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From: "abhishek singh" <abhicc285@gmail.com>
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	http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-abhi-eap-radius-00.txt
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>
> Hi Every One,
>
>    I had some thoughts for secure communication between EAP and RADIUS
> server. I have posted a draft for the same.
>
> I will appreciate feedback and comments on the same.
>
>
> Best Regards,
> Abhishek Singh
>
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<div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid">Hi Every One,<br><br>&nbsp;&nbsp; I had some thoughts for secure communication between EAP and RADIUS&nbsp; server. I have posted a draft for the same. <br>
<br>I will appreciate feedback and comments on the same.<br clear="all"><br>&nbsp;<br>Best Regards,<br>Abhishek Singh<br><br>The information contained in this electronic mail transmission may be privileged and confidential, and therefore, protected from disclosure. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by replying to this message and deleting it from your computer without copying or disclosing it </blockquote>
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_______________________________________________
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun  5 06:50:10 2008
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  While the charter updates are being formally approved, we can start
discussions about the new work items.  Please respond with comments,
queries, or feedback on the items listed below.

Work item:

- A mechanism based on strong shared secrets. This mechanism
should strive to be simple and compact for implementation in
resource constrained environments.

Status:

- GPSK  (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08)

  Waiting on revision from authors to address AD comments.

  Alan DeKok
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun  5 06:50:17 2008
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  While the charter updates are being formally approved, we can start
discussions about the new work items.  Please respond with comments,
queries, or feedback on the items listed below.

Work item:

- Charter updates

Status:

  The charter revision is in IESG evaluation.

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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun  5 06:50:18 2008
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Subject: [Emu] EAP Channel bindings  (Current WG Work item status)
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  While the charter updates are being formally approved, we can start
discussions about the new work items.  Please respond with comments,
queries, or feedback on the items listed below.

Work items:

- A document that defines EAP channel bindings and provides
guidance for establishing EAP channel bindings within EAP methods.

- Enable a TLS-based EAP method to support channel bindings.
This item will not generate a new method, rather it will
extend EAP-TLS and/or the above tunnel method.

Status:

  Potential drafts for consideration by the working group:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-clancy-emu-chbind-00.txt
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-arkko-eap-service-identity-auth-04

  Are there additional comments or updates on these drafts?  There has
been little activity on the list recently.  These drafts would be a good
basis for discussion.
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun  5 06:50:23 2008
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Subject: [Emu] Tunnel Method (Current WG Work item status)
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  While the charter updates are being formally approved, we can start
discussions about the new work items.  Please respond with comments,
queries, or feedback on the items listed below.

Work item:

- A mechanism to support extensible communication within a
TLS protected tunnel. This mechanism must support channel
bindings in order to meet RFC 4962 requirements. This
mechanism will support meeting the requirements of an
enhanced TLS mechanism, a password based authentication
mechanism, and additional inner authentication mechanisms.

Status:

  A tunnel method draft has been submitted:

http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt

  A separate call for consensus will be issued for this document.
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun  5 06:55:10 2008
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This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel requirements draft
as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last until June 20,
2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you are in favor or
opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.

http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
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From: "Josh Howlett" <Josh.Howlett@ja.net>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Tunnel Method (Current WG Work item status)
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>   A tunnel method draft has been submitted:
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
> 
>   A separate call for consensus will be issued for this document.

RFC3748 (section 2.1) states:

   However, the peer
   and authenticator MUST utilize only one authentication method (Type 4
   or greater) within an EAP conversation, after which the authenticator
   MUST send a Success or Failure packet.

Am I correct in understanding that section 3.3 ('Chained EAP Methods')
is not a violation of RFC3748 because it only applies to methods run
*within* the tunnel method itself, and not to other methods that might
precede or follow the tunnel method? In other words, this is not an
attempt to change the behaviour stipulated in RFC3748?

>From the same section:

   However,
   chained EAP methods from different conversations can be re-directed
   into the same conversation by an attacker giving the authenticator
   the impression...

At the risk of appearing pedantic, would it be more accurate to say 'EAP
server' rather than 'authenticator'?

josh.

JANET(UK) is a trading name of The JNT Association, a company limited
by guarantee which is registered in England under No. 2881024 
and whose Registered Office is at Lumen House, Library Avenue,
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun  5 08:29:02 2008
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Josh Howlett wrote:
> Am I correct in understanding that section 3.3 ('Chained EAP Methods')
> is not a violation of RFC3748 because it only applies to methods run
> *within* the tunnel method itself, and not to other methods that might
> precede or follow the tunnel method? In other words, this is not an
> attempt to change the behaviour stipulated in RFC3748?

  That would be my understanding.  Section 2.1 of RFC 3748 also says:

   Multiple authentication methods within an EAP conversation are not
   supported due to their vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks
   (see Section 7.4) and incompatibility with existing implementations.

  And Section 7.4 says:

   As noted in Section 2.1, EAP does not permit untunneled sequences of
   authentication methods.

  Due to MITM attacks, which may be mitigated by:

   [b] Requiring cryptographic binding between the EAP tunneling
       protocol and the tunneled EAP methods.

  Hence the current WG work items on cryptographic binding.

  Alan DeKok.
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Alan:

I don't think we have a cryptographic binding WG work item, but a
channel binding one. However, the crypto-binding requirement is captured
in the Tunnel method requirement draft, as it is required to run a
single tunneled EAP method or chained ones.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Alan DeKok
> Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 11:24 AM
> To: Josh Howlett
> Cc: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] Tunnel Method (Current WG Work item status)
> 
> Josh Howlett wrote:
> > Am I correct in understanding that section 3.3 ('Chained 
> EAP Methods') 
> > is not a violation of RFC3748 because it only applies to methods run
> > *within* the tunnel method itself, and not to other methods 
> that might 
> > precede or follow the tunnel method? In other words, this is not an 
> > attempt to change the behaviour stipulated in RFC3748?
> 
>   That would be my understanding.  Section 2.1 of RFC 3748 also says:
> 
>    Multiple authentication methods within an EAP conversation are not
>    supported due to their vulnerability to man-in-the-middle attacks
>    (see Section 7.4) and incompatibility with existing 
> implementations.
> 
>   And Section 7.4 says:
> 
>    As noted in Section 2.1, EAP does not permit untunneled 
> sequences of
>    authentication methods.
> 
>   Due to MITM attacks, which may be mitigated by:
> 
>    [b] Requiring cryptographic binding between the EAP tunneling
>        protocol and the tunneled EAP methods.
> 
>   Hence the current WG work items on cryptographic binding.
> 
>   Alan DeKok.
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 
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Hao Zhou (hzhou) wrote:
> I don't think we have a cryptographic binding WG work item, but a
> channel binding one. However, the crypto-binding requirement is captured
> in the Tunnel method requirement draft, as it is required to run a
> single tunneled EAP method or chained ones.

  Sorry, my mistake.

  Alan DeKok.
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Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the tunnel
	requirements draft as a work item
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I'm in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.

Joe 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Alan DeKok
> Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the 
> tunnel requirements draft as a work item
> 
> This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel 
> requirements draft
> as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last until June 20,
> 2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you are 
> in favor or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jun 18 13:38:31 2008
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From: "Stephen Hanna" <shanna@juniper.net>
To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>,
	"Alan DeKok" <aland@deployingradius.com>, <emu@ietf.org>
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+1

Steve 

-----Original Message-----
From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 11:58 AM
To: Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the
tunnelrequirements draft as a work item

I'm in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.

Joe 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Alan DeKok
> Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the 
> tunnel requirements draft as a work item
> 
> This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel 
> requirements draft
> as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last until June 20,
> 2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you are 
> in favor or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.
> 
> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 
_______________________________________________
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jun 18 13:42:59 2008
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From: "Hao Zhou (hzhou)" <hzhou@cisco.com>
To: "Stephen Hanna" <shanna@juniper.net>,
	"Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>,
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Me too. 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Stephen Hanna
> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 4:31 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of 
> thetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> 
> +1
> 
> Steve 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 11:58 AM
> To: Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the 
> tunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> 
> I'm in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.
> 
> Joe 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of 
> > Alan DeKok
> > Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM
> > To: emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the tunnel 
> > requirements draft as a work item
> > 
> > This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel requirements 
> > draft
> > as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last 
> until June 20,
> > 2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you 
> are in favor 
> > or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.
> > 
> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> > 
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 
_______________________________________________
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From: "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)" <ncamwing@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance
	ofthetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
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 I'm also in favor...

	Nancy

-----Original Message-----
From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Hao Zhou (hzhou)
Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:45 PM
To: Stephen Hanna; Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance
ofthetunnelrequirements draft as a work item

Me too. 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of 
> Stephen Hanna
> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 4:31 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of 
> thetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> 
> +1
> 
> Steve
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of 
> Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 11:58 AM
> To: Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the 
> tunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> 
> I'm in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.
> 
> Joe
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of
> > Alan DeKok
> > Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM
> > To: emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the tunnel 
> > requirements draft as a work item
> > 
> > This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel requirements 
> > draft
> > as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last 
> until June 20,
> > 2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you
> are in favor
> > or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.
> > 
> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> > 
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 
_______________________________________________
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
_______________________________________________
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+1

>  I'm also in favor...
>
> 	Nancy
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Hao Zhou (hzhou)
> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:45 PM
> To: Stephen Hanna; Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance
> ofthetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
>
> Me too.
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>> Stephen Hanna
>> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 4:31 PM
>> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of
>> thetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
>>
>> +1
>>
>> Steve
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
>> Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
>> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 11:58 AM
>> To: Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the
>> tunnelrequirements draft as a work item
>>
>> I'm in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.
>>
>> Joe
>>
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On
>> Behalf Of
>> > Alan DeKok
>> > Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM
>> > To: emu@ietf.org
>> > Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the tunnel
>> > requirements draft as a work item
>> >
>> > This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel requirements
>> > draft
>> > as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last
>> until June 20,
>> > 2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you
>> are in favor
>> > or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.
>> >
>> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > Emu mailing list
>> > Emu@ietf.org
>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>> >
>> _______________________________________________
>> Emu mailing list
>> Emu@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>> _______________________________________________
>> Emu mailing list
>> Emu@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>>
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>

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	acceptanceofthetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
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I am also in favor.

On Wed, Jun 18, 2008 at 4:57 PM, <badra@isima.fr> wrote:

> +1
>
> >  I'm also in favor...
> >
> >       Nancy
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> > Hao Zhou (hzhou)
> > Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:45 PM
> > To: Stephen Hanna; Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance
> > ofthetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> >
> > Me too.
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> >> Stephen Hanna
> >> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 4:31 PM
> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of
> >> thetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> >>
> >> +1
> >>
> >> Steve
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> >> Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 11:58 AM
> >> To: Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the
> >> tunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> >>
> >> I'm in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.
> >>
> >> Joe
> >>
> >> > -----Original Message-----
> >> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >> Behalf Of
> >> > Alan DeKok
> >> > Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM
> >> > To: emu@ietf.org
> >> > Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the tunnel
> >> > requirements draft as a work item
> >> >
> >> > This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel requirements
> >> > draft
> >> > as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last
> >> until June 20,
> >> > 2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you
> >> are in favor
> >> > or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.
> >> >
> >> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > Emu mailing list
> >> > Emu@ietf.org
> >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >> >
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Emu mailing list
> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Emu mailing list
> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>
>

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I am also in favor.<br><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Jun 18, 2008 at 4:57 PM, &lt;<a href="mailto:badra@isima.fr">badra@isima.fr</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid">+1<br>
<div>
<div></div>
<div class="Wj3C7c"><br>&gt; &nbsp;I&#39;m also in favor...<br>&gt;<br>&gt; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Nancy<br>&gt;<br>&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>&gt; From: <a href="mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org">emu-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org">emu-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of<br>
&gt; Hao Zhou (hzhou)<br>&gt; Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:45 PM<br>&gt; To: Stephen Hanna; Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; <a href="mailto:emu@ietf.org">emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance<br>
&gt; ofthetunnelrequirements draft as a work item<br>&gt;<br>&gt; Me too.<br>&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>&gt;&gt; From: <a href="mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org">emu-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org">emu-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of<br>
&gt;&gt; Stephen Hanna<br>&gt;&gt; Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 4:31 PM<br>&gt;&gt; To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; <a href="mailto:emu@ietf.org">emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of<br>
&gt;&gt; thetunnelrequirements draft as a work item<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; +1<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; Steve<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; -----Original Message-----<br>&gt;&gt; From: <a href="mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org">emu-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org">emu-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On Behalf Of<br>
&gt;&gt; Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)<br>&gt;&gt; Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 11:58 AM<br>&gt;&gt; To: Alan DeKok; <a href="mailto:emu@ietf.org">emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt; Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the<br>
&gt;&gt; tunnelrequirements draft as a work item<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; I&#39;m in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; Joe<br>&gt;&gt;<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; -----Original Message-----<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; From: <a href="mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org">emu-bounces@ietf.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org">emu-bounces@ietf.org</a>] On<br>&gt;&gt; Behalf Of<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; Alan DeKok<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; To: <a href="mailto:emu@ietf.org">emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt; &gt; Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the tunnel<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; requirements draft as a work item<br>&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel requirements<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; draft<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; as an EMU WG work item. &nbsp; The consensus call will last<br>&gt;&gt; until June 20,<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; 2008. &nbsp;Please send email to the list stating whether you<br>&gt;&gt; are in favor<br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.<br>&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt" target="_blank">http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt; _______________________________________________<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; Emu mailing list<br>&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href="mailto:Emu@ietf.org">Emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt; &gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu</a><br>
&gt;&gt; &gt;<br>&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>&gt;&gt; Emu mailing list<br>&gt;&gt; <a href="mailto:Emu@ietf.org">Emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu</a><br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>&gt;&gt; Emu mailing list<br>&gt;&gt; <a href="mailto:Emu@ietf.org">Emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt;&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>&gt; _______________________________________________<br>&gt; Emu mailing list<br>&gt; <a href="mailto:Emu@ietf.org">Emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu</a><br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>&gt; Emu mailing list<br>&gt; <a href="mailto:Emu@ietf.org">Emu@ietf.org</a><br>&gt; <a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu</a><br>
&gt;<br><br>_______________________________________________<br>Emu mailing list<br><a href="mailto:Emu@ietf.org">Emu@ietf.org</a><br><a href="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu" target="_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu</a><br>
<br></div></div></blockquote></div><br>

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Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of
	the	tunnelrequirements draft as a work item
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Won't hurt, I suppose, as long as the adoption isn't a pass to WGLC (as it
seems to be in some other WGs).
...


