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Subject: [Emu] WG Action: RECHARTER: EAP Method Update (emu)
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The EAP Method Update (emu) working group in the Security Area of the IETF
has been rechartered.  For additional information, please contact the Area
Directors or the working group Chairs.

EAP Method Update (emu)
========================

Last Modified: 2008-05-22

Current Status: Active Working Group

Chair(s):
Joseph Salowey (jsalowey@cisco.com)
Alan DeKok (aland@deployingradius.com)

Security Area Director(s):
Tim Polk (tim.polk@nist.gov)
Pasi Eronen (pasi.eronen@nokia.com)

Security Area Advisor:
Pasi Eronen (pasi.eronen@nokia.com)

Mailing Lists:
General Discussion: emu@ietf.org
To Subscribe: https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
Archive: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/index.html

Description of Working Group:

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] is a network
access authentication framework used in the PPP, 802.11, 802.16, VPN,
PANA, and in some functions in 3G networks. EAP itself is a simple
protocol and actual authentication happens in EAP methods.

Over 40 different EAP methods exist. Most of these methods are
proprietary methods, but some are documented in informational RFCs. In
the past the lack of documented, open specifications has been a
deployment and interoperability problem. There are currently only two
EAP methods in the standards track that implement features such as key
derivation that are required for many modern applications.
Authentication types and credentials continue to evolve as do
requirements for EAP methods.

This group is chartered to work on the following types of mechanisms
to meet requirements relevant to EAP methods in RFC 3748, RFC 4017,
RFC 4962 and EAP Keying:

- A mechanism based on strong shared secrets. This mechanism should
strive to be simple and compact for implementation in resource
constrained environments.

- A document that defines EAP channel bindings and provides guidance
for establishing EAP channel bindings within EAP methods.

- Enable TLS-based EAP methods to support channel bindings. This item
will not generate a new method; rather, it will focus on adding
support for EAP channel bindings to the tunneled method (described
below), and if possible, other TLS-based EAP methods. Potential
mechanisms for adding channel binding support will be investigated,
including tunneling of channel binding parameters, or a TLS extension,
or other standard TLS mechanism

- A mechanism to support extensible communication within a TLS
protected tunnel. This mechanism will support meeting the requirements
of an enhanced TLS mechanism, a password based authentication
mechanism, and additional inner authentication mechanisms. It will
also support channel bindings (as described above) in order to meet
RFC 4962 requirements.

- A mechanism that makes use of existing password databases such as AAA
databases. This item will be based on the above tunnel method.

Goals and Milestones:

Jun 2008 Submit Tunnel and Password Method requirements first Draft
Sep 2008 Submit EAP Channel Bindings First Draft
Sep 2008 Submit Tunnel Method first draft
Oct 2008 Submit TLS based method channel binding first draft
Oct 2008 Submit Password Method first draft
Jan 2009 Send EAP Channel Bindings to IESG
Mar 2009 Send Tunnel Method to IESG
Apr 2009 Send TLS based method channel binding to IESG
Apr 2009 Send Password based method to IESG
_______________________________________________
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Emu@ietf.org
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From: <Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08 (1st round of
	comments)
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Charles Clancy wrote:

> See comments inline.  An updated draft will be released shortly.
> Also note that the new draft addresses Dan's comments about
> resistance to dictionary attack.  

Thanks for the update! I have some additional comments (see below),
but they should be easy to address.

> > S4, "EAP_Method_Type refers to the integer value of the IANA
> > allocated EAP Type code", "...to the EAP type code (1 byte),
> > specified in Section XX"?
> 
> I don't think it's ever been clear how to reference the IANA
> allocated EAP type code in an I-D before it's been allocated.  These
> are things that would be fixed by the RFC Editor or in AUTH48, once
> IANA has allocated the type code.

For clarity, I'd still suggest adding the "(1 octet)" part (although
someone reading RFC 3748 will of course figure out that it's 1 octet).

> > S6 and elsewhere: Several places in the document assume that KS
> > (key size of the ciphersuite) is always the same as the MAC output
> > length.  This would make it difficult to define ciphersuites based
> > on e.g. AES-CMAC-256. If this restriction is intentional (and WG
> > is happy with it), at the very least it needs to be emphasized
> > much more.
> 
> I'm not sure what AES-CMAC-256 means.  RFC 4493 defines CMAC
> specifically for 128 length AES, so if you wanted to something
> involving 256, you'd need to define exactly what AES-CMAC-256 was,
> and I imagine it would have a 256-bit input and a 256-bit output.
> Regardless, I added a statement in the key derivation section saying
> the input and output lengths of your ciphersuite must be equal.

As Dan Harkins already pointed out, NIST 800-38B does define CMAC 
for 256-bit AES, with 256-bit key and 128-bit output.

So hardcoding this assumption in EAP-GPSK seems to limit the future
algorithm agility somewhat -- is the WG sure this is an acceptable
limitation?

(If this limitation is kept, I'd suggest mentioning in Section 2
that "KS" is not only the key size, but also MAC output length.)

> > S5 and S8.2 are not consistent about ciphersuite formatting (is
> > enterprise number 3 or 4 octets; if you're not sure, suggest
> > doing what RFC3748 did)
> 
> Fixed (should be 4).

Figure 3 in S6 still assumes it's 3.

> > S8.4, text and bit diagram are not consistent about whether
> > enterprise code is 3 or 4 bytes
> 
> Text consistent with length 4 enterprise code.

The 1st figure (now in S9.4) still shows 3 octets; so does the text 
at end of S9.4, and IANA considerations text for PData/Specifier.

> > S9, "If the MAC validation fails, the server MUST transmit a
> > GPSK-Fail message specifying "Authentication Failure" and discard
> > the received packet." Not quite sure what "discard the received
> > packet" here exactly means in the context of EAP state machine (If
> > the server sends a reply, it's not discarding the packet as such).
> 
> Fixed.

It seems this text was not changed at all? 

> > Interoperability requires the ability to enter same PSK in 
> > both client and server. See e.g. RFC4306 S2.15 and RFC4279 S5.4 
> > for examples of management interface requirements.
> 
> Added.

The text (Section 5) should probably say something about non-ASCII
characters, especially since NAIs can contain them (and IETF policies
usually require dealing with non-ASCII in strings handled by ordinary
users -- RFC4306/4279 are probably mostly for admins).

Maybe "SHOULD support non-ASCII", with pointer to detailed instructions 
in Section 2.4 of RFC 4282?


Addtional comments:

S2, "PL": would help reading if it said PL must be >= KS (it's said
in S6, but this assumption is already needed in S4).

S3, should also mention GPSK-Fail and GPSK-Protected-Fail messages
for completeness (in additino to GPSK-1...4).

S4, how is PL encoded when input to KDF? (1 octet, 2 octets?)

S9.3, "from the ID_Client length" -> "from the ID_Peer length"

S11, GPSK-3 and GPSK-Fail are distinct message Op-Codes, so showing
e.g. "EAP-Request/GPSK-3 (GPSK-Fail (PSK Not Found or Authentication
Failure))" is confusing. Should be just "EAP-Request/GPSK-Fail ...".

S12.1, the references to sections 11.* should be to 12.* (and some 
of the subsection numbers don't match; e.g. channel binding is .13, 
not .12).

S12.9: the text about minimal state (only RAND_Peer) seems
inconsistent with S10, which requires discarding GPSK-3 if the
RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel fields are not the same as in GPSK-2.  
To make that comparison, it seems you need to store the values after
sending GPSK-2?

>From idnits: 
Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2434 (Obsoleted by RFC 5226)

Best regards,
Pasi
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08 (1st round of
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Hi Pasi,

thanks for the new round of comments.

Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> Charles Clancy wrote:
>
>   
>> See comments inline.  An updated draft will be released shortly.
>> Also note that the new draft addresses Dan's comments about
>> resistance to dictionary attack.  
>>     
>
> Thanks for the update! I have some additional comments (see below),
> but they should be easy to address.
>
>   
>>> S4, "EAP_Method_Type refers to the integer value of the IANA
>>> allocated EAP Type code", "...to the EAP type code (1 byte),
>>> specified in Section XX"?
>>>       
>> I don't think it's ever been clear how to reference the IANA
>> allocated EAP type code in an I-D before it's been allocated.  These
>> are things that would be fixed by the RFC Editor or in AUTH48, once
>> IANA has allocated the type code.
>>     
>
> For clarity, I'd still suggest adding the "(1 octet)" part (although
> someone reading RFC 3748 will of course figure out that it's 1 octet).
>
>   
Does this sound better:
"
EAP_Method_Type refers to the 1-octet IANA allocated EAP Type code value.
"

>>> S6 and elsewhere: Several places in the document assume that KS
>>> (key size of the ciphersuite) is always the same as the MAC output
>>> length.  This would make it difficult to define ciphersuites based
>>> on e.g. AES-CMAC-256. If this restriction is intentional (and WG
>>> is happy with it), at the very least it needs to be emphasized
>>> much more.
>>>       
>> I'm not sure what AES-CMAC-256 means.  RFC 4493 defines CMAC
>> specifically for 128 length AES, so if you wanted to something
>> involving 256, you'd need to define exactly what AES-CMAC-256 was,
>> and I imagine it would have a 256-bit input and a 256-bit output.
>> Regardless, I added a statement in the key derivation section saying
>> the input and output lengths of your ciphersuite must be equal.
>>     
>
> As Dan Harkins already pointed out, NIST 800-38B does define CMAC 
> for 256-bit AES, with 256-bit key and 128-bit output.
>
> So hardcoding this assumption in EAP-GPSK seems to limit the future
> algorithm agility somewhat -- is the WG sure this is an acceptable
> limitation?
>
> (If this limitation is kept, I'd suggest mentioning in Section 2
> that "KS" is not only the key size, but also MAC output length.)
>
>   
This seems to require a separate discussion on the list.

>>> S5 and S8.2 are not consistent about ciphersuite formatting (is
>>> enterprise number 3 or 4 octets; if you're not sure, suggest
>>> doing what RFC3748 did)
>>>       
>> Fixed (should be 4).
>>     
>
>   
> Figure 3 in S6 still assumes it's 3.
>
>   
Fixed the figure.


+------------+----+-------------+--------------+----------------+
| CSuite/    | KS | Encryption  | Integrity /  | Key Derivation |
| Specifier  |    |             | KDF MAC      | Function       |
+------------+----+-------------+--------------+----------------+
| 0x00000001 | 16 | AES-CBC-128 | AES-CMAC-128 | GKDF           |
+------------+----+-------------+--------------+----------------+
| 0x00000002 | 32 | NULL        | HMAC-SHA256  | GKDF           |
+------------+----+-------------+--------------+----------------+


>>> S8.4, text and bit diagram are not consistent about whether
>>> enterprise code is 3 or 4 bytes
>>>       
>> Text consistent with length 4 enterprise code.
>>     
>
> The 1st figure (now in S9.4) still shows 3 octets; so does the text 
> at end of S9.4, and IANA considerations text for PData/Specifier.
>
>   
Done.

>>> S9, "If the MAC validation fails, the server MUST transmit a
>>> GPSK-Fail message specifying "Authentication Failure" and discard
>>> the received packet." Not quite sure what "discard the received
>>> packet" here exactly means in the context of EAP state machine (If
>>> the server sends a reply, it's not discarding the packet as such).
>>>       
>> Fixed.
>>     
>
> It seems this text was not changed at all? 
>
>   
Done.

>>> Interoperability requires the ability to enter same PSK in 
>>> both client and server. See e.g. RFC4306 S2.15 and RFC4279 S5.4 
>>> for examples of management interface requirements.
>>>       
>> Added.
>>     
>
> The text (Section 5) should probably say something about non-ASCII
> characters, especially since NAIs can contain them (and IETF policies
> usually require dealing with non-ASCII in strings handled by ordinary
> users -- RFC4306/4279 are probably mostly for admins).
>
> Maybe "SHOULD support non-ASCII", with pointer to detailed instructions 
> in Section 2.4 of RFC 4282?
>
>
>   

Fixed.


> Addtional comments:
>
> S2, "PL": would help reading if it said PL must be >= KS (it's said
> in S6, but this assumption is already needed in S4).
>   
Done.

> S3, should also mention GPSK-Fail and GPSK-Protected-Fail messages
> for completeness (in additino to GPSK-1...4).
>   
Ok.

> S4, how is PL encoded when input to KDF? (1 octet, 2 octets?)
>
>   
2 octets.


> S9.3, "from the ID_Client length" -> "from the ID_Peer length"
>
>   
OK

> S11, GPSK-3 and GPSK-Fail are distinct message Op-Codes, so showing
> e.g. "EAP-Request/GPSK-3 (GPSK-Fail (PSK Not Found or Authentication
> Failure))" is confusing. Should be just "EAP-Request/GPSK-Fail ...".
>
>   
OK

> S12.1, the references to sections 11.* should be to 12.* (and some 
> of the subsection numbers don't match; e.g. channel binding is .13, 
> not .12).
>   
Fixed.

