.=A0</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>A much better approach in my view is to start by looking =
at an object oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would =
use in that context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data =
needed to service that query to a DNS &#39;super-request&#39;.</div>
<div><br></div><div>At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in whic=
h I have an &#39;InternetClient&#39; object that exposes the following opti=
ons for starting a connection:</div><div><br></div><div>Open (string domain=
, integer port)</div>
<div>Open (string domain, string service)</div><div><meta charset=3D"utf-8"=
>Open (string domain, string service, integer port)</div><div>Retry ()</div=
><div><br></div><div>So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:<=
/div>
<div><br></div><div>Open (&quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com<=
/a>&quot;, &quot;_http._tcp&quot;, 80)</div><div><br></div><div>If (and it =
is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between the client and t=
he resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell the resolver what =
the parameters it was presented with were and then have the resolver perfor=
m however many queries were required to perform discovery.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Some important design constraints that flow from this a=
pproach are:</div><div><br></div><div>1) The discovery process must be stan=
dard across all protocols.</div><div>2) The discovery process cannot involv=
e processing of regular expressions or other matching rules.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Amongst the issues raised on the URI dra=
ft were:</div><div><br></div><div>1) What about the problems of using prefi=
xes (CNAME, wildcards)</div><div>2) How does it relate to other discovery s=
chemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR etc.)</div>
<div>3) Should it use the same prefix registry?</div><div>4) Web services u=
se HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discovery, which governs?<br c=
lear=3D"all"><br></div><div>Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as =
ESRV allows all of these issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.</di=
v>
<div><br></div><div>The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record=
. At the end of that first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a ca=
nonical name and can use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing a=
nd/or wildcards.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta d=
iscovery information we need or tell us the range extended discovery option=
s that are supported.=A0</div><div><br></div><div>So for example, the maps =
service at <a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a> might be configur=
ed as follows:</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D=
"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">$ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com">e=
xample.com</a></font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#=
39;courier new&#39;, monospace">maps =A0 =A0 =A0 CNAME <a href=3D"http://ex=
ample.com">example.com</a></font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace"><meta charset=3D"utf-8">. =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0ESRV disc prefix</font></=
div><meta charset=3D"utf-8"><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&=
#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">_maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc srv</font></div>
<meta charset=3D"utf-8"><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;=
courier new&#39;, monospace">_maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc uri</font></div><div>=
<font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">=
_maps._ws =A0ESRV tls required</font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace"><meta charset=3D"utf-8">_maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0</font><span cla=
ss=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace; "><a href=3D"http://host1.example.com">host1.example.com</a></span></d=
iv>
<div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;courier ne=
w&#39;, monospace; "><meta charset=3D"utf-8"><span class=3D"Apple-style-spa=
n" style=3D"font-family: arial; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"=
&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">_maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0</font><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;courier new&#39;, m=
onospace; "><a href=3D"http://host2.example.com">host2.example.com</a></spa=
n></span></span></div>
<meta charset=3D"utf-8"><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;=
courier new&#39;, monospace">_maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 <a href=3D"https:/=
/host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/">https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_map=
s/</a></font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace"><meta charset=3D"utf-8">_maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 <a href=3D"https:/=
/host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/">https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_map=
s/</a></font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace">host1 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.1</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-s=
tyle-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">host2 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A0=
10.1.1.2</font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace">host2 =A0 =A0 =A0AAAA .....</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-styl=
e-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace"><br></font></div><div><fo=
nt class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace"><br=
>
</font></div><div>Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equ=
ivalent means of discovering the maps service. The application can choose t=
o use either SRV or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The resu=
lt will also be the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resol=
ve for <a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a> or <a href=3D"http://=
www.example.com">www.example.com</a>.</div>
<div><br></div><div>I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, t=
he client does not want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL =
in the URI method. These should be canonical just like every other right ha=
nd side in a DNS file.</div>
<div><br></div><div>It is also clear from this example that the prefix spac=
e should apply to all extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. =
It should be one space and belong to the ESRV level.</div><div><br></div>
<div><br></div><div>Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider=
 how we might tweak this at the resolver level.</div><div><br></div><div>Wi=
thout some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver is doin=
g the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more signific=
antly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy a clever new=
 discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation in the resolver.=
</div>
<div><br></div><div>If on the other hand, the client could ask something li=
ke</div><div><br></div><div>MESRV =A0_maps._<a href=3D"http://ws.example.co=
m">ws.example.com</a></div><div><br></div><div>The resolver can break the q=
uery down according to decidable rules and collect up all the information t=
hat the client requires in one big answer.</div>
<div><br></div><div>OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the r=
eal payoff, the real advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce su=
pport for extended discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could hav=
e discovery that takes geographic location into account or directs account =
based services according to the account.</div>
<div><br></div><div>This is only possible if the resolver is not required t=
o keep track of which protocol uses which discovery mechanism.=A0</div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><div>This approach also plays nice with administr=
ation considerations. If I have a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web=
 services, I can authorize individual Web services to update their specific=
 domain name and no other.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver=
 detail at progressive levels of=A0granularity=A0- domain - service - servi=
ce-host.</div><div><br></div><div>This need not cause excessive numbers of =
queries however since all the records at the service and service-host level=
 can be presumed to be relevant. So the client can ask for all the records =
at the node rather than specific RR types.</div>
<div><br></div><div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">htt=
p://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e6509d0416deab0494b876bd--

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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 16:30:40 -0400
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From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Enhanced Discovery and Optimization
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Hi, Phillip,

While I understand what you're saying, I think there may be two levels
of API needed or at least recommended. This would permit both the
linage you suggest, as well as permit other uses of the "vehicle".

The APIs would be:
(1) A new low-level API which does, in a more generic fashion, what
the 2-lookup suggested;
(2) A set of new higher-level APIs that call the low-level new API
with appropriate values.

Having queries that retrieve multiple values, helps avoid the issue of
iterative lookups for things that "should" be together.
E.g., if DNSSEC queries don't return all the expected values,
re-querying explicitly for the expected RRtypes, as a single query,
would certainly be more reliable, as well as more efficient.

The scope of the low-level API would be common owner, common class,
set of RRtypes.

If there is agreement on this in the WG, I would be happy to write up
the low-level API.

Input on the "how", e.g. pseudo RR vs EDNS0 option (bit vector?) are welcom=
e.

Brian

On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 4:11 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wr=
ote:
> Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI
> proposal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminating t=
he
> need for dual A/AAAA lookups.
> I suggest that these two issues are actually linked and that it is
> counterproductive to try to unlink them. Most engineering tasks are best
> approached by reduction and modular approaches. Security and optimization
> are the exceptions. If you want efficiency you have to consider the whole
> system.
>
> I think that what we need to do is to get the discovery system understood
> first and then look at how to optimize. In particular we need to consider
> what the API presented to the applications is going to look like.
> The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyname and then plug =
the
> IP address returned into the open () call.
> A much better approach in my view is to start by looking at an object
> oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would use in that
> context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data needed to
> service that query to a DNS 'super-request'.
> At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in which I have an
> 'InternetClient' object that exposes the following options for starting a
> connection:
> Open (string domain, integer port)
> Open (string domain, string service)
> Open (string domain, string service, integer port)
> Retry ()
> So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:
> Open ("example.com", "_http._tcp", 80)
> If (and it is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between the
> client and the resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell the
> resolver what the parameters it was presented with were and then have the
> resolver perform however many queries were required to perform discovery.
> Some important design constraints that flow from this approach are:
> 1) The discovery process must be standard across all protocols.
> 2) The discovery process cannot involve processing of regular expressions=
 or
> other matching rules.
>
> Amongst the issues raised on the URI draft were:
> 1) What about the problems of using prefixes (CNAME, wildcards)
> 2) How does it relate to other discovery schemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR etc.)
> 3) Should it use the same prefix registry?
> 4) Web services use HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discovery,
> which governs?
>
> Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as ESRV allows all of these
> issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.
> The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record. At the end of th=
at
> first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a canonical name and can
> use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing and/or wildcards.
> The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta discovery informati=
on
> we need or tell us the range extended discovery options that are supporte=
d.
> So for example, the maps service at example.com might be configured as
> follows:
>
> $ORIGIN example.com
> maps =A0 =A0 =A0 CNAME example.com
> . =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0ESRV disc prefix
> _maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc srv
> _maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc uri
> _maps._ws =A0ESRV tls required
> _maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0host1.example.com
> _maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0host2.example.com
> _maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
> _maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
> host1 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.1
> host2 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.2
> host2 =A0 =A0 =A0AAAA .....
>
> Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equivalent means of
> discovering the maps service. The application can choose to use either SRV
> or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The result will also be
> the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resolve for
> example.com or www.example.com.
> I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, the client does not
> want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL in the URI method.
> These should be canonical just like every other right hand side in a DNS
> file.
> It is also clear from this example that the prefix space should apply to =
all
> extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. It should be one spa=
ce
> and belong to the ESRV level.
>
> Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider how we might tweak
> this at the resolver level.
> Without some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver is
> doing the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more
> significantly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy a
> clever new discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation in t=
he
> resolver.
> If on the other hand, the client could ask something like
> MESRV =A0_maps._ws.example.com
> The resolver can break the query down according to decidable rules and
> collect up all the information that the client requires in one big answer.
> OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the real payoff, the re=
al
> advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce support for extended
> discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could have discovery that
> takes geographic location into account or directs account based services
> according to the account.
> This is only possible if the resolver is not required to keep track of wh=
ich
> protocol uses which discovery mechanism.
>
> This approach also plays nice with administration considerations. If I ha=
ve
> a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web services, I can authorize
> individual Web services to update their specific domain name and no other.
> The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver detail at
> progressive levels of=A0granularity=A0- domain - service - service-host.
> This need not cause excessive numbers of queries however since all the
> records at the service and service-host level can be presumed to be
> relevant. So the client can ask for all the records at the node rather th=
an
> specific RR types.
> --
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>
_______________________________________________
dnsext mailing list
dnsext@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

From brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com  Wed Nov 10 12:30:16 2010
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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 16:30:40 -0400
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From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Enhanced Discovery and Optimization
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Hi, Phillip,

While I understand what you're saying, I think there may be two levels
of API needed or at least recommended. This would permit both the
linage you suggest, as well as permit other uses of the "vehicle".

The APIs would be:
(1) A new low-level API which does, in a more generic fashion, what
the 2-lookup suggested;
(2) A set of new higher-level APIs that call the low-level new API
with appropriate values.

Having queries that retrieve multiple values, helps avoid the issue of
iterative lookups for things that "should" be together.
E.g., if DNSSEC queries don't return all the expected values,
re-querying explicitly for the expected RRtypes, as a single query,
would certainly be more reliable, as well as more efficient.

The scope of the low-level API would be common owner, common class,
set of RRtypes.

If there is agreement on this in the WG, I would be happy to write up
the low-level API.

Input on the "how", e.g. pseudo RR vs EDNS0 option (bit vector?) are welcom=
e.

Brian

On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 4:11 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wr=
ote:
> Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI
> proposal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminating t=
he
> need for dual A/AAAA lookups.
> I suggest that these two issues are actually linked and that it is
> counterproductive to try to unlink them. Most engineering tasks are best
> approached by reduction and modular approaches. Security and optimization
> are the exceptions. If you want efficiency you have to consider the whole
> system.
>
> I think that what we need to do is to get the discovery system understood
> first and then look at how to optimize. In particular we need to consider
> what the API presented to the applications is going to look like.
> The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyname and then plug =
the
> IP address returned into the open () call.
> A much better approach in my view is to start by looking at an object
> oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would use in that
> context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data needed to
> service that query to a DNS 'super-request'.
> At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in which I have an
> 'InternetClient' object that exposes the following options for starting a
> connection:
> Open (string domain, integer port)
> Open (string domain, string service)
> Open (string domain, string service, integer port)
> Retry ()
> So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:
> Open ("example.com", "_http._tcp", 80)
> If (and it is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between the
> client and the resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell the
> resolver what the parameters it was presented with were and then have the
> resolver perform however many queries were required to perform discovery.
> Some important design constraints that flow from this approach are:
> 1) The discovery process must be standard across all protocols.
> 2) The discovery process cannot involve processing of regular expressions=
 or
> other matching rules.
>
> Amongst the issues raised on the URI draft were:
> 1) What about the problems of using prefixes (CNAME, wildcards)
> 2) How does it relate to other discovery schemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR etc.=
)
> 3) Should it use the same prefix registry?
> 4) Web services use HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discovery,
> which governs?
>
> Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as ESRV allows all of these
> issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.
> The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record. At the end of th=
at
> first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a canonical name and ca=
n
> use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing and/or wildcards.
> The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta discovery informati=
on
> we need or tell us the range extended discovery options that are supporte=
d.
> So for example, the maps service at example.com might be configured as
> follows:
>
> $ORIGIN example.com
> maps =A0 =A0 =A0 CNAME example.com
> . =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0ESRV disc prefix
> _maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc srv
> _maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc uri
> _maps._ws =A0ESRV tls required
> _maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0host1.example.com
> _maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0host2.example.com
> _maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
> _maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
> host1 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.1
> host2 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.2
> host2 =A0 =A0 =A0AAAA .....
>
> Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equivalent means of
> discovering the maps service. The application can choose to use either SR=
V
> or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The result will also be
> the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resolve for
> example.com or www.example.com.
> I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, the client does not
> want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL in the URI method=
.
> These should be canonical just like every other right hand side in a DNS
> file.
> It is also clear from this example that the prefix space should apply to =
all
> extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. It should be one spa=
ce
> and belong to the ESRV level.
>
> Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider how we might twea=
k
> this at the resolver level.
> Without some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver is
> doing the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more
> significantly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy a
> clever new discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation in t=
he
> resolver.
> If on the other hand, the client could ask something like
> MESRV =A0_maps._ws.example.com
> The resolver can break the query down according to decidable rules and
> collect up all the information that the client requires in one big answer=
.
> OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the real payoff, the re=
al
> advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce support for extended
> discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could have discovery that
> takes geographic location into account or directs account based services
> according to the account.
> This is only possible if the resolver is not required to keep track of wh=
ich
> protocol uses which discovery mechanism.
>
> This approach also plays nice with administration considerations. If I ha=
ve
> a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web services, I can authorize
> individual Web services to update their specific domain name and no other=
.
> The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver detail at
> progressive levels of=A0granularity=A0- domain - service - service-host.
> This need not cause excessive numbers of queries however since all the
> records at the service and service-host level can be presumed to be
> relevant. So the client can ask for all the records at the node rather th=
an
> specific RR types.
> --
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>

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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 16:41:51 -0500
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Enhanced Discovery and Optimization
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The offer is much appreciated.

I think that first I need to get a new draft out for the new approach to
ESRV that rolls in the many comments I have received.

I agree that we are going to require a low level API - we are going to need
that to implement the abstract version if nothing else.

At this point I just wanted to point out that the two issues were linked and
we need to look to get the application discovery mechanism right before we
look at optimization.


On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 3:30 PM, Brian Dickson <
brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi, Phillip,
>
> While I understand what you're saying, I think there may be two levels
> of API needed or at least recommended. This would permit both the
> linage you suggest, as well as permit other uses of the "vehicle".
>
> The APIs would be:
> (1) A new low-level API which does, in a more generic fashion, what
> the 2-lookup suggested;
> (2) A set of new higher-level APIs that call the low-level new API
> with appropriate values.
>
> Having queries that retrieve multiple values, helps avoid the issue of
> iterative lookups for things that "should" be together.
> E.g., if DNSSEC queries don't return all the expected values,
> re-querying explicitly for the expected RRtypes, as a single query,
> would certainly be more reliable, as well as more efficient.
>
> The scope of the low-level API would be common owner, common class,
> set of RRtypes.
>
> If there is agreement on this in the WG, I would be happy to write up
> the low-level API.
>
> Input on the "how", e.g. pseudo RR vs EDNS0 option (bit vector?) are
> welcome.
>
> Brian
>
> On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 4:11 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI
> > proposal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminating
> the
> > need for dual A/AAAA lookups.
> > I suggest that these two issues are actually linked and that it is
> > counterproductive to try to unlink them. Most engineering tasks are best
> > approached by reduction and modular approaches. Security and optimization
> > are the exceptions. If you want efficiency you have to consider the whole
> > system.
> >
> > I think that what we need to do is to get the discovery system understood
> > first and then look at how to optimize. In particular we need to consider
> > what the API presented to the applications is going to look like.
> > The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyname and then plug
> the
> > IP address returned into the open () call.
> > A much better approach in my view is to start by looking at an object
> > oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would use in that
> > context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data needed to
> > service that query to a DNS 'super-request'.
> > At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in which I have an
> > 'InternetClient' object that exposes the following options for starting a
> > connection:
> > Open (string domain, integer port)
> > Open (string domain, string service)
> > Open (string domain, string service, integer port)
> > Retry ()
> > So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:
> > Open ("example.com", "_http._tcp", 80)
> > If (and it is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between the
> > client and the resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell the
> > resolver what the parameters it was presented with were and then have the
> > resolver perform however many queries were required to perform discovery.
> > Some important design constraints that flow from this approach are:
> > 1) The discovery process must be standard across all protocols.
> > 2) The discovery process cannot involve processing of regular expressions
> or
> > other matching rules.
> >
> > Amongst the issues raised on the URI draft were:
> > 1) What about the problems of using prefixes (CNAME, wildcards)
> > 2) How does it relate to other discovery schemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR
> etc.)
> > 3) Should it use the same prefix registry?
> > 4) Web services use HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discovery,
> > which governs?
> >
> > Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as ESRV allows all of these
> > issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.
> > The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record. At the end of
> that
> > first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a canonical name and
> can
> > use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing and/or wildcards.
> > The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta discovery
> information
> > we need or tell us the range extended discovery options that are
> supported.
> > So for example, the maps service at example.com might be configured as
> > follows:
> >
> > $ORIGIN example.com
> > maps       CNAME example.com
> > .          ESRV disc prefix
> > _maps._ws  ESRV disc srv
> > _maps._ws  ESRV disc uri
> > _maps._ws  ESRV tls required
> > _maps._ws  SRV  1 1 443 host1.example.com
> > _maps._ws  SRV  1 1 443 host2.example.com
> > _maps._ws  URI  1 1 443 https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
> > _maps._ws  URI  1 1 443 https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
> > host1      A  10.1.1.1
> > host2      A  10.1.1.2
> > host2      AAAA .....
> >
> > Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equivalent means of
> > discovering the maps service. The application can choose to use either
> SRV
> > or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The result will also be
> > the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resolve for
> > example.com or www.example.com.
> > I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, the client does not
> > want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL in the URI
> method.
> > These should be canonical just like every other right hand side in a DNS
> > file.
> > It is also clear from this example that the prefix space should apply to
> all
> > extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. It should be one
> space
> > and belong to the ESRV level.
> >
> > Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider how we might
> tweak
> > this at the resolver level.
> > Without some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver is
> > doing the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more
> > significantly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy a
> > clever new discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation in
> the
> > resolver.
> > If on the other hand, the client could ask something like
> > MESRV  _maps._ws.example.com
> > The resolver can break the query down according to decidable rules and
> > collect up all the information that the client requires in one big
> answer.
> > OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the real payoff, the
> real
> > advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce support for extended
> > discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could have discovery that
> > takes geographic location into account or directs account based services
> > according to the account.
> > This is only possible if the resolver is not required to keep track of
> which
> > protocol uses which discovery mechanism.
> >
> > This approach also plays nice with administration considerations. If I
> have
> > a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web services, I can authorize
> > individual Web services to update their specific domain name and no
> other.
> > The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver detail at
> > progressive levels of granularity - domain - service - service-host.
> > This need not cause excessive numbers of queries however since all the
> > records at the service and service-host level can be presumed to be
> > relevant. So the client can ask for all the records at the node rather
> than
> > specific RR types.
> > --
> > Website: http://hallambaker.com/
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > dnsext mailing list
> > dnsext@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
> >
> >
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e68de9b7a843090494b9b910
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The offer is much appreciated.=A0<div><br></div><div>I think that first I n=
eed to get a new draft out for the new approach to ESRV that rolls in the m=
any comments I have received.</div><div><br></div><div>I agree that we are =
going to require a low level API - we are going to need that to implement t=
he abstract version if nothing else.</div>
<div><br></div><div>At this point I just wanted to point out that the two i=
ssues were linked and we need to look to get the application discovery mech=
anism right before we look at optimization.</div><div><br><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">
On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 3:30 PM, Brian Dickson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com">brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com</a=
>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Hi, Phillip,<br>
<br>
While I understand what you&#39;re saying, I think there may be two levels<=
br>
of API needed or at least recommended. This would permit both the<br>
linage you suggest, as well as permit other uses of the &quot;vehicle&quot;=
.<br>
<br>
The APIs would be:<br>
(1) A new low-level API which does, in a more generic fashion, what<br>
the 2-lookup suggested;<br>
(2) A set of new higher-level APIs that call the low-level new API<br>
with appropriate values.<br>
<br>
Having queries that retrieve multiple values, helps avoid the issue of<br>
iterative lookups for things that &quot;should&quot; be together.<br>
E.g., if DNSSEC queries don&#39;t return all the expected values,<br>
re-querying explicitly for the expected RRtypes, as a single query,<br>
would certainly be more reliable, as well as more efficient.<br>
<br>
The scope of the low-level API would be common owner, common class,<br>
set of RRtypes.<br>
<br>
If there is agreement on this in the WG, I would be happy to write up<br>
the low-level API.<br>
<br>
Input on the &quot;how&quot;, e.g. pseudo RR vs EDNS0 option (bit vector?) =
are welcome.<br>
<br>
Brian<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 4:11 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI<=
br>
&gt; proposal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminatin=
g the<br>
&gt; need for dual A/AAAA lookups.<br>
&gt; I suggest that these two issues are actually linked and that it is<br>
&gt; counterproductive to try to unlink them. Most engineering tasks are be=
st<br>
&gt; approached by reduction and modular approaches. Security and optimizat=
ion<br>
&gt; are the exceptions. If you want efficiency you have to consider the wh=
ole<br>
&gt; system.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I think that what we need to do is to get the discovery system underst=
ood<br>
&gt; first and then look at how to optimize. In particular we need to consi=
der<br>
&gt; what the API presented to the applications is going to look like.<br>
&gt; The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyname and then pl=
ug the<br>
&gt; IP address returned into the open () call.<br>
&gt; A much better approach in my view is to start by looking at an object<=
br>
&gt; oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would use in t=
hat<br>
&gt; context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data needed =
to<br>
&gt; service that query to a DNS &#39;super-request&#39;.<br>
&gt; At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in which I have an<br>
&gt; &#39;InternetClient&#39; object that exposes the following options for=
 starting a<br>
&gt; connection:<br>
&gt; Open (string domain, integer port)<br>
&gt; Open (string domain, string service)<br>
&gt; Open (string domain, string service, integer port)<br>
&gt; Retry ()<br>
&gt; So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:<br>
&gt; Open (&quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.c=
om</a>&quot;, &quot;_http._tcp&quot;, 80)<br>
&gt; If (and it is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between =
the<br>
&gt; client and the resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell t=
he<br>
&gt; resolver what the parameters it was presented with were and then have =
the<br>
&gt; resolver perform however many queries were required to perform discove=
ry.<br>
&gt; Some important design constraints that flow from this approach are:<br=
>
&gt; 1) The discovery process must be standard across all protocols.<br>
&gt; 2) The discovery process cannot involve processing of regular expressi=
ons or<br>
&gt; other matching rules.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Amongst the issues raised on the URI draft were:<br>
&gt; 1) What about the problems of using prefixes (CNAME, wildcards)<br>
&gt; 2) How does it relate to other discovery schemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR e=
tc.)<br>
&gt; 3) Should it use the same prefix registry?<br>
&gt; 4) Web services use HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discover=
y,<br>
&gt; which governs?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as ESRV allows all of thes=
e<br>
&gt; issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.<br>
&gt; The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record. At the end of=
 that<br>
&gt; first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a canonical name and=
 can<br>
&gt; use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing and/or wildcards.=
<br>
&gt; The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta discovery inform=
ation<br>
&gt; we need or tell us the range extended discovery options that are suppo=
rted.<br>
&gt; So for example, the maps service at <a href=3D"http://example.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">example.com</a> might be configured as<br>
&gt; follows:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; $ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</=
a><br>
&gt; maps =A0 =A0 =A0 CNAME <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank=
">example.com</a><br>
&gt; . =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0ESRV disc prefix<br>
&gt; _maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc srv<br>
&gt; _maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc uri<br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0ESRV tls required<br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0<a href=3D"http://host1.example.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">host1.example.com</a><br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0<a href=3D"http://host2.example.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">host2.example.com</a><br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 <a href=3D"https://host1.example.com/_wks/=
_ws/_maps/" target=3D"_blank">https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/</a>=
<br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 <a href=3D"https://host2.example.com/_wks/=
_ws/_maps/" target=3D"_blank">https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/</a>=
<br>
&gt; host1 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.1<br>
&gt; host2 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.2<br>
&gt; host2 =A0 =A0 =A0AAAA .....<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equivalent means=
 of<br>
&gt; discovering the maps service. The application can choose to use either=
 SRV<br>
&gt; or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The result will also=
 be<br>
&gt; the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resolve for<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a> or <a=
 href=3D"http://www.example.com" target=3D"_blank">www.example.com</a>.<br>
&gt; I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, the client does =
not<br>
&gt; want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL in the URI met=
hod.<br>
&gt; These should be canonical just like every other right hand side in a D=
NS<br>
&gt; file.<br>
&gt; It is also clear from this example that the prefix space should apply =
to all<br>
&gt; extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. It should be one =
space<br>
&gt; and belong to the ESRV level.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider how we might t=
weak<br>
&gt; this at the resolver level.<br>
&gt; Without some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver =
is<br>
&gt; doing the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more=
<br>
&gt; significantly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy=
 a<br>
&gt; clever new discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation i=
n the<br>
&gt; resolver.<br>
&gt; If on the other hand, the client could ask something like<br>
&gt; MESRV =A0_maps._<a href=3D"http://ws.example.com" target=3D"_blank">ws=
.example.com</a><br>
&gt; The resolver can break the query down according to decidable rules and=
<br>
&gt; collect up all the information that the client requires in one big ans=
wer.<br>
&gt; OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the real payoff, the=
 real<br>
&gt; advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce support for extend=
ed<br>
&gt; discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could have discovery th=
at<br>
&gt; takes geographic location into account or directs account based servic=
es<br>
&gt; according to the account.<br>
&gt; This is only possible if the resolver is not required to keep track of=
 which<br>
&gt; protocol uses which discovery mechanism.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This approach also plays nice with administration considerations. If I=
 have<br>
&gt; a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web services, I can authorize<=
br>
&gt; individual Web services to update their specific domain name and no ot=
her.<br>
&gt; The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver detail at<br>
&gt; progressive levels of=A0granularity=A0- domain - service - service-hos=
t.<br>
&gt; This need not cause excessive numbers of queries however since all the=
<br>
&gt; records at the service and service-host level can be presumed to be<br=
>
&gt; relevant. So the client can ask for all the records at the node rather=
 than<br>
&gt; specific RR types.<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/" target=3D"_blank">http://=
hallambaker.com/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; dnsext mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"htt=
p://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

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Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2010 16:41:51 -0500
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Enhanced Discovery and Optimization
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The offer is much appreciated.

I think that first I need to get a new draft out for the new approach to
ESRV that rolls in the many comments I have received.

I agree that we are going to require a low level API - we are going to need
that to implement the abstract version if nothing else.

At this point I just wanted to point out that the two issues were linked and
we need to look to get the application discovery mechanism right before we
look at optimization.


On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 3:30 PM, Brian Dickson <
brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi, Phillip,
>
> While I understand what you're saying, I think there may be two levels
> of API needed or at least recommended. This would permit both the
> linage you suggest, as well as permit other uses of the "vehicle".
>
> The APIs would be:
> (1) A new low-level API which does, in a more generic fashion, what
> the 2-lookup suggested;
> (2) A set of new higher-level APIs that call the low-level new API
> with appropriate values.
>
> Having queries that retrieve multiple values, helps avoid the issue of
> iterative lookups for things that "should" be together.
> E.g., if DNSSEC queries don't return all the expected values,
> re-querying explicitly for the expected RRtypes, as a single query,
> would certainly be more reliable, as well as more efficient.
>
> The scope of the low-level API would be common owner, common class,
> set of RRtypes.
>
> If there is agreement on this in the WG, I would be happy to write up
> the low-level API.
>
> Input on the "how", e.g. pseudo RR vs EDNS0 option (bit vector?) are
> welcome.
>
> Brian
>
> On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 4:11 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI
> > proposal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminating
> the
> > need for dual A/AAAA lookups.
> > I suggest that these two issues are actually linked and that it is
> > counterproductive to try to unlink them. Most engineering tasks are best
> > approached by reduction and modular approaches. Security and optimization
> > are the exceptions. If you want efficiency you have to consider the whole
> > system.
> >
> > I think that what we need to do is to get the discovery system understood
> > first and then look at how to optimize. In particular we need to consider
> > what the API presented to the applications is going to look like.
> > The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyname and then plug
> the
> > IP address returned into the open () call.
> > A much better approach in my view is to start by looking at an object
> > oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would use in that
> > context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data needed to
> > service that query to a DNS 'super-request'.
> > At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in which I have an
> > 'InternetClient' object that exposes the following options for starting a
> > connection:
> > Open (string domain, integer port)
> > Open (string domain, string service)
> > Open (string domain, string service, integer port)
> > Retry ()
> > So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:
> > Open ("example.com", "_http._tcp", 80)
> > If (and it is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between the
> > client and the resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell the
> > resolver what the parameters it was presented with were and then have the
> > resolver perform however many queries were required to perform discovery.
> > Some important design constraints that flow from this approach are:
> > 1) The discovery process must be standard across all protocols.
> > 2) The discovery process cannot involve processing of regular expressions
> or
> > other matching rules.
> >
> > Amongst the issues raised on the URI draft were:
> > 1) What about the problems of using prefixes (CNAME, wildcards)
> > 2) How does it relate to other discovery schemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR
> etc.)
> > 3) Should it use the same prefix registry?
> > 4) Web services use HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discovery,
> > which governs?
> >
> > Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as ESRV allows all of these
> > issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.
> > The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record. At the end of
> that
> > first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a canonical name and
> can
> > use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing and/or wildcards.
> > The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta discovery
> information
> > we need or tell us the range extended discovery options that are
> supported.
> > So for example, the maps service at example.com might be configured as
> > follows:
> >
> > $ORIGIN example.com
> > maps       CNAME example.com
> > .          ESRV disc prefix
> > _maps._ws  ESRV disc srv
> > _maps._ws  ESRV disc uri
> > _maps._ws  ESRV tls required
> > _maps._ws  SRV  1 1 443 host1.example.com
> > _maps._ws  SRV  1 1 443 host2.example.com
> > _maps._ws  URI  1 1 443 https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
> > _maps._ws  URI  1 1 443 https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/
> > host1      A  10.1.1.1
> > host2      A  10.1.1.2
> > host2      AAAA .....
> >
> > Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equivalent means of
> > discovering the maps service. The application can choose to use either
> SRV
> > or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The result will also be
> > the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resolve for
> > example.com or www.example.com.
> > I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, the client does not
> > want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL in the URI
> method.
> > These should be canonical just like every other right hand side in a DNS
> > file.
> > It is also clear from this example that the prefix space should apply to
> all
> > extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. It should be one
> space
> > and belong to the ESRV level.
> >
> > Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider how we might
> tweak
> > this at the resolver level.
> > Without some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver is
> > doing the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more
> > significantly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy a
> > clever new discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation in
> the
> > resolver.
> > If on the other hand, the client could ask something like
> > MESRV  _maps._ws.example.com
> > The resolver can break the query down according to decidable rules and
> > collect up all the information that the client requires in one big
> answer.
> > OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the real payoff, the
> real
> > advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce support for extended
> > discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could have discovery that
> > takes geographic location into account or directs account based services
> > according to the account.
> > This is only possible if the resolver is not required to keep track of
> which
> > protocol uses which discovery mechanism.
> >
> > This approach also plays nice with administration considerations. If I
> have
> > a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web services, I can authorize
> > individual Web services to update their specific domain name and no
> other.
> > The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver detail at
> > progressive levels of granularity - domain - service - service-host.
> > This need not cause excessive numbers of queries however since all the
> > records at the service and service-host level can be presumed to be
> > relevant. So the client can ask for all the records at the node rather
> than
> > specific RR types.
> > --
> > Website: http://hallambaker.com/
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > dnsext mailing list
> > dnsext@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
> >
> >
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e68de9b7a843090494b9b910
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The offer is much appreciated.=A0<div><br></div><div>I think that first I n=
eed to get a new draft out for the new approach to ESRV that rolls in the m=
any comments I have received.</div><div><br></div><div>I agree that we are =
going to require a low level API - we are going to need that to implement t=
he abstract version if nothing else.</div>
<div><br></div><div>At this point I just wanted to point out that the two i=
ssues were linked and we need to look to get the application discovery mech=
anism right before we look at optimization.</div><div><br><br><div class=3D=
"gmail_quote">
On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 3:30 PM, Brian Dickson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com">brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com</a=
>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Hi, Phillip,<br>
<br>
While I understand what you&#39;re saying, I think there may be two levels<=
br>
of API needed or at least recommended. This would permit both the<br>
linage you suggest, as well as permit other uses of the &quot;vehicle&quot;=
.<br>
<br>
The APIs would be:<br>
(1) A new low-level API which does, in a more generic fashion, what<br>
the 2-lookup suggested;<br>
(2) A set of new higher-level APIs that call the low-level new API<br>
with appropriate values.<br>
<br>
Having queries that retrieve multiple values, helps avoid the issue of<br>
iterative lookups for things that &quot;should&quot; be together.<br>
E.g., if DNSSEC queries don&#39;t return all the expected values,<br>
re-querying explicitly for the expected RRtypes, as a single query,<br>
would certainly be more reliable, as well as more efficient.<br>
<br>
The scope of the low-level API would be common owner, common class,<br>
set of RRtypes.<br>
<br>
If there is agreement on this in the WG, I would be happy to write up<br>
the low-level API.<br>
<br>
Input on the &quot;how&quot;, e.g. pseudo RR vs EDNS0 option (bit vector?) =
are welcome.<br>
<br>
Brian<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
On Wed, Nov 10, 2010 at 4:11 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt; Two of the issues that came up at the meeting last night were the URI<=
br>
&gt; proposal and the performance optimization proposal aimed at eliminatin=
g the<br>
&gt; need for dual A/AAAA lookups.<br>
&gt; I suggest that these two issues are actually linked and that it is<br>
&gt; counterproductive to try to unlink them. Most engineering tasks are be=
st<br>
&gt; approached by reduction and modular approaches. Security and optimizat=
ion<br>
&gt; are the exceptions. If you want efficiency you have to consider the wh=
ole<br>
&gt; system.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I think that what we need to do is to get the discovery system underst=
ood<br>
&gt; first and then look at how to optimize. In particular we need to consi=
der<br>
&gt; what the API presented to the applications is going to look like.<br>
&gt; The traditional sockets approach was to call gethostbyname and then pl=
ug the<br>
&gt; IP address returned into the open () call.<br>
&gt; A much better approach in my view is to start by looking at an object<=
br>
&gt; oriented language and see what the most abstract API we would use in t=
hat<br>
&gt; context would look like. Then look at ways of mapping the data needed =
to<br>
&gt; service that query to a DNS &#39;super-request&#39;.<br>
&gt; At an abstract level, I want a discovery system in which I have an<br>
&gt; &#39;InternetClient&#39; object that exposes the following options for=
 starting a<br>
&gt; connection:<br>
&gt; Open (string domain, integer port)<br>
&gt; Open (string domain, string service)<br>
&gt; Open (string domain, string service, integer port)<br>
&gt; Retry ()<br>
&gt; So to make an HTTP connection a client would present:<br>
&gt; Open (&quot;<a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.c=
om</a>&quot;, &quot;_http._tcp&quot;, 80)<br>
&gt; If (and it is a big if) we need to optimize the communication between =
the<br>
&gt; client and the resolver, I would give the client the ability to tell t=
he<br>
&gt; resolver what the parameters it was presented with were and then have =
the<br>
&gt; resolver perform however many queries were required to perform discove=
ry.<br>
&gt; Some important design constraints that flow from this approach are:<br=
>
&gt; 1) The discovery process must be standard across all protocols.<br>
&gt; 2) The discovery process cannot involve processing of regular expressi=
ons or<br>
&gt; other matching rules.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Amongst the issues raised on the URI draft were:<br>
&gt; 1) What about the problems of using prefixes (CNAME, wildcards)<br>
&gt; 2) How does it relate to other discovery schemes (SRV, NAPTR, UNAPTR e=
tc.)<br>
&gt; 3) Should it use the same prefix registry?<br>
&gt; 4) Web services use HTTP URIs which may employ SRV (or NAPTR) discover=
y,<br>
&gt; which governs?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Introducing a meta-discovery mechanism such as ESRV allows all of thes=
e<br>
&gt; issues to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.<br>
&gt; The first ESRV lookup would be for an unprefixed record. At the end of=
 that<br>
&gt; first lookup we are guaranteed to be dealing with a canonical name and=
 can<br>
&gt; use prefixes without the problems caused by aliasing and/or wildcards.=
<br>
&gt; The first ESRV lookup can either give us all the meta discovery inform=
ation<br>
&gt; we need or tell us the range extended discovery options that are suppo=
rted.<br>
&gt; So for example, the maps service at <a href=3D"http://example.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">example.com</a> might be configured as<br>
&gt; follows:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; $ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</=
a><br>
&gt; maps =A0 =A0 =A0 CNAME <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank=
">example.com</a><br>
&gt; . =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0ESRV disc prefix<br>
&gt; _maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc srv<br>
&gt; _maps._ws=A0=A0ESRV disc uri<br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0ESRV tls required<br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0<a href=3D"http://host1.example.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">host1.example.com</a><br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0SRV =A01 1 443=A0<a href=3D"http://host2.example.com" tar=
get=3D"_blank">host2.example.com</a><br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 <a href=3D"https://host1.example.com/_wks/=
_ws/_maps/" target=3D"_blank">https://host1.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/</a>=
<br>
&gt; _maps._ws =A0URI =A01 1 443 <a href=3D"https://host2.example.com/_wks/=
_ws/_maps/" target=3D"_blank">https://host2.example.com/_wks/_ws/_maps/</a>=
<br>
&gt; host1 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.1<br>
&gt; host2 =A0 =A0 =A0A =A010.1.1.2<br>
&gt; host2 =A0 =A0 =A0AAAA .....<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Here we have a configuration file that advertises two equivalent means=
 of<br>
&gt; discovering the maps service. The application can choose to use either=
 SRV<br>
&gt; or URI discovery. The results should be the same. The result will also=
 be<br>
&gt; the same regardless of whether the client attempts to resolve for<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a> or <a=
 href=3D"http://www.example.com" target=3D"_blank">www.example.com</a>.<br>
&gt; I think that it is pretty clear that in this example, the client does =
not<br>
&gt; want to be performing meta-discovery to resolve the URL in the URI met=
hod.<br>
&gt; These should be canonical just like every other right hand side in a D=
NS<br>
&gt; file.<br>
&gt; It is also clear from this example that the prefix space should apply =
to all<br>
&gt; extended discovery mechanisms, SRV, URI, NAPTR, etc. It should be one =
space<br>
&gt; and belong to the ESRV level.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Now returning to the performance issue. Let us consider how we might t=
weak<br>
&gt; this at the resolver level.<br>
&gt; Without some form of super-query, the client rather than the resolver =
is<br>
&gt; doing the discovery complexity. That has a performance impact but more=
<br>
&gt; significantly has a functionality impact. It is not possible to deploy=
 a<br>
&gt; clever new discovery scheme by tweaking the discovery implementation i=
n the<br>
&gt; resolver.<br>
&gt; If on the other hand, the client could ask something like<br>
&gt; MESRV =A0_maps._<a href=3D"http://ws.example.com" target=3D"_blank">ws=
.example.com</a><br>
&gt; The resolver can break the query down according to decidable rules and=
<br>
&gt; collect up all the information that the client requires in one big ans=
wer.<br>
&gt; OK so we get a performance boost. But that is not the real payoff, the=
 real<br>
&gt; advantage is functional, the resolver can introduce support for extend=
ed<br>
&gt; discovery beyond SRV, URI, etc. For example we could have discovery th=
at<br>
&gt; takes geographic location into account or directs account based servic=
es<br>
&gt; according to the account.<br>
&gt; This is only possible if the resolver is not required to keep track of=
 which<br>
&gt; protocol uses which discovery mechanism.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This approach also plays nice with administration considerations. If I=
 have<br>
&gt; a large infrastructure with hundreds of Web services, I can authorize<=
br>
&gt; individual Web services to update their specific domain name and no ot=
her.<br>
&gt; The enhanced discovery mechanism can be used to deliver detail at<br>
&gt; progressive levels of=A0granularity=A0- domain - service - service-hos=
t.<br>
&gt; This need not cause excessive numbers of queries however since all the=
<br>
&gt; records at the service and service-host level can be presumed to be<br=
>
&gt; relevant. So the client can ask for all the records at the node rather=
 than<br>
&gt; specific RR types.<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/" target=3D"_blank">http://=
hallambaker.com/</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div>&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; dnsext mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_bl=
ank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"htt=
p://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations
	Author(s)       : D. Eastlake 3rd
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-00.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2010-11-09

Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) parameter assignment
considerations are specified for the allocation of Domain Name System
(DNS) resource record types, CLASSes, operation codes, error codes,
DNS protocol message header bits, and AFSDB resource record subtypes.

