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Thread-Topic: EMU charter update
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Subject: [Emu] EMU charter update
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Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects discussions we had at
IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I would like to have
comments in by January 23, 2008.

Thanks,

Joe =20

Description of Working Group:
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is a network
access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11, 802.16, VPN,
PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself is a simple
protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.

Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these methods are
proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented in RFCs. The
lack of documented, open specifications is a deployment and
interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP methods in the
standards track implement features such as key derivation that are
required for many modern applications. This poses a problem for, among
other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP method in
new network access technologies. For example, no standards track methods
meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC 4017, which documents
IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.

This group is chartered to work on the following types of mechanisms to
meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:

- An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards track, clarify
specification, interoperability, and implementation issues gathered over
the years, and update the document to meet the requirements of RFC 3748,
RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents. Backwards compatibility
with RFC 2716 is a requirement.

- A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC 3748 and RFC
4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and compact
for implementation in resource constrained environments.

- A mechanism to support extensible communication within a TLS protected
tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements. This mechanism
must=20
support channel bindings in order to meet RFC 4962 requirements.=20
This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of an enhanced TLS
mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and =20
additional inner authentication mechanisms.

- Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel bindings. So as to=20
enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the existing=20
protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate document.  This item
will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance EAP-TLS or the=20
TLS based tunnel method. =20

- A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that makes use
of existing password databases such as AAA databases.  This
item will be based on the above tunnel method.

Goals and Milestones:
Done	  	Form design team to work on strong shared secret
mechanism
Done	  	Submit 2716bis I-D
Done	  	Submit first draft of shared secret mechanism I-D
Done	  	Form password based mechanism design team
Done		Submit 2716bis draft to IESG for Proposed Standard
Jan 2008	Submit Strong Shared Secret Mechanism to IESG
Mar 2008 	Submit Tunnel and Password Method requirements first
draft
Jun 2008 	Send Tunnel and Password Method requirements to IESG
Sep 2008 	Submit Tunnel Method first draft
Oct 2008    Submit TLS based method channel binding first draft
Oct 2008 	Submit Password Method first draft
Jan 2009	Send Tunnel Method to IESG
Apr 2009	Send TLS based method channel binding to IESG
Apr 2009	Send Password based method to IESG


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the EAP Method Update Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : The EAP TLS Authentication Protocol
	Author(s)       : D. Simon, et al.
	Filename        : draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-13.txt
	Pages           : 33
	Date            : 2008-01-09

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748,
provides support for multiple authentication methods.  Transport
Level Security (TLS) provides for mutual authentication, integrity-
protected ciphersuite negotiation and key exchange between two
endpoints.  This document defines EAP-TLS, which includes support for
certificate-based mutual authentication and key derivation.

This document obsoletes RFC 2716.  A summary of the changes between
this document and RFC 2716 is available in Appendix A.

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Hi,=20
=20
Question on the following text:=20

=20

"However, in the case where the EAP-TLS peer is attempting to obtain
network access, it will not have network connectivity and is therefore
not capable of checking for certificate revocation until after
authentication completes and network connectivity is available. For this
reason EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD implement Certificate Status
Request messages, as described in "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions" [RFC4366] section 3.6.  To enable revocation checking in
situations where servers do not support Certificate Status Request
messages and network connectivity is not available prior to
authentication completion, peer implementations MUST also support
checking for certificate revocation after authentication completes and
network connectivity is available, and they SHOULD utilize this
capability by default."

=20

In cases where the server does not support the certificate_status
extension, this is a little awkward, the server's cert is expired, but
the server does not support the extension. The client has already gotten
access to the network after EAP-TLS and so both TLS and the EAP exchange
is terminated by an EAP Success. How is the spec suggesting the client
to perform the revocation checking? and what is the process to break the
network access (ignoring the question on why a client who would
otherwise be a paying customer, really wanted this) after already have
gained the access?

=20

Thanks,

=20

Madjid=20

=20


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	charset="us-ascii"
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2900.3243" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D522525300-19012008><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Hi,=20
</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D522525300-19012008><FONT face=3DArial=20
size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D522525300-19012008>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008><FONT size=3D2>Question on the following =
text:=20
</FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008><FONT size=3D2></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008>"</SPAN>However, in the case where the =
EAP-TLS peer is=20
attempting to obtain network access, it will not have network =
connectivity and=20
is therefore not capable of checking for certificate revocation until =
after=20
authentication completes and network connectivity is available. For this =
reason=20
EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD implement Certificate Status Request =
messages,=20
as described in "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions" [RFC4366] =
section=20
3.6.<SPAN style=3D"mso-spacerun: yes">&nbsp; </SPAN>To enable revocation =
checking=20
in situations where <STRONG>servers</STRONG> do not support Certificate =
Status=20
Request messages and network connectivity is not available prior to=20
authentication completion, peer implementations MUST also support =
checking for=20
certificate revocation after authentication completes and network =
connectivity=20
is available, and they SHOULD utilize this capability by default.<SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008>"</SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008>In cases where the server does not support =
the=20
certificate_status extension, this is a little awkward, the server's =
cert is=20
expired, but the server does not support the extension. The client has =
already=20
gotten access to the network after EAP-TLS&nbsp;and so both TLS =
and&nbsp;the EAP=20
exchange is terminated by an EAP Success. How is the spec suggesting the =
client=20
to perform the revocation checking? and what is the process to break the =
network=20
access (ignoring the question on why a client who would otherwise be a =
paying=20
customer, really wanted this) after already have&nbsp;gained the=20
access?</SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008>Thanks,</SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><FONT size=3D2><SPAN=20
class=3D522525300-19012008>Madjid&nbsp;</SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0in 0in 0pt"><?xml:namespace =
prefix =3D o ns =3D=20
"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o:p><FONT=20
size=3D2>&nbsp;</FONT></o:p></P></SPAN></DIV></BODY></HTML>

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_______________________________________________
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Subject: RE:  [Emu] EMU charter update, 
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
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  Hi Joe,

  Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a strong shared secret
and the method resistant to dictionary attack must use the tunneled
method? That seems odd. How about something along these lines:

  - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC 3748 and RFC
  4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and compac=
t
  for implementation in resource constrained environments. Preference
  will be given to solutions that can be used with a cryptographically
  weak shared secret and that are resistant to dictionary attack.

If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to not require
a cryptographically strong shared secret and was resistant to dictionary
attack I really hope EMU would accept it and not say, "no, sorry that
is too strong for us, our charter mandates a much weaker solution." Of
course if such a solution was not, for whatever reason, acceptable to the
working group we could fall back on the "must be a strong shared secret"
requirement.

  The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary attack but if the
non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary attack wouldn't that
be goodness?

  regards,

  Dan.

"Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
> Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects discussions we had at
> IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I would like to have
> comments in by January 23, 2008.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Joe
>
> Description of Working Group:
> The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is a network
> access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11, 802.16, VPN,
> PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself is a simple
> protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
>
> Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these methods are
> proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented in RFCs. The
> lack of documented, open specifications is a deployment and
> interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP methods in the
> standards track implement features such as key derivation that are
> required for many modern applications. This poses a problem for, among
> other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP method in
> new network access technologies. For example, no standards track method=
s
> meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC 4017, which documents
> IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
>
> This group is chartered to work on the following types of mechanisms to
> meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
>
> - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards track, clarify
> specification, interoperability, and implementation issues gathered ove=
r
> the years, and update the document to meet the requirements of RFC 3748=
,
> RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents. Backwards compatibility
> with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
>
> - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC 3748 and RF=
C
> 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and compac=
t
> for implementation in resource constrained environments.
>
> - A mechanism to support extensible communication within a TLS protecte=
d
> tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements. This mechanism
> must
> support channel bindings in order to meet RFC 4962 requirements.
> This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of an enhanced TLS
> mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and
> additional inner authentication mechanisms.
>
> - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel bindings. So as to
> enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the existing
> protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate document.  This ite=
m
> will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance EAP-TLS or the
> TLS based tunnel method.
>
> - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that makes use
> of existing password databases such as AAA databases.  This
> item will be based on the above tunnel method.




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Subject: RE: [Emu] 2716bis13: Support of certificate_status extension
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 12:30:31 -0800
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Hi Madjid,

Comments inline below:=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Nakhjiri Madjid-VXT746 [mailto:madjid.nakhjiri@motorola.com]=20
> Sent: Friday, January 18, 2008 5:03 PM
> To: bernarda@windows.microsoft.com; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] 2716bis13: Support of certificate_status extension
>=20
> Hi,=20
> =20
> Question on the following text:=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> "However, in the case where the EAP-TLS peer is attempting to=20
> obtain network access, it will not have network connectivity=20
> and is therefore not capable of checking for certificate=20
> revocation until after authentication completes and network=20
> connectivity is available. For this reason EAP-TLS peers and=20
> servers SHOULD implement Certificate Status Request messages,=20
> as described in "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions"=20
> [RFC4366] section 3.6.  To enable revocation checking in=20
> situations where servers do not support Certificate Status=20
> Request messages and network connectivity is not available=20
> prior to authentication completion, peer implementations MUST=20
> also support checking for certificate revocation after=20
> authentication completes and network connectivity is=20
> available, and they SHOULD utilize this capability by default."
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In cases where the server does not support the=20
> certificate_status extension, this is a little awkward, the=20
> server's cert is expired, but the server does not support the=20
> extension. The client has already gotten access to the=20
> network after EAP-TLS and so both TLS and the EAP exchange is=20
> terminated by an EAP Success. How is the spec suggesting the=20
> client to perform the revocation checking?=20

[Joe] Once the client has network access it can attempt to access CRLs
or certificate status services using existing mechanisms (CRL
distribution points, OCSP, etc.)=20

> and what is the=20
> process to break the network access (ignoring the question on=20
> why a client who would otherwise be a paying customer, really=20
> wanted this) after already have gained the access?
>=20
[Joe] The process depends upon the client and underlying network access
technology.=20

> =20
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Madjid=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
>=20


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Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update, 
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Hi Dan,=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]=20
> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,=20
>=20
>=20
>   Hi Joe,
>=20
>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a strong=20
> shared secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack=20
> must use the tunneled method? That seems odd.=20

[Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and is resistant
to dictionary attack. =20

> How about=20
> something along these lines:
>=20
>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC 3748 and RFC
>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be=20
> simple and compact
>   for implementation in resource constrained environments. Preference
>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a cryptographically
>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to dictionary attack.
>=20
[Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.  The GPSK
document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at this time.=20

> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to not=20
> require a cryptographically strong shared secret and was=20
> resistant to dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept=20
> it and not say, "no, sorry that is too strong for us, our=20
> charter mandates a much weaker solution." Of course if such a=20
> solution was not, for whatever reason, acceptable to the=20
> working group we could fall back on the "must be a strong=20
> shared secret"
> requirement.
>=20
>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary=20
> attack but if the non-tunneled one was also resistant to=20
> dictionary attack wouldn't that be goodness?
>=20
>   regards,
>=20
>   Dan.
>=20
> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects=20
> discussions we had=20
> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I would like to=20
> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Joe
> >
> > Description of Working Group:
> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is=20
> a network=20
> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,=20
> 802.16, VPN,=20
> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself is a simple=20
> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
> >
> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these methods are=20
> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented=20
> in RFCs. The=20
> > lack of documented, open specifications is a deployment and=20
> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP=20
> methods in the=20
> > standards track implement features such as key derivation that are=20
> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem=20
> for, among=20
> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP=20
> method in=20
> > new network access technologies. For example, no standards track=20
> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC=20
> 4017, which=20
> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
> >
> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of=20
> mechanisms=20
> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
> >
> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards=20
> track, clarify=20
> > specification, interoperability, and implementation issues gathered=20
> > over the years, and update the document to meet the requirements of=20
> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents. Backwards=20
> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
> >
> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC=20
> 3748 and=20
> > RFC
> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and=20
> > compact for implementation in resource constrained environments.
> >
> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication within a TLS=20
> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017=20
> requirements. This=20
> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet RFC 4962=20
> > requirements.
> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of an enhanced=20
> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and=20
> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
> >
> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel=20
> bindings. So as to=20
> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the=20
> existing=20
> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate document.  This=20
> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance=20
> EAP-TLS or=20
> > the TLS based tunnel method.
> >
> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that makes=20
> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases. =20
> This item=20
> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>=20


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Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 14:13:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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  Hi Joe,

On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
>> To: emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>>
>>
>>   Hi Joe,
>>
>>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a strong
>> shared secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack
>> must use the tunneled method? That seems odd.
>
> [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and is resistant
> to dictionary attack.