> S12.9: the text about minimal state (only RAND_Peer) seems
> inconsistent with S10, which requires discarding GPSK-3 if the
> RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel fields are not the same as in GPSK-2.  
> To make that comparison, it seems you need to store the values after
> sending GPSK-2?
>
>   
I added text on this issue. I am not fully sure whether it resolves the 
aspect entirely though.

> >From idnits: 
> Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2434 (Obsoleted by RFC 5226)
>
>   
Ok.

I am going to ship an update to make sure that we capture the previously 
discussed aspects.


Ciao
Hannes

> Best regards,
> Pasi
>   

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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the EAP Method Update Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method
	Author(s)       : C. Clancy, H. Tschofenig
	Filename        : draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-10.txt
	Pages           : 39
	Date            : 2008-07-05

This Internet Draft defines an Extensible Authentication Protocol
method called EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK).  This method
is a lightweight shared-key authentication protocol supporting mutual
authentication and key derivation.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-10.txt

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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Mon Jul  7 11:47:41 2008
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
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I think this issues has been raised in the past, does anyone on the list
have any specific scenarios where EAP header protections are important?
If not the requirement can be downgraded or removed entirely.  

With respect to making one method look like another, some systems such
as 802.1X-2004, do not make use of the MSK/EMSK.  Does this introduce a
problem?  I can't really think an exploitable attack outside of denial
of service at this point. In addition, more and more systems are moving
towards some type of cryptographic verification in the lower layer so
this might not being an ongoing problem.  

Joe

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Bernard Aboba
> Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2008 11:47 PM
> To: emu@ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
> 
> Overall, this document is in very good shape.  Kudos to the authors. 
> 
> A comment on EAP header protection (Section 4.2.3) and Type 
> code modification (Section 6.3): 
> 
> 4.2.3. EAP Header Protection
> 
> 
>    A tunnel method SHOULD provide protection of the outer EAP header
>    information when possible to make sure the outer EAP header is not
>    modified by the intermediaries.
> 
> 6.3.  Outer EAP Method Header
> 
>    There are several existing EAP methods which use a similar packet
>    format to EAP-TLS.  Often for the initial portions of the exchange
>    the execution of the method is identical except for the method ID.
>    Protection of the outer EAP header helps to avoid vulnerabilities
>    that may arise when an attacker attempts to modify packets to make
>    one EAP message look like one from a different method.
> 
> [BA] The EAP header defined in RFC 3748 looks like this: 
> 
>     0                   1                   2                   3
>     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>    |     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             |
>    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
>    |    Type ...
>    +-+-+-+-+
> 
> Section 6.3 refers to modification of the Type field which 
> can potentially enable an attacker to make one TLS-based EAP 
> method look like another one.  It's worth noting that such an 
> attack can be addressed without necessarily requiring EAP 
> header protection, as described in Section 4.2.3. 
> 
> For example, a Type field modification attack will only 
> enable an EAP peer to subsequently connect to an 
> authenticator if the peer and server were able to derive the 
> same MSK/EMSK. 
> 
> To prevent such an attack, it is highly desirable for 
> TLS-based EAP methods to utilize key derivation formulas 
> unique to the method.  As an example, EAP-TLS and EAP-TTLSv0 
> utilize different key derivation formulas:
> 
> EAP-TLS:   
>    Key_Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, "client EAP encryption",
>                      client.random || server.random)
> EAP-TTLSv0:  
>       Keying Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, 
>                 "ttls keying material", client_random || 
> server_random) 
> 
> Assuming that this approach is taken, the Type modification 
> threat described in Section 6.3 can be addressed without EAP 
> header protection. 
> 
> Given this, it seems to me that EAP header protection is 
> really about protection of the Code, Identifier
> and Length fields of the EAP header.   However, the behavior 
> of these fields is fairly rigidly specified
> in RFC 3748, so that a well written implementation should 
> only be vulnerable to DoS attack, which would be the case 
> even if EAP header protection were implemented.  
> 
> For example, an attacker modifying the Code field might be 
> able to cause an EAP peer or server to drop the packet.  
> However, the same thing would happen if EAP header protection 
> were implemented, and the packet failed the MIC check. 
> 
> 
> Via modification of the Identifier field, it might be 
> possible to cause the peer or server to abort the EAP session 
> in progress.  However, in TLS-based methods, failure of TLS 
> integrity check is also a terminal error, so that I'm not 
> sure if anything is gained here either. 
> 
> 
> Modification of the Length field might have as its objective 
> the inducement of a buffer overflow on either the peer or the 
> server, so it's aims are somewhat more nefarious than attacks 
> on the Code or Identifier fields.  However, implementation of 
> EAP header protection would not be likely to address such an 
> implementation bug since the MIC could not be computed until 
> the EAP packet was fully received, by which time the buffer 
> overflow would have already occurred. 
> 
> 
> In summary, I am not clear that EAP header protection as 
> described in Section 4.2.3 really brings much value beyond 
> addressing the EAP Type Code attack described in Section 6.3. 
>  I would therefore recommend that this section be deleted, or 
> at least justified in more depth.  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jul  9 07:18:00 2008
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  The following is the draft agenda for IETF 72.  If there are no
comments or additions, it will be submitted later this week to the IETF
web site.


Agenda for IETF 72:

Blue sheets and Agenda updates
5 minutes

draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-00.txt
60 minutes

Intermezzo (Some people need to leave to catch flights)
5 minutes

draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
5 minutes  (any updates, if necessary)

draft-clancy-emu-chbind-01.txt
30 minutes

Closing comments
10 minutes
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
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The intent of this requirement is to protect any data sent outside the
TLS data. This would include the EAP header and any method specific
fields such as version number field. We know we cannot protect these
data before a TLS session is established, most likely we are talking
about validation afterwards. 

The EAP header protection, as discussed below, might not bring much
value. I am ok with removing it.

Another related problem is protection or validation of version
negotiation, which is usually happened outside the TLS protection. To
prevent downgrade attack, we should add some requirement to make sure
there is some validation of the advertised version number or any method
specific data sent outside TLS of both sides.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 2:48 PM
> To: Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based 
> EAP Method
> 
> I think this issues has been raised in the past, does anyone 
> on the list have any specific scenarios where EAP header 
> protections are important?
> If not the requirement can be downgraded or removed entirely.  
> 
> With respect to making one method look like another, some 
> systems such as 802.1X-2004, do not make use of the MSK/EMSK. 
>  Does this introduce a problem?  I can't really think an 
> exploitable attack outside of denial of service at this 
> point. In addition, more and more systems are moving towards 
> some type of cryptographic verification in the lower layer so 
> this might not being an ongoing problem.  
> 
> Joe
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of 
> > Bernard Aboba
> > Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2008 11:47 PM
> > To: emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
> > 
> > Overall, this document is in very good shape.  Kudos to the 
> authors. 
> > 
> > A comment on EAP header protection (Section 4.2.3) and Type code 
> > modification (Section 6.3):
> > 
> > 4.2.3. EAP Header Protection
> > 
> > 
> >    A tunnel method SHOULD provide protection of the outer EAP header
> >    information when possible to make sure the outer EAP 
> header is not
> >    modified by the intermediaries.
> > 
> > 6.3.  Outer EAP Method Header
> > 
> >    There are several existing EAP methods which use a similar packet
> >    format to EAP-TLS.  Often for the initial portions of 
> the exchange
> >    the execution of the method is identical except for the 
> method ID.
> >    Protection of the outer EAP header helps to avoid vulnerabilities
> >    that may arise when an attacker attempts to modify 
> packets to make
> >    one EAP message look like one from a different method.
> > 
> > [BA] The EAP header defined in RFC 3748 looks like this: 
> > 
> >     0                   1                   2                   3
> >     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> >    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> >    |     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             |
> >    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> >    |    Type ...
> >    +-+-+-+-+
> > 
> > Section 6.3 refers to modification of the Type field which can 
> > potentially enable an attacker to make one TLS-based EAP 
> method look 
> > like another one.  It's worth noting that such an attack can be 
> > addressed without necessarily requiring EAP header protection, as 
> > described in Section 4.2.3.
> > 
> > For example, a Type field modification attack will only 
> enable an EAP 
> > peer to subsequently connect to an authenticator if the peer and 
> > server were able to derive the same MSK/EMSK.
> > 
> > To prevent such an attack, it is highly desirable for TLS-based EAP 
> > methods to utilize key derivation formulas unique to the 
> method.  As 
> > an example, EAP-TLS and EAP-TTLSv0 utilize different key derivation 
> > formulas:
> > 
> > EAP-TLS:   
> >    Key_Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, "client EAP 
> encryption",
> >                      client.random || server.random)
> > EAP-TTLSv0:  
> >       Keying Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, 
> >                 "ttls keying material", client_random ||
> > server_random)
> > 
> > Assuming that this approach is taken, the Type modification threat 
> > described in Section 6.3 can be addressed without EAP header 
> > protection.
> > 
> > Given this, it seems to me that EAP header protection is 
> really about 
> > protection of the Code, Identifier
> > and Length fields of the EAP header.   However, the behavior 
> > of these fields is fairly rigidly specified in RFC 3748, so that a 
> > well written implementation should only be vulnerable to 
> DoS attack, 
> > which would be the case even if EAP header protection were 
> > implemented.
> > 
> > For example, an attacker modifying the Code field might be able to 
> > cause an EAP peer or server to drop the packet.
> > However, the same thing would happen if EAP header protection were 
> > implemented, and the packet failed the MIC check.
> > 
> > 
> > Via modification of the Identifier field, it might be 
> > possible to cause the peer or server to abort the EAP session 
> > in progress.  However, in TLS-based methods, failure of TLS 
> > integrity check is also a terminal error, so that I'm not 
> > sure if anything is gained here either. 
> > 
> > 
> > Modification of the Length field might have as its objective 
> > the inducement of a buffer overflow on either the peer or the 
> > server, so it's aims are somewhat more nefarious than attacks 
> > on the Code or Identifier fields.  However, implementation of 
> > EAP header protection would not be likely to address such an 
> > implementation bug since the MIC could not be computed until 
> > the EAP packet was fully received, by which time the buffer 
> > overflow would have already occurred. 
> > 
> > 
> > In summary, I am not clear that EAP header protection as 
> > described in Section 4.2.3 really brings much value beyond 
> > addressing the EAP Type Code attack described in Section 6.3. 
> >  I would therefore recommend that this section be deleted, or 
> > at least justified in more depth.  
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 
_______________________________________________
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Thread-Topic: [Emu] A comment on credential provisioning
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Subject: Re: [Emu] A comment on credential provisioning
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Bernard:
=20
There might be multiple uses cases for credential provisioning and
enrollment. One case is just like you mentioned to initial bootstrap the
device. Other case might be provisioning additional credentials used for
other applications once the device has been fully provisioned. Third
case will be provisioning something useful for fast reconnect for future
authentications. Only in the first case, there is the potential MITM
attack you mentioned. In some deployment cases, this could be offset by
certain measures, such as using a relative strong password inner
authentication method, pre-provisioned trust anchor, restricted
environment etc. or tradeoff by admin for ease of deployment.  =20
=20
In any case, the section cited is only discussing the use case needed to
be supported. The actual requirement section doesn't actually list any
requirement for credential provisioning. Other than the tunnel method
MUST support extensive attributes and EAP method. This will allow
someone to develop credential provisioning scheme using the EAP method
or attributes. We certainly don't want to develop a new tunnel method
preventing this from happening. Of course, security considerations
especially for MITM attack needs to be added. Are you ok with this
approach? =20



________________________________

	From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On
Behalf Of Bernard Aboba
	Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2008 4:17 AM
	To: emu@ietf.org
	Subject: [Emu] A comment on credential provisioning
=09
=09
	Section 3.7 of the tunnel requirements document states the
following:=20
=09
=09
	3.7.  Credential Provisioning and Enrollment
=09
	   When a peer has authenticated with EAP, this is a convenient
time to
	   distribute credentials to that peer that may be used for
later
	   authentication exchanges.  For example, the authentication
server can
	   provide a private key or shared key to the peer that can be
used by
	   the peer to perform rapid re-authentication or roaming.  In
addition
	   there have been proposals to perform enrollment within EAP,
such as
	   [I-D.mahy-eap-enrollment].
=09
	   The tunnel method SHOULD support carrying credential
distribution
	   protocols.
	Given the extensive EMU WG discussion relating to ZKPP, and the
need to avoid MITM attacks,=20
	it seems quite odd to me that the WG would so readily take on
the credential provisioning problem.=20
=09
	As we move increasingly towards a world in which network access
will be increasingly likely to=20
	require authentication, mechanisms for credential provisioning
will become increasingly important.=20
	For example, consider the situation where someone has obtained a
spanking new handset/PC/notebook
	and wishes to get connected in an environment where
authentication is required for all access=20
	mechanisms:  VPN/WLAN/Ethernet/PPP, etc. =20
=09
	That said, moving from a state where no credentials, trust
anchors or policy is provisioned to
	one where everything is set up can be quite tricky:
=09
	a. No trust anchor may be provisioned, which makes server
certificate authentication difficult.=20
	Without server certificate authentication, we need to be very
careful about MITM attacks!
=09
	b. If the server may be a rogue, then the dictionary attack
protection provided by the TLS
	tunnel is worth much.  This implies that the credential
provisioning mechanism itself
	needs to be immune to dictionary attack.  Merely binding the
inner authentication to=20
	the outer tunnel only demonstrates that there is no MITM attack,
but it doesn't demonstrate
	that the server is authentic.  Unless the client is willing to
consider its password compromised
	if the cryptographic binding fails (a nasty situation) we're
back to the pure password
	discussion initiated by Glen and Dan, or a poor man's
substitute, such a progressive
	disclosure, which was used in the WFA WPS EAP method.=20
=09
	Given all of this, my advice would be to delete Section 3.7.
Leaving this in is likely to=20
	lead to a lot of additional discussion which is largely
tangential to the core of what
	needs to be accomplished.  If and when the WG decides to add the
password-based
	method item to the Charter, we could bring this item back.  But
until then, it seems
	like it would be best ruled out of scope.
=09
=09