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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations
	Author(s)       : D. Eastlake 3rd
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-00.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2010-11-09

Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) parameter assignment
considerations are specified for the allocation of Domain Name System
(DNS) resource record types, CLASSes, operation codes, error codes,
DNS protocol message header bits, and AFSDB resource record subtypes.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-00.txt

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From dnsext-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Nov 10 19:26:36 2010
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To: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <20101108113046.8BB25657AAD@drugs.dv.isc.org><4CDA7CF8.3040304@nlnetlabs.nl>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 10 Nov 2010 12:07:36 BST." <4CDA7CF8.3040304@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 14:26:44 +1100
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-20
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In message <4CDA7CF8.3040304@nlnetlabs.nl>, "W.C.A. Wijngaards" writes:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> Hi Mark,
> 
> Let's use this empty new mailing list :-)
> 
> On 11/08/2010 12:30 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> > Section 5.2 paragraph 2 (below) is just plain wrong
> > 
> >    A server MUST ignore a dynamic update message that attempts to add a
> >    non-DNAME/CNAME RR at a name that already has a DNAME RR associated
> >    with that name.  Otherwise, replace the DNAME RR with the DNAME (or
> >    CNAME) update RR.  This is similar behavior to dynamic updates to an
> >    owner name of a CNAME RR [RFC2136].
> > 
> > The only additional restriction on DNAME is that is it to be treated
> > as a singleton.  i.e. Adding a DNAME removes the exiting DNAME.
> > Apart from that it should be treated like any other record as far
> > as UPDATE is concerned.
> 
> yes, but also no CNAME+DNAME and a zone transfer might break
> interoperability with a secondary if such an update is accepted.
> 
> > You can add other records so long as the rules for the other records
> > permit them to be added.
> > 
> > The above text prevents you updating the SOA and NS records for
> > example when a DNAME is use at the apex of a zone.
> 
> That was not the intent.  Here is a new 5.2 paragraph 2:
> 
> If a dynamic update message attempts to add a DNAME but a CNAME is
> associated with that name, then the server MUST ignore the DNAME.  If a
> DNAME is associated with that name, then it is replaced with the new
> DNAME.  Otherwise, add the DNAME.  If a CNAME is added but a DNAME is
> associated with that name, then the CNAME MUST be ignored.  This is
> similar behavior to dynamic updates to an owner name of a CNAME RR
> [RFC2136].

Sounds reasonable.

> Best regards,
>    Wouter
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
> Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
> 
> iEYEARECAAYFAkzafPgACgkQkDLqNwOhpPiPdgCfbJc/KAxA8qtSM38NEoVQwjYz
> nM0AoLezRrom1Eqiua8KigwaEfS+A3Fr
> =oQHN
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org
_______________________________________________
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From marka@isc.org  Wed Nov 10 19:26:35 2010
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To: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <20101108113046.8BB25657AAD@drugs.dv.isc.org><4CDA7CF8.3040304@nlnetlabs.nl>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 10 Nov 2010 12:07:36 BST." <4CDA7CF8.3040304@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 14:26:44 +1100
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-20
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In message <4CDA7CF8.3040304@nlnetlabs.nl>, "W.C.A. Wijngaards" writes:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> Hi Mark,
> 
> Let's use this empty new mailing list :-)
> 
> On 11/08/2010 12:30 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> > Section 5.2 paragraph 2 (below) is just plain wrong
> > 
> >    A server MUST ignore a dynamic update message that attempts to add a
> >    non-DNAME/CNAME RR at a name that already has a DNAME RR associated
> >    with that name.  Otherwise, replace the DNAME RR with the DNAME (or
> >    CNAME) update RR.  This is similar behavior to dynamic updates to an
> >    owner name of a CNAME RR [RFC2136].
> > 
> > The only additional restriction on DNAME is that is it to be treated
> > as a singleton.  i.e. Adding a DNAME removes the exiting DNAME.
> > Apart from that it should be treated like any other record as far
> > as UPDATE is concerned.
> 
> yes, but also no CNAME+DNAME and a zone transfer might break
> interoperability with a secondary if such an update is accepted.
> 
> > You can add other records so long as the rules for the other records
> > permit them to be added.
> > 
> > The above text prevents you updating the SOA and NS records for
> > example when a DNAME is use at the apex of a zone.
> 
> That was not the intent.  Here is a new 5.2 paragraph 2:
> 
> If a dynamic update message attempts to add a DNAME but a CNAME is
> associated with that name, then the server MUST ignore the DNAME.  If a
> DNAME is associated with that name, then it is replaced with the new
> DNAME.  Otherwise, add the DNAME.  If a CNAME is added but a DNAME is
> associated with that name, then the CNAME MUST be ignored.  This is
> similar behavior to dynamic updates to an owner name of a CNAME RR
> [RFC2136].

Sounds reasonable.

> Best regards,
>    Wouter
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
> Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
> 
> iEYEARECAAYFAkzafPgACgkQkDLqNwOhpPiPdgCfbJc/KAxA8qtSM38NEoVQwjYz
> nM0AoLezRrom1Eqiua8KigwaEfS+A3Fr
> =oQHN
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

From owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org  Wed Nov 10 22:07:15 2010
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Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2010 00:57:28 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Subject: [dnsext] Reminder: DNSEXT has moved
Message-ID: <20101111055727.GD99001@shinkuro.com>
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Dear colleagues,

Because we had to move the list so quickly, we will be posting these
reminders frequently in the next little while.  Apologies for the noise.

This list, namedroppers@ops.ietf.org, is not longer the mailing list
for the DNS Extensions WG at the IETF.  That list is dnsext@ietf.org.

Thanks and best regards,

Andrew

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.


From Internet-Drafts@ietf.org  Wed Nov 10 23:00:29 2010
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations
	Author(s)       : D. Eastlake 3rd
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-01.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2010-11-10

Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) parameter assignment
considerations are specified for the allocation of Domain Name System
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations
	Author(s)       : D. Eastlake 3rd
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-01.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2010-11-10

Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) parameter assignment
considerations are specified for the allocation of Domain Name System
(DNS) resource record types, CLASSes, operation codes, error codes,
DNS protocol message header bits, and AFSDB resource record subtypes.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-01.txt

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From dnsext-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Nov 11 10:42:09 2010
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Hi all,

[sending separately to dnsext and to dnsop, apologies for duplicates]

http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-liman-tld-names-04.txt

is the latest iteration of an effort started quite some time ago to clarify the somewhat vague inference in RFC 1123 and create a more precise specification for the syntax of TLD labels in the DNS. The authors have not received any feedback on this document from the wider DNS community, and would welcome some.


Joe

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From jabley@hopcount.ca  Thu Nov 11 10:42:08 2010
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Hi all,

[sending separately to dnsext and to dnsop, apologies for duplicates]

http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-liman-tld-names-04.txt

is the latest iteration of an effort started quite some time ago to =
clarify the somewhat vague inference in RFC 1123 and create a more =
precise specification for the syntax of TLD labels in the DNS. The =
authors have not received any feedback on this document from the wider =
DNS community, and would welcome some.


Joe


From ogud@ogud.com  Fri Nov 12 18:10:07 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] WGLC: RFC5395bis obsoleting RFC5395
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This message starts an accelerated review of this draft, ending on 
November 21'st 2010.
For the latest version of the document see:
http://tools.ietf.org/wg/dnsext/draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis/

The document is aimed at BCP.
The only significant document change from its predecessor is the
renaming of the working group mailing list.

Due to small changes in the document the default action is to advance 
the document.
If you object to the publication of this document please state that on 
the mailing list.

Any changes to RFC5395 other than clarification of existing text
and the change in mailing list are out of scope.

	Olafur for the chairs


From george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk  Mon Nov 15 11:02:17 2010
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From ajs@shinkuro.com  Mon Nov 15 11:37:20 2010
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Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2010 14:37:49 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] CDS RRTYPE review - Comments period end Dec 6th
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Colleagues,

As the chair of the experts for expert review requests, I haven't
actually received this request yet.  So George's posting isn't quite
right.

George, is this a request from you for an RRTYPE assignment?  If so, I
can forward your completed template to the relevant list, or else you
may do so (by mailing it to dns-rrtype-applications@ietf.org).

Alternatively, you can leave it posted here for more discussion before
formally requesting assignment.

A

On Mon, Nov 15, 2010 at 06:49:25PM -0000, George Barwood wrote:
> Dear Colleagues,
> 
> Below is a completed template requesting a new RRTYPE assignment
> under the procedures of RFC5395.
> 
> This message starts a 3 weeks period for an expert-review of the DNS
> RRTYPE parameter allocation for CDS specified in
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barwood-dnsop-ds-publish-01
> 
> Please refer to dnsop list for discussion of this draft.
> 
> If you have comments on the request, please post them here before Dec 6th 2010.
> 
> Best Regards,
> George Barwood
> 
> --begin 5395 template URI--
> 
>    A.    Submission Date: 15 November 2010
> 
>    B.    Submission Type:
>          [X] New RRTYPE
>          [ ] Modification to existing RRTYPE
> 
>    C.    Contact Information for submitter:
>             Name: George Barwood
>             Email Address: george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk
>             International telephone number: +44 1452 722670
>             Other contact handles: N/A
> 
>    D.    Motivation for the new RRTYPE application?
> 
>          To allow a copy of the DS RRset [RFC4034] to be published 
>          in the child zone, which is used to update the parent DS RRset.
>          It is expected that this will allow the rollover of a key signing
>          key to be automated.
> 
>    E.    Description of the proposed RR type.
> 
>          The format is identical to the DS record.
>          However there is no special processing for servers/resolvers.        
> 
>    F.    What existing RRTYPE or RRTYPEs come closest to filling that
>          need and why are they unsatisfactory?
> 
>          None.
> 
>    G.    What mnemonic is requested for the new RRTYPE (optional)?
> 
>          CDS to stand for "Child DS".
> 
>    H.    Does the requested RRTYPE make use of any existing IANA
>          Registry or require the creation of a new IANA sub-registry in
>          DNS Parameters?
> 
>          It uses the same registries as the DS record.
> 
>    I.    Does the proposal require/expect any changes in DNS
>          servers/resolvers that prevent the new type from being
>          processed as an unknown RRTYPE (see [RFC3597])?
> 
>          No.
> 
>    J.    Comments:
>          An RFC describing in detail how the CDS RRset may be used
>          to update the parent DS RRset is anticipated. The current draft
>          is draft-barwood-dnsop-ds-publish-01.
> 
> --end 5395 template URI--
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Mon Nov 15 15:10:28 2010
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Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2010 18:10:33 -0500
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Subject: [dnsext]  CDS RRTYPE review - Comments period end Dec 6th
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Forwarded on behalf of George Barwood.

--begin 5395 template URI--

   A.    Submission Date: 15 November 2010

   B.    Submission Type:
         [X] New RRTYPE
         [ ] Modification to existing RRTYPE

   C.    Contact Information for submitter:
            Name: George Barwood
            Email Address: george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk
            International telephone number: +44 1452 722670
            Other contact handles: N/A

   D.    Motivation for the new RRTYPE application?

         To allow a copy of the DS RRset [RFC4034] to be published 
         in the child zone, which is used to update the parent DS RRset.
         It is expected that this will allow the rollover of a key signing
         key to be automated.

   E.    Description of the proposed RR type.

         The format is identical to the DS record.
         However there is no special processing for servers/resolvers.        

   F.    What existing RRTYPE or RRTYPEs come closest to filling that
         need and why are they unsatisfactory?

         None.

   G.    What mnemonic is requested for the new RRTYPE (optional)?

         CDS to stand for "Child DS".

   H.    Does the requested RRTYPE make use of any existing IANA
         Registry or require the creation of a new IANA sub-registry in
         DNS Parameters?

         It uses the same registries as the DS record.

   I.    Does the proposal require/expect any changes in DNS
         servers/resolvers that prevent the new type from being
         processed as an unknown RRTYPE (see [RFC3597])?

         No.

   J.    Comments:
         An RFC describing in detail how the CDS RRset may be used
         to update the parent DS RRset is anticipated. The current draft
         is draft-barwood-dnsop-ds-publish-01.

--end 5395 template URI--


From ajs@shinkuro.com  Mon Nov 15 15:12:43 2010
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Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2010 18:12:40 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Sorry for the noise, all, I fat-fingered the redirect.

A
-- 
Andrew Sullivan
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From weiler@watson.org  Tue Nov 16 00:21:00 2010
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Commenting just on the template, not the idea in general:

>   E.    Description of the proposed RR type.
>
>         The format is identical to the DS record.
>         However there is no special processing for servers/resolvers.

I suggest including a citation to RFC3658.

>   F.    What existing RRTYPE or RRTYPEs come closest to filling that
>         need and why are they unsatisfactory?
>
>         None.

This analysis is obviously incomplete.  At the very least, explain why 
the three RR types that share the same format (DS, TA, and DLV) are 
unacceptable.

>   H.    Does the requested RRTYPE make use of any existing IANA
>         Registry or require the creation of a new IANA sub-registry in
>         DNS Parameters?
>
>         It uses the same registries as the DS record.

Name them?  They are "Delegation Signer Resource Record
Digest Algorithms" and "DNS Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers".

http://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.xhtml
http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml

-- Sam

From stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com  Tue Nov 16 09:11:53 2010
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From: "Stephan Lagerholm" <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>
To: "Samuel Weiler" <weiler@watson.org>, <dnsext@ietf.org>
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> >   F.    What existing RRTYPE or RRTYPEs come closest to filling that
> >         need and why are they unsatisfactory?
> >
> >         None.
>=20
> This analysis is obviously incomplete.  At the very least, explain why
> the three RR types that share the same format (DS, TA, and DLV) are
> unacceptable.

+1. Especially since the draft contains a section that discusses a new
RR compared to reusing the DNSKEY RR. "A new resource record type is
preferred to using flags in the DNSKEY RRset". This must be better
explained for me to support this draft.

/Stephan

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Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2010 12:19:29 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: dnsext@ietf.org
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References: <20101115231033.GC674@shinkuro.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011160315400.75277@fledge.watson.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4A39@exchange.secure64.com>
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On Tue, Nov 16, 2010 at 10:02:17AM -0700, Stephan Lagerholm wrote:
> preferred to using flags in the DNSKEY RRset". This must be better
> explained for me to support this draft.

Note that this thread is not actually discussing the _draft_, just the
RRTYPE assignment request.  Also, note that we don't actually have the
assignment type machinery up and running yet.  In particular, IANA
hasn't appointed an expert who will actually do this evaluation.
Nevertheless, I'm sure the chosen expert will take into consideration
discussion of the assignment request in this thread.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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On Nov 16 2010, Samuel Weiler wrote:

>>   F.    What existing RRTYPE or RRTYPEs come closest to filling that
>>         need and why are they unsatisfactory?
>>
>>         None.
>
>This analysis is obviously incomplete.  At the very least, explain why 
>the three RR types that share the same format (DS, TA, and DLV) are 
>unacceptable.

Well, obviously not DLV, to start with. A DLV record at the apex of a
zone is a purported trust anchor for the root zone, nothing to do with
the zone in which it occurs.

-- 
Chris Thompson
Email: cet1@cam.ac.uk

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References: <20101115231033.GC674@shinkuro.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011160315400.75277@fledge.watson.org><Prayer.1.3.3.1011162342270.12745@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk>
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In message <Prayer.1.3.3.1011162342270.12745@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk>, Chris Tho
mpson writes:
> On Nov 16 2010, Samuel Weiler wrote:
> 
> >>   F.    What existing RRTYPE or RRTYPEs come closest to filling that
> >>         need and why are they unsatisfactory?
> >>
> >>         None.
> >
> >This analysis is obviously incomplete.  At the very least, explain why 
> >the three RR types that share the same format (DS, TA, and DLV) are 
> >unacceptable.
> 
> Well, obviously not DLV, to start with. A DLV record at the apex of a
> zone is a purported trust anchor for the root zone, nothing to do with
> the zone in which it occurs.

No.  For example we could split the namespace under dlv.isc.org
into multiple zones (and would have done if we need to for scaling
reasons).  Only a DLV at dlv.isc.org would represent the root. DLV
records at the apex of any other zones would represent the zone
with the dlv.isc.org suffix removed.

DLV only has special meaning within zones which are being used for
dnssec look-aside valiation.  This is the same as PTR has special
meaning within in-addr.arpa and ip6.arpa but not outside of those
zones.

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

From weiler@watson.org  Wed Nov 17 01:12:33 2010
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On Tue, 16 Nov 2010, Chris Thompson wrote:

>> This analysis is obviously incomplete.  At the very least, explain why the 
>> three RR types that share the same format (DS, TA, and DLV) are 
>> unacceptable.
>
> Well, obviously not DLV, to start with. A DLV record at the apex of 
> a zone is a purported trust anchor for the root zone, nothing to do 
> with the zone in which it occurs.

So what?  One choice of semantics for a record need not preclude other 
choices: see the TXT record.  :-)  Seeing a DLV RR should not trigger 
any special processing.  Unless validators have configured a domain as 
a DLV domain, having a DLV RR in that domain should be a non-issue.

That doesn't mean reusing the RR type is a good idea, just that this 
arugment against it is bunk.

As a further nit: the described semantics (DLV RR at zone apex = root 
trust anchor) are not correct.  A DLV domain (v. zone) need not be a 
separate zone, and it may include delegations (sub-zones). 
Furthermore, the top level of a DLV domain may not target the root. 
A DLV domain can target any zone (e.g. .net), not just the root.  See 
section three of RFC5074.  BIND makes the assumption that the top 
level of every DLV domain targets the root, but that it an 
implementation quirk that can worked around in practice.

-- Sam


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Subject: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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Recently CZNIC reported on some algorithm rollover problems they 
encountered when they didn't follow the "mandatory algorithm rules" in 
the "Zone Signing" section of RFC4035.  These rules create a method to 
signal to resolvers what algorithms are in use in a zone.  As 
historical perspective, these rules were written in order to avoid the 
dilemma of opening resolvers to a downgrade attack or discouraging the 
use of new algorithms.

CZNIC published a DNSKEY for a "new" algorithm without simultaneously 
publishing the corresponding RRSIGs.  Unbound started rejecting 
answers from .cz because the zone didn't also include the new RRSIGs, 
even though Unbound fully supported the old algorithm and the RRSIGs 
for that old algorithm were present in the zone.

These rules are indeed for zone operators and/or signers and do not 
need to be enforced by a validator.  While I haven't worked through 
the validation sections of 4035 closely, I think Unbound is violating 
the RFC by checking for this.  (It would fine for Unbound to disable 
support for the "old" algorithm entirely, in which case the answers 
should indeed be rejected, but that isn't what happened here.)  In 
contrast, BIND found the signatures from the "old" algorithm 
sufficient.


I've heard folks from CZNIC advocating adding some clarifications to
4641bis and other operational documents reminding zone operators of
these rules, perhaps in better language.  I generally support that.

I've also been encouraged to add an explanation of this to 
dnssec-bis-updates.  Since validator implementers did different 
things, I agree that clarification is in order.

The most general thing we could say is "Pay attention to the section 
headings in RFC4035.  Note that Section 2 ("Zone Signing") provides 
guidance to zone signers, not resolvers.  Resolvers should pay careful 
attention to Sections 4 and 5 ("Resolving" and "Authenticating DNS 
Responses") and do not need to separately check for compliance with 
every item in Section 2.  In particular the "mandatory algorithm 
rules" in the last paragraph of section 2.2 do not need to be enforced 
by a resolver.  Note that this document makes some minor changes to 
the validation rules in RFC4035, including the rules for handling DS 
records with unknown message digest algorithms."

I'm not sure if the generalization (that validators can ignore section 
2) is 100% correct.  Is it?


Alternatively, we could say something specific:

"The last paragraph of RFC4035 Section 2.2 includes rules for which
algorithms must be used to sign a zone.  Since these rules have been
confusing, we restate them in different language here:

Every algorithm present in a zone's DS RRset (if any) must also be 
present in its DNSKEY RRset.  Every algorithm present in the DNSKEY 
RRset must be used to sign every RRset in the zone, including the 
DNSKEY RRset itself.  If more than one key of the same algorithm is in 
the DNSKEY RRset, it is sufficient to sign each RRset with any subset 
of these DNSKEYs.  It is acceptable to sign some RRsets with one 
subset of keys (or key) and other RRsets with a different subset, so 
long as at least one DNSKEY of each ALGORITHM is used to sign each 
RRset.  Likewise, if there are DS records for multiple keys of the 
same algorithm, any subset of those may appear in the DNSKEY RRset.

Furthermore, note that these rules are for zone operators and zone
operators, as might be inferred from the Section 2 heading: "Zone
Signing".  These rules do not need to be separately enforced by
validating resolvers."


Does the WG have a preference for which version of this to add to 
dnssec-bis-updates?  By default, I propose to add the specific one. 
If someone else has walked through RFC4035 Sections 4 and 5 carefully, 
perhaps we could use the general one.  I also welcome other 
restatements of the rules: I wrote the original ones which have been 
confusing, and having someone else rewrite them might make more sense.

-- Sam Weiler


From ondrej.sury@nic.cz  Thu Nov 18 03:20:39 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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Hi Sam,

I actually gave it some thought yesterday and there is one thing I still 
don't understand.  If the case is indeed to protect against downgrade 
attack then if the resolver doesn't implement same strictness as zone 
operators then there is in fact no protection at all against downgrade 
attack.

Maybe it's a right time to clarify what the downgrade attack is.  My 
understanding is that:

1) there is a known cryptographic attack against algorithm A

2) there is a algorithm B which is safe to use

3) the zone operator publish zone with algorithm A and B in the apex

4) the zone is signed by both algorithm A and B (Note: when I say signed 
by algorithm I mean signed by key or chain of keys (KSK+ZSK) using that 
particular algorithm)

5) an attacker computes the signature for his spoofed records using 
algoritm A

6) an attacker injects his spoofed RRs together with computed sigs to a 
validating resolver

7) if the validating resolver is OK with just one or another and not 
both algorithm signatures, it could be convinced to validate the result 
just by seeing (spoofed) signatures with algorithm A.  So the validating 
resolver sees spoofed records and it's spoofed signatures using just 
algoritm A and it validates the result.


What do I miss here?  I really do think that there is no downgrade 
attack protection if it's not implemented on both sides (authoritative 
and validating-recursive).

Ondrej.

On 18.11.2010 12:02, Samuel Weiler wrote:
> Recently CZNIC reported on some algorithm rollover problems they
> encountered when they didn't follow the "mandatory algorithm rules" in
> the "Zone Signing" section of RFC4035. These rules create a method to
> signal to resolvers what algorithms are in use in a zone. As historical
> perspective, these rules were written in order to avoid the dilemma of
> opening resolvers to a downgrade attack or discouraging the use of new
> algorithms.
>
> CZNIC published a DNSKEY for a "new" algorithm without simultaneously
> publishing the corresponding RRSIGs. Unbound started rejecting answers
> from .cz because the zone didn't also include the new RRSIGs, even
> though Unbound fully supported the old algorithm and the RRSIGs for that
> old algorithm were present in the zone.
>
> These rules are indeed for zone operators and/or signers and do not need
> to be enforced by a validator. While I haven't worked through the
> validation sections of 4035 closely, I think Unbound is violating the
> RFC by checking for this. (It would fine for Unbound to disable support
> for the "old" algorithm entirely, in which case the answers should
> indeed be rejected, but that isn't what happened here.) In contrast,
> BIND found the signatures from the "old" algorithm sufficient.
>
>
> I've heard folks from CZNIC advocating adding some clarifications to
> 4641bis and other operational documents reminding zone operators of
> these rules, perhaps in better language. I generally support that.
>
> I've also been encouraged to add an explanation of this to
> dnssec-bis-updates. Since validator implementers did different things, I
> agree that clarification is in order.
>
> The most general thing we could say is "Pay attention to the section
> headings in RFC4035. Note that Section 2 ("Zone Signing") provides
> guidance to zone signers, not resolvers. Resolvers should pay careful
> attention to Sections 4 and 5 ("Resolving" and "Authenticating DNS
> Responses") and do not need to separately check for compliance with
> every item in Section 2. In particular the "mandatory algorithm rules"
> in the last paragraph of section 2.2 do not need to be enforced by a
> resolver. Note that this document makes some minor changes to the
> validation rules in RFC4035, including the rules for handling DS records
> with unknown message digest algorithms."
>
> I'm not sure if the generalization (that validators can ignore section
> 2) is 100% correct. Is it?
>
>
> Alternatively, we could say something specific:
>
> "The last paragraph of RFC4035 Section 2.2 includes rules for which
> algorithms must be used to sign a zone. Since these rules have been
> confusing, we restate them in different language here:
>
> Every algorithm present in a zone's DS RRset (if any) must also be
> present in its DNSKEY RRset. Every algorithm present in the DNSKEY RRset
> must be used to sign every RRset in the zone, including the DNSKEY RRset
> itself. If more than one key of the same algorithm is in the DNSKEY
> RRset, it is sufficient to sign each RRset with any subset of these
> DNSKEYs. It is acceptable to sign some RRsets with one subset of keys
> (or key) and other RRsets with a different subset, so long as at least
> one DNSKEY of each ALGORITHM is used to sign each RRset. Likewise, if
> there are DS records for multiple keys of the same algorithm, any subset
> of those may appear in the DNSKEY RRset.
>
> Furthermore, note that these rules are for zone operators and zone
> operators, as might be inferred from the Section 2 heading: "Zone
> Signing". These rules do not need to be separately enforced by
> validating resolvers."
>
>
> Does the WG have a preference for which version of this to add to
> dnssec-bis-updates? By default, I propose to add the specific one. If
> someone else has walked through RFC4035 Sections 4 and 5 carefully,
> perhaps we could use the general one. I also welcome other restatements
> of the rules: I wrote the original ones which have been confusing, and
> having someone else rewrite them might make more sense.
>
> -- Sam Weiler
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext


-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
  tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
  -------------------------------------------

From ondrej.sury@nic.cz  Thu Nov 18 03:31:38 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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Based on off-list discussion with Sam, I should add that both algorithm 
A and algorithm B in my example are supported by the validating resolver.

Ondrej

On 18.11.2010 12:20, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> Hi Sam,
>
> I actually gave it some thought yesterday and there is one thing I still
> don't understand. If the case is indeed to protect against downgrade
> attack then if the resolver doesn't implement same strictness as zone
> operators then there is in fact no protection at all against downgrade
> attack.
>
> Maybe it's a right time to clarify what the downgrade attack is. My
> understanding is that:
>
> 1) there is a known cryptographic attack against algorithm A
>
> 2) there is a algorithm B which is safe to use
>
> 3) the zone operator publish zone with algorithm A and B in the apex
>
> 4) the zone is signed by both algorithm A and B (Note: when I say signed
> by algorithm I mean signed by key or chain of keys (KSK+ZSK) using that
> particular algorithm)
>
> 5) an attacker computes the signature for his spoofed records using
> algoritm A
>
> 6) an attacker injects his spoofed RRs together with computed sigs to a
> validating resolver
>
> 7) if the validating resolver is OK with just one or another and not
> both algorithm signatures, it could be convinced to validate the result
> just by seeing (spoofed) signatures with algorithm A. So the validating
> resolver sees spoofed records and it's spoofed signatures using just
> algoritm A and it validates the result.
>
>
> What do I miss here? I really do think that there is no downgrade attack
> protection if it's not implemented on both sides (authoritative and
> validating-recursive).
>
> Ondrej.
>
> On 18.11.2010 12:02, Samuel Weiler wrote:
>> Recently CZNIC reported on some algorithm rollover problems they
>> encountered when they didn't follow the "mandatory algorithm rules" in
>> the "Zone Signing" section of RFC4035. These rules create a method to
>> signal to resolvers what algorithms are in use in a zone. As historical
>> perspective, these rules were written in order to avoid the dilemma of
>> opening resolvers to a downgrade attack or discouraging the use of new
>> algorithms.
>>
>> CZNIC published a DNSKEY for a "new" algorithm without simultaneously
>> publishing the corresponding RRSIGs. Unbound started rejecting answers
>> from .cz because the zone didn't also include the new RRSIGs, even
>> though Unbound fully supported the old algorithm and the RRSIGs for that
>> old algorithm were present in the zone.
>>
>> These rules are indeed for zone operators and/or signers and do not need
>> to be enforced by a validator. While I haven't worked through the
>> validation sections of 4035 closely, I think Unbound is violating the
>> RFC by checking for this. (It would fine for Unbound to disable support
>> for the "old" algorithm entirely, in which case the answers should
>> indeed be rejected, but that isn't what happened here.) In contrast,
>> BIND found the signatures from the "old" algorithm sufficient.
>>
>>
>> I've heard folks from CZNIC advocating adding some clarifications to
>> 4641bis and other operational documents reminding zone operators of
>> these rules, perhaps in better language. I generally support that.
>>
>> I've also been encouraged to add an explanation of this to
>> dnssec-bis-updates. Since validator implementers did different things, I
>> agree that clarification is in order.
>>
>> The most general thing we could say is "Pay attention to the section
>> headings in RFC4035. Note that Section 2 ("Zone Signing") provides
>> guidance to zone signers, not resolvers. Resolvers should pay careful
>> attention to Sections 4 and 5 ("Resolving" and "Authenticating DNS
>> Responses") and do not need to separately check for compliance with
>> every item in Section 2. In particular the "mandatory algorithm rules"
>> in the last paragraph of section 2.2 do not need to be enforced by a
>> resolver. Note that this document makes some minor changes to the
>> validation rules in RFC4035, including the rules for handling DS records
>> with unknown message digest algorithms."
>>
>> I'm not sure if the generalization (that validators can ignore section
>> 2) is 100% correct. Is it?
>>
>>
>> Alternatively, we could say something specific:
>>
>> "The last paragraph of RFC4035 Section 2.2 includes rules for which
>> algorithms must be used to sign a zone. Since these rules have been
>> confusing, we restate them in different language here:
>>
>> Every algorithm present in a zone's DS RRset (if any) must also be
>> present in its DNSKEY RRset. Every algorithm present in the DNSKEY RRset
>> must be used to sign every RRset in the zone, including the DNSKEY RRset
>> itself. If more than one key of the same algorithm is in the DNSKEY
>> RRset, it is sufficient to sign each RRset with any subset of these
>> DNSKEYs. It is acceptable to sign some RRsets with one subset of keys
>> (or key) and other RRsets with a different subset, so long as at least
>> one DNSKEY of each ALGORITHM is used to sign each RRset. Likewise, if
>> there are DS records for multiple keys of the same algorithm, any subset
>> of those may appear in the DNSKEY RRset.
>>
>> Furthermore, note that these rules are for zone operators and zone
>> operators, as might be inferred from the Section 2 heading: "Zone
>> Signing". These rules do not need to be separately enforced by
>> validating resolvers."
>>
>>
>> Does the WG have a preference for which version of this to add to
>> dnssec-bis-updates? By default, I propose to add the specific one. If
>> someone else has walked through RFC4035 Sections 4 and 5 carefully,
>> perhaps we could use the general one. I also welcome other restatements
>> of the rules: I wrote the original ones which have been confusing, and
>> having someone else rewrite them might make more sense.
>>
>> -- Sam Weiler
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> dnsext mailing list
>> dnsext@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>


-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
  tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
  -------------------------------------------

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From: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On Thu, 18 Nov 2010, Ond?ej Sur? wrote:

> 1) there is a known cryptographic attack against algorithm A
...
> 7) if the validating resolver is OK with just one or another and not 
> both algorithm signatures, it could be convinced to validate the result 
> just by seeing (spoofed) signatures with algorithm A.  So the validating 
> resolver sees spoofed records and it's spoofed signatures using just 
> algoritm A and it validates the result.

This is a different sort of downgrade attack than the one these rules 
were designed to protect against.  Indeed, to address this attack 
within the protocol, we'd need to require resolvers to check EVERY 
algorithm's signature (if they can).  We didn't do that before, and 
it's probably unwise to make that change now.

The current work-around is for the zone owner to STOP signing with the 
known-broken algorithm A.  That leaves code that only supports A out 
in the cold.  If you're assuming resolvers support both A and B 
(as your clarification says), there's no problem.

> What do I miss here?  I really do think that there is no downgrade 
> attack protection if it's not implemented on both sides (authoritative 
> and validating-recursive).

Indeed, for the attack you're describing, the resolver would need to 
be involved, and it would need to change.

The downgrade attack that led to this is documented in a message to 
namedroppers on 13 August 2003, Subject line "DNSSECbis Q-2: 
degradation attack".  With the archives off-line, perhaps I should 
resend it.

-- Sam


From wouter@nlnetlabs.nl  Thu Nov 18 03:48:00 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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Hi Samuel,

Several people have complained that unbound is too strict, and I keep
defending this.  I do claim to be RFC conformant; and I want to oppose
the change.  (but not the clarification of signing rules).

On 11/18/2010 12:02 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:
> opening resolvers to a downgrade attack or discouraging the use of new
> algorithms.

This is what I do, I want to avoid a downgrade attack.  A proper signed
zone has these signatures.  They are missing.  Something is wrong.

> CZNIC published a DNSKEY for a "new" algorithm without simultaneously
> publishing the corresponding RRSIGs.  Unbound started rejecting answers
> from .cz because the zone didn't also include the new RRSIGs, even
> though Unbound fully supported the old algorithm and the RRSIGs for that
> old algorithm were present in the zone.

Yes.  Even though one signature worked, because the other did not work
(was 'stripped off') it was obvious that there was a downgrade attack.
Signatures had been removed from the answer.  To be safe, unbound blocks
this suspect content.

And if you interpret the downgrade to include algorithm-downgrade, then
it might be unbound itself that is under a downgrade attack.  It is
certain that someone-else (that has less algorithm support) is getting a
signature-presence-downgrade attack.

> These rules are indeed for zone operators and/or signers and do not need
> to be enforced by a validator.  While I haven't worked through the

I am ok with OPTIONAL.  I understand cryptographically it works with a
single signature, but operationally I do not agree with you.
Operationally, something really bad is happening.

> validation sections of 4035 closely, I think Unbound is violating the
> RFC by checking for this.  (It would fine for Unbound to disable support
> for the "old" algorithm entirely, in which case the answers should
> indeed be rejected, but that isn't what happened here.)  In contrast,
> BIND found the signatures from the "old" algorithm sufficient.

You must not be lenient with security.

I disagree, I am not violating the RFC.  I choose to reject zones that
are not signed properly.  You understand that unbound gets
algorithm-downgrade-protection from applying this policy?  There is
actual security benefit to this policy?

> I've heard folks from CZNIC advocating adding some clarifications to
> 4641bis and other operational documents reminding zone operators of
> these rules, perhaps in better language.  I generally support that.

Yes, people should know how to keep it signed properly.

> I've also been encouraged to add an explanation of this to
> dnssec-bis-updates.  Since validator implementers did different things,
> I agree that clarification is in order.
> 
> I'm not sure if the generalization (that validators can ignore section
> 2) is 100% correct.  Is it?

No, don't do this, it makes the situation less understandable; I want to
reject this because referring to section headers is perhaps something of
an excuse, but not good for understanding.

> Alternatively, we could say something specific:
> 
> "The last paragraph of RFC4035 Section 2.2 includes rules for which
> algorithms must be used to sign a zone.  Since these rules have been
> confusing, we restate them in different language here:

Perhaps the above paragraph can be shortened, 'rules are restated here'.

> Every algorithm present in a zone's DS RRset (if any) must also be
> present in its DNSKEY RRset.  Every algorithm present in the DNSKEY
> RRset must be used to sign every RRset in the zone, including the DNSKEY
> RRset itself.  If more than one key of the same algorithm is in the
> DNSKEY RRset, it is sufficient to sign each RRset with any subset of
> these DNSKEYs.  It is acceptable to sign some RRsets with one subset of
> keys (or key) and other RRsets with a different subset, so long as at
> least one DNSKEY of each ALGORITHM is used to sign each RRset. 
> Likewise, if there are DS records for multiple keys of the same
> algorithm, any subset of those may appear in the DNSKEY RRset.

I agree with this text, and I like it.

I would like you to add that 'extra signatures are allowed to be present
(that have nothing to do with the keys in the DNSKEY rrset)'.  I want to
add it because people asked me that as a question.

