Subject: [Dots] draft-use-cases-09b.

From: "Roland Dobbins" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 03 Nov 2017 21:34:14 +0700

This beta of -09 incorporates feedback from Kathleen Moriarty, Roman 
Danyliw, Daniel Migault, and Artyom Gavrichenkov.

As always, feedback is welcome.  In particular, feedback on the utility 
of Section 3.2.2,  'Home Network DDoS Detection Collaboration for ISP 
network management', would be greatly appreciated!

-----

DOTS                                                          R. Dobbins
Internet-Draft                                            Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational                                D. Migault
Expires: May 7, 2018                                            Ericsson
                                                                S. 
Fouant

                                                             R. 
Moskowitz
                                                           HTT 
Consulting
                                                                N. 
Teague
                                                                 Verisign
                                                                   L. 
Xia
                                                                   Huawei
                                                             K. 
Nishizuka
                                                       NTT 
Communications
                                                        November 03, 
2017

                 Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
                       draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-09b

Abstract

    The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide 
a
    protocol to facilitate interoperability between multivendor DDoS
    mitigation solutions and services.  This document presents use cases
    which describe the interactions expected between the DOTS components
    as well as DOTS messaging exchanges.  The purpose of describing use
    cases is to identify the interacting DOTS components, how they
    collaborate and what are the types of information to be exchanged.

Status of This Memo

    This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
    provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
    working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
    Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six 
months
    and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

    This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2018.

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Copyright Notice

    Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.

    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with 
respect
    to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
    include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
    the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
    described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

    1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
3
    2.  Terminology and Acronyms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
4
      2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
4
    3.  Use Cases Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
4
      3.1.  Inter-domain Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
5
        3.1.1.  End-customer with a single upstream transit provider
                offering DDoS mitigation services . . . . . . . . . .   
5
        3.1.2.  End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers
                offering DDoS mitigation services . . . . . . . . . .   
6
        3.1.3.  End-customer with multiple upstream transit
                providers, but only a single upstream transit
                provider offering DDoS mitigation services  . . . . .   
7
        3.1.4.  End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed
                security service provider (MSSP)  . . . . . . . . . .   
8
        3.1.5.  End-customer operating an application or service with
                an integrated DOTS client . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   
9
        3.1.6.  End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure
                device with an integrated DOTS client . . . . . . . .   
9
        3.1.7.  End-customer with an out-of-band smartphone
                application featuring DOTS client capabilities  . . .  
10
        3.1.8.  MSSP as an end-customer requesting overflow DDoS
                mitigation assistance from other MSSPs  . . . . . . .  
10
        3.1.9.  End-customer with an upstream transit provider or
                overly MSSP providing DDoS mitigation services on an
                ongoing basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
11
        3.1.10. End-customer with an upstream transit provider or
                overly MSSP providing DDoS mitigation services, but
                DDoS mitigation service is refused  . . . . . . . . .  
11
      3.2.  Intra-domain Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
12
        3.2.1.  Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from
                a consumer broadband access network . . . . . . . . .  
12

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        3.2.2.  Home Network DDoS Detection Collaboration for ISP
                network management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
14
        3.2.3.  DDoS Orchestration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
17
    4.  Overview of DOTS Messaging Interactions During a DDoS
        Mitigation Session  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
19
      4.1.  Successful DOTS DDoS Mitigation Request Example . . . . .  
19
      4.2.  Unsuccessful DOTS DDoS Mitigation Request Example . . . .  
21
    5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
22
    6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
23
    7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
23
    8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
23
      8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
23
      8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
23
    Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
23

1.  Introduction

    Currently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation
    solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary communications
    schemes which result in vendor lock-in.  As a side-effect, this 
makes
    the configuration, provisioning, operation, and activation of these
    solutions a highly manual and often time-consuming process.
    Additionally, coordination of multiple DDoS mitigation solutions
    simultaneously engaged in defending the same organization 
(resources)
    against DDoS attacks is fraught with both technical and process-
    related hurdles.  This greatly increase operational complexity and
    often results in suboptimal DDoS attack mitigation efficacy.

    The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify 
a
    protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor DDoS
    mitigation solutions and ensures more automation in term of
    mitigation requests and attack characterization patterns.  As DDoS
    solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the primary goal
    of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst differeing DDoS
    solutions, such as initiating or terminating DDoS mitigation
    assistance.

    It should be noted that DOTS is not intended toperform orchestration
    functions; rather, DOTS is intended to allowdevices, services, and
    applications to request DDoS attack mitigation assistance and 
receive
    mitigation status updates.

    These use cases are expected to provide inputs for the design of the
    DOTS protocol(s).

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2.  Terminology and Acronyms

    This document makes use of the terms defined in
    [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

    In addition, this document introduces the following terms:

      Inter-domain: a DOTS communications relationship between distinct
      organizations with separate spans of administrative control.
      Typical inter-domain DOTS communication relationships would be
      between a DDoS mitigation service provider and an end-customer who
      requires DDoS mitigation assistance; between multiple DDoS
      mitigation service providers coordinating mutual defense of a
      mutual end-customer; or between DDoS mitigation service providers
      which are requesting additional DDoS mitigation assistance in for
      attacks which exceed their inherent DDoS mitigation capacities
      and/or capabilities.

      Intra-domain: a DOTS communications relationship between various
      (network) elements that are owned and operated by the same
      administrative entity.  A typical intra-domain DOTS communications
      relationship would be between DOTS agents [I-D.ietf-dots-
      requirements] within the same organization.

