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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
CC: "draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org>, "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16 (Sections 1- 7.1.4)
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Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 09:03:47 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16 (Sections 1- 7.1.4)
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Subject: [Dots] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-09.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DDoS Open Threat Signaling WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
        Authors         : Mohamed Boucadair
                          Tirumaleswar Reddy
                          Wei Pan
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-09.txt
	Pages           : 16
	Date            : 2021-12-02

Abstract:
   This document discusses multi-homing considerations for Distributed-
   Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS).  The goal is to
   provide some guidance for DOTS clients/gateways when multihomed.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dots-multihoming/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-09

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-09


Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



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To: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>, 'Valery Smyslov' <valery@smyslov.net>
CC: "dots-chairs@ietf.org" <dots-chairs@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org>, "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
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Hi Valery,=20

FWIW, the changes are now available online: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?ur=
l2=3Ddraft-ietf-dots-multihoming-09

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de
> mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> Envoy=E9=A0: mardi 23 novembre 2021 15:07
> =C0=A0: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>; 'Valery Smyslov'
> <valery@smyslov.net>; dots@ietf.org
> Cc=A0: dots-chairs@ietf.org; draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: Re: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
>=20
> Hi Valery,
>=20
> Thank you for the follow-up.
>=20
> The changes to address your comments can be tracked at:
> https://tinyurl.com/dots-multihoming-latest.
>=20
> Please see inline for more context.
>=20
> Cheers,
> Med
>=20
> > -----Message d'origine-----
> > De=A0: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com> Envoy=E9=A0: vendredi 19
> > novembre 2021 09:51 =C0=A0: BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET
> > <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>; 'Valery Smyslov' <valery@smyslov.net>;
> > dots@ietf.org Cc=A0: dots-chairs@ietf.org;
> > draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org
> > Objet=A0: RE: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
> >
> > HI Med,
> >
> > please see inline.
> >
> > > Hi Valery,
> > >
> > > Many thanks for the detailed review.
> > >
> > > Please see inline.
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > > Med
> > >
> > > > Hi,
> > > >
> > > > here is my review of the draft (sorry for delay).
> > > >
> > > > [chair hat on]
> > > >
> > > > First, I'm a bit confused why this is a Standards Track document.
> > > > draft explicitly states that it defines no new protocol, it only
> > > > contains recommendations how applications should deal with
> > > > multihomed
> > scenarios.
> > > >
> > > > Isn't Informational or BCP status more appropriate for this
> document?
> > >
> > > [Med] Informational is just OK as the intent is to complement the
> > > DOTS
> > arch. Fixed.
> >
> > Good.
> >
> > > > A related issue - the draft has a normative reference to RFC 8811,
> > > > which is an Informational RFC and is not listed in the downref
> > registry.
> > > > If this draft persists as Standards Track document, this should be
> > > > worked around.
> > >
> > > [Med] 8811 is cited as normative as we built on that reference
> > architecture.
> >
> > That's OK if you changed intended status to Informational.
>=20
> [Med] ACK.
>=20
> >
> > > > [chair hat off]
> > > >
> > > > Section 4.
> > > >
> > > > I might be missing something very obvious, but from my reading of
> > > > the scenarios I have an impression that only those situations when
> > > > upstream network providers are also the DDoS mitigation providers
> > > > are
> > considered.
> > > > What if you have multiple ISPs and a single independent DDOS
> > > > mitigation provider?
> > >
> > > [Med] This is a subcase of the ones that are discussed in the draft.
> > > Each of multiple ISPs will provision that independent DDoS server to
> > > the CE. The key assumption is that a DOTS server is unambiguously
> > associated with the interconnection link over which it can be used.
> >
> > Well, what if the independent DOTS server is configured manually, not
> > provisioned by ISPs?
> > Is it possible (and how) to use it with only subset of ISPs?
>=20
> [Med] Added this NEW text:
>=20
> A multihomed network may enable DOTS for all or a subset of its
> upstream interconnection links.  In such a case, DOTS servers can be
> explicitly configured or dynamically discovered by a DOTS client
> using means such as those discussed in [RFC8973].  These DOTS servers
> can be owned by the upstream provider, managed by a third-party
> (e.g., mitigation service provider), or a combination thereof.
>=20
> If a DOTS server is explicitly configured, it is assumed that an
> interface is also provided to bind the DOTS service to an
> interconnection link.  If no interface is provided, this means that
> the DOTS server can be reached via any active interface.
>=20
> >
> > >  Or you have several DDOS mitigation providers, and some of them
> > > > are provided by ISPs and some are independent?
> > >
> > > [Med] This is also allowed in the current draft as we don't make an
> > > assumption of the provisioned DOTS server's name nor wither the
> > same/distinct one are provisioned over each interconnection link:
> > >
> > >    *  Each of these provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes
> > >       to the CPE and provides additional configuration information
> such
> > >       as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the
> > >       network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name
> > >                                             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > >       [RFC8973].  These addresses/prefixes are assumed to be Provider-
> > >       ^^^^^^^^
> > >       Aggregatable (PA).
> > >
> > > Please let me know if you think that an explicit statement is needed
> > > to the draft to further clarify the rationale.
> >
> > I think it's worth to to clarify situation with manually configured
> > independent DOTS servers, when some of them can be used with only a
> > subset of ISPs.
>=20
> [Med] Covered by the NEW text above and this one:
>=20
> In the following subsections, all or a subset of interconnection
> links are associated with DOTS servers.
>=20
> >
> > > > Section 5.1.
> > > >
> > > >    For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the
> DOTS
> > > >    server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([RFC8973])
> > > > using
> > the
> > > >    DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain.
> > > >
> > > > What if explicit configuration (RFC8973, Section 4, item 1) is used?
> > > > If this case this recommendation is unnecessary.
> > >
> > > [Med] This text refers to the DOTS server's name, that is also
> > > mentioned
> > in (RFC8973, Section 4, item 1):
> > >
> > >           "These may be
> > >           specified either as a list of IP addresses or the DNS name
> of
> > >           a DOTS server."
> >
> > That's what my concern is. The draft says that you MUST resolve DOTS
> > server's name provided by a PD using the DNS servers from the same PD.
> > So, what if DOTS server's name was configured manually, not learned
> > from PD - what DNS server to use to resolve it? Any? Should this be
> > more explicit in the text?
>=20
> [Med] Made this change:
>=20
> OLD:
>    For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
>    server's name provided by a provisioning domain [RFC8973] using the
>    DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain.
>=20
> NEW:
>    For each provisioning domain, the DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS
>    server's name provided by a provisioning domain [RFC8973] using the
>    DNS servers learned from the respective provisioning domain (or the
>    DNS servers associated with the interface(s) for which a DOTS server
>    was explicitly configured).
>=20
>=20
> >
> > > > Then, it seems to be implied that all network attachments have
> > > > provided CPE with DOTS servers. In this case how can happen what
> > > > is described
> > > > earlier:
> > > >
> > > >   This implies that if no appropriate DOTS server is found,
> > > >    the DOTS client MUST NOT send the mitigation request to any other
> > > >    available DOTS server.
> > > >
> > > > I think that this situation is only possible when some network
> > > > attachments don't provide CPE with DOTS servers.
> > >
> > > [Med] Agree. This is to echo this part from the introduction:
> > >
> > >    2.  Identify DOTS deployment schemes in a multi-homing context,
> where
> > >        DOTS services can be offered by all or a subset of upstream
> > >                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > >        providers.
> > >
> > > I added this NEW sentence to the intro text of Section 4:
> > >
> > > "In the following subsections, all or a subset of interconnection
> > > links
> > are associated with DOTS servers."
> >
> > OK.
> >
> > > > Section 5.1.
> > > >
> > > >    DOTS signaling session to a
> > > >    given DOTS server must be established using the interface from
> > which
> > > >    the DOTS server was provisioned.
> > > >
> > > > What about explicit configuration, when DOTS server IP is not
> > > > associated with a network interface?
> > >
> > > [Med] An interface can also be indicated when explicit configuration
> > > is used. If no such information is provided, this means that the
> > > address
> > applies for any active interface.
> >
> > Please, add this clarification.
>=20
> [Med] Done.
>=20
> >
> > > As a reminder, RFC8973 says the following:
> > >
> > >    The results of the discovery procedure are a function of the
> > >                                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > >    interface/address family.  Contacting a discovered DOTS server via
> an
> > >    ^^^^^^^^^^
> > >    interface to which it is not bound may exacerbate the delay
> required
> > >    to establish a DOTS channel.  Moreover, such behavior may reveal
> that
> > >    a DOTS service is enabled by a DOTS client domain and exposes the
> > >    identity of the DOTS service provider (which can be inferred from
> the
> > >    name and the destination IP address) to external networks.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Section 5.2.
> > > >
> > > >    Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with policies (e.g., a prefix
> > > >    filter that will be against DDoS detection alarms) that will
> > trigger
> > > >    DOTS communications with the DOTS servers.  Such policies will
> help
> > > >    the DOTS client to select the appropriate destination DOTS
> server.
> > > >
> > > > It's unclear for me to which scenario this recommendation applies.
> > > > In Figure 8 each DOTS client may communicate only with a single
> > > > DOTS server.
> > >
> > > [Med] It applies to both figure 7/8. Clients in Figure 8 may still
> > > receive detection alarms on resources that are not handled by their
> > > peer
> > DOTS server.
> >
> > It is not clear. Previously the draft says:
> >
> >    Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of
> >    them is responsible for handling communications with a specific
> > DOTS
> >
> > ^^^^^^^
> >    server (see Figure 8).
> >
> > Probably some clarification is needed.
>=20
> [Med] Added "For both deployments depicted in Figures 7 and 8 ..."
>=20
> >
> > > > Related question - why SHOULD (and not MUST)?.  What if clients
> > > > are not provided with these policies?
> > >
> > > [Med] SHOULD is used because in Figure 8 some filters may be applied
> > when directing alarms to DOTS clients.
> >
> > I read the sentence "Each DOTS client SHOULD be provided with
> policies..."
> > that under some conditions it's OK to not provide clients with
> > policies
> > (filters) at all, that's why my question. My understanding, that they
> > MUST be provided always, but the policies may differ. Am I missing
> something?
>=20
> [Med] This can't be a MUST as the filtering can be on the alarms
> themselves before being known to the DOTS client.
>=20
> >
> > > > Section 5.2.
> > > >
> > > >    The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when
> > forwarding
> > > >    DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client.  If anycast
> > > >    addresses are used to reach multiple DOTS servers, the CPE may
> > > > not
> > be
> > > >    able to select the appropriate provisioning domain to which the
> > > >    mitigation request should be forwarded.  As a consequence, the
> > > >    request may not be forwarded to the appropriate DOTS server.
> > > >
> > > > I'm confused. What to do in this case? Using anycast addresses is
> > > > NOT RECOMMENDED (earlier), but is not prohibited.
> > > > I believe better recommendations should be given for this case.
> > > >
> > >
> > > [Med] The risk here is that the mitigation request will be rejected
> > > by the DOTS server to which the CPE decided to froward the request.
> > > If the CPE embeds a DOTS gateways, the situation can be better as it
> > > may
> > use a sequential mode. I think that NOT RECOMMENDED is appropriate.
> >
> > So it's just an explanation why using anycast is not recommended?
> > Then, can you move it closer to the recommendation not to use anycast?
>=20
> [Med] Done. Thanks.
>=20
> >
> > > > Section 5.3.
> > > >
> > > >    The use of anycast addresses
> > > >    to establish DOTS sessions between DOTS clients and DOTS
> > > > gateways
> > is
> > > >    not an option.
> > > >
> > > > What does "is not an option" mean?
> > >
> > > [Med] It means that it is not a valid technical solution to fulfil
> > > the "MUST contact all" requirement, as by definition, only one will
> > > be
> > selected.
> > >
> > >  MUST NOT be used? Or impossible to use?
> >
> > "Cannot be used, because <explanation>" ?
>=20
> [Med] Updated the text as suggested.
>=20
> >
> > > > Section 6.
> > > >
> > > >    In particular, if a DOTS client maintains DOTS
> > > >    associations with specific DOTS servers per interconnection
> > > > link,
> > the
> > > >    DOTS client SHOULD NOT leak information specific to a given link
> to
> > > >    DOTS servers on different interconnection links that are not
> > > >    authorized to mitigate attacks for that given link.
> > > >
> > > > How this rule can be followed when DOTS clients send requests to
> > > > all available DOTS servers (with PI scenarios)?
> > >
> > > [Med] In such case, the "information specific to a given link" will
> > > point to the target (PI@) that is authorized to be revealed to all
> > servers.
> >
> > OK.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Valery.
> >
>=20
> __________________________________________________________________________
> _______________________________________________
>=20
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> pieces jointes. Les messages electroniques etant susceptibles
> d'alteration, Orange decline toute responsabilite si ce message a ete
> altere, deforme ou falsifie. Merci.
>=20
> This message and its attachments may contain confidential or privileged
> information that may be protected by law; they should not be distributed,
> used or copied without authorisation.
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> delete this message and its attachments.
> As emails may be altered, Orange is not liable for messages that have been
> modified, changed or falsified.
> Thank you.
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Dots mailing list
> Dots@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dots