It states something new: the DNSKEY RRset must be signed with every
algorithm present in the DNSKEY RRset validly.  This makes a (small)
difference to the revoke step in the
RFC5011-singlecombinedkey-algorithm-rollover scheme, where the DNSKEY
must also be signed with the temporary-ZSK (I believe).  Some signers
take leeway when no DS points to a zone, since the DNSKEY does not get
validated with those algorithms by current validator implementations.
But I am OK with this change.

> Furthermore, note that these rules are for zone operators and zone
> operators, as might be inferred from the Section 2 heading: "Zone
> Signing".  These rules do not need to be separately enforced by
> validating resolvers."

I do not agree with this, because it diminishes security.

> Does the WG have a preference for which version of this to add to
> dnssec-bis-updates?  By default, I propose to add the specific one. If
> someone else has walked through RFC4035 Sections 4 and 5 carefully,
> perhaps we could use the general one.  I also welcome other restatements
> of the rules: I wrote the original ones which have been confusing, and
> having someone else rewrite them might make more sense.

You are removing algorithm-downgrade protection, even though the current
rules seem to make this optional today.  I disagree with that.

If someone decides to sign his zone (permanently, not rollover) with
algorithms X and Y, he should get protection from X AND Y, not X OR Y
when this is possible and implemented.  The protocol can easily deal
with this, we should not allow misconfiguration.

Best regards,
   Wouter
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Hi Sam,

You seem to want to enforce an original idea (which Mark understood
perfectly, it seems), about protection from signature-missing.  This is
not what RFC4035 says.

On 11/18/2010 12:37 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Nov 2010, Ond?ej Sur? wrote:
> This is a different sort of downgrade attack than the one these rules
> were designed to protect against.  Indeed, to address this attack within
> the protocol, we'd need to require resolvers to check EVERY algorithm's
> signature (if they can).  We didn't do that before, and it's probably
> unwise to make that change now.

That is what unbound does.  And it gets algorithm downgrade protection
security as a benefit (for the algorithms that it implements).

Since owners MUST sign their zone correctly, I see no need to specify a
MUST accept missing signatures if you implement the other algorithm?
Why do you want to allow inproperly-signed zones?  It will break
resolvers that implement only a subset of algorithms?

> Indeed, for the attack you're describing, the resolver would need to be
> involved, and it would need to change.

Unbound would not need to change.  Today, if people sign their zones
properly, this is compatible with BIND and Unbound.

Because it is unknown if future algorithm numbers may allow signatures
to be absent; unbound does not check if signatures are missing for
algorithms that it does not implement (and anyway a spoofed signature
would trivially get accepted since it cannot validate).

> The downgrade attack that led to this is documented in a message to
> namedroppers on 13 August 2003, Subject line "DNSSECbis Q-2: degradation
> attack".  With the archives off-line, perhaps I should resend it.

No.

Best regards,
   Wouter
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I can't quite understand why we would make a change to require acceptance of
the unsigned zone in this case.

1) What is easier, for operators to change their behavior and sign before
they publish keys or for resolvers to change their behavior.

2) What is more secure, to protect against the downgrade attack or to allow
it for the sake of incompetent signers?

3) What is more sustainable? If the WG accepts this change, what is the
probability others will implement a choice that appears eccentric and wrong?


Absent a really compelling reason to allow for zones to be signed in this
way, I can't see why we would not change the operations section rather than
the validation. Is there any reason that the operators cannot publish the
signatures before the keys?

The problem of what relying applications should to do when a zone is
incorrectly signed is much more general than this one example and one that I
don't think has been fully considered by those advocating end-to-end DNSSEC
design with the validation taking place at the relying application.

This is a general problem in cryptographic protocols: if there is no
possibility of an attack succeeding, there is no point in attempting the
attack. Therefore the probability that a signature is failing because of an
attack falls to zero and the overwhelming likelihood is that the cause of
any failure is misconfiguration.


There are controls that can be implemented to mitigate this but they depend
on having more state information than an endpoint can acquire on its own.


On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 7:02 AM, W.C.A. Wijngaards <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Hi Sam,
>
> You seem to want to enforce an original idea (which Mark understood
> perfectly, it seems), about protection from signature-missing.  This is
> not what RFC4035 says.
>
> On 11/18/2010 12:37 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:
> > On Thu, 18 Nov 2010, Ond?ej Sur? wrote:
> > This is a different sort of downgrade attack than the one these rules
> > were designed to protect against.  Indeed, to address this attack within
> > the protocol, we'd need to require resolvers to check EVERY algorithm's
> > signature (if they can).  We didn't do that before, and it's probably
> > unwise to make that change now.
>
> That is what unbound does.  And it gets algorithm downgrade protection
> security as a benefit (for the algorithms that it implements).
>
> Since owners MUST sign their zone correctly, I see no need to specify a
> MUST accept missing signatures if you implement the other algorithm?
> Why do you want to allow inproperly-signed zones?  It will break
> resolvers that implement only a subset of algorithms?
>
> > Indeed, for the attack you're describing, the resolver would need to be
> > involved, and it would need to change.
>
> Unbound would not need to change.  Today, if people sign their zones
> properly, this is compatible with BIND and Unbound.
>
> Because it is unknown if future algorithm numbers may allow signatures
> to be absent; unbound does not check if signatures are missing for
> algorithms that it does not implement (and anyway a spoofed signature
> would trivially get accepted since it cannot validate).
>
> > The downgrade attack that led to this is documented in a message to
> > namedroppers on 13 August 2003, Subject line "DNSSECbis Q-2: degradation
> > attack".  With the archives off-line, perhaps I should resend it.
>
> No.
>
> Best regards,
>   Wouter
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-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e6434ae8d82eeb049554029c
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I can&#39;t quite understand why we would make a change to require acceptan=
ce of the unsigned zone in this case.<div><br></div><div>1) What is easier,=
 for operators to change their behavior and sign before they publish keys o=
r for resolvers to change their behavior.</div>
<div><br></div><div>2) What is more secure, to protect against the downgrad=
e attack or to allow it for the sake of incompetent signers?</div><div><br>=
</div><div>3) What is more sustainable? If the WG accepts this change, what=
 is the probability others will implement a choice that appears eccentric a=
nd wrong?</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Absent a really compelling reason to all=
ow for zones to be signed in this way, I can&#39;t see why we would not cha=
nge the operations section rather than the validation. Is there any reason =
that the operators cannot publish the signatures before the keys?</div>
<div><br></div><div>The problem of what relying applications should to do w=
hen a zone is incorrectly signed is much more general than this one example=
 and one that I don&#39;t think has been fully considered by those advocati=
ng end-to-end DNSSEC design with the validation taking place at the relying=
 application.</div>
<div><br></div><div>This is a general problem in cryptographic protocols: i=
f there is no possibility of an attack succeeding, there is no point in att=
empting the attack. Therefore the probability that a signature is failing b=
ecause of an attack falls to zero and the overwhelming likelihood is that t=
he cause of any failure is misconfiguration.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>There are controls that can be implement=
ed to mitigate this but they depend on having more state information than a=
n endpoint can acquire on its own.</div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_qu=
ote">
On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 7:02 AM, W.C.A. Wijngaards <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:wouter@nlnetlabs.nl">wouter@nlnetlabs.nl</a>&gt;</span> wro=
te:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-=
left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----<br>
Hash: SHA1<br>
<br>
</div>Hi Sam,<br>
<br>
You seem to want to enforce an original idea (which Mark understood<br>
perfectly, it seems), about protection from signature-missing. =A0This is<b=
r>
not what RFC4035 says.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
On 11/18/2010 12:37 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:<br>
&gt; On Thu, 18 Nov 2010, Ond?ej Sur? wrote:<br>
</div><div class=3D"im">&gt; This is a different sort of downgrade attack t=
han the one these rules<br>
&gt; were designed to protect against. =A0Indeed, to address this attack wi=
thin<br>
&gt; the protocol, we&#39;d need to require resolvers to check EVERY algori=
thm&#39;s<br>
&gt; signature (if they can). =A0We didn&#39;t do that before, and it&#39;s=
 probably<br>
&gt; unwise to make that change now.<br>
<br>
</div>That is what unbound does. =A0And it gets algorithm downgrade protect=
ion<br>
security as a benefit (for the algorithms that it implements).<br>
<br>
Since owners MUST sign their zone correctly, I see no need to specify a<br>
MUST accept missing signatures if you implement the other algorithm?<br>
Why do you want to allow inproperly-signed zones? =A0It will break<br>
resolvers that implement only a subset of algorithms?<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; Indeed, for the attack you&#39;re describing, the resolver would need =
to be<br>
&gt; involved, and it would need to change.<br>
<br>
</div>Unbound would not need to change. =A0Today, if people sign their zone=
s<br>
properly, this is compatible with BIND and Unbound.<br>
<br>
Because it is unknown if future algorithm numbers may allow signatures<br>
to be absent; unbound does not check if signatures are missing for<br>
algorithms that it does not implement (and anyway a spoofed signature<br>
would trivially get accepted since it cannot validate).<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; The downgrade attack that led to this is documented in a message to<br=
>
&gt; namedroppers on 13 August 2003, Subject line &quot;DNSSECbis Q-2: degr=
adation<br>
&gt; attack&quot;. =A0With the archives off-line, perhaps I should resend i=
t.<br>
<br>
</div>No.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
Best regards,<br>
 =A0 Wouter<br>
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Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)<br>
Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - <a href=3D"http://enigmail.mozdev.org/" =
target=3D"_blank">http://enigmail.mozdev.org/</a><br>
<br>
</div>iEYEARECAAYFAkzlFe0ACgkQkDLqNwOhpPjODACcCjh2uSefIUiMUdTtpJit9yfa<br>
5fEAn2aYmizlQcZm4sJVQgjfFv/FJSEj<br>
=3DI/FY<br>
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">_________________________________________=
______<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a=
 href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e6434ae8d82eeb049554029c--

From fweimer@bfk.de  Thu Nov 18 06:04:57 2010
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References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE50C01.4010104@nic.cz> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180630550.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE515ED.5010009@nlnetlabs.nl>
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* W. C. A. Wijngaards:

> That is what unbound does.  And it gets algorithm downgrade protection
> security as a benefit (for the algorithms that it implements).

And I don't see any other way to get a priori downgrade protection.
There is no ordering of algorithm strengths.  For example, we don't
know if SHA-1 or SHA-256 will be broken first.

A posterio, you can drop validation for known-to-be-broken algorithms.
But even that might be not so easy because it's somewhat subjective
when an algorithm is broken.

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99

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On 11/18/2010 12:02 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:
> 
> CZNIC published a DNSKEY for a "new" algorithm without simultaneously
> publishing the corresponding RRSIGs.  Unbound started rejecting answers
> from .cz because the zone didn't also include the new RRSIGs, even
> though Unbound fully supported the old algorithm and the RRSIGs for that
> old algorithm were present in the zone.
> 
> These rules are indeed for zone operators and/or signers and do not need
> to be enforced by a validator.  While I haven't worked through the

So what you're saying is that validators should not check for something
because the signer (or the operator) might not be following the spec and
that may break stuff?

Or, more generally, why say that you MUST do a, then say that you
SHOULD/MAY NOT check whether A was done?

IMHO, we should either do downgrade protection for all cases (which is
how i interpret the rfc too, and yes i am aware that this makes
algorithm rolls a PITA, but see below), and not just a specific subset,
or leave it out completely.

btw. the 'loose' interpretation would still make the hypothetical case
fail where the *old* algorithm is not supported by a validator, but the
new one is. And if algorithms are going to be obsoleted, perhaps that
case will not be that hypothetical in the future. But perhaps that is
exactly why that text is there (and why, whether or not validators check
for it, the procedure that triggered this round of discussion was still
wrong).

Jelte
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From: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On Thu, 18 Nov 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> I can't quite understand why we would make a change to require 
> acceptance of the unsigned zone in this case.

There is a difference of opinion about what's being "changed" here. 
I think my proposed clarification is NOT a change -- RFC4035 does not 
tell resolvers to do what Unbound is doing.  Wouter seems to disagree.

>From my perspective, it's Wouter (and you?) that wants to make a 
change, in the form of requiring resolvers to check something RFC4035 
doesn't require them to check.

Different perspectives.


The "check everything and fail if anything break" seems to differ in 
spirit from the guidance that's already in dnssec-bis-updates; see 
section 5.4 "Caution About Local Policy and Multiple RRSIGs". 
(Slightly different details, same flavor.)  That section has been in 
this doc since the -00 version, dated May 2005.

While there may be merit in the approach Wouter suggests, my 
inclination as doc editor is to avoid changes unless strictly 
necessary.

Since we seem to have different ideas about the current state of the 
world, perhaps we need some more voices in this.  Perhaps the BIND 
authors have an opinion.  :-)

-- Sam

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On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 7:02 AM, Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org> wrote:
> Recently CZNIC reported on some algorithm rollover problems they encounte=
red
> when they didn't follow the "mandatory algorithm rules" in the "Zone
> Signing" section of RFC4035. =A0These rules create a method to signal to
> resolvers what algorithms are in use in a zone. =A0As historical perspect=
ive,
> these rules were written in order to avoid the dilemma of opening resolve=
rs
> to a downgrade attack or discouraging the use of new algorithms.
>
> CZNIC published a DNSKEY for a "new" algorithm without simultaneously
> publishing the corresponding RRSIGs. =A0Unbound started rejecting answers=
 from
> .cz because the zone didn't also include the new RRSIGs, even though Unbo=
und
> fully supported the old algorithm and the RRSIGs for that old algorithm w=
ere
> present in the zone.
>
> These rules are indeed for zone operators and/or signers and do not need =
to
> be enforced by a validator. =A0While I haven't worked through the validat=
ion
> sections of 4035 closely, I think Unbound is violating the RFC by checkin=
g
> for this. =A0(It would fine for Unbound to disable support for the "old"
> algorithm entirely, in which case the answers should indeed be rejected, =
but
> that isn't what happened here.) =A0In contrast, BIND found the signatures=
 from
> the "old" algorithm sufficient.
>
>
> I've heard folks from CZNIC advocating adding some clarifications to
> 4641bis and other operational documents reminding zone operators of
> these rules, perhaps in better language. =A0I generally support that.

What server software were they running?

The whole point of "MUST" is that compliant implementations do exactly
the "MUST" thing.

The zone operator should be aware of the rules, but the authority
server software really
should be enforcing the rules. If it doesn't, it's at least a bug, if
not an RFC violation.

The zone should not have been able to be loaded with the signatures missing=
.

And given that it did, I'd say unbound did everyone a favor in this
instance, highlighting both
the operational issue, and the RFC issue we're discussing here.

Brian

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On Thu, 18 Nov 2010, W.C.A. Wijngaards wrote:

> Since owners MUST sign their zone correctly, I see no need to 
> specify a MUST accept missing signatures if you implement the other 
> algorithm? Why do you want to allow inproperly-signed zones?  It 
> will break resolvers that implement only a subset of algorithms?

Honestly, I haven't thought about the constraint in this light.

Some hisorical perspective may help.

Before these mandatory algorithm rules were adopted, a "properly 
signed" zone required that each RRset be signed by ANY of the DNSKEYs 
in the zone, with no regard to algorithms.  Some RRsets could be 
signed only with alg 5, some only with alg 234, and some with both.

We adopted these mandatory algorithm rules to deal with a particular 
downgrade attack (or, depending on how you look at it, a debilitating 
incentive against deploying a new algorithm).  For this purpose, it 
was (and is) sufficient to require a zone to follow the rules.  It was 
(and is) not necessary to require the resolver to check that the zone 
had followed the rules.


So we're starting from different places: I still remember the 
arguments from 2003 about why we should have ANY restrictions.  I also 
remember talking about whether we wanted to address other downgrade 
possibilities (e.g. key length) -- the WG decided not to tackle any of 
that.

-- Sam


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Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2010 10:19:34 -0500 (EST)
From: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On Thu, 18 Nov 2010, Brian Dickson wrote:

> The zone should not have been able to be loaded with the signatures 
> missing.

Concur.

> And given that it did, I'd say unbound did everyone a favor in this 
> instance, highlighting both the operational issue, and the RFC issue 
> we're discussing here.

Concur re: operational issue.  I don't think there is an RFC issue 
(other than clarity, obviously).

-- Sam

From A.Hoenes@TR-Sys.de  Thu Nov 18 07:51:34 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] Robustness & Extensibility -- was: Re: Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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At Thu, 18 Nov 2010 15:33:11 +0100 , Jelte Jansen wrote:

> [...]
>
> Or, more generally, why say that you MUST do a, then say that you
> SHOULD/MAY NOT check whether A was done?
>
> [...]


Isn't that simply a basic corollary of Jon Postel's robustness
principle?


We frequently say:
     [the originator] MUST set xxxxx to yyyyyy.
and:
     [the recipient] MUST ignore xxxxx.

IMO, this is a basic principle that allows a smooth path forward
for the introduction of new protocol elements.

In the case discussed here, introduction of a new crypto-algorithm
into a DNSSEC-signed DNS zone, a similar application of the robustness
principle seems appropriate.
Unless the recipient (= validator) is *required* (by policy, or
lack of support of the previously used crypto-algorithm) to validate
signatures based on the new algorithm, any other working validation
path should suffice.
It is up to the zone maintainer/signer to decide when they deem the
old algorithm insecure enough to regard its usage as a downgrade
attack: they just have to retire the corresponding keys and signatures.
At that time, they cut off the tail of validators that do not support
the new crypto.
Until that is done, these will be able validate, and it makes no
sense to expect other validators to regard that validation path as
insufficient -- there's no point in regarding the old way as
insecure for some validators and secure for other validators.


Cf. the principles in X.509 / PKIX:  Absent specific local policy,
*any* validatable certification path from an available trust anchor
to a given certificate under consideration is acceptable.
(RFC 5280 explicitely tells you to try the next possible cert path
whenever validation of a candidate cert path fails, for any reason.)
Here, "validatable" includes built-in support of the signature
algorithm and underlying hash algorithm, local policy admitting the
acceptance of these algorithms for signature validation, and the
mathematical verification of the signatures found.


Therefore, I fully support Samuel Weiler's PoV that DNSSEC validating
resolvers should only care about syntactical correctness of RRs
and the specific rules codified for such resolvers in the specs.
Otherwise, we would likely tend to  more and more close windows for
a smooth migration to protocol extensions (including migration to
new crypto) and make DNSSEC administration and management subject
to even more restrictions (that essentially would only serve to make
that management more fragile and error-prone and thereby make DNSSEC
itself looking more error-prone from the PoV of DNS users.

Making independent things happen at the same time is particularly
difficult in a highly distributed environment like the DNS, and so
allowing small steps on the signer/maintainer side of a zone and have
only particular "milestones" trigger change of mandatory behavior
in validating resolvers seems to be a valid and valuable strategy.

Kind regards,
  Alfred.


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Jelte and all,


-----Original Message-----
>From: Jelte Jansen <jelte@isc.org>
>Sent: Nov 18, 2010 8:33 AM
>To: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>
>Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
>
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA1
>
>On 11/18/2010 12:02 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:
>> 
>> CZNIC published a DNSKEY for a "new" algorithm without simultaneously
>> publishing the corresponding RRSIGs.  Unbound started rejecting answers
>> from .cz because the zone didn't also include the new RRSIGs, even
>> though Unbound fully supported the old algorithm and the RRSIGs for that
>> old algorithm were present in the zone.
>> 
>> These rules are indeed for zone operators and/or signers and do not need
>> to be enforced by a validator.  While I haven't worked through the
>
>So what you're saying is that validators should not check for something
>because the signer (or the operator) might not be following the spec and
>that may break stuff?
>
>Or, more generally, why say that you MUST do a, then say that you
>SHOULD/MAY NOT check whether A was done?
>
>IMHO, we should either do downgrade protection for all cases (which is
>how i interpret the rfc too, and yes i am aware that this makes
>algorithm rolls a PITA, but see below), and not just a specific subset,
>or leave it out completely.

FWIW, I believe that the middle ground here is that we MUST do
downgrade protection, but limit how long that will remain in place.
>
>btw. the 'loose' interpretation would still make the hypothetical case
>fail where the *old* algorithm is not supported by a validator, but the
>new one is. And if algorithms are going to be obsoleted, perhaps that
>case will not be that hypothetical in the future. But perhaps that is
>exactly why that text is there (and why, whether or not validators check
>for it, the procedure that triggered this round of discussion was still
>wrong).

  Not supporting and 'old' alg. is simply wrong for obvious reasons.
And the validator MUST check for it and recognize the 'old' alg. If
the resolver is change to disallow for this than that needs to be fixed
or changed/changed back to allowing for the 'old' alg. but only for some
limited amount of time.
>
>Jelte
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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>_______________________________________________
>dnsext mailing list
>dnsext@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

Regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Phone: 214-244-4827




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<HEAD>
<STYLE>body{font-size:10pt;font-family:arial,sans-serif;background-color:#f=
fffff;color:black;}p{margin:0px;}</STYLE>

<META name=3DGENERATOR content=3D"MSHTML 8.00.6001.18975"></HEAD>
<BODY>Phillip and all,<BR><BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MAR=
GIN-LEFT: 0px">-----Original Message----- <BR>From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <H=
ALLAM@GMAIL.COM><BR>Sent: Nov 18, 2010 7:46 AM <BR>To: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" =
<WOUTER@NLNETLABS.NL><BR>Cc: dnsext@ietf.org <BR>Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clar=
ifying the mandatory algorithm rules <BR><BR>I can't quite understand why w=
e would make a change to require acceptance of the unsigned zone in this ca=
se.
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>1) What is easier, for operators to change their behavior and sign bef=
ore they publish keys or for resolvers to change their behavior.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>2) What is more secure, to protect against the downgrade attack or to =
allow it for the sake of incompetent signers?</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; Wait a s=
econd here.&nbsp; If there are incompetant signers for 'old' alg's. than th=
ere will likely be similar for 'Approved'</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; newer/different=
 Alg's.&nbsp; So niether is MORE secure than the other.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>3) What is more sustainable? If the WG accepts this change, what is th=
e probability others will implement a choice that appears eccentric and wro=
ng?</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; Well&nbsp;I am often accused of being 'Eccentric', so I guess I=
 would be wrong fairly often. &gt;;)<BR></DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Absent a really compelling reason to allow for zones to be signed in t=
his way, I can't see why we would not change the operations section rather =
than the validation. Is there any reason that the operators cannot publish =
the signatures before the keys?</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
No.&nbsp; But some operators are little more than the old term 'Tape Apes',=
 even still.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>The problem of what relying applications should to do when a zone is i=
ncorrectly signed is much more general than this one example and one that I=
 don't think has been fully considered by those advocating end-to-end DNSSE=
C design with the validation taking place at the relying application.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>This is a general problem in cryptographic protocols: if there is no p=
ossibility of an attack succeeding, there is no point in attempting the att=
ack. Therefore the probability that a signature is failing because of an at=
tack falls to zero and the overwhelming likelihood is that the cause of any=
 failure is misconfiguration.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p; &nbsp;Sound logic here.&nbsp; BUT, there is no such thing as an attack p=
roof crypto protocol.&nbsp; And it is very</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; unlikely that in my lifetime there ever will be.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>There are controls that can be implemented to mitigate this but they d=
epend on having more state information than an endpoint can acquire on its =
own.</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Agreed.</DIV>
<DIV><BR><BR>
<DIV class=3Dgmail_quote>On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 7:02 AM, W.C.A. Wijngaards=
 <SPAN dir=3Dltr>&lt;<A href=3D"mailto:wouter@nlnetlabs.nl" target=3D_blank=
>wouter@nlnetlabs.nl</A>&gt;</SPAN> wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex=
; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex" class=3Dgmail_quote>
<DIV class=3Dim>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----<BR>Hash: SHA1<BR><BR></D=
IV>Hi Sam,<BR><BR>You seem to want to enforce an original idea (which Mark =
understood<BR>perfectly, it seems), about protection from signature-missing=
. &nbsp;This is<BR>not what RFC4035 says.<BR>
<DIV class=3Dim><BR>On 11/18/2010 12:37 PM, Samuel Weiler wrote:<BR>&gt; On=
 Thu, 18 Nov 2010, Ond?ej Sur? wrote:<BR></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dim>&gt; This is a different sort of downgrade attack than the =
one these rules<BR>&gt; were designed to protect against. &nbsp;Indeed, to =
address this attack within<BR>&gt; the protocol, we'd need to require resol=
vers to check EVERY algorithm's<BR>&gt; signature (if they can). &nbsp;We d=
idn't do that before, and it's probably<BR>&gt; unwise to make that change =
now.<BR><BR></DIV>That is what unbound does. &nbsp;And it gets algorithm do=
wngrade protection<BR>security as a benefit (for the algorithms that it imp=
lements).<BR><BR>Since owners MUST sign their zone correctly, I see no need=
 to specify a<BR>MUST accept missing signatures if you implement the other =
algorithm?<BR>Why do you want to allow inproperly-signed zones? &nbsp;It wi=
ll break<BR>resolvers that implement only a subset of algorithms?<BR>
<DIV class=3Dim><BR>&gt; Indeed, for the attack you're describing, the reso=
lver would need to be<BR>&gt; involved, and it would need to change.<BR><BR=
></DIV>Unbound would not need to change. &nbsp;Today, if people sign their =
zones<BR>properly, this is compatible with BIND and Unbound.<BR><BR>Because=
 it is unknown if future algorithm numbers may allow signatures<BR>to be ab=
sent; unbound does not check if signatures are missing for<BR>algorithms th=
at it does not implement (and anyway a spoofed signature<BR>would trivially=
 get accepted since it cannot validate).<BR>
<DIV class=3Dim><BR>&gt; The downgrade attack that led to this is documente=
d in a message to<BR>&gt; namedroppers on 13 August 2003, Subject line "DNS=
SECbis Q-2: degradation<BR>&gt; attack". &nbsp;With the archives off-line, =
perhaps I should resend it.<BR><BR></DIV>No.<BR>
<DIV class=3Dim><BR>Best regards,<BR>&nbsp; Wouter<BR>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNAT=
URE-----<BR>Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)<BR>Comment: Using GnuPG with=
 Fedora - <A href=3D"http://enigmail.mozdev.org/" target=3D_blank>http://en=
igmail.mozdev.org/</A><BR><BR></DIV>iEYEARECAAYFAkzlFe0ACgkQkDLqNwOhpPjODAC=
cCjh2uSefIUiMUdTtpJit9yfa<BR>5fEAn2aYmizlQcZm4sJVQgjfFv/FJSEj<BR>=3DI/FY<BR=
>-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----<BR>
<DIV>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=3Dh5>_______________________________________________<BR>dnsext m=
ailing list<BR><A href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org" target=3D_blank>dnsext@ie=
tf.org</A><BR><A href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" targ=
et=3D_blank>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</A><BR></DIV></DIV=
></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><BR><BR clear=3Dall><BR>-- <BR>Website: <A href=3D"http=
://hallambaker.com/" target=3D_blank>http://hallambaker.com/</A><BR><BR>Reg=
ards,<BR>Jeffrey A. Williams<BR>"Obedience of the law is the greatest freed=
om" -<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Abraham Lincoln<BR><BR>"Credit should go with the per=
formance of duty and not with what is very<BR>often the accident of glory" =
- Theodore Roosevelt<BR><BR>"If the probability be called P; the injury, L;=
 and the burden, B; liability<BR>depends upon whether B is less than L mult=
iplied by<BR>P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."<BR>United States v. Carro=
ll Towing&nbsp; (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]<BR>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D<BR>Updated 1/26/04<BR>Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data secur=
ity<BR>ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 <BR>E-Mail jwkckid1@i=
x.netcom.com<BR>Phone: 214-244-4827<BR><BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY>

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Florian and all,

SHA-1 was broken aroud 3 years ago now.  1024k keysize was
not long ago broken by the University of Mich.=20


-----Original Message-----
>From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
>Sent: Nov 18, 2010 8:05 AM
>To: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
>Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
>
>* W. C. A. Wijngaards:
>
>> That is what unbound does.  And it gets algorithm downgrade protection
>> security as a benefit (for the algorithms that it implements).
>
>And I don't see any other way to get a priori downgrade protection.
>There is no ordering of algorithm strengths.  For example, we don't
>know if SHA-1 or SHA-256 will be broken first.
>
>A posterio, you can drop validation for known-to-be-broken algorithms.
>But even that might be not so easy because it's somewhat subjective
>when an algorithm is broken.
>
>--=20
>Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
>BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
>Kriegsstra=C3=9Fe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
>D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99
>_______________________________________________
>dnsext mailing list
>dnsext@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

Regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liabilit=
y
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
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=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
Updated 1/26/04
Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402=20
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Phone: 214-244-4827




From ondrej.sury@nic.cz  Thu Nov 18 12:15:30 2010
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Sam,

we discussed it with Jaromir on our walk to Vatican Museum and came to 
conclusion that validating resolver only needs to stop and declare 
security problem only when there is a chain of trust leading to a key 
with a new algorithm and there are missing signatures for that algorithm.

So the resolver should return SERVFAIL only when (all conditions must 
apply):

a) there are DS records in parent zone for algorithm A and algorithm B

b) the zone has keys for algorithm A and algorithm B in the zone apex 
(it has to according to RFC)

c) there are signatures either only for algorithm A or only for algorithm B

The idea is that just adding a new key with algorithm B (the strong) 
without chaining it to the parent zone doesn't add any new security, 
since the chain of trust is secured by the (the weak) algorithm A.

So, yes the RFCs need a clarification and yes the unbound is 
unnecessarily strict since such strict implementation doesn't add any 
additional security (because you don't have a chain of trust leading to 
a key).  Wouter, object now or never :).

Sam, thanks for your persistence :), the "unsupported algorithm" was the 
missing piece I was looking for.

Ondrej

On 18.11.2010 12:37, Samuel Weiler wrote:
> On Thu, 18 Nov 2010, Ond?ej Sur? wrote:
>
>> 1) there is a known cryptographic attack against algorithm A
> ...
>> 7) if the validating resolver is OK with just one or another and not
>> both algorithm signatures, it could be convinced to validate the
>> result just by seeing (spoofed) signatures with algorithm A. So the
>> validating resolver sees spoofed records and it's spoofed signatures
>> using just algoritm A and it validates the result.
>
> This is a different sort of downgrade attack than the one these rules
> were designed to protect against. Indeed, to address this attack within
> the protocol, we'd need to require resolvers to check EVERY algorithm's
> signature (if they can). We didn't do that before, and it's probably
> unwise to make that change now.
>
> The current work-around is for the zone owner to STOP signing with the
> known-broken algorithm A. That leaves code that only supports A out in
> the cold. If you're assuming resolvers support both A and B (as your
> clarification says), there's no problem.
>
>> What do I miss here? I really do think that there is no downgrade
>> attack protection if it's not implemented on both sides (authoritative
>> and validating-recursive).
>
> Indeed, for the attack you're describing, the resolver would need to be
> involved, and it would need to change.
>
> The downgrade attack that led to this is documented in a message to
> namedroppers on 13 August 2003, Subject line "DNSSECbis Q-2: degradation
> attack". With the archives off-line, perhaps I should resend it.

Please do.

Ondrej
-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
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  -------------------------------------------

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On 18.11.2010 15:05, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * W. C. A. Wijngaards:
>
>> That is what unbound does.  And it gets algorithm downgrade protection
>> security as a benefit (for the algorithms that it implements).
>
> And I don't see any other way to get a priori downgrade protection.
> There is no ordering of algorithm strengths.  For example, we don't
> know if SHA-1 or SHA-256 will be broken first.

(See my other mail.)  You don't get a downgrade protection before 
chaining the new algorithm to the parent zone.

> A posterio, you can drop validation for known-to-be-broken algorithms.
> But even that might be not so easy because it's somewhat subjective
> when an algorithm is broken.

Dropping the know-to-be-broken algorithms doesn't help the old 
non-upgraded resolvers, hence we should not rely on anything like that.

Ondrej
-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
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  -------------------------------------------

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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Wouter, Jelte,

On 18.11.2010 15:33, Jelte Jansen wrote:
> IMHO, we should either do downgrade protection for all cases

I suggest we properly define what a "downgrade protection" is and how 
does it protect the zone.  I've fallen for this trap too and it helped 
me a lot to write it down.

Let's define (I skip KSK and ZSK for sake of sanity and I skip RFC5011 
for the same reason):

Algorithm A is supported.
Algorithm B is also supported.

Zone X has following properties:
   1) DS record for algorithm A
   2) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm A - DNSKEY(A)
   3) Signatures with DNSKEY(A)

Zone Y has following properties:
   1) DS record for algorithm A
   2) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm A - DNSKEY(A)
   3) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm B - DNSKEY(B)
   4) Signatures with DNSKEY(A) and DNSKEY(B)

What you are saying is that Zone Y is more secure than Zone X.  And I 
don't think so, because there is a step when you rely only on algorithm A.

Now let's add:

Zone Z has following properties
   1) DS record for algorithm A
   2) DS record for algorithm B
   3) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm A - DNSKEY(A)
   4) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm B - DNSKEY(B)
   5) Signatures with DNSKEY(A) and DNSKEY(B)

I think that only Zone Z is more secure than Zone X and Zone Y.  And 
because you don't have to keep both DS records for algorithm A and 
algorithm B in the parent zone (ie. you can just exchange the DS) then 
the key algorithm rollover can be less painful.

I would even suggest that the condition of "having the chain of trust" 
from TA to the key with a specific algorithm also applies for Sam's case 
for introducing the new "unknown" algorithm.  But I haven't given it 
much thought and I rather thing it through more before coming to any 
conclusion.

Ondrej
-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
  tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
  -------------------------------------------

From brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com  Thu Nov 18 13:01:19 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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I don't think the example is complete or accurate enough, since the
security at the delegation step depends on the parent's algorithms,
not the child's.

See below in-line for additional comments...

On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 4:37 PM, Ond=F8ej Sur=FD <ondrej.sury@nic.cz> wrote=
:
> Wouter, Jelte,
>
> On 18.11.2010 15:33, Jelte Jansen wrote:
>>
>> IMHO, we should either do downgrade protection for all cases
>
> I suggest we properly define what a "downgrade protection" is and how doe=
s
> it protect the zone. =A0I've fallen for this trap too and it helped me a =
lot
> to write it down.
>
> Let's define (I skip KSK and ZSK for sake of sanity and I skip RFC5011 fo=
r
> the same reason):
>
> Algorithm A is supported.
> Algorithm B is also supported.
>
> Zone X has following properties:
> =A01) DS record for algorithm A
1a) Signatures for DS(A), using DNSKEY(PA),DNSKEY(PB) (parent alg A
and parent alg B) -- may not be the same as A and B
> =A02) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm A - DNSKEY(A)
> =A03) Signatures with DNSKEY(A)
>
> Zone Y has following properties:
> =A01) DS record for algorithm A
1a) Signatures for DS(A), using DNSKEY(PA),DNSKEY(PB) (id.)
> =A02) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm A - DNSKEY(A)
> =A03) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm B - DNSKEY(B)
> =A04) Signatures with DNSKEY(A) and DNSKEY(B)
>
> What you are saying is that Zone Y is more secure than Zone X. =A0And I d=
on't
> think so, because there is a step when you rely only on algorithm A.

NB - the DS does not use the algorithms, it uses (orthogonal to
algorithms) hashes.
If the hash used is more secure than A, then Y is more secure than X.

> Now let's add:
>
> Zone Z has following properties
> =A01) DS record for algorithm A
> =A02) DS record for algorithm B
> =A03) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm A - DNSKEY(A)
> =A04) DNSKEY in apex for algorithm B - DNSKEY(B)
> =A05) Signatures with DNSKEY(A) and DNSKEY(B)

Here is where the example definitely helps in at least presenting the
components for comparison.

If something is seen on the wire in zone Z, without the signature
DNSKEY(B), it might be the result of a downgrade.
I.e., if A is weak, and the signature based on DNSKEY(A) can be
spoofed, this needs to be protected against.
This also means the signatures over the DNSKEYs at the apex similarly
need downgrade protection, and can only be used/trusted,
if they all match those found in the corresponding DS set of the parent.

If the parent DS is not the source of the list of algorithms which
must all be used for signing everything in the zone, downgrades are
possible.

I think there is wiggle room for the addition of new DNSKEYs and
algorithms, via the ZSK/KSK linkage, that differs slightly.

I.e. KSK must match DS for algorithms, and ZSK must match RRSIG for
algorithms. It is possible that algorithms present in ZSKs are not
present in KSKs.
And in such a case, unbound is correct and bind is incorrect, IMHO.

Brian

> I think that only Zone Z is more secure than Zone X and Zone Y. =A0And be=
cause
> you don't have to keep both DS records for algorithm A and algorithm B in
> the parent zone (ie. you can just exchange the DS) then the key algorithm
> rollover can be less painful.
>
> I would even suggest that the condition of "having the chain of trust" fr=
om
> TA to the key with a specific algorithm also applies for Sam's case for
> introducing the new "unknown" algorithm. =A0But I haven't given it much
> thought and I rather thing it through more before coming to any conclusio=
n.
>
> Ondrej
> --
> =A0Ond=F8ej Sur=FD
> =A0vedouc=ED v=FDzkumu/Head of R&D department
> =A0-------------------------------------------
> =A0CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o. =A0 =A0-- =A0 =A0Laborato=F8e CZ.NIC
> =A0Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
> =A0mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz =A0 =A0http://nic.cz/
> =A0tel:+420.222745110 =A0 =A0 =A0 fax:+420.222745112
> =A0-------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>

From ondrej.sury@nic.cz  Thu Nov 18 13:30:57 2010
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On 18.11.2010 22:02, Brian Dickson wrote:
> I think there is wiggle room for the addition of new DNSKEYs and
> algorithms, via the ZSK/KSK linkage, that differs slightly.

Indeed.  But I see that as a variation of "must have a chain of trust" 
and relation between DS(parent)-DNSKEY(child).

> I.e. KSK must match DS for algorithms, and ZSK must match RRSIG for
> algorithms. It is possible that algorithms present in ZSKs are not
> present in KSKs.

Although bind doesn't treat this case as a valid zone and 
dnssec-signzone has to be silenced with -P, I was unable to find the 
reference to invalidity of such zone neither in 403[3-5] nor 3757.  That 
doesn't mean it doesn't exists, just that I didn't find it.

> And in such a case, unbound is correct and bind is incorrect, IMHO.

My feeling is that the same rule about DS-DNSKEY should apply for 
KSK-ZSK.  So if you publish a ZSK(A) and ZSK(B) and sign them with your 
KSK, you have to have RRSIG(ZSK(A)) and RRSIG(ZSK(B)) over all RRs in 
your zone.

O.
-- 
  Ondøej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoøe CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
  tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
  -------------------------------------------

From hallam@gmail.com  Thu Nov 18 13:52:57 2010
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Subject: [dnsext] Advice sought on DNS file format for new RRs
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--0016e6434ae8de001c04955ad238
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

All,

I am currently writing up a major revision to CAA which I hope to have
available as an ID in the near future.