2.1.  Requirements Terminology

    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  Use Cases Scenarios

    This section provides a high-level description of scenarios 
addressed
    by DOTS.  In both sub-sections, the scenarios are provided in order
    to illustrate the use of DOTS in typical DDoS attack scenarios.  
They
    are not definitive, and other use cases are expected to emerge with
    widespread DOTS deployment.

    All scenarios present a coordination between the targeted
    organization, the DDoS attack telemetry and the mitigator.  The
    coordination and communication between these entities depends, for
    example, on the characteristic or functionality of the entity 
itself,
    the reliability of the information provided by DDoS attack 
telemetry,
    and the business relationship between the DDoS target domain and the
    mitigator.

    More explicitly, in some cases, the DDoS attack telemetry may simply
    activate a DDoS mitigation, whereas in other cases, it may

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    collaborate by providing some information about an attack.  In some
    cases, the DDoS mitigation may be orchestrated, which includes
    selecting a specific appliance as well as starting/ending a
    mitigation.

3.1.  Inter-domain Use Cases

    Inter-domain DOTS deployment scenarios encompass two or more 
distinct
    spans of administrative control.  A typical inter-domain DOTS
    deployment may consist of an endpoint network such as an Internet-
    connected enterprise requesting DDoS mitigation assistance from one
    or more upstream transit providers offering DDoS mitigation 
services,
    or from a topologically-distant MSSP offering cloud-based overlay
    DDoS mitigation services.  DOTS may also be used to facilitate
    coordination of DDoS mitigation activities between mitigation
    providers.

    Coordination between organizations making use of DOTS in such
    scenarios is necessary.  Along with DOTS-specific tasks such as DOTS
    peering and validating the exchange of DOTS messaging between the
    relevant organizations, externalities relating to routing
    advertisements, authoritative DNS records (for DNS-based diversion),
    network access policies for DOTS nodes, service-level agreements
    (SLAs), and DDoS mitigation provisioning are required.

3.1.1.  End-customer with a single upstream transit provider offering
         DDoS mitigation services

    In this scenario, an enterprise network with self-hosted Internet-
    facing properties such as Web servers, authoritative DNS servers, 
and
    VoIP PBXes has an intelligent DDoS mitigation system (IDMS) deployed
    to protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks.  In
    addition to their on-premise DDoS defense capability, they have
    contracted with their Internet transit provider for DDoS mitigation
    services which threaten to overwhelm their transit link bandwidth.

    The IDMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet traffic
    volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet transit link
    capacity, the IDMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from the
    upstream transit provider.

    The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS mitigation
    between the enterprise IDMS and the transit provider is performed
    using DOTS.  The enterprise IDMS implements a DOTS client while the
    transit provider implements a DOTS server which is integrated with
    their DDoS mitigation orchestration system.

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    When the IDMS detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting the 
enterprise
    servers and applications, it immediately begins mitigating the
    attack.

    During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume exceeds
    the 50% threshold; the IDMS DOTS client signals the DOTS server on
    the upstream transit provider network to initiate DDoS mitigation.
    The DOTS server signals the DOTS client that it can service this
    request, and mitigation is initiated on the transit provider 
network.

    Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server on the transit
    provider network periodically signals the DOTS client on the
    enterprise IDMS in order to provide mitigation status information,
    statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related
    information.  Once the DDoS attack has ended, the DOTS server 
signals
    the enterprise IDMS DOTS client that the attack has subsided.

    The enterprise IDMS then requests that DDoS mitigation services on
    the upstream transit provider network be terminated.  The DOTS 
server
    on the transit provider network receives this request, communicates
    with the transit provider orchestration system controlling its DDoS
    mitigation system to terminate attack mitigation, and once the
    mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS mitigation
    service to the enterprise IDMS DOTS client.

    Note that communications between the enterprise DOTS client and the
    upstream transit provider DOTS server may take place in-band within
    the main Internet transit link between the enterprise and the 
transit
    provider; out-of-band via a separate, dedicated wireline network 
link
    utilized solely for DOTS signaling; or out-of-band via some other
    form of network connectivity such as a third-party wireless 4G
    network link.  An overview of DOTS messaging interactions between 
the
    DOTS client and server in this scenario may be found in Section 4.1.

3.1.2.  End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers offering
         DDoS mitigation services

    This scenario shares many characteristics with Section 3.1.1, but
    with the key difference that the enterprise in question is multi-
    homed, i.e., has two or more upstream transit providers, and that
    they all provide DDoS mitigation services.

    In most cases, the communications model for a multi-homed model 
would
    be the same as in the single-homed model, merely duplicated in
    parallel.  However, if two or more of the upstream transit providers
    have entered into a mutual DDoS mitigation agreement and have
    established DOTS peering relationships, DDoS mitigation status
    messages may exchanged between their respective DOTS servers in 
order

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    to provide a more complete picture of the DDoS attack scope.  This
    will also allow for either automated or operator-assisted
    programmatic cooperative DDoS mitigation activities on the part of
    the DOTS-peered transit providers.

    The DOTS communications between the upstream transit providers will
    consist of mitigation start, mitigation status, and mitigation
    termination messages.