The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not based on the strengt=
h
of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage an adversary can gain to
determine the PSK is based _solely_ on interaction with a protocol
participant. If any advantage can be gained through something like
computation then the protocol is not resistant to dictionary attack.

  The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack regardless
of the assumptions placed on the PSK.

>> How about
>> something along these lines:
>>
>>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC 3748 and RFC
>>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
>> simple and compact
>>   for implementation in resource constrained environments. Preference
>>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a cryptographically
>>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to dictionary attack.
>>
> [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.  The GPSK
> document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at this time.

  That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak solution and is
not open to revision. What other portions are not open for revision?

  Dan.

>> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to not
>> require a cryptographically strong shared secret and was
>> resistant to dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept
>> it and not say, "no, sorry that is too strong for us, our
>> charter mandates a much weaker solution." Of course if such a
>> solution was not, for whatever reason, acceptable to the
>> working group we could fall back on the "must be a strong
>> shared secret"
>> requirement.
>>
>>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
>> attack but if the non-tunneled one was also resistant to
>> dictionary attack wouldn't that be goodness?
>>
>>   regards,
>>
>>   Dan.
>>
>> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
>> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
>> discussions we had
>> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I would like to
>> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
>> >
>> > Thanks,
>> >
>> > Joe
>> >
>> > Description of Working Group:
>> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
>> a network
>> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
>> 802.16, VPN,
>> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself is a simple
>> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
>> >
>> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these methods are
>> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
>> in RFCs. The
>> > lack of documented, open specifications is a deployment and
>> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
>> methods in the
>> > standards track implement features such as key derivation that are
>> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
>> for, among
>> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
>> method in
>> > new network access technologies. For example, no standards track
>> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
>> 4017, which
>> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
>> >
>> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
>> mechanisms
>> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
>> >
>> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
>> track, clarify
>> > specification, interoperability, and implementation issues gathered
>> > over the years, and update the document to meet the requirements of
>> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents. Backwards
>> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
>> >
>> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
>> 3748 and
>> > RFC
>> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and
>> > compact for implementation in resource constrained environments.
>> >
>> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication within a TLS
>> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
>> requirements. This
>> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet RFC 4962
>> > requirements.
>> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of an enhanced
>> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and
>> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
>> >
>> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
>> bindings. So as to
>> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
>> existing
>> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate document.  This
>> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
>> EAP-TLS or
>> > the TLS based tunnel method.
>> >
>> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that makes
>> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
>> This item
>> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Emu mailing list
>> Emu@ietf.org
>> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>>
>




_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



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Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
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=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]=20
> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>=20
>=20
>   Hi Joe,
>=20
> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> > Hi Dan,
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
> >> To: emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >>
> >>
> >>   Hi Joe,
> >>
> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a strong shared=20
> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack must use the=20
> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
> >
> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and=20
> is resistant=20
> > to dictionary attack.
>=20
> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not based on=20
> the strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage=20
> an adversary can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_=20
> on interaction with a protocol participant. If any advantage=20
> can be gained through something like computation then the=20
> protocol is not resistant to dictionary attack.
>=20
>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack=20
> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
>=20
[Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement for GPSK.=20

> >> How about
> >> something along these lines:
> >>
> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC 3748 and RFC
> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and=20
> >> compact
> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.=20
> Preference
> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a=20
> cryptographically
> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to dictionary attack.
> >>
> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.  The GPSK=20
> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at this time.
>=20
>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak=20
> solution and is not open to revision. What other portions are=20
> not open for revision?
>=20
[Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel method, a
password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS".  Other items,
especially items that are near completion, are not open for revision. =20


>   Dan.
>=20
> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to=20
> not require=20
> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was resistant to=20
> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and=20
> not say, "no,=20
> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a=20
> much weaker=20
> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for=20
> whatever reason,=20
> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the=20
> "must be a=20
> >> strong shared secret"
> >> requirement.
> >>
> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary=20
> attack but if=20
> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary=20
> attack wouldn't=20
> >> that be goodness?
> >>
> >>   regards,
> >>
> >>   Dan.
> >>
> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
> >> discussions we had
> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I=20
> would like to=20
> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
> >> >
> >> > Thanks,
> >> >
> >> > Joe
> >> >
> >> > Description of Working Group:
> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
> >> a network
> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
> >> 802.16, VPN,
> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself=20
> is a simple=20
> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
> >> >
> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these methods are=20
> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
> >> in RFCs. The
> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a deployment and=20
> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
> >> methods in the
> >> > standards track implement features such as key=20
> derivation that are=20
> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
> >> for, among
> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
> >> method in
> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no standards track=20
> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
> >> 4017, which
> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
> >> >
> >> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
> >> mechanisms
> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
> >> >
> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
> >> track, clarify
> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation=20
> issues gathered=20
> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the=20
> requirements of=20
> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.=20
> Backwards=20
> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
> >> >
> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
> >> 3748 and
> >> > RFC
> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and=20
> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained environments.
> >> >
> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication within a TLS=20
> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
> >> requirements. This
> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet=20
> RFC 4962=20
> >> > requirements.
> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of=20
> an enhanced=20
> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and=20
> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
> >> >
> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
> >> bindings. So as to
> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
> >> existing
> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate=20
> document.  This=20
> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
> >> EAP-TLS or
> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
> >> >
> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements=20
> that makes=20
> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
> >> This item
> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Emu mailing list
> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >>
> >
>=20
>=20
>=20


_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



From emu-bounces@ietf.org Tue Jan 22 20:11:47 2008
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Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 17:11:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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  Hi Joe,

  OK, so the charter is being opened up to add support for a
password-based mechanism, which should be resistant to a dictionary
attack, and that mechanism must use the tunnel method. Right?

  It looks to me like we're explicitly writing a stand-alone password-bas=
ed
method (which is resistant to dictionary attack) out of the charter.
That seems odd. Why are we doing that?

  Dan.

On Tue, January 22, 2008 2:41 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
>> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> Cc: emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>>
>>
>>   Hi Joe,
>>
>> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>> > Hi Dan,
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
>> >> To: emu@ietf.org
>> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >>
>> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a strong shared
>> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack must use the
>> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
>> >
>> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and
>> is resistant
>> > to dictionary attack.
>>
>> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not based on
>> the strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage
>> an adversary can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_
>> on interaction with a protocol participant. If any advantage
>> can be gained through something like computation then the
>> protocol is not resistant to dictionary attack.
>>
>>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack
>> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
>>
> [Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement for GPSK.
>
>> >> How about
>> >> something along these lines:
>> >>
>> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC 3748 and RFC
>> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and
>> >> compact
>> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.
>> Preference
>> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a
>> cryptographically
>> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to dictionary attack.
>> >>
>> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.  The GPSK
>> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at this time.
>>
>>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak
>> solution and is not open to revision. What other portions are
>> not open for revision?
>>
> [Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel method, a
> password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS".  Other items,
> especially items that are near completion, are not open for revision.
>
>
>>   Dan.
>>
>> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to
>> not require
>> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was resistant to
>> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and
>> not say, "no,
>> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a
>> much weaker
>> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for
>> whatever reason,
>> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the
>> "must be a
>> >> strong shared secret"
>> >> requirement.
>> >>
>> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
>> attack but if
>> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary
>> attack wouldn't
>> >> that be goodness?
>> >>
>> >>   regards,
>> >>
>> >>   Dan.
>> >>
>> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
>> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
>> >> discussions we had
>> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I
>> would like to
>> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
>> >> >
>> >> > Thanks,
>> >> >
>> >> > Joe
>> >> >
>> >> > Description of Working Group:
>> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
>> >> a network
>> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
>> >> 802.16, VPN,
>> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself
>> is a simple
>> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
>> >> >
>> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these methods are
>> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
>> >> in RFCs. The
>> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a deployment and
>> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
>> >> methods in the
>> >> > standards track implement features such as key
>> derivation that are
>> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
>> >> for, among
>> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
>> >> method in
>> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no standards track
>> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
>> >> 4017, which
>> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
>> >> >
>> >> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
>> >> mechanisms
>> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
>> >> >
>> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
>> >> track, clarify
>> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation
>> issues gathered
>> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the
>> requirements of
>> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.
>> Backwards
>> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
>> >> >
>> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
>> >> 3748 and
>> >> > RFC
>> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be simple and
>> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained environments.
>> >> >
>> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication within a TLS
>> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
>> >> requirements. This
>> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet
>> RFC 4962
>> >> > requirements.
>> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of
>> an enhanced
>> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and
>> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
>> >> >
>> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
>> >> bindings. So as to
>> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
>> >> existing
>> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate
>> document.  This
>> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
>> >> EAP-TLS or
>> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
>> >> >
>> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements
>> that makes
>> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
>> >> This item
>> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> Emu mailing list
>> >> Emu@ietf.org
>> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>> >>
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>




_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



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From: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]=20
> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 5:12 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>=20
>=20
>   Hi Joe,
>=20
>   OK, so the charter is being opened up to add support for a=20
> password-based mechanism, which should be resistant to a=20
> dictionary attack, and that mechanism must use the tunnel=20
> method. Right?
>=20
[Joe] Yes, this is the decision the working group made and the reason
why we are opening the charter.=20

>   It looks to me like we're explicitly writing a stand-alone=20
> password-based method (which is resistant to dictionary=20
> attack) out of the charter.
> That seems odd. Why are we doing that?
>=20
[Joe] We are explicitly adding a charter item for a tunnel method and a
password method based on the tunnel method.  This is the direction the
working group chose. =20

>   Dan.
>=20
> On Tue, January 22, 2008 2:41 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >>
> >>
> >>   Hi Joe,
> >>
> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> >> > Hi Dan,
> >> >
> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
> >> >> To: emu@ietf.org
> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>   Hi Joe,
> >> >>
> >> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a=20
> strong shared=20
> >> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack=20
> must use the=20
> >> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
> >> >
> >> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and
> >> is resistant
> >> > to dictionary attack.
> >>
> >> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not based on the=20
> >> strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage=20
> an adversary=20
> >> can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_ on=20
> interaction with a=20
> >> protocol participant. If any advantage can be gained through=20
> >> something like computation then the protocol is not resistant to=20
> >> dictionary attack.
> >>
> >>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack=20
> >> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
> >>
> > [Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement=20
> for GPSK.
> >
> >> >> How about
> >> >> something along these lines:
> >> >>
> >> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC=20
> 3748 and RFC
> >> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be=20
> simple and=20
> >> >> compact
> >> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.
> >> Preference
> >> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a
> >> cryptographically
> >> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to=20
> dictionary attack.
> >> >>
> >> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.=20
>  The GPSK=20
> >> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at=20
> this time.
> >>
> >>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak=20
> solution and is=20
> >> not open to revision. What other portions are not open for=20
> revision?
> >>
> > [Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel=20
> method, a=20
> > password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS".  Other items,=20
> > especially items that are near completion, are not open for=20
> revision.
> >
> >
> >>   Dan.
> >>
> >> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to
> >> not require
> >> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was resistant to=20
> >> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and
> >> not say, "no,
> >> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a
> >> much weaker
> >> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for
> >> whatever reason,
> >> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the
> >> "must be a
> >> >> strong shared secret"
> >> >> requirement.
> >> >>
> >> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
> >> attack but if
> >> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary
> >> attack wouldn't
> >> >> that be goodness?
> >> >>
> >> >>   regards,
> >> >>
> >> >>   Dan.
> >> >>
> >> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
> >> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
> >> >> discussions we had
> >> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I
> >> would like to
> >> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Thanks,
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Joe
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Description of Working Group:
> >> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
> >> >> a network
> >> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
> >> >> 802.16, VPN,
> >> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself
> >> is a simple
> >> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these=20
> methods are=20
> >> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
> >> >> in RFCs. The
> >> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a deployment and=20
> >> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
> >> >> methods in the
> >> >> > standards track implement features such as key
> >> derivation that are
> >> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
> >> >> for, among
> >> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
> >> >> method in
> >> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no=20
> standards track=20
> >> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
> >> >> 4017, which
> >> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
> >> >> mechanisms
> >> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
> >> >> >
> >> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
> >> >> track, clarify
> >> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation
> >> issues gathered
> >> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the
> >> requirements of
> >> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.
> >> Backwards
> >> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
> >> >> 3748 and
> >> >> > RFC
> >> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be=20
> simple and=20
> >> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained=20
> environments.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication=20
> within a TLS=20
> >> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
> >> >> requirements. This
> >> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet
> >> RFC 4962
> >> >> > requirements.
> >> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of
> >> an enhanced
> >> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and=20
> >> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
> >> >> bindings. So as to
> >> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
> >> >> existing
> >> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate
> >> document.  This
> >> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
> >> >> EAP-TLS or
> >> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements
> >> that makes
> >> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
> >> >> This item
> >> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> _______________________________________________
> >> >> Emu mailing list
> >> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>=20
>=20
>=20


_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



From emu-bounces@ietf.org Wed Jan 23 14:34:07 2008
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Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2008 11:34:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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  Hi Joe,

  I went back and looked at the mailing list archives and the thing
is I can't really see where the group decided NOT to pursue an EAP
method that is resistant to dictionary attack and is also not based
on a tunnel method.