The main outstanding issue is the mapping between the wire format and the
DNS file representation.

The ideal file format would be something like the following:

   $ORIGIN example.com
   .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1

   .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
                    XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==

   .       CAA critical path


At a high level the syntax is

CAA "policy" <OID> | "path" <BASE64> | critical <string> | "unknown"
<BASE64>

Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the next person. But I am trying
to think round the question of maintaining DNS servers. I have a subfield
encoding here with three different variations on the data type. Is this
acceptable?

The other thing that I was thinking about was that maybe using EBNF might be
too big a hammer here. LR(1) grammars were developed as a model for natural
language. They are not a good basis for programming language syntax and a
worse basis for data and protocol representations. A meta-encoding that
enforces some degree of regularity is generally superior. Has anyone else
been thinking along those lines?

I know that I can crib what I need from other RFCs, but there are good cribs
and bad ones. Which ones would people recommend?

I want to get this draft right first time if possible because it is cutting
across two separate standards area. The subject matter is deeply connected
to issues in the practices space and I am really sure that the IETF does not
want to get into that type of discussion. So I want to design a proposal
that allows the IETF to hand over a mechanism which can then be elaborated
endlessly by the lawyers if needed. If this is to work we need to allow IETF
and CABForum to decouple their efforts.

The other incentive for getting this right first time is that CAA has a very
powerful deployment incentive for the CAs and deployment only requires the
co-operation of about 20 parties. While there are 200 organizations that
represent themselves as CAs, many are white label to another CA. And even
though there are multiple roots in the browsers, most of the major CAs have
collected multiple roots. The bottom line here is that this is a feature
that can be presented as an immediate and important win that illustrates the
type of benefits that DNSSEC can realize for the Internet.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e6434ae8de001c04955ad238
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

All,<div><br></div><div>I am currently writing up a major revision to CAA w=
hich I hope to have available as an ID in the near future.</div><div><br></=
div><div>The main outstanding issue is the mapping between the wire format =
and the DNS file representation.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>The ideal file format would be something like the follo=
wing:</div><div><br></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"fo=
nt-family: &#39;Times New Roman&#39;; font-size: medium; "><pre style=3D"wo=
rd-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap; ">
   $ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a>
   .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1</pre><pre style=3D"word-wrap:=
 break-word; white-space: pre-wrap; ">   .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIA=
WUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
                    XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA=3D=3D</pre><pre style=
=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap; ">   .       CAA critical=
 path</pre></span></div><div><br clear=3D"all">At a high level the syntax i=
s=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>CAA &quot;policy&quot; &lt;OID&gt; | &quot;path&quot; &=
lt;BASE64&gt; | critical &lt;string&gt; | &quot;unknown&quot; &lt;BASE64&gt=
;</div><div><br></div><div>Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the ne=
xt person. But I am trying to think round the question of maintaining DNS s=
ervers. I have a subfield encoding here with three different variations on =
the data type. Is this acceptable?</div>
<div><br></div><div>The other thing that I was thinking about was that mayb=
e using EBNF might be too big a hammer here. LR(1) grammars were developed =
as a model for natural language. They are not a good basis for programming =
language syntax and a worse basis for data and protocol representations. A =
meta-encoding that enforces some degree of regularity is generally superior=
. Has anyone else been thinking along those lines?</div>
<div><br></div><div>I know that I can crib what I need from other RFCs, but=
 there are good cribs and bad ones. Which ones would people recommend?</div=
><div><br></div><div>I want to get this draft right first time if possible =
because it is cutting across two separate standards area. The subject matte=
r is deeply connected to issues in the practices space and I am really sure=
 that the IETF does not want to get into that type of discussion. So I want=
 to design a proposal that allows the IETF to hand over a mechanism which c=
an then be elaborated endlessly by the lawyers if needed. If this is to wor=
k we need to allow IETF and CABForum to decouple their efforts.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>The other incentive for getting this right first time i=
s that CAA has a very powerful deployment incentive for the CAs and deploym=
ent only requires the co-operation of about 20 parties. While there are 200=
 organizations that represent themselves as CAs, many are white label to an=
other CA. And even though there are multiple roots in the browsers, most of=
 the major CAs have collected multiple roots. The bottom line here is that =
this is a feature that can be presented as an immediate and important win t=
hat illustrates the type of benefits that DNSSEC can realize for the Intern=
et.=A0</div>
<div><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallamb=
aker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e6434ae8de001c04955ad238--

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To: dnsext@ietf.org
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE53927.9090203@isc.org> <4CE58E90.6030607@nic.cz> <AANLkTin2H7UkP7FVfz3GN74CKtqn2OKo7MmcKMGOkvNY@mail.gmail.com><4CE59B3D.5020109@nic.cz>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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The intent of this section was to prevent downgrade to insecure due
to a attacker dropping RRSIGS.  DNSSEC has always been "if *any*
signature validates then the RRset validates".  There is no concept
of a "more secure algorithm" in DNSSEC.  There may be outside of
DNSSEC but not inside.

If the archives were online you could see that this was the intent
of this paragraph.

When a operator of a zone publishes DS (or trust-anchors) for a
zone with a algorithm that is a claim that the entire zone is signed
with that algorithm.  That claim will continue to hold for the life
of the DS records or until the operator can be assured that the
trust anchors have been removed for the algorithm, whichever is
longer.

Additionally the MUST is a directive to *zone operators*.  A zone
operator can comply with that MUST but validation will still fail
with unbound as unbound requires that a zone be signed with DNSKEYs
which are NOT in the zone prior to adding the DNSKEY to the zone
due to caching.  On this alone it is clear that unbound is in the
wrong.

If you want to do downgrade protection between algorithms one can
but only for the algorithms listed in the DS / trust-anchors.  They
are the only algorithms that the zone operator has made any claims
of existance for.

I think the paragraph in question should be relaxed to make to MUST
only apply to algorithms listed in the DS / published trust anchors.
This will allow for gradual introduction of RRSIG for new algorithms.
The current wording prevents this and is a real pain for large
zones.

It will also resolve this issue as now it is the sum of the algorithms
listed in DS (trust-anchors) + DNSKEY.

Mark

P.S. we need a better way to publish trust anchors in-band with
lifetimes etc. so that one can be assured that trust anchors expire
like DS and zones expire but that should be a different discussion.
RFC 5011 really isn't good enough.

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

From brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com  Thu Nov 18 21:01:17 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 8:41 PM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
>
> The intent of this section was to prevent downgrade to insecure due
> to a attacker dropping RRSIGS. =A0DNSSEC has always been "if *any*
> signature validates then the RRset validates". =A0There is no concept
> of a "more secure algorithm" in DNSSEC. =A0There may be outside of
> DNSSEC but not inside.

This is likely what the original intent was, and certainly within the conte=
xt
of a single algorithm, or a validator that only understands one of the
algorithms
present, then it makes sense that only one RRSIG needs to validate.

However, consider the case of multiple algorithms used (to sign), and
validators that understand just one of those, vs validators that understand
more than one, ideally all of them.

What are the implications of "any RRSIG will do" versus the alternative of
 "one RRSIG of each understood algorithm must validate"?

For brevity, the algorithms are A, B, C, .... and the possible requirements
are either "A | B | C..." (or any subset thereof), or "A & B & C ..."
(or any subset thereof).

It might not be known apriori which of A, B, C, ... is "weaker", or
which might be broken first.

The argument should be, if the "&" logic is used, it doesn't matter.
And in fact, the bad
things that result from "|" result regardless of which is broken first.

If any given algorithm is broken, and only one RRSIG needs to match
(the "|" case),
then every zone signed with that algorithm can subsequently be compromised.
RRSIGs can be produced by an attacker, matching forged data. This
applies not only
to zone data, but also to DNSKEYs, and DS records and their RRSIGs.

The implication as far as both detection, and response, are
substantial. Removal of the bad
algorithm would be mandated, and need to happen extremely fast, on the
data side. Zones would
need to be re-signed completely. The rest is left as an exercise for
the paranoid reader.

On the other hand, if the requirement is that all understood
algorithms present, must have a valid
matching RRSIG, then having even two algorithms (in common between the
signer and validator)
changes everything.

The compromise of one algorithm has no immediate implication, since
forgeries cannot occur without
forging the RRSIGs for all known algorithms. At worst, validators that
only understand one of the
algorithms used, and specifically the broken algorithm, are exposed to
attack. Everyone else can safely
respond at their leisure, with no need for drastic immediate action.

The incremental cost of signing, and of validating, multiple RRSIGs,
is linear, O(n) where n is the number of algorithms.
For zone owners who are already signing using multiple algorithms, the
incremental cost is zero.
And for validating, caching resolvers, the incremental cost occurs
only the first time the record is retrieved, and validated.
Once validated, and cached, there is no incremental cost.

So, my suggestion is, if we need to revisit the scope of the -bis to
incorporate this logic, perhaps we should.
And if it can be already considered in-scope, the benefits arguably
outweigh the concerns of  "changing the meaning" of the  existing
RFC(s).

Brian


> If the archives were online you could see that this was the intent
> of this paragraph.
>
> When a operator of a zone publishes DS (or trust-anchors) for a
> zone with a algorithm that is a claim that the entire zone is signed
> with that algorithm. =A0That claim will continue to hold for the life
> of the DS records or until the operator can be assured that the
> trust anchors have been removed for the algorithm, whichever is
> longer.
>
> Additionally the MUST is a directive to *zone operators*. =A0A zone
> operator can comply with that MUST but validation will still fail
> with unbound as unbound requires that a zone be signed with DNSKEYs
> which are NOT in the zone prior to adding the DNSKEY to the zone
> due to caching. =A0On this alone it is clear that unbound is in the
> wrong.
>
> If you want to do downgrade protection between algorithms one can
> but only for the algorithms listed in the DS / trust-anchors. =A0They
> are the only algorithms that the zone operator has made any claims
> of existance for.

I'm unclear here. Are you arguing that downgrade protection is signaled
by the zone owner via DS using multiple algorithms, and if signaled is mand=
atory
for implementations to do?

Or that downgrade protection is optional, and can only be done for algorith=
ms
present in DS/trust anchors?

> I think the paragraph in question should be relaxed to make to MUST
> only apply to algorithms listed in the DS / published trust anchors.
> This will allow for gradual introduction of RRSIG for new algorithms.
> The current wording prevents this and is a real pain for large
> zones.

I like gradual introduction of RRSIGs for new algorithms.

I do not like optional for downgrade protection.

Downgrade protection for algorithms is every bit as important as
downgrade to insecure.
Precisely because a broken algorithm *is* insecure, in fact.

> It will also resolve this issue as now it is the sum of the algorithms
> listed in DS (trust-anchors) + DNSKEY.

I'm fine with excluding DNSKEY, so long as it is the sum of DS/trust-anchor=
s.

Brian

> Mark
>
> P.S. we need a better way to publish trust anchors in-band with
> lifetimes etc. so that one can be assured that trust anchors expire
> like DS and zones expire but that should be a different discussion.
> RFC 5011 really isn't good enough.
>
> --
> Mark Andrews, ISC
> 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
> PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 INTERNET: marka@is=
c.org
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>

From marka@isc.org  Thu Nov 18 22:03:54 2010
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To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE53927.9090203@isc.org> <4CE58E90.6030607@nic.cz> <AANLkTin2H7UkP7FVfz3GN74CKtqn2OKo7MmcKMGOkvNY@mail.gmail.com> <4CE59B3D.5020109@nic.cz> <20101119004134.993F26EB749@drugs.dv.isc.org><AANLkTi=Hp6s4xwLQGyWv3BNtvUf5-SDtgUzHbNKtfCV1@mail.gmail.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 19 Nov 2010 01:02:02 EDT." <AANLkTi=Hp6s4xwLQGyWv3BNtvUf5-SDtgUzHbNKtfCV1@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2010 17:04:15 +1100
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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In message <AANLkTi=Hp6s4xwLQGyWv3BNtvUf5-SDtgUzHbNKtfCV1@mail.gmail.com>, Bria
n Dickson writes:
> On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 8:41 PM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
> >
> > The intent of this section was to prevent downgrade to insecure due
> > to a attacker dropping RRSIGS.  DNSSEC has always been "if *any*
> > signature validates then the RRset validates".  There is no concept
> > of a "more secure algorithm" in DNSSEC.  There may be outside of
> > DNSSEC but not inside.
> 
> This is likely what the original intent was, and certainly within the conte=
> xt
> of a single algorithm, or a validator that only understands one of the
> algorithms
> present, then it makes sense that only one RRSIG needs to validate.

It was expressed in the context of multiple algorithms and no one rejected
the premise.
 
> However, consider the case of multiple algorithms used (to sign), and
> validators that understand just one of those, vs validators that understand
> more than one, ideally all of them.
> 
> What are the implications of "any RRSIG will do" versus the alternative of
> "one RRSIG of each understood algorithm must validate"?

The working group looked at this when making the decision to accept one
signature as good enough.
 
> For brevity, the algorithms are A, B, C, .... and the possible requirements
> are either "A | B | C..." (or any subset thereof), or "A & B & C ..."
> (or any subset thereof).
> 
> It might not be known apriori which of A, B, C, ... is "weaker", or
> which might be broken first.
> 
> The argument should be, if the "&" logic is used, it doesn't matter.
> And in fact, the bad
> things that result from "|" result regardless of which is broken first.
> 
> If any given algorithm is broken, and only one RRSIG needs to match
> (the "|" case),
> then every zone signed with that algorithm can subsequently be compromised.
> RRSIGs can be produced by an attacker, matching forged data. This
> applies not only
> to zone data, but also to DNSKEYs, and DS records and their RRSIGs.
> 
> The implication as far as both detection, and response, are
> substantial. Removal of the bad algorithm would be mandated, and need
> to happen extremely fast, on the data side. Zones would
> need to be re-signed completely. The rest is left as an exercise for
> the paranoid reader.

You don't need to remove the broken algorithm from the zone.  You
just need to stop the validator using it to validate.

> On the other hand, if the requirement is that all understood
> algorithms present, must have a valid matching RRSIG, then having even
> two algorithms (in common between the signer and validator)
> changes everything.

This isn't a requirement of DNSSEC and never has been.
 
> The compromise of one algorithm has no immediate implication, since
> forgeries cannot occur without forging the RRSIGs for all known
> algorithms. At worst, validators that only understand one of the
> algorithms used, and specifically the broken algorithm, are exposed to
> attack. Everyone else can safely respond at their leisure, with no need
> for drastic immediate action.

Which was understood when the decision to accept any signature was made.

> The incremental cost of signing, and of validating, multiple RRSIGs,
> is linear, O(n) where n is the number of algorithms.
> For zone owners who are already signing using multiple algorithms, the
> incremental cost is zero.
> And for validating, caching resolvers, the incremental cost occurs
> only the first time the record is retrieved, and validated.
> Once validated, and cached, there is no incremental cost.
> 
> So, my suggestion is, if we need to revisit the scope of the -bis to
> incorporate this logic, perhaps we should.
> And if it can be already considered in-scope, the benefits arguably
> outweigh the concerns of  "changing the meaning" of the  existing
> RFC(s).
> 
> Brian
> 
> > If the archives were online you could see that this was the intent
> > of this paragraph.
> >
> > When a operator of a zone publishes DS (or trust-anchors) for a
> > zone with a algorithm that is a claim that the entire zone is signed
> > with that algorithm.  That claim will continue to hold for the life
> > of the DS records or until the operator can be assured that the
> > trust anchors have been removed for the algorithm, whichever is
> > longer.
> >
> > Additionally the MUST is a directive to *zone operators*.  A zone
> > operator can comply with that MUST but validation will still fail
> > with unbound as unbound requires that a zone be signed with DNSKEYs
> > which are NOT in the zone prior to adding the DNSKEY to the zone
> > due to caching.  On this alone it is clear that unbound is in the
> > wrong.
> >
> > If you want to do downgrade protection between algorithms one can
> > but only for the algorithms listed in the DS / trust-anchors.  They
> > are the only algorithms that the zone operator has made any claims
> > of existance for.
> 
> I'm unclear here. Are you arguing that downgrade protection is signaled
> by the zone owner via DS using multiple algorithms, and if signaled is mand=
> atory
> for implementations to do?
> 
> Or that downgrade protection is optional, and can only be done for algorith=
> ms
> present in DS/trust anchors?

If you have multiple algorithms listed in the DS then as a validator
you should expect to be able to validate the response using either
of those algorithms.  If you have a local policy that says "only
trust A if A and B are present" then you can only do that reliably
when the DS lists A and B.  Note this local policy is NOT the default
policy for DNSSEC and would require extensions to a standard validator
to support.

Personally I don't think there is any real benefit in supporting
such a policy.  If you don't trust B just don't use it.

One could also have a local policy of verify all algorithms.  This
too would require extensions to the validator.  You would need to
check all the algorithms in the DNSKEY RRset and record which ones
successfully validated then examine the DS RRset/trust anchors and
check that all the algorithms there were in the successful list
produced from the DNSKEY RRset.  You get algorithm downgrade
protection if you do this.

Note this does not require that you check that there is a signature
for every algorithm in the DNSKEY RRset.

> > I think the paragraph in question should be relaxed to make to MUST
> > only apply to algorithms listed in the DS / published trust anchors.
> > This will allow for gradual introduction of RRSIG for new algorithms.
> > The current wording prevents this and is a real pain for large
> > zones.
> 
> I like gradual introduction of RRSIGs for new algorithms.
> 
> I do not like optional for downgrade protection.
> 
> Downgrade protection for algorithms is every bit as important as
> downgrade to insecure.
> Precisely because a broken algorithm *is* insecure, in fact.

If a algorithm is insecure then you should remove it from the list
of acceptable algorithms in you validator.  That way you get insecure
not trusted out of the validator.

> > It will also resolve this issue as now it is the sum of the algorithms
> > listed in DS (trust-anchors) + DNSKEY.
> 
> I'm fine with excluding DNSKEY, so long as it is the sum of
> DS/trust-anchors.
> 
> Brian
> 
> > Mark
> >
> > P.S. we need a better way to publish trust anchors in-band with
> > lifetimes etc. so that one can be assured that trust anchors expire
> > like DS and zones expire but that should be a different discussion.
> > RFC 5011 really isn't good enough.
> >
> > --
> > Mark Andrews, ISC
> > 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
> > PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org
> > _______________________________________________
> > dnsext mailing list
> > dnsext@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
> >
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On 19.11.2010 01:41, Mark Andrews wrote:
> If you want to do downgrade protection between algorithms one can
> but only for the algorithms listed in the DS / trust-anchors.  They
> are the only algorithms that the zone operator has made any claims
> of existance for.
>
> I think the paragraph in question should be relaxed to make to MUST
> only apply to algorithms listed in the DS / published trust anchors.
> This will allow for gradual introduction of RRSIG for new algorithms.
> The current wording prevents this and is a real pain for large
> zones.

I agree.  That was exactly what I was trying to say in my last few emails.

Ondrej
-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
  tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
  -------------------------------------------

From george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk  Thu Nov 18 23:05:44 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On 11/19/2010 07:04 AM, Mark Andrews wrote:
>>
>> Downgrade protection for algorithms is every bit as important as
>> downgrade to insecure.
>> Precisely because a broken algorithm *is* insecure, in fact.
> 
> If a algorithm is insecure then you should remove it from the list
> of acceptable algorithms in you validator.  That way you get insecure
> not trusted out of the validator.
> 

If you do that, and the zone(s) do 'normal' pre-publish rollover from
that broken algorithm to a not-yet-broken one, you'd get bogus, not
insecure, during the roll

Jelte

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Cc: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>, dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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Hi,

On 11/18/2010 09:16 PM, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> The idea is that just adding a new key with algorithm B (the strong)
> without chaining it to the parent zone doesn't add any new security,
> since the chain of trust is secured by the (the weak) algorithm A.

Today, the RFC has rules for DS-DNSKEY and rule for DNSKEY-DATA.  You
want to create new rules for DS-DATA.

> So, yes the RFCs need a clarification and yes the unbound is
> unnecessarily strict since such strict implementation doesn't add any
> additional security (because you don't have a chain of trust leading to
> a key).  Wouter, object now or never :).

You called?  Yes, unbound is strict, it enforces the exact zone signing
requirements from the RFC.  But, I am not objecting to you strongly.  I
want to caution making changes to RFC4035, there must be backwards
compatibility.

But the above makes the algorithm-set determined by the parent.
Now, the algorithm set is determined by the child (when you get there).
I appreciate the concern that if you want to protect a downgrade, then
you must signal this at the parent.

(the security of that parent is that of a new zone; with different owners).

Mark Andrews wrote:
> Additionally the MUST is a directive to *zone operators*.  A zone
> operator can comply with that MUST but validation will still fail
> with unbound as unbound requires that a zone be signed with DNSKEYs
> which are NOT in the zone prior to adding the DNSKEY to the zone
> due to caching.  On this alone it is clear that unbound is in the
> wrong.

Let me try to understand this and then respond.  You talk about having
to prepublish signatures before the keys are published.

This is necessary with the current rules today for algorithm-support
reasons.  It does not go away if unbound has less strict checking.  The
affected servers could be bind, unbound or other implementations.

Your change to the rules makes it possible to add the key, and then
signatures slowly, with a new algorithm, (as long as the DS is not added
yet).  I appreciate that niceness.

You are correct that you must also take the trust-anchors into account
to do it properly (and I do not do that today).

Best regards,
   Wouter
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On 19.11.2010 10:46, W.C.A. Wijngaards wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> Hi,
>
> On 11/18/2010 09:16 PM, Ondřej Surý wrote:
>> The idea is that just adding a new key with algorithm B (the strong)
>> without chaining it to the parent zone doesn't add any new security,
>> since the chain of trust is secured by the (the weak) algorithm A.
>
> Today, the RFC has rules for DS-DNSKEY and rule for DNSKEY-DATA.  You
> want to create new rules for DS-DATA.

Just to clarify - I agree that what Unbound does is in alignment with 
what RFC says.

>> So, yes the RFCs need a clarification and yes the unbound is
>> unnecessarily strict since such strict implementation doesn't add any
>> additional security (because you don't have a chain of trust leading to
>> a key).  Wouter, object now or never :).
>
> You called?  Yes, unbound is strict, it enforces the exact zone signing
> requirements from the RFC.  But, I am not objecting to you strongly.  I
> want to caution making changes to RFC4035, there must be backwards
> compatibility.
 >
> But the above makes the algorithm-set determined by the parent.
> Now, the algorithm set is determined by the child (when you get there).
> I appreciate the concern that if you want to protect a downgrade, then
> you must signal this at the parent.

Yes.

> Mark Andrews wrote:
>> Additionally the MUST is a directive to *zone operators*.  A zone
>> operator can comply with that MUST but validation will still fail
>> with unbound as unbound requires that a zone be signed with DNSKEYs
>> which are NOT in the zone prior to adding the DNSKEY to the zone
>> due to caching.  On this alone it is clear that unbound is in the
>> wrong.
>
> Let me try to understand this and then respond.  You talk about having
> to prepublish signatures before the keys are published.
>
> This is necessary with the current rules today for algorithm-support
> reasons.  It does not go away if unbound has less strict checking.  The
> affected servers could be bind, unbound or other implementations.
>
> Your change to the rules makes it possible to add the key, and then
> signatures slowly, with a new algorithm, (as long as the DS is not added
> yet).  I appreciate that niceness.
>
> You are correct that you must also take the trust-anchors into account
> to do it properly (and I do not do that today).

I suggest we all think about that and put the result into a -bis document.

Ondrej
-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
  tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
  -------------------------------------------

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On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 10:53 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>wrote:

> I am currently writing up a major revision to CAA which I hope to have
> available as an ID in the near future.
> The main outstanding issue is the mapping between the wire format and the
> DNS file representation.
>

Hi Phillip,

You are certainly doing something new here - no other RR I know of can
appear in different syntaxes. This alone will make 'CAA' special. All
RRtypes I know about have a rigid specification, and put their flexibility
in a label or text field (which has issues of its own!).

95% of all RRtypes have a remarkable symmetry between their wire
representation and their 'zone file format', to the extent that PowerDNS has
templated RRtype code which, depending on the operation required either
emits or consumes, wire format or 'representation format'.

For the SOA record, this looks like:
boilerplate_conv(SOA, ns_t_soa,
                 conv.xfrLabel(d_mname, true);  // true means compression
may be used
                 conv.xfrLabel(d_rname, true);
                 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.serial);
                 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.refresh);
                 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.retry);
                 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.expire);
                 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.minimum);
                 );
This is the *full* definition of how the SOA rrtype works in PowerDNS.
'conv' either reads or writes, either to/from a packet or to/from zone file
format.

Given the fact that this works so well for so many record types, it feels
like it is a Good Thing for records to display this symmetry.

The ideal file format would be something like the following:
>
>    $ORIGIN example.com
>    .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
>
>    .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
>                     XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==
>
>    .       CAA critical path
>
>
> At a high level the syntax is
>
> CAA "policy" <OID> | "path" <BASE64> | critical <string> | "unknown"
> <BASE64>
>
> Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the next person. But I am trying
> to think round the question of maintaining DNS servers. I have a subfield
> encoding here with three different variations on the data type. Is this
> acceptable?
>

It would of course be acceptable, and PowerDNS will surely implement it. We
do NSEC3 too, which also required a lot of infrastructure (for the
bitfields).

However, if you care about widespread acceptance of your record, you may
find it advantageous to not be the first RRtype that can appear in three
wholly different forms (both on the wire and in zone representation).

I realise that this might turn CAA into 'another TXT record with formatting
rules', of course. But it also might pay not to be too special.

    Bert

--20cf3054a6e9cb306504955b6954
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 10:53 PM, Phillip Ha=
llam-Baker <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam=
@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

<div>I am currently writing up a major revision to CAA which I hope to have=
 available as an ID in the near future.</div><div>The main outstanding issu=
e is the mapping between the wire format and the DNS file representation.=
=A0</div>

</blockquote><div><br></div><div>Hi Phillip,</div><div><br></div><div>You a=
re certainly doing something new here - no other RR I know of can appear in=
 different syntaxes. This alone will make &#39;CAA&#39; special. All RRtype=
s I know about have a rigid specification, and put their flexibility in a l=
abel or text field (which has issues of its own!).</div>

<div><br></div><div>95% of all RRtypes have a remarkable symmetry between t=
heir wire representation and their &#39;zone file format&#39;, to the exten=
t that PowerDNS has templated RRtype code which, depending on the operation=
 required either emits or consumes, wire format or &#39;representation form=
at&#39;.</div>

<div><br></div><div>For the SOA record, this looks like:</div><div><div>boi=
lerplate_conv(SOA, ns_t_soa,=A0</div><div>=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =
=A0 conv.xfrLabel(d_mname, true); =A0// true means compression may be used<=
/div><div>=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 conv.xfrLabel(d_rname, true);<=
/div>

<div>=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.serial);</div=
><div>=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.refresh);</d=
iv><div>=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.retry);</d=
iv><div>=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.expire);</=
div>

<div>=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 conv.xfr32BitInt(d_st.minimum);</di=
v><div>=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 );</div></div><div>This is the *f=
ull* definition of how the SOA rrtype works in PowerDNS. &#39;conv&#39; eit=
her reads or writes, either to/from a packet or to/from zone file format.</=
div>

<div><br></div><div>Given the fact that this works so well for so many reco=
rd types, it feels like it is a Good Thing for records to display this symm=
etry.</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">

<div>The ideal file format would be something like the following:</div><div=
><br></div><div><span style=3D"font-family:&#39;Times New Roman&#39;;font-s=
ize:medium"><pre style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;white-space:pre-wrap">   $OR=
IGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example.com</a>
   .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1</pre><pre style=3D"word-wrap:=
break-word;white-space:pre-wrap">   .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBA=
IBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
                    XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA=3D=3D</pre><pre style=
=3D"word-wrap:break-word;white-space:pre-wrap">   .       CAA critical path=
</pre></span></div><div><br clear=3D"all">At a high level the syntax is=A0<=
/div>
<div><br></div><div>CAA &quot;policy&quot; &lt;OID&gt; | &quot;path&quot; &=
lt;BASE64&gt; | critical &lt;string&gt; | &quot;unknown&quot; &lt;BASE64&gt=
;</div><div><br></div><div>Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the ne=
xt person. But I am trying to think round the question of maintaining DNS s=
ervers. I have a subfield encoding here with three different variations on =
the data type. Is this acceptable?</div>

</blockquote><div><br></div><div>It would of course be acceptable, and Powe=
rDNS will surely implement it. We do NSEC3 too, which also required a lot o=
f infrastructure (for the bitfields).</div><div><br></div><div>However, if =
you care about widespread acceptance of your record, you may find it advant=
ageous to not be the first RRtype that can appear in three wholly different=
 forms (both on the wire and in zone representation).</div>

<div><br></div><div>I realise that this might turn CAA into &#39;another TX=
T record with formatting rules&#39;, of course. But it also might pay not t=
o be too special.</div><div><br></div><div>=A0=A0 =A0Bert</div></div>

--20cf3054a6e9cb306504955b6954--

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On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 04:53:44PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the next person. But I am trying
> to think round the question of maintaining DNS servers. I have a subfield
> encoding here with three different variations on the data type. Is this
> acceptable?

I'm trying to understand the motivation.  Why not use three different
RRTYPEs?

I haven't thought about it very hard, but my first reaction is that
this RRTYPE is not going to be eligible for assignment by expert
review.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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In message <4CE629F1.2090907@isc.org>, Jelte Jansen writes:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> On 11/19/2010 07:04 AM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> >>
> >> Downgrade protection for algorithms is every bit as important as
> >> downgrade to insecure.
> >> Precisely because a broken algorithm *is* insecure, in fact.
> > 
> > If a algorithm is insecure then you should remove it from the list
> > of acceptable algorithms in you validator.  That way you get insecure
> > not trusted out of the validator.
> > 
> 
> If you do that, and the zone(s) do 'normal' pre-publish rollover from
> that broken algorithm to a not-yet-broken one, you'd get bogus, not
> insecure, during the roll
> 
> Jelte

No you don't.  Once a algorithm is marked as invalid the validator
behaves exactly as if the validator doesn't know about the algorithm.

During the pre-publish period there isn't a trust path into the zone with
a supported algorithm.
 
Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE50C01.4010104@nic.cz> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180630550.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE5898C.7050801@nic.cz><4CE64785.7090401@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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In message <4CE64785.7090401@nlnetlabs.nl>, "W.C.A. Wijngaards" writes:
> Hi,
> 
> On 11/18/2010 09:16 PM, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> > The idea is that just adding a new key with algorithm B (the strong)
> > without chaining it to the parent zone doesn't add any new security,
> > since the chain of trust is secured by the (the weak) algorithm A.
> 
> Today, the RFC has rules for DS-DNSKEY and rule for DNSKEY-DATA.  You
> want to create new rules for DS-DATA.

I want to make it possible to do incremental signing of new algorithms
which requires the rules to be relaxed but we can leave discussion of
that until we resolve the issue about whether the validator should be
checking or not.
 
> > So, yes the RFCs need a clarification and yes the unbound is
> > unnecessarily strict since such strict implementation doesn't add any
> > additional security (because you don't have a chain of trust leading to
> > a key).  Wouter, object now or never :).
> 
> You called?  Yes, unbound is strict, it enforces the exact zone signing
> requirements from the RFC.  But, I am not objecting to you strongly.  I
> want to caution making changes to RFC4035, there must be backwards
> compatibility.

Except the validator is not supposed to enforce it.  The point of
the rule, for the signer, was to ensure that there would be *a*
signature to validate with.

The downgrade attack it was supposed to protect against is downgrade
to insecure not downgrade between algorithms.

> But the above makes the algorithm-set determined by the parent.
> Now, the algorithm set is determined by the child (when you get there).
> I appreciate the concern that if you want to protect a downgrade, then
> you must signal this at the parent.

A zone is deem secure or insecure based on the list of algorithms
in the DS RRset.

> (the security of that parent is that of a new zone; with different owners).
> 
> Mark Andrews wrote:
> > Additionally the MUST is a directive to *zone operators*.  A zone
> > operator can comply with that MUST but validation will still fail
> > with unbound as unbound requires that a zone be signed with DNSKEYs
> > which are NOT in the zone prior to adding the DNSKEY to the zone
> > due to caching.  On this alone it is clear that unbound is in the
> > wrong.
> 
> Let me try to understand this and then respond.  You talk about having
> to prepublish signatures before the keys are published.
> 
> This is necessary with the current rules today for algorithm-support
> reasons.  It does not go away if unbound has less strict checking.  The
> affected servers could be bind, unbound or other implementations.

No it isn't necessary.

I start out with algorithm A in DS and DNSKEY.  The DNSKEY has a
TTL of 600.  I have a TXT record with a TTL of 600 which is fetch
300 seconds after the DNSKEY record is fetched.  I add a DNSKEY
with algorithm B and re-sign the entire zone with A+B meeting the
MUST.  301 second later a downstream validating client asks for the
TXT record.  The client get a DNSKEY RRset with A+B and a TXT with
A signatures.  This will validate as secure by a validator that
supports A only.  This will validate as insecure by a validator
that supports B only as there is no secure path from the parent to
the child.  It will validate as secure by a validator that supports
A+B.

Only when you start enforcing that the TXT and DNSKEY records have
to have matching algorithms in the validator does this break despite
the signer meeting the MUST.

Similarly you can go from A+B to just A by removing the DS records
for A, waiting for the old DS RRset to expire then removing the A
DNSKEYs.

> Your change to the rules makes it possible to add the key, and then
> signatures slowly, with a new algorithm, (as long as the DS is not added
> yet).  I appreciate that niceness.

> You are correct that you must also take the trust-anchors into account
> to do it properly (and I do not do that today).
> 
> Best regards,
>    Wouter
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Hi Mark,

On 11/19/2010 03:18 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> Except the validator is not supposed to enforce it.  The point of
> the rule, for the signer, was to ensure that there would be *a*
> signature to validate with.

Right, that is the confusion.

>> Let me try to understand this and then respond.  You talk about having
>> to prepublish signatures before the keys are published.
>>
>> This is necessary with the current rules today for algorithm-support
>> reasons.  It does not go away if unbound has less strict checking.  The
>> affected servers could be bind, unbound or other implementations.
> 
> No it isn't necessary.
>
> I start out with algorithm A in DS and DNSKEY.  The DNSKEY has a
> TTL of 600.  I have a TXT record with a TTL of 600 which is fetch
> 300 seconds after the DNSKEY record is fetched.  I add a DNSKEY
> with algorithm B and re-sign the entire zone with A+B meeting the
> MUST.  301 second later a downstream validating client asks for the
> TXT record.  The client get a DNSKEY RRset with A+B and a TXT with
> A signatures.  This will validate as secure by a validator that
> supports A only.  This will validate as insecure by a validator
> that supports B only as there is no secure path from the parent to
> the child.  It will validate as secure by a validator that supports
> A+B.

Let me explain why I thought it was necessary.  The RFC links the
algorithms in the DS to the algorithms in the DNSKEY.  And the RFC links
the algorithms in the DNSKEY to the algorithms over the data.
Therefore, I did not think it was allowed to link the algorithms in the
DS to the algorithms over the data.  And that you had to check if
algorithms (and thus their signatures) were missing.

If you pick the algorithms from the DNSKEY to see if signatures over
data are missing, then in the above example, a validator that supports
A+B has to mark the answer bogus.

(I happily note as an aside, you can take the subset of algorithms that
is also published in the DS set and do strict-checks with that; this has
safe communication from the parent and more lenient algorithm rollover).

> Only when you start enforcing that the TXT and DNSKEY records have
> to have matching algorithms in the validator does this break despite
> the signer meeting the MUST.

Another source for this is RFC4641 algorithm rollover (with prepublish
of signatures before key).  I am a bit hazy why the 4641 (and -bis)
documents specify algorithm rollovers with signature introduction, if
this was not necessary; the editors and reviewers had similar confusion?
 I certainly looked at them to make sure they worked when I wrote the
algorithm code.

Best regards,
   Wouter
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: RFC5395bis obsoleting RFC5395
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Remember this last call ends over the weekend.

	Olafur


On 12/11/2010 9:10 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
>
>
> This message starts an accelerated review of this draft, ending on
> November 21'st 2010.
> For the latest version of the document see:
> http://tools.ietf.org/wg/dnsext/draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis/
>
> The document is aimed at BCP.
> The only significant document change from its predecessor is the
> renaming of the working group mailing list.
>
> Due to small changes in the document the default action is to advance
> the document.
> If you object to the publication of this document please state that on
> the mailing list.
>
> Any changes to RFC5395 other than clarification of existing text
> and the change in mailing list are out of scope.
>
> Olafur for the chairs
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>
>


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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Advice sought on DNS file format for new RRs
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The semantics of the properties are inter-related.

I am attempting to define a mechanism that works with a bare minimum of
properties, but PKI is highly complex and that may not prove possible.

A layered architecture requires that the upper layers of abstraction be able
to express necessary data structures without the need for constant recourse
to extend foundation layers.


The community that is going to use the published information is about 50,
highly technical organizations who are only going to make use of the
information to effect additional validation checks within a precisely
calibrated legal process. The proposal does not directly affect the state
transitions or bits on the wire of DNS, DNSSEC or any Internet protocol.

If this type of work cannot be performed under the expert review approach,
then I don't think anything else can.


On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:41 AM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 04:53:44PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the next person. But I am
> trying
> > to think round the question of maintaining DNS servers. I have a subfield
> > encoding here with three different variations on the data type. Is this
> > acceptable?
>
> I'm trying to understand the motivation.  Why not use three different
> RRTYPEs?
>
> I haven't thought about it very hard, but my first reaction is that
> this RRTYPE is not going to be eligible for assignment by expert
> review.
>
> A
>
> --
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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The semantics of the properties are inter-related.<div><br></div><div>I am =
attempting to define a mechanism that works with a bare minimum of properti=
es, but PKI is highly complex and that may not prove possible.</div><div>
<br></div><div>A layered architecture requires that the upper layers of abs=
traction be able to express necessary data structures without the need for =
constant recourse to extend foundation layers.</div><div><br></div><div>
<br></div><div>The community that is going to use the published information=
 is about 50, highly technical organizations who are only going to make use=
 of the information to effect additional validation checks within a precise=
ly calibrated legal process. The proposal does not directly affect the stat=
e transitions or bits on the wire of DNS, DNSSEC or any Internet protocol.<=
/div>
<div><br></div><div>If this type of work cannot be performed under the expe=
rt review approach, then I don&#39;t think anything else can.=A0</div><div>=
<br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:41 =
AM, Andrew Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ajs@shinkuro.co=
m">ajs@shinkuro.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 0=
4:53:44PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
&gt; Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the next person. But I am tr=
ying<br>
&gt; to think round the question of maintaining DNS servers. I have a subfi=
eld<br>
&gt; encoding here with three different variations on the data type. Is thi=
s<br>
&gt; acceptable?<br>
<br>
</div>I&#39;m trying to understand the motivation. =A0Why not use three dif=
ferent<br>
RRTYPEs?<br>
<br>
I haven&#39;t thought about it very hard, but my first reaction is that<br>
this RRTYPE is not going to be eligible for assignment by expert<br>
review.<br>
<br>
A<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--<br>
Andrew Sullivan<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:ajs@shinkuro.com">ajs@shinkuro.com</a><br>
Shinkuro, Inc.<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
</font></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=
=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--001485f547ca104a2604956b8e5e--

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Fri Nov 19 10:11:07 2010
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On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 12:51:24PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> The semantics of the properties are inter-related.

