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From: "Roni Even" <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
To: <draft-ietf-dhc-vpn-option.all@tools.ietf.org>
Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2012 16:21:20 +0200
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-dhc-vpn-option-14
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you
may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-dhc-vpn-option-14

Reviewer: Roni Even

Review Date: 2012-1-1

IETF LC End Date: 2012-1-4

IESG Telechat date:  2012-1-5

 

Summary: This draft is ready for publication as a standard  RFC.  

 

Major issues:

 

 

Minor issues:

 

 

Nits/editorial comments:  

 

1.       In section 3.2 "Type and VSS Information -- see Section 35" should
be 3.5

2.       In section 3.3 "This sub-option only only" 

3.       In 3.5 last bullet not clear - "and the length of the MUST be 1."

 

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>I am the =
assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, =
please see the FAQ at &lt;<a =
href=3D"http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq" =
target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq=
</a>&gt;.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Please resolve these =
comments along with any other Last Call comments you may =
receive.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span lang=3DFR =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Document: =
</span><span lang=3DFR style=3D'font-family:"Courier =
New"'>draft-ietf-dhc-vpn-option-14<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Reviewer: =
Roni Even<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Review =
Date: 2012&#8211;1&#8211;1<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>IETF LC =
End Date: 2012&#8211;1&#8211;4<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>IESG =
Telechat date:&nbsp; 2012-1-5<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Summary: =
This draft is ready for publication as a standard&nbsp; RFC.&nbsp; =
<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Major =
issues:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Minor =
issues:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Nits/editor=
ial comments:&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span dir=3DLTR></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>In section =
3.2 &#8220;</span><span style=3D'font-family:"Courier New"'>Type and VSS =
Information -- see Section 35&#8221; should be 3.5</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span dir=3DLTR></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>In section =
3.3 &#8220;</span><span style=3D'font-family:"Courier New"'>This =
sub-option only only&#8221; </span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo1'><![if !supportLists]><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>3.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span dir=3DLTR></span><span =
style=3D'font-family:"Courier New"'>In 3.5 last bullet not clear - =
&#8220;and the length of the MUST be 1.&#8221;</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
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From brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com  Sun Jan  1 11:15:22 2012
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Date: Mon, 02 Jan 2012 08:15:01 +1300
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--------------000107070609040407030709--

From tom111.taylor@bell.net  Sun Jan  1 11:48:58 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>, draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>
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Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].

On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
> you may receive.
>
> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
> Operation
> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>
> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
> Informational RFC.
>
> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of behaviors,
> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this ought to
> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something that
> could, in theory, later become standards track.

[PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your suggestion.
>
> Major issues:
> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third bullet,
> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified in RFC
> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what conditions
> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559 instead? No
> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific about
> which section / conditions are meant.

[PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long time 
since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention was. 
My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>
> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document indicated
> that the edge node information about how to determine
> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After describing
> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text refers to
> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing information. In
> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does occur in
> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make this
> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this seems
> to be a serious hole in the specification.

[PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it, operators 
don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of 
alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet header. 
The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow the 
same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize jitter. The 
implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to 
identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e. flowing 
from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on their 
header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes are a 
different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>
> Minor issues:
> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However, section
> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if the
> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than any
> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are stated.)

[PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value equal to
something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of 
packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U - 1)/U is 
greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds. When the 
CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above that 
threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second threshold, 
flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In the SM 
mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a 
per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is specified 
by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of operation 
the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>
>
> Nits/editorial comments:
>
>

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Sun Jan  1 11:58:51 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>, draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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Thank you for responding promptly Tom.  Let me try to elaborate on the 
two issues where I was unclear.

On the ingress-egress-aggregate issue and ECMP, the concern I have is 
relative to the third operational alternative where routing is used to 
determine where the ingress and egress of a flow is.  To be blunt, as 
far as I can tell this does not work.
1) It does not work on the ingress side because traffic from a given 
source prefix can come in at multiple places.  Some of these places may 
claim reachability to the source prefix.  Some may not.  While a given 
flow will use only one of these paths, there is no way to determine from 
routing information, at the egress, which ingress that flow used.
2) A site may use multiple exits for a given destination prefix.  Again, 
while the site will only use one of these egresses for a given flow, 
there is no way for the ingress to know which egress it will be on the 
basis of routing information.
Thus, the text seems to allow for a behavior that simply does not work.

I am still confused about the relationship of section 3.3.2 to the 
behavior you describe.  3.3.2 says that as long as any excess traffic is 
being reported, teh decision point shall direct the blocking of 
additional flows.  That does not match 3.3.1, and does not match your 
description.

Yours,
Joel

On 1/1/2012 2:48 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
>
> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>
>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
>> you may receive.
>>
>> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
>> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
>> Operation
>> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
>> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
>> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
>> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>>
>> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
>> Informational RFC.
>>
>> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of behaviors,
>> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this ought to
>> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something that
>> could, in theory, later become standards track.
>
> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your suggestion.
>>
>> Major issues:
>> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third bullet,
>> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified in RFC
>> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what conditions
>> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559 instead? No
>> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific about
>> which section / conditions are meant.
>
> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long time
> since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention was.
> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>>
>> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document indicated
>> that the edge node information about how to determine
>> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
>> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
>> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After describing
>> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text refers to
>> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing information. In
>> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does occur in
>> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make this
>> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this seems
>> to be a serious hole in the specification.
>
> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it, operators
> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of
> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet header.
> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow the
> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize jitter. The
> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to
> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e. flowing
> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on their
> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes are a
> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>>
>> Minor issues:
>> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
>> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However, section
>> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if the
>> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
>> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
>> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
>> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than any
>> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are stated.)
>
> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value equal to
> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of
> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U - 1)/U is
> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds. When the
> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above that
> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second threshold,
> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In the SM
> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a
> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is specified
> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of operation
> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>>
>>
>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>
>>
>

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Sun Jan  1 12:30:15 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-07
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on=20
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at=20
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments=20
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-07

Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov

Review Date: 2012=9601=9601

IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-04

IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19

Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a standard RFC,=20
but it has some issues that need fixing/discussing.

Major issues:


I understand that this is a bit pedantic, but ID-nits reports the following:

   ** Downref: Normative reference to an Experimental RFC: RFC 4408 (ref.
      'SPF')

and this was not called out during the IETF LC announcement.
This reference is truly Normative, so just making it Informative=20
wouldn't work.

Minor issues:


1. Introduction

[ARF] defines a message format for sending reports of abuse in the
messaging infrastructure, with an eye towards automating both the
generation and consumption of those reports. There is now also a
desire to extend the ARF format to include reporting of messages that
fail to authenticate using known authentication methods, as these are
sometimes evidence of abuse that can be detected and reported through
automated means. The same mechanism can be used to convey forensic
information about the specific reason the authentication method
failed. Thus, this memo presents such extensions to the Abuse
Reporting Format to allow for detailed reporting of message
authentication method failures.

Maybe that is just me, but when I read "message authentication" I don't=20
really have a clue what you are talking about. I needed to read the rest=20
of the document in order to understand its scope.


2.2. Base 64

base64 is defined in [MIME].

The values that are base64 encodings may contain FWS for formatting
purposes as per the usual header field wrapping defined in [MAIL].
During decoding, any characters not in the base64 alphabet are
ignored so that such line wrapping does not harm the value.



This sentence can be read as allowing other invalid characters outside=20
of FWS. I suggest you reword to make it clear that that is not the case.


The ABNF
token "FWS" is defined in [DKIM].


3.1. New ARF Feedback Type:

For privacy reasons, report generators might need to redact portions
of a reported message such as the end user whose complaint action
resulted in the report. See [I-D.IETF-MARF-REDACTION] for a

This reference is currently Normative and is a DownRef (as it wasn't=20
called out explicitly during IETF LC). I don't think the reference needs=20
to be Normative: making it Informative
will also get rid of the DownRef problem.

discussion of this.


3.2.2. Optional For All Reports

Delivery-Result: The final message disposition that was enacted by
the ADMD generating the report and MUST NOT appear more than once.

The first use of acronym ADMD needs expansion and, ideally, an=20
informative reference to where the term is defined.

Possible values are:


In Section 4:

spf-dns =3D "SPF-DNS:" : { "txt" / "spf" } [FWS] ":" [FWS]
domain [FWS] ":" [FWS] quoted-string

I think this field is missing CRLF at the end.
Also, other fields listed in the same sections are using CFWS,
but this one doesn't. Should ABNF for this be aligned with other
fields?

Nits/editorial comments: None



From msk@cloudmark.com  Sun Jan  1 12:57:21 2012
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From: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <msk@cloudmark.com>
To: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>, "Hilda L. Fontana" <hilda@hfontana.com>, Pete Resnick <presnick@qualcomm.com>
Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2012 12:57:28 -0800
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-07
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-07
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alexey Melnikov [mailto:alexey.melnikov@isode.com]
> Sent: Sunday, January 01, 2012 12:30 PM
> To: Hilda L. Fontana; Murray S. Kucherawy; Pete Resnick
> Cc: gen-art@ietf.org; The IESG
> Subject: Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-
> report-07

Hi Alexey,

> Major issues:
>=20
> I understand that this is a bit pedantic, but ID-nits reports the
> following:
>=20
>    ** Downref: Normative reference to an Experimental RFC: RFC 4408
> (ref.
>       'SPF')
>=20
> and this was not called out during the IETF LC announcement.
> This reference is truly Normative, so just making it Informative
> wouldn't work.

Yep, this was pointed out by someone else too.  I missed it during my sheph=
erd write-up.  It's been moved to the 1/19 telechat, partly because we'll p=
robably need a second LC to handle this properly.

> Minor issues:
>=20
> 1. Introduction
>=20
> [ARF] defines a message format for sending reports of abuse in the
> messaging infrastructure, with an eye towards automating both the
> generation and consumption of those reports. There is now also a desire
> to extend the ARF format to include reporting of messages that fail to
> authenticate using known authentication methods, as these are sometimes
> evidence of abuse that can be detected and reported through automated
> means. The same mechanism can be used to convey forensic information
> about the specific reason the authentication method failed. Thus, this
> memo presents such extensions to the Abuse Reporting Format to allow
> for detailed reporting of message authentication method failures.
>=20
> Maybe that is just me, but when I read "message authentication" I don't
> really have a clue what you are talking about. I needed to read the
> rest of the document in order to understand its scope.

Rather than adding a paragraph or two about what message authentication is,=
 would it be sufficient to add references to the SPF and DKIM specification=
s, and perhaps the DKIM Threats document, to the second sentence above (a l=
a "such as...")?  I'm weary of adding text that repeats what's stated elsew=
here and would prefer we just add some references to appropriate reading.

> 2.2. Base 64
>=20
> base64 is defined in [MIME].
>=20
> The values that are base64 encodings may contain FWS for formatting
> purposes as per the usual header field wrapping defined in [MAIL].
> During decoding, any characters not in the base64 alphabet are ignored
> so that such line wrapping does not harm the value.
>=20
> This sentence can be read as allowing other invalid characters outside
> of FWS. I suggest you reword to make it clear that that is not the
> case.

Easy; will do.

> The ABNF
> token "FWS" is defined in [DKIM].

Right.

> 3.1. New ARF Feedback Type:
>=20
> For privacy reasons, report generators might need to redact portions
> of a reported message such as the end user whose complaint action
> resulted in the report. See [I-D.IETF-MARF-REDACTION] for a
>=20
> This reference is currently Normative and is a DownRef (as it wasn't
> called out explicitly during IETF LC). I don't think the reference needs
> to be Normative: making it Informative
> will also get rid of the DownRef problem.
>=20
> discussion of this.

The Working Group is considering doing either that or upgrading the redacti=
on draft to Proposed Standard.  Both of those approaches would deal with it=
 nicely.  We'll have figured that out by the time of the 1/19 telechat.

> 3.2.2. Optional For All Reports
>=20
> Delivery-Result: The final message disposition that was enacted by
> the ADMD generating the report and MUST NOT appear more than once.
>=20
> The first use of acronym ADMD needs expansion and, ideally, an
> informative reference to where the term is defined.

That's RFC5598.  Will do.

> In Section 4:
>=20
> spf-dns =3D "SPF-DNS:" : { "txt" / "spf" } [FWS] ":" [FWS]
> domain [FWS] ":" [FWS] quoted-string
>=20
> I think this field is missing CRLF at the end.
> Also, other fields listed in the same sections are using CFWS,
> but this one doesn't. Should ABNF for this be aligned with other
> fields?

Yes to both.  Also an easy fix.

Thanks!  We'll get a new one posted as soon as the WG decides the document =
status question.

-MSK


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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review of draft-ietf-pcn-cl-edge-behaviour-11.txt
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Please see attached review.

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On 01/01/2012 20:57, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Alexey Melnikov [mailto:alexey.melnikov@isode.com]
>> Sent: Sunday, January 01, 2012 12:30 PM
>> To: Hilda L. Fontana; Murray S. Kucherawy; Pete Resnick
>> Cc: gen-art@ietf.org; The IESG
>> Subject: Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-
>> report-07
> Hi Alexey,
Hi Murray,
>
>> Major issues:
>>
>> I understand that this is a bit pedantic, but ID-nits reports the
>> following:
>>
>>     ** Downref: Normative reference to an Experimental RFC: RFC 4408
>> (ref.
>>        'SPF')
>>
>> and this was not called out during the IETF LC announcement.
>> This reference is truly Normative, so just making it Informative
>> wouldn't work.
> Yep, this was pointed out by someone else too.  I missed it during my shepherd write-up.  It's been moved to the 1/19 telechat, partly because we'll probably need a second LC to handle this properly.
Yep.
>> Minor issues:
>>
>> 1. Introduction
>>
>> [ARF] defines a message format for sending reports of abuse in the
>> messaging infrastructure, with an eye towards automating both the
>> generation and consumption of those reports. There is now also a desire
>> to extend the ARF format to include reporting of messages that fail to
>> authenticate using known authentication methods, as these are sometimes
>> evidence of abuse that can be detected and reported through automated
>> means. The same mechanism can be used to convey forensic information
>> about the specific reason the authentication method failed. Thus, this
>> memo presents such extensions to the Abuse Reporting Format to allow
>> for detailed reporting of message authentication method failures.
>>
>> Maybe that is just me, but when I read "message authentication" I don't
>> really have a clue what you are talking about. I needed to read the
>> rest of the document in order to understand its scope.
> Rather than adding a paragraph or two about what message authentication is, would it be sufficient to add references to the SPF and DKIM specifications, and perhaps the DKIM Threats document, to the second sentence above (a la "such as...")?
That would be fine.
(I originally was asking myself if TLS and SASL authentication was in 
scope, but it is clearly isn't.)
> I'm weary of adding text that repeats what's stated elsewhere and would prefer we just add some references to appropriate reading.
>
>> 2.2. Base 64
>>
>> base64 is defined in [MIME].
I forgot to mention: It might be worth referencing the base64 RFC instead.

  [...]

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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>, draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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On 01/01/2012 2:58 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
> Thank you for responding promptly Tom. Let me try to elaborate on the
> two issues where I was unclear.
>
> On the ingress-egress-aggregate issue and ECMP, the concern I have is
> relative to the third operational alternative where routing is used to
> determine where the ingress and egress of a flow is. To be blunt, as far
> as I can tell this does not work.
> 1) It does not work on the ingress side because traffic from a given
> source prefix can come in at multiple places. Some of these places may
> claim reachability to the source prefix. Some may not. While a given
> flow will use only one of these paths, there is no way to determine from
> routing information, at the egress, which ingress that flow used.
> 2) A site may use multiple exits for a given destination prefix. Again,
> while the site will only use one of these egresses for a given flow,
> there is no way for the ingress to know which egress it will be on the
> basis of routing information.
> Thus, the text seems to allow for a behavior that simply does not work.

[PTT] I think the disconnect here is that you read the text to say that 
an individual node uses routing information to determine the IEA. That 
wasn't the intention. Instead, administrators use routing information to 
derive filters that are installed at the ingress and egress nodes.
>
> I am still confused about the relationship of section 3.3.2 to the
> behavior you describe. 3.3.2 says that as long as any excess traffic is
> being reported, teh decision point shall direct the blocking of
> additional flows. That does not match 3.3.1, and does not match your
> description.

[PTT] I can't see the text in section 3.3.2 that says you continue to 
block as long as any excess traffic is being reported. What I think it 
says is that as long as excess traffic is reported, the decision point 
checks to see whether the traffic being admitted to the aggregate 
exceeds the supportable level. Excess traffic may be non-zero, yet no 
termination may be required (i.e., traffic is below the second threshold).
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> On 1/1/2012 2:48 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
>>
>> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>
>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
>>> you may receive.
>>>
>>> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
>>> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
>>> Operation
>>> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
>>> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
>>> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
>>> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>>>
>>> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
>>> Informational RFC.
>>>
>>> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of behaviors,
>>> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this ought to
>>> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something that
>>> could, in theory, later become standards track.
>>
>> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your suggestion.
>>>
>>> Major issues:
>>> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third bullet,
>>> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified in RFC
>>> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what conditions
>>> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559 instead? No
>>> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific about
>>> which section / conditions are meant.
>>
>> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long time
>> since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention was.
>> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>>>
>>> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document indicated
>>> that the edge node information about how to determine
>>> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
>>> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
>>> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After describing
>>> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text refers to
>>> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing information. In
>>> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does occur in
>>> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make this
>>> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this seems
>>> to be a serious hole in the specification.
>>
>> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it, operators
>> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of
>> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet header.
>> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow the
>> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize jitter. The
>> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to
>> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e. flowing
>> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on their
>> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes are a
>> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>>>
>>> Minor issues:
>>> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
>>> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However, section
>>> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if the
>>> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
>>> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
>>> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
>>> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than any
>>> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are stated.)
>>
>> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value equal to
>> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of
>> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U - 1)/U is
>> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds. When the
>> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above that
>> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second threshold,
>> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In the SM
>> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a
>> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is specified
>> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of operation
>> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>>>
>>>
>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>

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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>, draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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In-line...

