Received: from mx11.bbn.com (mx11.bbn.com [128.33.0.80]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4SIWCja012917 for ; Thu, 28 May 2009 11:32:12 -0700 Received: from [128.89.254.152] (helo=dhcp192-1-118-109.bbn.com) by mx11.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1M9kLh-00051q-Dj; Thu, 28 May 2009 14:29:05 -0400 Message-ID: <4A1ED7F1.2040304@bbn.com> Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 14:29:05 -0400 From: Armando Caro User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (Macintosh/20090302) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> <4A1DD73F.50000@bbn.com> <4A1DF457.1060400@LeonixSolutions.com> <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0BCCDF0@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> In-Reply-To: <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0BCCDF0@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: "dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net" Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 18:32:13 -0000 Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) wrote: > ->Armando Caro wrote: > ->What about "transiently" disconnected nodes? Can we accept loss of > ->transmission for a fraction of a second? Or even a few seconds? > -> > > That is up to the acceptability of the end user. For example, I prefer the grainy ghost of analog TV to Digital TV with interrupted voice bits and pixilation during signal fades. > > ->If I stipulate a network that carries primarily voice traffic (albeit > ->as VoIP), then what does DTN bring me? I could argue that it adds a > ->degree of complexity that brings no gain. > > I would agree. > > ->I suppose that the gain is > ->that the network is distributed and has no central infrastructure > ->(although, to split hairs, that is an ah-hoc network, which not all DTN > ->need to be); I can see that that would be attractive to DARPA. > > A DTN can be an overlay on an Ad Hoc network or an overlay on a fixed fully connected network or an overlay on a predictive network like a deep space network or a combination. My personal view of a DTN to date is an application level store-and-forward gateway and/or potentially a secure content storage and distribution network. Until we get some type of scalable naming structure, I don't see this scaling very well. > I'm confused, because I don't remember writing the words above that you quoted me as saying. I did say the following paragraph: > ->> One important take-away from this work... the motivation of DTN is to > ->> support delay/disrupted scenarios and apps that can operate in that > ->> regime, but it is possible to implement a DTN stack that can also > ->deal with time-sensitive traffic. > One thing I see is that many non-technical or even technical, but uninformed/misinformed people think DTN is a magic box that you put in front of applications that require a connected network and it makes them work in a disconnected, store-and-forward, environment. I agree that there are many people who are uninformed about what exactly DTN is and how it works. > > I think we need to educate people that this is not the case. I agree. > However, I think that sometimes we don't in order to obtain/retain funding. It's always important to educate the customer funding a project, because otherwise the customer will have unrealistic expectations. I think (at least I would hope) that people involved in acquiring funding understand that it is critical to ensure that a customer maintains realistic expectations. Otherwise the end result will be a failure in the eyes of the customer, and that is detrimental to future funding prospects from that same customer. There is nothing dishonest about the claim that BBN's DTN stack is able to handle time-sensitive VoIP traffic. In Dec 2008, we demo'd this capability for small multihop wireless networks. The point we are trying to make in the WNaN program is that there should be a single network stack and it should include DTN functionality. The applications should specify whether or not their traffic should tolerate delays/disruptions. Then when disruptions occur, the "DTN functionality" is invoked only for the app traffic that is declared to be delay/disruption tolerant. Armando Received: from ndmsnpf02.ndc.nasa.gov (ndmsnpf02.ndc.nasa.gov [198.117.0.122]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4SCeN6W029125 for ; Thu, 28 May 2009 05:40:23 -0700 Received: from ndjsppt02.ndc.nasa.gov (ndjsppt02.ndc.nasa.gov [198.117.1.101]) by ndmsnpf02.ndc.nasa.gov (Postfix) with ESMTP id BD22479032; Thu, 28 May 2009 07:37:22 -0500 (CDT) Received: from ndjshub02.ndc.nasa.gov (ndjshub02.ndc.nasa.gov [198.117.4.161]) by ndjsppt02.ndc.nasa.gov (8.14.3/8.14.3) with ESMTP id n4SCbM8v031411; Thu, 28 May 2009 07:37:22 -0500 Received: from NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov ([198.117.4.170]) by ndjshub02.ndc.nasa.gov ([198.117.4.161]) with mapi; Thu, 28 May 2009 07:37:22 -0500 From: "Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" , Armando Caro Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 07:37:09 -0500 Thread-Topic: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice Thread-Index: AcnfOodAaS0lz27WTeu1NEyjIKvb4gAVPzjA Message-ID: <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0BCCDF0@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> <4A1DD73F.50000@bbn.com> <4A1DF457.1060400@LeonixSolutions.com> In-Reply-To: <4A1DF457.1060400@LeonixSolutions.