3.1.3.  End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers, but only
         a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation
         services

    This scenario is similar to that outlined in Section 3.1.2; however,
    only one of the upstream transit providers in question offers DDoS
    mitigation services.  In this situation, the enterprise would cease
    advertising the relevant network prefixes via the transit providers
    which do not provide DDoS mitigation services - or, in the case 
where
    the enterprise does not control its own routing, request that the
    upstream transit providers which do not offer DDoS mitigation
    services stop advertising the relevant network prefixes on their
    behalf.

    Once it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ceased, the
    enterprise once again announces the relevant routes to the upstream
    transit providers which do not offer DDoS mitigation services, or
    requests that they resume announcing the relevant routes on behalf 
of
    the enterprise.

    Note that falling back to a single transit provider has the effect 
of
    reducing available inbound transit bandwidth during a DDoS attack.
    Without proper planning and sufficient provisioning of both the link
    capacity and DDoS mitigation capacity of the sole transit provider
    offering DDoS mitigation services, this reduction of available
    bandwidth could lead to network link congestion caused by legitimate
    inbound network traffic.  Therefore, careful planning and
    provisioning of both upstream transit bandwidth as well as DDoS
    mitigation capacity is required in scenarios of this nature.

    The withdrawal and announcement of routing prefixes described in 
this
    use-case falls outside the scope of DOTS, although they could
    conceivably be triggered as a result of provider-specific
    orchestration triggered by the receipt of specific DOTS messages 
from
    the enterprise in question.

    The DOTS communications model for this scenario will be identical to
    that described in Section 3.1.1.

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3.1.4.  End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed security
         service provider (MSSP)

    This use case details an enterprise that has a local DDoS detection
    and classification capability and may or may not have an on-premise
    mitigation capability.  The enterprise is contracted with an overlay
    DDoS mitigation MSSP, topologically distant from the enterprise
    network (i.e., not a direct upstream transit provider), which can
    redirect (divert) traffic away from the enterprise, provide DDoS
    mitigation services services, and then forward (re-inject) 
legitimate
    traffic to the enterprise on an on-demand basis.  In this scenario,
    diversion of Internet traffic destined for the enterprise network
    into the overlay DDoS mitigation MSSP network is typically
    accomplished via eBGP announcements of the relevant enterprise
    network CIDR blocks, or via authoritative DNS subdomain-based
    mechanisms (other mechanisms are not precluded, these are merely the
    most common ones in use today).

    The enterprise determines thresholds at which a request for
    mitigation is triggered indicating to the MSSP that inbound network
    traffic should be diverted into the MSSP network and that DDoS
    mitigation should be initiated.  The enterprise may also elect to
    manually request diversion and mitigation via the MSSP network as
    desired.

    The communications required to initiate, manage, and terminate 
active
    DDoS mitigation by the MSSP is performed using DOTS.  The enterprise
    DDoS detection/classification system implements a DOTS client, while
    the MSSP implements a DOTS server integrated with its DDoS 
mitigation
    orchestration system.  One or more out-of-band methods for 
initiating
    a mitigation request, such as a Web portal, a smartphone app, or
    voice support hotline, may also be made available by the MSSP.

    When an attack is detected, an automated or manual DOTS mitigation
    request is generated by the enterprise and sent to the MSSP.  The
    enterprise DOTS mitigation request is processed by the MSSP DOTS
    server, which validates the origin of the request and passes it to
    the MSSP DDoS mitigation orchestration system, which then initiates
    active DDoS mitigation.  This action will usually involve the
    diversion of all network traffic destined for the targeted 
enterprise
    into the MSSP DDoS mitigation network, where it will be subjected to
    further scrutiny, with DDoS attack traffic filtered by the MSSP.
    Successful mitigation of the DDoS attack will not only result
    preserving the availability of services and applications resident on
    the enterprise network, but will also prevent DDoS attack traffic
    from ingressing the networks of the enterprise upstream transit
    providers and/or peers.

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    The MSSP should signal via DOTS to the enterprise that a mitigation
    request has been received and acted upon, and should also include an
    update of the mitigation status.  The MSSP may respond periodically
    with additional updates on the mitigation status to in order to
    enable the enterprise to make an informed decision on whether to
    maintain or terminate the mitigation.  An alternative approach would
    be for the DOTS client mitigation request to include a time to live
    (TTL) for the mitigation, which may also be extended by the client
    should the attack still be ongoing as the TTL reaches expiration.

    A variation of this use case may be that the enterprise is providing
    a DDoS monitoring and analysis service to customers whose networks
    may be protected by any one of a number of third-party providers.
    The enterprise in question may integrate with these third-party
    providers using DOTS and signal accordingly when a customer is
    attacked - the MSSP may then manage the life-cycle of the attack
    mitigation on behalf of the enterprise.

    The DOTS communication model used in these scenarios will be
    identical to those described in Section 3.1.1 or Section 3.1.2.

3.1.5.  End-customer operating an application or service with an
         integrated DOTS client

    In this scenario, a Web server has a built-in mechanism to detect 
and
    classify DDoS attacks, which also incorporates a DOTS client.  When
    an attack is detected, the self-defense mechanism is activated, and
    local DDoS mitigation is initiated.

    The DOTS client built into the Web server has been configured to
    request DDoS mitigation services from an upstream transit provider 
or
    overlay MSSP once specific attack traffic thresholds have been
    reached, or certain network traffic conditions prevail.  Once the
    specified conditions have been met, the DOTS communications dialogue
    and subsequent DDoS mitigation initiation and termination actions
    described above take place.