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From: Pascal Urien <Pascal.Urien@enst.fr>
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 =?iso-8859-1?q?=C2=A0=C2=A0EMU=C2=A0WG=C2=A0Consensus=C2=A0?=
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I am also in favor

Pascal

At 22:57 18/06/2008, badra@isima.fr wrote:
>+1
>
> >  I'm also in favor...
> >
> >       Nancy
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> > Hao Zhou (hzhou)
> > Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:45 PM
> > To: Stephen Hanna; Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance
> > ofthetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> >
> > Me too.
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> >> Stephen Hanna
> >> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 4:31 PM
> >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of
> >> thetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> >>
> >> +1
> >>
> >> Steve
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> >> Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> >> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 11:58 AM
> >> To: Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the
> >> tunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> >>
> >> I'm in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.
> >>
> >> Joe
> >>
> >> > -----Original Message-----
> >> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On
> >> Behalf Of
> >> > Alan DeKok
> >> > Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM
> >> > To: emu@ietf.org
> >> > Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the tunnel
> >> > requirements draft as a work item
> >> >
> >> > This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel requirements
> >> > draft
> >> > as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last
> >> until June 20,
> >> > 2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you
> >> are in favor
> >> > or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.
> >> >
> >> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
> >> > _______________________________________________
> >> > Emu mailing list
> >> > Emu@ietf.org
> >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >> >
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Emu mailing list
> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Emu mailing list
> >> Emu@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >
>
>_______________________________________________
>Emu mailing list
>Emu@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu


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	<20080620170315.B238DB8AFA@smtp2.enst.fr>
From: "Josh Howlett" <Josh.Howlett@ja.net>
To: <emu@ietf.org>
Cc: Josh Howlett <Josh.Howlett@ja.net>
Subject: Re: [Emu]
	=?iso-8859-1?q?=C2=A0=C2=A0EMU=C2=A0WG=C2=A0Consensus=C2=A0?=
	=?iso-8859-1?q?call=C2=A0on_=C2=A0acceptanceofthetunnelrequirement?=
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Me too.

josh. =


> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On =

> Behalf Of Pascal Urien
> Sent: 20 June 2008 18:03
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] =C2 =C2 EMU=C2 WG=C2 Consensus=C2 call=C2 on =C2 =

> acceptanceofthetunnelrequirements=C2 draft=C2 as =C2 a=C2 work=C2 item
> =

> I am also in favor
> =

> Pascal
> =

> At 22:57 18/06/2008, badra@isima.fr wrote:
> >+1
> >
> > >  I'm also in favor...
> > >
> > >       Nancy
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] =

> On Behalf =

> > > Of Hao Zhou (hzhou)
> > > Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 1:45 PM
> > > To: Stephen Hanna; Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; =

> > > emu@ietf.org
> > > Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance =

> > > ofthetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> > >
> > > Me too.
> > >
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] =

> On Behalf =

> > >> Of Stephen Hanna
> > >> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 4:31 PM
> > >> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> > >> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of =

> > >> thetunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> > >>
> > >> +1
> > >>
> > >> Steve
> > >>
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] =

> On Behalf =

> > >> Of Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> > >> Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2008 11:58 AM
> > >> To: Alan DeKok; emu@ietf.org
> > >> Subject: Re: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of the =

> > >> tunnelrequirements draft as a work item
> > >>
> > >> I'm in favor of accepting this document as an EMU work item.
> > >>
> > >> Joe
> > >>
> > >> > -----Original Message-----
> > >> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > >> Behalf Of
> > >> > Alan DeKok
> > >> > Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2008 6:51 AM
> > >> > To: emu@ietf.org
> > >> > Subject: [Emu] EMU WG Consensus call on acceptance of =

> the tunnel =

> > >> > requirements draft as a work item
> > >> >
> > >> > This is a consensus call for acceptance of the tunnel =

> > >> > requirements draft
> > >> > as an EMU WG work item.   The consensus call will last
> > >> until June 20,
> > >> > 2008.  Please send email to the list stating whether you
> > >> are in favor
> > >> > or opposed to accepting this document as an EMU WG work item.
> > >> >
> > >> > http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-salowey-emu-eaptunnel-req-01.txt
> > >> > _______________________________________________
> > >> > Emu mailing list
> > >> > Emu@ietf.org
> > >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> > >> >
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> Emu mailing list
> > >> Emu@ietf.org
> > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> > >> _______________________________________________
> > >> Emu mailing list
> > >> Emu@ietf.org
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> > >>
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> > > Emu@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
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> > >
> >
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> =

> =

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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Sun Jun 22 16:19:47 2008
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Hannes and I will have a revision out shortly.

--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland


Alan DeKok wrote:
>   While the charter updates are being formally approved, we can start
> discussions about the new work items.  Please respond with comments,
> queries, or feedback on the items listed below.
> 
> Work item:
> 
> - A mechanism based on strong shared secrets. This mechanism
> should strive to be simple and compact for implementation in
> resource constrained environments.
> 
> Status:
> 
> - GPSK  (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08)
> 
>   Waiting on revision from authors to address AD comments.
> 
>   Alan DeKok
> _______________________________________________
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jun 23 11:55:54 2008
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  Hello,

  The following draft has been updated and may be of interest to
some people in this Working Group.

  It addresses comments received on the -01 version. It also includes
a way for the peer and server to agree on password pre-processing if
the server does not have access to the plaintext password.

  Please have a look. Comments are welcome.

  regards,

  Dan.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: IETF I-D Submission Tool [mailto:idsubmission@ietf.org]
> Sent: Monday, June 23, 2008 11:35 AM
> To: Dan Harkins
> Cc: gwz@netcube.com
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-harkins-emu-eap-pwd-02
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-harkins-emu-eap-pwd-02.txt has
> been successfuly submitted by Dan Harkins and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Filename:         draft-harkins-emu-eap-pwd
> Revision:         02
> Title:                 EAP Authentication Using Only A Password
> Creation_date:         2008-06-23
> WG ID:                 Independent Submission
> Number_of_pages: 36
>
> Abstract:
> This memo describes an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
> method, EAP-pwd, which uses a shared password for authentication.
> The password may be a low-entropy one and may be drawn from some set
> of possible passwords, like a dictionary, which is available to an
> attacker.
>
>
>
>
> The IETF Secretariat.
>
>


