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Thread-Topic: [Emu] [Ecrit] emergency access and EAP-TLS (and denial of serviceattacks on the emergency.com domain)
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From: "Kroeselberg, Dirk (NSN - DE/Munich)" <dirk.kroeselberg@nsn.com>
To: "ext Dawson, Martin" <Martin.Dawson@andrew.com>, =?iso-8859-1?Q?Andres_K=FCtt?= <andres.kytt@skype.net>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] [Ecrit] emergency access and EAP-TLS (and denial of serviceattacks on the emergency.com domain)
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Martin,

see inline.

Thanks,
Dirk=20

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces@ietf.org] On=20
> Behalf Of ext Dawson, Martin
> Sent: Saturday, March 27, 2010 1:51 AM
> To: Andres K=FCtt
> Cc: emu@ietf.org; ecrit@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Emu] [Ecrit] emergency access and EAP-TLS (and=20
> denial of serviceattacks on the emergency.com domain)
>=20
> It seems to me that fly in the ointment is this point:
>=20
> > - because the protocol used is opaque, the access provider=20
> has no way to
> > distinguish between session establishment, an actual EC,=20
> ordinary IM traffic
> > or common web browsing (one could envision a VoIP=20
> application that uses HTTP
> > bindings for signaling purposes)
>=20
> I agree with this point. Effectively it says that the access=20
> has no way of knowing whether the third party application=20
> actually is just supporting an emergency call. Not only is it=20
> opaque but it has no control signalling relationship with the=20
> access either - so the access has no independent way to=20
> inform the application that the client is only supposed to be=20
> doing an emergency call.

I am not sure whether there is any need for the 'access' informing the =
application, but of course there are examples where a signaling =
relationship between the access/ISP part and the application exists. So =
here you seem to be talking about a specific subset of access only.
Or do we want to limit ourselves to such subset?

>=20
> I do not see how the "it's understood to be an emergency IP=20
> context" knowledge facilitates any of this policy control.=20
> Out of control is out of control.
>=20
>=20
> On you first point about the UI implementation. I have...=20
> hang on... five applications on my Android device menu that=20
> do voice in one form or another. Frankly, it would be most=20
> convenient to have one there that just said "Emergency" and=20
> whose sole purpose was to do the ECRIT procedures (as=20
> described in this draft). That would be an ECRIT direct=20
> calling client. Access networks can most readily support=20
> policies that allow for this mode of use - without the third=20
> party trust issues that you raise.

Could you please detail what would be required to make 'Access networks =
can most readily support...' work, i.e., allow the client access when =
not yet connected (Andres' scenario)? Especially for access networks =
other than WLAN.

