From nobody Tue Jul 14 09:00:47 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: emu@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: emu@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42A291A1AB9; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 09:00:46 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.999 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id F8ZGy-Or0CFn; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 09:00:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wi0-x236.google.com (mail-wi0-x236.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c05::236]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5A6461A1B5B; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 09:00:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: by wibud3 with SMTP id ud3so59432223wib.1; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 09:00:43 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=s6MwcYjpcwjzU08OUOADaEAlDlvbHjdiVFsPA4PTuXM=; b=owyIyeVS+9XOnP0eHVDx8HqKV5cujls9d1hBUXmlmGzQUouc3aJzicrh3qq2Pm4EFq Lec+xx1xvolZRUaWhtSm0FMeQj6FTcrfQf3p8yi7HdtvRJWTAD6iWrpYMVOZszghPp4D /xhx1A9GhEC7EwkRXIj07DwnsGM5+osZ7aicboccBXfqaA+w2wTLs0JKvB+sKtC/XntT /Pz3KCiuM6f5xHg09pVrqbsEg+/kj0WQJ3UfoVIbrZKQUdCk6soBLIC+604KGiqNibBs kbvWIQ6D2oX8o2omjvi3tmDH5RDADwFvIjZllpFka3cq6P96ivyrY3Mn2D4taPgWBXVJ Gwdw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.194.75.132 with SMTP id c4mr75166929wjw.80.1436889643136; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 09:00:43 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.28.31.194 with HTTP; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 09:00:43 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 12:00:43 -0400 Message-ID: From: Kathleen Moriarty To: Sam Hartman Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7bb04b7cc2bbf5051ad7f06f Archived-At: Cc: "saag@ietf.org" , emu@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Emu] [saag] Feedback on Salted EAP draft X-BeenThere: emu@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "EAP Methods Update \(EMU\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:00:46 -0000 --047d7bb04b7cc2bbf5051ad7f06f Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Hello, Is there interest in reviewing this draft? Sam pointed out the importance of moving this work forward, it would be helpful to have volunteers to review the work and also to understand the level of interest (if any) before this goes forward as AD sponsored. Thank you! On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 1:34 PM, Sam Hartman wrote: > >>>>> "Kathleen" == Kathleen Moriarty > writes: > > Kathleen> I meant to send the link to Dan's draft: > Kathleen> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-01 > Kathleen> Long week... > > I have briefly reviewed the goals behind this proposal and a sketch of > the details but have not done a technical review of the proposal. > > The underlying goal is important and valuable. > This issue is the same issue that was behind my response to your AD > review of the oauth dynamic registration draft. > The more we can do to make it possible to use deployed password > databases with more modern security, the more we will be able to employ > that modern security. > > However, take careful note of section 5 of the draft. > > Assuming that you can get positive technical reviews of the proposal, > this draft seems to solve an important problem that would be valuable to > solve in the EAP community. > -- Best regards, Kathleen --047d7bb04b7cc2bbf5051ad7f06f Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hello,

Is there interest in reviewing t= his draft?=C2=A0 Sam pointed out the importance of moving this work forward= , it would be helpful to have volunteers to review the work and also to und= erstand the level of interest (if any) before this goes forward as AD spons= ored.

Thank you!
<= br>
On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 1:34 PM, Sam Hartman = <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> wrote:
>>>>> "Kathleen" =3D=3D Kathleen Moriarty= <kathleen.moriarty.= ietf@gmail.com> writes:

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Kathleen>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 I meant to send the link to Dan'= ;s draft:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Kathleen> https://tools.= ietf.org/html/draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-01
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Kathleen> Long week...

I have briefly reviewed the goals behind this proposal and a sketch of
the details but have not done a technical review of the proposal.

The underlying goal is important and valuable.
This issue is the same issue that was behind my response to your AD
review of the oauth dynamic registration draft.
The more we can do to make it possible to use=C2=A0 deployed password
databases with more modern security, the more we will be able to employ
that modern security.

However, take careful note of section 5 of the draft.

Assuming that=C2=A0 you can get positive technical reviews of the proposal,=
this draft seems to solve an important problem that would be valuable to solve in the EAP community.



