
From ajs@shinkuro.com  Wed Dec  1 04:30:31 2010
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Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2010 07:31:35 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>, iesg@ietf.org, dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] WG Review: Recharter of DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 06:07:04PM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> The point is in any case moot since WGs do not get a pocket veto on work
> proposals.

I don't think anyone was proposing that: the WG clearly doesn't have
some sort of monopoly on what happens using the DNS, because we have
fairly relaxed rules for RRTYPE assignment.

But the WG is chartered to deal with extensions to the DNS protocol.
If, in the face of proposals to extend the protocol, one cannot find
five people to develop that extension and work within the WG to achieve
it, then I think it is fair to ask whether such an extension is such a
hot idea.  

If the complaint is that DNSEXT is dysfunctional, then that is perhaps
a reason that the ADs should replace the chairs, or that the WG needs
to be shut down, or something.  But note that there's no membership
requirement, so if the WG is just dysfunctional because of
indifference on the part of participants, the problem can be solved:
find interested participants.

There are, I imagine, protocols that are appropriate for
standardization even if five people aren't interested, because the
likely user community is tiny.  That's not the case with the DNS:
changes to it affect everyone.  If we really can't find five people to
say an extension is a good idea, then that's likely an indication that
the protocol ought to be left alone.  It's old and creaky enough as it
is.  That's all the five-reviewer convention is intended to illustrate.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From A.Hoenes@TR-Sys.de  Wed Dec  1 04:48:22 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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Paul,
you have presented a modified registry table for the draft
under consideration.
  <http://www.IETF.ORG/mail-archive/web/dnsext/current/msg10121.html>

> ...
>
> Please let me know if you think I have succeeded in keeping
> the ideas from -06 but making them clearer.

IMO, that's true.
Standards terminologists might however prefer "Compliance with" over
"Conformance to" in such cases -- in SMIv2 language, this draft could
be regarded as a COMPLIANCE statement (recorded in the table column)
that implementations can claim to conform to.
So maybe this change of term could earn bonus points with the OPS ADs
in the IESG.  :-)

Someone had raised concerns about not filling in the new column
for algorithms that are considered "DISCRETIONARY" or "OPTIONAL".

IMO, it makes sense to stay with the current style (that you have
preserved), i.e. to only add entries in the newly added column where
the document expresses a standing-out viewpoint.  This should help to
visually focus implementors on the important statements of this memo.

Maybe, for completeness, a footnote could be added to the table
that says:  

   Table rows where the Conformance column is not filled in are left
   to the discretion of implementors, i.e. they are strictly OPTIONAL.


Kind regards,
  Alfred.

-- 

+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| TR-Sys Alfred Hoenes   |  Alfred Hoenes   Dipl.-Math., Dipl.-Phys.  |
| Gerlinger Strasse 12   |  Phone: (+49)7156/9635-0, Fax: -18         |
| D-71254  Ditzingen     |  E-Mail:  ah@TR-Sys.de                     |
+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+


From scott.rose@nist.gov  Wed Dec  1 07:25:45 2010
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From: "Rose, Scott W." <scott.rose@nist.gov>
To: Ben Niven-Jenkins <ben@niven-jenkins.co.uk>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2010 10:26:34 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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Will fix the DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 discrepancy.  

As for the other blanks - those were semi-intentional.  I was thinking of asking the WG for status, but other things took over.  However, the -07 will only list the status if it is not OPTIONAL - so all blank entries will be OPTIONAL.  The text will be updated to state this.

Scott

On Nov 26, 2010, at 7:17 AM, Ben Niven-Jenkins wrote:

> Andrew,
> 
> I gave the draft a quick read.
> 
> Section 2.1 states:
> 
>   The status of RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 and DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 are set to
>   RECOMMENDED and OPTIONAL respectively.
> 
> However, the status column for DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 in the table in section 2.2 is blank.
> 
> Also the status column for some other algorithms (Diffie-Hellman, DSA/SHA-1, GOST R) are also blank and the document does not provide any advice on how a blank status column entry should be interpreted.
> 
> Ben
> 
> On 25 Nov 2010, at 17:30, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> 
>> Dear colleagues,
>> 
>> We noted in our report from the chairs around the time of IETF 79 that
>> we'd soon start a Working Group Last Call for
>> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06.  Only 8 days late, this
>> message is in fact initiating that LC.
>> 
>> We hereby commence a Working Group Last Call on
>> draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06 ending 2011-12-03 at 22:00
>> UTC.  Please review the document for correctness and clarity, and send
>> to the list any comments you might have.  If you have no comments but
>> support the document being published, we ask that you also send that
>> information to the list.  Finally, if you read the document and do not
>> support its publication, that is also information we would appreciate
>> receiving on list.
>> 
>> There is one nit in the document you may overlook in your review:
>> there is a reference to ietf-dnsext-dnssec-alg-allocation, but that is
>> now available as RFC 6014.  The reference will be updated in the next
>> revision.
>> 
>> Under the conventions adopted by DNSEXT, the document needs at least
>> five reviewers to say that they have read the document, and that they
>> support its publication.  This is a short document that, in my
>> personal view, makes the IANA registry for Domain Name System Security
>> (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers more useful to the Internet protocols
>> community.  I urge participants in the working group to review the
>> document so that we can proceed with the next steps in its
>> publication.  If you are a new participant here and are looking for
>> something with which to get your feet wet, this is an excellent
>> document to start with.
>> 
>> Best regards,
>> 
>> Andrew (document shepherd)
>> 
>> -- 
>> Andrew Sullivan
>> ajs@shinkuro.com
>> Shinkuro, Inc.
>> _______________________________________________
>> dnsext mailing list
>> dnsext@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
> 
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

===================================
Scott Rose
NIST
scottr@nist.gov
+1 301-975-8439
Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
http://www.dnsops.gov/
===================================


From ajs@shinkuro.com  Wed Dec  1 07:44:09 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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On Wed, Dec 01, 2010 at 10:26:34AM -0500, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
> Will fix the DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 discrepancy.  
> 
> As for the other blanks - those were semi-intentional.  I was thinking of asking the WG for status, but other things took over.  However, the -07 will only list the status if it is not OPTIONAL - so all blank entries will be OPTIONAL.  The text will be updated to state this.
> 

The text does need to be updated to state that, but let's just explain
for a moment why the column is blank instead of saying "optional".

The document specifies a rule for the registry that says that if the
column in question has an entry that is changed, then the entire
registry needs to be respecified by whatever document is so changing
the column.

But, new entries can be added to the registry under the process
established by RFC 6014.  Such additions don't need to produce a
completely new registry every time.

Remember that the goal here is to have the registry reflect (loosely
speaking) an interoperability "requirement" level for algorithms, to
expect new allocations most of which are not really required for
interoperability among implementations, that registries cannot be
normative, and that it is impossible for any given RFC to change the
facts of the matter about a previous RFC.  So a non-entry for
"optional" algorithms is a little process trick by which we can
constrain later changes to the registry that specify a "required
algorithm" while yet satisfying the above requirements.  Really, for
the registry to say that an algorithm is "required" is to say that, to
conform with such-and-thus RFC, you need to implement such-and-thus
algorithm.  So we just don't have an entry for anything that will come
in under normal circumstances, and for those things where the WG wants
to say, "Really implement this," we have to do more work.  (Sorry to
be so process-wonky about this, but we really do have to work within
the strictures of the RFC series.)

I think another participant may be going to post a suggestion about
the table layout to make the above even clearer, so I'll wait for
that.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Dec  1 07:46:58 2010
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At 1:49 PM +0100 12/1/10, Alfred =?hp-roman8?B?SM5uZXM=?= wrote:
>Paul,
>you have presented a modified registry table for the draft
>under consideration.
>  <http://www.IETF.ORG/mail-archive/web/dnsext/current/msg10121.html>
>
>> ...
>>
>> Please let me know if you think I have succeeded in keeping
>> the ideas from -06 but making them clearer.
>
>IMO, that's true.

Thanks. What do others think?

>Standards terminologists might however prefer "Compliance with" over
>"Conformance to" in such cases -- in SMIv2 language, this draft could
>be regarded as a COMPLIANCE statement (recorded in the table column)
>that implementations can claim to conform to.
>So maybe this change of term could earn bonus points with the OPS ADs
>in the IESG.  :-)

This is a distinction without a difference. There are no solid definitions for either term, but there *is* a difference from "status".

>Someone had raised concerns about not filling in the new column
>for algorithms that are considered "DISCRETIONARY" or "OPTIONAL".
>
>IMO, it makes sense to stay with the current style (that you have
>preserved), i.e. to only add entries in the newly added column where
>the document expresses a standing-out viewpoint.  This should help to
>visually focus implementors on the important statements of this memo.

Andrew tells me that I was the one wanting to fill in that column a few months ago, but after a discussion with him, I don't remember my logic. I, too, prefer the blank entries that Scott used and I copy here.

>Maybe, for completeness, a footnote could be added to the table
>that says: 
>
>   Table rows where the Conformance column is not filled in are left
>   to the discretion of implementors, i.e. they are strictly OPTIONAL.

But that's not true. For example:
 12      GOST R          GOST-ECC   Y     *                   [RFC5933]
         34.10-2001                                         
For an implmenter who wants to implement GOST-ECC, it is not "optional". It is only optional for those who want to only implement from RFC TBD1. There is no reason to make this confusing point in the IANA registry, I believe.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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On Wed, Dec 01, 2010 at 10:45:20AM -0500, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> I think another participant may be going to post a suggestion about
> the table layout to make the above even clearer, so I'll wait for
> that.

Oops, I see Paul Hoffman already did this.  Please see his message on the topic.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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At 10:45 AM -0500 12/1/10, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>On Wed, Dec 01, 2010 at 10:26:34AM -0500, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
>> Will fix the DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 discrepancy. 
>>
>> As for the other blanks - those were semi-intentional.  I was thinking of asking the WG for status, but other things took over.  However, the -07 will only list the status if it is not OPTIONAL - so all blank entries will be OPTIONAL.  The text will be updated to state this.
>>
>
>The text does need to be updated to state that, but let's just explain
>for a moment why the column is blank instead of saying "optional".
>
>The document specifies a rule for the registry that says that if the
>column in question has an entry that is changed, then the entire
>registry needs to be respecified by whatever document is so changing
>the column.
>
>But, new entries can be added to the registry under the process
>established by RFC 6014.  Such additions don't need to produce a
>completely new registry every time.
>
>Remember that the goal here is to have the registry reflect (loosely
>speaking) an interoperability "requirement" level for algorithms, to
>expect new allocations most of which are not really required for
>interoperability among implementations, that registries cannot be
>normative, and that it is impossible for any given RFC to change the
>facts of the matter about a previous RFC.  So a non-entry for
>"optional" algorithms is a little process trick by which we can
>constrain later changes to the registry that specify a "required
>algorithm" while yet satisfying the above requirements.  Really, for
>the registry to say that an algorithm is "required" is to say that, to
>conform with such-and-thus RFC, you need to implement such-and-thus
>algorithm.  So we just don't have an entry for anything that will come
>in under normal circumstances, and for those things where the WG wants
>to say, "Really implement this," we have to do more work.  (Sorry to
>be so process-wonky about this, but we really do have to work within
>the strictures of the RFC series.)

A different (and shorter) way to say this is "A blank entry for the conformance requirement to RFC TBD1 means that there is no conformance requirement for RFC TDB1." This RFC does not make implementing something optional: it is already optional.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Wed Dec  1 10:34:51 2010
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At 7:48 -0800 12/1/10, Paul Hoffman wrote:

>Thanks. What do others think?

Since you asked...

I think the compliance column is useless.  I've stayed away from this 
debate until now because I can't think of any reason to support 
putting any such recommendations in the registry.

To me it is like having a registry that says 10.1.1.0/24 belongs to 
Bill's Bait and Sushi and 10.1.2.0/24 belongs to Ralph's Bait and 
sushi - and then adding reputations to that.

   Address Block     Owner                  Worth doing business with
   10.1.1.0/24       Bill's Bait and Sushi  Untrustworthy
   10.1.2.0/24       Ralphs' Bait and Sushi Paid his promotional fee

Implementors build code for different reasons.  What's required for 
one situation might be unwise in another.  Implementors should be 
free to pick their own constituency.  No one is forced to implement 
DNSSEC, or NOTIFY, for that matter.

If you want to develop an RFC that gives a profile of what 
constitutes a general purpose implementation, that's where it is 
appropriate to say what is needed for such a beast.

If you want to opine on the goodness of cryptographic algorithms, I'm 
sure there  is an appropriate soap box somewhere.

The DNS RR type registry doesn't do this - it doesn't say what types 
are required.  There are a few marked as experimental or obsolete, 
but that hasn't been kept up, a sign it's not that useful.  (Are A 
records as important to an implementation as KX records?  The answer 
isn't in the registry, but we all know the answer - as far as we 
[personally] care.)

I think the column is a bad idea, goes against what a registry is 
meant to do, will just become something that fails to be maintained, 
and result in more confusion amongst new(bie) implementors that do 
not follow the IETF daily.
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?

From scott.rose@nist.gov  Wed Dec  1 11:18:32 2010
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From: "Rose, Scott W." <scott.rose@nist.gov>
To: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2010 14:19:31 -0500
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I understand the argument, but I don't think it applies here.  This doc doesn't seek to force anything, just gives a set of requirements if an implementor wants to claim conformance to "DNSSEC". 

Implementors writing code to meet a specific purpose may or may not care about compliance, and that's fine as long as those using the code don't care either.  They may not even care about RFC's or registries at all.  However, operators and admins have requirements too, and don't use custom code but want/expect compliance to some definition of a protocol. 

The doc also explicitly states that this is not an effort to put value judgements on cryptographic algorithms, only which ones should be implemented to claim conformance.  

As for the final point, yes I agree that this must be maintained somehow or else it will become dated and stale - that's what is happening now. 

Scott


On Dec 1, 2010, at 1:32 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:

> At 7:48 -0800 12/1/10, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
>> Thanks. What do others think?
> 
> Since you asked...
> 
> I think the compliance column is useless.  I've stayed away from this 
> debate until now because I can't think of any reason to support 
> putting any such recommendations in the registry.
> 
> To me it is like having a registry that says 10.1.1.0/24 belongs to 
> Bill's Bait and Sushi and 10.1.2.0/24 belongs to Ralph's Bait and 
> sushi - and then adding reputations to that.
> 
>   Address Block     Owner                  Worth doing business with
>   10.1.1.0/24       Bill's Bait and Sushi  Untrustworthy
>   10.1.2.0/24       Ralphs' Bait and Sushi Paid his promotional fee
> 
> Implementors build code for different reasons.  What's required for 
> one situation might be unwise in another.  Implementors should be 
> free to pick their own constituency.  No one is forced to implement 
> DNSSEC, or NOTIFY, for that matter.
> 
> If you want to develop an RFC that gives a profile of what 
> constitutes a general purpose implementation, that's where it is 
> appropriate to say what is needed for such a beast.
> 
> If you want to opine on the goodness of cryptographic algorithms, I'm 
> sure there  is an appropriate soap box somewhere.
> 
> The DNS RR type registry doesn't do this - it doesn't say what types 
> are required.  There are a few marked as experimental or obsolete, 
> but that hasn't been kept up, a sign it's not that useful.  (Are A 
> records as important to an implementation as KX records?  The answer 
> isn't in the registry, but we all know the answer - as far as we 
> [personally] care.)
> 
> I think the column is a bad idea, goes against what a registry is 
> meant to do, will just become something that fails to be maintained, 
> and result in more confusion amongst new(bie) implementors that do 
> not follow the IETF daily.
> -- 
> -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
> Edward Lewis
> NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468
> 
> Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
> you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

===================================
Scott Rose
NIST
scottr@nist.gov
+1 301-975-8439
Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
http://www.dnsops.gov/
===================================


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At 14:19 -0500 12/1/10, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
>I understand the argument, but I don't think it applies here.  This doc
>doesn't seek to force anything, just gives a set of requirements if an
>implementor wants to claim conformance to "DNSSEC".

To clarify the theme of my objection, a registry is the wrong place 
to document conformance criteria.  Conformance belongs in profile 
documents and documents that act as contracts, memoranda of 
understanding, rules and regulations.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Wed Dec  1 13:14:13 2010
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On Wed, Dec 01, 2010 at 02:19:31PM -0500, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
> I understand the argument, but I don't think it applies here.  This
> doc doesn't seek to force anything, just gives a set of requirements
> if an implementor wants to claim conformance to "DNSSEC".

Speaking both personally and with my chair hat on, I disagree with the
above characterization, and were it true I don't think this WG would
be in a position to add such a column to the registry.  We can't, and
Ed is right about why: registries cannot be the source of any
authority to which one can comply.  They're not immutable documents
like RFCs, so there's no way to conform to them (because the reference
isn't stable).  Moreover, there is no such thing as "conformance to
DNSSEC", because DNSSEC is defined in a set of RFCs.

What the registry _is_ supposed to be is a useful tool for
implementers and contract writers.  Implementers can look in a
registry and know what they need to implement; the details of that
implementation are supposed to be pointed to by the registry.
Similarly, a contract writer can look in the registry and see what
things are needed for the compliance checklist (again, possibly
following the RFC references from the registry in order to provide
detail and stable references for the contract).

The problem with the DNSSEC algorithm registry as it stands is that it
doesn't actually provide that.  You can't tell, from looking at the
registry, which things are needed for which sort of interoperation.
This is harmful to both implementers and contract writers.

So the goal of the current approach is in fact to give quick, easy to
find guidance to those two constituencies, the main users of such a
registry.  Assuming the current document were to become an RFC, then
the stable reference for the implementation levels for these
algorithms would in fact be _this_ document, although the details of
how to do the implementation will remain in the RFCs that actually
specify the algorithms and their use in DNSSEC.  (This is, by the way,
one of the reasons I like Paul Hoffman's suggestion about how to
recast the table so much: it makes this distinction clear.)  When
we're done, contract writers will be able to specify implementation of
RFC TBD1, and implementers will be able to say that they have
implemented RFC TBD1, and everyone will know exactly what algorithms
are guaranteed to be in the implementations in question.

> The doc also explicitly states that this is not an effort to put
> value judgements on cryptographic algorithms, only which ones should
> be implemented to claim conformance.

And that conformance, of course, would be _with this document_, not
some other document.

> As for the final point, yes I agree that this must be maintained
> somehow or else it will become dated and stale - that's what is
> happening now.

That's actually why there is the rule that to add anything to the
contentious column, you have to replace the whole registry.  At the
moment of such replacement, the new RFC becomes wholly authoritative
for all those entries in the column, and this document becomes wholly
obsoleted.  That's also why it's important not to have an entry like
"OPTIONAL" in the registry for new algorithms: that approach is the
maintenance problem that Ed is mentioning.  So this little
bureaucratic trick is, as it happens, a way to enforce registry
maintenance: want a new "required" or "recommended" algorithm in the
sense that the registry has such a notation?  Then do your registry
maintenance and obsolete this document.  Otherwise, you don't get it.
Of course, the new algorithm can be "required" in order to conform to
the specification in the RFC that specifies that new algorithm: that's
trivially true.

I hope this makes clearer what the point of this effort is.  Ed, does
it to you?

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Dec  1 13:51:41 2010
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>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>
>	Title           : Elliptic Curve DSA for DNSSEC
>	Author(s)       : P. Hoffman, W. Wijngaards
>	Filename        : draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04.txt
>	Pages           : 9
>	Date            : 2010-12-01
>
>This document describes how to specify Elliptic Curve DSA keys and
>signatures in DNSSEC.  It lists curves of different sizes, and uses
>the SHA-2 family of hashes for signatures.
>
>A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04.txt

Wouter and I made a few changes based on the comments from the last round. We think this is nearly ready, and would love to get more review.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

From marka@isc.org  Wed Dec  1 17:08:33 2010
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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <50DA0744-6DDA-446A-B4AE-C897F440D149@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 01 Dec 2010 11:39:02 -0800." <50DA0744-6DDA-446A-B4AE-C897F440D149@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>
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Cc: dnsop@ietf.org, dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] [DNSOP] Neglect for RFC3597 for 128 <= RTYPES < 256. Should such RTYPES be off limits to allocation?
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This is the wrong list for this as this is a protocol issue.  Redirecting
to dnsext@ietf.org.

In message <50DA0744-6DDA-446A-B4AE-C897F440D149@ICSI.Berkeley.EDU>, Nicholas W
eaver writes:
> 	Much to my embarrassment, our Netalyzr test for RFC3597 (unknown RRTYPE
>  handling.  We used RRTYPE=169 for our testing, as its unassigned yet a conve
> nient mnemonic) was broken for us by the upstream authorities in our path wit
> hout my realizing it:
> 
> 	Bad enough is that all of the authorities for icsi.berkeley.edu and ber
> keley.edu are running BIND of various versions (including the latest), which 
> it turns out all return FORMERR for unknown RTYPE requests where 128 <= RRTYP
> E < 256.  [1]  
> 
> 	Now true these are 'meta' RRTYPEs (my screwup for using, only now do I 
> realize that), but RFC 5395 does state that sometimes meta types may be queri
> ed directly (with any processing optional), so you'd hope that between that a
> nd RFC3597, it would work.  In didn't.

I'm trying to envision a response to a meta query that would pass
through the normal acceptance tests for a cache and still be useful
apart from NODATA (zero answers after CNAME/DNAME processing not
zero answers that match the query type, we so need a explict NODATA
rcode) / NXDOMAIN.  The type in the query needs to be in the answer
for unknown types to pass through a cache.

A meta query answer for ALLADDRESSES for example (returns A and
AAAA and X25 and ...) won't pass through opaque cache as the records
won't be accepted and would become NODATA once you strip out all
the unexpected stuff.

Having the cache reject the query is better than potentially returning
a bad answer.

ALLADDRESSES can be implemented as a ordinary qtype if you want
opportunistic responses.

> 	That was bad.  But it gets worse.  Namely, all ROOTS but h, k, and l fa
> il to properly handle an unknown RTYPE in that range:

Parent servers should be returning referrals.  I'll generate a
ticket for this.

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

From A.Hoenes@TR-Sys.de  Thu Dec  2 06:05:46 2010
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Paul & Wouter:
  Ack for the changes,
  in particular for fixing "bit string" --> "octet string"
  for the signatures ( r | s ) .

  Wouldn't that change also make sense for the keys Q ( x | y ) ?
  (Doesn't matter actually for the two curves supported,
  but if someone goes on to add P-521 later ...)

All:
  Previous concerns addressed.

  Adopt <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04> !

  I'd like the WG to consider Section 7.2 (and all preceding
  parts to which it refers) of draft-mcgrew-fundamental-ecc-03.
  This should help to counter potential IPR-related concerns.

BR,
  Alfred.


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--_000_C91D16C4DD21jeffreydamickneustarbiz_
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In looking at the edns0 spec, it appears that the behavior is undefined in =
regard to truncated responses.  (please correct me)

Should the edns0 be included in response if the truncation occurred in popu=
lating any section?

It would seem that Bind does include the edns0 in its responses, however I =
don't see wording that suggests that edns0 MUST be included in the response=
 to an edns0 request.

>From 2671, 4.1:

4.1. One OPT pseudo-RR can be added to the additional data section of
    either a request or a response.


Does anyone have any further clarification on this?


Thanks,



--_000_C91D16C4DD21jeffreydamickneustarbiz_
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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>edns0 in truncated response</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:=
11pt'>In looking at the edns0 spec, it appears that the behavior is undefin=
ed in regard to truncated responses. &nbsp;(please correct me)<BR>
<BR>
Should the edns0 be included in response if the truncation occurred in popu=
lating any section?<BR>
<BR>
It would seem that Bind does include the edns0 in its responses, however I =
don&#8217;t see wording that suggests that edns0 MUST be included in the re=
sponse to an edns0 request.<BR>
<BR>
>From 2671, 4.1:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><B>4.1. One OPT pseudo-RR can be adde=
d to the additional data section of<BR>
</B></SPAN></FONT><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><FONT FACE=3D"Times, Times=
 New Roman"> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;either a request or a response.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Does anyone have any further clarification on this?<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Thanks,<BR>
</FONT></SPAN><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=
=3D'font-size:11pt'><BR>
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To: "Damick, Jeffrey" <Jeffrey.Damick@neustar.biz>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 02 Dec 2010 09:26:28 EST." <C91D16C4.DD21%jeffrey.damick@neustar.biz> 
References: <C91D16C4.DD21%jeffrey.damick@neustar.biz> 
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by intent, the space needed for the OPT RR would be reserved before
building the response, so that if truncation occurred it would not
prevent adding the OPT RR.  we should have added a second TC bit in
the OPT RR to properly signal whether TC had occurred before the OPT
RR was added.

From george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk  Thu Dec  2 07:12:13 2010
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edns0 in truncated responseI think this is addressed the the bis draft :

  The minimal response must be the DNS header, question section, and an
   OPT record.  This must also occur when an truncated response (using
   the DNS header's TC bit) is returned.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04#section-=
7
  ----- Original Message -----=20
  From: Damick, Jeffrey=20
  To: dnsext@ietf.org=20
  Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2010 2:26 PM
  Subject: [dnsext] edns0 in truncated response


  In looking at the edns0 spec, it appears that the behavior is =
undefined in regard to truncated responses.  (please correct me)

  Should the edns0 be included in response if the truncation occurred in =
populating any section?

  It would seem that Bind does include the edns0 in its responses, =
however I don't see wording that suggests that edns0 MUST be included in =
the response to an edns0 request.

  From 2671, 4.1:

  4.1. One OPT pseudo-RR can be added to the additional data section of
      either a request or a response.


  Does anyone have any further clarification on this?


  Thanks,





-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----


  _______________________________________________
  dnsext mailing list
  dnsext@ietf.org
  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

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<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>edns0 in truncated response</TITLE>
<META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" =
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<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>I think this is addressed the the bis =
draft=20
:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>&nbsp;&nbsp;The minimal response must =
be the DNS=20
header, question section, and an<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; OPT record.&nbsp; This =
must=20
also occur when an truncated response (using<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; the DNS =
header's TC=20
bit) is returned.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><A=20
href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04#=
section-7">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-=
04#section-7</A></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; =
PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV>
  <DIV=20
  style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial; BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; font-color: =
black"><B>From:</B>=20
  <A title=3DJeffrey.Damick@neustar.biz=20
  href=3D"mailto:Jeffrey.Damick@neustar.biz">Damick, Jeffrey</A> </DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A title=3Ddnsext@ietf.org=20
  href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</A> </DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, December 02, =
2010 2:26=20
  PM</DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> [dnsext] edns0 in =
truncated=20
  response</DIV>
  <DIV><BR></DIV><FONT face=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN =

  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt">In looking at the edns0 spec, it appears =
that the=20
  behavior is undefined in regard to truncated responses. &nbsp;(please =
correct=20
  me)<BR><BR>Should the edns0 be included in response if the truncation =
occurred=20
  in populating any section?<BR><BR>It would seem that Bind does include =
the=20
  edns0 in its responses, however I don=92t see wording that suggests =
that edns0=20
  MUST be included in the response to an edns0 request.<BR><BR>From =
2671,=20
  4.1:<BR><BR></SPAN><SPAN style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><B>4.1. One OPT =
pseudo-RR can=20
  be added to the additional data section of<BR></B></SPAN></FONT><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt"><FONT=20
  face=3D"Times, Times New Roman">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;either a =
request or a=20
  response.<BR><BR><BR>Does anyone have any further clarification on=20
  this?<BR><BR><BR>Thanks,<BR></FONT></SPAN><FONT=20
  face=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN=20
  style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 11pt"><BR><BR></SPAN></FONT>
  <P>
  <HR>

  <P></P>_______________________________________________<BR>dnsext =
mailing=20
  =
list<BR>dnsext@ietf.org<BR>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext<B=
R></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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From: "Damick, Jeffrey" <Jeffrey.Damick@neustar.biz>
To: George Barwood <george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk>, "dnsext@ietf.org" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2010 10:32:11 -0500
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--_000_C91D262BDD42jeffreydamickneustarbiz_
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That looks clear to me, thanks.



On 12/2/10 10:13 AM, "George Barwood" <george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk> wro=
te:

I think this is addressed the the bis draft :

 The minimal response must be the DNS header, question section, and an
   OPT record.  This must also occur when an truncated response (using
   the DNS header's TC bit) is returned.

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04#section-7

----- Original Message -----

From:  Damick, Jeffrey <mailto:Jeffrey.Damick@neustar.biz>

To: dnsext@ietf.org

Sent: Thursday, December 02, 2010 2:26  PM

Subject: [dnsext] edns0 in truncated  response


In looking at the edns0 spec, it appears that the  behavior is undefined in=
 regard to truncated responses.  (please correct  me)

Should the edns0 be included in response if the truncation occurred  in pop=
ulating any section?

It would seem that Bind does include the  edns0 in its responses, however I=
 don't see wording that suggests that edns0  MUST be included in the respon=
se to an edns0 request.

>From 2671,  4.1:

4.1. One OPT pseudo-RR can  be added to the additional data section of
   either a request or a  response.


Does anyone have any further clarification on  this?


Thanks,





________________________________


_______________________________________________
dnsext mailing  list
dnsext@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext


--_000_C91D262BDD42jeffreydamickneustarbiz_
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<TITLE>Re: [dnsext] edns0 in truncated response</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:=
11pt'>That looks clear to me, thanks.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 12/2/10 10:13 AM, &quot;George Barwood&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"george.barwo=
od@blueyonder.co.uk">george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'><FONT FACE=3D"Aria=
l">I think this is addressed the the bis draft :<BR>
</FONT><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"> <BR>
</FONT><FONT FACE=3D"Arial"> &nbsp;The minimal response must be the DNS hea=
der, question section, and an<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;OPT record. &nbsp;This must also occur when an truncated =
response (using<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;the DNS header's TC bit) is returned.<BR>
</FONT><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"> <BR>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-04=
#section-7">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2671bis-edns0-0=
4#section-7</a><BR>
</FONT></SPAN><BLOCKQUOTE><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'><FONT FACE=3D"Cali=
bri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"> <BR>
----- Original Message ----- <BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
<B>From:</B> &nbsp;Damick, Jeffrey &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:Jeffrey.Damick@neu=
star.biz">mailto:Jeffrey.Damick@neustar.biz</a>&gt; &nbsp;<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
<B>To:</B> <a href=3D"dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a> <BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
<B>Sent:</B> Thursday, December 02, 2010 2:26 &nbsp;PM<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
<B>Subject:</B> [dnsext] edns0 in truncated &nbsp;response<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
<BR>
In looking at the edns0 spec, it appears that the &nbsp;behavior is undefin=
ed in regard to truncated responses. &nbsp;(please correct &nbsp;me)<BR>
<BR>
Should the edns0 be included in response if the truncation occurred &nbsp;i=
n populating any section?<BR>
<BR>
It would seem that Bind does include the &nbsp;edns0 in its responses, howe=
ver I don&#8217;t see wording that suggests that edns0 &nbsp;MUST be includ=
ed in the response to an edns0 request.<BR>
<BR>
>From 2671, &nbsp;4.1:<BR>
<BR>
</FONT></SPAN><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=
=3D'font-size:12pt'><B>4.1. One OPT pseudo-RR can &nbsp;be added to the add=
itional data section of<BR>
</B></SPAN></FONT><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:12pt'><FONT FACE=3D"Times, Times=
 New Roman"> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;either a request or a &nbsp;response.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Does anyone have any further clarification on &nbsp;this?<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Thanks,<BR>
</FONT></SPAN><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=
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From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Thu Dec  2 07:36:40 2010
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At 3:06 PM +0100 12/2/10, Alfred =?hp-roman8?B?SM5uZXM=?= wrote:
>Paul & Wouter:
>  Ack for the changes,
>  in particular for fixing "bit string" --> "octet string"
>  for the signatures ( r | s ) .
>
>  Wouldn't that change also make sense for the keys Q ( x | y ) ?
>  (Doesn't matter actually for the two curves supported,
>  but if someone goes on to add P-521 later ...)

If someone wants to add a different curve later, they have to deal with more than just this. We are defining the rule for the curves given.

>All:
>  Previous concerns addressed.
>
>  Adopt <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04> !
>
>  I'd like the WG to consider Section 7.2 (and all preceding
>  parts to which it refers) of draft-mcgrew-fundamental-ecc-03.
>  This should help to counter potential IPR-related concerns.

Wouter and I would be open to that if people felt that this gave developers enough information.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DNS Extensions Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Update to DNAME Redirection in the DNS
	Author(s)       : S. Rose, W. Wijngaards
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2672bis-dname-21.txt
	Pages           : 18
	Date            : 2010-12-02

The DNAME record provides redirection for a sub-tree of the domain
name tree in the DNS system.  That is, all names that end with a
particular suffix are redirected to another part of the DNS.  This is
a revision of the original specification in RFC 2672, also aligning
RFC 3363 and RFC 4294 with this revision.

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From scott.rose@nist.gov  Thu Dec  2 09:30:43 2010
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dname-bis-21 version updated to reflect Mark Andrew's comment about an error in the -20 version:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsext/current/msg09958.html

Link goes to Wouter's reply and suggested replacement text for Section 5.2.

Scott

===================================
Scott Rose
NIST
scottr@nist.gov
+1 301-975-8439
Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
http://www.dnsops.gov/
===================================


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The following application for a DNS RR assignment is submitted in
accordance with the procedures described in RFC 5395.

  A.    Submission Date: 3 Dec 2010

  B.    Submission Type:
        [X] New RRTYPE
        [ ] Modification to existing RRTYPE

  C.    Contact Information for submitter:
           Name: Phillip Hallam-Baker
           Email Address: phill@hallambaker.com
           International telephone number: +1 617 395 4123
           Other contact handles:

           (Note: This information will be publicly posted.)

  D.    Motivation for the new RRTYPE application?
        Please keep this part at a high level to inform the Expert and
        reviewers about uses of the RRTYPE.  Remember most reviewers
        will be DNS experts that may have limited knowledge of your
        application space.

 The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record
  allows a DNS domain name holder to specify the certificate signing
  certificate(s) authorized to issue certificates for that domain.  CAA
  resource records allow a public Certification Authority to implement
  additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended certificate mis-
  issue. And is designed to be extensible in order to support related
  concerns including enforcement of issue restriction in applications.

  E.    Description of the proposed RR type.
        This description can be provided in-line in the template, as an
        attachment, or with a publicly available URL:

A detailed specification is posted is given in
draft-hallambaker-donotissue:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hallambaker-donotissue/


  F.    What existing RRTYPE or RRTYPEs come closest to filling that
        need and why are they unsatisfactory?

The only current means by which this information can be expressed
in the DNS is via a TXT record which is not differentiated for this
purpose.

The approach here addfresses purposes that are clearly outside
the purpose of the CERT record and similar 'keys-in-DNS'
approaches.


  G.    What mnemonic is requested for the new RRTYPE (optional)?
        Note: This can be left blank and the mnemonic decided after the
        template is accepted.

The proposed mnemonic is CAA standing for Certification Authority
Authorization.

  H.    Does the requested RRTYPE make use of any existing IANA
        Registry or require the creation of a new IANA sub-registry in
        DNS Parameters?

        If so, please indicate which registry is to be used or created.
        If a new sub-registry is needed, specify the allocation policy
        for it and its initial contents.  Also include what the
        modification procedures will be.

Yes, the following registry assignment is requested.

5.2.  Certification Authority Authorization Properties

  IANA [is requested to create] the Certification Authority
Authorization Properties
  registry with the following initial values:

             Meaning                                          Reference
 -----------  -----------------------------------------------  ---------
 path         Authorization Entry by Signature Path            [RFCXXXX]
 policy       Authorization Entry by Certificate Policy        [RFCXXXX]

  Addition of tag identifiers requires a public specification and
  expert review as set out in RFC5395 [RFC5395]

Note that information carried in this record addresses application
layer concerns. As such it is highly desirable to employ a tag-value
approach to attribute specification than the code-value approach that
is employed at lower layers in the stack.

  I.    Does the proposal require/expect any changes in DNS
        servers/resolvers that prevent the new type from being
        processed as an unknown RRTYPE (see [RFC3597])?

No.

  J.    Comments:

While the CAA proposal made in the accompanying Internet Draft
represents a complete technical proposal, development of a full CAA
standard will require further work that cannot be begun until a DNS RR
assignment is made.

In particular the CAA proposal MAY be proposed as the basis of future
minimum issue guidelines for Domain Validated Certificates published
by CA-Browser Forum. It is hard to see how such a proposal could be
made without first obtaining significant experience of enforcing CAA
issue restrictions.

The CAA proposal MAY also be relevant to ongoing work in the IETF
Applications area (WEBSEC) and the security area (TLS, IPSEC, Proposed
KIDNS).

Given the large number of moving parts, the proposal has been crafted
with the intention of minimizing the number of dependencies in the
system.

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Sun Dec  5 15:38:29 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
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Greetings again. One of the items on the new WG charter is "Mechanisms that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)", and many people have decried the lack of protection for the "last hop" (stub resolver to its recursive resolver upstream) as a deterrent for real DNSSEC deployment. There are a bunch of (sometimes-conflicting) requirements for protecting such queries and responses.

To that end, I have created a new draft, shown below. The protocols described can be used by any two DNS resolvers, but they are probably most useful in the last hop. Instead of developing new protocols, I used existing protocols (HTTP and TLS) for which there are plenty of toolkits.

Comments are appreciated.

--Paul Hoffman

=========================

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.

	Title           : Wrapping DNS for Traffic Protection
	Author(s)       : P. Hoffman
	Filename        : draft-hoffman-dns-last-hop-00.txt
	Pages           : 11
	Date            : 2010-12-05

DNS queries from one resolver to an upstream resolver are often run
over connections with no protection of any kind.  This connection, is
currently susceptible to both malicious and unintentional alteration
that prevents the querying resolver from being sure that the results
it receives are valid.  Some middleboxes can prevent a querying
resolver that does DNSSEC validation from getting enough information
to validate a response.  Further, a non-validating, non-iterative
resolver querying a trusted recursive resolver is susceptible to
active attacks in which the results are purposely altered.

The protocols described in this document provide two methods to avoid
these problems and thus make resolution significantly more secure.
These protocols can be used between any two DNS resolvers, but they
are particularly useful for queries from "last-hop" stub resolvers to
trusted recursive resolvers.

=========================

From vixie@vix.com  Sun Dec  5 18:13:05 2010
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From: Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org>
To: DNSEXT Working Group <dnsext@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sun, 05 Dec 2010 15:39:21 PST." <p0624081fc921d18d948c@[10.20.30.151]> 
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
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> Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2010 15:39:21 -0800
> From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
> 
> Greetings again. One of the items on the new WG charter is "Mechanisms
> that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)", and many
> people have decried the lack of protection for the "last hop" (stub
> resolver to its recursive resolver upstream) as a deterrent for real
> DNSSEC deployment. There are a bunch of (sometimes-conflicting)
> requirements for protecting such queries and responses.
> 
> To that end, I have created a new draft, shown below. The protocols
> described can be used by any two DNS resolvers, but they are probably
> most useful in the last hop. Instead of developing new protocols, I
> used existing protocols (HTTP and TLS) for which there are plenty of
> toolkits.
> 
> Comments are appreciated.

referring to two threads from 2008 where this was pretty well hashed out:

http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/11732
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/11769

and to my comments on another (current year, 2010) thread:

http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/17108/focus=17116

my current comments are just these four:

1. if dnssec deployment the motive, then SIG(0) as specified today will
   just work, no relaxation of any specification would be required.