___________________________________________________________________________=
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From nobody Thu Dec  2 12:49:03 2021
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Subject: [Dots] Secdir early review of draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-09
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Reviewer: Kathleen Moriarty
Review result: Ready

This draft does not add any significant security considerations from the base
publications for the protocol. Key security considerations are addressed in
supporting document including mutual authentication and key (asymmetric and
symmetric) provisioning as well as policy requirements. The security
considerations add awareness to mitigate from the possibilities of data leaks.

Congratulations to all those who have worked on this series of documents!

Best regards,
Kathleen



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A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        
        RFC 9066

        Title:      Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling 
                    (DOTS) Signal Channel Call Home 
        Author:     T. Reddy.K,
                    M. Boucadair, Ed.,
                    J. Shallow
        Status:     Standards Track
        Stream:     IETF
        Date:       December 2021
        Mailbox:    kondtir@gmail.com,
                    mohamed.boucadair@orange.com,
                    supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com
        Pages:      34
        Updates/Obsoletes/SeeAlso:   None

        I-D Tag:    draft-ietf-dots-signal-call-home-14.txt

        URL:        https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9066

        DOI:        10.17487/RFC9066

This document specifies the Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
(DOTS) signal channel Call Home, which enables a Call Home DOTS
server to initiate a secure connection to a Call Home DOTS client and
to receive attack traffic information from the Call Home DOTS client.
The Call Home DOTS server in turn uses the attack traffic information
to identify compromised devices launching outgoing DDoS attacks and
take appropriate mitigation action(s).

The DOTS signal channel Call Home is not specific to home networks;
the solution targets any deployment in which it is required to block
DDoS attack traffic closer to the source(s) of a DDoS attack.

This document is a product of the DDoS Open Threat Signaling Working Group of the IETF.

This is now a Proposed Standard.

STANDARDS TRACK: This document specifies an Internet Standards Track
protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the DDoS Open Threat Signaling WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
        Authors         : Mohamed Boucadair
                          Tirumaleswar Reddy
                          Ehud Doron
                          Meiling Chen
                          Jon Shallow
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18.txt
	Pages           : 116
	Date            : 2021-12-13

Abstract:
   This document aims to enrich the DOTS signal channel protocol with
   various telemetry attributes, allowing for optimal Distributed
   Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigation.  It specifies the normal
   traffic baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS
   client can convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the
   mitigation status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate
   to a DOTS client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a
   DOTS client can communicate to a DOTS server.  The telemetry
   attributes can assist the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation
   techniques and perform optimal DDoS attack mitigation.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry/

There is also an htmlized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18


Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts



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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Thread-Topic: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18.txt
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Hi Ben, all,

This version integrates the AD review.

Please let us know if there are issues we didn't address. Thank you.=20

Cheers,
Med

> -----Message d'origine-----
> De=A0: I-D-Announce <i-d-announce-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de interne=
t-
> drafts@ietf.org
> Envoy=E9=A0: lundi 13 d=E9cembre 2021 11:49
> =C0=A0: i-d-announce@ietf.org
> Cc=A0: dots@ietf.org
> Objet=A0: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18.txt
>=20
>=20
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the DDoS Open Threat Signaling WG of the
> IETF.
>=20
>         Title           : Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
> Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
>         Authors         : Mohamed Boucadair
>                           Tirumaleswar Reddy
>                           Ehud Doron
>                           Meiling Chen
>                           Jon Shallow
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18.txt
> 	Pages           : 116
> 	Date            : 2021-12-13
>=20
> Abstract:
>    This document aims to enrich the DOTS signal channel protocol with
>    various telemetry attributes, allowing for optimal Distributed
>    Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigation.  It specifies the normal
>    traffic baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS
>    client can convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the
>    mitigation status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate
>    to a DOTS client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a
>    DOTS client can communicate to a DOTS server.  The telemetry
>    attributes can assist the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation
>    techniques and perform optimal DDoS attack mitigation.
>=20
>=20
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry/
>=20
> There is also an htmlized version available at:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18
>=20
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18
>=20
>=20
> Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org::internet-
> drafts
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
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From nobody Thu Dec 23 12:18:56 2021
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Subject: [Dots] Opsdir early review of draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-09
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Reviewer: Joel Jaeggli
Review result: Has Nits

I have reviewed draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-09 for on behalf of the operations
and and management area directorate. While I think this document is largely
complete, I have a couple of questions ab out the ways in which is proposes to
implment the various cases which may or may not add clarity to the document.

It would seem that the chief difference between the residential CPE case and
the enterprise case would seem to be the intercession of BGP,  Who manages the
CPE from the vantage point of configuration,

In practice I don't see a meaningful difference between a single CPE and
multiple CPEs in the enterprise case (5.2/5.3), source address selection is a
coordination problem in either case? but in fact that's mostly a coordination
problem.  selecting the path to the dots server(s) can be achieved via route
selection if no mechanism for signaling routes between CPEs that seems like a
serious limitation.

In a multihoming scenario involving a provider assigned prefix the prefix may
well be both deaggrated for a large provider assignment and advertised to both
providers (e.g. I have an office which receives a /24 assignment from lumen and
also advertises that self same prefix to zayo), in this case the prefix must be
advertised de-aggregated to both providers. enterprise pa assignments of this
form are necessarily equivalent to pi prefixes from a usage standpoint. which
ip is used for dots signaling in cases like this is necessarily a problem of
coordination whether it be the cpe/router peer interface, router loopback, or
some other source ip enclosed within the assigned prefix (or indeed some other
prefix).

> When PI addresses/prefixes are used, DOTS clients MUST contact all the DOTS
gateways to send a DOTS message.

When engaged in DOS related signaling not all dos attacks are in fact
distributed, when attack traffic is unspoffed as it is in most upper layer
targeting attacks it must necessarily follow a consistent path per attacker, 
moreover, your telemetry may well tell you which ingress interface and
therefore provider needs to receive which signaling sending them to un-impacted
providers unnecessary and may result in unintentional information leakage.

>   The use of anycast addresses is NOT RECOMMENDED to reach DOTS gateways.

provider specific anycasts do not in principle seem worse then  provider
specific unicasts, they allow a provider reduce the ammount of coordination
required within their own infrastructure. assigning a well know anycast for
this purpose among all providers on the other hand sounds like a terrible idea,
for the reasons that well known-anycasts are generally bad.



From nobody Mon Dec 27 18:39:33 2021
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Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2021 18:39:16 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
Cc: "draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org>, "dots@ietf.org" <dots@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16 (Sections 8-10)
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Hi Med,

On Thu, Nov 25, 2021 at 10:37:03AM +0000, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> Re-,
> 
> You can track the changes at: https://tinyurl.com/dots-telemetry-latest.
> 
> Please see inline for more context for Sections 8 to 10. 

Thanks.  I also had no need to reply to the message with sections 11-15;
that all looked good (and I got to learn a few things; thanks!).

> Cheers,
> Med
> 
> > -----Message d'origine-----
> > De : Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Benjamin Kaduk
> > Envoyé : mercredi 24 novembre 2021 23:42
> > À : draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org
> > Cc : dots@ietf.org
> > Objet : [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16
> > 
> > Hi all,
> ...
> > 
> > Section 8.2
> > 
> >    As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include
> >    several countermeasure mechanisms.  The DOTS server signals the
> >    current operational status of relevant countermeasures.  A list of
> >    attacks detected by each countermeasure MAY also be included.  The
> > 
> > I see how in stock DOTS signal channel, the server signals whether an
> > attack is fully/partially/not mitigated, but I don't see how the server
> > indicates the specific relevant countermeasures that were used.  Am I just
> > missing something there?
> 
> [Med] The text does not say that we signal the measures themselves. I think you were confused by "... each countermeasure ..."

Yes, that was it, and the fix is good.

>   (Similarly, the list of attacks we returned may
> > or may not be at the granularity of "detected by each countermeasure",
> > depending on the ansewr to the previous part.)
> 
> [Med] s/each countermeasure/these countermeasures
> 
> > 
> > Also (editorial), I think we should be more clear about when we switch
> > from describing RFC 9132 behavior to to describing the new functionality
> > provided by this document.
> > 
> >    Figure 46 shows an example of an asynchronous notification of attack
> >    mitigation status from the DOTS server.  This notification signals
> > 
> > Is the "new stuff" in Figure 46 just the subtree under :(server-to-client-
> > only)? 

Oops, I think I meant the tree diagram prior to figure 46, which does not
seem to have a dedicated label (or "anchor" attribute in the XML).  I can
see how that made the question confusion; sorry about that.

> [Med] What is new is what is indicated right after the text you quoted: 
> 
> " This notification signals
>    both the mid-percentile value of processed attack traffic and the
>    peak count of unique sources involved in the attack. "
> 
> 
> this can be identified in the figure by looking at items that are prefixes with "ietf-dots-telemetry:".
> 
> 
>  The 'total-attack-traffic' leaf seems to be the same content as in
> > Figure 45, and maybe could be omitted?
> 
> [Med] Please note this is not for the same mid. Putting that aside, the one in Figure 45 is what is seen by the client, while figure 46 as about the server's view. Changed the total attack traffic value to avoid inducing readers to assume a correlation between the two.  

(So this comment was attempting to compare two tree diagrams, which
obviously did not come across properly to you.)  Note that I must have
meant the other tree diagram in figure 44, not the example message in
figure 45.