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Overview I have read this document and have found several major issues with=
 it.  As a result,I don't think it is currently suitable for adoption of an=
 EMU WG work item.  Issues:  a. Mistatement of the 'Lying NAS' problem.   T=
he 'Lying NAS' problem does not just concern the issue of whether the authe=
nticatorgives different information to the peer and the server;  it also re=
lates to the ability of the server to verify that the information is actual=
ly correct.  The document does not refer to the necessity of first-hop veri=
fication of the information provided by the authenticator, such as the mapp=
ing between theNAS-Identification attributes and the source address.   The =
need for verification impacts the trust model in some major ways, sincenot =
only does the authentication server need to trust that the authenticatoratt=
ributes have not been modified along the path -- it also needs to trust tha=
tthe first hop was configured to check the validity of attributes that only=
 it cancheck.   For example, it's not much help for the AAA Server to verif=
y that the RSN IEprovided to the STA is the same one it got from the AP if =
there is no way ofverifying whether the AP actually was configured to emit =
that RSN IE.  b. Lack of applicability to the roaming case.  The document s=
tates that Channel Bindings only apply to the non-roaming case. I'm not sur=
e why this restriction is mentioned because the issue of verificationis pre=
sent even within a single domain.   c. Discussion of 'fuzzy' comparisions. =
 By their nature, Channel Bindings may includeinformation that may be opaqu=
e to the AAA server, such as the RSN IE.  Given thatthe AAA server may not =
be capable of understanding the contents of the attributes,I question wheth=
er the concept of 'fuzzy comparisons' makes sense.  Rather, I thinkwe need =
to assume that a AAA server will probably only be capable of 'byte by byte'=
comparisons in most cases.  This is an important issue, because it affects =
the structureof data that needs to be provided by the client, and avoid pot=
ential 'canonicalization'issues that could greatly complicate the successfu=
l implementation of channel bindings.  d. Discussion of lower layer channel=
 bindings.  The document does not discuss the potential use of channel bind=
ings in lower layers suchas IEEE 802.11r.  I think that this is important s=
ince lower layers such as 11r do bind EAPkeying material to lower layer par=
ameters (such as the peer and authenticator MAC address). Thus, lower layer=
 channel bindings is an alternative that should be discussed.  e. Developme=
nt of requirements.  If this document is going to include an evaluation ofa=
lternative approaches, then it needs to clearly articulate the requirements=
 for such anevaluation.  f. Clear distinction between RFC 5056 and 3748 cha=
nnel binding concepts.  The currentdocument is not as clear as it could be =
on this.  The RFC 5056 channel binding conceptis closer to that of 'cryptog=
raphic binding' than it is to EAP channel bindings.  This shouldbe made cle=
ar.  g. Exploration of operations implications.  There are a number of barr=
iers to successfulimplementation of channel bindings that need to be explor=
ed, including: 1. Required configuration for first-hop AAA clients. 2. Pote=
ntial changes to drivers and AAA servers. 3. Potential impacts on authentic=
ation reliability.  h. Motivation.  Why should we care about Channel Bindin=
gs?  Given the operational costsI'd suggest that the document needs to make=
 a case that there is a potentially serioussecurity vulnerability here.  Su=
ch a case probably involves some kind of financial fraudissue which is most=
 likely in a roaming situation - which is unfortunately a scenario that the=
document rules out of scope.   Some specific comments.  =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Abstract=
   This document defines how to implement channel bindings for   Extensible=
 Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods. [BA] I'd add a definition of the pr=
oblem to the abstract goals.  Section 1   A well-documented problem with th=
e current Extensible Authentication   Protocol (EAP) architecture [RFC3748]=
 when used in pass-through   authenticator mode is the so-called 'lying NAS=
' problem.  Here, a   Network Access Server (NAS), or pass-through authenti=
cator, may   authenticate to the backend AAA infrastructure using one set o=
f   credentials, while representing contrary information to EAP clients. [B=
A] The 'lying NAS' problem is not really about credentials, since in RADIUS=
 the identity of a RADIUS client is defined by its IP address.Rather, the i=
ssue is providing different *information* (e.g.Called-Station-Id, NAS-Ident=
ifier, etc.) to the peer and AAA server.     A concrete example of this may=
 be an IEEE 802.11 access point with a   security association to a particul=
ar AAA server.  While there may be   some identity tied to that security as=
sociation, there's no reason   the access point need advertise the same ide=
ntity to clients.   [BA] The identity used in the AAA server security assoc=
iation and theone advertised to clients do not necessary have to agree, eve=
n if theNAS is not lying.     In   fact, it may include whatever informatio=
n in its beacons (to include   different SSID or security properties) it de=
sires.  This could lead   to situations where, for example, a client joins =
one network that's   masquerading as another. [BA] The SSID is a good examp=
le, but the 'security properties' (e.g. RSN IE)are not provided to the AAA =
server.  Therefore it isnot possible for a NAS to 'lie' to the AAA server a=
bout the RSN IE itsent in a Beacon.    Channel bindings [RFC5056] seek to e=
nforce a stronger security   relationship between the three entities, by al=
lowing the client and   server to compare their relative perception of the =
authenticator's   identity in a secure channel.  [BA] RFC 5056 specifically=
 states that it does not apply to EAP, andthat the use of the term 'Channel=
 Bindings' is not the same as theone used in EAP.  As a result, I'd recomme=
nd deleting the aboveparagraph or clarifying the relationship.     This doc=
ument defines how to use 'AAA   Payloads' [I-D.clancy-emu-aaapay] within EA=
P methods to implement   channel bindings.  Unlike [RFC5056], channel bindi=
ng in EAP context   does not ensure binding different layers of a session b=
ut rather the   information advertized to client and authentication server =
by an   authenticator acting as pass-through device during an EAP session. =
[BA] You might say that 'Channel Bindings' in RFC 5056 corresponds tothe te=
rm 'cryptographic binding' in EAP.     It is preferable to use this idea, r=
ather than hashing identity   information directly into keys, for a number =
of reasons:   o  It allows for fuzzy comparisons of entity names, rather th=
an      requiring absolute.  This can facilitate deployment and debugging. =
[BA] Not sure this is convincing because it's doubtful whether'fuzzy compar=
isons' are implementable in the alternative approach either. Wouldn't this =
require the AAA server to be able to parse the attributesand 'understand' t=
hem in some deep manner?     o  Any EAP method that provides mutual authent=
ication and key      derivation can easily add channel binding as proposed =
in this      draft.  On the other hand, including identities into key      =
derivations requires the modification of EAP methods.  For      instance, m=
any EAP methods specify how MSK and other keying      material is derived a=
nd adding channel binding by adding      identifiers would need to be speci=
fied for each method      individually. [BA] I think you are making assumpt=
ions about how the keys are mixed inthat may not necessarily be valid.  For=
 example, couldn't the mixingoccur in a lower layer rather than in the EAP =
method?  A more validreason would be that EAP methods need to be lower laye=
r independent,whereas Channel Bindings often are not -- so that mixing them=
 intoEAP keying material could be an issue.  However, this argument wouldno=
t hold for mixing that occurs in a lower layer.  This practice isalready in=
corporated into lower layer specifications such as IEEE 802.11r.    o  Clie=
nt and authentication server may communicate on different      layers with =
the authenticator and thus receive different      identifiers that may belo=
ng to the same device.  A server may be      able to recognize which differ=
ent identifiers belong to the same      device (e.g. by performing a table =
look up).  This scenario cannot      be solved by hashing identities into k=
eys. [BA] I think what you're trying to say here is that the set of channel=
bindings may vary between authenticator implementations, no? 4.  Trust Mode=
l [BA] I think that you need to include this introduction earlier in thedoc=
ument.     Channel bindings are always provided between two communication  =
 endpoints, i.e. here between client and server, who communicate   through =
an authenticator in pass-trough mode (as illustrated in   Figure 1).  Chann=
el binding prevents attacks by rogue authenticators   in pass-trough mode (=
see Example Attacks).  Clancy & Hoeper          Expires August 21, 2008    =
            [Page 4]Internet-Draft                 EAP-CHBIND              =
    February 2008                         ---------------------------------=
------------     --------   info1   |   -------------     info2     -------=
----   |    |EAP peer| <--------|  |Authenticator| ----------> |Auth.Server=
|  |     --------           |   -------------               -----------   |=
       |                |                                     |       |    =
   |                |                 Home Domain         |       |       |=
                 ---------------------------------------------       |     =
                                                 |       |                 =
                                     |       |                     Channel =
binding                  |       |<----------------------------------------=
------------>|                   Figure 1: Overview of Channel Binding [BA]=
 There is an important piece missing from this picture -- theneed of the fi=
rst hop proxy to check the *correctness* of the informationpassed by the au=
thenticator.  For example, only the first hop can checkif the NAS-Identifie=
r attribute actually corresponds to the source IPaddress of the authenticat=
or; downstream proxies or servers cannot checkthis, since the information w=
ill have been 'laundered' by the time itreaches them.     During an EAP exe=
cution, an authenticator presents information info1   and info2 to client a=
nd server, respectively.  Such information can   include the authenticator'=
s identifier/address and/or advertised   network information (such as offer=
ed services and billing   information).  To prevent attacks by rogue authen=
ticators, the server   must be able to recognize any inconsistencies in inf=
o1 and info2.   Therefore, the client sends info1 to the server and upon pe=
rforming   an inconsistency check, the server notifies the client about the=
   result.  Only in case of a positive result, channel binding is   provide=
d and the EAP session continues.  Note that under some   circumstances, the=
 client could be able to check for inconsistencies;   however the check is =
generally easier to implement on the server.   The trust model for channel =
binding consists of three parties, namely   a client, an authentication ser=
ver and an authenticator in pass-   through mode as illustrated in Figure 1=
.  In this trust model, client   and authentication server are honest while=
 the authenticator is   maliciously sending false information to client and=
/or server.  The   three parties have the following trust relationships:   =
o  The server trusts that the channel binding information received      fro=
m the client is the information that the client received from      the auth=
enticator (i.e. info1)   o  The client trusts the channel binding result re=
ceived from the      server   o  The server trusts the identifier received =
from the authenticator [BA] The first hop cannot just trust the identifer r=
eceived from the authenticator -- it is *required*  that it be able to veri=
fy it, based on configuration.    Note that the model includes all cases in=
 which authenticator and   authentication server communicate over one or mo=
re intermediate nodes   as long as 1) these nodes only forward the messages=
 (e.g. routers)   and 2) authenticator and server communicate using an end-=
to-end   protocol (e.g.  AAA).  However, roaming scenarios with proxies are=
   out of the scope of this document. [BA] Roaming scenarios are actually q=
uite central to the problem statementbecause almost all the severe security=
 vulnerabilities relate to roaming in some way.  ______________________