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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dus-ascii">
<STYLE>
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{
margin:0px;
padding:0px
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{
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<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2900.3354" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY class=3Dhmmessage>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D203133414-09072008><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff>Bernard:</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D203133414-09072008><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D203133414-09072008><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff>There might be multiple uses cases for credential =
provisioning and=20
enrollment. One case is just like you mentioned to initial bootstrap the =

device.&nbsp;Other case might be provisioning additional credentials =
used for=20
other applications once the device has been fully provisioned. Third =
case will=20
be provisioning something useful for fast reconnect for future =
authentications.=20
Only in the first case, there is the potential MITM attack you =
mentioned. In=20
some deployment cases, this&nbsp;could be offset by certain =
measures,&nbsp;such=20
as using a relative strong password inner authentication method, =
pre-provisioned=20
trust anchor, restricted environment etc. or tradeoff by admin =
for&nbsp;ease of=20
deployment.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D203133414-09072008><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D203133414-09072008><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff>In any case, the section cited is only discussing the =
use case=20
needed to be supported. The actual requirement section doesn't=20
actually&nbsp;list any requirement for credential provisioning. Other =
than the=20
tunnel method MUST support extensive attributes and EAP method. This =
will allow=20
someone to develop credential provisioning scheme using the EAP method =
or=20
attributes. We certainly don't want to develop a&nbsp;new tunnel=20
method&nbsp;preventing this from happening. Of course, security =
considerations=20
especially for MITM attack needs to be added. Are you ok with this=20
approach?&nbsp;&nbsp;</FONT></SPAN></DIV><FONT face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff></FONT><FONT face=3DArial color=3D#0000ff></FONT><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE=20
style=3D"PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px =
solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader lang=3Den-us dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft>
  <HR tabIndex=3D-1>
  <FONT face=3DTahoma><B>From:</B> emu-bounces@ietf.org=20
  [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] <B>On Behalf Of </B>Bernard=20
  Aboba<BR><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, June 26, 2008 4:17 AM<BR><B>To:</B>=20
  emu@ietf.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> [Emu] A comment on credential=20
  provisioning<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
  <DIV></DIV>
  <STYLE>.hmmessage P{margin:0px;padding:0px}body.hmmessage{FONT-SIZE: =
10pt;FONT-FAMILY:Tahoma}</STYLE>
  Section 3.7 of the tunnel requirements document states the following: =
<BR><BR><PRE>3.7.  Credential Provisioning and Enrollment<BR><BR>   When =
a peer has authenticated with EAP, this is a convenient time to<BR>   =
distribute credentials to that peer that may be used for later<BR>   =
authentication exchanges.  For example, the authentication server =
can<BR>   provide a private key or shared key to the peer that can be =
used by<BR>   the peer to perform rapid re-authentication or roaming.  =
In addition<BR>   there have been proposals to perform enrollment within =
EAP, such as<BR>   [I-D.mahy-eap-enrollment].<BR><BR>   The tunnel =
method SHOULD support carrying credential distribution<BR>   =
protocols.</PRE>Given=20
  the extensive EMU WG discussion relating to ZKPP, and the need to =
avoid MITM=20
  attacks, <BR>it seems quite odd to me that the WG would so readily =
take on the=20
  credential provisioning problem. <BR><BR>As we move increasingly =
towards a=20
  world in which network access will be increasingly likely to =
<BR>require=20
  authentication, mechanisms for credential provisioning will become=20
  increasingly important. <BR>For example, consider the situation where =
someone=20
  has obtained a spanking new handset/PC/notebook<BR>and wishes to get =
connected=20
  in an environment where authentication is required for all access=20
  <BR>mechanisms:&nbsp; VPN/WLAN/Ethernet/PPP, etc.&nbsp; <BR><BR>That =
said,=20
  moving from a state where no credentials, trust anchors or policy is=20
  provisioned to<BR>one where everything is set up can be quite=20
  tricky:<BR><BR>a. No trust anchor may be provisioned, which makes =
server=20
  certificate authentication difficult. <BR>Without server certificate=20
  authentication, we need to be very careful about MITM =
attacks!<BR><BR>b. If=20
  the server may be a rogue, then the dictionary attack protection =
provided by=20
  the TLS<BR>tunnel is worth much.&nbsp; This implies that the =
credential=20
  provisioning mechanism itself<BR>needs to be immune to dictionary=20
  attack.&nbsp; Merely binding the inner authentication to <BR>the outer =
tunnel=20
  only demonstrates that there is no MITM attack, but it doesn't=20
  demonstrate<BR>that the server is authentic.&nbsp; Unless the client =
is=20
  willing to consider its password compromised<BR>if the cryptographic =
binding=20
  fails (a nasty situation) we're back to the pure =
password<BR>discussion=20
  initiated by Glen and Dan, or a poor man's substitute, such a=20
  progressive<BR>disclosure, which was used in the WFA WPS EAP method.=20
  <BR><BR>Given all of this, my advice would be to delete Section =
3.7.&nbsp;=20
  Leaving this in is likely to <BR>lead to a lot of additional =
discussion which=20
  is largely tangential to the core of what<BR>needs to be =
accomplished.&nbsp;=20
  If and when the WG decides to add the password-based<BR>method item to =
the=20
  Charter, we could bring this item back.&nbsp; But until then, it =
seems<BR>like=20
  it would be best ruled out of =
scope.<BR><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>

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_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu

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Thread-Topic: [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel Method
	Requirements document
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References: <BLU137-W189F5758EB1CD4968D06B693A30@phx.gbl>
From: "Hao Zhou (hzhou)" <hzhou@cisco.com>
To: "Bernard Aboba" <bernard_aboba@hotmail.com>, <emu@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel Method
	Requirements document
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Bernard:
=20
Section 4.4 lists the requirement for channel binding as "The tunnel
method MUST be capable of supporting EAP channel bindings described
above.". I think this is the intent of the requirement. Section 4.1.1
language of "MUST support" might be too strong. Are you ok with changing
Section 4.1.1 to be consistent with Section 4.4?
=20
I think this will allow WG to work on channel binding separately and if
deemed important, not requiring us to modify the tunnel method.



________________________________

	From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On
Behalf Of Bernard Aboba
	Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2008 3:50 AM
	To: emu@ietf.org
	Subject: [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel
Method Requirements document
=09
=09
	Section 4.1.1 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document
includes the following statement:
=09
=09
	   In addition, the tunnel method MUST support EAP channel
bindings to
	   enable a system based on EAP to meet the additional
requirements in
	   Section 3 of RFC 4962.
	While I have no problem with including support for channel
bindings within the EMU tunnel method,
	I do not believe that any requirement for EAP Channel Bindings
can be inferred from Section 3 of RFC 4962.=20
	Here is what Section 3 says:=20
=09
	         The context will include the peer and NAS identities in
more
	         than one form.  One (or more) name form is needed to
identify
	         these parties in the authentication exchange and the
AAA
	         protocol.  Another name form may be needed to identify
these
	         parties within the lower layer that will employ the
session
	         key.
	Notice that neither this paragraph nor the ones surrounding it
mention exported EAP keying material
	specifically.  This omission was intentional -- the intent was
to enable the requirement to be met by
	subsequent cryptographic binding operations operating within
lower layers.  As an example,=20
	IEEE 802.11r's PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 cryptographically bind the
PMK/MSK to channel properties,
	satisfying this requirement.=20
=09
	Part of the reason that EAP channel bindings were not mandatory
to implement is that they were (and remain)
	undeployed, so that their practicality remains unproven.  For
this reason, despite considerable
	IESG pressure, RFC 4017 included EAP channel bindings only as an
optional feature within=20
	Section 2.4, rather than promoting it to required or even
recommended to implement.=20
=09
	Between the publication of RFC 4017 and 4962, many aspects of
EAP, including new methods,
	RFC 3748 implementations, etc. moved ahead, but progress in the
channel binding area
	remained slow, so that the case for requiring EAP channel
binding did not grow stronger.
=09
	As proof that EAP channel binding is NOT required by RFC 4962
Section 3, RFC 5247=20
	which was chartered to demonstrate how RFC 4962 requirements can
met by
	EAP/Secure Association/AAA systems does not mention EAP channel
bindings at all in=20
	Section 5.4, which discussed how the RFC 4962 key binding
requirements from Section 3=20
	can be met.  Rather, RFC 5247 Section 2.3 which discussed
authenticator identification, mentions both
	EAP channel binding and lower layer bindings in points (f)
through (k), albeit without
	normative language.=20
=09
	Given the extensive discussion of RFC 4017 and 4962 on the IETF
mailing list and various
	other mailing lists, including the EAP WG list, it is therefore
somewhat disappointing to see
	something which could only garner IETF consensus as an optional
capability promoted to=20
	mandatory, purely due to IESG re-interpretation of a BCP after
publication.=20
=09
	Given that the EMU WG has as a work item for development of an
Internet Draft on EAP channel
	binding, my advice is for the WG, through its analysis of the
problem and the potential solutions,
	to develop its own consensus as to the value and practicality of
channel bindings, rather than=20
	allowing an opinion to be imposed upon it from the IESG. =20
=09
	As a first step toward that, a concise statement of the problem
is very important.=20
	Section 4.4 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document includes
the following statement
	of the Channel Binding problem:
=09
	   The so-called "lying NAS" problem is a well-documented
problem with
	   the current Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
architecture
	   [RFC3748] when used with pass-through authenticators.  Here,
a
	   Network Access Server (NAS), or pass-through authenticator,
may
	   authenticate to the backend AAA infrastructure using one set
of
	   credentials, while representing contrary information to EAP
peers.
=09
	The issue is not just whether the information presented to
	the peer and server are contradictory, but also whether the
information is correct.=20
	To make this clear, RFC 5247 Section 5.3.3 included additional
text beyond
	what was present in RFC 3748 Section 7.15:
=09
	   While the verification [of channel bindings] can be done
	   either by the peer or the server, typically only the server
has the
	   knowledge to determine the correctness of the values, as
opposed to
	   merely verifying their equality. =20
=09
=09
	The use of the term "credentials" in the short problem
description is somewhat odd, since in=20
	AAA protocols, the credentials used for mutual authentication
between the AAA client and server=20
	do not relate to channel binding parameters such as the
NAS-Identifier.  For example, a AAA client=20
	can use a certificate containing a subjectAltName field of
"aaaclient.example.com" to authenticate to the AAA server,=20
	whereas the enclosed NAS-Identifier attribute could contain a
the R0KH-ID from IEEE 802.11r.
	Such an Access-Request would be completely valid, and RFC 5247
Section 2.5 notes some of
	the issues that can arise:
=09
	   It is possible for problems to arise in situations where the
EAP
	   server identifies itself differently to the EAP peer and
	   authenticator.  For example, it is possible that the
Server-Id
	   exported by EAP methods will not be identical to the Fully
Qualified
	   Domain Name (FQDN) of the backend authentication server.
Where
	   certificate-based authentication is used within RADIUS or
Diameter,
	   it is possible that the subjectAltName used in the backend
	   authentication server certificate will not be identical to
the
	   Server-Id or backend authentication server FQDN.  This is not
	   normally an issue in EAP, as the authenticator will be
unaware of the
	   identities used between the EAP peer and server.  However,
this can
	   be an issue for key caching, if the authenticator is expected
to
	   locate a backend authentication server corresponding to a
Server-Id
	   provided by an EAP peer.
=09
	   Where the backend authentication server FQDN differs from the
	   subjectAltName in the backend authentication server
certificate, it
	   is possible that the AAA client will not be able to determine
whether
	   it is talking to the correct backend authentication server.
Where
	   the Server-Id and backend server FQDN differ, it is possible
that the
	   combination of the key scope (Peer-Id(s), Server- Id(s)) and
EAP
	   conversation identifier (Session-Id) will not be sufficient
to
	   determine where the key resides.  For example, the
authenticator can
	   identify backend servers by their IP address (as occurs in
RADIUS),
	   or using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (as in Diameter).  If
the
	   Server-Id does not correspond to the IP address or FQDN of a
known
	   backend authentication server, then it may not be possible to
locate
	   which backend authentication server possesses the key.
=09
=09
=09
=09