On 1/1/2012 4:06 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>
>
> On 01/01/2012 2:58 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>> Thank you for responding promptly Tom. Let me try to elaborate on the
>> two issues where I was unclear.
>>
>> On the ingress-egress-aggregate issue and ECMP, the concern I have is
>> relative to the third operational alternative where routing is used to
>> determine where the ingress and egress of a flow is. To be blunt, as far
>> as I can tell this does not work.
>> 1) It does not work on the ingress side because traffic from a given
>> source prefix can come in at multiple places. Some of these places may
>> claim reachability to the source prefix. Some may not. While a given
>> flow will use only one of these paths, there is no way to determine from
>> routing information, at the egress, which ingress that flow used.
>> 2) A site may use multiple exits for a given destination prefix. Again,
>> while the site will only use one of these egresses for a given flow,
>> there is no way for the ingress to know which egress it will be on the
>> basis of routing information.
>> Thus, the text seems to allow for a behavior that simply does not work.
>
> [PTT] I think the disconnect here is that you read the text to say that
> an individual node uses routing information to determine the IEA. That
> wasn't the intention. Instead, administrators use routing information to
> derive filters that are installed at the ingress and egress nodes.

As far as I can tell, your response describes a situation even less 
effective than what I assumed.
Firstly, it does not matter whether it is the edge node, the decision 
node, or the human administrator.  Routing information is not enough to 
determine what the ingress-egress pairing is.  The problems I describe 
above apply no matter who is making the decision.
Secondly, having a human make the decision means that as soon as routing 
changes, the configured filters are wrong.

I would suggest that the text in question be removed, and replaced with 
a warning against attempting what is currently described.

>>
>> I am still confused about the relationship of section 3.3.2 to the
>> behavior you describe. 3.3.2 says that as long as any excess traffic is
>> being reported, teh decision point shall direct the blocking of
>> additional flows. That does not match 3.3.1, and does not match your
>> description.
>
> [PTT] I can't see the text in section 3.3.2 that says you continue to
> block as long as any excess traffic is being reported. What I think it
> says is that as long as excess traffic is reported, the decision point
> checks to see whether the traffic being admitted to the aggregate
> exceeds the supportable level. Excess traffic may be non-zero, yet no
> termination may be required (i.e., traffic is below the second threshold).

I think I see what you are saying.  If I am reading this correctly, the 
decision process must re-calculate to determine if there is termination 
every time it receives a report with non-zero excess and the port is 
already blocked.  But it does not have to actually block anything.
This however seems to depend upon the correct relative configuration of 
the limit that flips it into blocked state, the value of U, and maybe 
some other values.
Put differently, I understand that the two are not contradictory. 
However, since the two things use different calculations, it is not at 
all clear that they are consistent.  This may well be acceptable.  But 
the difference in methods is likely to lead to confusion.  So, as a 
minor (rather than major) comment, I would suggest that you provide 
clarifying text explaining why it is okay to use one condition to decide 
if there is blocking, but a different condition (which could produce a 
lower threshold) to decide how much to get rid of.

Yours,
Joel

>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> On 1/1/2012 2:48 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
>>>
>>> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>>>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>>>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>>
>>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
>>>> you may receive.
>>>>
>>>> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
>>>> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
>>>> Operation
>>>> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
>>>> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
>>>> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
>>>> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>>>>
>>>> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
>>>> Informational RFC.
>>>>
>>>> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of behaviors,
>>>> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this ought to
>>>> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something that
>>>> could, in theory, later become standards track.
>>>
>>> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your suggestion.
>>>>
>>>> Major issues:
>>>> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third bullet,
>>>> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified in RFC
>>>> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what conditions
>>>> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559 instead? No
>>>> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific about
>>>> which section / conditions are meant.
>>>
>>> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long time
>>> since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention was.
>>> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>>>>
>>>> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document indicated
>>>> that the edge node information about how to determine
>>>> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
>>>> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
>>>> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After describing
>>>> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text
>>>> refers to
>>>> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing information. In
>>>> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does occur in
>>>> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make this
>>>> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this seems
>>>> to be a serious hole in the specification.
>>>
>>> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it, operators
>>> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of
>>> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet header.
>>> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow the
>>> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize jitter. The
>>> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to
>>> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e. flowing
>>> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on their
>>> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes are a
>>> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>>>>
>>>> Minor issues:
>>>> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
>>>> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However, section
>>>> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if the
>>>> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
>>>> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
>>>> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
>>>> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than any
>>>> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are
>>>> stated.)
>>>
>>> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value equal to
>>> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of
>>> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U - 1)/U is
>>> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds. When the
>>> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above that
>>> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second threshold,
>>> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In the SM
>>> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a
>>> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is specified
>>> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of operation
>>> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>

From vkg@bell-labs.com  Sun Jan  1 20:37:45 2012
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Date: Sun, 01 Jan 2012 22:41:20 -0600
From: "Vijay K. Gurbani" <vkg@bell-labs.com>
Organization: Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent
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Cc: General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-gregorio-uritemplate-07
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-gregorio-uritemplate-07
Reviewer: Vijay K. Gurbani
Review Date: Jan-01-2012
IETF LC End Date: Not known
IESG Telechat date: Jan-05-2012

Summary: This draft is ready as an Proposed Standard.

Major issues: 0
Minor issues: 2
Nits/editorial comments: 0

Minor issue:

- S3.2.1, first paragraph: "A variable defined as an associative
  array of (name, value) pairs is considered undefined if the
  array contains zero members or if all member names in the array
  have undefined values."

  Here, do you mean "if all member names in the array have no values."?
  That is, "undefined values" implies that values are present in the
  template, but are not understood.  On the other hand, "no values"
  implies the absence of any values at all.  In my reading of the
  text, it appears that "no values" conveys more context than "undefined
  values".

- S4, general comment: I am not sure where the template expansion is
  done --- at the client (browser) or at the origin server (the draft
  does not enunciate this, and if it does, I may have missed it).  If
  the expansion is done at the origin server, I suspect that one can
  keep it a bit more busy by asking it to perform unnecessary
  template expansion for a resource that may be accessed normally
  even without template expansion.  Is it worth documenting this at
  all in the Security Considerations section?  (Clearly, if the expansion
  is done at the client, then it is the client incurring the expense
  of expansion.  Insofar as the client is malicious, it is best to
  let it expend as much effort as necessary.)

Thanks,

- vijay
- vijay
-- 
Vijay K. Gurbani, Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent
1960 Lucent Lane, Rm. 9C-533, Naperville, Illinois 60566 (USA)
Email: vkg@{bell-labs.com,acm.org} / vijay.gurbani@alcatel-lucent.com
Web:   http://ect.bell-labs.com/who/vkg/

From tom.taylor.stds@gmail.com  Mon Jan  2 06:17:10 2012
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Cc: draft-ietf-pcn-cl-edge-behaviour.all@tools.ietf.org, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review of draft-ietf-pcn-cl-edge-behaviour-11.txt
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Thanks for the review, Brian.

On the 'incomplete state machine' issue: I'll think about additional 
text to make sure things keep on moving along.

On the matter of PRI, etc.: I was working straight from the Syslog RFC, 
RFC 5424. I can add text to make it clear I am referring to terminology 
(field names) defined in that RFC.

Tom Taylor

From tom.taylor.stds@gmail.com  Mon Jan  2 06:21:16 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>, draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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It shall be as you say, subject to comment from my co-authors when they 
get back from holiday.

On 01/01/2012 5:43 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
> In-line...
>
> On 1/1/2012 4:06 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01/01/2012 2:58 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>> Thank you for responding promptly Tom. Let me try to elaborate on the
>>> two issues where I was unclear.
>>>
>>> On the ingress-egress-aggregate issue and ECMP, the concern I have is
>>> relative to the third operational alternative where routing is used to
>>> determine where the ingress and egress of a flow is. To be blunt, as far
>>> as I can tell this does not work.
>>> 1) It does not work on the ingress side because traffic from a given
>>> source prefix can come in at multiple places. Some of these places may
>>> claim reachability to the source prefix. Some may not. While a given
>>> flow will use only one of these paths, there is no way to determine from
>>> routing information, at the egress, which ingress that flow used.
>>> 2) A site may use multiple exits for a given destination prefix. Again,
>>> while the site will only use one of these egresses for a given flow,
>>> there is no way for the ingress to know which egress it will be on the
>>> basis of routing information.
>>> Thus, the text seems to allow for a behavior that simply does not work.
>>
>> [PTT] I think the disconnect here is that you read the text to say that
>> an individual node uses routing information to determine the IEA. That
>> wasn't the intention. Instead, administrators use routing information to
>> derive filters that are installed at the ingress and egress nodes.
>
> As far as I can tell, your response describes a situation even less
> effective than what I assumed.
> Firstly, it does not matter whether it is the edge node, the decision
> node, or the human administrator. Routing information is not enough to
> determine what the ingress-egress pairing is. The problems I describe
> above apply no matter who is making the decision.
> Secondly, having a human make the decision means that as soon as routing
> changes, the configured filters are wrong.
>
> I would suggest that the text in question be removed, and replaced with
> a warning against attempting what is currently described.
>
>>>
>>> I am still confused about the relationship of section 3.3.2 to the
>>> behavior you describe. 3.3.2 says that as long as any excess traffic is
>>> being reported, teh decision point shall direct the blocking of
>>> additional flows. That does not match 3.3.1, and does not match your
>>> description.
>>
>> [PTT] I can't see the text in section 3.3.2 that says you continue to
>> block as long as any excess traffic is being reported. What I think it
>> says is that as long as excess traffic is reported, the decision point
>> checks to see whether the traffic being admitted to the aggregate
>> exceeds the supportable level. Excess traffic may be non-zero, yet no
>> termination may be required (i.e., traffic is below the second
>> threshold).
>
> I think I see what you are saying. If I am reading this correctly, the
> decision process must re-calculate to determine if there is termination
> every time it receives a report with non-zero excess and the port is
> already blocked. But it does not have to actually block anything.
> This however seems to depend upon the correct relative configuration of
> the limit that flips it into blocked state, the value of U, and maybe
> some other values.
> Put differently, I understand that the two are not contradictory.
> However, since the two things use different calculations, it is not at
> all clear that they are consistent. This may well be acceptable. But the
> difference in methods is likely to lead to confusion. So, as a minor
> (rather than major) comment, I would suggest that you provide clarifying
> text explaining why it is okay to use one condition to decide if there
> is blocking, but a different condition (which could produce a lower
> threshold) to decide how much to get rid of.
>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>> On 1/1/2012 2:48 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
>>>>
>>>> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>>>>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>>>>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>>>
>>>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
>>>>> you may receive.
>>>>>
>>>>> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
>>>>> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
>>>>> Operation
>>>>> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
>>>>> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
>>>>> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
>>>>> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>>>>>
>>>>> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
>>>>> Informational RFC.
>>>>>
>>>>> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of behaviors,
>>>>> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this ought to
>>>>> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something that
>>>>> could, in theory, later become standards track.
>>>>
>>>> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your suggestion.
>>>>>
>>>>> Major issues:
>>>>> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third
>>>>> bullet,
>>>>> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified in RFC
>>>>> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what conditions
>>>>> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559 instead? No
>>>>> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific about
>>>>> which section / conditions are meant.
>>>>
>>>> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long time
>>>> since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention was.
>>>> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>>>>>
>>>>> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document indicated
>>>>> that the edge node information about how to determine
>>>>> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
>>>>> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
>>>>> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After describing
>>>>> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text
>>>>> refers to
>>>>> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing
>>>>> information. In
>>>>> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does occur in
>>>>> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make this
>>>>> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this
>>>>> seems
>>>>> to be a serious hole in the specification.
>>>>
>>>> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it,
>>>> operators
>>>> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of
>>>> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet header.
>>>> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow the
>>>> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize jitter. The
>>>> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to
>>>> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e. flowing
>>>> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on their
>>>> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes are a
>>>> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>>>>>
>>>>> Minor issues:
>>>>> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
>>>>> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However,
>>>>> section
>>>>> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if the
>>>>> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
>>>>> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
>>>>> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
>>>>> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than any
>>>>> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are
>>>>> stated.)
>>>>
>>>> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value
>>>> equal to
>>>> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of
>>>> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U - 1)/U is
>>>> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds. When the
>>>> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above that
>>>> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second
>>>> threshold,
>>>> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In the SM
>>>> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a
>>>> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is
>>>> specified
>>>> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of
>>>> operation
>>>> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>

From menth@informatik.uni-tuebingen.de  Mon Jan  2 08:55:14 2012
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Cc: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, Bob Briscoe <bob.briscoe@bt.com>, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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Hi Tom, hi Joel,

I wish you a happy new year!

Here are my comments to address Joel's concerns:

====================================================================

The issue with ECMP: I'd add a comment that CL and SM should not be in 
the presence of ECMP if routing information is used to determine 
ingress-egress-aggregates since this seems to be messy and error-prone.

====================================================================

The following text may clarify at the beginning of Section 3.3.2 the 
relation
between admission control and flow termination to address one of Joel's
comments (for both SM and CL):

In the presence of light pre-congestion, i.e., in the presence of a small,
positive ETM-rate (relative to the overall PCN traffic rate), new flows may
already be blocked. However, in the presence of heavy pre-congestion, i.e.,
in the presence of a relatively large ETM-rate, termination of some admitted
flows is required. Thus, flow blocking is logical prerequisite for flow
termination.

====================================================================

The following sentence in 3.3.2 should be corrected (only SM-specific):

U represents the average ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to 
PCN-admissible-rate
over all the links of the PCN-domain.

->

U represents the ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to PCN-admissible-rate 
for all
the links of the PCN-domain.

====================================================================

I also recommend to change the following text as I think it may cause 
misinterpretations (applies both to SM and CL):

If the difference calculated in the second step is positive, the Decision
Point SHOULD select PCN-flows to terminate, until it determines that the
PCN-traffic admission rate will no longer be greater than the estimated
sustainable aggregate rate. If the Decision Point knows the bandwidth
required by individual PCN-flows (e.g., from resource signalling used to
establish the flows), it MAY choose to complete its selection of 
PCN-flows to
terminate in a single round of decisions.

Alternatively, the Decision Point MAY spread flow termination over multiple
rounds to avoid over-termination. If this is done, it is RECOMMENDED that
enough time elapse between successive rounds of termination to allow the
effects of previous rounds to be reflected in the measurements upon 
which the
termination decisions are based. (See [IEEE-Satoh] and sections 4.2 and 4.3
of [MeLe10].)

->

If the difference calculated in the second step is positive (traffic rate to
be terminated), the Decision Point SHOULD select PCN-flows to terminate. To
that end, the Decision Point MAY use upper rate limits for individual
PCN-flows (e.g., from resource signalling used to establish the flows) and
select a set of flows whose sum of upper rate limits is up to the traffic
rate to be terminated. Then, these flows are terminated. The use of upper
limits on flow rates avoids over-termination.

Termination may be continuously needed after consecutive measurement 
intervals for various
reasons, e.g., if the used upper rate limits overestimate the actual 
flow rates.
For such cases it is RECOMMENDED that enough time elapses between successive
termination events to allow the effects of previous termination events to be
reflected in the measurements upon which the termination decisions are 
based;
otherwise, over-termination may occur. See [IEEE-Satoh] and Sections 4.2 and
4.3 of [MeLe10].

====================================================================

[IEEE-Satoh] is not a good key for Daisuke's work as the prefix "IEEE" 
makes it look like a reference to a standards document.
You better use [SaUe10] or [Satoh10]. Applies both to CL and SM.