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-cr-hashedpuzzle: BZgr D1gF KBSA MkNH MoE2 Nygh ONTL R//u Sko8 WDln WxkC Xp2i YJtI YVxj Zeit cJSu; 3; YQBjAGEAcgBvAEAAYgBiAG4ALgBjAG8AbQA7AGQAdABuAC0AcwBlAGMAdQByAGkAdAB5AEAAbQBhAGkAbABsAGkAcwB0AHMALgBpAG4AdABlAGwALQByAGUAcwBlAGEAcgBjAGgALgBuAGUAdAA7AGcAcgBhAGgAYQBtAEAAbABlAG8AbgBpAHgAcwBvAGwAdQB0AGkAbwBuAHMALgBjAG8AbQA=; Sosha1_v1; 7; {5CDA34FA-C139-400F-AB68-CC47061F0DA3}; dwBpAGwAbABpAGEAbQAuAGQALgBpAHYAYQBuAGMAaQBjAEAAbgBhAHMAYQAuAGcAbwB2AA==; Thu, 28 May 2009 12:37:09 GMT; UgBFADoAIABbAGQAdABuAC0AcwBlAGMAdQByAGkAdAB5AF0AIABOAGUAdwBiAGkAZQAgAHMAZQBlAGsAaQBuAGcAIABzAG8AbQBlACAAcwBlAGMAdQByAGkAdAB5ACAAcgBlAGwAYQB0AGUAZAAgAGEAZAB2AGkAYwBlAA== x-cr-puzzleid: {5CDA34FA-C139-400F-AB68-CC47061F0DA3} acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=1.12.7400:2.4.4, 1.2.40, 4.0.166 definitions=2009-05-28_07:2009-05-27, 2009-05-28, 2009-05-27 signatures=0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from quoted-printable to 8bit by maillists.intel-research.net id n4SCeN6W029125 Cc: "dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net" Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 12:40:26 -0000 ->Armando Caro wrote: ->What about "transiently" disconnected nodes? Can we accept loss of ->transmission for a fraction of a second? Or even a few seconds? -> That is up to the acceptability of the end user. For example, I prefer the grainy ghost of analog TV to Digital TV with interrupted voice bits and pixilation during signal fades. ->If I stipulate a network that carries primarily voice traffic (albeit ->as VoIP), then what does DTN bring me? I could argue that it adds a ->degree of complexity that brings no gain. I would agree. ->I suppose that the gain is ->that the network is distributed and has no central infrastructure ->(although, to split hairs, that is an ah-hoc network, which not all DTN ->need to be); I can see that that would be attractive to DARPA. A DTN can be an overlay on an Ad Hoc network or an overlay on a fixed fully connected network or an overlay on a predictive network like a deep space network or a combination. My personal view of a DTN to date is an application level store-and-forward gateway and/or potentially a secure content storage and distribution network. Until we get some type of scalable naming structure, I don't see this scaling very well. -> ->> ->> One important take-away from this work... the motivation of DTN is to ->> support delay/disrupted scenarios and apps that can operate in that ->> regime, but it is possible to implement a DTN stack that can also ->deal with time-sensitive traffic. ->> One thing I see is that many non-technical or even technical, but uninformed/misinformed people think DTN is a magic box that you put in front of applications that require a connected network and it makes them work in a disconnected, store-and-forward, environment. I think we need to educate people that this is not the case. However, I think that sometimes we don't in order to obtain/retain funding. Will Received: from sky.fastbighost.net (sky.fastbighost.net [76.76.22.153]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4S2KnDJ000743 for ; Wed, 27 May 2009 19:20:50 -0700 Received: from dyn98-b60-access.superdsl.com.sg ([202.73.60.98] helo=[192.9.200.103]) by sky.fastbighost.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1M9VBt-0000iV-Uc; Wed, 27 May 2009 22:17:58 -0400 Message-ID: <4A1DF457.1060400@LeonixSolutions.com> Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 10:17:59 +0800 From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (X11/20090409) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Armando Caro References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> <4A1DD73F.50000@bbn.com> In-Reply-To: <4A1DD73F.50000@bbn.com> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.7 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------000200020504010005080106" X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - sky.fastbighost.net X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - maillists.intel-research.net X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - LeonixSolutions.com X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: Cc: "dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net" Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 02:20:50 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------000200020504010005080106 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Armando Caro wrote: > Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) wrote: >> I believe DARPA is using DTN for voice networks but I believe the >> disruption is expected to be very quick fades and the like or perhaps >> that voice simply will not make sense at certain times. > > I believe you are referring to the work that BBN is doing for the > DARPA WNaN program. For this program, we run IP over DTN and use VoIP > without modifications to the VoIP application. We are using the BPA as > a forwarding engine that works in both connected and disconnected > scenarios. VoIP traffic (and other delay sensitive traffic) are only > routed/forwarded to destinations that are currently connected, since > VoIP doesn't make sense for disconnected destinations. If a node > receives VoIP traffic for a disconnected destination, the traffic is > dropped. What about "transiently" disconnected nodes? Can we accept loss of transmission for a fraction of a second? Or even a few