From emu-bounces@ietf.org Fri Sep 07 20:40:15 2007
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From: "kevin" <kevin@wire.cs.nthu.edu.tw>
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Subject: [Emu] WIRE1x 2.2 - free software of 802.1x supplicant 
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We are pleased to announce the release of WIRE1x Version 2.2. Both 
source code and executable code can be downloaded from 
http://wire.cs.nthu.edu.tw/wire1x/

WIRE1x 2.2 supports: 
1. EAP: MD5, TLS, TTLS, PEAP, SIM, and AKA 
2. Encryption: WEP, WPA with TKIP, WPA2 with CCMP 
3. Connection manager: user-friendly GUI to choose a wireless network 
and use the software

What is WIRE1x?

The WIRE1x is an implementation of IEEE 802.1x client (supplicant) 
developed by the Wireless Internet Research & Engineering (WIRE) Lab.



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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Wed Sep 12 06:59:40 2007
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Subject: [Emu] Re: Last Call: draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2 (EAP-IKEv2 Method)
 to Experimental RFC
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FYI

> The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
> the following document:
>
> - 'EAP-IKEv2 Method '
>    <draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-14.txt> as an Experimental RFC
>
> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
> final comments on this action.  Please send substantive comments to the
> ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2007-10-09. Exceptionally, 
> comments may be sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please 
> retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
>
> The file can be obtained via
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-tschofenig-eap-ikev2-14.txt
>
>
> IESG discussion can be tracked via
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=view_id&dTag=10250&rfc_flag=0
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> IETF-Announce mailing list
> IETF-Announce@ietf.org
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>
>
>   



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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Fri Sep 14 08:55:33 2007
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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
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Subject: [Emu] Proposed way forward: emu and channel bindings
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Hi.

One of EMU's goals is to produce methods that meet requirements of RFC
4962 and hopefully the EAP keying framework.

I've been a bit concerned about what you are going to do about channel
bindings.  It seems clear that EAP channel bindings are not mature
enough that we want to require all your methods support
them--especially not the EAP TLS draft that is on my plate now.
However channel bindings seem important for meeting the RFC 4962
requirements to authenticate all parties and limit the key scope.


So, how do we proceed?
I was discussing the issue with Tim, Russ and Jari.
They had what I think is good advice.

I'm going to ask that you show that it would be possible to extend any
method you send to me to support channel bindings in an interoperable
manner in the future.  I would want to understand that it is possible
to make it work with old clients or old EAP servers.  Once I'm
convinced it is possible to add in the future, I will be OK on the
channel bindings issue.

does this seem reasonable?

Sam Hartman
Security Area Director



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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Fri Sep 14 09:10:05 2007
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To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [Emu] Proposed way forward: emu and channel bindings
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It is possible to add, at later stage, an interopelable channel
bindings mechanism that can work with old clients and servers, by
using EAP-EXT method with running any EAP authentication method inside
it.

Yoshihiro Ohba

On Fri, Sep 14, 2007 at 08:55:26AM -0400, Sam Hartman wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi.
> 
> One of EMU's goals is to produce methods that meet requirements of RFC
> 4962 and hopefully the EAP keying framework.
> 
> I've been a bit concerned about what you are going to do about channel
> bindings.  It seems clear that EAP channel bindings are not mature
> enough that we want to require all your methods support
> them--especially not the EAP TLS draft that is on my plate now.
> However channel bindings seem important for meeting the RFC 4962
> requirements to authenticate all parties and limit the key scope.
> 
> 
> So, how do we proceed?
> I was discussing the issue with Tim, Russ and Jari.
> They had what I think is good advice.
> 
> I'm going to ask that you show that it would be possible to extend any
> method you send to me to support channel bindings in an interoperable
> manner in the future.  I would want to understand that it is possible
> to make it work with old clients or old EAP servers.  Once I'm
> convinced it is possible to add in the future, I will be OK on the
> channel bindings issue.
> 
> does this seem reasonable?
> 
> Sam Hartman
> Security Area Director
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Fri Sep 14 10:20:19 2007
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Proposed way forward: emu and channel bindings
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>>>>> "Yoshihiro" == Yoshihiro Ohba <yohba@tari.toshiba.com> writes:

    Yoshihiro> It is possible to add, at later stage, an interopelable
    Yoshihiro> channel bindings mechanism that can work with old
    Yoshihiro> clients and servers, by using EAP-EXT method with
    Yoshihiro> running any EAP authentication method inside it.

I understand this approach is possible.  One of the reasons I'm not
asking emu to solve the channel bindings problem now is that the IETF
may choose to adopt this approach.

However I am not willing to depend on this approach now.



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Subject: RE: [Emu] Proposed way forward: emu and channel bindings
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Hi Sam,

This does sound reasonable.  Some questions for the group to solidify
what it means to support channel bindings:

1) Is encryption required or is integrity protection enough. =20

In my opinion integrity protection should be sufficient since channel
bindings communicate parameters that are visible from the lower layer. =20

2) Should EAP channel bindings be sent from the peer to server, server
to peer, or both. =20

It seems that it would be more deployable to support peer to server.  It
probably would be desirable to support both.

3) How much data is necessary to carry?