2. if we're going to support the non-dnssec case, then we should do this
   in-band without a new transport, and the relaxation to TKEY mentioned
   in the above references would be the only specification needing changes,
   and that relaxation would be completely harmless to the installed base.

3. if we're going to do a new transport in spite of #1 and #2 above then
   that transport should be datagram oriented, meaning DTLS rather than HTTP.

4. if we're going to use HTTP in spite of #1, #2, and #3 above then we
   should define an XML schema for DNS transactions so that they can be
   carried by either HTTP, HTTPS, or other XML-bearing transports, and use
   a JSON style URI syntax to place this service within a web-dns server.

From ben@niven-jenkins.co.uk  Sun Dec  5 22:56:11 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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Paul,

One question for clarification which also relates to the table you =
posted in a previous mail.

On 1 Dec 2010, at 17:30, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> At 10:45 AM -0500 12/1/10, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 01, 2010 at 10:26:34AM -0500, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
>>> Will fix the DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 discrepancy.=20
>>>=20
>>> As for the other blanks - those were semi-intentional.  I was =
thinking of asking the WG for status, but other things took over.  =
However, the -07 will only list the status if it is not OPTIONAL - so =
all blank entries will be OPTIONAL.  The text will be updated to state =
this.
>>>=20
>>=20
>> The text does need to be updated to state that, but let's just =
explain
>> for a moment why the column is blank instead of saying "optional".
>>=20
>> The document specifies a rule for the registry that says that if the
>> column in question has an entry that is changed, then the entire
>> registry needs to be respecified by whatever document is so changing
>> the column.
>>=20
>> But, new entries can be added to the registry under the process
>> established by RFC 6014.  Such additions don't need to produce a
>> completely new registry every time.
>>=20
>> Remember that the goal here is to have the registry reflect (loosely
>> speaking) an interoperability "requirement" level for algorithms, to
>> expect new allocations most of which are not really required for
>> interoperability among implementations, that registries cannot be
>> normative, and that it is impossible for any given RFC to change the
>> facts of the matter about a previous RFC.  So a non-entry for
>> "optional" algorithms is a little process trick by which we can
>> constrain later changes to the registry that specify a "required
>> algorithm" while yet satisfying the above requirements.  Really, for
>> the registry to say that an algorithm is "required" is to say that, =
to
>> conform with such-and-thus RFC, you need to implement such-and-thus
>> algorithm.  So we just don't have an entry for anything that will =
come
>> in under normal circumstances, and for those things where the WG =
wants
>> to say, "Really implement this," we have to do more work.  (Sorry to
>> be so process-wonky about this, but we really do have to work within
>> the strictures of the RFC series.)
>=20
> A different (and shorter) way to say this is "A blank entry for the =
conformance requirement to RFC TBD1 means that there is no conformance =
requirement for RFC TDB1." This RFC does not make implementing something =
optional: it is already optional.

RFC TBD1 =3D=3D the RFC number eventually allocated to =
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes, right?

Ben


From hallam@gmail.com  Mon Dec  6 05:23:39 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
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I disagree with both of you here.

Reading through Paul's draft, it seems to be using application layer
transports which I find inappropriate for a facility that is really
tied to the transport/session boundary.

Reuse of code is good. Reuse of protocol is less so.


I took a look at the possibility of using TKEY when designing DPLS. I
don't see it as viable for the following reasons:

1) The spec is old, the key exchange proposed is obsolete. It would
need a substantial revision to be acceptable

Since most DNSSEC implementations are built on libraries that include
SSL support, it is natural to look at re-use of the TLS key exchange
rather than revise TKEY, use IPSEC or design from scratch.

2) Any spec should allow (but not require) DNS resolvers to be
operated without server side per connection state. This really calls
for a ticket based scheme and this is not currently anticipated in
TKEY/TSIG

3) If we are going to address (1) and (2), we might as well address
the main reason that DNS messages between an endpoint and resolver
would have to be pushed into TCP and that is that in DNS over UDP
there is exactly one request packet and exactly one response packet.

4) DTLS and IPSEC are really not suited to DNS. They provide far too
many features. We really need a profile and apply a part of the stack.


So the approach taken in DPLS is:

1) Re-use the existing TLS key exchange to establish a ticket that MAY
contain the connection state if required

2) Allow one request packet to be followed by multiple response
packets. This does not significantly increase server complexity as
allowing multiple request packets would and the client can cope with
multiple responses as it is only querying one resolver at a time.


We are currently looking at making the following changes

1) Use EDNS(0) for signaling the existence of the capability

2) Revise the Extended Service Discovery hooks



On Sun, Dec 5, 2010 at 9:14 PM, Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org> wrote:
>> Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2010 15:39:21 -0800
>> From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
>>
>> Greetings again. One of the items on the new WG charter is "Mechanisms
>> that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)", and many
>> people have decried the lack of protection for the "last hop" (stub
>> resolver to its recursive resolver upstream) as a deterrent for real
>> DNSSEC deployment. There are a bunch of (sometimes-conflicting)
>> requirements for protecting such queries and responses.
>>
>> To that end, I have created a new draft, shown below. The protocols
>> described can be used by any two DNS resolvers, but they are probably
>> most useful in the last hop. Instead of developing new protocols, I
>> used existing protocols (HTTP and TLS) for which there are plenty of
>> toolkits.
>>
>> Comments are appreciated.
>
> referring to two threads from 2008 where this was pretty well hashed out:
>
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/11732
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/11769
>
> and to my comments on another (current year, 2010) thread:
>
> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/17108/focus=3D17116
>
> my current comments are just these four:
>
> 1. if dnssec deployment the motive, then SIG(0) as specified today will
> =A0 just work, no relaxation of any specification would be required.
>
> 2. if we're going to support the non-dnssec case, then we should do this
> =A0 in-band without a new transport, and the relaxation to TKEY mentioned
> =A0 in the above references would be the only specification needing chang=
es,
> =A0 and that relaxation would be completely harmless to the installed bas=
e.
>
> 3. if we're going to do a new transport in spite of #1 and #2 above then
> =A0 that transport should be datagram oriented, meaning DTLS rather than =
HTTP.
>
> 4. if we're going to use HTTP in spite of #1, #2, and #3 above then we
> =A0 should define an XML schema for DNS transactions so that they can be
> =A0 carried by either HTTP, HTTPS, or other XML-bearing transports, and u=
se
> =A0 a JSON style URI syntax to place this service within a web-dns server=
.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Mon Dec  6 06:57:25 2010
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At 6:57 AM +0000 12/6/10, Ben Niven-Jenkins wrote:
>Paul,
>
>One question for clarification which also relates to the table you posted in a previous mail.
>
> > A different (and shorter) way to say this is "A blank entry for the conformance requirement to RFC TBD1 means that there is no conformance requirement for RFC TDB1." This RFC does not make implementing something optional: it is already optional.
>
>RFC TBD1 == the RFC number eventually allocated to draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes, right?

Exactly right. And, if the table is later replaced (as is described in the RFC), that column header would be updated with the new RFC.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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Paul and all,

  Seems that your still relying on "Trusted recursive resolvers"
though.  Is that wise?


-----Original Message-----
>From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
>Sent: Dec 5, 2010 5:39 PM
>To: DNSEXT Working Group <dnsext@ietf.org>
>Subject: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
>
>Greetings again. One of the items on the new WG charter is "Mechanisms that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)", and many people have decried the lack of protection for the "last hop" (stub resolver to its recursive resolver upstream) as a deterrent for real DNSSEC deployment. There are a bunch of (sometimes-conflicting) requirements for protecting such queries and responses.
>
>To that end, I have created a new draft, shown below. The protocols described can be used by any two DNS resolvers, but they are probably most useful in the last hop. Instead of developing new protocols, I used existing protocols (HTTP and TLS) for which there are plenty of toolkits.
>
>Comments are appreciated.
>
>--Paul Hoffman
>
>=========================
>
>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>
>	Title           : Wrapping DNS for Traffic Protection
>	Author(s)       : P. Hoffman
>	Filename        : draft-hoffman-dns-last-hop-00.txt
>	Pages           : 11
>	Date            : 2010-12-05
>
>DNS queries from one resolver to an upstream resolver are often run
>over connections with no protection of any kind.  This connection, is
>currently susceptible to both malicious and unintentional alteration
>that prevents the querying resolver from being sure that the results
>it receives are valid.  Some middleboxes can prevent a querying
>resolver that does DNSSEC validation from getting enough information
>to validate a response.  Further, a non-validating, non-iterative
>resolver querying a trusted recursive resolver is susceptible to
>active attacks in which the results are purposely altered.
>
>The protocols described in this document provide two methods to avoid
>these problems and thus make resolution significantly more secure.
>These protocols can be used between any two DNS resolvers, but they
>are particularly useful for queries from "last-hop" stub resolvers to
>trusted recursive resolvers.
>
>=========================
>_______________________________________________
>dnsext mailing list
>dnsext@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

Regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Phone: 214-244-4827



From hallam@gmail.com  Mon Dec  6 13:46:06 2010
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I think it is a particularly bad idea to trust random DNS resolver -
whether 'secure' or not.

But in the context of a network, choosing one specific DNS resolver
service to trust makes very good sense - whether that be the Google,
DNS.com, something run in-house or whatever.


I don't particularly want providers of Internet packet transport to
know what I am doing with those packets. So I want to secure the
communication to my resolver regardless of whether I perform
end-to-end security on top.

And I certainly don't consider the fact that someone has paid for an
ICANN domain name to authorize them to advertise services to my
machines. If a DNS name is known to be malicious, I don't want my
machines to be able to see it - end of story.

So I really have no interest in performing the full DNSSEC stack
end-to-end. I do not want my clients to be balking because malicious
domains are black-holed. And in general I probably don't want to
bother about redoing the DNS security in any case. If I really care
about the security of a site, I probably want an EV cert chain.



On Mon, Dec 6, 2010 at 3:11 PM, Jeffrey A. Williams
<jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> Paul and all,
>
> =A0Seems that your still relying on "Trusted recursive resolvers"
> though. =A0Is that wise?
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
>>From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
>>Sent: Dec 5, 2010 5:39 PM
>>To: DNSEXT Working Group <dnsext@ietf.org>
>>Subject: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
>>
>>Greetings again. One of the items on the new WG charter is "Mechanisms th=
at complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)", and many people ha=
ve decried the lack of protection for the "last hop" (stub resolver to its =
recursive resolver upstream) as a deterrent for real DNSSEC deployment. The=
re are a bunch of (sometimes-conflicting) requirements for protecting such =
queries and responses.
>>
>>To that end, I have created a new draft, shown below. The protocols descr=
ibed can be used by any two DNS resolvers, but they are probably most usefu=
l in the last hop. Instead of developing new protocols, I used existing pro=
tocols (HTTP and TLS) for which there are plenty of toolkits.
>>
>>Comments are appreciated.
>>
>>--Paul Hoffman
>>
>>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D
>>
>>A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts direct=
ories.
>>
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Wrapping DNS for Traffic Protect=
ion
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 Author(s) =A0 =A0 =A0 : P. Hoffman
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 Filename =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: draft-hoffman-dns-last-hop-00.txt
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 Pages =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : 11
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 Date =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: 2010-12-05
>>
>>DNS queries from one resolver to an upstream resolver are often run
>>over connections with no protection of any kind. =A0This connection, is
>>currently susceptible to both malicious and unintentional alteration
>>that prevents the querying resolver from being sure that the results
>>it receives are valid. =A0Some middleboxes can prevent a querying
>>resolver that does DNSSEC validation from getting enough information
>>to validate a response. =A0Further, a non-validating, non-iterative
>>resolver querying a trusted recursive resolver is susceptible to
>>active attacks in which the results are purposely altered.
>>
>>The protocols described in this document provide two methods to avoid
>>these problems and thus make resolution significantly more secure.
>>These protocols can be used between any two DNS resolvers, but they
>>are particularly useful for queries from "last-hop" stub resolvers to
>>trusted recursive resolvers.
>>
>>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D
>>_______________________________________________
>>dnsext mailing list
>>dnsext@ietf.org
>>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
> Regards,
> Jeffrey A. Williams
> "Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
> =A0 Abraham Lincoln
>
> "Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
> often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt
>
> "If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liabil=
ity
> depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
> P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
> United States v. Carroll Towing =A0(159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
> Updated 1/26/04
> Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
> ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402
> E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
> Phone: 214-244-4827
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Mon Dec  6 14:56:50 2010
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At 2:14 AM +0000 12/6/10, Paul Vixie wrote:
>referring to two threads from 2008 where this was pretty well hashed out:
>
>http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/11732
>http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/11769

There was a side-thread on root signing, a side-thread on extra random bits in the query, a side-thread on session cookies, a short useful thread on anycast resolvers, and a valid criticism of TKEY that you said "was not part of your problem statement". I think "hashed out" might be a bit of an overstatement for that thread.

>and to my comments on another (current year, 2010) thread:
>
>http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.dnsext/17108/focus=17116

...which is much less specific that your earlier postings.

>my current comments are just these four:
>
>1. if dnssec deployment the motive, then SIG(0) as specified today will
>   just work, no relaxation of any specification would be required.
>
>2. if we're going to support the non-dnssec case, then we should do this
>   in-band without a new transport, and the relaxation to TKEY mentioned
>   in the above references would be the only specification needing changes,
>   and that relaxation would be completely harmless to the installed base.
>
>3. if we're going to do a new transport in spite of #1 and #2 above then
>   that transport should be datagram oriented, meaning DTLS rather than HTTP.
>
>4. if we're going to use HTTP in spite of #1, #2, and #3 above then we
>   should define an XML schema for DNS transactions so that they can be
>   carried by either HTTP, HTTPS, or other XML-bearing transports, and use
>   a JSON style URI syntax to place this service within a web-dns server.

We probably have different threat models. Can you clarify?

- As I said in my draft, I consider bad DNS middleboxes a problem to be solved; your #1 and #2 above do not seem to consider that a problem. Is that correct?

- I consider a trivial CPU denial-of-service attack on the responder to be significant. As the TKEY RFC boldly states, "Protection against denial of service via the use of TKEY is not provided." Your #1 and #2 above do not seem to consider this a problem. Correct?

For #3, I agree from a cleanliness standpoint. I consider "easy for a DNS operator to set up" to be fairly important, and thus chose well-known toolkits. If people really don't operational ease that is important, and don't care about helping first hop resolvers that are behind bad DNS middleboxes a problem, I can se "DNS-over-DTLS" as a viable solution to that limited problem.

I have no idea what would motivate you to suggest the large extra complexity of #4. Base64-of-DNS can be carried by HTTP and HTTPS, and "XML-bearing transports" is thus not needed to solve the problems listed.

Please do say whether you agree with my assessments that you do not care about the two problems I listed in the document and above, or if you do care but think that your proposals actually deal with them.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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On Mon, 6 Dec 2010, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> I have no idea what would motivate you to suggest the large extra complexity of #4. Base64-of-DNS can be carried by HTTP and HTTPS, and "XML-bearing transports" is thus not needed to solve the problems listed.

It is very worrysome when people say "Oh, I know. I will just use port
80/443 and all my problems will go away". The internet is not port 80/443
and piggybacking DNS into HTTP (whether base64 or xml) is a bad design.

Avoid adding more bootstrap problems (to do DNS, I need HTTPS, for which
I need DNS).

Do not reduce the security of a crypto system to the most vulnerable
part of two cryptosystems with totally different trust models (X.509
and DNSSEC)

As for the last mile... Phones can now play HDTV. Surely they can do some
validating resolving using DHCP supplied forwarders. This should work
in most cases. Using one root key (or possibly a very few preloaded keys)

For those cases where it does not, because DNS modifications by third
parties are desired, these should be established as much as possible
through already known secure channels. This could either be the DNS
modifier service publishing a DNSSEC signed public key for query
transactions to its systems from untrusted networks - to be obtained
via generic DNSSEC protected queries, or a pre-loaded public key via
another medium (an X.509 cert?)

Putting DNS in HTTPS via stacked content encodings will just lead to
"very very deep packet inspections", and more HTTPS "friendly" man in
the middle attacks on ignoring certificate warnings to the enduser.

And if we are going to define a new method to protect queries for the
last mile (which could be across the world), we might as well add
optional encryption to it to provide privacy, and avoid another dnscurve
discussion.

Paul

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Mon Dec  6 16:48:16 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
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At 7:19 PM -0500 12/6/10, Paul Wouters wrote:
>It is very worrysome when people say "Oh, I know. I will just use port
>80/443 and all my problems will go away".

That is true, which is why I didn't do it that way. I made sure that everything was done properly in HTTP and TLS.

> The internet is not port 80/443
>and piggybacking DNS into HTTP (whether base64 or xml) is a bad design.

If port 443 is unmolested on more transits from end hosts than any other port, and unknown ports are routinely blocked (as many of us found in hotels for the IETF in the Netherlands), then using 443 properly is possibly a better design than "use a port that is known to be blocked in many scenarios". It's a question of availability versus purity, and I chose availability; you might choose purity.

>Avoid adding more bootstrap problems (to do DNS, I need HTTPS, for which
>I need DNS).

Why do you DNS to do HTTPS if the client has the key used by the server in their trust anchor store (as I specfied in the draft)?

>Do not reduce the security of a crypto system to the most vulnerable
>part of two cryptosystems with totally different trust models (X.509
>and DNSSEC)

If the key of the server is known to be in the trust anchor store, where does the trust model of X.509 come into play?

>As for the last mile... Phones can now play HDTV. Surely they can do some
>validating resolving using DHCP supplied forwarders. This should work
>in most cases. Using one root key (or possibly a very few preloaded keys)

If all last-hop routers are on the same network as their trusted DHCP server, you are correct. That was not an assumption that I made. When I travel, I want to continue to use my home ISP's DNS service, not the crap that Starbucks hands me.

>For those cases where it does not, because DNS modifications by third
>parties are desired, these should be established as much as possible
>through already known secure channels. This could either be the DNS
>modifier service publishing a DNSSEC signed public key for query
>transactions to its systems from untrusted networks - to be obtained
>via generic DNSSEC protected queries, or a pre-loaded public key via
>another medium (an X.509 cert?)

I cannot parse that paragraph, and I would like to because I think we might be in agreement. Please try again.

>Putting DNS in HTTPS via stacked content encodings will just lead to
>"very very deep packet inspections", and more HTTPS "friendly" man in
>the middle attacks on ignoring certificate warnings to the enduser.

Quite possibly true. I expect that the wrapped-in-HTTP protocol to not be used much, but I see no reason not to offer it, given that the same server will be running it under TLS. If you don't want to serve it (and I can see reasons not to), you don't have to.

>And if we are going to define a new method to protect queries for the
>last mile (which could be across the world), we might as well add
>optional encryption to it to provide privacy, and avoid another dnscurve
>discussion.

Right. I'm confused, then. TLS offers encryption: why are you saying we don't want it?

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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there are two replies here.

> Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2010 14:57:33 -0800
> From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
> 
> >my current comments are just these four:
> >
> >1. if dnssec deployment the motive, then SIG(0) as specified today will
> >   just work, no relaxation of any specification would be required.
> >
> >2. if we're going to support the non-dnssec case, then we should do this
> >   in-band without a new transport, and the relaxation to TKEY mentioned
> >   in the above references would be the only specification needing changes,
> >   and that relaxation would be completely harmless to the installed base.
> >
> >3. if we're going to do a new transport in spite of #1 and #2 above then
> >   that transport should be datagram oriented, meaning DTLS rather than HTTP.
> >
> >4. if we're going to use HTTP in spite of #1, #2, and #3 above then we
> >   should define an XML schema for DNS transactions so that they can be
> >   carried by either HTTP, HTTPS, or other XML-bearing transports, and use
> >   a JSON style URI syntax to place this service within a web-dns server.
> 
> We probably have different threat models. Can you clarify?
> 
> - As I said in my draft, I consider bad DNS middleboxes a problem to
> be solved; your #1 and #2 above do not seem to consider that a
> problem. Is that correct?

i'm giving you a choice. if you think dnssec will be deployed, one option.
if you think it won't be deployed, another option.  note for the gallery--
#1 (if you think dnssec is going to deployed) and #2 (if you don't) are
my proposed existing answer to the problem statement of paul hoffman's draft,
and the rest of this is just selling past the close as far as i'm concerned.

> - I consider a trivial CPU denial-of-service attack on the responder
> to be significant. As the TKEY RFC boldly states, "Protection against
> denial of service via the use of TKEY is not provided." Your #1 and #2
> above do not seem to consider this a problem. Correct?

i expect people to implement it sanely or not at all.  the fact that the
RFC does not talk about cpu-dos protection doesn't mean that trivial rate
limiting and trivial preference lists don't address the problem adequately.
as marka has said here several times, a full resolver should know who its
clients are or should know where they might be coming from.  (though opendns
and google don't have that option, most last miles are same-perimeter.)

> For #3, I agree from a cleanliness standpoint. I consider "easy for a
> DNS operator to set up" to be fairly important, and thus chose
> well-known toolkits.  If people really don't operational ease that is
> important, ...

which toolkit is required does not bear on ease of setup.  people install
from pkgsrc, sunfreeware, ports, packages, rpm's, .deb's, and etc.  the
total list or depth of dependencies are in 2010 irrelevant to operations.

> ... and don't care about helping first hop resolvers that are behind
> bad DNS middleboxes a problem, I can se "DNS-over-DTLS" as a viable
> solution to that limited problem.

people who care about bad middleboxes are already using vpn's because of
the many non-dns forms of damage they also expect.  i don't think that we
should start a war of escalation against middlebox vendors where every
protocol finds its own workarounds and every middlebox vendor breaks
whatever they still can.  this is an incredibly important philosophic
point in light of the ongoing debate about "network neutrality".

> I have no idea what would motivate you to suggest the large extra
> complexity of #4. Base64-of-DNS can be carried by HTTP and HTTPS, and
> "XML-bearing transports" is thus not needed to solve the problems
> listed.

that's what kaminsky did in his work in this area, except without base64,
since everything after the crlf-crlf that terminates the http headers can
safely be binary.  i'm suggesting that an xml schema, even if binary xml,
would also be useful in other applications.

> Please do say whether you agree with my assessments that you do not
> care about the two problems I listed in the document and above, or if
> you do care but think that your proposals actually deal with them.

i think that you should use #1 or #2 depending on whether you believe that
dnssec will be implemented.  i do not think we need any new protocol work
in this area.  our discussions of #3 or #4 are just two friends talking.

---

> Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2010 19:19:27 -0500 (EST)
> From: Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com>
> 
> It is very worrysome when people say "Oh, I know. I will just use port
> 80/443 and all my problems will go away". The internet is not port 80/443
> and piggybacking DNS into HTTP (whether base64 or xml) is a bad design.

i *would* agree except for the success of skype and bittorrent.  the market
is always attracted to stuff that just works.  after a decade we're still
trying to get ip fragmentation fixed so that edns can work, and most days
i think that's a good fight even if it takes two decades.  but it's hard
to ignore the installed base.  i *do* agree to this extent: since this
is a last mile issue where vpn's are already in common use to deal with the
extraordinary brokitude of middleboxen, we should just presume on vpn's here.

(as this is not a server-to-server proposal, the fact that vpn's don't scale
to that use case is not important to the discussion.)

> As for the last mile... Phones can now play HDTV. Surely they can do some
> validating resolving using DHCP supplied forwarders. This should work
> in most cases. Using one root key (or possibly a very few preloaded keys)

noting, this is my preferred model also.  we have to deploy dnssec for many
reasons.  once deployed it will have many positive impacts including making
the last mile secure, either by virtue of end-to-end validation, or by
virtue of making SIG(0) "just work", depending on how each implementor
decides the question of "heavyweight?".  let's use the architecture we've
defined for Secure DNS (dnssec, tsig, tkey, sig(0), whatever else) or let's
change it but let's not add more ad-hoc crud like "0x20" without having
explicitly decided to either implement Secure DNS or redesign Secure DNS.

> For those cases where it does not, because DNS modifications by third
> parties are desired, these should be established as much as possible
> through already known secure channels. This could either be the DNS
> modifier service publishing a DNSSEC signed public key for query
> transactions to its systems from untrusted networks - to be obtained
> via generic DNSSEC protected queries, or a pre-loaded public key via
> another medium (an X.509 cert?)

while i agree that a voluntary dns modifier service could do this, the model
has to accomodate the current involuntary dns modifier "services" as well.
(and it does, because a full resolver can do dnssec validation, and their
stub clients can use sig(0)... but i want to make sure this is mentioned in
the specific context of the above-quoted remarks.)

> ... if we are going to define a new method to protect queries for the
> last mile (which could be across the world), we might as well add
> optional encryption to it to provide privacy, and avoid another dnscurve
> discussion.

i'm hoping that the fact that last miles might be across the world won't
affect any part of the DNS design, and that the business and operational
models that seek to expand the definition of "last mile" in this way will
continue their struggle without protocol-revision support, so that we can
avoid another client-ip discussion.  but i think we're both likely to be
disappointed about what discussions we hope can be avoided.

From wwwrun@core3.amsl.com  Tue Dec  7 09:43:52 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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The DNS Extensions (dnsext) working group in the Internet Area of the IETF
has been rechartered.  For additional information, please contact the Area
Directors or the working group Chairs.

DNS Extensions (dnsext)
---------------------------------------------------
Current Status: Active Working Group

Chairs:
  Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
  Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>

Internet Area Directors:
  Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>
  Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>

Internet Area Advisor:
  Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>

Mailing Lists:
  Address:	dnsext@ietf.org
  To Subscribe:	https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
  Archive:	http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsext/

Description of Working Group:

The DNS has a large installed base and repertoire of protocol
specifications. The DNSEXT working group will actively advance DNS
protocol-related RFCs on the standards track while thoroughly
reviewing further proposed extensions. The scope of the DNSEXT WG is
confined to the DNS protocol, particularly changes that affect DNS
protocols "on the wire" or the internal processing of DNS data. DNS
operations are out of scope for the WG.

The WG will consider work in the following areas:

* DNSSEC and TSIG/TKEY algorithm maintenance
* Mechanisms that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)
* Hardening DNS protocol and providing guidance to implementers
* Advancing existing DNS-related Proposed Standard RFCs to Draft/Full
  Standard
* Obsoleting DNS-related RFCs
* Maintaining a Wiki containing a guide to DNS protocol RFCs
* Improving DNS zone synchronization mechanisms 
* Examining transport protocols, possibly adding new ones.
* Mechanisms to alias DNS trees or parts thereof

While the DNS offers two mechanisms for aliasing DNS labels -- CNAME
and DNAME -- neither of these provides the support necessary to alias
completely one part of the DNS tree as another part.  There are claims
that the restriction has proven to be too great in practice,
particularly with burgeoning deployment of IDNA and the need to
provide domain name variants.  The issue is made more complex by
DNSSEC

The DNSEXT WG will evaluate ways to provide such aliasing, to add
metadata to zones to allow easier operation of zones when such
aliasing is needed, or both.  The WG will also provide an
informational document outlining the various strategies available,
what they might be used for, and what their limitations are.  It is
possible that the WG will conclude no aliasing or metadata support is
possible, or that none of the proposals so far made are adequate.

Before formal adoption of any work item at least 5 working group
participants must publicly state that the item is within charter and
is a worthwhile item for further study.

The DNSEXT WG will conduct the specified RFC5395 review of RR
templates as they are posted, and EDNS0 Option templates if EDNS0-bis
updates registration requirements.

The WG will review DNS protocol related work which may originate
elsewhere in the IETF, including AD-sponsored submissions or drafts
in other working group.

Goals and Milestones:

Done           AXFR Clarify to IESG
Done           DNS existing transport protocol
                    recommendations/clarifications to IESG
Dec 2010       RFC3597-bis Unknown RR advanced to IESG for PS 
Dec 2010       DNSKEY Registry fixes and allocation procedure
                    advanced to IESG
Dec 2010       EDNS0-bis update advanced to IESG
Dec 2010       TSIG/MD5 Obsoleting to IESG
Dec 2010       IXFR-only to IESG
Jan 2011       DNSSEC Errata document to IESG 
Jul 2011       WG consensus on new or revised RRTYPEs for aliasing
                    work
Jul 2011       Interoperation testing on new or revised RRTYPEs
                    (particularly with existing deployed code)
Nov 2011       Document on new RRTYPE or revised RRTYPE handling for
                    alias to IESG
Nov 2011       Document on in-zone metadata for aliases to IESG
Nov 2011       Document on uses and limitations of different alias
                    techniques to IESG


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From: Alex Nicoll <anicoll@cert.org>
To: "dnsext@ietf.org" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2010 14:21:08 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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As a relative newbie to this group, and a long time lurker, can anyone tell=
 me where the DNS RFC Wiki that is mentioned in the charter is located?  I =
have recently become aware of a similar effort by others outside the IETF, =
and I would like to be able to compare the two.  It was also the focus of a=
n "Ask Slashdot" question I posted some while back, and I think that there =
may be others who are interested as well.

Thank you,

Alex

-----Original Message-----
From: dnsext-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dnsext-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 IESG Secretary
Sent: Tuesday, December 07, 2010 12:44 PM
To: IETF Announcement list
Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)

The DNS Extensions (dnsext) working group in the Internet Area of the IETF
has been rechartered.  For additional information, please contact the Area
Directors or the working group Chairs.

DNS Extensions (dnsext)
---------------------------------------------------
Current Status: Active Working Group

Chairs:
  Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
  Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>

Internet Area Directors:
  Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>
  Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>

Internet Area Advisor:
  Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>

Mailing Lists:
  Address:	dnsext@ietf.org
  To Subscribe:	https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
  Archive:	http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsext/

Description of Working Group:

The DNS has a large installed base and repertoire of protocol
specifications. The DNSEXT working group will actively advance DNS
protocol-related RFCs on the standards track while thoroughly
reviewing further proposed extensions. The scope of the DNSEXT WG is
confined to the DNS protocol, particularly changes that affect DNS
protocols "on the wire" or the internal processing of DNS data. DNS
operations are out of scope for the WG.

The WG will consider work in the following areas:

* DNSSEC and TSIG/TKEY algorithm maintenance
* Mechanisms that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)
* Hardening DNS protocol and providing guidance to implementers
* Advancing existing DNS-related Proposed Standard RFCs to Draft/Full
  Standard
* Obsoleting DNS-related RFCs
* Maintaining a Wiki containing a guide to DNS protocol RFCs
* Improving DNS zone synchronization mechanisms=20
* Examining transport protocols, possibly adding new ones.
* Mechanisms to alias DNS trees or parts thereof

While the DNS offers two mechanisms for aliasing DNS labels -- CNAME
and DNAME -- neither of these provides the support necessary to alias
completely one part of the DNS tree as another part.  There are claims
that the restriction has proven to be too great in practice,
particularly with burgeoning deployment of IDNA and the need to
provide domain name variants.  The issue is made more complex by
DNSSEC

The DNSEXT WG will evaluate ways to provide such aliasing, to add
metadata to zones to allow easier operation of zones when such
aliasing is needed, or both.  The WG will also provide an
informational document outlining the various strategies available,
what they might be used for, and what their limitations are.  It is
possible that the WG will conclude no aliasing or metadata support is
possible, or that none of the proposals so far made are adequate.

Before formal adoption of any work item at least 5 working group
participants must publicly state that the item is within charter and
is a worthwhile item for further study.

The DNSEXT WG will conduct the specified RFC5395 review of RR
templates as they are posted, and EDNS0 Option templates if EDNS0-bis
updates registration requirements.

The WG will review DNS protocol related work which may originate
elsewhere in the IETF, including AD-sponsored submissions or drafts
in other working group.

Goals and Milestones:

Done           AXFR Clarify to IESG
Done           DNS existing transport protocol
                    recommendations/clarifications to IESG
Dec 2010       RFC3597-bis Unknown RR advanced to IESG for PS=20
Dec 2010       DNSKEY Registry fixes and allocation procedure
                    advanced to IESG
Dec 2010       EDNS0-bis update advanced to IESG
Dec 2010       TSIG/MD5 Obsoleting to IESG
Dec 2010       IXFR-only to IESG
Jan 2011       DNSSEC Errata document to IESG=20
Jul 2011       WG consensus on new or revised RRTYPEs for aliasing
                    work
Jul 2011       Interoperation testing on new or revised RRTYPEs
                    (particularly with existing deployed code)
Nov 2011       Document on new RRTYPE or revised RRTYPE handling for
                    alias to IESG
Nov 2011       Document on in-zone metadata for aliases to IESG
Nov 2011       Document on uses and limitations of different alias
                    techniques to IESG

_______________________________________________
dnsext mailing list
dnsext@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

From scott.rose@nist.gov  Tue Dec  7 11:39:07 2010
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From: "Rose, Scott W." <scott.rose@nist.gov>
To: "dnsext@ietf.org" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2010 14:40:23 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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References: <20101125173050.GE21047@shinkuro.com> <E3CC655E-596A-4ECC-A8CA-50A468EC7FC4@niven-jenkins.co.uk> <4FDA699C-7609-4757-B602-630D9693D601@nist.gov> <20101201154519.GJ1042@shinkuro.com>	<p06240813c91c3607a36c@[10.20.30.150]> <2D6210D1-2C01-4BB2-AA34-95A227B626F2@niven-jenkins.co.uk> <p06240825c922aa624254@[10.20.30.151]>
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FWIW, the current, working version of Section 2.2:

2.2.  Domain Name System (DNS) Security Algorithm Number Registry Table

   The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Algorithm Number registry is
   hereby specified as follows:

                                       Trans-
                                 Zone  action  Compliance to
Number  Description    Mnemonic   Sign  Sign     this memo     Reference
------  -----------     ------    ----  -----  ------------   ---------
 0      Reserved                                             [RFC4398]
 1      RSA/MD5         RSAMD5     N     Y    MUST NOT       [RFC2537]
                                              IMPLEMENT
 2      Diffie-Hellman  DH         N     Y                   [RFC2539]
 3      DSA/SHA-1       DSASHA1    Y     Y                   [RFC2536]
 4      Reserved until
        2020
 5      RSA/SHA-1       RSASHA1    Y     Y    MUST           [RFC3110]
                                              IMPLEMENT
 6      DSA-NSEC3-SHA1  DSA-NSEC3  Y     Y                   [RFC5155]
                        -SHA1
 7      RSASHA1-NSEC3   RSASHA1-   Y     Y    RECOMMENDED    [RFC5155]
        -SHA1           NSEC3-                TO IMPLEMENT
                        SHA1
 8      RSA/SHA-256     RSASHA256  Y     *    RECOMMENDED    [RFC5702]
                                              TO IMPLEMENT
 9      Reserved until
        2020
 10      RSA/SHA-512     RSASHA512  Y     *    RECOMMENDED    [RFC5702]
                                              TO IMPLEMENT
 11      Reserved until
        2020
 12      GOST R          GOST-ECC   Y     *                   [RFC5933]
        34.10-2001
13-251   Unassigned
 252     Reserved for    INDIRECT   N     N                   [RFC4034]
        Indirect keys
 253     private         PRIVATE    Y     Y                   [RFC4034]
        algorithm
 254     private         PRIVATEOID Y     Y                   [RFC4034]
        algorithm OID
 255     Reserved

   Table rows where the compliance column is not filled in are left to
   the discretion of implementors and are NOT REQUIRED for compliance to
   this document.

/end

Not posted, still tinkering with the wording and still have to make a minor change to the IANA Considerations section to reflect the necessary edits they need to do.  

Scott


On Dec 6, 2010, at 9:58 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> At 6:57 AM +0000 12/6/10, Ben Niven-Jenkins wrote:
>> Paul,
>> 
>> One question for clarification which also relates to the table you posted in a previous mail.
>> 
>>> A different (and shorter) way to say this is "A blank entry for the conformance requirement to RFC TBD1 means that there is no conformance requirement for RFC TDB1." This RFC does not make implementing something optional: it is already optional.
>> 
>> RFC TBD1 == the RFC number eventually allocated to draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes, right?
> 
> Exactly right. And, if the table is later replaced (as is described in the RFC), that column header would be updated with the new RFC.
> 
> --Paul Hoffman, Director
> --VPN Consortium
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

===================================
Scott Rose
NIST
scottr@nist.gov
+1 301-975-8439
Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
http://www.dnsops.gov/
===================================


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http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/dnsext/trac/wiki

On 07/12/2010 2:21 PM, Alex Nicoll wrote:
> As a relative newbie to this group, and a long time lurker, can anyone tell me where the DNS RFC Wiki that is mentioned in the charter is located?  I have recently become aware of a similar effort by others outside the IETF, and I would like to be able to compare the two.  It was also the focus of an "Ask Slashdot" question I posted some while back, and I think that there may be others who are interested as well.
>
> Thank you,
>
> Alex
>

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From: Alex Nicoll <anicoll@cert.org>
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2010 16:07:14 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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The other effort is a start up by Dave Crocker of BBIW, with some help by R=
ay Bellis (and others), located at http://bbiw.net/clusters/#clusterdnsrole=
.  Ray had put together a very cool perl script that helped people figure o=
ut how to traverse RFC chains, and reported the results graphically.  The i=
dea behind Dave's effort is to get all of the information about a specific =
topic in one place and grouped together so that idiots like me don't have t=
o go play "hunt and peck" in an RFC repository to try to find everything re=
levant to a topic.  I tried to do that using the RFC chaining information, =
but when I was done, I really wasn't sure if I was DONE, or if I had missed=
 something - there was no way to know.

I am very interested in the idea of codifying the documentation of the DNS =
protocol (maybe as a template for other protocols) in a way such that idiot=
s like me can have a chance to really get a complete picture of how it all =
works, without buying implementation specific books (like BIND).

-Alex

-----Original Message-----
From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@shinkuro.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, December 07, 2010 2:42 PM
To: Alex Nicoll
Subject: Re: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)

On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 02:21:08PM -0500, Alex Nicoll wrote:
> As a relative newbie to this group, and a long time lurker, can anyone te=
ll me where the DNS RFC Wiki that is mentioned in the charter is located?  =
I have recently become aware of a similar effort by others outside the IETF=
, and I would like to be able to compare the two.  It was also the focus of=
 an "Ask Slashdot" question I posted some while back, and I think that ther=
e may be others who are interested as well.
>=20

I guess to "maintain" it we are supposed to "create" it too.  But I'm sligh=
tly alarmed, because this post seems to have a previous version of the char=
ter.  I'll follow up and report to the WG.

In the meantime, where is the other effort?  Maybe we can help with it.