But not the same.  It seems to me that you have three different data
types here, and that maps rather nicely to three different RRTYPEs.
What's the problem with using three?  I don't get it.

> The proposal does not directly affect the state
> transitions or bits on the wire of DNS, DNSSEC or any Internet protocol.

I'm not so sure, but I'd have to see the use case for this.  In
particular, if the RDATA for this stuff changes between queries, then
you're going to have awfully funny effects with caching (and
especially funny interactions with DNSSEC).
 
> If this type of work cannot be performed under the expert review approach,
> then I don't think anything else can.

We know of some things that have proceeded under expert review, so
your consequent is empirically false there.  The sticker is going to
be RFC 5395 (or successor) section 3.1.2 number 1.  The implementation
and evaluation of this RRTYPE with the variations seems to me to be
tricky to understand.

A

> 
> 
> On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:41 AM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 04:53:44PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > > Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the next person. But I am
> > trying
> > > to think round the question of maintaining DNS servers. I have a subfield
> > > encoding here with three different variations on the data type. Is this
> > > acceptable?
> >
> > I'm trying to understand the motivation.  Why not use three different
> > RRTYPEs?
> >
> > I haven't thought about it very hard, but my first reaction is that
> > this RRTYPE is not going to be eligible for assignment by expert
> > review.
> >
> > A
> >
> > --
> > Andrew Sullivan
> > ajs@shinkuro.com
> > Shinkuro, Inc.
> > _______________________________________________
> > dnsext mailing list
> > dnsext@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
> >
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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Well given the feedback so far, I am thinking that for this particular
purpose it is looking like it is going to be better to have an RR that is
essentially a different RR code for a TXT field and use a sub-encoding.

The reason I was looking at the bit field format was that that had appeared
to be the sentiment at the start of DKIM.

The only downside I can see to that approach is that there will be a slight
loss of coding efficiency due to the use of Base64 encoding rather than
binary. But that is not a major concern for me as I don't expect ODIs to
ever be more than 50 bytes so the overhead is not a worry.

So instead of:

   $ORIGIN example.com
   .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1

   .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
                    XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==

   .       CAA critical path


It would be:

$ORIGIN example.com
.       CAA "policy=1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1"
.       CAA "path@=MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXz"
            "JgPaoT7FeXaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhM"
            "GLe/oBA=="

There would have to be appropriate statements on how to cope with space
characters.


On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 1:11 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 12:51:24PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > The semantics of the properties are inter-related.
>
> But not the same.  It seems to me that you have three different data
> types here, and that maps rather nicely to three different RRTYPEs.
> What's the problem with using three?  I don't get it.
>
> > The proposal does not directly affect the state
> > transitions or bits on the wire of DNS, DNSSEC or any Internet protocol.
>
> I'm not so sure, but I'd have to see the use case for this.  In
> particular, if the RDATA for this stuff changes between queries, then
> you're going to have awfully funny effects with caching (and
> especially funny interactions with DNSSEC).
>
> > If this type of work cannot be performed under the expert review
> approach,
> > then I don't think anything else can.
>
> We know of some things that have proceeded under expert review, so
> your consequent is empirically false there.  The sticker is going to
> be RFC 5395 (or successor) section 3.1.2 number 1.  The implementation
> and evaluation of this RRTYPE with the variations seems to me to be
> tricky to understand.
>
> A
>
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:41 AM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 04:53:44PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > > > Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the next person. But I am
> > > trying
> > > > to think round the question of maintaining DNS servers. I have a
> subfield
> > > > encoding here with three different variations on the data type. Is
> this
> > > > acceptable?
> > >
> > > I'm trying to understand the motivation.  Why not use three different
> > > RRTYPEs?
> > >
> > > I haven't thought about it very hard, but my first reaction is that
> > > this RRTYPE is not going to be eligible for assignment by expert
> > > review.
> > >
> > > A
> > >
> > > --
> > > Andrew Sullivan
> > > ajs@shinkuro.com
> > > Shinkuro, Inc.
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > dnsext mailing list
> > > dnsext@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
> --
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e645b8e2e149cf04956c4b7b
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Well given the feedback so far, I am thinking that for this particular purp=
ose it is looking like it is going to be better to have an RR that is essen=
tially a different RR code for a TXT field and use a sub-encoding.<div><br>
</div><div>The reason I was looking at the bit field format was that that h=
ad appeared to be the sentiment at the start of DKIM.</div><div><br></div><=
div>The only downside I can see to that approach is that there will be a sl=
ight loss of coding efficiency due to the use of Base64 encoding rather tha=
n binary. But that is not a major concern for me as I don&#39;t expect ODIs=
 to ever be more than 50 bytes so the overhead is not a worry.</div>
<div><br></div><div>So instead of:</div><div><meta charset=3D"utf-8"><span =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;Times New Roman&#39;;=
 font-size: medium; border-collapse: collapse; color: rgb(51, 51, 51); "><p=
re style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap; word-wrap: break-word; ">
   $ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com/" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color=
: rgb(54, 68, 82); ">example.com</a>
   .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1</pre><pre style=3D"white-spac=
e: pre-wrap; word-wrap: break-word; ">   .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIA=
WUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
                    XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA=3D=3D</pre><pre style=
=3D"white-space: pre-wrap; word-wrap: break-word; ">   .       CAA critical=
 path</pre></span></div><div><br></div><div>It would be:</div><div><meta ch=
arset=3D"utf-8"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39=
;Times New Roman&#39;; font-size: medium; border-collapse: collapse; color:=
 rgb(51, 51, 51); "><pre style=3D"white-space: pre-wrap; word-wrap: break-w=
ord; ">
$ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com/" target=3D"_blank" style=3D"color: r=
gb(54, 68, 82); ">example.com</a>
.       CAA &quot;policy=3D1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1&quot;
.       CAA &quot;path@=3DMDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXz&quot;
            &quot;JgPaoT7FeXaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhM&quot;
            &quot;GLe/oBA=3D=3D&quot;</pre></span></div><div>There would ha=
ve to be appropriate statements on how to cope with space characters.</div>=
<div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 1:11 PM, An=
drew Sullivan <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ajs@shinkuro.com">ajs=
@shinkuro.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 1=
2:51:24PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
&gt; The semantics of the properties are inter-related.<br>
<br>
</div>But not the same. =A0It seems to me that you have three different dat=
a<br>
types here, and that maps rather nicely to three different RRTYPEs.<br>
What&#39;s the problem with using three? =A0I don&#39;t get it.<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; The proposal does not directly affect the state<br>
&gt; transitions or bits on the wire of DNS, DNSSEC or any Internet protoco=
l.<br>
<br>
</div>I&#39;m not so sure, but I&#39;d have to see the use case for this. =
=A0In<br>
particular, if the RDATA for this stuff changes between queries, then<br>
you&#39;re going to have awfully funny effects with caching (and<br>
especially funny interactions with DNSSEC).<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt; If this type of work cannot be performed under the expert review appro=
ach,<br>
&gt; then I don&#39;t think anything else can.<br>
<br>
</div>We know of some things that have proceeded under expert review, so<br=
>
your consequent is empirically false there. =A0The sticker is going to<br>
be RFC 5395 (or successor) section 3.1.2 number 1. =A0The implementation<br=
>
and evaluation of this RRTYPE with the variations seems to me to be<br>
tricky to understand.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
A<br>
</font><div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:41 AM, Andrew Sullivan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto=
:ajs@shinkuro.com">ajs@shinkuro.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 04:53:44PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wr=
ote:<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; Now I can convert this to EBNF as well as the next person. B=
ut I am<br>
&gt; &gt; trying<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; to think round the question of maintaining DNS servers. I ha=
ve a subfield<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; encoding here with three different variations on the data ty=
pe. Is this<br>
&gt; &gt; &gt; acceptable?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I&#39;m trying to understand the motivation. =A0Why not use three=
 different<br>
&gt; &gt; RRTYPEs?<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; I haven&#39;t thought about it very hard, but my first reaction i=
s that<br>
&gt; &gt; this RRTYPE is not going to be eligible for assignment by expert<=
br>
&gt; &gt; review.<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; A<br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt; &gt; --<br>
&gt; &gt; Andrew Sullivan<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:ajs@shinkuro.com">ajs@shinkuro.com</a><br>
&gt; &gt; Shinkuro, Inc.<br>
&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; &gt; dnsext mailing list<br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; &gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
&gt; &gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; --<br>
&gt; Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/" target=3D"_blank">http://=
hallambaker.com/</a><br>
<br>
</div>--<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">Andrew Sullivan<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:ajs@shinkuro.com">ajs@shinkuro.com</a><br>
Shinkuro, Inc.<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a=
 href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e645b8e2e149cf04956c4b7b--

From A.Hoenes@TR-Sys.de  Fri Nov 19 12:10:10 2010
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From: Alfred =?hp-roman8?B?SM5uZXM=?= <ah@TR-Sys.de>
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> Remember this last call ends over the weekend.
>
>     Olafur

Olafur,
thanks for the heads-up!


In general: Support.


Minor concerns:

(1)
Section 5 and Annex A call for use of the dns-rrtype-applications
AT ietf.org mailing list, but the two descriptions of the purpose
and usage do not match precisely.  I'd appreciate a consistent
clarification of who's to send to that address at which stage of the
process.

IIUC what Section 5 says, only the expert(s) should be able to send
to dns-rrtype-applications, and this is the final step in the review,
which triggers IANA's clerical workflow; this should be made more
explicit.  (See below.)

Wouldn't  dns-rrtype-applications AT IANA.ORG  make more sense for
the purpose indicated in Annex A?

Sections 1, 3.1.1, and 3.1.2 and Annex B point to dnsext AT ietf.org
for discussion. To avoid surprise/confusion, it might be wise to
mention the dns-rrtype-applications email address and its use by the
expert(s) in an additional paragraph appended to 3.1.2.

(2)
I suggest to turn text in Sect. 5 to past tense where it actually
describes what IANA already has done on behalf of RFC 5395,
to better distinguish that from the References and mailing list
name update that IANA will have to perform for this memo;
e.g.   s/IANA shall establish/IANA has established/


Nits:

a)
The draft uses old (verbous++) "Status of This Memo" boilerplate.

b)
Essential procedural clauses are hidden therein:

                           It is intended to become the
   new BCP 42 obsoleting RFC 5395. Comments should be sent to the DNS
   Extensions Working Group mailing list <dnsext@ietf.org>.

Nobody reads the (assumed) boilerplate text.  Therefore, it might
be preferable to place these sentences in an additional front note
(using the xml2rfc <note> element inside <front>).

c)
It looks like the draft was based on a draft for RFC 5395 and
RFC-Ed changes retrofitted; yet, I miss some of the editorial
improvements applied in the RFC.
(For instance, compare the unpleasant layout of the table in
section 2.2 with the much better readable version in RFC 5395.)
This can be fixed at the RFC Editor.

Note that a rfcdiff of the RFC and the current draft might be more
instructive than the standard diffs offered at tools.ietf.org ; use:
  <http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?difftype=--hwdiff&url1=rfc5395.txt
         &url2=draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-01.txt>
But also note that this diff tool hides formating changes, e.g. in
table alignment or References.

d)
In the table in 3.1.4, hyphen is used for interval ranges *and* to
separate values from description.
In combination with the irregular indentation, that's rather confusing:

-------- snip --------
        0
   0x0000 - Reserved; allocation requires IETF Standards Action.

        1
   0x0001 - Andrews File Service v3.0 Location Service [RFC1183].

        2
   0x0002 - DCE/NCA root cell directory node [RFC1183].

        3 - 65,279
   0x0003 - 0xFEFF - Allocation by IETF Review.

   65,280 - 65,534
   0xFF00 - 0xFFFE - Private Use.

   65,535
   0xFFFF - Reserved; allocation requires IETF Standards Action.

-------- snip --------

A better layout with columnar alignment would look like this:

-------- snip --------

        0
   0x0000           Reserved; allocation requires IETF Standards Action

        1
   0x0001           Andrews File Service v3.0 Location Service [RFC1183]

        2
   0x0002           DCE/NCA root cell directory node [RFC1183]

        3 - 65,279
   0x0003 - 0xFEFF  Allocation by IETF Review

   65,280 - 65,534
   0xFF00 - 0xFFFE  Private Use

   65,535
   0xFFFF           Reserved; allocation requires IETF Standards Action

-------- snip --------

(Note: Trailing periods are not needed in the table; dropping these
 allows to adhere to the margins.)

e)
Similar considerations apply to the table in 3.2.

f)
Other SDOs use "Annex" for normative appendices, yes, but the
RFC Editor doesn't like that.  :-(
"Annex B" however is likely to be regarded as non-normative;
so "Annex" isn't a good match.

g)
FYI: Idnits yields funny comments.  :-)
(No action needed.)


Kind regards,
  Alfred.

-- 

+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| TR-Sys Alfred Hoenes   |  Alfred Hoenes   Dipl.-Math., Dipl.-Phys.  |
| Gerlinger Strasse 12   |  Phone: (+49)7156/9635-0, Fax: -18         |
| D-71254  Ditzingen     |  E-Mail:  ah@TR-Sys.de                     |
+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+


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On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 09:10:33PM +0100, Alfred Hönes wrote:
> 
> (1)
> Section 5 and Annex A call for use of the dns-rrtype-applications
> AT ietf.org mailing list, but the two descriptions of the purpose
> and usage do not match precisely.  I'd appreciate a consistent
> clarification of who's to send to that address at which stage of the
> process.

Hrm.  You're right that this isn't consistent.  The actual workflow is
that we send the template to dns-rrtype-applications in order to
_start_ the review process.  IANA's ticketing system is a subscriber
to that list, and that's actually how they get the ticket.  So what's
in the annex is right.

I'm ok with cleaning this up, if nobody objects, since it's the same
sort of clean-up as the other goal of getting the address of where to
send discussion correct.

> Wouldn't  dns-rrtype-applications AT IANA.ORG  make more sense for
> the purpose indicated in Annex A?

Doesn't matter: this is the list we have.  Let's not tinker, please.

> Sections 1, 3.1.1, and 3.1.2 and Annex B point to dnsext AT ietf.org
> for discussion. To avoid surprise/confusion, it might be wise to
> mention the dns-rrtype-applications email address and its use by the
> expert(s) in an additional paragraph appended to 3.1.2.

No.  It's not used for anything other than submission.  That's how
we've actually done this, so let's stick with the practice as it
stands.

> a)
> The draft uses old (verbous++) "Status of This Memo" boilerplate.

This is actually on purpose, because we wanted diffs not to show up
extraneous things.  (Not that it was completely successful.)

> (using the xml2rfc <note> element inside <front>).

Well, that'd be entertaining in a draft that comes from nroff ;-)

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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From: Michael Graff <mgraff@isc.org>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Advice sought on DNS file format for new RRs
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On 11/19/10 12:44 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> The only downside I can see to that approach is that there will be a
> slight loss of coding efficiency due to the use of Base64 encoding
> rather than binary. But that is not a major concern for me as I don't
> expect ODIs to ever be more than 50 bytes so the overhead is not a worry.

Don't confuse the textual representation with what may be on the wire.

An example of this is the DS record, where the hash is displayed in hex
but the wire format is binary.  This means your first example is workable.

Ordering is not guaranteed, so I assume this would work with or without
a specific ordering of records.

I may be confused here as well but if there is a requirement for more
than one of these at a specific name, then either put all the data on
the same single record (making it complete) or add an ID number to line
up the policy with a specific path.

What I'm proposing is something like:

  . CAA (policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
	 path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
	      XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==
	 critical path)

--Michael

> So instead of:
> 
>    $ORIGIN example.com <http://example.com/>
>    .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
> 
>    .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
>                     XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==
> 
>    .       CAA critical path
> 
> 
> It would be:
> 
> $ORIGIN example.com <http://example.com/>
> .       CAA "policy=1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1"
> .       CAA "path@=MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXz"
>             "JgPaoT7FeXaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhM"
>             "GLe/oBA=="

Note that there is a big difference in a TXT record with those quotes
and without.

--Michael

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Advice sought on DNS file format for new RRs
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Thanks,

The records are independent of each other, Each record specifies one
Authorization Entry and the set of RRs make up an Authorization Set similar
to an ACL but a set not a list.

We did have a concern raised for the possibility that a RR set would become
fragmented and a relying party might only get some of the records. In other
words there are 5 CAA records in a domain and the resolver only caches 3.
Would this really be an issue? I would have thought not since signatures are
over the full RR set.


What I am trying to do at this stage is to work out what the range of
options is here. I see the following choices:

1) Binary encoding with potentially different data types depending on the
sub tag.

CAA   policy <oid> | path <base64> | critical <string>

2) Binary encoding with a uniform data structure like in the CERT tag:

CAA <tag> <critical flag> <base64>

3) TXT style encoding in the manner of DKIM

CAA <tag>  <TXT data>


I think that there have been enough objections to 1 to exclude it. I am
willing to go with either 2 or 3 if there is a really strong opinion one way
or the other but would otherwise tend to go for 3 as that allows for a more
flexibility.


On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 3:45 PM, Michael Graff <mgraff@isc.org> wrote:

> On 11/19/10 12:44 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > The only downside I can see to that approach is that there will be a
> > slight loss of coding efficiency due to the use of Base64 encoding
> > rather than binary. But that is not a major concern for me as I don't
> > expect ODIs to ever be more than 50 bytes so the overhead is not a worry.
>
> Don't confuse the textual representation with what may be on the wire.
>
> An example of this is the DS record, where the hash is displayed in hex
> but the wire format is binary.  This means your first example is workable.
>
> Ordering is not guaranteed, so I assume this would work with or without
> a specific ordering of records.
>
> I may be confused here as well but if there is a requirement for more
> than one of these at a specific name, then either put all the data on
> the same single record (making it complete) or add an ID number to line
> up the policy with a specific path.
>
> What I'm proposing is something like:
>
>  . CAA (policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
>          path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
>              XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==
>          critical path)
>
> --Michael
>
> > So instead of:
> >
> >    $ORIGIN example.com <http://example.com/>
> >    .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
> >
> >    .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
> >                     XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==
> >
> >    .       CAA critical path
> >
> >
> > It would be:
> >
> > $ORIGIN example.com <http://example.com/>
> > .       CAA "policy=1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1"
> > .       CAA "path@=MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXz"
> >             "JgPaoT7FeXaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhM"
> >             "GLe/oBA=="
>
> Note that there is a big difference in a TXT record with those quotes
> and without.
>
> --Michael
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e645b8481c8e2504956ee5e6
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Thanks,=A0<div><br></div><div>The records are independent of each other, Ea=
ch record specifies one Authorization Entry and the set of RRs make up an A=
uthorization Set similar to an ACL but a set not a list.</div><div><br></di=
v>
<div>We did have a concern raised for the possibility that a RR set would b=
ecome fragmented and a relying party might only get some of the records. In=
 other words there are 5 CAA records in a domain and the resolver only cach=
es 3. Would this really be an issue? I would have thought not since signatu=
res are over the full RR set.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>What I am trying to do at this stage is =
to work out what the range of options is here. I see the following choices:=
</div><div><br></div><div>1) Binary encoding with potentially different dat=
a types depending on the sub tag.</div>
<div><br></div><div>CAA =A0 policy &lt;oid&gt; | path &lt;base64&gt; | crit=
ical &lt;string&gt;</div><div><br></div><div>2) Binary encoding with a unif=
orm data structure like in the CERT tag:</div><div><br></div><div>CAA &lt;t=
ag&gt; &lt;critical flag&gt; &lt;base64&gt;</div>
<div><br>3) TXT style encoding in the manner of DKIM</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>CAA &lt;tag&gt; =A0&lt;TXT data&gt;</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><=
div>I think that there have been enough objections to 1 to exclude it. I am=
 willing to go with either 2 or 3 if there is a really strong opinion one w=
ay or the other but would otherwise tend to go for 3 as that allows for a m=
ore flexibility.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at =
3:45 PM, Michael Graff <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:mgraff@isc.o=
rg">mgraff@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"=
>
<div class=3D"im">On 11/19/10 12:44 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
&gt; The only downside I can see to that approach is that there will be a<b=
r>
&gt; slight loss of coding efficiency due to the use of Base64 encoding<br>
&gt; rather than binary. But that is not a major concern for me as I don&#3=
9;t<br>
&gt; expect ODIs to ever be more than 50 bytes so the overhead is not a wor=
ry.<br>
<br>
</div>Don&#39;t confuse the textual representation with what may be on the =
wire.<br>
<br>
An example of this is the DS record, where the hash is displayed in hex<br>
but the wire format is binary. =A0This means your first example is workable=
.<br>
<br>
Ordering is not guaranteed, so I assume this would work with or without<br>
a specific ordering of records.<br>
<br>
I may be confused here as well but if there is a requirement for more<br>
than one of these at a specific name, then either put all the data on<br>
the same single record (making it complete) or add an ID number to line<br>
up the policy with a specific path.<br>
<br>
What I&#39;m proposing is something like:<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
 =A0. CAA (policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1<br>
</div><div class=3D"im"> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXz=
JgPaoT7Fe<br>
 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA=3D=3D<br>
</div> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 critical path)<br>
<br>
--Michael<br>
<br>
&gt; So instead of:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0$ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">exampl=
e.com</a> &lt;<a href=3D"http://example.com/" target=3D"_blank">http://exam=
ple.com/</a>&gt;<br>
<div class=3D"im">&gt; =A0 =A0. =A0 =A0 =A0 CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.66=
6.1<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0. =A0 =A0 =A0 CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe<b=
r>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/o=
BA=3D=3D<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0. =A0 =A0 =A0 CAA critical path<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; It would be:<br>
&gt;<br>
</div>&gt; $ORIGIN <a href=3D"http://example.com" target=3D"_blank">example=
.com</a> &lt;<a href=3D"http://example.com/" target=3D"_blank">http://examp=
le.com/</a>&gt;<br>
<div class=3D"im">&gt; . =A0 =A0 =A0 CAA &quot;policy=3D1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.6=
66.1&quot;<br>
&gt; . =A0 =A0 =A0 CAA &quot;path@=3DMDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXz&quot;<br=
>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 &quot;JgPaoT7FeXaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhM&quot;=
<br>
&gt; =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 &quot;GLe/oBA=3D=3D&quot;<br>
<br>
</div>Note that there is a big difference in a TXT record with those quotes=
<br>
and without.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888"><br>
--Michael<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">__________________________________=
_____________<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a=
 href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

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On 19/11/2010 4:50 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> Thanks,
>
> The records are independent of each other, Each record specifies one
> Authorization Entry and the set of RRs make up an Authorization Set
> similar to an ACL but a set not a list.
>
> We did have a concern raised for the possibility that a RR set would
> become fragmented and a relying party might only get some of the
> records. In other words there are 5 CAA records in a domain and the
> resolver only caches 3. Would this really be an issue? I would have
> thought not since signatures are over the full RR set.
>

Impossible, DNS caches store either all or none.

>
> What I am trying to do at this stage is to work out what the range of
> options is here. I see the following choices:
>
> 1) Binary encoding with potentially different data types depending on
> the sub tag.
>
> CAA   policy <oid> | path <base64> | critical <string>
>
> 2) Binary encoding with a uniform data structure like in the CERT tag:
>
> CAA <tag> <critical flag> <base64>
>
> 3) TXT style encoding in the manner of DKIM
>
> CAA <tag> <TXT data>
>
>

You are still confusing DNS wire format and DNS presentation format.

Wire format is always binary i.e. all base64 blocks are translated to
8bit binary, Text blocks are translated to a special text format, etc.

Work out what you want in the textual format of your record(s), and how 
the record(s) are used.
Then ask someone to help you convert that to DNS wire format.

> I think that there have been enough objections to 1 to exclude it. I am
> willing to go with either 2 or 3 if there is a really strong opinion one
> way or the other but would otherwise tend to go for 3 as that allows for
> a more flexibility.
>

Format 1 is fine if the records are dependent on each other (i.e. 
atomic), If the records are independent subsets you should use different 
types. Every time DNS has started using sup-typing we have run into 
problems.

	Olafur

>
> On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 3:45 PM, Michael Graff <mgraff@isc.org
> <mailto:mgraff@isc.org>> wrote:
>
>     On 11/19/10 12:44 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>      > The only downside I can see to that approach is that there will be a
>      > slight loss of coding efficiency due to the use of Base64 encoding
>      > rather than binary. But that is not a major concern for me as I don't
>      > expect ODIs to ever be more than 50 bytes so the overhead is not
>     a worry.
>
>     Don't confuse the textual representation with what may be on the wire.
>
>     An example of this is the DS record, where the hash is displayed in hex
>     but the wire format is binary.  This means your first example is
>     workable.
>
>     Ordering is not guaranteed, so I assume this would work with or without
>     a specific ordering of records.
>
>     I may be confused here as well but if there is a requirement for more
>     than one of these at a specific name, then either put all the data on
>     the same single record (making it complete) or add an ID number to line
>     up the policy with a specific path.
>
>     What I'm proposing is something like:
>
>       . CAA (policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
>              path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
>                   XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==
>              critical path)
>
>     --Michael
>
>      > So instead of:
>      >
>      >    $ORIGIN example.com <http://example.com> <http://example.com/>
>      >    .       CAA policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
>      >
>      >    .       CAA path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
>      >                     XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA==
>      >
>      >    .       CAA critical path
>      >
>      >
>      > It would be:
>      >
>      > $ORIGIN example.com <http://example.com> <http://example.com/>
>      > .       CAA "policy=1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1"
>      > .       CAA "path@=MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXz"
>      > "JgPaoT7FeXaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhM"
>      > "GLe/oBA=="
>
>     Note that there is a big difference in a TXT record with those quotes
>     and without.
>
>     --Michael
>     _______________________________________________
>     dnsext mailing list
>     dnsext@ietf.org <mailto:dnsext@ietf.org>
>     https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>
>
>
> --
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext


From hallam@gmail.com  Fri Nov 19 15:55:23 2010
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Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2010 18:56:12 -0500
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Advice sought on DNS file format for new RRs
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On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 5:34 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com> wrote:

> On 19/11/2010 4:50 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> The records are independent of each other, Each record specifies one
>> Authorization Entry and the set of RRs make up an Authorization Set
>> similar to an ACL but a set not a list.
>>
>> We did have a concern raised for the possibility that a RR set would
>> become fragmented and a relying party might only get some of the
>> records. In other words there are 5 CAA records in a domain and the
>> resolver only caches 3. Would this really be an issue? I would have
>> thought not since signatures are over the full RR set.
>>
>>
> Impossible, DNS caches store either all or none.


That was my belief, but I wanted to check.



> What I am trying to do at this stage is to work out what the range of
>> options is here. I see the following choices:
>>
>> 1) Binary encoding with potentially different data types depending on
>> the sub tag.
>>
>> CAA   policy <oid> | path <base64> | critical <string>
>>
>> 2) Binary encoding with a uniform data structure like in the CERT tag:
>>
>> CAA <tag> <critical flag> <base64>
>>
>> 3) TXT style encoding in the manner of DKIM
>>
>> CAA <tag> <TXT data>
>>
>>
>>
> You are still confusing DNS wire format and DNS presentation format.
>

No I understand the difference.

The constraint here is that if I have a complex binary format, then DNS
servers are going to have to be able to parse a correspondingly complex
syntax to encode the data. That may not be desirable.


Wire format is always binary i.e. all base64 blocks are translated to
> 8bit binary, Text blocks are translated to a special text format, etc.
>

That is not the case in DKIM.

In DKIM the key blobs are encoded in base64 and that is how the data is
stored in the DNS TXT record.



> Format 1 is fine if the records are dependent on each other (i.e. atomic),
> If the records are independent subsets you should use different types. Every
> time DNS has started using sup-typing we have run into problems.
>

The TXT approach appears to work in DKIM because the records in question do
not affect the operation of DNS itself.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e644cf50b198ef049570a616
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 5:34 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:ogud@ogud.com">ogud@ogud.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On 19/11/2010 4:50 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Thanks,<br>
<br>
The records are independent of each other, Each record specifies one<br>
Authorization Entry and the set of RRs make up an Authorization Set<br>
similar to an ACL but a set not a list.<br>
<br>
We did have a concern raised for the possibility that a RR set would<br>
become fragmented and a relying party might only get some of the<br>
records. In other words there are 5 CAA records in a domain and the<br>
resolver only caches 3. Would this really be an issue? I would have<br>
thought not since signatures are over the full RR set.<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
Impossible, DNS caches store either all or none.</blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>That was my belief, but I wanted to check.</div><div><br></div><div>=
=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;borde=
r-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">What I am trying to do at =
this stage is to work out what the range of<br>
options is here. I see the following choices:<br>
<br>
1) Binary encoding with potentially different data types depending on<br>
the sub tag.<br>
<br>
CAA =A0 policy &lt;oid&gt; | path &lt;base64&gt; | critical &lt;string&gt;<=
br>
<br>
2) Binary encoding with a uniform data structure like in the CERT tag:<br>
<br>
CAA &lt;tag&gt; &lt;critical flag&gt; &lt;base64&gt;<br>
<br>
3) TXT style encoding in the manner of DKIM<br>
<br>
CAA &lt;tag&gt; &lt;TXT data&gt;<br>
<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
You are still confusing DNS wire format and DNS presentation format.<br></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>No I understand the difference.</div><div><br=
></div><div>The constraint here is that if I have a complex binary format, =
then DNS servers are going to have to be able to parse a correspondingly co=
mplex syntax to encode the data. That may not be desirable.</div>
<div>=A0</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Wire format is always binary i.e. all base64 blocks are translated to<br>
8bit binary, Text blocks are translated to a special text format, etc.<br><=
/blockquote><div><br></div><div>That is not the case in DKIM.</div><div><br=
></div><div>In DKIM the key blobs are encoded in base64 and that is how the=
 data is stored in the DNS TXT record.</div>
<div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"mar=
gin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
Format 1 is fine if the records are dependent on each other (i.e. atomic), =
If the records are independent subsets you should use different types. Ever=
y time DNS has started using sup-typing we have run into problems.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>The TXT approach appears to work in DKIM b=
ecause the records in question do not affect the operation of DNS itself.=
=A0</div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div></div>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http=
://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br>
<br>

--0016e644cf50b198ef049570a616--

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To: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@NLnetLabs.nl>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE50C01.4010104@nic.cz> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180630550.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE5898C.7050801@nic.cz><4CE64785.7090401@nlnetlabs.nl> <20101119141852.DC56A6F90C8@drugs.dv.isc.org><4CE69FBF.3070706@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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In message <4CE69FBF.3070706@nlnetlabs.nl>, "W.C.A. Wijngaards" writes:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> Hi Mark,
> 
> On 11/19/2010 03:18 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> > Except the validator is not supposed to enforce it.  The point of
> > the rule, for the signer, was to ensure that there would be *a*
> > signature to validate with.
> 
> Right, that is the confusion.
> 
> >> Let me try to understand this and then respond.  You talk about having
> >> to prepublish signatures before the keys are published.
> >>
> >> This is necessary with the current rules today for algorithm-support
> >> reasons.  It does not go away if unbound has less strict checking.  The
> >> affected servers could be bind, unbound or other implementations.
> > 
> > No it isn't necessary.
> >
> > I start out with algorithm A in DS and DNSKEY.  The DNSKEY has a
> > TTL of 600.  I have a TXT record with a TTL of 600 which is fetch
> > 300 seconds after the DNSKEY record is fetched.  I add a DNSKEY
> > with algorithm B and re-sign the entire zone with A+B meeting the
> > MUST.  301 second later a downstream validating client asks for the
> > TXT record.  The client get a DNSKEY RRset with A+B and a TXT with
> > A signatures.  This will validate as secure by a validator that
> > supports A only.  This will validate as insecure by a validator
> > that supports B only as there is no secure path from the parent to
> > the child.  It will validate as secure by a validator that supports
> > A+B.
> 
> Let me explain why I thought it was necessary.  The RFC links the
> algorithms in the DS to the algorithms in the DNSKEY.

You can only list DS's that cover algorithms in the DNSKEY RRset.
If you don't support one of the algorithms in the DS then the zone
is insecure for that validator.  You don't add the DSs for a algorithm
until max zone TTL has expired from the initial publication of that
algorithm in a DNSKEY RRset.

> And the RFC links the algorithms in the DNSKEY to the algorithms over
> the data.

In a particular version of the zone.

> Therefore, I did not think it was allowed to link the algorithms in the
> DS to the algorithms over the data.

We're not yet.  To do incremental introduction of RRSIGs we need
to make that clearer.

> And that you had to check if algorithms (and thus their signatures)
> were missing.

Except there is nothing in RFC 4035 saying to perform this check.
The signer is told to generate them, the validator is not told to
check for them.  Yes this asymetic,  strict sender - liberal receiver
but it allow DNSSEC to work with caches learning data at different
times.  It's also is consistent with any signature validates.

> If you pick the algorithms from the DNSKEY to see if signatures over
> data are missing, then in the above example, a validator that supports
> A+B has to mark the answer bogus.

Which isn't part of the protocol.

I also note that you don't disagree with A only as being secure and
B only as being insecure.  If you are checking algorithm presence
then all should be treated as bogus.

> (I happily note as an aside, you can take the subset of algorithms that
> is also published in the DS set and do strict-checks with that; this has
> safe communication from the parent and more lenient algorithm rollover).
> 
> > Only when you start enforcing that the TXT and DNSKEY records have
> > to have matching algorithms in the validator does this break despite
> > the signer meeting the MUST.
> 
> Another source for this is RFC4641 algorithm rollover (with prepublish
> of signatures before key).  I am a bit hazy why the 4641 (and -bis)
> documents specify algorithm rollovers with signature introduction, if
> this was not necessary; the editors and reviewers had similar confusion?
> I certainly looked at them to make sure they worked when I wrote the
> algorithm code.

RFC4641 doesn't describe algorithm rolls it describes key rollovers within
a algorithm.

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Advice sought on DNS file format for new RRs
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On 11/19/10 5:56 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> The constraint here is that if I have a complex binary format, then DNS
> servers are going to have to be able to parse a correspondingly complex
> syntax to encode the data. That may not be desirable.

I really hate to suggest this, but could you go back to basics?  What is
the data item you are attempting to transmit?  I admit I stepped into
this conversation in the middle, so if there are references I should be
reading kindly point me at TFM.

If a single block of data is the goal -- that is, the concept of "a key"
or "a certificate" or something, where you really don't want to split
the individual components of those items up, why split them at all?

With a custom type, you have to choose two things:  textual
representation and wire format. I would take the idea of using a TXT
encoding right off the table from the start so you are free to choose
more efficient wire format than a TXT-like encoder would typically use.

> That is not the case in DKIM.
> 
> In DKIM the key blobs are encoded in base64 and that is how the data is
> stored in the DNS TXT record.

If they had used a custom type, that would not have happened.

TXT is the record they chose, and of course it's a literal translation
from what is in the zone file to what is on the wire.

> The TXT approach appears to work in DKIM because the records in question
> do not affect the operation of DNS itself. 

It appears to work, but each user who overloads TXT has to deal with all
the other crap that may be there, now or in the future.

--Michael

From paf@cisco.com  Sat Nov 20 05:06:10 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Advice sought on DNS file format for new RRs
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On 19 nov 2010, at 21.45, Michael Graff wrote:

> What I'm proposing is something like:
>=20
>  . CAA (policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
> 	 path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
> 	      XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA=3D=3D
> 	 critical path)

+1

I think, given the three pieces always stay together, that this would be =
the best solution.

   Patrik


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Patrik and all,

  I tend to agree as well.


-----Original Message-----
>From: Patrik F=C3=A4ltstr=C3=B6m <paf@cisco.com>
>Sent: Nov 20, 2010 7:06 AM
>To: Michael Graff <mgraff@isc.org>
>Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [dnsext] Advice sought on DNS file format for new RRs
>
>
>On 19 nov 2010, at 21.45, Michael Graff wrote:
>
>> What I'm proposing is something like:
>>=20
>>  . CAA (policy 1.3.6.1.4.1.35405.666.1
>> =09 path MDIGA1UEJQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBCAXzJgPaoT7Fe
>> =09      XaPzKv6mI2D0yilif+7WhzmhMGLe/oBA=3D=3D
>> =09 critical path)
>
>+1
>
>I think, given the three pieces always stay together, that this would be t=
he best solution.
>
>   Patrik
>
>_______________________________________________
>dnsext mailing list
>dnsext@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

Regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liabilit=
y
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
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References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE53927.9090203@isc.org> <4CE58E90.6030607@nic.cz> <AANLkTin2H7UkP7FVfz3GN74CKtqn2OKo7MmcKMGOkvNY@mail.gmail.com> <4CE59B3D.5020109@nic.cz> <20101119004134.993F26EB749@drugs.dv.isc.org><AANLkTi=Hp6s4xwLQGyWv3BNtvUf5-SDtgUzHbNKtfCV1@mail.gmail.com> <20101119060416.024456F87CD@drugs.dv.isc.org> <4CE629F1.2090907@isc.org> <20101119131627.E8B616F8F8B@drugs.dv.isc.org>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 11/19/2010 02:16 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
>>> If a algorithm is insecure then you should remove it from the list
>>> of acceptable algorithms in you validator.  That way you get insecure
>>> not trusted out of the validator.
>>>
>>
>> If you do that, and the zone(s) do 'normal' pre-publish rollover from
>> that broken algorithm to a not-yet-broken one, you'd get bogus, not
>> insecure, during the roll
>>
> 
> No you don't.  Once a algorithm is marked as invalid the validator
> behaves exactly as if the validator doesn't know about the algorithm.
> 
> During the pre-publish period there isn't a trust path into the zone with
> a supported algorithm.
>  

no, but during the DS switch there would be, same problem, just a different level.

If it is the DS set that specifies which algorithms are used, you either have to
have both algorithms in that set at one point, or have the zone fully signed
with both algorithms. But if you have both DS's in there, and the zone itself
signed with only one, it'll be bogus for validators that only support the other
algorithm.

But I now notice that the current draft for 4641bis says not to do pre-publish
rollover when switching algorithms, only double signature, so that's ok :)

The part about adding signatures first could probably be removed if 4035 is
clarified (changed, depending on one's POV ;) ) that it is the DS set and not
the DNSKEY set that one should check for algorithm support.

Jelte

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Cc: Samuel Weiler <weiler@watson.org>, dnsext@ietf.org, "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@NLnetLabs.nl>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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I agree with Mark here, and my recollection of the history is the same 
as Mark's and Sam's.