Best wishes,

     Michael


Am 02.01.2012 15:21, schrieb Tom Taylor:
> It shall be as you say, subject to comment from my co-authors when 
> they get back from holiday.
>
> On 01/01/2012 5:43 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>> In-line...
>>
>> On 1/1/2012 4:06 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 01/01/2012 2:58 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>> Thank you for responding promptly Tom. Let me try to elaborate on the
>>>> two issues where I was unclear.
>>>>
>>>> On the ingress-egress-aggregate issue and ECMP, the concern I have is
>>>> relative to the third operational alternative where routing is used to
>>>> determine where the ingress and egress of a flow is. To be blunt, 
>>>> as far
>>>> as I can tell this does not work.
>>>> 1) It does not work on the ingress side because traffic from a given
>>>> source prefix can come in at multiple places. Some of these places may
>>>> claim reachability to the source prefix. Some may not. While a given
>>>> flow will use only one of these paths, there is no way to determine 
>>>> from
>>>> routing information, at the egress, which ingress that flow used.
>>>> 2) A site may use multiple exits for a given destination prefix. 
>>>> Again,
>>>> while the site will only use one of these egresses for a given flow,
>>>> there is no way for the ingress to know which egress it will be on the
>>>> basis of routing information.
>>>> Thus, the text seems to allow for a behavior that simply does not 
>>>> work.
>>>
>>> [PTT] I think the disconnect here is that you read the text to say that
>>> an individual node uses routing information to determine the IEA. That
>>> wasn't the intention. Instead, administrators use routing 
>>> information to
>>> derive filters that are installed at the ingress and egress nodes.
>>
>> As far as I can tell, your response describes a situation even less
>> effective than what I assumed.
>> Firstly, it does not matter whether it is the edge node, the decision
>> node, or the human administrator. Routing information is not enough to
>> determine what the ingress-egress pairing is. The problems I describe
>> above apply no matter who is making the decision.
>> Secondly, having a human make the decision means that as soon as routing
>> changes, the configured filters are wrong.
>>
>> I would suggest that the text in question be removed, and replaced with
>> a warning against attempting what is currently described.
>>
My view is also that CL ans SM do not work in the presence of ECMP. This 
should be indicated as a warning.

>>>>
>>>> I am still confused about the relationship of section 3.3.2 to the
>>>> behavior you describe. 3.3.2 says that as long as any excess 
>>>> traffic is
>>>> being reported, teh decision point shall direct the blocking of
>>>> additional flows. That does not match 3.3.1, and does not match your
>>>> description.
>>>
>>> [PTT] I can't see the text in section 3.3.2 that says you continue to
>>> block as long as any excess traffic is being reported. What I think it
>>> says is that as long as excess traffic is reported, the decision point
>>> checks to see whether the traffic being admitted to the aggregate
>>> exceeds the supportable level. Excess traffic may be non-zero, yet no
>>> termination may be required (i.e., traffic is below the second
>>> threshold).
>>
>> I think I see what you are saying. If I am reading this correctly, the
>> decision process must re-calculate to determine if there is termination
>> every time it receives a report with non-zero excess and the port is
>> already blocked. But it does not have to actually block anything.
>> This however seems to depend upon the correct relative configuration of
>> the limit that flips it into blocked state, the value of U, and maybe
>> some other values.
>> Put differently, I understand that the two are not contradictory.
>> However, since the two things use different calculations, it is not at
>> all clear that they are consistent. This may well be acceptable. But the
>> difference in methods is likely to lead to confusion. So, as a minor
>> (rather than major) comment, I would suggest that you provide clarifying
>> text explaining why it is okay to use one condition to decide if there
>> is blocking, but a different condition (which could produce a lower
>> threshold) to decide how much to get rid of.
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>> On 1/1/2012 2:48 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>>> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
>>>>>
>>>>> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>>>>>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>>>>>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call 
>>>>>> comments
>>>>>> you may receive.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
>>>>>> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
>>>>>> Operation
>>>>>> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
>>>>>> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
>>>>>> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
>>>>>> Informational RFC.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of 
>>>>>> behaviors,
>>>>>> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this 
>>>>>> ought to
>>>>>> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something 
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> could, in theory, later become standards track.
>>>>>
>>>>> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your 
>>>>> suggestion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Major issues:
>>>>>> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third
>>>>>> bullet,
>>>>>> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified in RFC
>>>>>> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what conditions
>>>>>> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559 
>>>>>> instead? No
>>>>>> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific 
>>>>>> about
>>>>>> which section / conditions are meant.
>>>>>
>>>>> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long 
>>>>> time
>>>>> since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention 
>>>>> was.
>>>>> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document 
>>>>>> indicated
>>>>>> that the edge node information about how to determine
>>>>>> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
>>>>>> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
>>>>>> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After 
>>>>>> describing
>>>>>> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text
>>>>>> refers to
>>>>>> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing
>>>>>> information. In
>>>>>> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does 
>>>>>> occur in
>>>>>> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make 
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this
>>>>>> seems
>>>>>> to be a serious hole in the specification.
>>>>>
>>>>> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it,
>>>>> operators
>>>>> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of
>>>>> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet header.
>>>>> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow the
>>>>> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize jitter. The
>>>>> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to
>>>>> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e. 
>>>>> flowing
>>>>> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on 
>>>>> their
>>>>> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes are a
>>>>> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Minor issues:
>>>>>> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
>>>>>> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However,
>>>>>> section
>>>>>> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if the
>>>>>> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
>>>>>> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
>>>>>> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
>>>>>> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than 
>>>>>> any
>>>>>> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are
>>>>>> stated.)
>>>>>
>>>>> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value
>>>>> equal to
>>>>> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of
>>>>> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U - 
>>>>> 1)/U is
>>>>> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds. 
>>>>> When the
>>>>> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above that
>>>>> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second
>>>>> threshold,
>>>>> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In the SM
>>>>> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a
>>>>> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is
>>>>> specified
>>>>> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of
>>>>> operation
>>>>> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>

-- 
Prof. Dr. habil. Michael Menth
University of Tuebingen
Faculty of Science
Department of Computer Science
Chair of Communication Networks
Sand 13, 72076 Tuebingen, Germany
phone: (+49)-7071/29-70505
fax: (+49)-7071/29-5220
mailto:menth@uni-tuebingen.de
http://kn.inf.uni-tuebingen.de


From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Mon Jan  2 09:18:47 2012
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Cc: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, Bob Briscoe <bob.briscoe@bt.com>, Tom Taylor <tom.taylor.stds@gmail.com>, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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Michael, I am not sure what to make of your recommended text abut ECMP.
ECMP is used by almost all operators.  It is generally considered a 
necessary tool in the tool-kit.
More significantly, at least for the egress understanding of the 
ingress, it is not even the single operator's ECMP, but other operators 
selections of paths that produce the issue.  So even in the unlikely 
event that this operator does not use ECMP, it still is not sufficient.

Yours,
Joel

On 1/2/2012 11:54 AM, Michael Menth wrote:
> Hi Tom, hi Joel,
>
> I wish you a happy new year!
>
> Here are my comments to address Joel's concerns:
>
> ====================================================================
>
> The issue with ECMP: I'd add a comment that CL and SM should not be in
> the presence of ECMP if routing information is used to determine
> ingress-egress-aggregates since this seems to be messy and error-prone.
>
> ====================================================================
>
> The following text may clarify at the beginning of Section 3.3.2 the
> relation
> between admission control and flow termination to address one of Joel's
> comments (for both SM and CL):
>
> In the presence of light pre-congestion, i.e., in the presence of a small,
> positive ETM-rate (relative to the overall PCN traffic rate), new flows may
> already be blocked. However, in the presence of heavy pre-congestion, i.e.,
> in the presence of a relatively large ETM-rate, termination of some
> admitted
> flows is required. Thus, flow blocking is logical prerequisite for flow
> termination.
>
> ====================================================================
>
> The following sentence in 3.3.2 should be corrected (only SM-specific):
>
> U represents the average ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to
> PCN-admissible-rate
> over all the links of the PCN-domain.
>
> ->
>
> U represents the ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to PCN-admissible-rate
> for all
> the links of the PCN-domain.
>
> ====================================================================
>
> I also recommend to change the following text as I think it may cause
> misinterpretations (applies both to SM and CL):
>
> If the difference calculated in the second step is positive, the Decision
> Point SHOULD select PCN-flows to terminate, until it determines that the
> PCN-traffic admission rate will no longer be greater than the estimated
> sustainable aggregate rate. If the Decision Point knows the bandwidth
> required by individual PCN-flows (e.g., from resource signalling used to
> establish the flows), it MAY choose to complete its selection of
> PCN-flows to
> terminate in a single round of decisions.
>
> Alternatively, the Decision Point MAY spread flow termination over multiple
> rounds to avoid over-termination. If this is done, it is RECOMMENDED that
> enough time elapse between successive rounds of termination to allow the
> effects of previous rounds to be reflected in the measurements upon
> which the
> termination decisions are based. (See [IEEE-Satoh] and sections 4.2 and 4.3
> of [MeLe10].)
>
> ->
>
> If the difference calculated in the second step is positive (traffic
> rate to
> be terminated), the Decision Point SHOULD select PCN-flows to terminate. To
> that end, the Decision Point MAY use upper rate limits for individual
> PCN-flows (e.g., from resource signalling used to establish the flows) and
> select a set of flows whose sum of upper rate limits is up to the traffic
> rate to be terminated. Then, these flows are terminated. The use of upper
> limits on flow rates avoids over-termination.
>
> Termination may be continuously needed after consecutive measurement
> intervals for various
> reasons, e.g., if the used upper rate limits overestimate the actual
> flow rates.
> For such cases it is RECOMMENDED that enough time elapses between
> successive
> termination events to allow the effects of previous termination events
> to be
> reflected in the measurements upon which the termination decisions are
> based;
> otherwise, over-termination may occur. See [IEEE-Satoh] and Sections 4.2
> and
> 4.3 of [MeLe10].
>
> ====================================================================
>
> [IEEE-Satoh] is not a good key for Daisuke's work as the prefix "IEEE"
> makes it look like a reference to a standards document.
> You better use [SaUe10] or [Satoh10]. Applies both to CL and SM.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Michael
>
>
> Am 02.01.2012 15:21, schrieb Tom Taylor:
>> It shall be as you say, subject to comment from my co-authors when
>> they get back from holiday.
>>
>> On 01/01/2012 5:43 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>> In-line...
>>>
>>> On 1/1/2012 4:06 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 01/01/2012 2:58 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>> Thank you for responding promptly Tom. Let me try to elaborate on the
>>>>> two issues where I was unclear.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the ingress-egress-aggregate issue and ECMP, the concern I have is
>>>>> relative to the third operational alternative where routing is used to
>>>>> determine where the ingress and egress of a flow is. To be blunt,
>>>>> as far
>>>>> as I can tell this does not work.
>>>>> 1) It does not work on the ingress side because traffic from a given
>>>>> source prefix can come in at multiple places. Some of these places may
>>>>> claim reachability to the source prefix. Some may not. While a given
>>>>> flow will use only one of these paths, there is no way to determine
>>>>> from
>>>>> routing information, at the egress, which ingress that flow used.
>>>>> 2) A site may use multiple exits for a given destination prefix.
>>>>> Again,
>>>>> while the site will only use one of these egresses for a given flow,
>>>>> there is no way for the ingress to know which egress it will be on the
>>>>> basis of routing information.
>>>>> Thus, the text seems to allow for a behavior that simply does not
>>>>> work.
>>>>
>>>> [PTT] I think the disconnect here is that you read the text to say that
>>>> an individual node uses routing information to determine the IEA. That
>>>> wasn't the intention. Instead, administrators use routing
>>>> information to
>>>> derive filters that are installed at the ingress and egress nodes.
>>>
>>> As far as I can tell, your response describes a situation even less
>>> effective than what I assumed.
>>> Firstly, it does not matter whether it is the edge node, the decision
>>> node, or the human administrator. Routing information is not enough to
>>> determine what the ingress-egress pairing is. The problems I describe
>>> above apply no matter who is making the decision.
>>> Secondly, having a human make the decision means that as soon as routing
>>> changes, the configured filters are wrong.
>>>
>>> I would suggest that the text in question be removed, and replaced with
>>> a warning against attempting what is currently described.
>>>
> My view is also that CL ans SM do not work in the presence of ECMP. This
> should be indicated as a warning.
>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am still confused about the relationship of section 3.3.2 to the
>>>>> behavior you describe. 3.3.2 says that as long as any excess
>>>>> traffic is
>>>>> being reported, teh decision point shall direct the blocking of
>>>>> additional flows. That does not match 3.3.1, and does not match your
>>>>> description.
>>>>
>>>> [PTT] I can't see the text in section 3.3.2 that says you continue to
>>>> block as long as any excess traffic is being reported. What I think it
>>>> says is that as long as excess traffic is reported, the decision point
>>>> checks to see whether the traffic being admitted to the aggregate
>>>> exceeds the supportable level. Excess traffic may be non-zero, yet no
>>>> termination may be required (i.e., traffic is below the second
>>>> threshold).
>>>
>>> I think I see what you are saying. If I am reading this correctly, the
>>> decision process must re-calculate to determine if there is termination
>>> every time it receives a report with non-zero excess and the port is
>>> already blocked. But it does not have to actually block anything.
>>> This however seems to depend upon the correct relative configuration of
>>> the limit that flips it into blocked state, the value of U, and maybe
>>> some other values.
>>> Put differently, I understand that the two are not contradictory.
>>> However, since the two things use different calculations, it is not at
>>> all clear that they are consistent. This may well be acceptable. But the
>>> difference in methods is likely to lead to confusion. So, as a minor
>>> (rather than major) comment, I would suggest that you provide clarifying
>>> text explaining why it is okay to use one condition to decide if there
>>> is blocking, but a different condition (which could produce a lower
>>> threshold) to decide how much to get rid of.
>>>
>>> Yours,
>>> Joel
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>> On 1/1/2012 2:48 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>>>> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>>>>>>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>>>>>>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
>>>>>>> comments
>>>>>>> you may receive.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
>>>>>>> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
>>>>>>> Operation
>>>>>>> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
>>>>>>> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
>>>>>>> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
>>>>>>> Informational RFC.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of
>>>>>>> behaviors,
>>>>>>> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this
>>>>>>> ought to
>>>>>>> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> could, in theory, later become standards track.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your
>>>>>> suggestion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Major issues:
>>>>>>> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third
>>>>>>> bullet,
>>>>>>> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified in RFC
>>>>>>> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what conditions
>>>>>>> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559
>>>>>>> instead? No
>>>>>>> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific
>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>> which section / conditions are meant.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long
>>>>>> time
>>>>>> since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention
>>>>>> was.
>>>>>> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document
>>>>>>> indicated
>>>>>>> that the edge node information about how to determine
>>>>>>> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
>>>>>>> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
>>>>>>> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After
>>>>>>> describing
>>>>>>> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text
>>>>>>> refers to
>>>>>>> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing
>>>>>>> information. In
>>>>>>> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does
>>>>>>> occur in
>>>>>>> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make
>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this
>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>> to be a serious hole in the specification.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it,
>>>>>> operators
>>>>>> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of
>>>>>> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet header.
>>>>>> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow the
>>>>>> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize jitter. The
>>>>>> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to
>>>>>> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e.
>>>>>> flowing
>>>>>> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on
>>>>>> their
>>>>>> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes are a
>>>>>> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Minor issues:
>>>>>>> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
>>>>>>> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However,
>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if the
>>>>>>> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
>>>>>>> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
>>>>>>> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
>>>>>>> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than
>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are
>>>>>>> stated.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value
>>>>>> equal to
>>>>>> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of
>>>>>> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U -
>>>>>> 1)/U is
>>>>>> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds.
>>>>>> When the
>>>>>> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above that
>>>>>> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second
>>>>>> threshold,
>>>>>> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In the SM
>>>>>> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a
>>>>>> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is
>>>>>> specified
>>>>>> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of
>>>>>> operation
>>>>>> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>

From menth@informatik.uni-tuebingen.de  Mon Jan  2 09:59:08 2012
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Cc: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, Bob Briscoe <bob.briscoe@bt.com>, Tom Taylor <tom.taylor.stds@gmail.com>, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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Hi Joel, hi Tom,

Am 02.01.2012 18:18, schrieb Joel M. Halpern:
> Michael, I am not sure what to make of your recommended text abut ECMP.
> ECMP is used by almost all operators.  It is generally considered a 
> necessary tool in the tool-kit.
> More significantly, at least for the egress understanding of the 
> ingress, it is not even the single operator's ECMP, but other 
> operators selections of paths that produce the issue.  So even in the 
> unlikely event that this operator does not use ECMP, it still is not 
> sufficient.

Then I better leave the ECMP issue for others to answer.

The definition of U can be better corrected as follows (improved 
rewording of my previous email):

U represents the average ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to 
PCN-admissible-rate over all the links of the PCN-domain.
->
U is a domain-wide constant which implicitly defines the 
PCN-supportable-rate by U*PCN-admissible-rate on all links of the PCN 
domain.