Would 100 - 200 bytes be sufficient?=20

Thanks,

Joe

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sam Hartman [mailto:hartmans-ietf@mit.edu]=20
> Sent: Friday, September 14, 2007 5:55 AM
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] Proposed way forward: emu and channel bindings
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Hi.
>=20
> One of EMU's goals is to produce methods that meet requirements of RFC
> 4962 and hopefully the EAP keying framework.
>=20
> I've been a bit concerned about what you are going to do=20
> about channel bindings.  It seems clear that EAP channel=20
> bindings are not mature enough that we want to require all=20
> your methods support them--especially not the EAP TLS draft=20
> that is on my plate now.
> However channel bindings seem important for meeting the RFC=20
> 4962 requirements to authenticate all parties and limit the key scope.
>=20
>=20
> So, how do we proceed?
> I was discussing the issue with Tim, Russ and Jari.
> They had what I think is good advice.
>=20
> I'm going to ask that you show that it would be possible to=20
> extend any method you send to me to support channel bindings=20
> in an interoperable manner in the future.  I would want to=20
> understand that it is possible to make it work with old=20
> clients or old EAP servers.  Once I'm convinced it is=20
> possible to add in the future, I will be OK on the channel=20
> bindings issue.
>=20
> does this seem reasonable?
>=20
> Sam Hartman
> Security Area Director
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>=20


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Subject: [Emu] Draft liaison response for IEEE 802.11u EAP method for
	emergency calls
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The EMU working group has a liaison request from IEEE 802.11u on EAP
methods for emergency calls.  The liaison request can be found on the
liaison statement page, https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/ (May
2007).  We had a presentations and discussion of this topic at the
Chicago EMU meeting.  Below is a draft response based on the discussion
in the meeting.  It would be good to have comments on or approval of the
text by Monday, October 1, so a revised response can be created to be
sent as a response to the IEEE. =20

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

802.11u Liaison response for EAP Methods for Emergency Communications=20

We have had discussion of EAP method for Emergency services at the last
IETF meeting in Chicago.  The following is a summary of working group
discussion on this topic. =20

Currently there are no standards track EAP methods that meet the
requirements as understood by the EMU working group.  There are several
possible candidates of existing EAP methods that may meet or be slightly
modified to meet some of the 802.11u requirements for emergency
services, especially if minimal latency is not the strongest
requirement.  TTLS (draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01.txt) and EAP-FAST
(RFC4851) are TLS based methods that can support server only
authentication.  It was also pointed out that EAP-TLS
(draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-11.txt) could be modified to create a new
EAP method that only requires server side authentication.  In order to
truly support emergency services these methods would need to forego
server certificate validation which negates much of the security they
provide by allowing man-in-the-middle attacks.   These TLS based methods
also require a significant number of round trips that may not be
acceptable for emergency communication. =20

There were also several questions raised in the working group during the
discussion that might help in further determining the best approach.
These are summarized below:

1) It is not clear how to make the tradeoff between security and
low-latency.  If there is not existing trust relationship there are
limits as to what security properties can be provided.  What security
properties are desirable and what is the tolerance for extra-round trips
for the communication?

2) PSK was described as having worse DOS resistance properties that EAP.
It seems that in many cases EAP would have worse DOS resistance that
PSK, which cases is EAP better?

3) It seems that most public access networks already provide an open
access network, why couldn't this network be used for emergency
communication?=20

4) What regulatory requirements are driving the need for encryption?
This creates some conflicts because encryption without authentication
does not satisfy most useful security requirements.=20

As the 802.11u group is certainly aware, there are other groups within
the IETF that are looking at unauthenticated emergency services.  In
particular, the ECRIT group within the IETF has ongoing work in this
area:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schulzrinne-ecrit-unauthenticated-acces
s-00 =20

We encourage IEEE working group members to continue the discussion with
the IETF in the EMU and the ECRIT working groups.


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Mon Sep 17 15:09:45 2007
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Subject: [Emu] RE: Draft liaison response for IEEE 802.11u EAP method for
	emergency calls
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It is not clear to me whether the requirements do in fact prohibit 
server-side authentication.  As you note, without server-side authentication 
man-in-the-middle attacks are possible;  however, even with server-side 
authentication, additional requirements may need to be imposed in order to 
provide the desired level of security.

Requirement #1 is "No Pre-configured trust relationship".  This could refer 
to pre-configuration of the server with respect to the expected client 
credential (PSK or certificate), or it could refer to pre-configuration of 
the client with respect to the server, (such trust anchors).  The text seems 
focused on the former more than the latter.  Assuming that clients can be 
pre-configured with trust anchors, then TLS-based EAP methods could meet the 
requirement.

Requirement #2 is "Small" number of messages.  While this requirement 
clearly excludes long exchanges, it is not clear to me that TLS-based 
methods are excluded, particularly if the method is to be implemented on the 
AP itself, which potentially would result in lower round-trip times and 
eliminate the possibility of AAA-based frame loss.

It may be possible that requirements #1 and #2 are compatible with proposals 
involving unauthenticated client access combined with server authentication. 
   However, due to lack of a pre-configured network access profile, this 
scenario presents additional threats that are worthy of further discussion.