> > 
> >            "mitigation-start": "1507818434",
> > 
> > (This date is from 2017; as above, we could use a more current one if we
> > want.)
> 
> [Med] This was on purpose so easily identify the telemetry addition vs base spec as depicted in Figure 14 of RFC9134. 
> 
> > 
> >                "source-count": {
> >                  "peak-g": "10000"
> > 
> > (Suspiciously round numbers like this are indications of fabricated data
> > ... which is totally reasonable for an example like this!  But if we
> > wanted to be "more realistic" we could use a less-round number.)
> 
> [Med] Agree. Updated. 
> 
> > 
> >    DOTS clients can filter out the asynchronous notifications from the
> >    DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET
> >    request.  A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters:
> >    'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn',
> >    'target-uri', 'alias-name', and 'c' (content) (Section 4.2.4).  The
> > 
> > Up in §7.3 the analogous list also included 'mid'.  Is 'mid' appropriate
> > here (or is it implicitly already included by the base signal channel
> > mechanisms)?
> 
> [Med] Unlike 7.3, the filtering is happing within a request that includes mid as an uri path.
> 
>   Hmm, but maybe 'c' is also already allowed by the base
> > signal channel mechanism, so that theory is not great...
> > 
> >    If the target query does not match the target of the enclosed 'mid'
> >    as maintained by the DOTS server, the latter MUST respond with a 4.04
> >    (Not Found) error Response Code.  The DOTS server MUST NOT add a new
> >    observe entry if this query overlaps with an existing one. 
> > 
> > How should the server respond if this query overlaps with an existing one?
> > 
> 
> [Med] We don't mention this as this is already handled by the base spec:
> 
>    4.09 (Conflict)  is returned by the DOTS server if the DOTS server
>       detects that a request conflicts with a previous request.  
>  
> 
> Updated the text to make this explicit: 
> 
> "In such a case, the DOTS server replies with 4.09 (Conflict)."
> 
> 
> > Section 10.1
> > 
> >    This module uses types defined in [RFC6991] and [RFC8345].
> > 
> > Should we mention the data structure extension from RFC 8791 here, as
> > well?
> 
> [Med] It is not cited here because we don't use any type from 8791. We do have a statement in the document that we rely on 8791.  
> 
> > 
> >   typedef attack-severity {
> >     type enumeration {
> >       enum none {
> >         value 1;
> >         description
> >           "No effect on the DOTS client domain.";
> > 
> > It seems like the closest analogue to our attack-serverity typedef in RFC
> > 7970 is in §3.12.2, "BusinessImpact Class".
> 
> [Med] Yes. We do have the following: 
> 
>    attack-severity:  Attack severity level.  This attribute takes one of
>       the values defined in Section 3.12.2 of [RFC7970].
> 
>  But the phrasing used in RFC
> > 7970 is slightly different than the descriptions we have here.
> 
> [Med] It was adjusted for the DOTS context, but I think they are aligned. 
> 
> > Do we want to tweak our phrasings and/or clarify in the typedef
> > description that we use a slightly modified formulation?
> 
> [Med] I don't think this is needed. 
> 
>   (Indeed, we do
> > not have an extension point, either, though 7970 does have an extension
> > mechanism.)  Also, a section reference within RFC 7970 might be helpful.
> > 
> 
> [Med] Added Section 3.12.2  
> 
> >       enum kilopacket-ps {
> >         value 4;
> >         description
> >           "Kilo packets per second (kpps).";
> > 
> > We may get someone who asks if we are using 1000 or 1024 ("kibi"), but I'm
> > inclined to leave it alone for now.
> > 
> >       leaf unit-status {
> >         type boolean;
> >         default true;
> >         description
> >           "Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit class.";
> > 
> > Does the "default true" imply that even unit classes not present in "list
> > unit-config" are assumed to be supported by default?
> 
> [Med] This is a bug. This should be "mandatory true". 
> 
> > 
> >   grouping connection {
> >     description
> >       "A set of data nodes which represent the attack
> >        characteristics.";
> >     [...]
> >     leaf embryonic {
> >       type yang:gauge64;
> >       description
> >         "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
> >          the target server.";
> > 
> > It's a little interesting that this is the only leaf in the grouping that
> > we can't attach the word "attack" to the description of, but as far as I
> > can tell we shouldn't make any change here.
> > (I originally wrote a comment that we shouldn't use "attack" for any of
> > them, since we have analogous nodes in the total-connection-capacity
> > config entries, but those seem to not use this grouping.)
> > 
> >     list talker {
> >       key "source-prefix";
> >       description
> >         "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
> > 
> > My read of the YANG is that this is the description for "list talker", but
> > the content matches the description given for the "source-prefix" leaf
> > within the list.  Should the list itself have a different description?
> 
> [Med] Yes. This was a copy/past issue.
> 
> > 
> >   grouping top-talker-aggregate {
> >   [...]
> >   grouping top-talker {
> > 
> > The diff between these two is pretty small -- just the top-level
> > description and connection-all vs connection-protocol-all.  Is there any
> > value in introducing another grouping to hold the common elements?
> > 
> 
> [Med] This allows to shorten the doc by 1/2 page. Made the change.
> 
> >             container max-config-values {
> >               description
> >                 "Maximum acceptable configuration values.";
> >               uses telemetry-parameters;
> > 
> > I guess the convenience of having the reusable grouping probably outweighs
> > the value of having YANG-level constraints that the 'max'
> > values are >= the 'min' values (which we can set for the "telemetry-
> > notify-interval" that is not part of "telemetry-parameters", but can't set
> > here because we use the grouping).
> 
> [Med] I confirm. Please note that we have that guard in the core document. 
> 
> > 
> >               leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
> >                 type uint32 {
> >                   range "1 .. 3600";
> > 
> > (Pedantically, this range would fit in a uint16, though maybe there is
> > some other reason to prefer the 32-bit type.)
> 
> [Med] I lost the context why we had it like this. From a yang perspective, the current one is still correct, but it is better to adjust. Will change this but will check my archives as well. 
> 
> > 
> >             case baseline {
> >               [...]
> >               list baseline {
> >                 [...]
> >                 leaf id {
> >                   type uint32;
> >                   must '. >= 1';
> >                   description
> >                     "An identifier that uniquely identifies a baseline
> >                      entry communicated by a DOTS client.";
> > 
> > I a little bit wonder if we should have a little bit of prose up in §6.3
> > discussing the need for "id" and how it is used.
> 
> [Med] Added this NEW text to 6.3:
> 
>    A DOTS client can share one or multiple normal traffic baselines
>    (e.g., aggregate or per-prefix baselines), each are uniquely within
>    the DOTS client domain with an identifier 'id'.  This identifier can
>    be used to update a baseline entry, delete a specific entry, etc.

Thanks!

-Ben

> > 
> >               leaf tmid {
> >                 type uint32;
> >                 description
> >                   "An identifier to uniquely demux telemetry data sent
> >                    using the same message.";
> > 
> > The description for "tsid" in the analogous setup was just "an identifier
> > for the DOTS telemetry setup data".  As far as I can tell, the usage of
> > the two is analogous, so shouldn't the descriptions be analogous as well?
> 
> [Med] Fair. Adjusted the text accordingly. 
> 
> > In particular, I am not sure that "uniquely demux" is the only usage of
> > this leaf, since in server-initiated telemetry messages, this leaf might
> > be needed to indicate which telemetry entry is being described (right?).
> 
> [Med] Yes. 
> 
> > 
> >             leaf-list mid-list {
> >               type uint32;
> >               description
> >                 "Reference a list of associated mitigation requests.";
> > 
> > Should we reference RFC 9132 somehow to indicate that the base signal
> > channel is how these "mid" values are assigned (and assigned meaning)?
> > 
> 
> [Med] Good suggestion. Added: 
> 
>               reference
>                 "RFC 9132: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat 
>                            Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel 
>                            Specification, Section 4.4.1";
> 
> > Section 10.2
> > 
> >          description
> >            "Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number.";
> > 
> > Should we say something about "IANA-assigned" and/or link to the
> > corresponding registry?
> 
> [Med] Added a reference statement to the IANA registry.  
> 
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From nobody Mon Dec 27 19:01:21 2021
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Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2021 19:01:06 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
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Subject: Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16 (Sections 7.1.5 - 7.3)
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Hi Med,

Also inline

On Thu, Nov 25, 2021 at 01:48:04PM +0000, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> Re-,
> 
> You can track the changes at: https://tinyurl.com/dots-telemetry-latest.
> 
> Please see inline for more context for Sections 7.1.5 to 7.3. 
> 
> Cheers,
> Med
> 
> > -----Message d'origine-----
> > De : Dots <dots-bounces@ietf.org> De la part de Benjamin Kaduk
> > Envoyé : mercredi 24 novembre 2021 23:42
> > À : draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org
> > Cc : dots@ietf.org
> > Objet : [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16
> > 
> > Hi all,
> > 
> ...
> > 
> > Section 7.1.5
> > 
> >    vendor-id:  Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number as
> >       registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers].  It is a four-byte
> >       integer value.
> > 
> >    attack-id:  Unique identifier assigned for the attack.
> > 
> > If the vendor-id is being used as a scoping value to let each vendor
> > assign attack-id values, then we should say so here, the first place we
> > really handle this part of the YANG tree.  Even if not, we should probably
> > say more about why we care what the vendor-id is, and we should also say
> > who assigns the attack-id.  (Maybe it's scoped to the DOTS server; I don't
> > know yet at this point in the document!)
> 
> [Med] The is assigned by the vendor. We don't have globally unique attack-ids and we don't ambition to have such a registry. 
> 
> We have the following in the YANG module "Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the attack". 
> 
> Updated the text to align. 
> 
> > 
> > Furthermore, the module structure where attack-id and vendor-id are always
> > required, but there is going to need to be the ability to assign a new
> > attack description at runtime, seems to force us to conflate
> > externally/statically assigned attack-ids and dynamically assigned ones in
> > the same number space.  Should we give any guidance to vendors about how
> > to allocate IDs in a way that will not produce collisions between
> > predistributed/fixed attack IDs and new ones created at runtime?  Or is
> > the thought that there will be no dynamic attack-ids since that just
> > corresponds to the attack-description string and a generic description can
> > be used if there is not a better one available?
> 
> [Med] We really don't want to interfere with how these ids are assigned by vendors. For new attacks, and because the client may not have the mapping we do allow for the following:
> 
>    When conveying attack details in DOTS telemetry messages (Sections
>    7.2, 7.3, and 8), DOTS agents MUST NOT include the 'attack-
>    description' attribute unless the corresponding attack mapping
>    details were not previously shared with the peer DOTS agent.

This is good, but it's of the form "only include the string version if you
can't use a preestablished mapping"; I don't remember any guidance about
not providing an integer attack-id in this case.  In particular, since
'attack-id' is a list key, it seems to be a mandatory YANG element,
implying that there needs to be *some* value to put in there even for a new
attack.

> > 
> > Regardless, I think we should have more verbiage as to what the scope of
> > the attack-id is -- what information is it supposed to indicate or
> > replace?
> > 
> >    start-time:  The time the attack started.  The attack's start time is
> >       expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time
> > 
> > (nit) "in UTC time" and "Z" seem redundant (which does not necessarily
> > imply that we should only use one of them...).
> 
> [Med] We preferred to echo 3.4.2 of RFC8949 cited right after
> 
> > 
> >       (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC8949]).  The CBOR encoding is modified so
> >       that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
> > 
> > (nit) Maybe we should move the CBOR section reference to after we start
> > talking about CBOR encoding.  (And we should do the same for 'end-time',
> > if we do anything.)
> 
> [Med] The section where we discuss CBOR encoding is 4.5. I prefer to keep this mention here. Thanks. 
> 
> > 
> >    top-talker:  A list of top talkers among attack sources.  The top
> >       talkers are represented using the 'source-prefix'.
> > 
> > Is there a good reference or short description for the notion of top-
> > talkers?  I know it's a well-established term of art in many different
> > circles, but it's hard to be fully confident that all readers will be
> > familiar with it.
> 
> [Med] What about:
> 
>       A list of attack sources that are involved in an attack
>       and which are generating an important part of the attack traffic.

I'll take it; thanks.

> > 
> > Also, should we say anything about how the number of talkers to include is
> > determined?  (I assume it is best left to the discretion of the sender,
> > but we probably want to set a clear expectation that the list is not all
> > talkers or a complete list in any other way.)
> 
> [Med] We don't include any hint as this is deployment-specific. 
> 
> > 
> >       'spoofed-status' indicates whether a top talker is a spoofed IP
> >       address (e.g., reflection attacks) or not.
> > 
> > Is this something that can be unambiguously determined by all parties that
> > might be producing this telemetry data, or should we use a tri-statae (for
> > "unknown") rather than a boolean to represent it?
> 
> [Med] The unknown status is handled by not including the leaf. Update the text to indicate so. 

