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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Valery Smyslov <valery@smyslov.net>, "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
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Hi Valery,=20

Many thanks for the detailed review.=20

Please see inline.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Valery Smyslov <valery@smyslov.net>
> Envoy=E9=A0: vendredi 29 octobre 2021 15:26
> =C0=A0: dots@ietf.org
> Cc=A0: dots-chairs@ietf.org; draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: RE: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
> here is my review of the draft (sorry for delay).
>=20
> [chair hat on]
>=20
> First, I'm a bit confused why this is a Standards Track document.
> draft explicitly states that it defines no new protocol, it only contains
> recommendations how applications should deal with multihomed scenarios.
>=20
> Isn't Informational or BCP status more appropriate for this document?

[Med] Informational is just OK as the intent is to complement the DOTS arch=
. Fixed.

>=20
> A related issue - the draft has a normative reference to RFC 8811, which
> is an Informational RFC and is not listed in the downref registry.
> If this draft persists as Standards Track document, this should be worked
> around.

[Med] 8811 is cited as normative as we built on that reference architecture=
.=20

>=20
> [chair hat off]
>=20
> Section 4.
>=20
> I might be missing something very obvious, but from my reading of the
> scenarios I have an impression that only those situations when upstream
> network providers are also the DDoS mitigation providers are considered.
> What if you have multiple ISPs and a single independent DDOS mitigation
> provider?

[Med] This is a subcase of the ones that are discussed in the draft. Each o=
f multiple ISPs will provision that independent DDoS server to the CE. The =
key assumption is that a DOTS server is unambiguously associated with the i=
nterconnection link over which it can be used.=20=20=20

 Or you have several DDOS mitigation providers, and some of them
> are provided by ISPs and some are independent?

[Med] This is also allowed in the current draft as we don't make an assumpt=
ion of the provisioned DOTS server's name nor wither the same/distinct one =
are provisioned over each interconnection link:

   *  Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes
      to the CPE and provides additional configuration information such
      as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the
      network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name
                                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
      [RFC8973].  These addresses/prefixes are assumed to be Provider-
      ^^^^^^^^
      Aggregatable (PA).


Please let me know if you think that an explicit statement is needed to the=
 draft to further clarify the rationale.=20

>=20
> Section 5.1.
>=20
>    For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
>    server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([RFC8973]) using the
>    DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain.
>=20
> What if explicit configuration (RFC8973, Section 4, item 1) is used?
> If this case this recommendation is unnecessary.

[Med] This text refers to the DOTS server's name, that is also mentioned in=
 (RFC8973, Section 4, item 1):

          "These may be
          specified either as a list of IP addresses or the DNS name of
          a DOTS server."

>=20
> Section 5.1.
>=20
>    Consequently, if a CPE detects a DDoS attack that spreads over all
>    its network attachments, it MUST contact both DOTS servers for
>    mitigation purposes.
>=20
> s/both/all

[Med] Fixed. Thanks.

>=20
> Then, it seems to be implied that all network attachments have provided
> CPE with DOTS servers. In this case how can happen what is described
> earlier:
>=20
>   This implies that if no appropriate DOTS server is found,
>    the DOTS client MUST NOT send the mitigation request to any other
>    available DOTS server.
>=20
> I think that this situation is only possible when some network attachments
> don't provide CPE with DOTS servers.

[Med] Agree. This is to echo this part from the introduction:

   2.  Identify DOTS deployment schemes in a multi-homing context, where
       DOTS services can be offered by all or a subset of upstream
                                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^=20=20=20=
=20=20=20
       providers.

I added this NEW sentence to the intro text of Section 4:

"In the following subsections, all or a subset of interconnection links are=
 associated with DOTS servers."

>=20
> Section 5.1.
>=20
>    DOTS signaling session to a
>    given DOTS server must be established using the interface from which
>    the DOTS server was provisioned.
>=20
> What about explicit configuration, when DOTS server IP is not associated
> with a network interface?

[Med] An interface can also be indicated when explicit configuration is use=
d. If no such information is provided, this means that the address applies =
for any active interface.=20=20

As a reminder, RFC8973 says the following:

   The results of the discovery procedure are a function of the
                                              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
   interface/address family.  Contacting a discovered DOTS server via an
   ^^^^^^^^^^
   interface to which it is not bound may exacerbate the delay required
   to establish a DOTS channel.  Moreover, such behavior may reveal that
   a DOTS service is enabled by a DOTS client domain and exposes the
   identity of the DOTS service provider (which can be inferred from the
   name and the destination IP address) to external networks.

>=20
> Section 5.2.
>=20
> I think the readability would benefit from moving pictures 6 and 7 closer
> to the text that refers to them. Currently they are almost half page
> apart.

[Med] Sure. Moved up.=20

>=20
> Section 5.2.
>=20
>    Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix
>    filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will trigger
>    DOTS communications with the DOTS servers.  Such policies will help
>    the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS server.
>=20
> It's unclear for me to which scenario this recommendation applies.
> In Figure 8 each DOTS client may communicate only with a single DOTS
> server.

[Med] It applies to both figure 7/8. Clients in Figure 8 may still receive =
detection alarms on resources that are not handled by their peer DOTS serve=
r.=20=20

>=20
> Related question - why SHOULD (and not MUST)?.  What if clients are not
> provided with these policies?

[Med] SHOULD is used because in Figure 8 some filters may be applied when d=
irecting alarms to DOTS clients.=20

>=20
> Section 5.2.
>=20
>    The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding
>    DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client.  If anycast
>    addresses are used to reach multiple DOTS servers, the CPE may not be
>    able to select the appropriate provisioning domain to which the
>    mitigation request should be forwarded.  As a consequence, the
>    request may not be forwarded to the appropriate DOTS server.
>=20
> I'm confused. What to do in this case? Using anycast addresses is NOT
> RECOMMENDED (earlier), but is not prohibited.
> I believe better recommendations should be given for this case.
>=20

[Med] The risk here is that the mitigation request will be rejected by the =
DOTS server to which the CPE decided to froward the request. If the CPE emb=
eds a DOTS gateways, the situation can be better as it may use a sequential=
 mode. I think that NOT RECOMMENDED is appropriate.=20

> Section 5.3.
>=20
> Again, I think it's worth to move Figure 9 closer to the text that refers
> to it.

[Med] Done.=20

>=20
> Section 5.3.
>=20
>    The use of anycast addresses
>    to establish DOTS sessions between DOTS clients and DOTS gateways is
>    not an option.
>=20
> What does "is not an option" mean?

[Med] It means that it is not a valid technical solution to fulfil the "MUS=
T contact all" requirement, as by definition, only one will be selected.=20

 MUST NOT be used? Or impossible to use?

>=20
> Section 6.
>=20
>    In particular, if a DOTS client maintains DOTS
>    associations with specific DOTS servers per interconnection link, the
>    DOTS client SHOULD NOT leak information specific to a given link to
>    DOTS servers on different interconnection links that are not
>    authorized to mitigate attacks for that given link.
>=20
> How this rule can be followed when DOTS clients send requests to all
> available DOTS servers (with PI scenarios)?

[Med] In such case, the "information specific to a given link" will point t=
o the target (PI@) that is authorized to be revealed to all servers.=20

>=20
> Regards,
> Valery.
>=20
>=20
> > Hi,
> >
> > this message starts a two-week working group last call for draft-ietf-
> dots-multihoming-07.
> > The WGLC will end on Monday, October 25. Please, review the draft and
> > send your comments to the mailing list.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Frank & Valery.
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Dots mailing list
> > Dots@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dots


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From nobody Tue Nov 16 03:22:52 2021
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Subject: [Dots] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DDoS Open Threat Signaling WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
        Authors         : Mohamed Boucadair
                          Tirumaleswar Reddy
                          Ehud Doron
                          Meiling Chen
                          Jon Shallow
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17.txt
	Pages           : 115
	Date            : 2021-11-16

Abstract:
   This document aims to enrich the DOTS signal channel protocol with
   various telemetry attributes, allowing for optimal Distributed
   Denial-of-Service attack mitigation.  It specifies the normal traffic
   baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can
   convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the mitigation
   status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS
   client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS
   client can communicate to a DOTS server.  The telemetry attributes
   can assist the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation techniques and
   perform optimal DDoS attack mitigation.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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Subject: Re: [Dots] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17.txt
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Hi all,=20

This version takes into account the editorial changes proposed by Ben (http=
s://github.com/boucadair/draft-dots-telemetry/pull/9). It also updates some=
 refs and fix some nits.=20

The IANA section was also updated to remove the assignment request for 'low=
er-type' and 'upper-type' given that those were now assigned in the call-ho=
me.=20=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: I-D-Announce <i-d-announce-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de interne=
t-
> drafts@ietf.org
> Envoy=E9=A0: mardi 16 novembre 2021 12:23
> =C0=A0: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Cc=A0: dots@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17.txt
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the DDoS Open Threat Signaling WG of the
> IETF.
>=20
>         Title           : Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
> Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
>         Authors         : Mohamed Boucadair
>                           Tirumaleswar Reddy
>                           Ehud Doron
>                           Meiling Chen
>                           Jon Shallow
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17.txt
> 	Pages           : 115
> 	Date            : 2021-11-16
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document aims to enrich the DOTS signal channel protocol with
>    various telemetry attributes, allowing for optimal Distributed
>    Denial-of-Service attack mitigation.  It specifies the normal traffic
>    baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can
>    convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the mitigation
>    status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS
>    client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS
>    client can communicate to a DOTS server.  The telemetry attributes
>    can assist the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation techniques and
>    perform optimal DDoS attack mitigation.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry/
>=20
> There is also an htmlized version available at:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-dots-telemetry-17
>=20
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I-D-Announce mailing list
> I-D-Announce@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i-d-announce
> Internet-Draft directories: http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html or
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf/1shadow-sites.txt

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From: "Valery Smyslov" <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
To: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>, "'Valery Smyslov'" <valery@smyslov.net>, <dots@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
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HI Med,

please see inline.

> Hi Valery,
> 
> Many thanks for the detailed review.
> 
> Please see inline.
> 
> Cheers,
> Med
> 
> > Hi,
> >
> > here is my review of the draft (sorry for delay).
> >
> > [chair hat on]
> >
> > First, I'm a bit confused why this is a Standards Track document.
> > draft explicitly states that it defines no new protocol, it only contains
> > recommendations how applications should deal with multihomed scenarios.
> >
> > Isn't Informational or BCP status more appropriate for this document?
> 
> [Med] Informational is just OK as the intent is to complement the DOTS arch. Fixed.

Good.

> > A related issue - the draft has a normative reference to RFC 8811, which
> > is an Informational RFC and is not listed in the downref registry.
> > If this draft persists as Standards Track document, this should be worked
> > around.
> 
> [Med] 8811 is cited as normative as we built on that reference architecture.

That's OK if you changed intended status to Informational.

> > [chair hat off]
> >
> > Section 4.
> >
> > I might be missing something very obvious, but from my reading of the
> > scenarios I have an impression that only those situations when upstream
> > network providers are also the DDoS mitigation providers are considered.
> > What if you have multiple ISPs and a single independent DDOS mitigation
> > provider?
> 
> [Med] This is a subcase of the ones that are discussed in the draft. Each of multiple ISPs will provision that
> independent DDoS server to the CE. The key assumption is that a DOTS server is unambiguously associated
> with the interconnection link over which it can be used.

Well, what if the independent DOTS server is configured manually, not provisioned by ISPs?
Is it possible (and how) to use it with only subset of ISPs?

>  Or you have several DDOS mitigation providers, and some of them
> > are provided by ISPs and some are independent?
> 
> [Med] This is also allowed in the current draft as we don't make an assumption of the provisioned DOTS
> server's name nor wither the same/distinct one are provisioned over each interconnection link:
> 
>    *  Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes
>       to the CPE and provides additional configuration information such
>       as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the
>       network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name
>                                             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>       [RFC8973].  These addresses/prefixes are assumed to be Provider-
>       ^^^^^^^^
>       Aggregatable (PA).
> 
> Please let me know if you think that an explicit statement is needed to the draft to further clarify the
> rationale.

I think it's worth to to clarify situation with manually configured independent DOTS servers,
when some of them can be used with only a subset of ISPs. 

> > Section 5.1.
> >
> >    For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
> >    server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([RFC8973]) using the
> >    DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain.
> >
> > What if explicit configuration (RFC8973, Section 4, item 1) is used?
> > If this case this recommendation is unnecessary.
> 
> [Med] This text refers to the DOTS server's name, that is also mentioned in (RFC8973, Section 4, item 1):
> 
>           "These may be
>           specified either as a list of IP addresses or the DNS name of
>           a DOTS server."

That's what my concern is. The draft says that you MUST resolve DOTS server's name provided by a PD
using the DNS servers from the same PD. So, what if DOTS server's name was configured manually,
not learned from PD - what DNS server to use to resolve it? Any? Should this be more explicit in the text?

> > Then, it seems to be implied that all network attachments have provided
> > CPE with DOTS servers. In this case how can happen what is described
> > earlier:
> >
> >   This implies that if no appropriate DOTS server is found,
> >    the DOTS client MUST NOT send the mitigation request to any other
> >    available DOTS server.
> >
> > I think that this situation is only possible when some network attachments
> > don't provide CPE with DOTS servers.
> 
> [Med] Agree. This is to echo this part from the introduction:
> 
>    2.  Identify DOTS deployment schemes in a multi-homing context, where
>        DOTS services can be offered by all or a subset of upstream
>                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>        providers.
> 
> I added this NEW sentence to the intro text of Section 4:
> 
> "In the following subsections, all or a subset of interconnection links are associated with DOTS servers."

OK.

> > Section 5.1.
> >
> >    DOTS signaling session to a
> >    given DOTS server must be established using the interface from which
> >    the DOTS server was provisioned.
> >
> > What about explicit configuration, when DOTS server IP is not associated
> > with a network interface?
> 
> [Med] An interface can also be indicated when explicit configuration is used. If no such information is
> provided, this means that the address applies for any active interface.

Please, add this clarification.

> As a reminder, RFC8973 says the following:
> 
>    The results of the discovery procedure are a function of the
>                                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>    interface/address family.  Contacting a discovered DOTS server via an
>    ^^^^^^^^^^
>    interface to which it is not bound may exacerbate the delay required
>    to establish a DOTS channel.  Moreover, such behavior may reveal that
>    a DOTS service is enabled by a DOTS client domain and exposes the
>    identity of the DOTS service provider (which can be inferred from the
>    name and the destination IP address) to external networks.
> 
> >
> > Section 5.2.
> >
> >    Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix
> >    filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will trigger
> >    DOTS communications with the DOTS servers.  Such policies will help
> >    the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS server.
> >
> > It's unclear for me to which scenario this recommendation applies.
> > In Figure 8 each DOTS client may communicate only with a single DOTS
> > server.
> 
> [Med] It applies to both figure 7/8. Clients in Figure 8 may still receive detection alarms on resources that are
> not handled by their peer DOTS server.

It is not clear. Previously the draft says:

   Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of
   them is responsible for handling communications with a specific DOTS
                                                                                                           ^^^^^^^
   server (see Figure 8).

Probably some clarification is needed.

> > Related question - why SHOULD (and not MUST)?.  What if clients are not
> > provided with these policies?
> 
> [Med] SHOULD is used because in Figure 8 some filters may be applied when directing alarms to DOTS clients.

I read the sentence "Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies..."
that under some conditions it's OK to not provide clients with policies (filters) at all,
that's why my question. My understanding, that they MUST be provided
always, but the policies may differ. Am I missing something?

> > Section 5.2.
> >
> >    The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding
> >    DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client.  If anycast
> >    addresses are used to reach multiple DOTS servers, the CPE may not be
> >    able to select the appropriate provisioning domain to which the
> >    mitigation request should be forwarded.  As a consequence, the
> >    request may not be forwarded to the appropriate DOTS server.
> >
> > I'm confused. What to do in this case? Using anycast addresses is NOT
> > RECOMMENDED (earlier), but is not prohibited.
> > I believe better recommendations should be given for this case.
> >
> 
> [Med] The risk here is that the mitigation request will be rejected by the DOTS server to which the CPE
> decided to froward the request. If the CPE embeds a DOTS gateways, the situation can be better as it may use
> a sequential mode. I think that NOT RECOMMENDED is appropriate.

So it's just an explanation why using anycast is not recommended?
Then, can you move it closer to the recommendation not to use anycast?

> > Section 5.3.
> >
> >    The use of anycast addresses
> >    to establish DOTS sessions between DOTS clients and DOTS gateways is
> >    not an option.
> >
> > What does "is not an option" mean?
> 
> [Med] It means that it is not a valid technical solution to fulfil the "MUST contact all" requirement, as by
> definition, only one will be selected.
> 
>  MUST NOT be used? Or impossible to use?

"Cannot be used, because <explanation>" ?

> > Section 6.
> >
> >    In particular, if a DOTS client maintains DOTS
> >    associations with specific DOTS servers per interconnection link, the
> >    DOTS client SHOULD NOT leak information specific to a given link to
> >    DOTS servers on different interconnection links that are not
> >    authorized to mitigate attacks for that given link.
> >
> > How this rule can be followed when DOTS clients send requests to all
> > available DOTS servers (with PI scenarios)?
> 
> [Med] In such case, the "information specific to a given link" will point to the target (PI@) that is authorized to
> be revealed to all servers.

OK.

Regards,
Valery.

> > Regards,
> > Valery.
> >
> >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > this message starts a two-week working group last call for draft-ietf-
> > dots-multihoming-07.
> > > The WGLC will end on Monday, October 25. Please, review the draft and
> > > send your comments to the mailing list.
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Frank & Valery.
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Dots mailing list
> > > Dots@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dots
> 
> 
> ____________________________________________________________________________________________
> _____________________________
> 
> Ce message et ses pieces jointes peuvent contenir des informations confidentielles ou privilegiees et ne
> doivent donc
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> signaler
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> This message and its attachments may contain confidential or privileged information that may be protected
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> Thank you.
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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, 'Valery Smyslov' <valery@smyslov.net>, "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>
CC: "dots-chairs@ietf.org" <dots-chairs@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
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Subject: Re: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
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Hi Valery,

Thank you for the follow-up.=20

The changes to address your comments can be tracked at: https://tinyurl.com=
/dots-multihoming-latest.

Please see inline for more context.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
> Envoy=E9=A0: vendredi 19 novembre 2021 09:51
> =C0=A0: BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>; 'Vale=
ry
> Smyslov' <valery@smyslov.net>; dots@ietf.org
> Cc=A0: dots-chairs@ietf.org; draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: RE: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
>=20
> HI Med,
>=20
> please see inline.
>=20
> > Hi Valery,
> >
> > Many thanks for the detailed review.
> >
> > Please see inline.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Med
> >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > here is my review of the draft (sorry for delay).
> > >
> > > [chair hat on]
> > >
> > > First, I'm a bit confused why this is a Standards Track document.
> > > draft explicitly states that it defines no new protocol, it only
> > > contains recommendations how applications should deal with multihomed
> scenarios.
> > >
> > > Isn't Informational or BCP status more appropriate for this document?
> >
> > [Med] Informational is just OK as the intent is to complement the DOTS
> arch. Fixed.
>=20
> Good.
>=20
> > > A related issue - the draft has a normative reference to RFC 8811,
> > > which is an Informational RFC and is not listed in the downref
> registry.
> > > If this draft persists as Standards Track document, this should be
> > > worked around.
> >
> > [Med] 8811 is cited as normative as we built on that reference
> architecture.
>=20
> That's OK if you changed intended status to Informational.

[Med] ACK.

>=20
> > > [chair hat off]
> > >
> > > Section 4.
> > >
> > > I might be missing something very obvious, but from my reading of
> > > the scenarios I have an impression that only those situations when
> > > upstream network providers are also the DDoS mitigation providers are
> considered.
> > > What if you have multiple ISPs and a single independent DDOS
> > > mitigation provider?
> >
> > [Med] This is a subcase of the ones that are discussed in the draft.
> > Each of multiple ISPs will provision that independent DDoS server to
> > the CE. The key assumption is that a DOTS server is unambiguously
> associated with the interconnection link over which it can be used.
>=20
> Well, what if the independent DOTS server is configured manually, not
> provisioned by ISPs?
> Is it possible (and how) to use it with only subset of ISPs?

[Med] Added this NEW text:

A multihomed network may enable DOTS for all or a subset of its=09
upstream interconnection links.  In such a case, DOTS servers can be=09
explicitly configured or dynamically discovered by a DOTS client=09
using means such as those discussed in [RFC8973].  These DOTS servers=09
can be owned by the upstream provider, managed by a third-party=09
(e.g., mitigation service provider), or a combination thereof.=09
=09=20=09=09
If a DOTS server is explicitly configured, it is assumed that an=09
interface is also provided to bind the DOTS service to an=09
interconnection link.  If no interface is provided, this means that=09
the DOTS server can be reached via any active interface.

>=20
> >  Or you have several DDOS mitigation providers, and some of them
> > > are provided by ISPs and some are independent?
> >
> > [Med] This is also allowed in the current draft as we don't make an
> > assumption of the provisioned DOTS server's name nor wither the
> same/distinct one are provisioned over each interconnection link:
> >
> >    *  Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes
> >       to the CPE and provides additional configuration information such
> >       as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the
> >       network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name
> >                                             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >       [RFC8973].  These addresses/prefixes are assumed to be Provider-
> >       ^^^^^^^^
> >       Aggregatable (PA).
> >
> > Please let me know if you think that an explicit statement is needed
> > to the draft to further clarify the rationale.
>=20
> I think it's worth to to clarify situation with manually configured
> independent DOTS servers, when some of them can be used with only a subset
> of ISPs.

[Med] Covered by the NEW text above and this one:=20

In the following subsections, all or a subset of interconnection=09
links are associated with DOTS servers.

>=20
> > > Section 5.1.
> > >
> > >    For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
> > >    server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([RFC8973]) using
> the
> > >    DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain.
> > >
> > > What if explicit configuration (RFC8973, Section 4, item 1) is used?
> > > If this case this recommendation is unnecessary.
> >
> > [Med] This text refers to the DOTS server's name, that is also mentioned
> in (RFC8973, Section 4, item 1):
> >
> >           "These may be
> >           specified either as a list of IP addresses or the DNS name of
> >           a DOTS server."
>=20
> That's what my concern is. The draft says that you MUST resolve DOTS
> server's name provided by a PD using the DNS servers from the same PD. So,
> what if DOTS server's name was configured manually, not learned from PD -
> what DNS server to use to resolve it? Any? Should this be more explicit in
> the text?

[Med] Made this change:

OLD:
   For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
   server's name provided by a provisioning domain [RFC8973] using the
   DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain.

NEW:
   For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
   server's name provided by a provisioning domain [RFC8973] using the
   DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain (or the
   DNS servers associated with the interface(s) for which a DOTS server
   was explicitly configured).