Assume all of the following:
1. Alg(A) is still considered "secure" (validator local policy)
2. There is a DS/DNSKEY/RRSIG chain for Alg(A) in the zone already
3. A new DNSKEY for Alg(B) is added to the zone, but no RRSIGs using 
that key exist (with or without a DS for DNSKEY(B) in the parent).

That situation is NOT a downgrade attack, and should never be considered 
one. (And yes, arguably the authoritative server should not have allowed 
the zone to be loaded, but that's another issue.)


Doug


On Sat, 20 Nov 2010, Mark Andrews wrote:

> In message <4CE64785.7090401@nlnetlabs.nl>, "W.C.A. Wijngaards" writes:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On 11/18/2010 09:16 PM, Ond??ej Sur?? wrote:
>>> The idea is that just adding a new key with algorithm B (the strong)
>>> without chaining it to the parent zone doesn't add any new security,
>>> since the chain of trust is secured by the (the weak) algorithm A.
>>
>> Today, the RFC has rules for DS-DNSKEY and rule for DNSKEY-DATA.  You
>> want to create new rules for DS-DATA.
>
> I want to make it possible to do incremental signing of new algorithms
> which requires the rules to be relaxed but we can leave discussion of
> that until we resolve the issue about whether the validator should be
> checking or not.
>
>>> So, yes the RFCs need a clarification and yes the unbound is
>>> unnecessarily strict since such strict implementation doesn't add any
>>> additional security (because you don't have a chain of trust leading to
>>> a key).  Wouter, object now or never :).
>>
>> You called?  Yes, unbound is strict, it enforces the exact zone signing
>> requirements from the RFC.  But, I am not objecting to you strongly.  I
>> want to caution making changes to RFC4035, there must be backwards
>> compatibility.
>
> Except the validator is not supposed to enforce it.  The point of
> the rule, for the signer, was to ensure that there would be *a*
> signature to validate with.
>
> The downgrade attack it was supposed to protect against is downgrade
> to insecure not downgrade between algorithms.
>
>> But the above makes the algorithm-set determined by the parent.
>> Now, the algorithm set is determined by the child (when you get there).
>> I appreciate the concern that if you want to protect a downgrade, then
>> you must signal this at the parent.
>
> A zone is deem secure or insecure based on the list of algorithms
> in the DS RRset.
>
>> (the security of that parent is that of a new zone; with different owners).
>>
>> Mark Andrews wrote:
>>> Additionally the MUST is a directive to *zone operators*.  A zone
>>> operator can comply with that MUST but validation will still fail
>>> with unbound as unbound requires that a zone be signed with DNSKEYs
>>> which are NOT in the zone prior to adding the DNSKEY to the zone
>>> due to caching.  On this alone it is clear that unbound is in the
>>> wrong.
>>
>> Let me try to understand this and then respond.  You talk about having
>> to prepublish signatures before the keys are published.
>>
>> This is necessary with the current rules today for algorithm-support
>> reasons.  It does not go away if unbound has less strict checking.  The
>> affected servers could be bind, unbound or other implementations.
>
> No it isn't necessary.
>
> I start out with algorithm A in DS and DNSKEY.  The DNSKEY has a
> TTL of 600.  I have a TXT record with a TTL of 600 which is fetch
> 300 seconds after the DNSKEY record is fetched.  I add a DNSKEY
> with algorithm B and re-sign the entire zone with A+B meeting the
> MUST.  301 second later a downstream validating client asks for the
> TXT record.  The client get a DNSKEY RRset with A+B and a TXT with
> A signatures.  This will validate as secure by a validator that
> supports A only.  This will validate as insecure by a validator
> that supports B only as there is no secure path from the parent to
> the child.  It will validate as secure by a validator that supports
> A+B.
>
> Only when you start enforcing that the TXT and DNSKEY records have
> to have matching algorithms in the validator does this break despite
> the signer meeting the MUST.
>
> Similarly you can go from A+B to just A by removing the DS records
> for A, waiting for the old DS RRset to expire then removing the A
> DNSKEYs.
>
>> Your change to the rules makes it possible to add the key, and then
>> signatures slowly, with a new algorithm, (as long as the DS is not added
>> yet).  I appreciate that niceness.
>
>> You are correct that you must also take the trust-anchors into account
>> to do it properly (and I do not do that today).
>>
>> Best regards,
>>    Wouter
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>
>


-- 

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 			-- OK Go

 	Breadth of IT experience, and depth of knowledge in the DNS.
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References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE53927.9090203@isc.org> <4CE58E90.6030607@nic.cz> <AANLkTin2H7UkP7FVfz3GN74CKtqn2OKo7MmcKMGOkvNY@mail.gmail.com> <4CE59B3D.5020109@nic.cz> <20101119004134.993F26EB749@drugs.dv.isc.org><AANLkTi=Hp6s4xwLQGyWv3BNtvUf5-SDtgUzHbNKtfCV1@mail.gmail.com> <20101119060416.024456F87CD@drugs.dv.isc.org> <4CE629F1.2090907@isc.org> <20101119131627.E8B616F8F8B@drugs.dv.isc.org> <4CE8F5DC.80406@isc.org>
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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In message <4CE8F5DC.80406@isc.org>, Jelte Jansen writes:
> On 11/19/2010 02:16 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> >>> If a algorithm is insecure then you should remove it from the list
> >>> of acceptable algorithms in you validator.  That way you get insecure
> >>> not trusted out of the validator.
> >>
> >> If you do that, and the zone(s) do 'normal' pre-publish rollover from
> >> that broken algorithm to a not-yet-broken one, you'd get bogus, not
> >> insecure, during the roll
> >>
> > 
> > No you don't.  Once a algorithm is marked as invalid the validator
> > behaves exactly as if the validator doesn't know about the algorithm.
> > 
> > During the pre-publish period there isn't a trust path into the zone with
> > a supported algorithm.
> >  
> 
> no, but during the DS switch there would be, same problem, just a different
> level.
> 
> If it is the DS set that specifies which algorithms are used, you either have
> to have both algorithms in that set at one point, or have the zone fully
> signed with both algorithms. But if you have both DS's in there, and the
> zone itself signed with only one, it'll be bogus for validators that only
> support the other algorithm.

To roll from one algorithm to another you need to add the new
DNSKEY(s) and sign.  Wait max zone ttl (for all the RRSIGs with
only one set of signatures to clear caches).  Change DS set to
remove the old algorthm and add the new algorith.  Wait DNSKEY TTL
(so there is now no longer a secure path to the zone in any cache).
Removed old algorithm DNSKEY(s) and any signatures made with them.

This is the fastest way to roll from one algorithm to another without
going insecure at somepoint for some validators that support both
algorithms.

You can shorten it (by removing the old DS earlier) but there will
be a time when the zone is insecure for validators that support
both algorithms.

However while this is all happening the validator can be configured
to ignore the old algorithm.  The zone goes immediately to insecure as
far as that validator is concerned on the presumption that insecure is
better than a false secure.

> But I now notice that the current draft for 4641bis says not to do pre-publis
> h
> rollover when switching algorithms, only double signature, so that's ok :)
> 
> The part about adding signatures first could probably be removed if 4035 is
> clarified (changed, depending on one's POV ;) ) that it is the DS set and not
> the DNSKEY set that one should check for algorithm support.
> 
> Jelte
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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Hi,

On 11/21/2010 11:35 AM, Jelte Jansen wrote:
> On 11/19/2010 02:16 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
>>>> If a algorithm is insecure then you should remove it from the list
>>>> of acceptable algorithms in you validator.  That way you get insecure
>>>> not trusted out of the validator.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you do that, and the zone(s) do 'normal' pre-publish rollover from
>>> that broken algorithm to a not-yet-broken one, you'd get bogus, not
>>> insecure, during the roll
>>>
> 
>> No you don't.  Once a algorithm is marked as invalid the validator
>> behaves exactly as if the validator doesn't know about the algorithm.
> 
>> During the pre-publish period there isn't a trust path into the zone with
>> a supported algorithm.
> 
> 
> no, but during the DS switch there would be, same problem, just a different level.
> 
> If it is the DS set that specifies which algorithms are used, you either have to
> have both algorithms in that set at one point, or have the zone fully signed
> with both algorithms. But if you have both DS's in there, and the zone itself
> signed with only one, it'll be bogus for validators that only support the other
> algorithm.
> 
> But I now notice that the current draft for 4641bis says not to do pre-publish
> rollover when switching algorithms, only double signature, so that's ok :)

Actually, you cannot even do pre-publish algorithm rollover. In order to
introduce the new algorithm at the parent, you need to fully sign your
zone with that algorithm. Effectively, it becomes a double-signature
rollover.

> The part about adding signatures first could probably be removed if 4035 is
> clarified (changed, depending on one's POV ;) ) that it is the DS set and not
> the DNSKEY set that one should check for algorithm support.

You would still need to pre-publish signatures if you want to support
RFC 5011 (because you have no method to delay adding this trust anchor
until the zone is fully signed with the new algorithm).

Matthijs
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References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org>	<4CE53927.9090203@isc.org> <4CE58E90.6030607@nic.cz>	<AANLkTin2H7UkP7FVfz3GN74CKtqn2OKo7MmcKMGOkvNY@mail.gmail.com>	<4CE59B3D.5020109@nic.cz>	<20101119004134.993F26EB749@drugs.dv.isc.org><AANLkTi=Hp6s4xwLQGyWv3BNtvUf5-SDtgUzHbNKtfCV1@mail.gmail.com>	<20101119060416.024456F87CD@drugs.dv.isc.org>	<4CE629F1.2090907@isc.org>	<20101119131627.E8B616F8F8B@drugs.dv.isc.org> <4CE8F5DC.80406@isc.org> <4CEA2F8E.7060104@nlnetlabs.nl>
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On 11/22/2010 09:53 AM, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
> 
>> If it is the DS set that specifies which algorithms are used, you either have to
>> have both algorithms in that set at one point, or have the zone fully signed
>> with both algorithms. But if you have both DS's in there, and the zone itself
>> signed with only one, it'll be bogus for validators that only support the other
>> algorithm.
> 
>> But I now notice that the current draft for 4641bis says not to do pre-publish
>> rollover when switching algorithms, only double signature, so that's ok :)
> 
> Actually, you cannot even do pre-publish algorithm rollover. In order to
> introduce the new algorithm at the parent, you need to fully sign your
> zone with that algorithm. Effectively, it becomes a double-signature
> rollover.
> 

That's what I was saying; for algorithm rolls: pre-publish bad, double sig good.


>> The part about adding signatures first could probably be removed if 4035 is
>> clarified (changed, depending on one's POV ;) ) that it is the DS set and not
>> the DNSKEY set that one should check for algorithm support.
> 
> You would still need to pre-publish signatures if you want to support
> RFC 5011 (because you have no method to delay adding this trust anchor
> until the zone is fully signed with the new algorithm).
> 

I was trying to carefully tread around the trust-anchor thing until the point
above was cleared out :) But I'm not sure at all why this is (or should be)
different (except that it could take longer)

Jelte
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To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@NLnetLabs.nl>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE53927.9090203@isc.org> <4CE58E90.6030607@nic.cz> <AANLkTin2H7UkP7FVfz3GN74CKtqn2OKo7MmcKMGOkvNY@mail.gmail.com> <4CE59B3D.5020109@nic.cz> <20101119004134.993F26EB749@drugs.dv.isc.org><AANLkTi=Hp6s4xwLQGyWv3BNtvUf5-SDtgUzHbNKtfCV1@mail.gmail.com> <20101119060416.024456F87CD@drugs.dv.isc.org> <4CE629F1.2090907@isc.org> <20101119131627.E8B616F8F8B@drugs.dv.isc.org> <4CE8F5DC.80406@isc.org> <4CEA2F8E.7060104@nlnetlabs.nl>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 22 Nov 2010 09:53:34 BST." <4CEA2F8E.7060104@nlnetlabs.nl>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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In message <4CEA2F8E.7060104@nlnetlabs.nl>, Matthijs Mekking writes:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> Hi,
> 
> On 11/21/2010 11:35 AM, Jelte Jansen wrote:
> > On 11/19/2010 02:16 PM, Mark Andrews wrote:
> >>>> If a algorithm is insecure then you should remove it from the list
> >>>> of acceptable algorithms in you validator.  That way you get insecure
> >>>> not trusted out of the validator.
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>> If you do that, and the zone(s) do 'normal' pre-publish rollover from
> >>> that broken algorithm to a not-yet-broken one, you'd get bogus, not
> >>> insecure, during the roll
> >>>
> > 
> >> No you don't.  Once a algorithm is marked as invalid the validator
> >> behaves exactly as if the validator doesn't know about the algorithm.
> > 
> >> During the pre-publish period there isn't a trust path into the zone with
> >> a supported algorithm.
> > 
> > 
> > no, but during the DS switch there would be, same problem, just a different
>  level.
> > 
> > If it is the DS set that specifies which algorithms are used, you either ha
> ve to
> > have both algorithms in that set at one point, or have the zone fully signe
> d
> > with both algorithms. But if you have both DS's in there, and the zone itse
> lf
> > signed with only one, it'll be bogus for validators that only support the o
> ther
> > algorithm.
> > 
> > But I now notice that the current draft for 4641bis says not to do pre-publ
> ish
> > rollover when switching algorithms, only double signature, so that's ok :)
> 
> Actually, you cannot even do pre-publish algorithm rollover. In order to
> introduce the new algorithm at the parent, you need to fully sign your
> zone with that algorithm. Effectively, it becomes a double-signature
> rollover.
> 
> > The part about adding signatures first could probably be removed if 4035 is
> > clarified (changed, depending on one's POV ;) ) that it is the DS set and n
> ot
> > the DNSKEY set that one should check for algorithm support.
> 
> You would still need to pre-publish signatures if you want to support
> RFC 5011 (because you have no method to delay adding this trust anchor
> until the zone is fully signed with the new algorithm).

Unless the max zone ttl is greater than the Add Hold-Down timer (min 30 days)
this is a non-issue.

Mark
 
> Matthijs
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> _______________________________________________
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Mon Nov 22 04:58:35 2010
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Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2010 07:58:53 -0500
To: "W.C.A. Wijngaards" <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
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At 12:48 +0100 11/18/10, W.C.A. Wijngaards wrote:

>Several people have complained that unbound is too strict, and I keep
>defending this.  I do claim to be RFC conformant; and I want to oppose
>the change.  (but not the clarification of signing rules).

Add me to that list.  I think Unbound is not acting in the best 
interests of the network at large.

>This is what I do, I want to avoid a downgrade attack.  A proper signed
>zone has these signatures.  They are missing.  Something is wrong.

What is wrong is that Unbound is not adhering to the spirit of 
DNSSEC.  DNSSEC is designed to protect against cache poisoning.  If 
there is a chain of trust to an RRSet, then the set validates, it has 
proven source authenticity and data integrity.

Since time began (for DNS), there is always something wrong 
somewhere.  The goal is a robust system, not a tightly correct system.

>Yes.  Even though one signature worked, because the other did not work
>(was 'stripped off') it was obvious that there was a downgrade attack.
>Signatures had been removed from the answer.  To be safe, unbound blocks
>this suspect content.

I question the use of the word "obvious."  Recall how the TC bit 
works - if a message cannot include all of the required records, the 
message contains what it can.  The receiver has the option to request 
the full answer over TCP or live with what it has already gotten - 
with the chance that what matters was received.

Stripping of records has always been accommodated in the protocol. 
DNSSEC shouldn't forget that.

>Operationally, something really bad is happening.

You do not know that. ;)

>You must not be lenient with security.

Security must be as lenient as possible without allowing badness. 
(If you illegally cross the street, should the police track you down, 
arrest you, question you, etc., if there was no other record than a 
CCTV image?  Sorry, I hate analogies.)

>I disagree, I am not violating the RFC.  I choose to reject zones that
>are not signed properly.  You understand that unbound gets
>algorithm-downgrade-protection from applying this policy?  There is
>actual security benefit to this policy?

You aren't violating a specific RFC but you are causing "false 
positive" situations.

>Yes, people should know how to keep it signed properly.

Remember, there is more than a signer and authority involved, there 
are caches, etc.  The big cooperative Internet and all that. 
End-to-end principle.

>I do not agree with this, because it diminishes security.

Security isn't the goal - robustness, resiliency, and response is. 
(Think about that one for a while.)
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?

From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Mon Nov 22 06:48:08 2010
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Apologies for not thoroughly reading the thread (volume is 
overwhelming), but I wanted to send this which I sent privately to 
Ondrej.  The reason is that I don't think anyone has properly stated 
the "use case" that prompted the questioned text.  (E.g., it isn't 
about algorithm "strength".)

Using a proof-by-contradiction approach, let's assume a signer *does 
not* have to have a signature by every algorithm at each and every 
set.

Let's say a signer has an alg 5 and alg 8 key in DS/DNSKEY and 
decides to signs all sets owned by names from a-m with alg 5 and all 
others with alg 8.  This decision is not expressible in the protocol 
(meaning the signer can't signal this to the verifier).

Let's say a verifier has implemented alg 5 but not alg 8.  When it 
asks for a set beginning with "a" it is supposed to arrive with a 
signature of alg 5.  The verifier should be able to validate the set. 
We know that only because we have "above vision" - knowing the intent 
of the sender.

If the verifier gets the set desired but there is an alg 8 signature 
there and no alg 5 signature, the verifier has no choice but to 
accept the data, even if the data has been forged.  Without the 
knowledge that the signer must have alg 5 and alg 8 signatures at the 
set, the verifier would be correct to conclude that this set was 
signed only by 8 and not by 5, thus out of bounds for the verifier.

The problem is, we know that the set was signed only by alg 5.  What 
happened is an interloper stripped off the legitimate alg 5 signature 
and inserted a completely bogus alg 8 signature - perhaps merely by 
changing the 5 to an 8 - and changing the data (maybe).  Recall that 
the verifier has not implemented alg 8 and hence cannot determine 
that the signature is bogus.

So, because the verifier is in an undecidable position - it can't 
distinguish between properly signed by alg 8 or improperly stripped 
of an alg 5, we have to require the signer include both.  The intent 
of this rule is to allow the verifier to have a "right to expect" an 
algorithm it can handle (given that the algorithm is in the DS and 
DNSKEY sets).  The intent was never to "look for trouble" in the 
sense that Unbound does.

- In summary, what we were concerned about was supporting old 
resolvers that didn't know about some algorithms, not a choice of 
algorithm situation.  And we were trying to make sure the protocol 
had a sufficient specification because we couldn't convey policy 
in-band.

- What the text missed was we didn't properly account for caching 
behavior and transition states.  (The latter a genetic problem in 
IETF solutions.)

- Oh, and yes, we probably could scope the requirement to the set of 
algorithms with keys that have an SEP bit set.


-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?

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On Fri, 19 Nov 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
> The community that is going to use the published information is about 50,
> highly technical organizations who are only going to make use of the
> information to effect additional validation checks within a precisely
> calibrated legal process.

I expect that whether you like it or not, people other than CAs are going
to check the assertions in these records, and they are going to implement
these checks in widely-deployed software.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7,
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.

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I think that it is right that people will perform such checking, but to do
so on the basis of current CA issuing authorizations will lead to error.

When example.com changes from VeriSign to Comodo they would expect to change
their CAA record to revoke VeriSign's issue authorization immediately. They
would not want this to invalidate existing certificates.


Looking at the mechanics of Certificate management within enterprises, I
think it is going to be necessary for most sites to get their issue of certs
under control as a pre-condition for implementing client enforceable policy.

We had this experience with DKIM. It did not take as much time to write the
spec as people imagine. What really took the time was the fact that
deployment at the sites that mattered required a vast amount of effort to
catalog what was already deployed. From a technical standpoint, DKIM is very
easy to deploy, from an administrative standpoint it is really easy to
administer once it is installed. But going from not using DKIM to using DKIM
can require major changes to management processes and in some cases
centralization of concerns that had previously not been tracked at all.


That is why I think that we need to separate this part of the problem from
the rest and why I think we need a separate DNS RR.



On Mon, Nov 22, 2010 at 11:04 AM, Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> wrote:

> On Fri, 19 Nov 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> >
> > The community that is going to use the published information is about 50,
> > highly technical organizations who are only going to make use of the
> > information to effect additional validation checks within a precisely
> > calibrated legal process.
>
> I expect that whether you like it or not, people other than CAs are going
> to check the assertions in these records, and they are going to implement
> these checks in widely-deployed software.
>
> Tony.
> --
> f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
> HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO
> 7,
> DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
> ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e645b848d001fc0495a6f1ad
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I think that it is right that people will perform such checking, but to do =
so on the basis of current CA issuing authorizations will lead to error.<di=
v><br></div><div>When <a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a> change=
s from VeriSign to Comodo they would expect to change their CAA record to r=
evoke VeriSign&#39;s issue authorization immediately. They would not want t=
his to invalidate existing certificates.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Looking at the mechanics of Certificate =
management within enterprises, I think it is going to be necessary for most=
 sites to get their issue of certs under control as a pre-condition for imp=
lementing client enforceable policy.</div>
<div><br></div><div>We had this experience with DKIM. It did not take as mu=
ch time to write the spec as people imagine. What really took the time was =
the fact that deployment at the sites that mattered required a vast amount =
of effort to catalog what was already deployed. From a technical standpoint=
, DKIM is very easy to deploy, from an administrative standpoint it is real=
ly easy to administer once it is installed. But going from not using DKIM t=
o using DKIM can require major changes to management processes and in some =
cases centralization of concerns that had previously not been tracked at al=
l.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>That is why I think that we need to sepa=
rate this part of the problem from the rest and why I think we need a separ=
ate DNS RR.</div><div><br></div><div><br><div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
">
On Mon, Nov 22, 2010 at 11:04 AM, Tony Finch <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=
=3D"mailto:dot@dotat.at">dot@dotat.at</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On Fri, 19 Nov 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The community that is going to use the published information is about =
50,<br>
&gt; highly technical organizations who are only going to make use of the<b=
r>
&gt; information to effect additional validation checks within a precisely<=
br>
&gt; calibrated legal process.<br>
<br>
</div>I expect that whether you like it or not, people other than CAs are g=
oing<br>
to check the assertions in these records, and they are going to implement<b=
r>
these checks in widely-deployed software.<br>
<br>
Tony.<br>
<font color=3D"#888888">--<br>
f.anthony.n.finch =A0&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dot@dotat.at">dot@dotat.at</a>&g=
t; =A0<a href=3D"http://dotat.at/" target=3D"_blank">http://dotat.at/</a><b=
r>
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7=
,<br>
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR<b=
r>
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.<br>
</font></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=
=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div></div>

--0016e645b848d001fc0495a6f1ad--

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On 21.11.2010 22:20, Doug Barton wrote:
> I agree with Mark here, and my recollection of the history is the same
> as Mark's and Sam's.
>
> Assume all of the following:
> 1. Alg(A) is still considered "secure" (validator local policy)
> 2. There is a DS/DNSKEY/RRSIG chain for Alg(A) in the zone already
> 3. A new DNSKEY for Alg(B) is added to the zone, but no RRSIGs using
> that key exist (with or without a DS for DNSKEY(B) in the parent).

I don't think you can mix the "with or without".  If you publish DS for 
DNSKEY(Alg(B)) you must have signatures created by DNSKEY(Alg(B) in the 
zone (ie. double sign over all your zone).

> That situation is NOT a downgrade attack, and should never be considered
> one. (And yes, arguably the authoritative server should not have allowed
> the zone to be loaded, but that's another issue.)
>
>
> Doug
>
>
> On Sat, 20 Nov 2010, Mark Andrews wrote:
>
>> In message <4CE64785.7090401@nlnetlabs.nl>, "W.C.A. Wijngaards" writes:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> On 11/18/2010 09:16 PM, Ond??ej Sur?? wrote:
>>>> The idea is that just adding a new key with algorithm B (the strong)
>>>> without chaining it to the parent zone doesn't add any new security,
>>>> since the chain of trust is secured by the (the weak) algorithm A.
>>>
>>> Today, the RFC has rules for DS-DNSKEY and rule for DNSKEY-DATA. You
>>> want to create new rules for DS-DATA.
>>
>> I want to make it possible to do incremental signing of new algorithms
>> which requires the rules to be relaxed but we can leave discussion of
>> that until we resolve the issue about whether the validator should be
>> checking or not.
>>
>>>> So, yes the RFCs need a clarification and yes the unbound is
>>>> unnecessarily strict since such strict implementation doesn't add any
>>>> additional security (because you don't have a chain of trust leading to
>>>> a key). Wouter, object now or never :).
>>>
>>> You called? Yes, unbound is strict, it enforces the exact zone signing
>>> requirements from the RFC. But, I am not objecting to you strongly. I
>>> want to caution making changes to RFC4035, there must be backwards
>>> compatibility.
>>
>> Except the validator is not supposed to enforce it. The point of
>> the rule, for the signer, was to ensure that there would be *a*
>> signature to validate with.
>>
>> The downgrade attack it was supposed to protect against is downgrade
>> to insecure not downgrade between algorithms.
>>
>>> But the above makes the algorithm-set determined by the parent.
>>> Now, the algorithm set is determined by the child (when you get there).
>>> I appreciate the concern that if you want to protect a downgrade, then
>>> you must signal this at the parent.
>>
>> A zone is deem secure or insecure based on the list of algorithms
>> in the DS RRset.
>>
>>> (the security of that parent is that of a new zone; with different
>>> owners).
>>>
>>> Mark Andrews wrote:
>>>> Additionally the MUST is a directive to *zone operators*. A zone
>>>> operator can comply with that MUST but validation will still fail
>>>> with unbound as unbound requires that a zone be signed with DNSKEYs
>>>> which are NOT in the zone prior to adding the DNSKEY to the zone
>>>> due to caching. On this alone it is clear that unbound is in the
>>>> wrong.
>>>
>>> Let me try to understand this and then respond. You talk about having
>>> to prepublish signatures before the keys are published.
>>>
>>> This is necessary with the current rules today for algorithm-support
>>> reasons. It does not go away if unbound has less strict checking. The
>>> affected servers could be bind, unbound or other implementations.
>>
>> No it isn't necessary.
>>
>> I start out with algorithm A in DS and DNSKEY. The DNSKEY has a
>> TTL of 600. I have a TXT record with a TTL of 600 which is fetch
>> 300 seconds after the DNSKEY record is fetched. I add a DNSKEY
>> with algorithm B and re-sign the entire zone with A+B meeting the
>> MUST. 301 second later a downstream validating client asks for the
>> TXT record. The client get a DNSKEY RRset with A+B and a TXT with
>> A signatures. This will validate as secure by a validator that
>> supports A only. This will validate as insecure by a validator
>> that supports B only as there is no secure path from the parent to
>> the child. It will validate as secure by a validator that supports
>> A+B.
>>
>> Only when you start enforcing that the TXT and DNSKEY records have
>> to have matching algorithms in the validator does this break despite
>> the signer meeting the MUST.
>>
>> Similarly you can go from A+B to just A by removing the DS records
>> for A, waiting for the old DS RRset to expire then removing the A
>> DNSKEYs.
>>
>>> Your change to the rules makes it possible to add the key, and then
>>> signatures slowly, with a new algorithm, (as long as the DS is not added
>>> yet). I appreciate that niceness.
>>
>>> You are correct that you must also take the trust-anchors into account
>>> to do it properly (and I do not do that today).
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Wouter
>>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
>>> Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
>>> Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
>>>
>>> iEYEARECAAYFAkzmR4UACgkQkDLqNwOhpPh6FACeLAsw/oeIyPpsA4YIL0Bn0jom
>>> YBoAnRm3491f7m5Y4ipbNc5bpYPNTb6U
>>> =e/Yn
>>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> dnsext mailing list
>>> dnsext@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>>
>>
>
>


-- 
  Ondřej Surý
  vedoucí výzkumu/Head of R&D department
  -------------------------------------------
  CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laboratoře CZ.NIC
  Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
  mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
  tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
  -------------------------------------------

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In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 22 Nov 2010 07:58:53 EST." <a06240801c9101620d463@[192.168.128.163]> 
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> Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2010 07:58:53 -0500
> From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
> ...
> DNSSEC is designed to protect against cache poisoning.  If there is a chain
> of trust to an RRSet, then the set validates, it has proven source
> authenticity and data integrity.
> 
> Since time began (for DNS), there is always something wrong somewhere.  The
> goal is a robust system, not a tightly correct system.

+1.

From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Mon Nov 22 10:25:10 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] RFC 6014 on Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Allocation for DNSSEC
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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 6014

        Title:      Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Allocation for 
                    DNSSEC 
        Author:     P. Hoffman
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       November 2010
        Mailbox:    paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
        Pages:      6
        Characters: 11182
        Updates:    RFC4033, RFC4034, RFC4035

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-alg-allocation-03.txt

        URL:        http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6014.txt

This document specifies how DNSSEC cryptographic algorithm
identifiers in the IANA registries are allocated.  It changes the
requirement from "standard required" to "RFC Required".  It does not
change the list of algorithms that are recommended or required for
DNSSEC implementations.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]

This document is a product of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard Protocol.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet standards track
protocol for the Internet community,and requests discussion and suggestions
for improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the Internet
Official Protocol Standards (STD 1) for the standardization state and
status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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From ogud@ogud.com  Mon Nov 22 13:01:07 2010
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Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2010 16:01:59 -0500
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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Subject: [dnsext] WGLC Summary Re:  WGLC: RFC5395bis obsoleting RFC5395
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This working group last call has ended.
There was no opposition voiced thus the document will be advanced.
There was one comment about clarifying text that was within the scope of 
the WGLC and chairs will work with editor on addressing that.

As soon as new version is ready we will advance this document to the IESG.

	Olafur


On 12/11/2010 9:10 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
>
>
> This message starts an accelerated review of this draft, ending on
> November 21'st 2010.
> For the latest version of the document see:
> http://tools.ietf.org/wg/dnsext/draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis/
>
> The document is aimed at BCP.
> The only significant document change from its predecessor is the
> renaming of the working group mailing list.
>
> Due to small changes in the document the default action is to advance
> the document.
> If you object to the publication of this document please state that on
> the mailing list.
>
> Any changes to RFC5395 other than clarification of existing text
> and the change in mailing list are out of scope.
>
> Olafur for the chairs
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>
>


From wwwrun@core3.amsl.com  Tue Nov 23 09:25:39 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] WG Review: Recharter of DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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A modified charter has been submitted for the DNS Extensions (dnsext)
working group in the Internet Area of the IETF.  The IESG has not made any
determination as yet.  The modified charter is provided below for
informational purposes only.  Please send your comments to the IESG
mailing list (iesg@ietf.org) by Tuesday, November 30, 2010.

DNS Extensions (dnsext)
---------------------------------------------
Status: Active Working Group
Last updated: 2010-11-09

Chairs:
  Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
  Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>

Internet Area Directors:
  Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>
  Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>

Internet Area Advisor:
  Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>

Mailing Lists:
  Address:	dnsext@ietf.org
  To Subscribe:	https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
  Archive:	http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsext/

Description of Working Group:

The DNS has a large installed base and repertoire of protocol
specifications. The DNSEXT working group will actively advance DNS
protocol-related RFCs on the standards track while thoroughly
reviewing further proposed extensions. The scope of the DNSEXT WG is
confined to the DNS protocol, particularly changes that affect DNS
protocols "on the wire" or the internal processing of DNS data. DNS
operations are out of scope for the WG.

The WG will consider work in the following areas:

* DNSSEC and TSIG/TKEY algorithm maintenance
* Mechanisms that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)
* Hardening DNS protocol and providing guidance to implementers
* Advancing existing DNS-related Proposed Standard RFCs to Draft/Full
  Standard
* Obsoleting DNS-related RFCs
* Maintaining a Wiki containing a guide to DNS protocol RFCs
* Improving DNS zone synchronization mechanisms 
* Examining transport protocols, possibly adding new ones.
* Mechanisms to alias DNS trees or parts thereof

While the DNS offers two mechanisms for aliasing DNS labels -- CNAME
and DNAME -- neither of these provides the support necessary to alias
completely one part of the DNS tree as another part.  There are claims
that the restriction has proven to be too great in practice,
particularly with burgeoning deployment of IDNA and the need to
provide domain name variants.  The issue is made more complex by
DNSSEC

The DNSEXT WG will evaluate ways to provide such aliasing, to add
metadata to zones to allow easier operation of zones when such
aliasing is needed, or both.  The WG will also provide an
informational document outlining the various strategies available,
what they might be used for, and what their limitations are.  It is
possible that the WG will conclude no aliasing or metadata support is
possible, or that none of the proposals so far made are adequate.

Before formal adoption of any work item at least 5 working group
participants must publicly state that the item is within charter and
is a worthwhile item for further study.

The DNSEXT WG will conduct the specified RFC5395 review of RR
templates as they are posted, and EDNS0 Option templates if EDNS0-bis
updates registration requirements.

The WG will review DNS protocol related work which may originate
elsewhere in the IETF, including AD-sponsored submissions or drafts
in other working group.

Goals and Milestones:

Done           AXFR Clarify to IESG
Done           DNS existing transport protocol
                    recommendations/clarifications to IESG
Dec 2010       RFC3597-bis Unknown RR advanced to IESG for PS 
Dec 2010       DNSKEY Registry fixes and allocation procedure
                    advanced to IESG
Dec 2010       EDNS0-bis update advanced to IESG
Dec 2010       TSIG/MD5 Obsoleting to IESG
Dec 2010       IXFR-only to IESG
Jan 2011       DNSSEC Errata document to IESG 
Jul 2011       WG consensus on new or revised RRTYPEs for aliasing
                    work
Jul 2011       Interoperation testing on new or revised RRTYPEs
                    (particularly with existing deployed code)
Nov 2011       Document on new RRTYPE or revised RRTYPE handling for
                    alias to IESG
Nov 2011       Document on in-zone metadata for aliases to IESG
Nov 2011       Document on uses and limitations of different alias
                    techniques to IESG


From ajs@shinkuro.com  Tue Nov 23 12:21:30 2010
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Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 15:22:26 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Subject: [dnsext] Draft minutes posted
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Dear colleagues,

The draft minutes of the WG meeting in Beijing are up at 

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/79/minutes/dnsext.txt

If you have corrections, please send them to me or the list.

A
-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Tue Nov 23 12:25:31 2010
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Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 15:26:27 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 03:22:26PM -0500, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> 
> The draft minutes of the WG meeting in Beijing are up at 

Also, my apologies for failing to thank Wes Hardaker for taking the
minutes (and submitting them very promptly -- I was the laggard) for
us.

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From johnl@iecc.com  Tue Nov 23 14:07:29 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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I've been pondering how rDNS and DNSBLs will or won't work with IPv6.

Since each end user is likely to get a /64, it would be easy even if
somewhat antisocial for a host to use a different IP address for every
HTTP or SMTP conection.  Bulk mailers who think they're clever might
use that to do bounce or delivery management by IP address, and
spammers will doubtless do it both on outbound SMTP connections and
inbound HTTP payload connections to try to evade IP based filters.

It will surely be common for the whole /64 to have the same rDNS, or a
common DNSBL entry.  While it is straightforward for rDNS and DNSBL
servers to use wildcards or, in specialized BL servers, CIDR ranges,
to keep the file sizes down to something reasonable, this will be bad
news for DNS caches that will fill up with uselesly cached single use
rDNS and BL entries.

I see that there is an arcane but well documented* aspect of DNSSEC
that makes it possible for a DNS cache that has an entry synthesized
from a wildcard to use RRSIG to see what the wildcard was, and NSEC to
tell the range of names the wildcard covers, so the cache can handle
other names under the same wildcard itself, without having to contact
the authoritative server.  RFC 4035 says it would be "prudent" not to
do that, but it's not clear why.  It would certainly help mitigate the
rDNS and DNSBL cache explosion.

Do any caches do wildcard expansion?  Is anyone planning to do it?

R's,
John

* - a pleasant switch from the usual tradition




From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Wed Nov 24 09:40:47 2010
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At 22:08 +0000 11/23/10, John Levine wrote:

>Do any caches do wildcard expansion?  Is anyone planning to do it?

Caches cannot do the expansion.  A cache would have to have the 
entire zone in it's memory to accurately apply the wild card rule.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?

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>> Do any caches do wildcard expansion?  Is anyone planning to do it?
>
> Caches cannot do the expansion.  A cache would have to have the entire zone 
> in it's memory to accurately apply the wild card rule.

The authors of RFC 4035 disagree with you.  See section 4.5, particularly 
bullet 1 on page 22.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

From brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com  Wed Nov 24 10:36:33 2010
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rDNS for IPv6 is one place where DNAME is much better than wildcards,
but can still accomplish the same thing, more or less.

Recall that in IPv6, rDNS is on a nibble boundary (one hex digit).
The recipe using DNAME to pre-populate a /64 with identical data is:
At each nibble, have one "true" entry, and 15 DNAMEs pointing at the "true"
entry.

(Actually, the "true" entry is only needed at the last nibble,
i.e. the full /128 of the "real" RDATA to be used.)

So, pre-populating a /64 rDNS zone would require 16*15 DNAMEs,
plus the singleton "real" entry, or 241 entries.

This is less than pre-populating an IPv4 /24.

It also involves no further cache impact than the entries above.

Caches might have to synthesize CNAMEs for DNAME-unaware clients,
but those values don't get cached.

DNAME-unaware caches would explode with synthesized CNAMES,
which is why they should probably upgrade to DNAME-aware code.

Brian

On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 6:08 PM, John Levine <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:
> I've been pondering how rDNS and DNSBLs will or won't work with IPv6.
>
> Since each end user is likely to get a /64, it would be easy even if
> somewhat antisocial for a host to use a different IP address for every
> HTTP or SMTP conection. =A0Bulk mailers who think they're clever might
> use that to do bounce or delivery management by IP address, and
> spammers will doubtless do it both on outbound SMTP connections and
> inbound HTTP payload connections to try to evade IP based filters.
>
> It will surely be common for the whole /64 to have the same rDNS, or a
> common DNSBL entry. =A0While it is straightforward for rDNS and DNSBL
> servers to use wildcards or, in specialized BL servers, CIDR ranges,
> to keep the file sizes down to something reasonable, this will be bad
> news for DNS caches that will fill up with uselesly cached single use
> rDNS and BL entries.
>
> I see that there is an arcane but well documented* aspect of DNSSEC
> that makes it possible for a DNS cache that has an entry synthesized
> from a wildcard to use RRSIG to see what the wildcard was, and NSEC to
> tell the range of names the wildcard covers, so the cache can handle
> other names under the same wildcard itself, without having to contact
> the authoritative server. =A0RFC 4035 says it would be "prudent" not to
> do that, but it's not clear why. =A0It would certainly help mitigate the
> rDNS and DNSBL cache explosion.
>
> Do any caches do wildcard expansion? =A0Is anyone planning to do it?
>
> R's,
> John
>
> * - a pleasant switch from the usual tradition
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>

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On Nov 24 2010, John R. Levine wrote:

>>> Do any caches do wildcard expansion?  Is anyone planning to do it?
>>
>> Caches cannot do the expansion.  A cache would have to have the entire zone 
>> in it's memory to accurately apply the wild card rule.
>
>The authors of RFC 4035 disagree with you.  See section 4.5, particularly 
>bullet 1 on page 22.