>=20
> Cheers,
> Martin
>=20
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andres K=FCtt [mailto:andres.kytt@skype.net]=20
> Sent: Friday, 26 March 2010 10:12 PM
> To: Dawson, Martin
> Cc: emu@ietf.org; ecrit@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ecrit] emergency access and EAP-TLS (and denial=20
> of serviceattacks on the emergency.com domain)
>=20
> Hi,
>=20
>     Certainly. Let's assume the following:
> - existing UI implementation is used (i.e. the software=20
> provider will not
> build a separate SIP client with distinct UI just for=20
> emergency calling)
> - the client is multifunctional i.e. it is used for more=20
> things than calling
> - the client has been authenticated already, this kind of=20
> software tends to
> run in the background continuously
> - there is no network connection
>=20
> Given these assumptions EC  would work like this:
> - user attempts to place an EC
> - the client, being offline, attempts to re-establish it's=20
> session with the
> network/server (i.e. get online)
> - at this point, the access provider needs to know that the=20
> session being
> established is for the purposes of an EC and needs to allow=20
> the connection
> - session gets established with the server/network
> - user attempts an emergency call
> - the call reaches servers/network and is connected
> - the call ends
> - at this point there needs to be a way to drop the=20
> connection as the access
> provider has no way of knowing whether the call has ended or not.
>=20
> Please note that
> - session establishment happens before the call and access=20
> provider has no
> idea whether this is because of ordinary client use or EC.=20
> Remember, the
> protocol used is opaque
> - it is impossible for the client to know whether EC is even
> allowed/implemented for a particular location before the session is
> established
> - because the protocol used is opaque, the access provider=20
> has no way to
> distinguish between session establishment, an actual EC,=20
> ordinary IM traffic
> or common web browsing (one could envision a VoIP application=20
> that uses HTTP
> bindings for signaling purposes)
>=20
> Thus, regardless of the methods used, the access provider=20
> needs to trust the
> service provider to only use the connection for emergency calling and
> nothing else.  =20
>=20
> As for the session establishment, one way to do this is the=20
> way Skype Access
> (you buy WIFI time using your Skype credit) works:
> - the client wraps a session request in a DNS query against=20
> skype.com name
> server. DNS is usually quite unrestricted but there are, of course,
> exceptions
> - single-use credentials are issued
> - WISPr authentication is attempted using the credentials acquired
> - the access provider attempts authentication against Skype
> - session is established
> - when the authentication session ends, the access provider attempts a
> re-authenticate and terminates the connection should it fail
>=20
> Yours,
> Andres
>=20
> On 3/24/10 12:55 PM, "Dawson, Martin"=20
> <Martin.Dawson@andrew.com> wrote:
>=20
> > Hi Andres,
> >=20
> > Could you take us step by step through the establishment of=20
> the anonymous
> > connection and the initiation of the emergency call and=20
> highlight where/how
> > this notification mechanism would be invoked and what it would do?
> >=20
> > I would find that helpful. I'm interested in how people see=20
> the access network
> > being able to limit the use of an arbitrary third party=20
> VoIP application to
> > emergency calling, if that's the intent, in the context of
> > unauthenticated/anonymous access.
> >=20
> > BTW, I haven't said that access is completely out of scope.=20
> Actually, it
> > obviously is in scope both in terms of what facilities it=20
> provides and what
> > its policies are with respect to emergency calling=20
> procedures in the context
> > of unaurthenticated/anonymous connections. It's the concept=20
> of gating the
> > establishment of unauthenticated/anonymous connections on=20
> some kind of a
> > priori knowledge or indication that its for the purpose of=20
> an emergency call
> > that I question.
> >=20
> > Regards,
> > Martin
> >=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Kutt, Andres [mailto:akutt@ebay.com]
> > Sent: Wednesday, 24 March 2010 9:31 PM
> > To: Dawson, Martin
> > Cc: emu@ietf.org; ecrit@ietf.org
> > Subject: Re: [Ecrit] emergency access and EAP-TLS (and denial of
> > serviceattacks on the emergency.com domain)
> >=20
> > Hi,
> >    =20
> >     Leaving access completely out of scope is of course the=20
> easiest course
> > but some synchronization must remain. In case of Skype,=20
> there is no way for
> > the access provider to tell whether the user is placing an=20
> emergency call or
> > chatting with their friends as the protocol used is opaque=20
> for the outsider.
> > This is true in any case the service provider uses a=20
> protocol not known or
> > understood by access provider and we must assume this can=20
> legally occur.
> > Thus, should anonymous access be required, a mechanism must=20
> exist to notify
> > the access provider about an attempted emergency call.
> >=20
> > Yours,
> > Andres=20
> >=20
> >=20
> > On 3/24/10 3:14 AM, "Dawson, Martin"=20
> <Martin.Dawson@andrew.com> wrote:
> >=20
> >> Consider the access out of scope, certainly. Recommend to=20
> access-specific
> >> forums that they shouldn't *assume* the connecting device=20
> is actually the
> >> device making the emergency call (e.g. a WiFi device on a=20
> portable 3G router)
> >> so there's no reliable assumption the connecting device=20
> can provide an
> >> emergency flag.
> >>=20
> >> Then it's whatever ECRIT might recommend as appropriate on=20
> top of IP. I think
> >> Richard's questions are along the line of what the value=20
> of this specific
> >> "emergency flag" is at the IP level. It's not like anyone=20
> but the device user
> >> knows whether the access really is only required for=20
> emergency purposes. It's
> >> a valid question; access policy may just be to bar or=20
> allow (depending on
> >> whether it's a prohibitive or a permissive policy) access=20
> to emergency
> >> specific things - such as routes to PSAPs. A flag is not=20
> necessarily required
> >> to apply that sort of policy.