>=20
> > > Then, it seems to be implied that all network attachments have
> > > provided CPE with DOTS servers. In this case how can happen what is
> > > described
> > > earlier:
> > >
> > >   This implies that if no appropriate DOTS server is found,
> > >    the DOTS client MUST NOT send the mitigation request to any other
> > >    available DOTS server.
> > >
> > > I think that this situation is only possible when some network
> > > attachments don't provide CPE with DOTS servers.
> >
> > [Med] Agree. This is to echo this part from the introduction:
> >
> >    2.  Identify DOTS deployment schemes in a multi-homing context, where
> >        DOTS services can be offered by all or a subset of upstream
> >                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >        providers.
> >
> > I added this NEW sentence to the intro text of Section 4:
> >
> > "In the following subsections, all or a subset of interconnection links
> are associated with DOTS servers."
>=20
> OK.
>=20
> > > Section 5.1.
> > >
> > >    DOTS signaling session to a
> > >    given DOTS server must be established using the interface from
> which
> > >    the DOTS server was provisioned.
> > >
> > > What about explicit configuration, when DOTS server IP is not
> > > associated with a network interface?
> >
> > [Med] An interface can also be indicated when explicit configuration
> > is used. If no such information is provided, this means that the address
> applies for any active interface.
>=20
> Please, add this clarification.

[Med] Done.=20

>=20
> > As a reminder, RFC8973 says the following:
> >
> >    The results of the discovery procedure are a function of the
> >                                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >    interface/address family.  Contacting a discovered DOTS server via an
> >    ^^^^^^^^^^
> >    interface to which it is not bound may exacerbate the delay required
> >    to establish a DOTS channel.  Moreover, such behavior may reveal that
> >    a DOTS service is enabled by a DOTS client domain and exposes the
> >    identity of the DOTS service provider (which can be inferred from the
> >    name and the destination IP address) to external networks.
> >
> > >
> > > Section 5.2.
> > >
> > >    Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix
> > >    filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will
> trigger
> > >    DOTS communications with the DOTS servers.  Such policies will help
> > >    the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS server.
> > >
> > > It's unclear for me to which scenario this recommendation applies.
> > > In Figure 8 each DOTS client may communicate only with a single DOTS
> > > server.
> >
> > [Med] It applies to both figure 7/8. Clients in Figure 8 may still
> > receive detection alarms on resources that are not handled by their peer
> DOTS server.
>=20
> It is not clear. Previously the draft says:
>=20
>    Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of
>    them is responsible for handling communications with a specific DOTS
>=20
> ^^^^^^^
>    server (see Figure 8).
>=20
> Probably some clarification is needed.

[Med] Added "For both deployments depicted in Figures 7 and 8 ..."

>=20
> > > Related question - why SHOULD (and not MUST)?.  What if clients are
> > > not provided with these policies?
> >
> > [Med] SHOULD is used because in Figure 8 some filters may be applied
> when directing alarms to DOTS clients.
>=20
> I read the sentence "Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies..."
> that under some conditions it's OK to not provide clients with policies
> (filters) at all, that's why my question. My understanding, that they MUST
> be provided always, but the policies may differ. Am I missing something?

[Med] This can't be a MUST as the filtering can be on the alarms themselves=
 before being known to the DOTS client.

>=20
> > > Section 5.2.
> > >
> > >    The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when
> forwarding
> > >    DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client.  If anycast
> > >    addresses are used to reach multiple DOTS servers, the CPE may not
> be
> > >    able to select the appropriate provisioning domain to which the
> > >    mitigation request should be forwarded.  As a consequence, the
> > >    request may not be forwarded to the appropriate DOTS server.
> > >
> > > I'm confused. What to do in this case? Using anycast addresses is
> > > NOT RECOMMENDED (earlier), but is not prohibited.
> > > I believe better recommendations should be given for this case.
> > >
> >
> > [Med] The risk here is that the mitigation request will be rejected by
> > the DOTS server to which the CPE decided to froward the request. If
> > the CPE embeds a DOTS gateways, the situation can be better as it may
> use a sequential mode. I think that NOT RECOMMENDED is appropriate.
>=20
> So it's just an explanation why using anycast is not recommended?
> Then, can you move it closer to the recommendation not to use anycast?

[Med] Done. Thanks.

>=20
> > > Section 5.3.
> > >
> > >    The use of anycast addresses
> > >    to establish DOTS sessions between DOTS clients and DOTS gateways
> is
> > >    not an option.
> > >
> > > What does "is not an option" mean?
> >
> > [Med] It means that it is not a valid technical solution to fulfil the
> > "MUST contact all" requirement, as by definition, only one will be
> selected.
> >
> >  MUST NOT be used? Or impossible to use?
>=20
> "Cannot be used, because <explanation>" ?

[Med] Updated the text as suggested.=20

>=20
> > > Section 6.
> > >
> > >    In particular, if a DOTS client maintains DOTS
> > >    associations with specific DOTS servers per interconnection link,
> the
> > >    DOTS client SHOULD NOT leak information specific to a given link to
> > >    DOTS servers on different interconnection links that are not
> > >    authorized to mitigate attacks for that given link.
> > >
> > > How this rule can be followed when DOTS clients send requests to all
> > > available DOTS servers (with PI scenarios)?
> >
> > [Med] In such case, the "information specific to a given link" will
> > point to the target (PI@) that is authorized to be revealed to all
> servers.
>=20
> OK.
>=20
> Regards,
> Valery.
>=20

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Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 14:41:40 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16
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Hi all,

Sorry to have been working on this for so long -- some health issues
intervened, and it is perhaps easier to let onesself be interrupted if
there is no hope of finishing in a single sitting :-/

[Note that I reviewed the -16 but the -17 is the current version, which
includes some editorial work I had sent in a PR.  It looks like that
will not have changed many things I comment on.]

This review is pretty long (which I guess befits a long document).  We
probably want to chunk up replies to it so that the emails/threads stay
manageable.

A couple meta-comments on the other reviews so far:

- the shepherd writeup only answers one of the three questions in point
  (1).  It is likely that Murray will point this out in his ballot if
  not updated before then.

- it's a little surprising that the yangdoctor didn't ask for encoded
  examples of the RESTCONF (data channel) functionality.  (For the
  sx:structure parts, I think we're already in good shape on examples.)  That
  said, I don't think our use of RESTCONF is particularly novel, and am happy
  to proceed without such examples if desired.

High-level remarks before going in to the detailed section-by-section
comments:

I'm happy to see the note at the end of §4.5 that the data channel is
available to optimize the data that needs to be exchanged over the signal
channel during attack-time, in some sense reiterating the original split
between signal and data channels (but see my note in the inline comments
about the "MAY").  But this is already rather far into the design overview,
let alone the document overall!  I think it would be helpful to have a
paragraph or two in the toplevel §4 to get in front of how the telemetry
mechanisms integrate into the signal+data channels, perhaps something like:

% The DOTS protocol suite is divided into two logical channels: the signal
% channel and data channel.  This division is due to the vastly different
% requirements placed upon the traffic they carry.  The signal channel must
% remain available and usable even in the face of attack traffic that might,
% for example, saturate one direction of the links involved, rendering
% acknowledgment-based mechanisms unreliable and strongly incentivizing
% messages to be small enough to be contained in a single IP packet.  In
% contrast, the data channel is available for high-bandwidth data transfer
% before or after an attack, using more conventional transport protocol
% techniques.  It is generally preferable to perform advance configuration
% over the data channel, including configuring short aliases for static or
% nearly static data sets such as sets of network addresses/prefixes that
% might be subject to related attacks -- this helps to optimize the use of
% the signal channel for the small messages that truly require reliable
% delivery during an attack.
%
% Telemetry information has aspects that correspond to both operational
% modes: there is certainly a need to convey updated information about
% ongoing attack traffic and targets during an attack, so as to convey
% detailed information about mitigation status and inform updates to
% mitigation strategy in the face of adaptive attacks, but it is also useful
% to provide mitigation services with a picture of normal or "baseline"
% traffic towards potential targets, to aid in detecting when incoming
% traffic deviates from normal into being an attack.  Likewise, one might
% populate a "database" of classifications of known types of attack so that
% a short alias can be used during attack time to describe an observed
% attack.  This specification does make provision for use of the data
% channel for the latter function, but otherwise retains most telemetry
% functionality in the signal channel.  This is partly out of necessity and
% partly out of expedience -- it is a functional requirement to convey
% information about ongoing attack traffic during an attack, and information
% about baseline traffic uses an essentially identical datastructure that is
% naturally defined to sit next to the description of attack traffic.  The
% related telemetry setup information used to parametrize actual traffic
% data is also sent over the signal channel, out of expediency. [I can't
% actually populate this part; maybe it's something about having the
% configuration values that define the percentile measurements be in-band
% with the percentile measurements themselves, and then a desire to not
% define two similar setup schemes over data+signal channels that justifies
% the other telemetry-config and pipe branches?]

The use of the "list telemetry" in the telemetry-setup message confused me
for a while, since it seems like the client can only send a zero- or
one-element list to the server (based on the 'tsid' for that direction being
part of the Uri-Path).  Can you confirm that the list structure was used
just for the server-to-client direction combined with maximizing
data-structure reuse?

We should say somewhere that the examples use CBOR presentation format.
(This could be a note near the terminology section or accompanying each
example.)

I think we should probably include a bit of a brief refresher on percentile
calculation, in addition to the reference to RFC 2330.  Right now we
basically just say that the peers negotiation parameter including
"percentile-related measurement parameters" which was not quite enough to
clue me in that 2330 was basically required reading to know what we actually
do.  So this might look something like:

% DOTS telemetry uses several percentile values to provide a picture of a
% traffic distribution overall, as opposed to just a single snapshot of
% observed traffic at a single point in time.  Modeling raw traffic flow
% data as a distribution and describing that distribution entails choosing a
% measurement period that the distribution will describe, and a number of
% sampling intervals, or "buckets", within that measurement period.  Traffic
% within each bucket is treated as a single event (i.e., averaged), and then
% the distribution of buckets is used to describe the distribution of
% traffic over the measurement period.  A distribution an be characterized
% by statistical measures such as mean, median, and standard deviation, and
% also by reporting the value of the distribution at various percentile
% levels of the data set in question, such as "quartiles" that correspond to
% 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile.  More details about percentile values and
% their computation are found in Section 11.3 of [RFC2330]; DOTS telemetry
% uses up to three percentile values, plus the overall peak, to characterize
% traffic distributions.  Which percentile thresholds are used for these
% "low", "medium", and "high" percentile values is configurable (with
% suitable defaults).


It seems like we are setting up somewhat conflicting goals between the
overall desire for compact signal-channel messages and our guidance to
"include in any request to update information related to [a thing] the
information of other [like things] (already communicated using a lower
['tsid'/'tmid'] value" that results in larger individual messages (albeit
fewer of them).  Do we want to make some statement about how this guidance
to coalesce can be ignored if needed to make individual signal-channel
messages fit in a single packet?  (Hmm, I guess we do have a note about
"assumes that all link information can fit in one single message" at
least for the 'tsid'/link case, but the text from that note only appears
once.)

My editorial suggestions in
https://github.com/boucadair/draft-dots-telemetry/pull/9 included some edits
relating to whether a given target is "susceptible to" vs "subject to" (or
even "actively being subjected to") different types of attacks.  Med has
diligently already merged that PR while I was sick, so I mostly assume that
these already got reviewed for correctness.  Still, I want to call out that
there is a difference and I was not always 100% sure that I picked the right
one for each case.

It looks like we have to use backslash continuation markers for several of
the CoAP request target resources in the examples; do we want to reference
RFC 8792 folding and use its specific note text about line wrapping?

There are a few places where we say something like "the DOTS client MUST
auto-scale so that the appropriate unit is used".  (1) We don't specifically
say what the goal of this automatic behavior is (I guess, use the "largest
unit" that gives a value greater than one?), and (2) it seems that we are in
part relying on this behavior to ensure that the client only specifies one
measure in a given unit class.  That is, I didn't see anything else that
would prevent a client from sending (say) both Mbps and Gbps values, that
could of course be in conflict with each other -- if there's a potential for
conflict we'd need to say how to resolve the conflict.

Relatedly, there seems to *also* be potential for conflict in that we allow
both bit/second and Byte/second as unit-classes.  What is to happen if I say
that something is both 2 bit/second and 2 Byte/second?

We have a lot of examples that use the same 'cuid' of
dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw, which is fine and representative of normal
operation.  Do we want to curate the 'tsid' and 'tmid' values used by that
client?  I see some reuse, which I think is not prohibited (at least for
'tsid'), but may merit checking, and the values are not monotonically
increasing throughout the course of the document, which may or may not be
desirable.

(nit) we seem to have both "signalled" and "signaled" present, and
should standardize on our spelling.  (It looks like the one-'l' form is
more common in the RFC archive so far.)

Section 1

   Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have become more
   sophisticated.  [...]

We might want to say something about the baseline for the comparison
("more sophisticated compared to what?").

       100 Mbps to 100s of Gbps or even Tbps.  Attacks are commonly
       carried out leveraging botnets and attack reflectors for
       amplification attacks such as NTP (Network Time Protocol), DNS
       (Domain Name System), SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol),
       or SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol).

Is https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4732#section-3.1 still
current enough to make a useful reference for amplification attacks?

                                          Nevertheless, when DOTS
   telemetry attributes are available to a DOTS agent, and absent any
   policy, it can signal the attributes in order to optimize the overall
   mitigation service provisioned using DOTS.

I'm not sure what type of policy we have in mind, here.

Section 2

   The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].

It looks like RFC 8612 doesn't define "idle time" and "attack time", so
we may want to pull in a couple more documents as required reading or define
them ourselves.

Section 3.1

   If the DOTS server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to
   facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adapts its protection
   strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately
   (automation enabled) for the sake of optimized attack mitigation
   decisions and actions.

I'm not entirely sure I understand this part.  It seems to be talking
about telemetry between the DOTS server and the associated mitigation
resources, but the previous discussion has been about telemetry between
DOTS client and DOTS server (and I do not think the mitigation resources
associated with the DOTS server have been said to be DOTS clients in any
of the previous DOTS work).

Section 3.2

   DOTS telemetry can also be used to tune the DDoS mitigators with the
   correct state of an attack.  During the last few years, DDoS attack

(nit) I don't think "with" is the right verb -- "tune with <X>" implies
that X is used as a tool to effectuate the tuning, but I think what's
going on here is more like using the telemetry data as an input for
determining what values to use for the tuning parameters available on
the mitigation resources.

   Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal
   traffic can be inaccurate at best.  This is especially true for
   recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]).

RFC 8903 makes no mention of "recursive", "recursion", or any
hierarchical mitigation scenario (at least in my quick search).   Even
the linked draft version (-25) doesn't have a section 3.2.3.  I do
remember reading about this type of recursive or hierarchical scenario
somwhere, so I think we just need to locate the right reference to put
here...I'm just not sure what reference that is, offhand.

   In addition, the highly diverse types of use cases where DOTS clients
   are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of each DOTS
   client domain behavior.  Consequently, common global thresholds for
   attack detection practically cannot be realized.  [...]

(editorial?) When we say "the highly diverse types of use cases where
DOTS clients are integrated" that's essentially an unsupported claim,
but the way it's written we are presupposing that claim to be true
without directly stating it as an observation or assumption.  I think we
might be better served by starting off with a declarative statement like
"DOTS clients can be integrated in a highly diverse set of scenarios and
use cases", and then moving on from that now-explicit assumption/fact to
conclude that any single global threshold will mischaracterize the
traffic for some of those diverse DOTS clients.

Section 4.3

   DOTS clients can also use CoAP Block1 Option in a PUT request (see
   Section 2.5 of [RFC7959]) to initiate large transfers, but these
   Block1 transfers will fail if the inbound "pipe" is running full, so
   consideration needs to be made to try to fit this PUT into a single
   transfer, or to separate out the PUT into several discrete PUTs where
   each of them fits into a single packet.

If I understand/recall correctly, the Block1 transfer is expected to
fail only in a statistical sense, since the client can't send more
blocks until it gets the positive reply from the server to continue to
the next block (on a block-by-block basis), and that reply from the
server is competing with the attack traffic for the inbound "pipe" and
likely to fail for at least one of the blocks.  I think we should
probably reword slightly to say only "expected to fail" or "likely
fail", since there is some small chance of success; we may also want to
give a brief reminder about why it is expected to fail (e.g., "the
transfer requires a message from the server for each block, which would
likely be lost in the incoming flood").

Section 6

   Telemetry setup configuration is bound to a DOTS client domain.  DOTS
   servers MUST NOT expect DOTS clients to send regular requests to
   refresh the telemetry setup configuration.  Any available telemetry
   setup configuration has a validity timeout of the DOTS association
   with a DOTS client domain.  [...]

The term "DOTS association" does not seem to have been used previously
(in RFC 9132 we discuss the "DOTS session" heavily, though).  Also, I
don't remember any previous requirement to keep state on the server for
the duration of anything scoped to the entire client *domain*, just
individual DOTS sessions.  We do mention detecting conflicts/overlapping
requests within the scope of a client domain, in RFC 9132, but as far as
I can tell that only holds when all the DOTS sessions involved in the
conflict are still active.

Perhaps related, this discussion (at least so far) is not clear to me
about what level of coordination/consistency is expected between clients
in the same domain.  I believe that stock DOTS works fine with no such
coordination amongst clients within a domain, so if we are introducing such
a requirement we should say prominently that it's a change.

Section 6.1.1

   Upon receipt of such request, and assuming no error is encountered by
   processing the request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content)
   response that conveys the current and telemetry parameters acceptable
   by the DOTS server.  [...]

(editorial) Something seems off, here (around "current and telemetry
parameters acceptable").  Is it returning current configuration, acceptable
parameter values, or some combination thereof?

          |  |     +-- query-type*            query-type

Since this is a leaf-list of supported query types, should the list name
include the word "supported" or similar?

Section 6.1.2

   The PUT request with a higher numeric 'tsid' value overrides the DOTS
   telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower
   numeric 'tsid' value.  To avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid'
   requests for requests carrying telemetry configuration data from a
   DOTS client, the lower numeric 'tsid' MUST be automatically deleted
   and no longer be available at the DOTS server.

The way this is phrased with "the lower" and "higher" (vs "highest") assumes
or implies that there is only one "lower" 'tsid' value, perhaps leaving some
ambiguity if there is actually more than one.  We might make a statement
about how there is only at most one active 'tsid' per 'cuid'+'cdid' at a
time other than during a config change (if that's the intent), or
alternatively to qualify that the requirement to remove is only incurred in
the event of a conflict (as is done for other types of config, later).

   o  If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include
      'cuid' or 'tsid' Uri-Path parameters, or contains one or more
      invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned
      in the response.

Just to confirm: this does not rule out the ability to define new
parameters in the future (for example, the client might learn of new
ones in the response to a GET request)?

Section 6.3

      *  The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the
         target.

Should we say anything about the requirement on the protocol in question
that "request" is a meaningful concept and observable by the mitigator
(analogous to what we have about "embryonic connections" earlier)?

          |           +-- baseline* [id]
          |              +-- id
          |              |       uint32
          |              +-- target-prefix*
          |              |       inet:ip-prefix

(nit) the formatting here is a bit surprising, to wrap the line between
leaf name and type.  But if that's what pyang gives, we probably don't
want to mess with it...

          |              |  +-- partial-request-ps?          uint64
          |              |  +-- partial-request-client-ps?   uint64

I wonder whether the limit on "partial requests" should really be a rate
("per second") versus a point-in-time cap (i.e., "oustanding partial
requests").  It seems like a given request could in principle remain in
"partial" state for an extended period of time, and that having remaing
in such a state for a second should not justify the client being able to
produce more partial requests...but the current formulation as a rate seems
to do so.

Section 6.3.1

   Two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if there
   is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name.  Also,
   two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if the
   addresses associated with the FQDN, URI, or alias are overlapping
   with each other or with 'target-prefix'.

There can be some subtlety here involving where the FQDN/URI/alias are
resolved into IP addresses from; we may want to say "from the perspective of
the server", "as observed by the server", or similar.

Section 7

   DOTS agents SHOULD bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data with
   mitigation requests relying upon the target attribute.  In

(nit??) Is this "target attribute" a telemetry attribute, or something
else (an attack target?)?

   When generating telemetry data to send to a peer, the DOTS agent MUST
   auto-scale so that appropriate unit(s) are used.

(editorial) This requirement is not terribly tightly connected to either
what comes after it in the text or what comes before it in the text.  We
might consider moving it (earlier, maybe?) and adding a bit more
transition phrasing about how the agent may send telemetry data many
times and in different situations, so the right unit to use will vary
over time.

Section 7.1.1

   If the target is subjected to bandwidth consuming attack, the
   attributes representing the percentile values of the 'attack-id'
   attack traffic are included.

   If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attacks, the
   same attributes defined for Section 7.1.4 are applicable for
   representing the attack.

One of these just says "the attributes representing" and the other
references attributes defined in a specific section; can we use the same
formulation/phrasing to talk about the two cases?

   This is an optional attribute.

Er, which one is optional?  Just a few paragraphs earlier we said that
at least one attribute MUST be present (so as to be able to identify a
target).

Section 7.1.2

   The 'total-traffic' attribute (Figure 26) conveys the percentile
   values (including peak and current observed values) of total traffic
   observed during a DDoS attack.  [...]

This attribute is under the "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation" hierarchy; is it
really right to only say "traffic observed during a DDoS attack" (i.e.,
implicitly excluding the "pre-attack" case)?

Section 7.1.3

   The 'total-attack-traffic' attribute (Figure 27) conveys the total
   attack traffic identified by the DOTS client domain's DDoS Mitigation
   System (or DDoS Detector).  [...]

(editorial?) "Identified by [the client domain]" seems to imply that
this is only used in telemetry reports from client to server, and not in
updates flowing the other direction.  Is that correct?

Section 7.1.4

                +-- total-attack-connection
                |  +-- low-percentile-l* [protocol]
                |  |  +-- protocol              uint8
                |  |  +-- connection?           yang:gauge64
                |  |  +-- embryonic?            yang:gauge64
                |  |  +-- connection-ps?        yang:gauge64
                |  |  +-- request-ps?           yang:gauge64
                |  |  +-- partial-request-ps?   yang:gauge64

I think I'm confused about what semantics this is trying to represent.
The "low-percentile-l" seems like it should be providing aggregate
information about some particular snapshot of traffic that we have
determined to be representative of the "low percentile" level of attack
traffic.  That is, if we take the recorded attack traffic and divide it
into a bunch of bins on the time axis, we can order the respective bins
from "least noticable attack" to "worst attack", and we pick the fifth
percentile (or whatever is configured) bin to represent the
"low-percentile" bucket.  But now we're reporting a bunch of attributes
of that bin -- number of connections, embryonic connections, connections
per second, etc., even though the bins were ordered based on a single
"worst" metric (and I don't see us specify what metric we actually use
to do that ordering).  So even though this is the "low percentile" (e.g.,
fifth percentile) bin of attack traffic (i.e., probably not a very bad
attack), we can't say specifically that the reported total attack
connection count is fifth percentile and the embryonic connection count
is fifth percentile and the requests-per-second is also fifth
percentile.  Which makes me confused at why the list is structured this
way -- if we were just saying "for each of connection, embryonic, etc., bin
the samples over that metric and compute the low/med/high percentage values
for that single metric, and this list holds those resulting values", it
seems like a more natural structure to group things would be to have a list
of low/med/high for each of the attributes/metrics.