A

--
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Tue Dec  7 13:13:33 2010
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Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2010 16:14:56 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: dnsext@ietf.org
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On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 04:07:14PM -0500, Alex Nicoll wrote:

> The other effort is a start up by Dave Crocker of BBIW, with some
> help by Ray Bellis (and others), located at
> http://bbiw.net/clusters/#clusterdnsrole.

Right, I saw that.  It's a little shy on many of the details, but it's
not wrong, I think.

>  Ray had put together a
> very cool perl script that helped people figure out how to traverse
> RFC chains, and reported the results graphically. 

That tool is indeed cool.  And it is something we talked about using
in the past.  Glad it'd been useful in Dave's effort.

> I am very interested in the idea of codifying the documentation of
> the DNS protocol (maybe as a template for other protocols) in a way
> such that idiots like me can have a chance to really get a complete
> picture of how it all works, without buying implementation specific
> books (like BIND).

The WG actually undertook an effort of this sort a few years ago, and
it was a massive failure.  It's where the idea for the wiki came from,
but I think we have concluded that such a wiki isn't really a proper
job of the WG (and the version of the charter that should have been
published -- I attach it below for posterity -- doesn't include it).

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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DRAFT charter for DNSEXT, 2010-09-07.  SUBJECT TO CHANGE

Description of Working Group:

The DNS has a large installed base and repertoire of protocol
specifications. The DNSEXT working group will actively advance DNS
protocol-related RFCs on the standards track while thoroughly
reviewing further proposed extensions. The scope of the DNSEXT WG is
confined to the DNS protocol, particularly changes that affect DNS
protocols "on the wire" or the internal processing of DNS data. DNS
operations are out of scope for the WG.

The WG will consider work in the following areas:

* DNSSEC and TSIG/TKEY algorithm maintenance;
* Mechanisms that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0);
* Hardening DNS protocol and providing guidance to implementers;
* Advancing existing DNS-related Proposed Standard RFCs to Draft/Full
  Standard;
* Obsoleting DNS-related RFCs;
* Improving DNS zone synchronization mechanisms; 
* Examining transport protocols, possibly adding new ones;
* Mechanisms to alias DNS trees or parts thereof.

Before formal adoption of any work item at least 5 working group
participants must publicly state that the item is within charter and
is a worthwhile item for further study.

The DNSEXT WG will conduct the specified RFC5395 review of RR
templates as they are posted, and EDNS0 Option templates if EDNS0-bis
updates registration requirements.

The WG will review DNS protocol related work which may originate
elsewhere in the IETF, including AD-sponsored submissions or drafts
in other working group.

Goals and Milestones:

Sept 2010      RFC3597-bis Unknown RR advanced to IESG for PS                   
Sept 2010      DNSKEY Registry fixes and allocation procedure advanced to       
                               IESG                                                                            
Oct 2010       DNSSEC Errata document to IESG                                   
Oct 2010       DNAME-bis to IESG                                                
Nov 2010       EDNS0-bis update advanced to IESG                                
Nov 2010       Requirements and current state survey document to IESG           
                             for publication                                    
Nov 2010       Decision about new protocol elements, if any.                    
Dec 2010       If new protocol elements, recharter                              
Dec 2010       IXFR-only to IESG   
Jan 2010       Algorithm signaling document to IESG 

--GBuTPvBEOL0MYPgd--

From jay@nzrs.net.nz  Tue Dec  7 14:00:10 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
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> Greetings again. One of the items on the new WG charter is "Mechanisms =
that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)", and many =
people have decried the lack of protection for the "last hop" (stub =
resolver to its recursive resolver upstream) as a deterrent for real =
DNSSEC deployment. There are a bunch of (sometimes-conflicting) =
requirements for protecting such queries and responses.
>=20
> To that end, I have created a new draft, shown below. The protocols =
described can be used by any two DNS resolvers, but they are probably =
most useful in the last hop. Instead of developing new protocols, I used =
existing protocols (HTTP and TLS) for which there are plenty of =
toolkits.
>=20
> Comments are appreciated.

I do not agree that the basic problem statement requires a new protocol =
to address it.

Quoting selectively from the draft, the first element of the problem is:

>    DNS intermediaries have been found to cause a number of tenacious =
and
>    difficult-to-solve problems.

Implementers only mess with DNS because it is so easy and because it has =
been undetectable until now.  I would suggest that making messing with =
DNS detectable is going to eliminate this malpractice unless it is =
entirely deliberate (e.g. a corporate network)

But I see you've thought about that in the second element:

>    Spoofing does not affect DNS
>    responses that are protected by DNSSEC that are sent to resolvers
>    that validate; note, however, that non-validating resolvers,
>    particularly non-validating stub resolvers, are quite common.


The only problem there is that DNSSEC is not yet implemented =
ubiquitously, and to expect anything else to have happened when the root =
was only signed in July and only a few TLDs/registrars offer full DNSSEC =
support, is unrealistic.  This second element will solve itself over =
time.

That leaves the only the narrowest use cases of users who are behind a =
middlebox that is deliberately messing with DNS as part of some =
corporate policy and we want to design a protocol that gets around this =
and that cannot be trivially blocked.

Jay

--=20
Jay Daley
Chief Executive
.nz Registry Services (New Zealand Domain Name Registry Limited)
desk: +64 4 931 6977
mobile: +64 21 678840


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Jay and all,


-----Original Message-----
>From: Jay Daley <jay@nzrs.net.nz>
>Sent: Dec 7, 2010 4:01 PM
>To: DNSEXT Working Group <dnsext@ietf.org>
>Subject: Re: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
>
>> Greetings again. One of the items on the new WG charter is "Mechanisms that complement, or are alternatives to, TSIG and SIG(0)", and many people have decried the lack of protection for the "last hop" (stub resolver to its recursive resolver upstream) as a deterrent for real DNSSEC deployment. There are a bunch of (sometimes-conflicting) requirements for protecting such queries and responses.
>> 
>> To that end, I have created a new draft, shown below. The protocols described can be used by any two DNS resolvers, but they are probably most useful in the last hop. Instead of developing new protocols, I used existing protocols (HTTP and TLS) for which there are plenty of toolkits.
>> 
>> Comments are appreciated.
>
>I do not agree that the basic problem statement requires a new protocol to address it.
>
>Quoting selectively from the draft, the first element of the problem is:
>
>>    DNS intermediaries have been found to cause a number of tenacious and
>>    difficult-to-solve problems.
>
>Implementers only mess with DNS because it is so easy and because it has been undetectable until now.  I would suggest that making messing with DNS detectable is going to eliminate this malpractice unless it is entirely deliberate (e.g. a corporate network)
>
>But I see you've thought about that in the second element:
>
>>    Spoofing does not affect DNS
>>    responses that are protected by DNSSEC that are sent to resolvers
>>    that validate; note, however, that non-validating resolvers,
>>    particularly non-validating stub resolvers, are quite common.
>
>
>The only problem there is that DNSSEC is not yet implemented ubiquitously, and to expect anything else to have happened when the root was only signed in July and only a few TLDs/registrars offer full DNSSEC support, is unrealistic.  This second element will solve itself over time.
>
>That leaves the only the narrowest use cases of users who are behind a middlebox that is deliberately messing with DNS as part of some corporate policy and we want to design a protocol that gets around this and that cannot be trivially blocked.

  I cound not agree more here!
>
>Jay
>
>-- 
>Jay Daley
>Chief Executive
>.nz Registry Services (New Zealand Domain Name Registry Limited)
>desk: +64 4 931 6977
>mobile: +64 21 678840
>
>_______________________________________________
>dnsext mailing list
>dnsext@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

Regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
Network Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Phone: 214-244-4827



From ajs@shinkuro.com  Tue Dec  7 14:12:25 2010
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[no hat]

On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 05:01:30PM -0500, Jay Daley wrote:
> 
> That leaves the only the narrowest use cases of users who are behind a middlebox that is deliberately messing with DNS as part of some corporate policy and we want to design a protocol that gets around this and that cannot be trivially blocked.
> 

I note that just about every hotel I've ever been in has this problem,
so it's not like it's a total non-problem.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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On Dec 7, 2010, at 2:13 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:

> [no hat]
>=20
> On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 05:01:30PM -0500, Jay Daley wrote:
>>=20
>> That leaves the only the narrowest use cases of users who are behind =
a middlebox that is deliberately messing with DNS as part of some =
corporate policy and we want to design a protocol that gets around this =
and that cannot be trivially blocked.
>>=20
>=20
> I note that just about every hotel I've ever been in has this problem,
> so it's not like it's a total non-problem.

Which is why you should always run an sshd on port 443 at your home =
institution and tunnel all traffic through it: its about the only thing =
that does work (reasonably) reliably through b0rken netwonks [sic].


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In-Reply-To: Your message of "Tue, 07 Dec 2010 17:13:46 EST." <20101207221345.GT29384@shinkuro.com> 
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> Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2010 17:13:46 -0500
> From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
> 
> > That leaves the only the narrowest use cases of users who are behind
> > a middlebox that is deliberately messing with DNS as part of some
> > corporate policy and we want to design a protocol that gets around
> > this and that cannot be trivially blocked.
> 
> I note that just about every hotel I've ever been in has this problem,
> so it's not like it's a total non-problem.

and yet, dns isn't the only protocol that hotels mess with, and folks who
care about this mess are already using some form of vpn, so it's not like
this is a new or dns-specific problem.


From bortzmeyer@nic.fr  Wed Dec  8 00:35:31 2010
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On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 02:17:03PM -0800,
 Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu> wrote 
 a message of 19 lines which said:

> Which is why you should always run an sshd on port 443 at your home
> institution and tunnel all traffic through it: 

I assume that every member of this working group do something similar
(but think of Joe User, who does not have a dedicated server with a
sshd). The problem is "do we take this fact into account when writing
RFCs?" Because, then, one could say (and I suspect this is what you
meant) "the problem is solved, everything works, we don't need new
protocols".


From bortzmeyer@nic.fr  Wed Dec  8 00:38:37 2010
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On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 11:03:08PM +0000,
 Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org> wrote 
 a message of 19 lines which said:

> and yet, dns isn't the only protocol that hotels mess with, and
> folks who care about this mess are already using some form of vpn,
> so it's not like this is a new or dns-specific problem.

>From my experience with hotels, DNS is the most common practical
problem, among the protocols I use (SSH, HTTP and HTTPs, XMPP). If it
is solved, the need for a generic tunnel (IPsec or SSH) would
seriously diminish.

In the future, with mandatory filtering of Wikileaks, things may be
different and we will need to tunnel everything. But not yet today.

From bortzmeyer@nic.fr  Wed Dec  8 00:42:19 2010
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On Mon, Dec 06, 2010 at 02:14:25AM +0000,
 Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org> wrote 
 a message of 48 lines which said:

> use a JSON style URI syntax to place this service within a web-dns
> server.

I know that the IETF is not to be used for personal training but,
nevertheless, I wonder what is a "JSON-style URI"... (And I have read
and - I believe - understood RFC 4627 and 3986.)

From bortzmeyer@nic.fr  Wed Dec  8 07:04:37 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] Gen-ART review of draft-cheshire-dnsext-dns-sd-07.txt
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[Also sent to the gen-art mailing list but I think it is appropriate
to send a copy here.]



I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-cheshire-dnsext-dns-sd-07.txt
Reviewer: Stéphane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
Review Date: 2010-12-06
IETF LC End Date: 2010-11-23
IESG Telechat date: Unknown


Summary:

The draft is long, containing a lot of interesting material, but not
always well organized. As a general rule, I am a big fan of
"rationale" sections, which let you know why a MUST or a SHOULD was
used. But, here, they are intermixed with the normative content and it
is often difficult to know when standard stops and background material
begins. Examples are sections 4.4 or 6.2.

In the same way, user interface discussions (section 4.2 for instance)
are very interesting and useful but should be more clearly separated
(may be in a distinct document).

It also raises a major issue when you put it in perspective with other
DNS-related documents: non-standard terminology and strange ways to
describe the rest of the DNS world. It does not seem suitable for a
Standards-Track document.

Major issues:

There are non-standard terms which may create confusion with existing
technologies. My main concern is with "unicast DNS". There is no such
thing as unicast DNS, there is the DNS and there are other protocols
(like LLMNR or Apple Bonjour name protocol) which are not DNS. Even
worse is "unicast DNS domain name" (unicast refers to a name
resolution method, but a name exists independently of a resolution
method).

Using "local", outside of the procedures of RFC 2606 and 2826 and
similar is a bad idea. I do not elaborate here since the problem is
actually in draft-cheshire-dnsext-multicastdns-12.txt.

The idea in section 7 of using _udp for every SRV records (but TCP) is
a bad one, which you cannot find in RFC 2782 which states clearly that
other values than _tcp and _udp can be used. The fact (section 18)
that there is no IANA registry for these values is not, in my opinion,
a sufficient reason.

The idea of "IANA secret registrations" (section 18) would be, it
seems, a first in the IETF world and should be rejected. The entire
point of IANA registries is to document publicly the *technical*
identifiers. Trademarks and marketing terms do not have to be in the
IANA registry and therefore do not need special rules for them.


Minor issues:

For name resolution on the local network, only mDNS (a misnomer since
it is not DNS) is mentioned, not LLMNR (RFC 4795) which seems it would
work as well.

Section 4.1 says that the name must be in NFC. Why not referring to
its subset defined in RFC 5198? Among the practical differences are
the fact that RFC 5198 handles the case of end-of-lines, which is
ignored by the draft.

"commonly-used 16-bit Unicode space" is a misnomer. If one wants to
talk about the Basic Multilingual Plane (which stores only a minority
of Unicode code points), it should use the standard term
<http://unicode.org/glossary/>.

The "standard DNS message size" is no longer 512 bytes since RFC 2671
(section 6.1). Yes, EDNS0 sometimes is blocked by broken middleboxes
but for a technique used only in local networks, this is not a too
serious issue.

It seems that the possibility of several TXT in a RRset (not several
strings in a TXT, which is covered in 6.1) is not mentioned. Is it
legal and, if yes, how to use it?

The advice of section 13.1 to stuff several other records (which may
be in different bailiwicks) in the DNS answer is at odds with security
practices (RFC 2181, section 5.4.1 and RFC 5452, section 6).


Nits/editorial comments:

Long quotes of existing RFCs (section 4.1) are unecessary since the
other RFCs are available elsewhere.






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From: Alex Nicoll <anicoll@cert.org>
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>, "dnsext@ietf.org" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 10:35:26 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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I agree that it is shy on some details, and I hope to help them flesh thing=
s out quite a bit over time.  Are you folks using other tools like that to =
consolidate the current RFC list?  From reading the list for a while, the b=
ulk of you seem to have an encyclopedic knowledge of the protocol and assoc=
iated RFCs.  If there are methods you have for correlating all of the RFCs =
into a cohesive whole, I think it would be very valuable to the internet co=
mmunity at large.

-Alex

-----Original Message-----
From: dnsext-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dnsext-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Andrew Sullivan
Sent: Tuesday, December 07, 2010 4:15 PM
To: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)

On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 04:07:14PM -0500, Alex Nicoll wrote:

> The other effort is a start up by Dave Crocker of BBIW, with some help=20
> by Ray Bellis (and others), located at=20
> http://bbiw.net/clusters/#clusterdnsrole.

Right, I saw that.  It's a little shy on many of the details, but it's not =
wrong, I think.

>  Ray had put together a
> very cool perl script that helped people figure out how to traverse=20
> RFC chains, and reported the results graphically.

That tool is indeed cool.  And it is something we talked about using in the=
 past.  Glad it'd been useful in Dave's effort.

> I am very interested in the idea of codifying the documentation of the=20
> DNS protocol (maybe as a template for other protocols) in a way such=20
> that idiots like me can have a chance to really get a complete picture=20
> of how it all works, without buying implementation specific books=20
> (like BIND).

The WG actually undertook an effort of this sort a few years ago, and it wa=
s a massive failure.  It's where the idea for the wiki came from, but I thi=
nk we have concluded that such a wiki isn't really a proper job of the WG (=
and the version of the charter that should have been published -- I attach =
it below for posterity -- doesn't include it).

A

--
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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It does seem somewhat overkill to use an IPSEC VPN just to protect the
DNS when surfing the general inter-web.

I much prefer a model for road access in which I have secure DNS
resolution plus SSL tunnels for my SMTP and corporate POP/IMAP and go
direct for the rest.

Routing streaming video through a VPN located the other side of the
planet is rather a bore.


With all these proposals 'a really sophisticated user can hack
something together that is clunky but almost works' is not an argument
against doing the job right in my view.

The reason that I am working on DPLS is that Comodo already offers
curated DNS as a product and we have over a million users. While we do
provide a client, I would much prefer to allow the technology to be
built into the O/S and/or applications direct.

I have looked at DNSCurve, but I prefer Kerberos tickets to an ECC approach=
.

I have looked at DTLS but that tries to provide a general purpose
transport and I think the DNS does actually merit a one off package
format given the unique constraints. At the very least it would be
necessary to constrain DPLS significantly.

On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 3:40 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> wro=
te:
> On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 11:03:08PM +0000,
> =A0Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org> wrote
> =A0a message of 19 lines which said:
>
>> and yet, dns isn't the only protocol that hotels mess with, and
>> folks who care about this mess are already using some form of vpn,
>> so it's not like this is a new or dns-specific problem.
>
> From my experience with hotels, DNS is the most common practical
> problem, among the protocols I use (SSH, HTTP and HTTPs, XMPP). If it
> is solved, the need for a generic tunnel (IPsec or SSH) would
> seriously diminish.
>
> In the future, with mandatory filtering of Wikileaks, things may be
> different and we will need to tunnel everything. But not yet today.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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On Wed, 8 Dec 2010, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 06, 2010 at 02:14:25AM +0000,
>  Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org> wrote
>  a message of 48 lines which said:
>
> > use a JSON style URI syntax to place this service within a web-dns
> > server.
>
> I know that the IETF is not to be used for personal training but,
> nevertheless, I wonder what is a "JSON-style URI"... (And I have read
> and - I believe - understood RFC 4627 and 3986.)

I guess Paul meant "RESTful".

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7,
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.

From ben@niven-jenkins.co.uk  Wed Dec  8 09:57:57 2010
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Andrew,

Thanks. Your explanation of some of the history and requirement for =
process finessing was most helpful (for my understanding at least).

I think the new table Scott proposed in his e-mail yesterday along with =
the additional sentence that a blank compliance field are NOT =
REQUIRED[1] address my LC comment.

Ben

[1] Although if my memory serves me right the idnits tools will complain =
that NOT REQUIRED is not specified in RFC2119.


On 1 Dec 2010, at 15:45, Andrew Sullivan wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 01, 2010 at 10:26:34AM -0500, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
>> Will fix the DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 discrepancy. =20
>>=20
>> As for the other blanks - those were semi-intentional.  I was =
thinking of asking the WG for status, but other things took over.  =
However, the -07 will only list the status if it is not OPTIONAL - so =
all blank entries will be OPTIONAL.  The text will be updated to state =
this.
>>=20
>=20
> The text does need to be updated to state that, but let's just explain
> for a moment why the column is blank instead of saying "optional".
>=20
> The document specifies a rule for the registry that says that if the
> column in question has an entry that is changed, then the entire
> registry needs to be respecified by whatever document is so changing
> the column.
>=20
> But, new entries can be added to the registry under the process
> established by RFC 6014.  Such additions don't need to produce a
> completely new registry every time.
>=20
> Remember that the goal here is to have the registry reflect (loosely
> speaking) an interoperability "requirement" level for algorithms, to
> expect new allocations most of which are not really required for
> interoperability among implementations, that registries cannot be
> normative, and that it is impossible for any given RFC to change the
> facts of the matter about a previous RFC.  So a non-entry for
> "optional" algorithms is a little process trick by which we can
> constrain later changes to the registry that specify a "required
> algorithm" while yet satisfying the above requirements.  Really, for
> the registry to say that an algorithm is "required" is to say that, to
> conform with such-and-thus RFC, you need to implement such-and-thus
> algorithm.  So we just don't have an entry for anything that will come
> in under normal circumstances, and for those things where the WG wants
> to say, "Really implement this," we have to do more work.  (Sorry to
> be so process-wonky about this, but we really do have to work within
> the strictures of the RFC series.)
>=20
> I think another participant may be going to post a suggestion about
> the table layout to make the above even clearer, so I'll wait for
> that.
>=20
> A
>=20
> --=20
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext


From vixie@vix.com  Wed Dec  8 10:04:59 2010
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> Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 17:05:12 +0000
> From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
> ...
> I guess Paul meant "RESTful".

yup.  too many timezones, too few hours.

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Wed Dec  8 10:09:16 2010
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From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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Hi,

One nit.

On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 02:40:23PM -0500, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
> FWIW, the current, working version of Section 2.2:

>                                        Trans-
>                                  Zone  action  Compliance to
> Number  Description    Mnemonic   Sign  Sign     this memo     Reference
> ------  -----------     ------    ----  -----  ------------   ---------

The title "Compliance to this memo" won't work for the registry,
because in the registry there's no memo for it to refer to.  I think
Paul Hoffman suggested TBD1, with an RFC Editor note saying "please
replace TBD1 with the RFC number if the document is published as an
RFC."  If you have the same note, except using "this memo", that's
also ok, I guess, though "this memo" is sometimes used in text without
the full spelling out of the RFC's series number.

Thanks,

A


-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From scott.rose@nist.gov  Wed Dec  8 10:27:46 2010
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From: "Rose, Scott W." <scott.rose@nist.gov>
To: "dnsext@ietf.org" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 13:28:53 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] WGLC: draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-registry-fixes-06
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I was going to change the IANA Considerations section to replace the whole "this memo" with "RFC XXXX", but RFC TBD1 is probably more straightforward.  

As per the comment from Ben Niven-Jenkins:  "NOT REQUIRED" is not a keyword in RFC 2119 (yet "REQUIRED" is).  Probably will change text at the bottom of the table to read:

"Table rows where the compliance column is not filled in are left to
  the discretion of implementors and their implementation (or lack thereof) MUST NOT be 
  included when judging compliance to this document."

Too strong?  "SHOULD NOT" instead?

Scott


On Dec 8, 2010, at 1:10 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:

> Hi,
> 
> One nit.
> 
> On Tue, Dec 07, 2010 at 02:40:23PM -0500, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
>> FWIW, the current, working version of Section 2.2:
> 
>>                                       Trans-
>>                                 Zone  action  Compliance to
>> Number  Description    Mnemonic   Sign  Sign     this memo     Reference
>> ------  -----------     ------    ----  -----  ------------   ---------
> 
> The title "Compliance to this memo" won't work for the registry,
> because in the registry there's no memo for it to refer to.  I think
> Paul Hoffman suggested TBD1, with an RFC Editor note saying "please
> replace TBD1 with the RFC number if the document is published as an
> RFC."  If you have the same note, except using "this memo", that's
> also ok, I guess, though "this memo" is sometimes used in text without
> the full spelling out of the RFC's series number.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> A
> 
> 
> -- 
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

===================================
Scott Rose
NIST
scottr@nist.gov
+1 301-975-8439
Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
http://www.dnsops.gov/
===================================


From ted.ietf@gmail.com  Wed Dec  8 10:33:56 2010
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On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 8:42 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> The reason that I am working on DPLS is that Comodo already offers
> curated DNS as a product and we have over a million users. While we do
> provide a client, I would much prefer to allow the technology to be
> built into the O/S and/or applications direct.
>

The DPLS draft uses "curated DNS", but in a way that seems to indicate
further detail is forthcoming.  As it stands, it appears to say something that
boils down to "we select which parts of the DNS namespace are visible
to the user".  That seems to be separate problem space from securing the
hop to the DNS resolver where you are getting whatever view of the
DNS namespace you get (full, split, curated, poisoned).

If I understand your problem space right, in other words, it appears to
be a subset of the larger problem space.  I'd rather tackle the whole
space at once if it is going to be a standards-based solution.

My own take, personally, is that DTLS is actually a reasonable candidate
for this.  It has simple return routability checks that make DDoS a bit
harder, it ties pretty well into TLS models that most people understand,
and the chances are that the code will already be available to many OSes
for other reasons.  The real question for me is whether the overhead is too
painful, and I don't really have data on that.  If you do, I'd be interested
in hearing about it.

regards,

Ted Hardie

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Dec  8 10:44:36 2010
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At 1:28 PM -0500 12/8/10, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
>I was going to change the IANA Considerations section to replace the whole "this memo" with "RFC XXXX", but RFC TBD1 is probably more straightforward.

I think so. The last thing we want is IANA misunderstanding this and "this memo" appears in the registry.

>As per the comment from Ben Niven-Jenkins:  "NOT REQUIRED" is not a keyword in RFC 2119 (yet "REQUIRED" is).  Probably will change text at the bottom of the table to read:
>
>"Table rows where the compliance column is not filled in are left to
>  the discretion of implementors and their implementation (or lack thereof) MUST NOT be
>  included when judging compliance to this document."
>
>Too strong?  "SHOULD NOT" instead?

Both are too strong, given the first clause of the sentence. I propose "... discretion of implementors and their implementation (or lack thereof) therefore cannot be ..."

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Wed Dec  8 10:48:38 2010
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Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 13:50:02 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: Alex Nicoll <anicoll@cert.org>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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On Wed, Dec 08, 2010 at 10:35:26AM -0500, Alex Nicoll wrote:
> flesh things out quite a bit over time.  Are you folks using other
> tools like that to consolidate the current RFC list? 

If anyone is doing serious work on such consolidation, it's news to
me.  Are you volunteering?  I think this is important work, but nobody
seems to have the time for it (as measured by the previous output on the task).

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Dec  8 10:56:13 2010
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Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 10:57:27 -0800
To: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: [dnsext] DTLS for the last hop
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At 10:35 AM -0800 12/8/10, Ted Hardie wrote:
>My own take, personally, is that DTLS is actually a reasonable candidate
>for this.  It has simple return routability checks that make DDoS a bit
>harder, it ties pretty well into TLS models that most people understand,
>and the chances are that the code will already be available to many OSes
>for other reasons.  The real question for me is whether the overhead is too
>painful, and I don't really have data on that.  If you do, I'd be interested
>in hearing about it.

I think DNS-in-DTLS is probably fine if we don't think that the issue of firewalls that block everything other than 80 and 443 are a problem. I still consider that a problem; maybe I stay in different hotels than you do.

(Before anyone says "DNS-in-DTLS on port 443", please remember that there is zero chance of getting this on standards track, and it is important to have whatever we produce as a standard.)

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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From: Alex Nicoll <anicoll@cert.org>
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 13:58:05 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)
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I may gnaw my tongue off later for saying this, but sure, I'll volunteer.  =
I've been given some time per week to devote to outside projects by my boss=
 here at CERT, so I'd be happy to help.  I can't think of a better way to l=
earn everything about DNS and DNSSEC than to try to make the documentation =
make sense to someone else. =20

Ultimately, it's not nearly as sexy as fixing issues with the DNS protocol =
itself, but it's a good way to make sure I don't say too many stupid things=
 when talking about the protocol with you folks.

I didn't see anything on the wiki link that Olafur sent out that looked lik=
e a start at this, so do you (or anyone else on the list) have anything tha=
t was created during the initial effort?

-Alex

-----Original Message-----
From: Andrew Sullivan [mailto:ajs@shinkuro.com]=20
Sent: Wednesday, December 08, 2010 1:50 PM
To: Alex Nicoll
Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] WG Action: RECHARTER: DNS Extensions (dnsext)

On Wed, Dec 08, 2010 at 10:35:26AM -0500, Alex Nicoll wrote:
> flesh things out quite a bit over time.  Are you folks using other=20
> tools like that to consolidate the current RFC list?

If anyone is doing serious work on such consolidation, it's news to me.  Ar=
e you volunteering?  I think this is important work, but nobody seems to ha=
ve the time for it (as measured by the previous output on the task).

A

--
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Dec  8 11:15:11 2010
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To: Alex Nicoll <anicoll@cert.org>, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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At 1:58 PM -0500 12/8/10, Alex Nicoll wrote:
>Ultimately, it's not nearly as sexy as fixing issues with the DNS protocol itself, but it's a good way to make sure I don't say too many stupid things when talking about the protocol with you folks.

Further, I would be a fair amount that when you document a list of "anomalous things in DNS", you will (or at least should) cause issues to be fixed in the DNS protocol. This is a valuable first step to that.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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Use SRV records for discovery and you can have as many ports as you like.




On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 1:57 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
> At 10:35 AM -0800 12/8/10, Ted Hardie wrote:
>>My own take, personally, is that DTLS is actually a reasonable candidate
>>for this. =A0It has simple return routability checks that make DDoS a bit
>>harder, it ties pretty well into TLS models that most people understand,
>>and the chances are that the code will already be available to many OSes
>>for other reasons. =A0The real question for me is whether the overhead is=
 too
>>painful, and I don't really have data on that. =A0If you do, I'd be inter=
ested
>>in hearing about it.
>
> I think DNS-in-DTLS is probably fine if we don't think that the issue of =
firewalls that block everything other than 80 and 443 are a problem. I stil=
l consider that a problem; maybe I stay in different hotels than you do.
>
> (Before anyone says "DNS-in-DTLS on port 443", please remember that there=
 is zero chance of getting this on standards track, and it is important to =
have whatever we produce as a standard.)
>
> --Paul Hoffman, Director
> --VPN Consortium
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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No DPLS is intended to address the whole solution space. That is only
one of the use cases mentioned.

The reason I put that in there is that there are a lot of people in
this WG who have the notion that DNSSEC is going to force people to
route domains that they don't wan't to. Just like open port IPv6, it
ain't going to happen.

People have very good reason for adopting the security restrictions
they do. End-to-End DNSSEC is not a viable model for most enterprises
and it is not actually a desirable model for home use.


My problem on DTLS comes down to the fact that DNS is one UDP packet
request and response. And that starts to become very confining when
records are carrying RSA signatures.

I would like to have a mechanism that allows me to have one UDP
request packet followed by a reasonable number of responses.

Given that I would want to profile any solution anyway, and given that
packaging is not very difficult to implement, I don't see much value
to using DTLS here. While using the TLS key exchange to obtain a
ticket is very useful indeed.




On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 1:35 PM, Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 8:42 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> w=
rote:
>>
>> The reason that I am working on DPLS is that Comodo already offers
>> curated DNS as a product and we have over a million users. While we do
>> provide a client, I would much prefer to allow the technology to be
>> built into the O/S and/or applications direct.
>>
>
> The DPLS draft uses "curated DNS", but in a way that seems to indicate
> further detail is forthcoming. =A0As it stands, it appears to say somethi=
ng that
> boils down to "we select which parts of the DNS namespace are visible
> to the user". =A0That seems to be separate problem space from securing th=
e
> hop to the DNS resolver where you are getting whatever view of the
> DNS namespace you get (full, split, curated, poisoned).
>
> If I understand your problem space right, in other words, it appears to
> be a subset of the larger problem space. =A0I'd rather tackle the whole
> space at once if it is going to be a standards-based solution.
>
> My own take, personally, is that DTLS is actually a reasonable candidate
> for this. =A0It has simple return routability checks that make DDoS a bit
> harder, it ties pretty well into TLS models that most people understand,
> and the chances are that the code will already be available to many OSes
> for other reasons. =A0The real question for me is whether the overhead is=
 too
> painful, and I don't really have data on that. =A0If you do, I'd be inter=
ested
> in hearing about it.
>
> regards,
>
> Ted Hardie
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

From paul@xelerance.com  Wed Dec  8 14:45:46 2010
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On Wed, 8 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> End-to-End DNSSEC is not a viable model for most enterprises
> and it is not actually a desirable model for home use.

For argumentation against untamperable security features being
undesriable, please see RFC 1984.

Rewriting DNS packets is not a viable model for most enterprises, and
it is a continued battleground for people by many commercial entities
to grab the attention span of the home user (you might be familiar with
Verisign's attempt in the past, or perhaps with Rogers current policy).

DNSSEC is the solution in general. VPN with corporate DNS servers
is the enterprise solution (L2TP/IPSEC or IPsec/XAUTH or any of the
openvpn/sslvpn variations that can assign DNS servers)

> I would like to have a mechanism that allows me to have one UDP
> request packet followed by a reasonable number of responses.

Or one response with more Additional Answers in a larger UDP packet? Also,
running a local validating caching resolver greatly reduces lookups
required, especially for typical users going to the same subset of domains.

I've actually have a very good successrate using ns.xelerance.net (public
dnssec enabled resolver) with a local resolver on my laptop while travelling.

Capturing the IP stream seems to become more popular then capturing the DNS
answers.

Paul

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Wed Dec  8 14:57:50 2010
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Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 17:59:15 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Speaking as chair, but without having consulted Olafur:

On Wed, Dec 08, 2010 at 05:47:10PM -0500, Paul Wouters wrote:
>
> I've actually have a very good successrate using ns.xelerance.net (public
> dnssec enabled resolver) with a local resolver on my laptop while travelling.
>
> Capturing the IP stream seems to become more popular then capturing the DNS
> answers.

I've been working on some more comprehensive remarks about various
topics in this thread; dayjob and snowstorms keep interrupting, so my
apologies.  But the above makes me think that some serious empirical
data would be very helpful in determining whether the "interfering
middleboxes" are a real issue, and whether anything we do for the DNS
is likely to help.  The only real evidence I've seen on this to date
suggests that interfering middleboxes are in fact a problem, and one
that I think we have reason to take seriously.  But I'm open to
arguments.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] DTLS for the last hop
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On Dec 8, 2010, at 3:13 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> Use SRV records for discovery and you can have as many ports as you =
like.

<soapbox>

Yes, but SRV records also lead to multiple DNS round trips, which can =
lead to user unhappiness....

</soapbox>

In this particular applications that probably not an issue, but I saw a =
soapbox and stood on it....

W

>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 1:57 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> =
wrote:
>> At 10:35 AM -0800 12/8/10, Ted Hardie wrote:
>>> My own take, personally, is that DTLS is actually a reasonable =
candidate
>>> for this.  It has simple return routability checks that make DDoS a =
bit
>>> harder, it ties pretty well into TLS models that most people =
understand,
>>> and the chances are that the code will already be available to many =
OSes
>>> for other reasons.  The real question for me is whether the overhead =
is too
>>> painful, and I don't really have data on that.  If you do, I'd be =
interested
>>> in hearing about it.
>>=20
>> I think DNS-in-DTLS is probably fine if we don't think that the issue =
of firewalls that block everything other than 80 and 443 are a problem. =
I still consider that a problem; maybe I stay in different hotels than =
you do.
>>=20
>> (Before anyone says "DNS-in-DTLS on port 443", please remember that =
there is zero chance of getting this on standards track, and it is =
important to have whatever we produce as a standard.)
>>=20
>> --Paul Hoffman, Director
>> --VPN Consortium
>> _______________________________________________
>> dnsext mailing list
>> dnsext@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext


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There is a huge difference between having random DNS servers rewrite
DNS responses for their own commercial interests and choosing a DNS
resolver with a declared policy.

I have no intention of opening up my systems to route DNS names
controlled by Russian gangsters.

An RFC written 14 years ago by people who were rather naive as to the
real issues of Internet crime does not persuade me.


On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 5:47 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 8 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> End-to-End DNSSEC is not a viable model for most enterprises
>> and it is not actually a desirable model for home use.
>
> For argumentation against untamperable security features being
> undesriable, please see RFC 1984.
>
> Rewriting DNS packets is not a viable model for most enterprises, and
> it is a continued battleground for people by many commercial entities
> to grab the attention span of the home user (you might be familiar with
> Verisign's attempt in the past, or perhaps with Rogers current policy).
>
> DNSSEC is the solution in general. VPN with corporate DNS servers
> is the enterprise solution (L2TP/IPSEC or IPsec/XAUTH or any of the
> openvpn/sslvpn variations that can assign DNS servers)
>
>> I would like to have a mechanism that allows me to have one UDP
>> request packet followed by a reasonable number of responses.
>
> Or one response with more Additional Answers in a larger UDP packet? Also,
> running a local validating caching resolver greatly reduces lookups
> required, especially for typical users going to the same subset of domains.
>
> I've actually have a very good successrate using ns.xelerance.net (public
> dnssec enabled resolver) with a local resolver on my laptop while
> travelling.
>
> Capturing the IP stream seems to become more popular then capturing the DNS
> answers.
>
> Paul
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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That sounds like a good plan. In particular I would like some firmer
data on the following issues:


1) Size of packet allowed
     Is restriction to 500 bytes an issue?

2) Fragmentation
     Will middleboxes fragment large packets or just drop them?

3) Intermediation.
     Is interception of traffic on the DNS UDP/TCP ports an issue?

There are most definitely middleboxes that cause real issues due to
cretinous implementation. The question is how common they are.

[In the main however, my personal experience has been that the
majority are so shoddily built that they don't last very long. I have
a large box of Linksys, Netgear, Belkin etc. WiFi routers that all
stopped working reliably within about a year. So maybe there is some
hope attrition will fix some of this.]


In general though, anyone who is worried by the possibility of
interception needs to have a plan to get round carrier level DNS
redirects.




On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 5:59 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> wrote:
> Speaking as chair, but without having consulted Olafur:
>
> On Wed, Dec 08, 2010 at 05:47:10PM -0500, Paul Wouters wrote:
>>
>> I've actually have a very good successrate using ns.xelerance.net (publi=
c
>> dnssec enabled resolver) with a local resolver on my laptop while travel=
ling.
>>
>> Capturing the IP stream seems to become more popular then capturing the =
DNS
>> answers.
>
> I've been working on some more comprehensive remarks about various
> topics in this thread; dayjob and snowstorms keep interrupting, so my
> apologies. =A0But the above makes me think that some serious empirical
> data would be very helpful in determining whether the "interfering
> middleboxes" are a real issue, and whether anything we do for the DNS
> is likely to help. =A0The only real evidence I've seen on this to date
> suggests that interfering middleboxes are in fact a problem, and one
> that I think we have reason to take seriously. =A0But I'm open to
> arguments.
>
> A
>
> --
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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On Wed, 8 Dec 2010, Andrew Sullivan wrote:

> Speaking as chair, but without having consulted Olafur:
>
> I've been working on some more comprehensive remarks about various
> topics in this thread; dayjob and snowstorms keep interrupting, so my
> apologies.  But the above makes me think that some serious empirical
> data would be very helpful in determining whether the "interfering
> middleboxes" are a real issue, and whether anything we do for the DNS
> is likely to help.  The only real evidence I've seen on this to date
> suggests that interfering middleboxes are in fact a problem, and one
> that I think we have reason to take seriously.  But I'm open to
> arguments.

It would be ideal if we could get the RIPE Atlas probes that are deployed
to do an inventory to see about the scale of this problem.

http://atlas.ripe.net/

Paul

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On Wed, 8 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> There is a huge difference between having random DNS servers rewrite
> DNS responses for their own commercial interests and choosing a DNS
> resolver with a declared policy.
>
> I have no intention of opening up my systems to route DNS names
> controlled by Russian gangsters.

Your desire for your own custom local policy is duly noted.

>>> End-to-End DNSSEC is not a viable model for most enterprises
>>> and it is not actually a desirable model for home use.