  The group wants to add a tunnel method and that method should
support passwords as well as other authentication mechanisms. And
I'm all on board for that! But that doesn't mean that password
authentication without a tunnel method is something we should not
work on.

  The working group had consensus for EAP-GPSK over EAP-TLS with TLS-PSK
and for those very same reasons I think an EAP-password method that is
resistant to dictionary attack would be good. Is there some reason why
it wouldn't be good? Is there something I'm missing?

  regards,

  Dan.

On Tue, January 22, 2008 9:17 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 5:12 PM
>> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>>
>>
>>   Hi Joe,
>>
>>   OK, so the charter is being opened up to add support for a
>> password-based mechanism, which should be resistant to a
>> dictionary attack, and that mechanism must use the tunnel
>> method. Right?
>>
> [Joe] Yes, this is the decision the working group made and the reason
> why we are opening the charter.
>
>>   It looks to me like we're explicitly writing a stand-alone
>> password-based method (which is resistant to dictionary
>> attack) out of the charter.
>> That seems odd. Why are we doing that?
>>
> [Joe] We are explicitly adding a charter item for a tunnel method and a
> password method based on the tunnel method.  This is the direction the
> working group chose.
>
>>   Dan.
>>
>> On Tue, January 22, 2008 2:41 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
>> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> >> Cc: emu@ietf.org
>> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >>
>> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>> >> > Hi Dan,
>> >> >
>> >> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
>> >> >> To: emu@ietf.org
>> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a
>> strong shared
>> >> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack
>> must use the
>> >> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
>> >> >
>> >> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and
>> >> is resistant
>> >> > to dictionary attack.
>> >>
>> >> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not based on the
>> >> strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage
>> an adversary
>> >> can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_ on
>> interaction with a
>> >> protocol participant. If any advantage can be gained through
>> >> something like computation then the protocol is not resistant to
>> >> dictionary attack.
>> >>
>> >>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack
>> >> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
>> >>
>> > [Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement
>> for GPSK.
>> >
>> >> >> How about
>> >> >> something along these lines:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC
>> 3748 and RFC
>> >> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
>> simple and
>> >> >> compact
>> >> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.
>> >> Preference
>> >> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a
>> >> cryptographically
>> >> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to
>> dictionary attack.
>> >> >>
>> >> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.
>>  The GPSK
>> >> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at
>> this time.
>> >>
>> >>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak
>> solution and is
>> >> not open to revision. What other portions are not open for
>> revision?
>> >>
>> > [Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel
>> method, a
>> > password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS".  Other items,
>> > especially items that are near completion, are not open for
>> revision.
>> >
>> >
>> >>   Dan.
>> >>
>> >> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to
>> >> not require
>> >> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was resistant to
>> >> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and
>> >> not say, "no,
>> >> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a
>> >> much weaker
>> >> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for
>> >> whatever reason,
>> >> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the
>> >> "must be a
>> >> >> strong shared secret"
>> >> >> requirement.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
>> >> attack but if
>> >> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary
>> >> attack wouldn't
>> >> >> that be goodness?
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   regards,
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   Dan.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
>> >> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
>> >> >> discussions we had
>> >> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I
>> >> would like to
>> >> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Thanks,
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Joe
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Description of Working Group:
>> >> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
>> >> >> a network
>> >> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
>> >> >> 802.16, VPN,
>> >> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself
>> >> is a simple
>> >> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these
>> methods are
>> >> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
>> >> >> in RFCs. The
>> >> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a deployment and
>> >> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
>> >> >> methods in the
>> >> >> > standards track implement features such as key
>> >> derivation that are
>> >> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
>> >> >> for, among
>> >> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
>> >> >> method in
>> >> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no
>> standards track
>> >> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
>> >> >> 4017, which
>> >> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
>> >> >> mechanisms
>> >> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
>> >> >> track, clarify
>> >> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation
>> >> issues gathered
>> >> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the
>> >> requirements of
>> >> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.
>> >> Backwards
>> >> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
>> >> >> 3748 and
>> >> >> > RFC
>> >> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
>> simple and
>> >> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained
>> environments.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication
>> within a TLS
>> >> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
>> >> >> requirements. This
>> >> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet
>> >> RFC 4962
>> >> >> > requirements.
>> >> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of
>> >> an enhanced
>> >> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and
>> >> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
>> >> >> bindings. So as to
>> >> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
>> >> >> existing
>> >> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate
>> >> document.  This
>> >> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
>> >> >> EAP-TLS or
>> >> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements
>> >> that makes
>> >> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
>> >> >> This item
>> >> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> >> Emu mailing list
>> >> >> Emu@ietf.org
>> >> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>




_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



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Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2008 14:44:41 -0500
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From: "Hao Zhou (hzhou)" <hzhou@cisco.com>
To: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>,
	"Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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Dan:

Not on the charter doesn't mean it prevent from someone working on such
method. Just the group agreed to develop a tunnel method supports
password authentication as a WG charter item.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2008 2:34 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>=20
>=20
>   Hi Joe,
>=20
>   I went back and looked at the mailing list archives and the=20
> thing is I can't really see where the group decided NOT to=20
> pursue an EAP method that is resistant to dictionary attack=20
> and is also not based on a tunnel method.
>=20
>   The group wants to add a tunnel method and that method=20
> should support passwords as well as other authentication=20
> mechanisms. And I'm all on board for that! But that doesn't=20
> mean that password authentication without a tunnel method is=20
> something we should not work on.
>=20
>   The working group had consensus for EAP-GPSK over EAP-TLS=20
> with TLS-PSK and for those very same reasons I think an=20
> EAP-password method that is resistant to dictionary attack=20
> would be good. Is there some reason why it wouldn't be good?=20
> Is there something I'm missing?
>=20
>   regards,
>=20
>   Dan.
>=20
> On Tue, January 22, 2008 9:17 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 5:12 PM
> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >>
> >>
> >>   Hi Joe,
> >>
> >>   OK, so the charter is being opened up to add support for a=20
> >> password-based mechanism, which should be resistant to a=20
> dictionary=20
> >> attack, and that mechanism must use the tunnel method. Right?
> >>
> > [Joe] Yes, this is the decision the working group made and=20
> the reason=20
> > why we are opening the charter.
> >
> >>   It looks to me like we're explicitly writing a stand-alone=20
> >> password-based method (which is resistant to dictionary
> >> attack) out of the charter.
> >> That seems odd. Why are we doing that?
> >>
> > [Joe] We are explicitly adding a charter item for a tunnel=20
> method and=20
> > a password method based on the tunnel method.  This is the=20
> direction=20
> > the working group chose.
> >
> >>   Dan.
> >>
> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 2:41 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
> >> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> >> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>   Hi Joe,
> >> >>
> >> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey=20
> (jsalowey) wrote:
> >> >> > Hi Dan,
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> >> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
> >> >> >> To: emu@ietf.org
> >> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   Hi Joe,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a
> >> strong shared
> >> >> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack
> >> must use the
> >> >> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and
> >> >> is resistant
> >> >> > to dictionary attack.
> >> >>
> >> >> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not=20
> based on the=20
> >> >> strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage
> >> an adversary
> >> >> can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_ on
> >> interaction with a
> >> >> protocol participant. If any advantage can be gained through=20
> >> >> something like computation then the protocol is not=20
> resistant to=20
> >> >> dictionary attack.
> >> >>
> >> >>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack=20
> >> >> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
> >> >>
> >> > [Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement
> >> for GPSK.
> >> >
> >> >> >> How about
> >> >> >> something along these lines:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC
> >> 3748 and RFC
> >> >> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
> >> simple and
> >> >> >> compact
> >> >> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.
> >> >> Preference
> >> >> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a
> >> >> cryptographically
> >> >> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to
> >> dictionary attack.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.
> >>  The GPSK
> >> >> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at
> >> this time.
> >> >>
> >> >>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak
> >> solution and is
> >> >> not open to revision. What other portions are not open for
> >> revision?
> >> >>
> >> > [Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel
> >> method, a
> >> > password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS". =20
> Other items,=20
> >> > especially items that are near completion, are not open for
> >> revision.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >>   Dan.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to
> >> >> not require
> >> >> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was=20
> resistant to=20
> >> >> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and
> >> >> not say, "no,
> >> >> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a
> >> >> much weaker
> >> >> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for
> >> >> whatever reason,
> >> >> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the
> >> >> "must be a
> >> >> >> strong shared secret"
> >> >> >> requirement.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
> >> >> attack but if
> >> >> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary
> >> >> attack wouldn't
> >> >> >> that be goodness?
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   regards,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   Dan.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
> >> >> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
> >> >> >> discussions we had
> >> >> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I
> >> >> would like to
> >> >> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Thanks,
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Joe
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Description of Working Group:
> >> >> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
> >> >> >> a network
> >> >> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
> >> >> >> 802.16, VPN,
> >> >> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself
> >> >> is a simple
> >> >> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these
> >> methods are
> >> >> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
> >> >> >> in RFCs. The
> >> >> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a=20
> deployment and=20
> >> >> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
> >> >> >> methods in the
> >> >> >> > standards track implement features such as key
> >> >> derivation that are
> >> >> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
> >> >> >> for, among
> >> >> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
> >> >> >> method in
> >> >> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no
> >> standards track
> >> >> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
> >> >> >> 4017, which
> >> >> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
> >> >> >> mechanisms
> >> >> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
> >> >> >> track, clarify
> >> >> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation
> >> >> issues gathered
> >> >> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the
> >> >> requirements of
> >> >> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.
> >> >> Backwards
> >> >> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
> >> >> >> 3748 and
> >> >> >> > RFC
> >> >> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
> >> simple and
> >> >> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained
> >> environments.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication
> >> within a TLS
> >> >> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
> >> >> >> requirements. This
> >> >> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet
> >> >> RFC 4962
> >> >> >> > requirements.
> >> >> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of
> >> >> an enhanced
> >> >> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication=20
> mechanism, and=20
> >> >> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
> >> >> >> bindings. So as to
> >> >> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
> >> >> >> existing
> >> >> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate
> >> >> document.  This
> >> >> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
> >> >> >> EAP-TLS or
> >> >> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements
> >> >> that makes
> >> >> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
> >> >> >> This item
> >> >> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> _______________________________________________
> >> >> >> Emu mailing list
> >> >> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> >> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>=20


_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



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Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2008 12:35:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Hao Zhou (hzhou)" <hzhou@cisco.com>
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  Well of course! Nothing prevents anyone from making an individual
submission. And yes, I understand very clearly that "the group agreed
to develop a tunnel method [that] supports password authentication as
a WG charter item." What I don't seem to see is where the group decided
that development of a non-tunneled EAP method for password authentication
is expressly not an item for the WG charter. That's not in the archives
of the mailing list and it doesn't seem to make much sense to me (for the
reasons I noted below). Care to explain why you, in particular, would not
like to see the WG work on a non-tunneled EAP method that supports
password authentication?

  Dan.