seconds? If I stipulate a network that carries primarily voice traffic (albeit as VoIP), then what does DTN bring me? I could argue that it adds a degree of complexity that brings no gain. I suppose that the gain is that the network is distributed and has no central infrastructure (although, to split hairs, that is an ah-hoc network, which not all DTN need to be); I can see that that would be attractive to DARPA. > > One important take-away from this work... the motivation of DTN is to > support delay/disrupted scenarios and apps that can operate in that > regime, but it is possible to implement a DTN stack that can also deal > with time-sensitive traffic. > > Armando > Thanks very much for taking the time to reply. Graham -- Technical Director Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd 18 Boon Lay Way #09-95 TradeHub 21 Singapore 609966 Telephone:+65 6316 9968 Fax: +65 6316 9208 --------------000200020504010005080106 Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=utf-8; name="Graham.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Graham.vcf" begin:vcard fn:Graham Keellings n:Keellings;Graham org:Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd adr:TradeHub 21;;18 Boon Lay Way #09-95;;;609966;Singapore email;internet:Graham@LeonixSolutions.com title:Technical director tel;work:+65 6316 9968 tel;fax:+65 6316 9208 tel;cell:+65 9725 7353 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://leonixsolutions.com/ version:2.1 end:vcard --------------000200020504010005080106-- Received: from mx3.bbn.com (mx3.bbn.com [128.33.1.81]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4S0PVMA028077 for ; Wed, 27 May 2009 17:25:31 -0700 Received: from mproxy02.bbn.com ([192.1.122.24]) by mx3.bbn.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1M9TOP-0002Kl-BK; Wed, 27 May 2009 20:22:45 -0400 Received: from [173.48.210.200] (helo=Oteil) by mproxy02.bbn.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES128-SHA:128) (Exim 4.69 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from ) id 1M9TOP-000AGm-D8; Wed, 27 May 2009 20:22:45 -0400 From: "Jason Redi" To: "'Armando Caro'" , "'Ivancic, William D. \(GRC-RHN0\)'" References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> <4A1DD73F.50000@bbn.com> In-Reply-To: <4A1DD73F.50000@bbn.com> Date: Wed, 27 May 2009 20:22:35 -0400 Organization: BBN Technologies Message-ID: <023601c9df2a$694fd5b0$3bef8110$@com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 12.0 Thread-Index: AcnfKURXRvAJwX5wS8Kln/JWAG910gAAC6Rg Content-Language: en-us Cc: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list Reply-To: redi@bbn.com List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 00:25:31 -0000 Minor comment to Armando's email: > -----Original Message----- > From: dtn-security-bounces@maillists.intel-research.net [mailto:dtn- > security-bounces@maillists.intel-research.net] On Behalf Of Armando > Caro > Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2009 8:14 PM > To: Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) > Cc: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net > Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice > > Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) wrote: > > I believe DARPA is using DTN for voice networks but I believe the > disruption is expected to be very quick fades and the like or perhaps > that voice simply will not make sense at certain times. > > I believe you are referring to the work that BBN is doing for the DARPA > WNaN program. For this program, we run IP over DTN and use VoIP without > modifications to the VoIP application. We are using the BPA as a > forwarding engine that works in both connected and disconnected > scenarios. VoIP traffic (and other delay sensitive traffic) are only > routed/forwarded to destinations that are currently connected, since > VoIP doesn't make sense for disconnected destinations. If a node > receives VoIP traffic for a disconnected destination, the traffic is > dropped. As Armando describes, we are currently using streaming voice over BP. Individual packets contain 20-100ms of voice, so sending those individual buffers in an individual disrupted fashion would not make a whole lot of sense. Note that we are also working on providing voice-snippets of 1-10s that could be sent in a disrupted fashion over the network. But ultimately that's just data like any other bundle. The only real "work" there is in the application, not the BP. The key point is that voice can either be streaming as little snippets or buffered as a big blob. If it is a big blob, it's just another bundle. If it is streaming, then one needs to make sure you have a BPA/router that adds only a minimal amount of additional overhead to the forwarding process. (as Armando says below) > One important take-away from this work... the motivation of DTN is to > support delay/disrupted scenarios and apps that can operate in that > regime, but it is possible to implement a DTN stack that can also deal > with time-sensitive traffic. > > Armando > _______________________________________________ > dtn-security mailing list > dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net > http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security Received: from mx3.bbn.com (mx3.bbn.com [128.33.1.81]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4S0Gfhh027661 for ; Wed, 27 May 2009 17:16:41 -0700 Received: from lion.bbn.com ([128.89.80.73]) by mx3.bbn.com with