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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 14:35:55 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Christian Huitema" <huitema@microsoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] [saag] Feedback on Salted EAP draft
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  Hi Christian,

On Tue, July 14, 2015 10:50 am, Christian Huitema wrote:
[snip]
> The draft is short and clear enough, but it acknowledges a pretty big
> security issue: "the salted
> password from a compromised database can be used directly to impersonate
> the client-- there
> is no dictionary attack needed to recover the plaintext password."
>
> That's a pretty big caveat, but there are still some advantages over
> operating with unsalted passwords. The draft aligns server side password
> management for EAP-pwd  with standard industry practices, which is good.
> In case of server compromise, the immediate effect of the compromise is an
> attack on the already compromised server, and the per-user salt make
> password discovery harder. The security section should be expanded to
> explain this tradeoff.

  Yes, it's a big caveat and, as I mentioned, I'm trying to
be as blunt as possible about it. I have updated the Security
Considerations to include the point you are making about server
compromise and the per-user salt still making password recovery
harder.

> Nits:
>
> - in the abstract, missing "not" in " but did (not?) include support for
> salted passwords."

  Nice catch.

  An -02 version has been posted. Would you please take a look
and let me know whether it satisfactorily addresses your comments?

  regards,

  Dan.



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From: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] [saag] Feedback on Salted EAP draft
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--089e0112bf7edc4370051d7a4ce2
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Hi Dan,

I read the latest version of the draft (-02) and it looks mostly good to
me.   some comments:

I think you want to change the RFC references in the abstract from RFC 2751
to RFC 2759.

One question I have is there any reason why you specify the input of the
hash function as password | salt instead of the other way around?  Is this
the way it is done in practice?

Thanks,

Joe

On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 2:35 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:

>
>   Hi Christian,
>
> On Tue, July 14, 2015 10:50 am, Christian Huitema wrote:
> [snip]
> > The draft is short and clear enough, but it acknowledges a pretty big
> > security issue: "the salted
> > password from a compromised database can be used directly to impersonate
> > the client-- there
> > is no dictionary attack needed to recover the plaintext password."
> >
> > That's a pretty big caveat, but there are still some advantages over
> > operating with unsalted passwords. The draft aligns server side password
> > management for EAP-pwd  with standard industry practices, which is good.
> > In case of server compromise, the immediate effect of the compromise is
> an
> > attack on the already compromised server, and the per-user salt make
> > password discovery harder. The security section should be expanded to
> > explain this tradeoff.
>
>   Yes, it's a big caveat and, as I mentioned, I'm trying to
> be as blunt as possible about it. I have updated the Security
> Considerations to include the point you are making about server
> compromise and the per-user salt still making password recovery
> harder.
>
> > Nits:
> >
> > - in the abstract, missing "not" in " but did (not?) include support for
> > salted passwords."
>
>   Nice catch.
>
>   An -02 version has been posted. Would you please take a look
> and let me know whether it satisfactorily addresses your comments?
>
>   regards,
>
>   Dan.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> saag mailing list
> saag@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>