    The DOTS communication model used in these scenarios will be
    identical to those described in Section 3.1.1, Section 3.1.2 or
    Section 3.1.4, with the exception that the DOTS client will be the
    application or service in question.

3.1.6.  End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure device with
         an integrated DOTS client

    Similar to the above use-case featuring applications or services 
with
    built-in DDoS attack detection/classification and DOTS client
    capabilities, in this scenario, an end-customer network

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    infrastructure CPE device such as a router, layer-3 switch, 
firewall,
    IDS/IPS, Web application firewall or load-balancer incorporates both
    the functionality required to detect and classify incoming DDoS
    attacks as well as DOTS client functionality.

    The subsequent DOTS communications dialogue and resultant DDoS
    mitigation initiation and termination activities take place as
    described in Section 3.1.1, Section 3.1.2 or Section 3.1.4.

3.1.7.  End-customer with an out-of-band smartphone application
         featuring DOTS client capabilities

    This scenario would typically apply in a small office or home office
    (SOHO) setting, where the end-customer does not have CPE equipment 
or
    software capable of detecting/classifying/mitigating DDoS attack, 
yet
    still has a requirement for on-demand DDoS mitigation services.  A
    smartphone application containing a DOTS client would be provided by
    the upstream transit mitigation provider or overlay DDoS MSSP to the
    SOHO end-customer; this application would allow a manual 'panic-
    button' to request the initiation and termination of DDoS mitigation
    services.

    The DOTS communications dialogue and resultant DDoS mitigation
    initiation/status reporting/termination actions would then take 
place
    as in as described in in Section 3.1.1, Section 3.1.2 or
    Section 3.1.4, with the end-customer DOTS client application serving
    to display received status information while DDoS mitigation
    activities are taking place.

3.1.8.  MSSP as an end-customer requesting overflow DDoS mitigation
         assistance from other MSSPs

    This is a more complex use-case involving multiple DDoS MSSPs,
    whether transit operators, overlay MSSPs, or both.  In this 
scenario,
    an MSSP has entered into a pre-arranged DDoS mitigation assistance
    agreement with one or more other DDoS MSSPs in order to ensure that
    sufficient DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be
    activated in the event that a given DDoS attack threatens to
    overwhelm the ability of a given DDoS MSSP to mitigate the attack on
    its own.

    BGP-based diversion (including relevant Letters of Authorization, or
    LoAs), DNS-based diversion (including relevant LoAs), traffic re-
    injection mechanisms such as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
    tunnels, provisioning of DDoS orchestration systems, et. al,. must 
be
    arranged in advance between the DDoS MSSPs which are parties to the
    agreement.  They should also be tested on a regular basis.

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    When a DDoS MSSP which is party to the agreement is nearing its
    capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack traffic, the 
DOTS
    client integrated with the MSSP DDoS mitigation orchestration system
    signals partner MSSPs to initiate network traffic diversion and DDoS
    mitigation activities.  Ongoing attack and mitigation status 
messages
    may be passed between the DDoS MSSPs, and between the requesting 
MSSP
    and the ultimate end-customer of the attack.

    The DOTS dialogues and resultant DDoS mitigation-related activities
    in this scenario progress as described in the other use-cases
    detailed above.  Once the requesting DDoS MSSP is confident that the
    DDoS attack has either ceased or has fallen to levels of traffic/
    complexity which they can handle on their own, the requesting DDoS
    MSSP DOTS client sends mitigation termination requests to the
    participating overflow DDoS MSSPs.

3.1.9.  End-customer with an upstream transit provider or overly MSSP
         providing DDoS mitigation services on an ongoing basis

    This scenario is similar to that described in Section 3.1.1, except
    that due to the lack of a capable local IDMS solution, strict uptime
    requirements, or other considerations, the end-customer has
    previously arranged for continuous active DDoS mitigation coverage;
    thus, the concepts of initiating or terminating DDoS mitigation
    services do not apply.

    During an attack, the DOTS server on the upstream transit provider
    network immediately notifies the DOTS client on the enterprise
    network about the attack and periodically signals the DOTS client in
    order to provide mitigation status information and related
    information.  The end-customer may then use this information to add
    capacity or implement configuration changes intended to increase
    resilience, to plan maintenance windows or changes to routing
    policies, etc.

3.1.10.  End-customer with an upstream transit provider or overly MSSP
          providing DDoS mitigation services, but DDoS mitigation 
service
          is refused

    This scenario is similar to that described in Section 3.1.1, except
    that the upstream transit provider or MSSP is unable to honor the
    DDoS mitigation service request from the end-customer due to
    mitigation capacity limitations, technical faults, or other
    circumstances.  The end-customer DOTS client may be configured to
    make repeated attempts to engage DDoS mitigation service from the
    refusing provider, or alternately may be configured to request DDoS
    mitigation service from alternate providers.

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    The DOTS communication model for this use case is outlined in
    Section 4.2.

3.2.  Intra-domain Use Cases

    While many of the DOTS-specific elements of inter-domain DOTS
    deployment scenarios apply to intra-domain scenarios, it is expected
    that many externalities such as coordination of and authorization 
for
    routing advertisements and authoritative DNS updates may be 
automated
    to a higher degree than is practicable in inter-domain scenarios,
    given that the scope of required activities and authorizations are
    confined to a single organization.  In theory, provisioning and
    change-control related both to DOTS itself as well as relevant
    externalities may require less administrative overhead and less
    implementation lead-times.