Best wishes,

     Michael


>
> Yours,
> Joel
>
> On 1/2/2012 11:54 AM, Michael Menth wrote:
>> Hi Tom, hi Joel,
>>
>> I wish you a happy new year!
>>
>> Here are my comments to address Joel's concerns:
>>
>> ====================================================================
>>
>> The issue with ECMP: I'd add a comment that CL and SM should not be in
>> the presence of ECMP if routing information is used to determine
>> ingress-egress-aggregates since this seems to be messy and error-prone.
>>
>> ====================================================================
>>
>> The following text may clarify at the beginning of Section 3.3.2 the
>> relation
>> between admission control and flow termination to address one of Joel's
>> comments (for both SM and CL):
>>
>> In the presence of light pre-congestion, i.e., in the presence of a 
>> small,
>> positive ETM-rate (relative to the overall PCN traffic rate), new 
>> flows may
>> already be blocked. However, in the presence of heavy pre-congestion, 
>> i.e.,
>> in the presence of a relatively large ETM-rate, termination of some
>> admitted
>> flows is required. Thus, flow blocking is logical prerequisite for flow
>> termination.
>>
>> ====================================================================
>>
>> The following sentence in 3.3.2 should be corrected (only SM-specific):
>>
>> U represents the average ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to
>> PCN-admissible-rate
>> over all the links of the PCN-domain.
>>
>> ->
>>
>> U represents the ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to PCN-admissible-rate
>> for all
>> the links of the PCN-domain.
>>
>> ====================================================================
>>
>> I also recommend to change the following text as I think it may cause
>> misinterpretations (applies both to SM and CL):
>>
>> If the difference calculated in the second step is positive, the 
>> Decision
>> Point SHOULD select PCN-flows to terminate, until it determines that the
>> PCN-traffic admission rate will no longer be greater than the estimated
>> sustainable aggregate rate. If the Decision Point knows the bandwidth
>> required by individual PCN-flows (e.g., from resource signalling used to
>> establish the flows), it MAY choose to complete its selection of
>> PCN-flows to
>> terminate in a single round of decisions.
>>
>> Alternatively, the Decision Point MAY spread flow termination over 
>> multiple
>> rounds to avoid over-termination. If this is done, it is RECOMMENDED 
>> that
>> enough time elapse between successive rounds of termination to allow the
>> effects of previous rounds to be reflected in the measurements upon
>> which the
>> termination decisions are based. (See [IEEE-Satoh] and sections 4.2 
>> and 4.3
>> of [MeLe10].)
>>
>> ->
>>
>> If the difference calculated in the second step is positive (traffic
>> rate to
>> be terminated), the Decision Point SHOULD select PCN-flows to 
>> terminate. To
>> that end, the Decision Point MAY use upper rate limits for individual
>> PCN-flows (e.g., from resource signalling used to establish the 
>> flows) and
>> select a set of flows whose sum of upper rate limits is up to the 
>> traffic
>> rate to be terminated. Then, these flows are terminated. The use of 
>> upper
>> limits on flow rates avoids over-termination.
>>
>> Termination may be continuously needed after consecutive measurement
>> intervals for various
>> reasons, e.g., if the used upper rate limits overestimate the actual
>> flow rates.
>> For such cases it is RECOMMENDED that enough time elapses between
>> successive
>> termination events to allow the effects of previous termination events
>> to be
>> reflected in the measurements upon which the termination decisions are
>> based;
>> otherwise, over-termination may occur. See [IEEE-Satoh] and Sections 4.2
>> and
>> 4.3 of [MeLe10].
>>
>> ====================================================================
>>
>> [IEEE-Satoh] is not a good key for Daisuke's work as the prefix "IEEE"
>> makes it look like a reference to a standards document.
>> You better use [SaUe10] or [Satoh10]. Applies both to CL and SM.
>>
>>
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>> Michael
>>
>>
>> Am 02.01.2012 15:21, schrieb Tom Taylor:
>>> It shall be as you say, subject to comment from my co-authors when
>>> they get back from holiday.
>>>
>>> On 01/01/2012 5:43 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>> In-line...
>>>>
>>>> On 1/1/2012 4:06 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 01/01/2012 2:58 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>>> Thank you for responding promptly Tom. Let me try to elaborate on 
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> two issues where I was unclear.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On the ingress-egress-aggregate issue and ECMP, the concern I 
>>>>>> have is
>>>>>> relative to the third operational alternative where routing is 
>>>>>> used to
>>>>>> determine where the ingress and egress of a flow is. To be blunt,
>>>>>> as far
>>>>>> as I can tell this does not work.
>>>>>> 1) It does not work on the ingress side because traffic from a given
>>>>>> source prefix can come in at multiple places. Some of these 
>>>>>> places may
>>>>>> claim reachability to the source prefix. Some may not. While a given
>>>>>> flow will use only one of these paths, there is no way to determine
>>>>>> from
>>>>>> routing information, at the egress, which ingress that flow used.
>>>>>> 2) A site may use multiple exits for a given destination prefix.
>>>>>> Again,
>>>>>> while the site will only use one of these egresses for a given flow,
>>>>>> there is no way for the ingress to know which egress it will be 
>>>>>> on the
>>>>>> basis of routing information.
>>>>>> Thus, the text seems to allow for a behavior that simply does not
>>>>>> work.
>>>>>
>>>>> [PTT] I think the disconnect here is that you read the text to say 
>>>>> that
>>>>> an individual node uses routing information to determine the IEA. 
>>>>> That
>>>>> wasn't the intention. Instead, administrators use routing
>>>>> information to
>>>>> derive filters that are installed at the ingress and egress nodes.
>>>>
>>>> As far as I can tell, your response describes a situation even less
>>>> effective than what I assumed.
>>>> Firstly, it does not matter whether it is the edge node, the decision
>>>> node, or the human administrator. Routing information is not enough to
>>>> determine what the ingress-egress pairing is. The problems I describe
>>>> above apply no matter who is making the decision.
>>>> Secondly, having a human make the decision means that as soon as 
>>>> routing
>>>> changes, the configured filters are wrong.
>>>>
>>>> I would suggest that the text in question be removed, and replaced 
>>>> with
>>>> a warning against attempting what is currently described.
>>>>
>> My view is also that CL ans SM do not work in the presence of ECMP. This
>> should be indicated as a warning.
>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am still confused about the relationship of section 3.3.2 to the
>>>>>> behavior you describe. 3.3.2 says that as long as any excess
>>>>>> traffic is
>>>>>> being reported, teh decision point shall direct the blocking of
>>>>>> additional flows. That does not match 3.3.1, and does not match your
>>>>>> description.
>>>>>
>>>>> [PTT] I can't see the text in section 3.3.2 that says you continue to
>>>>> block as long as any excess traffic is being reported. What I 
>>>>> think it
>>>>> says is that as long as excess traffic is reported, the decision 
>>>>> point
>>>>> checks to see whether the traffic being admitted to the aggregate
>>>>> exceeds the supportable level. Excess traffic may be non-zero, yet no
>>>>> termination may be required (i.e., traffic is below the second
>>>>> threshold).
>>>>
>>>> I think I see what you are saying. If I am reading this correctly, the
>>>> decision process must re-calculate to determine if there is 
>>>> termination
>>>> every time it receives a report with non-zero excess and the port is
>>>> already blocked. But it does not have to actually block anything.
>>>> This however seems to depend upon the correct relative 
>>>> configuration of
>>>> the limit that flips it into blocked state, the value of U, and maybe
>>>> some other values.
>>>> Put differently, I understand that the two are not contradictory.
>>>> However, since the two things use different calculations, it is not at
>>>> all clear that they are consistent. This may well be acceptable. 
>>>> But the
>>>> difference in methods is likely to lead to confusion. So, as a minor
>>>> (rather than major) comment, I would suggest that you provide 
>>>> clarifying
>>>> text explaining why it is okay to use one condition to decide if there
>>>> is blocking, but a different condition (which could produce a lower
>>>> threshold) to decide how much to get rid of.
>>>>
>>>> Yours,
>>>> Joel
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 1/1/2012 2:48 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>>>>> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For 
>>>>>>>> background on
>>>>>>>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>>>>>>>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
>>>>>>>> comments
>>>>>>>> you may receive.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
>>>>>>>> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
>>>>>>>> Operation
>>>>>>>> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
>>>>>>>> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
>>>>>>>> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
>>>>>>>> Informational RFC.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of
>>>>>>>> behaviors,
>>>>>>>> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this
>>>>>>>> ought to
>>>>>>>> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> could, in theory, later become standards track.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your
>>>>>>> suggestion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Major issues:
>>>>>>>> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third
>>>>>>>> bullet,
>>>>>>>> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified 
>>>>>>>> in RFC
>>>>>>>> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what 
>>>>>>>> conditions
>>>>>>>> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559
>>>>>>>> instead? No
>>>>>>>> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific
>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>> which section / conditions are meant.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long
>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>> since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention
>>>>>>> was.
>>>>>>> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document
>>>>>>>> indicated
>>>>>>>> that the edge node information about how to determine
>>>>>>>> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
>>>>>>>> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
>>>>>>>> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After
>>>>>>>> describing
>>>>>>>> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text
>>>>>>>> refers to
>>>>>>>> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing
>>>>>>>> information. In
>>>>>>>> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does
>>>>>>>> occur in
>>>>>>>> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make
>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this
>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>> to be a serious hole in the specification.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it,
>>>>>>> operators
>>>>>>> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of
>>>>>>> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet 
>>>>>>> header.
>>>>>>> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow 
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize 
>>>>>>> jitter. The
>>>>>>> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to
>>>>>>> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e.
>>>>>>> flowing
>>>>>>> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on
>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes 
>>>>>>> are a
>>>>>>> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Minor issues:
>>>>>>>> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
>>>>>>>> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However,
>>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if 
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
>>>>>>>> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
>>>>>>>> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
>>>>>>>> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than
>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are
>>>>>>>> stated.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value
>>>>>>> equal to
>>>>>>> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of
>>>>>>> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U -
>>>>>>> 1)/U is
>>>>>>> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds.
>>>>>>> When the
>>>>>>> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above 
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second
>>>>>>> threshold,
>>>>>>> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In 
>>>>>>> the SM
>>>>>>> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a
>>>>>>> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is
>>>>>>> specified
>>>>>>> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of
>>>>>>> operation
>>>>>>> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>

-- 
Prof. Dr. habil. Michael Menth
University of Tuebingen
Faculty of Science
Department of Computer Science
Chair of Communication Networks
Sand 13, 72076 Tuebingen, Germany
phone: (+49)-7071/29-70505
fax: (+49)-7071/29-5220
mailto:menth@uni-tuebingen.de
http://kn.inf.uni-tuebingen.de


From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Mon Jan  2 10:04:33 2012
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Message-ID: <4F01F1AD.8000806@joelhalpern.com>
Date: Mon, 02 Jan 2012 13:04:29 -0500
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Cc: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, Steven Blake <slblake@petri-meat.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, Bob Briscoe <bob.briscoe@bt.com>, Tom Taylor <tom.taylor.stds@gmail.com>, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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The clarification on U is very helpful.  I look forward to comments from 
others on the routing based behavior / ECMP text removal / replacement 
question.

On 1/2/2012 12:58 PM, Michael Menth wrote:
> Hi Joel, hi Tom,
>
> Am 02.01.2012 18:18, schrieb Joel M. Halpern:
>> Michael, I am not sure what to make of your recommended text abut ECMP.
>> ECMP is used by almost all operators. It is generally considered a
>> necessary tool in the tool-kit.
>> More significantly, at least for the egress understanding of the
>> ingress, it is not even the single operator's ECMP, but other
>> operators selections of paths that produce the issue. So even in the
>> unlikely event that this operator does not use ECMP, it still is not
>> sufficient.
>
> Then I better leave the ECMP issue for others to answer.
>
> The definition of U can be better corrected as follows (improved
> rewording of my previous email):
>
> U represents the average ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to
> PCN-admissible-rate over all the links of the PCN-domain.
> ->
> U is a domain-wide constant which implicitly defines the
> PCN-supportable-rate by U*PCN-admissible-rate on all links of the PCN
> domain.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Michael
>
>
>>
>> Yours,
>> Joel
>>
>> On 1/2/2012 11:54 AM, Michael Menth wrote:
>>> Hi Tom, hi Joel,
>>>
>>> I wish you a happy new year!
>>>
>>> Here are my comments to address Joel's concerns:
>>>
>>> ====================================================================
>>>
>>> The issue with ECMP: I'd add a comment that CL and SM should not be in
>>> the presence of ECMP if routing information is used to determine
>>> ingress-egress-aggregates since this seems to be messy and error-prone.
>>>
>>> ====================================================================
>>>
>>> The following text may clarify at the beginning of Section 3.3.2 the
>>> relation
>>> between admission control and flow termination to address one of Joel's
>>> comments (for both SM and CL):
>>>
>>> In the presence of light pre-congestion, i.e., in the presence of a
>>> small,
>>> positive ETM-rate (relative to the overall PCN traffic rate), new
>>> flows may
>>> already be blocked. However, in the presence of heavy pre-congestion,
>>> i.e.,
>>> in the presence of a relatively large ETM-rate, termination of some
>>> admitted
>>> flows is required. Thus, flow blocking is logical prerequisite for flow
>>> termination.
>>>
>>> ====================================================================
>>>
>>> The following sentence in 3.3.2 should be corrected (only SM-specific):
>>>
>>> U represents the average ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to
>>> PCN-admissible-rate
>>> over all the links of the PCN-domain.
>>>
>>> ->
>>>
>>> U represents the ratio of PCN-supportable-rate to PCN-admissible-rate
>>> for all
>>> the links of the PCN-domain.
>>>
>>> ====================================================================
>>>
>>> I also recommend to change the following text as I think it may cause
>>> misinterpretations (applies both to SM and CL):
>>>
>>> If the difference calculated in the second step is positive, the
>>> Decision
>>> Point SHOULD select PCN-flows to terminate, until it determines that the
>>> PCN-traffic admission rate will no longer be greater than the estimated
>>> sustainable aggregate rate. If the Decision Point knows the bandwidth
>>> required by individual PCN-flows (e.g., from resource signalling used to
>>> establish the flows), it MAY choose to complete its selection of
>>> PCN-flows to
>>> terminate in a single round of decisions.
>>>
>>> Alternatively, the Decision Point MAY spread flow termination over
>>> multiple
>>> rounds to avoid over-termination. If this is done, it is RECOMMENDED
>>> that
>>> enough time elapse between successive rounds of termination to allow the
>>> effects of previous rounds to be reflected in the measurements upon
>>> which the
>>> termination decisions are based. (See [IEEE-Satoh] and sections 4.2
>>> and 4.3
>>> of [MeLe10].)
>>>
>>> ->
>>>
>>> If the difference calculated in the second step is positive (traffic
>>> rate to
>>> be terminated), the Decision Point SHOULD select PCN-flows to
>>> terminate. To
>>> that end, the Decision Point MAY use upper rate limits for individual
>>> PCN-flows (e.g., from resource signalling used to establish the
>>> flows) and
>>> select a set of flows whose sum of upper rate limits is up to the
>>> traffic
>>> rate to be terminated. Then, these flows are terminated. The use of
>>> upper
>>> limits on flow rates avoids over-termination.
>>>
>>> Termination may be continuously needed after consecutive measurement
>>> intervals for various
>>> reasons, e.g., if the used upper rate limits overestimate the actual
>>> flow rates.
>>> For such cases it is RECOMMENDED that enough time elapses between
>>> successive
>>> termination events to allow the effects of previous termination events
>>> to be
>>> reflected in the measurements upon which the termination decisions are
>>> based;
>>> otherwise, over-termination may occur. See [IEEE-Satoh] and Sections 4.2
>>> and
>>> 4.3 of [MeLe10].
>>>
>>> ====================================================================
>>>
>>> [IEEE-Satoh] is not a good key for Daisuke's work as the prefix "IEEE"
>>> makes it look like a reference to a standards document.
>>> You better use [SaUe10] or [Satoh10]. Applies both to CL and SM.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best wishes,
>>>
>>> Michael
>>>
>>>
>>> Am 02.01.2012 15:21, schrieb Tom Taylor:
>>>> It shall be as you say, subject to comment from my co-authors when
>>>> they get back from holiday.
>>>>
>>>> On 01/01/2012 5:43 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>> In-line...
>>>>>
>>>>> On 1/1/2012 4:06 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 01/01/2012 2:58 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>>>> Thank you for responding promptly Tom. Let me try to elaborate on
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> two issues where I was unclear.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On the ingress-egress-aggregate issue and ECMP, the concern I
>>>>>>> have is
>>>>>>> relative to the third operational alternative where routing is
>>>>>>> used to
>>>>>>> determine where the ingress and egress of a flow is. To be blunt,
>>>>>>> as far
>>>>>>> as I can tell this does not work.
>>>>>>> 1) It does not work on the ingress side because traffic from a given
>>>>>>> source prefix can come in at multiple places. Some of these
>>>>>>> places may
>>>>>>> claim reachability to the source prefix. Some may not. While a given
>>>>>>> flow will use only one of these paths, there is no way to determine
>>>>>>> from
>>>>>>> routing information, at the egress, which ingress that flow used.
>>>>>>> 2) A site may use multiple exits for a given destination prefix.
>>>>>>> Again,
>>>>>>> while the site will only use one of these egresses for a given flow,
>>>>>>> there is no way for the ingress to know which egress it will be
>>>>>>> on the
>>>>>>> basis of routing information.
>>>>>>> Thus, the text seems to allow for a behavior that simply does not
>>>>>>> work.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [PTT] I think the disconnect here is that you read the text to say
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> an individual node uses routing information to determine the IEA.
>>>>>> That
>>>>>> wasn't the intention. Instead, administrators use routing
>>>>>> information to
>>>>>> derive filters that are installed at the ingress and egress nodes.
>>>>>
>>>>> As far as I can tell, your response describes a situation even less
>>>>> effective than what I assumed.
>>>>> Firstly, it does not matter whether it is the edge node, the decision
>>>>> node, or the human administrator. Routing information is not enough to
>>>>> determine what the ingress-egress pairing is. The problems I describe
>>>>> above apply no matter who is making the decision.
>>>>> Secondly, having a human make the decision means that as soon as
>>>>> routing
>>>>> changes, the configured filters are wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> I would suggest that the text in question be removed, and replaced
>>>>> with
>>>>> a warning against attempting what is currently described.
>>>>>
>>> My view is also that CL ans SM do not work in the presence of ECMP. This
>>> should be indicated as a warning.
>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I am still confused about the relationship of section 3.3.2 to the
>>>>>>> behavior you describe. 3.3.2 says that as long as any excess
>>>>>>> traffic is
>>>>>>> being reported, teh decision point shall direct the blocking of
>>>>>>> additional flows. That does not match 3.3.1, and does not match your
>>>>>>> description.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [PTT] I can't see the text in section 3.3.2 that says you continue to
>>>>>> block as long as any excess traffic is being reported. What I
>>>>>> think it
>>>>>> says is that as long as excess traffic is reported, the decision
>>>>>> point
>>>>>> checks to see whether the traffic being admitted to the aggregate
>>>>>> exceeds the supportable level. Excess traffic may be non-zero, yet no
>>>>>> termination may be required (i.e., traffic is below the second
>>>>>> threshold).
>>>>>
>>>>> I think I see what you are saying. If I am reading this correctly, the
>>>>> decision process must re-calculate to determine if there is
>>>>> termination
>>>>> every time it receives a report with non-zero excess and the port is
>>>>> already blocked. But it does not have to actually block anything.
>>>>> This however seems to depend upon the correct relative
>>>>> configuration of
>>>>> the limit that flips it into blocked state, the value of U, and maybe
>>>>> some other values.
>>>>> Put differently, I understand that the two are not contradictory.
>>>>> However, since the two things use different calculations, it is not at
>>>>> all clear that they are consistent. This may well be acceptable.
>>>>> But the
>>>>> difference in methods is likely to lead to confusion. So, as a minor
>>>>> (rather than major) comment, I would suggest that you provide
>>>>> clarifying
>>>>> text explaining why it is okay to use one condition to decide if there
>>>>> is blocking, but a different condition (which could produce a lower
>>>>> threshold) to decide how much to get rid of.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yours,
>>>>> Joel
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yours,
>>>>>>> Joel
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 1/1/2012 2:48 PM, Tom Taylor wrote:
>>>>>>>> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>>>>>>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For
>>>>>>>>> background on
>>>>>>>>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>>>>>>>>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
>>>>>>>>> comments
>>>>>>>>> you may receive.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
>>>>>>>>> PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
>>>>>>>>> Operation
>>>>>>>>> Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
>>>>>>>>> Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
>>>>>>>>> IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
>>>>>>>>> IESG Telechat date: N/A
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
>>>>>>>>> Informational RFC.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of
>>>>>>>>> behaviors,
>>>>>>>>> which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that this
>>>>>>>>> ought to
>>>>>>>>> be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes something
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> could, in theory, later become standards track.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your
>>>>>>>> suggestion.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Major issues:
>>>>>>>>> Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the third
>>>>>>>>> bullet,
>>>>>>>>> states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified
>>>>>>>>> in RFC
>>>>>>>>> 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what
>>>>>>>>> conditions
>>>>>>>>> these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559
>>>>>>>>> instead? No
>>>>>>>>> matter which document it is referencing, please be more specific
>>>>>>>>> about
>>>>>>>>> which section / conditions are meant.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a long
>>>>>>>> time
>>>>>>>> since that text was written that I can't recall what the intention
>>>>>>>> was.
>>>>>>>> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It would have been helpful if the early part of the document
>>>>>>>>> indicated
>>>>>>>>> that the edge node information about how to determine
>>>>>>>>> ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
>>>>>>>>> In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
>>>>>>>>> describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After
>>>>>>>>> describing
>>>>>>>>> how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the text
>>>>>>>>> refers to
>>>>>>>>> inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing
>>>>>>>>> information. In
>>>>>>>>> the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which does
>>>>>>>>> occur in
>>>>>>>>> reality), the routing table is not sufficient information to make
>>>>>>>>> this
>>>>>>>>> determination. Unless I am very confused (which does happen) this
>>>>>>>>> seems
>>>>>>>>> to be a serious hole in the specification.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand it,
>>>>>>>> operators
>>>>>>>> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of
>>>>>>>> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet
>>>>>>>> header.
>>>>>>>> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize
>>>>>>>> jitter. The
>>>>>>>> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to
>>>>>>>> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate (i.e.
>>>>>>>> flowing
>>>>>>>> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based on
>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes
>>>>>>>> are a
>>>>>>>> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Minor issues:
>>>>>>>>> Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
>>>>>>>>> (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. However,
>>>>>>>>> section
>>>>>>>>> 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
>>>>>>>>> deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
>>>>>>>>> important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
>>>>>>>>> initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, rather than
>>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>>> non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none are
>>>>>>>>> stated.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a value
>>>>>>>> equal to
>>>>>>>> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of
>>>>>>>> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U -
>>>>>>>> 1)/U is
>>>>>>>> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two thresholds.
>>>>>>>> When the
>>>>>>>> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second
>>>>>>>> threshold,
>>>>>>>> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In
>>>>>>>> the SM
>>>>>>>> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a
>>>>>>>> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold is
>>>>>>>> specified
>>>>>>>> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode of
>>>>>>>> operation
>>>>>>>> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>