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<BODY class=3Dhmmessage>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D078260615-09072008><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff>Bernard:</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D078260615-09072008><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><SPAN class=3D078260615-09072008><FONT =
face=3DArial=20
color=3D#0000ff>Section 4.4 lists the requirement for channel binding as =
"<FONT=20
color=3D#000000>The tunnel method MUST be capable of supporting EAP =
channel=20
bindings described above.". I think this is the intent of the =
requirement.=20
Section 4.1.1 language of "MUST support" might be too strong. Are you ok =
with=20
changing Section 4.1.1 to be consistent with Section=20
4.4?</FONT></FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D078260615-09072008><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff><FONT=20
color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></SPAN>&nbsp;</DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=3D078260615-09072008><FONT face=3DArial =
color=3D#0000ff><FONT=20
color=3D#000000><FONT color=3D#0000ff>I think this will allow WG to work =
on channel=20
binding separately and if deemed important, not requiring us to modify =
the=20
tunnel method.</FONT></DIV>
<DIV dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft><BR></DIV></FONT></FONT></SPAN><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=3Dltr=20
style=3D"PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px =
solid; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
  <DIV class=3DOutlookMessageHeader lang=3Den-us dir=3Dltr align=3Dleft>
  <HR tabIndex=3D-1>
  <FONT face=3DTahoma><B>From:</B> emu-bounces@ietf.org=20
  [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] <B>On Behalf Of </B>Bernard=20
  Aboba<BR><B>Sent:</B> Thursday, June 26, 2008 3:50 AM<BR><B>To:</B>=20
  emu@ietf.org<BR><B>Subject:</B> [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding =
in the=20
  Tunnel Method Requirements document<BR></FONT><BR></DIV>
  <DIV></DIV>Section 4.1.1 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document =
includes=20
  the following statement:<BR><BR><PRE>   In addition, the tunnel method =
MUST support EAP channel bindings to<BR>   enable a system based on EAP =
to meet the additional requirements in<BR>   Section 3 of RFC =
4962.<BR></PRE>While=20
  I have no problem with including support for channel bindings within =
the EMU=20
  tunnel method,<BR>I do not believe that any requirement for EAP =
Channel=20
  Bindings can be inferred from Section 3 of RFC 4962. <BR>Here is what =
Section=20
  3 says: <BR><PRE>         The context will include the peer and NAS =
identities in more<BR>         than one form.  One (or more) name form =
is needed to identify<BR>         these parties in the authentication =
exchange and the AAA<BR>         protocol.  Another name form may be =
needed to identify these<BR>         parties within the lower layer that =
will employ the session<BR>         key.</PRE>Notice=20
  that neither this paragraph nor the ones surrounding it mention =
exported EAP=20
  keying material<BR>specifically.&nbsp; This omission was intentional =
-- the=20
  intent was to enable the requirement to be met by<BR>subsequent =
cryptographic=20
  binding operations operating within lower layers.&nbsp; As an example, =

  <BR>IEEE 802.11r's PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 cryptographically bind the =
PMK/MSK to=20
  channel properties,<BR>satisfying this requirement. <BR><BR>Part of =
the reason=20
  that EAP channel bindings were not mandatory to implement is that they =
were=20
  (and remain)<BR>undeployed, so that their practicality remains =
unproven.&nbsp;=20
  For this reason, despite considerable<BR>IESG pressure, RFC 4017 =
included EAP=20
  channel bindings only as an optional feature within <BR>Section 2.4, =
rather=20
  than promoting it to required or even recommended to implement.=20
  <BR><BR>Between the publication of RFC 4017 and 4962, many aspects of =
EAP,=20
  including new methods,<BR>RFC 3748 implementations, etc. moved ahead, =
but=20
  progress in the channel binding area<BR>remained slow, so that the =
case for=20
  requiring EAP channel binding did not grow stronger.<BR><BR>As proof =
that EAP=20
  channel binding is NOT required by RFC 4962 Section 3, RFC 5247 =
<BR>which was=20
  chartered to demonstrate how RFC 4962 requirements can met =
by<BR>EAP/Secure=20
  Association/AAA systems does not mention EAP channel bindings at all =
in=20
  <BR>Section 5.4, which discussed how the RFC 4962 key binding =
requirements=20
  from Section 3 <BR>can be met.&nbsp; Rather, RFC 5247 Section 2.3 =
which=20
  discussed authenticator identification, mentions both<BR>EAP channel =
binding=20
  and lower layer bindings in points (f) through (k), albeit=20
  without<BR>normative language. <BR><BR>Given the extensive discussion =
of RFC=20
  4017 and 4962 on the IETF mailing list and various<BR>other mailing =
lists,=20
  including the EAP WG list, it is therefore somewhat disappointing to=20
  see<BR>something which could only garner IETF consensus as an optional =

  capability promoted to <BR>mandatory, purely due to IESG =
re-interpretation of=20
  a BCP after publication. <BR><BR>Given that the EMU WG has as a work =
item for=20
  development of an Internet Draft on EAP channel<BR>binding, my advice =
is for=20
  the WG, through its analysis of the problem and the potential =
solutions,<BR>to=20
  develop its own consensus as to the value and practicality of channel=20
  bindings, rather than <BR>allowing an opinion to be imposed upon it =
from the=20
  IESG.&nbsp; <BR><BR>As a first step toward that, a concise statement =
of the=20
  problem is very important. <BR>Section 4.4 of the Tunnel Method =
Requirements=20
  document includes the following statement<BR>of the Channel Binding=20
  problem:<BR><PRE>   The so-called "lying NAS" problem is a =
well-documented problem with<BR>   the current Extensible Authentication =
Protocol (EAP) architecture<BR>   [RFC3748] when used with pass-through =
authenticators.  Here, a<BR>   Network Access Server (NAS), or =
pass-through authenticator, may<BR>   authenticate to the backend AAA =
infrastructure using one set of<BR>   credentials, while representing =
contrary information to EAP peers.<BR><BR style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif"><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif">The issue is not just whether the =
information presented to<BR>the peer and server are contradictory, but =
also whether the information is correct. <BR></SPAN><SPAN =
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif">To make this clear, =
RFC 5247 Section 5.3.3 included additional text beyond<BR>what was =
present in RFC 3748 Section 7.15:<BR><BR></SPAN>   While the =
verification [of channel bindings] can be done<BR>   either by the peer =
or the server, typically only the server has the<BR>   knowledge to =
determine the correctness of the values, as opposed to<BR>   merely =
verifying their equality.  <BR><BR><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif">The use of the term "credentials" in the =
short problem description is somewhat odd, since in <BR>AAA protocols, =
the credentials used for mutual authentication between the AAA client =
and server <BR>do not relate to channel binding parameters such as the =
NAS-Identifier.  For example, a AAA client <BR>can use a certificate =
containing a subjectAltName field of "aaaclient.example.com" to =
authenticate to the AAA server, <BR>whereas the enclosed NAS-Identifier =
attribute could contain a the R0KH-ID from IEEE 802.11r.<BR>Such an =
Access-Request would be completely valid, and RFC 5247 Section 2.5 notes =
some of<BR>the issues that can arise:<BR><BR></SPAN>   It is possible =
for problems to arise in situations where the EAP<BR>   server =
identifies itself differently to the EAP peer and<BR>   authenticator.  =
For example, it is possible that the Server-Id<BR>   exported by EAP =
methods will not be identical to the Fully Qualified<BR>   Domain Name =
(FQDN) of the backend authentication server.  Where<BR>   =
certificate-based authentication is used within RADIUS or Diameter,<BR>  =
 it is possible that the subjectAltName used in the backend<BR>   =
authentication server certificate will not be identical to the<BR>   =
Server-Id or backend authentication server FQDN.  This is not<BR>   =
normally an issue in EAP, as the authenticator will be unaware of =
the<BR>   identities used between the EAP peer and server.  However, =
this can<BR>   be an issue for key caching, if the authenticator is =
expected to<BR>   locate a backend authentication server corresponding =
to a Server-Id<BR>   provided by an EAP peer.<BR><BR>   Where the =
backend authentication server FQDN differs from the<BR>   subjectAltName =
in the backend authentication server certificate, it<BR>   is possible =
that the AAA client will not be able to determine whether<BR>   it is =
talking to the correct backend authentication server.  Where<BR>   the =
Server-Id and backend server FQDN differ, it is possible that the<BR>   =
combination of the key scope (Peer-Id(s), Server- Id(s)) and EAP<BR>   =
conversation identifier (Session-Id) will not be sufficient to<BR>   =
determine where the key resides.  For example, the authenticator can<BR> =
  identify backend servers by their IP address (as occurs in =
RADIUS),<BR>   or using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (as in Diameter).  =
If the<BR>   Server-Id does not correspond to the IP address or FQDN of =
a known<BR>   backend authentication server, then it may not be possible =
to locate<BR>   which backend authentication server possesses the =
key.<BR><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif"></SPAN><BR><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: =
Tahoma,Helvetica,Sans-Serif"><BR></SPAN></PRE></BLOCKQUOTE></BODY></HTML>=


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Alan DeKok [mailto://aland@deployingradius.com] writes:

>   The following is the draft agenda for IETF 72.  If there are no
> comments or additions, it will be submitted later this week to the IETF
> web site.

Given some of the recent comments on the list, I wonder if it would be
permissible to discuss eap-pwd.  Recent changes to the protocol have made it
more usable with popular authentication databases...




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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
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Given this, the requirement could be rephrased to highlight the items
that need to be protected (type code, version numbers, etc.), while dropping
the
EAP Header protection requirement.  

-----Original Message-----
From: Hao Zhou (hzhou) [mailto:hzhou@cisco.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 7:24 AM
To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method

The intent of this requirement is to protect any data sent outside the
TLS data. This would include the EAP header and any method specific
fields such as version number field. We know we cannot protect these
data before a TLS session is established, most likely we are talking
about validation afterwards. 

The EAP header protection, as discussed below, might not bring much
value. I am ok with removing it.

Another related problem is protection or validation of version
negotiation, which is usually happened outside the TLS protection. To
prevent downgrade attack, we should add some requirement to make sure
there is some validation of the advertised version number or any method
specific data sent outside TLS of both sides.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 2:48 PM
> To: Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based 
> EAP Method
> 
> I think this issues has been raised in the past, does anyone 
> on the list have any specific scenarios where EAP header 
> protections are important?
> If not the requirement can be downgraded or removed entirely.  
> 
> With respect to making one method look like another, some 
> systems such as 802.1X-2004, do not make use of the MSK/EMSK. 
>  Does this introduce a problem?  I can't really think an 
> exploitable attack outside of denial of service at this 
> point. In addition, more and more systems are moving towards 
> some type of cryptographic verification in the lower layer so 
> this might not being an ongoing problem.  
> 
> Joe
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of 
> > Bernard Aboba
> > Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2008 11:47 PM
> > To: emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
> > 
> > Overall, this document is in very good shape.  Kudos to the 
> authors. 
> > 
> > A comment on EAP header protection (Section 4.2.3) and Type code 
> > modification (Section 6.3):
> > 
> > 4.2.3. EAP Header Protection
> > 
> > 
> >    A tunnel method SHOULD provide protection of the outer EAP header
> >    information when possible to make sure the outer EAP 
> header is not
> >    modified by the intermediaries.
> > 
> > 6.3.  Outer EAP Method Header
> > 
> >    There are several existing EAP methods which use a similar packet
> >    format to EAP-TLS.  Often for the initial portions of 
> the exchange
> >    the execution of the method is identical except for the 
> method ID.
> >    Protection of the outer EAP header helps to avoid vulnerabilities
> >    that may arise when an attacker attempts to modify 
> packets to make
> >    one EAP message look like one from a different method.
> > 
> > [BA] The EAP header defined in RFC 3748 looks like this: 
> > 
> >     0                   1                   2                   3
> >     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
> >    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> >    |     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             |
> >    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> >    |    Type ...
> >    +-+-+-+-+
> > 
> > Section 6.3 refers to modification of the Type field which can 
> > potentially enable an attacker to make one TLS-based EAP 
> method look 
> > like another one.  It's worth noting that such an attack can be 
> > addressed without necessarily requiring EAP header protection, as 
> > described in Section 4.2.3.
> > 
> > For example, a Type field modification attack will only 
> enable an EAP 
> > peer to subsequently connect to an authenticator if the peer and 
> > server were able to derive the same MSK/EMSK.
> > 
> > To prevent such an attack, it is highly desirable for TLS-based EAP 
> > methods to utilize key derivation formulas unique to the 
> method.  As 
> > an example, EAP-TLS and EAP-TTLSv0 utilize different key derivation 
> > formulas:
> > 
> > EAP-TLS:   
> >    Key_Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, "client EAP 
> encryption",
> >                      client.random || server.random)
> > EAP-TTLSv0:  
> >       Keying Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, 
> >                 "ttls keying material", client_random ||
> > server_random)
> > 
> > Assuming that this approach is taken, the Type modification threat 
> > described in Section 6.3 can be addressed without EAP header 
> > protection.
> > 
> > Given this, it seems to me that EAP header protection is 
> really about 
> > protection of the Code, Identifier
> > and Length fields of the EAP header.   However, the behavior 
> > of these fields is fairly rigidly specified in RFC 3748, so that a 
> > well written implementation should only be vulnerable to 
> DoS attack, 
> > which would be the case even if EAP header protection were 
> > implemented.
> > 
> > For example, an attacker modifying the Code field might be able to 
> > cause an EAP peer or server to drop the packet.
> > However, the same thing would happen if EAP header protection were 
> > implemented, and the packet failed the MIC check.
> > 
> > 
> > Via modification of the Identifier field, it might be 
> > possible to cause the peer or server to abort the EAP session 
> > in progress.  However, in TLS-based methods, failure of TLS 
> > integrity check is also a terminal error, so that I'm not 
> > sure if anything is gained here either. 
> > 
> > 
> > Modification of the Length field might have as its objective 
> > the inducement of a buffer overflow on either the peer or the 
> > server, so it's aims are somewhat more nefarious than attacks 
> > on the Code or Identifier fields.  However, implementation of 
> > EAP header protection would not be likely to address such an 
> > implementation bug since the MIC could not be computed until 
> > the EAP packet was fully received, by which time the buffer 
> > overflow would have already occurred. 
> > 
> > 
> > In summary, I am not clear that EAP header protection as 
> > described in Section 4.2.3 really brings much value beyond 
> > addressing the EAP Type Code attack described in Section 6.3. 
> >  I would therefore recommend that this section be deleted, or 
> > at least justified in more depth.  
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> 