esmtp (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1M9TFp-0002Bg-Bt; Wed, 27 May 2009 20:13:53 -0400 Message-ID: <4A1DD73F.50000@bbn.com> Date: Wed, 27 May 2009 20:13:51 -0400 From: Armando Caro User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (X11/20090318) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> In-Reply-To: <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: "dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net" Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 28 May 2009 00:16:42 -0000 Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0) wrote: > I believe DARPA is using DTN for voice networks but I believe the disruption is expected to be very quick fades and the like or perhaps that voice simply will not make sense at certain times. I believe you are referring to the work that BBN is doing for the DARPA WNaN program. For this program, we run IP over DTN and use VoIP without modifications to the VoIP application. We are using the BPA as a forwarding engine that works in both connected and disconnected scenarios. VoIP traffic (and other delay sensitive traffic) are only routed/forwarded to destinations that are currently connected, since VoIP doesn't make sense for disconnected destinations. If a node receives VoIP traffic for a disconnected destination, the traffic is dropped. One important take-away from this work... the motivation of DTN is to support delay/disrupted scenarios and apps that can operate in that regime, but it is possible to implement a DTN stack that can also deal with time-sensitive traffic. Armando Received: from mail-qy0-f129.google.com (mail-qy0-f129.google.com [209.85.221.129]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4MNWR9U025533 for ; Fri, 22 May 2009 16:32:27 -0700 Received: by qyk35 with SMTP id 35so4928455qyk.6 for ; Fri, 22 May 2009 16:32:03 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.224.67.132 with SMTP id r4mr4516889qai.286.1243035123009; Fri, 22 May 2009 16:32:03 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <4A1601EC.2090406@LeonixSolutions.com> References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> <4A1601EC.2090406@LeonixSolutions.com> Date: Fri, 22 May 2009 16:32:02 -0700 Message-ID: From: Kristian Erik Hermansen To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 May 2009 23:32:27 -0000 On Thu, May 21, 2009 at 6:37 PM, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd) wrote: > Thanks again for the feedback, Kristian. Bottom line - do I really have to > worry about it? That is up to you to make the determination ;) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_authentication_code -- Kristian Erik Hermansen Received: from ndjsnpf01.ndc.nasa.gov (ndjsnpf01.ndc.nasa.gov [198.117.1.121]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4JBheYt021639 for ; Tue, 19 May 2009 04:43:40 -0700 Received: from ndjsppt03.ndc.nasa.gov (ndjsppt03.ndc.nasa.gov [198.117.1.102]) by ndjsnpf01.ndc.nasa.gov (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58639328066; Tue, 19 May 2009 06:38:42 -0500 (CDT) Received: from ndjshub02.ndc.nasa.gov (ndjshub02.ndc.nasa.gov [198.117.4.161]) by ndjsppt03.ndc.nasa.gov (8.14.3/8.14.3) with ESMTP id n4JBcgHb010273; Tue, 19 May 2009 06:38:42 -0500 Received: from NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov ([198.117.4.170]) by ndjshub02.ndc.nasa.gov ([198.117.4.161]) with mapi; Tue, 19 May 2009 06:38:42 -0500 From: "Ivancic, William D. (GRC-RHN0)" To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" , "dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net" Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 06:38:35 -0500 Thread-Topic: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice Thread-Index: AcnYKlZz1J/O3UaeR7CxsgjOsmDpZQAS4yqw Message-ID: <3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196@NDJSSCC03.ndc.nasa.gov> References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> In-Reply-To: <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: acceptlanguage: en-US Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196NDJSSCC03ndcn_" MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=1.12.7400:2.4.4, 1.2.40, 4.0.166 definitions=2009-05-19_05:2009-05-19, 2009-05-19, 2009-05-19 signatures=0 Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 11:43:41 -0000 --_000_3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196NDJSSCC03ndcn_ Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable From: dtn-security-bounces@maillists.intel-research.net [mailto:dtn-securit= y-bounces@maillists.intel-research.net] On Behalf Of Graham Keellings (Leon= ix Solutions Pte Ltd) Sent: Monday, May 18, 2009 10:29 PM To: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net Subject: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice Someone recently asked me to look into a secure, ad-hoc, DTN network. It is= likely to be a voice network, probably with SMS and possibly also some vid= eo. If this is a voice Network, is this really a DTN or is it a Disconnected Ad= Hoc network? In other words, how much disruption and disconnection do you= have on a per node basis? I believe DARPA is using DTN for voice networks= but I believe the disruption is expected to be very quick fades and the li= ke or perhaps that voice simply will not make sense at certain times. /Will --_000_3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196NDJSSCC03ndcn_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