The presentation refers to the desire to for confidentiality (presumably at 
L2, rather than using SRTP).  Where confidentiality is desirable, it will 
also presumably be important for the client to determine that it has 
connected to a legitimate network.

Where a pre-configured network access profile exists, the binding between a 
validated server certificate and an advertised SSID is pre-configured.  
However, where there is no pre-configured network access profile, the 
binding may be difficult to establish without imposition of additional 
requirements.

For example, the server certificate/SSID binding cannot be determined solely 
via verification of the server certificate.  An attacker could obtain a 
valid server certificate for "example.com"; does this entitle them to 
advertise an SSID of "Emergency Network" or even "Example"?  Since SSIDs are 
not globally unique, there is no verifiable mapping between a Server-Id and 
an allowed set of SSIDs. In general, a CA has no way of determining whether 
a server has the rights to a particular SSID or not, so that a CA cannot in 
practice vouch for an RFC 4334 SSID extension within a server certificate.

Therefore verification of a binding between the server identity and the 
advertised network would only seem to be possible by requiring the 
advertised network name to match the Server-Id advertised in the server 
certificate.  This in turn would require restricting the allowable SSIDs, or 
adding another field to the IEEE 802.11 Beacon/Probe Response.







>From: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
>To: <emu@ietf.org>
>CC: <ecrit-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, "Bernard Aboba" 
><bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
>Subject: Draft liaison response for IEEE 802.11u EAP method for emergency 
>calls
>Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2007 22:26:36 -0700
>
>The EMU working group has a liaison request from IEEE 802.11u on EAP
>methods for emergency calls.  The liaison request can be found on the
>liaison statement page, https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/ (May
>2007).  We had a presentations and discussion of this topic at the
>Chicago EMU meeting.  Below is a draft response based on the discussion
>in the meeting.  It would be good to have comments on or approval of the
>text by Monday, October 1, so a revised response can be created to be
>sent as a response to the IEEE.
>
>==============================================================
>
>802.11u Liaison response for EAP Methods for Emergency Communications
>
>We have had discussion of EAP method for Emergency services at the last
>IETF meeting in Chicago.  The following is a summary of working group
>discussion on this topic.
>
>Currently there are no standards track EAP methods that meet the
>requirements as understood by the EMU working group.  There are several
>possible candidates of existing EAP methods that may meet or be slightly
>modified to meet some of the 802.11u requirements for emergency
>services, especially if minimal latency is not the strongest
>requirement.  TTLS (draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01.txt) and EAP-FAST
>(RFC4851) are TLS based methods that can support server only
>authentication.  It was also pointed out that EAP-TLS
>(draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-11.txt) could be modified to create a new
>EAP method that only requires server side authentication.  In order to
>truly support emergency services these methods would need to forego
>server certificate validation which negates much of the security they
>provide by allowing man-in-the-middle attacks.   These TLS based methods
>also require a significant number of round trips that may not be
>acceptable for emergency communication.
>
>There were also several questions raised in the working group during the
>discussion that might help in further determining the best approach.
>These are summarized below:
>
>1) It is not clear how to make the tradeoff between security and
>low-latency.  If there is not existing trust relationship there are
>limits as to what security properties can be provided.  What security
>properties are desirable and what is the tolerance for extra-round trips
>for the communication?
>
>2) PSK was described as having worse DOS resistance properties that EAP.
>It seems that in many cases EAP would have worse DOS resistance that
>PSK, which cases is EAP better?
>
>3) It seems that most public access networks already provide an open
>access network, why couldn't this network be used for emergency
>communication?
>
>4) What regulatory requirements are driving the need for encryption?
>This creates some conflicts because encryption without authentication
>does not satisfy most useful security requirements.
>
>As the 802.11u group is certainly aware, there are other groups within
>the IETF that are looking at unauthenticated emergency services.  In
>particular, the ECRIT group within the IETF has ongoing work in this
>area:
>
>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schulzrinne-ecrit-unauthenticated-acces
>s-00
>
>We encourage IEEE working group members to continue the discussion with
>the IETF in the EMU and the ECRIT working groups.




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Subject: Re: [Emu] Proposed way forward: emu and channel bindings
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	(Joseph Salowey's message of "Sun, 16 Sep 2007 22:21:57 -0700")
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>>>>> "Joseph" == Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) <jsalowey@cisco.com> writes:

    Joseph> 2) Should EAP channel bindings be sent from the peer to
    Joseph> server, server to peer, or both.

I hope you can avoid needing to answer this question as it could be a
bit tricky.



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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Thu Sep 20 04:51:11 2007
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Hi all,=20

What is the issue? The first message from the server to the peer is not
authenticated. This may allow some kind of denial of service attack
against the peer. The peer should be ready to accept new sessions from
the same server, so the peer must store one server nonce and one peer
nonce for each message 1 it receives.  An attacker can then flood the
network with fake message
1s to overflow the peer's buffer.  This issue is similar to an issue
found in the 802.11i 4-way handshake.

When receiving message 1, the peer checks to see if it has open
conversations with the server listed in the message.  If it does, then
it will reuse the peer nonce it already sent.  In addition, it will not
store the server nonce, since the server nonce comes back in message 3.
Message 3 then contains almost all the information necessary to validate
the MAC.  It is only missing the ID_Server.  There seem to be three ways
to solve this which are discussed in the next paragraph. =20

1) The first is to drop ID_Server from the input string, allowing the
peer to check the MAC without the ID. This might require another NIST
review. =20

2) The second is to add ID_Server to message 3.