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Subject: Re: [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel Method
	Requirements document
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Yes, changing the language to be consistent with Section 4.4 would be good.
I would also remove the reference to RFC 4962 Section 3, and substitute one
to RFC 4017 instead (since channel bindings are explicitly discussed there
and indicated as optional). 

 

From: Hao Zhou (hzhou) [mailto:hzhou@cisco.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 8:11 AM
To: Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel Method
Requirements document

 

Bernard:

 

Section 4.4 lists the requirement for channel binding as "The tunnel method
MUST be capable of supporting EAP channel bindings described above.". I
think this is the intent of the requirement. Section 4.1.1 language of "MUST
support" might be too strong. Are you ok with changing Section 4.1.1 to be
consistent with Section 4.4?

 

I think this will allow WG to work on channel binding separately and if
deemed important, not requiring us to modify the tunnel method.

 

 


  _____  


From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Bernard Aboba
Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2008 3:50 AM
To: emu@ietf.org
Subject: [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel Method
Requirements document

Section 4.1.1 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document includes the
following statement:

   In addition, the tunnel method MUST support EAP channel bindings to


   enable a system based on EAP to meet the additional requirements in


   Section 3 of RFC 4962.

While I have no problem with including support for channel bindings within
the EMU tunnel method,
I do not believe that any requirement for EAP Channel Bindings can be
inferred from Section 3 of RFC 4962. 
Here is what Section 3 says: 

         The context will include the peer and NAS identities in more


         than one form.  One (or more) name form is needed to identify


         these parties in the authentication exchange and the AAA


         protocol.  Another name form may be needed to identify these


         parties within the lower layer that will employ the session


         key.

Notice that neither this paragraph nor the ones surrounding it mention
exported EAP keying material
specifically.  This omission was intentional -- the intent was to enable the
requirement to be met by
subsequent cryptographic binding operations operating within lower layers.
As an example, 
IEEE 802.11r's PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 cryptographically bind the PMK/MSK to
channel properties,
satisfying this requirement. 

Part of the reason that EAP channel bindings were not mandatory to implement
is that they were (and remain)
undeployed, so that their practicality remains unproven.  For this reason,
despite considerable
IESG pressure, RFC 4017 included EAP channel bindings only as an optional
feature within 
Section 2.4, rather than promoting it to required or even recommended to
implement. 

Between the publication of RFC 4017 and 4962, many aspects of EAP, including
new methods,
RFC 3748 implementations, etc. moved ahead, but progress in the channel
binding area
remained slow, so that the case for requiring EAP channel binding did not
grow stronger.

As proof that EAP channel binding is NOT required by RFC 4962 Section 3, RFC
5247 
which was chartered to demonstrate how RFC 4962 requirements can met by
EAP/Secure Association/AAA systems does not mention EAP channel bindings at
all in 
Section 5.4, which discussed how the RFC 4962 key binding requirements from
Section 3 
can be met.  Rather, RFC 5247 Section 2.3 which discussed authenticator
identification, mentions both
EAP channel binding and lower layer bindings in points (f) through (k),
albeit without
normative language. 

Given the extensive discussion of RFC 4017 and 4962 on the IETF mailing list
and various
other mailing lists, including the EAP WG list, it is therefore somewhat
disappointing to see
something which could only garner IETF consensus as an optional capability
promoted to 
mandatory, purely due to IESG re-interpretation of a BCP after publication. 

Given that the EMU WG has as a work item for development of an Internet
Draft on EAP channel
binding, my advice is for the WG, through its analysis of the problem and
the potential solutions,
to develop its own consensus as to the value and practicality of channel
bindings, rather than 
allowing an opinion to be imposed upon it from the IESG.  

As a first step toward that, a concise statement of the problem is very
important. 
Section 4.4 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document includes the
following statement
of the Channel Binding problem:

   The so-called "lying NAS" problem is a well-documented problem with


   the current Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) architecture


   [RFC3748] when used with pass-through authenticators.  Here, a


   Network Access Server (NAS), or pass-through authenticator, may


   authenticate to the backend AAA infrastructure using one set of


   credentials, while representing contrary information to EAP peers.





The issue is not just whether the information presented to


the peer and server are contradictory, but also whether the information is
correct. 


To make this clear, RFC 5247 Section 5.3.3 included additional text beyond


what was present in RFC 3748 Section 7.15:





   While the verification [of channel bindings] can be done


   either by the peer or the server, typically only the server has the


   knowledge to determine the correctness of the values, as opposed to


   merely verifying their equality.  








The use of the term "credentials" in the short problem description is
somewhat odd, since in 


AAA protocols, the credentials used for mutual authentication between the
AAA client and server 


do not relate to channel binding parameters such as the NAS-Identifier.  For
example, a AAA client 


can use a certificate containing a subjectAltName field of
"aaaclient.example.com" to authenticate to the AAA server, 


whereas the enclosed NAS-Identifier attribute could contain a the R0KH-ID
from IEEE 802.11r.


Such an Access-Request would be completely valid, and RFC 5247 Section 2.5
notes some of


the issues that can arise:





   It is possible for problems to arise in situations where the EAP


   server identifies itself differently to the EAP peer and


   authenticator.  For example, it is possible that the Server-Id


   exported by EAP methods will not be identical to the Fully Qualified


   Domain Name (FQDN) of the backend authentication server.  Where


   certificate-based authentication is used within RADIUS or Diameter,


   it is possible that the subjectAltName used in the backend


   authentication server certificate will not be identical to the


   Server-Id or backend authentication server FQDN.  This is not


   normally an issue in EAP, as the authenticator will be unaware of the


   identities used between the EAP peer and server.  However, this can


   be an issue for key caching, if the authenticator is expected to


   locate a backend authentication server corresponding to a Server-Id


   provided by an EAP peer.





   Where the backend authentication server FQDN differs from the


   subjectAltName in the backend authentication server certificate, it


   is possible that the AAA client will not be able to determine whether


   it is talking to the correct backend authentication server.  Where


   the Server-Id and backend server FQDN differ, it is possible that the


   combination of the key scope (Peer-Id(s), Server- Id(s)) and EAP


   conversation identifier (Session-Id) will not be sufficient to


   determine where the key resides.  For example, the authenticator can


   identify backend servers by their IP address (as occurs in RADIUS),


   or using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (as in Diameter).  If the


   Server-Id does not correspond to the IP address or FQDN of a known


   backend authentication server, then it may not be possible to locate


   which backend authentication server possesses the key.











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<body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple>

<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>Yes, changing the language to be consistent with Section =
4.4
would be good. &nbsp;I would also remove the reference to RFC 4962 =
Section 3, and
substitute one to RFC 4017 instead (since channel bindings are =
explicitly
discussed there and indicated as optional). <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Hao Zhou =
(hzhou)
[mailto:hzhou@cisco.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, July 09, 2008 8:11 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel =
Method
Requirements document<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>Bernard:</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>Section 4.4 lists the requirement for channel binding as =
&quot;</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:black'>T=
he
tunnel method MUST be capable of supporting EAP channel bindings =
described
above.&quot;. I think this is the intent of the requirement. Section =
4.1.1
language of &quot;MUST support&quot; might be too strong. Are you ok =
with
changing Section 4.1.1 to be consistent with Section 4.4?</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>

</div>

<div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>I think this will allow WG to work on channel binding =
separately
and if deemed important, not requiring us to modify the tunnel =
method.</span><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:black'><=
o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:black'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue =
1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;
margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'=
>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter>

