
From Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net  Thu Mar 31 12:34:17 2011
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From: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2011 21:35:48 +0200
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Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net>
Subject: [Atoca] Remarks on the security discussion today
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Hi all,=20

in the discussions today a few interesting remarks were raised. I wanted =
to share them with you. Richard, Martin and Cullen listed two aspects =
that need to be described in the requirements/architecture document, =
namely=20

(1) How does the recipient/receiver learn which author/originator to =
trust?

In this case Richard distinguished two scenarios:

a) Tsunami warning

Here the warning may be provided to the recipient/receiver by some local =
entity. How does the author/originator know when it receives an alert =
that can indeed be trusted? It could be sent by anyone. It is not very =
likely that the author of the message is known.

For this specific case Richard suggested to build on the work in =
draft-rosen-ecrit-lost-early-warning-01.txt. The basic idea is that the =
receiver uses LoST to discovers organizations issuing alerts for =
specific geographical regions. When an alert is received then the author =
and/or originator fields are checked against the info previously =
obtained via LoST.=20

b) School closed warning

Here, the recipient will have a prior relationship with the author (the =
school). A prior "registration" step is likely going to be required.=20

(2) Transitive Trust vs. End-to-End Security

In order to ensure that the comparison between the identity information =
can be processed by the recipient/receiver there is a need for =
cryptographic assurance. During the meeting we had discussed the =
possibility to use transitive trust (I know my service provider and I =
assume that he will only accept and forward alerts it got from other =
trusted sources) and end-to-end security.=20

In the area of end-to-end security it was noticed that the deployment =
reality of SIP (and XMPP) with regard to e2e security is rather weak. =
Security at the alert level was seen as OK but XMLDSIG was not =
acceptable.=20

I hope my writeup makes sense (even though I am tired already).=20

Ciao
Hannes


From artbotterell@gmail.com  Thu Mar 31 12:42:51 2011
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To: earlywarning@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Atoca] Remarks on the security discussion today
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On Mar 31, 2011, at 12:35 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:

> In the area of end-to-end security it was noticed that the deployment =
reality of SIP (and XMPP) with regard to e2e security is rather weak. =
Security at the alert level was seen as OK but XMLDSIG was not =
acceptable.=20

Hannes, could please you say a bit more about that?  In particular, what =
was meant by "OK" and "not acceptable"?

On a related note, I'd suggest that digital signatures may sometimes be =
useful even in transitive trust regimes in order to make the =
certification of an alert, wherever it occurred, provably persistent =
over time for auditing and forensic purposes.

- Art