But please stop arguing DNSSEC is not a valid local policy to choose for
others - especially speaking for "the world at large"

You can't have the cake and eat it too.

Paul

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Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 19:12:51 -0500
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
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Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] DTLS for the last hop
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I think we can fix this in the general with a meta-query, but only
after we have cleaned up Extended Service Discovery in general.


In this case, it is not relevant as the general idea is going to be
that the client establishes a long term relationship with a resolution
service that is then used exclusively until reset.

So we are talking about a couple of extra DNS round trips per O/S
reset or application install. I am not going to get at all worried by
that.


On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 6:03 PM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>
> On Dec 8, 2010, at 3:13 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> Use SRV records for discovery and you can have as many ports as you like=
.
>
> <soapbox>
>
> Yes, but SRV records also lead to multiple DNS round trips, which can lea=
d to user unhappiness....
>
> </soapbox>
>
> In this particular applications that probably not an issue, but I saw a s=
oapbox and stood on it....
>
> W
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 1:57 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wro=
te:
>>> At 10:35 AM -0800 12/8/10, Ted Hardie wrote:
>>>> My own take, personally, is that DTLS is actually a reasonable candida=
te
>>>> for this. =A0It has simple return routability checks that make DDoS a =
bit
>>>> harder, it ties pretty well into TLS models that most people understan=
d,
>>>> and the chances are that the code will already be available to many OS=
es
>>>> for other reasons. =A0The real question for me is whether the overhead=
 is too
>>>> painful, and I don't really have data on that. =A0If you do, I'd be in=
terested
>>>> in hearing about it.
>>>
>>> I think DNS-in-DTLS is probably fine if we don't think that the issue o=
f firewalls that block everything other than 80 and 443 are a problem. I st=
ill consider that a problem; maybe I stay in different hotels than you do.
>>>
>>> (Before anyone says "DNS-in-DTLS on port 443", please remember that the=
re is zero chance of getting this on standards track, and it is important t=
o have whatever we produce as a standard.)
>>>
>>> --Paul Hoffman, Director
>>> --VPN Consortium
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> dnsext mailing list
>>> dnsext@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>> _______________________________________________
>> dnsext mailing list
>> dnsext@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
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When you have 30 million users opted into your policy it is a bit more
than a 'local policy'.

If you stop asserting that support for local DNS policy that overrides
the default is not a valid requirement then I won't have to keep
giving use cases that prove that you are wrong.

People want an Internet that is safe. Please stop trying to impose
your personal political ideology on this technology.


On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 7:11 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 8 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>> There is a huge difference between having random DNS servers rewrite
>> DNS responses for their own commercial interests and choosing a DNS
>> resolver with a declared policy.
>>
>> I have no intention of opening up my systems to route DNS names
>> controlled by Russian gangsters.
>
> Your desire for your own custom local policy is duly noted.
>
>>>> End-to-End DNSSEC is not a viable model for most enterprises
>>>> and it is not actually a desirable model for home use.
>
> But please stop arguing DNSSEC is not a valid local policy to choose for
> others - especially speaking for "the world at large"
>
> You can't have the cake and eat it too.
>
> Paul
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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From: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 20:22:14 -0500
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, "dnsext@ietf.org" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dnsext] DTLS for the last hop
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Warren Kumari
------
Please excuse typing, etc -- This was sent from a device with a tiny keyboar=
d.

On Dec 8, 2010, at 7:12 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:

> I think we can fix this in the general with a meta-query, but only
> after we have cleaned up Extended Service Discovery in general.
>=20
>=20
> In this case, it is not relevant as the general idea is going to be
> that the client establishes a long term relationship with a resolution
> service that is then used exclusively until reset.
>=20
> So we are talking about a couple of extra DNS round trips per O/S
> reset or application install. I am not going to get at all worried by
> that.
>=20

Yes, fully agree that for this (and similar applications) the extra RTT is i=
nsignificant,  'twas more of a general statement, and I (apparently unsucces=
sfully) tried to mark it as such...

W


>=20
> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 6:03 PM, Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net> wrote:
>>=20
>> On Dec 8, 2010, at 3:13 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>=20
>>> Use SRV records for discovery and you can have as many ports as you like=
.
>>=20
>> <soapbox>
>>=20
>> Yes, but SRV records also lead to multiple DNS round trips, which can lea=
d to user unhappiness....
>>=20
>> </soapbox>
>>=20
>> In this particular applications that probably not an issue, but I saw a s=
oapbox and stood on it....
>>=20
>> W
>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 1:57 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wro=
te:
>>>> At 10:35 AM -0800 12/8/10, Ted Hardie wrote:
>>>>> My own take, personally, is that DTLS is actually a reasonable candida=
te
>>>>> for this.  It has simple return routability checks that make DDoS a bi=
t
>>>>> harder, it ties pretty well into TLS models that most people understan=
d,
>>>>> and the chances are that the code will already be available to many OS=
es
>>>>> for other reasons.  The real question for me is whether the overhead i=
s too
>>>>> painful, and I don't really have data on that.  If you do, I'd be inte=
rested
>>>>> in hearing about it.
>>>>=20
>>>> I think DNS-in-DTLS is probably fine if we don't think that the issue o=
f firewalls that block everything other than 80 and 443 are a problem. I sti=
ll consider that a problem; maybe I stay in different hotels than you do.
>>>>=20
>>>> (Before anyone says "DNS-in-DTLS on port 443", please remember that the=
re is zero chance of getting this on standards track, and it is important to=
 have whatever we produce as a standard.)
>>>>=20
>>>> --Paul Hoffman, Director
>>>> --VPN Consortium
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> dnsext mailing list
>>>> dnsext@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> --
>>> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> dnsext mailing list
>>> dnsext@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>>=20
>>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> --=20
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 21:47:43 -0400
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From: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
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Hi, Phillip,

In the interests of clarity, can I get a yea or nay, on a paraphrasing
of the policy you want to implement?

Is it the case, that you want to do all of these:
(a) have a resolver that speaks DNSSEC, to authority servers
(b) substitutes or deletes some subset according to some kind of
policy mechanism, or manual intervention
(c) serves up the results to a client base, without having to re-sign
the results?

Is this the objective you're trying to achieve?

I think that there may be ways to accomplish the above, while still
using DNSSEC, albeit in a kludgey, non-traditional way.

The important question is:
Is having clients install some trust anchor acceptable, e.g. provided
along with a stub resolver package?

Observe - DNSSEC guarantees the ability to validate results, but
doesn't necessarily guarantee receiving any results at all, since it
cannot.
Or, if two "valid" (but conflicting!) alternative results might be
received, if it gets one or the other, cannot differentiate them per
se.

By having both a "real" trust anchor (the anchor for the signed root
zone), *and* a private trust anchor which pretends to authoritatively
deny everything (root down),
you can selectively present authoritative data for "real" domains, or
"private" (fake) NXDOMAIN-everything results which are signed by the
private trust anchor.
(Think of TLD zones, containing just the apex and a single wildcard
'*' entry, signed and whose root DS entries are signed with the
private trust anchor.)

(To paraphrase the MythBusters, "I reject your reality, and substitute my own.")

It's a nasty, ugly hack, but uses DNSSEC, and thus doesn't require
non-DNSSEC extra stuff to work. It secures everything to the last
mile, too.

Would it work? (I think so.)

Is it an acceptable hack?

(That's a non-rhetorical question, BTW.)

Brian

On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 8:51 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
> When you have 30 million users opted into your policy it is a bit more
> than a 'local policy'.
>
> If you stop asserting that support for local DNS policy that overrides
> the default is not a valid requirement then I won't have to keep
> giving use cases that prove that you are wrong.
>
> People want an Internet that is safe. Please stop trying to impose
> your personal political ideology on this technology.
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 7:11 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, 8 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>
>>> There is a huge difference between having random DNS servers rewrite
>>> DNS responses for their own commercial interests and choosing a DNS
>>> resolver with a declared policy.
>>>
>>> I have no intention of opening up my systems to route DNS names
>>> controlled by Russian gangsters.
>>
>> Your desire for your own custom local policy is duly noted.
>>
>>>>> End-to-End DNSSEC is not a viable model for most enterprises
>>>>> and it is not actually a desirable model for home use.
>>
>> But please stop arguing DNSSEC is not a valid local policy to choose for
>> others - especially speaking for "the world at large"
>>
>> You can't have the cake and eat it too.
>>
>> Paul
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>

From hallam@gmail.com  Wed Dec  8 18:14:16 2010
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References: <p0624081fc921d18d948c@10.20.30.151> <E3D42F0F-EEB2-46C3-B438-66C5CE7A22F5@nzrs.net.nz> <20101207221345.GT29384@shinkuro.com> <37649.1291762988@nsa.vix.com> <20101208084003.GB13678@nic.fr> <AANLkTi=V05Vnb8fn=9NTMLx_X4PvRAKX2fxtgVP60SXu@mail.gmail.com> <AANLkTi=pcbOyh9F3yxoLH14VX3iNdSmC3WOW=bHxov8V@mail.gmail.com> <AANLkTi=hr_Eqo-y5wfbRHG0MQ6eZvdfYvk60wowyRucS@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LFD.1.10.1012081735420.11536@newtla.xelerance.com> <AANLkTik4CKnv9dsf+VO782eS81VhyLjFvDDKVPTmMvWb@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LFD.1.10.1012081906290.11536@newtla.xelerance.com> <AANLkTimEQdA2EZkNo1b25W=-jJZEVQC3k3eZnJmHym-8@mail.gmail.com> <AANLkTi=2+M_UAzNLJyVTwAPaU_B+nzSr4yt2AnNZ78Ln@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Dec 2010 21:15:42 -0500
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] New proposal for securing the last hop (and other hops)
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Yes it is possible to do trust management at the endpoints.

But even in the PKIX stack that is expressly designed to support that
model and no other the complexity of doing so is kludgy beyond
comprehension. As in the US government has managed to spend heroic
quantities of cash trying to make that model work.

Writing the protocol is one thing, getting the policy data out to the
endpoints is quite another.

Now this can be made to work if enough consulting dollars are thrown
at it. Which is for some people not merely a feature, it is their
principal design objective. But it is really hard to get to work
right.

And if you don't get it right you have to get into the game of
patching code at your endpoints.

It turns into a hack even if you plan the system as a PKI from day one.


If you do not require non-repudiation then a key-centric approach such
as XKMS is better in my view.

There are a lot of devices that I would want to have hooked up to a
secure DNS that are not going to be able to process public key crypto.


The other reason to do DNSSEC processing at the resolver and rely on
those results is that the resolver is much better placed to collect
the context data that makes it possible to decide what the next step
should be.

At the moment nobody can tell me how applications should do in
response to DNSSEC authentication failures. Do they refuse to go to
the site? Do they go there anyway? At this point we do not consider
warning boxes to be acceptable, if the machine has no idea what to do
then why expect the user to have a clue?

Every time a stupid popup appears on her screen, my wife calls me on
the telephone to ask what to do. She has a degree in rocket science
from MIT plus an MIT PhD. We are not putting any more popup boxes in
the browser.


A DNSSEC aware resolver can store state and that can allow it to make
a better decision. If a DNS server is no longer correctly signed but
none of the records have changed it is probably still safe to go
there. If on the other hand the zone is not signed and everything has
changed and it is a known phishing target then it is probably safe to
conclude that there has been some form of attack.

I do not know any way that I can make the same quality of decision
based on the information that is plausibly available at the endpoint.


so an important additional objective here is

(d) works out what is the best response given the data available and
advise the client accordingly.


This is anti-virus for your DNS and that is how it is sold. Or would
be if we charged for it (the basic AV is free but there is a paid
phone support option for all your PC related problems.)


On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 8:47 PM, Brian Dickson
<brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi, Phillip,
>
> In the interests of clarity, can I get a yea or nay, on a paraphrasing
> of the policy you want to implement?
>
> Is it the case, that you want to do all of these:
> (a) have a resolver that speaks DNSSEC, to authority servers
> (b) substitutes or deletes some subset according to some kind of
> policy mechanism, or manual intervention
> (c) serves up the results to a client base, without having to re-sign
> the results?
>
> Is this the objective you're trying to achieve?
>
> I think that there may be ways to accomplish the above, while still
> using DNSSEC, albeit in a kludgey, non-traditional way.
>
> The important question is:
> Is having clients install some trust anchor acceptable, e.g. provided
> along with a stub resolver package?
>
> Observe - DNSSEC guarantees the ability to validate results, but
> doesn't necessarily guarantee receiving any results at all, since it
> cannot.
> Or, if two "valid" (but conflicting!) alternative results might be
> received, if it gets one or the other, cannot differentiate them per
> se.
>
> By having both a "real" trust anchor (the anchor for the signed root
> zone), *and* a private trust anchor which pretends to authoritatively
> deny everything (root down),
> you can selectively present authoritative data for "real" domains, or
> "private" (fake) NXDOMAIN-everything results which are signed by the
> private trust anchor.
> (Think of TLD zones, containing just the apex and a single wildcard
> '*' entry, signed and whose root DS entries are signed with the
> private trust anchor.)
>
> (To paraphrase the MythBusters, "I reject your reality, and substitute my own.")
>
> It's a nasty, ugly hack, but uses DNSSEC, and thus doesn't require
> non-DNSSEC extra stuff to work. It secures everything to the last
> mile, too.
>
> Would it work? (I think so.)
>
> Is it an acceptable hack?
>
> (That's a non-rhetorical question, BTW.)
>
> Brian
>
> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 8:51 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>> When you have 30 million users opted into your policy it is a bit more
>> than a 'local policy'.
>>
>> If you stop asserting that support for local DNS policy that overrides
>> the default is not a valid requirement then I won't have to keep
>> giving use cases that prove that you are wrong.
>>
>> People want an Internet that is safe. Please stop trying to impose
>> your personal political ideology on this technology.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 7:11 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@xelerance.com> wrote:
>>> On Wed, 8 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>>
>>>> There is a huge difference between having random DNS servers rewrite
>>>> DNS responses for their own commercial interests and choosing a DNS
>>>> resolver with a declared policy.
>>>>
>>>> I have no intention of opening up my systems to route DNS names
>>>> controlled by Russian gangsters.
>>>
>>> Your desire for your own custom local policy is duly noted.
>>>
>>>>>> End-to-End DNSSEC is not a viable model for most enterprises
>>>>>> and it is not actually a desirable model for home use.
>>>
>>> But please stop arguing DNSSEC is not a valid local policy to choose for
>>> others - especially speaking for "the world at large"
>>>
>>> You can't have the cake and eat it too.
>>>
>>> Paul
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>> _______________________________________________
>> dnsext mailing list
>> dnsext@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>>
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

From bernhard@net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de  Wed Dec  8 08:39:13 2010
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From: Bernhard Ager <bernhard+dnsext@net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de>
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Subject: [dnsext] DNS in the Wild: Your Help is needed
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Dear IETF DNS Extensions working group members,


Today, the end-user experience and the performance of more and more
applications depend not only on the responsiveness of DNS, but also
the exact answer returned by the queried DNS resolver, e.g., for
Content Distribution Networks (CDN) and mirror selection. In this
context extensions to the DNS protocol have been suggested, e.g.,
draft-vandergaast-edns-client-ip or the upcoming client-subnet draft.

We aim to understand how DNS works in the wild, i.e., as experienced
by end users. First results of our research have been recently
published at ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) in
Melbourne, Australia:

http://www.net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de/papers/AMSU-CDRW-10.pdf

To better understand DNS and its performance, we would like to scale
up the experiments and for this we are seeking your help. If you are
willing to participate in this effort, please go to the following
link:

http://www.fg-inet.de

Download the script that can be found in the download section of the
website, and run it from an Internet connection provided by a
commercial ISP, e.g., at home.

The typical duration of the experiment is around six hours. All major
operating systems are supported (Linux, Mac OS, Windows etc.). Once
the experiment is done, please upload the traces on our website:

http://www.fg-inet.de/upload.php

Our script performs DNS queries for a number of predefined hosts. This
list is included in plain text in the download packages. The traces
collected with our program do not interact with any of your browsing
or download history or activity. The additional bandwidth consumption
and CPU load due to the experiment are negligible. The traces
collected on this website will be kept confidential within the project
and will not be distributed to any third party, nor shared with any
third party. You also have the option to make them accessible to the
research community if you wish so.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you face any problems in
downloading or running the program.


Thank you for your participation,

Bernhard Ager, Wolfgang Muehlbauer, Georgios Smaragdakis, Steve Uhlig.
email: dnstraces@net.t-labs.tu-berlin.de

--=20
Technische Universit=E4t Berlin
An-Institut Deutsche Telekom Laboratories
FG INET, Research Group Anja Feldmann
Sekr. TEL 4
Ernst-Reuter-Platz 7
D-10587 Berlin


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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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Hi,

I would say you need to check the algorithms signaled in the DS RRset
(the already (in)famous section 2.2 from RFC 4035 implicitly says so).

Now whether the validator SHOULD or MUST check that the algorithms
signalled in the DS-set work: If the working group decides this should
be a SHOULD, validating resolvers will have a choice to fallback to "One
Signature Is Enough". In practice, this would probably be a
configuration knob algorithm-compromise-protection: "yes" or "no".

Although this is local policy, I also think it is bad policy for a
validator to allow algorithm compromises and badly signed zones. Thus, I
would go for a MUST here.

Best regards,

Matthijs






On 11/30/2010 11:43 AM, W.C.A. Wijngaards wrote:
> Hi workgroup,
> 
> The unbound implementation is the way it has been written, and I agree
> that changes have to be made to it.  Now, what is the right way?
> 
> On 11/22/2010 06:33 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:
>>> Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2010 07:58:53 -0500
>>> From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
>>> ...
>>> DNSSEC is designed to protect against cache poisoning.  If there is a chain
>>> of trust to an RRSet, then the set validates, it has proven source
>>> authenticity and data integrity.
>>>
>>> Since time began (for DNS), there is always something wrong somewhere.  The
>>> goal is a robust system, not a tightly correct system.
> 
>> +1.
> 
> It would be good to have some text in bis-updates on this.  (I mean on
> the algorithm topic, the general leniency has been put forward by Alfred
> and others and I wholeheartedly agree with it :-) ).
> 
> It is clear that checking the set of algorithms present in the DNSKEY
> set is not a good idea, and checking the set of algorithms from the DS
> set is the right, more lenient way to go.  (so this is what Mark was
> proposing).  This is what validators use to determine if they can
> support the algorithms present in the zone today (and tomorrow).
> 
> However, there are choices that I see here, that change the security
> properties.
> 
> 
> * One Signature Is Enough
> 
> Check one signature, if it works, it's enough, and the added text is
> 'regardless of the algorithms signalled in the DS-set'.
> + it is lenient.
>   (it would have avoided the operational problems that incited this).
> + if a zone is badly signed, so it includes algorithms in the DS set for
> which proper signatures are not available, the validators that support
> both algorithms approve of this situation.
> - no algorithm-protection (explanation below).
> 
> 
> * Check the Algorithms
> 
> For the algorithms signalled in the DS set, check that there is a valid
> chain of trust for them.  Added text is, the validator SHOULD or MUST
> check (choice here) that the algorithms signalled in the DS-set work
> (but only for algorithms supported by the validator, of course).
> 
> + it is lenient because uses DS-set not DNSKEY-set.
>   (this allows the easier algo rollovers; it would have avoided the
> operational problems that incited this).
> - but not as lenient as 'one signature', this is the case of zones that
> are badly signed but have signalled the algorithm with their DS, so that
> a portion of validators are certain to fail for it.  Validators that
> support the other algo now also fail for it.
> + algorithm protection (explanation below).
>   + if SHOULD, local-policy decides what protection to apply.
> 
> 
> Algorithm compromise protection.
> This is a security property that the validation result can have or not.
>  Security algorithms have different properties, and by checking them you
> receive joined benefits.  Specifically, if one algorithm is 'broken'
> (but you do not yet know which one that will be), then you are protected
> against this because you check the other algorithm.
> 
> For zones that perform a single-DS rollover, this never applies, as the
> single DS makes validators check one algorithm anyway (since this
> minimizes communication with the parent, many zones can be envisioned to
> do this).  Other zones may have multiple DSes (or DLVs) and thus can
> have multiple crypto algorithms checked, at their option (and the
> validator local policy).
> 
> 
> I would like to know what the (seems rough) consensus is, so that I can
> go forward and implement this right.  It is then a good idea that Sam
> puts conclusions in the dnssec-bis-updates draft.
> 
> Best regards,
>    Wouter
_______________________________________________
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dnsext@ietf.org
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From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
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On 9 Dec 2010, at 00:12, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
> In this case, it is not relevant as the general idea is going to be
> that the client establishes a long term relationship with a resolution
> service that is then used exclusively until reset.

That's not how it works. Most devices are mobile and change their connection=
 frequently. Your resolved changes when your connection changes - you want t=
he resolved to be close to your point of connection.

Also I like the idea of doing a SRV lookup to configure your resolver when y=
ou can't yet do DNS lookups because your resolver isn't configured.

Tony.
--
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/=

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On Thu, 9 Dec 2010, Tony Finch wrote:
>
> That's not how it works. Most devices are mobile and change their
> connection frequently. Your resolved changes when your connection
> changes - you want the resolved to be close to your point of connection.

Sorry, "resolver" not "resolved". Damn you, autocorrect!

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7,
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.

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On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 5:19 AM, Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> wrote:
> On 9 Dec 2010, at 00:12, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> In this case, it is not relevant as the general idea is going to be
>> that the client establishes a long term relationship with a resolution
>> service that is then used exclusively until reset.
>
> That's not how it works. Most devices are mobile and change their connection frequently. Your resolved changes when your connection changes - you want the resolved to be close to your point of connection.

The server can change frequently without having to change the
resolution service.

Anycast is frequently used to allow this. We may well develop other
schemes in due course. That is why I see service discovery to be a
useful component in a general solution.


> Also I like the idea of doing a SRV lookup to configure your resolver when you can't yet do DNS lookups because your resolver isn't configured.

You can use the locally advertised DNS as bootstrap. Thats not
difficult to work out how to do. I had thought that was obvious.

Thats why I have a fingerprint mechanism for verifying the service in
the -01: To allow the bootstrap connection to be authenticated out of
band.


When it is first configured, the client pulls service from either the
local net via DHCP or via a trustworthy resolution service defined by
the manufacturer. If the device is capable of supporting the choice,
this can be left to O/S install.

An authorized administrator can override the original setting. Either
to use local DNS or to use a different resolver that is identified by
domain name.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Thu Dec  9 05:43:04 2010
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Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 08:44:20 -0500
To: Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@NLnetLabs.nl>
From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
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At 10:59 +0100 12/9/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:

>Although this is local policy, I also think it is bad policy for a
>validator to allow algorithm compromises and badly signed zones. Thus, I
>would go for a MUST here.

The reason it can't be a MUST is that a zone may be signed with 
algorithm 42.  If a resolver does not know algorithm 42, how can it 
determine whether the signature using algorithm 42 is valid or 
invalid?

Let's say a zone is signed by algorithms 5 and 7.  (A choice made 
specifically because the two algorithms have the same mathematical 
properties. ;))  What would you think if you received a set of data 
and signatures and discovered that the algorithm 5 signature 
validated the signature but the algorithm 7 signature did not.  What 
if the reason were cryptographic?  What if the reason was that the 
algorithm 7 signature had simply expired (with or without NTP 
running)?  What if the reason was that the algorithm 7 signature had 
not yet entered its effectivity period?

If you can establish a chain of trust to a data set, why withhold it 
from the application requesting it in case you find that there is 
also a signature that fails?

Assume a set of data has a legitimate signature in algorithm 5 that 
validates and you see an algorithm 7 signature that does not 
validate?  What if the cause of this was that an attacker wanted to 
perform a Denial of Service by applying an intentionally bad 
signature (which is trivial to do) to guarantee a failed chain of 
trust?  It's like allowing someone to say "don't trust the 
authorities, I'll insert some doubt so you won't use the information."

When you consider that it is far easier to insert harmful bad 
signatures than harmful bad data (because the latter requires a valid 
signature), you have to build the (or any security) protocol to be 
somewhat skeptical of it's own potentially-false positives.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?

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References: <20101123220822.11227.qmail@joyce.lan> <a06240802c912fe08d3b2@10.31.200.110> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241301070.66677@joyce.lan> <Prayer.1.3.3.1011241937320.12202@hermes-2.csi.cam.ac.uk> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 08:45:19 -0500
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Stephan Lagerholm <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com>
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 8:26 PM, Stephan Lagerholm
<stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com> wrote:
> Given that:
>
> 1. A wildcard/DNAME solution for rDNS violates RFC 1912.

Where is that stated in RFC 1912? I see no mention of rDNS in the
wildcard section.

Moreover it is an informational document written 14 years ago and
probably did not fully consider the operational requirements of DNS
for IPv6.


-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 09:04:05 -0500
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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There are two considerations here:

1) Ensure that a service is available as long as there is an
acceptably secure path
2) Enable reliance of weak algorithms to be discontinued before the
algorithm is broken

It is very easy to meet the first at the expense of the second. And
when the real life operational requirements are concerned, we have
problems with TLS in this respect as well.


The ability of a relying party to process an algorithm does not mean
that the relying party trusts it as secure.

In particular an RP may process an algorithm it does not accept as
secure. This is necessary since by default there is no authentication
on DNS at all


One concern here is that we do not want to force zones to discontinue
signing with an obsolete algorithm prematurely because that is going
to weaken the security of their site.


In the normal course of action, an RP that sees a site advertise 2
algorithms, only one of which is trusted, will only process the
trusted one and simply ignore the other, even if the trusted algorithm
fails.

But the same RP that visits a site that advertises only the untrusted
algorithm should probably process the chain and check for consistency
in any case since the alternative is to accept the data without any
checks at all.

If an RP sees a site advertise two algs and both are trusted, the RP
should probably choose one and accept the records if it succeeds.
Otherwise it should make a second attempt but the site cannot rely on
that.


On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 8:44 AM, Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz> wrote:
> At 10:59 +0100 12/9/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
>
>> Although this is local policy, I also think it is bad policy for a
>> validator to allow algorithm compromises and badly signed zones. Thus, I
>> would go for a MUST here.
>
> The reason it can't be a MUST is that a zone may be signed with algorithm
> 42. =A0If a resolver does not know algorithm 42, how can it determine whe=
ther
> the signature using algorithm 42 is valid or invalid?
>
> Let's say a zone is signed by algorithms 5 and 7. =A0(A choice made
> specifically because the two algorithms have the same mathematical
> properties. ;)) =A0What would you think if you received a set of data and
> signatures and discovered that the algorithm 5 signature validated the
> signature but the algorithm 7 signature did not. =A0What if the reason we=
re
> cryptographic? =A0What if the reason was that the algorithm 7 signature h=
ad
> simply expired (with or without NTP running)? =A0What if the reason was t=
hat
> the algorithm 7 signature had not yet entered its effectivity period?
>
> If you can establish a chain of trust to a data set, why withhold it from
> the application requesting it in case you find that there is also a
> signature that fails?
>
> Assume a set of data has a legitimate signature in algorithm 5 that
> validates and you see an algorithm 7 signature that does not validate? =
=A0What
> if the cause of this was that an attacker wanted to perform a Denial of
> Service by applying an intentionally bad signature (which is trivial to d=
o)
> to guarantee a failed chain of trust? =A0It's like allowing someone to sa=
y
> "don't trust the authorities, I'll insert some doubt so you won't use the
> information."
>
> When you consider that it is far easier to insert harmful bad signatures
> than harmful bad data (because the latter requires a valid signature), yo=
u
> have to build the (or any security) protocol to be somewhat skeptical of
> it's own potentially-false positives.
>
> --
> -=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=
=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D-=3D=
-
> Edward Lewis
> NeuStar =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0You can leave a voice mess=
age at +1-571-434-5468
>
> Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
> you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazo=
n?
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] DTLS for the last hop
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On Thu, 9 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
> The server can change frequently without having to change the
> resolution service.

I am talking about devices that are mobile between multiple networks
managed by different providers. This is normal since one prefers not to
use 3G cellular connectivity if there's a local WiFi network one can use
instead.

> You can use the locally advertised DNS as bootstrap. Thats not
> difficult to work out how to do. I had thought that was obvious.

You seem to be talking about 3rd party DNS resolvers, whereas I thought
the topic was securing the connection between the device and the local
network's resolver. The local resolver still needs to be secured in order
to bootstrap a third party resolver in the way you suggest.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7,
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Thu Dec  9 06:54:21 2010
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From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in	DNS caches
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On Thu, Dec 09, 2010 at 08:45:19AM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 8:26 PM, Stephan Lagerholm
> <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com> wrote:
> > Given that:
> >
> > 1. A wildcard/DNAME solution for rDNS violates RFC 1912.
> 
> Where is that stated in RFC 1912? I see no mention of rDNS in the
> wildcard section.

I expect the part being referred to is this:

   Make sure your PTR and A records match.  For every IP address, there
   should be a matching PTR record in the in-addr.arpa domain.  If a
   host is multi-homed, (more than one IP address) make sure that all IP
   addresses have a corresponding PTR record (not just the first one).
   Failure to have matching PTR and A records can cause loss of Internet
   services similar to not being registered in the DNS at all.  Also,
   PTR records must point back to a valid A record, not a alias defined
   by a CNAME.

which is in section 2.1 (and which also, I note, is about in-addr.arpa
and not the reverse tree).

But I ask once again that we not continue this discussion on DNSEXT.
There is nothing at all in this discussion, as near as I can tell,
that is an issue of the DNS protocol as such.  This is all operations,
and therefore it doesn't belong on this list.

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl  Thu Dec  9 07:18:07 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Hi Ed,

On 12/09/2010 02:44 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> At 10:59 +0100 12/9/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
> 
>> Although this is local policy, I also think it is bad policy for a
>> validator to allow algorithm compromises and badly signed zones. Thus, I
>> would go for a MUST here.
> 
> The reason it can't be a MUST is that a zone may be signed with
> algorithm 42.  If a resolver does not know algorithm 42, how can it
> determine whether the signature using algorithm 42 is valid or invalid?

Of course, the statement is still only valid for algorithms that the
resolver knows of. So it can still be a MUST.

> Let's say a zone is signed by algorithms 5 and 7.  (A choice made
> specifically because the two algorithms have the same mathematical
> properties. ;))  What would you think if you received a set of data and
> signatures and discovered that the algorithm 5 signature validated the
> signature but the algorithm 7 signature did not.  What if the reason
> were cryptographic?  What if the reason was that the algorithm 7
> signature had simply expired (with or without NTP running)?  What if the
> reason was that the algorithm 7 signature had not yet entered its
> effectivity period?

When following the guidelines for "Check the Algorithms" with MUST, if
both algorithms are present in the DS RRset, and the algorithm 7
signature did not validate, the security status would be set to bogus.
The reason why the signature failed does not matter.

> If you can establish a chain of trust to a data set, why withhold it
> from the application requesting it in case you find that there is also a
> signature that fails?

Because the zone operator specifically wants to be protected against
algorithm compromises and does that by listing more than one algorithm
in the DS RRset.

> Assume a set of data has a legitimate signature in algorithm 5 that
> validates and you see an algorithm 7 signature that does not validate? 
> What if the cause of this was that an attacker wanted to perform a
> Denial of Service by applying an intentionally bad signature (which is
> trivial to do) to guarantee a failed chain of trust?  It's like allowing
> someone to say "don't trust the authorities, I'll insert some doubt so
> you won't use the information."

A Denial of Service is always easy. Stripping the signature is just as
easy to perform a DoS attack.


Best regards,

Matthijs


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From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Thu Dec  9 07:48:22 2010
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At 16:19 +0100 12/9/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:

>Because the zone operator specifically wants to be protected against
>algorithm compromises and does that by listing more than one algorithm
>in the DS RRset.

DNSSEC is not designed to protect the zone operator, it is designed 
to protect the relying party.  Listing more than one algorithm is 
done to reach a wider audience, it does not enhance the security as 
far as the zone operator is concerned.

In the experimentation period before the first RFCs were produced 
(RFC 2052 being the first milestone) we played with the notion of key 
strengths.  (Keys, not algorithms because back then we only had the 
unencumbered DSA and the copyrighted RSA available.)  Trying to 
enhance the concept of DNSSEC by using the notion that one algorithm 
is better or one key is better than another failed time and time 
again.  When there's a weak link involved you can't overcome it.

What if your zone is signed with algorithm 42?  You might be more 
strongly signed than anyone else.  But what if you are delegated from 
a parent using RSA/MD5?  Your strengths are negated and if algorithm 
42 is not widely deployed you are even seen as unsigned to the masses.

So, so what if I say DNSSEC is not there to protect the zone 
operator.  Why does that mean that MUST is wrong?  The rationale is 
that no matter what you do, local policy is going to be followed. 
Local policy is going to prefer quick resolution of the query. 
Requiring DNSSEC to do extra or extraneous work is not constructive - 
by that I mean, once you've gotten a chain of trust why keep trying 
to find faults?  DNSSEC is not designed to be the last line of 
defense.

DNSSEC is never going to overcome weaknesses in the underlying 
cryptography.  Trying to do so is a futile quest and the relying 
party suffers.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?

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In my model the local resolver goes away except for possible one-time
use in configuration and/or for wifi config.

A DNS resolver is a trusted service regardless of whether DNSSEC is
deployed. The model of picking up the DNS resolver via DHCP was
adopted in the era when a major consideration on the design of a
machine was if it would fit into a freight elevator. It is bogus.

It is a model that is entirely inappropriate to modern computer use.

At one time my machine would take notice of the domain prefix
advertised in DHCP as well. I am just saying, ignore the DNS server
except to the extent that it may be necessary to do so in order allow
the DNS to be hijacked if necessary to get a connection.


If I am sitting in Panera, my machine would try to connect to my
chosen DNS resolver. If bocked it would then sense that it is on a
WiFi connection and allow limited use of HTTP/HTML to accept the
connection terms.

I would use the same DNS resolution service whether connecting over
3G, Edge, WiFi or avian carriers. I might use a different server but I
would use the same service.


On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 9:10 AM, Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> wrote:
> On Thu, 9 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>
>> The server can change frequently without having to change the
>> resolution service.
>
> I am talking about devices that are mobile between multiple networks
> managed by different providers. This is normal since one prefers not to
> use 3G cellular connectivity if there's a local WiFi network one can use
> instead.
>
>> You can use the locally advertised DNS as bootstrap. Thats not
>> difficult to work out how to do. I had thought that was obvious.
>
> You seem to be talking about 3rd party DNS resolvers, whereas I thought
> the topic was securing the connection between the device and the local
> network's resolver. The local resolver still needs to be secured in order
> to bootstrap a third party resolver in the way you suggest.
>
> Tony.
> --
> f.anthony.n.finch =A0<dot@dotat.at> =A0http://dotat.at/
> HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO=
 7,
> DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
> ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.
>



--=20
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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On Thu, 9 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> In my model the local resolver goes away except for possible one-time
> use in configuration and/or for wifi config.

We have to be able to secure the link to the resolver without forcing
everyone to change their service model.

I don't disagree with your point that it would be better for everyone to
use a trustworthy resolver instead of whatever is provided by their
connectivity, but this is orthogonal to the low-level mechanism of
securing the data channel.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7,
DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR
ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD.

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On Thu, 9 Dec 2010, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> A DNS resolver is a trusted service

Only if you call "forced to use our DNS" as "trusted".

It is not neccessarilly trusted if you ever move into business
environments with multiviews and want to reach a local resource.

Or if you're in the office of a large TLD operator, and they block VPN
and port 53 to everything but their local resolver

Or when the company you are in uses a fake TLD such as .internal.

The proper modern way of resolving is to use the DHCP assigned resolver as
a forwarder for a locally running validating (dnssec) caching resolver.

> I would use the same DNS resolution service whether connecting over
> 3G, Edge, WiFi or avian carriers. I might use a different server but I
> would use the same service.

Again, this is your local client policy. It does not fit all.

unbound for instance, can deal with switching between dnssec and non-dnssec
aware forwarders on the fly (using unbound-remote triggers from networkmanager)
and for instance drop part of the cache when switching back to a dnssec aware
resolver.

Paul

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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241438200.66677@joyce.lan> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C09@exchange.secure64.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTimm5NYr_pfVSaN-xZ8NzH_b0kgSGGpZW5LNVa=1@mail.gmail.com> <20101209145545.GM29384@shinkuro.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Thu, 09 Dec 2010 09:55:46 CDT." <20101209145545.GM29384@shinkuro.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2010 08:07:52 +1100
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Cc: dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] IPv6 forward/reverse DNS, was Wildcard expansion in DNS caches
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In message <20101209145545.GM29384@shinkuro.com>, Andrew Sullivan writes:
> On Thu, Dec 09, 2010 at 08:45:19AM -0500, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 8:26 PM, Stephan Lagerholm
> > <stephan.lagerholm@secure64.com> wrote:
> > > Given that:
> > >
> > > 1. A wildcard/DNAME solution for rDNS violates RFC 1912.
> > 
> > Where is that stated in RFC 1912? I see no mention of rDNS in the
> > wildcard section.
> 
> I expect the part being referred to is this:
> 
>    Make sure your PTR and A records match.  For every IP address, there
>    should be a matching PTR record in the in-addr.arpa domain.  If a
>    host is multi-homed, (more than one IP address) make sure that all IP
>    addresses have a corresponding PTR record (not just the first one).
>    Failure to have matching PTR and A records can cause loss of Internet
>    services similar to not being registered in the DNS at all.  Also,
>    PTR records must point back to a valid A record, not a alias defined
>    by a CNAME.
> 
> which is in section 2.1 (and which also, I note, is about in-addr.arpa
> and not the reverse tree).
> 
> But I ask once again that we not continue this discussion on DNSEXT.
> There is nothing at all in this discussion, as near as I can tell,
> that is an issue of the DNS protocol as such.  This is all operations,
> and therefore it doesn't belong on this list.

The discussion about whether it is good or not I would agree with
you.  But you would agree that some people want this sort of matching?
And how to supply it given, pre-population doesn't work, is within
dnsext's purview.

We have had claims that UPDATE won't work because there is no
cleanup.  How to get UPDATE with cleanup working in a implementation
independent way definitely is withing dnsext's perview.  We already
have a hack done by one vendor.

I would like to discuss just that technical feature.

Mark
> A
> 
> -- 
> Andrew Sullivan
> ajs@shinkuro.com
> Shinkuro, Inc.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 16:11:03 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: dnsext@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20101209211103.GR29384@shinkuro.com>
References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011241606030.66677@joyce.lan> <EA594604-33C4-466D-B3E5-84F74E5D935E@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C0E@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTikao5+0grxokKHXb-9KJgHALHQaODuOGew6D5O9@mail.gmail.com> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB8C4C1E@exchange.secure64.com> <A3190966-A7EE-4561-A6E3-D90D9DBE748C@virtualized.org> <DD056A31A84CFC4AB501BD56D1E14BBB54D26C@exchange.secure64.com> <AANLkTimm5NYr_pfVSaN-xZ8NzH_b0kgSGGpZW5LNVa=1@mail.gmail.com> <20101209145545.GM29384@shinkuro.com> <20101209210752.65B317B9ACB@drugs.dv.isc.org>
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On Fri, Dec 10, 2010 at 08:07:52AM +1100, Mark Andrews wrote:
> you.  But you would agree that some people want this sort of matching?
> And how to supply it given, pre-population doesn't work, is within
> dnsext's purview.