On Wed, January 23, 2008 11:44 am, Hao Zhou (hzhou) wrote:
> Dan:
>
> Not on the charter doesn't mean it prevent from someone working on such
> method. Just the group agreed to develop a tunnel method supports
> password authentication as a WG charter item.
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2008 2:34 PM
>> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> Cc: emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>>
>>
>>   Hi Joe,
>>
>>   I went back and looked at the mailing list archives and the
>> thing is I can't really see where the group decided NOT to
>> pursue an EAP method that is resistant to dictionary attack
>> and is also not based on a tunnel method.
>>
>>   The group wants to add a tunnel method and that method
>> should support passwords as well as other authentication
>> mechanisms. And I'm all on board for that! But that doesn't
>> mean that password authentication without a tunnel method is
>> something we should not work on.
>>
>>   The working group had consensus for EAP-GPSK over EAP-TLS
>> with TLS-PSK and for those very same reasons I think an
>> EAP-password method that is resistant to dictionary attack
>> would be good. Is there some reason why it wouldn't be good?
>> Is there something I'm missing?
>>
>>   regards,
>>
>>   Dan.
>>
>> On Tue, January 22, 2008 9:17 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 5:12 PM
>> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> >> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
>> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >>
>> >>   OK, so the charter is being opened up to add support for a
>> >> password-based mechanism, which should be resistant to a
>> dictionary
>> >> attack, and that mechanism must use the tunnel method. Right?
>> >>
>> > [Joe] Yes, this is the decision the working group made and
>> the reason
>> > why we are opening the charter.
>> >
>> >>   It looks to me like we're explicitly writing a stand-alone
>> >> password-based method (which is resistant to dictionary
>> >> attack) out of the charter.
>> >> That seems odd. Why are we doing that?
>> >>
>> > [Joe] We are explicitly adding a charter item for a tunnel
>> method and
>> > a password method based on the tunnel method.  This is the
>> direction
>> > the working group chose.
>> >
>> >>   Dan.
>> >>
>> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 2:41 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
>> >> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> >> >> Cc: emu@ietf.org
>> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey
>> (jsalowey) wrote:
>> >> >> > Hi Dan,
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> >> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
>> >> >> >> To: emu@ietf.org
>> >> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a
>> >> strong shared
>> >> >> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack
>> >> must use the
>> >> >> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and
>> >> >> is resistant
>> >> >> > to dictionary attack.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not
>> based on the
>> >> >> strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage
>> >> an adversary
>> >> >> can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_ on
>> >> interaction with a
>> >> >> protocol participant. If any advantage can be gained through
>> >> >> something like computation then the protocol is not
>> resistant to
>> >> >> dictionary attack.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack
>> >> >> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
>> >> >>
>> >> > [Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement
>> >> for GPSK.
>> >> >
>> >> >> >> How about
>> >> >> >> something along these lines:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC
>> >> 3748 and RFC
>> >> >> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
>> >> simple and
>> >> >> >> compact
>> >> >> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.
>> >> >> Preference
>> >> >> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a
>> >> >> cryptographically
>> >> >> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to
>> >> dictionary attack.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.
>> >>  The GPSK
>> >> >> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at
>> >> this time.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak
>> >> solution and is
>> >> >> not open to revision. What other portions are not open for
>> >> revision?
>> >> >>
>> >> > [Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel
>> >> method, a
>> >> > password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS".
>> Other items,
>> >> > especially items that are near completion, are not open for
>> >> revision.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >>   Dan.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to
>> >> >> not require
>> >> >> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was
>> resistant to
>> >> >> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and
>> >> >> not say, "no,
>> >> >> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a
>> >> >> much weaker
>> >> >> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for
>> >> >> whatever reason,
>> >> >> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the
>> >> >> "must be a
>> >> >> >> strong shared secret"
>> >> >> >> requirement.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
>> >> >> attack but if
>> >> >> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary
>> >> >> attack wouldn't
>> >> >> >> that be goodness?
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   regards,
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   Dan.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
>> >> >> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
>> >> >> >> discussions we had
>> >> >> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I
>> >> >> would like to
>> >> >> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Thanks,
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Joe
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Description of Working Group:
>> >> >> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
>> >> >> >> a network
>> >> >> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
>> >> >> >> 802.16, VPN,
>> >> >> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself
>> >> >> is a simple
>> >> >> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these
>> >> methods are
>> >> >> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
>> >> >> >> in RFCs. The
>> >> >> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a
>> deployment and
>> >> >> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
>> >> >> >> methods in the
>> >> >> >> > standards track implement features such as key
>> >> >> derivation that are
>> >> >> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
>> >> >> >> for, among
>> >> >> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
>> >> >> >> method in
>> >> >> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no
>> >> standards track
>> >> >> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
>> >> >> >> 4017, which
>> >> >> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
>> >> >> >> mechanisms
>> >> >> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
>> >> >> >> track, clarify
>> >> >> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation
>> >> >> issues gathered
>> >> >> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the
>> >> >> requirements of
>> >> >> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.
>> >> >> Backwards
>> >> >> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
>> >> >> >> 3748 and
>> >> >> >> > RFC
>> >> >> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
>> >> simple and
>> >> >> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained
>> >> environments.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication
>> >> within a TLS
>> >> >> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
>> >> >> >> requirements. This
>> >> >> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet
>> >> >> RFC 4962
>> >> >> >> > requirements.
>> >> >> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of
>> >> >> an enhanced
>> >> >> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication
>> mechanism, and
>> >> >> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
>> >> >> >> bindings. So as to
>> >> >> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
>> >> >> >> existing
>> >> >> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate
>> >> >> document.  This
>> >> >> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
>> >> >> >> EAP-TLS or
>> >> >> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements
>> >> >> that makes
>> >> >> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
>> >> >> >> This item
>> >> >> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> >> >> Emu mailing list
>> >> >> >> Emu@ietf.org
>> >> >> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Emu mailing list
>> Emu@ietf.org
>> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>>
>




_______________________________________________
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Wed Jan 23 15:39:30 2008
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Subject: RE: [Emu] 2716bis13: Support of certificate_status extension
Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2008 15:39:18 -0500
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From: "Nakhjiri Madjid-VXT746" <madjid.nakhjiri@motorola.com>
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	<bernarda@windows.microsoft.com>, <emu@ietf.org>
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Hi Joe,=20

Thanks for the reply, so basically if the underlying network access
technology does not provide specification how to force the client to do
a cert checking following successful access, there is essentially no
benefit by using 6366 extensions, when the server does not support it.

Madjid

-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) [mailto:jsalowey@cisco.com]=20
Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 12:31 PM
To: Nakhjiri Madjid-VXT746; bernarda@windows.microsoft.com; emu@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Emu] 2716bis13: Support of certificate_status extension

Hi Madjid,

Comments inline below:=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Nakhjiri Madjid-VXT746 [mailto:madjid.nakhjiri@motorola.com]
> Sent: Friday, January 18, 2008 5:03 PM
> To: bernarda@windows.microsoft.com; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] 2716bis13: Support of certificate_status extension
>=20
> Hi,
> =20
> Question on the following text:=20
>=20
> =20
>=20
> "However, in the case where the EAP-TLS peer is attempting to obtain=20
> network access, it will not have network connectivity and is therefore

> not capable of checking for certificate revocation until after=20
> authentication completes and network connectivity is available. For=20
> this reason EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD implement Certificate=20
> Status Request messages, as described in "Transport Layer Security=20
> (TLS) Extensions"
> [RFC4366] section 3.6.  To enable revocation checking in situations=20
> where servers do not support Certificate Status Request messages and=20
> network connectivity is not available prior to authentication=20
> completion, peer implementations MUST also support checking for=20
> certificate revocation after authentication completes and network=20
> connectivity is available, and they SHOULD utilize this capability by=20
> default."
>=20
> =20
>=20
> In cases where the server does not support the certificate_status=20
> extension, this is a little awkward, the server's cert is expired, but

> the server does not support the extension. The client has already=20
> gotten access to the network after EAP-TLS and so both TLS and the EAP

> exchange is terminated by an EAP Success. How is the spec suggesting=20
> the client to perform the revocation checking?

[Joe] Once the client has network access it can attempt to access CRLs
or certificate status services using existing mechanisms (CRL
distribution points, OCSP, etc.)=20

> and what is the
> process to break the network access (ignoring the question on why a=20
> client who would otherwise be a paying customer, really wanted this)=20
> after already have gained the access?
>=20
[Joe] The process depends upon the client and underlying network access
technology.=20

> =20
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Madjid
>=20
> =20
>=20
>=20


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Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
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Hi Dan,

Comments inline below:=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]=20
> Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2008 11:34 AM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>=20
>=20
>   Hi Joe,
>=20
>   I went back and looked at the mailing list archives and the=20
> thing is I can't really see where the group decided NOT to=20
> pursue an EAP method that is resistant to dictionary attack=20
> and is also not based on a tunnel method.
>=20
[Joe] The group has decided to work on the set of EAP methods in the
charter.  For the password based method the group has decided to work on
a tunnel method (see list archives October 2007).  While this does not
explicitly exclude another password based method, another password based
method is not within the scope of the charter. =20

>   The group wants to add a tunnel method and that method=20
> should support passwords as well as other authentication=20
> mechanisms. And I'm all on board for that! But that doesn't=20
> mean that password authentication without a tunnel method is=20
> something we should not work on.
>=20
[Joe] We need to make more progress on the current work items before we
consider taking on new work. =20

>   The working group had consensus for EAP-GPSK over EAP-TLS=20
> with TLS-PSK and for those very same reasons I think an=20
> EAP-password method that is resistant to dictionary attack=20
> would be good. Is there some reason why it wouldn't be good?=20
> Is there something I'm missing?
>=20
[Joe] I think there are differing opinions within the group. There is a
strong sentiment that fewer EAP methods is better than more.  Others may
be more liberal with respect to new methods.  Right now it is important
that we make progress on the items that we have consensus on before we
attempt to open up new ones.=20


>   regards,
>=20
>   Dan.
>=20
> On Tue, January 22, 2008 9:17 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 5:12 PM
> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >>
> >>
> >>   Hi Joe,
> >>
> >>   OK, so the charter is being opened up to add support for a=20
> >> password-based mechanism, which should be resistant to a=20
> dictionary=20
> >> attack, and that mechanism must use the tunnel method. Right?
> >>
> > [Joe] Yes, this is the decision the working group made and=20
> the reason=20
> > why we are opening the charter.
> >
> >>   It looks to me like we're explicitly writing a stand-alone=20
> >> password-based method (which is resistant to dictionary
> >> attack) out of the charter.
> >> That seems odd. Why are we doing that?
> >>
> > [Joe] We are explicitly adding a charter item for a tunnel=20
> method and=20
> > a password method based on the tunnel method.  This is the=20
> direction=20
> > the working group chose.
> >
> >>   Dan.
> >>
> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 2:41 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
> >> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> >> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>   Hi Joe,
> >> >>
> >> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey=20
> (jsalowey) wrote:
> >> >> > Hi Dan,
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> >> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
> >> >> >> To: emu@ietf.org
> >> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   Hi Joe,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a
> >> strong shared
> >> >> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack
> >> must use the
> >> >> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and
> >> >> is resistant
> >> >> > to dictionary attack.
> >> >>
> >> >> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not=20
> based on the=20
> >> >> strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage
> >> an adversary
> >> >> can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_ on
> >> interaction with a
> >> >> protocol participant. If any advantage can be gained through=20
> >> >> something like computation then the protocol is not=20
> resistant to=20
> >> >> dictionary attack.
> >> >>
> >> >>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack=20
> >> >> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
> >> >>
> >> > [Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement
> >> for GPSK.
> >> >
> >> >> >> How about
> >> >> >> something along these lines:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC
> >> 3748 and RFC
> >> >> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
> >> simple and
> >> >> >> compact
> >> >> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.
> >> >> Preference
> >> >> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a
> >> >> cryptographically
> >> >> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to
> >> dictionary attack.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.
> >>  The GPSK
> >> >> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at
> >> this time.
> >> >>
> >> >>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak
> >> solution and is
> >> >> not open to revision. What other portions are not open for
> >> revision?
> >> >>
> >> > [Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel
> >> method, a
> >> > password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS". =20
> Other items,=20
> >> > especially items that are near completion, are not open for
> >> revision.
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >>   Dan.
> >> >>
> >> >> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to
> >> >> not require
> >> >> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was=20
> resistant to=20
> >> >> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and
> >> >> not say, "no,
> >> >> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a
> >> >> much weaker
> >> >> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for
> >> >> whatever reason,
> >> >> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the
> >> >> "must be a
> >> >> >> strong shared secret"
> >> >> >> requirement.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
> >> >> attack but if
> >> >> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary
> >> >> attack wouldn't
> >> >> >> that be goodness?
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   regards,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   Dan.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
> >> >> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
> >> >> >> discussions we had
> >> >> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I
> >> >> would like to
> >> >> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Thanks,
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Joe
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Description of Working Group:
> >> >> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
> >> >> >> a network
> >> >> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
> >> >> >> 802.16, VPN,
> >> >> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself
> >> >> is a simple
> >> >> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these
> >> methods are
> >> >> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
> >> >> >> in RFCs. The
> >> >> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a=20
> deployment and=20
> >> >> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
> >> >> >> methods in the
> >> >> >> > standards track implement features such as key
> >> >> derivation that are
> >> >> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
> >> >> >> for, among
> >> >> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
> >> >> >> method in
> >> >> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no
> >> standards track
> >> >> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
> >> >> >> 4017, which
> >> >> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
> >> >> >> mechanisms
> >> >> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
> >> >> >> track, clarify
> >> >> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation
> >> >> issues gathered
> >> >> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the
> >> >> requirements of
> >> >> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.
> >> >> Backwards
> >> >> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
> >> >> >> 3748 and
> >> >> >> > RFC
> >> >> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
> >> simple and
> >> >> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained
> >> environments.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication
> >> within a TLS
> >> >> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
> >> >> >> requirements. This
> >> >> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet
> >> >> RFC 4962
> >> >> >> > requirements.
> >> >> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of
> >> >> an enhanced
> >> >> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication=20
> mechanism, and=20
> >> >> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
> >> >> >> bindings. So as to
> >> >> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
> >> >> >> existing
> >> >> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate
> >> >> document.  This
> >> >> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
> >> >> >> EAP-TLS or
> >> >> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements
> >> >> that makes
> >> >> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
> >> >> >> This item
> >> >> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> _______________________________________________
> >> >> >> Emu mailing list
> >> >> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> >> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>=20
>=20
>=20


_______________________________________________
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Wed Jan 23 17:01:11 2008
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Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2008 14:01:08 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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  Hi Joe,

  With all due respect to your chairmanship of the group let me
make the following comments.