Ah, that makes sense.

> > 
> >    In order to optimize the size of telemetry data conveyed over the
> >    DOTS signal channel, DOTS agents MAY use the DOTS data channel
> >    [RFC8783] to exchange vendor specific attack mapping details (that
> >    is, {vendor identifier, attack identifier} ==> attack description).
> >    As such, DOTS agents do not have to convey systematically an attack
> >    description in their telemetry messages over the DOTS signal channel.
> > 
> > It's a little surprising to me that this is only a MAY.  Does it make
> > sense as a SHOULD (expected to usually happen, but leaving open the
> > flexibility when an observed attack does not match a previously
> > characterized attack description)?
> 
> [Med] We went for "MAY" because this is an optimization for a an optional feature. 
> 
> > 
> > Also, when reading this I assumed that the "attack description" being
> > mapped to could include things like the target port/protocol, whether it
> > was spoofed, etc.
> 
> [Med] Some of the details you cited can be discovered during an attack. 
> 
>   But reading on to the ietf-dots-mapping module, it
> > seems that this is intended to just be the single "attack-description"
> > string.
> 
> [Med] This is the portion that consumes most packet size and is thus problematic. 
> 
>   If so, we might give some more indications of that, e.g., by
> > spelling it that way and having some prose about it being a "string", or
> > similar.
> 
> [Med] OK.
> 
> > 
> > Also^2, from here to the end of the section might benefit from being split
> > off into a dedicated subsection on using the data channel to pre-populate
> > vendor and attack description information
> 
> [Med] Makes sense. 
> 
> > 
> >    tables are at different revisions.  The DOTS client SHOULD transmit
> >    telemetry information using the vendor mapping(s) that it provided to
> >    the DOTS server and the DOTS server SHOULD use the vendor mappings(s)
> >    provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to peer
> >    DOTS agent.
> > 
> > Having read a bit further on, I'm not actually sure where in the protocol
> > the client has provided vendor mappings to the server, and the server
> > provided vendor mappings to the client.  It *might* be the GET and POST
> > from/to dots-data/ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping, but we don't really
> > give a clear indication of that.  I think we should try to be more precise
> > about what we mean by "provided".
> 
> [Med] added: (e.g., using a POST as depicted in Figure 34) 
> 
> > (editorial) would this then be "SHOULD use any vendor mapping(s)"
> > (s/the/any/)?
> 
> [Med] Yeah.
> 
> > 
> >      augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities:
> >        +--ro vendor-mapping-enabled?   boolean {dots-telemetry}?
> > 
> > None of the other capabilities in this tree (as specified by RFC 8783)
> > include a name suffix like "-enabled".  Should this just be "vendor-
> > mapping"?
> 
> [Med] We could, but we went for -enabled to ease referencing this data node in the text. See for example:
> 
>    attack mapping details is supported by the server (i.e., check the
>    value of 'vendor-mapping-enabled'). 
> 
> Otherwise, we would need to provide the full hierarchy because we do have "vendor-mapping" in 
> 
>      augment /data-channel:dots-data:
>        +--ro vendor-mapping {dots-telemetry}?

Okay.  We can see if anyone complains later on.

> > 
> >            "vendor-id": 1234,
> >            "vendor-name": "mitigator-s",
> >            "last-updated": "1576856561",
> >            "attack-mapping": []
> > 
> > [this last updated is from December 2019; we could probably pick something
> > more current if we wanted, but it doesn't really matter.]
> 
> [Med] OK
> 
> > 
> >    The DOTS client reiterates the above procedure regularly (e.g., once
> >    a week) to update the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details.
> > 
> > Do the udpates have to preserve any existing assignments?
> 
> [Med] No. The client can even determine that a given vendor is not used anymore.

I was trying to ask if the server has to preserve its existing assignments
when the client asks for the current mapping.  In some sense it's just a
"quality of implementation" matter for the server, but on the other hand if
it's allowed to change, we may have to give clients a warning to prepare
for that.

> > 
> >    If the DOTS client concludes that the DOTS server does not have any
> >    reference to the specific vendor attack mapping details, the DOTS
> >    client uses a POST request to install its vendor attack mapping
> >    details.  [...]
> > 
> > This suggests that a client would not bother sending its own vendor
> > mapping if the server already has one
> 
> [Med] yes, because there same mapping is used in both sides.

Ah, I think I see where this came from, now.  My question was asked with
the idea of dynamic attack-id assignment still in mind.  It sounds like
this is basically just something that each vendor maintains in a
mini-registry and is expected to be fairly stable.

> , and at least to me further implies
> > that the client would use the sever-provided mapping for the messages that
> > the client generates.  This seems at odds with the earlier guidance that
> > the client should send using the vendor-mapping it provided to the server,
> > and the server should send using the vendor-mapping it provided to the
> > client.  Which one is it?
> > 
> >    The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
> >    using the status-line.  Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be
> >    returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the vendor
> >    attack mapping details.  If the request is missing a mandatory
> >    attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad
> >    Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the
> >    response.  [...]
> > 
> > I think (but did not specifically check) that these specific status code
> > values are preexisting requirements of core RESTCONF (and HTTP), so we may
> > not need to write new "MUST" keywords.
> 
> [Med] We tried to be consistent with RFC8782, where we can find:
> 
>    If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or it contains an
>    invalid or unknown parameter, a "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be
>    returned by the DOTS server.
> 
> > 
> >    If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the
> >    DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid'
> >    is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403
> >    Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied".  Upon
> >    receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Section 5.1
> >    of [RFC8783]).
> > 
> > (nit) the analogous text in RFC 8783 itself refers only to "Section 5"
> > (not 5.1).
> 
> [Med] I prefer to keep 5.1 because 5 covers both registration and de-registration.
> 
> > 
> >    The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its vendor attack
> >    mapping details maintained by the DOTS server (e.g., add a new
> >    mapping).
> > 
> > As above, is this really just an example behavior or a hard requirement to
> > preserve existing mappings?
> 
> [Med] We are not using any normative language for POST, hence this wording for PUT.  

(For what it's worth, it looks like I was asking about the "e.g., add a new
mapping" phrase specifically.  If there is a requirement for the
server/vendor to preserve existing mappings, then it seems that the only
kind of modification possible would be to add a new mapping, so we wouldn't
need the "e.g." modifier.  But this is probably not worth spending more
time on.)

Everything else looks okay.  Thanks,

Ben

> 
> > 
> > Section 7.2
> > 
> >            "attack-detail": [
> >              {
> >                "vendor-id": 1234,
> > 
> > The vendor-ID is supposed to be an IANA-assigned PEN, and 1234 is assigned
> > to Linkage Software Inc.  We have other options, like 32473, "Example
> > Enterprise Number for Documentation Use" (RFC 5612).
> 
> [Med] This is better. Added a note to Section 4.6 as well. 
> 
> > 
> >                "start-time": "1957811234",
> > 
> > This value represents a time in 2032; should we be using something a
> > little more current?
> 
> [Med] No problem. Updated.  
> 
> > 
> > Section 7.3
> > 
> >    This request MUST be maintained active by the DOTS server until a
> >    delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear this
> >    pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry.
> > 
> > It seems like we might want to allow some provision for a server to clean
> > up state associated with a client that disappears entirely without
> > cleaning itself up.
> 
> [Med] this was a hidden behavior. Thanks for catching this. Updated as follows: 
> 
>    This request MUST be maintained in an active state by the DOTS server
>    until a delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear
>    this pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry or when the DOTS client is
>    considered inactive (e.g., Section 3.5 of [RFC8783]).
> 
>   For example, is the server allowed to discard state
> > when it reboots, or does this requirement extend to writing the state to
> > persistent storage?
> > 
> >       If more than one Uri-Query option is included in a request, these
> >       options are interpreted in the same way as when multiple target
> >       attributes are included in a message body.
> > 
> > I a little bit wonder if we could put a section reference here for
> > "interpreted in the same way", since the reader may not remember what that
> > way is, at least on the first reading.
> > 
> 
> [Med] Added a pointer to 4.4.1 of 9132 where there is some text about appending target values. 
> 
> >       parameters.  DOTS clients MUST NOT include a name in which the "*"
> >       character is included in a label other than the leftmost label.
> > 
> > Do we want to say what the server should do if it gets one anyway?
> > (It's not really clear that we need to say anything, strictly speaking.)
> > 
> 
> [Med] This is covered by:
> 
>    Requests with invalid query types (e.g., not supported, malformed)
>    received by the DOTS server MUST be rejected with a 4.00 (Bad
>    Request) response code.
> 
> >                "vendor-id": 1234,
> >                "attack-id": 77,
> >                "start-time": "1957818434",
> > 
> > [same as above]
> 
> [Med] OK
> 
> > 
> >    A DOTS client that is not interested to receive pre-or-ongoing-
> >    mitigation telemetry data for a target MUST send a delete request
> >    similar to the one depicted in Figure 37.
> > 
> > I'm not sure that this strictly needs to be a "MUST"; it seems like we
> > could say that such a client "sends a delete request" and leave it at
> > that.
> > 
> 
> [Med] OK 
> 
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> Thank you.
> 


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From: "Valery Smyslov" <valery@smyslov.net>
To: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Cc: <dots-chairs@ietf.org>, <draft-ietf-dots-multihoming@ietf.org>, <dots@ietf.org>
References: <002101d7be93$c890ed10$59b2c730$@smyslov.net> <059501d7ccc8$8ad61390$a0823ab0$@smyslov.net> <29138_1637054139_619376BB_29138_50_1_787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93303545258E@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <174101d7dd22$8f6cd5a0$ae4680e0$@gmail.com> <31854_1637676424_619CF588_31854_112_1_787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B933035457D44@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup> <7628_1638436311_61A88DD7_7628_373_4_787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93303545DB24@OPEXCAUBMA2.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup>
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Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 15:45:47 +0300
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Subject: Re: [Dots] WGLC for draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-07
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Hi Med,

thank you for addressing my concerns. 

Regards,
Valery.

> Hi Valery,
> 
> FWIW, the changes are now available online: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-dots-multihoming-
> 09
> 
> Cheers,
> Med


From nobody Tue Dec 28 07:08:47 2021
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Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 07:08:30 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: dots@ietf.org
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Subject: [Dots] [iesg-secretary@ietf.org: Last Call: <draft-ietf-bmwg-ngfw-performance-12.txt> (Benchmarking Methodology for Network Security Device Performance) to Informational RFC]
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Hi DOTS,

The BMWG has put out a spec for benchmarking the performance of
"next-generation network security devices including next-generation
firewalls (NGFW), next-generation intrusion prevention systems (NGIPS), and
unified threat management (UTM) implementations."  This testing might
include "anti-botnet" features, among other things.  Maybe the draft is of
interest to some of you; please send any comments to the last-call@ietf.org
list as usual.

-Ben

----- Forwarded message from The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org> -----

Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2021 09:37:46 -0800
From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: acm@research.att.com, bmwg-chairs@ietf.org, bmwg@ietf.org,
	draft-ietf-bmwg-ngfw-performance@ietf.org
Subject: Last Call: <draft-ietf-bmwg-ngfw-performance-12.txt> (Benchmarking
	Methodology for Network Security Device Performance) to Informational RFC


The IESG has received a request from the Benchmarking Methodology WG (bmwg)
to consider the following document: - 'Benchmarking Methodology for Network
Security Device Performance'
  <draft-ietf-bmwg-ngfw-performance-12.txt> as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-call@ietf.org mailing lists by 2021-12-29. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document provides benchmarking terminology and methodology for
   next-generation network security devices including next-generation
   firewalls (NGFW), next-generation intrusion prevention systems
   (NGIPS), and unified threat management (UTM) implementations.  The
   main areas covered in this document are test terminology, test
   configuration parameters, and benchmarking methodology for NGFW and
   NGIPS.  This document aims to improve the applicability,
   reproducibility, and transparency of benchmarks and to align the test
   methodology with today's increasingly complex layer 7 security
   centric network application use cases.  As a result, this document
   makes [RFC3511] obsolete.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bmwg-ngfw-performance/



No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.