 EMAILING FOR THE GREATER GOOD=

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<body class=3D'hmmessage'>
Overview<BR>&nbsp;<BR>I have read this document and have found several majo=
r issues with it.&nbsp; As a result,<BR>I don't think it is currently suita=
ble for adoption of an EMU WG work item. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>Issues: <BR>&nbsp;<B=
R>a. Mistatement of the 'Lying NAS' problem.&nbsp; <BR>&nbsp;<BR>The&nbsp;'=
Lying NAS' problem does not just concern the issue of whether the authentic=
ator<BR>gives different information to the peer and the server;&nbsp; it al=
so relates to the <BR>ability of the server to verify that the information =
is actually correct. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>The document does not refer to the neces=
sity of first-hop verification of the <BR>information provided by the authe=
nticator, such as the mapping between the<BR>NAS-Identification attributes =
and the source address.&nbsp; <BR>&nbsp;<BR>The need for verification impac=
ts the trust model in some major ways, since<BR>not only does the authentic=
ation server need to trust that the authenticator<BR>attributes have not be=
en modified along the path -- it also needs to trust that<BR>the first hop =
was configured to check the validity of attributes that only it can<BR>chec=
k.&nbsp; <BR>&nbsp;<BR>For example, it's not much help for the AAA Server t=
o verify that the RSN IE<BR>provided to the STA is the same one it got from=
 the AP if there is no way of<BR>verifying whether the AP actually was conf=
igured to emit that RSN IE. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>b. Lack of applicability to the r=
oaming case. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>The document states that Channel Bindings only a=
pply to the non-roaming case. <BR>I'm not sure why this restriction is ment=
ioned because the issue of verification<BR>is present even within a single =
domain.&nbsp; <BR>&nbsp;<BR>c. Discussion of 'fuzzy' comparisions.&nbsp;&nb=
sp;By their nature, Channel Bindings may include<BR>information that may be=
 opaque to the AAA server, such as the RSN IE.&nbsp; Given that<BR>the AAA =
server may not be capable of understanding the contents of the attributes,<=
BR>I question&nbsp;whether the concept of 'fuzzy&nbsp;comparisons' makes se=
nse.&nbsp; Rather, I think<BR>we need to assume that a AAA&nbsp;server will=
&nbsp;probably only be capable of 'byte by byte'<BR>comparisons&nbsp;in mos=
t cases.&nbsp; This is an important issue, because it affects the structure=
<BR>of data that needs to be provided by the client, and avoid potential 'c=
anonicalization'<BR>issues that could greatly complicate the successful imp=
lementation of channel <BR>bindings. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>d.&nbsp;Discussion of lo=
wer layer channel bindings. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>The document does not discuss the=
 potential use of channel bindings in lower layers such<BR>as IEEE 802.11r.=
&nbsp; I think that this is important since lower layers such as 11r do bin=
d EAP<BR>keying material to lower layer parameters (such as the peer and au=
thenticator MAC address). <BR>Thus, lower layer channel bindings is an alte=
rnative that should be discussed. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>e. Development of requireme=
nts.&nbsp; If this document is going to include an evaluation of<BR>alterna=
tive approaches, then it needs to clearly articulate the requirements for s=
uch an<BR>evaluation. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>f. Clear distinction between RFC 5056 a=
nd 3748 channel binding concepts.&nbsp; The current<BR>document is not as c=
lear as it could be on this.&nbsp; The RFC 5056 channel binding concept<BR>=
is closer to that of 'cryptographic binding' than it is to EAP channel bind=
ings.&nbsp; This should<BR>be made clear. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>g. Exploration of o=
perations implications.&nbsp; There are a number of barriers to successful<=
BR>implementation of channel bindings that need to be explored, including:<=
BR>&nbsp;<BR>1. Required configuration for first-hop AAA clients. <BR>2. Po=
tential changes to drivers and AAA servers. <BR>3. Potential impacts on aut=
hentication reliability. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>h. Motivation.&nbsp; Why should we c=
are about Channel Bindings?&nbsp; Given the operational costs<BR>I'd sugges=
t that the document needs to make a case that there is a potentially seriou=
s<BR>security vulnerability here.&nbsp; Such a case probably involves some =
kind of financial fraud<BR>issue which is most likely in a roaming situatio=
n -&nbsp;which is unfortunately&nbsp;a scenario that the<BR>document rules =
out of scope. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp;<BR>Some specific comments. <BR>&nbsp;<BR=
>=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D<BR>&nbsp;<BR>Abstract<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; This document defines ho=
w to implement channel bindings for<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Extensible Authenticati=
on Protocol (EAP) methods.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] I'd add a definition of the pr=
oblem to the abstract goals. <BR>&nbsp;<BR><BR>Section 1<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; A =
well-documented problem with the current Extensible Authentication<BR>&nbsp=
;&nbsp; Protocol (EAP) architecture [RFC3748] when used in pass-through<BR>=
&nbsp;&nbsp; authenticator mode is the so-called 'lying NAS' problem.&nbsp;=
 Here, a<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Network Access Server (NAS), or pass-through authe=
nticator, may<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; authenticate to the backend AAA infrastructur=
e using one set of<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; credentials, while representing contrary=
 information to EAP clients.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] The 'lying NAS' problem is n=
ot really about credentials, since in <BR>RADIUS the identity of a RADIUS c=
lient is defined by its IP address.<BR>Rather, the issue is providing diffe=
rent *information* (e.g.<BR>Called-Station-Id, NAS-Identifier, etc.) to the=
 peer and AAA server. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; A concrete example of this=
 may be an IEEE 802.11 access point with a<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; security associa=
tion to a particular AAA server.&nbsp; While there may be<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; s=
ome identity tied to that security association, there's no reason<BR>&nbsp;=
&nbsp; the access point need advertise the same identity to clients.&nbsp; =
<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] The identity used in the AAA server security association=
 and the<BR>one advertised to clients do not necessary have to agree, even =
if the<BR>NAS is not lying. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; In<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; f=
act, it may include whatever information in its beacons (to include<BR>&nbs=
p;&nbsp; different SSID or security properties) it desires.&nbsp; This coul=
d lead<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; to situations where, for example, a client joins one=
 network that's<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; masquerading as another.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] =
The SSID is a good example, but the 'security properties' (e.g. RSN IE)<BR>=
are not provided to the AAA server.&nbsp; Therefore it is<BR>not possible f=
or a NAS to 'lie' to the AAA server about the RSN IE it<BR>sent in a Beacon=
. <BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Channel bindings [RFC5056] seek to enforce a stronge=
r security<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; relationship between the three entities, by allo=
wing the client and<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; server to compare their relative percep=
tion of the authenticator's<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; identity in a secure channel.&n=
bsp; <BR><BR>[BA] RFC 5056 specifically states that it does not apply to EA=
P, and<BR>that the use of the term 'Channel Bindings' is not the same as th=
e<BR>one used in EAP.&nbsp; As a result, I'd recommend deleting the above<B=
R>paragraph or clarifying the relationship. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; This=
 document defines how to use 'AAA<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Payloads' [I-D.clancy-emu=
-aaapay] within EAP methods to implement<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; channel bindings.&=
nbsp; Unlike [RFC5056], channel binding in EAP context<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; does=
 not ensure binding different layers of a session but rather the<BR>&nbsp;&=
nbsp; information advertized to client and authentication server by an<BR>&=
nbsp;&nbsp; authenticator acting as pass-through device during an EAP sessi=
on.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] You might say that 'Channel Bindings' in RFC 5056 cor=
responds to<BR>the term 'cryptographic binding' in EAP. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp=
;&nbsp; It is preferable to use this idea, rather than hashing identity<BR>=
&nbsp;&nbsp; information directly into keys, for a number of reasons:<BR>&n=
bsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp; It allows for fuzzy comparisons of entity names, rather =
than<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; requiring absolute.&nbsp; This can f=
acilitate deployment and debugging.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA]&nbsp;Not sure this is=
 convincing&nbsp;because it's doubtful whether<BR>'fuzzy comparisons' are i=
mplementable in the alternative approach either. <BR>Wouldn't this require =
the AAA server to be able to parse the attributes<BR>and 'understand' them =
in some deep manner?&nbsp; <BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp; Any EAP method that=
 provides mutual authentication and key<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; d=
erivation can easily add channel binding as proposed in this<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; draft.&nbsp; On the other hand, including identities in=
to key<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; derivations requires the modificat=
ion of EAP methods.&nbsp; For<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; instance, m=
any EAP methods specify how MSK and other keying<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp; material is derived and adding channel binding by adding<BR>&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; identifiers would need to be specified for each met=
hod<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; individually.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] I thi=
nk you are making assumptions about how the keys are mixed in<BR>that may n=
ot necessarily be valid.&nbsp; For example, couldn't the mixing<BR>occur in=
 a lower layer rather than in the EAP method?&nbsp; A more valid<BR>reason =
would be that EAP methods need to be lower layer independent,<BR>whereas Ch=
annel Bindings often are not -- so that mixing them into<BR>EAP keying mate=
rial could be an issue.&nbsp; However, this argument would<BR>not hold for =
mixing that occurs in a lower layer.&nbsp; This practice is<BR>already inco=
rporated into lower layer specifications such as IEEE 802.11r. <BR><BR>&nbs=
p;&nbsp; o&nbsp; Client and authentication server may communicate on differ=
ent<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; layers with the authenticator and thu=
s receive different<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; identifiers that may =
belong to the same device.&nbsp; A server may be<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp; able to recognize which different identifiers belong to the same<BR=
>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; device (e.g. by performing a table look up)=
.&nbsp; This scenario cannot<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; be solved by=
 hashing identities into keys.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] I think what you're trying=
 to say here is that the set of channel<BR>bindings may vary between authen=
ticator implementations, no? <BR><BR>4.&nbsp; Trust Model<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA]=
 I think that you need to include this introduction earlier in the<BR>docum=
ent. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Channel bindings are always provided betwee=
n two communication<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; endpoints, i.e. here between client and=
 server, who communicate<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; through an authenticator in pass-t=
rough mode (as illustrated in<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Figure 1).&nbsp; Channel bind=
ing prevents attacks by rogue authenticators<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; in pass-trough=
 mode (see Example Attacks).<BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp;<BR><BR>Clancy &amp; Hoeper=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Expires August 21, 2=
008&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; [Page 4]<BR><BR>Internet-Draft&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; EAP-=
CHBIND&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; February 2008<BR><BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -------------------------=
--------------------<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; --------&nbsp;&nbsp; info1=
&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp; -------------&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; info2&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -----------&nbsp;&nbsp; |<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |EAP pe=
er| &lt;--------|&nbsp; |Authenticator| ----------&gt; |Auth.Server|&nbsp; =
|<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; --------&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp; -------------&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; -----------&nb=
sp;&nbsp; |<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Home Domain&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ------------------------------=
---------------<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nb=
sp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 |<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |<BR>&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp=
; Channel binding&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs=
p;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; |<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&=
nbsp;&nbsp; |&lt;----------------------------------------------------&gt;|<=
BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Figure 1: Overview of Channel Binding<=
BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] There is an important piece missing from this picture -- =
the<BR>need of the first hop proxy to check the *correctness* of the inform=
ation<BR>passed by the authenticator.&nbsp; For example, only the first hop=
 can check<BR>if the NAS-Identifier attribute actually corresponds to the s=
ource IP<BR>address of the authenticator; downstream proxies or servers can=
not check<BR>this, since the information will have been 'laundered' by the =
time it<BR>reaches them. <BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; During an EAP execution=
, an authenticator presents information info1<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; and info2 to =
client and server, respectively.&nbsp; Such information can<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;=
 include the authenticator's identifier/address and/or advertised<BR>&nbsp;=
&nbsp; network information (such as offered services and billing<BR>&nbsp;&=
nbsp; information).&nbsp; To prevent attacks by rogue authenticators, the s=
erver<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; must be able to recognize any inconsistencies in info=
1 and info2.<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Therefore, the client sends info1 to the serve=
r and upon performing<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; an inconsistency check, the server no=
tifies the client about the<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; result.&nbsp; Only in case of a=
 positive result, channel binding is<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; provided and the EAP s=
ession continues.&nbsp; Note that under some<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; circumstances,=
 the client could be able to check for inconsistencies;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; how=
ever the check is generally easier to implement on the server.<BR>&nbsp;&nb=
sp; The trust model for channel binding consists of three parties, namely<B=
R>&nbsp;&nbsp; a client, an authentication server and an authenticator in p=
ass-<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; through mode as illustrated in Figure 1.&nbsp; In this=
 trust model, client<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; and authentication server are honest w=
hile the authenticator is<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; maliciously sending false informa=
tion to client and/or server.&nbsp; The<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; three parties have =
the following trust relationships:<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp; The server trust=
s that the channel binding information received<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;=
&nbsp; from the client is the information that the client received from<BR>=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the authenticator (i.e. info1)<BR>&nbsp;&nbs=
p; o&nbsp; The client trusts the channel binding result received from the<B=
R>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; server<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; o&nbsp; The server =
trusts the identifier received from the authenticator<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] The=
 first hop cannot&nbsp;just trust the identifer received from the <BR>authe=
nticator -- it is *required*&nbsp; that it be able to verify it, based on c=
onfiguration.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; Note that the model includes all ca=
ses in which authenticator and<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; authentication server commun=
icate over one or more intermediate nodes<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; as long as 1) the=
se nodes only forward the messages (e.g. routers)<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; and 2) au=
thenticator and server communicate using an end-to-end<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp; prot=
ocol (e.g.&nbsp; AAA).&nbsp; However, roaming scenarios with proxies are<BR=
>&nbsp;&nbsp; out of the scope of this document.<BR>&nbsp;<BR>[BA] Roaming =
scenarios are actually quite central to the problem statement<BR>because al=
most all the severe security vulnerabilities relate to roaming in <BR>some =
way.&nbsp; <BR>______________________<BR><BR>
<TABLE style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 9pt; COLOR: #0099cc; FONT-FAMILY: " 24px? HEIGHT=
: UI?,Tahoma,san-serif; Segoe>
<TBODY>
<TR>
<TD><A style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold; COLOR: #339966; TEXT-DECORATION: none" h=
ref=3D"http://im.live.com/Messenger/IM/Home/?source=3DEML_WLHM_GreaterGood"=
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none; BORDER-LEFT-STYLE: none; BORDER-BOTTOM-STYLE: none" alt=3Di src=3D"ht=
tp://gfx1.hotmail.com/mail/w2/ltr/i_charity.gif" m?></A> EMAILING FOR THE G=
REATER GOOD</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE></body>
</html>=

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Subject: [Emu] Summary of Consensus Call on Tunnel Requirements draft
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  A consensus call was issued to the WG mailing list on June 5, for
accepting the tunnel requirements draft as an EMU WG work item

  The consensus call closed on June 20.  Based on the mailing list
response (9 in favor, 0 opposed), the consensus is judged to be in favor.

  The authors should therefore submit the document as an EMU WG
document.  Please use the name:

	draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-00.txt

  Alan DeKok.
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Tue Jun 24 01:45:24 2008
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  This is a call for agenda items for the EMU WG meeting at IETF 72 in
Dublin.  The meeting is tentatively scheduled for Friday August 1 2008
from 9 AM - 11:30 AM.

  If you have an item that you would like to have on the agenda, please
contact myself or Joe Salowey <jsalowey@cisco.com>

  Alan DeKok.
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the EAP Method Update Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
	Author(s)       : K. Hoeper, et al.
	Filename        : draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-00.txt
	Pages           : 23
	Date            : 2008-06-25

This memo defines the requirements for a tunnel-based Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method.  This method will use Transport
Layer Security (TLS) to establish a secure tunnel.  The tunnel will
provide support for password authentication, EAP authentication and
the transport of additional data for other purposes.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-00.txt

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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jun 25 23:46:56 2008
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Subject: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
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Overall, this document is in very good shape.  Kudos to the authors.=20

A comment on EAP header protection (Section 4.2.3) and Type code modificati=
on (Section 6.3): 4.2.3.  EAP Header Protection

   A tunnel method SHOULD provide protection of the outer EAP header
   information when possible to make sure the outer EAP header is not
   modified by the intermediaries.

6.3.  Outer EAP Method Header

   There are several existing EAP methods which use a similar packet
   format to EAP-TLS.  Often for the initial portions of the exchange
   the execution of the method is identical except for the method ID.
   Protection of the outer EAP header helps to avoid vulnerabilities
   that may arise when an attacker attempts to modify packets to make
   one EAP message look like one from a different method.

[BA] The EAP header defined in RFC 3748 looks like this:=20
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |    Type ...
   +-+-+-+-+
Section 6.3 refers to modification of the Type field which can potentiallye=
nable an attacker to make one TLS-based EAP method look like another one.  =
It's worth
noting that such an attack can be addressed without necessarily requiring E=
AP
header protection, as described in Section 4.2.3.=20

For example, a Type field modification attack will only enable an EAP peer =
to subsequently
connect to an authenticator if the peer and server were able to derive the =
same MSK/EMSK.=20

To prevent such an attack, it is highly desirable for TLS-based EAP methods=
 to utilize
key derivation formulas unique to the method.  As an example, EAP-TLS and E=
AP-TTLSv0
utilize different key derivation formulas:

EAP-TLS:  =20
   Key_Material =3D TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, "client EAP encryption",
                     client.random || server.random)
EAP-TTLSv0: =20
      Keying Material =3D TLS-PRF-128(master_secret,=20
                "ttls keying material", client_random || server_random)=20

Assuming that this approach is taken, the Type modification threat describe=
d in Section 6.3 can be
addressed without EAP header protection.=20

Given this, it seems to me that EAP header protection is really about prote=
ction of the Code, Identifier
and Length fields of the EAP header.   However, the behavior of these field=
s is fairly rigidly specified
in RFC 3748, so that a well written implementation should only be vulnerabl=
e to DoS attack, which
would be the case even if EAP header protection were implemented. =20

For example, an attacker modifying the Code field might be able to cause an=
 EAP peer or server to
drop the packet.  However, the same thing would happen if EAP header protec=
tion were implemented,
and the packet failed the MIC check.=20


Via modification of the Identifier field, it might be possible to cause the=
 peer or server to abort the EAP
session in progress.  However, in TLS-based methods, failure of TLS integri=
ty check is also a terminal
error, so that I'm not sure if anything is gained here either.=20


Modification of the Length field might have as its objective the inducement=
 of a buffer overflow on=20
either the peer or the server, so it's aims are somewhat more nefarious tha=
n attacks on the Code or
Identifier fields.  However, implementation of EAP header protection would =
not be likely to address=20
such an implementation bug since the MIC could not be computed until the EA=
P packet was fully received,
by which time the buffer overflow would have already occurred.=20


In summary, I am not clear that EAP header protection as described in Secti=
on 4.2.3 really brings much value=20
beyond addressing the EAP Type Code attack described in Section 6.3.  I wou=
ld therefore recommend that this
section be deleted, or at least justified in more depth. =20