Section 7.1.5

   vendor-id:  Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number as
      registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers].  It is a four-byte
      integer value.

   attack-id:  Unique identifier assigned for the attack.

If the vendor-id is being used as a scoping value to let each vendor
assign attack-id values, then we should say so here, the first place we
really handle this part of the YANG tree.  Even if not, we should probably
say more about why we care what the vendor-id is, and we should also say who
assigns the attack-id.  (Maybe it's scoped to the DOTS server; I don't know
yet at this point in the document!)

Furthermore, the module structure where attack-id and vendor-id are
always required, but there is going to need to be the ability to assign
a new attack description at runtime, seems to force us to conflate
externally/statically assigned attack-ids and dynamically assigned ones
in the same number space.  Should we give any guidance to vendors about
how to allocate IDs in a way that will not produce collisions between
predistributed/fixed attack IDs and new ones created at runtime?  Or is the
thought that there will be no dynamic attack-ids since that just corresponds
to the attack-description string and a generic description can be used if
there is not a better one available?

Regardless, I think we should have more verbiage as to what the scope of the
attack-id is -- what information is it supposed to indicate or replace?

   start-time:  The time the attack started.  The attack's start time is
      expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time

(nit) "in UTC time" and "Z" seem redundant (which does not necessarily
imply that we should only use one of them...).

      (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC8949]).  The CBOR encoding is modified so
      that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.

(nit) Maybe we should move the CBOR section reference to after we start
talking about CBOR encoding.  (And we should do the same for 'end-time',
if we do anything.)

   top-talker:  A list of top talkers among attack sources.  The top
      talkers are represented using the 'source-prefix'.

Is there a good reference or short description for the notion of
top-talkers?  I know it's a well-established term of art in many different
circles, but it's hard to be fully confident that all readers will be
familiar with it.

Also, should we say anything about how the number of talkers to include
is determined?  (I assume it is best left to the discretion of the
sender, but we probably want to set a clear expectation that the list is
not all talkers or a complete list in any other way.)

      'spoofed-status' indicates whether a top talker is a spoofed IP
      address (e.g., reflection attacks) or not.

Is this something that can be unambiguously determined by all parties
that might be producing this telemetry data, or should we use a
tri-statae (for "unknown") rather than a boolean to represent it?

   In order to optimize the size of telemetry data conveyed over the
   DOTS signal channel, DOTS agents MAY use the DOTS data channel
   [RFC8783] to exchange vendor specific attack mapping details (that
   is, {vendor identifier, attack identifier} ==> attack description).
   As such, DOTS agents do not have to convey systematically an attack
   description in their telemetry messages over the DOTS signal channel.

It's a little surprising to me that this is only a MAY.  Does it make
sense as a SHOULD (expected to usually happen, but leaving open the
flexibility when an observed attack does not match a previously
characterized attack description)?

Also, when reading this I assumed that the "attack description" being
mapped to could include things like the target port/protocol, whether it
was spoofed, etc.  But reading on to the ietf-dots-mapping module, it
seems that this is intended to just be the single "attack-description"
string.  If so, we might give some more indications of that, e.g., by
spelling it that way and having some prose about it being a "string", or
similar.

Also^2, from here to the end of the section might benefit from being
split off into a dedicated subsection on using the data channel to
pre-populate vendor and attack description information

   tables are at different revisions.  The DOTS client SHOULD transmit
   telemetry information using the vendor mapping(s) that it provided to
   the DOTS server and the DOTS server SHOULD use the vendor mappings(s)
   provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to peer
   DOTS agent.

Having read a bit further on, I'm not actually sure where in the
protocol the client has provided vendor mappings to the server, and the
server provided vendor mappings to the client.  It *might* be the GET
and POST from/to dots-data/ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping, but we
don't really give a clear indication of that.  I think we should try to
be more precise about what we mean by "provided".
(editorial) would this then be "SHOULD use any vendor mapping(s)"
(s/the/any/)?

     augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities:
       +--ro vendor-mapping-enabled?   boolean {dots-telemetry}?

None of the other capabilities in this tree (as specified by RFC 8783)
include a name suffix like "-enabled".  Should this just be
"vendor-mapping"?

           "vendor-id": 1234,
           "vendor-name": "mitigator-s",
           "last-updated": "1576856561",
           "attack-mapping": []

[this last updated is from December 2019; we could probably pick
something more current if we wanted, but it doesn't really matter.]

   The DOTS client reiterates the above procedure regularly (e.g., once
   a week) to update the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details.

Do the udpates have to preserve any existing assignments?

   If the DOTS client concludes that the DOTS server does not have any
   reference to the specific vendor attack mapping details, the DOTS
   client uses a POST request to install its vendor attack mapping
   details.  [...]

This suggests that a client would not bother sending its own vendor
mapping if the server already has one, and at least to me further
implies that the client would use the sever-provided mapping for the
messages that the client generates.  This seems at odds with the earlier
guidance that the client should send using the vendor-mapping it
provided to the server, and the server should send using the
vendor-mapping it provided to the client.  Which one is it?

   The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
   using the status-line.  Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be
   returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the vendor
   attack mapping details.  If the request is missing a mandatory
   attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad
   Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the
   response.  [...]

I think (but did not specifically check) that these specific status code
values are preexisting requirements of core RESTCONF (and HTTP), so we
may not need to write new "MUST" keywords.

   If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the
   DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid'
   is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403
   Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied".  Upon
   receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Section 5.1
   of [RFC8783]).

(nit) the analogous text in RFC 8783 itself refers only to "Section 5"
(not 5.1).

   The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its vendor attack
   mapping details maintained by the DOTS server (e.g., add a new
   mapping).

As above, is this really just an example behavior or a hard requirement
to preserve existing mappings?

Section 7.2

           "attack-detail": [
             {
               "vendor-id": 1234,

The vendor-ID is supposed to be an IANA-assigned PEN, and 1234 is
assigned to Linkage Software Inc.  We have other options, like 32473,
"Example Enterprise Number for Documentation Use" (RFC 5612).

               "start-time": "1957811234",

This value represents a time in 2032; should we be using something a
little more current?

Section 7.3

   This request MUST be maintained active by the DOTS server until a
   delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear this
   pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry.

It seems like we might want to allow some provision for a server to
clean up state associated with a client that disappears entirely without
cleaning itself up.  For example, is the server allowed to discard state
when it reboots, or does this requirement extend to writing the state to
persistent storage?

      If more than one Uri-Query option is included in a request, these
      options are interpreted in the same way as when multiple target
      attributes are included in a message body.

I a little bit wonder if we could put a section reference here for
"interpreted in the same way", since the reader may not remember what
that way is, at least on the first reading.

      parameters.  DOTS clients MUST NOT include a name in which the "*"
      character is included in a label other than the leftmost label.

Do we want to say what the server should do if it gets one anyway?
(It's not really clear that we need to say anything, strictly speaking.)

               "vendor-id": 1234,
               "attack-id": 77,
               "start-time": "1957818434",

[same as above]

   A DOTS client that is not interested to receive pre-or-ongoing-
   mitigation telemetry data for a target MUST send a delete request
   similar to the one depicted in Figure 37.

I'm not sure that this strictly needs to be a "MUST"; it seems like we
could say that such a client "sends a delete request" and leave it at
that.

Section 8.1

       +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
       [...]
          +-- top-talker
             +-- talker* [source-prefix]
             [...]
                +-- total-attack-connection
                   +-- low-percentile-c
                   |  +-- connection?           yang:gauge64

I'm kind of surprised that there is no 'protocol' leaf in this subtree;
it seems to usually appear in combination with these connection counts.

          |  +-- peak-g?              yang:gauge64
          |  +-- current-g?              yang:gauge64
[...]
                |  +-- peak-g?              yang:gauge64
                |  +-- current-g?              yang:gauge64

(nit) the indentation seems off for type of these two 'current-g's.

   In order to signal telemetry data in a mitigation efficacy update, it
   is RECOMMENDED that the DOTS client has already established a DOTS
   telemetry setup session with the server in 'idle' time.

If I understand correctly, it seems that at least part of the need for
having a preestablished telemetry session is that the mitigation
efficacy update is identified only by the 'mid', and so we cannot
specify a 'tmid' as part of such an efficacy update.  Thus, in order
for the server to associate the telemetry data in the efficacy update
with an ongoing telemetry status session, the 'tsid' must be associated
with the 'mid' that is the subject of the efficacy update.
If that is correct, then I think we should have some text here about how
the efficacy update does not/cannot include the 'tmid', and so is
associated with the 'mid' of the update.

Section 8.2

   As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include
   several countermeasure mechanisms.  The DOTS server signals the
   current operational status of relevant countermeasures.  A list of
   attacks detected by each countermeasure MAY also be included.  The

I see how in stock DOTS signal channel, the server signals whether an
attack is fully/partially/not mitigated, but I don't see how the server
indicates the specific relevant countermeasures that were used.  Am I
just missing something there?  (Similarly, the list of attacks we
returned may or may not be at the granularity of "detected by each
countermeasure", depending on the ansewr to the previous part.)

Also (editorial), I think we should be more clear about when we switch
from describing RFC 9132 behavior to to describing the new functionality
provided by this document.

   Figure 46 shows an example of an asynchronous notification of attack
   mitigation status from the DOTS server.  This notification signals

Is the "new stuff" in Figure 46 just the subtree under
:(server-to-client-only)?  The 'total-attack-traffic' leaf seems to be
the same content as in Figure 45, and maybe could be omitted?

           "mitigation-start": "1507818434",

(This date is from 2017; as above, we could use a more current one if we
want.)

               "source-count": {
                 "peak-g": "10000"

(Suspiciously round numbers like this are indications of fabricated data
... which is totally reasonable for an example like this!  But if we
wanted to be "more realistic" we could use a less-round number.)

   DOTS clients can filter out the asynchronous notifications from the
   DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET
   request.  A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters:
   'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn',
   'target-uri', 'alias-name', and 'c' (content) (Section 4.2.4).  The

Up in §7.3 the analogous list also included 'mid'.  Is 'mid' appropriate
here (or is it implicitly already included by the base signal channel
mechanisms)?  Hmm, but maybe 'c' is also already allowed by the base
signal channel mechanism, so that theory is not great...

   If the target query does not match the target of the enclosed 'mid'
   as maintained by the DOTS server, the latter MUST respond with a 4.04
   (Not Found) error Response Code.  The DOTS server MUST NOT add a new
   observe entry if this query overlaps with an existing one.

How should the server respond if this query overlaps with an existing
one?

Section 10.1

   This module uses types defined in [RFC6991] and [RFC8345].

Should we mention the data structure extension from RFC 8791 here, as
well?

  typedef attack-severity {
    type enumeration {
      enum none {
        value 1;
        description
          "No effect on the DOTS client domain.";

It seems like the closest analogue to our attack-serverity typedef in
RFC 7970 is in §3.12.2, "BusinessImpact Class". But the phrasing used in
RFC 7970 is slightly different than the descriptions we have here.
Do we want to tweak our phrasings and/or clarify in the typedef
description that we use a slightly modified formulation?  (Indeed, we do
not have an extension point, either, though 7970 does have an extension
mechanism.)  Also, a section reference within RFC 7970 might be helpful.

      enum kilopacket-ps {
        value 4;
        description
          "Kilo packets per second (kpps).";

We may get someone who asks if we are using 1000 or 1024 ("kibi"), but
I'm inclined to leave it alone for now.

      leaf unit-status {
        type boolean;
        default true;
        description
          "Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit class.";

Does the "default true" imply that even unit classes not present in
"list unit-config" are assumed to be supported by default?

  grouping connection {
    description
      "A set of data nodes which represent the attack
       characteristics.";
    [...]
    leaf embryonic {
      type yang:gauge64;
      description
        "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
         the target server.";

It's a little interesting that this is the only leaf in the grouping
that we can't attach the word "attack" to the description of, but as far
as I can tell we shouldn't make any change here.
(I originally wrote a comment that we shouldn't use "attack" for any of
them, since we have analogous nodes in the total-connection-capacity
config entries, but those seem to not use this grouping.)

    list talker {
      key "source-prefix";
      description
        "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";

My read of the YANG is that this is the description for "list talker",
but the content matches the description given for the "source-prefix" leaf
within the list.  Should the list itself have a different description?

  grouping top-talker-aggregate {
  [...]
  grouping top-talker {

The diff between these two is pretty small -- just the top-level
description and connection-all vs connection-protocol-all.  Is there any
value in introducing another grouping to hold the common elements?

            container max-config-values {
              description
                "Maximum acceptable configuration values.";
              uses telemetry-parameters;

I guess the convenience of having the reusable grouping probably
outweighs the value of having YANG-level constraints that the 'max'
values are >= the 'min' values (which we can set for the
"telemetry-notify-interval" that is not part of "telemetry-parameters", but
can't set here because we use the grouping).

              leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
                type uint32 {
                  range "1 .. 3600";

(Pedantically, this range would fit in a uint16, though maybe there is
some other reason to prefer the 32-bit type.)

            case baseline {
              [...]
              list baseline {
                [...]
                leaf id {
                  type uint32;
                  must '. >= 1';
                  description
                    "An identifier that uniquely identifies a baseline
                     entry communicated by a DOTS client.";

I a little bit wonder if we should have a little bit of prose up in §6.3
discussing the need for "id" and how it is used.

              leaf tmid {
                type uint32;
                description
                  "An identifier to uniquely demux telemetry data sent
                   using the same message.";

The description for "tsid" in the analogous setup was just "an
identifier for the DOTS telemetry setup data".  As far as I can tell,
the usage of the two is analogous, so shouldn't the descriptions be
analogous as well?  In particular, I am not sure that "uniquely demux" is
the only usage of this leaf, since in server-initiated telemetry messages,
this leaf might be needed to indicate which telemetry entry is being
described (right?).

            leaf-list mid-list {
              type uint32;
              description
                "Reference a list of associated mitigation requests.";

Should we reference RFC 9132 somehow to indicate that the base signal
channel is how these "mid" values are assigned (and assigned meaning)?

Section 10.2

         description
           "Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number.";

Should we say something about "IANA-assigned" and/or link to the
corresponding registry?

Section 11, 12.1

A handful of the entries in the tables still have an
"ietf-dots-telemetry:" prefix, and I don't understand why only some of
the entries would need it but not others.

In particular, there seems to be an entry for both "total-traffic" and
"ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic", and I don't understand how they are
different.  (I did not check if there are other "duplicate"s like that.)

Section 11

  | telemetry            | container   |TBA2  | 5 map         | Object |

I see both a "list telemetry" and a "case telemetry" in the YANG module,
but I'm not sure which of them is supposed to correspond to the YANG
type "container".
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7950#section-7.9.2 does not
really give me the impression that there is an implicit container of
this name.

  | baseline             | container   |TBA49 | 5 map         | Object |

Similarly, I see a 'baseline' that's a list, as the only content of a
"case baseline" statement.

Section 12.1

   Note that 'lower-type' and 'upper-type' are also requested for
   assignment in the call-home I-D.  Both I-Ds should be sync'ed as
   depending the one that will make it first to the IANA.

(I think we tweaked call-home already to account for the registration
requests being from different ranges between the two documents, but
mention it just in case I'm misremembering.)

Section 12.3

            URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-mapping
            Registrant Contact: The IESG.
            XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

I wonder if this (module) name is perhaps somewhat more generic than the
functionality it provides.

Section 13

Should we mention the security considerations for the blockwise transfer
technologies?

Looking through the YANG tree, the only thing that really sticks out as
potentially worth mentioning here is the server-originated-telemetry
option.  But even for that, I'm not sure that there's much to say.

   The DOTS telemetry information includes DOTS client network topology,
   DOTS client domain pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline and
   connections capacity, and threat and mitigation information.  Such
   information is sensitive; it MUST be protected at rest by the DOTS
   server domain to prevent data leakage.

I'd consider adding a sentence or two here noting that even though this
data is sensitive, sending it explicitly to the DOTS server does not
introduce any new significant considerations (other than the need for
protection at rest) because the DOTS server is already trusted to have
access to that kind of information by being in the position to mitigate
(and observe) attacks.

Section 16.1

A normative reference on draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control will
cause a document cluster, delaying publication until that document is
ready to be an RFC.  It's not clear to me that such a dependency is
needed in this case, since there is only one citation to that document
and it seems more descriptive than imposing a strong dependency.

Similarly, we seem to cite RFC 7641 just as a statement of fact (clients
can use CoAP OBSERVE), which may not require it to be classified as a
normative reference.

Section 16.2

The current state of this document doesn't really include enough detail
about percentiles and their calculation to be implementable without
referring to RFC 2330, currently listed only as a normative reference.
I would prefer to add more text to this document rather than promote
2330 to a normative refrence, though I think we would need more text
than I suggested above in order to achieve that effect.

We say we assume familiarity with RFC 8612 at least for terminology,
which may indicate that it is best classified as a normative reference.


Thanks,

Ben


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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16 (Sections 11-16)
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Hi Ben,=20

Thank you for the detailed review. Much appreciated as usual.=20

You can track the changes at: https://tinyurl.com/dots-telemetry-latest.

Please see inline for more context for Section 11 to 16.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Benjamin Kaduk
> Envoy=E9=A0: mercredi 24 novembre 2021 23:42
> =C0=A0: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org
> Cc=A0: dots@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
...
>=20
> Section 11, 12.1
>=20
> A handful of the entries in the tables still have an "ietf-dots-
> telemetry:" prefix, and I don't understand why only some of the entries
> would need it but not others.

[Med] This is because of the prefix conventions set in RFC7951:

   The name of a module determines the namespace of all data node names
   defined in that module.
   ...
   A namespace-qualified member name MUST be used for all members of a
   top-level JSON object and then also whenever the namespaces of the
   data node and its parent node are different.  In all other cases, the
   simple form of the member name MUST be used.

>=20
> In particular, there seems to be an entry for both "total-traffic" and
> "ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic", and I don't understand how they are
> different.  (I did not check if there are other "duplicate"s like that.)

[Med] As a general rule: A telemetry attribute that is included in a mitiga=
tion request has to be prefixed with "ietf-dots-telemetry:", but it does no=
t when it is included in a telemetry message.

>=20
> Section 11
>=20
>   | telemetry            | container   |TBA2  | 5 map         | Object |
>=20
> I see both a "list telemetry" and a "case telemetry" in the YANG module,
> but I'm not sure which of them is supposed to correspond to the YANG type
> "container".
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7950#section-7.9.2 does not
> really give me the impression that there is an implicit container of this
> name.
>=20
>   | baseline             | container   |TBA49 | 5 map         | Object |
>=20
> Similarly, I see a 'baseline' that's a list, as the only content of a
> "case baseline" statement.

[Med] Argh. We spent many cycles with Jon checking the tables. The type sho=
uld be list.=20

>=20
> Section 12.1
>=20
>    Note that 'lower-type' and 'upper-type' are also requested for
>    assignment in the call-home I-D.  Both I-Ds should be sync'ed as
>    depending the one that will make it first to the IANA.
>=20
> (I think we tweaked call-home already to account for the registration
> requests being from different ranges between the two documents, but
> mention it just in case I'm misremembering.)

[Med] We don't have this note in -16.

>=20
> Section 12.3
>=20
>             URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-mapping
>             Registrant Contact: The IESG.
>             XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
>=20
> I wonder if this (module) name is perhaps somewhat more generic than the
> functionality it provides.
>=20

[Med] We thought about other alternatives but all are very long (e.g., ietf=
-dots-vendor-attack-mapping, ietf-dots-attack-mapping) or do not hint what =
the module is about (e.g., ietf-dots-vam, ietf-dots-vendor-map). We prefer =
to keep this one. Thanks.=20


> Section 13
>=20
> Should we mention the security considerations for the blockwise transfer
> technologies?

[Med] We don't have any mention of blockwise because this is not specific t=
o the telemetry spec and is already used in RFC9132.=20

>=20
> Looking through the YANG tree, the only thing that really sticks out as
> potentially worth mentioning here is the server-originated-telemetry
> option.  But even for that, I'm not sure that there's much to say.

[Med] Agree, especially that it relies upon the status update defined in 91=
32.=20

>=20
>    The DOTS telemetry information includes DOTS client network topology,
>    DOTS client domain pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline and
>    connections capacity, and threat and mitigation information.  Such
>    information is sensitive; it MUST be protected at rest by the DOTS
>    server domain to prevent data leakage.
>=20
> I'd consider adding a sentence or two here noting that even though this
> data is sensitive, sending it explicitly to the DOTS server does not
> introduce any new significant considerations (other than the need for
> protection at rest) because the DOTS server is already trusted to have
> access to that kind of information by being in the position to mitigate
> (and observe) attacks.

[Med] Good suggestion. Added the following:=20

NEW:=20
   Note that sharing this
   sensitive data with a trusted DOTS server does not introduce any new
   significant considerations other that the need for the aforementioned
   protection.  Such a DOTS server is already trusted to have access to
   that kind of information by being in the position to observe and
   mitigate attacks.

>=20
> Section 16.1
>=20
> A normative reference on draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control will cause
> a document cluster, delaying publication until that document is ready to
> be an RFC.=20

[Med] This was already published as RFC9133, but ...

 It's not clear to me that such a dependency is needed in this
> case, since there is only one citation to that document and it seems more
> descriptive than imposing a strong dependency.

[Med] you are right. it does not need to be cited as normative. Fixed.=20

>=20
> Similarly, we seem to cite RFC 7641 just as a statement of fact (clients
> can use CoAP OBSERVE), which may not require it to be classified as a
> normative reference.

[Med] ACK. observe is needed for asynchronous telemetry notification. Added=
 this explicit statement to Section 5:

NEW:
  DOTS implementations MUST support the Observe Option for 'tm'.

>=20
> Section 16.2
>=20
> The current state of this document doesn't really include enough detail
> about percentiles and their calculation to be implementable without
> referring to RFC 2330, currently listed only as a normative reference.

[Med] I guess you meant informative.=20

> I would prefer to add more text to this document rather than promote
> 2330 to a normative refrence, though I think we would need more text than
> I suggested above in order to achieve that effect.

[Med] I don't think we need to cite 2330 as normative. Made this change:=20

OLD:
   o  Percentile-related measurement parameters.=20=20

NEW:
   o  Percentile-related measurement parameters.  In particular,
      'measurement-interval' defines the period on which percentiles are
      computed, while 'measurement-sample' defines the time distribution
      for measuring values that are used to compute percentiles.
      Section 11.3 of [RFC2330] includes more details about computing
      percentiles.
=20
>=20
> We say we assume familiarity with RFC 8612 at least for terminology, which
> may indicate that it is best classified as a normative reference.
>=20

[Med] I prefer to keep it as informative to be consistent with 8782, 8783, =
9132, etc. Thanks.=20=20

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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16 (Sections 8-10)
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Re-,

You can track the changes at: https://tinyurl.com/dots-telemetry-latest.