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Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 07:40:33 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Cc: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry.all@ietf.org, dots@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20211228154033.GU11486@mit.edu>
References: <20211124224140.GH93060@kduck.mit.edu> <CAFpG3gfBSarzE7aPm6JM0h1LJHt=DwfKXnaRUGosU6_=VY150A@mail.gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Dots] AD review of draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-16
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Hi Tiru,

Thanks for these (and thanks Med as well for the additional follow-up; I
don't think I have any replies to that part).
A few comments inline...

On Tue, Nov 30, 2021 at 12:59:02PM +0530, tirumal reddy wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> Thanks for the detailed review. Please see inline for responses till
> Section 7.1.4.
> 
> On Thu, 25 Nov 2021 at 04:12, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> > Hi all,
> >
> > Sorry to have been working on this for so long -- some health issues
> > intervened, and it is perhaps easier to let onesself be interrupted if
> > there is no hope of finishing in a single sitting :-/
> >
> > [Note that I reviewed the -16 but the -17 is the current version, which
> > includes some editorial work I had sent in a PR.  It looks like that
> > will not have changed many things I comment on.]
> >
> > This review is pretty long (which I guess befits a long document).  We
> > probably want to chunk up replies to it so that the emails/threads stay
> > manageable.
> >
> > A couple meta-comments on the other reviews so far:
> >
> > - the shepherd writeup only answers one of the three questions in point
> >   (1).  It is likely that Murray will point this out in his ballot if
> >   not updated before then.
> >
> > - it's a little surprising that the yangdoctor didn't ask for encoded
> >   examples of the RESTCONF (data channel) functionality.  (For the
> >   sx:structure parts, I think we're already in good shape on examples.)
> > That
> >   said, I don't think our use of RESTCONF is particularly novel, and am
> > happy
> >   to proceed without such examples if desired.
> >
> > High-level remarks before going in to the detailed section-by-section
> > comments:
> >
> > I'm happy to see the note at the end of §4.5 that the data channel is
> > available to optimize the data that needs to be exchanged over the signal
> > channel during attack-time, in some sense reiterating the original split
> > between signal and data channels (but see my note in the inline comments
> > about the "MAY").  But this is already rather far into the design overview,
> > let alone the document overall!  I think it would be helpful to have a
> > paragraph or two in the toplevel §4 to get in front of how the telemetry
> > mechanisms integrate into the signal+data channels, perhaps something like:
> >
> > % The DOTS protocol suite is divided into two logical channels: the signal
> > % channel and data channel.  This division is due to the vastly different
> > % requirements placed upon the traffic they carry.  The signal channel must
> > % remain available and usable even in the face of attack traffic that
> > might,
> > % for example, saturate one direction of the links involved, rendering
> > % acknowledgment-based mechanisms unreliable and strongly incentivizing
> > % messages to be small enough to be contained in a single IP packet.  In
> > % contrast, the data channel is available for high-bandwidth data transfer
> > % before or after an attack, using more conventional transport protocol
> > % techniques.  It is generally preferable to perform advance configuration
> > % over the data channel, including configuring short aliases for static or
> > % nearly static data sets such as sets of network addresses/prefixes that
> > % might be subject to related attacks -- this helps to optimize the use of
> > % the signal channel for the small messages that truly require reliable
> > % delivery during an attack.
> > %
> > % Telemetry information has aspects that correspond to both operational
> > % modes: there is certainly a need to convey updated information about
> > % ongoing attack traffic and targets during an attack, so as to convey
> > % detailed information about mitigation status and inform updates to
> > % mitigation strategy in the face of adaptive attacks, but it is also
> > useful
> > % to provide mitigation services with a picture of normal or "baseline"
> > % traffic towards potential targets, to aid in detecting when incoming
> > % traffic deviates from normal into being an attack.  Likewise, one might
> > % populate a "database" of classifications of known types of attack so that
> > % a short alias can be used during attack time to describe an observed
> > % attack.  This specification does make provision for use of the data
> > % channel for the latter function, but otherwise retains most telemetry
> > % functionality in the signal channel.  This is partly out of necessity and
> > % partly out of expedience -- it is a functional requirement to convey
> > % information about ongoing attack traffic during an attack, and
> > information
> > % about baseline traffic uses an essentially identical datastructure that
> > is
> > % naturally defined to sit next to the description of attack traffic.  The
> > % related telemetry setup information used to parametrize actual traffic
> > % data is also sent over the signal channel, out of expediency. [I can't
> > % actually populate this part; maybe it's something about having the
> > % configuration values that define the percentile measurements be in-band
> > % with the percentile measurements themselves, and then a desire to not
> > % define two similar setup schemes over data+signal channels that justifies
> > % the other telemetry-config and pipe branches?]
> >
> 
> Proposed text looks good, we will add the above text to section 4.
> 
> 
> >
> > The use of the "list telemetry" in the telemetry-setup message confused me
> > for a while, since it seems like the client can only send a zero- or
> > one-element list to the server (based on the 'tsid' for that direction
> > being
> > part of the Uri-Path).  Can you confirm that the list structure was used
> > just for the server-to-client direction combined with maximizing
> > data-structure reuse?
> >
> > We should say somewhere that the examples use CBOR presentation format.
> > (This could be a note near the terminology section or accompanying each
> > example.)
> >
> > I think we should probably include a bit of a brief refresher on percentile
> > calculation, in addition to the reference to RFC 2330.  Right now we
> > basically just say that the peers negotiation parameter including
> > "percentile-related measurement parameters" which was not quite enough to
> > clue me in that 2330 was basically required reading to know what we
> > actually
> > do.  So this might look something like:
> >
> > % DOTS telemetry uses several percentile values to provide a picture of a
> > % traffic distribution overall, as opposed to just a single snapshot of
> > % observed traffic at a single point in time.  Modeling raw traffic flow
> > % data as a distribution and describing that distribution entails choosing
> > a
> > % measurement period that the distribution will describe, and a number of
> > % sampling intervals, or "buckets", within that measurement period.
> > Traffic
> > % within each bucket is treated as a single event (i.e., averaged), and
> > then
> > % the distribution of buckets is used to describe the distribution of
> > % traffic over the measurement period.  A distribution an be characterized
> > % by statistical measures such as mean, median, and standard deviation, and
> > % also by reporting the value of the distribution at various percentile
> > % levels of the data set in question, such as "quartiles" that correspond
> > to
> > % 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile.  More details about percentile values
> > and
> > % their computation are found in Section 11.3 of [RFC2330]; DOTS telemetry
> > % uses up to three percentile values, plus the overall peak, to
> > characterize
> > % traffic distributions.  Which percentile thresholds are used for these
> > % "low", "medium", and "high" percentile values is configurable (with
> > % suitable defaults).
> >
> 
> Looks good, we will update the draft.
> 
> 
> >
> >
> > It seems like we are setting up somewhat conflicting goals between the
> > overall desire for compact signal-channel messages and our guidance to
> > "include in any request to update information related to [a thing] the
> > information of other [like things] (already communicated using a lower
> > ['tsid'/'tmid'] value" that results in larger individual messages (albeit
> > fewer of them).  Do we want to make some statement about how this guidance
> > to coalesce can be ignored if needed to make individual signal-channel
> > messages fit in a single packet?  (Hmm, I guess we do have a note about
> > "assumes that all link information can fit in one single message" at
> > least for the 'tsid'/link case, but the text from that note only appears
> > once.)
> >
> > My editorial suggestions in
> > https://github.com/boucadair/draft-dots-telemetry/pull/9 included some
> > edits
> > relating to whether a given target is "susceptible to" vs "subject to" (or
> > even "actively being subjected to") different types of attacks.  Med has
> > diligently already merged that PR while I was sick, so I mostly assume that
> > these already got reviewed for correctness.  Still, I want to call out that
> > there is a difference and I was not always 100% sure that I picked the
> > right
> > one for each case.
> >
> > It looks like we have to use backslash continuation markers for several of
> > the CoAP request target resources in the examples; do we want to reference
> > RFC 8792 folding and use its specific note text about line wrapping?
> >
> > There are a few places where we say something like "the DOTS client MUST
> > auto-scale so that the appropriate unit is used".  (1) We don't
> > specifically
> > say what the goal of this automatic behavior is (I guess, use the "largest
> > unit" that gives a value greater than one?), and (2) it seems that we are
> > in
> > part relying on this behavior to ensure that the client only specifies one
> > measure in a given unit class.  That is, I didn't see anything else that
> > would prevent a client from sending (say) both Mbps and Gbps values, that
> > could of course be in conflict with each other -- if there's a potential
> > for
> > conflict we'd need to say how to resolve the conflict.
> >
> > Relatedly, there seems to *also* be potential for conflict in that we allow
> > both bit/second and Byte/second as unit-classes.  What is to happen if I
> > say
> > that something is both 2 bit/second and 2 Byte/second?

Med's follow-up implies that we are to just treat that as "invalid
parameters".  I'd prefer to be more explicit about that, e.g., with a
statement like "at most one of the bit/second and Byte/second unit-class
entries can be present; if such conflicting values are received the
combination is treated as specifying an illegal parameter and rejected with
4.00 (Bad Request)".

> > We have a lot of examples that use the same 'cuid' of
> > dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw, which is fine and representative of normal
> > operation.  Do we want to curate the 'tsid' and 'tmid' values used by that
> > client?  I see some reuse, which I think is not prohibited (at least for
> > 'tsid'), but may merit checking, and the values are not monotonically
> > increasing throughout the course of the document, which may or may not be
> > desirable.

Did you have any thoughts on this part?

> > (nit) we seem to have both "signalled" and "signaled" present, and
> > should standardize on our spelling.  (It looks like the one-'l' form is
> > more common in the RFC archive so far.)
> >
> > Section 1
> >
> >    Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have become more
> >    sophisticated.  [...]
> >
> > We might want to say something about the baseline for the comparison
> > ("more sophisticated compared to what?").
> >
> >        100 Mbps to 100s of Gbps or even Tbps.  Attacks are commonly
> >        carried out leveraging botnets and attack reflectors for
> >        amplification attacks such as NTP (Network Time Protocol), DNS
> >        (Domain Name System), SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol),
> >        or SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol).
> >
> > Is https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4732#section-3.1 still
> > current enough to make a useful reference for amplification attacks?
> >
> >                                           Nevertheless, when DOTS
> >    telemetry attributes are available to a DOTS agent, and absent any
> >    policy, it can signal the attributes in order to optimize the overall
> >    mitigation service provisioned using DOTS.
> >
> > I'm not sure what type of policy we have in mind, here.
> >
> > Section 2
> >
> >    The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].
> >
> > It looks like RFC 8612 doesn't define "idle time" and "attack time", so
> > we may want to pull in a couple more documents as required reading or
> > define
> > them ourselves.
> >
> 
> Sure, we will elaborate these terms with an example.
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 3.1
> >
> >    If the DOTS server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to
> >    facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adapts its protection
> >    strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately
> >    (automation enabled) for the sake of optimized attack mitigation
> >    decisions and actions.
> >
> > I'm not entirely sure I understand this part.  It seems to be talking
> > about telemetry between the DOTS server and the associated mitigation
> > resources, but the previous discussion has been about telemetry between
> > DOTS client and DOTS server (and I do not think the mitigation resources
> > associated with the DOTS server have been said to be DOTS clients in any
> > of the previous DOTS work).
> >
> > Section 3.2
> >
> >    DOTS telemetry can also be used to tune the DDoS mitigators with the
> >    correct state of an attack.  During the last few years, DDoS attack
> >
> > (nit) I don't think "with" is the right verb -- "tune with <X>" implies
> > that X is used as a tool to effectuate the tuning, but I think what's
> > going on here is more like using the telemetry data as an input for
> > determining what values to use for the tuning parameters available on
> > the mitigation resources.
> >
> 
> Fixed.
> 
> 
> >
> >    Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal
> >    traffic can be inaccurate at best.  This is especially true for
> >    recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]).
> >
> > RFC 8903 makes no mention of "recursive", "recursion", or any
> > hierarchical mitigation scenario (at least in my quick search).   Even
> > the linked draft version (-25) doesn't have a section 3.2.3.  I do
> > remember reading about this type of recursive or hierarchical scenario
> > somwhere, so I think we just need to locate the right reference to put
> > here...I'm just not sure what reference that is, offhand.
> >
> 
> Good catch, recursive signaling is discussed in RFC8811.