On Wed, January 23, 2008 1:32 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
> Comments inline below:
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2008 11:34 AM
>> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>>
>>
>>   Hi Joe,
>>
>>   I went back and looked at the mailing list archives and the
>> thing is I can't really see where the group decided NOT to
>> pursue an EAP method that is resistant to dictionary attack
>> and is also not based on a tunnel method.
>>
> [Joe] The group has decided to work on the set of EAP methods in the
> charter.  For the password based method the group has decided to work o=
n
> a tunnel method (see list archives October 2007).  While this does not
> explicitly exclude another password based method, another password base=
d
> method is not within the scope of the charter.

  We are updating the charter. We have consensus to update add
something to it. I do not see how that equates to consensus to not add
something else.

  Strictly speaking a tunnel-based EAP method that supports passwords
is not within the scope of the current charter, right? Which is why the
title of this thread is "EMU charter update". We're updating our charter
to put such a method in our scope. This seems like an opportune time
to put another method in our scope.

>>   The group wants to add a tunnel method and that method
>> should support passwords as well as other authentication
>> mechanisms. And I'm all on board for that! But that doesn't
>> mean that password authentication without a tunnel method is
>> something we should not work on.
>>
> [Joe] We need to make more progress on the current work items before we
> consider taking on new work.

  From the looks of our last meeting we have considerable progress on
that front. In fact, we have 2 competing EAP methods that already
satisfy the requirements! The technical work necessary once we choose
the protocol to advance should be minimal. In fact, due to the claims
of a large deployed base for both protocols I would be inclined to
believe that substantive changes to the selected protocol will be
strongly resisted.

>>   The working group had consensus for EAP-GPSK over EAP-TLS
>> with TLS-PSK and for those very same reasons I think an
>> EAP-password method that is resistant to dictionary attack
>> would be good. Is there some reason why it wouldn't be good?
>> Is there something I'm missing?
>>
> [Joe] I think there are differing opinions within the group. There is a
> strong sentiment that fewer EAP methods is better than more.  Others ma=
y
> be more liberal with respect to new methods.  Right now it is important
> that we make progress on the items that we have consensus on before we
> attempt to open up new ones.

  I understand that is important but, again respectfully, I do not
believe your desire to speed things up necessarily translates into
consensus in the group.

  We certainly do not suffer from a lack of EAP methods but that is
largely due to different flavors of exactly the same thing-- PEAPv0,
PEAPv1, FAST, TTLS all provide server-side authentication with something
that looks awefully like EAP-TLS followed by a generic second phase
which does client-side authentication with a suite of options. What we
do suffer from is some EAP methods providing certain useful functionality=
.
EAP-GPSK filled one gap (PSK-based authentication that is compact,
lightweight, and does not require certificates) but it  cannot fill
another (robustness and resistance to dictionary attack).

  I respectfully ask you to make a call for consensus on the topic of
adding a password-based authentication method that is resistant to
dictionary attack to our charter.

  regards,

  Dan.




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So far I have only seen responses from Dan Harkins on the proposed
charter update=20
( http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg00712.html )

Please respond on the list if you have reviewed the charter and have
comments or if you approve of the current text.  Also make sure to
review the milestones. =20

Thanks,

Joe


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Thu Jan 24 22:59:13 2008
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Chris Newman has filed an IETF DISCUSS comment on RFC 2716bis Section 2.4. =
=20
=20
The text of this section reads as follows:
=20
"2.4.  Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation   EAP-TLS implementations MU=
ST support TLS v1.0.   EAP-TLS implementations need not necessarily support=
 all TLS   ciphersuites listed in [RFC4346].  Not all TLS ciphersuites are =
  supported by available TLS tool kits and licenses may be required in   so=
me cases.   To ensure interoperability, EAP-TLS peers and servers MUST supp=
ort   the TLS [RFC4346] mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite:       TLS_RSA_W=
ITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.   In addition, EAP-TLS servers SHOULD support and be =
able to negotiate=0C   all of the following TLS ciphersuites:       TLS_RSA=
_WITH_RC4_128_MD5       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128=
_CBC_SHA   In addition, EAP-TLS peers SHOULD support the following TLS   ci=
phersuites defined in [RFC3268]:       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       T=
LS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA   Since TLS supports ciphersuite negotiation, peers=
 completing the TLS   negotiation will also have selected a ciphersuite, wh=
ich includes   encryption and hashing methods.  Since the ciphersuite negot=
iated   within EAP-TLS applies only to the EAP conversation, TLS ciphersuit=
e   negotiation MUST NOT be used to negotiate the ciphersuites used to   se=
cure data.   TLS also supports compression as well as ciphersuite negotiati=
on.   However, during the EAP-TLS conversation the EAP peer and server MUST=
   NOT request or negotiate compression."
=20
Here is the comment:
=20
"Chris Newman:Discuss [2008-01-24]:I'd like to discuss the cipher suite iss=
ue raised in my comment on theIESG call.  An RFC editor note or even an ass=
urance the typos will befixed before publication would suffice to clear my =
discuss position.Comment [2008-01-10]:In this excerpt:----   all of the fol=
lowing TLS ciphersuites:       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5       TLS_RSA_WITH_=
RC4_128_SHA       TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA   In addition, EAP-TLS peers=
 SHOULD support the following TLS   ciphersuites defined in [RFC3268]:     =
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA----There are =
two errors: 1. two of the cipher suites are listed twice.2. the RC4_128 cip=
her suite is not defined in RFC 3268.Q: Would it be useful for this protoco=
l to recommend support for theserver name indication extension in RFC 4366?=
  Otherwise the serverrequires an IP address for each name it supports."
=20
The proposed resolution to this comment is as follows:
=20
With respect to the server name indication extension, I am not sure
that the IP address issue applies to EAP-TLS, which typically runs
over the link layer without IP.  Or is there something I'm missing?
=20
With respect to the ciphersuite comments, I suggest that the=20
text of Section 2.4 be changed to the following:
=20
"2.4.  Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation   EAP-TLS implementations MU=
ST support TLS v1.0.   EAP-TLS implementations need not necessarily support=
 all TLS   ciphersuites listed in [RFC4346].  Not all TLS ciphersuites are =
  supported by available TLS tool kits and licenses may be required in   so=
me cases.   To ensure interoperability, EAP-TLS peers and servers MUST supp=
ort   the TLS [RFC4346] mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite:       TLS_RSA_W=
ITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
=20
   EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD also support and be able
   to negotiate the following TLS ciphersuites:
=20
        TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA [RFC4346]
        TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC3268]   In addition, EAP-TLS serve=
rs SHOULD support and be able to negotiate   the following TLS ciphersuite:=
       TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 [RFC4346]   Since TLS supports ciphersuite =
negotiation, peers completing the TLS   negotiation will also have selected=
 a ciphersuite, which includes   encryption and hashing methods.  Since the=
 ciphersuite negotiated   within EAP-TLS applies only to the EAP conversati=
on, TLS ciphersuite   negotiation MUST NOT be used to negotiate the ciphers=
uites used to   secure data.   TLS also supports compression as well as cip=
hersuite negotiation.   However, during the EAP-TLS conversation the EAP pe=
er and server MUST   NOT request or negotiate compression."
 =

--_08ec4c81-7be8-4f1c-bec7-f5f35f534108_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html>
<head>
<style>
.hmmessage P
{
margin:0px;
padding:0px
}
body.hmmessage
{
FONT-SIZE: 10pt;
FONT-FAMILY:Tahoma
}
</style>
</head>
<body class=3D'hmmessage'>
Chris Newman has filed an IETF DISCUSS comment on RFC 2716bis Section 2.4.&=
nbsp; <BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
The text of this section reads as follows:<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
"2.4.&nbsp; Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; EAP=
-TLS implementations MUST support TLS v1.0.<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; EAP-TLS imp=
lementations need not necessarily support all TLS<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; ciphersui=
tes listed in [RFC4346].&nbsp; Not all TLS ciphersuites are<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 supported by available TLS tool kits and licenses may be required in<BR>&n=
bsp;&nbsp; some cases.<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; To ensure interoperability, EAP-=
TLS peers and servers MUST support<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; the TLS [RFC4346] mandat=
ory-to-implement ciphersuite:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; T=
LS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, EAP-TLS serv=
ers SHOULD support and be able to negotiate<BR>=0C&nbsp;&nbsp; all of the f=
ollowing TLS ciphersuites:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_=
RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_R=
C4_128_SHA<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC=
_SHA<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, EAP-TLS peers SHOULD support the foll=
owing TLS<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; ciphersuites defined in [RFC3268]:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Since =
TLS supports ciphersuite negotiation, peers completing the TLS<BR>&nbsp;&nb=
sp; negotiation will also have selected a ciphersuite, which includes<BR>&n=
bsp;&nbsp; encryption and hashing methods.&nbsp; Since the ciphersuite nego=
tiated<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; within EAP-TLS applies only to the EAP conversation,=
 TLS ciphersuite<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; negotiation MUST NOT be used to negotiate =
the ciphersuites used to<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; secure data.<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; T=
LS also supports compression as well as ciphersuite negotiation.<BR>&nbsp;&=
nbsp; However, during the EAP-TLS conversation the EAP peer and server MUST=
<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; NOT request or negotiate compression."<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Here is the comment:<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
"Chris Newman:<BR><BR>Discuss [2008-01-24]:<BR>I'd like to discuss the ciph=
er suite issue raised in my comment on the<BR>IESG call.&nbsp; An RFC edito=
r note or even an assurance the typos will be<BR>fixed before publication w=
ould suffice to clear my discuss position.<BR><BR>Comment [2008-01-10]:<BR>=
In this excerpt:<BR>----<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; all of the following TLS ciphersui=
tes:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5<B=
R>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA<BR>&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbs=
p; In addition, EAP-TLS peers SHOULD support the following TLS<BR>&nbsp;&nb=
sp; ciphersuites defined in [RFC3268]:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA<BR>----<BR><BR>There are two errors: 1. two of t=
he cipher suites are listed twice.<BR>2. the RC4_128 cipher suite is not de=
fined in RFC 3268.<BR><BR>Q: Would it be useful for this protocol to recomm=
end support for the<BR>server name indication extension in RFC 4366?&nbsp; =
Otherwise the server<BR>requires an IP address for each name it supports."<=
BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
The proposed resolution to this comment is as follows:<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
With respect to the server name indication extension, I am not sure<BR>
that the IP address issue applies to EAP-TLS, which typically runs<BR>
over the link layer without IP.&nbsp; Or is there something I'm missing?<BR=
>
&nbsp;<BR>
With respect to the ciphersuite comments, I suggest that the <BR>
text of Section 2.4 be changed to the following:<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
"2.4.&nbsp; Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; EAP=
-TLS implementations MUST support TLS v1.0.<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; EAP-TLS imp=
lementations need not necessarily support all TLS<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; ciphersui=
tes listed in [RFC4346].&nbsp; Not all TLS ciphersuites are<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 supported by available TLS tool kits and licenses may be required in<BR>&n=
bsp;&nbsp; some cases.<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; To ensure interoperability, EAP-=
TLS peers and servers MUST support<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; the TLS [RFC4346] mandat=
ory-to-implement ciphersuite:<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; T=
LS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp; EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD also support and be able<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp; to negotiate the following TLS ciphersuites:<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA [RFC434=
6]<BR>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RF=
C3268]<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, EAP-TLS servers SHOULD support and =
be able to negotiate<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; the following TLS ciphersuite:<BR><BR>=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 [RFC4346]<BR>=
<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Since TLS supports ciphersuite negotiation, peers completi=
ng the TLS<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; negotiation will also have selected a ciphersuit=
e, which includes<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; encryption and hashing methods.&nbsp; Sin=
ce the ciphersuite negotiated<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; within EAP-TLS applies only t=
o the EAP conversation, TLS ciphersuite<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; negotiation MUST NO=
T be used to negotiate the ciphersuites used to<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; secure data=
.<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; TLS also supports compression as well as ciphersuite =
negotiation.<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; However, during the EAP-TLS conversation the E=
AP peer and server MUST<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; NOT request or negotiate compressio=
n."<BR>
<BR>&nbsp;<BR></body>
</html>=

--_08ec4c81-7be8-4f1c-bec7-f5f35f534108_--



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_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu

--===============1039052917==--





From emu-bounces@ietf.org Fri Jan 25 18:20:04 2008
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Subject: RE: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update
Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2008 18:15:36 -0500
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From: "Stephen Hanna" <shanna@juniper.net>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>,
	<emu@ietf.org>
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I apologize for not responding earlier. I have reviewed the
proposed charter revision and milestones. I think they are
good and should be approved.