Please see inline for more context for Sections 8 to 10.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Benjamin Kaduk
> Envoy=E9=A0: mercredi 24 novembre 2021 23:42
> =C0=A0: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org
> Cc=A0: dots@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16
>=20
> Hi all,
...
>=20
> Section 8.2
>=20
>    As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include
>    several countermeasure mechanisms.  The DOTS server signals the
>    current operational status of relevant countermeasures.  A list of
>    attacks detected by each countermeasure MAY also be included.  The
>=20
> I see how in stock DOTS signal channel, the server signals whether an
> attack is fully/partially/not mitigated, but I don't see how the server
> indicates the specific relevant countermeasures that were used.  Am I just
> missing something there?

[Med] The text does not say that we signal the measures themselves. I think=
 you were confused by "... each countermeasure ..."

  (Similarly, the list of attacks we returned may
> or may not be at the granularity of "detected by each countermeasure",
> depending on the ansewr to the previous part.)

[Med] s/each countermeasure/these countermeasures

>=20
> Also (editorial), I think we should be more clear about when we switch
> from describing RFC 9132 behavior to to describing the new functionality
> provided by this document.
>=20
>    Figure 46 shows an example of an asynchronous notification of attack
>    mitigation status from the DOTS server.  This notification signals
>=20
> Is the "new stuff" in Figure 46 just the subtree under :(server-to-client-
> only)?=20

[Med] What is new is what is indicated right after the text you quoted:=20

" This notification signals
   both the mid-percentile value of processed attack traffic and the
   peak count of unique sources involved in the attack. "


this can be identified in the figure by looking at items that are prefixes =
with "ietf-dots-telemetry:".


 The 'total-attack-traffic' leaf seems to be the same content as in
> Figure 45, and maybe could be omitted?

[Med] Please note this is not for the same mid. Putting that aside, the one=
 in Figure 45 is what is seen by the client, while figure 46 as about the s=
erver's view. Changed the total attack traffic value to avoid inducing read=
ers to assume a correlation between the two.=20=20

>=20
>            "mitigation-start": "1507818434",
>=20
> (This date is from 2017; as above, we could use a more current one if we
> want.)

[Med] This was on purpose so easily identify the telemetry addition vs base=
 spec as depicted in Figure 14 of RFC9134.=20

>=20
>                "source-count": {
>                  "peak-g": "10000"
>=20
> (Suspiciously round numbers like this are indications of fabricated data
> ... which is totally reasonable for an example like this!  But if we
> wanted to be "more realistic" we could use a less-round number.)

[Med] Agree. Updated.=20

>=20
>    DOTS clients can filter out the asynchronous notifications from the
>    DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET
>    request.  A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters:
>    'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn',
>    'target-uri', 'alias-name', and 'c' (content) (Section 4.2.4).  The
>=20
> Up in =A77.3 the analogous list also included 'mid'.  Is 'mid' appropriate
> here (or is it implicitly already included by the base signal channel
> mechanisms)?

[Med] Unlike 7.3, the filtering is happing within a request that includes m=
id as an uri path.

  Hmm, but maybe 'c' is also already allowed by the base
> signal channel mechanism, so that theory is not great...
>=20
>    If the target query does not match the target of the enclosed 'mid'
>    as maintained by the DOTS server, the latter MUST respond with a 4.04
>    (Not Found) error Response Code.  The DOTS server MUST NOT add a new
>    observe entry if this query overlaps with an existing one.=20
>=20
> How should the server respond if this query overlaps with an existing one?
>=20

[Med] We don't mention this as this is already handled by the base spec:

   4.09 (Conflict)  is returned by the DOTS server if the DOTS server
      detects that a request conflicts with a previous request.=20=20
=20

Updated the text to make this explicit:=20

"In such a case, the DOTS server replies with 4.09 (Conflict)."


> Section 10.1
>=20
>    This module uses types defined in [RFC6991] and [RFC8345].
>=20
> Should we mention the data structure extension from RFC 8791 here, as
> well?

[Med] It is not cited here because we don't use any type from 8791. We do h=
ave a statement in the document that we rely on 8791.=20=20

>=20
>   typedef attack-severity {
>     type enumeration {
>       enum none {
>         value 1;
>         description
>           "No effect on the DOTS client domain.";
>=20
> It seems like the closest analogue to our attack-serverity typedef in RFC
> 7970 is in =A73.12.2, "BusinessImpact Class".

[Med] Yes. We do have the following:=20

   attack-severity:  Attack severity level.  This attribute takes one of
      the values defined in Section 3.12.2 of [RFC7970].

 But the phrasing used in RFC
> 7970 is slightly different than the descriptions we have here.

[Med] It was adjusted for the DOTS context, but I think they are aligned.=
=20

> Do we want to tweak our phrasings and/or clarify in the typedef
> description that we use a slightly modified formulation?

[Med] I don't think this is needed.=20

  (Indeed, we do
> not have an extension point, either, though 7970 does have an extension
> mechanism.)  Also, a section reference within RFC 7970 might be helpful.
>=20

[Med] Added Section 3.12.2=20=20

>       enum kilopacket-ps {
>         value 4;
>         description
>           "Kilo packets per second (kpps).";
>=20
> We may get someone who asks if we are using 1000 or 1024 ("kibi"), but I'm
> inclined to leave it alone for now.
>=20
>       leaf unit-status {
>         type boolean;
>         default true;
>         description
>           "Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit class.";
>=20
> Does the "default true" imply that even unit classes not present in "list
> unit-config" are assumed to be supported by default?

[Med] This is a bug. This should be "mandatory true".=20

>=20
>   grouping connection {
>     description
>       "A set of data nodes which represent the attack
>        characteristics.";
>     [...]
>     leaf embryonic {
>       type yang:gauge64;
>       description
>         "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
>          the target server.";
>=20
> It's a little interesting that this is the only leaf in the grouping that
> we can't attach the word "attack" to the description of, but as far as I
> can tell we shouldn't make any change here.
> (I originally wrote a comment that we shouldn't use "attack" for any of
> them, since we have analogous nodes in the total-connection-capacity
> config entries, but those seem to not use this grouping.)
>=20
>     list talker {
>       key "source-prefix";
>       description
>         "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
>=20
> My read of the YANG is that this is the description for "list talker", but
> the content matches the description given for the "source-prefix" leaf
> within the list.  Should the list itself have a different description?

[Med] Yes. This was a copy/past issue.

>=20
>   grouping top-talker-aggregate {
>   [...]
>   grouping top-talker {
>=20
> The diff between these two is pretty small -- just the top-level
> description and connection-all vs connection-protocol-all.  Is there any
> value in introducing another grouping to hold the common elements?
>=20

[Med] This allows to shorten the doc by 1/2 page. Made the change.

>             container max-config-values {
>               description
>                 "Maximum acceptable configuration values.";
>               uses telemetry-parameters;
>=20
> I guess the convenience of having the reusable grouping probably outweighs
> the value of having YANG-level constraints that the 'max'
> values are >=3D the 'min' values (which we can set for the "telemetry-
> notify-interval" that is not part of "telemetry-parameters", but can't set
> here because we use the grouping).

[Med] I confirm. Please note that we have that guard in the core document.=
=20

>=20
>               leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
>                 type uint32 {
>                   range "1 .. 3600";
>=20
> (Pedantically, this range would fit in a uint16, though maybe there is
> some other reason to prefer the 32-bit type.)

[Med] I lost the context why we had it like this. From a yang perspective, =
the current one is still correct, but it is better to adjust. Will change t=
his but will check my archives as well.=20

>=20
>             case baseline {
>               [...]
>               list baseline {
>                 [...]
>                 leaf id {
>                   type uint32;
>                   must '. >=3D 1';
>                   description
>                     "An identifier that uniquely identifies a baseline
>                      entry communicated by a DOTS client.";
>=20
> I a little bit wonder if we should have a little bit of prose up in =A76.3
> discussing the need for "id" and how it is used.

[Med] Added this NEW text to 6.3:

   A DOTS client can share one or multiple normal traffic baselines
   (e.g., aggregate or per-prefix baselines), each are uniquely within
   the DOTS client domain with an identifier 'id'.  This identifier can
   be used to update a baseline entry, delete a specific entry, etc.

>=20
>               leaf tmid {
>                 type uint32;
>                 description
>                   "An identifier to uniquely demux telemetry data sent
>                    using the same message.";
>=20
> The description for "tsid" in the analogous setup was just "an identifier
> for the DOTS telemetry setup data".  As far as I can tell, the usage of
> the two is analogous, so shouldn't the descriptions be analogous as well?

[Med] Fair. Adjusted the text accordingly.=20

> In particular, I am not sure that "uniquely demux" is the only usage of
> this leaf, since in server-initiated telemetry messages, this leaf might
> be needed to indicate which telemetry entry is being described (right?).

[Med] Yes.=20

>=20
>             leaf-list mid-list {
>               type uint32;
>               description
>                 "Reference a list of associated mitigation requests.";
>=20
> Should we reference RFC 9132 somehow to indicate that the base signal
> channel is how these "mid" values are assigned (and assigned meaning)?
>=20

[Med] Good suggestion. Added:=20

              reference
                "RFC 9132: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat=20
                           Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel=20
                           Specification, Section 4.4.1";

> Section 10.2
>=20
>          description
>            "Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number.";
>=20
> Should we say something about "IANA-assigned" and/or link to the
> corresponding registry?

[Med] Added a reference statement to the IANA registry.=20=20

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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, "draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org>
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Re-,

You can track the changes at: https://tinyurl.com/dots-telemetry-latest.

Please see inline for more context for Sections 7.1.5 to 7.3.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Benjamin Kaduk
> Envoy=E9=A0: mercredi 24 novembre 2021 23:42
> =C0=A0: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org
> Cc=A0: dots@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
...
>=20
> Section 7.1.5
>=20
>    vendor-id:  Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number as
>       registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers].  It is a four-byte
>       integer value.
>=20
>    attack-id:  Unique identifier assigned for the attack.
>=20
> If the vendor-id is being used as a scoping value to let each vendor
> assign attack-id values, then we should say so here, the first place we
> really handle this part of the YANG tree.  Even if not, we should probably
> say more about why we care what the vendor-id is, and we should also say
> who assigns the attack-id.  (Maybe it's scoped to the DOTS server; I don't
> know yet at this point in the document!)

[Med] The is assigned by the vendor. We don't have globally unique attack-i=
ds and we don't ambition to have such a registry.=20

We have the following in the YANG module "Unique identifier assigned by the=
 vendor for the attack".=20

Updated the text to align.=20

>=20
> Furthermore, the module structure where attack-id and vendor-id are always
> required, but there is going to need to be the ability to assign a new
> attack description at runtime, seems to force us to conflate
> externally/statically assigned attack-ids and dynamically assigned ones in
> the same number space.  Should we give any guidance to vendors about how
> to allocate IDs in a way that will not produce collisions between
> predistributed/fixed attack IDs and new ones created at runtime?  Or is
> the thought that there will be no dynamic attack-ids since that just
> corresponds to the attack-description string and a generic description can
> be used if there is not a better one available?

[Med] We really don't want to interfere with how these ids are assigned by =
vendors. For new attacks, and because the client may not have the mapping w=
e do allow for the following:

   When conveying attack details in DOTS telemetry messages (Sections
   7.2, 7.3, and 8), DOTS agents MUST NOT include the 'attack-
   description' attribute unless the corresponding attack mapping
   details were not previously shared with the peer DOTS agent.

>=20
> Regardless, I think we should have more verbiage as to what the scope of
> the attack-id is -- what information is it supposed to indicate or
> replace?
>=20
>    start-time:  The time the attack started.  The attack's start time is
>       expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time
>=20
> (nit) "in UTC time" and "Z" seem redundant (which does not necessarily
> imply that we should only use one of them...).

[Med] We preferred to echo 3.4.2 of RFC8949 cited right after

>=20
>       (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC8949]).  The CBOR encoding is modified so
>       that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
>=20
> (nit) Maybe we should move the CBOR section reference to after we start
> talking about CBOR encoding.  (And we should do the same for 'end-time',
> if we do anything.)

[Med] The section where we discuss CBOR encoding is 4.5. I prefer to keep t=
his mention here. Thanks.=20

>=20
>    top-talker:  A list of top talkers among attack sources.  The top
>       talkers are represented using the 'source-prefix'.
>=20
> Is there a good reference or short description for the notion of top-
> talkers?  I know it's a well-established term of art in many different
> circles, but it's hard to be fully confident that all readers will be
> familiar with it.

[Med] What about:

      A list of attack sources that are involved in an attack
      and which are generating an important part of the attack traffic.

>=20
> Also, should we say anything about how the number of talkers to include is
> determined?  (I assume it is best left to the discretion of the sender,
> but we probably want to set a clear expectation that the list is not all
> talkers or a complete list in any other way.)

[Med] We don't include any hint as this is deployment-specific.=20

>=20
>       'spoofed-status' indicates whether a top talker is a spoofed IP
>       address (e.g., reflection attacks) or not.
>=20
> Is this something that can be unambiguously determined by all parties that
> might be producing this telemetry data, or should we use a tri-statae (for
> "unknown") rather than a boolean to represent it?

[Med] The unknown status is handled by not including the leaf. Update the t=
ext to indicate so.=20

>=20
>    In order to optimize the size of telemetry data conveyed over the
>    DOTS signal channel, DOTS agents MAY use the DOTS data channel
>    [RFC8783] to exchange vendor specific attack mapping details (that
>    is, {vendor identifier, attack identifier} =3D=3D> attack description).
>    As such, DOTS agents do not have to convey systematically an attack
>    description in their telemetry messages over the DOTS signal channel.
>=20
> It's a little surprising to me that this is only a MAY.  Does it make
> sense as a SHOULD (expected to usually happen, but leaving open the
> flexibility when an observed attack does not match a previously
> characterized attack description)?

[Med] We went for "MAY" because this is an optimization for a an optional f=
eature.=20

>=20
> Also, when reading this I assumed that the "attack description" being
> mapped to could include things like the target port/protocol, whether it
> was spoofed, etc.

[Med] Some of the details you cited can be discovered during an attack.=20

  But reading on to the ietf-dots-mapping module, it
> seems that this is intended to just be the single "attack-description"
> string.

[Med] This is the portion that consumes most packet size and is thus proble=
matic.=20

  If so, we might give some more indications of that, e.g., by
> spelling it that way and having some prose about it being a "string", or
> similar.

[Med] OK.

>=20
> Also^2, from here to the end of the section might benefit from being split
> off into a dedicated subsection on using the data channel to pre-populate
> vendor and attack description information

[Med] Makes sense.=20

>=20
>    tables are at different revisions.  The DOTS client SHOULD transmit
>    telemetry information using the vendor mapping(s) that it provided to
>    the DOTS server and the DOTS server SHOULD use the vendor mappings(s)
>    provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to peer
>    DOTS agent.
>=20
> Having read a bit further on, I'm not actually sure where in the protocol
> the client has provided vendor mappings to the server, and the server
> provided vendor mappings to the client.  It *might* be the GET and POST
> from/to dots-data/ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping, but we don't really
> give a clear indication of that.  I think we should try to be more precise
> about what we mean by "provided".

[Med] added: (e.g., using a POST as depicted in Figure 34)=20

> (editorial) would this then be "SHOULD use any vendor mapping(s)"
> (s/the/any/)?

[Med] Yeah.

>=20
>      augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities:
>        +--ro vendor-mapping-enabled?   boolean {dots-telemetry}?
>=20
> None of the other capabilities in this tree (as specified by RFC 8783)
> include a name suffix like "-enabled".  Should this just be "vendor-
> mapping"?

[Med] We could, but we went for -enabled to ease referencing this data node=
 in the text. See for example:

   attack mapping details is supported by the server (i.e., check the
   value of 'vendor-mapping-enabled').=20

Otherwise, we would need to provide the full hierarchy because we do have "=
vendor-mapping" in=20

     augment /data-channel:dots-data:
       +--ro vendor-mapping {dots-telemetry}?

>=20
>            "vendor-id": 1234,
>            "vendor-name": "mitigator-s",
>            "last-updated": "1576856561",
>            "attack-mapping": []
>=20
> [this last updated is from December 2019; we could probably pick something
> more current if we wanted, but it doesn't really matter.]

[Med] OK

>=20
>    The DOTS client reiterates the above procedure regularly (e.g., once
>    a week) to update the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details.
>=20
> Do the udpates have to preserve any existing assignments?

[Med] No. The client can even determine that a given vendor is not used any=
more.

>=20
>    If the DOTS client concludes that the DOTS server does not have any
>    reference to the specific vendor attack mapping details, the DOTS
>    client uses a POST request to install its vendor attack mapping
>    details.  [...]
>=20
> This suggests that a client would not bother sending its own vendor
> mapping if the server already has one

[Med] yes, because there same mapping is used in both sides.

, and at least to me further implies
> that the client would use the sever-provided mapping for the messages that
> the client generates.  This seems at odds with the earlier guidance that
> the client should send using the vendor-mapping it provided to the server,
> and the server should send using the vendor-mapping it provided to the
> client.  Which one is it?
>=20
>    The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
>    using the status-line.  Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be
>    returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the vendor
>    attack mapping details.  If the request is missing a mandatory
>    attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad
>    Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the
>    response.  [...]
>=20
> I think (but did not specifically check) that these specific status code
> values are preexisting requirements of core RESTCONF (and HTTP), so we may
> not need to write new "MUST" keywords.

[Med] We tried to be consistent with RFC8782, where we can find:

   If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or it contains an
   invalid or unknown parameter, a "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be
   returned by the DOTS server.

>=20
>    If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the
>    DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid'
>    is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403
>    Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied".  Upon
>    receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Section 5.1
>    of [RFC8783]).
>=20
> (nit) the analogous text in RFC 8783 itself refers only to "Section 5"
> (not 5.1).

[Med] I prefer to keep 5.1 because 5 covers both registration and de-regist=
ration.

>=20
>    The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its vendor attack
>    mapping details maintained by the DOTS server (e.g., add a new
>    mapping).
>=20
> As above, is this really just an example behavior or a hard requirement to
> preserve existing mappings?

[Med] We are not using any normative language for POST, hence this wording =
for PUT.=20=20

>=20
> Section 7.2
>=20
>            "attack-detail": [
>              {
>                "vendor-id": 1234,
>=20
> The vendor-ID is supposed to be an IANA-assigned PEN, and 1234 is assigned
> to Linkage Software Inc.  We have other options, like 32473, "Example
> Enterprise Number for Documentation Use" (RFC 5612).

[Med] This is better. Added a note to Section 4.6 as well.=20

>=20
>                "start-time": "1957811234",
>=20
> This value represents a time in 2032; should we be using something a
> little more current?

[Med] No problem. Updated.=20=20

>=20
> Section 7.3
>=20
>    This request MUST be maintained active by the DOTS server until a
>    delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear this
>    pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry.
>=20
> It seems like we might want to allow some provision for a server to clean
> up state associated with a client that disappears entirely without
> cleaning itself up.

[Med] this was a hidden behavior. Thanks for catching this. Updated as foll=
ows:=20

   This request MUST be maintained in an active state by the DOTS server
   until a delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear
   this pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry or when the DOTS client is
   considered inactive (e.g., Section 3.5 of [RFC8783]).

  For example, is the server allowed to discard state
> when it reboots, or does this requirement extend to writing the state to
> persistent storage?
>=20
>       If more than one Uri-Query option is included in a request, these
>       options are interpreted in the same way as when multiple target
>       attributes are included in a message body.
>=20
> I a little bit wonder if we could put a section reference here for
> "interpreted in the same way", since the reader may not remember what that
> way is, at least on the first reading.
>=20

[Med] Added a pointer to 4.4.1 of 9132 where there is some text about appen=
ding target values.=20

>       parameters.  DOTS clients MUST NOT include a name in which the "*"
>       character is included in a label other than the leftmost label.
>=20
> Do we want to say what the server should do if it gets one anyway?
> (It's not really clear that we need to say anything, strictly speaking.)
>=20

[Med] This is covered by:

   Requests with invalid query types (e.g., not supported, malformed)
   received by the DOTS server MUST be rejected with a 4.00 (Bad
   Request) response code.

>                "vendor-id": 1234,
>                "attack-id": 77,
>                "start-time": "1957818434",
>=20
> [same as above]

[Med] OK

>=20
>    A DOTS client that is not interested to receive pre-or-ongoing-
>    mitigation telemetry data for a target MUST send a delete request
>    similar to the one depicted in Figure 37.
>=20
> I'm not sure that this strictly needs to be a "MUST"; it seems like we
> could say that such a client "sends a delete request" and leave it at
> that.
>=20

[Med] OK=20

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Hi Ben,

Thanks for the detailed review. Please see inline for responses till
Section 7.1.4.

On Thu, 25 Nov 2021 at 04:12, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> Sorry to have been working on this for so long -- some health issues
> intervened, and it is perhaps easier to let onesself be interrupted if
> there is no hope of finishing in a single sitting :-/
>
> [Note that I reviewed the -16 but the -17 is the current version, which
> includes some editorial work I had sent in a PR.  It looks like that
> will not have changed many things I comment on.]
>
> This review is pretty long (which I guess befits a long document).  We
> probably want to chunk up replies to it so that the emails/threads stay
> manageable.
>
> A couple meta-comments on the other reviews so far:
>
> - the shepherd writeup only answers one of the three questions in point
>   (1).  It is likely that Murray will point this out in his ballot if
>   not updated before then.
>
> - it's a little surprising that the yangdoctor didn't ask for encoded
>   examples of the RESTCONF (data channel) functionality.  (For the
>   sx:structure parts, I think we're already in good shape on examples.)
> That
>   said, I don't think our use of RESTCONF is particularly novel, and am
> happy
>   to proceed without such examples if desired.
>
> High-level remarks before going in to the detailed section-by-section
> comments:
>
> I'm happy to see the note at the end of =C2=A74.5 that the data channel i=
s
> available to optimize the data that needs to be exchanged over the signal
> channel during attack-time, in some sense reiterating the original split
> between signal and data channels (but see my note in the inline comments
> about the "MAY").  But this is already rather far into the design overvie=
w,
> let alone the document overall!  I think it would be helpful to have a
> paragraph or two in the toplevel =C2=A74 to get in front of how the telem=
etry
> mechanisms integrate into the signal+data channels, perhaps something lik=
e:
>
> % The DOTS protocol suite is divided into two logical channels: the signa=
l
> % channel and data channel.  This division is due to the vastly different
> % requirements placed upon the traffic they carry.  The signal channel mu=
st
> % remain available and usable even in the face of attack traffic that
> might,
> % for example, saturate one direction of the links involved, rendering
> % acknowledgment-based mechanisms unreliable and strongly incentivizing
> % messages to be small enough to be contained in a single IP packet.  In
> % contrast, the data channel is available for high-bandwidth data transfe=
r
> % before or after an attack, using more conventional transport protocol
> % techniques.  It is generally preferable to perform advance configuratio=
n
> % over the data channel, including configuring short aliases for static o=
r
> % nearly static data sets such as sets of network addresses/prefixes that
> % might be subject to related attacks -- this helps to optimize the use o=
f
> % the signal channel for the small messages that truly require reliable
> % delivery during an attack.
> %
> % Telemetry information has aspects that correspond to both operational
> % modes: there is certainly a need to convey updated information about
> % ongoing attack traffic and targets during an attack, so as to convey
> % detailed information about mitigation status and inform updates to
> % mitigation strategy in the face of adaptive attacks, but it is also
> useful
> % to provide mitigation services with a picture of normal or "baseline"
> % traffic towards potential targets, to aid in detecting when incoming
> % traffic deviates from normal into being an attack.  Likewise, one might
> % populate a "database" of classifications of known types of attack so th=
at
> % a short alias can be used during attack time to describe an observed
> % attack.  This specification does make provision for use of the data
> % channel for the latter function, but otherwise retains most telemetry
> % functionality in the signal channel.  This is partly out of necessity a=
nd
> % partly out of expedience -- it is a functional requirement to convey
> % information about ongoing attack traffic during an attack, and
> information
> % about baseline traffic uses an essentially identical datastructure that
> is
> % naturally defined to sit next to the description of attack traffic.  Th=
e
> % related telemetry setup information used to parametrize actual traffic
> % data is also sent over the signal channel, out of expediency. [I can't
> % actually populate this part; maybe it's something about having the
> % configuration values that define the percentile measurements be in-band
> % with the percentile measurements themselves, and then a desire to not
> % define two similar setup schemes over data+signal channels that justifi=
es
> % the other telemetry-config and pipe branches?]
>

Proposed text looks good, we will add the above text to section 4.