Ah, and that's where the section reference points to.  I probably should
have figured that out on my own, but thanks for fixing it regardless.

> >
> >    In addition, the highly diverse types of use cases where DOTS clients
> >    are integrated also emphasize the need for knowledge of each DOTS
> >    client domain behavior.  Consequently, common global thresholds for
> >    attack detection practically cannot be realized.  [...]
> >
> > (editorial?) When we say "the highly diverse types of use cases where
> > DOTS clients are integrated" that's essentially an unsupported claim,
> > but the way it's written we are presupposing that claim to be true
> > without directly stating it as an observation or assumption.  I think we
> > might be better served by starting off with a declarative statement like
> > "DOTS clients can be integrated in a highly diverse set of scenarios and
> > use cases", and then moving on from that now-explicit assumption/fact to
> > conclude that any single global threshold will mischaracterize the
> > traffic for some of those diverse DOTS clients.
> >
> > Section 4.3
> >
> >    DOTS clients can also use CoAP Block1 Option in a PUT request (see
> >    Section 2.5 of [RFC7959]) to initiate large transfers, but these
> >    Block1 transfers will fail if the inbound "pipe" is running full, so
> >    consideration needs to be made to try to fit this PUT into a single
> >    transfer, or to separate out the PUT into several discrete PUTs where
> >    each of them fits into a single packet.
> >
> > If I understand/recall correctly, the Block1 transfer is expected to
> > fail only in a statistical sense, since the client can't send more
> > blocks until it gets the positive reply from the server to continue to
> > the next block (on a block-by-block basis), and that reply from the
> > server is competing with the attack traffic for the inbound "pipe" and
> > likely to fail for at least one of the blocks.  I think we should
> > probably reword slightly to say only "expected to fail" or "likely
> > fail", since there is some small chance of success; we may also want to
> > give a brief reminder about why it is expected to fail (e.g., "the
> > transfer requires a message from the server for each block, which would
> > likely be lost in the incoming flood").
> >
> 
> Thanks, we will fix the text.
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 6
> >
> >    Telemetry setup configuration is bound to a DOTS client domain.  DOTS
> >    servers MUST NOT expect DOTS clients to send regular requests to
> >    refresh the telemetry setup configuration.  Any available telemetry
> >    setup configuration has a validity timeout of the DOTS association
> >    with a DOTS client domain.  [...]
> >
> > The term "DOTS association" does not seem to have been used previously
> > (in RFC 9132 we discuss the "DOTS session" heavily, though).  Also, I

Are we planning to keep the "DOTS association" phrasing?

> > don't remember any previous requirement to keep state on the server for
> > the duration of anything scoped to the entire client *domain*, just
> > individual DOTS sessions.  We do mention detecting conflicts/overlapping
> > requests within the scope of a client domain, in RFC 9132, but as far as
> > I can tell that only holds when all the DOTS sessions involved in the
> > conflict are still active.
> >
> > Perhaps related, this discussion (at least so far) is not clear to me
> > about what level of coordination/consistency is expected between clients
> > in the same domain.  I believe that stock DOTS works fine with no such
> > coordination amongst clients within a domain, so if we are introducing such
> > a requirement we should say prominently that it's a change.
> >
> 
> Yes, telemetry configuration is not specific to the client. For example,
> the pipe capacity is specific to the site.

So what happens if there are two clients in a site and they are reporting
different values for pipe-capacity?

I think I'm just generally unsure what the expected division of work is
between multiple clients in a domain, so my questions involve a lot of
speculating and I don't have a good suggestion for changes to the text yet.

> 
> >
> > Section 6.1.1
> >
> >    Upon receipt of such request, and assuming no error is encountered by
> >    processing the request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content)
> >    response that conveys the current and telemetry parameters acceptable
> >    by the DOTS server.  [...]
> >
> 
> NEW:
> 
> Upon receipt of such request, and assuming no error is encountered by
> 
> processing the request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content)
> 
> response that conveys the telemetry parameters acceptable by the DOTS
> server
> 
> and the current baseline information maintained by the DOTS server.
> 
> 
> >
> > (editorial) Something seems off, here (around "current and telemetry
> > parameters acceptable").  Is it returning current configuration, acceptable
> > parameter values, or some combination thereof?
> >
> >           |  |     +-- query-type*            query-type
> >
> > Since this is a leaf-list of supported query types, should the list name
> > include the word "supported" or similar?
> >
> > Section 6.1.2
> >
> >    The PUT request with a higher numeric 'tsid' value overrides the DOTS
> >    telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower
> >    numeric 'tsid' value.  To avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid'
> >    requests for requests carrying telemetry configuration data from a
> >    DOTS client, the lower numeric 'tsid' MUST be automatically deleted
> >    and no longer be available at the DOTS server.
> >
> > The way this is phrased with "the lower" and "higher" (vs "highest")
> > assumes
> > or implies that there is only one "lower" 'tsid' value, perhaps leaving
> > some
> > ambiguity if there is actually more than one.  We might make a statement
> > about how there is only at most one active 'tsid' per 'cuid'+'cdid' at a
> > time other than during a config change (if that's the intent), or
> > alternatively to qualify that the requirement to remove is only incurred in
> > the event of a conflict (as is done for other types of config, later).
> >
> 
> We can have multiple tsids for the same client for pipe/baseline
> information. This is why we have:
> 

Ok.  Should we say something like "when telemetry configuration data is
received that has overlapping scope with existing telemetry configuration,
the PUT request with higher numeric 'tsid' value [...]"?

The rest of this looks good; thanks again for all the updates.