Yes, that is.  And if people stick to the discussion of how to offer
such a feature, I won't complain.  Whether such a feature is actually
desirable is possibly something for discussion in Another WG -- one
that has provided us a problem statement or two in the past, I think.

A


-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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Subject: [dnsext] Adopting draft:  draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04.txt
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Dear colleagues

The chairs have received a request to adopt the following draft as a 
working group document.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04


The draft falls within the WG charter because it pertains to DNSSEC 
algorithm maintenance

The rules of the working group require that at least 5 members of the 
working group publicly state that they support adoption. If 5 people
have not stepped forward by January 15'th the draft will not be adopted.

Please read the document and say what changes are needed to get the 
document to be ready for advancement. The plan is to dispose of this
document in short order.
Please comment on if this document should be for informational or 
standards track.

	Olafur & Andrew
PS: as always dispose means in this context, advance or explicitly reject.


From ogudmund@gmail.com  Thu Dec  9 13:32:41 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC4343 (2647)
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Good catch, this errata is correct.

Olafur (wg document shepherd)

On Mon, Nov 29, 2010 at 3:44 PM, RFC Errata System <
rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:

>
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4343,
> "Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity Clarification".
>
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=4343&eid=2647
>
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Editorial
> Reported by: Sam Bretheim <sam.bretheim@gmail.com>
>
> Section: 2.1
>
> Original Text
> -------------
>   ("."), which can be expressed as and 6 or \.  It is advisable to
>
>
> Corrected Text
> --------------
>   ("."), which can be expressed as 6 or \.  It is advisable to
>
>
> Notes
> -----
>
>
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This errata is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>
> --------------------------------------
> RFC4343 (draft-ietf-dnsext-insensitive-06)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity
> Clarification
> Publication Date    : January 2006
> Author(s)           : D. Eastlake 3rd
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : DNS Extensions
> Area                : Internet
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
>
>

--0016364ef3da563aaa049700ffbf
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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<br><div>Good catch, this errata is correct.=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Ol=
afur (wg document shepherd)=A0</div><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_quot=
e">On Mon, Nov 29, 2010 at 3:44 PM, RFC Errata System <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt=
;<a href=3D"mailto:rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org">rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><br>
The following errata report has been submitted for RFC4343,<br>
&quot;Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity Clarification&quot;.<br>
<br>
--------------------------------------<br>
You may review the report below and at:<br>
<a href=3D"http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3D4343&amp;eid=
=3D2647" target=3D"_blank">http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=
=3D4343&amp;eid=3D2647</a><br>
<br>
--------------------------------------<br>
Type: Editorial<br>
Reported by: Sam Bretheim &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:sam.bretheim@gmail.com">sam=
.bretheim@gmail.com</a>&gt;<br>
<br>
Section: 2.1<br>
<br>
Original Text<br>
-------------<br>
 =A0 (&quot;.&quot;), which can be expressed as and 6 or \. =A0It is advisa=
ble to<br>
<br>
<br>
Corrected Text<br>
--------------<br>
 =A0 (&quot;.&quot;), which can be expressed as 6 or \. =A0It is advisable =
to<br>
<br>
<br>
Notes<br>
-----<br>
<br>
<br>
Instructions:<br>
-------------<br>
This errata is currently posted as &quot;Reported&quot;. If necessary, plea=
se<br>
use &quot;Reply All&quot; to discuss whether it should be verified or<br>
rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)<br>
can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.<br>
<br>
--------------------------------------<br>
RFC4343 (draft-ietf-dnsext-insensitive-06)<br>
--------------------------------------<br>
Title =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensiti=
vity Clarification<br>
Publication Date =A0 =A0: January 2006<br>
Author(s) =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 : D. Eastlake 3rd<br>
Category =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: PROPOSED STANDARD<br>
Source =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: DNS Extensions<br>
Area =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: Internet<br>
Stream =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0: IETF<br>
Verifying Party =A0 =A0 : IESG<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div><br>

--0016364ef3da563aaa049700ffbf--

From matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl  Fri Dec 10 01:07:17 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On 12/09/2010 04:47 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> At 16:19 +0100 12/9/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
> 
>> Because the zone operator specifically wants to be protected against
>> algorithm compromises and does that by listing more than one algorithm
>> in the DS RRset.
> 
> DNSSEC is not designed to protect the zone operator, it is designed to
> protect the relying party.  Listing more than one algorithm is done to
> reach a wider audience, it does not enhance the security as far as the
> zone operator is concerned.

Maybe it is not designed for this, but it sure is nice that it is
possible. I think both benefits apply: listing two algorithms (for
example, x and y) does not only give you algorithm compromise
protection, also a wider audience is reached. Now your zone is seen as
secure by validators that understand only x, or understand only y, or
understand both.

> In the experimentation period before the first RFCs were produced (RFC
> 2052 being the first milestone) we played with the notion of key
> strengths.  (Keys, not algorithms because back then we only had the
> unencumbered DSA and the copyrighted RSA available.)  Trying to enhance
> the concept of DNSSEC by using the notion that one algorithm is better
> or one key is better than another failed time and time again.  When
> there's a weak link involved you can't overcome it.

I am not making any assumptions about one algorithm being better than
the other, just because I use two of them.

> What if your zone is signed with algorithm 42?  You might be more
> strongly signed than anyone else.  But what if you are delegated from a
> parent using RSA/MD5?  Your strengths are negated and if algorithm 42 is
> not widely deployed you are even seen as unsigned to the masses.

No: Your strengths are negated only if you accept only one signature.
But if the validator requires to check both signatures, your strength is
not negated.

If 42 is not widely deployed, meaning most validators do not understand
algorithm 42, then most validators will only use RSA/MD5 in this case
and construct the security status of responses based on that algorithm
only. So the masses still have some sense of security, they don't see
the zone as insecure.

> So, so what if I say DNSSEC is not there to protect the zone operator. 
> Why does that mean that MUST is wrong?  The rationale is that no matter
> what you do, local policy is going to be followed. Local policy is going
> to prefer quick resolution of the query. Requiring DNSSEC to do extra or
> extraneous work is not constructive - by that I mean, once you've gotten
> a chain of trust why keep trying to find faults?  DNSSEC is not designed
> to be the last line of defense.

The additional work is there for algorithm compromise protection. And as
I argued before, yes it is local policy to let the validator fallback to
"One Signature Is Enough". But it is kind of insane to me to have a
local policy that says 'allow badly signed zones'.

> DNSSEC is never going to overcome weaknesses in the underlying
> cryptography.  Trying to do so is a futile quest and the relying party
> suffers.

And that's why I think it is nice that you can have a set of algorithms
to rely on. So in my opinion it is not futile.

But you do make a good point here: A name server using more algorithms
puts more work load on the validator. With that in mind, I am willing to
say that a SHOULD should be there.

Best regards,

Matthijs
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This (very sketchy) proposal is an attempt to address the problem of
"rogue changes" in the DNS (for instance by a censorship authority). I
wouldn't suggest the WG to adopt it but it is an interesting technical
problem.

--bp/iNruPH9dso1Pn
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Old-Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] .p2p domain
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Old-Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] .p2p domain
From: David Barrett <dbarrett@quinthar.com>
Subject: Re: .p2p domain
Received-SPF: on batilda: SPF-none SPF: domain of sender p2p-hackers-bounces@lists.zooko.com does not designate mailers spfquery: domain of p2p-hackers-bounces@lists.zooko.com does not designate permitted sender hosts Received-SPF: none (spfquery: domain of p2p-hackers-bounces@lists.zooko.com does not designate permitted sender hosts) client-ip=192.134.4.162; envelope-from=p2p-hackers-bounces@lists.zooko.com; helo=relay1.nic.fr;

Agreed on it not going anywhere anytime soon.  I think they haven't been 
clear on what problem they're trying to solve.  If it's to prevent 
government seizures of the domain, I'd suggest that be built into the 
existing DNS infrastructure in a backwards-compatible fashion.  Ideally 
this would be part of DNSSec (though I don't think it is) as something like:

1) When the domain is registered (and renewed), record the new owner's 
public key in a big TXT record.

2) When the domain's DNS record is changed in any way, sign it with that 
public key.  (This means only the owner can actually update the DNS record.)

3) On the client (or recursive DNS server) side, cache a domain's public 
key (if available) until its registration expires.  (The "TTL" for the 
key is independent from the TTL of the record itself.)

4) When renewing the record, refuse any unsigned change, or change whose 
signature fails.

5) (This is the big one) If a domain is signed, when the domain record's 
TTL expires, don't flush the cache -- just attempt to renew.  If you 
can't renew, keep the old values.  (This one is costly as it means you 
essentially never flush signed domain values from your cache.)

The goal is to ensure that even if the ICANN, Verisign, your registrar, 
and the USG all conspire against you, your domain still continues to 
function to a large degree.


Furthermore, even if you were to do some P2P DNS approach (which I think 
should just be called DDNS), it should again be a fallback to regular 
DNS.  Basically, in the above scenario, only search the P2P network if 
it turns out that the registrar has an invalid record.  In 
99.99999999999% of cases, normal DNS will be correct, faster, easier, 
more reliable, more efficient, etc.  DDNS should be used 0.00000000001% 
of the time.  But its existence will prevent anybody from trying to 
seize domains in the first place, so it's OK if it's only used in very 
extreme scenarios.

-david



On 11/30/2010 06:30 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
> Surprised someone else hasn't linked this yet:
>
> http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-based-dns-to-counter-us-domain-seizures-101130/
>
> So some folks think a BitTorrent-powered .p2p domain is a good idea as
> an alternative to ICANN. Some are even suggested the system should be
> distributed:
>
> http://dot-p2p.org/index.php?title=Distributed_decision_example
>
> Somehow I don't really see this going anywhere any time soon.
>
> --
> Tony Arcieri
> Medioh! A Kudelski Brand
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> p2p-hackers mailing list
> p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com
> http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers
_______________________________________________
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Cc: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>, dnsext@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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On Fri, Dec 10, 2010 at 5:08 AM, Matthijs Mekking <matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl> w=
rote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 12/09/2010 04:47 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
>> At 16:19 +0100 12/9/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
>>
>> So, so what if I say DNSSEC is not there to protect the zone operator.
>> Why does that mean that MUST is wrong? =A0The rationale is that no matte=
r
>> what you do, local policy is going to be followed. Local policy is going
>> to prefer quick resolution of the query. Requiring DNSSEC to do extra or
>> extraneous work is not constructive - by that I mean, once you've gotten
>> a chain of trust why keep trying to find faults? =A0DNSSEC is not design=
ed
>> to be the last line of defense.
>
> The additional work is there for algorithm compromise protection. And as
> I argued before, yes it is local policy to let the validator fallback to
> "One Signature Is Enough". But it is kind of insane to me to have a
> local policy that says 'allow badly signed zones'.

I think there are two issues here.

One is, whether all signatures are of equal importance.

I'd say, SEP-related signatures (DS signatures, DNSKEY signatures) are much
more critical, and should receive maximum protection, performance
notwithstanding.

I'd also say,  the fewer labels there are, the more important, for the
same or similar reasoning.
The higher up the food chain, the bigger the target painted on the zone.

The second is, that accepting just *any* (valid) signature, means the
following consequence occurs:
If *I* choose which signature to check, the bad guy trying to spoof
the signature risks detection.
If the bad guy chooses (by ensuring only his spoofed signature will
validate, by stripping others
or replacing others with bad signatures), he can guarantee avoiding detecti=
on.

Even adding a randomization among known algorithms, and insisting that
a match must occur for that,
adds the probability of detection, without adding to the crypto burden
of the validator.

And something else that bothers me:

If $implementation does detect a validation failure, which in theory should=
 not
be possible, what about signaling this to the zone owner/operator?

The zone itself might not be broken, but merely be under attack from
an off-axis attacker.
Or, the zone might be broken. There is no way for the validator to
know, and no way for
the owner/operator to currently discover this (automatically).

Should this be addressed? If so, how?

Brian

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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<no-hat>

Historical note and some observations:

The original intent of the DNSSEC design was as far as I can tell:
- One validating signature is sufficient
	
Once we had DSA rammed down our throat we started thinking about 
different algorithms, and the idea was:
- validator prioritizes the algorithms it supports, and sees signatures 
for.

Then during the RFC403x production the concept of downgrade attacks was 
brought up and the following rule was added
- all algorithms in DNSKEY must sign zone

At the time we failed to make the full connection between all the
moving parts in the DNS system
- The contents of the DS set
- The impact of zone distribution delays
- That for a while different caches/authorities may have different 
contents for the RRset and DNSKEY/DS records. (i.e. old DNSKEY set and 
newly signed RRset or vice versa).

For this reason the new text in DNSSEC best practices document says 
something like the following for introducing new algorithm:
	add RRSIG's,
	after a while add to DNSKEY,
	after a while add to DS
(and converse for retiring the algorithm)

During the long development phase of DNSSEC there was the concept of 
different policies by validators
  - paranoid
  - relaxed
The paranoid resolver will check everything,  the relaxed one will 
accept any single signature.

What Matthijs is effectively saying is he thinks paranoid is the way to 
go, while Ed argues that relaxed is the way to go (sorry for putting 
words in your mouths).
For what it is worth paranoid is what security people are more 
comfortable while relaxed is more what traditional DNS is about, and 
given how much some common DNS resolvers will bend backwards in 
accepting answers from broken implementations this is what large part of 
the world seems to expect.

My personal feeling is that zone publishers SHOULD assume all validators 
are paranoid and proceed accordingly. I to not think we can successfully 
prescribe either behavior or any variants in between.
Number of people have argued in the past that this should be a local 
configuration option.

The torture test is when you ask the following questions:
"Do you think paranoid is safer than relaxed?"

If the answer was yes:
"Are you willing accept not reaching <your best customer> because
their DNS setup is messed up?"

	Olafur



On 10/12/2010 4:08 AM, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
> On 12/09/2010 04:47 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
>> At 16:19 +0100 12/9/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
>>
>>> Because the zone operator specifically wants to be protected against
>>> algorithm compromises and does that by listing more than one algorithm
>>> in the DS RRset.
>>
>> DNSSEC is not designed to protect the zone operator, it is designed to
>> protect the relying party.  Listing more than one algorithm is done to
>> reach a wider audience, it does not enhance the security as far as the
>> zone operator is concerned.
>
> Maybe it is not designed for this, but it sure is nice that it is
> possible. I think both benefits apply: listing two algorithms (for
> example, x and y) does not only give you algorithm compromise
> protection, also a wider audience is reached. Now your zone is seen as
> secure by validators that understand only x, or understand only y, or
> understand both.
>
>> In the experimentation period before the first RFCs were produced (RFC
>> 2052 being the first milestone) we played with the notion of key
>> strengths.  (Keys, not algorithms because back then we only had the
>> unencumbered DSA and the copyrighted RSA available.)  Trying to enhance
>> the concept of DNSSEC by using the notion that one algorithm is better
>> or one key is better than another failed time and time again.  When
>> there's a weak link involved you can't overcome it.
>
> I am not making any assumptions about one algorithm being better than
> the other, just because I use two of them.
>
>> What if your zone is signed with algorithm 42?  You might be more
>> strongly signed than anyone else.  But what if you are delegated from a
>> parent using RSA/MD5?  Your strengths are negated and if algorithm 42 is
>> not widely deployed you are even seen as unsigned to the masses.
>
> No: Your strengths are negated only if you accept only one signature.
> But if the validator requires to check both signatures, your strength is
> not negated.
>
> If 42 is not widely deployed, meaning most validators do not understand
> algorithm 42, then most validators will only use RSA/MD5 in this case
> and construct the security status of responses based on that algorithm
> only. So the masses still have some sense of security, they don't see
> the zone as insecure.
>
>> So, so what if I say DNSSEC is not there to protect the zone operator.
>> Why does that mean that MUST is wrong?  The rationale is that no matter
>> what you do, local policy is going to be followed. Local policy is going
>> to prefer quick resolution of the query. Requiring DNSSEC to do extra or
>> extraneous work is not constructive - by that I mean, once you've gotten
>> a chain of trust why keep trying to find faults?  DNSSEC is not designed
>> to be the last line of defense.
>
> The additional work is there for algorithm compromise protection. And as
> I argued before, yes it is local policy to let the validator fallback to
> "One Signature Is Enough". But it is kind of insane to me to have a
> local policy that says 'allow badly signed zones'.
>
>> DNSSEC is never going to overcome weaknesses in the underlying
>> cryptography.  Trying to do so is a futile quest and the relying party
>> suffers.
>
> And that's why I think it is nice that you can have a set of algorithms
> to rely on. So in my opinion it is not futile.
>
> But you do make a good point here: A name server using more algorithms
> puts more work load on the validator. With that in mind, I am willing to
> say that a SHOULD should be there.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Matthijs

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From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
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On Wed, Dec 08, 2010 at 07:51:51PM -0500,
 Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> wrote 
 a message of 42 lines which said:

> People want an Internet that is safe. Please stop trying to impose
> your personal political ideology on this technology.

I have no problem with people expressing political views. I am more
concerned when people disguise their own views under blanket
statements like "people want this or that". I suggest that, if we
express our political opinions on this list, we do it frankly and we
do not recruit "the people" when we want an argument of authority.


From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Fri Dec 10 06:05:00 2010
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Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2010 09:06:15 -0500
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
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At 8:30 -0400 12/10/10, Brian Dickson wrote:

>One is, whether all signatures are of equal importance.
>
>I'd say, SEP-related signatures (DS signatures, DNSKEY signatures) are much
>more critical, and should receive maximum protection, performance
>notwithstanding.

RFC 4034, section 2.1.1 says this:

# Bit 15 of the Flags field is the Secure Entry Point flag, described in
# [RFC3757].  If bit 15 has value 1, then the DNSKEY record holds a key
# intended for use as a secure entry point.  This flag is only zone signing
# or debugging software as to the intended use of this DNSKEY record;
# validators MUST NOT alter their behavior during the signature validation
# process in any way based on the setting of this bit.

All signatures are equal.

>I'd also say,  the fewer labels there are, the more important, for the
>same or similar reasoning.  The higher up the food chain, the bigger the
>target painted on the zone.

An attack to "steal" from example.co.tld. will be more effective if 
just that is "taken out" than if "tld." is taken out.  Why?  Who do 
you think is better defended?  How many will "fight back" if the 
attack goes to tld's infrastructure?

>Should this be addressed? If so, how?

I've already spent more time on this theoretical topic than I will 
ever spend on it in reality.

Can someone could actually demonstrate/deliver two RRSets for a 
name/class/type that validated against the same signature.  Even for 
RSA/MD5.  (Yes, I know MD5 is "broken" but every case I've heard of 
involves large, unstructured data.  Within the constraints of the 
DNS/DNSSEC protocol elements, can it be done?)

The restriction to the same owner/class/type is because the forgery 
would have to be tied to the question asked, RFC 2181 considerations. 
I'd be curious what is the minimum number of RR's needed in the 
forged set.  (Note - if the original set has one A record, the 
forgery can have more, many more.  If the minimum needed is absurdly 
high, then we can discount the odds that the forged set would 
accepted.)

(Wish we had put the RR's in set count in the RRSIG.)

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis             
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life story,
you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale at Amazon?
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<html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
 --></style><title>Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm
rules</title></head><body>
<div>At 8:30 -0400 12/10/10, Brian Dickson wrote:</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&gt;One is, whether all signatures are of equal importance.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;I'd say, SEP-related signatures (DS signatures, DNSKEY signatures)
are much<br>
&gt;more critical, and should receive maximum protection,
performance</div>
<div>&gt;notwithstanding.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>RFC 4034, section 2.1.1 says this:</div>
<div><br></div>
<div># Bit 15 of the Flags field is the Secure Entry Point flag,
described in</div>
<div># [RFC3757].&nbsp; If bit 15 has value 1, then the DNSKEY record
holds a key</div>
<div># intended for use as a secure entry point.&nbsp; This flag is
only zone signing</div>
<div># or debugging software as to the intended use of this DNSKEY
record;</div>
<div># validators MUST NOT alter their behavior during the signature
validation</div>
<div># process in any way based on the setting of this bit.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>All signatures are equal.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&gt;I'd also say,&nbsp; the fewer labels there are, the more
important, for the</div>
<div>&gt;same or similar reasoning.&nbsp; The higher up the food
chain, the bigger the</div>
<div>&gt;target painted on the zone.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>An attack to &quot;steal&quot; from example.co.tld. will be more
effective if just that is &quot;taken out&quot; than if &quot;tld.&quot;
is taken out.&nbsp; Why?&nbsp; Who do you think is better defended?&nbsp;
How many will &quot;fight back&quot; if the attack goes to tld's
infrastructure?</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>&gt;Should this be addressed? If so, how?</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>I've already spent more time on this theoretical topic than I
will ever spend on it in reality.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Can someone could actually demonstrate/deliver two RRSets for a
name/class/type that validated against the same signature.&nbsp; Even
for RSA/MD5.&nbsp; (Yes, I know MD5 is &quot;broken&quot; but every
case I've heard of involves large, unstructured data.&nbsp; Within the
constraints of the DNS/DNSSEC protocol elements, can it be
done?)</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>The restriction to the same owner/class/type is because the
forgery would have to be tied to the question asked, RFC 2181
considerations.&nbsp; I'd be curious what is the minimum number of
RR's needed in the forged set.&nbsp; (Note - if the original set has
one A record, the forgery can have more, many more.&nbsp; If the
minimum needed is absurdly high, then we can discount the odds that
the forged set would accepted.)</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>(Wish we had put the RR's in set count in the RRSIG.)</div>
<div><br></div>
<x-sigsep><pre>-- 
</pre></x-sigsep>
<div
>-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=<span
></span>-=-=-=-</div>
<div>Edward
Lewis&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>
NeuStar&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; You can
leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Ever get the feeling that someday if you google for your own life
story,</div>
<div>you'll find that someone has already written it and it's on sale
at Amazon?</div>
</body>
</html>
--============_-920132516==_ma============--

From A.Hoenes@TR-Sys.de  Fri Dec 10 10:52:02 2010
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In his longer message of Fri, 10 Dec 2010 08:59:54 -0500,
Olafur Gudmundsson said:

> [...]  For what it is worth paranoid is what security people are
> more comfortable [...]

... where "paranoid" indicates "validate every signature path
you find and only accept the end signature if they all verify".


I still believe that's a wrong perception, wrt verification of
signatures.

In X.509 / PKIX, a single, fully verified certificate chain
(from a trust anchor to the certificate under consideration)
suffices, as I already have recalled twice in this debate.
So all major "customers" of those certificates, in particular
TLS, certificate-based IKE/IPsec, and CMS / S/MIME are based on
this paradigm.  Please refer to RFC 5280 for the details.

I see no reason why DNSSEC validating resolvers should behave
more "paranoid" than TLS, IKE, and CMS/SMIME implementations do.

In PKIX, any certificate can be revoked by listing it in a CRL,
which needs being looked up in cert path validation for each cert.
The equivalent revocation operation in DNSSEC is withdrawing the DS;
as long as the signer maintains the DS, it considers the signatures
produced by the respective algorithm/key pair as valid and sufficient,
and hence the algorithm as "safe enough for this zone".

Kind regards,
  Alfred.


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At 10:08 +0100 12/10/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
>But you do make a good point here: A name server using more algorithms
>puts more work load on the validator. With that in mind, I am willing to
>say that a SHOULD should be there.

For the record, I'd put "could" and only that.

As in "a validator could check all of the signatures."  Doing more is 
deviating from the main purpose of DNS, that is quick, appropriate 
responses.

(Yes, I know "could" isn't an RFC 2119-defined term.)

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

In going through my family medical history I recently realized I was
born with congenital amnesia.  I couldn't even remember my name at birth.

From paul@xelerance.com  Fri Dec 10 12:46:14 2010
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On Fri, 10 Dec 2010, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:

> This (very sketchy) proposal is an attempt to address the problem of
> "rogue changes" in the DNS (for instance by a censorship authority). I
> wouldn't suggest the WG to adopt it but it is an interesting technical
> problem.

And its an elaborate scheme to try and detect "rogue" vs "benign" checks,
which I think is pretty futile.

Current terms of services vs rule of law in the wikileaks case are
interesting, and I think it might re-ignite the whole ICANN independance
question again (rightly or not).

But I think the RFC1984 approach here is wise. It's not a problem for
the protocol level to solve.

Paul

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To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <alpine.BSF.2.00.1011180553250.83352@fledge.watson.org> <4CE51293.5040605@nlnetlabs.nl> <a06240801c9101620d463@[192.168.128.163]> <22284.1290447209@nsa.vix.com> <4CF4D54B.5000407@nlnetlabs.nl> <4D00A86D.1040304@nlnetlabs.nl> <a06240800c9268ae26e12@[192.168.1.104]> <4D00F385.4010405@nlnetlabs.nl> <a06240801c926a690eaef@[10.31.200.118]> <4D01EE19.3060006@nlnetlabs.nl> <4D02325A.1010403@ogud.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 10 Dec 2010 08:59:54 CDT." <4D02325A.1010403@ogud.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Clarifying the mandatory algorithm rules
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In message <4D02325A.1010403@ogud.com>, Olafur Gudmundsson writes:
> <no-hat>
> 
> Historical note and some observations:
> 
> The original intent of the DNSSEC design was as far as I can tell:
> - One validating signature is sufficient
> 	
> Once we had DSA rammed down our throat we started thinking about 
> different algorithms, and the idea was:
> - validator prioritizes the algorithms it supports, and sees signatures 
> for.
> 
> Then during the RFC403x production the concept of downgrade attacks was 
> brought up and the following rule was added
> - all algorithms in DNSKEY must sign zone

And the threat discussed was downgrade TO INSECURE by dropping
algorithms that were understood.  The solution to this was to
have the validator look at the list of algorithms in the DS RRset
to determine if it should treat the zone as insecure or not.

Instructions were then written to tell the SIGNER how to sign the
zone such that the VALIDATOR would always get a signture that could
validate if they were followed.  We were already aware that one had
to wait for the old zone content to flush before adding a DS.

There was no expectation that the validator would check this.

> At the time we failed to make the full connection between all the
> moving parts in the DNS system
> - The contents of the DS set
> - The impact of zone distribution delays
> - That for a while different caches/authorities may have different 
> contents for the RRset and DNSKEY/DS records. (i.e. old DNSKEY set and 
> newly signed RRset or vice versa).
>
> For this reason the new text in DNSSEC best practices document says 
> something like the following for introducing new algorithm:
> 	add RRSIG's,
> 	after a while add to DNSKEY,
> 	after a while add to DS
> (and converse for retiring the algorithm)
>
> During the long development phase of DNSSEC there was the concept of 
> different policies by validators
>   - paranoid
>   - relaxed
> The paranoid resolver will check everything,  the relaxed one will 
> accept any single signature.
> 
> What Matthijs is effectively saying is he thinks paranoid is the way to 
> go, while Ed argues that relaxed is the way to go (sorry for putting 
> words in your mouths).
> For what it is worth paranoid is what security people are more 
> comfortable while relaxed is more what traditional DNS is about, and 
> given how much some common DNS resolvers will bend backwards in 
> accepting answers from broken implementations this is what large part of 
> the world seems to expect.
> 
> My personal feeling is that zone publishers SHOULD assume all validators 
> are paranoid and proceed accordingly. I to not think we can successfully 
> prescribe either behavior or any variants in between.
> Number of people have argued in the past that this should be a local 
> configuration option.

Except there are degrees of paranoia.  Checking that you have
signatures for all algorithms in the DS RRset vs checking for all
algorithms in the DNSKEY RRset.

If a zone is supposed to be secure for a algorithm then it is
reasonable to check that it is secure for that algorithm.  Checking
this list of algorithms in the DNSKEY RRset does NOT do this.

> The torture test is when you ask the following questions:
> "Do you think paranoid is safer than relaxed?"
> 
> If the answer was yes:
> "Are you willing accept not reaching <your best customer> because
> their DNS setup is messed up?"
> 
> 	Olafur
> 
> 
> 
> On 10/12/2010 4:08 AM, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> > Hash: SHA1
> >
> > On 12/09/2010 04:47 PM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> >> At 16:19 +0100 12/9/10, Matthijs Mekking wrote:
> >>
> >>> Because the zone operator specifically wants to be protected against
> >>> algorithm compromises and does that by listing more than one algorithm
> >>> in the DS RRset.
> >>
> >> DNSSEC is not designed to protect the zone operator, it is designed to
> >> protect the relying party.  Listing more than one algorithm is done to
> >> reach a wider audience, it does not enhance the security as far as the
> >> zone operator is concerned.
> >
> > Maybe it is not designed for this, but it sure is nice that it is
> > possible. I think both benefits apply: listing two algorithms (for
> > example, x and y) does not only give you algorithm compromise
> > protection, also a wider audience is reached. Now your zone is seen as
> > secure by validators that understand only x, or understand only y, or
> > understand both.
> >
> >> In the experimentation period before the first RFCs were produced (RFC
> >> 2052 being the first milestone) we played with the notion of key
> >> strengths.  (Keys, not algorithms because back then we only had the
> >> unencumbered DSA and the copyrighted RSA available.)  Trying to enhance
> >> the concept of DNSSEC by using the notion that one algorithm is better
> >> or one key is better than another failed time and time again.  When
> >> there's a weak link involved you can't overcome it.
> >
> > I am not making any assumptions about one algorithm being better than
> > the other, just because I use two of them.
> >
> >> What if your zone is signed with algorithm 42?  You might be more
> >> strongly signed than anyone else.  But what if you are delegated from a
> >> parent using RSA/MD5?  Your strengths are negated and if algorithm 42 is
> >> not widely deployed you are even seen as unsigned to the masses.
> >
> > No: Your strengths are negated only if you accept only one signature.
> > But if the validator requires to check both signatures, your strength is
> > not negated.
> >
> > If 42 is not widely deployed, meaning most validators do not understand
> > algorithm 42, then most validators will only use RSA/MD5 in this case
> > and construct the security status of responses based on that algorithm
> > only. So the masses still have some sense of security, they don't see
> > the zone as insecure.
> >
> >> So, so what if I say DNSSEC is not there to protect the zone operator.
> >> Why does that mean that MUST is wrong?  The rationale is that no matter
> >> what you do, local policy is going to be followed. Local policy is going
> >> to prefer quick resolution of the query. Requiring DNSSEC to do extra or
> >> extraneous work is not constructive - by that I mean, once you've gotten
> >> a chain of trust why keep trying to find faults?  DNSSEC is not designed
> >> to be the last line of defense.
> >
> > The additional work is there for algorithm compromise protection. And as
> > I argued before, yes it is local policy to let the validator fallback to
> > "One Signature Is Enough". But it is kind of insane to me to have a
> > local policy that says 'allow badly signed zones'.
> >
> >> DNSSEC is never going to overcome weaknesses in the underlying
> >> cryptography.  Trying to do so is a futile quest and the relying party
> >> suffers.
> >
> > And that's why I think it is nice that you can have a set of algorithms
> > to rely on. So in my opinion it is not futile.
> >
> > But you do make a good point here: A name server using more algorithms
> > puts more work load on the validator. With that in mind, I am willing to
> > say that a SHOULD should be there.
> >
> > Best regards,
> >
> > Matthijs
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

From Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr  Sat Dec 11 06:43:12 2010
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From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>
To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of Thu, 09 Dec 2010 16:30:44 EST. <4D014A84.5070204@ogud.com> 
Date: Sat, 11 Dec 2010 15:44:43 +0100
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Adopting draft: draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04.txt
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I am in favor of the adoption of this document but I have 3 major
questions/concerns:
 - IMHO the SHA-384 DS stuff should be put in another document:
  * there is no reason to mix SHA-384 DS with ECDSA DNSKEY/RRSIG
  * there is even no text explaining when SHA-384 should be used
   in this case
  * it makes easier to address the next item

 - if there is no 'strength order' between keys/signatures this is not
  the case for DS digest types. Today the only text using it is
  the section 6.1 of RFC 4509. Obviously it is no longer enough with
  more than 2 types, so IMHO we need a new/more general text about
  potential digest type downgrade attacks.

 - do ECDSAP256SHA256 and ECDSAP384SHA384 two variants of the same
 algorithm or different algorithms, i.e., it is allowed to use a
 ECDSAP256SHA256 zone signing key with a ECDSAP384SHA384 key signing key?
 Today this is not the case because algorithm numbers are different, so:
  * do we want to allow this?
  * in anycase a text should be added explaining it is (or it is not)
   allowed.

Thanks

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

PS: using another hat, I have an implementation of a previous version
of the draft.

From A.Hoenes@TR-Sys.de  Sun Dec 12 11:11:19 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Adopting draft: draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04.txt
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At Thu, 09 Dec 2010 16:30:44 -0500, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
> Dear colleagues
>
> The chairs have received a request to adopt the following draft
> as a working group document
>   http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04
>
> The draft falls within the WG charter because it pertains to
> DNSSEC algorithm maintenance.
>
> The rules of the working group require that at least 5 members
> of the working group publicly state that they support adoption.
> If 5 people have not stepped forward by January 15'th the draft
> will not be adopted.
>
> Please read the document and say what changes are needed to get
> the document to be ready for advancement.

See [*] below.

> The plan is to dispose of this document in short order.
>
> Please comment on if this document should be for informational
> or standards track.
>
>      Olafur & Andrew
>
> PS: as always dispose means in this context, advance or explicitly
>     reject.


I have read the current draft version and am willing to further
contribute to this effort by review and discussion.

As I already had expressed in comments on a previous draft version
sent to this list, this is a very much needed building block for the
evolution of DNSSEC; it provides additional options for crypto-
algorithm agility in DNSSEC, and it does so with valuable, substantial
savings in DNSSEC RR sizes.  (The DNS packet space consumed by DNSSEC
RRs is an ongoing concern regarding DNSSEC deployment!)

Hence, DNSEXT should adopt this draft as a work item, and aim to
bring it on the Standards Track.  We have placed RFC 5933 on Std Track,
and it looks like the algorithms whose useage are specified in this
draft will likely see much widespread use than RFC 5933 signatures;
thus aiming at Informational in this case would not make sense to me.



[*] Regarding the coupling expressed in the tagged statement:

I'd have appreciated it very much if the two questions of adoption
and further improvements of a draft would not have been merged into
a single poll.

The former has to be concerned with whether
   a) the topic of the I-D is within charter of the WG, and
   b) there is enough interest and available manpower for reviews.
Olafur already has answered question a) in an affirmative manner,
and I fully agree.  This message is a contribution towards b).

IMO, the WG would be better served by quickly adopting the draft
and *then* discussing how it can be improved, because then the WG
has taken over effective change control over the memo.


Therefore, I defer further comments to distinct messages and only
note that the WG and leadership should make serious commitments for
efforts to counter the FUD against EC-related IPR claims, which
still persists at large in an IMHO incommensurate manner, and that
the WG needs to make an informed engineering decision regarding the
balance of gain in RR size and the amount of FUD we are willing to
reject.

For reference, I once more refer to draft-mcgrew-fundamental-ecc-04,
which currently is in IESG state "approved, announcement to be sent".
I'll dedicate a subsequent message to the applicability and
importance of the considerations in Appendix C of that document
to the design of the DNSKEY format to be used for ECDSA public keys
with DNSSEC.


Kind regards,
  Alfred HÎnes.

-- 

+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| TR-Sys Alfred Hoenes   |  Alfred Hoenes   Dipl.-Math., Dipl.-Phys.  |
| Gerlinger Strasse 12   |  Phone: (+49)7156/9635-0, Fax: -18         |
| D-71254  Ditzingen     |  E-Mail:  ah@TR-Sys.de                     |
+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+


From A.Hoenes@TR-Sys.de  Sun Dec 12 12:12:28 2010
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From: Alfred =?hp-roman8?B?SM5uZXM=?= <ah@TR-Sys.de>
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To: dnsext@ietf.org, draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa@tools.ietf.org
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Subject: [dnsext] draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04 -- crypto-strength considerations
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First the easy part:

Apparently due to a copyedit flaw, the 4th paragraph of Sect.1 of
draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04 erroneously states:

                ... the equivalent strength of SHA-256 and SHA-384
  is half the length of the key.
          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The hash algorithms SHA-xxx do not have a key parameter.  :-(
The clause therefore should be edited to say:

                ... the equivalent strength of SHA-256 and SHA-384
  is half the hash size (as indicated in the algorithm designations).

[ I have added the parenthetical explanation to make the sentence
  unambiguously understandable even to those not fluent in the
  properties of the SHS algorithms.  If it is deemed unnecessary,
  please feel fre to drop it. ]



Now, more fundamentally, regarding Francis' point:

  It has been pointed out in the past that observed practice for RSA
  key sizes for DNSSEC purposes is not based on "hard" arguments from
  cryptography/cryptanalysis.

  Currently, the DNSSEC "algorithm" code points for both RSA and DSA
  signatures entail a rather unfortunate coupling of the signature
  algorithm (indepentent of key size) with a fixed, specific member
  of the SHS family of hashes.  This seems to be contrary to crypto
  state-of-the-art and the spirit of the DSS, which requests matching
  of the hash algorithm to the key size (according to NIST SP 800-57),
  for all three signature schemes (DSA, RSA, and ECDSA) supported in
  the current DSS, FIPS 186-3.

  Therefore, *if* we want to continue to decouple the "algorithm" code
  point from crypto-strength, it might be considered to only assign a
  *single* code point for "ECDSA-RECP-SHA", which would be used for
  the entire family of adopted standard, randomly-chosen MODP fields
  and Elliptic Curves thereover ("Random ECP groups"); in this case,
  the size of the public keys published in DNSKEY RRs would determine
  both the EC parameters and the matching hash function.
  Doing so would perhaps require an IANA sub-registry for that new,
  single "algorithm" code point that lists the pairing:
  key-size  --> { curve, hash },
  which would be populated by this document with two entries for
  P-256/SHA-256 and P-384/SHA-384.
  If someone later wanted to specify more choices, they could do so
  by registering additional entries, e.g. using P-521/SHA-512 or
  the curves from RFC 5639 with matching hash functions (which would
  offer a 512/512 choice as well).

  However, the alternative with two DNSSEC "algorithm" code points
  as specified in the current draft indeed implicitly carries the
  message that, for ECDSA usage in DNSSEC, the arguments from crypto-
  geeks take precedence over other arguments and the same pairing
  of strength-matched algorithms be used for KSK and ZSK of a zone.
  This arguably also would have benefits regarding interoperability
  and implementation security (less options --> simpler code -->
  less complexity --> less risk)..

                 =

Kind regards,
  Alfred H=CEnes.