>
> The use of the "list telemetry" in the telemetry-setup message confused m=
e
> for a while, since it seems like the client can only send a zero- or
> one-element list to the server (based on the 'tsid' for that direction
> being
> part of the Uri-Path).  Can you confirm that the list structure was used
> just for the server-to-client direction combined with maximizing
> data-structure reuse?
>
> We should say somewhere that the examples use CBOR presentation format.
> (This could be a note near the terminology section or accompanying each
> example.)
>
> I think we should probably include a bit of a brief refresher on percenti=
le
> calculation, in addition to the reference to RFC 2330.  Right now we
> basically just say that the peers negotiation parameter including
> "percentile-related measurement parameters" which was not quite enough to
> clue me in that 2330 was basically required reading to know what we
> actually
> do.  So this might look something like:
>
> % DOTS telemetry uses several percentile values to provide a picture of a
> % traffic distribution overall, as opposed to just a single snapshot of
> % observed traffic at a single point in time.  Modeling raw traffic flow
> % data as a distribution and describing that distribution entails choosin=
g
> a
> % measurement period that the distribution will describe, and a number of
> % sampling intervals, or "buckets", within that measurement period.
> Traffic
> % within each bucket is treated as a single event (i.e., averaged), and
> then
> % the distribution of buckets is used to describe the distribution of
> % traffic over the measurement period.  A distribution an be characterize=
d
> % by statistical measures such as mean, median, and standard deviation, a=
nd
> % also by reporting the value of the distribution at various percentile
> % levels of the data set in question, such as "quartiles" that correspond
> to
> % 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile.  More details about percentile values
> and
> % their computation are found in Section 11.3 of [RFC2330]; DOTS telemetr=
y
> % uses up to three percentile values, plus the overall peak, to
> characterize
> % traffic distributions.  Which percentile thresholds are used for these
> % "low", "medium", and "high" percentile values is configurable (with
> % suitable defaults).
>

Looks good, we will update the draft.


>
>
> It seems like we are setting up somewhat conflicting goals between the
> overall desire for compact signal-channel messages and our guidance to
> "include in any request to update information related to [a thing] the
> information of other [like things] (already communicated using a lower
> ['tsid'/'tmid'] value" that results in larger individual messages (albeit
> fewer of them).  Do we want to make some statement about how this guidanc=
e
> to coalesce can be ignored if needed to make individual signal-channel
> messages fit in a single packet?  (Hmm, I guess we do have a note about
> "assumes that all link information can fit in one single message" at
> least for the 'tsid'/link case, but the text from that note only appears
> once.)
>
> My editorial suggestions in
> https://github.com/boucadair/draft-dots-telemetry/pull/9 included some
> edits
> relating to whether a given target is "susceptible to" vs "subject to" (o=
r
> even "actively being subjected to") different types of attacks.  Med has
> diligently already merged that PR while I was sick, so I mostly assume th=
at
> these already got reviewed for correctness.  Still, I want to call out th=
at
> there is a difference and I was not always 100% sure that I picked the
> right
> one for each case.
>
> It looks like we have to use backslash continuation markers for several o=
f
> the CoAP request target resources in the examples; do we want to referenc=
e
> RFC 8792 folding and use its specific note text about line wrapping?
>
> There are a few places where we say something like "the DOTS client MUST
> auto-scale so that the appropriate unit is used".  (1) We don't
> specifically
> say what the goal of this automatic behavior is (I guess, use the "larges=
t
> unit" that gives a value greater than one?), and (2) it seems that we are
> in
> part relying on this behavior to ensure that the client only specifies on=
e
> measure in a given unit class.  That is, I didn't see anything else that
> would prevent a client from sending (say) both Mbps and Gbps values, that
> could of course be in conflict with each other -- if there's a potential
> for
> conflict we'd need to say how to resolve the conflict.
>
> Relatedly, there seems to *also* be potential for conflict in that we all=
ow
> both bit/second and Byte/second as unit-classes.  What is to happen if I
> say
> that something is both 2 bit/second and 2 Byte/second?
>
> We have a lot of examples that use the same 'cuid' of
> dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw, which is fine and representative of normal
> operation.  Do we want to curate the 'tsid' and 'tmid' values used by tha=
t
> client?  I see some reuse, which I think is not prohibited (at least for
> 'tsid'), but may merit checking, and the values are not monotonically
> increasing throughout the course of the document, which may or may not be
> desirable.
>
> (nit) we seem to have both "signalled" and "signaled" present, and
> should standardize on our spelling.  (It looks like the one-'l' form is
> more common in the RFC archive so far.)
>
> Section 1
>
>    Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have become more
>    sophisticated.  [...]
>
> We might want to say something about the baseline for the comparison
> ("more sophisticated compared to what?").
>
>        100 Mbps to 100s of Gbps or even Tbps.  Attacks are commonly
>        carried out leveraging botnets and attack reflectors for
>        amplification attacks such as NTP (Network Time Protocol), DNS
>        (Domain Name System), SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol),
>        or SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol).
>
> Is https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4732#section-3.1 still
> current enough to make a useful reference for amplification attacks?
>
>                                           Nevertheless, when DOTS
>    telemetry attributes are available to a DOTS agent, and absent any
>    policy, it can signal the attributes in order to optimize the overall
>    mitigation service provisioned using DOTS.
>
> I'm not sure what type of policy we have in mind, here.
>
> Section 2
>
>    The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].
>
> It looks like RFC 8612 doesn't define "idle time" and "attack time", so
> we may want to pull in a couple more documents as required reading or
> define
> them ourselves.
>

Sure, we will elaborate these terms with an example.


>
> Section 3.1
>
>    If the DOTS server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to
>    facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adapts its protection
>    strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately
>    (automation enabled) for the sake of optimized attack mitigation
>    decisions and actions.
>
> I'm not entirely sure I understand this part.  It seems to be talking
> about telemetry between the DOTS server and the associated mitigation
> resources, but the previous discussion has been about telemetry between
> DOTS client and DOTS server (and I do not think the mitigation resources
> associated with the DOTS server have been said to be DOTS clients in any
> of the previous DOTS work).
>
> Section 3.2
>
>    DOTS telemetry can also be used to tune the DDoS mitigators with the
>    correct state of an attack.  During the last few years, DDoS attack
>
> (nit) I don't think "with" is the right verb -- "tune with <X>" implies
> that X is used as a tool to effectuate the tuning, but I think what's
> going on here is more like using the telemetry data as an input for
> determining what values to use for the tuning parameters available on
> the mitigation resources.
>

Fixed.


>
>    Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal
>    traffic can be inaccurate at best.  This is especially true for
>    recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]).
>
> RFC 8903 makes no mention of "recursive", "recursion", or any
> hierarchical mitigation scenario (at least in my quick search).   Even
> the linked draft version (-25) doesn't have a section 3.2.3.  I do
> remember reading about this type of recursive or hierarchical scenario
> somwhere, so I think we just need to locate the right reference to put
> here...I'm just not sure what reference that is, offhand.
>

Good catch, recursive signaling is discussed in RFC8811.


>
>    In addition, the highly diverse types of use cases where DOTS clients
>    are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of each DOTS
>    client domain behavior.  Consequently, common global thresholds for
>    attack detection practically cannot be realized.  [...]
>
> (editorial?) When we say "the highly diverse types of use cases where
> DOTS clients are integrated" that's essentially an unsupported claim,
> but the way it's written we are presupposing that claim to be true
> without directly stating it as an observation or assumption.  I think we
> might be better served by starting off with a declarative statement like
> "DOTS clients can be integrated in a highly diverse set of scenarios and
> use cases", and then moving on from that now-explicit assumption/fact to
> conclude that any single global threshold will mischaracterize the
> traffic for some of those diverse DOTS clients.
>
> Section 4.3
>
>    DOTS clients can also use CoAP Block1 Option in a PUT request (see
>    Section 2.5 of [RFC7959]) to initiate large transfers, but these
>    Block1 transfers will fail if the inbound "pipe" is running full, so
>    consideration needs to be made to try to fit this PUT into a single
>    transfer, or to separate out the PUT into several discrete PUTs where
>    each of them fits into a single packet.
>
> If I understand/recall correctly, the Block1 transfer is expected to
> fail only in a statistical sense, since the client can't send more
> blocks until it gets the positive reply from the server to continue to
> the next block (on a block-by-block basis), and that reply from the
> server is competing with the attack traffic for the inbound "pipe" and
> likely to fail for at least one of the blocks.  I think we should
> probably reword slightly to say only "expected to fail" or "likely
> fail", since there is some small chance of success; we may also want to
> give a brief reminder about why it is expected to fail (e.g., "the
> transfer requires a message from the server for each block, which would
> likely be lost in the incoming flood").
>

Thanks, we will fix the text.


>
> Section 6
>
>    Telemetry setup configuration is bound to a DOTS client domain.  DOTS
>    servers MUST NOT expect DOTS clients to send regular requests to
>    refresh the telemetry setup configuration.  Any available telemetry
>    setup configuration has a validity timeout of the DOTS association
>    with a DOTS client domain.  [...]
>
> The term "DOTS association" does not seem to have been used previously
> (in RFC 9132 we discuss the "DOTS session" heavily, though).  Also, I
> don't remember any previous requirement to keep state on the server for
> the duration of anything scoped to the entire client *domain*, just
> individual DOTS sessions.  We do mention detecting conflicts/overlapping
> requests within the scope of a client domain, in RFC 9132, but as far as
> I can tell that only holds when all the DOTS sessions involved in the
> conflict are still active.
>
> Perhaps related, this discussion (at least so far) is not clear to me
> about what level of coordination/consistency is expected between clients
> in the same domain.  I believe that stock DOTS works fine with no such
> coordination amongst clients within a domain, so if we are introducing su=
ch
> a requirement we should say prominently that it's a change.
>

Yes, telemetry configuration is not specific to the client. For example,
the pipe capacity is specific to the site.


>
> Section 6.1.1
>
>    Upon receipt of such request, and assuming no error is encountered by
>    processing the request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content)
>    response that conveys the current and telemetry parameters acceptable
>    by the DOTS server.  [...]
>

NEW:

Upon receipt of such request, and assuming no error is encountered by

processing the request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content)

response that conveys the telemetry parameters acceptable by the DOTS
server

and the current baseline information maintained by the DOTS server.


>
> (editorial) Something seems off, here (around "current and telemetry
> parameters acceptable").  Is it returning current configuration, acceptab=
le
> parameter values, or some combination thereof?
>
>           |  |     +-- query-type*            query-type
>
> Since this is a leaf-list of supported query types, should the list name
> include the word "supported" or similar?
>
> Section 6.1.2
>
>    The PUT request with a higher numeric 'tsid' value overrides the DOTS
>    telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower
>    numeric 'tsid' value.  To avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid'
>    requests for requests carrying telemetry configuration data from a
>    DOTS client, the lower numeric 'tsid' MUST be automatically deleted
>    and no longer be available at the DOTS server.
>
> The way this is phrased with "the lower" and "higher" (vs "highest")
> assumes
> or implies that there is only one "lower" 'tsid' value, perhaps leaving
> some
> ambiguity if there is actually more than one.  We might make a statement
> about how there is only at most one active 'tsid' per 'cuid'+'cdid' at a
> time other than during a config change (if that's the intent), or
> alternatively to qualify that the requirement to remove is only incurred =
in
> the event of a conflict (as is done for other types of config, later).
>

We can have multiple tsids for the same client for pipe/baseline
information. This is why we have:



   DOTS clients SHOULD minimize the number of active 'tsid's used for

   baseline information.  In order to avoid maintaining a long list of

   'tsid's for baseline information, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients

   include in a request to update information related to a given target,

   the information of other targets (already communicated using a lower

   'tsid' value) (assuming this fits within one single datagram).  This

   update request will override these existing requests and hence

   optimize the number of 'tsid' requests per DOTS client.


>
>    o  If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include
>       'cuid' or 'tsid' Uri-Path parameters, or contains one or more
>       invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned
>       in the response.
>
> Just to confirm: this does not rule out the ability to define new
> parameters in the future (for example, the client might learn of new
> ones in the response to a GET request)?
>

Yes.


>
> Section 6.3
>
>       *  The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the
>          target.
>
> Should we say anything about the requirement on the protocol in question
> that "request" is a meaningful concept and observable by the mitigator
> (analogous to what we have about "embryonic connections" earlier)?
>

Okay, updated text to say: The maximum number of requests (e.g.,
HTTP/DNS/SIP requests) allowed per second to the target.


>
>           |           +-- baseline* [id]
>           |              +-- id
>           |              |       uint32
>           |              +-- target-prefix*
>           |              |       inet:ip-prefix
>
> (nit) the formatting here is a bit surprising, to wrap the line between
> leaf name and type.  But if that's what pyang gives, we probably don't
> want to mess with it...
>
>           |              |  +-- partial-request-ps?          uint64
>           |              |  +-- partial-request-client-ps?   uint64
>
> I wonder whether the limit on "partial requests" should really be a rate
> ("per second") versus a point-in-time cap (i.e., "oustanding partial
> requests").  It seems like a given request could in principle remain in
> "partial" state for an extended period of time, and that having remaing
> in such a state for a second should not justify the client being able to
> produce more partial requests...but the current formulation as a rate see=
ms
> to do so.
>

Good point, added partial requests pending per client.


>
> Section 6.3.1
>
>    Two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if there
>    is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name.  Also,
>    two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if the
>    addresses associated with the FQDN, URI, or alias are overlapping
>    with each other or with 'target-prefix'.
>
> There can be some subtlety here involving where the FQDN/URI/alias are
> resolved into IP addresses from; we may want to say "from the perspective
> of
> the server", "as observed by the server", or similar.
>

Fixed.


>
> Section 7
>
>    DOTS agents SHOULD bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data with
>    mitigation requests relying upon the target attribute.  In
>
> (nit??) Is this "target attribute" a telemetry attribute, or something
> else (an attack target?)?
>

NEW:

   DOTS agents SHOULD bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data to

   mitigation requests relying upon the resources under attack.



>
>    When generating telemetry data to send to a peer, the DOTS agent MUST
>    auto-scale so that appropriate unit(s) are used.
>
> (editorial) This requirement is not terribly tightly connected to either
> what comes after it in the text or what comes before it in the text.  We
> might consider moving it (earlier, maybe?) and adding a bit more
> transition phrasing about how the agent may send telemetry data many
> times and in different situations, so the right unit to use will vary
> over time.
>

We will add an example like DDoS attack enhancing the attack volume
from Gbps to Tbps to justify the need

for auto-scaling the units.



>
> Section 7.1.1
>
>    If the target is subjected to bandwidth consuming attack, the
>    attributes representing the percentile values of the 'attack-id'
>    attack traffic are included.
>
>    If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attacks, the
>    same attributes defined for Section 7.1.4 are applicable for
>    representing the attack.
>
> One of these just says "the attributes representing" and the other
> references attributes defined in a specific section; can we use the same
> formulation/phrasing to talk about the two cases?
>
>    This is an optional attribute.
>
> Er, which one is optional?  Just a few paragraphs earlier we said that
> at least one attribute MUST be present (so as to be able to identify a
> target).
>

Added the following line:
At least the 'target' attribute and another
pre-or-ongoing-mitigation attribute MUST be present in the DOTS telemetry
message.

Removed the line "This is an optional attribute"


>
> Section 7.1.2
>
>    The 'total-traffic' attribute (Figure 26) conveys the percentile
>    values (including peak and current observed values) of total traffic
>    observed during a DDoS attack.  [...]
>
> This attribute is under the "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation" hierarchy; is it
> really right to only say "traffic observed during a DDoS attack" (i.e.,
> implicitly excluding the "pre-attack" case)?
>

Good catch, fixed.


>
> Section 7.1.3
>
>    The 'total-attack-traffic' attribute (Figure 27) conveys the total
>    attack traffic identified by the DOTS client domain's DDoS Mitigation
>    System (or DDoS Detector).  [...]
>
> (editorial?) "Identified by [the client domain]" seems to imply that
> this is only used in telemetry reports from client to server, and not in
> updates flowing the other direction.  Is that correct?
>

Yes, telemetry is applicable in both directions and not specific to client
to server only.


>
> Section 7.1.4
>
>                 +-- total-attack-connection
>                 |  +-- low-percentile-l* [protocol]
>                 |  |  +-- protocol              uint8
>                 |  |  +-- connection?           yang:gauge64
>                 |  |  +-- embryonic?            yang:gauge64
>                 |  |  +-- connection-ps?        yang:gauge64
>                 |  |  +-- request-ps?           yang:gauge64
>                 |  |  +-- partial-request-ps?   yang:gauge64
>
> I think I'm confused about what semantics this is trying to represent.
> The "low-percentile-l" seems like it should be providing aggregate
> information about some particular snapshot of traffic that we have
> determined to be representative of the "low percentile" level of attack
> traffic.  That is, if we take the recorded attack traffic and divide it
> into a bunch of bins on the time axis, we can order the respective bins
> from "least noticable attack" to "worst attack", and we pick the fifth
> percentile (or whatever is configured) bin to represent the
> "low-percentile" bucket.  But now we're reporting a bunch of attributes
> of that bin -- number of connections, embryonic connections, connections
> per second, etc., even though the bins were ordered based on a single
> "worst" metric (and I don't see us specify what metric we actually use
> to do that ordering).  So even though this is the "low percentile" (e.g.,
> fifth percentile) bin of attack traffic (i.e., probably not a very bad
> attack), we can't say specifically that the reported total attack
> connection count is fifth percentile and the embryonic connection count
> is fifth percentile and the requests-per-second is also fifth
> percentile.  Which makes me confused at why the list is structured this
> way -- if we were just saying "for each of connection, embryonic, etc., b=
in
> the samples over that metric and compute the low/med/high percentage valu=
es
> for that single metric, and this list holds those resulting values", it
> seems like a more natural structure to group things would be to have a li=
st
> of low/med/high for each of the attributes/metrics.
>

Good point, we should have a list of low/med/high/peak/current for each of
the connection attributes.