    The scope of potential DDoS mitigation actions may also be broader 
in
    intra-organizational scenarios, as presumably an organization will
    have a higher degree of autonomy with regards to both techically and
    administratively feasible activities.

3.2.1.  Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from a consumer
         broadband access network

    While most DDoS defenses concentrate on inbound DDoS attacks
    ingressing from direct peering links or upstream transit providers,
    the DDoS attack traffic in question originates from one or more
    Internet-connected networks.  In some cases, compromised devices
    residing on the local networks of broadband access customers are 
used
    to directly generate this DDoS attack traffic; in others,
    misconfigured devices residing on said local customer networks are
    exploited by attackers to launch reflection/amplification DDoS
    attacks.  In either scenario, the outbound DDoS traffic emanating
    from these devices can be just as disruptive as an inbound DDoS
    attack, and can cause disruption for substantial proportions of the
    broadband access network operator's customer base.

    Some broadband access network operators provide CPE devices (DSL
    modems/routers, cablemodems, FTTH routers, etc.) to their end-
    customers.  Others allow end-customers to provide their own CPE
    devices.  Many will either provide CPE devices or allow 
end-customers
    to supply their own.

    Broadband access network operators typically have mechanisms to
    detect and classify both inbound and outbound DDoS attacks, 
utilizing
    flow telemetry exported from their peering/transit and customer
    aggregation routers.  In the event of an outbound DDoS attack, they
    may make use of internally-developed systems which leverage their

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    subscriber-management systems to de-provision end-customers who are
    sourcing outbound DDoS traffic; in some cases, they may have
    implemented quarantine systems to block all outbound traffic sourced
    from the offending end-customers.  In either case, the perceived
    disruption of the end-customer's Internet access often prompts a
    help-desk call, which erodes the margins of the broadband access
    provider and can cause end-customer dissatisfaction.

    Increasingly, CPE devices themselves are targeted by attackers who
    exploit security flaws in these devices in order to compromise them
    and subsume them into botnets, and then leverage them to launch
    outbound DDoS attacks.  In all of the described scenarios, the end-
    customers are unaware that their computers and/or CPE devices have
    been compromised and are being used to launch outbound DDoS attacks 
-
    however, they may notice a degradation of their Internet 
connectivity
    as a result of outbound bandwidth consumption or other disruption.

    By deploying DOTS-enabled telemetry systems and CPE devices (and
    possibly requiring DOTS functionality in customer-provided CPE
    devices), broadband access providers can utilize a standards-based
    mechanism to suppress outbound DDoS attack traffic while optionally
    allowing legitimate end-customer traffic to proceed unmolested.

    In order to achieve this capability, the telemetry analysis system
    utilized by the broadband access provider must have DOTS client
    functionality, and the end-customer CPE devices must have DOTS 
server
    functionality.  When the telemetry analysis system detects and
    classifies an outbound DDoS attack sourced from one or more end-
    customer networks/devices, the DOTS client of the telemetry analysis
    system sends a DOTS request to the DOTS server implemented on the 
CPE
    devices, requesting local mitigation assistance in suppressing 
either
    the identified outbound DDoS traffic, or all outbound traffic 
sourced
    from the end-customer networks/devices.  The DOTS server residing
    within the CPE device(s) would then perform predefined actions such
    as implementing on-board access-control lists (ACLs) to suppress the
    outbound traffic in question and prevent it from leaving the local
    end-customer network(s).

    Broadband access network operators may choose to implement a
    quarantine of all or selected network traffic originating from end-
    customer networks/devices which are sourcing outbound DDoS traffic,
    redirecting traffic from interactive applications such as Web
    browsers to an internal portal which informs the end-customer of the
    quarantine action, and providing instructions for self-remediation
    and/or helpdesk contact information.

    Quarantine systems for broadband access networks are typically
    custom-developed and -maintained, and are generally deployed only by

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    a relatively small number of broadband access providers with
    considerable internal software development and support capabilities.
    By requiring the manufacturers of operator-supplied CPE devices to
    implement DOTS server functionality, and requiring customer-provided
    CPE devices to feature DOTS server functionality, broadband access
    network operators who previously could not afford the development
    expense of creating custom quarantine systems to integrate DOTS-
    enabled network telemetry systems to act as DOTS clients and perform
    effective quarantine of end-customer networks and devices until such
    time as they have been remediated.

    The DOTS communications model in this scenario resembles that
    described in Section 3.1.1, except that all the DOTS communications
    take place within the same span of administrative control and the
    same network.

3.2.2.  Home Network DDoS Detection Collaboration for ISP network
         management

    Home networks run with (limited) bandwidth as well as limited 
routing
    resources, while they are expected to provide services reachable 
from
    the outside [RFC7368].  This makes such networks some easy targets 
to
    DDoS attacks via their WAN interface.  As these DDoS attacks are 
easy
    to perform, they may remain undetected by the upstream ISP.  When 
the
    CPE is congested, the customer is likely to call the ISP hotline.  
In
    order to improve the quality of experience of the connectivity as
    well as to automate the request for DDoS mitigation, ISPs are likely
    to consider a standard mean for CPEs to automatically inform a
    dedicated service mitigation platform when they are under a 
suspected
    DDoS.