From: dtn-security-bounces@maillists.intel-research.net [mailto:dtn-security-bounces@maillists.intel-research.net] On Behalf Of = Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)
Sent: Monday, May 18, 2009 10:29 PM
To: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net
Subject: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice<= o:p>

 

Someone recently asked me to look into a se=
cure, ad-hoc, DTN network. It is likely to be a voice network, probably wit=
h SMS and possibly also some video.
 <=
/span>
If this is a voice Network, is this really a DTN or is it a Disconnected A=
d Hoc network?  In other words, how much disruption and disconnection =
do you have on a per node basis?  I believe DARPA is using DTN for voi=
ce networks but I believe the disruption is expected to be very quick fades=
 and the like or perhaps that voice simply will not make sense at certain t=
imes.
 
 
/Will
--_000_3A5AA67A8B120B48825BFFCF5443856137E0B06196NDJSSCC03ndcn_-- Received: from mail.newbay.com (87-198-172-198.ptr.magnet.ie [87.198.172.198]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4J8eUq6012992 for ; Tue, 19 May 2009 01:40:30 -0700 Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mail.newbay.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3261A1003F4BB; Tue, 19 May 2009 09:35:35 +0100 (IST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at newbay.com Received: from mail.newbay.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.newbay.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id sVCW4kVGvtpB; Tue, 19 May 2009 09:35:34 +0100 (IST) Received: from [192.168.3.55] (unknown [192.168.3.55]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.newbay.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B59BC1003F4AD; Tue, 19 May 2009 09:35:32 +0100 (IST) Message-ID: <4A127006.4020108@cs.tcd.ie> Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 09:38:30 +0100 From: Stephen Farrell User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (X11/20090302) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> In-Reply-To: <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 08:40:31 -0000 Hi Graham, I guess the 1st question I'd ask is what it is you want to secure, the identity of a next (dtn-)hop peer or the bundle headers and payload? If the former, then it seems like you want some security from your convergence layer, or the BSP's hop-by-hop authentication scheme. If the latter then probably (some variant of) the BSP end-to-end spec. The usual way to figure out which you want is to think about what bad thing(s) you want to prevent, i.e. your threat model, and only after you know that start to figure out what security mechanisms to use. Either way, if you find a use for TESLA that'd be interesting. Your MAC v. hash question doesn't make sense - neither is "more" secure since they do different things. I'd recommend maybe reading a bit more about, e.g. HMAC. (e.g. rfc 2104) You should also check out Pete Lovell's BSP code which is integrated into the DTN2 codebase. Regards, Stephen. Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd) wrote: > Someone recently asked me to look into a secure, ad-hoc, DTN network. It is likely to be a voice network, probably with SMS and possibly also some video. > > There are not many resources available for the project, so it has been suggested to take a phased approach. With a few decades of telcoms, protocol stack, experience, but no DTN experience and not much idea of comms security beyond Kasumi F8 and F9 (cyphering and integrity (MAC), both usually done in hardware), I wonder if anyone would care to comment on this proposed roadmap (for which many thanks in advance...) > > * for the initial phase,just add MAC with secret key to the reference DTN > implementation at link establish and acknowledgement (*) and hand that > over to the cryptography guy to see if he can infiltrate, > subvert, eavesdrop or deny service at the network level. > > * since the project is mainly voice based we should scale up the > number of nodes at some point and see just how delay tolerant > voice is (not a security concern). > > * consider encrypting data as well as securing it with MAC, since > MAC secured data is broadcast in the clear (maybe of less concern > for voice?) > > * for all variants, run some profiling, to see how much timing > impact they are having and attempt again to break the security. > > * consider public key encryption. The drawback is the need for a key > distribution service, which is a very weak link. > > * consider TESLA for key distribution (although it cannot revoke the > secret key at will if a node is compromised, only at a pre-set > time in the future) > > * whether secret key of public key, we should give some > consideration to how we can secure the network if a handset is > lost, stolen, left in the coffee-shop, etc. > > * look again at DTLSR/OLSR. It may be very efficient, but it is also > power hungry as there is constant background traffic to keep the > network updated. If the projected end device is battery powered, > we ought to look at alternative link establishment mechanisms and > compare