Cheers,
-Tiru


> Section 7.1.5
>
>    vendor-id:  Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number as
>       registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers].  It is a four-byte
>       integer value.
>
>    attack-id:  Unique identifier assigned for the attack.
>
> If the vendor-id is being used as a scoping value to let each vendor
> assign attack-id values, then we should say so here, the first place we
> really handle this part of the YANG tree.  Even if not, we should probabl=
y
> say more about why we care what the vendor-id is, and we should also say
> who
> assigns the attack-id.  (Maybe it's scoped to the DOTS server; I don't kn=
ow
> yet at this point in the document!)
>
> Furthermore, the module structure where attack-id and vendor-id are
> always required, but there is going to need to be the ability to assign
> a new attack description at runtime, seems to force us to conflate
> externally/statically assigned attack-ids and dynamically assigned ones
> in the same number space.  Should we give any guidance to vendors about
> how to allocate IDs in a way that will not produce collisions between
> predistributed/fixed attack IDs and new ones created at runtime?  Or is t=
he
> thought that there will be no dynamic attack-ids since that just
> corresponds
> to the attack-description string and a generic description can be used if
> there is not a better one available?
>
> Regardless, I think we should have more verbiage as to what the scope of
> the
> attack-id is -- what information is it supposed to indicate or replace?
>
>    start-time:  The time the attack started.  The attack's start time is
>       expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time
>
> (nit) "in UTC time" and "Z" seem redundant (which does not necessarily
> imply that we should only use one of them...).
>
>       (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC8949]).  The CBOR encoding is modified so
>       that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
>
> (nit) Maybe we should move the CBOR section reference to after we start
> talking about CBOR encoding.  (And we should do the same for 'end-time',
> if we do anything.)
>
>    top-talker:  A list of top talkers among attack sources.  The top
>       talkers are represented using the 'source-prefix'.
>
> Is there a good reference or short description for the notion of
> top-talkers?  I know it's a well-established term of art in many differen=
t
> circles, but it's hard to be fully confident that all readers will be
> familiar with it.
>
> Also, should we say anything about how the number of talkers to include
> is determined?  (I assume it is best left to the discretion of the
> sender, but we probably want to set a clear expectation that the list is
> not all talkers or a complete list in any other way.)
>
>       'spoofed-status' indicates whether a top talker is a spoofed IP
>       address (e.g., reflection attacks) or not.
>
> Is this something that can be unambiguously determined by all parties
> that might be producing this telemetry data, or should we use a
> tri-statae (for "unknown") rather than a boolean to represent it?
>
>    In order to optimize the size of telemetry data conveyed over the
>    DOTS signal channel, DOTS agents MAY use the DOTS data channel
>    [RFC8783] to exchange vendor specific attack mapping details (that
>    is, {vendor identifier, attack identifier} =3D=3D> attack description)=
.
>    As such, DOTS agents do not have to convey systematically an attack
>    description in their telemetry messages over the DOTS signal channel.
>
> It's a little surprising to me that this is only a MAY.  Does it make
> sense as a SHOULD (expected to usually happen, but leaving open the
> flexibility when an observed attack does not match a previously
> characterized attack description)?
>
> Also, when reading this I assumed that the "attack description" being
> mapped to could include things like the target port/protocol, whether it
> was spoofed, etc.  But reading on to the ietf-dots-mapping module, it
> seems that this is intended to just be the single "attack-description"
> string.  If so, we might give some more indications of that, e.g., by
> spelling it that way and having some prose about it being a "string", or
> similar.
>
> Also^2, from here to the end of the section might benefit from being
> split off into a dedicated subsection on using the data channel to
> pre-populate vendor and attack description information
>
>    tables are at different revisions.  The DOTS client SHOULD transmit
>    telemetry information using the vendor mapping(s) that it provided to
>    the DOTS server and the DOTS server SHOULD use the vendor mappings(s)
>    provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to peer
>    DOTS agent.
>
> Having read a bit further on, I'm not actually sure where in the
> protocol the client has provided vendor mappings to the server, and the
> server provided vendor mappings to the client.  It *might* be the GET
> and POST from/to dots-data/ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping, but we
> don't really give a clear indication of that.  I think we should try to
> be more precise about what we mean by "provided".
> (editorial) would this then be "SHOULD use any vendor mapping(s)"
> (s/the/any/)?
>
>      augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities:
>        +--ro vendor-mapping-enabled?   boolean {dots-telemetry}?
>
> None of the other capabilities in this tree (as specified by RFC 8783)
> include a name suffix like "-enabled".  Should this just be
> "vendor-mapping"?
>
>            "vendor-id": 1234,
>            "vendor-name": "mitigator-s",
>            "last-updated": "1576856561",
>            "attack-mapping": []
>
> [this last updated is from December 2019; we could probably pick
> something more current if we wanted, but it doesn't really matter.]
>
>    The DOTS client reiterates the above procedure regularly (e.g., once
>    a week) to update the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details.
>
> Do the udpates have to preserve any existing assignments?
>
>    If the DOTS client concludes that the DOTS server does not have any
>    reference to the specific vendor attack mapping details, the DOTS
>    client uses a POST request to install its vendor attack mapping
>    details.  [...]
>
> This suggests that a client would not bother sending its own vendor
> mapping if the server already has one, and at least to me further
> implies that the client would use the sever-provided mapping for the
> messages that the client generates.  This seems at odds with the earlier
> guidance that the client should send using the vendor-mapping it
> provided to the server, and the server should send using the
> vendor-mapping it provided to the client.  Which one is it?
>
>    The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
>    using the status-line.  Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be
>    returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the vendor
>    attack mapping details.  If the request is missing a mandatory
>    attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad
>    Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the
>    response.  [...]
>
> I think (but did not specifically check) that these specific status code
> values are preexisting requirements of core RESTCONF (and HTTP), so we
> may not need to write new "MUST" keywords.
>
>    If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the
>    DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid'
>    is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403
>    Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied".  Upon
>    receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Section 5.1
>    of [RFC8783]).
>
> (nit) the analogous text in RFC 8783 itself refers only to "Section 5"
> (not 5.1).
>
>    The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its vendor attack
>    mapping details maintained by the DOTS server (e.g., add a new
>    mapping).
>
> As above, is this really just an example behavior or a hard requirement
> to preserve existing mappings?
>
> Section 7.2
>
>            "attack-detail": [
>              {
>                "vendor-id": 1234,
>
> The vendor-ID is supposed to be an IANA-assigned PEN, and 1234 is
> assigned to Linkage Software Inc.  We have other options, like 32473,
> "Example Enterprise Number for Documentation Use" (RFC 5612).
>
>                "start-time": "1957811234",
>
> This value represents a time in 2032; should we be using something a
> little more current?
>
> Section 7.3
>
>    This request MUST be maintained active by the DOTS server until a
>    delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear this
>    pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry.
>
> It seems like we might want to allow some provision for a server to
> clean up state associated with a client that disappears entirely without
> cleaning itself up.  For example, is the server allowed to discard state
> when it reboots, or does this requirement extend to writing the state to
> persistent storage?
>
>       If more than one Uri-Query option is included in a request, these
>       options are interpreted in the same way as when multiple target
>       attributes are included in a message body.
>
> I a little bit wonder if we could put a section reference here for
> "interpreted in the same way", since the reader may not remember what
> that way is, at least on the first reading.
>
>       parameters.  DOTS clients MUST NOT include a name in which the "*"
>       character is included in a label other than the leftmost label.
>
> Do we want to say what the server should do if it gets one anyway?
> (It's not really clear that we need to say anything, strictly speaking.)
>
>                "vendor-id": 1234,
>                "attack-id": 77,
>                "start-time": "1957818434",
>
> [same as above]
>
>    A DOTS client that is not interested to receive pre-or-ongoing-
>    mitigation telemetry data for a target MUST send a delete request
>    similar to the one depicted in Figure 37.
>
> I'm not sure that this strictly needs to be a "MUST"; it seems like we
> could say that such a client "sends a delete request" and leave it at
> that.
>
> Section 8.1
>
>        +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
>        [...]
>           +-- top-talker
>              +-- talker* [source-prefix]
>              [...]
>                 +-- total-attack-connection
>                    +-- low-percentile-c
>                    |  +-- connection?           yang:gauge64
>
> I'm kind of surprised that there is no 'protocol' leaf in this subtree;
> it seems to usually appear in combination with these connection counts.
>
>           |  +-- peak-g?              yang:gauge64
>           |  +-- current-g?              yang:gauge64
> [...]
>                 |  +-- peak-g?              yang:gauge64
>                 |  +-- current-g?              yang:gauge64
>
> (nit) the indentation seems off for type of these two 'current-g's.
>
>    In order to signal telemetry data in a mitigation efficacy update, it
>    is RECOMMENDED that the DOTS client has already established a DOTS
>    telemetry setup session with the server in 'idle' time.
>
> If I understand correctly, it seems that at least part of the need for
> having a preestablished telemetry session is that the mitigation
> efficacy update is identified only by the 'mid', and so we cannot
> specify a 'tmid' as part of such an efficacy update.  Thus, in order
> for the server to associate the telemetry data in the efficacy update
> with an ongoing telemetry status session, the 'tsid' must be associated
> with the 'mid' that is the subject of the efficacy update.
> If that is correct, then I think we should have some text here about how
> the efficacy update does not/cannot include the 'tmid', and so is
> associated with the 'mid' of the update.
>
> Section 8.2
>
>    As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include
>    several countermeasure mechanisms.  The DOTS server signals the
>    current operational status of relevant countermeasures.  A list of
>    attacks detected by each countermeasure MAY also be included.  The
>
> I see how in stock DOTS signal channel, the server signals whether an
> attack is fully/partially/not mitigated, but I don't see how the server
> indicates the specific relevant countermeasures that were used.  Am I
> just missing something there?  (Similarly, the list of attacks we
> returned may or may not be at the granularity of "detected by each
> countermeasure", depending on the ansewr to the previous part.)
>
> Also (editorial), I think we should be more clear about when we switch
> from describing RFC 9132 behavior to to describing the new functionality
> provided by this document.
>
>    Figure 46 shows an example of an asynchronous notification of attack
>    mitigation status from the DOTS server.  This notification signals
>
> Is the "new stuff" in Figure 46 just the subtree under
> :(server-to-client-only)?  The 'total-attack-traffic' leaf seems to be
> the same content as in Figure 45, and maybe could be omitted?
>
>            "mitigation-start": "1507818434",
>
> (This date is from 2017; as above, we could use a more current one if we
> want.)
>
>                "source-count": {
>                  "peak-g": "10000"
>
> (Suspiciously round numbers like this are indications of fabricated data
> ... which is totally reasonable for an example like this!  But if we
> wanted to be "more realistic" we could use a less-round number.)
>
>    DOTS clients can filter out the asynchronous notifications from the
>    DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET
>    request.  A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters:
>    'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn',
>    'target-uri', 'alias-name', and 'c' (content) (Section 4.2.4).  The
>
> Up in =C2=A77.3 the analogous list also included 'mid'.  Is 'mid' appropr=
iate
> here (or is it implicitly already included by the base signal channel
> mechanisms)?  Hmm, but maybe 'c' is also already allowed by the base
> signal channel mechanism, so that theory is not great...
>
>    If the target query does not match the target of the enclosed 'mid'
>    as maintained by the DOTS server, the latter MUST respond with a 4.04
>    (Not Found) error Response Code.  The DOTS server MUST NOT add a new
>    observe entry if this query overlaps with an existing one.
>
> How should the server respond if this query overlaps with an existing
> one?
>
> Section 10.1
>
>    This module uses types defined in [RFC6991] and [RFC8345].
>
> Should we mention the data structure extension from RFC 8791 here, as
> well?
>
>   typedef attack-severity {
>     type enumeration {
>       enum none {
>         value 1;
>         description
>           "No effect on the DOTS client domain.";
>
> It seems like the closest analogue to our attack-serverity typedef in
> RFC 7970 is in =C2=A73.12.2, "BusinessImpact Class". But the phrasing use=
d in
> RFC 7970 is slightly different than the descriptions we have here.
> Do we want to tweak our phrasings and/or clarify in the typedef
> description that we use a slightly modified formulation?  (Indeed, we do
> not have an extension point, either, though 7970 does have an extension
> mechanism.)  Also, a section reference within RFC 7970 might be helpful.
>
>       enum kilopacket-ps {
>         value 4;
>         description
>           "Kilo packets per second (kpps).";
>
> We may get someone who asks if we are using 1000 or 1024 ("kibi"), but
> I'm inclined to leave it alone for now.
>
>       leaf unit-status {
>         type boolean;
>         default true;
>         description
>           "Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit class.";
>
> Does the "default true" imply that even unit classes not present in
> "list unit-config" are assumed to be supported by default?
>
>   grouping connection {
>     description
>       "A set of data nodes which represent the attack
>        characteristics.";
>     [...]
>     leaf embryonic {
>       type yang:gauge64;
>       description
>         "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
>          the target server.";
>
> It's a little interesting that this is the only leaf in the grouping
> that we can't attach the word "attack" to the description of, but as far
> as I can tell we shouldn't make any change here.
> (I originally wrote a comment that we shouldn't use "attack" for any of
> them, since we have analogous nodes in the total-connection-capacity
> config entries, but those seem to not use this grouping.)
>
>     list talker {
>       key "source-prefix";
>       description
>         "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
>
> My read of the YANG is that this is the description for "list talker",
> but the content matches the description given for the "source-prefix" lea=
f
> within the list.  Should the list itself have a different description?
>
>   grouping top-talker-aggregate {
>   [...]
>   grouping top-talker {
>
> The diff between these two is pretty small -- just the top-level
> description and connection-all vs connection-protocol-all.  Is there any
> value in introducing another grouping to hold the common elements?
>
>             container max-config-values {
>               description
>                 "Maximum acceptable configuration values.";
>               uses telemetry-parameters;
>
> I guess the convenience of having the reusable grouping probably
> outweighs the value of having YANG-level constraints that the 'max'
> values are >=3D the 'min' values (which we can set for the
> "telemetry-notify-interval" that is not part of "telemetry-parameters", b=
ut
> can't set here because we use the grouping).
>
>               leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
>                 type uint32 {
>                   range "1 .. 3600";
>
> (Pedantically, this range would fit in a uint16, though maybe there is
> some other reason to prefer the 32-bit type.)
>
>             case baseline {
>               [...]
>               list baseline {
>                 [...]
>                 leaf id {
>                   type uint32;
>                   must '. >=3D 1';
>                   description
>                     "An identifier that uniquely identifies a baseline
>                      entry communicated by a DOTS client.";
>
> I a little bit wonder if we should have a little bit of prose up in =C2=
=A76.3
> discussing the need for "id" and how it is used.
>
>               leaf tmid {
>                 type uint32;
>                 description
>                   "An identifier to uniquely demux telemetry data sent
>                    using the same message.";
>
> The description for "tsid" in the analogous setup was just "an
> identifier for the DOTS telemetry setup data".  As far as I can tell,
> the usage of the two is analogous, so shouldn't the descriptions be
> analogous as well?  In particular, I am not sure that "uniquely demux" is
> the only usage of this leaf, since in server-initiated telemetry messages=
,
> this leaf might be needed to indicate which telemetry entry is being
> described (right?).
>
>             leaf-list mid-list {
>               type uint32;
>               description
>                 "Reference a list of associated mitigation requests.";
>
> Should we reference RFC 9132 somehow to indicate that the base signal
> channel is how these "mid" values are assigned (and assigned meaning)?
>
> Section 10.2
>
>          description
>            "Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number.";
>
> Should we say something about "IANA-assigned" and/or link to the
> corresponding registry?
>
> Section 11, 12.1
>
> A handful of the entries in the tables still have an
> "ietf-dots-telemetry:" prefix, and I don't understand why only some of
> the entries would need it but not others.
>
> In particular, there seems to be an entry for both "total-traffic" and
> "ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic", and I don't understand how they are
> different.  (I did not check if there are other "duplicate"s like that.)
>
> Section 11
>
>   | telemetry            | container   |TBA2  | 5 map         | Object |
>
> I see both a "list telemetry" and a "case telemetry" in the YANG module,
> but I'm not sure which of them is supposed to correspond to the YANG
> type "container".
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7950#section-7.9.2 does not
> really give me the impression that there is an implicit container of
> this name.
>
>   | baseline             | container   |TBA49 | 5 map         | Object |
>
> Similarly, I see a 'baseline' that's a list, as the only content of a
> "case baseline" statement.
>
> Section 12.1
>
>    Note that 'lower-type' and 'upper-type' are also requested for
>    assignment in the call-home I-D.  Both I-Ds should be sync'ed as
>    depending the one that will make it first to the IANA.
>
> (I think we tweaked call-home already to account for the registration
> requests being from different ranges between the two documents, but
> mention it just in case I'm misremembering.)
>
> Section 12.3
>
>             URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-mapping
>             Registrant Contact: The IESG.
>             XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
>
> I wonder if this (module) name is perhaps somewhat more generic than the
> functionality it provides.
>
> Section 13
>
> Should we mention the security considerations for the blockwise transfer
> technologies?
>
> Looking through the YANG tree, the only thing that really sticks out as
> potentially worth mentioning here is the server-originated-telemetry
> option.  But even for that, I'm not sure that there's much to say.
>
>    The DOTS telemetry information includes DOTS client network topology,
>    DOTS client domain pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline and
>    connections capacity, and threat and mitigation information.  Such
>    information is sensitive; it MUST be protected at rest by the DOTS
>    server domain to prevent data leakage.
>
> I'd consider adding a sentence or two here noting that even though this
> data is sensitive, sending it explicitly to the DOTS server does not
> introduce any new significant considerations (other than the need for
> protection at rest) because the DOTS server is already trusted to have
> access to that kind of information by being in the position to mitigate
> (and observe) attacks.
>
> Section 16.1
>
> A normative reference on draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control will
> cause a document cluster, delaying publication until that document is
> ready to be an RFC.  It's not clear to me that such a dependency is
> needed in this case, since there is only one citation to that document
> and it seems more descriptive than imposing a strong dependency.
>
> Similarly, we seem to cite RFC 7641 just as a statement of fact (clients
> can use CoAP OBSERVE), which may not require it to be classified as a
> normative reference.
>
> Section 16.2
>
> The current state of this document doesn't really include enough detail
> about percentiles and their calculation to be implementable without
> referring to RFC 2330, currently listed only as a normative reference.
> I would prefer to add more text to this document rather than promote
> 2330 to a normative refrence, though I think we would need more text
> than I suggested above in order to achieve that effect.
>
> We say we assume familiarity with RFC 8612 at least for terminology,
> which may indicate that it is best classified as a normative reference.
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ben
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Hi Ben,</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks for the detai=
led review. Please see inline for responses till Section 7.1.4.</div><br><d=
iv class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" class=3D"gmail_attr">On Thu, 25 N=
ov 2021 at 04:12, Benjamin Kaduk &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu">kaduk=
@mit.edu</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D=
"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-le=
ft:1ex">Hi all,<br>
<br>
Sorry to have been working on this for so long -- some health issues<br>
intervened, and it is perhaps easier to let onesself be interrupted if<br>
there is no hope of finishing in a single sitting :-/<br>
<br>
[Note that I reviewed the -16 but the -17 is the current version, which<br>
includes some editorial work I had sent in a PR.=C2=A0 It looks like that<b=
r>
will not have changed many things I comment on.]<br>
<br>
This review is pretty long (which I guess befits a long document).=C2=A0 We=