-- =


+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| TR-Sys Alfred Hoenes   |  Alfred Hoenes   Dipl.-Math., Dipl.-Phys.  |
| Gerlinger Strasse 12   |  Phone: (+49)7156/9635-0, Fax: -18         |
| D-71254  Ditzingen     |  E-Mail:  ah@TR-Sys.de                     |
+------------------------+--------------------------------------------+


From scott.rose@nist.gov  Mon Dec 13 10:12:08 2010
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From: "Rose, Scott W." <scott.rose@nist.gov>
To: "dnsext@ietf.org" <dnsext@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2010 13:13:35 -0500
Thread-Topic: [dnsext] Adopting draft: draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04.txt
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I have read the draft and I am in favor of adoption.

Also:
On Dec 11, 2010, at 9:44 AM, Francis Dupont wrote:

> I am in favor of the adoption of this document but I have 3 major
> questions/concerns:
> - IMHO the SHA-384 DS stuff should be put in another document:
>  * there is no reason to mix SHA-384 DS with ECDSA DNSKEY/RRSIG
>  * there is even no text explaining when SHA-384 should be used
>   in this case
>  * it makes easier to address the next item
> 
While "single serving" Internet Drafts can get annoying (with an explosion of references to track), I think it might be a good idea to remove the discussion of SHA-384 for DS hashes.  


> - if there is no 'strength order' between keys/signatures this is not
>  the case for DS digest types. Today the only text using it is
>  the section 6.1 of RFC 4509. Obviously it is no longer enough with
>  more than 2 types, so IMHO we need a new/more general text about
>  potential digest type downgrade attacks.
> 
> - do ECDSAP256SHA256 and ECDSAP384SHA384 two variants of the same
> algorithm or different algorithms, i.e., it is allowed to use a
> ECDSAP256SHA256 zone signing key with a ECDSAP384SHA384 key signing key?
> Today this is not the case because algorithm numbers are different, so:
>  * do we want to allow this?
>  * in anycase a text should be added explaining it is (or it is not)
>   allowed.
> 
They are related, much like RSASHA1 and RSASHA256, but since they would have different algorithm codes, they must be treated as different algorithms in DNSSEC as per RFC 4035.  

Like the SHA-384 for DS RR discussion, I don't think this draft should be the place to discuss clarification (or desired changes) of the text in RFC 4035 that discusses multiple algorithm use in a zone.

Scott


> Thanks
> 
> Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr
> 
> PS: using another hat, I have an implementation of a previous version
> of the draft.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

===================================
Scott Rose
NIST
scottr@nist.gov
+1 301-975-8439
Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
http://www.dnsops.gov/
===================================


From iesg-secretary@ietf.org  Wed Dec 15 08:54:26 2010
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The IESG has received a request from the DNS Extensions WG (dnsext) to
consider the following document:
- 'Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations'
  <draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis-02.txt> as a BCP

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2011-01-05. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsext-5395bis/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

From cheshire@apple.com  Wed Dec 15 23:54:31 2010
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From: Stuart Cheshire <cheshire@apple.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2010 23:56:12 -0800
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On 8 Dec 2010, at 7:06 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:

> The idea of "IANA secret registrations" (section 18) would be, it
> seems, a first in the IETF world and should be rejected. The entire
> point of IANA registries is to document publicly the *technical*
> identifiers. Trademarks and marketing terms do not have to be in the
> IANA registry and therefore do not need special rules for them.

We have removed this.

> Section 4.1 says that the name must be in NFC. Why not referring to
> its subset defined in RFC 5198? Among the practical differences are
> the fact that RFC 5198 handles the case of end-of-lines, which is
> ignored by the draft.

I changed the reference to RFC 5198.

> "commonly-used 16-bit Unicode space" is a misnomer. If one wants to
> talk about the Basic Multilingual Plane (which stores only a minority
> of Unicode code points), it should use the standard term
> <http://unicode.org/glossary/>.

I changed it to say "Basic Multilingual Plane"

> The "standard DNS message size" is no longer 512 bytes since RFC 2671
> (section 6.1). Yes, EDNS0 sometimes is blocked by broken middleboxes
> but for a technique used only in local networks, this is not a too
> serious issue.

I removed the phrase "standard 512-byte DNS message"

> It seems that the possibility of several TXT in a RRset (not several
> strings in a TXT, which is covered in 6.1) is not mentioned. Is it
> legal and, if yes, how to use it?

I have added this text explaining how multiple TXT records can be used:

    Generally speaking every DNS-SD service has exactly one TXT record.
    However it is possible for the DNS-SD advertising specification for
    a particular protocol to specify that it allows multiple TXT  
records.
    In this case, each TXT record describes a different variant of the
    same logical service, offered using the same underlying protocol on
    the same port, described by the same SRV record. The is very rare,
    and to date, of the many hundreds of registered DNS-SD service types
    [services], only one makes use of this capability, namely printing
    [BJP]. This is used when printers support more than one page
    description language, such as plain text, Adobe PostScript, or other
    proprietary page description language. When this is used, printers
    include two additional keys in each TXT records, 'qtotal', which
    specifies the total number of TXT records associated with this SRV
    record, and 'priority', which gives the printer's relative  
preference
    for this particular TXT record. Clients then select the most  
preferred
    TXT record suitable for the client's needs [BJP].

> The advice of section 13.1 to stuff several other records (which may
> be in different bailiwicks) in the DNS answer is at odds with security
> practices (RFC 2181, section 5.4.1 and RFC 5452, section 6).

I have added this text:

    Note that while servers may choose to add these additional records
    for efficiency purposes, as with all DNS additional records it is
    the client's responsibility to determine whether it trusts them.
    Generally speaking stub resolves that talk to a single recursive  
name
    server for all their queries will trust all records they receive  
from
    that recursive name server. Recursive name servers that talk to
    multiple authoritate name servers should verify that any records  
they
    receive from a given authoritate name server are "in bailiwick" for
    that server, and ignore them if not.


Stuart Cheshire <cheshire@apple.com>
* Wizard Without Portfolio, Apple Inc.
* www.stuartcheshire.org


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From: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
To: dnsext@ietf.org
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Subject: [dnsext] RRSIG TTL check in RFC 4035
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Hi,

In RFC 4035, section 2.2, it is mentioned:

o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the TTL of the RRset.

The reason original TTL is there in RRSIG is because the TTL of the
RRSet may not have the correct value due to caching servers. For
example,


www.isc.org.		588	IN	A	149.20.64.42

www.isc.org.		588	IN	RRSIG	A 5 3 600 20110117233213 20101218233213
14457 isc.org. zy94Qvha84/+ouoEQZH2/c46UBiAcftWb9ULh2+gsbS33a+TRCI0qoAt
rKzMThW3MmM8KzaBX2DjZiRtpUdMI+NClBTuw96qd3q+2GeoU8XtQfPa
bSNFn8xl/1+x3IDojE69ZhQa7M4RF8NDJR3sltwfUVIweumXXM8kV6Vn mR4=


What am i reading wrong ?


-Sean

--000e0cd24370b5f9450497bd41fa
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi,<div><br></div><div>In RFC 4035, section 2.2, it is mentioned:</div><div=
><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: monospace; font-siz=
e: 16px; white-space: pre; "><br></span></div><div><span class=3D"Apple-sty=
le-span" style=3D"font-family: monospace; font-size: 16px; white-space: pre=
; "> o  The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the TTL of the RRset.</spa=
n></div>
<div><pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 1em; margin-top: 0px; margi=
n-bottom: 0px; page-break-before: always; font-family: Times; "><span class=
=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-size: 16px; white-space: normal; "><pre=
 class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 1em; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:=
 0px; page-break-before: always; ">
</pre><pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"font-size: 1em; margin-top: 0px; marg=
in-bottom: 0px; page-break-before: always; ">The reason original TTL is the=
re in RRSIG is because the TTL of the RRSet may not have the correct value =
due to caching servers. For example,</pre>
</span></pre><pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom=
: 0px; page-break-before: always; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=
=3D"arial"><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"white-space: normal;">=
<br></span></font></pre>
<pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; page-b=
reak-before: always; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"arial"><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"white-space: normal;"><a href=3D"http=
://www.isc.org">www.isc.org</a>.		588	IN	A	149.20.64.42</span></font></pre>
<pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; page-b=
reak-before: always; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"arial"><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"white-space: normal;"><a href=3D"http=
://www.isc.org">www.isc.org</a>.		588	IN	RRSIG	A 5 3 600 20110117233213 201=
01218233213 14457 <a href=3D"http://isc.org">isc.org</a>. zy94Qvha84/+ouoEQ=
ZH2/c46UBiAcftWb9ULh2+gsbS33a+TRCI0qoAt rKzMThW3MmM8KzaBX2DjZiRtpUdMI+NClBT=
uw96qd3q+2GeoU8XtQfPa bSNFn8xl/1+x3IDojE69ZhQa7M4RF8NDJR3sltwfUVIweumXXM8kV=
6Vn mR4=3D</span></font></pre>
<pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; page-b=
reak-before: always; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"arial"><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"white-space: normal;"><br></span></fo=
nt></pre>
<pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; page-b=
reak-before: always; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"arial"><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"white-space: normal;">What am i readi=
ng wrong ?</span></font></pre>
<pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; page-b=
reak-before: always; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"arial"><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"white-space: normal;"><br></span></fo=
nt></pre>
<pre class=3D"newpage" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; page-b=
reak-before: always; "><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"arial"><spa=
n class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"white-space: normal;">-Sean</span></f=
ont></pre>
</div>

--000e0cd24370b5f9450497bd41fa--

From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Sun Dec 19 06:08:27 2010
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From: Edward Lewis <Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] RRSIG TTL check in RFC 4035
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At 22:10 -0800 12/18/10, Sean Wells wrote:
>In RFC 4035, section 2.2, it is mentioned:
>
>o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the TTL of the RRset.
>
>The reason original TTL is there in RRSIG is because the TTL of the 
>RRSet may not
>have the correct value due to caching servers. For example,
>
><http://www.isc.org>www.isc.org  588 IN A      149.20.64.42
><http://www.isc.org>www.isc.org. 588 IN RRSIG  A 5 3 600 20110117233213
>                       20101218233213 14457 <http://isc.org>isc.org.
> 
>zy94Qvha84/+ouoEQZH2/c46UBiAcftWb9ULh2+gsbS33a+TRCI0qoAt
> 
>rKzMThW3MmM8KzaBX2DjZiRtpUdMI+NClBTuw96qd3q+2GeoU8XtQfPa
> 
>bSNFn8xl/1+x3IDojE69ZhQa7M4RF8NDJR3sltwfUVIweumXXM8kV6Vn mR4=
>What am i reading wrong ?

I'm not sure.  Perhaps the requirement should be:

o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the original (or 
authoritative) TTL of the RRset.

(The word "original" is important.)

That means, when you get the RR set and signature in order to 
validate you have to assemble the validation data (according to 
another place in the spec) and then make sure you replace the 
received TTL with the authoritative TTL as it appears in the 
signature.

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis             
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

In going through my family medical history I recently realized I was
born with congenital amnesia.  I couldn't even remember my name at birth.
--============_-919354687==_ma============
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<!doctype html public "-//W3C//DTD W3 HTML//EN">
<html><head><style type="text/css"><!--
blockquote, dl, ul, ol, li { padding-top: 0 ; padding-bottom: 0 }
 --></style><title>Re: [dnsext] RRSIG TTL check in RFC
4035</title></head><body>
<div>At 22:10 -0800 12/18/10, Sean Wells wrote:</div>
<div>&gt;In RFC 4035, section 2.2, it is mentioned:</div>
<div>&gt;</div>
<div>&gt;o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the TTL of the
RRset.</div>
<div>&gt;</div>
<div><tt>&gt;The reason original TTL is there in RRSIG is because the
TTL of the RRSet may not</tt></div>
<div><tt>&gt;have the correct value due to caching servers. For
example,</tt></div>
<div>&gt;</div>
<div><tt>&gt;</tt><a
href="http://www.isc.org"><tt>www.isc.org</tt></a><tt>&nbsp; 588 IN
A&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 149.20.64.42</tt></div>
<div>&gt;<a href="http://www.isc.org"><tt>www.isc.org</tt></a><tt>.
588 IN RRSIG&nbsp; A 5 3 600 20110117233213</tt></div>
<div
>&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<tt
> 20101218233213 14457</tt> <a
href="http://isc.org"><tt>isc.org</tt></a><tt>.</tt></div>
<div><tt
>&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
zy94Qvha84/+ouoEQZH2/c46UBiAcftWb9ULh2+gsbS33a+TRCI0qoAt</tt></div>
<div><tt
>&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
rKzMThW3MmM8KzaBX2DjZiRtpUdMI+NClBTuw96qd3q+2GeoU8XtQfPa</tt></div>
<div><tt
>&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
bSNFn8xl/1+x3IDojE69ZhQa7M4RF8NDJR3sltwfUVIweumXXM8kV6Vn
mR4=</tt></div>
<div><tt>&gt;What am i reading wrong ?</tt></div>
<div><tt><br></tt></div>
<div><tt>I'm not sure.&nbsp; Perhaps the requirement should
be:</tt></div>
<div><tt><br></tt></div>
<div>o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the original (or
authoritative) TTL of the RRset.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>(The word &quot;original&quot; is important.)</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>That means, when you get the RR set and signature in order to
validate you have to assemble the validation data (according to
another place in the spec) and then make sure you replace the received
TTL with the authoritative TTL as it appears in the signature.</div>
<div><br></div>
<x-sigsep><pre>-- 
</pre></x-sigsep>
<div
>-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=<span
></span>-=-=-=-</div>
<div>Edward
Lewis&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<br>
NeuStar&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<span
></span>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; You can
leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>In going through my family medical history I recently realized I
was</div>
<div>born with congenital amnesia.&nbsp; I couldn't even remember my
name at birth.</div>
</body>
</html>
--============_-919354687==_ma============--

From ogud@ogud.com  Sun Dec 19 10:21:42 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] RRSIG TTL check in RFC 4035
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On 19/12/2010 9:10 AM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> At 22:10 -0800 12/18/10, Sean Wells wrote:
>  >In RFC 4035, section 2.2, it is mentioned:
>  >
>  >o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the TTL of the RRset.
>  >
>  >The reason original TTL is there in RRSIG is because the TTL of the
> RRSet may not
>  >have the correct value due to caching servers. For example,
>  >
>  >www.isc.org <http://www.isc.org>588 IN A 149.20.64.42
>  >www.isc.org <http://www.isc.org>. 588 IN RRSIG A 5 3 600 20110117233213
>  > 20101218233213 14457 isc.org <http://isc.org>.
>  > zy94Qvha84/+ouoEQZH2/c46UBiAcftWb9ULh2+gsbS33a+TRCI0qoAt
>  > rKzMThW3MmM8KzaBX2DjZiRtpUdMI+NClBTuw96qd3q+2GeoU8XtQfPa
>  > bSNFn8xl/1+x3IDojE69ZhQa7M4RF8NDJR3sltwfUVIweumXXM8kV6Vn mR4=
>  >What am i reading wrong ?
>
> I'm not sure. Perhaps the requirement should be:
>
> o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the original (or
> authoritative) TTL of the RRset.
>
> (The word "original" is important.)
>
> That means, when you get the RR set and signature in order to validate
> you have to assemble the validation data (according to another place in
> the spec) and then make sure you replace the received TTL with the
> authoritative TTL as it appears in the signature.
>
> -

<no-hat>

The original reason for the OTTL field was to make validation possible.
The actual value of the TTL on the records verifying and signing does 
not need to have any relationship to what the TTL is in authorative 
servers.
IMHO we should treat this value as a 16 bit random number to make 
potential guessing attacks on future value of RSA signatures harder. 
(along with treating the bottom n bits of the timer values the same way).

For ECC and DSA signatures that already use random number in the 
signing/verification process this is not needed.

	Olafur

	Olafur

From davidb@verisign.com  Mon Dec 20 06:58:01 2010
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To: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] RRSIG TTL check in RFC 4035
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On Dec 19, 2010, at 1:23 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:

> On 19/12/2010 9:10 AM, Edward Lewis wrote:
>> At 22:10 -0800 12/18/10, Sean Wells wrote:
>> >In RFC 4035, section 2.2, it is mentioned:
>> >
>> >o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the TTL of the RRset.
>> >
>> >The reason original TTL is there in RRSIG is because the TTL of the
>> RRSet may not
>> >have the correct value due to caching servers. For example,
>> >
>> >www.isc.org <http://www.isc.org>588 IN A 149.20.64.42
>> >www.isc.org <http://www.isc.org>. 588 IN RRSIG A 5 3 600 =
20110117233213
>> > 20101218233213 14457 isc.org <http://isc.org>.
>> > zy94Qvha84/+ouoEQZH2/c46UBiAcftWb9ULh2+gsbS33a+TRCI0qoAt
>> > rKzMThW3MmM8KzaBX2DjZiRtpUdMI+NClBTuw96qd3q+2GeoU8XtQfPa
>> > bSNFn8xl/1+x3IDojE69ZhQa7M4RF8NDJR3sltwfUVIweumXXM8kV6Vn mR4=3D
>> >What am i reading wrong ?
>>=20
>> I'm not sure. Perhaps the requirement should be:
>>=20
>> o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the original (or
>> authoritative) TTL of the RRset.
>>=20
>> (The word "original" is important.)
>>=20
>> That means, when you get the RR set and signature in order to =
validate
>> you have to assemble the validation data (according to another place =
in
>> the spec) and then make sure you replace the received TTL with the
>> authoritative TTL as it appears in the signature.
>>=20
>> -
>=20
> <no-hat>
>=20
> The original reason for the OTTL field was to make validation =
possible.
> The actual value of the TTL on the records verifying and signing does =
not need to have any relationship to what the TTL is in authorative =
servers.
> IMHO we should treat this value as a 16 bit random number to make =
potential guessing attacks on future value of RSA signatures harder. =
(along with treating the bottom n bits of the timer values the same =
way).
>=20
> For ECC and DSA signatures that already use random number in the =
signing/verification process this is not needed.

What?

While the original TTL is absolutely necessary for validation, it is =
also useful in preventing an attacker from increasing the TTL beyond the =
original value, thus pinning old data in caches.

--
David Blacka                          <davidb@verisign.com>=20
Principal Engineer    Verisign Platform Product Development


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Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 10:33:33 -0500
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] RRSIG TTL check in RFC 4035
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On 20/12/2010 9:59 AM, David Blacka wrote:
> On Dec 19, 2010, at 1:23 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
>
>> On 19/12/2010 9:10 AM, Edward Lewis wrote:
>>> At 22:10 -0800 12/18/10, Sean Wells wrote:
>>>> In RFC 4035, section 2.2, it is mentioned:
>>>>
>>>> o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the TTL of the RRset.
>>>>
>>>> The reason original TTL is there in RRSIG is because the TTL of the
>>> RRSet may not
>>>> have the correct value due to caching servers. For example,
>>>>
>>>> www.isc.org<http://www.isc.org>588 IN A 149.20.64.42
>>>> www.isc.org<http://www.isc.org>. 588 IN RRSIG A 5 3 600 20110117233213
>>>> 20101218233213 14457 isc.org<http://isc.org>.
>>>> zy94Qvha84/+ouoEQZH2/c46UBiAcftWb9ULh2+gsbS33a+TRCI0qoAt
>>>> rKzMThW3MmM8KzaBX2DjZiRtpUdMI+NClBTuw96qd3q+2GeoU8XtQfPa
>>>> bSNFn8xl/1+x3IDojE69ZhQa7M4RF8NDJR3sltwfUVIweumXXM8kV6Vn mR4=
>>>> What am i reading wrong ?
>>> I'm not sure. Perhaps the requirement should be:
>>>
>>> o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the original (or
>>> authoritative) TTL of the RRset.
>>>
>>> (The word "original" is important.)
>>>
>>> That means, when you get the RR set and signature in order to validate
>>> you have to assemble the validation data (according to another place in
>>> the spec) and then make sure you replace the received TTL with the
>>> authoritative TTL as it appears in the signature.
>>>
>>> -
>> <no-hat>
>>
>> The original reason for the OTTL field was to make validation possible.
>> The actual value of the TTL on the records verifying and signing does not need to have any relationship to what the TTL is in authorative servers.
>> IMHO we should treat this value as a 16 bit random number to make potential guessing attacks on future value of RSA signatures harder. (along with treating the bottom n bits of the timer values the same way).
>>
>> For ECC and DSA signatures that already use random number in the signing/verification process this is not needed.
> What?
>
> While the original TTL is absolutely necessary for validation, it is also useful in preventing an attacker from increasing the TTL beyond the original value, thus pinning old data in caches.
>
> --
> David Blacka<davidb@verisign.com>
> Principal Engineer    Verisign Platform Product Development
>

In theory yes, in practice I doubt OTTL has any protective value against 
changes in TTL settings.
I should have been clearer that I want to use the bottom 16 out of 32 
bits TTL as jitter.
16 bits is represents  about 18 hours, thus  by just using the bottom 
bits of the OTTL field then a
Record could be stored for on average 9 hours longer than the TTL in 
authoritative server was
but also sometimes less.

     Olafur


From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Mon Dec 20 07:51:39 2010
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Subject: [dnsext] jittered values for OTTL was Re: RRSIG TTL ...
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(Email readers against over quoting strike again...)

At 10:33 -0500 12/20/10, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:

>In theory yes, in practice I doubt OTTL has any protective value
>against changes in TTL settings.

Shortening the TTL is one strategy a zone administrator can use to 
lower the Mean Time To Repair (at the expense of raising load) in a 
key compromise.  Lowered TTL's also help when changing data.

Long TTLs means data will stick in a cache longer, if the data was 
poisoned, the poisoning will linger longer in an unmanaged cache.

No protection against changes in TTL?  If software doesn't do the 
right thing, all bets are off.  But you certainly don't want a 
poisoner to up the TTL - even if the attack is merely a replay-style 
attack (meaning, no need to disrupt the crypto stuff, like guessing 
the key or forging data/hash colliding).

>I should have been clearer that I want to use the bottom 16 out of 32 bits
>TTL as jitter.

Why?  You already have a signature.  Why would you want more jitter?

In general, jitter works against one of the goals of operations and 
security - stability and predictability.  Things that are jittered 
are (inherently) less predictable.  Note: this doesn't mean jitter is 
bad.  CZ zone jitters their signature lifetimes, and they manage 
quite well.  But they won't know ahead of time the expiration of a 
particular change, if they wanted to.

More that than, I can't understand why you'd wring out any more bits 
"for jitter."

>16 bits is represents  about 18 hours, thus  by just using the bottom bits
>of the OTTL field then a Record could be stored for on average 9 hours longer
>than the TTL in authoritative server was but also sometimes less.

Huh?

-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

In going through my family medical history I recently realized I was
born with congenital amnesia.  I couldn't even remember my name at birth.

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> Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 10:33:33 -0500
> From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogudmund@gmail.com>
> ...
> In theory yes, in practice I doubt OTTL has any protective value
> against changes in TTL settings.  I should have been clearer that I
> want to use the bottom 16 out of 32 bits TTL as jitter.  16 bits is
> represents about 18 hours, thus by just using the bottom bits of the
> OTTL field then a Record could be stored for on average 9 hours longer
> than the TTL in authoritative server was but also sometimes less.

this seems like a good idea to me.

From fweimer@bfk.de  Mon Dec 20 10:05:56 2010
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* Olafur Gudmundsson:

> IMHO we should treat this value as a 16 bit random number to make
> potential guessing attacks on future value of RSA signatures
> harder. (along with treating the bottom n bits of the timer values the
> same way).

The field is 32 bits.  I think you should check that the observed TTL
is not larger than the original TTL.  This does not conflict with your
intended (ab)use of the field.

As discussed before, for DS records, there's also the possiblity to
stuff in randomness using algorithm 0.  DS records are particularly
sensitive because in DNSSEC, it's the place where attacker-submitted
data is potentially signed.

Has the IETF a general recommendation to use randomized hashing in
digital signature schemes?  Or will there be a DNSSEC-related
presentation at 27C3? 8-)  (The RSAMD5 attack against X.509 should
also work against the DNSSEC protocol.)

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
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From thierry.moreau@connotech.com  Mon Dec 20 11:02:36 2010
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Florian Weimer wrote:
> 
> Has the IETF a general recommendation to use randomized hashing in
> digital signature schemes?

I guess RSASSA-PSS would qualify, see informational RFC3447 section 8.1.


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- Thierry Moreau

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From matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl  Tue Dec 21 02:48:52 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Adopting draft: draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04.txt
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Read it, in favor of adoption.

Matthijs

On 12/13/2010 07:13 PM, Rose, Scott W. wrote:
> I have read the draft and I am in favor of adoption.
> 
> Also:
> On Dec 11, 2010, at 9:44 AM, Francis Dupont wrote:
> 
>> I am in favor of the adoption of this document but I have 3 major
>> questions/concerns:
>> - IMHO the SHA-384 DS stuff should be put in another document:
>>  * there is no reason to mix SHA-384 DS with ECDSA DNSKEY/RRSIG
>>  * there is even no text explaining when SHA-384 should be used
>>   in this case
>>  * it makes easier to address the next item
>>
> While "single serving" Internet Drafts can get annoying (with an explosion of references to track), I think it might be a good idea to remove the discussion of SHA-384 for DS hashes.  
> 
> 
>> - if there is no 'strength order' between keys/signatures this is not
>>  the case for DS digest types. Today the only text using it is
>>  the section 6.1 of RFC 4509. Obviously it is no longer enough with
>>  more than 2 types, so IMHO we need a new/more general text about
>>  potential digest type downgrade attacks.
>>
>> - do ECDSAP256SHA256 and ECDSAP384SHA384 two variants of the same
>> algorithm or different algorithms, i.e., it is allowed to use a
>> ECDSAP256SHA256 zone signing key with a ECDSAP384SHA384 key signing key?
>> Today this is not the case because algorithm numbers are different, so:
>>  * do we want to allow this?
>>  * in anycase a text should be added explaining it is (or it is not)
>>   allowed.
>>
> They are related, much like RSASHA1 and RSASHA256, but since they would have different algorithm codes, they must be treated as different algorithms in DNSSEC as per RFC 4035.  
> 
> Like the SHA-384 for DS RR discussion, I don't think this draft should be the place to discuss clarification (or desired changes) of the text in RFC 4035 that discusses multiple algorithm use in a zone.
> 
> Scott
> 
> 
>> Thanks
>>
>> Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr
>>
>> PS: using another hat, I have an implementation of a previous version
>> of the draft.
>> _______________________________________________
>> dnsext mailing list
>> dnsext@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
> 
> ===================================
> Scott Rose
> NIST
> scottr@nist.gov
> +1 301-975-8439
> Google Voice: +1 571-249-3671
> http://www.dnsops.gov/
> ===================================
> 
> _______________________________________________
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From: Miek Gieben <miek@miek.nl>
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Subject: [dnsext] RRSIG inception/expiration times
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Hello,

I'm looking at the expiration- and inception timing parameters
in the RRSIG record. And I'm getting confused.

Consider these text from the relevant rfcs:

In rfc4034, section 3.1.5. "Signature Expiration and Inception Fields"

    The Signature Expiration and Inception fields specify a validity
    period for the signature.  The RRSIG record MUST NOT be used for
    authentication prior to the inception date and MUST NOT be used for
    authentication after the expiration date.

    The Signature Expiration and Inception field values specify a date and
    time in the form of a 32-bit unsigned number of seconds elapsed since
    1 January 1970 00:00:00 UTC, ignoring leap seconds, in network byte
    order.

And rfc4035, section 5.3.1. "Checking the RRSIG RR Validity"

   o  The validator's notion of the current time MUST be less than or
      equal to the time listed in the RRSIG RR's Expiration field.

   o  The validator's notion of the current time MUST be
      greater than or equal to the time listed in the RRSIG RR's
      Inception field.

Both these values are absolute. In the rfcs there is text on how to deal
with serial arithmetic to compare these values, but nothing on how a
resolver must deal with them when the values themselves overflow the 32
bits.

So now I'm confused with how a resolver on a 64 bit (with a 64 bit time_t)
system has to cope with this. At some point in the future (granted this
will take a while), the local time of the resolver will be larger than the
32 bit value of the expiration field.

What should the resolver do?

o Discard the signature as invalid?
o Detect that this has happens and add 68 years to the time stamp?
o ...

Or am I not looking at the right rfcs?

Kind regards,

--
 Miek

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From Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr  Tue Dec 21 10:00:08 2010
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From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   Both these values are absolute. In the rfcs there is text on how to deal
   with serial arithmetic to compare these values, but nothing on how a
   resolver must deal with them when the values themselves overflow the 32
   bits.
   
=> it is not serial arithmetic but standard 32 bit unsigned arithmetic.
And it should overflow in 2106 so the guy who should have to fix this
is likely not yet born.

   What should the resolver do?
   
=> stay in the 21th century (:-)?

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

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[ Quoting Francis Dupont in "Re: [dnsext] RRSIG inception/expira"... ]
>  In your previous mail you wrote:
>=20
>    Both these values are absolute. In the rfcs there is text on how to de=
al
>    with serial arithmetic to compare these values, but nothing on how a
>    resolver must deal with them when the values themselves overflow the 32
>    bits.
>   =20
> =3D> it is not serial arithmetic but standard 32 bit unsigned arithmetic.
> And it should overflow in 2106 so the guy who should have to fix this
> is likely not yet born.

Ah, ok. Not our problem :-)

It *is* a good thing to have an end date for DNSSEC, so we are not
stuck forever with it...

grtz,

--
 Miek

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From: Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2010 13:32:47 -0500
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On Tue, Dec 21, 2010 at 1:08 PM, Miek Gieben <miek@miek.nl> wrote:
> [ Quoting Francis Dupont in "Re: [dnsext] RRSIG inception/expira"... ]
>> =A0In your previous mail you wrote:
>>
>> =A0 =A0Both these values are absolute. In the rfcs there is text on how =
to deal
>> =A0 =A0with serial arithmetic to compare these values, but nothing on ho=
w a
>> =A0 =A0resolver must deal with them when the values themselves overflow =
the 32
>> =A0 =A0bits.
>>
>> =3D> it is not serial arithmetic but standard 32 bit unsigned arithmetic=
.
>> And it should overflow in 2106 so the guy who should have to fix this
>> is likely not yet born.
>
> Ah, ok. Not our problem :-)
>
> It *is* a good thing to have an end date for DNSSEC, so we are not
> stuck forever with it...

Section 3.1.5 of RFC 4034 seems reasonably clear. You use ring
arithmetic. The idea is that, if you actually run into the time
ambiguity because you are trying to verify a signature more than N*68+
years (N>0) old, you will have changed keys by then and it won't be a
problem because the signature won't verify. DNSSEC is designed to
outlast the age of the universe. :-)

Thanks,
Donald

> grtz,
>
> --
> =A0Miek

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[ Quoting Donald Eastlake in "Re: [dnsext] RRSIG inception/expira"... ]
> > It *is* a good thing to have an end date for DNSSEC, so we are not
> > stuck forever with it...
>=20
> Section 3.1.5 of RFC 4034 seems reasonably clear. You use ring
> arithmetic. The idea is that, if you actually run into the time
> ambiguity because you are trying to verify a signature more than N*68+
> years (N>0) old, you will have changed keys by then and it won't be a
> problem because the signature won't verify. DNSSEC is designed to
> outlast the age of the universe. :-)

Ah, okay, now I see:

    Because of this, all comparisons involving these fields MUST use
    "Serial number arithmetic", as defined in [RFC1982].  As a direct
    consequence, the values contained in these fields cannot refer to
    dates more than 68 years in either the past or the future.

The key here is "all comparisons", including comparing with the local
time of the resolver.

grtz Miek

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Subject: [dnsext] An efficient method to publish ranges of IP addresses in the DNS
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[ I also sent this to dnsop, which may be more appropriate. ]

We all know how DNSBLs and DNSWLs work for IPv4 addresses, just like
rDNS only with A or TXT records rather than PTR.

When I wrote RFC 5782 I assumed the same thing would work for IPv6
addresses.  But I was wrong -- the address space is so big that a
modestly hostile opponent can use a different IP address for each
message, which would cause disastrous cache behavior and equally
disastrous amounts of traffic to the DNSBL's servers.

So I came up with an entirely different way to store and query the
data in the DNS, which as far as I can tell will have excellent
performance and cache behavior, even if bad guys are hopping all over
the IP address space.  Take a look, tell me if I'm nuts:

http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-levine-iprangepub-00.txt

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

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* John Levine:

> So I came up with an entirely different way to store and query the
> data in the DNS, which as far as I can tell will have excellent
> performance and cache behavior, even if bad guys are hopping all over
> the IP address space.  Take a look, tell me if I'm nuts:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-levine-iprangepub-00.txt

I think the crux is this:

   One significant practical difference is that it is much easier for
   clients to obtain copies of all or part of the database.

If this isn't a problem, why not publish the list of CIDRs directly
(perhaps with incremental updates based on WebDAV/VCDIFF)?

--=20
Florian Weimer                <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH       http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100              tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe             fax: +49-721-96201-99

From johnl@iecc.com  Wed Dec 22 07:00:33 2010
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>> http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-levine-iprangepub-00.txt
>
> I think the crux is this:
>
>   One significant practical difference is that it is much easier for
>   clients to obtain copies of all or part of the database.
>
> If this isn't a problem, why not publish the list of CIDRs directly
> (perhaps with incremental updates based on WebDAV/VCDIFF)?

It's the same reason that even though you can FTP a copy of the whole .COM 
zone, most people prefer to use the DNS.

For very large mail systems, it is indeed common to keep a local copy of a 
DNSBL, typically updated by rsync.  But most mail systems are not very 
large, and it's more efficient for them to query the entries they need. 
My goal here is to keep the aggregate traffic from the non-giant mail 
system from overwhelming caches and servers.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

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On Wed, Dec 22, 2010 at 9:02 AM, John R. Levine <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:
> For very large mail systems, it is indeed common to keep a local copy of =
a
> DNSBL, typically updated by rsync. =C2=A0But most mail systems are not ve=
ry
> large, and it's more efficient for them to query the entries they need. M=
y
> goal here is to keep the aggregate traffic from the non-giant mail system
> from overwhelming caches and servers.

Even for low volume mail systems, is it really true that DNSBL usage
is more efficient (not to mention reliable?) than rsyncing a fixed
list on a reasonable schedule given some engineering to have a good
list of rsync mirrors and randomize the request times?

-- Brandon

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> Even for low volume mail systems, is it really true that DNSBL usage
> is more efficient (not to mention reliable?) than rsyncing a fixed
> list on a reasonable schedule given some engineering to have a good
> list of rsync mirrors and randomize the request times?

The widely used CBL has about 7 million entries, and is updated every 15 
minutes.  That's an awful lot of rsyncing for a system like mine that only 
gets 100,000 mail connections per day.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

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Forgive me if this has been discussed before, I find it hard to keep up =
enough with this list to be sure that it hasn't ...

More and more people are looking to publish information in DNS that is =
intended to signal a set of instructions to a third party to control =
their actions.  This might include:

1. what configuration the third party should hold with respect to the =
publishing domain
2. the nature of service that the publishing domain regards as =
acceptable for a third party to provide  (e.g. the recent CAA proposal)
3. what the connection acceptance policy of a host found at the =
publishing domain will be.  (e.g. DKIM discussions)
4. information on the publishing host that can be used by another host =
when deciding whether or not to accept a connection from it (or was this =
the DKIM discussion?).

There are a number of problems with storing policy in the DNS

- we could end up with many (pick a number) records of a particular type =
at any domain and as we all know DNS does not provide a sub-selector to =
aid with that.
- there is no boundary definition on what is appropriate for the DNS and =
what is not
- this will eat up RR codes quickly
- it changes the nature of the way DNS is used, in particular it =
undermines the comfortable acceptance of loose synchronisation and =
pushes DNS more towards a traditional database
- the careful process for getting new RRs assigned leads many to use TXT =
records as a quick way out and that is now becoming overloaded and =
increasingly misused.

So I would propose that we have a mechanism for pushing this policy away =
from DNS but using the DNS to point to the location.

One complication though is that a distinction needs to be made between =
this policy information and information that describes the structure of =
a part of the DNS tree.  Examples of the latter include:

- Constraints on the format of domains found at the next level (for =
example a declaration by a TLD on what characters it supports at the =
next level in IDN domains)
- A statement of the expected depth of a series of labels (for example =
the number of digits in a specific section of the ENUM tree).

One way to do this is to define a service policy record that can be used =
to publish the location of a policy protocol server where the policy for =
a domain can be published.  This record would use the same form as the =
SRV record with the LHS specifying the service and the RHS the location. =
 Examples:

	_tls._tcp.www.example.com.     POL     =
my-tls-policy-server.example.com
	_sip._tcp.7.7.9.6.1.3.9.4.6.e164.arpa.     POL     =
my-sip-policy-server.example.com

The definition of policy would be anything that meets the four numbered =
criteria above, excluding information that specifically describes the =
structure of the tree.

Obviously there is no such thing as a policy protocol yet so someone has =
to define one or define one per LHS protocol.  But at least this way we =
point people to the real problem that needs to be solved and away from =
DNS.

Any thoughts?
Jay

PS I don't think this undermines keyassure as that is not policy - if it =
is extended to add details on what certificates might be used then it =
does become policy.

--=20
Jay Daley
Chief Executive
.nz Registry Services (New Zealand Domain Name Registry Limited)
desk: +64 4 931 6977
mobile: +64 21 678840


From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Dec 22 15:23:33 2010
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At 11:51 AM +1300 12/23/10, Jay Daley wrote:
>There are a number of problems with storing policy in the DNS
>
>- we could end up with many (pick a number) records of a particular type at any domain and as we all know DNS does not provide a sub-selector to aid with that.

Can you say more why this is a problem for the records you are talking about but not the ones we already have?

>- there is no boundary definition on what is appropriate for the DNS and what is not

There is: it's called IETF consensus. So far, IETF consensus has been that the DNS is an (the?) appropriate place to put information that relates to a domain.

>- this will eat up RR codes quickly

Where is the evidence for "quickly"? I certainly don't see it looking at the RRTypes registry in <http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters>

>- it changes the nature of the way DNS is used, in particular it undermines the comfortable acceptance of loose synchronisation and pushes DNS more towards a traditional database

That seems completely wrong. The records I have seen discussed lately in fact (after a rev or two to get terminology right) do look like they use the same data model we use for the long-established RRtypes. Can you give examples where that is not the case?

>- the careful process for getting new RRs assigned leads many to use TXT records as a quick way out and that is now becoming overloaded and increasingly misused.

...which argues directly against your proposal for making it harder for proposals to use the RRType mechanism for things that relate to domains.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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To: DNSEXT Working Group <dnsext@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2010 16:12:26 -0800
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: dnsext-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dnsext-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Jay Daley
> Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2010 2:52 PM
> To: DNSEXT Working Group
> Subject: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
>=20
> More and more people are looking to publish information in DNS that is
> intended to signal a set of instructions to a third party to control
> their actions.  This might include:
> [...]
> 3. what the connection acceptance policy of a host found at the
> publishing domain will be.  (e.g. DKIM discussions)
> 4. information on the publishing host that can be used by another host
> when deciding whether or not to accept a connection from it (or was
> this the DKIM discussion?).