their impact (profiling/timing/traffic load) and security (not a security concern). > > The main point to me is that they are proposing to authenticate only at link establishment and acknowledgement thereof(*), and not also as each bundle is transferred. I suppose they theory is that once you have verified a node then there is no need to further verify all subsequent traffic to/from that node, which cuts down on the system overhead of security. But, what do the gurus think? > > * is security only at link establish really safe? > * should data also be encrypted > * how secure is MAC? One person is claiming that it is not good > enough and needs to supplemented by hashing which sounds strange > to me since I thought that MAC _is_ strong one-way hashing. > * any recommendations for a fast, secure, open source MAC code? Or > should I just pull something from source-forge? > * any ideas on key distribution without a central server? Or, > perhaps I can say that the "handsets" (or whatever) will be given > out at the start of every business day from a secure location > which could contain a key distribution server, and returned there > each night. However, if a handset is lost or compromised during > the day I would like a way to revoke it. > > Since each handset/node would have to have the public keys of all > other nodes loaded to it a the start of the day and would not be > able to query the server during the day, is there any easy way to > determine a reasonable number of nodes for such a network (or is > it just a matter of how much RAM each node has)? > * are there any other recommendations for security? > * Are there any existing open source implementation of a 'secure' > version of DTN2? > > Sorry to ask so many questions. I am doing as much research as I can, > although am somewhat hindered by lack of resources, so thought that I > might ask the experts. > > Sorry to trouble the list so(*) and thanks in advance for any reply. > > With best wishes, > > Graham > > (*) since I _have_ troubled the list, I will be cheeky and ask if anyone > knows exactly where in the code the link establish and acknowledgement > are sent/received. I am ploughing my way through the DoxyGen, but if > anyone can save me some trouble, I would be grateful. Thnaks > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > dtn-security mailing list > dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net > http://maillists.intel-research.net/mailman/listinfo/dtn-security Received: from sky.fastbighost.net (sky.fastbighost.net [76.76.22.153]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4J36FVE030360 for ; Mon, 18 May 2009 20:06:15 -0700 Received: from dyn98-b60-access.superdsl.com.sg ([202.73.60.98] helo=[192.9.200.135]) by sky.fastbighost.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1M6FZz-0005EE-JX; Mon, 18 May 2009 23:01:24 -0400 Message-ID: <4A122106.9060307@LeonixSolutions.com> Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 11:01:26 +0800 From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (X11/20090409) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Kristian Erik Hermansen References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> In-Reply-To: X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.7 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------010406090306070403050906" X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - sky.fastbighost.net X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - maillists.intel-research.net X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - LeonixSolutions.com X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: Cc: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 03:06:16 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------010406090306070403050906 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------000604000904080101090702" --------------000604000904080101090702 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Kristian Erik Hermansen wrote: > Hello Graham, > > On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 7:28 PM, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions > Pte Ltd) wrote: > >> how secure is MAC? One person is claiming that it is not good enough and >> needs to supplemented by hashing which sounds strange to me since I thought >> that MAC _is_ strong one-way hashing. >> > > MAC will not be secure from tampering without hashing in cases such as > chosen plaintext attacks. Thanks very much, Kristian. In that case, I wonder why MAC used!? Can you point me to something that explains how MAC + hashing works? Do I now need two secret keys? > You should join us via IRC in #noisebridge > on freenode.net ;-) > I shall. I need to get up to speed on this, but it's a personal favour to someone and I can't spare too much time to work on it. I'll see you on IRC. -- Technical Director Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd 18 Boon Lay Way #09-95 TradeHub 21 Singapore 609966 Telephone:+65 6316 9968 Fax: +65 6316 9208 --------------000604000904080101090702 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Kristian Erik Hermansen wrote: 
Hello Graham,