3) Thirdly, the peer could iterate through its list of associated
servers trying to find one which matches. =20
This allows the peer to store state per server instead of storing state
per message.  SiFrom emu-bounces@ietf.org Thu Sep 20 04:51:11 2007
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Hi all,=20

What is the issue? The first message from the server to the peer is not
authenticated. This may allow some kind of denial of service attack
against the peer. The peer should be ready to accept new sessions from
the same server, so the peer must store one server nonce and one peer
nonce for each message 1 it receives.  An attacker can then flood the
network with fake message
1s to overflow the peer's buffer.  This issue is similar to an issue
found in the 802.11i 4-way handshake.

When receiving message 1, the peer checks to see if it has open
conversations with the server listed in the message.  If it does, then
it will reuse the peer nonce it already sent.  In addition, it will not
store the server nonce, since the server nonce comes back in message 3.
Message 3 then contains almost all the information necessary to validate
the MAC.  It is only missing the ID_Server.  There seem to be three ways
to solve this which are discussed in the next paragraph. =20

1) The first is to drop ID_Server from the input string, allowing the
peer to check the MAC without the ID. This might require another NIST
review. =20

2) The second is to add ID_Server to message 3.

3) Thirdly, the peer could iterate through its list of associated
servers trying to find one which matches. =20
This allows the peer to store state per server instead of storing state
per message.  Since the peer has a fixed (for the duration of a DoS
attack) and limited number of associated servers, this fixes the attack.

Initially, I was a bit curious about the need to allocate state on the
client side with an injected Message 1 by the adversary. The text in
Section 4.2 of [1] was, however, convincing that the end host needs to
keep state information of multiple sessions even if it only accepts a
single one since otherwise you would be able to put the client into a
blocking state. [1] focuses on a case where only a single nonce is used
in message 3 whereas in EAP-GPSK both nonces are present in message 3.
When the client receives message (3) then it needs to derive keying
material based on the following info: RAND_Peer, ID_Peer, RAND_Server,
ID_Server, RAND_Peer, RAND_Server is in message 3 provided by the server
and ID_Peer is known to the peer. The EAP peer may have multiple
identities too. Hence, in EAP-GPSK at least the ID_Server attribute is
missing in message 3. Now, the question is how many EAP server
identities a client has. I suspect only a single one, with the realm
name for the entire domain (with respect to a particular credential) and
how many identities the client uses.=20

In any case, I agree with the assessment and the need to document
something in the draft.

Do you agree that the problem is real?
If yes, what type of solution approach would the group prefer?

Ciao
Hannes

Reference:

[1] Changhua He, John C. Mitchell. Analysis of the 802.11i 4-Way
Handshake. In Proceedings of the Third ACM International Workshop on
Wireless Security (WiSe'04), pages 43-50. Philadelphia, PA, Oct. 2004
=20

=20


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From: "Tschofenig,
	Hannes (NSN - DE/Germany - MiniMD)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
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List-Unsubscribe: <https://www1.ietnce the peer has a fixed (for the duration of a DoS
attack) and limited number of associated servers, this fixes the attack.

Initially, I was a bit curious about the need to allocate state on the
client side with an injected Message 1 by the adversary. The text in
Section 4.2 of [1] was, however, convincing that the end host needs to
keep state information of multiple sessions even if it only accepts a
single one since otherwise you would be able to put the client into a
blocking state. [1] focuses on a case where only a single nonce is used
in message 3 whereas in EAP-GPSK both nonces are present in message 3.
When the client receives message (3) then it needs to derive keying
material based on the following info: RAND_Peer, ID_Peer, RAND_Server,
ID_Server, RAND_Peer, RAND_Server is in message 3 provided by the server
and ID_Peer is known to the peer. The EAP peer may have multiple
identities too. Hence, in EAP-GPSK at least the ID_Server attribute is
missing in message 3. Now, the question is how many EAP server
identities a client has. I suspect only a single one, with the realm
name for the entire domain (with respect to a particular credential) and
how many identities the client uses.=20

In any case, I agree with the assessment and the need to document
something in the draft.

Do you agree that the problem is real?
If yes, what type of solution approach would the group prefer?

Ciao
Hannes

Reference:

[1] Changhua He, John C. Mitchell. Analysis of the 802.11i 4-Way
Handshake. In Proceedings of the Third ACM International Workshop on
Wireless Security (WiSe'04), pages 43-50. Philadelphia, PA, Oct. 2004
=20

=20


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Hi all,=20
=20
Paul Rowe, Arnab Roy, Prof. Andre Scedrov and Prof. John C. Mitchell did
an analysis of EAP-GPSK and they essentially found three issues:

1) Use of encryption algorithms before choice is confirmed

This aspect can be covered in the security consideration section of the
upcoming draft version of EAP-GPSK:
http://www.tschofenig.com/svn/draft-clancy-emu-eap-gpsk/draft-ietf-emu-e
ap-gpsk-07.txt

