Subject: RE: [eap] RE: Some ideas for keying framework

From: "Lortz, Victor" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 09:24:25 -0700

We think that data after the NULL in the Identity-Request should be considered as a hint.  It can be useful in guiding the network discovery and authentication process, but it should be treated similarly to the SSID in beacon broadcasts:  subject to modification and spoofing.  One could conceivably try to secure the data, but we feel the costs of doing so would outweigh the benefits.  The network discovery hint can be useful to help the EAP peer decide whether or not to try connecting to the network and to help it formulate a suitable NAI for that network (presuming that the peer might need to select a particular identity to use and/or include some NAI decoration for directing the routing of the AAA messages).  More complex network discovery or client provisioning functions should be accomplished through other methods with more robust security properties.

Regards,
Vic

-----Original Message-----
From: [email-masked] [mailto:[email-masked]]
Sent: Friday, August 15, 2003 5:41 AM
To: [email-masked]
Cc: [email-masked]
Subject: [eap] RE: Some ideas for keying framework

...

BTW, it seems that no EAP method currently protects the contents 
of the Identity Request; the assumption probably was that it 
doesn't contain anything important. Thus, if it includes
some data after a NUL, it could be modified by an attacker. 
I'm not sure if any of the data currently included counts 
as "important" or not, but it's worth keeping in mind...

> > 3:  C<--S: Prove that you know the shared secret (K_S-C).
> > 4:  C-->S: Here's proof. Could you prove that you know K_S-C too?
..
Best regards,
Pasi
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