    Note also that this section only considers DDoS attacks CPE or
    services in the home network are encountering.  This differs from
    DDoS attacks the CPE or any device within the home network may take
    part of - such as botnets.  In the later attacks, the home network
    generates traffic under the control of a botmaster.  Such attacks 
may
    only be detected once the attacks have been characterized.  It would
    be tempting to consider a feature in the DOTS protocol to allow a
    DOTS server to inform a CPE that some suspect traffic is being sent
    by the CPE so that appropriate actions are undertaken by the CPE/
    user.  Nevertheless, this feature would require some interaction 
with
    the CPE administrator.  Such scenario is outside the scope of this
    document.

    In this use case, ISPs are willing to prevent their customer
    undergoing DDoS attacks in order to enhance the quality of 
experience
    of their customers, to avoid unnecessary costly call on hot lines as
    well as to optimize the bandwidth of their network.  A key challenge

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    for the ISP is to detect DDoS attacks.  In fact, DDoS detection is
    not only fine grained but is also expected to be different for each
    home network or small businesses networks (SOHO), and the ISP is
    unlikely to have sufficient resource to inspect the traffic of all
    its customers.

    In order to address these challenges, ISPs are delegating the DDoS
    detection to CPE of home network or SOHO.  Outsourcing the detection
    on the CPE provides the following advantages to the ISP: 1) Avoid 
the
    ISP to dedicate a huge amount of resource for deep packet inspection
    over a large amount of traffic with a specific security policies
    associated to each home network.  It is expected that such traffic
    only constitutes a small fraction of the total traffic the ISP is
    responsible for. 2) DDoS detection is deployed in a scalable way. 3)
    Provide more deterministic DDoS attack detection.  For example, what
    could be suspected to be an UDP flood by the ISP may be consented by
    the terminating point hosted in the home network or SOHO.  In fact,
    without specific home network security policies, the ISP is likely 
to
    detect DDoS attack over regular traffic or to miss DDoS attacks
    targeting a specific home network or CPE.  In the first case, this
    would result in the ISP spending unnecessary resources and in the
    second case this would directly impact the quality of experience of
    the customer.

    Note that in this scenario slightly differs from the "Enterprise 
with
    an upstream transit provider DDoS mitigation Service" scenario
    described in Section 3.1.1.  In this scenario, the detection DDoS is
    motivated by the ISP in order to operate appropriately its network.

    For that purpose, it requires some collaboration with the home
    network.  In Section 3.1.1, the target network requests a mitigation
    service from the upstream transit provider in order to operate its
    services.

    Even though the motivations differ, there are still significant
    advantages for the home network to collaborate.  On the home network
    or SOHO perspective such collaboration provides the following
    advantages: 1) If it removes the flows contributing to a DDoS
    attacks, then it enhances the quality of experience of the users of
    the targeted services or the entire home network. 2) If mitigation 
is
    being handled by the ISP rather then the home network, then it
    reduces the management of DDoS attacks by the network administrator
    which involves detection as well as mitigation as well as the
    provisioning of extra resources. 3) If the DDoS detection is based 
on
    information specific to the home network, such as for example the
    description of the services, the hosts capacities or the network
    topology, then performing the DDoS detection by the home network
    instead of the ISP avoids the home network to leak private

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    information to the ISP.  In that sense, it better preserves the home
    network or SOHO privacy while enabling a better detection.  However,
    the request for mitigation may still leak some informations.  ISPs
    must not retrieve sensitive data without the consent of the user.
    This is usually captured in administrative contracts that are out of
    scope of this document.

    When the CPE suspects an attack, it notifies automatically or the
    ISP.  The contact address of the DDoS Mitigation service of the ISP
    may be hard coded or may be configured manually or automatically
    (e.g., eventually the DHCP server may provide the DDoS mitigation
    service via specific DHCP options).

    The communication to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the home
    network and the ISP is performed using DOTS.  The home network CPE
    implements a DOTS client while the ISP implements a DOTS server.

    The DOTS client on the CPE monitors the status of CPE's resource and
    WAN link bandwidth usage.  If something unusual happens based on
    preconfigured throughput, traffic patter, explicit action from the
    user, or some heuristics methods, the DOTS client sends a DOTS
    mitigation request to the ISP DOTS server.  Typically, a default
    configuration with no additional information associated to the DOTS
    mitigation request is expected.  The ISP derives traffic to mitigate
    from the CPE IP address.

    In some cases, the DOTS mitigation request contains options such as
    some IP addresses or prefixes that belongs to a whitelist or a
    blacklist.  In this case, the white and black lists are not
    associated to some analysis performed by the CPE - as the CPE is
    clearly not expected to analyze such attacks.  Instead these are 
part
    of some configuration parameters.  For example, in the case of small
    business, one may indicate specific legitimate IP addresses such as
    those used for VPNs, or third party services the company is likely 
to
    set a session.  Similarly, the CPE may provide the IP addresses
    targeting the assets to be protected inside the network.  Note that
    the IP address is the IP address used to reach the asset from the
    internet, and as such is expected to be globally routable.  Such
    options may include the IP address as well as a service description.
    Similarly to the previous blacklist and whitelist, such information
    are likely not derived from a traffic analysis performed by the CPE,
    but instead are more related to configuration parameters.

    Upon receiving the DOTS mitigation request, the DOTS server
    acknowledges its reception and confirms DDoS mitigation starts or
    not.  Such feed back is mostly to avoid retransmission of the
    request.