2) Mitigation of potential DOS attack against client=20

This aspect is a bit more controversial and we would require feedback
from the group. I will post a separate mail on this subject.=20

3) Potential problem with the key derivation function

This aspect also requires feedback from the group and a separate mail
will be posted to the list.=20

Ciao
Hannes

PS: Thanks to the group for doing the analysis and for discussing the
issues with us.=20


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Errors-To: emu-bounces@ietf.org


Hi all,=20
=20
Paul Rowe, Arnab Roy, Prof. Andre Scedrov and Prof. John C. Mitchell did
an analysis of EAP-GPSK and they essentially found three issues:

1) Use of encryption algorithms before choice is confirmed

This aspect can be covered in the security consideration section of the
upcoming draft version of EAP-GPSK:
http://www.tschofenig.com/svn/draft-clancy-emu-eap-gpsk/draft-ietf-emu-e
ap-gpsk-07.txt

2) Mitigation of potential DOS attack against client=20

This aspect is a bit more controversial and we would require feedback
from the group. I will post a separate mail on this subject.=20

3) Potential problem with the key derivation function

This aspect also requires feedback from the group and a separate mail
will be posted to the list.=20

Ciao
Hannes

PS: Thanks to the group for doing the analysis and for discussing the
issues with us.=20


_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu





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From: "Tschofenig,
	Hannes (NSN - DE/Germany - MiniMD)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
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Subject: [Emu] EAP-GPSK & Key Derivation Function
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Hi all,=20

What is the issue? The derivation of MK uses "0x00" as a key for the
KDF.=20
Here is the key derivation step:  =20

MK =3D GKDF-16 (zero, PL || PSK || CSuite_Sel || inputString)
              ^^^^^
              Here is the problem.=20

Here is what Charles recognized during the discussion:

"
I just looked though the definition of CMAC, the MAC used in one of our
two ciphersuites, and the zero key looks like it might cause some
problems.  Unlike the HMAC ciphersuites, it doesn't simply concatenate
the key with the data input.  The first step is to compute:

  k0=3DE_k(0x00)
  k1=3Dk0*x mod p(x)
  k2=3Dk1*x mod p(x)

These values would always be fixed.  During the CBC operation, they are
XOR'd with the final message block.  k1 is XOR'd if the final message
block's length matches the encryption block length.  k2 is used
otherwise on a message padded with 1000...0000b.

I think what using an all-zero key does is reduce the security of CMAC
to the security of CBC-MAC with an all-zeros IV.  While the
ramifications of this are debatable for our applications, it's still
probably not a great idea.

Currently we can't use the PSK as the input to the first KDF because its
length may not match the selected ciphersuite's block length.  We wanted
to try to do was have a ciphersuite that could be implemented using only
AES.
"

Do you agree that the problem is real?=20

If yes, then we believe that there are the following solution steps:

1) We would need some way to normalize the length of the PSK for the
selected ciphersuite. We could define an additional cryptographic
primitive in every ciphersuite that does this derivation, such as
SHA256-128 for the AES ciphersuite and SHA256 for the HMAC ciphersuite.

2) We could switch to a different KDF, for example to the one used for
IKEv2.

Can you come up with other solution approaches?

Which solution approach should we pick?

Ciao
Hannes


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Thu Sep 20 07:12:00 2007
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Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2007 07:11:04 -0400
From: Charles Clancy <clancy@cs.umd.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] EAP-GPSK & Key Derivation Function
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All,

My suggestion is adding the following to the GPSK document:

- For AES ciphersuite say keys MUST be 128 bits in length or longer, and 
longer keys be truncated to 128 bits for use
- For HMAC ciphersuite say keys MUST be 256 bits in length or longer, 
and longer keys be truncated to 256 bits for use
- RECOMMEND that 256 bit keys be provisioned in all cases to provide 
enough entropy for all current and many possible future ciphersuites
- Add a new section describing requirements on future ciphersuites that 
addresses necessary security requirements and describes their need to 
specify PSK sizes and how they deal with different-length keys

-- 
t. charles clancy, ph.d.  |  tcc@umd.edu  |  www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy

Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - DE/Germany - MiniMD) wrote:
> Hi all, 
> 
> What is the issue? The derivation of MK uses "0x00" as a key for the
> KDF. 
> Here is the key derivation step:   
> 
> MK = GKDF-16 (zero, PL || PSK || CSuite_Sel || inputString)
>               ^^^^^
>               Here is the problem. 
> 
> Here is what Charles recognized during the discussion:
> 
> "
> I just looked though the definition of CMAC, the MAC used in one of our
> two ciphersuites, and the zero key looks like it might cause some
> problems.  Unlike the HMAC ciphersuites, it doesn't simply concatenate
> the key with the data input.  The first step is to compute:
> 
>   k0=E_k(0x00)
>   k1=k0*x mod p(x)
>   k2=k1*x mod p(x)
> 
> These values would always be fixed.  During the CBC operation, they are
> XOR'd with the final message block.  k1 is XOR'd if the final message
> block's length matches the encryption block length.  k2 is used
> otherwise on a message padded with 1000...0000b.
> 
> I think what using an all-zero key does is reduce the security of CMAC
> to the security of CBC-MAC with an all-zeros IV.  While the
> ramifications of this are debatable for our applications, it's still
> probably not a great idea.
> 
> Currently we can't use the PSK as the input to the first KDF because its
> length may not match the selected ciphersuite's block length.  We wanted
> to try to do was have a ciphersuite that could be implemented using only
> AES.
> "
> 
> Do you agree that the problem is real? 
> 
> If yes, then we believe that there are the following solution steps:
> 
> 1) We would need some way to normalize the length of the PSK for the
> selected ciphersuite. We could define an additional cryptographic
> primitive in every ciphersuite that does this derivation, such as
> SHA256-128 for the AES ciphersuite and SHA256 for the HMAC ciphersuite.
> 
> 2) We could switch to a different KDF, for example to the one used for
> IKEv2.
> 
> Can you come up with other solution approaches?
> 
> Which solution approach should we pick?
> 
> Ciao
> Hannes
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Thu Sep 20 08:26:25 2007
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Subject: AW: [Emu] EAP-GPSK & Key Derivation Function
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That's also a reasonable suggestion.=20
I like this one.=20