Thanks,

Steve

-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) [mailto:jsalowey@cisco.com]=20
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 12:45 PM
To: emu@ietf.org
Subject: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update

So far I have only seen responses from Dan Harkins on the proposed
charter update=20
( http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg00712.html )

Please respond on the list if you have reviewed the charter and have
comments or if you approve of the current text.  Also make sure to
review the milestones. =20

Thanks,

Joe


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Mon Jan 28 13:03:12 2008
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Subject: RE: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update
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From: "Nancy Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
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 Hi Joe,

The emu charter looks fine to me, the only item I would put in question
right now is whether we can actually have a clean first draft of the
requirements by the March meeting?

	Nancy.

-----Original Message-----
From: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)=20
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 9:45 AM
To: emu@ietf.org
Subject: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update

So far I have only seen responses from Dan Harkins on the proposed
charter update (
http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg00712.html )

Please respond on the list if you have reviewed the charter and have
comments or if you approve of the current text.  Also make sure to
review the milestones. =20

Thanks,

Joe


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Mon Jan 28 13:49:01 2008
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Subject: [Emu] PPP authentication and encryption - reality check
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Hi,

not sure if this mailing list is the appropriate one for asking these 
questions. I guess most people here are rather interested in the use of 
EAP in wireless networks. But I hope someone can help me to answer them:

- What are currently the widely deployed methods for authenticating PPP 
peers? MSCHAP2? EAP-MD5? PPP-EAP-TLS?

- Is there any encryption used?! e.g. with PPP ECP?

Best,
  Ali

P.S. the background of my question is that there has been some attacked 
reported lately on hijacked DSL connections.


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Mon Jan 28 16:40:06 2008
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From: Lakshminath Dondeti <ldondeti@qualcomm.com>
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I know it's after the deadline, but I think we should clarify some of 
the text to avoid debates on interpretation later.  (Note: this is going 
to sound like nit picking :) ).

For instance, on,
"Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel bindings. So as to
enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the existing
protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate document.  This item
will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance EAP-TLS or the
TLS based tunnel method.  "

Which is "the TLS based tunnel method" that is going to be enhanced?

We need to specify what we mean by channel bindings.  Is there an agreed 
upon definition that we can refer to?

regards,
Lakshminath

On 1/24/2008 9:44 AM, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> So far I have only seen responses from Dan Harkins on the proposed
> charter update 
> ( http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg00712.html )
> 
> Please respond on the list if you have reviewed the charter and have
> comments or if you approve of the current text.  Also make sure to
> review the milestones.  
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Joe
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 


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Subject: RE: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update
Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2008 16:50:01 -0500
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From: "Hao Zhou (hzhou)" <hzhou@cisco.com>
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Joe:

I am ok with the updated charter, with the following minor comments:

1. Should we add crypto-agility to the requirements of tunnel method?
And maybe strong shared secret method as well?
2. Move this paragraph right after the tunnel method paragraph, as it
reference the tunnel method above. This way if causes less confusion
with the TLS based channel binding method.
"A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that makes use
of existing password databases such as AAA databases.  This item will be
based on the above tunnel method."
3. TLS based channel binding paragraph:=20
"Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel bindings. So as to
enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the existing
protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate document.  This item
will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance EAP-TLS or the
TLS based tunnel method."

What does "will not generate a new method" mean? If we enhance EAP-TLS,
we are likely need to create a new method ID (the current one doesn't
have a version field). Even if we do, likely we will create backward
compatibility issue. Sound like the tunnel method is better, so we
creating minimum new EAP methods. If we choose the TLS based tunnel
method, the requirements already cover the channel binding. Why don't we
just make the decision now and say it is part of the tunnel method, or
at least make the minimum operation mode of the tunnel method is just
TLS with channel binding? =20


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)=20
> Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 12:45 PM
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update
>=20
> So far I have only seen responses from Dan Harkins on the=20
> proposed charter update (=20
> http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg00712.html )
>=20
> Please respond on the list if you have reviewed the charter=20
> and have comments or if you approve of the current text. =20
> Also make sure to review the milestones. =20
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Joe
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>=20


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=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Lakshminath Dondeti [mailto:ldondeti@qualcomm.com]=20
> Sent: Monday, January 28, 2008 1:40 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update
>=20
> I know it's after the deadline, but I think we should clarify=20
> some of the text to avoid debates on interpretation later. =20
> (Note: this is going to sound like nit picking :) ).
>=20
> For instance, on,
> "Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel bindings.=20
> So as to enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications=20
> to the existing protocol, this effort will be handled in a=20
> separate document.  This item will not generate a new method,=20
> rather it will enhance EAP-TLS or the TLS based tunnel method.  "
>=20
> Which is "the TLS based tunnel method" that is going to be enhanced?
>=20

[Joe] This "the TLS based tunnel method" is the method the working group
will be working.  Would it help if I said "the above TLS based tunnel
method"

> We need to specify what we mean by channel bindings.  Is=20
> there an agreed upon definition that we can refer to?
>=20
[Joe] I think we are working towards this, I will check with the Ads to
see where this is at. I don't think we should hold up the charter
definition for this.=20


> regards,
> Lakshminath
>=20
> On 1/24/2008 9:44 AM, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> > So far I have only seen responses from Dan Harkins on the proposed=20
> > charter update (=20
> > http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg00712.html )
> >=20
> > Please respond on the list if you have reviewed the charter=20
> and have=20
> > comments or if you approve of the current text.  Also make sure to=20
> > review the milestones.
> >=20
> > Thanks,
> >=20
> > Joe
> >=20
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >=20
>=20


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=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hao Zhou (hzhou)=20
> Sent: Monday, January 28, 2008 1:50 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update
>=20
> Joe:
>=20
> I am ok with the updated charter, with the following minor comments:
>=20
> 1. Should we add crypto-agility to the requirements of tunnel=20
> method?=20
>And maybe strong shared secret method as well?

[Joe] I think crypto agility is a well accepted requirement, but I can
explicitly add it.=20

> 2. Move this paragraph right after the tunnel method=20
> paragraph, as it reference the tunnel method above. This way=20
> if causes less confusion with the TLS based channel binding method.
> "A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that=20
> makes use of existing password databases such as AAA=20
> databases.  This item will be based on the above tunnel method."

[Joe] Since we have two work items that reference tunnel method, how
about changing "above tunnel method" to "tunnel method work item"?

> 3. TLS based channel binding paragraph:=20
> "Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel bindings.=20
> So as to enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications=20
> to the existing protocol, this effort will be handled in a=20
> separate document.  This item will not generate a new method,=20
> rather it will enhance EAP-TLS or the TLS based tunnel method."
>=20
> What does "will not generate a new method" mean? If we=20
> enhance EAP-TLS, we are likely need to create a new method ID=20
> (the current one doesn't have a version field). Even if we=20
> do, likely we will create backward compatibility issue. Sound=20
> like the tunnel method is better, so we creating minimum new=20
> EAP methods.=20
> If we choose the TLS based tunnel method, the=20
> requirements already cover the channel binding. Why don't we=20
> just make the decision now and say it is part of the tunnel=20
> method, or at least make the minimum operation mode of the=20
> tunnel method is just TLS with channel binding? =20
>=20
[Joe] Jari requested that we do not close the door and create a solution
that works only with a tunnel method in the charter.  If the solution
requires large modifications to EAP-TLS then it probably won't be
attractive to the group.  I think it is reasonable to keep this open in
the charter.=20


>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> > Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 12:45 PM
> > To: emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update
> >=20
> > So far I have only seen responses from Dan Harkins on the proposed=20
> > charter update (=20
> > http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg00712.html )
> >=20
> > Please respond on the list if you have reviewed the charter=20
> and have=20
> > comments or if you approve of the current text.
> > Also make sure to review the milestones. =20
> >=20
> > Thanks,
> >=20
> > Joe
> >=20
> >=20
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >=20
>=20


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Tue Jan 29 16:07:15 2008
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From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Emu] Protocol Action: 'The EAP TLS Authentication Protocol' 
 to Proposed Standard 
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The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'The EAP TLS Authentication Protocol '
   <draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-13.txt> as a Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the EAP Method Update Working Group. 

The IESG contact persons are Sam Hartman and Tim Polk.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-13.txt

Technical Summary
 
   The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748,
   provides support for multiple authentication methods. Transport Level
   Security (TLS) provides for mutual authentication, integrity-protected
   ciphersuite negotiation and key exchange between two endpoints. This
   document defines EAP-TLS, which includes support for certificate-based
   mutual authentication and key derivation. This document obsoletes RFC
   2716 to bring EAP-TLS into the standards track.
 
Working Group Summary
 
   The document represents rough consensus of the working group.
 
Protocol Quality
 
This document has been reviewed for the IESG by Sam Hartman.   There are
many interoperable implementation of EAP-TLS deployed today.
   This document has been reviewed by people involved in the EAP, TLS and
   PKIX working groups.


Note to RFC Editor
 
Please replace Section 2.4 with the following text:

2.4.  Ciphersuite and Compression Negotiation

  EAP-TLS implementations MUST support TLS v1.0.

  EAP-TLS implementations need not necessarily support all TLS
  ciphersuites listed in [RFC4346].  Not all TLS ciphersuites are
  supported by available TLS tool kits and licenses may be required in
  some cases.

  To ensure interoperability, EAP-TLS peers and servers MUST support
  the TLS [RFC4346] mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite:

      TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

  EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD also support and be able
  to negotiate the following TLS ciphersuites:

        TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA [RFC4346]
        TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA [RFC3268]

  In addition, EAP-TLS servers SHOULD support and be able to negotiate
  the following TLS ciphersuite:

      TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 [RFC4346]

  Since TLS supports ciphersuite negotiation, peers completing the TLS
  negotiation will also have selected a ciphersuite, which includes
  encryption and hashing methods.  Since the ciphersuite negotiated
  within EAP-TLS applies only to the EAP conversation, TLS ciphersuite
  negotiation MUST NOT be used to negotiate the ciphersuites used to
  secure data.

  TLS also supports compression as well as ciphersuite negotiation.
  However, during the EAP-TLS conversation the EAP peer and server MUST
  NOT request or negotiate compression.



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From emu-bounces@ietf.org Tue Jan 29 20:04:59 2008
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Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2008 17:04:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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  Hi Joe,

  I don't think I've been very clear. In fact, after speaking to other
people about this topic I'm pretty sure I have not been clear. So let
me try to explain myself again.

  Currently the EMU charter says:

"This group is chartered to work on the following types of mechanisms to
meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
[snip]
- A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that makes use
of existing password databases such as AAA databases. The
implementation should strive to be usable in resource constrained
environments."