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    Note that the ISP is connected to multiple CPEs and as such the CPE
    can potentially perform DDoS attack to the DOTS server.  ISP may use
    gateways to absorbs the traffic.  These gateways, will typically
    aggregate a smaller number of CPEs and retransmit to the destination
    DOTS Server a selected information.  Note that such gateways may
    somehow act as a DOTS relay, which is implemented with a DOTS Server
    and a DOTS Client.  Note also that the case of a large DDoS attack
    targeting simultaneously multiple CPEs is expected to be detected 
and
    mitigated by the upstream architecture, eventually without DOTS
    alerts sent by each single CPE.

    ISP may activate mitigation for the traffic associated to the CPE
    sending the alert or instead to the traffic associated to all CPE.
    Such decisions are not part of DOTS, but instead depend on the
    policies of the ISP.

    It is unlikely the CPE will follow the status of the mitigation.  
The
    ISP is only expected to inform the CPE the mitigation has been
    stopped.

    Upon receipt of such notification the CPE may, for example, re-
    activate the monitoring jobs and thus is likely to provide some
    further DOTS alert.

3.2.3.  DDoS Orchestration

    In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring
    devices such as a flow telemetry collector monitor a network --
    typically an ISP network.  Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these
    telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of coordinating 
the
    various DDoS mitigation systems within the domain.  The telemetry
    systems may be configured to provide necessary and useful pieces of
    information, such as a preliminary analysis of the observation to 
the
    orchestrator.

    The orchestrator analyses the various information it receives from
    specialized equipement, and elaborates one or multiple DDoS
    mitigation strategies.  In some case, a manual confirmation may also
    be required to choose a proposed strategy or to initiate a DDoS
    mitigation.  The DDoS mitigation may consist of multiple steps such
    as configuring the network, various hardware, or updating already
    instantiated DDoS mitigation functions.  In some cases, some 
specific
    virtual DDoS mitigation functions must be instantiated and properly
    ordered.  Eventually, the coordination of the mitigation may involve
    external DDoS resources such as a transit provider (Section 3.1.1) 
or
    an MSSP (Section 3.1.4).

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    The communications used to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the
    telemetry and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed
    using DOTS.  The telemetry systems implements a DOTS client while 
the
    orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

    The communication between a network administrator and the
    orchestrator is also performed using DOTS.  The network 
administrator
    via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the
    Orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

    The communication between the Orchestrator and the DDoS mitigation
    systems is performed using DOTS.  The Orchestrator implements a DOTS
    client while the DDoS mitigation systems implement a DOTS server.

    The configuration aspects of each DDoS mitigation system, as well as
    the instantiations of DDoS mitigation functions or network
    configuration is not part of DOTS.  Similarly, the discovery of
    available DDoS mitigation functions is not part of DOTS.

               +----------+
               | network  |C
               | adminis  |<-+
               | trator   |  |
               +----------+  |
                             |                       (internal)
               +----------+  | S+--------------+     +-----------+
               |telemetry/|  +->|              |C   S| DDoS      |+
               |monitoring|<--->| Orchestrator |<--->| mitigation||
               |systems   |C   S|              |<-+  | systems   ||
               +----------+     +--------------+C |  +-----------+|
                                                  |    +----------+
                                                  |
                                                  |  (external)
                                                  |  +-----------+
                                                  | S| DDoS      |
                                                  +->| mitigation|
                                                     | systems   |
                                                     +-----------+
               * C is for DOTS client functionality
               * S is for DOTS server functionality

       Figure 1: DDoS Orchestration

    The telemetry systems monitor various traffic network and perform
    their measurement tasks.  They are configured so that when an event
    or some measurements reach a predefined level to report a DOTS

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    mitigation request to the Orchestrator.  The DOTS mitigation request
    may be associated with some element such as specific reporting.

    Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the telemetry
    system, the Orchestrator responds with an acknowledgement, to avoid
    retransmission of the request for mitigation.  The status of the 
DDoS
    mitigation indicates the Orchestrator is in an analysing phase.  The
    Orchestrator begins collecting various information from various
    telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements and provide
    an analysis of the event.  Eventually, the Orchestrator may ask
    additional information to the telemetry system, however, the
    collection of these information is performed outside DOTS.

    The orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS mitigation upon
    approval from a network administrator.  The analysis from the
    orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via a web
    interface.  If the network administrator decides to start the
    mitigation, she orders through her web interface a DOTS client to
    send a request for DDoS mitigation.  This request is expected to be
    associated with a context that identifies the DDoS mitigation
    selected.

    Upon receiving the DOTS request for DDoS mitigation from the network
    administrator, the orchestrator orchestrates the DDoS mitigation
    according to the specified strategy.  Its status indicates the DDoS
    mitigation is starting while not effective.

    Orchestration of the DDoS mitigation systems works similarly as
    described in Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.4.  The Orchestrator
    indicates with its status whether the DDoS Mitigation is effective.

    When the DDoS mitigation is finished on the DDoS mitigation systems,
    the orchestrator indicates to the Telemetry systems as well as to 
the
    network administrator the DDoS mitigation is finished.

4.  Overview of DOTS Messaging Interactions During a DDoS Mitigation
     Session

    This section provides an overview of the DOTS messaging interactions
    between the DOTS client and server as described in Section 3.1.1 and
    Section 3.1.10.  Scenario-specific variations are noted in the text
    describing each specific use case.

4.1.  Successful DOTS DDoS Mitigation Request Example

    (a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
    organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS mitigators.

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    (b) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin mitigating
    the DDoS attack.