Which says: yes, you could use such learned data to second-guess what
is in the rest of the zone, but it's a bloody stupid idea. "Resolvers
that follow this recommendation [i.e. not to do that] will have a more
consistent view of the namespace."

-- 
Chris Thompson
Email: cet1@cam.ac.uk

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Chris and all,


-----Original Message-----
>From: Chris Thompson <cet1@cam.ac.uk>
>Sent: Nov 24, 2010 1:37 PM
>To: "John R. Levine" <johnl@iecc.com>
>Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
>
>On Nov 24 2010, John R. Levine wrote:
>
>>>> Do any caches do wildcard expansion?  Is anyone planning to do it?
>>>
>>> Caches cannot do the expansion.  A cache would have to have the entire zone 
>>> in it's memory to accurately apply the wild card rule.
>>
>>The authors of RFC 4035 disagree with you.  See section 4.5, particularly 
>>bullet 1 on page 22.
>
>Which says: yes, you could use such learned data to second-guess what
>is in the rest of the zone, but it's a bloody stupid idea. "Resolvers
>that follow this recommendation [i.e. not to do that] will have a more
>consistent view of the namespace."

  Well that's just bloody wonderful isn't it?  Perhaps
it would be a equally bloody wonderful thing if the RFC
were to better reflect that more clearly, eh?
>
>-- 
>Chris Thompson
>Email: cet1@cam.ac.uk
>_______________________________________________
>dnsext mailing list
>dnsext@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

Regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Phone: 214-244-4827



From johnl@iecc.com  Wed Nov 24 11:56:42 2010
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>> The authors of RFC 4035 disagree with you.  See section 4.5, particularly 
>> bullet 1 on page 22.
>
> Which says: yes, you could use such learned data to second-guess what
> is in the rest of the zone, but it's a bloody stupid idea. "Resolvers
> that follow this recommendation [i.e. not to do that] will have a more
> consistent view of the namespace."

It's true, your view of the namespace would be less consistent, but if the 
alternative is to blow your cache out with useless entries, I would have 
to say the stupid alternative would be not to do so.  Assuming the TTLs on 
the wildcards are chosen sensibly, I don't see any reason why one would 
expect the decrease in consistency to be significant.

As Ed Lewis said two days ago:

> Since time began (for DNS), there is always something wrong somewhere. 
> The goal is a robust system, not a tightly correct system.

The suggestion to do it with DNAME is an interesting one.  I'll have to 
see if I can model the two approaches.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

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John R. Levine:
> As Ed Lewis said two days ago:
>=20
> > Since time began (for DNS), there is always something wrong
somewhere.
> > The goal is a robust system, not a tightly correct system.
>=20
> The suggestion to do it with DNAME is an interesting one.  I'll have
to
> see if I can model the two approaches.
>=20
Indeed a very interesting approach. The problem with both this and the
wildcard approach is that it fails the expectation in [RFC1912] for
forward and reverse to match.

What needs to be done to solve the rDNS in IPv6 problem is to synthesize
the mapping on the fly on the authoritative side and create some kind of
signaling mechanism between authoritative servers. This would either
require a whole new definition of wildcards or some kind of PTRPARAM /
AAAAPARAM records to tell the slave how to do the synthesis. I have some
ideas but can't really figure out how DNSSEC would work in such case.

/Stephan


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>> The suggestion to do it with DNAME is an interesting one.  I'll have
>> to see if I can model the two approaches.
>>
> Indeed a very interesting approach. The problem with both this and the
> wildcard approach is that it fails the expectation in [RFC1912] for
> forward and reverse to match.

Hmmn.  I suppose a name with 2^64 AAAA records would be pretty bulky, 
wouldn't it?   I'm more worried about DNSBLs where the forward/reverse 
problem doesn't apply.

> What needs to be done to solve the rDNS in IPv6 problem is to synthesize
> the mapping on the fly on the authoritative side and create some kind of
> signaling mechanism between authoritative servers. This would either
> require a whole new definition of wildcards or some kind of PTRPARAM /
> AAAAPARAM records to tell the slave how to do the synthesis. I have some
> ideas but can't really figure out how DNSSEC would work in such case.

I can't help but wonder why, after a decade of IPv6, we're just thinking 
about these problems now.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

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On Nov 24, 2010, at 1:33 PM, John R. Levine wrote:
> I can't help but wonder why, after a decade of IPv6, we're just =
thinking about these problems now.

They've been discussed before and I believe the answer has been "DDNS =
with online signing keys for reverse zones doing DNSSEC".

Regards,
-drc


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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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> They've been discussed before and I believe the answer has been "DDNS 
> with online signing keys for reverse zones doing DNSSEC".

I'm a little unclear.  Is the idea that the hosts would poke their rDNS 
into the authoritative servers when they configure themselves, or DHCP 
servers would do it on their behalf, or something else?

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

From stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com  Wed Nov 24 13:48:12 2010
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Thread-Topic: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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From: "Stephan Lagerholm" <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>
To: "David Conrad" <drc@virtualized.org>, "John R. Levine" <johnl@iecc.com>
Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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Hi David,

> From: dnsext-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dnsext-bounces@ietf.org] On
Behalf
> Of David Conrad
> Sent: Wednesday, November 24, 2010 3:42 PM
> To: John R. Levine
> Cc: Stephan Lagerholm; dnsext@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
>=20
> On Nov 24, 2010, at 1:33 PM, John R. Levine wrote:
> > I can't help but wonder why, after a decade of IPv6, we're just
thinking
> about these problems now.
>=20
> They've been discussed before and I believe the answer has been "DDNS
with
> online signing keys for reverse zones doing DNSSEC".

There is an RFC requirement with DDNS to commit to stable storage prior
sending an ACK back to the client. So DDNS performance is limited by the
number of disk writes your hardware can do. This is typically in the
range of a few hundreds with modern hardware. This doesn't really scale
to large service provider environments.

Additionally, how do you solve DHCP prefix delegation? How do you know
what address the client will use? How do you implement security around
this?

DDNS is just the wrong way to go.

/S


From matthew@dempsky.org  Wed Nov 24 14:15:53 2010
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On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:38 PM, Stephan Lagerholm
<stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com> wrote:
> There is an RFC requirement with DDNS to commit to stable storage prior
> sending an ACK back to the client. So DDNS performance is limited by the
> number of disk writes your hardware can do.

Nonsense.  Multiple transaction commits can be batched into a single disk write.

From brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com  Wed Nov 24 14:22:59 2010
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On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 2:37 PM, Brian Dickson
<brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:
> rDNS for IPv6 is one place where DNAME is much better than wildcards,
> but can still accomplish the same thing, more or less.
>
> Recall that in IPv6, rDNS is on a nibble boundary (one hex digit).
> The recipe using DNAME to pre-populate a /64 with identical data is:
> At each nibble, have one "true" entry, and 15 DNAMEs pointing at the "tru=
e"
> entry.
>
> (Actually, the "true" entry is only needed at the last nibble,
> i.e. the full /128 of the "real" RDATA to be used.)
>
> So, pre-populating a /64 rDNS zone would require 16*15 DNAMEs,
> plus the singleton "real" entry, or 241 entries.

Slight correction - the bottommost nibble entries would have to be
CNAMEs, of course, 15 of them.

Brian

> This is less than pre-populating an IPv4 /24.
>
> It also involves no further cache impact than the entries above.
>
> Caches might have to synthesize CNAMEs for DNAME-unaware clients,
> but those values don't get cached.
>
> DNAME-unaware caches would explode with synthesized CNAMES,
> which is why they should probably upgrade to DNAME-aware code.
>
> Brian
>
> On Tue, Nov 23, 2010 at 6:08 PM, John Levine <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:
>> I've been pondering how rDNS and DNSBLs will or won't work with IPv6.
>>
>> Since each end user is likely to get a /64, it would be easy even if
>> somewhat antisocial for a host to use a different IP address for every
>> HTTP or SMTP conection. =A0Bulk mailers who think they're clever might
>> use that to do bounce or delivery management by IP address, and
>> spammers will doubtless do it both on outbound SMTP connections and
>> inbound HTTP payload connections to try to evade IP based filters.
>>
>> It will surely be common for the whole /64 to have the same rDNS, or a
>> common DNSBL entry. =A0While it is straightforward for rDNS and DNSBL
>> servers to use wildcards or, in specialized BL servers, CIDR ranges,
>> to keep the file sizes down to something reasonable, this will be bad
>> news for DNS caches that will fill up with uselesly cached single use
>> rDNS and BL entries.
>>
>> I see that there is an arcane but well documented* aspect of DNSSEC
>> that makes it possible for a DNS cache that has an entry synthesized
>> from a wildcard to use RRSIG to see what the wildcard was, and NSEC to
>> tell the range of names the wildcard covers, so the cache can handle
>> other names under the same wildcard itself, without having to contact
>> the authoritative server. =A0RFC 4035 says it would be "prudent" not to
>> do that, but it's not clear why. =A0It would certainly help mitigate the
>> rDNS and DNSBL cache explosion.
>>
>> Do any caches do wildcard expansion? =A0Is anyone planning to do it?
>>
>> R's,
>> John
>>
>> * - a pleasant switch from the usual tradition
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> dnsext mailing list
>> dnsext@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>>
>

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>> There is an RFC requirement with DDNS to commit to stable storage prior
>> sending an ACK back to the client. So DDNS performance is limited by the
>> number of disk writes your hardware can do.
>
> Nonsense.  Multiple transaction commits can be batched into a single disk write.

I'd think that you could do a pretty effective DOS against the name 
service if you were planning to use a lot of addresses in your /64.  I 
realize that's not what people anticipated, but it's not hard to think of 
more or less legitimate scenarios to use a lot of IP addresses to keep 
track of a lot of sessions.  And it would be pitiful to say, well, yes, 
the bits are there, but because of our lame infrastructure, you can't use 
them.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

From sthaug@nethelp.no  Wed Nov 24 14:44:24 2010
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> >> There is an RFC requirement with DDNS to commit to stable storage prior
> >> sending an ACK back to the client. So DDNS performance is limited by the
> >> number of disk writes your hardware can do.
> >
> > Nonsense.  Multiple transaction commits can be batched into a single disk write.
> 
> I'd think that you could do a pretty effective DOS against the name 
> service if you were planning to use a lot of addresses in your /64.  I 
> realize that's not what people anticipated, but it's not hard to think of 
> more or less legitimate scenarios to use a lot of IP addresses to keep 
> track of a lot of sessions.  And it would be pitiful to say, well, yes, 
> the bits are there, but because of our lame infrastructure, you can't use 
> them.

We've been very happy with machine generated static forward and reverse
DNS for our DHCP customers. Using DDNS for customers just because they
have an IPv6 address / prefix is not particularly interesting. As I see
it, the relevant alternatives for us are:

- Some kind of static forward and reverse mapping, presumably involving
wildcards / CNAMEs / DNAMEs.

- DNS records synthesized on the fly by name servers (as is possible
with for instance a suitable PowerDNS backend).

- No DNS entries at all for our DHCP customers.

YMMV, obviously. But DDNS is not on the table...

Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug@nethelp.no

From stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com  Wed Nov 24 15:26:04 2010
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References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan><a06240802c912fe08d3b2@10.31.200.110><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan><Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan><DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan><EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org><DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com>
From: "Stephan Lagerholm" <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>
To: "Matthew Dempsky" <matthew@dempsky.org>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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Matthew,

> > There is an RFC requirement with DDNS to commit to stable storage
prior
> > sending an ACK back to the client. So DDNS performance is limited by
the
> > number of disk writes your hardware can do.
>=20
> Nonsense.  Multiple transaction commits can be batched into a single
disk
> write.

There is a flip side of that coin. You will not be able to answer any
queries while you batch.

RFC 2136: When a zone is modified by an UPDATE operation, the server
must commit the change to nonvolatile storage before sending a response
to the requestor or answering any queries or transfers for the modified
zone.

/S

From johnl@iecc.com  Wed Nov 24 15:37:48 2010
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>> Nonsense.  Multiple transaction commits can be batched into a single
>> disk write.
>
> There is a flip side of that coin. You will not be able to answer any
> queries while you batch.

This all sounds rather hypothetical.

Does anyone here have actual experience with DNS for IPv6 networks of 
non-toy size?  I certainly don't.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

From matthew@dempsky.org  Wed Nov 24 15:43:47 2010
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On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Stephan Lagerholm
<stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com> wrote:
> There is a flip side of that coin. You will not be able to answer any
> queries while you batch.

You just delay responding while you batch.  If you're limited to 100
writes per second, that's only adding 10ms of latency to your response
time.

If you can only do 100 writes and you get 500 requests, what's better?
 To answer 100 of them with minimal overhead, or to answer all 500
with an average of 5ms of extra latency?

From marka@isc.org  Wed Nov 24 15:48:47 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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In message <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com>, "Ste
phan Lagerholm" writes:
> Hi David,
> 
> > From: dnsext-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dnsext-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf
> > Of David Conrad
> > Sent: Wednesday, November 24, 2010 3:42 PM
> > To: John R. Levine
> > Cc: Stephan Lagerholm; dnsext@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
> > 
> > On Nov 24, 2010, at 1:33 PM, John R. Levine wrote:
> > > I can't help but wonder why, after a decade of IPv6, we're just
> thinking
> > about these problems now.
> > 
> > They've been discussed before and I believe the answer has been "DDNS
> with
> > online signing keys for reverse zones doing DNSSEC".
> 
> There is an RFC requirement with DDNS to commit to stable storage prior
> sending an ACK back to the client. So DDNS performance is limited by the
> number of disk writes your hardware can do. This is typically in the
> range of a few hundreds with modern hardware. This doesn't really scale
> to large service provider environments.
> 
> Additionally, how do you solve DHCP prefix delegation? How do you know
> what address the client will use? How do you implement security around
> this?
> 
> DDNS is just the wrong way to go.

Given lots of enterpises do reverse dns this way today, and they
don't fall over, why do you think ISP's will fallover?  The addresses
for hosts will be relatively stable unless the ISP deliberately
forces address changes on the customers.  One can always monitor
for abuses and cut off / recommend that they run their own servers
if they exceed reasonable update rates.  A couple of counters is
all that is needed on a per zone basis.  updates and updates with
commit.

ISP do this today for customers that make huge numbers of queries.

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

From drc@virtualized.org  Wed Nov 24 16:51:06 2010
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From: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
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References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan><a06240802c912fe08d3b2@[10.31.200.110]><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan><Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan><DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com>
To: Stephan Lagerholm <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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On Nov 24, 2010, at 1:38 PM, Stephan Lagerholm wrote:
> There is an RFC requirement with DDNS to commit to stable storage =
prior
> sending an ACK back to the client. So DDNS performance is limited by =
the
> number of disk writes your hardware can do.

As others have pointed out, there are ways of getting around this.

> DDNS is just the wrong way to go.

I think you may have misinterpreted my comment. I simply noted that the =
topic of IPv6 reverses had been brought up before (in response to John's =
question) and that the answer had been "DDNS". See section 7 of RFC =
4472. I am not arguing it is a good answer (I always thought it =
introduced a few too many moving parts for ISPs to be comfortable with), =
merely that it has been an answer in the past.

Regards,
-drc


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On Nov 24, 2010, at 1:49 PM, John R. Levine wrote:
>> They've been discussed before and I believe the answer has been "DDNS =
with online signing keys for reverse zones doing DNSSEC".
>=20
> I'm a little unclear.  Is the idea that the hosts would poke their =
rDNS into the authoritative servers when they configure themselves, or =
DHCP servers would do it on their behalf, or something else?

Both have been suggested.  See RFC 4472 section 7.

Regards,
-drc



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References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan><a06240802c912fe08d3b2@10.31.200.110><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan><Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan><DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan><EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org><DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com>
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On Nov 24, 2010, at 3:14 PM, Stephan Lagerholm wrote:
> There is a flip side of that coin. You will not be able to answer any
> queries while you batch.

There are name servers that are multi-threaded and which can queue =
queries for names, deferring responses until some condition (e.g., disk =
writes) are met.

There are numerous arguments against using DDNS.  Performance is not one =
of the better ones.

Regards,
-drc


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From: "Stephan Lagerholm" <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>
To: "David Conrad" <drc@virtualized.org>
Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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Given that:

1. A wildcard/DNAME solution for rDNS violates RFC 1912.
2. There are many arguments against DDNS, performance might or might not =
be one of them.

Would it then make sense to:
1. Adopt draft-howard-isp-ip6rdns-04 so that it is ok to do nothing. =
(I'm not in favor for this myself)
or
2. start working on extending the DNS protocol with some type of =
signaling mechanism describing how Synthesize of records on the fly =
would look?

/S

-----Original Message-----
From: David Conrad [mailto:drc@virtualized.org]
Sent: Wed 11/24/2010 5:55 PM
To: Stephan Lagerholm
Cc: Matthew Dempsky; John R. Levine; dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
=20
On Nov 24, 2010, at 3:14 PM, Stephan Lagerholm wrote:
> There is a flip side of that coin. You will not be able to answer any
> queries while you batch.

There are name servers that are multi-threaded and which can queue =
queries for names, deferring responses until some condition (e.g., disk =
writes) are met.

There are numerous arguments against using DDNS.  Performance is not one =
of the better ones.

Regards,
-drc



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<P><FONT SIZE=3D2>Given that:<BR>
<BR>
1. A wildcard/DNAME solution for rDNS violates RFC 1912.<BR>
2. There are many arguments against DDNS, performance might or might not =
be one of them.<BR>
<BR>
Would it then make sense to:<BR>
1. Adopt draft-howard-isp-ip6rdns-04 so that it is ok to do nothing. =
(I'm not in favor for this myself)<BR>
or<BR>
2. start working on extending the DNS protocol with some type of =
signaling mechanism describing how Synthesize of records on the fly =
would look?<BR>
<BR>
/S<BR>
<BR>
-----Original Message-----<BR>
From: David Conrad [<A =
HREF=3D"mailto:drc@virtualized.org">mailto:drc@virtualized.org</A>]<BR>
Sent: Wed 11/24/2010 5:55 PM<BR>
To: Stephan Lagerholm<BR>
Cc: Matthew Dempsky; John R. Levine; dnsext@ietf.org<BR>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches<BR>
<BR>
On Nov 24, 2010, at 3:14 PM, Stephan Lagerholm wrote:<BR>
&gt; There is a flip side of that coin. You will not be able to answer =
any<BR>
&gt; queries while you batch.<BR>
<BR>
There are name servers that are multi-threaded and which can queue =
queries for names, deferring responses until some condition (e.g., disk =
writes) are met.<BR>
<BR>
There are numerous arguments against using DDNS.&nbsp; Performance is =
not one of the better ones.<BR>
<BR>
Regards,<BR>
-drc<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
</FONT>
</P>

</BODY>
</HTML>
------_=_NextPart_001_01CB8C3F.BE355C6C--

From matthew@dempsky.org  Wed Nov 24 17:47:36 2010
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References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan> <a06240802c912fe08d3b2@10.31.200.110> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan> <Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 17:48:28 -0800
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From: Matthew Dempsky <matthew@dempsky.org>
To: Stephan Lagerholm <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Stephan Lagerholm
<stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com> wrote:
> 1. A wildcard/DNAME solution for rDNS violates RFC 1912.

This argument is a red herring.  In practice, nobody cares about
forward and reverse DNS entries matching.

$ dig +short -t a secure64.com
72.167.37.13

$ dig +short -t ptr 13.37.167.72.in-addr.arpa
ip-72-167-37-13.ip.secureserver.net.

From vixie@vix.com  Wed Nov 24 18:07:17 2010
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In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 24 Nov 2010 14:38:26 MST." <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> 
References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan><a06240802c912fe08d3b2@[10.31.200.110]><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan><Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan><DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com><alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> 
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> Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 14:38:26 -0700
> From: "Stephan Lagerholm" <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>
> 
> There is an RFC requirement with DDNS to commit to stable storage prior
> sending an ACK back to the client. So DDNS performance is limited by the
> number of disk writes your hardware can do. This is typically in the
> range of a few hundreds with modern hardware. This doesn't really scale
> to large service provider environments.

in large service provider environments, battery backed ram disks are used,
and it scales just fine, like 10K updates per second, more if you RAID it.

From marka@isc.org  Wed Nov 24 18:29:02 2010
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References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan> <a06240802c912fe08d3b2@10.31.200.110> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan> <Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTi=8Y7zLH72i0aSc+R8zUBjjCFOn5QxPMSFGGcf=@mail.gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2010 13:29:39 +1100
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Cc: Stephan Lagerholm <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>, dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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In message <AANLkTi=8Y7zLH72i0aSc+R8zUBjjCFOn5QxPMSFGGcf=@mail.gmail.com>, Matthew Dempsky writes:
> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Stephan Lagerholm
> <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com> wrote:
> > 1. A wildcard/DNAME solution for rDNS violates RFC 1912.
> 
> This argument is a red herring.  In practice, nobody cares about
> forward and reverse DNS entries matching.
> 
> $ dig +short -t a secure64.com
> 72.167.37.13
> 
> $ dig +short -t ptr 13.37.167.72.in-addr.arpa
> ip-72-167-37-13.ip.secureserver.net.

You left out the linkage most applications care about.
That if you start with a address you get that address
when you lookup the name returned from the reverse zone.

getaddrinfo(getnameinfo(address)) == address

% dig +short ip-72-167-37-13.ip.secureserver.net
72.167.37.13
% 

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 24 Nov 2010 17:48:28 PST." <AANLkTi=8Y7zLH72i0aSc+R8zUBjjCFOn5QxPMSFGGcf=@mail.gmail.com> 
References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan> <a06240802c912fe08d3b2@10.31.200.110> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan> <Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTi=8Y7zLH72i0aSc+R8zUBjjCFOn5QxPMSFGGcf=@mail.gmail.com> 
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From: Paul Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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> Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 17:48:28 -0800
> From: Matthew Dempsky <matthew@dempsky.org>
> 
> This argument is a red herring.  In practice, nobody cares about
> forward and reverse DNS entries matching.

this is false by obvious example.

% man 5 postconf
...
smtpd_peername_lookup (default: yes)
       Attempt to look up the remote SMTP client hostname, and verify
       that the name matches the client IP address. A client name is set
       to "unknown" when it cannot be looked up or verified, or when
       name lookup is disabled.  Turning off name lookup reduces delays
       due to DNS lookup and increases the maximal inbound delivery
       rate.

       This feature is available in Postfix 2.3 and later.
...

From mansaxel@besserwisser.org  Thu Nov 25 00:22:43 2010
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From: Mans Nilsson <mansaxel@besserwisser.org>
To: "John R. Levine" <johnl@iecc.com>
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References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan> <Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241837350.78793@joyce.lan>
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Cc: Stephan Lagerholm <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>, dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in	DNS caches
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in D=
NS caches Date: Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 06:38:45PM -0500 Quoting John R. Levin=
e (johnl@iecc.com):
>>> Nonsense.  Multiple transaction commits can be batched into a single
>>> disk write.
>>
>> There is a flip side of that coin. You will not be able to answer any
>> queries while you batch.
>
> This all sounds rather hypothetical.
>
> Does anyone here have actual experience with DNS for IPv6 networks of =20
> non-toy size?  I certainly don't.

I did it for a large LAN party (5000+ computers) once -- some 200
VLAN's with a /64 on each. Router had /64-prefix::1 which was in DNS=20
with PTR and all, and then i made wildcards like

*.<expanded-64-prefix>.ip6.arpa. PTR some-computer-on-VLAN-234.<domain.tld>.

to address any queries for nodes on that VLAN. Worked.

--=20
M=C3=A5ns Nilsson     primary/secondary/besserwisser/machina
MN-1334-RIPE                             +46 705 989668
Where do your SOCKS go when you lose them in th' WASHER?

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In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 24 Nov 2010 17:48:28 PST." <AANLkTi=8Y7zLH72i0aSc+R8zUBjjCFOn5QxPMSFGGcf=@mail.gmail.com> 
References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan> <a06240802c912fe08d3b2@10.31.200.110> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan> <Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTi=8Y7zLH72i0aSc+R8zUBjjCFOn5QxPMSFGGcf=@mail.gmail.com> 
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From: Paul Vixie <vixie@vix.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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> Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2010 17:48:28 -0800
> From: Matthew Dempsky <matthew@dempsky.org>
> 
> This argument is a red herring.  In practice, nobody cares about
> forward and reverse DNS entries matching.

this is false by obvious example.

% man 5 postconf
...
smtpd_peername_lookup (default: yes)
       Attempt to look up the remote SMTP client hostname, and verify
       that the name matches the client IP address. A client name is set
       to "unknown" when it cannot be looked up or verified, or when
       name lookup is disabled.  Turning off name lookup reduces delays
       due to DNS lookup and increases the maximal inbound delivery
       rate.

       This feature is available in Postfix 2.3 and later.
...

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Thu Nov 25 09:29:52 2010
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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2010 12:30:51 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Subject: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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Dear colleagues,

We noted in our report from the chairs around the time of IETF 79 that
we'd soon start a Working Group Last Call for
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06.  Only 8 days late, this
message is in fact initiating that LC.

We hereby commence a Working Group Last Call on
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06 ending 2011-12-03 at 22:00
UTC.  Please review the document for correctness and clarity, and send
to the list any comments you might have.  If you have no comments but
support the document being published, we ask that you also send that
information to the list.  Finally, if you read the document and do not
support its publication, that is also information we would appreciate
receiving on list.

There is one nit in the document you may overlook in your review:
there is a reference to ietf-dnsext-dnssec-alg-allocation, but that is
now available as RFC 6014.  The reference will be updated in the next
revision.

Under the conventions adopted by DNSEXT, the document needs at least
five reviewers to say that they have read the document, and that they
support its publication.  This is a short document that, in my
personal view, makes the IANA registry for Domain Name System Security
(DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers more useful to the Internet protocols
community.  I urge participants in the working group to review the
document so that we can proceed with the next steps in its
publication.  If you are a new participant here and are looking for
something with which to get your feet wet, this is an excellent
document to start with.

Best regards,

Andrew (document shepherd)

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Thu Nov 25 09:43:34 2010
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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2010 12:44:33 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: dnsext@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in	DNS caches
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On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 06:26:11PM -0700, Stephan Lagerholm wrote:
> Would it then make sense to:
> 1. Adopt draft-howard-isp-ip6rdns-04 so that it is ok to do nothing. (I'm not in favor for this myself)

Speaking as chair, I want to note that wherever that document might be
adopted, this WG is not it.  It makes no change to the DNS protocol.

(Speaking only personally, I'd also like to suggest that exploring the
reverse-mapping rathole yet again is not the best use of our time.
But I appreciate that others' views may be different.)

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com  Thu Nov 25 09:44:02 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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I have reviewed this document, have no comments, and support the
document being published.

Brian Dickson

On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 1:30 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote:
> Dear colleagues,
>
> We noted in our report from the chairs around the time of IETF 79 that
> we'd soon start a Working Group Last Call for
> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06. =A0Only 8 days late, this
> message is in fact initiating that LC.
>
> We hereby commence a Working Group Last Call on
> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06 ending 2011-12-03 at 22:00
> UTC. =A0Please review the document for correctness and clarity, and send
> to the list any comments you might have. =A0If you have no comments but
> support the document being published, we ask that you also send that
> information to the list. =A0Finally, if you read the document and do not
> support its publication, that is also information we would appreciate
> receiving on list.
>
> There is one nit in the document you may overlook in your review:
> there is a reference to ietf-dnsext-dnssec-alg-allocation, but that is
> now available as RFC 6014. =A0The reference will be updated in the next
> revision.
>
> Under the conventions adopted by DNSEXT, the document needs at least
> five reviewers to say that they have read the document, and that they
> support its publication. =A0This is a short document that, in my
> personal view, makes the IANA registry for Domain Name System Security
> (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers more useful to the Internet protocols
> community. =A0I urge participants in the working group to review the
> document so that we can proceed with the next steps in its
> publication. =A0If you are a new participant here and are looking for
> something with which to get your feet wet, this is an excellent
> document to start with.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Andrew (document shepherd)
>
> --
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>

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Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2010 12:45:43 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: dnsext@ietf.org
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References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTi=8Y7zLH72i0aSc+R8zUBjjCFOn5QxPMSFGGcf=@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in	DNS caches
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Moderator hat on.

On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 05:48:28PM -0800, Matthew Dempsky wrote:

> This argument is a red herring.  In practice, nobody cares about
> forward and reverse DNS entries matching.

Exploration of the details of operational practice for the DNS does
not belong on the dnsext list, please.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan> <a06240802c912fe08d3b2@10.31.200.110> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan> <Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTi=8Y7zLH72i0aSc+R8zUBjjCFOn5QxPMSFGGcf=@mail.gmail.com>
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> This argument is a red herring.  In practice, nobody cares about
> forward and reverse DNS entries matching.
>
> $ dig +short -t a secure64.com
> 72.167.37.13
>
> $ dig +short -t ptr 13.37.167.72.in-addr.arpa
> ip-72-167-37-13.ip.secureserver.net.

It would be more helpful if you refrained from speculating in areas with 
which you are unfamiliar.  MTAs check rDNS->DNS, not DNS->rDNS.  And yes, 
they really do.

$ dig  +short -t a  ip-72-167-37-13.ip.secureserver.net
72.167.37.13

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

From A.Hoenes@TR-Sys.de  Thu Nov 25 11:04:46 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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WGLC comments:  I have read, and support publication of,
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06 as a Standards Track RFC.


A few details that could be addressed during RFC Editor processing
(or in a new draft version in case that would become necessary for
other reasons):


(1)  Abstract

s/which lists/that lists/


(2)  Section 1, 1st para

Early this year, this WG has defined which set of documents shall
be regarded as comprising the current "DNSSEC specification", i.e.
what needs to be implemented in any DNSSEC implementation intended
for general-purpose use on the Internet.  The basic idea was to
"market" the full document set as an indivisible entity, to further
interoperability in production environments.
The full basic DNSSEC document set was agreed to be comprised of
RFCs 4033, 4034, 4035, 4509, 5155, and 5702  (i.e., this meant the
addition of SHA-2 hashes and NSEC3 to the initial DNSSECbis document
triple).

This decision has been recorded in RFC 5936 (AXFR), since it's been
faster than draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates, which in turn says:

|  [RFC5155] should be considered part of the DNS Security Document
|  Family as described by [RFC4033], Section 10.

   [...]

|  Both [RFC4509] and [RFC5702] should also be considered part of the
|  DNS Security Document Family as described by [RFC4033], Section 10.

Once published, according to the consensus of the WG, the published
dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates document will be added to this list for
purposes of "external communication".

For overall consistency in the messages this WG sends out, I therefore
suggest to add the latter three RFCs: 4509, 5155, and 5702, to the
list of citations in the first sentence of Section 1.


(3)  Section 2.2

According to Section 2.1, the entry for alg.#4 is changed to
"Reserved until 2020".
The new registry layout presented in Section 2.2 preserves the
previously (pre-)assigned Mnemonic (3rd table column) "ECC" for
this entry.

For consistency with the two other entries now being reserved
in the same way, I suggest to also drop this legacy mnemonic.

(This doesn't mean that I suggest to reuse that mnemonic in the
future for any assignment; "ECC" simply is much too unspecific
to make proper sense.  If really deemed necessary, IANA could be
instructed to not assign that mnemonic in the future.)


(4)  Section 3, 2nd para

For consistency with RFC 6014 (as indicated by Andrew, still referred
to as [I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-alg-allocation] in this draft), the now
accepted (thanks Paul for the struggle!), generic, simplified URL for
the IANA DNSSEC registry should be used:
  <http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers>


Kind regards,
  Alfred.


From ajs@shinkuro.com  Thu Nov 25 11:21:48 2010
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From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 08:05:25PM +0100, Alfred Hönes wrote:
> WGLC comments:  I have read, and support publication of,
> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06 as a Standards Track RFC.

Which reminds me: I didn't note this in my WGLC message, but we expect
to send this document up the chain for the Standards Track.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From johnl@iecc.com  Thu Nov 25 16:22:46 2010
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>Given lots of enterpises do reverse dns this way today, and they
>don't fall over, why do you think ISP's will fallover?  The addresses
>for hosts will be relatively stable unless the ISP deliberately
>forces address changes on the customers.  One can always monitor
>for abuses and cut off / recommend that they run their own servers
>if they exceed reasonable update rates.

ISPs have a lot less control over their users than enterprises do, and
the users can be very self-righteous.  Look at the absurd food fight
that ensued when Comcast did some clumsy peak shaving of their
heaviest Bittorrent users.

If an ISP has a rule that each consumer can only use N of their 2^64
IP addresses, expect a great deal of pushback, even if N is entirely
technically reasonable.

R's,
John

From marka@isc.org  Thu Nov 25 17:11:13 2010
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In message <20101126002346.15381.qmail@joyce.lan>, John Levine writes:
> >Given lots of enterpises do reverse dns this way today, and they
> >don't fall over, why do you think ISP's will fallover?  The addresses
> >for hosts will be relatively stable unless the ISP deliberately
> >forces address changes on the customers.  One can always monitor
> >for abuses and cut off / recommend that they run their own servers
> >if they exceed reasonable update rates.
> 
> ISPs have a lot less control over their users than enterprises do, and
> the users can be very self-righteous.  Look at the absurd food fight
> that ensued when Comcast did some clumsy peak shaving of their
> heaviest Bittorrent users.

Which was because Comcast failed to set expectations to match reality
in the first place.  When you live in parts of the world where the
expectations coincide with reality you don't get such fights.  This
was pointed out on numerous occasions at the time.

I get 1X G per/month 12:00-24:00 and 2X G per/month 00:00-12:00 and
if I exceed that I get throttled until the end of the month.  That
was plain and clear when I signed up for the contract.

I also get to see how much I've used in each category and how far
into the month I am for comparison.  The ISP is clearly trying to
get me to shift bulk traffic to the low period (midnight to noon)
and I update my machines during that period.

> If an ISP has a rule that each consumer can only use N of their 2^64
> IP addresses, expect a great deal of pushback, even if N is entirely
> technically reasonable.

It's all about how it's presented.

X records free and if you exceed X records it costs you $ per/month/X
records additional records or part there of.

Z changes per/month/X records and if you exceed Z then you need to
run your own servers if you are worried about transaction rates.

Provide the ability to see where you are up to on each and customers
will self regulate.

If you are doing reverse zones one may as well do forward zones as
well.

Anyway its out there as a idea.

Another alternative is to allow delegations to those that do DDNS
already or have the ability for customers to add DNAME records. The
latter requires OS vendors to do the right thing when they see a
DNAME / CNAME and adjust the DDNS update request to take the DNAME
/ CNAME into account.

Many DDNS services operate on records and changes per month basis
so its really nothing new.   Just new for the ISPs.

Mark

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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  This message is in MIME format.  The first part should be readable text,
  while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools.

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>> If an ISP has a rule that each consumer can only use N of their 2^64
>> IP addresses, expect a great deal of pushback, even if N is entirely
>> technically reasonable.
>
> Easily solved=E2=80=94delegate the zone for the /64 to the customer and l=
et them sweat it.

Sigh.  I get the impression you haven't dealt with many consumer ISP=20
users.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummi=
es",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly
--3825401791-586787244-1290743660=:20858--

From fweimer@bfk.de  Fri Nov 26 00:27:16 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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* John Levine:

> It will surely be common for the whole /64 to have the same rDNS, or a
> common DNSBL entry.  While it is straightforward for rDNS and DNSBL
> servers to use wildcards or, in specialized BL servers, CIDR ranges,
> to keep the file sizes down to something reasonable, this will be bad
> news for DNS caches that will fill up with uselesly cached single use
> rDNS and BL entries.

Per-address rewriting of TXT records is considered crucial by several
DNSBL operators.  This is fundamentally incompatible with wildcard
synthesis because under the current wildcard model, you cannot have a
wildcard apply to one record type, but not to another type.

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99

From ben@niven-jenkins.co.uk  Fri Nov 26 04:16:06 2010
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From: Ben Niven-Jenkins <ben@niven-jenkins.co.uk>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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Andrew,

I gave the draft a quick read.

Section 2.1 states:

   The status of RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 and DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 are set to
   RECOMMENDED and OPTIONAL respectively.

However, the status column for DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 in the table in section =
2.2 is blank.

Also the status column for some other algorithms (Diffie-Hellman, =
DSA/SHA-1, GOST R) are also blank and the document does not provide any =
advice on how a blank status column entry should be interpreted.

Ben

On 25 Nov 2010, at 17:30, Andrew Sullivan wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
>=20
> We noted in our report from the chairs around the time of IETF 79 that
> we'd soon start a Working Group Last Call for
> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06.  Only 8 days late, this
> message is in fact initiating that LC.
>=20
> We hereby commence a Working Group Last Call on
> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06 ending 2011-12-03 at 22:00
> UTC.  Please review the document for correctness and clarity, and send
> to the list any comments you might have.  If you have no comments but
> support the document being published, we ask that you also send that
> information to the list.  Finally, if you read the document and do not
> support its publication, that is also information we would appreciate
> receiving on list.
>=20
> There is one nit in the document you may overlook in your review:
> there is a reference to ietf-dnsext-dnssec-alg-allocation, but that is
> now available as RFC 6014.  The reference will be updated in the next
> revision.
>=20
> Under the conventions adopted by DNSEXT, the document needs at least
> five reviewers to say that they have read the document, and that they
> support its publication.  This is a short document that, in my
> personal view, makes the IANA registry for Domain Name System Security
> (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers more useful to the Internet protocols
> community.  I urge participants in the working group to review the
> document so that we can proceed with the next steps in its
> publication.  If you are a new participant here and are looking for
> something with which to get your feet wet, this is an excellent
> document to start with.
>=20
> Best regards,
>=20
> Andrew (document shepherd)
>=20
> --=20
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext


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> Per-address rewriting of TXT records is considered crucial by several
> DNSBL operators.  This is fundamentally incompatible with wildcard
> synthesis because under the current wildcard model, you cannot have a
> wildcard apply to one record type, but not to another type.

It's true that DNSBLs often embed the IP address in the TXT record.  But 
crucial?  Given a choice between using a fixed record, and people telling 
you that they can't use your DNSBL because it blows out their cache, what 
would you do?

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

From Ted.Lemon@nominum.com  Thu Nov 25 19:25:48 2010
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On Nov 25, 2010, at 10:54 PM, John R. Levine wrote:
> Sigh.  I get the impression you haven't dealt with many consumer ISP=20=

> users.

Not my point at all.   My point is that if they are in the entitled =
0.05% who absolutely must have things their way, delegating will =
actually make them much happier than letting them do DDNS.   For regular =
customers, you can just do DDNS.   Granted, having two choices is a =
pain, but if you plan for it in advance, it's probably not a very big =
deal.


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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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--0016e68ba1b7ded2520495f64204
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I would not be too worried about the effect RBLs might have on DNS
infrastructure. If they start to bust caches too often, people are going to
be implementing controls to avoid caching records from badly behaved RBLs.