> >>=20
> >> Cheers,
> >> Martin
> >>=20
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Kroeselberg, Dirk (NSN - DE/Munich)=20
> [mailto:dirk.kroeselberg@nsn.com]
> >> Sent: Wednesday, 24 March 2010 10:14 AM
> >> To: Dawson, Martin; Brian Rosen; Thomson, Martin; Richard=20
> Barnes; Bernard
> >> Aboba
> >> Cc: emu@ietf.org; ecrit@ietf.org
> >> Subject: RE: [Ecrit] emergency access and EAP-TLS (and denial of
> >> serviceattacks on the emergency.com domain)
> >>=20
> >>> So - it's more the domain of the IEEE, 3GPP, WiFi Alliance,
> >>> the DSL forum, etc. as to how a device is able to get an
> >>> unauthenticated IP context on their technology, for whatever
> >>> purpose, before the policies on permitting/prohibiting ECRIT
> >>=20
> >> but what is the concrete recommendation that you want to give here?
> >>=20
> >> - Drop the access/ISP part from the draft and say access/ISP is
> >> out-of-scope?
> >> - move this to EMU?
> >> - or deal with the EAP/NAI related aspects outside IETF as=20
> you seem to
> >> suggest (which is already partially the case today due to lack of
> >> guidance)?
> >>=20
> >>> is on others. I doubt that there's a reasonable assumption
> >>> that the connecting device can necessarily provide an
> >>> explicit "emergency intent" flag.
> >> maybe this is why some people do this via the NAI ;-)
> >>=20
> >> Dirk
> >>=20
> >>=20
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: ecrit-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ecrit-bounces@ietf.org]
> >>> On Behalf Of ext Dawson, Martin
> >>> Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2010 11:44 PM
> >>> To: Brian Rosen; Thomson, Martin; Richard Barnes; Bernard Aboba
> >>> Cc: emu@ietf.org; ecrit@ietf.org
> >>> Subject: Re: [Ecrit] emergency access and EAP-TLS (and denial
> >>> of serviceattacks on the emergency.com domain)
> >>>=20
> >>> To elaborate on Brian's "counter point" - some jurisdictions
> >>> may prefer to *forbid* access to the emergency service from
> >>> unauthenticated/anonymous access as opposed to *require* it
> >>> to be supported. Noting this is the equivalent of saying
> >>> emergency calls for circuit service cannot be made from
> >>> public phone booths; this is still a possible policy within a
> >>> given jurisdiction.
> >>>=20
> >>> I'd also posit that not only is it not a priority for IETF
> >>> but that the question actually needs to be dealt with in more
> >>> specific forums first. The ECRIT emergency procedures occur
> >>> at or above the IP layer. Before anything that ECRIT
> >>> describes becomes relevant, there needs to be an IP context.
> >>>=20
> >>> So - it's more the domain of the IEEE, 3GPP, WiFi Alliance,
> >>> the DSL forum, etc. as to how a device is able to get an
> >>> unauthenticated IP context on their technology, for whatever
> >>> purpose, before the policies on permitting/prohibiting ECRIT
> >>> procedures or anything else that can be done on IP can be
> >>> applied. This is easier on some access technologies than it
> >>> is on others. I doubt that there's a reasonable assumption
> >>> that the connecting device can necessarily provide an
> >>> explicit "emergency intent" flag.
> >>>=20
> >>> Cheers,
> >>> Martin
> >>>=20
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: ecrit-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ecrit-bounces@ietf.org]
> >>> On Behalf Of Brian Rosen
> >>> Sent: Wednesday, 24 March 2010 8:29 AM
> >>> To: Thomson, Martin; Richard Barnes; Bernard Aboba
> >>> Cc: emu@ietf.org; ecrit@ietf.org
> >>> Subject: Re: [Ecrit] emergency access and EAP-TLS (and denial
> >>> of serviceattacks on the emergency.com domain)
> >>>=20
> >>> I think the relevant part of this is 'it's not a high
> >>> priority'.  That is
> >>> policy of the work group, which we do have control over.
> >>>=20
> >>> If we have nothing else more important to do, then by all
> >>> means, let's waste
> >>> a ton of time on unauthenticated access.  If we have=20
> other work to do,
> >>> perhaps we could defer this.
> >>>=20
> >>> I am not the chair, but in general, anyone can discuss
> >>> anything, regardless
> >>> of "priority" on the list.  However, when it comes to
> >>> adopting work group
> >>> items, I think this should be way down our list.
> >>>=20
> >>> I might also suggest that unauthenticated access really isn't
> >>> within the
> >>> charter of the work group.  It may be that the reason
> >>> unauthenticated access
> >>> may be needed is for emergency calling, but that means we may
> >>> (eventually)
> >>> need to ask some other work group to do work for a
> >>> requirement we generate.
> >>> It would seem that dealing with EAP is not within the domain
> >>> of this work
> >>> group.
> >>>=20
> >>> Brian
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>> On 3/23/10 5:14 PM, "Thomson, Martin"
> >>> <Martin.Thomson@andrew.com> wrote:
> >>>=20
> >>>>> A large percentage (in fact an overwhelming percentage) of
> >>> PSAPs DON'T
> >>>>> WANT
> >>>>> unauthenticated access.  Their position is that they=20
> have lots of
> >>>>> relevant
> >>>>> experience, and its all bad (tens of thousands of calls
> >>> with no good
> >>>>> ones in
> >>>>> some cases).
> >>>>>=20
> >>>>> However, there are some PSAPs who want it, and there are some
> >>>>> regulatory
> >>>>> environments where there are some lawyers who think it's
> >>> required to
> >>>>> support
> >>>>> it in some environments.
> >>>>=20
> >>>> The good thing is: we don't set policy here.  I'm not
> >>> seeing sufficient
> >>>> evidence that _everyone_ doesn't want this, only that some
> >>> don't want this.
> >>>>=20
> >>>> I can't comment on priority.  That would be policy too.
> >>>>=20
> >>>> --Martin
> >>>=20
> >>>=20
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> Ecrit mailing list
> >>> Ecrit@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ecrit
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> Ecrit mailing list
> >>> Ecrit@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ecrit
> >>>=20
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Ecrit mailing list
> >> Ecrit@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ecrit
> >=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Emu mailing list
> Emu@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
>=20