From vkg@bell-labs.com  Mon Jan  2 10:55:56 2012
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From: "Vijay K. Gurbani" <vkg@bell-labs.com>
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-softwire-gateway-init-ds-lite-06
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-softwire-gateway-init-ds-lite-06
Reviewer: Vijay K. Gurbani
Review Date: Jan-02-2012
IETF LC End Date: Jan-04-2012
IESG Telechat date: Jan-05-2012

Summary: This draft is ready as an Proposed Standard.

Major issues: 0
Minor issues: 0
Nits/editorial comments: 0

Thanks,

- vijay
-- 
Vijay K. Gurbani, Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent
1960 Lucent Lane, Rm. 9C-533, Naperville, Illinois 60566 (USA)
Email: vkg@{bell-labs.com,acm.org} / vijay.gurbani@alcatel-lucent.com
Web:   http://ect.bell-labs.com/who/vkg/

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Cc: draft-ietf-pcn-cl-edge-behaviour.all@tools.ietf.org, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review of draft-ietf-pcn-cl-edge-behaviour-11.txt
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On 2012-01-03 03:17, Tom Taylor wrote:
> Thanks for the review, Brian.
> 
> On the 'incomplete state machine' issue: I'll think about additional
> text to make sure things keep on moving along.

Thanks!

> 
> On the matter of PRI, etc.: I was working straight from the Syslog RFC,
> RFC 5424. I can add text to make it clear I am referring to terminology
> (field names) defined in that RFC.

Yes, a well-placed reference would probably be sufficient. I sort of
guessed it was Syslog terminology, but it wasn't completely clear.

    Brian

> 
> Tom Taylor
> 

From mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com  Mon Jan  2 11:38:07 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART Review: draft-amundsen-item-and-collection-link-relations-04
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please wait for direction from your document shepherd or AD before
posting a new version of the draft.

Document: draft-amundsen-item-and-collection-link-relations-04
Reviewer:  Mary Barnes
Review Date:  2 January 2012
IETF LC End Date: 5 January 2012
Telechat Date: 5 January 2012

Summary:  Ready with nit.

Nits:
-----
- ID nits indicates that "You're using the IETF Trust Provisions'
Section 6.b License Notice from 12 Sep 2009 rather than the newer
Notice from 28 Dec 2009.

From cyrus@daboo.name  Mon Jan  2 11:43:55 2012
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Date: Mon, 02 Jan 2012 14:43:58 -0500
From: Cyrus Daboo <cyrus@daboo.name>
To: david.black@emc.com, arnaud.quillaud@oracle.com, gen-art@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org
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Cc: stpeter@stpeter.im
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-daboo-webdav-sync-06
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Hi David,
Thank you for your review. Comments inline:

--On December 27, 2011 11:07:49 PM -0500 david.black@emc.com wrote:

> [1] -Major- Section 3.5 does not appear to cover the case reporting added
> elements on a subsequent synchronization.  The problem may be that the
> word "changed" as used in Section 3.5.1 is assumed to cover adding an
> element - if so, that's not a good assumption, and the addition case
> should be explicitly called out in the title and body of Section 3.5.1.

The first sentence of 3.5.1 is:

    A member URL MUST be reported as changed if it has been mapped as a
    member of the target collection since the request sync-token was
    generated.

The term "mapped" implies creation/addition of a new resource in this case. 
That may not be obvious to anyone who is not intimately familiar with 
WebDAV terminology here, so I propose changing that to:

    A member URL MUST be reported as changed if it has been newly mapped as
    a member of the target collection since the request sync-token was
    generated (e.g., when a new resource has been created as a child of the
    collection).

> [2] -Major- The operations to retrieve changed members of a collection
> are not atomic wrt the operation that obtains a report on what has
> changed; collection changes can occur between retrieving the report and
> retrieving the changed elements or while retrieving the changed elements.
> For this reason, simply obtaining a change report and then retrieving the
> elements that have changed according to the report may not result in a
> consistent (e.g., as of a point in time) copy of a collection.  I believe
> that this absence of atomicity is a WebDAV "feature", as opposed to a
> "bug", but I believe that this behavior and what to do about it should be
> discussed in the draft.  I suggest the following, possibly to the end of
> section 3.1
>
> i) Add a sentence or two to warn that obtaining a change report and then
> retrieving the changed elements may not result in a consistent local
> version of the collection if nothing else is done because changes may
> have occurred in the interim.
>
> ii Add a discussion of how to ensure that a local copy of the collection
> is consistent. The basic idea is to re-presented the sync token for that
> copy to the server after the changed elements have been retrieved; the
> local copy is consistent if the server reports that there have been no
> changes.  Some pseudo-code may help, e.g.:
>
> 	GetSyncCollectionReport(in token, out newtoken, out report);
> 	while (ReportHasChangedItems(report) {
> 		GetChangedItems(report)
> 		token = newtoken;
> 		GetSyncCollectionReport(in token, out newtoken, out report);
> 	}
>
> Actual code should include a counter that counts the number of iterations
> of the while loop and exits with an error if the number of iterations
> exceeds some limit; that error exit implies that the collection is
> (currently) changing too rapidly to obtain a consistent local version.

Good point. I agree that this deserves some additional text to clarify this 
situation. However, I would rather not go into too much detail of how 
clients "re-sync" in cases like this as there are a bunch of different ways 
that could happen each of which depends on exactly what the client is 
trying to do (e.g., in a lot of cases clients will be doing two-way syncs 
so will need to reconcile server and local changes within the loop you 
propose above - the details of that are not in scope for this 
specification). What I propose is the addition of the following paragraph 
to the end of Section 3.1:

    Typically, a client will use the synchronization report to retrieve the
    list of changes, and will follow that with requests to retrieve the
    content of changed resources. It is possible that additional changes to
    the collection could occur between the time of the synchronization
    report and resource content retrieval, which could result in an
    inconsistent view of the collection. When clients use this method of
    synchronization, they need to be aware that such additional changes
    could occur, and track them through normal means (e.g., differences
    between the ETag values returned in the synchronization report and
    those returned when actually fetching resource content), conditional
    requests as described in Section 5, or repeating the synchronization
    process until no changes are returned.

> [3] -Minor- idnits 2.12.12  reports a Downref to RFC 5842.  Please
> consult your Area Director (Peter Saint-Andre) to determine what to do
> about this Downref (it requires attention, but may not require changes to
> the draft).

Working with IESG on this one.

> Nit: I suggest not using the author's own name (cyrusdaboo) in the
> examples.  Someone may copy the code from the resulting RFC.

This has been common practice in most of the other CalDAV/CardDAV RFCs I 
have worked on and has not been the source of any problems, so I would 
rather leave this unchanged. If there is an official IETF policy on using 
"real names" in examples, then I would be happy to change to follow that, 
but I am not aware of anything like that.

> Nit: idnits 2.12.12 reports that draft-ietf-vcarddav-carddav has been
> published as RFC 6352; the RFC Editor will correct this if a new version
> of the draft is not required for other reasons.

Fixed in my working copy.


-- 
Cyrus Daboo


From david.black@emc.com  Mon Jan  2 11:55:58 2012
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From: <david.black@emc.com>
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Date: Mon, 2 Jan 2012 14:55:34 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-daboo-webdav-sync-06
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Hi Cyrus,

The proposed changes for the two major issues look good to me:

[1] I'm pleased that the concern about adding elements turned out to be a w=
ording issue.

[2] Your proposed new text is fine - it provides adequate notice/warning ab=
out possible
collection inconsistency, so I'm ok with not providing pseudo-code.

I'll leave the Downref issue ([3]) for you and Peter to work out with the I=
ESG, and I'm
fine with continued use of your name in the examples if that's common pract=
ice.

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cyrus Daboo [mailto:cyrus@daboo.name]
> Sent: Monday, January 02, 2012 2:44 PM
> To: Black, David; arnaud.quillaud@oracle.com; gen-art@ietf.org; ietf@ietf=
.org
> Cc: stpeter@stpeter.im
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-daboo-webdav-sync-06
>=20
> Hi David,
> Thank you for your review. Comments inline:
>=20
> --On December 27, 2011 11:07:49 PM -0500 david.black@emc.com wrote:
>=20
> > [1] -Major- Section 3.5 does not appear to cover the case reporting add=
ed
> > elements on a subsequent synchronization.  The problem may be that the
> > word "changed" as used in Section 3.5.1 is assumed to cover adding an
> > element - if so, that's not a good assumption, and the addition case
> > should be explicitly called out in the title and body of Section 3.5.1.
>=20
> The first sentence of 3.5.1 is:
>=20
>     A member URL MUST be reported as changed if it has been mapped as a
>     member of the target collection since the request sync-token was
>     generated.
>=20
> The term "mapped" implies creation/addition of a new resource in this cas=
e.
> That may not be obvious to anyone who is not intimately familiar with
> WebDAV terminology here, so I propose changing that to:
>=20
>     A member URL MUST be reported as changed if it has been newly mapped =
as
>     a member of the target collection since the request sync-token was
>     generated (e.g., when a new resource has been created as a child of t=
he
>     collection).
>=20
> > [2] -Major- The operations to retrieve changed members of a collection
> > are not atomic wrt the operation that obtains a report on what has
> > changed; collection changes can occur between retrieving the report and
> > retrieving the changed elements or while retrieving the changed element=
s.
> > For this reason, simply obtaining a change report and then retrieving t=
he
> > elements that have changed according to the report may not result in a
> > consistent (e.g., as of a point in time) copy of a collection.  I belie=
ve
> > that this absence of atomicity is a WebDAV "feature", as opposed to a
> > "bug", but I believe that this behavior and what to do about it should =
be
> > discussed in the draft.  I suggest the following, possibly to the end o=
f
> > section 3.1
> >
> > i) Add a sentence or two to warn that obtaining a change report and the=
n
> > retrieving the changed elements may not result in a consistent local
> > version of the collection if nothing else is done because changes may
> > have occurred in the interim.
> >
> > ii Add a discussion of how to ensure that a local copy of the collectio=
n
> > is consistent. The basic idea is to re-presented the sync token for tha=
t
> > copy to the server after the changed elements have been retrieved; the
> > local copy is consistent if the server reports that there have been no
> > changes.  Some pseudo-code may help, e.g.:
> >
> > 	GetSyncCollectionReport(in token, out newtoken, out report);
> > 	while (ReportHasChangedItems(report) {
> > 		GetChangedItems(report)
> > 		token =3D newtoken;
> > 		GetSyncCollectionReport(in token, out newtoken, out report);
> > 	}
> >
> > Actual code should include a counter that counts the number of iteratio=
ns
> > of the while loop and exits with an error if the number of iterations
> > exceeds some limit; that error exit implies that the collection is
> > (currently) changing too rapidly to obtain a consistent local version.
>=20
> Good point. I agree that this deserves some additional text to clarify th=
is
> situation. However, I would rather not go into too much detail of how
> clients "re-sync" in cases like this as there are a bunch of different wa=
ys
> that could happen each of which depends on exactly what the client is
> trying to do (e.g., in a lot of cases clients will be doing two-way syncs
> so will need to reconcile server and local changes within the loop you
> propose above - the details of that are not in scope for this
> specification). What I propose is the addition of the following paragraph
> to the end of Section 3.1:
>=20
>     Typically, a client will use the synchronization report to retrieve t=
he
>     list of changes, and will follow that with requests to retrieve the
>     content of changed resources. It is possible that additional changes =
to
>     the collection could occur between the time of the synchronization
>     report and resource content retrieval, which could result in an
>     inconsistent view of the collection. When clients use this method of
>     synchronization, they need to be aware that such additional changes
>     could occur, and track them through normal means (e.g., differences
>     between the ETag values returned in the synchronization report and
>     those returned when actually fetching resource content), conditional
>     requests as described in Section 5, or repeating the synchronization
>     process until no changes are returned.
>=20
> > [3] -Minor- idnits 2.12.12  reports a Downref to RFC 5842.  Please
> > consult your Area Director (Peter Saint-Andre) to determine what to do
> > about this Downref (it requires attention, but may not require changes =
to
> > the draft).
>=20
> Working with IESG on this one.
>=20
> > Nit: I suggest not using the author's own name (cyrusdaboo) in the
> > examples.  Someone may copy the code from the resulting RFC.
>=20
> This has been common practice in most of the other CalDAV/CardDAV RFCs I
> have worked on and has not been the source of any problems, so I would
> rather leave this unchanged. If there is an official IETF policy on using
> "real names" in examples, then I would be happy to change to follow that,
> but I am not aware of anything like that.
>=20
> > Nit: idnits 2.12.12 reports that draft-ietf-vcarddav-carddav has been
> > published as RFC 6352; the RFC Editor will correct this if a new versio=
n
> > of the draft is not required for other reasons.
>=20
> Fixed in my working copy.
>=20
>=20
> --
> Cyrus Daboo
>=20


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From: Sri Gundavelli <sgundave@cisco.com>
To: "Vijay K. Gurbani" <vkg@bell-labs.com>, <draft-ietf-softwire-gateway-init-ds-lite@tools.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-softwire-gateway-init-ds-lite-06
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Thanks Vijay for the review. No open issues. Thanks !