On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 7:28 PM, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions
Pte Ltd) <Graham@leonixsolutions.com> wrote:
  
how secure is MAC? One person is claiming that it is not good enough and
needs to supplemented by hashing which sounds strange to me since I thought
that MAC _is_ strong one-way hashing.
    

MAC will not be secure from tampering without hashing in cases such as
chosen plaintext attacks.
Thanks very much, Kristian. In that case, I wonder why MAC used!?

Can you point me to something that explains how MAC + hashing works? Do I now need two secret keys?


You should join us via IRC in #noisebridge
on freenode.net ;-)
I shall. I need to get up to speed on this, but it's a personal favour to someone and I can't spare too much time to work on it.  I'll see you on IRC.




-- 
Technical Director
Leonix Solutions (Pte) Ltd
18 Boon Lay Way
#09-95 TradeHub 21
Singapore 609966
Telephone:+65 6316 9968
Fax: +65 6316 9208
--------------000604000904080101090702-- --------------010406090306070403050906 Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=utf-8; name="Graham.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="Graham.vcf" begin:vcard fn:Graham Keellings n:Keellings;Graham org:Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd adr:TradeHub 21;;18 Boon Lay Way #09-95;;;609966;Singapore email;internet:Graham@LeonixSolutions.com title:Technical director tel;work:+65 6316 9968 tel;fax:+65 6316 9208 tel;cell:+65 9725 7353 x-mozilla-html:FALSE url:http://leonixsolutions.com/ version:2.1 end:vcard --------------010406090306070403050906-- Received: from yw-out-1718.google.com (yw-out-1718.google.com [74.125.46.153]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4J2ovvH029647 for ; Mon, 18 May 2009 19:50:57 -0700 Received: by yw-out-1718.google.com with SMTP id 9so1870523ywk.34 for ; Mon, 18 May 2009 19:46:09 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.150.211.7 with SMTP id j7mr13934283ybg.263.1242701167901; Mon, 18 May 2009 19:46:07 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> Date: Mon, 18 May 2009 19:46:07 -0700 Message-ID: From: Kristian Erik Hermansen To: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net Subject: Re: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 02:50:58 -0000 Hello Graham, On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 7:28 PM, Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd) wrote: > how secure is MAC? One person is claiming that it is not good enough and > needs to supplemented by hashing which sounds strange to me since I thought > that MAC _is_ strong one-way hashing. MAC will not be secure from tampering without hashing in cases such as chosen plaintext attacks. You should join us via IRC in #noisebridge on freenode.net ;-) -- Kristian Erik Hermansen Received: from sky.fastbighost.net (sky.fastbighost.net [76.76.22.153]) by maillists.intel-research.net (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id n4J2XSXg028856 for ; Mon, 18 May 2009 19:33:28 -0700 Received: from dyn98-b60-access.superdsl.com.sg ([202.73.60.98] helo=[192.9.200.135]) by sky.fastbighost.net with esmtpa (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1M6F4H-0007HM-Q2; Mon, 18 May 2009 22:28:38 -0400 Message-ID: <4A12195A.6000207@LeonixSolutions.com> Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 10:28:42 +0800 From: "Graham Keellings (Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd)" Organization: Leonix Solutions Pte Ltd User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (X11/20090409) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net References: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> In-Reply-To: <89E48AE60E64EF4E8EB32B0B7EC74920A1B0F5@EVS-EC1-NODE2.surrey.ac.uk> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.95.7 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------010606030604040703010808" X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - sky.fastbighost.net X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - maillists.intel-research.net X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [47 12] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - LeonixSolutions.com X-Source: X-Source-Args: X-Source-Dir: Subject: [dtn-security] Newbie seeking some security related advice X-BeenThere: dtn-security@maillists.intel-research.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: DTN Security Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 19 May 2009 02:33:29 -0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------010606030604040703010808 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------060609020508060002080508" --------------060609020508060002080508 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Someone recently asked me to look into a secure, ad-hoc, DTN network. It is likely to be a voice network, probably with SMS and possibly also some video. There are not many resources available for the project, so it has been suggested to take a phased approach. With a few decades of telcoms, protocol stack, experience, but no DTN experience and not much idea of comms security beyond Kasumi F8 and F9 (cyphering and integrity (MAC), both usually done in hardware), I wonder if anyone would care to comment on this proposed roadmap (for which many thanks in advance...) * for the initial phase,just add MAC with secret key to the reference DTN implementation at link establish and acknowledgement (*) and hand that over to the cryptography guy to see if he can infiltrate, subvert, eavesdrop or deny service at the network level. * since the project is mainly voice based we should scale up the number of nodes at some point and see just how delay tolerant voice is (not a security concern). * consider encrypting data as well as securing it with MAC, since MAC secured data is broadcast in the clear (maybe of less concern for voice?) * for all variants, run some profiling, to see how much timing impact they are having and attempt again to break the security. * consider public key encryption. The drawback is the need for a key distribution service, which is a very weak link. * consider TESLA for key distribution (although it cannot revoke the secret key at will if a node is compromised, only at a pre-set time in the future) * whether secret key of public key, we should give some consideration to how we can secure the network if a handset is lost, stolen, left in the coffee-shop, etc. * look again at DTLSR/OLSR. It may be very efficient, but it is also power hungry as there is constant background traffic to keep the network updated. If the projected end device is battery powered, we ought to look at alternative link establishment mechanisms and compare their impact (profiling/timing/traffic load) and security (not a security concern). The main point to me is that they are proposing to authenticate only at link establishment and acknowledgement thereof(*), and not also as each bundle is transferred. I suppose they theory is that once you have verified a node then there is no need to further verify all subsequent traffic to/from that node, which cuts down on the system overhead of security. But, what do the gurus think? * is security only at link establish really safe? * should data also be encrypted * how secure is MAC? One person is claiming that it is not good enough and needs to supplemented by hashing which sounds strange to me since I thought that MAC _is_ strong one-way hashing. * any recommendations for a fast, secure, open source MAC code? Or should I just pull something from source-forge? * any ideas on key distribution without a central server? Or, perhaps I can say that the "handsets" (or whatever) will be given out at the start of every business day from a secure location which could contain a key distribution server, and returned there each night. However, if a handset is lost or compromised during the day I would like a way to revoke it. Since each handset/node would have to have the public keys of all other nodes loaded to it a the start of the day and would not be able to query the server during the day, is there any easy way to determine a reasonable number of nodes for such a network (or is it just a matter of how much RAM each node has)? * are there any other recommendations for security? * Are there any existing open source implementation of a 'secure' version of DTN2? Sorry to ask so many questions. I am doing as much research as I can, although am somewhat hindered by lack of resources, so thought that I might ask the experts. Sorry to trouble the list so(*) and thanks in advance for any reply. With best wishes, Graham (*) since I _have_ troubled the list, I will be cheeky and ask if anyone knows exactly where in the code the link establish and acknowledgement are sent/received. I am ploughing my way through the DoxyGen, but if anyone can save me some trouble, I would be grateful. Thnaks --------------060609020508060002080508 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit 
Someone recently asked me to look into a secure, ad-hoc, DTN network. It is likely to be a voice network, probably with SMS and possibly also some video.