DKIM isn't really interested in either of these.  You might be thinking of =
SPF.

> - we could end up with many (pick a number) records of a particular
> type at any domain and as we all know DNS does not provide a sub-
> selector to aid with that.

The "_name" mechanism introduced by things like ADSP, DKIM and VBR seem to =
be dealing with this problem just fine so far.

I do concur with the observation that getting new RR types is non-trivial, =
but that by itself is less of a problem than the fact that a new type then =
has to be integrated into a nameserver release from various vendors.  That =
reality is outside of the influence of the IETF.  Those two things together=
 are why people gravitate towards TXT records.

But coupled with underscore-name tagging that has come to be in popular use=
, this doesn't seem to be a big problem either.

From jabley@hopcount.ca  Wed Dec 22 16:12:38 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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On 2010-12-22, at 19:12, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

> I do concur with the observation that getting new RR types is =
non-trivial, but that by itself is less of a problem than the fact that =
a new type then has to be integrated into a nameserver release from =
various vendors.

Or those vendors could just implement RFC 3597.


Joe


From dotis@mail-abuse.org  Wed Dec 22 17:21:35 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] An efficient method to publish ranges of IP addresses in the DNS
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On 12/22/10 10:39 AM, John R. Levine wrote:
>> Even for low volume mail systems, is it really true that DNSBL usage
>> is more efficient (not to mention reliable?) than rsyncing a fixed
>> list on a reasonable schedule given some engineering to have a good
>> list of rsync mirrors and randomize the request times?
>
> The widely used CBL has about 7 million entries, and is updated every 
> 15 minutes.  That's an awful lot of rsyncing for a system like mine 
> that only gets 100,000 mail connections per day.
John,

Question the eventual complexity of this information.  The typical size 
of most prefixes (above the interface) assigned to entities already 
represents a range roughly 10,000 times greater than that used by v4.  
This estimate ignores the 64 bits found within the interface, which you 
also hope to map.  With v6 networks and addresses made freely available, 
there is nothing that suggests malefactors will cooperate and 
consolidate their locations.  Also B-Trees depend upon synchronous 
updates of related nodes.  CNAMEs are not a remedy for nodes already 
cached, which is something that can be exploited.

See:
  http://ipv6.he.net/bgpview/bgp-page-complete.html

A significant advantage of v6 is the ability to renumber networks 
quickly.  A white-listing scheme based upon v6 addresses will 
essentially destroy this ability.

Dealing with 6 million legitimate sources by host name is something DNS 
can handle within a single transaction without making v6 fragile.  (It 
would be better to authenticate hosts cryptographically, which your 
scheme ignores.)  v6 makes constructing address block-lists an effort 
likely to flood available system memory. Trapping networks controlled by 
malefactors is best done with BGP filters.  Trapping host names 
controlled by malefactors is best done with RPZ zones. Both schemes can 
be dynamically updated, and then offered as a service to smaller entities.

-Doug

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On 23/12/2010, at 12:25 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:

>> - we could end up with many (pick a number) records of a particular =
type at any domain and as we all know DNS does not provide a =
sub-selector to aid with that.
>=20
> Can you say more why this is a problem for the records you are talking =
about but not the ones we already have?

I didn't say or imply that.  There are some existing ones that have the =
problem, NAPTR and TXT for example, but those horses have bolted.

>> - there is no boundary definition on what is appropriate for the DNS =
and what is not
>=20
> There is: it's called IETF consensus. So far, IETF consensus has been =
that the DNS is an (the?) appropriate place to put information that =
relates to a domain.

"relates to a domain" is about as wide as it gets and a boundary that =
wide isn't a practical boundary.  What we get instead is that when =
people discuss individual proposals they are forced to repeat a debate =
about wider principles.  This is an attempt to codify those principles =
and move on.

BTW Do I take it from this that you don't agree with what I've proposed?=20=


>> - this will eat up RR codes quickly
>=20
> Where is the evidence for "quickly"? I certainly don't see it looking =
at the RRTypes registry in =
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters>

I'm not going to do a quant analysis to justify this, but I certainly =
perceive the number of proposals to put policy in DNS increasing, =
particularly as people realise just how useful DNSSEC is.

>> - it changes the nature of the way DNS is used, in particular it =
undermines the comfortable acceptance of loose synchronisation and =
pushes DNS more towards a traditional database
>=20
> That seems completely wrong. The records I have seen discussed lately =
in fact (after a rev or two to get terminology right) do look like they =
use the same data model we use for the long-established RRtypes. Can you =
give examples where that is not the case?

Unless you mean something very different for 'data model' from what it =
means to me, we are talking about two very different things. =20

>> - the careful process for getting new RRs assigned leads many to use =
TXT records as a quick way out and that is now becoming overloaded and =
increasingly misused.
>=20
> ...which argues directly against your proposal for making it harder =
for proposals to use the RRType mechanism for things that relate to =
domains.

Eh?  Are you seriously suggesting that because people misuse TXT in =
response to how hard it is to get a new RR, we should make it easier to =
get an RR to protect poor old TXT?=20

I'm not sure you understood the implications of my last point there - if =
we provide a standard mechanism for pointing to policy elsewhere then it =
provides an alternative to the "stuff it into TXT as you'll never get an =
RR" way of thinking.

cheers
Jay

>=20
> --Paul Hoffman, Director
> --VPN Consortium


--=20
Jay Daley
Chief Executive
.nz Registry Services (New Zealand Domain Name Registry Limited)
desk: +64 4 931 6977
mobile: +64 21 678840


From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Dec 22 17:43:19 2010
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At 2:25 PM +1300 12/23/10, Jay Daley wrote:
>On 23/12/2010, at 12:25 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>
>>> - we could end up with many (pick a number) records of a particular type at any domain and as we all know DNS does not provide a sub-selector to aid with that.
>>
>> Can you say more why this is a problem for the records you are talking about but not the ones we already have?
>
>I didn't say or imply that.  There are some existing ones that have the problem, NAPTR and TXT for example, but those horses have bolted.

OK. What then are the actual problems with not having sub-selectors in recent RRType proposals?

> >> - there is no boundary definition on what is appropriate for the DNS and what is not
>>
>> There is: it's called IETF consensus. So far, IETF consensus has been that the DNS is an (the?) appropriate place to put information that relates to a domain.
>
>"relates to a domain" is about as wide as it gets and a boundary that wide isn't a practical boundary.  What we get instead is that when people discuss individual proposals they are forced to repeat a debate about wider principles.  This is an attempt to codify those principles and move on.

This seems like an attempt to force a new paradigm, not to codify the current principles. I'd be happy to help with (but not originate) an effort to codify the current principles, such as "RRTypes must relate to a domain" and "RRTypes must not affect domains other than the one named".

>BTW Do I take it from this that you don't agree with what I've proposed?

Correct.

>
>>> - this will eat up RR codes quickly
>>
> > Where is the evidence for "quickly"? I certainly don't see it looking at the RRTypes registry in <http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters>
>
>I'm not going to do a quant analysis to justify this, but I certainly perceive the number of proposals to put policy in DNS increasing, particularly as people realise just how useful DNSSEC is.

I am going to do that analysis from the URL I just gave: we have either 65000 or 150 RRTypes left (depending on who you talk to), and we are burning them at a rate of about 3 per year.

> >> - it changes the nature of the way DNS is used, in particular it undermines the comfortable acceptance of loose synchronisation and pushes DNS more towards a traditional database
>>
>> That seems completely wrong. The records I have seen discussed lately in fact (after a rev or two to get terminology right) do look like they use the same data model we use for the long-established RRtypes. Can you give examples where that is not the case?
>
>Unless you mean something very different for 'data model' from what it means to me, we are talking about two very different things. 

Please say more about which RRType proposals you think "undermines the comfortable acceptance of loose synchronisation" or "pushes DNS more towards a traditional database". I just haven't seen these other than in a few abandoned -00 drafts.

>
>>> - the careful process for getting new RRs assigned leads many to use TXT records as a quick way out and that is now becoming overloaded and increasingly misused.
>>
>> ...which argues directly against your proposal for making it harder for proposals to use the RRType mechanism for things that relate to domains.
>
>Eh?  Are you seriously suggesting that because people misuse TXT in response to how hard it is to get a new RR, we should make it easier to get an RR to protect poor old TXT?

No, I'm saying we have reached a good equilibrium of how people use both TXT and new RRTypes.

>I'm not sure you understood the implications of my last point there - if we provide a standard mechanism for pointing to policy elsewhere then it provides an alternative to the "stuff it into TXT as you'll never get an RR" way of thinking.

That's true, but it is also true to say if we encourage people to put domain-specific policy in new RRTypes, then it provides an alternative to the "stuff it into TXT as you'll never get an RR" way of thinking.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

From marka@isc.org  Wed Dec 22 18:00:38 2010
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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <2E9C54A5-0E2B-4AF9-960E-CE4CA9C1A7BE@nzrs.net.nz><F5833273385BB34F99288B3648C4F06F1341E73C53@EXCH-C2.corp.cloudmark.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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In message <F5833273385BB34F99288B3648C4F06F1341E73C53@EXCH-C2.corp.cloudmark.com
>, "Murray S. Kucherawy" writes:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: dnsext-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:dnsext-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of J
> ay Daley
> > Sent: Wednesday, December 22, 2010 2:52 PM
> > To: DNSEXT Working Group
> > Subject: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
> > 
> > More and more people are looking to publish information in DNS that is
> > intended to signal a set of instructions to a third party to control
> > their actions.  This might include:
> > [...]
> > 3. what the connection acceptance policy of a host found at the
> > publishing domain will be.  (e.g. DKIM discussions)
> > 4. information on the publishing host that can be used by another host
> > when deciding whether or not to accept a connection from it (or was
> > this the DKIM discussion?).
> 
> DKIM isn't really interested in either of these.  You might be thinking of SPF.
> 
> > - we could end up with many (pick a number) records of a particular
> > type at any domain and as we all know DNS does not provide a sub-
> > selector to aid with that.
> 
> The "_name" mechanism introduced by things like ADSP, DKIM and VBR seem to be d
> ealing with this problem just fine so far.
> 
> I do concur with the observation that getting new RR types is non-trivial, but 
> that by itself is less of a problem than the fact that a new type then has to b
> e integrated into a nameserver release from various vendors.  That reality is o
> utside of the influence of the IETF.  Those two things together are why people 
> gravitate towards TXT records.

Which isn't a issue with modern nameservers either as they can
store, load and serve the record as unknown records, i.e. a hex dup
of the rdata field.

I don't know about other vendors but named is designed to make the
introductions of new records easy.  It doesn't require a new release
to add a new type to named.  It just requires someone to publish a
set of methods to parse the records and a recompile.  We have had
users do this themselves for records they wanted to experiment with.
Many of the methods end up being the proforma methods and there is
lots of example code.

e.g. for HIP 
	fromtext_hip
	totext_hip
	fromwire_hip
	towire_hip		* proforma
	compare_hip  		* proforma
	fromstruct_hip
	tostruct_hip
	freestruct_hip
	additionaldata_hip  	* proforma
	digest_hip  		* proforma
	checkowner_hip  	* proforma
	checknames_hip  	* proforma
	casecompare_hip

TXT records have their own limitations especially when you exceed
what fits in a single string as DKIM records can.  You then end up
having to teach the users how to break breakup the TXT record so
that it can be properly parsed.

Mark

> But coupled with underscore-name tagging that has come to be in popular use, th
> is doesn't seem to be a big problem either.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

From jay@nzrs.net.nz  Wed Dec 22 18:43:46 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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On 23/12/2010, at 2:45 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:

> OK. What then are the actual problems with not having sub-selectors in =
recent RRType proposals?

What we've got emerging as a de facto standard is a combination of _name =
prefix and parameter values embedded in a long string.  While this is =
very clever I would argue that it is deeply sub-optimal because it is =
forcing what could be quite expressive and complex policy into a poor =
container, of which a one-dimensional _name prefix is a characteristic.

Say I wanted to state, for host X
- here is how hosts that conform to Y should connect to me
- here is how hosts that conform to Z should connect to me
- here is the default how hosts should connect to me
- here is how I intend to connect to hosts that conform to A
- and so on

then either we use lots of sub-selectors or a big string on the RHS or =
lots of RRs.

My point, in case it is not clear, is that putting that in DNS is a =
kludge that follows the path of least resistance for the IETF process =
rather than the path of what's the best technology to use here.

> Please say more about which RRType proposals you think "undermines the =
comfortable acceptance of loose synchronisation" or "pushes DNS more =
towards a traditional database". I just haven't seen these other than in =
a few abandoned -00 drafts.

Any RRs that put third party policy into DNS and so create a mutually =
inconsistent set of data unless all instances are synchronised. =20

If I state in DNS that says "my key is ..." and two different answers =
are available during synchronisation, then that it is not inconsistent =
per se because I might have two keys.

If I state in DNS "I will only allow ..." and two different answers are =
available during synchronisation then that is inconsistent.

Jay

--=20
Jay Daley
Chief Executive
.nz Registry Services (New Zealand Domain Name Registry Limited)
desk: +64 4 931 6977
mobile: +64 21 678840


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At 3:45 PM +1300 12/23/10, Jay Daley wrote:
>On 23/12/2010, at 2:45 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>
>> OK. What then are the actual problems with not having sub-selectors in recent RRType proposals?
>
>What we've got emerging as a de facto standard is a combination of _name prefix and parameter values embedded in a long string.

I'm confused. Is the proposal that started this thread:
a) to stop folks from making new "policy" RRTypes?
b) to stop folks creating new TXT record semantics?
c) both?

The reason I ask is that you said in the first message:
At 11:51 AM +1300 12/23/10, Jay Daley wrote:
>There are a number of problems with storing policy in the DNS
>
>- we could end up with many (pick a number) records of a particular type at any domain and as we all know DNS does not provide a sub-selector to aid with that.

To me, that sounds like (a), and I have been responding to that. Now it sounds like you're talking more about (b) or possibly (c). I find (a) and (b) to be completely different.

>  While this is very clever I would argue that it is deeply sub-optimal because it is forcing what could be quite expressive and complex policy into a poor container, of which a one-dimensional _name prefix is a characteristic.

Any RRtype is a one-dimensional characteristic.

>Say I wanted to state, for host X
>- here is how hosts that conform to Y should connect to me
>- here is how hosts that conform to Z should connect to me
>- here is the default how hosts should connect to me
>- here is how I intend to connect to hosts that conform to A
>- and so on
>
>then either we use lots of sub-selectors or a big string on the RHS or lots of RRs.

What is the problem with "lots of RRs" that is so bad that this should be outside the DNS? We have this debate periodically on things more familiar, such as "give me both the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses together".

>My point, in case it is not clear, is that putting that in DNS is a kludge that follows the path of least resistance for the IETF process rather than the path of what's the best technology to use here.

We disagree here. I believe that data that relates to a domain actually belongs in the DNS.

> > Please say more about which RRType proposals you think "undermines the comfortable acceptance of loose synchronisation" or "pushes DNS more towards a traditional database". I just haven't seen these other than in a few abandoned -00 drafts.
>
>Any RRs that put third party policy into DNS and so create a mutually inconsistent set of data unless all instances are synchronised. 

We fully agree that that would be bad. Which specific RRType proposals are those?

>If I state in DNS that says "my key is ..." and two different answers are available during synchronisation, then that it is not inconsistent per se because I might have two keys.

That depends on the semantics of the RRType. I would say that the semantic is not "my key is" but "this key is mine". That eliminates your synch problem as well as a slew of related problems.

>If I state in DNS "I will only allow ..." and two different answers are available during synchronisation then that is inconsistent.

We fully agree there. Again, I don't think that is part of any fleshed-out proposal.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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On Thu, 23 Dec 2010, Jay Daley wrote:

> I'm not sure you understood the implications of my last point there - if we provide a standard mechanism for pointing to policy elsewhere then it provides an alternative to the "stuff it into TXT as you'll never get an RR" way of thinking.

Your POL RRTYPE will have some structure that won't fit in someone and they will go stuff it into a TXT
record anyway.

One use I could see is a modification to TXT that allows it to come along as additional data, but instead
of using some ADDTXT RRTYPE for that, I'd rather see some nice structured ENDS method that can work for
more types (even if Miek kills a kitten every time :)

Paul

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--0016e644caf0becf51049812f1a2
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How about this as an approach

1) use a new RR that is designed for RBL use.

2) Subtype the RR to support the following uses:

A) Meta-Data Declarations
B) Granularity specifications
C) RBL assertions

So the apex of blocklist verybad.info might contain the following
declarations:

Meta: The semantics are defined in format x at http://blahh
Granularity: IPv4 24 bits
Granularity: IPv6 12 bits
Assertion: IPv4 / Granularity=8 bits / <bitmask> / Unroutable
Assertion: IPv6 / Granularity=8 bits / <bitmask> / Unroutable

So the apex record in the zone tells receivers how to interpret the zone
data and that there are IPv4 and IPv6 versions.

Bitmasks allow us to quickly declare the reserved and unroutable sections as
being out of scope. if no bitmask declaration matches, resolution continues
at the next lowest level of granularity.

To perform the next level of resolution, we chop off whatever length of
prefix is required, convert to hex and use it as a prefix label:


_283.ipv6.verybad.info
Assertion: IPv6 / Granularity=8 bits / <bitmask> / Unroutable
Granularity: 52 bits

And so on.

We can be very confident that the NICs will issue address ranges in a
reasonably compact fashion. What we cannot know now or reasonably predict is
what the issue increments will turn out to be once the system is running in
steady state. We can know what they intend, but not what they will find
works in practice.

An alternative to the bitmask approach would be to specify address ranges.
This might yield a more compact representation.


Another point to consider is that ISPs might well find it convenient to use
a record of this type to help RBL type schemes by describing the structure
of what they provide.

A broadband ISP is likely to assign IP addresses in fairly large blocks.
Each residential user receiving a /64 perhaps. If one address in such a
block is compromised then likely all are compromised.

A co-loc facility might well assign IP addresses on a case by case basis.
Each machine asks for as many IP addresses as they need, but they all come
from the same /64 allocation that the ISP obtained. The fact that one
machine is compromised does not mean that we should automatically block
every machine in the facility.

So in some cases we need only 64 bit resolution, in another we need the full
128 bits.


This approach will require more round trips than at present, but that would
not worry me unduly. The granularity declarations are likely to cache for
extended periods in any case.

--0016e644caf0becf51049812f1a2
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

How about this as an approach
<div><br></div><div>1) use a new RR that is designed for RBL use.</div><div=
><br></div><div>2) Subtype the RR to support the following uses:</div><div>=
<br></div><div>A) Meta-Data Declarations</div><div>B) Granularity specifica=
tions</div>
<div>C) RBL assertions</div><div><br></div><div>So the apex of blocklist <a=
 href=3D"http://verybad.info">verybad.info</a> might contain the following =
declarations:</div><div><br></div><div>Meta: The semantics are defined in f=
ormat x at <a href=3D"http://blahh">http://blahh</a></div>
<div>Granularity: IPv4 24 bits</div><div>Granularity: IPv6 12 bits</div><di=
v><meta charset=3D"utf-8">Assertion: IPv4 / Granularity=3D8 bits / &lt;bitm=
ask&gt; / Unroutable</div><div>Assertion: IPv6 / Granularity=3D8 bits / &lt=
;bitmask&gt; / Unroutable</div>
<div><br></div><div>So the apex record in the zone tells receivers how to i=
nterpret the zone data and that there are IPv4 and IPv6 versions.</div><div=
><br></div><div>Bitmasks allow us to quickly declare the reserved and unrou=
table sections as being out of scope. if no bitmask declaration matches, re=
solution continues at the next lowest level of granularity.</div>
<div><br></div><div>To perform the next level of resolution, we chop off wh=
atever length of prefix is required, convert to hex and use it as a prefix =
label:</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>_<a href=3D"http://283.ipv6.=
verybad.info">283.ipv6.verybad.info</a>=A0</div>
<div><meta charset=3D"utf-8">Assertion: IPv6 / Granularity=3D8 bits / &lt;b=
itmask&gt; / Unroutable</div><div>Granularity: 52 bits</div><div><br></div>=
<div>And so on.</div><div><br></div><div>We can be very confident that the =
NICs will issue address ranges in a reasonably compact fashion. What we can=
not know now or reasonably predict is what the issue increments will turn o=
ut to be once the system is running in steady state. We can know what they =
intend, but not what they will find works in practice.</div>
<div><br></div><div>An alternative to the bitmask approach would be to spec=
ify address ranges. This might yield a more compact representation.=A0</div=
><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Another point to consider is that ISPs =
might well find it convenient to use a record of this type to help RBL type=
 schemes by describing the structure of what they provide.</div>
<div><br></div><div>A broadband ISP is likely to assign IP addresses in fai=
rly large blocks. Each residential user receiving a /64 perhaps. If one add=
ress in such a block is compromised then likely all are compromised.</div>
<div><br></div><div>A co-loc facility might well assign IP addresses on a c=
ase by case basis. Each machine asks for as many IP addresses as they need,=
 but they all come from the same /64 allocation that the ISP obtained. The =
fact that one machine is compromised does not mean that we should automatic=
ally block every machine in the facility.</div>
<div><br></div><div>So in some cases we need only 64 bit resolution, in ano=
ther we need the full 128 bits.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Thi=
s approach will require more round trips than at present, but that would no=
t worry me unduly. The granularity declarations are likely to cache for ext=
ended periods in any case.</div>

--0016e644caf0becf51049812f1a2--

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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Well I am going to surprise everyone by pointing out that I appear to be in
agreement with Paul Hoffman here.

On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 1:25 AM, Jay Daley <jay@nzrs.net.nz> wrote:

> On 23/12/2010, at 12:25 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>


> >> - there is no boundary definition on what is appropriate for the DNS and
> what is not
> >
> > There is: it's called IETF consensus. So far, IETF consensus has been
> that the DNS is an (the?) appropriate place to put information that relates
> to a domain.
>
> "relates to a domain" is about as wide as it gets and a boundary that wide
> isn't a practical boundary.  What we get instead is that when people discuss
> individual proposals they are forced to repeat a debate about wider
> principles.  This is an attempt to codify those principles and move on.
>

I don't see an attempt to codify those principles. I see a demand that we
halt everything for an unspecified period of time while we go down a very
deep rat-hole.

The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for managing assertions that relate
to domain names. The problems arise when people make a assertions that
relate to a domain name and they are NOT using the DNS.

The DNS infrastructure is more than sufficient to meet this need.



> BTW Do I take it from this that you don't agree with what I've proposed?
>
> >> - this will eat up RR codes quickly
> >
> > Where is the evidence for "quickly"? I certainly don't see it looking at
> the RRTypes registry in <http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters>
>
> I'm not going to do a quant analysis to justify this, but I certainly
> perceive the number of proposals to put policy in DNS increasing,
> particularly as people realise just how useful DNSSEC is.


So you are going to make assertions but not bother to back them up with
actual facts or figures?

At the moment we have about 75 records allocated. There are proposals on the
table for a couple more. Since there is an expert review criteria I cannot
imagine how we could possibly get to as many as 20 records a year without
someone saying 'hey wait a minute, something is wrong'. At that rate it will
take 3,705 years to exhaust the RR code space.

>> - the careful process for getting new RRs assigned leads many to use TXT
> records as a quick way out and that is now becoming overloaded and
> increasingly misused.
> >
> > ...which argues directly against your proposal for making it harder for
> proposals to use the RRType mechanism for things that relate to domains.
>
> Eh?  Are you seriously suggesting that because people misuse TXT in
> response to how hard it is to get a new RR, we should make it easier to get
> an RR to protect poor old TXT?
>

Yes, because one of the main reasons for opening up the RR code registry in
the first place was the observation that if people are not given a feasible
path for getting a new RR code point assigned officially they will either
(1) use a TXT record or (2) ignore the official process and assign their own
RR code.

I'm not sure you understood the implications of my last point there - if we
> provide a standard mechanism for pointing to policy elsewhere then it
> provides an alternative to the "stuff it into TXT as you'll never get an RR"
> way of thinking.
>

Which was precisely the point of the new RR allocation process.


Since the policy statements I am proposing are considerably shorter than the
typical URI, I fail to see the point in using an external reference.

Moreover, since I am proposing security policy, and looking to use DNSSEC to
secure the security policy, any external reference would require a digest
specifier to prevent alteration. So the external reference would be in
addition to the information already there.


I can now pack all the policy and extended discovery information relevant to
a query in a single response.

The key here being the realization that we can pipeline signature
verification and connection establishment - but I will put that in a
separate post.

-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e645ab9aff50250498136378
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
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Well I am going to surprise everyone by pointing out that I appear to be in=
 agreement with Paul Hoffman here.<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu=
, Dec 23, 2010 at 1:25 AM, Jay Daley <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:jay@nzrs.net.nz">jay@nzrs.net.nz</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">On 23/12/2010, at 12:25 P=
M, Paul Hoffman wrote:<br></div></blockquote><div>=A0</div><blockquote clas=
s=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;pad=
ding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"></div><div class=3D"im">
&gt;&gt; - there is no boundary definition on what is appropriate for the D=
NS and what is not<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; There is: it&#39;s called IETF consensus. So far, IETF consensus has b=
een that the DNS is an (the?) appropriate place to put information that rel=
ates to a domain.<br>
<br>
</div>&quot;relates to a domain&quot; is about as wide as it gets and a bou=
ndary that wide isn&#39;t a practical boundary. =A0What we get instead is t=
hat when people discuss individual proposals they are forced to repeat a de=
bate about wider principles. =A0This is an attempt to codify those principl=
es and move on.<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I don&#39;t see an attempt to codify those=
 principles. I see a demand that we halt everything for an unspecified peri=
od of time while we go down a very deep rat-hole.</div><div><br></div><div>
The DNS is the Internet infrastructure for managing assertions that relate =
to domain names. The problems arise when people make a assertions that rela=
te to a domain name and they are NOT using the DNS.</div><div><br></div>
<div>The DNS infrastructure is more than sufficient to meet this need.</div=
><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
BTW Do I take it from this that you don&#39;t agree with what I&#39;ve prop=
osed?<br>
<div class=3D"im"><br>
&gt;&gt; - this will eat up RR codes quickly<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Where is the evidence for &quot;quickly&quot;? I certainly don&#39;t s=
ee it looking at the RRTypes registry in &lt;<a href=3D"http://www.iana.org=
/assignments/dns-parameters" target=3D"_blank">http://www.iana.org/assignme=
nts/dns-parameters</a>&gt;<br>

<br>
</div>I&#39;m not going to do a quant analysis to justify this, but I certa=
inly perceive the number of proposals to put policy in DNS increasing, part=
icularly as people realise just how useful DNSSEC is.</blockquote><div>
<br></div><div>So you are going to make assertions but not bother to back t=
hem up with actual facts or figures?</div><div><br></div><div>At the moment=
 we have about 75 records allocated. There are proposals on the table for a=
 couple more. Since there is an expert review criteria I cannot imagine how=
 we could possibly get to as many as 20 records a year without someone sayi=
ng &#39;hey wait a minute, something is wrong&#39;. At that rate it will ta=
ke 3,705 years to exhaust the RR code space.</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div class=3D"im">
&gt;&gt; - the careful process for getting new RRs assigned leads many to u=
se TXT records as a quick way out and that is now becoming overloaded and i=
ncreasingly misused.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; ...which argues directly against your proposal for making it harder fo=
r proposals to use the RRType mechanism for things that relate to domains.<=
br>
<br>
</div>Eh? =A0Are you seriously suggesting that because people misuse TXT in=
 response to how hard it is to get a new RR, we should make it easier to ge=
t an RR to protect poor old TXT?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, b=
ecause one of the main reasons for opening up the RR code registry in the f=
irst place was the observation that if people are not given a feasible path=
 for getting a new RR code point assigned officially they will either (1) u=
se a TXT record or (2) ignore the official process and assign their own RR =
code.</div>
<div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex=
;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
I&#39;m not sure you understood the implications of my last point there - i=
f we provide a standard mechanism for pointing to policy elsewhere then it =
provides an alternative to the &quot;stuff it into TXT as you&#39;ll never =
get an RR&quot; way of thinking.<br>
</blockquote></div><div><br></div><div>Which was precisely the point of the=
 new RR allocation process.</div><div><br></div><br clear=3D"all">Since the=
 policy statements I am proposing are considerably shorter than the typical=
 URI, I fail to see the point in using an external reference.<div>
<br></div><div>Moreover, since I am proposing security policy, and looking =
to use DNSSEC to secure the security policy, any external reference would r=
equire a digest specifier to prevent alteration. So the external reference =
would be in addition to the information already there.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>I can now pack all the policy and extend=
ed discovery information relevant to a query in a single response.</div><di=
v><div><br></div><div>The key here being the realization that we can pipeli=
ne signature verification and connection establishment - but I will put tha=
t in a separate post.</div>
<div><br>-- <br>Website: <a href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallamb=
aker.com/</a><br><br>
</div></div>

--0016e645ab9aff50250498136378--

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Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2010 07:59:29 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 11:51:54AM +1300, Jay Daley wrote:
> So I would propose that we have a mechanism for pushing this policy away from DNS but using the DNS to point to the location.

I'm not actually convinced that you have the right audience on this
list.  But the audience I think _is_ right has not been interested in
proposals of this sort.

Over the past couple years, I made hand-wavy sketchy suggestions along
these lines more than once.  To my mind, the so-called "cookie
problem" and the public-suffix.org mess would be better handled by
authoritative (and DNSSEC verifiable) statements on the part of zone
operators about where their actual administrative boundaries lie.  A
number of issues with IDNA and knowing what character sets are
included in a zone operator's (or "registry" as we used to call it,
before that word was co-opted to mean "thing dealing with ICANN) IDNA
policies -- right now, AFAICT, the Mozilla answer to this has been to
code the policies into the browser.  And so on.

But every time I tried to drum up some interest (generally among
application devleopers) for such an effort, if only to persuade myself
to write the -00 draft, the reaction was, "Why do I care?  What I have
[which included underscore + TXT] works fine."

I therefore don't think that the people whose problem we might try to
solve with a DNS policy pointer believe they have a problem.
Nevertheless, if you want to have a whack at this, I'd be happy to
work on it with you.  I think the right forum is the Applcations Area
Working Group, however, since it's their problems we're trying to
solve.  This isn't really an extension of the DNS at all; instead,
it's an attempt to point out just how few extensions are needed :) 

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net  Thu Dec 23 05:55:10 2010
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+1 that a zone policy pointer, with or without registry-thingee-ness 
tending towards icann policy and joy, is of some utility, and
+1 that it is an apps area activity, and
+1 that i am willing to contribute in the work to get to -00

-e

From lconroy@insensate.co.uk  Thu Dec 23 06:18:37 2010
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On 23 Dec 2010, at 13:57, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
> +1 that a zone policy pointer, with or without registry-thingee-ness =
tending towards icann policy and joy, is of some utility, and

To which I reply:
Hi Eric, folks,
 Are you suggesting that "icann policy" and "joy" are two discrete =
items, or mutually exclusive?
More important ...
 are you really sure you want to engage in a dialogue with icann policy =
stakeholders?
(at least to find out what they want?)

all the best,
  Lawrence=

From johnl@iecc.com  Thu Dec 23 06:21:51 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] An efficient method to publish ranges of IP addresses in the DNS
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> Meta: The semantics are defined in format x at http://blahh
> Granularity: IPv4 24 bits
> Granularity: IPv6 12 bits
> Assertion: IPv4 / Granularity=8 bits / <bitmask> / Unroutable
> Assertion: IPv6 / Granularity=8 bits / <bitmask> / Unroutable

My original thought was something like that.

It fails completely for whitelists, which by their nature include single 
addresses.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Thu Dec 23 06:52:45 2010
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Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2010 09:54:42 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 02:20:34PM +0000, Lawrence Conroy wrote:
>  are you really sure you want to engage in a dialogue with icann policy stakeholders?
> (at least to find out what they want?)

Given our notable lack of success in learning anything at all about
what the presumed policy stakeholders think about the "alias" issue, I
don't believe for a New York minute that we're going to be successfun
in engaging in dialogue.

But it doesn't matter.  If there's a mechanism with a pointer to a
repository that then has some way to express various policy things,
then anyone can express their policies in there.  If there are ICANN
policy stakeholders who then want to express such a policy, they can
either write the policy in keeping with whatever mechansism we come up
with or they can hire someone(s) from these parts to do that work for
them.

FWIW, what originally made me think along these lines was the
historical confluence of the IDNA2008 start up and the deployment of
publicsuffix.org.  The latter struck me -- and still does strike me --
as a miserable hack that is there to try to solve the problem of legal
boundaries around DNS administrative boundaries.  The IDNA2008 work
started from the premise that what was really wanted was localization
of DNS, only in a fully global context.  Both of these strike me as
obviously amenable to statements on the part of a zone operator (or
maybe multiple zone operators) that their policies follow certain sets
of rules.

Anyway, if people are really interested in this, I will endeavour to
put together a draft some time in the early months of 2011.  I won't
have time for sure until mid-Jan anyway, so if someone else wants to
go ahead & start writing, don't let me stop you!

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

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Andrew and all,

  This approach has been in use in some sectors for some
time before publicsuffix.org was concieved and IMO remains
a good idea.  What bothers me a bit is that Chromium/Google 
Chrome still has third party cookies which seems to me to
be counter productive.  Given that Chromium/Google Chrome 
is open source though that code can/should be removed or replaced
as is appropriate.


-----Original Message-----
>From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
>Sent: Dec 23, 2010 8:54 AM
>To: dnsext@ietf.org
>Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
>
>On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 02:20:34PM +0000, Lawrence Conroy wrote:
>>  are you really sure you want to engage in a dialogue with icann policy stakeholders?
>> (at least to find out what they want?)
>
>Given our notable lack of success in learning anything at all about
>what the presumed policy stakeholders think about the "alias" issue, I
>don't believe for a New York minute that we're going to be successfun
>in engaging in dialogue.
>
>But it doesn't matter.  If there's a mechanism with a pointer to a
>repository that then has some way to express various policy things,
>then anyone can express their policies in there.  If there are ICANN
>policy stakeholders who then want to express such a policy, they can
>either write the policy in keeping with whatever mechansism we come up
>with or they can hire someone(s) from these parts to do that work for
>them.
>
>FWIW, what originally made me think along these lines was the
>historical confluence of the IDNA2008 start up and the deployment of
>publicsuffix.org.  The latter struck me -- and still does strike me --
>as a miserable hack that is there to try to solve the problem of legal
>boundaries around DNS administrative boundaries.  The IDNA2008 work
>started from the premise that what was really wanted was localization
>of DNS, only in a fully global context.  Both of these strike me as
>obviously amenable to statements on the part of a zone operator (or
>maybe multiple zone operators) that their policies follow certain sets
>of rules.
>
>Anyway, if people are really interested in this, I will endeavour to
>put together a draft some time in the early months of 2011.  I won't
>have time for sure until mid-Jan anyway, so if someone else wants to
>go ahead & start writing, don't let me stop you!
>
>A
>
>-- 
>Andrew Sullivan
>ajs@shinkuro.com
>Shinkuro, Inc.
>_______________________________________________
>dnsext mailing list
>dnsext@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

Kindest regards,
Jeffrey A. Williams
"Obedience of the law is the greatest freedom" -
   Abraham Lincoln

"Credit should go with the performance of duty and not with what is very
often the accident of glory" - Theodore Roosevelt

"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability
depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing  (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
===============================================================
Updated 1/26/04
Network security Eng. SR. Eng. Network data security,
IT/information security.
ABA member in good standing member ID 01257402 
E-Mail jwkckid1@ix.netcom.com
Phone: 214-244-4827



From vixie@vix.com  Thu Dec 23 08:07:21 2010
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From: Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org>
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In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 23 Dec 2010 07:59:29 EST." <20101223125929.GC9533@shinkuro.com> 
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> Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2010 07:59:29 -0500
> From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
> 
> On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 11:51:54AM +1300, Jay Daley wrote:

> > So I would propose that we have a mechanism for pushing this policy
> > away from DNS but using the DNS to point to the location.
> 
> I'm not actually convinced that you have the right audience on this
> list.  But the audience I think _is_ right has not been interested in
> proposals of this sort.
> ...

well, we could certainly benefit from subclassing that wasn't affected by
zone cuts.  to have done this right in dnssec we could have had to say
aaaa.rrsig._dnssec.www.example.com and ds.www._dnssec.example.com, noting
that the _dnssec marker is *after* the delegation point name in the parent,
just to keep this data both "in the parent" and "not in the same node".  to
avoid this fought a harder and longer battle which was to change the model
for delegation and allow a DS RR to be in the parent even though nothing
else can be.  this is a systemic weakness in the dns design, and if we'd
been thinking correctly we would have added subclassing instead.  it's not
too late to think about what we want dns to really be.  i don't like TXT
for stuff like SPF even though i do understand why people use it.  since
that's how new apps (like kaminsky's tlssec work) are going to occur, this
is the working group where we ought to help them not break dns with lots
and lots of large unsubclassable and unrelated TXT RRs in an RRset.

From ajs@shinkuro.com  Thu Dec 23 08:20:50 2010
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On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 04:09:18PM +0000, Paul Vixie wrote:
> else can be.  this is a systemic weakness in the dns design, and if we'd
> been thinking correctly we would have added subclassing instead.  it's not
> too late to think about what we want dns to really be. 

I fully agree that proposals for subclassing belong here.  Maybe I
misunderstood Jay's suggestion, but I didn't think that's what he was
making.  Nevertheless, if people have plans for some sort of
subclassing mechanism, yes, I think it's completely on-topic here and
that this is the audience for how that ought to work.  (I still think
finding out whether the application users of the data want that
support is important.  The sound of crickets in response to our pleas
for input on aliasing has tended to make me think -- even more than I
used to -- that adding features to solve a problem that we don't
ourselves have is not a good idea.)

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.

From ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net  Thu Dec 23 08:53:38 2010
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troll daily nutritional requirements are met in another mailing list.


On 12/23/10 9:20 AM, Lawrence Conroy wrote:
>
> On 23 Dec 2010, at 13:57, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
>> +1 that a zone policy pointer, with or without registry-thingee-ness tending towards icann policy and joy, is of some utility, and
>
> To which I reply:
> Hi Eric, folks,
>   Are you suggesting that "icann policy" and "joy" are two discrete items, or mutually exclusive?
> More important ...
>   are you really sure you want to engage in a dialogue with icann policy stakeholders?
> (at least to find out what they want?)
>
> all the best,
>    Lawrence
>
>


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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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On 23 Dec 2010, at 16:55, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
> troll daily nutritional requirements are met in another mailing list.
>=20
>=20
> On 12/23/10 9:20 AM, Lawrence Conroy wrote:
>>=20
>> On 23 Dec 2010, at 13:57, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
>>> +1 that a zone policy pointer, with or without registry-thingee-ness =
tending towards icann policy and joy, is of some utility, and
>>=20
>> To which I reply:
>> Hi Eric, folks,
>>  Are you suggesting that "icann policy" and "joy" are two discrete =
items, or mutually exclusive?
>> More important ...
>>  are you really sure you want to engage in a dialogue with icann =
policy stakeholders?
>> (at least to find out what they want?)
>>=20
>> all the best,
>>   Lawrence

To which I reply:
OK -- to phrase it another way, I disagree with the way this appeared to =
be going (from Jay's original proposal).