Regards
Sri




On 1/2/12 10:59 AM, "Vijay K. Gurbani" <vkg@bell-labs.com> wrote:

> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> 
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
> you may receive.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-softwire-gateway-init-ds-lite-06
> Reviewer: Vijay K. Gurbani
> Review Date: Jan-02-2012
> IETF LC End Date: Jan-04-2012
> IESG Telechat date: Jan-05-2012
> 
> Summary: This draft is ready as an Proposed Standard.
> 
> Major issues: 0
> Minor issues: 0
> Nits/editorial comments: 0
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> - vijay


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References: <00d401ccabbe$216a6ae0$643f40a0$@olddog.co.uk> <4ED1860F.3080501@ericsson.com> <4ED3CBF1.9050303@cisco.com> <4ED521FE.5080401@ericsson.com> <4ED3DBD8.1070207@cisco.com>
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Cc: adrian@olddog.co.uk, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-pim-port.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Russ's Discs on draft-ietf-pim-port [Was: Gen-ART Telechat review of draft-ietf-pim-port-09.txt]
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Russ, I've sent 3-4 emails in December asking if your discuss can be
resolved, but no response. I hope you can respond now.

Stig

On 11/28/2011 11:07 AM, Stig Venaas (svenaas) wrote:
> On 11/29/2011 10:18 AM, Suresh Krishnan wrote:
>  > Hi Stig,
>  >
>  >
>  > On 11/28/2011 12:59 PM, Stig Venaas wrote:
>  >>> Please note that the Connection ID AFI in the PORT Hello Option
> does not
>  >>> need to match the address family of PIM Hello message that carries it.
>  >>> e.g. an IPv6 PIM Hello message could contain a PORT Hello Option with a
>  >>> TCP Connection ID AFI of 1 (IPv4).
>  >>
>  >> While I am OK with this text, wouldn't it be better to add this to 3.1
>  >> and 3.2 where we formally define the hello options?
>  >>
>  >> My proposal would be:
>  >>
>  >> End of 3.1:
>  >>
>  >> OLD:
>  >> TCP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-family
>  >> of the address of the TCP Connection ID field. When this field is
>  >> 0, a mechanism outside the scope of this document is used to
>  >> obtain the addresses used to establish the TCP connection.
>  >>
>  >> NEW:
>  >> TCP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-family
>  >> of the address of the TCP Connection ID field. Note that this
>  >> value does not need to match the address-family of the PIM Hello
>  >> message that carries it. When this field is 0, a mechanism
>  >> outside the scope of this document is used to obtain the
>  >> addresses used to establish the TCP connection.
>  >>
>  >> End of 3.2:
>  >>
>  >> OLD:
>  >> SCTP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-
>  >> family of the address of the SCTP Connection ID field. When this
>  >> field is 0, a mechanism outside the scope of this document is used
>  >> to obtain the addresses used to establish the SCTP connection.
>  >>
>  >> NEW:
>  >> SCTP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-
>  >> family of the address of the SCTP Connection ID field. Note that
>  >> this value does not need to match the address-family of the PIM
>  >> Hello message that carries it. When this field is 0, a mechanism
>  >> outside the scope of this document is used to obtain the
>  >> addresses used to establish the SCTP connection.
>  >>
>  >> What do you think?
>  >
>  > This works great.
>
> Great, I hope we can then just add a note for the editor, and that the
> discuss can be cleared...
>
> Stig
>
>  >
>  > Thanks
>  > Suresh
>


From adrian@olddog.co.uk  Tue Jan  3 14:07:53 2012
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From: "Adrian Farrel" <adrian@olddog.co.uk>
To: "'Stig Venaas'" <svenaas@cisco.com>, "'Russ Housley'" <housley@vigilsec.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 22:07:47 -0000
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Cc: 'General Area Review Team' <gen-art@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-pim-port.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Russ Housley's Discuss on draft-ietf-pim-port [Was: Gen-ART Telechat review of draft-ietf-pim-port-09.txt]
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In the hope that the change (acceptable to Suresh) will work for Russ, I have
entered the RFC Editor note.

A

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Stig Venaas [mailto:svenaas@cisco.com]
> Sent: 03 January 2012 17:27
> To: Russ Housley
> Cc: Suresh Krishnan; adrian@olddog.co.uk;
draft-ietf-pim-port.all@tools.ietf.org;
> General Area Review Team
> Subject: Re: Russ's Discs on draft-ietf-pim-port [Was: Gen-ART Telechat review
of
> draft-ietf-pim-port-09.txt]
> 
> Russ, I've sent 3-4 emails in December asking if your discuss can be
> resolved, but no response. I hope you can respond now.
> 
> Stig
> 
> On 11/28/2011 11:07 AM, Stig Venaas (svenaas) wrote:
> > On 11/29/2011 10:18 AM, Suresh Krishnan wrote:
> >  > Hi Stig,
> >  >
> >  >
> >  > On 11/28/2011 12:59 PM, Stig Venaas wrote:
> >  >>> Please note that the Connection ID AFI in the PORT Hello Option
> > does not
> >  >>> need to match the address family of PIM Hello message that carries it.
> >  >>> e.g. an IPv6 PIM Hello message could contain a PORT Hello Option with a
> >  >>> TCP Connection ID AFI of 1 (IPv4).
> >  >>
> >  >> While I am OK with this text, wouldn't it be better to add this to 3.1
> >  >> and 3.2 where we formally define the hello options?
> >  >>
> >  >> My proposal would be:
> >  >>
> >  >> End of 3.1:
> >  >>
> >  >> OLD:
> >  >> TCP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-family
> >  >> of the address of the TCP Connection ID field. When this field is
> >  >> 0, a mechanism outside the scope of this document is used to
> >  >> obtain the addresses used to establish the TCP connection.
> >  >>
> >  >> NEW:
> >  >> TCP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-family
> >  >> of the address of the TCP Connection ID field. Note that this
> >  >> value does not need to match the address-family of the PIM Hello
> >  >> message that carries it. When this field is 0, a mechanism
> >  >> outside the scope of this document is used to obtain the
> >  >> addresses used to establish the TCP connection.
> >  >>
> >  >> End of 3.2:
> >  >>
> >  >> OLD:
> >  >> SCTP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-
> >  >> family of the address of the SCTP Connection ID field. When this
> >  >> field is 0, a mechanism outside the scope of this document is used
> >  >> to obtain the addresses used to establish the SCTP connection.
> >  >>
> >  >> NEW:
> >  >> SCTP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-
> >  >> family of the address of the SCTP Connection ID field. Note that
> >  >> this value does not need to match the address-family of the PIM
> >  >> Hello message that carries it. When this field is 0, a mechanism
> >  >> outside the scope of this document is used to obtain the
> >  >> addresses used to establish the SCTP connection.
> >  >>
> >  >> What do you think?
> >  >
> >  > This works great.
> >
> > Great, I hope we can then just add a note for the editor, and that the
> > discuss can be cleared...
> >
> > Stig
> >
> >  >
> >  > Thanks
> >  > Suresh
> >


From kathleen.moriarty@emc.com  Wed Jan  4 08:04:14 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec-03.txt
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec-03.txt
Reviewer: Kathleen M. Moriarty
Review Date: 1/4/12
IETF LC End Date: 1/11/12
IESG Telechat date: 1/19/12

Summary:  The draft is essentially ready with nits.  The last nit could be =
a minor issue, but has a simple resolution.  The security considerations se=
ction points out possible attacks and should also require logging of events=
 tied to the users/groups responsible for those actions.

Major issues:

Minor issues:

Nits/editorial comments:
The last line of the abstract should be on the previous line.

On the second to last paragraph of page 8, the following acronym is listed:=
 emergency traffic (ETS), should there be something for the "S"?
The second to last sentence of the same paragraph:
Consider changing from:
"Several
   assured forwarding (AF) queues may be used for various data traffic,
   for example, premium private data traffic, premium public data
   traffic, and a separate best-effort queue is used for the best-effort
   traffic."
To: "Several
   assured forwarding (AF) queues may be used for various data traffic,
   for example, premium private data traffic, premium public data
   traffic, and a separate best-effort queue for the best-effort
   traffic."

First paragraph of section 3: Consider removing "however", it doesn't add a=
nything:
Change from: "Requiring nodes to expose detailed and
   up-to-date CAC information, however, may result in unacceptably high
   rate of routing updates."
To: "Requiring nodes to expose detailed and
   up-to-date CAC information may result in unacceptably high
   rate of routing updates."

Second paragraph of Section 3: Consider removing "and cannot" - it is unnec=
essary:
Change from: "This common
   interpretation is in the form of an MPLS GCAC algorithm to be
   performed during MPLS LSP path selection to determine if a link or
   node can or cannot be included for consideration."
To: "This common
   interpretation is in the form of an MPLS GCAC algorithm to be
   performed during MPLS LSP path selection to determine if a link or
   node can be included for consideration."

Section 3.2: Consider breaking the first sentence into two:
"The assumption behind the MPLS GCAC is that the ratio between BWMck,
   which represents the safety margin the node is putting above the
   SBWck, and the standard deviation of the SBWck defined below does not
   change significantly as one new aggregate flow is added on the link."

Security Considerations:
I think a requirement for logging should be specified here as well.  If an =
attack were to occur, you will want the user/group and actions taken to be =
logged to trace the attack.  Without this, the other enforcement mechanisms=
 are inadequate.

Sentence that spans page 17-18 should be broken into multiple sentences (re=
adable, but long - as is the following sentence):
"For
   example, if aggregate flow requests are made for CT LSP bandwidth
   that exceeds the current DSTE tunnel bandwidth allocation, the GEF
   initiates a bandwidth modification request on the appropriate LSP(s),
   which may entail increasing the current LSP bandwidth allocation by a
   discrete increment of bandwidth denoted here as DBW, where DBW is the
   additional amount needed by the current aggregate flow request."

There is an extra line in the second line of A.1.



Thanks,
Kathleen


From suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com  Wed Jan  4 22:27:21 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART Telechat review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-lfa-applicability-04.txt
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I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).

Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-rtgwg-lfa-applicability-04
Reviewer: Suresh Krishnan
Review Date: 2012/01/04
IESG Telechat date: 2012/01/05

Summary: This document is ready for publication as an
Informational RFC but I have a suggestion.

Minor
=====

This draft needs an informative reference to RFC5286. Without this
reference it is very difficult to get the context required to understand
this draft. Please consider adding the reference

Thanks
Suresh




From aaron@serendipity.cx  Thu Jan  5 06:33:24 2012
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART Last Call Review of draft-ietf-sieve-include-13
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On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 12:46 PM, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
> Thanks for the response! Further comments inline, with sections that appe=
ar
> to need no further comment removed:
>
> On Dec 19, 2011, at 1:13 PM, Aaron Stone wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 2:13 PM, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>
> [=85]
>
>> Minor issues:
>>
>> -- section 3.1, paragraph 4: "Implementations MUST NOT generate errors f=
or
>> recursive inclusions at upload time, as this would force an upload order=
ing
>> requirement upon script authors / generators. =A0However, if an active s=
cript
>> is replaced with a faulty script and would remain the active script, an
>> error MUST be generated and the upload MUST fail."
>>
>> These two statements seem contradictory on a quick reading. =A0In
>> particular, how can the latter assertion avoid an upload ordering
>> requirement? Or do you mean faulty in some way other than being recursiv=
e?
>
>
> If you're replacing an active script, it has to be correct all the time, =
and
> uploads are atomic only on a per-script basis. There's a risk that if you=
're
> uploading a set of scripts that include one another, at some intermediate
> stage while some scripts are uploaded but not others, they are in an inva=
lid
> state. The managesieve spec says that scripts must be validated at upload
> time. The language above is trying to say that you can upload all of the
> scripts that may include one another in any order without generating erro=
rs
> immediately, however, if you're replacing an active script or a script
> included by the active script, then you DO have to upload a correct scrip=
t
> right from the get-go.
>
>
> Is this just a question of whether the script(s) are replacing active
> scripts? That is, the license to create a transient invalid state is
> suspended if if you are replacing an active script? If so, how would one =
go
> about updating a set of linked scripts when one or more of them replace
> active scripts? Should one somehow deactivate the old ones, load all the
> scripts, then activate them?

Having written this out, I don't recall how an implementation would
handle this. I haven't had luck tracking down maling list discussion
on the topic. I'll have to chase up on this.

>>
>> -- section 3.4.1, paragraph 5: "If a "global" command is given the name =
of
>> a variable that has previously been defined in the immediate script with
>> "set", an error MUST be generated either when the script is uploaded or =
at
>> execution time."
>>
>> Does this conflict with the previous statement that it is okay for a
>> global and a private variable to have the same name?
>
>
> It doesn't conflict, because those variables live in separate namespaces.
> The effect of the global command is to bind the two names. An error is
> generated rather than specifying if the local overwrites the global value=
,
> or the global overwrites the local value.
>
>
> I take this to mean you can have a global and a local variable with the s=
ame
> name, but not if they are in the same script, right? If so, then it would
> help to add that qualification to the 2nd paragraph in 3.4. As it is, it
> says implementation MUST allow a global and non-global variable to have t=
he
> same name with no interaction, and doesn't exclude it from happening in t=
he
> same script.

Ok.

>
>>
>> -- section 3.4.2:
>>
>> Why do you need two ways to accomplish the same thing?
>
>
> I might be making this up, but I think the original question was whether =
the
> variables spec would have namespaces.
>
>
> I think I need more context to understand that response--but _my_ origina=
l
> question was more along the lines of "if we have the global name space, w=
hy
> do we need the command, and vice-versa?" It seems like either one
> accomplishes the goal (I actually like the NS as it seems like it would
> obviate the previous question about globals and locals with the same name=
)
> But more practically, why make an implementation implement them both? It
> seems like twice as much work, and twice as much opportunity to introduce
> bugs.

Background on my reply: there was a question early-on in the variables
document about whether namespaces would be supported, at the same time
as early drafts of include. I checked, and these were contemporary
issues in 2003.

Ultimately, Sieve Variables provides namespaces, and this document
added support for namespaces without dropping the command-form global.

>>
>> Does the global namespace have the same "requires" requirement as the
>> global command?
>
>
> Yes, but this isn't explicitly stated.
>
>
> Thanks--I think it would help to state it explicitly.

I've added some text that quotes from Sieve Variables, where this
"require" requirement is stated.

>
>>
>> -- section 4.2, paragraph 2:
>>
>> Can you elaborate on what permissions are proper? Is it different for an
>> included script than for any other script?
>>
>> -- section 4.2, paragraph 3:
>>
>> Can you elaborate on what you mean by "safe for a storage system"?
>>
>
> There are both somewhat vague warnings, basically, "Don't allow 'include
> "./../..//etc/passwd"' and don't allow 'include "foo$(`rm star`)"'.
>
>
> Including those (or some other) examples would help.
>
> [=85]

Done.
>
>>
>> -- section 3.4.2, paragraph 3: "Variables declared global and variables
>> accessed via the global namespace MUST be one and the same."
>>
>> Plurality mismatch. I suggest something like "a variable declared as
>> global and a variable accesses with the global namespace, otherwise havi=
ng
>> the same name=85"
>
>
> I might insert the word "each" after MUST to account for the plurality
> without rewriting the sentence.
>
>
>
> That works, too.
>
> [=85]

Done.