So a method that uses an existing password database _is_ in the charter.
(Note that this was not satisfied by EAP-GPSK nor am I talking about
changing anything about the charter that refers to EAP-GPSK. EAP-GPSK
has an explicit mention in the current charter that is different from
the quoted item above). And the Goals and Milestones say:
"Aug 2007	  	Submit password Based Mechanism to IESG"

  Having a password-based authentication method is very valuable because
it uses a very simple trust model. It can be argued that this trust
model is the predominant one in the Internet today for human to computer
interaction. A method that operates in this simple trust model and uses
no public-key infrastructure would be a valuable contribution that EMU
could make.

  But I should be preaching to the choir because _it's already in the
charter_!!! Certainly the value of this method has already been discussed
in this working group because consensus was reached to have it be in the
charter.

  Now, I also see considerable value in having a tunneled method that
could, just so happen, allow for client-side authentication with a
password. I'd expect it can do a whole suite of options for various
client-side authentication but a password could be one. That's great.
Let's include that in the charter. In fact, that was "Option 2" that
that there was humming for back in October of 2007.

  What is being proposed is modifying the aforementioned charter item
to read:

"- A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that makes use
of existing password databases such as AAA databases.  This
item will be based on the above tunnel method."

And it's that last sentence that I'm taking issue with. There is already,
in the proposed charter update, explicit mention of a tunneled method
that will support a password-based authentication mechanism. So adding
that last sentence does nothing except _remove_ something from the charte=
r.

  I do not see any rationale for, or any value in, removing a stand-alone
method that provides password-authentication from the charter. All we
need to do is update the Goals and Milestones. I happen to have a protoco=
l
in mind that I think can satisfy this requirement and I'd like it to find
a home in EMU.

  regards,

  Dan.

On Wed, January 23, 2008 1:32 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
> Comments inline below:
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2008 11:34 AM
>> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>>
>>
>>   Hi Joe,
>>
>>   I went back and looked at the mailing list archives and the
>> thing is I can't really see where the group decided NOT to
>> pursue an EAP method that is resistant to dictionary attack
>> and is also not based on a tunnel method.
>>
> [Joe] The group has decided to work on the set of EAP methods in the
> charter.  For the password based method the group has decided to work o=
n
> a tunnel method (see list archives October 2007).  While this does not
> explicitly exclude another password based method, another password base=
d
> method is not within the scope of the charter.
>
>>   The group wants to add a tunnel method and that method
>> should support passwords as well as other authentication
>> mechanisms. And I'm all on board for that! But that doesn't
>> mean that password authentication without a tunnel method is
>> something we should not work on.
>>
> [Joe] We need to make more progress on the current work items before we
> consider taking on new work.
>
>>   The working group had consensus for EAP-GPSK over EAP-TLS
>> with TLS-PSK and for those very same reasons I think an
>> EAP-password method that is resistant to dictionary attack
>> would be good. Is there some reason why it wouldn't be good?
>> Is there something I'm missing?
>>
> [Joe] I think there are differing opinions within the group. There is a
> strong sentiment that fewer EAP methods is better than more.  Others ma=
y
> be more liberal with respect to new methods.  Right now it is important
> that we make progress on the items that we have consensus on before we
> attempt to open up new ones.
>
>
>>   regards,
>>
>>   Dan.
>>
>> On Tue, January 22, 2008 9:17 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 5:12 PM
>> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> >> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
>> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >>
>> >>   OK, so the charter is being opened up to add support for a
>> >> password-based mechanism, which should be resistant to a
>> dictionary
>> >> attack, and that mechanism must use the tunnel method. Right?
>> >>
>> > [Joe] Yes, this is the decision the working group made and
>> the reason
>> > why we are opening the charter.
>> >
>> >>   It looks to me like we're explicitly writing a stand-alone
>> >> password-based method (which is resistant to dictionary
>> >> attack) out of the charter.
>> >> That seems odd. Why are we doing that?
>> >>
>> > [Joe] We are explicitly adding a charter item for a tunnel
>> method and
>> > a password method based on the tunnel method.  This is the
>> direction
>> > the working group chose.
>> >
>> >>   Dan.
>> >>
>> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 2:41 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
>> >> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> >> >> Cc: emu@ietf.org
>> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey
>> (jsalowey) wrote:
>> >> >> > Hi Dan,
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
>> >> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
>> >> >> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
>> >> >> >> To: emu@ietf.org
>> >> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   Hi Joe,
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a
>> >> strong shared
>> >> >> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack
>> >> must use the
>> >> >> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and
>> >> >> is resistant
>> >> >> > to dictionary attack.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not
>> based on the
>> >> >> strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage
>> >> an adversary
>> >> >> can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_ on
>> >> interaction with a
>> >> >> protocol participant. If any advantage can be gained through
>> >> >> something like computation then the protocol is not
>> resistant to
>> >> >> dictionary attack.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack
>> >> >> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
>> >> >>
>> >> > [Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement
>> >> for GPSK.
>> >> >
>> >> >> >> How about
>> >> >> >> something along these lines:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC
>> >> 3748 and RFC
>> >> >> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
>> >> simple and
>> >> >> >> compact
>> >> >> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.
>> >> >> Preference
>> >> >> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a
>> >> >> cryptographically
>> >> >> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to
>> >> dictionary attack.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.
>> >>  The GPSK
>> >> >> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at
>> >> this time.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak
>> >> solution and is
>> >> >> not open to revision. What other portions are not open for
>> >> revision?
>> >> >>
>> >> > [Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel
>> >> method, a
>> >> > password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS".
>> Other items,
>> >> > especially items that are near completion, are not open for
>> >> revision.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >>   Dan.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to
>> >> >> not require
>> >> >> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was
>> resistant to
>> >> >> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and
>> >> >> not say, "no,
>> >> >> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a
>> >> >> much weaker
>> >> >> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for
>> >> >> whatever reason,
>> >> >> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the
>> >> >> "must be a
>> >> >> >> strong shared secret"
>> >> >> >> requirement.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
>> >> >> attack but if
>> >> >> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary
>> >> >> attack wouldn't
>> >> >> >> that be goodness?
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   regards,
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>   Dan.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
>> >> >> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
>> >> >> >> discussions we had
>> >> >> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I
>> >> >> would like to
>> >> >> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Thanks,
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Joe
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Description of Working Group:
>> >> >> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is
>> >> >> >> a network
>> >> >> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
>> >> >> >> 802.16, VPN,
>> >> >> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself
>> >> >> is a simple
>> >> >> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these
>> >> methods are
>> >> >> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are documented
>> >> >> >> in RFCs. The
>> >> >> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a
>> deployment and
>> >> >> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
>> >> >> >> methods in the
>> >> >> >> > standards track implement features such as key
>> >> >> derivation that are
>> >> >> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a problem
>> >> >> >> for, among
>> >> >> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement EAP
>> >> >> >> method in
>> >> >> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no
>> >> standards track
>> >> >> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
>> >> >> >> 4017, which
>> >> >> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > This group is chartered to work on the following types of
>> >> >> >> mechanisms
>> >> >> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
>> >> >> >> track, clarify
>> >> >> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation
>> >> >> issues gathered
>> >> >> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the
>> >> >> requirements of
>> >> >> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.
>> >> >> Backwards
>> >> >> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC
>> >> >> >> 3748 and
>> >> >> >> > RFC
>> >> >> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
>> >> simple and
>> >> >> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained
>> >> environments.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication
>> >> within a TLS
>> >> >> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
>> >> >> >> requirements. This
>> >> >> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet
>> >> >> RFC 4962
>> >> >> >> > requirements.
>> >> >> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of
>> >> >> an enhanced
>> >> >> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication
>> mechanism, and
>> >> >> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
>> >> >> >> bindings. So as to
>> >> >> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to the
>> >> >> >> existing
>> >> >> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate
>> >> >> document.  This
>> >> >> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will enhance
>> >> >> >> EAP-TLS or
>> >> >> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
>> >> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements
>> >> >> that makes
>> >> >> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA databases.
>> >> >> >> This item
>> >> >> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> >> >> Emu mailing list
>> >> >> >> Emu@ietf.org
>> >> >> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>




_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



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Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2008 13:40:17 -0800
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Thread-Topic: [Emu] EMU charter update,
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Hi Dan,

The EMU group was chartered to work on a password based method to work
with existing password databases.  During the last year we have had
discussions in meetings and on the list to reach working group consensus
on the way to meet this task.  The consensus is to use a tunnel method
to meet this task and is the reason why we are adding this to the
charter.  Removing the sentence that indicates use of a tunnel method
from the charter would be counter to the consensus we have reached.=20

EMU was chartered with a constrained set of goals, which is why we must
re-charter to add a tunnel method.  Adding a new item requires gaining
consensus within the working group and approval from the IESG.  The
first step in this process would be to have a proposal.=20