There are not many resources available for the project, so it has been suggested to take a phased approach. With a few decades of telcoms, protocol stack, experience, but no DTN experience and not much idea of comms security beyond Kasumi F8 and F9 (cyphering and integrity (MAC), both usually done in hardware), I wonder if anyone would care to comment on this proposed roadmap (for which many thanks in advance...)

    * for the initial phase,just add MAC with secret key to the reference DTN
      implementation at link establish and acknowledgement (*) and hand that
      over to the cryptography guy to see if he can infiltrate,
      subvert, eavesdrop or deny service at the network level.

    * since the project is mainly voice based we should scale up the
      number of nodes at some point and see just how delay tolerant
      voice is (not a security concern).

    * consider encrypting data as well as securing it with MAC, since
      MAC secured data is broadcast in the clear (maybe of less concern
      for voice?)

    * for all variants, run some profiling, to see how much timing
      impact they are having and attempt again to break the security.

    * consider public key encryption. The drawback is the need for a key
      distribution service, which is a very weak link.

    * consider TESLA for key distribution (although it cannot revoke the
      secret key at will if a node is compromised, only at a pre-set
      time in the future)

    * whether secret key of public key, we should give some
      consideration to how we can secure the network if a handset is
      lost, stolen, left in the coffee-shop, etc.

    * look again at DTLSR/OLSR. It may be very efficient, but it is also
      power hungry as there is constant background traffic to keep the
      network  updated. If the projected end device is battery powered,
      we ought  to look at alternative link establishment mechanisms and
      compare their impact (profiling/timing/traffic load) and security (not a security concern).

The main point to me is that they are proposing to authenticate only at link establishment and acknowledgement thereof(*), and not also as each bundle is transferred. I suppose they theory is that once you have verified a node then there is no need to further verify all subsequent traffic to/from that node, which cuts down on the system overhead of security. But, what do the gurus think?
  • is security only at link establish really safe?
  • should data also be encrypted
  • how secure is MAC? One person is claiming that it is not good enough and needs to supplemented by hashing which sounds strange to me since I thought that MAC _is_ strong one-way hashing.
  • any recommendations for a fast, secure, open source MAC code? Or should I just pull something from source-forge?
  • any ideas on key distribution without a central server? Or, perhaps I can say that the "handsets" (or whatever) will be given out at the start of every business day from a secure location which could contain a key distribution server, and returned there each night. However, if a handset is lost or compromised during the day I would like a way to revoke it.

    Since each handset/node would have to have the public keys of all other nodes loaded to it a the start of the day and would not be able to query the server during the day, is there any easy way to determine a reasonable number of nodes for such a network (or is it just a matter of how much RAM each node has)?
  • are there any other recommendations for security?
  • Are there any existing open source implementation of a 'secure' version of DTN2?
Sorry to ask so many questions. I am doing as much research as I can, although am somewhat hindered by lack of resources, so thought that I might ask the experts.

Sorry to trouble the list so(*) and thanks in advance for any reply.

With best wishes,

Graham

(*) since I _have_ troubled the list, I will be cheeky and ask if anyone knows exactly where in the code the link establish and acknowledgement are sent/received. I am ploughing my way through the DoxyGen, but if anyone can save me some trouble, I would be grateful.  Thnaks

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