    (c) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or
    capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and utilize
    their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service
    initiation request to one or more DOTS servers residing on one or
    more upstream transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP
    networks.  This DOTS mitigation service initiation request may be
    automatically initiated by the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be
    manually triggered by personnel of the requesting organization in
    response to an alert from the mitigators (the mechanism by which 
this
    process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

    (d) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
    initiation requests determine that they have been configured to 
honor
    requests from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and initiate
    situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their 
respective
    networks (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond
    the scope of this document).

    (e) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
    requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS
    mitigation service has been initiated.

    (f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
    regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the requesting
    CPE or PE mitigators.

    (g) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the CPE or PE
    mitigators may optionally regularly transmit DOTS mitigation 
efficacy
    updates to the relevant DOTS servers.

    (h) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
    has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their respective
    DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process takes place is
    beyond the scope of this document).

    (i) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
    CPE or PE mitigators indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.

    (j) The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation service
    termination request to the DOTS servers.  This DOTS mitigation
    service termination request may be automatically initiated by the 
CPE
    or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by personnel of
    the requesting organization in response to an alert from the
    mitigators or a management system which monitors them (the mechanism

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    by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
    document).

    (k) The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
    respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes place
    is beyond the scope of this document).

    (l) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
    CPE or PE mitigators indicating that DDoS mitigation services have
    been terminated.

    (m) The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation
    termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.

4.2.  Unsuccessful DOTS DDoS Mitigation Request Example

    (a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
    organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS mitigators.

    (b) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin mitigating
    the DDoS attack.

    (c) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or
    capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and utilize
    their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service
    initiation request to one or more DOTS servers residing on one or
    more upstream transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP
    networks.

        This DOTS mitigation service initiation request may be
        automatically initiated by the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may
        be manually triggered by personnel of the requesting
        organization in response to an alert from the mitigators (the
        mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
        of this document).

    (d) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
    initiation requests determine that they have been to honor requests
    from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and attempt to initiate
    situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their 
respective
    networks (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond
    the scope of this document).

    (e) The DDoS mitigators on the upstream network report back to the
    DOTS servers that they are unable to initiate DDoS mitigation 
service
    for the requesting organization due to mitigation capacity
    constraints, bandwidth constraints, functionality constraints,

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    hardware casualties, or other impediments (the mechanism by which
    this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

    (f) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
    requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS
    mitigation service cannot be initiated as requested.  The scope,
    format, and content of these messages must be codified by the DOTS
    WG.

    (g) The CPE or PE mitigators may optionally regularly re-transmit
    DOTS mitigation status request messages to the relevant DOTS servers
    until acknowledgement that mitigation services have been initiated.
    The scope, format, and content of these messages must be codified by
    the DOTS WG.

    (h) The CPE or PE mitigators may optionally transmit a DOTS
    mitigation service initiation request to DOTS servers associated 
with
    a configured fallback upstream DDoS mitigation service.  The scope,
    format, and content of these messages must be codified by the DOTS
    WG.  Multiple fallback DDoS mitigation services may optionally be
    configured.

    (i) The process describe above cyclically continues until the DDoS
    mitigation service request is fulfilled; the CPE or PE mitigators
    determine that the DDoS attack volume has decreased to a level 
and/or
    complexity which they themselves can successfully mitigate; the DDoS
    attack has ceased; or manual intervention by personnel of the
    requesting organization has taken place.

5.  Security Considerations

    DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent 
impersonation,
    traffic injection, and signaling blocking.  Associated security
    requirements and additional ones are defined in
    [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

    Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be managed 
through
    current secure communications best practices.  DOTS is not subject 
to
    anything new in this area.  One consideration could be to minimize
    the security technologies in use at any one time.  The more needed,
    the greater the risk of failures coming from assumptions on one
    technology providing protection that it does not in the presence of
    another technology.

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6.  IANA Considerations

    No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.

7.  Acknowledgments

    The authors would like to thank among others Tirumaleswar Reddy;
    Andrew Mortensen; Mohamed Boucadaire; Artyom Gavrichenkov; and the
    DOTS WG chairs, Roman D.  Danyliw and Tobias Gondrom, for their
    valuable feedback.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

    [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
               DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
               editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

8.2.  Informative References

    [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
               Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
               Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
               Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-06 (work in
               progress), July 2017.

    [RFC6335]  Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
               Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
               Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
               Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
               RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
               <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.

    [RFC7368]  Chown, T., Ed., Arkko, J., Brandt, A., Troan, O., and J.
               Weil, "IPv6 Home Networking Architecture Principles",
               RFC 7368, DOI 10.17487/RFC7368, October 2014,
               <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7368>.

Authors' Addresses

    Roland Dobbins
    Arbor Networks
    Singapore

    EMail: [email-masked]

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    Daniel Migault
    Ericsson
    8400 boulevard Decarie
    Montreal, QC  H4P 2N2
    Canada

    EMail: [email-masked]

    Stefan Fouant
    USA

    EMail: [email-masked]

    Robert Moskowitz
    HTT Consulting
    Oak Park, MI  48237
    USA

    EMail: [email-masked]

    Nik Teague
    Verisign
    12061 Bluemont Way
    Reston, VA  20190

    EMail: [email-masked]

    Liang Xia
    Huawei
    No. 101, Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
    Nanjing
    China

    EMail: [email-masked]

    Kaname Nishizuka
    NTT Communications
    GranPark 16F 3-4-1 Shibaura, Minato-ku
    Tokyo  108-8118
    Japan

    EMail: [email-masked]

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-----

-----------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <[email-masked]>