</span></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> emu-bounces@ietf.org
[mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Bernard Aboba<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, June 26, 2008 3:50 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> emu@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [Emu] Requirements for Channel Binding in the Tunnel =
Method
Requirements document<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>Section 4.1.1 of the Tunnel Method
Requirements document includes the following =
statement:<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, the tunnel method MUST support EAP =
channel bindings to<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; enable a system based on EAP to meet the additional =
requirements in<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; Section 3 of RFC 4962.<o:p></o:p></pre>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>While
I have no problem with including support for channel bindings within the =
EMU
tunnel method,<br>
I do not believe that any requirement for EAP Channel Bindings can be =
inferred
from Section 3 of RFC 4962. <br>
Here is what Section 3 says: <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<pre>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The context will =
include the peer and NAS identities in more<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; than one form.&nbsp; =
One (or more) name form is needed to identify<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; these parties in the =
authentication exchange and the AAA<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; protocol.&nbsp; Another =
name form may be needed to identify these<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; parties within the =
lower layer that will employ the session<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; key.<o:p></o:p></pre>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>Notice
that neither this paragraph nor the ones surrounding it mention exported =
EAP
keying material<br>
specifically.&nbsp; This omission was intentional -- the intent was to =
enable
the requirement to be met by<br>
subsequent cryptographic binding operations operating within lower
layers.&nbsp; As an example, <br>
IEEE 802.11r's PMK-R0 and PMK-R1 cryptographically bind the PMK/MSK to =
channel
properties,<br>
satisfying this requirement. <br>
<br>
Part of the reason that EAP channel bindings were not mandatory to =
implement is
that they were (and remain)<br>
undeployed, so that their practicality remains unproven.&nbsp; For this =
reason,
despite considerable<br>
IESG pressure, RFC 4017 included EAP channel bindings only as an =
optional
feature within <br>
Section 2.4, rather than promoting it to required or even recommended to
implement. <br>
<br>
Between the publication of RFC 4017 and 4962, many aspects of EAP, =
including
new methods,<br>
RFC 3748 implementations, etc. moved ahead, but progress in the channel =
binding
area<br>
remained slow, so that the case for requiring EAP channel binding did =
not grow
stronger.<br>
<br>
As proof that EAP channel binding is NOT required by RFC 4962 Section 3, =
RFC
5247 <br>
which was chartered to demonstrate how RFC 4962 requirements can met =
by<br>
EAP/Secure Association/AAA systems does not mention EAP channel bindings =
at all
in <br>
Section 5.4, which discussed how the RFC 4962 key binding requirements =
from
Section 3 <br>
can be met.&nbsp; Rather, RFC 5247 Section 2.3 which discussed =
authenticator
identification, mentions both<br>
EAP channel binding and lower layer bindings in points (f) through (k), =
albeit
without<br>
normative language. <br>
<br>
Given the extensive discussion of RFC 4017 and 4962 on the IETF mailing =
list
and various<br>
other mailing lists, including the EAP WG list, it is therefore somewhat
disappointing to see<br>
something which could only garner IETF consensus as an optional =
capability
promoted to <br>
mandatory, purely due to IESG re-interpretation of a BCP after =
publication. <br>
<br>
Given that the EMU WG has as a work item for development of an Internet =
Draft
on EAP channel<br>
binding, my advice is for the WG, through its analysis of the problem =
and the
potential solutions,<br>
to develop its own consensus as to the value and practicality of channel =
bindings,
rather than <br>
allowing an opinion to be imposed upon it from the IESG.&nbsp; <br>
<br>
As a first step toward that, a concise statement of the problem is very
important. <br>
Section 4.4 of the Tunnel Method Requirements document includes the =
following
statement<br>
of the Channel Binding problem:<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<pre style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'>&nbsp;&nbsp; The so-called =
&quot;lying NAS&quot; problem is a well-documented problem with<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; the current Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) =
architecture<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; [RFC3748] when used with pass-through authenticators.&nbsp; =
Here, a<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; Network Access Server (NAS), or pass-through authenticator, =
may<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; authenticate to the backend AAA infrastructure using one =
set of<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; credentials, while representing contrary information to EAP =
peers.<br>
<span style=3D'font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'><br>
The issue is not just whether the information presented to<br>
the peer and server are contradictory, but also whether the information =
is correct. <br>
To make this clear, RFC 5247 Section 5.3.3 included additional text =
beyond<br>
what was present in RFC 3748 Section 7.15:<br>
<br>
</span>&nbsp;&nbsp; While the verification [of channel bindings] can be =
done<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; either by the peer or the server, typically only the server =
has the<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; knowledge to determine the correctness of the values, as =
opposed to<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; merely verifying their equality.&nbsp; <br>
<br>
<br>
<span style=3D'font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>The use of the term =
&quot;credentials&quot; in the short problem description is somewhat =
odd, since in <br>
AAA protocols, the credentials used for mutual authentication between =
the AAA client and server <br>
do not relate to channel binding parameters such as the =
NAS-Identifier.&nbsp; For example, a AAA client <br>
can use a certificate containing a subjectAltName field of =
&quot;aaaclient.example.com&quot; to authenticate to the AAA server, =
<br>
whereas the enclosed NAS-Identifier attribute could contain a the =
R0KH-ID from IEEE 802.11r.<br>
Such an Access-Request would be completely valid, and RFC 5247 Section =
2.5 notes some of<br>
the issues that can arise:<br>
<br>
</span>&nbsp;&nbsp; It is possible for problems to arise in situations =
where the EAP<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; server identifies itself differently to the EAP peer =
and<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; authenticator.&nbsp; For example, it is possible that the =
Server-Id<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; exported by EAP methods will not be identical to the Fully =
Qualified<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; Domain Name (FQDN) of the backend authentication =
server.&nbsp; Where<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; certificate-based authentication is used within RADIUS or =
Diameter,<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; it is possible that the subjectAltName used in the =
backend<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; authentication server certificate will not be identical to =
the<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; Server-Id or backend authentication server FQDN.&nbsp; This =
is not<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; normally an issue in EAP, as the authenticator will be =
unaware of the<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; identities used between the EAP peer and server.&nbsp; =
However, this can<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; be an issue for key caching, if the authenticator is =
expected to<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; locate a backend authentication server corresponding to a =
Server-Id<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; provided by an EAP peer.<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; Where the backend authentication server FQDN differs from =
the<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; subjectAltName in the backend authentication server =
certificate, it<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; is possible that the AAA client will not be able to =
determine whether<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; it is talking to the correct backend authentication =
server.&nbsp; Where<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; the Server-Id and backend server FQDN differ, it is =
possible that the<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; combination of the key scope (Peer-Id(s), Server- Id(s)) =
and EAP<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; conversation identifier (Session-Id) will not be sufficient =
to<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; determine where the key resides.&nbsp; For example, the =
authenticator can<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; identify backend servers by their IP address (as occurs in =
RADIUS),<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; or using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (as in =
Diameter).&nbsp; If the<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; Server-Id does not correspond to the IP address or FQDN of =
a known<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; backend authentication server, then it may not be possible =
to locate<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; which backend authentication server possesses the key.<br>
<br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></pre></blockquote>

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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP Method
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Sounds fine to me.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bernard Aboba [mailto:Bernard_Aboba@hotmail.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 5:05 PM
> To: Hao Zhou (hzhou); Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based 
> EAP Method
> 
> Given this, the requirement could be rephrased to highlight 
> the items that need to be protected (type code, version 
> numbers, etc.), while dropping the EAP Header protection 
> requirement.  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Hao Zhou (hzhou) [mailto:hzhou@cisco.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 7:24 AM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based 
> EAP Method
> 
> The intent of this requirement is to protect any data sent 
> outside the TLS data. This would include the EAP header and 
> any method specific fields such as version number field. We 
> know we cannot protect these data before a TLS session is 
> established, most likely we are talking about validation afterwards. 
> 
> The EAP header protection, as discussed below, might not 
> bring much value. I am ok with removing it.
> 
> Another related problem is protection or validation of 
> version negotiation, which is usually happened outside the 
> TLS protection. To prevent downgrade attack, we should add 
> some requirement to make sure there is some validation of the 
> advertised version number or any method specific data sent 
> outside TLS of both sides.
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On 
> Behalf Of 
> > Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> > Sent: Monday, July 07, 2008 2:48 PM
> > To: Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based EAP 
> > Method
> > 
> > I think this issues has been raised in the past, does anyone on the 
> > list have any specific scenarios where EAP header protections are 
> > important?
> > If not the requirement can be downgraded or removed entirely.  
> > 
> > With respect to making one method look like another, some 
> systems such 
> > as 802.1X-2004, do not make use of the MSK/EMSK.
> >  Does this introduce a problem?  I can't really think an 
> exploitable 
> > attack outside of denial of service at this point. In 
> addition, more 
> > and more systems are moving towards some type of cryptographic 
> > verification in the lower layer so this might not being an ongoing 
> > problem.
> > 
> > Joe
> > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On
> > Behalf Of
> > > Bernard Aboba
> > > Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2008 11:47 PM
> > > To: emu@ietf.org
> > > Subject: [Emu] Review of Requirements for an Tunnel Based 
> EAP Method
> > > 
> > > Overall, this document is in very good shape.  Kudos to the
> > authors. 
> > > 
> > > A comment on EAP header protection (Section 4.2.3) and Type code 
> > > modification (Section 6.3):
> > > 
> > > 4.2.3. EAP Header Protection
> > > 
> > > 
> > >    A tunnel method SHOULD provide protection of the outer 
> EAP header
> > >    information when possible to make sure the outer EAP
> > header is not
> > >    modified by the intermediaries.
> > > 
> > > 6.3.  Outer EAP Method Header
> > > 
> > >    There are several existing EAP methods which use a 
> similar packet
> > >    format to EAP-TLS.  Often for the initial portions of
> > the exchange
> > >    the execution of the method is identical except for the
> > method ID.
> > >    Protection of the outer EAP header helps to avoid 
> vulnerabilities
> > >    that may arise when an attacker attempts to modify
> > packets to make
> > >    one EAP message look like one from a different method.
> > > 
> > > [BA] The EAP header defined in RFC 3748 looks like this: 
> > > 
> > >     0                   1                   2                   3
> > >     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
> 7 8 9 0 1
> > >    
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> > >    |     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length    
>          |
> > >    
> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
> > >    |    Type ...
> > >    +-+-+-+-+
> > > 
> > > Section 6.3 refers to modification of the Type field which can 
> > > potentially enable an attacker to make one TLS-based EAP
> > method look
> > > like another one.  It's worth noting that such an attack can be 
> > > addressed without necessarily requiring EAP header protection, as 
> > > described in Section 4.2.3.
> > > 
> > > For example, a Type field modification attack will only
> > enable an EAP
> > > peer to subsequently connect to an authenticator if the peer and 
> > > server were able to derive the same MSK/EMSK.
> > > 
> > > To prevent such an attack, it is highly desirable for 
> TLS-based EAP 
> > > methods to utilize key derivation formulas unique to the
> > method.  As
> > > an example, EAP-TLS and EAP-TTLSv0 utilize different key 
> derivation
> > > formulas:
> > > 
> > > EAP-TLS:   
> > >    Key_Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, "client EAP
> > encryption",
> > >                      client.random || server.random)
> > > EAP-TTLSv0:  
> > >       Keying Material = TLS-PRF-128(master_secret, 
> > >                 "ttls keying material", client_random ||
> > > server_random)
> > > 
> > > Assuming that this approach is taken, the Type 
> modification threat 
> > > described in Section 6.3 can be addressed without EAP header 
> > > protection.
> > > 
> > > Given this, it seems to me that EAP header protection is
> > really about
> > > protection of the Code, Identifier
> > > and Length fields of the EAP header.   However, the behavior 
> > > of these fields is fairly rigidly specified in RFC 3748, 
> so that a 
> > > well written implementation should only be vulnerable to
> > DoS attack,
> > > which would be the case even if EAP header protection were 
> > > implemented.
> > > 
> > > For example, an attacker modifying the Code field might 
> be able to 
> > > cause an EAP peer or server to drop the packet.
> > > However, the same thing would happen if EAP header 
> protection were 
> > > implemented, and the packet failed the MIC check.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Via modification of the Identifier field, it might be possible to 
> > > cause the peer or server to abort the EAP session in progress.  
> > > However, in TLS-based methods, failure of TLS integrity check is 
> > > also a terminal error, so that I'm not sure if anything is gained 
> > > here either.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Modification of the Length field might have as its objective the 
> > > inducement of a buffer overflow on either the peer or the 
> server, so 
> > > it's aims are somewhat more nefarious than attacks on the Code or 
> > > Identifier fields.  However, implementation of EAP header 
> protection 
> > > would not be likely to address such an implementation bug 
> since the 
> > > MIC could not be computed until the EAP packet was fully 
> received, 
> > > by which time the buffer overflow would have already occurred.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > In summary, I am not clear that EAP header protection as 
> described 
> > > in Section 4.2.3 really brings much value beyond 
> addressing the EAP 
> > > Type Code attack described in Section 6.3.
> > >  I would therefore recommend that this section be deleted, or at 
> > > least justified in more depth.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> > 
> 
> 
_______________________________________________
Emu mailing list
Emu@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu


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Subject: Re: [Emu] A comment on credential provisioning
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I'm ok with saying that the tunnel method MUST support attribute
extensibility and EAP methods running within it.  As you say, an EAP method
could handle the credential provisioning, it doesn't need to be part of the
tunnel protocol.  The WFA's WPS EAP method is an example of this.  

 

If there is a section focusing on the use case, then it should make it clear
what concrete requirements come out of that (e.g. attribute extensibility,
EAP method support), as opposed to talking about the need to support
credential provisioning in general. 

 

From: Hao Zhou (hzhou) [mailto:hzhou@cisco.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 7:57 AM
To: Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [Emu] A comment on credential provisioning

 

Bernard:

 

There might be multiple uses cases for credential provisioning and
enrollment. One case is just like you mentioned to initial bootstrap the
device. Other case might be provisioning additional credentials used for
other applications once the device has been fully provisioned. Third case
will be provisioning something useful for fast reconnect for future
authentications. Only in the first case, there is the potential MITM attack
you mentioned. In some deployment cases, this could be offset by certain
measures, such as using a relative strong password inner authentication
method, pre-provisioned trust anchor, restricted environment etc. or
tradeoff by admin for ease of deployment.   

 

In any case, the section cited is only discussing the use case needed to be
supported. The actual requirement section doesn't actually list any
requirement for credential provisioning. Other than the tunnel method MUST
support extensive attributes and EAP method. This will allow someone to
develop credential provisioning scheme using the EAP method or attributes.
We certainly don't want to develop a new tunnel method preventing this from
happening. Of course, security considerations especially for MITM attack
needs to be added. Are you ok with this approach?  

 


  _____  


From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
Bernard Aboba
Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2008 4:17 AM
To: emu@ietf.org
Subject: [Emu] A comment on credential provisioning

Section 3.7 of the tunnel requirements document states the following: 

3.7.  Credential Provisioning and Enrollment





   When a peer has authenticated with EAP, this is a convenient time to


   distribute credentials to that peer that may be used for later


   authentication exchanges.  For example, the authentication server can


   provide a private key or shared key to the peer that can be used by


   the peer to perform rapid re-authentication or roaming.  In addition


   there have been proposals to perform enrollment within EAP, such as


   [I-D.mahy-eap-enrollment].





   The tunnel method SHOULD support carrying credential distribution


   protocols.

Given the extensive EMU WG discussion relating to ZKPP, and the need to
avoid MITM attacks, 
it seems quite odd to me that the WG would so readily take on the credential
provisioning problem. 

As we move increasingly towards a world in which network access will be
increasingly likely to 
require authentication, mechanisms for credential provisioning will become
increasingly important. 
For example, consider the situation where someone has obtained a spanking
new handset/PC/notebook
and wishes to get connected in an environment where authentication is
required for all access 
mechanisms:  VPN/WLAN/Ethernet/PPP, etc.  