<br>
probably want to chunk up replies to it so that the emails/threads stay<br>
manageable.<br>
<br>
A couple meta-comments on the other reviews so far:<br>
<br>
- the shepherd writeup only answers one of the three questions in point<br>
=C2=A0 (1).=C2=A0 It is likely that Murray will point this out in his ballo=
t if<br>
=C2=A0 not updated before then.<br>
<br>
- it&#39;s a little surprising that the yangdoctor didn&#39;t ask for encod=
ed<br>
=C2=A0 examples of the RESTCONF (data channel) functionality.=C2=A0 (For th=
e<br>
=C2=A0 sx:structure parts, I think we&#39;re already in good shape on examp=
les.)=C2=A0 That<br>
=C2=A0 said, I don&#39;t think our use of RESTCONF is particularly novel, a=
nd am happy<br>
=C2=A0 to proceed without such examples if desired.<br>
<br>
High-level remarks before going in to the detailed section-by-section<br>
comments:<br>
<br>
I&#39;m happy to see the note at the end of =C2=A74.5 that the data channel=
 is<br>
available to optimize the data that needs to be exchanged over the signal<b=
r>
channel during attack-time, in some sense reiterating the original split<br=
>
between signal and data channels (but see my note in the inline comments<br=
>
about the &quot;MAY&quot;).=C2=A0 But this is already rather far into the d=
esign overview,<br>
let alone the document overall!=C2=A0 I think it would be helpful to have a=
<br>
paragraph or two in the toplevel =C2=A74 to get in front of how the telemet=
ry<br>
mechanisms integrate into the signal+data channels, perhaps something like:=
<br>
<br>
% The DOTS protocol suite is divided into two logical channels: the signal<=
br>
% channel and data channel.=C2=A0 This division is due to the vastly differ=
ent<br>
% requirements placed upon the traffic they carry.=C2=A0 The signal channel=
 must<br>
% remain available and usable even in the face of attack traffic that might=
,<br>
% for example, saturate one direction of the links involved, rendering<br>
% acknowledgment-based mechanisms unreliable and strongly incentivizing<br>
% messages to be small enough to be contained in a single IP packet.=C2=A0 =
In<br>
% contrast, the data channel is available for high-bandwidth data transfer<=
br>
% before or after an attack, using more conventional transport protocol<br>
% techniques.=C2=A0 It is generally preferable to perform advance configura=
tion<br>
% over the data channel, including configuring short aliases for static or<=
br>
% nearly static data sets such as sets of network addresses/prefixes that<b=
r>
% might be subject to related attacks -- this helps to optimize the use of<=
br>
% the signal channel for the small messages that truly require reliable<br>
% delivery during an attack.<br>
%<br>
% Telemetry information has aspects that correspond to both operational<br>
% modes: there is certainly a need to convey updated information about<br>
% ongoing attack traffic and targets during an attack, so as to convey<br>
% detailed information about mitigation status and inform updates to<br>
% mitigation strategy in the face of adaptive attacks, but it is also usefu=
l<br>
% to provide mitigation services with a picture of normal or &quot;baseline=
&quot;<br>
% traffic towards potential targets, to aid in detecting when incoming<br>
% traffic deviates from normal into being an attack.=C2=A0 Likewise, one mi=
ght<br>
% populate a &quot;database&quot; of classifications of known types of atta=
ck so that<br>
% a short alias can be used during attack time to describe an observed<br>
% attack.=C2=A0 This specification does make provision for use of the data<=
br>
% channel for the latter function, but otherwise retains most telemetry<br>
% functionality in the signal channel.=C2=A0 This is partly out of necessit=
y and<br>
% partly out of expedience -- it is a functional requirement to convey<br>
% information about ongoing attack traffic during an attack, and informatio=
n<br>
% about baseline traffic uses an essentially identical datastructure that i=
s<br>
% naturally defined to sit next to the description of attack traffic.=C2=A0=
 The<br>
% related telemetry setup information used to parametrize actual traffic<br=
>
% data is also sent over the signal channel, out of expediency. [I can&#39;=
t<br>
% actually populate this part; maybe it&#39;s something about having the<br=
>
% configuration values that define the percentile measurements be in-band<b=
r>
% with the percentile measurements themselves, and then a desire to not<br>
% define two similar setup schemes over data+signal channels that justifies=
<br>
% the other telemetry-config and pipe branches?]<br></blockquote><div><br><=
/div><div>Proposed text looks good, we will add the above text to section 4=
.<br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">
<br>
The use of the &quot;list telemetry&quot; in the telemetry-setup message co=
nfused me<br>
for a while, since it seems like the client can only send a zero- or<br>
one-element list to the server (based on the &#39;tsid&#39; for that direct=
ion being<br>
part of the Uri-Path).=C2=A0 Can you confirm that the list structure was us=
ed<br>
just for the server-to-client direction combined with maximizing<br>
data-structure reuse?<br>
<br>
We should say somewhere that the examples use CBOR presentation format.<br>
(This could be a note near the terminology section or accompanying each<br>
example.)<br>
<br>
I think we should probably include a bit of a brief refresher on percentile=
<br>
calculation, in addition to the reference to RFC 2330.=C2=A0 Right now we<b=
r>
basically just say that the peers negotiation parameter including<br>
&quot;percentile-related measurement parameters&quot; which was not quite e=
nough to<br>
clue me in that 2330 was basically required reading to know what we actuall=
y<br>
do.=C2=A0 So this might look something like:<br>
<br>
% DOTS telemetry uses several percentile values to provide a picture of a<b=
r>
% traffic distribution overall, as opposed to just a single snapshot of<br>
% observed traffic at a single point in time.=C2=A0 Modeling raw traffic fl=
ow<br>
% data as a distribution and describing that distribution entails choosing =
a<br>
% measurement period that the distribution will describe, and a number of<b=
r>
% sampling intervals, or &quot;buckets&quot;, within that measurement perio=
d.=C2=A0 Traffic<br>
% within each bucket is treated as a single event (i.e., averaged), and the=
n<br>
% the distribution of buckets is used to describe the distribution of<br>
% traffic over the measurement period.=C2=A0 A distribution an be character=
ized<br>
% by statistical measures such as mean, median, and standard deviation, and=
<br>
% also by reporting the value of the distribution at various percentile<br>
% levels of the data set in question, such as &quot;quartiles&quot; that co=
rrespond to<br>
% 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile.=C2=A0 More details about percentile valu=
es and<br>
% their computation are found in Section 11.3 of [RFC2330]; DOTS telemetry<=
br>
% uses up to three percentile values, plus the overall peak, to characteriz=
e<br>
% traffic distributions.=C2=A0 Which percentile thresholds are used for the=
se<br>
% &quot;low&quot;, &quot;medium&quot;, and &quot;high&quot; percentile valu=
es is configurable (with<br>
% suitable defaults).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Looks good, we wi=
ll update the draft.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);=
padding-left:1ex">
<br>
<br>
It seems like we are setting up somewhat conflicting goals between the<br>
overall desire for compact signal-channel messages and our guidance to<br>
&quot;include in any request to update information related to [a thing] the=
<br>
information of other [like things] (already communicated using a lower<br>
[&#39;tsid&#39;/&#39;tmid&#39;] value&quot; that results in larger individu=
al messages (albeit<br>
fewer of them).=C2=A0 Do we want to make some statement about how this guid=
ance<br>
to coalesce can be ignored if needed to make individual signal-channel<br>
messages fit in a single packet?=C2=A0 (Hmm, I guess we do have a note abou=
t<br>
&quot;assumes that all link information can fit in one single message&quot;=
 at<br>
least for the &#39;tsid&#39;/link case, but the text from that note only ap=
pears<br>
once.)<br>
<br>
My editorial suggestions in<br>
<a href=3D"https://github.com/boucadair/draft-dots-telemetry/pull/9" rel=3D=
"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://github.com/boucadair/draft-dots-tele=
metry/pull/9</a> included some edits<br>
relating to whether a given target is &quot;susceptible to&quot; vs &quot;s=
ubject to&quot; (or<br>
even &quot;actively being subjected to&quot;) different types of attacks.=
=C2=A0 Med has<br>
diligently already merged that PR while I was sick, so I mostly assume that=
<br>
these already got reviewed for correctness.=C2=A0 Still, I want to call out=
 that<br>
there is a difference and I was not always 100% sure that I picked the righ=
t<br>
one for each case.<br>
<br>
It looks like we have to use backslash continuation markers for several of<=
br>
the CoAP request target resources in the examples; do we want to reference<=
br>
RFC 8792 folding and use its specific note text about line wrapping?<br>
<br>
There are a few places where we say something like &quot;the DOTS client MU=
ST<br>
auto-scale so that the appropriate unit is used&quot;.=C2=A0 (1) We don&#39=
;t specifically<br>
say what the goal of this automatic behavior is (I guess, use the &quot;lar=
gest<br>
unit&quot; that gives a value greater than one?), and (2) it seems that we =
are in<br>
part relying on this behavior to ensure that the client only specifies one<=
br>
measure in a given unit class.=C2=A0 That is, I didn&#39;t see anything els=
e that<br>
would prevent a client from sending (say) both Mbps and Gbps values, that<b=
r>
could of course be in conflict with each other -- if there&#39;s a potentia=
l for<br>
conflict we&#39;d need to say how to resolve the conflict.<br>
<br>
Relatedly, there seems to *also* be potential for conflict in that we allow=
<br>
both bit/second and Byte/second as unit-classes.=C2=A0 What is to happen if=
 I say<br>
that something is both 2 bit/second and 2 Byte/second?<br>
<br>
We have a lot of examples that use the same &#39;cuid&#39; of<br>
dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw, which is fine and representative of normal<br>
operation.=C2=A0 Do we want to curate the &#39;tsid&#39; and &#39;tmid&#39;=
 values used by that<br>
client?=C2=A0 I see some reuse, which I think is not prohibited (at least f=
or<br>
&#39;tsid&#39;), but may merit checking, and the values are not monotonical=
ly<br>
increasing throughout the course of the document, which may or may not be<b=
r>
desirable.<br>
<br>
(nit) we seem to have both &quot;signalled&quot; and &quot;signaled&quot; p=
resent, and<br>
should standardize on our spelling.=C2=A0 (It looks like the one-&#39;l&#39=
; form is<br>
more common in the RFC archive so far.)<br>
<br>
Section 1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have become more<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0sophisticated.=C2=A0 [...]<br>
<br>
We might want to say something about the baseline for the comparison<br>
(&quot;more sophisticated compared to what?&quot;).<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0100 Mbps to 100s of Gbps or even Tbps.=C2=A0 Att=
acks are commonly<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0carried out leveraging botnets and attack reflec=
tors for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0amplification attacks such as NTP (Network Time =
Protocol), DNS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0(Domain Name System), SNMP (Simple Network Manag=
ement Protocol),<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0or SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol).<br>
<br>
Is <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4732#section-3.1" re=
l=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rf=
c4732#section-3.1</a> still<br>
current enough to make a useful reference for amplification attacks?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 N=
evertheless, when DOTS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0telemetry attributes are available to a DOTS agent, and absent=
 any<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0policy, it can signal the attributes in order to optimize the =
overall<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mitigation service provisioned using DOTS.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not sure what type of policy we have in mind, here.<br>
<br>
Section 2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC86=
12].<br>
<br>
It looks like RFC 8612 doesn&#39;t define &quot;idle time&quot; and &quot;a=
ttack time&quot;, so<br>
we may want to pull in a couple more documents as required reading or defin=
e<br>
them ourselves.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sure, we will elaborate=
 these terms with an example.=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rg=
b(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 3.1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the DOTS server&#39;s mitigation resources have the capabil=
ities to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adapts its prot=
ection<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediatel=
y<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(automation enabled) for the sake of optimized attack mitigati=
on<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0decisions and actions.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not entirely sure I understand this part.=C2=A0 It seems to be talk=
ing<br>
about telemetry between the DOTS server and the associated mitigation<br>
resources, but the previous discussion has been about telemetry between<br>
DOTS client and DOTS server (and I do not think the mitigation resources<br=
>
associated with the DOTS server have been said to be DOTS clients in any<br=
>
of the previous DOTS work).<br>
<br>
Section 3.2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS telemetry can also be used to tune the DDoS mitigators wi=
th the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0correct state of an attack.=C2=A0 During the last few years, D=
DoS attack<br>
<br>
(nit) I don&#39;t think &quot;with&quot; is the right verb -- &quot;tune wi=
th &lt;X&gt;&quot; implies<br>
that X is used as a tool to effectuate the tuning, but I think what&#39;s<b=
r>
going on here is more like using the telemetry data as an input for<br>
determining what values to use for the tuning parameters available on<br>
the mitigation resources.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Fixed.</div><=
div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0=
px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of norm=
al<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0traffic can be inaccurate at best.=C2=A0 This is especially tr=
ue for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-c=
ases]).<br>
<br>
RFC 8903 makes no mention of &quot;recursive&quot;, &quot;recursion&quot;, =
or any<br>
hierarchical mitigation scenario (at least in my quick search).=C2=A0 =C2=
=A0Even<br>
the linked draft version (-25) doesn&#39;t have a section 3.2.3.=C2=A0 I do=
<br>
remember reading about this type of recursive or hierarchical scenario<br>
somwhere, so I think we just need to locate the right reference to put<br>
here...I&#39;m just not sure what reference that is, offhand.<br></blockquo=
te><div><br></div><div>Good catch, recursive signaling is discussed=C2=A0in=
 RFC8811.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"=
margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-lef=
t:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0In addition, the highly diverse types of use cases where DOTS =
clients<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of each D=
OTS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0client domain behavior.=C2=A0 Consequently, common global thre=
sholds for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attack detection practically cannot be realized.=C2=A0 [...]<b=
r>
<br>
(editorial?) When we say &quot;the highly diverse types of use cases where<=
br>
DOTS clients are integrated&quot; that&#39;s essentially an unsupported cla=
im,<br>
but the way it&#39;s written we are presupposing that claim to be true<br>
without directly stating it as an observation or assumption.=C2=A0 I think =
we<br>
might be better served by starting off with a declarative statement like<br=
>
&quot;DOTS clients can be integrated in a highly diverse set of scenarios a=
nd<br>
use cases&quot;, and then moving on from that now-explicit assumption/fact =
to<br>
conclude that any single global threshold will mischaracterize the<br>
traffic for some of those diverse DOTS clients.<br>
<br>
Section 4.3<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS clients can also use CoAP Block1 Option in a PUT request =
(see<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 2.5 of [RFC7959]) to initiate large transfers, but the=
se<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Block1 transfers will fail if the inbound &quot;pipe&quot; is =
running full, so<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0consideration needs to be made to try to fit this PUT into a s=
ingle<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0transfer, or to separate out the PUT into several discrete PUT=
s where<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0each of them fits into a single packet.<br>
<br>
If I understand/recall correctly, the Block1 transfer is expected to<br>
fail only in a statistical sense, since the client can&#39;t send more<br>
blocks until it gets the positive reply from the server to continue to<br>
the next block (on a block-by-block basis), and that reply from the<br>
server is competing with the attack traffic for the inbound &quot;pipe&quot=
; and<br>
likely to fail for at least one of the blocks.=C2=A0 I think we should<br>
probably reword slightly to say only &quot;expected to fail&quot; or &quot;=
likely<br>
fail&quot;, since there is some small chance of success; we may also want t=
o<br>
give a brief reminder about why it is expected to fail (e.g., &quot;the<br>
transfer requires a message from the server for each block, which would<br>
likely be lost in the incoming flood&quot;).<br></blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>Thanks, we will fix=C2=A0the text.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 6<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Telemetry setup configuration is bound to a DOTS client domain=
.=C2=A0 DOTS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0servers MUST NOT expect DOTS clients to send regular requests =
to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0refresh the telemetry setup configuration.=C2=A0 Any available=
 telemetry<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0setup configuration has a validity timeout of the DOTS associa=
tion<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0with a DOTS client domain.=C2=A0 [...]<br>
<br>
The term &quot;DOTS association&quot; does not seem to have been used previ=
ously<br>
(in RFC 9132 we discuss the &quot;DOTS session&quot; heavily, though).=C2=
=A0 Also, I<br>
don&#39;t remember any previous requirement to keep state on the server for=
<br>
the duration of anything scoped to the entire client *domain*, just<br>
individual DOTS sessions.=C2=A0 We do mention detecting conflicts/overlappi=
ng<br>
requests within the scope of a client domain, in RFC 9132, but as far as<br=
>
I can tell that only holds when all the DOTS sessions involved in the<br>
conflict are still active.<br>
<br>
Perhaps related, this discussion (at least so far) is not clear to me<br>
about what level of coordination/consistency is expected between clients<br=
>
in the same domain.=C2=A0 I believe that stock DOTS works fine with no such=
<br>
coordination amongst clients within a domain, so if we are introducing such=
<br>
a requirement we should say prominently that it&#39;s a change.<br></blockq=
uote><div><br></div><div>Yes, telemetry configuration is not specific to th=
e client. For example, the pipe capacity is specific to the site.=C2=A0</di=
v><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0p=
x 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 6.1.1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Upon receipt of such request, and assuming no error is encount=
ered by<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0processing the request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (C=
ontent)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0response that conveys the current and telemetry parameters acc=
eptable<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0by the DOTS server.=C2=A0 [...]<br></blockquote><div><br></div=
><div>NEW:</div><div><p style=3D"color:rgb(80,0,80);margin:0cm"><span style=
=3D"font-size:10pt;color:black">Upon receipt of such request, and assuming =
no error is encountered by</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style=3D"color:rgb(80=
,0,80);margin:0cm"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:black">processing th=
e request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content)</span><u></u><u></=
u></p><p style=3D"color:rgb(80,0,80);margin:0cm"><span style=3D"font-size:1=
0pt;color:black">response that conveys the telemetry parameters acceptable=
=C2=A0by the DOTS server=C2=A0</span><u></u><u></u></p><p style=3D"color:rg=
b(80,0,80);margin:0cm"><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:black">and the c=
urrent baseline information maintained by the DOTS server.</span></p></div>=
<div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
(editorial) Something seems off, here (around &quot;current and telemetry<b=
r>
parameters acceptable&quot;).=C2=A0 Is it returning current configuration, =
acceptable<br>
parameter values, or some combination thereof?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0+-- query-t=
ype*=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 query-type<br>
<br>
Since this is a leaf-list of supported query types, should the list name<br=
>
include the word &quot;supported&quot; or similar?<br>
<br>
Section 6.1.2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The PUT request with a higher numeric &#39;tsid&#39; value ove=
rrides the DOTS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a=
 lower<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0numeric &#39;tsid&#39; value.=C2=A0 To avoid maintaining a lon=
g list of &#39;tsid&#39;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0requests for requests carrying telemetry configuration data fr=
om a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS client, the lower numeric &#39;tsid&#39; MUST be automati=
cally deleted<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0and no longer be available at the DOTS server.<br>
<br>
The way this is phrased with &quot;the lower&quot; and &quot;higher&quot; (=
vs &quot;highest&quot;) assumes<br>
or implies that there is only one &quot;lower&quot; &#39;tsid&#39; value, p=
erhaps leaving some<br>
ambiguity if there is actually more than one.=C2=A0 We might make a stateme=
nt<br>
about how there is only at most one active &#39;tsid&#39; per &#39;cuid&#39=
;+&#39;cdid&#39; at a<br>
time other than during a config change (if that&#39;s the intent), or<br>
alternatively to qualify that the requirement to remove is only incurred in=
<br>
the event of a conflict (as is done for other types of config, later).<br><=
/blockquote><div><br></div><div><p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"ma=
rgin:0in;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">We can have multiple tsids for the=
 same client for
pipe/baseline information. This is why we have:</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0 DOTS clients SHOULD minimize the number of
active &#39;tsid&#39;s used for</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0 baseline information.=C2=A0 In order to
avoid maintaining a long list of</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0 &#39;tsid&#39;s for baseline information, it is
RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0 include in a request to update information
related to a given target,</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0 the information of other targets (already
communicated using a lower</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0 &#39;tsid&#39; value) (assuming this fits within one
single datagram).=C2=A0 This</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0 update request will override these existing
requests and hence</p>