I do not for a moment believe that this WG (or any other, or the IESG, =
or IAB) is going to be able to stop folk using existing RRs for their =
own purposes. or be able to decide what is a policy and what isn't. See =
the keyassure ML for proof (but not, of course, proof of trolls).

I am a load happier with Andrew's later response that this does not =
envisage "engaging", for the very reasons (e.g. aliases) he gave.

but ...
If this is just a pointer out to some other resource specifying =
policies, what's wrong with just provisioning a NAPTR with a pointer to =
an XML document on a server? No change to DNS needed. Others get to =
"engage" in specifying the XML schema.

If you really want to do some work, produce a semi-cloned RR with a new =
RR type that is only used to point to policy documents.

Why is anything else needed?
Otherwise, this seems to be just another occasional spasm over "misuse" =
of the DNS, without an incontrovertible basis.

atb,  L






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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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I have been working on ways to make subclassing work. For a more detailed
exposition, please look at my posts in DANE (formerly keyassure).

Note that since most of my current work builds on DNSSEC, my interest in
subclassing is mostly limited to using it for distinguishing records by
protocol. In DKIM and SPF the protocol had to work with legacy DNS servers
and so the lack of support for unknown RRs was significant. If we are
building on an assumption of using DNSSEC, we can assume that the server
supports insertion of unknown RRs. So unless the process for getting new RRs
assigned proves to be unworkable, I prefer to use a new RR.


The basic limitation of sub-classing is that a given record can be used with
aliasing and/or wildcards or with subclass prefixes but not both.


So the general scheme I am using in my revised extended discovery scheme
combines two records

RR-A  may be wildcarded and aliased but not subclassed.
RR-B is always subclassed and must be applied to a canonical name.


So imagine that we have a zone as follows:

$origin example.com
.                          RR-A   "Global policy"
.                          RR-A   "Lookup SRV & ESRV"
www                        CNAME  example.com
*                          CNAME  example.com
_http._tcp.example.com     RR-B   "Protocol policy"
_http._tcp.example.com     SRV   1 1 80 h1.example.com
_http._tcp.h1.example.com  RR-B  "host policy"

The discovery chain always starts with a non-subclassed lookup for RR-A.

If we lookup example.com we get the RR-As. If we lookup www.example.com we
get a CNAME plus the RR-As and if we lookup anything else we get the RR-As
plus a wildcard CNAME.

But after this lookup we are guaranteed a canonical name. Or at the very
least it is not our fault if the name is not canonical and this causes the
DNS resolution to fail.

We can then use protocol level subclassing and even protocol+host level
subclassing without the issues that using direct subclassing would incur.


The main drawback to this approach is that it does require the use of two
records or else wildcarding is going to cause problems. If there is a
wildcard on RR-A it is going to be returned as protocol detail and that is
going to result in a lot of fixup code to avoid unexpected results.


On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 4:09 PM, Paul Vixie <vixie@isc.org> wrote:

> > Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2010 07:59:29 -0500
> > From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
> >
> > On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 11:51:54AM +1300, Jay Daley wrote:
>
> > > So I would propose that we have a mechanism for pushing this policy
> > > away from DNS but using the DNS to point to the location.
> >
> > I'm not actually convinced that you have the right audience on this
> > list.  But the audience I think _is_ right has not been interested in
> > proposals of this sort.
> > ...
>
> well, we could certainly benefit from subclassing that wasn't affected by
> zone cuts.  to have done this right in dnssec we could have had to say
> aaaa.rrsig._dnssec.www.example.com and ds.www._dnssec.example.com, noting
> that the _dnssec marker is *after* the delegation point name in the parent,
> just to keep this data both "in the parent" and "not in the same node".  to
> avoid this fought a harder and longer battle which was to change the model
> for delegation and allow a DS RR to be in the parent even though nothing
> else can be.  this is a systemic weakness in the dns design, and if we'd
> been thinking correctly we would have added subclassing instead.  it's not
> too late to think about what we want dns to really be.  i don't like TXT
> for stuff like SPF even though i do understand why people use it.  since
> that's how new apps (like kaminsky's tlssec work) are going to occur, this
> is the working group where we ought to help them not break dns with lots
> and lots of large unsubclassable and unrelated TXT RRs in an RRset.
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

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I have been working on ways to make subclassing work. For a more detailed e=
xposition, please look at my posts in DANE (formerly keyassure).<div><div><=
div><br></div><div>Note that since most of my current work builds on DNSSEC=
, my interest in subclassing is mostly limited to using it for distinguishi=
ng records by protocol. In DKIM and SPF the protocol had to work with legac=
y DNS servers and so the lack of support for unknown RRs was significant. I=
f we are building on an assumption of using DNSSEC, we can assume that the =
server supports insertion of unknown RRs. So unless the process for getting=
 new RRs assigned proves to be unworkable, I prefer to use a new RR.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The basic limitation of sub-classing is =
that a given record can be used with aliasing and/or wildcards or with subc=
lass prefixes but not both.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>So the =
general scheme I am using in my revised extended discovery scheme combines =
two records</div>
<div><br></div><div>RR-A =A0may be wildcarded and aliased but not subclasse=
d.</div><div>RR-B is always subclassed and must be applied to a canonical n=
ame.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>So imagine that we have a zone=
 as follows:</div>
<div><br></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier n=
ew&#39;, monospace">$origin <a href=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a><=
/font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&=
#39;, monospace">. =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0RR-A =
=A0 &quot;Global policy&quot;</font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace">. =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0RR-A =A0 &quot;Lo=
okup SRV &amp; ESRV&quot;</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span"=
 face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">www =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0=A0</font=
><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: &#39;courier new&#3=
9;, monospace; ">=A0=A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 CNAME =A0<a href=3D"http://exam=
ple.com">example.com</a></span></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace">* =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0CNAME =A0<a href=
=3D"http://example.com">example.com</a></font></div><div><font class=3D"App=
le-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">_http._<a href=3D"=
http://tcp.example.com">tcp.example.com</a> =A0 =A0 RR-B =A0 &quot;Protocol=
 policy&quot;</font></div>
<div><font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monosp=
ace">_http._<a href=3D"http://tcp.example.com">tcp.example.com</a> =A0 =A0 =
SRV =A0 1 1 80 <a href=3D"http://h1.example.com">h1.example.com</a></font><=
/div><div>
<font class=3D"Apple-style-span" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace">=
_http._<a href=3D"http://tcp.h1.example.com">tcp.h1.example.com</a> =A0RR-B=
 =A0&quot;host policy&quot;</font></div><div><font class=3D"Apple-style-spa=
n" face=3D"&#39;courier new&#39;, monospace"><br>
</font></div><div>The discovery chain always starts with a non-subclassed l=
ookup for RR-A.</div><div><br></div><div>If we lookup <a href=3D"http://exa=
mple.com">example.com</a> we get the RR-As. If we lookup <a href=3D"http://=
www.example.com">www.example.com</a> we get a CNAME plus the RR-As and if w=
e lookup anything else we get the RR-As plus a wildcard CNAME.</div>
<div><br></div><div>But after this lookup we are guaranteed a canonical nam=
e. Or at the very least it is not our fault if the name is not canonical an=
d this causes the DNS resolution to fail.</div><div><br></div><div>We can t=
hen use protocol level subclassing and even protocol+host level subclassing=
 without the issues that using direct subclassing would incur.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The main drawback to this approach is th=
at it does require the use of two records or else wildcarding is going to c=
ause problems. If there is a wildcard on RR-A it is going to be returned as=
 protocol detail and that is going to result in a lot of fixup code to avoi=
d unexpected results.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Dec 2=
3, 2010 at 4:09 PM, Paul Vixie <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:vixi=
e@isc.org">vixie@isc.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmai=
l_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left=
:1ex;">
&gt; Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2010 07:59:29 -0500<br>
&gt; From: Andrew Sullivan &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ajs@shinkuro.com">ajs@shin=
kuro.com</a>&gt;<br>
<div class=3D"im">&gt;<br>
&gt; On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 11:51:54AM +1300, Jay Daley wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; &gt; So I would propose that we have a mechanism for pushing this poli=
cy<br>
&gt; &gt; away from DNS but using the DNS to point to the location.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I&#39;m not actually convinced that you have the right audience on thi=
s<br>
&gt; list. =A0But the audience I think _is_ right has not been interested i=
n<br>
&gt; proposals of this sort.<br>
</div>&gt; ...<br>
<br>
well, we could certainly benefit from subclassing that wasn&#39;t affected =
by<br>
zone cuts. =A0to have done this right in dnssec we could have had to say<br=
>
aaaa.rrsig._<a href=3D"http://dnssec.www.example.com" target=3D"_blank">dns=
sec.www.example.com</a> and ds.www._<a href=3D"http://dnssec.example.com" t=
arget=3D"_blank">dnssec.example.com</a>, noting<br>
that the _dnssec marker is *after* the delegation point name in the parent,=
<br>
just to keep this data both &quot;in the parent&quot; and &quot;not in the =
same node&quot;. =A0to<br>
avoid this fought a harder and longer battle which was to change the model<=
br>
for delegation and allow a DS RR to be in the parent even though nothing<br=
>
else can be. =A0this is a systemic weakness in the dns design, and if we&#3=
9;d<br>
been thinking correctly we would have added subclassing instead. =A0it&#39;=
s not<br>
too late to think about what we want dns to really be. =A0i don&#39;t like =
TXT<br>
for stuff like SPF even though i do understand why people use it. =A0since<=
br>
that&#39;s how new apps (like kaminsky&#39;s tlssec work) are going to occu=
r, this<br>
is the working group where we ought to help them not break dns with lots<br=
>
and lots of large unsubclassable and unrelated TXT RRs in an RRset.<br>
<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">_________________________________________=
______<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a=
 href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div></div></div>

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References: <20101222045123.50478.qmail@joyce.lan> <82lj3iusby.fsf@mid.bfk.de> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1012220953430.96625@joyce.lan> <AANLkTiks0XzPZ-TyO5=EBdTSUC-HyHmbo1z10r2+N16M@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1012221312090.1717@joyce.lan> <AANLkTimm=X-E7V5jteLm+zRkg02p_jsa233FhzNuqSOJ@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1012230923040.32298@joyce.lan>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2010 17:42:46 +0000
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I don't agree.

I have a whitelist declaration from Google, isn't it likely to be for a  /48
or so?

But more generally, I would like to get away from having to separate out
white and black. Even on a whitelist I would want to block out unroutable
space.



On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 2:23 PM, John R. Levine <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:

> Meta: The semantics are defined in format x at http://blahh
>> Granularity: IPv4 24 bits
>> Granularity: IPv6 12 bits
>> Assertion: IPv4 / Granularity=8 bits / <bitmask> / Unroutable
>> Assertion: IPv6 / Granularity=8 bits / <bitmask> / Unroutable
>>
>
> My original thought was something like that.
>
> It fails completely for whitelists, which by their nature include single
> addresses.
>
>
> Regards,
> John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for
> Dummies",
> Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e642d388d38b8504981765af
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I don&#39;t agree.<div><br></div><div><meta charset=3D"utf-8">I have a whit=
elist declaration from Google, isn&#39;t it likely to be for a =A0/48 or so=
?</div><div><br></div><div>But more generally, I would like to get away fro=
m having to separate out white and black. Even on a whitelist I would want =
to block out unroutable space.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Thu, Dec 23, 2010=
 at 2:23 PM, John R. Levine <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:johnl@i=
ecc.com">johnl@iecc.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail=
_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:=
1ex;">
<div class=3D"im"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .=
8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Meta: The semantics are defined in format x at <a href=3D"http://blahh" tar=
get=3D"_blank">http://blahh</a><br>
Granularity: IPv4 24 bits<br>
Granularity: IPv6 12 bits<br>
Assertion: IPv4 / Granularity=3D8 bits / &lt;bitmask&gt; / Unroutable<br>
Assertion: IPv6 / Granularity=3D8 bits / &lt;bitmask&gt; / Unroutable<br>
</blockquote>
<br></div>
My original thought was something like that.<br>
<br>
It fails completely for whitelists, which by their nature include single ad=
dresses.<div><div></div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
John Levine, <a href=3D"mailto:johnl@iecc.com" target=3D"_blank">johnl@iecc=
.com</a>, Primary Perpetrator of &quot;The Internet for Dummies&quot;,<br>
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. <a href=3D"http=
://jl.ly" target=3D"_blank">http://jl.ly</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a=
 href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e642d388d38b8504981765af--

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Subject: Re: [dnsext] An efficient method to publish ranges of IP addresses in the DNS
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> I have a whitelist declaration from Google, isn't it likely to be for a  /48
> or so?

No, it's individual sending hosts.

> But more generally, I would like to get away from having to separate out
> white and black. Even on a whitelist I would want to block out unroutable
> space.

The people I know who use DNSBLs and DNSWLs have shown little interest in 
complex assertions about what they mean.  If an address is in a DNSBL it's 
bad, if it's in a DNSWL, it's good.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly

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> Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2010 11:22:47 -0500
> From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
> 
> I fully agree that proposals for subclassing belong here.  ...
> Nevertheless, if people have plans for some sort of subclassing
> mechanism, yes, I think it's completely on-topic here and that this is
> the audience for how that ought to work.  (I still think finding out
> whether the application users of the data want that support is
> important.  The sound of crickets in response to our pleas for input
> on aliasing has tended to make me think -- even more than I used to --
> that adding features to solve a problem that we don't ourselves have
> is not a good idea.)

the fact that dns does not offer what people want and need won't be
readily apparent to "us" here in ietf-dnsext, that much is true.
likewise the solutions we may be able to offer won't be readily relevant
to application designers either because they think of dns as frozen or
because they don't want to deal with this working group's cantakerousness.

that sounds like, but need not be, a deadlock.  what's needed is not a
generally agreed problem statement but a generally compelling vision
statement.  that's why i wrote:

>> it's not too late to think about what we want dns to really be. 

it's up to those who know where the limits are AND who know how those
limits have stressed application designers, to describe possible paths
forward.  that's what john's doing with his reputation proposal since he
knows a lot about the reputation industry.  those here asking the
question, "why are you using dns for this at all when rsync would do?"
can be just ignored.  don't debate that point here -- it's a useless waste
of the working group's energy.  either there's a compelling vision or not.

dns has very high inertia due to its installed base.  a simple proposal
like EDNS0 has taken a decade to come anywhere close to a tipping point.
it's possible that we should treat that as a given and never add more to
DNS again unless it's stepwise (like UPDATE or IXFR or NOTIFY) and has
immediate benefits to those who use it and zero costs to those who don't.

so, simple-sounding proposals like "in EDNS2, the RR CLASS field is a
selector within an RRSet, and is no longer a namespace selector or a
zone attribute" fills me with dread and i don't even want to bother to
write it up, not just because of working group cantankerousness but
because i don't know how many more decade-long DNS feature deployment
curves i can ride.

our useful questions are of the form "hey this would be cool and it would
make it easier to do things like XYZ that currently stress the model, does
anybody want to work on it with me?"

From johnl@iecc.com  Thu Dec 23 15:05:42 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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>Given our notable lack of success in learning anything at all about
>what the presumed policy stakeholders think about the "alias" issue,
>I don't believe for a New York minute that we're going to be
>successfun in engaging in dialogue.

Actually, I think we learned pretty well.  They want aliased domains
to be "the same" for an ill-defined version of same that is far beyond
the abilities of any possible tweak to the DNS to provide.

The lesson I take away is that implementing powerful and complex
policy languages is a waste of time, because the only policy
assertions that are generally useful in a large scale environment like
the Internet are quite simple.

Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. http://jl.ly







From lendl@nic.at  Mon Dec 27 02:34:03 2010
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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On 23.12.2010 03:45, Jay Daley wrote:
>
> Say I wanted to state, for host X
> - here is how hosts that conform to Y should connect to me
> - here is how hosts that conform to Z should connect to me
> - here is the default how hosts should connect to me
> - here is how I intend to connect to hosts that conform to A
> - and so on

FYI,

I proposed a scheme to solve these a few years ago in the context of SIP
peering. In hindsight, the proposal was way too ambitious to catch on in
the speermint WG. It also relies on the DDDS, which has its own problems,
especially the selector within the RDATA.

If you want to have a look, check out

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-domain-policy-ddds-02
(the generic framework)

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-speermint-federations-03
(a use-case for federation-based SIP peering)

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-speermint-technical-policy-00
(a use-case similar to what you listed)

There is even running code for this:
http://www.kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules_k/domainpolicy.html
Look for "Usage Scenarios" to see some examples on what could be done with
this approach & code.

----

No, I'm not proposing that this list is taking these drafts up again. I
just hope that they might inspire some other ideas, and if they are just
used to fend off IPR claims in the future, I'm also satisfied.

cheers,

otmar
-- 
// Otmar Lendl <lendl@nic.at>, T: +43 1 5056416 - 33, F: - 933 //

From hallam@gmail.com  Mon Dec 27 03:17:31 2010
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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
To: Otmar Lendl <lendl@nic.at>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Moving policy data away from DNS
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The principle objection to putting policy in the DNS seems to be that doing
so represents a slippery slope and that we might end up with people putting
so much information in their DNS that it 'breaks'.

I don't see any reason that the policy information need go beyond that
needed to establish a sufficient connection to negotiate any additional
parameters that might be needed.

So it is not necessary (at present) to say anything more than 'TLS version
1.0 or better always offered, key is X' as far as TLS configuration goes
since TLS has an adequate mechanism for in-band negotiation of cryptographic
parameters once it is known that it is to be used.

It would be very easy to define a property in an extensible mechanism such
as CAA that would allow for linking to an external policy, but I absolutely
do not see any need to do so at present.


On Mon, Dec 27, 2010 at 10:36 AM, Otmar Lendl <lendl@nic.at> wrote:

> On 23.12.2010 03:45, Jay Daley wrote:
> >
> > Say I wanted to state, for host X
> > - here is how hosts that conform to Y should connect to me
> > - here is how hosts that conform to Z should connect to me
> > - here is the default how hosts should connect to me
> > - here is how I intend to connect to hosts that conform to A
> > - and so on
>
> FYI,
>
> I proposed a scheme to solve these a few years ago in the context of SIP
> peering. In hindsight, the proposal was way too ambitious to catch on in
> the speermint WG. It also relies on the DDDS, which has its own problems,
> especially the selector within the RDATA.
>
> If you want to have a look, check out
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-domain-policy-ddds-02
> (the generic framework)
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-speermint-federations-03
> (a use-case for federation-based SIP peering)
>
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-speermint-technical-policy-00
> (a use-case similar to what you listed)
>
> There is even running code for this:
> http://www.kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules_k/domainpolicy.html
> Look for "Usage Scenarios" to see some examples on what could be done with
> this approach & code.
>
> ----
>
> No, I'm not proposing that this list is taking these drafts up again. I
> just hope that they might inspire some other ideas, and if they are just
> used to fend off IPR claims in the future, I'm also satisfied.
>
> cheers,
>
> otmar
> --
> // Otmar Lendl <lendl@nic.at>, T: +43 1 5056416 - 33, F: - 933 //
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/

--0016e645ab9a9f5c8104986282c6
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The principle objection to putting policy in the DNS seems to be that doing=
 so represents a slippery slope and that we might end up with people puttin=
g so much information in their DNS that it &#39;breaks&#39;.<div><br></div>
<div>I don&#39;t see any reason that the policy information need go beyond =
that needed to establish a sufficient connection to negotiate any additiona=
l parameters that might be needed.</div><div><br></div><div>So it is not ne=
cessary (at present) to say anything more than &#39;TLS version 1.0 or bett=
er always offered, key is X&#39; as far as TLS configuration goes since TLS=
 has an adequate mechanism for in-band negotiation of cryptographic paramet=
ers once it is known that it is to be used.</div>
<div><br></div><div>It would be very easy to define a property in an extens=
ible mechanism such as CAA that would allow for linking to an external poli=
cy, but I absolutely do not see any need to do so at present.=A0</div><div>
<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Mon, Dec 27, 2010 at 10:36 AM, Otmar =
Lendl <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lendl@nic.at">lendl@nic.at</a=
>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<div class=3D"im">On 23.12.2010 03:45, Jay Daley wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Say I wanted to state, for host X<br>
&gt; - here is how hosts that conform to Y should connect to me<br>
&gt; - here is how hosts that conform to Z should connect to me<br>
&gt; - here is the default how hosts should connect to me<br>
&gt; - here is how I intend to connect to hosts that conform to A<br>
&gt; - and so on<br>
<br>
</div>FYI,<br>
<br>
I proposed a scheme to solve these a few years ago in the context of SIP<br=
>
peering. In hindsight, the proposal was way too ambitious to catch on in<br=
>
the speermint WG. It also relies on the DDDS, which has its own problems,<b=
r>
especially the selector within the RDATA.<br>
<br>
If you want to have a look, check out<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-domain-policy-ddds-02" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-domain-policy-ddds-0=
2</a><br>
(the generic framework)<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-speermint-federations-03"=
 target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-speermint-federat=
ions-03</a><br>
(a use-case for federation-based SIP peering)<br>
<br>
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-speermint-technical-polic=
y-00" target=3D"_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-lendl-speermint-te=
chnical-policy-00</a><br>
(a use-case similar to what you listed)<br>
<br>
There is even running code for this:<br>
<a href=3D"http://www.kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules_k/domainpoli=
cy.html" target=3D"_blank">http://www.kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modu=
les_k/domainpolicy.html</a><br>
Look for &quot;Usage Scenarios&quot; to see some examples on what could be =
done with<br>
this approach &amp; code.<br>
<br>
----<br>
<br>
No, I&#39;m not proposing that this list is taking these drafts up again. I=
<br>
just hope that they might inspire some other ideas, and if they are just<br=
>
used to fend off IPR claims in the future, I&#39;m also satisfied.<br>
<br>
cheers,<br>
<br>
otmar<br>
<font color=3D"#888888">--<br>
// Otmar Lendl &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:lendl@nic.at">lendl@nic.at</a>&gt;, T:=
 +43 1 5056416 - 33, F: - 933 //<br>
</font><div><div></div><div class=3D"h5">__________________________________=
_____________<br>
dnsext mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=3D"_blank">=
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><br>-- <br>Website: <a=
 href=3D"http://hallambaker.com/">http://hallambaker.com/</a><br><br>
</div>

--0016e645ab9a9f5c8104986282c6--

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From: Adrian Stanger <adstanger@yahoo.com>
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Subject: [dnsext] Re. Adotping draft: draft-hoffman-ecdsa-dnssec-04.txt
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I have read the draft and encourage adoption.

Adrian Stanger


      

From Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz  Thu Dec 30 11:34:01 2010
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With the end of the decade drawing close, I finally had time to look at this:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hoffman-dnssec-ecdsa-04

This should be adopted and edited by the WG.

Some first blush notes - it needs some support for these claims:

"Currently, the most popular signature algorithm is RSA with SHA-1, 
using keys 1024 or 2048 bits long."

I don't think that is a relevant point, so maybe there's no need to 
add a reference.  But if it sticks, as Wikipedia says "This article 
lacks inline citations.  Please help improve this article by 
introducing appropriate citations to additional sources."

Another example is the claim:

"Current estimates are that ECDSA with curve P-256 has an approximate 
equivalent strength to RSA with 3072-bit keys."

The notion of cryptographic strength is one that should be something 
I can find in a referenced document somewhere.

I welcome the definition of additional algorithms for DNSSEC.  But as 
an DNS engineer, don't expect me no know anything about cryptography. 
IOW, if a 3072 bit elliptical curve key was as strong as a normal RSA 
key of 100 bits, I'd welcome the definition.

I just wouldn't use it.

Seriously - what I am asking for are more references in the text, 
enough that this document could stand on it's own and I wouldn't need 
a background in cryptography to believe the arguments and claims made.
-- 
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Edward Lewis             
NeuStar                    You can leave a voice message at +1-571-434-5468

The 21st Century is 10% complete.

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Subject: [dnsext] Checking RRSIG RR validity
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Hi,

In section 5.3.1 of RFC 4035 :

  The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the name of the zone
  that contains the RRset.

  The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY
  RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7)
  set.

My question is with respect to the first two MUSTs: "MUST be the name
of the zone" and "MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset".
What does a validating stub resolver (that uses recursive query mode)
expected to do for implementing these two MUSTs ?

Thanks

Sean

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Hi,<div><br></div><div>In section 5.3.1 of RFC 4035 :</div><div><br></div><=
div><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: Times; font-size=
: medium; "><pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap; "> =
 The RRSIG RR&#39;s Signer&#39;s Name field MUST be the name of the zone
  that contains the RRset.</pre><pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-=
space: pre-wrap; "><span class=3D"Apple-style-span" style=3D"font-family: T=
imes; white-space: normal; "><pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-spa=
ce: pre-wrap; ">
  The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in the zone&#39;s apex DNSKEY
  RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7)
  set.</pre><pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap; ">M=
y question is with respect to the first two MUSTs:=A0&quot;MUST be the name=
 of the zone&quot; and &quot;MUST be present in the zone&#39;s apex DNSKEY =
RRset&quot;. What does a validating stub resolver (that uses recursive quer=
y mode) expected to do for implementing these two MUSTs ?</pre>
<pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap; ">Thanks</pre><=
pre style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap; ">Sean</pre></sp=
an></pre></span></div>

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From Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr  Fri Dec 31 09:06:54 2010
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From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>
To: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
In-reply-to: Your message of Fri, 31 Dec 2010 08:54:38 PST. <AANLkTinkmbx7yaTcd6P9sBryzQa7An2FMCS8aFk7jhb7@mail.gmail.com> 
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Checking RRSIG RR validity
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

   In section 5.3.1 of RFC 4035 :
   
     The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the name of the zone
     that contains the RRset.
   
     The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY
     RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7)
     set.
   
   What does a validating stub resolver (that uses recursive query mode)
   expected to do for implementing these two MUSTs ?
   
=> yes of course: there is a trivial attack if the first is not done
and possible (i.e., sure) confusion with other DNSKEY RR usages for
the second.

Happy New Year!

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

From george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk  Fri Dec 31 09:54:53 2010
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From: "George Barwood" <george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk>
To: "Sean Wells" <snwells82@gmail.com>, <dnsext@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Checking RRSIG RR validity
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I agree the standard is not explicit here. These are my thoughts on =
this:

Checking Signer Name in RRSIG record

The standard is not very clear on how the Signer Name in an RRSIG record =
is checked. It simply says "The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be =
the name of the zone that contains the RRset." ( RFC4035, section 5.3.1 =
)

Unfortunately a validating resolver does not know the zone in a secure =
way, so it's unclear how this is to be implemented.

Instead, the actual checks need to be:

(1) The Signers name must be equal to or a direct ancestor of the Owner =
of the RRSIG.

(2) If TypeCovered is DS, the Signers name must not be equal to the =
Owner of the RRSIG.

(3) The Signers name must not be above the Active trust anchor.

Optionally, for types that can only occur signed in the zone apex ( SOA, =
NS, DNSKEY, NSEC3PARAM ) an additional check that the Signers name is =
equal to the Owner of the RRSIG can be performed.

>From =
http://www.george-barwood.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/DnsServer/NotesOnDNSSSEC.h=
tm

Regards,
George
  ----- Original Message -----=20
  From: Sean Wells=20
  To: dnsext@ietf.org=20
  Sent: Friday, December 31, 2010 4:54 PM
  Subject: [dnsext] Checking RRSIG RR validity


  Hi,


  In section 5.3.1 of RFC 4035 :


  The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the name of the zone
  that contains the RRset.  The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in =
the zone's apex DNSKEY
  RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7)
  set.My question is with respect to the first two MUSTs: "MUST be the =
name of the zone" and "MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset". =
What does a validating stub resolver (that uses recursive query mode) =
expected to do for implementing these two MUSTs ?
ThanksSean

-------------------------------------------------------------------------=
-----


  _______________________________________________
  dnsext mailing list
  dnsext@ietf.org
  https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext

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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" =
http-equiv=3DContent-Type>
<META name=3DGENERATOR content=3D"MSHTML 8.00.6001.18999">
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>I agree the standard is not explicit =
here. These=20
are my thoughts on this:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT><FONT size=3D2 =
face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>Checking Signer Name in RRSIG =
record</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>The standard is not very clear on how =
the Signer=20
Name in an RRSIG record is checked. It simply says "The RRSIG RR's =
Signer's Name=20
field MUST be the name of the zone that contains the RRset." ( RFC4035, =
section=20
5.3.1 )</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>Unfortunately a validating resolver =
does not know=20
the zone in a secure way, so it's unclear how this is to be=20
implemented.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>Instead, the actual checks need to =
be:</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>(1) The Signers name must be equal to =
or a direct=20
ancestor of the Owner of the RRSIG.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>(2) If TypeCovered is DS, the Signers =
name must not=20
be equal to the Owner of the RRSIG.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>(3) The Signers name must not be above =
the Active=20
trust anchor.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>Optionally, for types that can only =
occur signed in=20
the zone apex ( SOA, NS, DNSKEY, NSEC3PARAM ) an additional check that =
the=20
Signers name is equal to the Owner of the RRSIG can be =
performed.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>From <A=20
href=3D"http://www.george-barwood.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/DnsServer/NotesOnD=
NSSSEC.htm"><FONT=20
size=3D3=20
face=3D"Times New =
Roman">http://www.george-barwood.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/DnsServer/NotesOnDN=
SSSEC.htm</FONT></A></FONT></DIV></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>Regards,</FONT></DIV>
<DIV><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>George</FONT></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"BORDER-LEFT: #000000 2px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; =
PADDING-RIGHT: 0px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </DIV>
  <DIV=20
  style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial; BACKGROUND: #e4e4e4; font-color: =
black"><B>From:</B>=20
  <A title=3Dsnwells82@gmail.com =
href=3D"mailto:snwells82@gmail.com">Sean Wells</A>=20
  </DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>To:</B> <A title=3Ddnsext@ietf.org=20
  href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org">dnsext@ietf.org</A> </DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Sent:</B> Friday, December 31, 2010 =
4:54=20
  PM</DIV>
  <DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"><B>Subject:</B> [dnsext] Checking =
RRSIG RR=20
  validity</DIV>
  <DIV><BR></DIV>Hi,
  <DIV><BR></DIV>
  <DIV>In section 5.3.1 of RFC 4035 :</DIV>
  <DIV><BR></DIV>
  <DIV><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Times; FONT-SIZE: medium"=20
  class=3DApple-style-span><PRE style=3D"WORD-WRAP: break-word; =
WHITE-SPACE: pre-wrap">  The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the =
name of the zone
  that contains the RRset.</PRE><PRE style=3D"WORD-WRAP: break-word; =
WHITE-SPACE: pre-wrap"><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Times; WHITE-SPACE: =
normal" class=3DApple-style-span><PRE style=3D"WORD-WRAP: break-word; =
WHITE-SPACE: pre-wrap">  The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in the =
zone's apex DNSKEY
  RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7)
  set.</PRE><PRE style=3D"WORD-WRAP: break-word; WHITE-SPACE: =
pre-wrap">My question is with respect to the first two MUSTs:&nbsp;"MUST =
be the name of the zone" and "MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY =
RRset". What does a validating stub resolver (that uses recursive query =
mode) expected to do for implementing these two MUSTs ?</PRE>
<PRE style=3D"WORD-WRAP: break-word; WHITE-SPACE: =
pre-wrap">Thanks</PRE><PRE style=3D"WORD-WRAP: break-word; WHITE-SPACE: =
pre-wrap">Sean</PRE></SPAN></PRE></SPAN></DIV>
  <P>
  <HR>

  <P></P>_______________________________________________<BR>dnsext =
mailing=20
  =
list<BR>dnsext@ietf.org<BR>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext<B=
R></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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From: Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Checking RRSIG RR validity
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On Fri, Dec 31, 2010 at 9:55 AM, George Barwood <
george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk> wrote:

>  I agree the standard is not explicit here. These are my thoughts on this=
:
>
> Checking Signer Name in RRSIG record
>
> The standard is not very clear on how the Signer Name in an RRSIG record =
is
> checked. It simply says "The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the n=
ame
> of the zone that contains the RRset." ( RFC4035, section 5.3.1 )
>
> Unfortunately a validating resolver does not know the zone in a secure wa=
y,
> so it's unclear how this is to be implemented.
>
>
That is exactly my issue.


> Instead, the actual checks need to be:
>
> (1) The Signers name must be equal to or a direct ancestor of the Owner o=
f
> the RRSIG.
>
> (2) If TypeCovered is DS, the Signers name must not be equal to the Owner
> of the RRSIG.
>
> (3) The Signers name must not be above the Active trust anchor.
>
> Optionally, for types that can only occur signed in the zone apex ( SOA,
> NS, DNSKEY, NSEC3PARAM ) an additional check that the Signers name is equ=
al
> to the Owner of the RRSIG can be performed.
>
>  From
> http://www.george-barwood.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/DnsServer/NotesOnDNSSSEC.h=
tm
>
>
thanks. Perhaps, it would be good to clarify this in the Clarifications
document ? (assuming there is consensus).

-mohan

> Regards,
> George
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Sean Wells <snwells82@gmail.com>
> *To:* dnsext@ietf.org
> *Sent:* Friday, December 31, 2010 4:54 PM
> *Subject:* [dnsext] Checking RRSIG RR validity
>
> Hi,
>
> In section 5.3.1 of RFC 4035 :
>
>   The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the name of the zone
>   that contains the RRset.
>
>   The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY
>   RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7)
>   set.
>
> My question is with respect to the first two MUSTs: "MUST be the name of =
the zone" and "MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset". What does =
a validating stub resolver (that uses recursive query mode) expected to do =
for implementing these two MUSTs ?
>
> Thanks
>
> Sean
>
>  ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> dnsext mailing list
> dnsext@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext
>
>

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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<br><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Fri, Dec 31, 2010 at 9:55 AM, George =
Barwood <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:george.barwood@blueyonder.c=
o.uk">george.barwood@blueyonder.co.uk</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid=
;padding-left:1ex;">






<div bgcolor=3D"#ffffff">
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">I agree the standard is not explicit h=
ere. These=20
are my thoughts on this:</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"=
></font>=A0</div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">Checking Signer Name in RRSIG record</=
font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">The standard is not very clear on how =
the Signer=20
Name in an RRSIG record is checked. It simply says &quot;The RRSIG RR&#39;s=
 Signer&#39;s Name=20
field MUST be the name of the zone that contains the RRset.&quot; ( RFC4035=
, section=20
5.3.1 )</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">Unfortunately a validating resolver do=
es not know=20
the zone in a secure way, so it&#39;s unclear how this is to be=20
implemented.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div></div></blockquote><di=
v>That is exactly my issue.</div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1e=
x;"><div bgcolor=3D"#ffffff">

<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">Instead, the actual checks need to be:=
</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">(1) The Signers name must be equal to =
or a direct=20
ancestor of the Owner of the RRSIG.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">(2) If TypeCovered is DS, the Signers =
name must not=20
be equal to the Owner of the RRSIG.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">(3) The Signers name must not be above=
 the Active=20
trust anchor.</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">Optionally, for types that can only oc=
cur signed in=20
the zone apex ( SOA, NS, DNSKEY, NSEC3PARAM ) an additional check that the=
=20
Signers name is equal to the Owner of the RRSIG can be performed.</font></d=
iv>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div>
<div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">From <a href=3D"http://www.george-barw=
ood.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/DnsServer/NotesOnDNSSSEC.htm" target=3D"_blank"><f=
ont size=3D"3" face=3D"Times New Roman">http://www.george-barwood.pwp.bluey=
onder.co.uk/DnsServer/NotesOnDNSSSEC.htm</font></a></font></div>
</div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial"></font>=A0</div></div></blockquote><di=
v>thanks. Perhaps, it would be good to clarify this in the Clarifications d=
ocument ? (assuming there is consensus).</div><div><br></div><div>-mohan=A0=
</div>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div bgcolor=3D"#ffffff">
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">Regards,</font></div>
<div><font size=3D"2" face=3D"Arial">George</font></div>
<blockquote style=3D"border-left:#000000 2px solid;padding-left:5px;padding=
-right:0px;margin-left:5px;margin-right:0px"><div><div></div><div class=3D"=
h5">
  <div style=3D"font:10pt arial">----- Original Message ----- </div>
  <div style=3D"font:10pt arial;background:#e4e4e4"><b>From:</b>=20
  <a title=3D"snwells82@gmail.com" href=3D"mailto:snwells82@gmail.com" targ=
et=3D"_blank">Sean Wells</a>=20
  </div>
  <div style=3D"font:10pt arial"><b>To:</b> <a title=3D"dnsext@ietf.org" hr=
ef=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">dnsext@ietf.org</a> </div>
  <div style=3D"font:10pt arial"><b>Sent:</b> Friday, December 31, 2010 4:5=
4=20
  PM</div>
  <div style=3D"font:10pt arial"><b>Subject:</b> [dnsext] Checking RRSIG RR=
=20
  validity</div>
  <div><br></div>Hi,
  <div><br></div>
  <div>In section 5.3.1 of RFC 4035 :</div>
  <div><br></div>
  <div><span style=3D"font-family:Times;font-size:medium"><pre style=3D"wor=
d-wrap:break-word;white-space:pre-wrap">  The RRSIG RR&#39;s Signer&#39;s N=
ame field MUST be the name of the zone
  that contains the RRset.</pre><pre style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;white-sp=
ace:pre-wrap"><span style=3D"font-family:Times;white-space:normal"><pre sty=
le=3D"word-wrap:break-word;white-space:pre-wrap">  The matching DNSKEY RR M=
UST be present in the zone&#39;s apex DNSKEY
  RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7)
  set.</pre><pre style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;white-space:pre-wrap">My que=
stion is with respect to the first two MUSTs:=A0&quot;MUST be the name of t=
he zone&quot; and &quot;MUST be present in the zone&#39;s apex DNSKEY RRset=
&quot;. What does a validating stub resolver (that uses recursive query mod=
e) expected to do for implementing these two MUSTs ?</pre>

<pre style=3D"word-wrap:break-word;white-space:pre-wrap">Thanks</pre><pre s=
tyle=3D"word-wrap:break-word;white-space:pre-wrap">Sean</pre></span></pre><=
/span></div>
  </div></div><p>
  </p><hr>

  <p></p>_______________________________________________<br>dnsext mailing=
=20
  list<br><a href=3D"mailto:dnsext@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">dnsext@ietf.=
org</a><br><a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext</a><br><p></p></bl=
ockquote>
</div>
</blockquote></div><br>

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