Ciao
Hannes
=20

> -----Urspr=FCngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: ext Charles Clancy [mailto:clancy@cs.umd.edu]=20
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 20. September 2007 13:11
> An: Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - DE/Germany - MiniMD)
> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> Betreff: Re: [Emu] EAP-GPSK & Key Derivation Function
>=20
> All,
>=20
> My suggestion is adding the following to the GPSK document:
>=20
> - For AES ciphersuite say keys MUST be 128 bits in length or=20
> longer, and=20
> longer keys be truncated to 128 bits for use
> - For HMAC ciphersuite say keys MUST be 256 bits in length or longer,=20
> and longer keys be truncated to 256 bits for use
> - RECOMMEND that 256 bit keys be provisioned in all cases to provide=20
> enough entropy for all current and many possible future ciphersuites
> - Add a new section describing requirements on future=20
> ciphersuites that=20
> addresses necessary security requirements and describes their need to=20
> specify PSK sizes and how they deal with different-length keys
>=20
> --=20
> t. charles clancy, ph.d.  |  tcc@umd.edu  |  www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy
>=20
> Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - DE/Germany - MiniMD) wrote:
> > Hi all,=20
> >=20
> > What is the issue? The derivation of MK uses "0x00" as a key for the
> > KDF.=20
> > Here is the key derivation step:  =20
> >=20
> > MK =3D GKDF-16 (zero, PL || PSK || CSuite_Sel || inputString)
> >               ^^^^^
> >               Here is the problem.=20
> >=20
> > Here is what Charles recognized during the discussion:
> >=20
> > "
> > I just looked though the definition of CMAC, the MAC used=20
> in one of our
> > two ciphersuites, and the zero key looks like it might cause some
> > problems.  Unlike the HMAC ciphersuites, it doesn't simply=20
> concatenate
> > the key with the data input.  The first step is to compute:
> >=20
> >   k0=3DE_k(0x00)
> >   k1=3Dk0*x mod p(x)
> >   k2=3Dk1*x mod p(x)
> >=20
> > These values would always be fixed.  During the CBC=20
> operation, they are
> > XOR'd with the final message block.  k1 is XOR'd if the=20
> final message
> > block's length matches the encryption block length.  k2 is used
> > otherwise on a message padded with 1000...0000b.
> >=20
> > I think what using an all-zero key does is reduce the=20
> security of CMAC
> > to the security of CBC-MAC with an all-zeros IV.  While the
> > ramifications of this are debatable for our applications, it's still
> > probably not a great idea.
> >=20
> > Currently we can't use the PSK as the input to the first=20
> KDF because its
> > length may not match the selected ciphersuite's block=20
> length.  We wanted
> > to try to do was have a ciphersuite that could be=20
> implemented using only
> > AES.
> > "
> >=20
> > Do you agree that the problem is real?=20
> >=20
> > If yes, then we believe that there are the following solution steps:
> >=20
> > 1) We would need some way to normalize the length of the PSK for the
> > selected ciphersuite. We could define an additional cryptographic
> > primitive in every ciphersuite that does this derivation, such as
> > SHA256-128 for the AES ciphersuite and SHA256 for the HMAC=20
> ciphersuite.
> >=20
> > 2) We could switch to a different KDF, for example to the=20
> one used for
> > IKEv2.
> >=20
> > Can you come up with other solution approaches?
> >=20
> > Which solution approach should we pick?
> >=20
> > Ciao
> > Hannes
> >=20
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>=20
>=20


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Subject: RE: [Emu] Open Issues with EAP-GPSK
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	Hannes \(NSN - DE/Germany - MiniMD\)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>,
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I added these issues to the issue list at
http://www3.tools.ietf.org/wg/emu/trac/report/1