<p class=3D"gmail-MsoPlainText" style=3D"margin:0in;font-family:Calibri,san=
s-serif">=C2=A0=C2=A0 optimize the number of &#39;tsid&#39; requests per
DOTS client.</p></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padd=
ing-left:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0o=C2=A0 If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does =
not include<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &#39;cuid&#39; or &#39;tsid&#39; Uri-Path parameters, =
or contains one or more<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST=
 be returned<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 in the response.<br>
<br>
Just to confirm: this does not rule out the ability to define new<br>
parameters in the future (for example, the client might learn of new<br>
ones in the response to a GET request)?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div=
>Yes.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1e=
x">
<br>
Section 6.3<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 *=C2=A0 The maximum number of requests allowed per sec=
ond to the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0target.<br>
<br>
Should we say anything about the requirement on the protocol in question<br=
>
that &quot;request&quot; is a meaningful concept and observable by the miti=
gator<br>
(analogous to what we have about &quot;embryonic connections&quot; earlier)=
?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Okay, updated text to say: T<span sty=
le=3D"font-family:Arial,sans-serif">he maximum number of requests (e.g., HT=
TP/DNS/SIP requests) allowed per second to the=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"f=
ont-family:Arial,sans-serif">target.</span></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px =
solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0+-- baseline* [id]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 +-- id<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0uint32<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 +-- target-prefix*<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0inet:ip-prefix<br>
<br>
(nit) the formatting here is a bit surprising, to wrap the line between<br>
leaf name and type.=C2=A0 But if that&#39;s what pyang gives, we probably d=
on&#39;t<br>
want to mess with it...<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +-- partial-request-ps?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 uint64<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +-- partial-request-client-ps?=C2=A0 =C2=A0uint64<br>
<br>
I wonder whether the limit on &quot;partial requests&quot; should really be=
 a rate<br>
(&quot;per second&quot;) versus a point-in-time cap (i.e., &quot;oustanding=
 partial<br>
requests&quot;).=C2=A0 It seems like a given request could in principle rem=
ain in<br>
&quot;partial&quot; state for an extended period of time, and that having r=
emaing<br>
in such a state for a second should not justify the client being able to<br=
>
produce more partial requests...but the current formulation as a rate seems=
<br>
to do so.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Good point, added <font color=
=3D"#000000" face=3D"Arial, sans-serif"><span style=3D"font-size:13.3333px;=
white-space:pre-wrap">partial requests pending per client.</span></font></d=
iv><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0=
px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 6.3.1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets i=
f there<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name.=
=C2=A0 Also,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets i=
f the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0addresses associated with the FQDN, URI, or alias are overlapp=
ing<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0with each other or with &#39;target-prefix&#39;.<br>
<br>
There can be some subtlety here involving where the FQDN/URI/alias are<br>
resolved into IP addresses from; we may want to say &quot;from the perspect=
ive of<br>
the server&quot;, &quot;as observed by the server&quot;, or similar.<br></b=
lockquote><div><br></div><div>Fixed.=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px s=
olid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 7<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS agents SHOULD bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry da=
ta with<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mitigation requests relying upon the target attribute.=C2=A0 I=
n<br>
<br>
(nit??) Is this &quot;target attribute&quot; a telemetry attribute, or some=
thing<br>
else (an attack target?)?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><pre style=3D=
"white-space:pre-wrap;margin:0cm;font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Courier N=
ew&quot;;color:rgb(80,0,80);break-before:page"><span style=3D"color:black">=
NEW:<u></u><u></u></span></pre><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;margin:0c=
m;font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:rgb(80,0,80);bre=
ak-before:page"><span style=3D"color:black">=C2=A0=C2=A0 DOTS agents SHOULD=
 bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data to<u></u><u></u></span></pre=
><pre style=3D"white-space:pre-wrap;margin:0cm;font-size:10pt;font-family:&=
quot;Courier New&quot;;color:rgb(80,0,80)"><span style=3D"color:black">=C2=
=A0=C2=A0 mitigation requests relying upon the resources under attack.</spa=
n></pre></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left=
:1ex">
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0When generating telemetry data to send to a peer, the DOTS age=
nt MUST<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0auto-scale so that appropriate unit(s) are used.<br>
<br>
(editorial) This requirement is not terribly tightly connected to either<br=
>
what comes after it in the text or what comes before it in the text.=C2=A0 =
We<br>
might consider moving it (earlier, maybe?) and adding a bit more<br>
transition phrasing about how the agent may send telemetry data many<br>
times and in different situations, so the right unit to use will vary<br>
over time.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div><pre style=3D"white-space:pr=
e-wrap;margin:0cm;font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;;color:=
rgb(80,0,80);break-before:page"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial,sans-serif=
;color:black">We will add an example like DDoS attack enhancing the attack =
volume from Gbps to Tbps to justify the need</span></pre><pre style=3D"whit=
e-space:pre-wrap;margin:0cm;font-size:10pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&qu=
ot;;color:rgb(80,0,80);break-before:page"><span style=3D"font-family:Arial,=
sans-serif;color:black">for auto-scaling the units.</span></pre></div><div>=
=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0=
.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 7.1.1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the target is subjected to bandwidth consuming attack, the<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attributes representing the percentile values of the &#39;atta=
ck-id&#39;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attack traffic are included.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attacks,=
 the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0same attributes defined for Section 7.1.4 are applicable for<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0representing the attack.<br>
<br>
One of these just says &quot;the attributes representing&quot; and the othe=
r<br>
references attributes defined in a specific section; can we use the same<br=
>
formulation/phrasing to talk about the two cases?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This is an optional attribute.<br>
<br>
Er, which one is optional?=C2=A0 Just a few paragraphs earlier we said that=
<br>
at least one attribute MUST be present (so as to be able to identify a<br>
target).<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Added the following line:</div=
><div><span style=3D"color:black">At least the &#39;target&#39; attribute a=
nd another pre-or-ongoing-mitigation=C2=A0attribute MUST be present in the=
=C2=A0</span><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:black">DOTS telemetry mess=
age.=C2=A0</span><br></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:black">=
<br></span></div><div><span style=3D"font-size:10pt;color:black">Removed th=
e line &quot;</span>This is an optional attribute&quot;</div><div>=C2=A0</d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 7.1.2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The &#39;total-traffic&#39; attribute (Figure 26) conveys the =
percentile<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0values (including peak and current observed values) of total t=
raffic<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0observed during a DDoS attack.=C2=A0 [...]<br>
<br>
This attribute is under the &quot;pre-or-ongoing-mitigation&quot; hierarchy=
; is it<br>
really right to only say &quot;traffic observed during a DDoS attack&quot; =
(i.e.,<br>
implicitly excluding the &quot;pre-attack&quot; case)?<br></blockquote><div=
><br></div><div>Good catch, fixed.=C2=A0</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 7.1.3<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The &#39;total-attack-traffic&#39; attribute (Figure 27) conve=
ys the total<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attack traffic identified by the DOTS client domain&#39;s DDoS=
 Mitigation<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0System (or DDoS Detector).=C2=A0 [...]<br>
<br>
(editorial?) &quot;Identified by [the client domain]&quot; seems to imply t=
hat<br>
this is only used in telemetry reports from client to server, and not in<br=
>
updates flowing the other direction.=C2=A0 Is that correct?<br></blockquote=
><div><br></div><div>Yes, telemetry is applicable in both directions and no=
t specific to client to server only.<br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<br>
Section 7.1.4<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 +-- total-attack-co=
nnection<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +-- low-per=
centile-l* [protocol]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +--=
 protocol=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 uint8<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +--=
 connection?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0yang:gauge64<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +--=
 embryonic?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 yang:gauge64<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +--=
 connection-ps?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 yang:gauge64<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +--=
 request-ps?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0yang:gauge64<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +--=
 partial-request-ps?=C2=A0 =C2=A0yang:gauge64<br>
<br>
I think I&#39;m confused about what semantics this is trying to represent.<=
br>
The &quot;low-percentile-l&quot; seems like it should be providing aggregat=
e<br>
information about some particular snapshot of traffic that we have<br>
determined to be representative of the &quot;low percentile&quot; level of =
attack<br>
traffic.=C2=A0 That is, if we take the recorded attack traffic and divide i=
t<br>
into a bunch of bins on the time axis, we can order the respective bins<br>
from &quot;least noticable attack&quot; to &quot;worst attack&quot;, and we=
 pick the fifth<br>
percentile (or whatever is configured) bin to represent the<br>
&quot;low-percentile&quot; bucket.=C2=A0 But now we&#39;re reporting a bunc=
h of attributes<br>
of that bin -- number of connections, embryonic connections, connections<br=
>
per second, etc., even though the bins were ordered based on a single<br>
&quot;worst&quot; metric (and I don&#39;t see us specify what metric we act=
ually use<br>
to do that ordering).=C2=A0 So even though this is the &quot;low percentile=
&quot; (e.g.,<br>
fifth percentile) bin of attack traffic (i.e., probably not a very bad<br>
attack), we can&#39;t say specifically that the reported total attack<br>
connection count is fifth percentile and the embryonic connection count<br>
is fifth percentile and the requests-per-second is also fifth<br>
percentile.=C2=A0 Which makes me confused at why the list is structured thi=
s<br>
way -- if we were just saying &quot;for each of connection, embryonic, etc.=
, bin<br>
the samples over that metric and compute the low/med/high percentage values=
<br>
for that single metric, and this list holds those resulting values&quot;, i=
t<br>
seems like a more natural structure to group things would be to have a list=
<br>
of low/med/high for each of the attributes/metrics.<br></blockquote><div><b=
r></div><div>Good point, we should have a list of low/med/high/peak/current=
 for each of the connection attributes.</div><div><br></div><div>Cheers,</d=
iv><div>-Tiru</div><div><br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding=
-left:1ex"><br>
Section 7.1.5<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0vendor-id:=C2=A0 Vendor ID is a security vendor&#39;s Enterpri=
se Number as<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers].=C2=A0 It is=
 a four-byte<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 integer value.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attack-id:=C2=A0 Unique identifier assigned for the attack.<br=
>
<br>
If the vendor-id is being used as a scoping value to let each vendor<br>
assign attack-id values, then we should say so here, the first place we<br>
really handle this part of the YANG tree.=C2=A0 Even if not, we should prob=
ably<br>
say more about why we care what the vendor-id is, and we should also say wh=
o<br>
assigns the attack-id.=C2=A0 (Maybe it&#39;s scoped to the DOTS server; I d=
on&#39;t know<br>
yet at this point in the document!)<br>
<br>
Furthermore, the module structure where attack-id and vendor-id are<br>
always required, but there is going to need to be the ability to assign<br>
a new attack description at runtime, seems to force us to conflate<br>
externally/statically assigned attack-ids and dynamically assigned ones<br>
in the same number space.=C2=A0 Should we give any guidance to vendors abou=
t<br>
how to allocate IDs in a way that will not produce collisions between<br>
predistributed/fixed attack IDs and new ones created at runtime?=C2=A0 Or i=
s the<br>
thought that there will be no dynamic attack-ids since that just correspond=
s<br>
to the attack-description string and a generic description can be used if<b=
r>
there is not a better one available?<br>
<br>
Regardless, I think we should have more verbiage as to what the scope of th=
e<br>
attack-id is -- what information is it supposed to indicate or replace?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0start-time:=C2=A0 The time the attack started.=C2=A0 The attac=
k&#39;s start time is<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in =
UTC time<br>
<br>
(nit) &quot;in UTC time&quot; and &quot;Z&quot; seem redundant (which does =
not necessarily<br>
imply that we should only use one of them...).<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC8949]).=C2=A0 The CBOR encoding =
is modified so<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be=
 omitted.<br>
<br>
(nit) Maybe we should move the CBOR section reference to after we start<br>
talking about CBOR encoding.=C2=A0 (And we should do the same for &#39;end-=
time&#39;,<br>
if we do anything.)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0top-talker:=C2=A0 A list of top talkers among attack sources.=
=C2=A0 The top<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 talkers are represented using the &#39;source-prefix&#=
39;.<br>
<br>
Is there a good reference or short description for the notion of<br>
top-talkers?=C2=A0 I know it&#39;s a well-established term of art in many d=
ifferent<br>
circles, but it&#39;s hard to be fully confident that all readers will be<b=
r>
familiar with it.<br>
<br>
Also, should we say anything about how the number of talkers to include<br>
is determined?=C2=A0 (I assume it is best left to the discretion of the<br>
sender, but we probably want to set a clear expectation that the list is<br=
>
not all talkers or a complete list in any other way.)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &#39;spoofed-status&#39; indicates whether a top talke=
r is a spoofed IP<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 address (e.g., reflection attacks) or not.<br>
<br>
Is this something that can be unambiguously determined by all parties<br>
that might be producing this telemetry data, or should we use a<br>
tri-statae (for &quot;unknown&quot;) rather than a boolean to represent it?=
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0In order to optimize the size of telemetry data conveyed over =
the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS signal channel, DOTS agents MAY use the DOTS data channel=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0[RFC8783] to exchange vendor specific attack mapping details (=
that<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0is, {vendor identifier, attack identifier} =3D=3D&gt; attack d=
escription).<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0As such, DOTS agents do not have to convey systematically an a=
ttack<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0description in their telemetry messages over the DOTS signal c=
hannel.<br>
<br>
It&#39;s a little surprising to me that this is only a MAY.=C2=A0 Does it m=
ake<br>
sense as a SHOULD (expected to usually happen, but leaving open the<br>
flexibility when an observed attack does not match a previously<br>
characterized attack description)?<br>
<br>
Also, when reading this I assumed that the &quot;attack description&quot; b=
eing<br>
mapped to could include things like the target port/protocol, whether it<br=
>
was spoofed, etc.=C2=A0 But reading on to the ietf-dots-mapping module, it<=
br>
seems that this is intended to just be the single &quot;attack-description&=
quot;<br>
string.=C2=A0 If so, we might give some more indications of that, e.g., by<=
br>
spelling it that way and having some prose about it being a &quot;string&qu=
ot;, or<br>
similar.<br>
<br>
Also^2, from here to the end of the section might benefit from being<br>
split off into a dedicated subsection on using the data channel to<br>
pre-populate vendor and attack description information<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0tables are at different revisions.=C2=A0 The DOTS client SHOUL=
D transmit<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0telemetry information using the vendor mapping(s) that it prov=
ided to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0the DOTS server and the DOTS server SHOULD use the vendor mapp=
ings(s)<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data t=
o peer<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS agent.<br>
<br>
Having read a bit further on, I&#39;m not actually sure where in the<br>
protocol the client has provided vendor mappings to the server, and the<br>
server provided vendor mappings to the client.=C2=A0 It *might* be the GET<=
br>
and POST from/to dots-data/ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping, but we<br>
don&#39;t really give a clear indication of that.=C2=A0 I think we should t=
ry to<br>
be more precise about what we mean by &quot;provided&quot;.<br>
(editorial) would this then be &quot;SHOULD use any vendor mapping(s)&quot;=
<br>
(s/the/any/)?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabiliti=
es:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0+--ro vendor-mapping-enabled?=C2=A0 =C2=A0boolea=
n {dots-telemetry}?<br>
<br>
None of the other capabilities in this tree (as specified by RFC 8783)<br>
include a name suffix like &quot;-enabled&quot;.=C2=A0 Should this just be<=
br>
&quot;vendor-mapping&quot;?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;vendor-id&quot;: 1234,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;vendor-name&quot;: &quot;mit=
igator-s&quot;,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;last-updated&quot;: &quot;15=
76856561&quot;,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;attack-mapping&quot;: []<br>
<br>
[this last updated is from December 2019; we could probably pick<br>
something more current if we wanted, but it doesn&#39;t really matter.]<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The DOTS client reiterates the above procedure regularly (e.g.=
, once<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0a week) to update the DOTS server&#39;s vendor attack mapping =
details.<br>
<br>
Do the udpates have to preserve any existing assignments?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the DOTS client concludes that the DOTS server does not hav=
e any<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0reference to the specific vendor attack mapping details, the D=
OTS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0client uses a POST request to install its vendor attack mappin=
g<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0details.=C2=A0 [...]<br>
<br>
This suggests that a client would not bother sending its own vendor<br>
mapping if the server already has one, and at least to me further<br>
implies that the client would use the sever-provided mapping for the<br>
messages that the client generates.=C2=A0 This seems at odds with the earli=
er<br>
guidance that the client should send using the vendor-mapping it<br>
provided to the server, and the server should send using the<br>
vendor-mapping it provided to the client.=C2=A0 Which one is it?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST re=
quest<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0using the status-line.=C2=A0 Concretely, &quot;201 Created&quo=
t; status-line MUST be<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the v=
endor<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attack mapping details.=C2=A0 If the request is missing a mand=
atory<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, &quot;4=
00 Bad<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Request&quot; status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server =
in the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0response.=C2=A0 [...]<br>
<br>
I think (but did not specifically check) that these specific status code<br=
>
values are preexisting requirements of core RESTCONF (and HTTP), so we<br>
may not need to write new &quot;MUST&quot; keywords.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, b=
ut the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS server does not maintain a &#39;cdid&#39; for this &#39;c=
uid&#39; while a &#39;cdid&#39;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with &q=
uot;403<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Forbidden&quot; status-line and the error-tag &quot;access-den=
ied&quot;.=C2=A0 Upon<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Sectio=
n 5.1<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0of [RFC8783]).<br>
<br>
(nit) the analogous text in RFC 8783 itself refers only to &quot;Section 5&=
quot;<br>
(not 5.1).<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its vendor atta=
ck<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mapping details maintained by the DOTS server (e.g., add a new=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mapping).<br>
<br>
As above, is this really just an example behavior or a hard requirement<br>
to preserve existing mappings?<br>
<br>
Section 7.2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;attack-detail&quot;: [<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0{<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;vendor-id&quot=
;: 1234,<br>
<br>
The vendor-ID is supposed to be an IANA-assigned PEN, and 1234 is<br>
assigned to Linkage Software Inc.=C2=A0 We have other options, like 32473,<=
br>
&quot;Example Enterprise Number for Documentation Use&quot; (RFC 5612).<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;start-time&quo=
t;: &quot;1957811234&quot;,<br>
<br>
This value represents a time in 2032; should we be using something a<br>
little more current?<br>
<br>
Section 7.3<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This request MUST be maintained active by the DOTS server unti=
l a<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear =
this<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry.<br>
<br>
It seems like we might want to allow some provision for a server to<br>
clean up state associated with a client that disappears entirely without<br=
>
cleaning itself up.=C2=A0 For example, is the server allowed to discard sta=
te<br>
when it reboots, or does this requirement extend to writing the state to<br=
>
persistent storage?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 If more than one Uri-Query option is included in a req=
uest, these<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 options are interpreted in the same way as when multip=
le target<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 attributes are included in a message body.<br>
<br>
I a little bit wonder if we could put a section reference here for<br>
&quot;interpreted in the same way&quot;, since the reader may not remember =
what<br>
that way is, at least on the first reading.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 parameters.=C2=A0 DOTS clients MUST NOT include a name=
 in which the &quot;*&quot;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 character is included in a label other than the leftmo=
st label.<br>
<br>
Do we want to say what the server should do if it gets one anyway?<br>
(It&#39;s not really clear that we need to say anything, strictly speaking.=
)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;vendor-id&quot=
;: 1234,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;attack-id&quot=
;: 77,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;start-time&quo=
t;: &quot;1957818434&quot;,<br>
<br>
[same as above]<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0A DOTS client that is not interested to receive pre-or-ongoing=
-<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mitigation telemetry data for a target MUST send a delete requ=
est<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0similar to the one depicted in Figure 37.<br>
<br>
I&#39;m not sure that this strictly needs to be a &quot;MUST&quot;; it seem=
s like we<br>
could say that such a client &quot;sends a delete request&quot; and leave i=
t at<br>
that.<br>
<br>
Section 8.1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0+-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0[...]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 +-- top-talker<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0+-- talker* [source-prefix]=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0[...]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 +-- total-attack-co=
nnection<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0+-- lo=
w-percentile-c<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0|=C2=
=A0 +-- connection?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0yang:gauge64<br=
>
<br>
I&#39;m kind of surprised that there is no &#39;protocol&#39; leaf in this =
subtree;<br>
it seems to usually appear in combination with these connection counts.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +-- peak-g?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 yang:gauge64<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +-- current-g?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 yang:gauge64<br>
[...]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +-- peak-g?=
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 yang:gauge64<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 |=C2=A0 +-- current=
-g?=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 yang:gauge64<br>
<br>
(nit) the indentation seems off for type of these two &#39;current-g&#39;s.=
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0In order to signal telemetry data in a mitigation efficacy upd=
ate, it<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0is RECOMMENDED that the DOTS client has already established a =
DOTS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0telemetry setup session with the server in &#39;idle&#39; time=
.<br>
<br>
If I understand correctly, it seems that at least part of the need for<br>
having a preestablished telemetry session is that the mitigation<br>
efficacy update is identified only by the &#39;mid&#39;, and so we cannot<b=
r>
specify a &#39;tmid&#39; as part of such an efficacy update.=C2=A0 Thus, in=
 order<br>
for the server to associate the telemetry data in the efficacy update<br>
with an ongoing telemetry status session, the &#39;tsid&#39; must be associ=
ated<br>
with the &#39;mid&#39; that is the subject of the efficacy update.<br>
If that is correct, then I think we should have some text here about how<br=
>
the efficacy update does not/cannot include the &#39;tmid&#39;, and so is<b=
r>
associated with the &#39;mid&#39; of the update.<br>
<br>
Section 8.2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can =
include<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0several countermeasure mechanisms.=C2=A0 The DOTS server signa=
ls the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0current operational status of relevant countermeasures.=C2=A0 =
A list of<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0attacks detected by each countermeasure MAY also be included.=
=C2=A0 The<br>
<br>
I see how in stock DOTS signal channel, the server signals whether an<br>
attack is fully/partially/not mitigated, but I don&#39;t see how the server=
<br>
indicates the specific relevant countermeasures that were used.=C2=A0 Am I<=
br>
just missing something there?=C2=A0 (Similarly, the list of attacks we<br>
returned may or may not be at the granularity of &quot;detected by each<br>
countermeasure&quot;, depending on the ansewr to the previous part.)<br>
<br>
Also (editorial), I think we should be more clear about when we switch<br>
from describing RFC 9132 behavior to to describing the new functionality<br=
>
provided by this document.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Figure 46 shows an example of an asynchronous notification of =
attack<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0mitigation status from the DOTS server.=C2=A0 This notificatio=
n signals<br>
<br>
Is the &quot;new stuff&quot; in Figure 46 just the subtree under<br>
:(server-to-client-only)?=C2=A0 The &#39;total-attack-traffic&#39; leaf see=
ms to be<br>
the same content as in Figure 45, and maybe could be omitted?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;mitigation-start&quot;: &quo=
t;1507818434&quot;,<br>
<br>
(This date is from 2017; as above, we could use a more current one if we<br=
>
want.)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;source-count&q=
uot;: {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;peak-g&=
quot;: &quot;10000&quot;<br>
<br>
(Suspiciously round numbers like this are indications of fabricated data<br=
>
... which is totally reasonable for an example like this!=C2=A0 But if we<b=
r>
wanted to be &quot;more realistic&quot; we could use a less-round number.)<=
br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS clients can filter out the asynchronous notifications fro=
m the<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its=
 GET<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0request.=C2=A0 A Uri-Query option can include the following pa=
rameters:<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&#39;target-prefix&#39;, &#39;target-port&#39;, &#39;target-pr=
otocol&#39;, &#39;target-fqdn&#39;,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0&#39;target-uri&#39;, &#39;alias-name&#39;, and &#39;c&#39; (c=
ontent) (Section 4.2.4).=C2=A0 The<br>
<br>
Up in =C2=A77.3 the analogous list also included &#39;mid&#39;.=C2=A0 Is &#=
39;mid&#39; appropriate<br>
here (or is it implicitly already included by the base signal channel<br>
mechanisms)?=C2=A0 Hmm, but maybe &#39;c&#39; is also already allowed by th=
e base<br>
signal channel mechanism, so that theory is not great...<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0If the target query does not match the target of the enclosed =
&#39;mid&#39;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0as maintained by the DOTS server, the latter MUST respond with=
 a 4.04<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0(Not Found) error Response Code.=C2=A0 The DOTS server MUST NO=
T add a new<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0observe entry if this query overlaps with an existing one.<br>
<br>
How should the server respond if this query overlaps with an existing<br>
one?<br>
<br>
Section 10.1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0This module uses types defined in [RFC6991] and [RFC8345].<br>
<br>
Should we mention the data structure extension from RFC 8791 here, as<br>
well?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 typedef attack-severity {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 type enumeration {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 enum none {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 value 1;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;No effect on the DOTS client domai=
n.&quot;;<br>
<br>
It seems like the closest analogue to our attack-serverity typedef in<br>
RFC 7970 is in =C2=A73.12.2, &quot;BusinessImpact Class&quot;. But the phra=
sing used in<br>
RFC 7970 is slightly different than the descriptions we have here.<br>
Do we want to tweak our phrasings and/or clarify in the typedef<br>
description that we use a slightly modified formulation?=C2=A0 (Indeed, we =
do<br>
not have an extension point, either, though 7970 does have an extension<br>
mechanism.)=C2=A0 Also, a section reference within RFC 7970 might be helpfu=
l.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 enum kilopacket-ps {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 value 4;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;Kilo packets per second (kpps).&qu=
ot;;<br>
<br>
We may get someone who asks if we are using 1000 or 1024 (&quot;kibi&quot;)=
, but<br>
I&#39;m inclined to leave it alone for now.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 leaf unit-status {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 type boolean;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 default true;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;Enable/disable the use of the meas=
urement unit class.&quot;;<br>
<br>
Does the &quot;default true&quot; imply that even unit classes not present =
in<br>
&quot;list unit-config&quot; are assumed to be supported by default?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 grouping connection {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;A set of data nodes which represent the attack<b=
r>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0characteristics.&quot;;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [...]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 leaf embryonic {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 type yang:gauge64;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;The number of simultaneous embryonic conn=
ections to<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0the target server.&quot;;<br>
<br>
It&#39;s a little interesting that this is the only leaf in the grouping<br=
>
that we can&#39;t attach the word &quot;attack&quot; to the description of,=
 but as far<br>
as I can tell we shouldn&#39;t make any change here.<br>
(I originally wrote a comment that we shouldn&#39;t use &quot;attack&quot; =
for any of<br>
them, since we have analogous nodes in the total-connection-capacity<br>
config entries, but those seem to not use this grouping.)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 list talker {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 key &quot;source-prefix&quot;;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attac=
ker(s).&quot;;<br>
<br>
My read of the YANG is that this is the description for &quot;list talker&q=
uot;,<br>
but the content matches the description given for the &quot;source-prefix&q=
uot; leaf<br>
within the list.=C2=A0 Should the list itself have a different description?=
<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 grouping top-talker-aggregate {<br>
=C2=A0 [...]<br>
=C2=A0 grouping top-talker {<br>
<br>
The diff between these two is pretty small -- just the top-level<br>
description and connection-all vs connection-protocol-all.=C2=A0 Is there a=
ny<br>
value in introducing another grouping to hold the common elements?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 container max-config-values {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;Maximum accep=
table configuration values.&quot;;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 uses telemetry-parameters;=
<br>
<br>
I guess the convenience of having the reusable grouping probably<br>
outweighs the value of having YANG-level constraints that the &#39;max&#39;=
<br>
values are &gt;=3D the &#39;min&#39; values (which we can set for the<br>
&quot;telemetry-notify-interval&quot; that is not part of &quot;telemetry-p=
arameters&quot;, but<br>
can&#39;t set here because we use the grouping).<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 leaf telemetry-notify-inte=
rval {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 type uint32 {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 range &quot;=
1 .. 3600&quot;;<br>
<br>
(Pedantically, this range would fit in a uint16, though maybe there is<br>
some other reason to prefer the 32-bit type.)<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 case baseline {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 [...]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 list baseline {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 [...]<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 leaf id {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 type uint32;=
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 must &#39;. =
&gt;=3D 1&#39;;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot=
;An identifier that uniquely identifies a baseline<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=
=A0entry communicated by a DOTS client.&quot;;<br>
<br>
I a little bit wonder if we should have a little bit of prose up in =C2=A76=
.3<br>
discussing the need for &quot;id&quot; and how it is used.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 leaf tmid {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 type uint32;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;An ide=
ntifier to uniquely demux telemetry data sent<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0using =
the same message.&quot;;<br>
<br>
The description for &quot;tsid&quot; in the analogous setup was just &quot;=
an<br>
identifier for the DOTS telemetry setup data&quot;.=C2=A0 As far as I can t=
ell,<br>
the usage of the two is analogous, so shouldn&#39;t the descriptions be<br>
analogous as well?=C2=A0 In particular, I am not sure that &quot;uniquely d=
emux&quot; is<br>
the only usage of this leaf, since in server-initiated telemetry messages,<=
br>
this leaf might be needed to indicate which telemetry entry is being<br>
described (right?).<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 leaf-list mid-list {<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 type uint32;<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 &quot;Reference a l=
ist of associated mitigation requests.&quot;;<br>
<br>
Should we reference RFC 9132 somehow to indicate that the base signal<br>
channel is how these &quot;mid&quot; values are assigned (and assigned mean=
ing)?<br>
<br>
Section 10.2<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0description<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0&quot;Vendor ID is a security vend=
or&#39;s Enterprise Number.&quot;;<br>
<br>
Should we say something about &quot;IANA-assigned&quot; and/or link to the<=
br>
corresponding registry?<br>
<br>
Section 11, 12.1<br>
<br>
A handful of the entries in the tables still have an<br>
&quot;ietf-dots-telemetry:&quot; prefix, and I don&#39;t understand why onl=
y some of<br>
the entries would need it but not others.<br>
<br>
In particular, there seems to be an entry for both &quot;total-traffic&quot=
; and<br>
&quot;ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic&quot;, and I don&#39;t understand h=
ow they are<br>
different.=C2=A0 (I did not check if there are other &quot;duplicate&quot;s=
 like that.)<br>
<br>
Section 11<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 | telemetry=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 | container=C2=
=A0 =C2=A0|TBA2=C2=A0 | 5 map=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| Object |<b=
r>
<br>
I see both a &quot;list telemetry&quot; and a &quot;case telemetry&quot; in=
 the YANG module,<br>
but I&#39;m not sure which of them is supposed to correspond to the YANG<br=
>
type &quot;container&quot;.<br>
<a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7950#section-7.9.2" rel=
=3D"noreferrer" target=3D"_blank">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc=
7950#section-7.9.2</a> does not<br>
really give me the impression that there is an implicit container of<br>
this name.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 | baseline=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| containe=
r=C2=A0 =C2=A0|TBA49 | 5 map=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0| Object |<br=
>
<br>
Similarly, I see a &#39;baseline&#39; that&#39;s a list, as the only conten=
t of a<br>
&quot;case baseline&quot; statement.<br>
<br>
Section 12.1<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0Note that &#39;lower-type&#39; and &#39;upper-type&#39; are al=
so requested for<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0assignment in the call-home I-D.=C2=A0 Both I-Ds should be syn=
c&#39;ed as<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0depending the one that will make it first to the IANA.<br>
<br>
(I think we tweaked call-home already to account for the registration<br>
requests being from different ranges between the two documents, but<br>
mention it just in case I&#39;m misremembering.)<br>
<br>
Section 12.3<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:=
ietf-dots-mapping<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 Registrant Contact: The IESG.<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 XML: N/A; the requested URI is an=
 XML namespace.<br>
<br>
I wonder if this (module) name is perhaps somewhat more generic than the<br=
>
functionality it provides.<br>
<br>
Section 13<br>
<br>
Should we mention the security considerations for the blockwise transfer<br=
>
technologies?<br>
<br>
Looking through the YANG tree, the only thing that really sticks out as<br>
potentially worth mentioning here is the server-originated-telemetry<br>
option.=C2=A0 But even for that, I&#39;m not sure that there&#39;s much to =
say.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0The DOTS telemetry information includes DOTS client network to=
pology,<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0DOTS client domain pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline and<=
br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0connections capacity, and threat and mitigation information.=
=C2=A0 Such<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0information is sensitive; it MUST be protected at rest by the =
DOTS<br>
=C2=A0 =C2=A0server domain to prevent data leakage.<br>
<br>
I&#39;d consider adding a sentence or two here noting that even though this=
<br>
data is sensitive, sending it explicitly to the DOTS server does not<br>
introduce any new significant considerations (other than the need for<br>
protection at rest) because the DOTS server is already trusted to have<br>
access to that kind of information by being in the position to mitigate<br>
(and observe) attacks.<br>
<br>
Section 16.1<br>
<br>
A normative reference on draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control will<br>
cause a document cluster, delaying publication until that document is<br>
ready to be an RFC.=C2=A0 It&#39;s not clear to me that such a dependency i=
s<br>
needed in this case, since there is only one citation to that document<br>
and it seems more descriptive than imposing a strong dependency.<br>
<br>
Similarly, we seem to cite RFC 7641 just as a statement of fact (clients<br=
>
can use CoAP OBSERVE), which may not require it to be classified as a<br>
normative reference.<br>
<br>
Section 16.2<br>
<br>
The current state of this document doesn&#39;t really include enough detail=
<br>
about percentiles and their calculation to be implementable without<br>
referring to RFC 2330, currently listed only as a normative reference.<br>
I would prefer to add more text to this document rather than promote<br>
2330 to a normative refrence, though I think we would need more text<br>
than I suggested above in order to achieve that effect.<br>
<br>
We say we assume familiarity with RFC 8612 at least for terminology,<br>
which may indicate that it is best classified as a normative reference.<br>
<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
<br>
Ben<br>
<br>
</blockquote></div></div>

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