That said, moving from a state where no credentials, trust anchors or policy
is provisioned to
one where everything is set up can be quite tricky:

a. No trust anchor may be provisioned, which makes server certificate
authentication difficult. 
Without server certificate authentication, we need to be very careful about
MITM attacks!

b. If the server may be a rogue, then the dictionary attack protection
provided by the TLS
tunnel is worth much.  This implies that the credential provisioning
mechanism itself
needs to be immune to dictionary attack.  Merely binding the inner
authentication to 
the outer tunnel only demonstrates that there is no MITM attack, but it
doesn't demonstrate
that the server is authentic.  Unless the client is willing to consider its
password compromised
if the cryptographic binding fails (a nasty situation) we're back to the
pure password
discussion initiated by Glen and Dan, or a poor man's substitute, such a
progressive
disclosure, which was used in the WFA WPS EAP method. 

Given all of this, my advice would be to delete Section 3.7.  Leaving this
in is likely to 
lead to a lot of additional discussion which is largely tangential to the
core of what
needs to be accomplished.  If and when the WG decides to add the
password-based
method item to the Charter, we could bring this item back.  But until then,
it seems
like it would be best ruled out of scope.


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<div class=3DSection1>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>I&#8217;m ok with saying that the tunnel method MUST =
support attribute
extensibility and EAP methods running within it.&nbsp; As you say, an =
EAP method
could handle the credential provisioning, it doesn&#8217;t need to be =
part of the
tunnel protocol.&nbsp; The WFA&#8217;s WPS EAP method is an example of =
this.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'>If there is a section focusing on the use case, then it =
should
make it clear what concrete requirements come out of that (e.g. =
attribute
extensibility, EAP method support), as opposed to talking about the need =
to
support credential provisioning in general. <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D'><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>

<div>

<div style=3D'border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt =
0in 0in 0in'>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span>=
</b><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> Hao Zhou =
(hzhou)
[mailto:hzhou@cisco.com] <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, July 09, 2008 7:57 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Bernard Aboba; emu@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> RE: [Emu] A comment on credential =
provisioning<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</div>

</div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>Bernard:</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>There might be multiple uses cases for credential =
provisioning and
enrollment. One case is just like you mentioned to initial bootstrap the
device.&nbsp;Other case might be provisioning additional credentials =
used for
other applications once the device has been fully provisioned. Third =
case will
be provisioning something useful for fast reconnect for future =
authentications.
Only in the first case, there is the potential MITM attack you =
mentioned. In
some deployment cases, this&nbsp;could be offset by certain =
measures,&nbsp;such
as using a relative strong password inner authentication method,
pre-provisioned trust anchor, restricted environment etc. or tradeoff by =
admin
for&nbsp;ease of deployment.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>&nbsp;<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";
color:blue'>In any case, the section cited is only discussing the use =
case
needed to be supported. The actual requirement section doesn't
actually&nbsp;list any requirement for credential provisioning. Other =
than the
tunnel method MUST support extensive attributes and EAP method. This =
will allow
someone to develop credential provisioning scheme using the EAP method =
or
attributes. We certainly don't want to develop a&nbsp;new tunnel
method&nbsp;preventing this from happening. Of course, security =
considerations
especially for MITM attack needs to be added. Are you ok with this
approach?&nbsp;&nbsp;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>

<blockquote style=3D'border:none;border-left:solid blue =
1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt;
margin-left:3.75pt;margin-top:5.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:5.0pt'=
>

<p class=3DMsoNormal><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;<=
/o:p></span></p>

<div class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><span
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>

<hr size=3D2 width=3D"100%" align=3Dcenter>

</span></div>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>From:</span></b><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'> emu-bounces@ietf.org
[mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] <b>On Behalf Of </b>Bernard Aboba<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, June 26, 2008 4:17 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> emu@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> [Emu] A comment on credential =
provisioning<o:p></o:p></span></p>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>Section 3.7 of the tunnel =
requirements
document states the following: <o:p></o:p></span></p>

<pre>3.7.&nbsp; Credential Provisioning and Enrollment<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; When a peer has authenticated with EAP, this is a =
convenient time to<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; distribute credentials to that peer that may be used for =
later<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; authentication exchanges.&nbsp; For example, the =
authentication server can<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; provide a private key or shared key to the peer that can be =
used by<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; the peer to perform rapid re-authentication or =
roaming.&nbsp; In addition<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; there have been proposals to perform enrollment within EAP, =
such as<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; [I-D.mahy-eap-enrollment].<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; The tunnel method SHOULD support carrying credential =
distribution<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp; protocols.<o:p></o:p></pre>

<p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'margin-bottom:12.0pt'><span =
style=3D'font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif"'>Given the extensive EMU WG discussion
relating to ZKPP, and the need to avoid MITM attacks, <br>
it seems quite odd to me that the WG would so readily take on the =
credential
provisioning problem. <br>
<br>
As we move increasingly towards a world in which network access will be
increasingly likely to <br>
require authentication, mechanisms for credential provisioning will =
become
increasingly important. <br>
For example, consider the situation where someone has obtained a =
spanking new
handset/PC/notebook<br>
and wishes to get connected in an environment where authentication is =
required
for all access <br>
mechanisms:&nbsp; VPN/WLAN/Ethernet/PPP, etc.&nbsp; <br>
<br>
That said, moving from a state where no credentials, trust anchors or =
policy is
provisioned to<br>
one where everything is set up can be quite tricky:<br>
<br>
a. No trust anchor may be provisioned, which makes server certificate
authentication difficult. <br>
Without server certificate authentication, we need to be very careful =
about
MITM attacks!<br>
<br>
b. If the server may be a rogue, then the dictionary attack protection =
provided
by the TLS<br>
tunnel is worth much.&nbsp; This implies that the credential =
provisioning
mechanism itself<br>
needs to be immune to dictionary attack.&nbsp; Merely binding the inner
authentication to <br>
the outer tunnel only demonstrates that there is no MITM attack, but it =
doesn't
demonstrate<br>
that the server is authentic.&nbsp; Unless the client is willing to =
consider
its password compromised<br>
if the cryptographic binding fails (a nasty situation) we're back to the =
pure
password<br>
discussion initiated by Glen and Dan, or a poor man's substitute, such a
progressive<br>
disclosure, which was used in the WFA WPS EAP method. <br>
<br>
Given all of this, my advice would be to delete Section 3.7.&nbsp; =
Leaving this
in is likely to <br>
lead to a lot of additional discussion which is largely tangential to =
the core
of what<br>
needs to be accomplished.&nbsp; If and when the WG decides to add the
password-based<br>
method item to the Charter, we could bring this item back.&nbsp; But =
until
then, it seems<br>
like it would be best ruled out of scope.<o:p></o:p></span></p>

</blockquote>

</div>

</body>

</html>

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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Wed Jul  9 22:20:43 2008
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  I think this is a very good idea. +1 and all that jazz. I hope some
time can be alloted to discuss this.

  Dan.

On Wed, July 9, 2008 10:28 am, Glen Zorn wrote:
> Alan DeKok [mailto://aland@deployingradius.com] writes:
>
>>   The following is the draft agenda for IETF 72.  If there are no
>> comments or additions, it will be submitted later this week to the IETF
>> web site.
>
> Given some of the recent comments on the list, I wonder if it would be
> permissible to discuss eap-pwd.  Recent changes to the protocol have made
> it
> more usable with popular authentication databases...
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> Emu@ietf.org
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>


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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Thu Jul 10 03:35:25 2008
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Dan Harkins wrote:
>   I think this is a very good idea. +1 and all that jazz. I hope some
> time can be alloted to discuss this.

  There is time.  We can add the document to the end of the current agenda.

  Alan DeKok.
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Hannes Tschofenig wrote:

> > As Dan Harkins already pointed out, NIST 800-38B does define CMAC 
> > for 256-bit AES, with 256-bit key and 128-bit output.
> >
> > So hardcoding this assumption in EAP-GPSK seems to limit the future
> > algorithm agility somewhat -- is the WG sure this is an acceptable
> > limitation?
> >
> > (If this limitation is kept, I'd suggest mentioning in Section 2
> > that "KS" is not only the key size, but also MAC output length.)
> 
> This seems to require a separate discussion on the list.

Ok -- please let me know once you think the discussion has
concluded.

> > The text (Section 5) should probably say something about non-ASCII
> > characters, especially since NAIs can contain them (and IETF
> > policies usually require dealing with non-ASCII in strings handled
> > by ordinary users -- RFC4306/4279 are probably mostly for admins).
> >
> > Maybe "SHOULD support non-ASCII", with pointer to detailed 
> > instructions in Section 2.4 of RFC 4282?
> 
> Fixed.

It seems this update got garbled somehow -- at least I have some
difficulties in parsing the new text:

   Thus the management interface SHOULD support non-ASCII to allow
   entering values for the ID_Peer and ID_Server as ASCII strings up
   to 254 octets in length.

> > S4, how is PL encoded when input to KDF? (1 octet, 2 octets?)
>    
> 2 octets.

The text in Section 4 should say so.

> > S12.9: the text about minimal state (only RAND_Peer) seems
> > inconsistent with S10, which requires discarding GPSK-3 if the
> > RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel fields are not the same as in GPSK-2.  
> > To make that comparison, it seems you need to store the values after
> > sending GPSK-2?
>   
> I added text on this issue. I am not fully sure whether it resolves
> the aspect entirely though.

Not really -- the text in Section 12.9 seems to say that doing
the comparison (of RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel) can be omitted,
but it's a MUST in Section 10. These two sections need to be
consistent.
 
> > >From idnits: 
> > Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2434 (Obsoleted by RFC 5226)
> 
> Ok.

The names of the pre-defined IANA policies were also slightly changed,
so Section 13 needs some small updates.

Best regards,
Pasi
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Subject: [Emu] GPSK Issue: Key Size and MAC Length
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Currently GPSK makes an implicit assumption that the MAC output size
will be the same as the key size.  This will not always be the case as
it is possible for the MAC output size to be different than the key
size.   For example it has been pointed out that AES-CMAC-256 has a 128
bit output.  

It seems that we have 2 choices:

1) Leave the key size and MAC size linked as they are and note the
limitation. The current draft does this in section 4.  This imposes
limitations on the types of cipher suites defined. 

2) Make key size and MAC size independent.  This would require some
changes in the document.  This would at least require changes to section
4 (remove text about limitation), section 6 (add MAC length parameter to
table), section 7 (use MAC length instead of KS when determining the
number of output blocks), section 9.3 (fix the MAC length), section 13
(cipher suites need to define MAC length).  

Which solution do you prefer?  

Thanks,

Joe
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Cc: draft-clancy-emu-chbind@tools.ietf.org
Subject: [Emu] Review of draft-clancy-emu-chbind-01
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In general I think the document is a good start.  I think it needs some
work in a few areas

1. Section 1

- The following sentence is a bit odd:

"Here, a Network Access Server (NAS), or pass-through authenticator, may
 authenticate to the backend AAA infrastructure using one set of
 credentials, while representing contrary information to EAP clients." 

The credentials are often different, it is the service that the AAA
server expects the NAS to provide vs. what is actually provided.

"Here, the backend AAA infrastructure may expect the Network Access
Server (NAS) or pass-through authenticator to provide one set of
services, while the NAS may represent contrary service offerings to EAP
clients."

- I would prefer if referred to the general solution technique before
referencing [AAAPAY].  For example in the last paragraph:

"This document uses a process in which the EAP client provides
information about the characteristics of the service provided by the
authenticator to the AAA server protected within the EAP method,
allowing the server to verify the authenticator is providing valid
information to the peer.  The server can also respond back with
additional information that could be useful for the client to decide
whether or not to continue its session with the authenticator.  "AAA
Payloads" defined in [AAAPAY] proposes a mechanism to carry this
information."

2. Section 3 

   Channel bindings [RFC5056] seek to enforce a stronger security
   relationship between the three entities, by allowing the client and
   server to compare their relative perception of the authenticator's
   identity in a secure channel.  

[Joe] Identity is only one aspect of channel binding issues.  Often the
client does not really care or know much about the authenticator
identity, it cares about the characteristics of the services provided by
the authenticator.  

   This document defines how to use "AAA
   Payloads" [I-D.clancy-emu-aaapay] within EAP methods to implement
   channel bindings.  

[Joe] Here again I would prefer to reference the general technique of
communicating information with [AAAPAY] as an example.  

   Unlike [RFC5056], channel binding in EAP context
   does not ensure binding different layers of a session but rather the
   information advertized to client and authentication server by an
   authenticator acting as pass-through device during an EAP session.

[Joe] It goes beyond just advertisement from the authenticator to AAA
server.  The AAA server must have an expectation of what the
authenticator should provide.  Without this the value of channel
bindings is greatly diminished.  Since the AAA server must have an
expectation of what is provided advertisement from the authenticator to
the AAA is not necessary.

 It is preferable to use this idea, rather than hashing identity
   information directly into keys, for a number of reasons:

   o  It allows for fuzzy comparisons of entity names, rather than
      requiring absolute.  This can facilitate deployment and debugging.