-Ben

> 
>    DOTS clients SHOULD minimize the number of active 'tsid's used for
> 
>    baseline information.  In order to avoid maintaining a long list of
> 
>    'tsid's for baseline information, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients
> 
>    include in a request to update information related to a given target,
> 
>    the information of other targets (already communicated using a lower
> 
>    'tsid' value) (assuming this fits within one single datagram).  This
> 
>    update request will override these existing requests and hence
> 
>    optimize the number of 'tsid' requests per DOTS client.
> 
> 
> >
> >    o  If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include
> >       'cuid' or 'tsid' Uri-Path parameters, or contains one or more
> >       invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned
> >       in the response.
> >
> > Just to confirm: this does not rule out the ability to define new
> > parameters in the future (for example, the client might learn of new
> > ones in the response to a GET request)?
> >
> 
> Yes.
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 6.3
> >
> >       *  The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the
> >          target.
> >
> > Should we say anything about the requirement on the protocol in question
> > that "request" is a meaningful concept and observable by the mitigator
> > (analogous to what we have about "embryonic connections" earlier)?
> >
> 
> Okay, updated text to say: The maximum number of requests (e.g.,
> HTTP/DNS/SIP requests) allowed per second to the target.
> 
> 
> >
> >           |           +-- baseline* [id]
> >           |              +-- id
> >           |              |       uint32
> >           |              +-- target-prefix*
> >           |              |       inet:ip-prefix
> >
> > (nit) the formatting here is a bit surprising, to wrap the line between
> > leaf name and type.  But if that's what pyang gives, we probably don't
> > want to mess with it...
> >
> >           |              |  +-- partial-request-ps?          uint64
> >           |              |  +-- partial-request-client-ps?   uint64
> >
> > I wonder whether the limit on "partial requests" should really be a rate
> > ("per second") versus a point-in-time cap (i.e., "oustanding partial
> > requests").  It seems like a given request could in principle remain in
> > "partial" state for an extended period of time, and that having remaing
> > in such a state for a second should not justify the client being able to
> > produce more partial requests...but the current formulation as a rate seems
> > to do so.
> >
> 
> Good point, added partial requests pending per client.
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 6.3.1
> >
> >    Two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if there
> >    is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name.  Also,
> >    two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if the
> >    addresses associated with the FQDN, URI, or alias are overlapping
> >    with each other or with 'target-prefix'.
> >
> > There can be some subtlety here involving where the FQDN/URI/alias are
> > resolved into IP addresses from; we may want to say "from the perspective
> > of
> > the server", "as observed by the server", or similar.
> >
> 
> Fixed.
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 7
> >
> >    DOTS agents SHOULD bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data with
> >    mitigation requests relying upon the target attribute.  In
> >
> > (nit??) Is this "target attribute" a telemetry attribute, or something
> > else (an attack target?)?
> >
> 
> NEW:
> 
>    DOTS agents SHOULD bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data to
> 
>    mitigation requests relying upon the resources under attack.
> 
> 
> 
> >
> >    When generating telemetry data to send to a peer, the DOTS agent MUST
> >    auto-scale so that appropriate unit(s) are used.
> >
> > (editorial) This requirement is not terribly tightly connected to either
> > what comes after it in the text or what comes before it in the text.  We
> > might consider moving it (earlier, maybe?) and adding a bit more
> > transition phrasing about how the agent may send telemetry data many
> > times and in different situations, so the right unit to use will vary
> > over time.
> >
> 
> We will add an example like DDoS attack enhancing the attack volume
> from Gbps to Tbps to justify the need
> 
> for auto-scaling the units.
> 
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 7.1.1
> >
> >    If the target is subjected to bandwidth consuming attack, the
> >    attributes representing the percentile values of the 'attack-id'
> >    attack traffic are included.
> >
> >    If the target is subjected to resource consuming DDoS attacks, the
> >    same attributes defined for Section 7.1.4 are applicable for
> >    representing the attack.
> >
> > One of these just says "the attributes representing" and the other
> > references attributes defined in a specific section; can we use the same
> > formulation/phrasing to talk about the two cases?
> >
> >    This is an optional attribute.
> >
> > Er, which one is optional?  Just a few paragraphs earlier we said that
> > at least one attribute MUST be present (so as to be able to identify a
> > target).
> >
> 
> Added the following line:
> At least the 'target' attribute and another
> pre-or-ongoing-mitigation attribute MUST be present in the DOTS telemetry
> message.
> 
> Removed the line "This is an optional attribute"
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 7.1.2
> >
> >    The 'total-traffic' attribute (Figure 26) conveys the percentile
> >    values (including peak and current observed values) of total traffic
> >    observed during a DDoS attack.  [...]
> >
> > This attribute is under the "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation" hierarchy; is it
> > really right to only say "traffic observed during a DDoS attack" (i.e.,
> > implicitly excluding the "pre-attack" case)?
> >
> 
> Good catch, fixed.
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 7.1.3
> >
> >    The 'total-attack-traffic' attribute (Figure 27) conveys the total
> >    attack traffic identified by the DOTS client domain's DDoS Mitigation
> >    System (or DDoS Detector).  [...]
> >
> > (editorial?) "Identified by [the client domain]" seems to imply that
> > this is only used in telemetry reports from client to server, and not in
> > updates flowing the other direction.  Is that correct?
> >
> 
> Yes, telemetry is applicable in both directions and not specific to client
> to server only.
> 
> 
> >
> > Section 7.1.4
> >
> >                 +-- total-attack-connection
> >                 |  +-- low-percentile-l* [protocol]
> >                 |  |  +-- protocol              uint8
> >                 |  |  +-- connection?           yang:gauge64
> >                 |  |  +-- embryonic?            yang:gauge64
> >                 |  |  +-- connection-ps?        yang:gauge64
> >                 |  |  +-- request-ps?           yang:gauge64
> >                 |  |  +-- partial-request-ps?   yang:gauge64
> >
> > I think I'm confused about what semantics this is trying to represent.
> > The "low-percentile-l" seems like it should be providing aggregate
> > information about some particular snapshot of traffic that we have
> > determined to be representative of the "low percentile" level of attack
> > traffic.  That is, if we take the recorded attack traffic and divide it
> > into a bunch of bins on the time axis, we can order the respective bins
> > from "least noticable attack" to "worst attack", and we pick the fifth
> > percentile (or whatever is configured) bin to represent the
> > "low-percentile" bucket.  But now we're reporting a bunch of attributes
> > of that bin -- number of connections, embryonic connections, connections
> > per second, etc., even though the bins were ordered based on a single
> > "worst" metric (and I don't see us specify what metric we actually use
> > to do that ordering).  So even though this is the "low percentile" (e.g.,
> > fifth percentile) bin of attack traffic (i.e., probably not a very bad
> > attack), we can't say specifically that the reported total attack
> > connection count is fifth percentile and the embryonic connection count
> > is fifth percentile and the requests-per-second is also fifth
> > percentile.  Which makes me confused at why the list is structured this
> > way -- if we were just saying "for each of connection, embryonic, etc., bin
> > the samples over that metric and compute the low/med/high percentage values
> > for that single metric, and this list holds those resulting values", it
> > seems like a more natural structure to group things would be to have a list
> > of low/med/high for each of the attributes/metrics.
> >
> 
> Good point, we should have a list of low/med/high/peak/current for each of
> the connection attributes.
> 
> Cheers,
> -Tiru
> 
> 
> > Section 7.1.5
> >
> >    vendor-id:  Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number as
> >       registered with IANA [Enterprise-Numbers].  It is a four-byte
> >       integer value.
> >
> >    attack-id:  Unique identifier assigned for the attack.
> >
> > If the vendor-id is being used as a scoping value to let each vendor
> > assign attack-id values, then we should say so here, the first place we
> > really handle this part of the YANG tree.  Even if not, we should probably
> > say more about why we care what the vendor-id is, and we should also say
> > who
> > assigns the attack-id.  (Maybe it's scoped to the DOTS server; I don't know
> > yet at this point in the document!)
> >
> > Furthermore, the module structure where attack-id and vendor-id are
> > always required, but there is going to need to be the ability to assign
> > a new attack description at runtime, seems to force us to conflate
> > externally/statically assigned attack-ids and dynamically assigned ones
> > in the same number space.  Should we give any guidance to vendors about
> > how to allocate IDs in a way that will not produce collisions between
> > predistributed/fixed attack IDs and new ones created at runtime?  Or is the
> > thought that there will be no dynamic attack-ids since that just
> > corresponds
> > to the attack-description string and a generic description can be used if
> > there is not a better one available?
> >
> > Regardless, I think we should have more verbiage as to what the scope of
> > the
> > attack-id is -- what information is it supposed to indicate or replace?
> >
> >    start-time:  The time the attack started.  The attack's start time is
> >       expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time
> >
> > (nit) "in UTC time" and "Z" seem redundant (which does not necessarily
> > imply that we should only use one of them...).
> >
> >       (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC8949]).  The CBOR encoding is modified so
> >       that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.
> >
> > (nit) Maybe we should move the CBOR section reference to after we start
> > talking about CBOR encoding.  (And we should do the same for 'end-time',
> > if we do anything.)
> >
> >    top-talker:  A list of top talkers among attack sources.  The top
> >       talkers are represented using the 'source-prefix'.
> >
> > Is there a good reference or short description for the notion of
> > top-talkers?  I know it's a well-established term of art in many different
> > circles, but it's hard to be fully confident that all readers will be
> > familiar with it.
> >
> > Also, should we say anything about how the number of talkers to include
> > is determined?  (I assume it is best left to the discretion of the
> > sender, but we probably want to set a clear expectation that the list is
> > not all talkers or a complete list in any other way.)
> >
> >       'spoofed-status' indicates whether a top talker is a spoofed IP
> >       address (e.g., reflection attacks) or not.
> >
> > Is this something that can be unambiguously determined by all parties
> > that might be producing this telemetry data, or should we use a
> > tri-statae (for "unknown") rather than a boolean to represent it?
> >
> >    In order to optimize the size of telemetry data conveyed over the
> >    DOTS signal channel, DOTS agents MAY use the DOTS data channel
> >    [RFC8783] to exchange vendor specific attack mapping details (that
> >    is, {vendor identifier, attack identifier} ==> attack description).
> >    As such, DOTS agents do not have to convey systematically an attack
> >    description in their telemetry messages over the DOTS signal channel.
> >
> > It's a little surprising to me that this is only a MAY.  Does it make
> > sense as a SHOULD (expected to usually happen, but leaving open the
> > flexibility when an observed attack does not match a previously
> > characterized attack description)?
> >
> > Also, when reading this I assumed that the "attack description" being
> > mapped to could include things like the target port/protocol, whether it
> > was spoofed, etc.  But reading on to the ietf-dots-mapping module, it
> > seems that this is intended to just be the single "attack-description"
> > string.  If so, we might give some more indications of that, e.g., by
> > spelling it that way and having some prose about it being a "string", or
> > similar.
> >
> > Also^2, from here to the end of the section might benefit from being
> > split off into a dedicated subsection on using the data channel to
> > pre-populate vendor and attack description information
> >
> >    tables are at different revisions.  The DOTS client SHOULD transmit
> >    telemetry information using the vendor mapping(s) that it provided to
> >    the DOTS server and the DOTS server SHOULD use the vendor mappings(s)
> >    provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to peer
> >    DOTS agent.
> >
> > Having read a bit further on, I'm not actually sure where in the
> > protocol the client has provided vendor mappings to the server, and the
> > server provided vendor mappings to the client.  It *might* be the GET
> > and POST from/to dots-data/ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping, but we
> > don't really give a clear indication of that.  I think we should try to
> > be more precise about what we mean by "provided".
> > (editorial) would this then be "SHOULD use any vendor mapping(s)"
> > (s/the/any/)?
> >
> >      augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities:
> >        +--ro vendor-mapping-enabled?   boolean {dots-telemetry}?
> >
> > None of the other capabilities in this tree (as specified by RFC 8783)
> > include a name suffix like "-enabled".  Should this just be
> > "vendor-mapping"?
> >
> >            "vendor-id": 1234,
> >            "vendor-name": "mitigator-s",
> >            "last-updated": "1576856561",
> >            "attack-mapping": []
> >
> > [this last updated is from December 2019; we could probably pick
> > something more current if we wanted, but it doesn't really matter.]
> >
> >    The DOTS client reiterates the above procedure regularly (e.g., once
> >    a week) to update the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details.
> >
> > Do the udpates have to preserve any existing assignments?
> >
> >    If the DOTS client concludes that the DOTS server does not have any
> >    reference to the specific vendor attack mapping details, the DOTS
> >    client uses a POST request to install its vendor attack mapping
> >    details.  [...]
> >
> > This suggests that a client would not bother sending its own vendor
> > mapping if the server already has one, and at least to me further
> > implies that the client would use the sever-provided mapping for the
> > messages that the client generates.  This seems at odds with the earlier
> > guidance that the client should send using the vendor-mapping it
> > provided to the server, and the server should send using the
> > vendor-mapping it provided to the client.  Which one is it?
> >
> >    The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request
> >    using the status-line.  Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be
> >    returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the vendor
> >    attack mapping details.  If the request is missing a mandatory
> >    attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad
> >    Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the
> >    response.  [...]
> >
> > I think (but did not specifically check) that these specific status code
> > values are preexisting requirements of core RESTCONF (and HTTP), so we
> > may not need to write new "MUST" keywords.
> >
> >    If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the
> >    DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid'
> >    is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403
> >    Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied".  Upon
> >    receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Section 5.1
> >    of [RFC8783]).
> >
> > (nit) the analogous text in RFC 8783 itself refers only to "Section 5"
> > (not 5.1).
> >
> >    The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its vendor attack
> >    mapping details maintained by the DOTS server (e.g., add a new
> >    mapping).
> >
> > As above, is this really just an example behavior or a hard requirement
> > to preserve existing mappings?
> >
> > Section 7.2
> >
> >            "attack-detail": [
> >              {
> >                "vendor-id": 1234,
> >
> > The vendor-ID is supposed to be an IANA-assigned PEN, and 1234 is
> > assigned to Linkage Software Inc.  We have other options, like 32473,
> > "Example Enterprise Number for Documentation Use" (RFC 5612).
> >
> >                "start-time": "1957811234",
> >
> > This value represents a time in 2032; should we be using something a
> > little more current?
> >
> > Section 7.3
> >
> >    This request MUST be maintained active by the DOTS server until a
> >    delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear this
> >    pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry.
> >
> > It seems like we might want to allow some provision for a server to
> > clean up state associated with a client that disappears entirely without
> > cleaning itself up.  For example, is the server allowed to discard state
> > when it reboots, or does this requirement extend to writing the state to
> > persistent storage?
> >
> >       If more than one Uri-Query option is included in a request, these
> >       options are interpreted in the same way as when multiple target
> >       attributes are included in a message body.
> >
> > I a little bit wonder if we could put a section reference here for
> > "interpreted in the same way", since the reader may not remember what
> > that way is, at least on the first reading.
> >
> >       parameters.  DOTS clients MUST NOT include a name in which the "*"
> >       character is included in a label other than the leftmost label.
> >
> > Do we want to say what the server should do if it gets one anyway?
> > (It's not really clear that we need to say anything, strictly speaking.)
> >
> >                "vendor-id": 1234,
> >                "attack-id": 77,
> >                "start-time": "1957818434",
> >
> > [same as above]
> >
> >    A DOTS client that is not interested to receive pre-or-ongoing-
> >    mitigation telemetry data for a target MUST send a delete request
> >    similar to the one depicted in Figure 37.
> >
> > I'm not sure that this strictly needs to be a "MUST"; it seems like we
> > could say that such a client "sends a delete request" and leave it at
> > that.
> >
> > Section 8.1
> >
> >        +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
> >        [...]
> >           +-- top-talker
> >              +-- talker* [source-prefix]
> >              [...]
> >                 +-- total-attack-connection
> >                    +-- low-percentile-c
> >                    |  +-- connection?           yang:gauge64
> >
> > I'm kind of surprised that there is no 'protocol' leaf in this subtree;
> > it seems to usually appear in combination with these connection counts.
> >
> >           |  +-- peak-g?              yang:gauge64
> >           |  +-- current-g?              yang:gauge64
> > [...]
> >                 |  +-- peak-g?              yang:gauge64
> >                 |  +-- current-g?              yang:gauge64
> >
> > (nit) the indentation seems off for type of these two 'current-g's.
> >
> >    In order to signal telemetry data in a mitigation efficacy update, it
> >    is RECOMMENDED that the DOTS client has already established a DOTS
> >    telemetry setup session with the server in 'idle' time.
> >
> > If I understand correctly, it seems that at least part of the need for
> > having a preestablished telemetry session is that the mitigation
> > efficacy update is identified only by the 'mid', and so we cannot
> > specify a 'tmid' as part of such an efficacy update.  Thus, in order
> > for the server to associate the telemetry data in the efficacy update
> > with an ongoing telemetry status session, the 'tsid' must be associated
> > with the 'mid' that is the subject of the efficacy update.
> > If that is correct, then I think we should have some text here about how
> > the efficacy update does not/cannot include the 'tmid', and so is
> > associated with the 'mid' of the update.
> >
> > Section 8.2
> >
> >    As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include
> >    several countermeasure mechanisms.  The DOTS server signals the
> >    current operational status of relevant countermeasures.  A list of
> >    attacks detected by each countermeasure MAY also be included.  The
> >
> > I see how in stock DOTS signal channel, the server signals whether an
> > attack is fully/partially/not mitigated, but I don't see how the server
> > indicates the specific relevant countermeasures that were used.  Am I
> > just missing something there?  (Similarly, the list of attacks we
> > returned may or may not be at the granularity of "detected by each
> > countermeasure", depending on the ansewr to the previous part.)
> >
> > Also (editorial), I think we should be more clear about when we switch
> > from describing RFC 9132 behavior to to describing the new functionality
> > provided by this document.
> >
> >    Figure 46 shows an example of an asynchronous notification of attack
> >    mitigation status from the DOTS server.  This notification signals
> >
> > Is the "new stuff" in Figure 46 just the subtree under
> > :(server-to-client-only)?  The 'total-attack-traffic' leaf seems to be
> > the same content as in Figure 45, and maybe could be omitted?
> >
> >            "mitigation-start": "1507818434",
> >
> > (This date is from 2017; as above, we could use a more current one if we
> > want.)
> >
> >                "source-count": {
> >                  "peak-g": "10000"
> >
> > (Suspiciously round numbers like this are indications of fabricated data
> > ... which is totally reasonable for an example like this!  But if we
> > wanted to be "more realistic" we could use a less-round number.)
> >
> >    DOTS clients can filter out the asynchronous notifications from the
> >    DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET
> >    request.  A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters:
> >    'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn',
> >    'target-uri', 'alias-name', and 'c' (content) (Section 4.2.4).  The
> >
> > Up in §7.3 the analogous list also included 'mid'.  Is 'mid' appropriate
> > here (or is it implicitly already included by the base signal channel
> > mechanisms)?  Hmm, but maybe 'c' is also already allowed by the base
> > signal channel mechanism, so that theory is not great...
> >
> >    If the target query does not match the target of the enclosed 'mid'
> >    as maintained by the DOTS server, the latter MUST respond with a 4.04
> >    (Not Found) error Response Code.  The DOTS server MUST NOT add a new
> >    observe entry if this query overlaps with an existing one.
> >
> > How should the server respond if this query overlaps with an existing
> > one?
> >
> > Section 10.1
> >
> >    This module uses types defined in [RFC6991] and [RFC8345].
> >
> > Should we mention the data structure extension from RFC 8791 here, as
> > well?
> >
> >   typedef attack-severity {
> >     type enumeration {
> >       enum none {
> >         value 1;
> >         description
> >           "No effect on the DOTS client domain.";
> >
> > It seems like the closest analogue to our attack-serverity typedef in
> > RFC 7970 is in §3.12.2, "BusinessImpact Class". But the phrasing used in
> > RFC 7970 is slightly different than the descriptions we have here.
> > Do we want to tweak our phrasings and/or clarify in the typedef
> > description that we use a slightly modified formulation?  (Indeed, we do
> > not have an extension point, either, though 7970 does have an extension
> > mechanism.)  Also, a section reference within RFC 7970 might be helpful.
> >
> >       enum kilopacket-ps {
> >         value 4;
> >         description
> >           "Kilo packets per second (kpps).";
> >
> > We may get someone who asks if we are using 1000 or 1024 ("kibi"), but
> > I'm inclined to leave it alone for now.
> >
> >       leaf unit-status {
> >         type boolean;
> >         default true;
> >         description
> >           "Enable/disable the use of the measurement unit class.";
> >
> > Does the "default true" imply that even unit classes not present in
> > "list unit-config" are assumed to be supported by default?
> >
> >   grouping connection {
> >     description
> >       "A set of data nodes which represent the attack
> >        characteristics.";
> >     [...]
> >     leaf embryonic {
> >       type yang:gauge64;
> >       description
> >         "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to
> >          the target server.";
> >
> > It's a little interesting that this is the only leaf in the grouping
> > that we can't attach the word "attack" to the description of, but as far
> > as I can tell we shouldn't make any change here.
> > (I originally wrote a comment that we shouldn't use "attack" for any of
> > them, since we have analogous nodes in the total-connection-capacity
> > config entries, but those seem to not use this grouping.)
> >
> >     list talker {
> >       key "source-prefix";
> >       description
> >         "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
> >
> > My read of the YANG is that this is the description for "list talker",
> > but the content matches the description given for the "source-prefix" leaf
> > within the list.  Should the list itself have a different description?
> >
> >   grouping top-talker-aggregate {
> >   [...]
> >   grouping top-talker {
> >
> > The diff between these two is pretty small -- just the top-level
> > description and connection-all vs connection-protocol-all.  Is there any
> > value in introducing another grouping to hold the common elements?
> >
> >             container max-config-values {
> >               description
> >                 "Maximum acceptable configuration values.";
> >               uses telemetry-parameters;
> >
> > I guess the convenience of having the reusable grouping probably
> > outweighs the value of having YANG-level constraints that the 'max'
> > values are >= the 'min' values (which we can set for the
> > "telemetry-notify-interval" that is not part of "telemetry-parameters", but
> > can't set here because we use the grouping).
> >
> >               leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
> >                 type uint32 {
> >                   range "1 .. 3600";
> >
> > (Pedantically, this range would fit in a uint16, though maybe there is
> > some other reason to prefer the 32-bit type.)
> >
> >             case baseline {
> >               [...]
> >               list baseline {
> >                 [...]
> >                 leaf id {
> >                   type uint32;
> >                   must '. >= 1';
> >                   description
> >                     "An identifier that uniquely identifies a baseline
> >                      entry communicated by a DOTS client.";
> >
> > I a little bit wonder if we should have a little bit of prose up in §6.3
> > discussing the need for "id" and how it is used.
> >
> >               leaf tmid {
> >                 type uint32;
> >                 description
> >                   "An identifier to uniquely demux telemetry data sent
> >                    using the same message.";
> >
> > The description for "tsid" in the analogous setup was just "an
> > identifier for the DOTS telemetry setup data".  As far as I can tell,
> > the usage of the two is analogous, so shouldn't the descriptions be
> > analogous as well?  In particular, I am not sure that "uniquely demux" is
> > the only usage of this leaf, since in server-initiated telemetry messages,
> > this leaf might be needed to indicate which telemetry entry is being
> > described (right?).
> >
> >             leaf-list mid-list {
> >               type uint32;
> >               description
> >                 "Reference a list of associated mitigation requests.";
> >
> > Should we reference RFC 9132 somehow to indicate that the base signal
> > channel is how these "mid" values are assigned (and assigned meaning)?
> >
> > Section 10.2
> >
> >          description
> >            "Vendor ID is a security vendor's Enterprise Number.";
> >
> > Should we say something about "IANA-assigned" and/or link to the
> > corresponding registry?
> >
> > Section 11, 12.1
> >
> > A handful of the entries in the tables still have an
> > "ietf-dots-telemetry:" prefix, and I don't understand why only some of
> > the entries would need it but not others.
> >
> > In particular, there seems to be an entry for both "total-traffic" and
> > "ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic", and I don't understand how they are
> > different.  (I did not check if there are other "duplicate"s like that.)
> >
> > Section 11
> >
> >   | telemetry            | container   |TBA2  | 5 map         | Object |
> >
> > I see both a "list telemetry" and a "case telemetry" in the YANG module,
> > but I'm not sure which of them is supposed to correspond to the YANG
> > type "container".
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7950#section-7.9.2 does not
> > really give me the impression that there is an implicit container of
> > this name.
> >
> >   | baseline             | container   |TBA49 | 5 map         | Object |
> >
> > Similarly, I see a 'baseline' that's a list, as the only content of a
> > "case baseline" statement.
> >
> > Section 12.1
> >
> >    Note that 'lower-type' and 'upper-type' are also requested for
> >    assignment in the call-home I-D.  Both I-Ds should be sync'ed as
> >    depending the one that will make it first to the IANA.
> >
> > (I think we tweaked call-home already to account for the registration
> > requests being from different ranges between the two documents, but
> > mention it just in case I'm misremembering.)
> >
> > Section 12.3
> >
> >             URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-mapping
> >             Registrant Contact: The IESG.
> >             XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
> >
> > I wonder if this (module) name is perhaps somewhat more generic than the
> > functionality it provides.
> >
> > Section 13
> >
> > Should we mention the security considerations for the blockwise transfer
> > technologies?
> >
> > Looking through the YANG tree, the only thing that really sticks out as
> > potentially worth mentioning here is the server-originated-telemetry
> > option.  But even for that, I'm not sure that there's much to say.
> >
> >    The DOTS telemetry information includes DOTS client network topology,
> >    DOTS client domain pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline and
> >    connections capacity, and threat and mitigation information.  Such
> >    information is sensitive; it MUST be protected at rest by the DOTS
> >    server domain to prevent data leakage.
> >
> > I'd consider adding a sentence or two here noting that even though this
> > data is sensitive, sending it explicitly to the DOTS server does not
> > introduce any new significant considerations (other than the need for
> > protection at rest) because the DOTS server is already trusted to have
> > access to that kind of information by being in the position to mitigate
> > (and observe) attacks.
> >
> > Section 16.1
> >
> > A normative reference on draft-ietf-dots-signal-filter-control will
> > cause a document cluster, delaying publication until that document is
> > ready to be an RFC.  It's not clear to me that such a dependency is
> > needed in this case, since there is only one citation to that document
> > and it seems more descriptive than imposing a strong dependency.
> >
> > Similarly, we seem to cite RFC 7641 just as a statement of fact (clients
> > can use CoAP OBSERVE), which may not require it to be classified as a
> > normative reference.
> >
> > Section 16.2
> >
> > The current state of this document doesn't really include enough detail
> > about percentiles and their calculation to be implementable without
> > referring to RFC 2330, currently listed only as a normative reference.
> > I would prefer to add more text to this document rather than promote
> > 2330 to a normative refrence, though I think we would need more text
> > than I suggested above in order to achieve that effect.
> >
> > We say we assume familiarity with RFC 8612 at least for terminology,
> > which may indicate that it is best classified as a normative reference.
> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Ben
> >
> >