From gash5107@yahoo.com  Thu Jan  5 10:52:05 2012
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From: Gerald Ash <gash5107@yahoo.com>
To: "kathleen.moriarty@emc.com" <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>,  "draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec.all@tools.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec-03.txt
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---2119685684-1575650744-1325789515=:13158
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Hi Kathleen,=0A=A0=0AThanks for your review.=A0 We'll pick up these editori=
al changes as RFC Editor notes.=0A=A0=0AThanks again,=0AJerry=0A=0A=0A_____=
___________________________=0AFrom: "kathleen.moriarty@emc.com" <kathleen.m=
oriarty@emc.com>=0ATo: gen-art@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org; draft-ash-gcac-algo=
rithm-spec.all@tools.ietf.org =0ACc: gash5107@yahoo.com; dave.mcdysan@veriz=
on.com =0ASent: Wednesday, January 4, 2012 11:03 AM=0ASubject: Gen-ART revi=
ew of draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec-03.txt=0A=0AI am the assigned Gen-ART r=
eviewer for this draft. For background on=0AGen-ART, please see the FAQ at=
=0A<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.=0A=0APlease r=
esolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments=0Ayou may rec=
eive.=0A=0ADocument: draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec-03.txt=0AReviewer: Kathl=
een M. Moriarty=0AReview Date: 1/4/12=0AIETF LC End Date: 1/11/12=0AIESG Te=
lechat date: 1/19/12=0A=0ASummary:=A0 The draft is essentially ready with n=
its.=A0 The last nit could be a minor issue, but has a simple resolution.=
=A0 The security considerations section points out possible attacks and sho=
uld also require logging of events tied to the users/groups responsible for=
 those actions.=0A=0AMajor issues:=0A=0AMinor issues:=0A=0ANits/editorial c=
omments:=0AThe last line of the abstract should be on the previous line.=0A=
=0AOn the second to last paragraph of page 8, the following acronym is list=
ed: emergency traffic (ETS), should there be something for the "S"?=0AThe s=
econd to last sentence of the same paragraph:=0AConsider changing from:=0A"=
Several=0A=A0 assured forwarding (AF) queues may be used for various data t=
raffic,=0A=A0 for example, premium private data traffic, premium public dat=
a=0A=A0 traffic, and a separate best-effort queue is used for the best-effo=
rt=0A=A0 traffic."=0ATo: "Several=0A=A0 assured forwarding (AF) queues may =
be used for various data traffic,=0A=A0 for example, premium private data t=
raffic, premium public data=0A=A0 traffic, and a separate best-effort queue=
 for the best-effort=0A=A0 traffic."=0A=0AFirst paragraph of section 3: Con=
sider removing "however", it doesn't add anything:=0AChange from: "Requirin=
g nodes to expose detailed and=0A=A0 up-to-date CAC information, however, m=
ay result in unacceptably high=0A=A0 rate of routing updates."=0ATo: "Requi=
ring nodes to expose detailed and=0A=A0 up-to-date CAC information may resu=
lt in unacceptably high=0A=A0 rate of routing updates."=0A=0ASecond paragra=
ph of Section 3: Consider removing "and cannot" - it is unnecessary:=0AChan=
ge from: "This common=0A=A0 interpretation is in the form of an MPLS GCAC a=
lgorithm to be=0A=A0 performed during MPLS LSP path selection to determine =
if a link or=0A=A0 node can or cannot be included for consideration."=0ATo:=
 "This common=0A=A0 interpretation is in the form of an MPLS GCAC algorithm=
 to be=0A=A0 performed during MPLS LSP path selection to determine if a lin=
k or=0A=A0 node can be included for consideration."=0A=0ASection 3.2: Consi=
der breaking the first sentence into two:=0A"The assumption behind the MPLS=
 GCAC is that the ratio between BWMck,=0A=A0 which represents the safety ma=
rgin the node is putting above the=0A=A0 SBWck, and the standard deviation =
of the SBWck defined below does not=0A=A0 change significantly as one new a=
ggregate flow is added on the link."=0A=0ASecurity Considerations:=0AI thin=
k a requirement for logging should be specified here as well.=A0 If an atta=
ck were to occur, you will want the user/group and actions taken to be logg=
ed to trace the attack.=A0 Without this, the other enforcement mechanisms a=
re inadequate.=0A=0ASentence that spans page 17-18 should be broken into mu=
ltiple sentences (readable, but long - as is the following sentence):=0A"Fo=
r=0A=A0 example, if aggregate flow requests are made for CT LSP bandwidth=
=0A=A0 that exceeds the current DSTE tunnel bandwidth allocation, the GEF=
=0A=A0 initiates a bandwidth modification request on the appropriate LSP(s)=
,=0A=A0 which may entail increasing the current LSP bandwidth allocation by=
 a=0A=A0 discrete increment of bandwidth denoted here as DBW, where DBW is =
the=0A=A0 additional amount needed by the current aggregate flow request."=
=0A=0AThere is an extra line in the second line of A.1.=0A=0A=0A=0AThanks,=
=0AKathleen
---2119685684-1575650744-1325789515=:13158
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html><body><div style=3D"color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:ar=
ial, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:10pt"><div style=3D"RIGHT: auto"><SPAN=
 style=3D"RIGHT: auto">Hi Kathleen,</SPAN></div>
<div style=3D"RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style=3D"RIGHT: auto"></SPAN>&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style=3D"RIGHT: auto">Thanks for your revi=
ew.&nbsp; We'll pick up these editorial changes as RFC Editor notes.</SPAN>=
</div>
<div style=3D"RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style=3D"RIGHT: auto"></SPAN>&nbsp;</div>
<div style=3D"RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style=3D"RIGHT: auto">Thanks again,</SPAN>=
</div>
<div style=3D"RIGHT: auto"><SPAN style=3D"RIGHT: auto">Jerry<VAR id=3Dyui-i=
e-cursor></VAR></SPAN></div>
<div><BR></div>
<DIV style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; FONT-SIZE: 10pt">
<DIV style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: times new roman, new york, times, serif; FONT-SI=
ZE: 12pt"><FONT size=3D2 face=3DArial>
<DIV style=3D"BORDER-BOTTOM: #ccc 1px solid; BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; P=
ADDING-BOTTOM: 0px; LINE-HEIGHT: 0; MARGIN: 5px 0px; PADDING-LEFT: 0px; PAD=
DING-RIGHT: 0px; HEIGHT: 0px; FONT-SIZE: 0px; BORDER-TOP: #ccc 1px solid; B=
ORDER-RIGHT: #ccc 1px solid; PADDING-TOP: 0px" class=3Dhr contentEditable=
=3Dfalse readonly=3D"true"></DIV><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">From:=
</SPAN></B> "kathleen.moriarty@emc.com" &lt;kathleen.moriarty@emc.com&gt;<B=
R><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">To:</SPAN></B> gen-art@ietf.org; iet=
f@ietf.org; draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec.all@tools.ietf.org <BR><B><SPAN s=
tyle=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Cc:</SPAN></B> gash5107@yahoo.com; dave.mcdysan@=
verizon.com <BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Sent:</SPAN></B> Wedne=
sday, January 4, 2012 11:03 AM<BR><B><SPAN style=3D"FONT-WEIGHT: bold">Subj=
ect:</SPAN></B> Gen-ART review of draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec-03.txt<BR><=
/FONT><BR>I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background
 on<BR>Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at<BR>&lt;<A href=3D"http://wiki.tools.i=
etf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq" target=3D_blank>http://wiki.tools.iet=
f.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq</A>&gt;.<BR><BR>Please resolve these com=
ments along with any other Last Call comments<BR>you may receive.<BR><BR>Do=
cument: draft-ash-gcac-algorithm-spec-03.txt<BR>Reviewer: Kathleen M. Moria=
rty<BR>Review Date: 1/4/12<BR>IETF LC End Date: 1/11/12<BR>IESG Telechat da=
te: 1/19/12<BR><BR>Summary:&nbsp; The draft is essentially ready with nits.=
&nbsp; The last nit could be a minor issue, but has a simple resolution.&nb=
sp; The security considerations section points out possible attacks and sho=
uld also require logging of events tied to the users/groups responsible for=
 those actions.<BR><BR>Major issues:<BR><BR>Minor issues:<BR><BR>Nits/edito=
rial comments:<BR>The last line of the abstract should be on the previous l=
ine.<BR><BR>On the second to last paragraph of page 8, the following
 acronym is listed: emergency traffic (ETS), should there be something for =
the "S"?<BR>The second to last sentence of the same paragraph:<BR>Consider =
changing from:<BR>"Several<BR>&nbsp; assured forwarding (AF) queues may be =
used for various data traffic,<BR>&nbsp; for example, premium private data =
traffic, premium public data<BR>&nbsp; traffic, and a separate best-effort =
queue is used for the best-effort<BR>&nbsp; traffic."<BR>To: "Several<BR>&n=
bsp; assured forwarding (AF) queues may be used for various data traffic,<B=
R>&nbsp; for example, premium private data traffic, premium public data<BR>=
&nbsp; traffic, and a separate best-effort queue for the best-effort<BR>&nb=
sp; traffic."<BR><BR>First paragraph of section 3: Consider removing "howev=
er", it doesn't add anything:<BR>Change from: "Requiring nodes to expose de=
tailed and<BR>&nbsp; up-to-date CAC information, however, may result in una=
cceptably high<BR>&nbsp; rate of routing updates."<BR>To: "Requiring
 nodes to expose detailed and<BR>&nbsp; up-to-date CAC information may resu=
lt in unacceptably high<BR>&nbsp; rate of routing updates."<BR><BR>Second p=
aragraph of Section 3: Consider removing "and cannot" - it is unnecessary:<=
BR>Change from: "This common<BR>&nbsp; interpretation is in the form of an =
MPLS GCAC algorithm to be<BR>&nbsp; performed during MPLS LSP path selectio=
n to determine if a link or<BR>&nbsp; node can or cannot be included for co=
nsideration."<BR>To: "This common<BR>&nbsp; interpretation is in the form o=
f an MPLS GCAC algorithm to be<BR>&nbsp; performed during MPLS LSP path sel=
ection to determine if a link or<BR>&nbsp; node can be included for conside=
ration."<BR><BR>Section 3.2: Consider breaking the first sentence into two:=
<BR>"The assumption behind the MPLS GCAC is that the ratio between BWMck,<B=
R>&nbsp; which represents the safety margin the node is putting above the<B=
R>&nbsp; SBWck, and the standard deviation of the SBWck defined
 below does not<BR>&nbsp; change significantly as one new aggregate flow is=
 added on the link."<BR><BR>Security Considerations:<BR>I think a requireme=
nt for logging should be specified here as well.&nbsp; If an attack were to=
 occur, you will want the user/group and actions taken to be logged to trac=
e the attack.&nbsp; Without this, the other enforcement mechanisms are inad=
equate.<BR><BR>Sentence that spans page 17-18 should be broken into multipl=
e sentences (readable, but long - as is the following sentence):<BR>"For<BR=
>&nbsp; example, if aggregate flow requests are made for CT LSP bandwidth<B=
R>&nbsp; that exceeds the current DSTE tunnel bandwidth allocation, the GEF=
<BR>&nbsp; initiates a bandwidth modification request on the appropriate LS=
P(s),<BR>&nbsp; which may entail increasing the current LSP bandwidth alloc=
ation by a<BR>&nbsp; discrete increment of bandwidth denoted here as DBW, w=
here DBW is the<BR>&nbsp; additional amount needed by the current
 aggregate flow request."<BR><BR>There is an extra line in the second line =
of A.1.<BR><BR><BR><BR>Thanks,<BR>Kathleen<BR><BR><BR><BR></DIV></DIV></div=
></body></html>
---2119685684-1575650744-1325789515=:13158--

From ben@nostrum.com  Thu Jan  5 14:32:48 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on =
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at =
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments =
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
Reviewer: Ben Campbell
Review Date: 2012-01-05
IETF LC End Date:2012-01-05
IESG Telechat date: (if known)

Summary: This draft is on the right track for publication as a proposed =
standard. However, there are a few minor issues, and sufficient =
editorial issues to make the document difficult to understand.=20

*** I noticed shortly before sending this that the authors submitted =
version 07 today. I have not reviewed that version--this review refers =
to version 06.

Major issues:

None

Minor issues:

-- section 3.2, last paragraph:  "=85 needs to correlate the TCP session =
from the SASL client with the SAML authentication."

Please elaborate on this correlation

-- section 4, 2nd paragraph: "The SAML Idenity Provider does not have a =
role in GSS-API, and is considered an internal matter for the OpenID =
mechanism."

Please elaborate, as this is the only mention of OpenID in the draft. It =
seems out of context.  (If OpenID was in fact intended, please include a =
citation?)

-- section 4, 3rd and 4th paragraph (paragraph a and b)

These seem like protocol affecting differences. If so, they need =
elaboration, such as normative statements and formal definitions, or =
references to such.

-- section 5, general:

The section seems to need further elaboration or references

-- section 6.1, step 5 (alt)

Please describe the circumstances where the alternative step would =
occur. (also, please spell out "alternative")=20

-- section 6.1, step 6: "The client now sends the URL to a browser for =
processing."

Isn't that a question of software design rather than protocol? (unless =
you mean something more abstract by "browser", in which case it would =
help to say so.)

Also, this section compresses the interaction with the identity =
provider. Why not show the details for those steps like the others? (If =
you mean them to be out of scope, then why give as much detail as you =
do?)

-- section 6.2:

The draft does not provide the decoding of the Base64 encoded parts like =
it did in 6.1, Without the decodes, the example is not very =
illuminating.

-- section 7.4: "This is an option the user has to understand and decide =
to use if the IdP is supporting it."

I doubt end users will read this spec. What does this mean for =
implementors?



Nits/editorial comments:

-- General:

There are a lot of editorial and organizational issues, some of which =
created difficulty in understanding the authors' intent. I noted a =
number of these below, but I doubt I caught everything. I suggest this =
draft have another detailed proofreading and editing pass before it =
progresses.

-- Pagination is strange throughout the document. (Mostly blank pages, =
etc.) It's worse in the PDF version, but still not right in the text =
version.

-- section 1.1, 2nd paragraph:

Repeating the SAML 2.0 citation here would be helpful.

-- section 1.2, 1st paragraph

The sentence structure makes it ambiguous whether the other side of the =
or should be just certificate validation, or TLS with cert validation.=20=


-- section 2, list starting in 2nd paragraph:

Please leave a blank line between list items. Without it, you get a =
wall-of-text effect that's difficult to read.

-- section 2, list item 3:

Is "service provider" a well defined term as used here?

-- section 2, paragraph after 1st numbered list: "This will be discussed =
below. The steps are shown from below:"

Redundant sentences. Also, I assume the discussion has already been =
written, so "will be" is not correct.

-- section 2, 2nd paragraph after 2nd numbered list: "=85 flow appears =
as follows:"

Please explicitly mention the figure number. E.g. "=85 flow appears as =
shown in Figure XX."

-- section 2, figure 2:

The numbers in parentheses are confusing. We just saw a numbered list =
that sort of corresponds to this flow, but the numbers don't match up. I =
realize later sections refer back to these numbers, but without some =
mention of that, a reader is almost certainly going to try to correlate =
this to the previous list.

-- section 3, 1st paragraph: "Recall section 5 of [RFC4422] for what =
needs to be described here."

That reads like an author's "to do" note to himself. Has the needed =
description been completed, or does it still need to be described?

-- section 3, 2nd paragraph: "The name of this mechanism "SAML20"."

Missing word?

-- "(via "gs2-header")"

Missing word?

-- section 3, 3rd paragraph: "The first mechanism message from the =
client to the server is the "initial-response" described below."

Please explicitly mention section.=20

-- section 3, 4th paragraph: "The second mechanism message is from the =
server to the client, the "authentication- request" described below."

I can't parse this sentence--are there missing words? Also, please =
mention section instead of saying "below".

-- section 3.1, first paragraph:

Is "authorization identifier" the same as "IdP-Identifier"?

-- section 3.1, ABNF

Is this the authoritative definition for "initial-response"? If so, =
please mention that in the text. The including section does not mention =
"initial-response"

-- section 3.1, last paragraph:

Used as follows where, the rest of this paragraph? If so, then the "used =
as follows" clause is redundant. Also, the paragraph would be much =
easier to read if you broke it into a bulleted list.

The 3rd sentence is awkward. I suggest something like "The =85 field is =
used as described in section 5."

Is there a word missing from the forth sentence?=20

-- section 3.2, 1st paragraph:

s/ (re)directs/ redirects . Also, what gets redirected (i.e. what is the =
direct object of "redirects"?)

-- section 3.2, 3rd paragraph (2nd note)

I can't parse this.

-- section 3.2, BNF

Is this the formal definition of authentication-request? The next =
paragraph suggests it is defined in a referenced document. If so, then =
the repeated definition creates confusion about which document is =
authoritative on the matter. (if the definition is repeated here as a =
courtesy, please say so explicitly)

-- section 3.2, 6th paragraph: "The client now sends=85"

s/now/then. Also, It seems like these sections jump back and forth =
between message definitions and a sequence of steps. I find that =
confusing. It would be better to keep the "sequence of steps" and the =
"message definitions" separate. But if you want each section to =
represent one or more steps in a sequence, then please add some context =
(e.g. "Once the widget completes the steps in section XXX, it then =85" =
). Keep in mind readers often jump directly to a section from the table =
of contents.

-- section 3.3, 2nd paragraph:  "and SHALL be used to set state in the =
server accordingly, and it shall be used by the server"

Is this new normative language, or a repeat of language from the SAML =
spec?

-- section 4, 1st paragraph:

I have difficulty parsing this.

-- section 4, 2nd paragraph, final sentence:

sentence fragment.

-- section 5, 1st sentence: 'The "gs2-cb-flag" MUST use "n" '

=85 MUST be set to "n"? (Or even better, 'the [actor] MUST set the =
[flag] to "n" '

-- section 7 " This section will address=85"

Addresses ( unless you haven't addressed it yet)

Also, does the GSS-API description introduce security considerations? If =
not, please say so.