Joe=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tschofenig,Hannes (NSN - DE/Germany - MiniMD)=20
> [mailto:hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com]=20
> Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2007 1:51 AM
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] Open Issues with EAP-GPSK
>=20
>=20
> Hi all,=20
> =20
> Paul Rowe, Arnab Roy, Prof. Andre Scedrov and Prof. John C.=20
> Mitchell did an analysis of EAP-GPSK and they essentially=20
> found three issues:
>=20
> 1) Use of encryption algorithms before choice is confirmed
>=20
> This aspect can be covered in the security consideration=20
> section of the upcoming draft version of EAP-GPSK:
> http://www.tschofenig.com/svn/draft-clancy-emu-eap-gpsk/draft-
> ietf-emu-e
> ap-gpsk-07.txt
>=20
> 2) Mitigation of potential DOS attack against client=20
>=20
> This aspect is a bit more controversial and we would require=20
> feedback from the group. I will post a separate mail on this subject.=20
>=20
> 3) Potential problem with the key derivation function
>=20
> This aspect also requires feedback from the group and a=20
> separate mail will be posted to the list.=20
>=20
> Ciao
> Hannes
>=20
> PS: Thanks to the group for doing the analysis and for=20
> discussing the issues with us.=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Sat Sep 22 09:23:30 2007
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Cc: ecrit-chairs@tools.ietf.org, emu@ietf.org, ECRIT <ecrit@ietf.org>
Subject: [Emu] Re: Draft liaison response for IEEE 802.11u EAP method for
 emergency calls
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Hi Bernard,

thanks for your input. Please find a few more thoughts below:

Bernard Aboba wrote:
> It is not clear to me whether the requirements do in fact prohibit 
> server-side authentication.  As you note, without server-side 
> authentication man-in-the-middle attacks are possible;  however, even 
> with server-side authentication, additional requirements may need to 
> be imposed in order to provide the desired level of security.
>
I also believe that the requirements does not rule out server-side 
authentication.

> Requirement #1 is "No Pre-configured trust relationship".  This could 
> refer to pre-configuration of the server with respect to the expected 
> client credential (PSK or certificate), or it could refer to 
> pre-configuration of the client with respect to the server, (such 
> trust anchors).  The text seems focused on the former more than the 
> latter.  Assuming that clients can be pre-configured with trust 
> anchors, then TLS-based EAP methods could meet the requirement.
>
I agree that this aspect of no pre-configured trust relationship is 
quite likely to refer to pre-established shared secrets.

> Requirement #2 is "Small" number of messages.  While this requirement 
> clearly excludes long exchanges, it is not clear to me that TLS-based 
> methods are excluded, particularly if the method is to be implemented 
> on the AP itself, which potentially would result in lower round-trip 
> times and eliminate the possibility of AAA-based frame loss.
>
I doubt that the performance argument counts a lot here given that the 
exchange is, as you indicated, local.

> It may be possible that requirements #1 and #2 are compatible with 
> proposals involving unauthenticated client access combined with server 
> authentication.   However, due to lack of a pre-configured network 
> access profile, this scenario presents additional threats that are 
> worthy of further discussion.
>
> The presentation refers to the desire to for confidentiality 
> (presumably at L2, rather than using SRTP).  Where confidentiality is 
> desirable, it will also presumably be important for the client to 
> determine that it has connected to a legitimate network.
Whereby "legitimate network" is already a quite difficult requirement.

>
> Where a pre-configured network access profile exists, the binding 
> between a validated server certificate and an advertised SSID is 
> pre-configured.  However, where there is no pre-configured network 
> access profile, the binding may be difficult to establish without 
> imposition of additional requirements.
>
> For example, the server certificate/SSID binding cannot be determined 
> solely via verification of the server certificate.  An attacker could 
> obtain a valid server certificate for "example.com"; does this entitle 
> them to advertise an SSID of "Emergency Network" or even "Example"?  
> Since SSIDs are not globally unique, there is no verifiable mapping 
> between a Server-Id and an allowed set of SSIDs. In general, a CA has 
> no way of determining whether a server has the rights to a particular 
> SSID or not, so that a CA cannot in practice vouch for an RFC 4334 
> SSID extension within a server certificate.
>
> Therefore verification of a binding between the server identity and 
> the advertised network would only seem to be possible by requiring the 
> advertised network name to match the Server-Id advertised in the 
> server certificate.  This in turn would require restricting the 
> allowable SSIDs, or adding another field to the IEEE 802.11 
> Beacon/Probe Response.
>
I don't think it make a lot of sense to bind the certificate to the 
advertised SSID.


WHAT CAN YOU ACCOMPLISH WITH SERVER-SIDE AUTHENTICATION?

The important question here, I believe, is what you would do with 
server-side authentication in such a context given that it has entirely 
different semantic than the server-side authentication that is typically 
exercised in EAP exchanges between the peer and the EAP server in the 
user's home network.

I don't think that addressing man-in-the-middle attacks is the main 
objective. Instead, I could imagine that when something goes wrong then 
the end user might be able to indicate that he or she was interacting 
with a specific network.I see this more as a "debugging" tool.

When some verification steps fails, for example because the certificate 
of the server is expired, then in an emergency situation you will just 
continue rather than dropping the conversation. Additionally, everyone 
should be able to setup networks and hence the adversary can easily do 
the same. What would the network of an adversary differentiate from one 
that is from someone else?


WHAT ASSUMPTIONS DO WE MAKE WITH RESPECT TO THE SERVER'S CERTIFICATE AND 
THE TRUST ANCHORS?

Do we assume that persons that setup networks, such as my home network, 
a coffee shop, the IETF network, have to obtain a certificate for their 
network from
a) from any company that sells certs typically found in web servers
b) from a dedicated emergency services provider

(Note1)

May I re-use existing trust anchors, such as those available with my web 
browsers, or do end devices need to add new root certs into their 
certificate store?