Joe



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]=20
> Sent: Tuesday, January 29, 2008 5:05 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
>=20
>=20
>   Hi Joe,
>=20
>   I don't think I've been very clear. In fact, after speaking=20
> to other people about this topic I'm pretty sure I have not=20
> been clear. So let me try to explain myself again.
>=20
>   Currently the EMU charter says:
>=20
> "This group is chartered to work on the following types of=20
> mechanisms to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
> [snip]
> - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that=20
> makes use of existing password databases such as AAA=20
> databases. The implementation should strive to be usable in=20
> resource constrained environments."
>=20
> So a method that uses an existing password database _is_ in=20
> the charter.
> (Note that this was not satisfied by EAP-GPSK nor am I=20
> talking about changing anything about the charter that refers=20
> to EAP-GPSK. EAP-GPSK has an explicit mention in the current=20
> charter that is different from the quoted item above). And=20
> the Goals and Milestones say:
> "Aug 2007	  	Submit password Based Mechanism to IESG"
>=20
>   Having a password-based authentication method is very=20
> valuable because it uses a very simple trust model. It can be=20
> argued that this trust model is the predominant one in the=20
> Internet today for human to computer interaction. A method=20
> that operates in this simple trust model and uses no=20
> public-key infrastructure would be a valuable contribution=20
> that EMU could make.
>=20
>   But I should be preaching to the choir because _it's=20
> already in the charter_!!! Certainly the value of this method=20
> has already been discussed in this working group because=20
> consensus was reached to have it be in the charter.
>=20
>   Now, I also see considerable value in having a tunneled=20
> method that could, just so happen, allow for client-side=20
> authentication with a password. I'd expect it can do a whole=20
> suite of options for various client-side authentication but a=20
> password could be one. That's great.
> Let's include that in the charter. In fact, that was "Option=20
> 2" that that there was humming for back in October of 2007.
>=20
>   What is being proposed is modifying the aforementioned=20
> charter item to read:
>=20
> "- A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements=20
> that makes use of existing password databases such as AAA=20
> databases.  This item will be based on the above tunnel method."
>=20
> And it's that last sentence that I'm taking issue with. There=20
> is already, in the proposed charter update, explicit mention=20
> of a tunneled method that will support a password-based=20
> authentication mechanism. So adding that last sentence does=20
> nothing except _remove_ something from the charter.
>=20
>   I do not see any rationale for, or any value in, removing a=20
> stand-alone method that provides password-authentication from=20
> the charter. All we need to do is update the Goals and=20
> Milestones. I happen to have a protocol in mind that I think=20
> can satisfy this requirement and I'd like it to find a home in EMU.
>=20
>   regards,
>=20
>   Dan.
>=20
> On Wed, January 23, 2008 1:32 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> > Hi Dan,
> >
> > Comments inline below:
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2008 11:34 AM
> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >>
> >>
> >>   Hi Joe,
> >>
> >>   I went back and looked at the mailing list archives and=20
> the thing=20
> >> is I can't really see where the group decided NOT to pursue an EAP=20
> >> method that is resistant to dictionary attack and is also=20
> not based=20
> >> on a tunnel method.
> >>
> > [Joe] The group has decided to work on the set of EAP=20
> methods in the=20
> > charter.  For the password based method the group has=20
> decided to work=20
> > on a tunnel method (see list archives October 2007).  While=20
> this does=20
> > not explicitly exclude another password based method,=20
> another password=20
> > based method is not within the scope of the charter.
> >
> >>   The group wants to add a tunnel method and that method should=20
> >> support passwords as well as other authentication=20
> mechanisms. And I'm=20
> >> all on board for that! But that doesn't mean that password=20
> >> authentication without a tunnel method is something we should not=20
> >> work on.
> >>
> > [Joe] We need to make more progress on the current work=20
> items before=20
> > we consider taking on new work.
> >
> >>   The working group had consensus for EAP-GPSK over EAP-TLS with=20
> >> TLS-PSK and for those very same reasons I think an EAP-password=20
> >> method that is resistant to dictionary attack would be=20
> good. Is there=20
> >> some reason why it wouldn't be good?
> >> Is there something I'm missing?
> >>
> > [Joe] I think there are differing opinions within the=20
> group. There is=20
> > a strong sentiment that fewer EAP methods is better than=20
> more.  Others=20
> > may be more liberal with respect to new methods.  Right now it is=20
> > important that we make progress on the items that we have=20
> consensus on=20
> > before we attempt to open up new ones.
> >
> >
> >>   regards,
> >>
> >>   Dan.
> >>
> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 9:17 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 5:12 PM
> >> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> >> Cc: Dan Harkins; emu@ietf.org
> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>   Hi Joe,
> >> >>
> >> >>   OK, so the charter is being opened up to add support for a=20
> >> >> password-based mechanism, which should be resistant to a
> >> dictionary
> >> >> attack, and that mechanism must use the tunnel method. Right?
> >> >>
> >> > [Joe] Yes, this is the decision the working group made and
> >> the reason
> >> > why we are opening the charter.
> >> >
> >> >>   It looks to me like we're explicitly writing a stand-alone=20
> >> >> password-based method (which is resistant to dictionary
> >> >> attack) out of the charter.
> >> >> That seems odd. Why are we doing that?
> >> >>
> >> > [Joe] We are explicitly adding a charter item for a tunnel
> >> method and
> >> > a password method based on the tunnel method.  This is the
> >> direction
> >> > the working group chose.
> >> >
> >> >>   Dan.
> >> >>
> >> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 2:41 pm, Joseph Salowey=20
> (jsalowey) wrote:
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> >> >> Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2008 2:13 PM
> >> >> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> >> >> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> >> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   Hi Joe,
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> On Tue, January 22, 2008 12:38 pm, Joseph Salowey
> >> (jsalowey) wrote:
> >> >> >> > Hi Dan,
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> >> >> >> From: Dan Harkins [mailto:dharkins@lounge.org]
> >> >> >> >> Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2008 9:56 PM
> >> >> >> >> To: emu@ietf.org
> >> >> >> >> Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>   Hi Joe,
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>   Why are we stating that the PSK method must use a
> >> >> strong shared
> >> >> >> >> secret and the method resistant to dictionary attack
> >> >> must use the
> >> >> >> >> tunneled method? That seems odd.
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> > [Joe] The PSK is assumed to be a strong shared secret and
> >> >> >> is resistant
> >> >> >> > to dictionary attack.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> The notion of resistance to dictionary attack is not
> >> based on the
> >> >> >> strength of the PSK it is based on whether the advantage
> >> >> an adversary
> >> >> >> can gain to determine the PSK is based _solely_ on
> >> >> interaction with a
> >> >> >> protocol participant. If any advantage can be gained through=20
> >> >> >> something like computation then the protocol is not
> >> resistant to
> >> >> >> dictionary attack.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   The GPSK protocol is NOT resistant to a dictionary attack=20
> >> >> >> regardless of the assumptions placed on the PSK.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> > [Joe] OK, dictionary attack resistance is not a requirement
> >> >> for GPSK.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> How about
> >> >> >> >> something along these lines:
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>   - A mechanism based on shared secrets that meets RFC
> >> >> 3748 and RFC
> >> >> >> >>   4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
> >> >> simple and
> >> >> >> >> compact
> >> >> >> >>   for implementation in resource constrained environments.
> >> >> >> Preference
> >> >> >> >>   will be given to solutions that can be used with a
> >> >> >> cryptographically
> >> >> >> >>   weak shared secret and that are resistant to
> >> >> dictionary attack.
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> > [Joe] This item of the charter is not open for revision.
> >> >>  The GPSK
> >> >> >> > document to meet this charter item is in IESG review at
> >> >> this time.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>   That's very curious. A charter that mandates a weak
> >> >> solution and is
> >> >> >> not open to revision. What other portions are not open for
> >> >> revision?
> >> >> >>
> >> >> > [Joe] The charter is opened up to add support for a tunnel
> >> >> method, a
> >> >> > password based method and to clarify "enhanced TLS".
> >> Other items,
> >> >> > especially items that are near completion, are not open for
> >> >> revision.
> >> >> >
> >> >> >
> >> >> >>   Dan.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> If a method based on a shared secret just so happened to
> >> >> >> not require
> >> >> >> >> a cryptographically strong shared secret and was
> >> resistant to
> >> >> >> >> dictionary attack I really hope EMU would accept it and
> >> >> >> not say, "no,
> >> >> >> >> sorry that is too strong for us, our charter mandates a
> >> >> >> much weaker
> >> >> >> >> solution." Of course if such a solution was not, for
> >> >> >> whatever reason,
> >> >> >> >> acceptable to the working group we could fall back on the
> >> >> >> "must be a
> >> >> >> >> strong shared secret"
> >> >> >> >> requirement.
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>   The tunneled method should be resistant to dictionary
> >> >> >> attack but if
> >> >> >> >> the non-tunneled one was also resistant to dictionary
> >> >> >> attack wouldn't
> >> >> >> >> that be goodness?
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>   regards,
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>   Dan.
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey at cisco.com> wrote
> >> >> >> >> > Below is a draft of the EMU charter that reflects
> >> >> >> >> discussions we had
> >> >> >> >> > at IETF 70.  Please review this and send comments.  I
> >> >> >> would like to
> >> >> >> >> > have comments in by January 23, 2008.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > Thanks,
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > Joe
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > Description of Working Group:
> >> >> >> >> > The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)=20
> [RFC 3748] is
> >> >> >> >> a network
> >> >> >> >> > access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11,
> >> >> >> >> 802.16, VPN,
> >> >> >> >> > PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself
> >> >> >> is a simple
> >> >> >> >> > protocol and actual authentication happens in=20
> EAP methods.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these
> >> >> methods are
> >> >> >> >> > proprietary methods and only a few methods are=20
> documented
> >> >> >> >> in RFCs. The
> >> >> >> >> > lack of documented, open specifications is a
> >> deployment and
> >> >> >> >> > interoperability problem. In addition, none of the EAP
> >> >> >> >> methods in the
> >> >> >> >> > standards track implement features such as key
> >> >> >> derivation that are
> >> >> >> >> > required for many modern applications. This poses a=20
> >> >> >> >> > problem
> >> >> >> >> for, among
> >> >> >> >> > other things, the selection of a mandatory to implement=20
> >> >> >> >> > EAP
> >> >> >> >> method in
> >> >> >> >> > new network access technologies. For example, no
> >> >> standards track
> >> >> >> >> > methods meet new requirements such as those posed in RFC
> >> >> >> >> 4017, which
> >> >> >> >> > documents IEEE 802.11 requirements for EAP methods.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > This group is chartered to work on the=20
> following types of
> >> >> >> >> mechanisms
> >> >> >> >> > to meet RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements:
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > - An update to RFC 2716 to bring EAP-TLS into standards
> >> >> >> >> track, clarify
> >> >> >> >> > specification, interoperability, and implementation
> >> >> >> issues gathered
> >> >> >> >> > over the years, and update the document to meet the
> >> >> >> requirements of
> >> >> >> >> > RFC 3748, RFC 4017, and EAP keying framework documents.
> >> >> >> Backwards
> >> >> >> >> > compatibility with RFC 2716 is a requirement.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets that meets=20
> >> >> >> >> > RFC
> >> >> >> >> 3748 and
> >> >> >> >> > RFC
> >> >> >> >> > 4017 requirements. This mechanism should strive to be
> >> >> simple and
> >> >> >> >> > compact for implementation in resource constrained
> >> >> environments.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > - A mechanism to support extensible communication
> >> >> within a TLS
> >> >> >> >> > protected tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017
> >> >> >> >> requirements. This
> >> >> >> >> > mechanism must support channel bindings in order to meet
> >> >> >> RFC 4962
> >> >> >> >> > requirements.
> >> >> >> >> > This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of
> >> >> >> an enhanced
> >> >> >> >> > TLS mechanism, a password based authentication
> >> mechanism, and
> >> >> >> >> > additional inner authentication mechanisms.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > - Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel
> >> >> >> >> bindings. So as to
> >> >> >> >> > enable RFC 2716bis to focus solely on clarifications to=20
> >> >> >> >> > the
> >> >> >> >> existing
> >> >> >> >> > protocol, this effort will be handled in a separate
> >> >> >> document.  This
> >> >> >> >> > item will not generate a new method, rather it will=20
> >> >> >> >> > enhance
> >> >> >> >> EAP-TLS or
> >> >> >> >> > the TLS based tunnel method.
> >> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >> >> > - A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements
> >> >> >> that makes
> >> >> >> >> > use of existing password databases such as AAA=20
> databases.
> >> >> >> >> This item
> >> >> >> >> > will be based on the above tunnel method.
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________
> >> >> >> >> Emu mailing list
> >> >> >> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> >> >> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> >
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
>=20
>=20
>=20


_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



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Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2008 00:07:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: RE: [Emu] EMU charter update,
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To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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  Hi Joe,

On Wed, January 30, 2008 1:40 pm, Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
> The EMU group was chartered to work on a password based method to work
> with existing password databases.  During the last year we have had
> discussions in meetings and on the list to reach working group consensu=
s
> on the way to meet this task.  The consensus is to use a tunnel method
> to meet this task and is the reason why we are adding this to the
> charter.  Removing the sentence that indicates use of a tunnel method
> from the charter would be counter to the consensus we have reached.

  I don't believe that would be the case. The changes to the charter that
are being proposed say:

 "- A mechanism to support extensible communication within a TLS protecte=
d
    tunnel that meets RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements. This mechanism
    must support channel bindings in order to meet RFC 4962 requirements.
    This mechanism will support meeting the requirements of an enhanced T=
LS
    mechanism, a password based authentication mechanism, and
    additional inner authentication mechanisms."

Which is all well and good. It will support a password-based authenticati=
on
mechanism. Great! I'm on board! But I'm not talking about that change and=
 I
don't really have a problem with with it.

  The change I'm talking about is adding the following sentence to the
_existing_ item dealing with a stand-alone password method:

   "This item will be based on the above tunnel method."

> EMU was chartered with a constrained set of goals, which is why we must
> re-charter to add a tunnel method.  Adding a new item requires gaining
> consensus within the working group and approval from the IESG.  The
> first step in this process would be to have a proposal.

  Yes, yes. I understand why the charter is being updated: to add that
stuff above about "A mechanism to support extensible communication within
a TLS protected tunnel...." That's great.

  But I'm not talking about "adding a new item" I'm talking about
_removing_ an existing item. The current charter, not the update that you
asked for consensus on, says:

  "- A mechanism meeting RFC 3748 and RFC 4017 requirements that makes us=
e
     of existing password databases such as AAA databases. The
     implementation should strive to be usable in resource constrained
     environments."

All I want is to leave that alone. Please, add the new item about the
tunnel method. I'm behind you 100% on that. But hat is a completely
separate issue.

  Yes, we have consensus to ADD a tunneled method. Great. No dispute. But
I don't see how that translates into consensus to REMOVE another item fro=
m
the charter. Especially something that obviously has so much value that
the group agreed to put it in its charter in the first place!

  regards,

  Dan.





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Subject: RE: [Emu] WG consensus on charter update
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Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) <mailto:jsalowey@cisco.com> scribbled on
Friday, January 25, 2008 12:45 AM:

> So far I have only seen responses from Dan Harkins on the proposed
> charter update (
> http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg00712.html ) =20

I'm a little confused: I interpreted the above-referenced message as a
call for consensus.  Was that correct?  If so, it seems like the
deadline came & went w/only the responses you mentioned from Dan.
Therefore, the (visible) consensus of the group (excluding yourself, as
Chair) expressed during the period of time allotted for comments was
that the password-based method (w/no tunnel involved) should _not_ be
removed from the charter, right?  If the people supporting the removal
couldn't be bothered to send comments for 2 weeks, I'm not sure that
their opinion should count afterwards: either there was a deadline or
there wasn't (surely we don't just continue to ask the question until we
get the answer we want).  OTOH, if the message was _not_ a consensus
call then it's not clear to me what the purpose was...

>=20
> Please respond on the list if you have reviewed the charter and have
> comments or if you approve of the current text.  Also make sure to
> review the milestones. =20
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Joe
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu



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