From wwwrun@core3.amsl.com  Fri Apr  2 08:41:21 2010
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Subject: [Emu] New Liaison Statement, "Response to Draft revised Recommendation          ITU-T X.1034"
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Title: Response to Draft revised Recommendation ITU-T X.1034
Submission Date: 2010-04-02
URL of the IETF Web page: https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/liaison_detail.cgi?detail_id=862 

From: Joseph Salowey(IETF EMU WG) <jsalowey@cisco.com>
To: ITU-T SG 17(tsbsg17@itu.int,pmwesigwa@ucc.co.ug,hyyoum@sch.ac.kr)
Cc: paf@cisco.com
emu-chairs@tools.ietf.org
emu-ads@tools.ietf.org
emu@ietf.org
Reponse Contact: emu@ietf.org
emu-chairs@tools.ietf.org
emu-ads@tools.ietf.org
Technical Contact: emu-chairs@tools.ietf.org
Purpose: In response 
Body: Members of the IETF EAP Method Update working group have reviewed the revised ITU-T X.1034 document.  The following is a summary of their comments:

1. Reviewers were not clear on the purpose of the document

Reviewers did not really understand the purpose of the document.  There are several documents that discuss EAP method requirements and classify EAP methods such as: RFC 4017, NIST SP 800-120. 

Is the group aware of these documents? What is this document providing beyond what is provided in these documents?

2. Out-of-Date discussion of EAP 

The main part of the document does not include any reference to much of the recent EAP work such as:

RFC 5247 - Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework RFC 5296 - EAP Extensions for EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) RFC 5295 - Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) RFC 5247 - Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework

Also, in numerous places the document uses terminology specific to IEEE
802.   For example, the document discusses "types of PTK", and "group
key handshake".  Non-IEEE 802 technologies typically don't use the term "PTK", and IEEE 802.1X-REV does not include a "group key handshake".
Moreover the "general flow of key management" described in Section 8.4 is not general at all, since this does not describe the lower layer key management used in IKEv2 or IEEE 802.16.