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<html>
<head>
<style>
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{
margin:0px;
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}
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<body class=3D'hmmessage'>
Overall, this document is in very good shape.&nbsp; Kudos to the authors. <=
br><br><span style=3D"font-family: Geneva,Arial,Sans-serif;">A comment on E=
AP header protection (Section 4.2.3) and Type code modification (Section 6.=
3): </span><br style=3D"font-family: Geneva,Arial,Sans-serif;"><br style=3D=
"font-family: Geneva,Arial,Sans-serif;"><span style=3D"font-family: Geneva,=
Arial,Sans-serif;">4.2.3.  EAP Header Protection</span><br><pre><br>   A tu=
nnel method SHOULD provide protection of the outer EAP header<br>   informa=
tion when possible to make sure the outer EAP header is not<br>   modified =
by the intermediaries.<br><br>6.3.  Outer EAP Method Header<br><br>   There=
 are several existing EAP methods which use a similar packet<br>   format t=
o EAP-TLS.  Often for the initial portions of the exchange<br>   the execut=
ion of the method is identical except for the method ID.<br>   Protection o=
f the outer EAP header helps to avoid vulnerabilities<br>   that may arise =
when an attacker attempts to modify packets to make<br>   one EAP message l=
ook like one from a different method.<br><br><span style=3D"font-family: Ge=
neva,Arial,Sans-serif;">[BA] The EAP header defined in RFC 3748 looks like =
this: </span><br style=3D"font-family: Geneva,Arial,Sans-serif;"><br>    0 =
                  1                   2                   3<br>    0 1 2 3 =
4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1<br>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+=
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<br>   |     Code      =
|  Identifier   |            Length             |<br>   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+=
-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<br>   |    Type ...<br>   +-=
+-+-+-+<br><br style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif;"><span st=
yle=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif;">Section 6.3 refers to mod=
ification of the Type field which can potentially</span><br style=3D"font-f=
amily: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif;"><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Hel=
vetica,Sans-Serif;">enable an attacker to make one TLS-based EAP method loo=
k like another one.  It's worth<br>noting that such an attack can be addres=
sed without necessarily requiring EAP<br>header protection, as described in=
 Section 4.2.3. <br><br>For example, a Type field modification attack will =
only enable an EAP peer to subsequently<br>connect to an authenticator if t=
he peer and server were able to derive the same MSK/EMSK. <br><br>To preven=
t such an attack, it is highly desirable for TLS-based EAP methods to utili=
ze<br>key derivation formulas unique to the method.  As an example, EAP-TLS=
 and EAP-TTLSv0<br>utilize different key derivation formulas:<br><br>EAP-TL=
S:   </span><br>   Key_Material =3D TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, "client EAP =
encryption",<br>                     client.random || server.random)<span s=
tyle=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif;"><br>EAP-TTLSv0:  <br></s=
pan>      Keying Material =3D TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, <br>              =
  "ttls keying material", client_random || server_random) <br><br><span sty=
le=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif;">Assuming that this approac=
h is taken, the Type modification threat described in Section 6.3 can be<br=
>addressed without EAP header protection. <br><br>Given this, it seems to m=
e that EAP header protection is really about protection of the Code, Identi=
fier<br>and Length fields of the EAP header.   However, the behavior of the=
se fields is fairly rigidly specified<br>in RFC 3748, so that a well writte=
n implementation should only be vulnerable to DoS attack, which<br>would be=
 the case even if EAP header protection were implemented.  <br><br>For exam=
ple, an attacker modifying the Code field might be able to cause an EAP pee=
r or server to<br>drop the packet.  However, the same thing would happen if=
 EAP header protection were implemented,<br>and the packet failed the MIC c=
heck. <br><br><br>Via modification of the Identifier field, it might be pos=
sible to cause the peer or server to abort the EAP<br>session in progress. =
 However, in TLS-based methods, failure of TLS integrity check is also a te=
rminal<br>error, so that I'm not sure if anything is gained here either. <b=
r><br><br>Modification of the Length field might have as its objective the =
inducement of a buffer overflow on <br>either the peer or the server, so it=
's aims are somewhat more nefarious than attacks on the Code or<br>Identifi=
er fields.  However, implementation of EAP header protection would not be l=
ikely to address <br>such an implementation bug since the MIC could not be =
computed until the EAP packet was fully received,<br>by which time the buff=
er overflow would have already occurred. <br><br><br>In summary, I am not c=
lear that EAP header protection as described in Section 4.2.3 really brings=
 much value <br>beyond addressing the EAP Type Code attack described in Sec=
tion 6.3.  I would therefore recommend that this<br>section be deleted, or =
at least justified in more depth. </span> <br><br><br><br><br><span style=
=3D"font-family: monospace;"><br><br></span><br><br><br></pre><br></body>
</html>=

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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun 26 00:50:33 2008
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Subject: [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel Method
 Requirements document
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Section 4.1.1 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document includes the follo=
wing statement:

   In addition, the tunnel method MUST support EAP channel bindings to
   enable a system based on EAP to meet the additional requirements in
   Section 3 of RFC 4962.
While I have no problem with including support for channel bindings within =
the EMU tunnel method,
I do not believe that any requirement for EAP Channel Bindings can be infer=
red from Section 3 of RFC 4962.=20
Here is what Section 3 says:=20
         The context will include the peer and NAS identities in more
         than one form.  One (or more) name form is needed to identify
         these parties in the authentication exchange and the AAA
         protocol.  Another name form may be needed to identify these
         parties within the lower layer that will employ the session
         key.
Notice that neither this paragraph nor the ones surrounding it mention expo=
rted EAP keying material
specifically.  This omission was intentional -- the intent was to enable th=
e requirement to be met by
subsequent cryptographic binding operations operating within lower layers. =
 As an example,=20
IEEE 802.11r's PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 cryptographically bind the PMK/MSK to chan=
nel properties,
satisfying this requirement.=20

Part of the reason that EAP channel bindings were not mandatory to implemen=
t is that they were (and remain)
undeployed, so that their practicality remains unproven.  For this reason, =
despite considerable
IESG pressure, RFC 4017 included EAP channel bindings only as an optional f=
eature within=20
Section 2.4, rather than promoting it to required or even recommended to im=
plement.=20

Between the publication of RFC 4017 and 4962, many aspects of EAP, includin=
g new methods,
RFC 3748 implementations, etc. moved ahead, but progress in the channel bin=
ding area
remained slow, so that the case for requiring EAP channel binding did not g=
row stronger.

As proof that EAP channel binding is NOT required by RFC 4962 Section 3, RF=
C 5247=20
which was chartered to demonstrate how RFC 4962 requirements can met by
EAP/Secure Association/AAA systems does not mention EAP channel bindings at=
 all in=20
Section 5.4, which discussed how the RFC 4962 key binding requirements from=
 Section 3=20
can be met.  Rather, RFC 5247 Section 2.3 which discussed authenticator ide=
ntification, mentions both
EAP channel binding and lower layer bindings in points (f) through (k), alb=
eit without
normative language.=20

Given the extensive discussion of RFC 4017 and 4962 on the IETF mailing lis=
t and various
other mailing lists, including the EAP WG list, it is therefore somewhat di=
sappointing to see
something which could only garner IETF consensus as an optional capability =
promoted to=20
mandatory, purely due to IESG re-interpretation of a BCP after publication.=
=20

Given that the EMU WG has as a work item for development of an Internet Dra=
ft on EAP channel
binding, my advice is for the WG, through its analysis of the problem and t=
he potential solutions,
to develop its own consensus as to the value and practicality of channel bi=
ndings, rather than=20
allowing an opinion to be imposed upon it from the IESG. =20


As a first step toward that, a concise statement of the problem is very imp=
ortant.=20
Section 4.4 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document includes the followi=
ng statement
of the Channel Binding problem:
   The so-called "lying NAS" problem is a well-documented problem with
   the current Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) architecture
   [RFC3748] when used with pass-through authenticators.  Here, a
   Network Access Server (NAS), or pass-through authenticator, may
   authenticate to the backend AAA infrastructure using one set of
   credentials, while representing contrary information to EAP peers.
The issue is not just whether the information presented to
the peer and server are contradictory, but also whether the information is =
correct.=20
To make this clear, RFC 5247 Section 5.3.3 included additional text beyond
what was present in RFC 3748 Section 7.15:

   While the verification [of channel bindings] can be done
   either by the peer or the server, typically only the server has the
   knowledge to determine the correctness of the values, as opposed to
   merely verifying their equality. =20


The use of the term "credentials" in the short problem description is somew=
hat odd, since in=20
AAA protocols, the credentials used for mutual authentication between the A=
AA client and server=20
do not relate to channel binding parameters such as the NAS-Identifier.  Fo=
r example, a AAA client=20
can use a certificate containing a subjectAltName field of "aaaclient.examp=
le.com" to authenticate to the AAA server,=20
whereas the enclosed NAS-Identifier attribute could contain a the R0KH-ID f=
rom IEEE 802.11r.
Such an Access-Request would be completely valid, and RFC 5247 Section 2.5 =
notes some of
the issues that can arise:

   It is possible for problems to arise in situations where the EAP
   server identifies itself differently to the EAP peer and
   authenticator.  For example, it is possible that the Server-Id
   exported by EAP methods will not be identical to the Fully Qualified
   Domain Name (FQDN) of the backend authentication server.  Where
   certificate-based authentication is used within RADIUS or Diameter,
   it is possible that the subjectAltName used in the backend
   authentication server certificate will not be identical to the
   Server-Id or backend authentication server FQDN.  This is not
   normally an issue in EAP, as the authenticator will be unaware of the
   identities used between the EAP peer and server.  However, this can
   be an issue for key caching, if the authenticator is expected to
   locate a backend authentication server corresponding to a Server-Id
   provided by an EAP peer.

   Where the backend authentication server FQDN differs from the
   subjectAltName in the backend authentication server certificate, it
   is possible that the AAA client will not be able to determine whether
   it is talking to the correct backend authentication server.  Where
   the Server-Id and backend server FQDN differ, it is possible that the
   combination of the key scope (Peer-Id(s), Server- Id(s)) and EAP
   conversation identifier (Session-Id) will not be sufficient to
   determine where the key resides.  For example, the authenticator can
   identify backend servers by their IP address (as occurs in RADIUS),
   or using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (as in Diameter).  If the
   Server-Id does not correspond to the IP address or FQDN of a known
   backend authentication server, then it may not be possible to locate
   which backend authentication server possesses the key.