--089e0112bf7edc4370051d7a4ce2
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<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Dan,<div><br></div><div>I read the latest version of th=
e draft (-02) and it looks mostly good to me. =C2=A0 some comments:</div><d=
iv><br></div><div>I think you want to change the RFC references in the abst=
ract from RFC 2751 to RFC 2759. =C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>One questio=
n I have is there any reason why you specify the input of the hash function=
 as password | salt instead of the other way around?=C2=A0 Is this the way =
it is done in practice? =C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div><=
br></div><div>Joe</div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"g=
mail_quote">On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 2:35 PM, Dan Harkins <span dir=3D"ltr">=
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:dharkins@lounge.org" target=3D"_blank">dharkins@loung=
e.org</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"m=
argin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=
=3D""><br>
=C2=A0 Hi Christian,<br>
<br>
On Tue, July 14, 2015 10:50 am, Christian Huitema wrote:<br>
</span>[snip]<br>
<span class=3D"">&gt; The draft is short and clear enough, but it acknowled=
ges a pretty big<br>
&gt; security issue: &quot;the salted<br>
&gt; password from a compromised database can be used directly to impersona=
te<br>
&gt; the client-- there<br>
&gt; is no dictionary attack needed to recover the plaintext password.&quot=
;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; That&#39;s a pretty big caveat, but there are still some advantages ov=
er<br>
&gt; operating with unsalted passwords. The draft aligns server side passwo=
rd<br>
&gt; management for EAP-pwd=C2=A0 with standard industry practices, which i=
s good.<br>
&gt; In case of server compromise, the immediate effect of the compromise i=
s an<br>
&gt; attack on the already compromised server, and the per-user salt make<b=
r>
&gt; password discovery harder. The security section should be expanded to<=
br>
&gt; explain this tradeoff.<br>
<br>
</span>=C2=A0 Yes, it&#39;s a big caveat and, as I mentioned, I&#39;m tryin=
g to<br>
be as blunt as possible about it. I have updated the Security<br>
Considerations to include the point you are making about server<br>
compromise and the per-user salt still making password recovery<br>
harder.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt; Nits:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; - in the abstract, missing &quot;not&quot; in &quot; but did (not?) in=
clude support for<br>
&gt; salted passwords.&quot;<br>
<br>
</span>=C2=A0 Nice catch.<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 An -02 version has been posted. Would you please take a look<br>
and let me know whether it satisfactorily addresses your comments?<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 regards,<br>
<br>
=C2=A0 Dan.<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
saag mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:saag@ietf.org">saag@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag" rel=3D"noreferrer" t=
arget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div>

--089e0112bf7edc4370051d7a4ce2--


From nobody Mon Aug 24 09:58:24 2015
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Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2015 09:58:18 -0700 (PDT)
From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins@lounge.org>
To: "Joseph Salowey" <joe@salowey.net>
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Subject: Re: [Emu] [saag] Feedback on Salted EAP draft
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  Hi Joe,

On Sun, August 16, 2015 9:33 pm, Joseph Salowey wrote:
> Hi Dan,
>
> I read the latest version of the draft (-02) and it looks mostly good to
> me.   some comments:
>
> I think you want to change the RFC references in the abstract from RFC
> 2751
> to RFC 2759.

  Yes, good catch! I am not referring to the "Signaled Preemption
Priority Policy Element." :-)

> One question I have is there any reason why you specify the input of the
> hash function as password | salt instead of the other way around?  Is this
> the way it is done in practice?

  I actually asked whether this was how it was done in eduroam and
did not get definitive answer back. When I poked around in the results
of a "how to hash passwords" query there were a few examples that had
code and they did it that way. If you know of a counter example, please
speak up while the cement has yet to dry.

  regards,

  Dan.

> Thanks,
>
> Joe
>
> On Thu, Aug 13, 2015 at 2:35 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>   Hi Christian,
>>
>> On Tue, July 14, 2015 10:50 am, Christian Huitema wrote:
>> [snip]
>> > The draft is short and clear enough, but it acknowledges a pretty big
>> > security issue: "the salted
>> > password from a compromised database can be used directly to
>> impersonate
>> > the client-- there
>> > is no dictionary attack needed to recover the plaintext password."
>> >
>> > That's a pretty big caveat, but there are still some advantages over
>> > operating with unsalted passwords. The draft aligns server side
>> password
>> > management for EAP-pwd  with standard industry practices, which is
>> good.
>> > In case of server compromise, the immediate effect of the compromise
>> is
>> an
>> > attack on the already compromised server, and the per-user salt make
>> > password discovery harder. The security section should be expanded to
>> > explain this tradeoff.
>>
>>   Yes, it's a big caveat and, as I mentioned, I'm trying to
>> be as blunt as possible about it. I have updated the Security
>> Considerations to include the point you are making about server
>> compromise and the per-user salt still making password recovery
>> harder.
>>
>> > Nits:
>> >
>> > - in the abstract, missing "not" in " but did (not?) include support
>> for
>> > salted passwords."
>>
>>   Nice catch.
>>
>>   An -02 version has been posted. Would you please take a look
>> and let me know whether it satisfactorily addresses your comments?
>>
>>   regards,
>>
>>   Dan.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> saag mailing list
>> saag@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/saag
>>
>