From nobody Tue Dec 28 07:52:16 2021
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Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 07:52:03 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Dots] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-18.txt
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On Mon, Dec 13, 2021 at 10:51:00AM +0000, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> Hi Ben, all,
> 
> This version integrates the AD review.
> 
> Please let us know if there are issues we didn't address. Thank you. 

Thanks, and sorry for not tending to my email more quickly.

You probably already saw the handful of replies I sent to the email thread
(and https://github.com/boucadair/draft-dots-telemetry/pull/10).

I do not think I saw a reply to this remark on Section 8.1:

===
   In order to signal telemetry data in a mitigation efficacy update, it
   is RECOMMENDED that the DOTS client has already established a DOTS
   telemetry setup session with the server in 'idle' time.

If I understand correctly, it seems that at least part of the need for
having a preestablished telemetry session is that the mitigation
efficacy update is identified only by the 'mid', and so we cannot
specify a 'tmid' as part of such an efficacy update.  Thus, in order
for the server to associate the telemetry data in the efficacy update
with an ongoing telemetry status session, the 'tsid' must be associated
with the 'mid' that is the subject of the efficacy update.
If that is correct, then I think we should have some text here about how
the efficacy update does not/cannot include the 'tmid', and so is
associated with the 'mid' of the update.
===

Of the things in the email chain, I am most interested in getting clarity
around:

- what to put in the "attack-id" field when we are sending an
  "attack-description" string for a not-previously-characterized attack (or
  make that field not mandatory at the YANG level).

- when a server updates its published attack mappings, if there's a
  requirement/expectation that already assigned attack-id values retain the
  same meaning.

Thanks again,

Ben