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<body class=3D'hmmessage'>
Section 4.1.1 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document includes the follo=
wing statement:<br><br><pre>   In addition, the tunnel method MUST support =
EAP channel bindings to<br>   enable a system based on EAP to meet the addi=
tional requirements in<br>   Section 3 of RFC 4962.<br></pre>While I have n=
o problem with including support for channel bindings within the EMU tunnel=
 method,<br>I do not believe that any requirement for EAP Channel Bindings =
can be inferred from Section 3 of RFC 4962. <br>Here is what Section 3 says=
: <br><pre>         The context will include the peer and NAS identities in=
 more<br>         than one form.  One (or more) name form is needed to iden=
tify<br>         these parties in the authentication exchange and the AAA<b=
r>         protocol.  Another name form may be needed to identify these<br>=
         parties within the lower layer that will employ the session<br>   =
      key.</pre>
Notice that neither this paragraph nor the ones surrounding it mention expo=
rted EAP keying material<br>specifically.&nbsp; This omission was intention=
al -- the intent was to enable the requirement to be met by<br>subsequent c=
ryptographic binding operations operating within lower layers.&nbsp; As an =
example, <br>IEEE 802.11r's PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 cryptographically bind the PM=
K/MSK to channel properties,<br>satisfying this requirement. <br><br>Part o=
f the reason that EAP channel bindings were not mandatory to implement is t=
hat they were (and remain)<br>undeployed, so that their practicality remain=
s unproven.&nbsp; For this reason, despite considerable<br>IESG pressure, R=
FC 4017 included EAP channel bindings only as an optional feature within <b=
r>Section 2.4, rather than promoting it to required or even recommended to =
implement. <br><br>Between the publication of RFC 4017 and 4962, many aspec=
ts of EAP, including new methods,<br>RFC 3748 implementations, etc. moved a=
head, but progress in the channel binding area<br>remained slow, so that th=
e case for requiring EAP channel binding did not grow stronger.<br><br>As p=
roof that EAP channel binding is NOT required by RFC 4962 Section 3, RFC 52=
47 <br>which was chartered to demonstrate how RFC 4962 requirements can met=
 by<br>EAP/Secure Association/AAA systems does not mention EAP channel bind=
ings at all in <br>Section 5.4, which discussed how the RFC 4962 key bindin=
g requirements from Section 3 <br>can be met.&nbsp; Rather, RFC 5247 Sectio=
n 2.3 which discussed authenticator identification, mentions both<br>EAP ch=
annel binding and lower layer bindings in points (f) through (k), albeit wi=
thout<br>normative language. <br><br>Given the extensive discussion of RFC =
4017 and 4962 on the IETF mailing list and various<br>other mailing lists, =
including the EAP WG list, it is therefore somewhat disappointing to see<br=
>something which could only garner IETF consensus as an optional capability=
 promoted to <br>mandatory, purely due to IESG re-interpretation of a BCP a=
fter publication. <br><br>Given that the EMU WG has as a work item for deve=
lopment of an Internet Draft on EAP channel<br>binding, my advice is for th=
e WG, through its analysis of the problem and the potential solutions,<br>t=
o develop its own consensus as to the value and practicality of channel bin=
dings, rather than <br>allowing an opinion to be imposed upon it from the I=
ESG.&nbsp; <br>
<br>As a first step toward that, a concise statement of the problem is very=
 important. <br>Section 4.4 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document incl=
udes the following statement<br>of the Channel Binding problem:<br><pre>   =
The so-called "lying NAS" problem is a well-documented problem with<br>   t=
he current Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) architecture<br>   [RFC=
3748] when used with pass-through authenticators.  Here, a<br>   Network Ac=
cess Server (NAS), or pass-through authenticator, may<br>   authenticate to=
 the backend AAA infrastructure using one set of<br>   credentials, while r=
epresenting contrary information to EAP peers.<br><br style=3D"font-family:=
 Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif;"><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica=
,Sans-Serif;">The issue is not just whether the information presented to<br=
>the peer and server are contradictory, but also whether the information is=
 correct. <br></span><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Seri=
f;">To make this clear, RFC 5247 Section 5.3.3 included additional text bey=
ond<br>what was present in RFC 3748 Section 7.15:<br><br></span>   While th=
e verification [of channel bindings] can be done<br>   either by the peer o=
r the server, typically only the server has the<br>   knowledge to determin=
e the correctness of the values, as opposed to<br>   merely verifying their=
 equality.  <br><br><br><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-S=
erif;">The use of the term "credentials" in the short problem description i=
s somewhat odd, since in <br>AAA protocols, the credentials used for mutual=
 authentication between the AAA client and server <br>do not relate to chan=
nel binding parameters such as the NAS-Identifier.  For example, a AAA clie=
nt <br>can use a certificate containing a subjectAltName field of "aaaclien=
t.example.com" to authenticate to the AAA server, <br>whereas the enclosed =
NAS-Identifier attribute could contain a the R0KH-ID from IEEE 802.11r.<br>=
Such an Access-Request would be completely valid, and RFC 5247 Section 2.5 =
notes some of<br>the issues that can arise:<br><br></span>   It is possible=
 for problems to arise in situations where the EAP<br>   server identifies =
itself differently to the EAP peer and<br>   authenticator.  For example, i=
t is possible that the Server-Id<br>   exported by EAP methods will not be =
identical to the Fully Qualified<br>   Domain Name (FQDN) of the backend au=
thentication server.  Where<br>   certificate-based authentication is used =
within RADIUS or Diameter,<br>   it is possible that the subjectAltName use=
d in the backend<br>   authentication server certificate will not be identi=
cal to the<br>   Server-Id or backend authentication server FQDN.  This is =
not<br>   normally an issue in EAP, as the authenticator will be unaware of=
 the<br>   identities used between the EAP peer and server.  However, this =
can<br>   be an issue for key caching, if the authenticator is expected to<=
br>   locate a backend authentication server corresponding to a Server-Id<b=
r>   provided by an EAP peer.<br><br>   Where the backend authentication se=
rver FQDN differs from the<br>   subjectAltName in the backend authenticati=
on server certificate, it<br>   is possible that the AAA client will not be=
 able to determine whether<br>   it is talking to the correct backend authe=
ntication server.  Where<br>   the Server-Id and backend server FQDN differ=
, it is possible that the<br>   combination of the key scope (Peer-Id(s), S=
erver- Id(s)) and EAP<br>   conversation identifier (Session-Id) will not b=
e sufficient to<br>   determine where the key resides.  For example, the au=
thenticator can<br>   identify backend servers by their IP address (as occu=
rs in RADIUS),<br>   or using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (as in Diameter=
).  If the<br>   Server-Id does not correspond to the IP address or FQDN of=
 a known<br>   backend authentication server, then it may not be possible t=
o locate<br>   which backend authentication server possesses the key.<br><b=
r><span style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif;"></span><br><spa=
n style=3D"font-family: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif;"><br></span></pre></bo=
dy>
</html>=

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_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun 26 01:16:50 2008
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From: Bernard Aboba <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>
To: <emu@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 01:16:47 -0700
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Subject: [Emu] A comment on credential provisioning
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Section 3.7 of the tunnel requirements document states the following:=20

3.7.  Credential Provisioning and Enrollment

   When a peer has authenticated with EAP, this is a convenient time to
   distribute credentials to that peer that may be used for later
   authentication exchanges.  For example, the authentication server can
   provide a private key or shared key to the peer that can be used by
   the peer to perform rapid re-authentication or roaming.  In addition
   there have been proposals to perform enrollment within EAP, such as
   [I-D.mahy-eap-enrollment].

   The tunnel method SHOULD support carrying credential distribution
   protocols.Given the extensive EMU WG discussion relating to ZKPP, and th=
e need to avoid MITM attacks,=20
it seems quite odd to me that the WG would so readily take on the credentia=
l provisioning problem.=20

As we move increasingly towards a world in which network access will be inc=
reasingly likely to=20
require authentication, mechanisms for credential provisioning will become =
increasingly important.=20
For example, consider the situation where someone has obtained a spanking n=
ew handset/PC/notebook
and wishes to get connected in an environment where authentication is requi=
red for all access=20
mechanisms:  VPN/WLAN/Ethernet/PPP, etc. =20

That said, moving from a state where no credentials, trust anchors or polic=
y is provisioned to
one where everything is set up can be quite tricky:

a. No trust anchor may be provisioned, which makes server certificate authe=
ntication difficult.=20
Without server certificate authentication, we need to be very careful about=
 MITM attacks!

b. If the server may be a rogue, then the dictionary attack protection prov=
ided by the TLS
tunnel is worth much.  This implies that the credential provisioning mechan=
ism itself
needs to be immune to dictionary attack.  Merely binding the inner authenti=
cation to=20
the outer tunnel only demonstrates that there is no MITM attack, but it doe=
sn't demonstrate
that the server is authentic.  Unless the client is willing to consider its=
 password compromised
if the cryptographic binding fails (a nasty situation) we're back to the pu=
re password
discussion initiated by Glen and Dan, or a poor man's substitute, such a pr=
ogressive
disclosure, which was used in the WFA WPS EAP method.=20

Given all of this, my advice would be to delete Section 3.7.  Leaving this =
in is likely to=20
lead to a lot of additional discussion which is largely tangential to the c=
ore of what
needs to be accomplished.  If and when the WG decides to add the password-b=
ased
method item to the Charter, we could bring this item back.  But until then,=
 it seems
like it would be best ruled out of scope.


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<style>.hmmessage P{margin:0px;padding:0px}body.hmmessage{FONT-SIZE: 10pt;F=
ONT-FAMILY:Tahoma}</style>Section 3.7 of the tunnel requirements document s=
tates the following: <br><br><pre>3.7.  Credential Provisioning and Enrollm=
ent<br><br>   When a peer has authenticated with EAP, this is a convenient =
time to<br>   distribute credentials to that peer that may be used for late=
r<br>   authentication exchanges.  For example, the authentication server c=
an<br>   provide a private key or shared key to the peer that can be used b=
y<br>   the peer to perform rapid re-authentication or roaming.  In additio=
n<br>   there have been proposals to perform enrollment within EAP, such as=
<br>   [I-D.mahy-eap-enrollment].<br><br>   The tunnel method SHOULD suppor=
t carrying credential distribution<br>   protocols.</pre>Given the extensiv=
e EMU WG discussion relating to ZKPP, and the need to avoid MITM attacks, <=
br>it seems quite odd to me that the WG would so readily take on the creden=
tial provisioning problem. <br><br>As we move increasingly towards a world =
in which network access will be increasingly likely to <br>require authenti=
cation, mechanisms for credential provisioning will become increasingly imp=
ortant. <br>For example, consider the situation where someone has obtained =
a spanking new handset/PC/notebook<br>and wishes to get connected in an env=
ironment where authentication is required for all access <br>mechanisms:&nb=
sp; VPN/WLAN/Ethernet/PPP, etc.&nbsp; <br><br>That said, moving from a stat=
e where no credentials, trust anchors or policy is provisioned to<br>one wh=
ere everything is set up can be quite tricky:<br><br>a. No trust anchor may=
 be provisioned, which makes server certificate authentication difficult. <=
br>Without server certificate authentication, we need to be very careful ab=
out MITM attacks!<br><br>b. If the server may be a rogue, then the dictiona=
ry attack protection provided by the TLS<br>tunnel is worth much.&nbsp; Thi=
s implies that the credential provisioning mechanism itself<br>needs to be =
immune to dictionary attack.&nbsp; Merely binding the inner authentication =
to <br>the outer tunnel only demonstrates that there is no MITM attack, but=
 it doesn't demonstrate<br>that the server is authentic.&nbsp; Unless the c=
lient is willing to consider its password compromised<br>if the cryptograph=
ic binding fails (a nasty situation) we're back to the pure password<br>dis=
cussion initiated by Glen and Dan, or a poor man's substitute, such a progr=
essive<br>disclosure, which was used in the WFA WPS EAP method. <br><br>Giv=
en all of this, my advice would be to delete Section 3.7.&nbsp; Leaving thi=
s in is likely to <br>lead to a lot of additional discussion which is large=
ly tangential to the core of what<br>needs to be accomplished.&nbsp; If and=
 when the WG decides to add the password-based<br>method item to the Charte=
r, we could bring this item back.&nbsp; But until then, it seems<br>like it=
 would be best ruled out of scope.<br><br></body>
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_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu

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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jun 26 05:33:40 2008
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of draft-clancy-emu-chbind-00
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Bernard,

00 was an extremely preliminary version.  01 has been completed for a 
while now, just not posted.  I just posted it.  We'll go through your 
comments and see which of them are addressed in the new version (I 
suspect many of them will be).

Regardless, thank you for your review.