In case (b) can I assume that the PSAP also uses the same trust anchor 
so that I could potentially use DTLS-SRTP for end-to-end media security 
to ensure that I am actually speaking to a real PSAP rather than to an 
adversary?


Ciao
Hannes

Note 1: Would it be allowed to just skip server-side authentication and 
to end-up with a unauthenticated Diffie-Helman exchange? One might argue 
that this does not provide a lot of advantages and we could also skip 
the EAP exchange entirely but that's not completely true that 
architectures, such as Wimax, assume that keying material is exported 
during network attachment and that these keys are used for other 
protocols. Hence, if one would change then the impact for the other work 
done before would be too large.

>
>
>
>
>
>> From: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
>> To: <emu@ietf.org>
>> CC: <ecrit-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, "Bernard Aboba" 
>> <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
>> Subject: Draft liaison response for IEEE 802.11u EAP method for 
>> emergency calls
>> Date: Sun, 16 Sep 2007 22:26:36 -0700
>>
>> The EMU working group has a liaison request from IEEE 802.11u on EAP
>> methods for emergency calls.  The liaison request can be found on the
>> liaison statement page, https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/ (May
>> 2007).  We had a presentations and discussion of this topic at the
>> Chicago EMU meeting.  Below is a draft response based on the discussion
>> in the meeting.  It would be good to have comments on or approval of the
>> text by Monday, October 1, so a revised response can be created to be
>> sent as a response to the IEEE.
>>
>> ==============================================================
>>
>> 802.11u Liaison response for EAP Methods for Emergency Communications
>>
>> We have had discussion of EAP method for Emergency services at the last
>> IETF meeting in Chicago.  The following is a summary of working group
>> discussion on this topic.
>>
>> Currently there are no standards track EAP methods that meet the
>> requirements as understood by the EMU working group.  There are several
>> possible candidates of existing EAP methods that may meet or be slightly
>> modified to meet some of the 802.11u requirements for emergency
>> services, especially if minimal latency is not the strongest
>> requirement.  TTLS (draft-funk-eap-ttls-v0-01.txt) and EAP-FAST
>> (RFC4851) are TLS based methods that can support server only
>> authentication.  It was also pointed out that EAP-TLS
>> (draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-11.txt) could be modified to create a new
>> EAP method that only requires server side authentication.  In order to
>> truly support emergency services these methods would need to forego
>> server certificate validation which negates much of the security they
>> provide by allowing man-in-the-middle attacks.   These TLS based methods
>> also require a significant number of round trips that may not be
>> acceptable for emergency communication.
>>
>> There were also several questions raised in the working group during the
>> discussion that might help in further determining the best approach.
>> These are summarized below:
>>
>> 1) It is not clear how to make the tradeoff between security and
>> low-latency.  If there is not existing trust relationship there are
>> limits as to what security properties can be provided.  What security
>> properties are desirable and what is the tolerance for extra-round trips
>> for the communication?
>>
>> 2) PSK was described as having worse DOS resistance properties that EAP.
>> It seems that in many cases EAP would have worse DOS resistance that
>> PSK, which cases is EAP better?
>>
>> 3) It seems that most public access networks already provide an open
>> access network, why couldn't this network be used for emergency
>> communication?
>>
>> 4) What regulatory requirements are driving the need for encryption?
>> This creates some conflicts because encryption without authentication
>> does not satisfy most useful security requirements.
>>
>> As the 802.11u group is certainly aware, there are other groups within
>> the IETF that are looking at unauthenticated emergency services.  In
>> particular, the ECRIT group within the IETF has ongoing work in this
>> area:
>>
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schulzrinne-ecrit-unauthenticated-acces
>> s-00
>>
>> We encourage IEEE working group members to continue the discussion with
>> the IETF in the EMU and the ECRIT working groups.
>



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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Wed Sep 26 16:48:45 2007
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Thread-Topic: EAP-TTLS Extensions I-D now published
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From: "Stephen Hanna" <shanna@juniper.net>
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Subject: [Emu] EAP-TTLS Extensions I-D now published
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Errors-To: emu-bounces@ietf.org

I finally got the first version of the EAP-TTLS extensions
draft posted. Here it is. This should address your questions
about how EAP-TTLS can be extended via AVPs to provide
algorithm agility, crypto bindings, etc.

Comments and questions are welcome.

Thanks,

Steve

-----Original Message-----
From: Internet-Drafts@ietf.org [mailto:Internet-Drafts@ietf.org]=20
Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2007 1:15 PM
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Subject: I-D ACTION:draft-hanna-eap-ttls-agility-00.txt=20

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts=20
directories.


	Title		: Key Agility Extensions for EAP-TTLSv0=20
	Author(s)	: S. Hanna, P. Funk
	Filename	: draft-hanna-eap-ttls-agility-00.txt
	Pages		: 23
	Date		: 2007-9-26
=09

   This document defines new Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs) that add=20
   cryptographic algorithm agility and other security features=20
   (protected results and cryptographic binding of inner authentications

   to the outer tunnel) to EAP-TTLSv0.=20


A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
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