Given that there are only 2^32 address bits available for the entire planet
today and given the fact that most people have no intention of mapping MAC
addresses to IP addresses in any form whatsoever, I have a real hard time
understanding why a residential user is going to be inconvenienced or upset
should they get a less than a /64.

Most will be happy with a /120 and nobody is going to actually need more
than a /96.

It is probably unwise to make too many assumptions about how people are
going to make use of allocation mechanisms. What is in the best interests o=
f
RIPE, ARIN and so on is not necessarily what is in the best interests of th=
e
ISPs.


What I would do is to propose that RBL maintainers adopt a different
strategy entirely. Instead of mapping the entire address in one go, map the
address in segments.

So querying at the root would specify that the default bucket interval was
maybe a /56 (or whatever the minimum allocation unit turns out to be.

In 99% of addresses that would map straight to the record.  For another 1%
of addresses there would be another record to say 'dig deeper'.


Approaches that were employed with IPv4 are going to have to be rethought
for IPv6. Well tough, you were going to have to write new code anyway.

Approaches that have the IP address in the TXT record are not going to work
with DNSSEC  and IPv6. Tough.

If you want to synthesize records on the fly then you should either write
your own protocol or look to mechanisms such as DNSCurve and/or DPLS



On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 10:54 PM, John R. Levine <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:

> If an ISP has a rule that each consumer can only use N of their 2^64
>>> IP addresses, expect a great deal of pushback, even if N is entirely
>>> technically reasonable.
>>>
>>
>> Easily solved=97delegate the zone for the /64 to the customer and let th=
em
>> sweat it.
>>
>
> Sigh.  I get the impression you haven't dealt with many consumer ISP user=
s.
>
>
> Regards,
> John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for
> Dummies",
> Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>


--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e68ba1b7ded2520495f64204
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div><meta charset=3D"utf-8"><div>I would not be too worried about the effe=
ct RBLs might have on DNS infrastructure. If they start to bust caches too =
often, people are going to be implementing controls to avoid caching record=
s from badly behaved RBLs.</div>
</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div>Given that there are onl=
y 2^32 address bits available for the entire planet today and given the fac=
t that most people have no intention of mapping MAC addresses to IP address=
es in any form whatsoever, I have a real hard time understanding why a resi=
dential user is going to be inconvenienced or upset should they get a less =
than a /64.=A0<div>
<br></div><div>Most will be happy with a /120 and nobody is going to actual=
ly need more than a /96.<br><br></div><div>It is probably unwise to make to=
o many assumptions about how people are going to make use of allocation mec=
hanisms. What is in the best interests of RIPE, ARIN and so on is not neces=
sarily what is in the best interests of the ISPs.=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>What I would do is to propose that RBL m=
aintainers adopt a different strategy entirely. Instead of mapping the enti=
re address in one go, map the address in segments.</div><div><br></div>
<div>So querying at the root would specify that the default bucket interval=
 was maybe a /56 (or whatever the minimum allocation unit turns out to be.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>In 99% of addresses that would map straight to the=
 record. =A0For another 1% of addresses there would be another record to sa=
y &#39;dig deeper&#39;.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><meta charset=3D"utf-8">Approaches that =
were employed with IPv4 are going to have to be rethought for IPv6. Well to=
ugh, you were going to have to write new code anyway.</div><div><br></div>
<div>Approaches that have the IP address in the TXT record are not going to=
 work with DNSSEC =A0and IPv6. Tough.</div><div><br></div><div>If you want =
to synthesize records on the fly then you should either write your own prot=
ocol or look to mechanisms such as DNSCurve and/or DPLS</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote=
">On Thu, Nov 25, 2010 at 10:54 PM, John R. Levine <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a=
 href=3D"mailto:johnl@iecc.com">johnl@iecc.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #=
ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex">
If an ISP has a rule that each consumer can only use N of their 2^64<br>
IP addresses, expect a great deal of pushback, even if N is entirely<br>
technically reasonable.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Easily solved=97delegate the zone for the /64 to the customer and let them =
sweat it.<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
Sigh. =A0I get the impression you haven&#39;t dealt with many consumer ISP =
users.<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
John Levine, <a href=3D"mailto:johnl@iecc.com" target=3D"_blank">johnl@iecc=
.com</a>, Primary Perpetrator of &quot;The Internet for Dummies&quot;,<br>
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. <a href=3D"http=
://jl.ly" target=3D"_blank">http://jl.ly</a></div></div><br>_______________=
________________________________<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D=
"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e68ba1b7ded2520495f64204--

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From: Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 2010 10:31:13 -0800
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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On Nov 26, 2010, at 10:20 AM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com> wro=
te:

> Given that there are only 2^32 address bits available for the entire plan=
et today and given the fact that most people have no intention of mapping M=
AC addresses to IP addresses in any form whatsoever, I have a real hard tim=
e understanding why a residential user is going to be inconvenienced or ups=
et should they get a less than a /64.=20

You can't do CGA and SEND without a /64 or better.  This would be a deal-br=
eaker to me.=

From johnl@iecc.com  Fri Nov 26 14:51:43 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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> I would not be too worried about the effect RBLs might have on DNS
> infrastructure. If they start to bust caches too often, people are going to
> be implementing controls to avoid caching records from badly behaved RBLs.

If bad guys are going to pick a new IPv6 address for every message, how 
are DNSBLs supposed to deal with it?  The DNSBLs I know keep their 
internal data as CIDR ranges, but there's no way to publish them that way.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

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On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 05:52:45PM -0500, John R. Levine wrote:
> are DNSBLs supposed to deal with it?  The DNSBLs I know keep their  
> internal data as CIDR ranges, but there's no way to publish them that 
> way.

Why not?

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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> Date: 26 Nov 2010 17:52:45 -0500
> From: "John R. Levine" <johnl@iecc.com>
> 
> If bad guys are going to pick a new IPv6 address for every message,
> how are DNSBLs supposed to deal with it?  The DNSBLs I know keep their
> internal data as CIDR ranges, but there's no way to publish them that
> way.

rpz format 2 will have that.  still tinkering with the exact zone syntax.

From Internet-Drafts@ietf.org  Fri Nov 26 16:45:02 2010
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations
	Author(s)       : D. Eastlake 3rd
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-02.txt
	Pages           : 20
	Date            : 2010-11-26

Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) parameter assignment
considerations are specified for the allocation of Domain Name System
(DNS) resource record types, CLASSes, operation codes, error codes,
DNS protocol message header bits, and AFSDB resource record subtypes.

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From johnl@iecc.com  Fri Nov 26 16:57:43 2010
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>> If bad guys are going to pick a new IPv6 address for every message,
>> how are DNSBLs supposed to deal with it?  The DNSBLs I know keep their
>> internal data as CIDR ranges, but there's no way to publish them that
>> way.
>
>rpz format 2 will have that.  still tinkering with the exact zone syntax.

That could certainly help for zones that change slowly, although I
expect DNSSEC aware caches that did wildcard expansion would help more
since that won't need to arrange for AXFR or IXFR access.

There's two kinds of DNSBLs, policy and evidence.  The policy DNSBLs like
the SBL tend to list largish CIDR ranges based on analyses of the policies
of the block owner.  The evidence DNSBLs tend to list single IPs based on
evidence of spam, zombies, or whatever.

The most widely used evidence DNSBL is probably the CBL, which has
about 7 million entries, and is updated about every 15 minutes, based
on what arrives in their spam feeds.  At that size it's probably OK,
but I worry what happens when bad guys use a different IP for each
message.  IXFR at that rate would be a bit much, although it's possible
that listing and querying by /64 could keep things under control.

R's,
John

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What is a deal breaker for you is almost certainly incomprehensible to the
average user.

Your use is not going to cause potential issues here. It is what the ISPs
decide to do to support the average user that may.

In the event I suspect that many ISPs will give end users a /128 just like
they gave out a /32 with IPv4 and demanded more money for additional
addresses.

Attempts to 'prevent' this outcome by limiting functionality merely play
into the ISPs hands and encourage this behavior.

On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 1:31 PM, Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com> wrote:

> On Nov 26, 2010, at 10:20 AM, "Phillip Hallam-Baker" <hallam@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Given that there are only 2^32 address bits available for the entire
> planet today and given the fact that most people have no intention of
> mapping MAC addresses to IP addresses in any form whatsoever, I have a real
> hard time understanding why a residential user is going to be inconvenienced
> or upset should they get a less than a /64.
>
> You can't do CGA and SEND without a /64 or better.  This would be a
> deal-breaker to me.




-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e644d0a27c5db90496005e68
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What is a deal breaker for you is almost certainly incomprehensible to the =
average user.<div><br></div><div>Your use is not going to cause potential i=
ssues here. It is what the ISPs decide to do to support the average user th=
at may.</div>
<div><br></div><div>In the event I suspect that many ISPs will give end use=
rs a /128 just like they gave out a /32 with IPv4 and demanded more money f=
or additional addresses.</div><div><br></div><div>Attempts to &#39;prevent&=
#39; this outcome by limiting functionality merely play into the ISPs hands=
 and encourage this behavior.=A0<br>
<br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 1:31 PM, Ted Lemon <=
span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Ted.Lemon@nominum.com">Ted.Lemon@nom=
inum.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On Nov 26, 2010, at 10:20 AM, &quot;Phillip Hallam-Baker&=
quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrot=
e:<br>
<br>
&gt; Given that there are only 2^32 address bits available for the entire p=
lanet today and given the fact that most people have no intention of mappin=
g MAC addresses to IP addresses in any form whatsoever, I have a real hard =
time understanding why a residential user is going to be inconvenienced or =
upset should they get a less than a /64.<br>

<br>
</div>You can&#39;t do CGA and SEND without a /64 or better. =A0This would =
be a deal-breaker to me.</blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br=
>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><b=
r>
<br>
</div>

--0016e644d0a27c5db90496005e68--

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In-Reply-To: Your message of "27 Nov 2010 00:58:45 GMT." <20101127005845.54574.qmail@joyce.lan> 
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> Date: 27 Nov 2010 00:58:45 -0000
> From: John Levine <johnl@iecc.com>
> 
> >> If bad guys are going to pick a new IPv6 address for every message,
> >> how are DNSBLs supposed to deal with it?  The DNSBLs I know keep
> >> their internal data as CIDR ranges, but there's no way to publish
> >> them that way.
> >
> > rpz format 2 will have that.  still tinkering with the exact zone syntax.
> 
> That could certainly help for zones that change slowly, ...

no, really.  my own personal dnsbl is robotically fed by nsupdate dozens
to hundreds and under load testing thousands of updates per second.  bind9
is able to turn these into NOTIFY and IXFR (signed by TSIG) in a way that
all of the zone's secondary servers are only a few seconds behind at any
given moment.  any story showing DNSIND (ixfr-notify-dynupd) being useful
only for slow-changing zones is total fiction.

see <http://sciencelinks.jp/j-east/article/200422/000020042204A0728684.php>
for publication info on a paper about this.  the paper is no longer online
at that site but i'll send a PDF to anyone who asks.

> although I expect DNSSEC aware caches that did wildcard expansion
> would help more since that won't need to arrange for AXFR or IXFR
> access.

i agree, and moreover i think that wildcard expansion and rrset synthesis
should always have been done in the full recursive server and not in the
authority server.  i would love to see an applicability statement for NSEC
which explains how this can be done.  (i don't think NSEC3 will allow it.)
i think it would take a new signal bit from recursive to authoritative, of
the nature of "don't synthesize for me, i'll do it, just send me wildcard
proofs and i'll work it out."

> There's two kinds of DNSBLs, policy and evidence.  The policy DNSBLs
> like the SBL tend to list largish CIDR ranges based on analyses of the
> policies of the block owner.  The evidence DNSBLs tend to list single
> IPs based on evidence of spam, zombies, or whatever.
> 
> The most widely used evidence DNSBL is probably the CBL, which has
> about 7 million entries, and is updated about every 15 minutes, based
> on what arrives in their spam feeds.  At that size it's probably OK,
> but I worry what happens when bad guys use a different IP for each
> message.  IXFR at that rate would be a bit much, although it's
> possible that listing and querying by /64 could keep things under
> control.

note that i'd love to know if the cbl guys have ever tried bind9 with
ixfr-from-differences, that is, generate a new zone once a minute from
cron, tell bind9 to reload it, and let bind9 generate the ixfr deltas.

but you're right, for ipv6 it's going to generally be /64's which are
listed, not /128's, since the low order 64 bits are under bad guy control.
(that's not due to limitations of dns, it's just security architecture.)

From johnl@iecc.com  Fri Nov 26 20:44:56 2010
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>no, really.  my own personal dnsbl is robotically fed by nsupdate dozens
>to hundreds and under load testing thousands of updates per second.  bind9
>is able to turn these into NOTIFY and IXFR (signed by TSIG) in a way that
>all of the zone's secondary servers are only a few seconds behind at any
>given moment.

Hmmn.  How big is it?

>note that i'd love to know if the cbl guys have ever tried bind9 with
>ixfr-from-differences, that is, generate a new zone once a minute from
>cron, tell bind9 to reload it, and let bind9 generate the ixfr deltas.

I'm pretty sure they use rbldnsd.  We've been scratching our heads for
a while about what to do to rbldnsd for IPv6 BLs.

R's,
John

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> Date: 27 Nov 2010 04:45:58 -0000
> From: John Levine <johnl@iecc.com>
> 
> Hmmn.  How big is it?

currently it's about 45000 entries.  it's run in production at 350K entries,
and i've load tested it at 5M entries.

> >note that i'd love to know if the cbl guys have ever tried bind9 with
> >ixfr-from-differences, that is, generate a new zone once a minute from
> >cron, tell bind9 to reload it, and let bind9 generate the ixfr deltas.
> 
> I'm pretty sure they use rbldnsd.  We've been scratching our heads for
> a while about what to do to rbldnsd for IPv6 BLs.

ok, well, i'm sorry to raise a bind-specific topic on the protocol forum.
the point i was really trying to make is that DNSIND (ixfr, notify, dynupd)
has been shown to do pretty well even for fast-changing zones.  as to what
BIND can do, i should take that to a BIND specific mailing list.  oops.

From Ted.Lemon@nominum.com  Fri Nov 26 20:57:15 2010
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On Nov 26, 2010, at 9:23 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> Attempts to 'prevent' this outcome by limiting functionality merely =
play into the ISPs hands and encourage this behavior.=20

Attempts to help the functionality to proliferate, on the other hand, =
might make it so that not providing it will be a deal breaker for more =
people than just me.   At this point, not having IPv6 addresses isn't a =
dealbreaker for anyone I'm aware of, so how could the lack of a /64 be a =
dealbreaker?


From brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com  Fri Nov 26 21:58:42 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 12:16 AM, Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org> wrote:

> i agree, and moreover i think that wildcard expansion and rrset synthesis
> should always have been done in the full recursive server and not in the
> authority server. =A0i would love to see an applicability statement for N=
SEC
> which explains how this can be done. =A0(i don't think NSEC3 will allow i=
t.)
> i think it would take a new signal bit from recursive to authoritative, o=
f
> the nature of "don't synthesize for me, i'll do it, just send me wildcard
> proofs and i'll work it out."

I think it boils down to this: if (and only if) it is possible for the
recursive server to synthesize
an answer (and proof) which validates correctly, then it may do so.



Basically, the recursive server would follow the same rules as the
authority server, until it failed to find
the needed data, at which point it punts the query to the authority
server (which by definition must
return all the necessary records).

The recursive server doesn't really need to signal anything to the
authority server.
Any failed attempt (to synthesize data) needs to fall back to the
authority server, at which point the needed
data will be received (and cached).

The RRs that would need to be present in the cache, to synthesize an answer=
 are:
- the wildcard RR plus RRSIGs
- suitable NSEC/NSEC3 records and RRSIG for the wildcard proof.

For NSEC, it's very straightforward, given that the owner names match
1:1 to the covered names.

For NSEC3, the original query name would need to be hashed, and a
covering NSEC3 record found.
But other than that, it's the same logic.

I think the main issue is the concern over requiring all NSEC (or
NSEC3 and NSEC3PARAM) records
to be time-synchronous, and for the cache to somehow know about
changes to the zone signing events.

Here's what isn't clear to me - are the two kinds of zone signing
actions independent (orthogonal)?
The actions are:
- generating NSEC or NSEC3 records over the zone
- signing the RRsets in the zone (which could include NSEC/NSEC3 RRs)

A cache that does wildcard synthesis would need to know about changes
to the NSEC/NSEC3 records in a zone.
Is that implicitly or explicitly signaled by any particular record,
e.g. SOA record (e.g. serial number change)?

Or is failure to bump the SN and re-sign the zone when
adding/changing/deleting zone data an operator error which is presumed
to not occur?

Is it acceptable for the TTL on the SOA to determine how long a cache
can synthesize wildcard answers (presuming it is able), before
checking the SOA SN again?

Brian

From sthaug@nethelp.no  Sat Nov 27 01:38:25 2010
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> What is a deal breaker for you is almost certainly incomprehensible to the
> average user.
> 
> Your use is not going to cause potential issues here. It is what the ISPs
> decide to do to support the average user that may.

Not getting on the net at all is definitely a "potential issue".

> In the event I suspect that many ISPs will give end users a /128 just like
> they gave out a /32 with IPv4 and demanded more money for additional
> addresses.

Maybe so - however, it's going to be far easier for the ISPs to support
their users if they hand out more normal sizes, like /56.

> Attempts to 'prevent' this outcome by limiting functionality merely play
> into the ISPs hands and encourage this behavior.

Normal competition between the ISPs will probably take care of this.
ISPs giving end users /128 are simply going to have a more difficult
(and resource intensive/expensive) job getting this to work.

We'll be giving out /56 as the default IPv6 prefix to our users, for
whatever it's worth.

Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug@nethelp.no

From johnl@iecc.com  Sat Nov 27 06:38:48 2010
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>Is it acceptable for the TTL on the SOA to determine how long a cache
>can synthesize wildcard answers (presuming it is able), before
>checking the SOA SN again?

Why wouldn't it use the usual cache rules?  The NSEC, RRSIG, and
wildcard record all have TTLs (which should, I presume, be the same.)

You'd use the SOA and NSEC to synthesize NXDOMAIN, again using the usual
cache rules.

R's,
John

From ogud@ogud.com  Mon Nov 29 08:26:58 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] RFC5395bis-02 advancement notice
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Ralph,
as you instructed us here is a replacement document for RFC5395,
please advance this through the IESG as soon as possible.
Document:  draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-02.txt
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-02.txt

Olafur & Andrew

-------


  (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
         Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
         document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
         version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

DNSEXT co-chair Olafur Gudmundsson


   (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
         and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
         any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
         have been performed?

Yes adequate review,
No concerns about the quality of the review.

Note this document is a minor update from RFC5395
the changes are
	- working group email list has changed
	- minor inconsistency in two sections has been aligned.


   (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
         needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
         e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
         AAA, internationalization or XML?

NO
   (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
         issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
         and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
         or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
         has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
         event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
         that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
         concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
         been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
         disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
         this issue.

NO

   (1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
         represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
         others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
         agree with it?

Strong,

   (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
         discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
         separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
         should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
         entered into the ID Tracker.)

NO

   (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
         document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts

Checklist
         and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
         not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
         met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
         Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?


There are 3 warnings on the document,
two are wrong as they confuse regular expression part with reference,
one is warning about the boilerplate template being older that 
recommended, the editor and chairs agreed that to keeps differences from 
RFC5395 to minimum we would use the same template as the RFC used.


   (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
         informative? Are there normative references to documents that
         are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
         state? If such normative references exist, what is the
         strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
         that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
         so, list these downward references to support the Area
         Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

No downward references.

   (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
         consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
         of the document? If the document specifies protocol
         extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
         registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
         the document creates a new registry, does it define the
         proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
         procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
         reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the
         document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
         conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
         can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

Checked no changes from RFC5395,
IANA will need to update references from 5395 to this document.


   (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
         document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
         code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
         an automated checker?

yes I checked the regular expressions.

   (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
         Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
         Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
         "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
         announcement contains the following sections:
      Technical Summary
         Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract
         and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be
         an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract
         or introduction.
      Working Group Summary
         Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For
         example, was there controversy about particular points or
         were there decisions where the consensus was particularly
         rough?
      Document Quality
         Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a
         significant number of vendors indicated their plan to
         implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that
         merit special mention as having done a thorough review,
         e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a
         conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If
         there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review,
         what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type
         review, on what date was the request posted?


Technical Summary:
The document obsoletes RFC5395 "Domain Name System (DNS) IANA 
Considerations" there is one major change: The mailing list for the 
working group has changed and the old address was embedded in the
expert review for new RR types.
There is also a small change that fixes inconsistency in who does what
during the expert review.

Working Group Summary
The working group held a short limited scope LC, with restrictions on
what could be changed. We accepted one change that fixed a known 
inconsistency in RFC5395, but rejected other suggested changes as being
out of scope.
We request accelerated processing by the IESG on this document.


Document Quality:
High quality




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* John R. Levine:

>> Per-address rewriting of TXT records is considered crucial by several
>> DNSBL operators.  This is fundamentally incompatible with wildcard
>> synthesis because under the current wildcard model, you cannot have a
>> wildcard apply to one record type, but not to another type.
>
> It's true that DNSBLs often embed the IP address in the TXT record.
> But crucial?

I'm just relaying the feedback I got when I tried to sign one of the
larger DNSBL zones.  I was told I couldn't apply the wildcard trick
because it removed important information from the TXT records.

(I would certainly prefer if we could use wildcards.)

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Mon Nov 29 10:05:40 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WG Review: Recharter of DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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At 9:25 AM -0800 11/23/10, IESG Secretary wrote:
>A modified charter has been submitted for the DNS Extensions (dnsext)
>working group in the Internet Area of the IETF.  The IESG has not made any
>determination as yet.  The modified charter is provided below for
>informational purposes only.  Please send your comments to the IESG
>mailing list (iesg@ietf.org) by Tuesday, November 30, 2010.

The proposed charter seems fine. However, the following requirement, carried over from the current charter, has not proven easy to meet:

>Before formal adoption of any work item at least 5 working group
>participants must publicly state that the item is within charter and
>is a worthwhile item for further study.

The IESG should recognize that this restriction will cause the DNSEXT WG to sometimes not be able to take on some of the items for which it is being chartered, and that those items might have to be done by individual submission in such cases.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Mon Nov 29 10:53:26 2010
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Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2010 13:54:31 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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On Mon, Nov 29, 2010 at 10:06:46AM -0800, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> The proposed charter seems fine. However, the following requirement, carried over from the current charter, has not proven easy to meet:
> 
> >Before formal adoption of any work item at least 5 working group
> >participants must publicly state that the item is within charter and
> >is a worthwhile item for further study.
> 
> The IESG should recognize that this restriction will cause the DNSEXT WG to sometimes not be able to take on some of the items for which it is being chartered, and that those items might have to be done by individual submission in such cases.
> 

In defence of this requirement (and speaking as chair but noting I
didn't discuss this message with my co-chair), I want to argue that
any draft that can't attract five reviews either really isn't
on-charter, or else it's an idea that shouldn't be standardized
because nobody has looked at it.  Most of the time our problem is the
latter.  I don't think such things should go by individual submission,
either; I think they just shouldn't be done.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From jari.arkko@piuha.net  Mon Nov 29 12:25:48 2010
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Agreeing with Andrew. Really, if we can't get enough interest to support 
a particular work item then its not worth doing...

I'll also note that if there's interest but the group feels that the 
topic is outside the charter, I think all of us are open to a discussion 
about extending the charter.

Jari


From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Mon Nov 29 12:38:31 2010
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At 10:26 PM +0200 11/29/10, Jari Arkko wrote:
>Agreeing with Andrew. Really, if we can't get enough interest to support a particular work item then its not worth doing...
>
>I'll also note that if there's interest but the group feels that the topic is outside the charter, I think all of us are open to a discussion about extending the charter.

I'm going to push back on this a bit. The DNSEXT WG has had times of extreme lack of interest, so "couldn't find five people in the WG who would say they would review it" is not a solid indicator of lack of value.

If a good idea has three authors on it, plus maybe two other DNS-capable people who will review it, why should that document *not* get to IETF Last Call? It is fine for the sponsoring AD for an individual submission to kill something due to lack of interest. The level of interest and review for a DNS-related idea can maybe be better judged in an IETF Last Call than in the DNSEXT WG.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

From wwwrun@rfc-editor.org  Mon Nov 29 12:43:07 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC4343 (2647)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4343,
"Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity Clarification".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4343&eid=2647

--------------------------------------
Type: Editorial
Reported by: Sam Bretheim <sam.bretheim@gmail.com>

Section: 2.1

Original Text
-------------
   ("."), which can be expressed as and 6 or \.  It is advisable to


Corrected Text
--------------
   ("."), which can be expressed as 6 or \.  It is advisable to


Notes
-----


Instructions:
-------------
This errata is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 

--------------------------------------
RFC4343 (draft-ietf-dnsext-insensitive-06)
--------------------------------------
Title               : Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity Clarification
Publication Date    : January 2006
Author(s)           : D. Eastlake 3rd
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : DNS Extensions
Area                : Internet
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG

From narten@us.ibm.com  Mon Nov 29 17:28:38 2010
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Comments: In-reply-to Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> message dated "Mon, 29 Nov 2010 12:39:32 -0800."
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2010 20:29:31 -0500
From: Thomas Narten <narten@us.ibm.com>
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Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> writes:

> I'm going to push back on this a bit. The DNSEXT WG has had times of
>  extreme lack of interest, so "couldn't find five people in the WG
>  who would say they would review it" is not a solid indicator of
>  lack of value.

And a twin part of "lack of interest" is that the document doesn't get
the review and improvement that it needs. WGs are wise not to take on
such documents.

> If a good idea has three authors on it, plus maybe two other
>  DNS-capable people who will review it, why should that document
>  *not* get to IETF Last Call?

If something is truly a good idea, and there is a need, the best way
to validate that is to get non-authors to do reviews and say "good
stuff".

Anything other than that places the burden on others who are often
poorly positioned to do that. E.g., the ADs or IESG.

We also know that that there are plenty of documents that no one looks
at during IETF LC, so using silence during LC as an indication of
support is also not wise.

I'm strongly in favor of a model where if a document can't get a
minimal level of support (and 5 non-authors doesn't seem that
unreasonable), it is far from clear the document is needed at all. And
the burden on finding those 5 individuals shoudl be on the authers,
not on the IETF leadership.

Better to kill documents (or more correctly "let die") at the start,
than to string them along for many month or years if there really
isn't enough interest to complete the work.

Thomas

From bmanning@karoshi.com  Mon Nov 29 21:37:47 2010
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On Mon, Nov 29, 2010 at 01:54:31PM -0500, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> 
> In defence of this requirement (and speaking as chair but noting I
> didn't discuss this message with my co-chair), I want to argue that
> any draft that can't attract five reviews either really isn't
> on-charter, or else it's an idea that shouldn't be standardized
> because nobody has looked at it.  Most of the time our problem is the
> latter.  I don't think such things should go by individual submission,
> either; I think they just shouldn't be done.


	i was with you right up to the; "(no).. individual submissions either"
	i think this is a huge problem with the modern IETF - too focused on
	products that can be monitized and shipped and far less on exploring and
	documenting ideas.  I guess that the right place to develop unpopular
	ideas is in academic papers, technical reports, and trademarked works
	indead of bringing them to a once open forum.  YMMV of course.

--bill

> 
> A
> 
> -- 
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
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From wouter@nlnetlabs.nl  Tue Nov 30 02:42:30 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Hi workgroup,

The unbound implementation is the way it has been written, and I agree
that changes have to be made to it.  Now, what is the right way?

On 11/22/2010 06:33 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:
>> Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2010 07:58:53 -0500
>> From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
>> ...
>> DNSSEC is designed to protect against cache poisoning.  If there is a chain
>> of trust to an RRSet, then the set validates, it has proven source
>> authenticity and data integrity.
>>
>> Since time began (for DNS), there is always something wrong somewhere.  The
>> goal is a robust system, not a tightly correct system.
> 
> +1.

It would be good to have some text in bis-updates on this.  (I mean on
the algorithm topic, the general leniency has been put forward by Alfred
and others and I wholeheartedly agree with it :-) ).

It is clear that checking the set of algorithms present in the DNSKEY
set is not a good idea, and checking the set of algorithms from the DS
set is the right, more lenient way to go.  (so this is what Mark was
proposing).  This is what validators use to determine if they can
support the algorithms present in the zone today (and tomorrow).

However, there are choices that I see here, that change the security
properties.


* One Signature Is Enough

Check one signature, if it works, it's enough, and the added text is
'regardless of the algorithms signalled in the DS-set'.
+ it is lenient.
  (it would have avoided the operational problems that incited this).
+ if a zone is badly signed, so it includes algorithms in the DS set for
which proper signatures are not available, the validators that support
both algorithms approve of this situation.
- - no algorithm-protection (explanation below).


* Check the Algorithms

For the algorithms signalled in the DS set, check that there is a valid
chain of trust for them.  Added text is, the validator SHOULD or MUST
check (choice here) that the algorithms signalled in the DS-set work
(but only for algorithms supported by the validator, of course).

+ it is lenient because uses DS-set not DNSKEY-set.
  (this allows the easier algo rollovers; it would have avoided the
operational problems that incited this).
- - but not as lenient as 'one signature', this is the case of zones that
are badly signed but have signalled the algorithm with their DS, so that
a portion of validators are certain to fail for it.  Validators that
support the other algo now also fail for it.
+ algorithm protection (explanation below).
  + if SHOULD, local-policy decides what protection to apply.


Algorithm compromise protection.
This is a security property that the validation result can have or not.
 Security algorithms have different properties, and by checking them you
receive joined benefits.  Specifically, if one algorithm is 'broken'
(but you do not yet know which one that will be), then you are protected
against this because you check the other algorithm.

For zones that perform a single-DS rollover, this never applies, as the
single DS makes validators check one algorithm anyway (since this
minimizes communication with the parent, many zones can be envisioned to
do this).  Other zones may have multiple DSes (or DLVs) and thus can
have multiple crypto algorithms checked, at their option (and the
validator local policy).


I would like to know what the (seems rough) consensus is, so that I can
go forward and implement this right.  It is then a good idea that Sam
puts conclusions in the dnssec-bis-updates draft.

Best regards,
   Wouter
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From jari.arkko@piuha.net  Tue Nov 30 04:25:36 2010
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Andrew, Bill,

Generally speaking I at least tend to use roughly the same bar for 
working group items and individual submissions via the AD. Both will be 
reviewed by the IETF, get a full IESG and directorate reviews, and may 
come with a label that shows the IETF recommends them (BCP or PS). Of 
course, there are various different types of documents and possible 
extensions. Experimental "someone's experimental extension of FOO" and 
informational ("thoughts on BAR") can be published more easily than 
standards ("the recommended way").

So I do agree with Andrew again that if some specific proposal is not 
interesting for the working group then its probably not interesting for 
the IETF as a whole either, and I probably would not sponsor it. And if 
there aren't N reviewers to look at a document, we can't really make a 
quality output anyway. Informational and Experimental have a lower bar 
in the sense that we do not have be so sure that they are the 
recommended approach for the Internet, but even they do require people 
to review the documents. However, I would like to point out we also have 
Independent submissions via the RFC Editor, which may sometimes be used 
to publish documents that the IETF does not take on.

Jari


From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Tue Nov 30 08:00:54 2010
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At 2:26 PM +0200 11/30/10, Jari Arkko wrote:
>Andrew, Bill,
>
>Generally speaking I at least tend to use roughly the same bar for working group items and individual submissions via the AD. Both will be reviewed by the IETF, get a full IESG and directorate reviews, and may come with a label that shows the IETF recommends them (BCP or PS). Of course, there are various different types of documents and possible extensions. Experimental "someone's experimental extension of FOO" and informational ("thoughts on BAR") can be published more easily than standards ("the recommended way").

Exactly. The fact that the DNSEXT WG chairs could not find five reviewers who wanted to work on an experimental or informational document should not prevent it from being published in the IETF stream if an AD wants to move it forwards.

>
>So I do agree with Andrew again that if some specific proposal is not interesting for the working group then its probably not interesting for the IETF as a whole either, and I probably would not sponsor it.

Right: "probably" is the operative word here.

> And if there aren't N reviewers to look at a document, we can't really make a quality output anyway. Informational and Experimental have a lower bar in the sense that we do not have be so sure that they are the recommended approach for the Internet, but even they do require people to review the documents.

That's the judgement call by the sponsoring AD, either before he sponsors or after the IETF Last Call. If not, and the authors still want it published as an RFC, it becomes the judgement call of the ISE. The fact that the DNSEXT WG couldn't find five reviewers should be a piece of data, not a hard stop.

> However, I would like to point out we also have Independent submissions via the RFC Editor, which may sometimes be used to publish documents that the IETF does not take on.

Of course, but it should not be considered the only method, particularly if an AD wants to see if there is enough review energy outside the often-dysfucntional DNSEXT WG.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 02:26:40PM +0200, Jari Arkko wrote:
> Andrew, Bill,
> 
> Generally speaking I at least tend to use roughly the same bar for 
> working group items and individual submissions via the AD. Both will be 
> reviewed by the IETF, get a full IESG and directorate reviews, and may 
> come with a label that shows the IETF recommends them (BCP or PS). Of 
> course, there are various different types of documents and possible 
> extensions. Experimental "someone's experimental extension of FOO" and 
> informational ("thoughts on BAR") can be published more easily than 
> standards ("the recommended way").

	so, if some mis-directd soul has a non-popular idea, does 
	work, runs the experiment, and wants to document it for the
	future - then the individual submission to experimental or
	informational is ok with our AD?

> 
> So I do agree with Andrew again that if some specific proposal is not 
> interesting for the working group then its probably not interesting for 
> the IETF as a whole either, and I probably would not sponsor it. And if 
> there aren't N reviewers to look at a document, we can't really make a 
> quality output anyway. Informational and Experimental have a lower bar 
> in the sense that we do not have be so sure that they are the 
> recommended approach for the Internet, but even they do require people 
> to review the documents. However, I would like to point out we also have 
> Independent submissions via the RFC Editor, which may sometimes be used 
> to publish documents that the IETF does not take on.

	or should we take this path?  (I'll note that the previous RFCed
	informed me that even this path has the AD/IESG/directorate review
	before being allowed publication).

--bill

> 
> Jari
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

From jari.arkko@piuha.net  Tue Nov 30 09:58:10 2010
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, iesg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] WG Review: Recharter of DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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Bill,

> then the individual submission to experimental or
> informational is ok with our AD?
>   
...
> 	or should we take this path?

Judgment call. You should ask Ralph or me about it. Depending on the 
case we may either tell you to take it to the RFC Editor, ask the WG to 
take it on, or be willing to sponsor a document through the IETF. A big 
factor is the interest from others to review etc.

> (I'll note that the previous RFCed
> informed me that even this path has the AD/IESG/directorate review
> before being allowed publication).
>   

That's not right, at least not as a general rule. There are some cases 
where you are allocating IANA numbers from an IETF number space, for 
instance, where you can only publish your RFC through the IETF. But in 
general the RFC Editor submissions are independent, and do not require 
IETF review.

There is however always an IESG check even for these documents, but not 
for technical content, just to check that the IANA rules have not been 
broken and that no end run is attempted to bypass something that an IETF 
WG is working on. As this is not a technical review, we do not ask for 
directorate reviews or IETF last call feedback.

Jari


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--0016e68ba1b739c82604964d3fd2
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

I can think of cases where the DNSEXT group would have no interest in a
draft but other parts of the IETF would have very serious interest.

A lot of work that needs to be done does not fit neatly in the IETF areas.
In particular to do useful work on security or optimization a proposal will
very often cut across multiple layers in the stack. DKIM does, KEYASSURE
does, WebSEC does.

The point is in any case moot since WGs do not get a pocket veto on work
proposals. It might be a different issue if there was active opposition to a
proposal. But indifference does not merit that consideration.

--0016e68ba1b739c82604964d3fd2
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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I can think of cases where the DNSEXT group would have no interest in a dra=
ft but other parts of the IETF would have very serious interest.
<div><br></div><div>A lot of work that needs to be done does not fit neatly=
 in the IETF areas. In particular to do useful work on security or optimiza=
tion a proposal will very often cut across multiple layers in the stack. DK=
IM does, KEYASSURE does, WebSEC does.</div>
<div><br></div><div>The point is in any case moot since WGs do not get a po=
cket veto on work proposals. It might be a different issue if there was act=
ive opposition to a proposal. But indifference does not merit that consider=
ation.</div>

--0016e68ba1b739c82604964d3fd2--

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Tue Nov 30 18:54:52 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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It feels like the table in the -06 draft will only be understood by people who have followed the discussion this year on DNSEXT, not by typical DNSSEC implementers. The latter won't fully understand what "status" means, even if they read the RFC. The fact that the normative words in the table don't match those in the main DNSSEC spec makes it even more problematic.

Given that, I thought I would make a pass at the table to see if I could make it clearer while saying the same thing as is intended by -06. The proposed changes are:
- Changed "Status" to "Conformance to RFC TBD1"
- Made the conformance requirements clearer
- Made the references to be where the algorithm is defined, not where
  it has a status change
- Removed "ECC" from 4


                                        Trans-  Conformance
                                  Zone  action      to
Number  Description    Mnemonic   Sign  Sign     RFC TBD1     Reference
------  -----------     ------    ----  -----  ------------   ---------
  0      Reserved                                             [RFC4398]
  1      RSA/MD5         RSAMD5     N     Y    MUST NOT       [RFC2537]
                                               IMPLEMENT     
  2      Diffie-Hellman  DH         N     Y                   [RFC2539]
  3      DSA/SHA-1       DSASHA1    Y     Y                   [RFC2536]
  4      Reserved until
         2020
  5      RSA/SHA-1       RSASHA1    Y     Y    MUST           [RFC3110]
                                               IMPLEMENT
  6      DSA-NSEC3-SHA1  DSA-NSEC3  Y     Y                   [RFC5155]
                         -SHA1                               
  7      RSASHA1-NSEC3   RSASHA1-   Y     Y    RECOMMENDED    [RFC5155]
         -SHA1           NSEC3-                TO IMPLEMENT   
                         SHA1
  8      RSA/SHA-256     RSASHA256  Y     *    RECOMMENDED    [RFC5702]
                                               TO IMPLEMENT
  9      Reserved until                                      
         2020
 10      RSA/SHA-512     RSASHA512  Y     *    RECOMMENDED    [RFC5702]
                                               TO IMPLEMENT
 11      Reserved until                                      
         2020
 12      GOST R          GOST-ECC   Y     *                   [RFC5933]
         34.10-2001                                          
13-251   Unassigned
 252     Reserved for    INDIRECT   N     N                   [RFC4034]
         Indirect keys                                       
 253     private         PRIVATE    Y     Y                   [RFC4034]
         algorithm                                           
 254     private         PRIVATEOID Y     Y                   [RFC4034]
         algorithm OID                                       
 255     Reserved

Please let me know if you think I have succeeded in keeping the ideas from -06 but making them clearer.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