--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland


Bernard Aboba wrote:
> Overview
>  
> I have read this document and have found several major issues with it.  
> As a result,
> I don't think it is currently suitable for adoption of an EMU WG work item.
>  
> Issues:
>  
> a. Mistatement of the 'Lying NAS' problem. 
>  
> The 'Lying NAS' problem does not just concern the issue of whether the 
> authenticator
> gives different information to the peer and the server;  it also relates 
> to the
> ability of the server to verify that the information is actually correct.
>  
> The document does not refer to the necessity of first-hop verification 
> of the
> information provided by the authenticator, such as the mapping between the
> NAS-Identification attributes and the source address. 
>  
> The need for verification impacts the trust model in some major ways, since
> not only does the authentication server need to trust that the authenticator
> attributes have not been modified along the path -- it also needs to 
> trust that
> the first hop was configured to check the validity of attributes that 
> only it can
> check. 
>  
> For example, it's not much help for the AAA Server to verify that the RSN IE
> provided to the STA is the same one it got from the AP if there is no way of
> verifying whether the AP actually was configured to emit that RSN IE.
>  
> b. Lack of applicability to the roaming case.
>  
> The document states that Channel Bindings only apply to the non-roaming 
> case.
> I'm not sure why this restriction is mentioned because the issue of 
> verification
> is present even within a single domain. 
>  
> c. Discussion of 'fuzzy' comparisions.  By their nature, Channel 
> Bindings may include
> information that may be opaque to the AAA server, such as the RSN IE.  
> Given that
> the AAA server may not be capable of understanding the contents of the 
> attributes,
> I question whether the concept of 'fuzzy comparisons' makes sense.  
> Rather, I think
> we need to assume that a AAA server will probably only be capable of 
> 'byte by byte'
> comparisons in most cases.  This is an important issue, because it 
> affects the structure
> of data that needs to be provided by the client, and avoid potential 
> 'canonicalization'
> issues that could greatly complicate the successful implementation of 
> channel
> bindings.
>  
> d. Discussion of lower layer channel bindings.
>  
> The document does not discuss the potential use of channel bindings in 
> lower layers such
> as IEEE 802.11r.  I think that this is important since lower layers such 
> as 11r do bind EAP
> keying material to lower layer parameters (such as the peer and 
> authenticator MAC address).
> Thus, lower layer channel bindings is an alternative that should be 
> discussed.
>  
> e. Development of requirements.  If this document is going to include an 
> evaluation of
> alternative approaches, then it needs to clearly articulate the 
> requirements for such an
> evaluation.
>  
> f. Clear distinction between RFC 5056 and 3748 channel binding 
> concepts.  The current
> document is not as clear as it could be on this.  The RFC 5056 channel 
> binding concept
> is closer to that of 'cryptographic binding' than it is to EAP channel 
> bindings.  This should
> be made clear.
>  
> g. Exploration of operations implications.  There are a number of 
> barriers to successful
> implementation of channel bindings that need to be explored, including:
>  
> 1. Required configuration for first-hop AAA clients.
> 2. Potential changes to drivers and AAA servers.
> 3. Potential impacts on authentication reliability.
>  
> h. Motivation.  Why should we care about Channel Bindings?  Given the 
> operational costs
> I'd suggest that the document needs to make a case that there is a 
> potentially serious
> security vulnerability here.  Such a case probably involves some kind of 
> financial fraud
> issue which is most likely in a roaming situation - which is 
> unfortunately a scenario that the
> document rules out of scope.
>  
>  
> Some specific comments.
>  
> ============================
>  
> Abstract
>    This document defines how to implement channel bindings for
>    Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods.
>  
> [BA] I'd add a definition of the problem to the abstract goals.
>  
> 
> Section 1
>    A well-documented problem with the current Extensible Authentication
>    Protocol (EAP) architecture [RFC3748] when used in pass-through
>    authenticator mode is the so-called 'lying NAS' problem.  Here, a
>    Network Access Server (NAS), or pass-through authenticator, may
>    authenticate to the backend AAA infrastructure using one set of
>    credentials, while representing contrary information to EAP clients.
>  
> [BA] The 'lying NAS' problem is not really about credentials, since in
> RADIUS the identity of a RADIUS client is defined by its IP address.
> Rather, the issue is providing different *information* (e.g.
> Called-Station-Id, NAS-Identifier, etc.) to the peer and AAA server.
>  
>    A concrete example of this may be an IEEE 802.11 access point with a
>    security association to a particular AAA server.  While there may be
>    some identity tied to that security association, there's no reason
>    the access point need advertise the same identity to clients. 
>  
> [BA] The identity used in the AAA server security association and the
> one advertised to clients do not necessary have to agree, even if the
> NAS is not lying.
>  
>    In
>    fact, it may include whatever information in its beacons (to include
>    different SSID or security properties) it desires.  This could lead
>    to situations where, for example, a client joins one network that's
>    masquerading as another.
>  
> [BA] The SSID is a good example, but the 'security properties' (e.g. RSN IE)
> are not provided to the AAA server.  Therefore it is
> not possible for a NAS to 'lie' to the AAA server about the RSN IE it
> sent in a Beacon.
> 
>    Channel bindings [RFC5056] seek to enforce a stronger security
>    relationship between the three entities, by allowing the client and
>    server to compare their relative perception of the authenticator's
>    identity in a secure channel. 
> 
> [BA] RFC 5056 specifically states that it does not apply to EAP, and
> that the use of the term 'Channel Bindings' is not the same as the
> one used in EAP.  As a result, I'd recommend deleting the above
> paragraph or clarifying the relationship.
>  
>    This document defines how to use 'AAA
>    Payloads' [I-D.clancy-emu-aaapay] within EAP methods to implement
>    channel bindings.  Unlike [RFC5056], channel binding in EAP context
>    does not ensure binding different layers of a session but rather the
>    information advertized to client and authentication server by an
>    authenticator acting as pass-through device during an EAP session.
>  
> [BA] You might say that 'Channel Bindings' in RFC 5056 corresponds to
> the term 'cryptographic binding' in EAP.
>  
>    It is preferable to use this idea, rather than hashing identity
>    information directly into keys, for a number of reasons:
>    o  It allows for fuzzy comparisons of entity names, rather than
>       requiring absolute.  This can facilitate deployment and debugging.
>  
> [BA] Not sure this is convincing because it's doubtful whether
> 'fuzzy comparisons' are implementable in the alternative approach either.
> Wouldn't this require the AAA server to be able to parse the attributes
> and 'understand' them in some deep manner? 
> 
>    o  Any EAP method that provides mutual authentication and key
>       derivation can easily add channel binding as proposed in this
>       draft.  On the other hand, including identities into key
>       derivations requires the modification of EAP methods.  For
>       instance, many EAP methods specify how MSK and other keying
>       material is derived and adding channel binding by adding
>       identifiers would need to be specified for each method
>       individually.
>  
> [BA] I think you are making assumptions about how the keys are mixed in
> that may not necessarily be valid.  For example, couldn't the mixing
> occur in a lower layer rather than in the EAP method?  A more valid
> reason would be that EAP methods need to be lower layer independent,
> whereas Channel Bindings often are not -- so that mixing them into
> EAP keying material could be an issue.  However, this argument would
> not hold for mixing that occurs in a lower layer.  This practice is
> already incorporated into lower layer specifications such as IEEE 802.11r.
> 
>    o  Client and authentication server may communicate on different
>       layers with the authenticator and thus receive different
>       identifiers that may belong to the same device.  A server may be
>       able to recognize which different identifiers belong to the same
>       device (e.g. by performing a table look up).  This scenario cannot
>       be solved by hashing identities into keys.
>  
> [BA] I think what you're trying to say here is that the set of channel
> bindings may vary between authenticator implementations, no?
> 
> 4.  Trust Model
>  
> [BA] I think that you need to include this introduction earlier in the
> document.
>  
>    Channel bindings are always provided between two communication
>    endpoints, i.e. here between client and server, who communicate
>    through an authenticator in pass-trough mode (as illustrated in
>    Figure 1).  Channel binding prevents attacks by rogue authenticators
>    in pass-trough mode (see Example Attacks).
>  
>  
> 
> Clancy & Hoeper          Expires August 21, 2008                [Page 4]
> 
> Internet-Draft                 EAP-CHBIND                  February 2008
> 
>                          ---------------------------------------------
>      --------   info1   |   -------------     info2     -----------   |
>     |EAP peer| <--------|  |Authenticator| ----------> |Auth.Server|  |
>      --------           |   -------------               -----------   |
>        |                |                                     |       |
>        |                |                 Home Domain         |       |
>        |                 ---------------------------------------------
>        |                                                      |
>        |                                                      |
>        |                     Channel binding                  |
>        |<---------------------------------------------------->|
>                    Figure 1: Overview of Channel Binding
>  
> [BA] There is an important piece missing from this picture -- the
> need of the first hop proxy to check the *correctness* of the information
> passed by the authenticator.  For example, only the first hop can check
> if the NAS-Identifier attribute actually corresponds to the source IP
> address of the authenticator; downstream proxies or servers cannot check
> this, since the information will have been 'laundered' by the time it
> reaches them.
>  
>    During an EAP execution, an authenticator presents information info1
>    and info2 to client and server, respectively.  Such information can
>    include the authenticator's identifier/address and/or advertised
>    network information (such as offered services and billing
>    information).  To prevent attacks by rogue authenticators, the server
>    must be able to recognize any inconsistencies in info1 and info2.
>    Therefore, the client sends info1 to the server and upon performing
>    an inconsistency check, the server notifies the client about the
>    result.  Only in case of a positive result, channel binding is
>    provided and the EAP session continues.  Note that under some
>    circumstances, the client could be able to check for inconsistencies;
>    however the check is generally easier to implement on the server.
>    The trust model for channel binding consists of three parties, namely
>    a client, an authentication server and an authenticator in pass-
>    through mode as illustrated in Figure 1.  In this trust model, client
>    and authentication server are honest while the authenticator is
>    maliciously sending false information to client and/or server.  The
>    three parties have the following trust relationships:
>    o  The server trusts that the channel binding information received
>       from the client is the information that the client received from
>       the authenticator (i.e. info1)
>    o  The client trusts the channel binding result received from the
>       server
>    o  The server trusts the identifier received from the authenticator
>  
> [BA] The first hop cannot just trust the identifer received from the
> authenticator -- it is *required*  that it be able to verify it, based 
> on configuration.
>  
>    Note that the model includes all cases in which authenticator and
>    authentication server communicate over one or more intermediate nodes
>    as long as 1) these nodes only forward the messages (e.g. routers)
>    and 2) authenticator and server communicate using an end-to-end
>    protocol (e.g.  AAA).  However, roaming scenarios with proxies are
>    out of the scope of this document.
>  
> [BA] Roaming scenarios are actually quite central to the problem statement
> because almost all the severe security vulnerabilities relate to roaming in
> some way. 
> ______________________
> 
> i <http://im.live.com/Messenger/IM/Home/?source=EML_WLHM_GreaterGood> 
> EMAILING FOR THE GREATER GOOD
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
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Pasi,

See comments inline.  An updated draft will be released shortly.  Also 
note that the new draft addresses Dan's comments about resistance to 
dictionary attack.

> Cover page: suggest adding word "method" to end of document title

Done.

> S4, "EAP_Method_Type refers to the integer value of the IANA allocated
> EAP Type code", "...to the EAP type code (1 byte), specified in
> Section XX"?

I don't think it's ever been clear how to reference the IANA allocated 
EAP type code in an I-D before it's been allocated.  These are things 
that would be fixed by the RFC Editor or in AUTH48, once IANA has 
allocated the type code.

> S5/S8.2: reference RFC3232 doesn't seem right here. RFC 3748 didn't
> have any reference, but if you want one, perhaps the registry
> itself (name+URL) would be better.

Replaced references with references to IANA's enterprise number registry.

> S5: does not say that enterprise code 0 means IETF/IANA managed registry

Fixed.

> S5, "is mandatory to implement" and "its support is optional",
> should use RFC2119 keywords?

Fixed.

> S6 and elsewhere: Several places in the document assume that KS (key
> size of the ciphersuite) is always the same as the MAC output length.
> This would make it difficult to define ciphersuites based on
> e.g. AES-CMAC-256. If this restriction is intentional (and WG is happy
> with it), at the very least it needs to be emphasized much more.

I'm not sure what AES-CMAC-256 means.  RFC 4493 defines CMAC 
specifically for 128 length AES, so if you wanted to something involving 
256, you'd need to define exactly what AES-CMAC-256 was, and I imagine 
it would have a 256-bit input and a 256-bit output.  Regardless, I added 
a statement in the key derivation section saying the input and output 
lengths of your ciphersuite must be equal.

> S7.1.2, "where Input refers to [..] Value of SEC_SK(Value)" this
> can be interpreted in two ways

Fixed.

> S7.1.3 and S7.2.3, these sections seem to be redundant (don't contain
> anything that isn't already said in S4?)

Removed sections.

> S5 and S8.2 are not consistent about ciphersuite formatting (is
> enterprise number 3 or 4 octets; if you're not sure, suggest
> doing what RFC3748 did)

Fixed (should be 4).

> S5/S8.2/S8.4, terminology: in this context, OID would usually mean the
> whole OID (e.g., "1.3.6.1.4.1.1080"); here we want just the enterprise
> code (e.g., 1080)

Replaced references to "OID" with "enterprise number".

> S8.3, should specify exactly which octets are used when
> calculating MACs.

Fixed.

> S8.4, text and bit diagram are not consistent about whether
> enterprise code is 3 or 4 bytes

Text consistent with length 4 enterprise code.

> S8.4, it seems that here you borrowed text from IKEv2. That's good...
> except that IKEv2 didn't get this quite right (it assumed CBC mode
> without saying so). In draft-hoffman-ikev2bis-03 say so explicitly
> (and add that other modes can be specified in the future).
 >
> S8.4, the part IKEv2 got really wrong was the text about IVs (the
> text suggests violating important security requirements from the
> actual CBC mode spec, NIST 800-38A). See draft-hoffman-ikev2bis-03
> for an attempt to fix it.

Added a bit more flexibility -- optional/arbitrary-length IV, and 
optional/arbitrary-length padding.  This would make the formatting 
compatible with stream-based modes like CCM, or self-contained modes 
like AEAD.

> S8.4, adding zero padding length byte when not doing encryption is
> confusing -- consider removing (or at least explaining much more
> clearly).

Allows for more modular implementations -- separate protocol processing 
from crypto processing.  Added text.

> S8.4.1, it seems that we have two different ways to send protected
> failure indication (GPSK-Protected-Fail opcode and protected result
> indication)? some change or explanation is needed.

Removed 8.4.1.

> S9, text seems to confuse mandatory-to-implement and mandatory-to-use.
> Making some crypto algorithm mandatory-to-use is extremely rare in
> IETF specs, and I can't recall any instance where this was done if
> the protocol had a working negotiation mechanism.

Removed the mandatory to use language.

> S9, "EAP peer should respond with an EAP-NAK". Is this a SHOULD?
> (and if it is, the reasons for not making it MUST should be explained)

Fixed.

> S9, "If the MAC validation fails, the server MUST transmit a GPSK-Fail
> message specifying "Authentication Failure" and discard the received
> packet." Not quite sure what "discard the received packet" here
> exactly means in the context of EAP state machine (If the server
> sends a reply, it's not discarding the packet as such).

Fixed.

> S11.6, "(PSK) that MUST be based on at least 16 octets of entropy" An
> implementor of EAP-GPSK cannot implement this MUST. If it's intended
> for administrator/user deploying this, it needs significantly more
> detailed instructions.

Changed to SHOULD.