--

Best regards,
Kath= leen
--047d7bb04b7cc2bbf5051ad7f06f-- From nobody Tue Jul 14 12:51:14 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: emu@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: emu@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 676571B2BB3; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 12:51:13 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -3.867 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.867 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, IP_NOT_FRIENDLY=0.334, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DM6Wx7iedPrZ; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 12:51:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from colo.trepanning.net (colo.trepanning.net [69.55.226.174]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4C491B2B9E; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 12:51:06 -0700 (PDT) Received: from www.trepanning.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by colo.trepanning.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3C4910224008; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 12:51:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from 24.43.232.186 (SquirrelMail authenticated user dharkins@lounge.org) by www.trepanning.net with HTTP; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 12:51:06 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <5636ab22edcd875820b72b48bbf27b2e.squirrel@www.trepanning.net> In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 12:51:06 -0700 (PDT) From: "Dan Harkins" To: "Christian Huitema" User-Agent: SquirrelMail/1.4.14 [SVN] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain;charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Priority: 3 (Normal) Importance: Normal Archived-At: Cc: "saag@ietf.org" , "emu@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [Emu] [saag] Feedback on Salted EAP draft X-BeenThere: emu@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "EAP Methods Update \(EMU\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 19:51:13 -0000 Hi Christian, On Tue, July 14, 2015 10:50 am, Christian Huitema wrote: > On Tuesday, July 14, 2015 9:01 AM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: > >> Is there interest in reviewing this draft?  Sam pointed out the >> importance of moving >> this work forward, it would be helpful to have volunteers to review the >> work and also >> to understand the level of interest (if any) before this goes forward as >> AD sponsored. > > The draft is short and clear enough, but it acknowledges a pretty big > security issue: "the salted > password from a compromised database can be used directly to impersonate > the client-- there > is no dictionary attack needed to recover the plaintext password." > > That's a pretty big caveat, but there are still some advantages over > operating with unsalted passwords. The draft aligns server side password > management for EAP-pwd with standard industry practices, which is good. > In case of server compromise, the immediate effect of the compromise is an > attack on the already compromised server, and the per-user salt make > password discovery harder. The security section should be expanded to > explain this tradeoff. Yea, that is a big caveat. There are existing databases of salted passwords that cannot be used with RFC 5931 so the motivation for this draft is to support those currently deployed databases. The Security Considerations are intended to be as blunt as possible. > Nits: > > - in the abstract, missing "not" in " but did (not?) include support for > salted passwords." Thanks for finding this; I'll fix it in an update. regards, Dan. > -- Christian Huitema > > > _______________________________________________ > saag mailing list > saag@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag > From nobody Tue Jul 14 13:05:58 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: emu@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: emu@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2D401B2C21; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 13:05:56 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.235 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.235 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_SOFTFAIL=0.665] autolearn=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id s7dwYNawylz3; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 13:05:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.painless-security.com (mail.painless-security.com [23.30.188.241]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7F25F1B2C1F; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 13:05:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.painless-security.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 064A020739; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:05:49 -0400 (EDT) Received: from mail.painless-security.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mail.suchdamage.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id buzZNjPINghP; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:05:48 -0400 (EDT) Received: from carter-zimmerman.suchdamage.org (unknown [10.1.10.105]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "laptop", Issuer "laptop" (not verified)) by mail.painless-security.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:05:48 -0400 (EDT) Received: by carter-zimmerman.suchdamage.org (Postfix, from userid 8042) id 4A02688EE8; Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:05:53 -0400 (EDT) From: Sam Hartman To: Christian Huitema References: Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 16:05:53 -0400 In-Reply-To: (Christian Huitema's message of "Tue, 14 Jul 2015 17:50:33 +0000") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.3 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Cc: Sam Hartman , "saag@ietf.org" , "emu@ietf.org" Subject: Re: [Emu] [saag] Feedback on Salted EAP draft X-BeenThere: emu@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "EAP Methods Update \(EMU\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2015 20:05:57 -0000 >>>>> "Christian" =3D=3D Christian Huitema writes: Christian> On Tuesday, July 14, 2015 9:01 AM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote: >> Is there interest in reviewing this draft?