[Joe] An example, where comparison is useful is when more than one value
for a service characteristic is valid.  If the exact information is not
communicated in the AAA protocol then the AAA server needs to compare
what is provided by the EAP client with a set of valid choices.  It is
also useful when you do not want things to fail, but would rather track
down the problem after the fact.  I think this bullet could be reworded,
perhaps 'fuzzy' is not the best term.  

   o  Any EAP method that provides mutual authentication and key
      derivation can easily add channel binding as proposed in this
      draft.  On the other hand, including identities into key
      derivations requires the modification of EAP methods.  For
      instance, many EAP methods specify how MSK and other keying
      material is derived and adding channel binding by adding
      identifiers would need to be specified for each method
      individually.
[Joe] This is one way to achieve this, but it could also be done in the
AAA server outside the EAP method.  It is more likely that channel
bindings will be exported outside a method and evaluated by the other
AAA subsystems instead of the method itself.  

   o  Client and authentication server may communicate on different
      layers with the authenticator and thus receive different
      identifiers that may belong to the same device.  A server may be
      able to recognize which different identifiers belong to the same
      device (e.g. by performing a table look up).  This scenario cannot
      be solved by hashing identities into keys.

[Joe] I'm not sure what this means. 

3. Seciton 4 

I think the discussion in this section is a little off target.  There is
a trust relationship between the authenticator and the AAA.  The AAA
trusts that the authenticator will provide the expected set of services
to the client.  The AAA needs to know what services it expects an
authenticator to provide.   This knowledge may be distributed across
several AAA servers in the case of a proxy relationship.  The trust is
rooted in the authentication between AAA servers and authenticator.  The
EAP client is trusting that all of this works correctly and its trust is
rooted in a relationship with the AAA server hosting the EAP Server.
The issue here is that the AAA server and client have no way to verify
correct behavior of the authenticator.  This is the gap that channel
bindings is trying to fill.  

The text is misleading in that at some points it suggests that the AAA
server needs to trust info2.  This is only partially true since trusting
info2 would allow the authenticator to advertise whatever it wants to
both sides.  Later in the text this is clarified, the AAA server needs
to have access to some information that allows it to determine if info1
and info2 are within the set of acceptable values.  It is not necessary
for the AAA to receive info2 from the authenticator since it needs to
know the set of acceptable values.  It may help in some schemes for the
AAA to receive what the authentication has chosen if there is more than
one element in the set of acceptable values for a particular
characteristic.

I think this document should discuss a bit more on who actually verifies
the channel bindings.  While EAP carries the channel bindings the EAP
method may not be the best place to carry out this evaluation.  This
would typically be done in a AAA server which has more authorization
information available to it.  If there is a proxy chain the evaluation
may be done at various points in the chain so the channel binding
information needs to be communicated down the chain from the EAP server.


There probably should also be some discussion on the implications of
having the EAP server collocated with the authenticator. 

I think this section could use a bit more work.  

4. Section 5

The introduction described a situation where an access point advertises
a different SSID than it should be allowed to, wouldn't this be
something to include in the example? 

5. Section 6

This section needs to make recommendations for requirements for EAP
methods, AAA protocols and lower layers. Something like the following: 

EAP method Support - EAP methods MUST be able to carry type x of data
integrity protected from client to server.  EAP methods SHOULD provide a
mechanism to carry protected data from server to client.  EAP methods
MUST export channel binding data to the AAA subsystem on the EAP server.
EAP methods MUST be able to import channel binding data from the lower
layer on the EAP peer.  

AAA protocol support - The AAA subsystem MUST be able to process channel
binding data returned from the EAP method.  It must be possible to pass
the channel binding data in AAA attributes to proxy AAA if a proxy AAA
will need to evaluate the data.  I'm pretty sure that this is not the
only consideration.   

Lower Layer Support - I don't think we want to define the requirements
for every lower layer in this section or in the document.  I think we
need to list some requirements as to what would make good candidates for
lower layer parameters to use as channel bindings.  Indicate that there
MUST be a way to convey this in the EAP method and MUST be a way to send
it in the AAA protocol unless the channel binding can be evaluated
entirely on the AAA that hosts the EAP server (home AAA).  

I think we can provide an other sections of the document such as an
appendix to detail the specifics of some lower layers.  These may also
belong in a separate document(s). 

Cheers,

Joe





 
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--NextPart

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the EAP Method Update Working Group of the IETF.


	Title           : EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method
	Author(s)       : C. Clancy, H. Tschofenig
	Filename        : draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-11.txt
	Pages           : 39
	Date            : 2008-07-29

This Internet Draft defines an Extensible Authentication Protocol
method called EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK).  This method
is a lightweight shared-key authentication protocol supporting mutual
authentication and key derivation.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-11.txt

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Charles,

Thanks for the update! There's one change I'm slightly worried 
about:

Version -10:
   For GPSK-3, a peer MUST silently discard messages where the
   RAND_Peer, the RAND_Server, or the CSuite_Sel fields do match 
   those transmitted in GPSK-2.

Version -11:
   For GPSK-3, a peer MUST silently discard messages where the 
   RAND_Peer field does match the value transmitted in GPSK-2. 

I guess the security analysis of GPSK was performed assuming
the peer does check RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel? 

While I can't come up with any attack even if this check is
omitted (e.g., RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel are still included 
in MK derivation), is the whole WG comfortable with this change?
(I didn't see any discussion about this topic yet.)

Best regards,
Pasi

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Charles Clancy [mailto:tcc@umd.edu] 
> Sent: 29 July, 2008 14:42
> To: Eronen Pasi (Nokia-NRC/Helsinki)
> Cc: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; clancy@cs.umd.edu; emu@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08 (1st round 
> of comments)
> 
> Pasi,
> 
> I've submitted an update that addresses the ASCII text garbling, PL 
> encoding, packet validation inconsistencies, and IANA policies.  All 
> that remains is the key/MAC-length issue.
> 
> --
> t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
> electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland
> 
> 
> Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> > Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> > 
> >>> As Dan Harkins already pointed out, NIST 800-38B does define CMAC 
> >>> for 256-bit AES, with 256-bit key and 128-bit output.
> >>>
> >>> So hardcoding this assumption in EAP-GPSK seems to limit 
> the future
> >>> algorithm agility somewhat -- is the WG sure this is an acceptable
> >>> limitation?
> >>>
> >>> (If this limitation is kept, I'd suggest mentioning in Section 2
> >>> that "KS" is not only the key size, but also MAC output length.)
> >> This seems to require a separate discussion on the list.
> > 
> > Ok -- please let me know once you think the discussion has
> > concluded.
> > 
> >>> The text (Section 5) should probably say something about non-ASCII
> >>> characters, especially since NAIs can contain them (and IETF
> >>> policies usually require dealing with non-ASCII in strings handled
> >>> by ordinary users -- RFC4306/4279 are probably mostly for admins).
> >>>
> >>> Maybe "SHOULD support non-ASCII", with pointer to detailed 
> >>> instructions in Section 2.4 of RFC 4282?
> >> Fixed.
> > 
> > It seems this update got garbled somehow -- at least I have some
> > difficulties in parsing the new text:
> > 
> >    Thus the management interface SHOULD support non-ASCII to allow
> >    entering values for the ID_Peer and ID_Server as ASCII strings up
> >    to 254 octets in length.
> > 
> >>> S4, how is PL encoded when input to KDF? (1 octet, 2 octets?)
> >>    
> >> 2 octets.
> > 
> > The text in Section 4 should say so.
> > 
> >>> S12.9: the text about minimal state (only RAND_Peer) seems
> >>> inconsistent with S10, which requires discarding GPSK-3 if the
> >>> RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel fields are not the same as in GPSK-2.  
> >>> To make that comparison, it seems you need to store the 
> values after
> >>> sending GPSK-2?
> >>   
> >> I added text on this issue. I am not fully sure whether it resolves
> >> the aspect entirely though.
> > 
> > Not really -- the text in Section 12.9 seems to say that doing
> > the comparison (of RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel) can be omitted,
> > but it's a MUST in Section 10. These two sections need to be
> > consistent.
> >  
> >>> >From idnits: 
> >>> Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2434 (Obsoleted by RFC 5226)
> >> Ok.
> > 
> > The names of the pre-defined IANA policies were also 
> slightly changed,
> > so Section 13 needs some small updates.
> > 
> > Best regards,
> > Pasi
> 
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Subject: Re: [Emu] Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08 (1st round of
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Pasi,

This state-minimization approach was proposed by the Stanford security 
review.  In earlier versions of the draft, CSuite_Sel and RAND_Server 
were not included in GPSK-3, and were not verified.  I'm not sure why 
the language you referenced below got updated after they were added to 
GPSK-3.

All -- Does anyone in the WG object to this change?

--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland


Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
> Charles,
> 
> Thanks for the update! There's one change I'm slightly worried 
> about:
> 
> Version -10:
>    For GPSK-3, a peer MUST silently discard messages where the
>    RAND_Peer, the RAND_Server, or the CSuite_Sel fields do match 
>    those transmitted in GPSK-2.
> 
> Version -11:
>    For GPSK-3, a peer MUST silently discard messages where the 
>    RAND_Peer field does match the value transmitted in GPSK-2. 
> 
> I guess the security analysis of GPSK was performed assuming
> the peer does check RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel? 
> 
> While I can't come up with any attack even if this check is
> omitted (e.g., RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel are still included 
> in MK derivation), is the whole WG comfortable with this change?
> (I didn't see any discussion about this topic yet.)
> 
> Best regards,
> Pasi
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ext Charles Clancy [mailto:tcc@umd.edu] 
>> Sent: 29 July, 2008 14:42
>> To: Eronen Pasi (Nokia-NRC/Helsinki)
>> Cc: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net; clancy@cs.umd.edu; emu@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: Review of draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08 (1st round 
>> of comments)
>>
>> Pasi,
>>
>> I've submitted an update that addresses the ASCII text garbling, PL 
>> encoding, packet validation inconsistencies, and IANA policies.  All 
>> that remains is the key/MAC-length issue.
>>
>> --
>> t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
>> electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland
>>
>>
>> Pasi.Eronen@nokia.com wrote:
>>> Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>>>
>>>>> As Dan Harkins already pointed out, NIST 800-38B does define CMAC 
>>>>> for 256-bit AES, with 256-bit key and 128-bit output.
>>>>>
>>>>> So hardcoding this assumption in EAP-GPSK seems to limit 
>> the future
>>>>> algorithm agility somewhat -- is the WG sure this is an acceptable
>>>>> limitation?
>>>>>
>>>>> (If this limitation is kept, I'd suggest mentioning in Section 2
>>>>> that "KS" is not only the key size, but also MAC output length.)
>>>> This seems to require a separate discussion on the list.
>>> Ok -- please let me know once you think the discussion has
>>> concluded.
>>>
>>>>> The text (Section 5) should probably say something about non-ASCII
>>>>> characters, especially since NAIs can contain them (and IETF
>>>>> policies usually require dealing with non-ASCII in strings handled
>>>>> by ordinary users -- RFC4306/4279 are probably mostly for admins).
>>>>>
>>>>> Maybe "SHOULD support non-ASCII", with pointer to detailed 
>>>>> instructions in Section 2.4 of RFC 4282?
>>>> Fixed.
>>> It seems this update got garbled somehow -- at least I have some
>>> difficulties in parsing the new text:
>>>
>>>    Thus the management interface SHOULD support non-ASCII to allow
>>>    entering values for the ID_Peer and ID_Server as ASCII strings up
>>>    to 254 octets in length.
>>>
>>>>> S4, how is PL encoded when input to KDF? (1 octet, 2 octets?)
>>>>    
>>>> 2 octets.
>>> The text in Section 4 should say so.
>>>
>>>>> S12.9: the text about minimal state (only RAND_Peer) seems
>>>>> inconsistent with S10, which requires discarding GPSK-3 if the
>>>>> RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel fields are not the same as in GPSK-2.  
>>>>> To make that comparison, it seems you need to store the 
>> values after
>>>>> sending GPSK-2?
>>>>   
>>>> I added text on this issue. I am not fully sure whether it resolves
>>>> the aspect entirely though.
>>> Not really -- the text in Section 12.9 seems to say that doing
>>> the comparison (of RAND_Server and CSuite_Sel) can be omitted,
>>> but it's a MUST in Section 10. These two sections need to be
>>> consistent.
>>>  
>>>>> >From idnits: 
>>>>> Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2434 (Obsoleted by RFC 5226)
>>>> Ok.
>>> The names of the pre-defined IANA policies were also 
>> slightly changed,
>>> so Section 13 needs some small updates.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Pasi
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Subject: [Emu] update channel binding documents
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EMU,

New versions of the EAP channel binding documents are now available:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-clancy-emu-chbind-02.txt
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-clancy-emu-aaapay-01.txt

They address issues raised in the two reviews received so far.

--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.                 eng.umd.edu/~tcc
electrical & computer engineering, university of maryland
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From emu-bounces@ietf.org  Fri Aug  1 01:34:00 2008
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Subject: [Emu] Reviewers for Tunnel Requirements draft
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  The following people have volunteered to review the tunnel
requirements draft.

Stefan
Kaushik
Klaas
Dave Mitton

  Alan DeKok.
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