> S11.8, 1st para: third form of DoS that should be relevant is
> preventing valid peer and authenticator from communicating (and
> there's plenty of text about silently discarding things etc. that
> attempts to address this)

Added.

> S11.8, the description about client not having to keep state seems
> wrong -- client needs to keep state to verify that RAND_Peer is
> fresh (i.e. RAND_Peer in GPSK-1 and GPSK-3 are the same), right?

This analysis was added after some reviews from Mitchell's group at 
Stanford.  This text actually could introduce vulnerability to a replay 
attack.

> S11.10, perhaps some other word than "Exposition" would be
> better here?

Replaced with "Compromise".

> S11.10, "In particular, this PSK must not be shared by a group of
> peers communicating with the same server." One literal interpretation
> of this sentence would be that ID_Peer can't identify a user account
> if the user can have multiple devices (EAP Peers). That's probably
> not exactly what was intended.

Addressed.

> S11.11, should explain what limitations this brings (since in theory
> EAP-GPSK packets can be longer than minimum EAP MTU)

Fixed.

> S11.16, "Although EAP-GPSK provides confidentiality in its protected
> data
> payloads, it cannot claim to do so as per Section 7.2.1 of [RFC3748]".
> Better explanation needed.

Fixed.

> S11 should include a "security claims" summary (see other EAP method
> RFCs for examples)

Added.

> S11 does not discuss key strenth (required by RFC 3748)

Added.

> S12 needs to give names for the new registries to be created
> (e.g. "EAP-GPSK Ciphersuite Registry" , etc.)

Added.

> S12, "IANA is furthermore instructed to add the specified
> ciphersuites, protected data types, failure codes and op-codes to
> these registries as defined in this document." -> "The initial contents
> of these registries are specified below" ?

Fixed.

> S12, "Values can be added or modified with informational RFCs..."
> Strongly suggest using one of the policies defined in RFC2434.
> (For example, current text prevents Standards Track RFCs from
> defining new values!)

Swithced to "IETF CONSENSUS".

> S12, needs some paragraph breaks (e.g. "The Failure-Code field is 32
> bits long and all other values are available via IANA registration.
> The following layout represents the initial OP-Code registry setup:"
> is very confusing).

Fixed.

> S15, there are several references that should be normative. At the
> very least: RFC4634, AES, CMAC, CBC. Possibly also eap-keying (as the
> concepts of EAP "Method-ID", "Session-ID", etc. are not defined
> anywhere else).

Done.

> Interoperability requires the ability to enter same PSK in both client
> and server. See e.g. RFC4306 S2.15 and RFC4279 S5.4 for examples of
> management interface requirements.

Added.

> The OP-Code field is not included in the MAC; if you're sure this
> is OK, perhaps slightly better explanation in e.g. S11.5. would
> be good to convince others about this.

Added.

> Defining ID_Server just as an "opaque blob" does not really allow
> interoperability -- and the spec doesn't really forbit using it in
> non-opaque ways. Even if we specified that ID_Server MUST NOT be
> processed in any other way than bytewise comparison, interoperability
> still requires entering the same ID_Server in both ends (and thus
> similar management interface requirements as PSK). And e.g. picking
> client identity "somebody@example.com" when seeing ID_Server
> "aaa.example.com" wouldn't mean opaque any more. I'm open to
> suggestions how to handle this, and there probably isn't just one
> right alternative. Specifying that ID_Server is a domain name, and
> some kind of simple rules how it could be processed, is one
> option. Explicitly forbidding any kind of non-opaque processing
> (i.e. requiring that the client MUST know ID_Server beforehand, and
> MUST reject GPSK-1 if it does not contain identical ID_Server) would
> be another.

ID_Server and ID_Peer must all be provisioned simultaneous to the PSK. 
The formatting doesn't matter too much other than to perhaps help the 
parties efficiently search a list of PSKs.  I've added text in the 
management interface section (see "Key Management") to discuss this.

> Document needs more text about leaking information via different
> failures codes (this is sort of implied in S9 when talking about
> "depending on its policy", but what exactly the policy and its
> implications are is not described).

Added text to section 11.2.

--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland

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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the EAP Method Update Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method
	Author(s)       : C. Clancy, H. Tschofenig
	Filename        : draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
	Pages           : 38
	Date            : 2008-06-27

This Internet Draft defines an Extensible Authentication Protocol
method called EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK).  This method
is a lightweight shared-key authentication protocol supporting mutual
authentication and key derivation.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt

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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Jun 27 12:45:30 2008
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From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08 (1st round of
 comments)
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  Hi Charles,

On Fri, June 27, 2008 8:05 am, Charles Clancy wrote:
[snip]
>> S6 and elsewhere: Several places in the document assume that KS (key
>> size of the ciphersuite) is always the same as the MAC output length.
>> This would make it difficult to define ciphersuites based on
>> e.g. AES-CMAC-256. If this restriction is intentional (and WG is happy
>> with it), at the very least it needs to be emphasized much more.
>
> I'm not sure what AES-CMAC-256 means.  RFC 4493 defines CMAC
> specifically for 128 length AES, so if you wanted to something involving
> 256, you'd need to define exactly what AES-CMAC-256 was, and I imagine
> it would have a 256-bit input and a 256-bit output.  Regardless, I added
> a statement in the key derivation section saying the input and output
> lengths of your ciphersuite must be equal.

  CMAC is defined in NIST SP 800-38B and section D.3 deals with the
instance of CMAC-AES-256 (with test vectors!). It takes a 256-bit key
and, like all AES-based MACs, produces a 128-bit digest.

  regards,

  Dan.



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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Jun 27 15:51:04 2008
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Subject: Re: [Emu] I-D Action:draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
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  Hi,

  I just glanced over this draft. In section 12.1 each of the security
claims seems to refer to sections from the -08 version of the draft.
For instance,

       Confidentiality:           No (section 11.14 and 11.16)

where in the -08 draft sections 11.14 and 11.16 discuss ID protection
and confidentiality, respectively, but it's 12.15 and 12.17 in the -09
version. Am I misreading this somehow?

  I also think that the security claims in 12.1 should explicitly spell
out whether they meet RFC 4017 requirements, like the charter says.

  I'm glad that my comment on non-resistance to dictionary attack
was accepted. Thanks! But I still think that section is somewhat
ambiguous. It says, "Users who use passwords as the basis of their PSK
are not protected against dictionary attacks." Well, that's true but users
who do not use passwords as the basis of their PSK are also not protected
against dictionary attacks!

  I'd like to suggest the following text for section 12.7:

      The success of a dictionary attack against EAP-GPSK depends on
      the strength of the long-term shared secret (PSK) it uses. The
      PSK used by EAP-GPSK SHOULD be drawn from a pool of secrets that
      is at least 2^128 bits large and whose distribution is uniformly
      random. Note that this does not imply resistance to dictionary
      attack, only that the probability of success in such an attack
      is acceptably remote.

That is, I believe, fair, accurate, and unambiguous.

  regards,

  Dan.

On Fri, June 27, 2008 8:30 am, Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the EAP Method Update Working Group of the
> IETF.
>
>
> 	Title           : EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method
> 	Author(s)       : C. Clancy, H. Tschofenig
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
> 	Pages           : 38
> 	Date            : 2008-06-27
>
> This Internet Draft defines an Extensible Authentication Protocol
> method called EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK).  This method
> is a lightweight shared-key authentication protocol supporting mutual
> authentication and key derivation.
>
> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
> implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
> Internet-Draft.
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Sat Jun 28 07:25:34 2008
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Subject: Re: [Emu] I-D Action:draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
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Hi Dan,

Dan Harkins wrote:
>   Hi,
>
>   I just glanced over this draft. In section 12.1 each of the security
> claims seems to refer to sections from the -08 version of the draft.
> For instance,
>
>        Confidentiality:           No (section 11.14 and 11.16)
>
> where in the -08 draft sections 11.14 and 11.16 discuss ID protection
> and confidentiality, respectively, but it's 12.15 and 12.17 in the -09
> version. Am I misreading this somehow?
>
>   
You are right. We should have used <xref target=".."/> in the XML text 
rather than hardcoding it. The structure changed but we forgot to update 
this text.

>   I also think that the security claims in 12.1 should explicitly spell
> out whether they meet RFC 4017 requirements, like the charter says.
>
>   I'm glad that my comment on non-resistance to dictionary attack
> was accepted. Thanks! But I still think that section is somewhat
> ambiguous. It says, "Users who use passwords as the basis of their PSK
> are not protected against dictionary attacks." Well, that's true but users
> who do not use passwords as the basis of their PSK are also not protected
> against dictionary attacks!
>
>   I'd like to suggest the following text for section 12.7:
>
>       The success of a dictionary attack against EAP-GPSK depends on
>       the strength of the long-term shared secret (PSK) it uses. The
>       PSK used by EAP-GPSK SHOULD be drawn from a pool of secrets that
>       is at least 2^128 bits large and whose distribution is uniformly
>       random. Note that this does not imply resistance to dictionary
>       attack, only that the probability of success in such an attack
>       is acceptably remote.
>
> That is, I believe, fair, accurate, and unambiguous.
>
>   

Aren't we saying essentially the same in the previous sentences?

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

12.7.  Dictionary Attacks

   EAP-GPSK relies on a long-term shared secret (PSK) that SHOULD be
   based on at least 16 octets of entropy to be fully secure.  The EAP-
   GPSK protocol makes no special provisions to ensure keys based on
   passwords are used securely.  Users who use passwords as the basis of
   their PSK are not protected against dictionary attacks.  Derivation
   of the long-term shared secret from a password is strongly
   discouraged.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

If you think we haven't discouraged folks enough to use passwords 
with the current text then we could add your text in addition to it. 



Ciao
Hannes

>   regards,
>
>   Dan.
>
> On Fri, June 27, 2008 8:30 am, Internet-Drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>   
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
>> directories.
>> This draft is a work item of the EAP Method Update Working Group of the
>> IETF.
>>
>>
>> 	Title           : EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method
>> 	Author(s)       : C. Clancy, H. Tschofenig
>> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
>> 	Pages           : 38
>> 	Date            : 2008-06-27
>>
>> This Internet Draft defines an Extensible Authentication Protocol
>> method called EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK).  This method
>> is a lightweight shared-key authentication protocol supporting mutual
>> authentication and key derivation.
>>
>> A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
>> Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader
>> implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the
>> Internet-Draft.
>> _______________________________________________
>> Emu mailing list
>> Emu@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>>
>>     
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>   

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  Hi Hannes,

On Sat, June 28, 2008 7:25 am, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
[snip]
>>
>>   I'd like to suggest the following text for section 12.7:
>>
>>       The success of a dictionary attack against EAP-GPSK depends on
>>       the strength of the long-term shared secret (PSK) it uses. The
>>       PSK used by EAP-GPSK SHOULD be drawn from a pool of secrets that
>>       is at least 2^128 bits large and whose distribution is uniformly
>>       random. Note that this does not imply resistance to dictionary
>>       attack, only that the probability of success in such an attack
>>       is acceptably remote.
>>
>> That is, I believe, fair, accurate, and unambiguous.
>
> Aren't we saying essentially the same in the previous sentences?
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> 12.7.  Dictionary Attacks
>
>    EAP-GPSK relies on a long-term shared secret (PSK) that SHOULD be
>    based on at least 16 octets of entropy to be fully secure.  The EAP-
>    GPSK protocol makes no special provisions to ensure keys based on
>    passwords are used securely.  Users who use passwords as the basis of
>    their PSK are not protected against dictionary attacks.  Derivation
>    of the long-term shared secret from a password is strongly
>    discouraged.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> If you think we haven't discouraged folks enough to use passwords
> with the current text then we could add your text in addition to it.

  My original comment wasn't because passwords were not being discouraged
sufficiently (although that is a good idea) but because EAP-GPSK just is
not resistant to dictionary attack regardless of the "strength" of the
PSK being input.

  The text above seems to suggest that the problem is that there are
"no special provisions" to ensure that passwords aren't used. That's not
really the problem. The problem is that EAP-GPSK allows an offline attack
that has a work factor based on the size of the pool from which the
secret was drawn. And that, according to RFC 3748 as well as other
cryptographic literature, means that EAP-GPSK is not resistant to
dictionary attack. It's not resistant to dictionary attack even if
passwords aren't used.

  Thankfully EAP-GPSK strongly recommends that the pool from which the
secret was drawn be extremely large (2^128). This makes a dictionary
attack highly unlikely to succeed but the improbability of success does
not mean EAP-GPSK is resistant to dictionary attack.

  I think it would be better to mention that the protocol itself is not
resistant to dictionary attack and the likelihood of successful attack
is inversely related to the strength of the PSK. In other words, use a
strong PSK but don't think you're resistant to dictionary attack because
you do.

  regards,

  Dan.



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