=C2=A0 Sam pointed out the >> importance of moving this work forward, it would be helpful to >> have volunteers to review the work and also to understand the >> level of interest (if any) before this goes forward as AD >> sponsored. Christian> The draft is short and clear enough, but it acknowledges Christian> a pretty big security issue: "the salted password from a Christian> compromised database can be used directly to impersonate Christian> the client-- there is no dictionary attack needed to Christian> recover the plaintext password." If you want to use an pre-existing salted database and you want to use some cryptographic mechanism rather than transporting plaintext passwords over encrypted transport, I think you have to accept that particular vulnerability or something similar. To defeat this you'd need some function that the peer, knowing the full plaintext password could compute, and the EAP server knowing the salted database entry could verify, but an attacker could not verify. Most of the ways I can think of of doing that would defeat other properties that the eap-pwd designers would probably consider important. You might be able to do something with a secondary authentication after the primary authentication had succeeded (vulnerable to attackers who own your database). Of course once an attacke= r gets your database, they could impersonate the server towards the peer and defeate this secondary authentication. However if the plaintext password were strong enough they could not log into the original server. Which is to say there are probably different tradeoffs that could be made, but the ones in this protocol are ones that reasonable folks have considered acceptable in the past. I'll note that password-protected Kerberos as described in RFC 4120/6112 is an example of another system with this vulnerability. From nobody Thu Jul 16 02:17:16 2015 Return-Path: X-Original-To: emu@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: emu@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 33F301A86E9; Thu, 16 Jul 2015 02:17:15 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.909 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.909 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01, WEIRD_PORT=0.001] autolearn=ham Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ASV-GjlTkGmM; Thu, 16 Jul 2015 02:17:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtprelay.restena.lu (smtprelay.restena.lu [IPv6:2001:a18:1::62]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C1E8F1A86E8; Thu, 16 Jul 2015 02:17:12 -0700 (PDT) Received: from aragorn.restena.lu (aragorn.restena.lu [IPv6:2001:a18:1:8::155]) by smtprelay.restena.lu (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D2BCD4395F; Thu, 16 Jul 2015 11:17:10 +0200 (CEST) Message-ID: <55A77696.8060604@restena.lu> Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 11:17:10 +0200 From: Stefan Winter User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Kathleen Moriarty , Sam Hartman References: In-Reply-To: OpenPGP: id=AD3091F3AB24E05F4F722C03C0DE6A358A39DC66; url=http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xC0DE6A358A39DC66 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="fG6nCL5G1goLIb1mtqa9mHVGBmhDa973r" Archived-At: Cc: "saag@ietf.org" , emu@ietf.org Subject: Re: [Emu] [saag] Feedback on Salted EAP draft X-BeenThere: emu@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: "EAP Methods Update \(EMU\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 09:17:15 -0000 This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --fG6nCL5G1goLIb1mtqa9mHVGBmhDa973r Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="------------040707060201000606010600" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. --------------040707060201000606010600 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, > Is there interest in reviewing this draft? Sam pointed out the > importance of moving this work forward, it would be helpful to have > volunteers to review the work and also to understand the level of > interest (if any) before this goes forward as AD sponsored. FWIW, I read and commented on the draft in its -00 state. I'm still very interested in this document as it enables contemporary real-life password databases to work with pwd. I'm still happy to be the doc shepherd once the time has come to move the document forward. Greetings, Stefan Winter >=20 > Thank you! >=20 > On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 1:34 PM, Sam Hartman > wrote: >=20 > >>>>> "Kathleen" =3D=3D Kathleen Moriarty > > writes: >=20 > Kathleen> I meant to send the link to Dan's draft: > Kathleen> > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-01 > Kathleen> Long week... >=20 > I have briefly reviewed the goals behind this proposal and a sketch= of > the details but have not done a technical review of the proposal. >=20 > The underlying goal is important and valuable. > This issue is the same issue that was behind my response to your AD= > review of the oauth dynamic registration draft. > The more we can do to make it possible to use deployed password > databases with more modern security, the more we will be able to em= ploy > that modern security. >=20 > However, take careful note of section 5 of the draft. >=20 > Assuming that you can get positive technical reviews of the propos= al, > this draft seems to solve an important problem that would be valuab= le to > solve in the EAP community. >=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 > --=20 >=20 > Best regards, > Kathleen >=20 >=20 > _______________________________________________ > Emu mailing list > Emu@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu >=20 --=20 Stefan WINTER Ingenieur de Recherche Fondation RESTENA - R=E9seau T=E9l=E9informatique de l'Education National= e et de la Recherche 6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi L-1359 Luxembourg Tel: +352 424409 1 Fax: +352 422473 PGP key updated to 4096 Bit RSA - I will encrypt all mails if the recipient's key is known to me http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=3Dget&search=3D0xC0DE6A358A39DC66 --------------040707060201000606010600 Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; 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