3. Out-of-Date discussion of EAP-Methods

The appendices discussing EAP methods have improved, however they still contain many discrepancies with the state of the art.  Appendix I claims it is presents an evaluation of the most well-known EAP methods.
EAP-SRP is abandoned work so it is not clear how this would qualify as well-known.  EAP-MD5 cannot be used in environments that require key generation so its evaluation is not all that useful.  Some additional methods are discussed in appendix III, but there are not discussed in
Appendix I.   It is not clear why there are two different appendices or
why the focus of appendix I is mostly on Obsolete or abandoned protocols.  Appendix I does not appear to provide much value. 

Appendix III contains many inaccuracies.  

- RFC 2284 was obsolete by RFC 3748.  
- EAP-SRP is abandoned work
- There is a standards track PSK EAP method EAP-GPSK (RFC 5433), it would be better to include this in the analysis
- An improved EAP-AKA mechanism has been published in RFC 5448
- EAP-FAST is also a tunnel method
- The PEAP internet draft has been abandoned, current documentation of the PEAP protocol is available from Microsoft.  

4. Out of date references 

- For EAP RFC 3748 should be referenced instead of RFC 2284.
- RFC 2716 is been made obsolete by RFC 5216
- The document should reference RFC 5247 - Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework
- The EAP-SRP reference is to an expired document
- The PEAP reference is to an expired document
- RADIUS references should include RFC 3579
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Minutes from the IETF-77 meeting in Anaheim have been uploaded to:

http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/10mar/minutes/emu.txt

Let me know if you have corrections.

Thanks,

Joe

From jsalowey@cisco.com  Tue Apr  6 10:40:15 2010
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We had some discussion of the mandatory attributes section in Anaheim.
There was disagreement on the exact behavior of mandatory attributes.
Instead of describing a specific behavior in the requirements document I
think it would be better to include the requirement instead.=20

Proposed modification:

Replace section " 4.3.3. Mandatory and Optional Attributes" with

"4.3.3  Indicating criticality of Attributes

It is expected that new attributes will be defined to be carried within
the tunnel method.  In some cases it is necessary for the sender to know
if the receiver did not understand the attribute.  To support this,
there MUST be a way for the sender to mark attributes such that the
receiver will indicate if an attribute is not understood.  "


From jsalowey@cisco.com  Sun Apr 25 19:42:57 2010
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I've had some discussions with Dan and below are my suggestions to
resolve his comments.   I'll try to update the document next Monday,
5/3, with these changes and the changes to mandatory attributes
(http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg01472.html)
depending upon the outcome of any discussion. =20

Cheers,

Joe  =20

1) Remove section 4.1.2 as discussed in
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/emu/current/msg01367.html

2) Add section 3.9

"3.9 Certificate-less Authentication and Generic EAP Method Extension

   In some cases the peer will not have a way to verify a server
   certificate and in some cases a server might not have a certificate
   to verify. Therefore, it is desirable to support certificate-less
   authentication. An application for this is credential provisioning
   where the peer and server authenticate each other with a shared
   password and credentials for subsequent authentication (e.g. a key
   pair and certificate or a shared key) can be passed inside the
tunnel.
   Another application is to extend existing strong EAP methods with
   new features such as channel bindings. =20

   Great care must be taken when attempting to perform certificate-less
   authentication. One way of doing it is to establish the tunnel
   without full server or client verification=20
   and inside the tunnel use an EAP method that performs
   mutual authentication and key derivation. If this technique is used
   the inner EAP method MUST provide resistance to dictionary attack
   and a cryptographic binding between the inner method and the
   tunnel method MUST be established.  In addition the cipher suite used
to=20
   establish the tunnel MUST derive the master key using contribution
from
   both client and server, as in ephemeral Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.


   The tunnel method MAY allow for certificate-less authentication."