-- section 7.1, "=85 unless a client always verify the server identity=85 =
"

s/verify/verifies

-- section 7.3: "SASL servers should be aware that SAML IdPs will track =
- to some extent - user access to their services."

I'm not sure what it means for a server to be aware of this sort of =
thing. You are talking about people, not servers, right? What actions do =
you propose implementors take to mitigate this?

-- section 7.4:

s/you/users

"By using the same identifier to log into every Relying Party, collusion =
between Relying Parties is possible."

But this isn't the Relying Party's decision, it is? I think you mean to =
say, if the client (or user) does this, it create a vulnerability where =
the Relying Parties can collude=85

-- section 8:

I suggest breaking each IANA requested action into its own subsection. =
Otherwise the second action looks like an afterthought, or a comment on =
the first.













From mahoney@nostrum.com  Thu Jan  5 16:43:22 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] A *new* batch of IETF LC reviews - 2012-01-05
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Hi all,

Here's the link to the new LC assignments:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/reviewers-120105-lc.html

The assignments are captured in the spreadsheets:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art.html
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art-by-reviewer.html

I've trimmed the spreadsheets to reflect 2012 assignments. Closed 
assignments can be found here:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/2011%20Assignments/

And I have made the assignments in the review tool:
http://art.tools.ietf.org/tools/art/genart/

The standard template is included below.

Happy new year!

Jean

-------------------------------------------------------------------

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
you may receive.

Document:
Reviewer:
Review Date:
IETF LC End Date:
IESG Telechat date: (if known)

Summary:

Major issues:

Minor issues:

Nits/editorial comments:

From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Fri Jan  6 02:08:37 2012
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Date: Fri, 06 Jan 2012 10:08:22 +0000
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Klaas Wierenga <klaas@cisco.com>
References: <3D6A7926-001A-409D-BC01-B45AD8C68AEC@nostrum.com> <E1CB18A3-CCFC-4039-AB7C-173639A31B23@cisco.com>
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Cc: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, "gen-art@ietf.org Review Team" <gen-art@ietf.org>, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@MIT.EDU>, draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml.all@tools.ietf.org, "kitten-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <kitten-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
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Hi Klaas,

Looks like those would justify a revised ID. If you've
time to do that in the next week then please go ahead
and shoot out a new version. IESG folk won't have
started reviewing it before then probably and this
review would probably generate a discuss or comment
we'd want to fix anyway.

Cheers,
S.

PS: I cc'd Sam Hartman who's the assigned secdir
reviewer. Be good if you can let him know if you
plan to do a new rev before he does his review.

On 01/06/2012 09:53 AM, Klaas Wierenga wrote:
> Ben,
>
> Thanks for your thorough review!
>
> Klaas
>
> On Jan 5, 2012, at 11:32 PM, Ben Campbell wrote:
>
>>
>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>
>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you may receive.
>>
>> Document: draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
>> Reviewer: Ben Campbell
>> Review Date: 2012-01-05
>> IETF LC End Date:2012-01-05
>> IESG Telechat date: (if known)
>>
>> Summary: This draft is on the right track for publication as a proposed standard. However, there are a few minor issues, and sufficient editorial issues to make the document difficult to understand.
>>
>> *** I noticed shortly before sending this that the authors submitted version 07 today. I have not reviewed that version--this review refers to version 06.
>>
>> Major issues:
>>
>> None
>>
>> Minor issues:
>>
>> -- section 3.2, last paragraph:  "� needs to correlate the TCP session from the SASL client with the SAML authentication."
>>
>> Please elaborate on this correlation
>>
>> -- section 4, 2nd paragraph: "The SAML Idenity Provider does not have a role in GSS-API, and is considered an internal matter for the OpenID mechanism."
>>
>> Please elaborate, as this is the only mention of OpenID in the draft. It seems out of context.  (If OpenID was in fact intended, please include a citation?)
>>
>> -- section 4, 3rd and 4th paragraph (paragraph a and b)
>>
>> These seem like protocol affecting differences. If so, they need elaboration, such as normative statements and formal definitions, or references to such.
>>
>> -- section 5, general:
>>
>> The section seems to need further elaboration or references
>>
>> -- section 6.1, step 5 (alt)
>>
>> Please describe the circumstances where the alternative step would occur. (also, please spell out "alternative")
>>
>> -- section 6.1, step 6: "The client now sends the URL to a browser for processing."
>>
>> Isn't that a question of software design rather than protocol? (unless you mean something more abstract by "browser", in which case it would help to say so.)
>>
>> Also, this section compresses the interaction with the identity provider. Why not show the details for those steps like the others? (If you mean them to be out of scope, then why give as much detail as you do?)
>>
>> -- section 6.2:
>>
>> The draft does not provide the decoding of the Base64 encoded parts like it did in 6.1, Without the decodes, the example is not very illuminating.
>>
>> -- section 7.4: "This is an option the user has to understand and decide to use if the IdP is supporting it."
>>
>> I doubt end users will read this spec. What does this mean for implementors?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>
>> -- General:
>>
>> There are a lot of editorial and organizational issues, some of which created difficulty in understanding the authors' intent. I noted a number of these below, but I doubt I caught everything. I suggest this draft have another detailed proofreading and editing pass before it progresses.
>>
>> -- Pagination is strange throughout the document. (Mostly blank pages, etc.) It's worse in the PDF version, but still not right in the text version.
>>
>> -- section 1.1, 2nd paragraph:
>>
>> Repeating the SAML 2.0 citation here would be helpful.
>>
>> -- section 1.2, 1st paragraph
>>
>> The sentence structure makes it ambiguous whether the other side of the or should be just certificate validation, or TLS with cert validation.
>>
>> -- section 2, list starting in 2nd paragraph:
>>
>> Please leave a blank line between list items. Without it, you get a wall-of-text effect that's difficult to read.
>>
>> -- section 2, list item 3:
>>
>> Is "service provider" a well defined term as used here?
>>
>> -- section 2, paragraph after 1st numbered list: "This will be discussed below. The steps are shown from below:"
>>
>> Redundant sentences. Also, I assume the discussion has already been written, so "will be" is not correct.
>>
>> -- section 2, 2nd paragraph after 2nd numbered list: "� flow appears as follows:"
>>
>> Please explicitly mention the figure number. E.g. "� flow appears as shown in Figure XX."
>>
>> -- section 2, figure 2:
>>
>> The numbers in parentheses are confusing. We just saw a numbered list that sort of corresponds to this flow, but the numbers don't match up. I realize later sections refer back to these numbers, but without some mention of that, a reader is almost certainly going to try to correlate this to the previous list.
>>
>> -- section 3, 1st paragraph: "Recall section 5 of [RFC4422] for what needs to be described here."
>>
>> That reads like an author's "to do" note to himself. Has the needed description been completed, or does it still need to be described?
>>
>> -- section 3, 2nd paragraph: "The name of this mechanism "SAML20"."
>>
>> Missing word?
>>
>> -- "(via "gs2-header")"
>>
>> Missing word?
>>
>> -- section 3, 3rd paragraph: "The first mechanism message from the client to the server is the "initial-response" described below."
>>
>> Please explicitly mention section.
>>
>> -- section 3, 4th paragraph: "The second mechanism message is from the server to the client, the "authentication- request" described below."
>>
>> I can't parse this sentence--are there missing words? Also, please mention section instead of saying "below".
>>
>> -- section 3.1, first paragraph:
>>
>> Is "authorization identifier" the same as "IdP-Identifier"?
>>
>> -- section 3.1, ABNF
>>
>> Is this the authoritative definition for "initial-response"? If so, please mention that in the text. The including section does not mention "initial-response"
>>
>> -- section 3.1, last paragraph:
>>
>> Used as follows where, the rest of this paragraph? If so, then the "used as follows" clause is redundant. Also, the paragraph would be much easier to read if you broke it into a bulleted list.
>>
>> The 3rd sentence is awkward. I suggest something like "The � field is used as described in section 5."
>>
>> Is there a word missing from the forth sentence?
>>
>> -- section 3.2, 1st paragraph:
>>
>> s/ (re)directs/ redirects . Also, what gets redirected (i.e. what is the direct object of "redirects"?)
>>
>> -- section 3.2, 3rd paragraph (2nd note)
>>
>> I can't parse this.
>>
>> -- section 3.2, BNF
>>
>> Is this the formal definition of authentication-request? The next paragraph suggests it is defined in a referenced document. If so, then the repeated definition creates confusion about which document is authoritative on the matter. (if the definition is repeated here as a courtesy, please say so explicitly)
>>
>> -- section 3.2, 6th paragraph: "The client now sends�"
>>
>> s/now/then. Also, It seems like these sections jump back and forth between message definitions and a sequence of steps. I find that confusing. It would be better to keep the "sequence of steps" and the "message definitions" separate. But if you want each section to represent one or more steps in a sequence, then please add some context (e.g. "Once the widget completes the steps in section XXX, it then �" ). Keep in mind readers often jump directly to a section from the table of contents.
>>
>> -- section 3.3, 2nd paragraph:  "and SHALL be used to set state in the server accordingly, and it shall be used by the server"
>>
>> Is this new normative language, or a repeat of language from the SAML spec?
>>
>> -- section 4, 1st paragraph:
>>
>> I have difficulty parsing this.
>>
>> -- section 4, 2nd paragraph, final sentence:
>>
>> sentence fragment.
>>
>> -- section 5, 1st sentence: 'The "gs2-cb-flag" MUST use "n" '
>>
>> � MUST be set to "n"? (Or even better, 'the [actor] MUST set the [flag] to "n" '
>>
>> -- section 7 " This section will address�"
>>
>> Addresses ( unless you haven't addressed it yet)
>>
>> Also, does the GSS-API description introduce security considerations? If not, please say so.
>>
>> -- section 7.1, "� unless a client always verify the server identity� "
>>
>> s/verify/verifies
>>
>> -- section 7.3: "SASL servers should be aware that SAML IdPs will track - to some extent - user access to their services."
>>
>> I'm not sure what it means for a server to be aware of this sort of thing. You are talking about people, not servers, right? What actions do you propose implementors take to mitigate this?
>>
>> -- section 7.4:
>>
>> s/you/users
>>
>> "By using the same identifier to log into every Relying Party, collusion between Relying Parties is possible."
>>
>> But this isn't the Relying Party's decision, it is? I think you mean to say, if the client (or user) does this, it create a vulnerability where the Relying Parties can collude�
>>
>> -- section 8:
>>
>> I suggest breaking each IANA requested action into its own subsection. Otherwise the second action looks like an afterthought, or a comment on the first.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

From stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie  Fri Jan  6 02:14:26 2012
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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To: Klaas Wierenga <klaas@cisco.com>
References: <3D6A7926-001A-409D-BC01-B45AD8C68AEC@nostrum.com> <E1CB18A3-CCFC-4039-AB7C-173639A31B23@cisco.com> <4F06C816.7040603@cs.tcd.ie> <AD07C951-C8F5-447C-B698-478B669E3DFF@cisco.com>
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Cc: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, "gen-art@ietf.org Review Team" <gen-art@ietf.org>, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@MIT.EDU>, draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml.all@tools.ietf.org, "kitten-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <kitten-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
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On 01/06/2012 10:12 AM, Klaas Wierenga wrote:
> Hi Stephen,
>
> I think I'll be able to crank out a new version before the end of next week.

Great.

 > I don't think that should stop Sam however from doing a security 
review as soon when he is up for it, most comments appear to be cosmetic.

Well, at least he now has the choice and won't be peeved
if your new one pops out when he half-way done;-)

S.

>
> Klaas
>
>
> On Jan 6, 2012, at 11:08 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
>>
>> Hi Klaas,
>>
>> Looks like those would justify a revised ID. If you've
>> time to do that in the next week then please go ahead
>> and shoot out a new version. IESG folk won't have
>> started reviewing it before then probably and this
>> review would probably generate a discuss or comment
>> we'd want to fix anyway.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>>
>> PS: I cc'd Sam Hartman who's the assigned secdir
>> reviewer. Be good if you can let him know if you
>> plan to do a new rev before he does his review.
>>
>> On 01/06/2012 09:53 AM, Klaas Wierenga wrote:
>>> Ben,
>>>
>>> Thanks for your thorough review!
>>>
>>> Klaas
>>>
>>> On Jan 5, 2012, at 11:32 PM, Ben Campbell wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>>
>>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you may receive.
>>>>
>>>> Document: draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
>>>> Reviewer: Ben Campbell
>>>> Review Date: 2012-01-05
>>>> IETF LC End Date:2012-01-05
>>>> IESG Telechat date: (if known)
>>>>
>>>> Summary: This draft is on the right track for publication as a proposed standard. However, there are a few minor issues, and sufficient editorial issues to make the document difficult to understand.
>>>>
>>>> *** I noticed shortly before sending this that the authors submitted version 07 today. I have not reviewed that version--this review refers to version 06.
>>>>
>>>> Major issues:
>>>>
>>>> None
>>>>
>>>> Minor issues:
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.2, last paragraph:  "� needs to correlate the TCP session from the SASL client with the SAML authentication."
>>>>
>>>> Please elaborate on this correlation
>>>>
>>>> -- section 4, 2nd paragraph: "The SAML Idenity Provider does not have a role in GSS-API, and is considered an internal matter for the OpenID mechanism."
>>>>
>>>> Please elaborate, as this is the only mention of OpenID in the draft. It seems out of context.  (If OpenID was in fact intended, please include a citation?)
>>>>
>>>> -- section 4, 3rd and 4th paragraph (paragraph a and b)
>>>>
>>>> These seem like protocol affecting differences. If so, they need elaboration, such as normative statements and formal definitions, or references to such.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 5, general:
>>>>
>>>> The section seems to need further elaboration or references
>>>>
>>>> -- section 6.1, step 5 (alt)
>>>>
>>>> Please describe the circumstances where the alternative step would occur. (also, please spell out "alternative")
>>>>
>>>> -- section 6.1, step 6: "The client now sends the URL to a browser for processing."
>>>>
>>>> Isn't that a question of software design rather than protocol? (unless you mean something more abstract by "browser", in which case it would help to say so.)
>>>>
>>>> Also, this section compresses the interaction with the identity provider. Why not show the details for those steps like the others? (If you mean them to be out of scope, then why give as much detail as you do?)
>>>>
>>>> -- section 6.2:
>>>>
>>>> The draft does not provide the decoding of the Base64 encoded parts like it did in 6.1, Without the decodes, the example is not very illuminating.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 7.4: "This is an option the user has to understand and decide to use if the IdP is supporting it."
>>>>
>>>> I doubt end users will read this spec. What does this mean for implementors?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>>
>>>> -- General:
>>>>
>>>> There are a lot of editorial and organizational issues, some of which created difficulty in understanding the authors' intent. I noted a number of these below, but I doubt I caught everything. I suggest this draft have another detailed proofreading and editing pass before it progresses.
>>>>
>>>> -- Pagination is strange throughout the document. (Mostly blank pages, etc.) It's worse in the PDF version, but still not right in the text version.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 1.1, 2nd paragraph:
>>>>
>>>> Repeating the SAML 2.0 citation here would be helpful.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 1.2, 1st paragraph
>>>>
>>>> The sentence structure makes it ambiguous whether the other side of the or should be just certificate validation, or TLS with cert validation.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 2, list starting in 2nd paragraph:
>>>>
>>>> Please leave a blank line between list items. Without it, you get a wall-of-text effect that's difficult to read.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 2, list item 3:
>>>>
>>>> Is "service provider" a well defined term as used here?
>>>>
>>>> -- section 2, paragraph after 1st numbered list: "This will be discussed below. The steps are shown from below:"
>>>>
>>>> Redundant sentences. Also, I assume the discussion has already been written, so "will be" is not correct.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 2, 2nd paragraph after 2nd numbered list: "� flow appears as follows:"
>>>>
>>>> Please explicitly mention the figure number. E.g. "� flow appears as shown in Figure XX."
>>>>
>>>> -- section 2, figure 2:
>>>>
>>>> The numbers in parentheses are confusing. We just saw a numbered list that sort of corresponds to this flow, but the numbers don't match up. I realize later sections refer back to these numbers, but without some mention of that, a reader is almost certainly going to try to correlate this to the previous list.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3, 1st paragraph: "Recall section 5 of [RFC4422] for what needs to be described here."
>>>>
>>>> That reads like an author's "to do" note to himself. Has the needed description been completed, or does it still need to be described?
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3, 2nd paragraph: "The name of this mechanism "SAML20"."
>>>>
>>>> Missing word?
>>>>
>>>> -- "(via "gs2-header")"
>>>>
>>>> Missing word?
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3, 3rd paragraph: "The first mechanism message from the client to the server is the "initial-response" described below."
>>>>
>>>> Please explicitly mention section.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3, 4th paragraph: "The second mechanism message is from the server to the client, the "authentication- request" described below."
>>>>
>>>> I can't parse this sentence--are there missing words? Also, please mention section instead of saying "below".
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.1, first paragraph:
>>>>
>>>> Is "authorization identifier" the same as "IdP-Identifier"?
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.1, ABNF
>>>>
>>>> Is this the authoritative definition for "initial-response"? If so, please mention that in the text. The including section does not mention "initial-response"
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.1, last paragraph:
>>>>
>>>> Used as follows where, the rest of this paragraph? If so, then the "used as follows" clause is redundant. Also, the paragraph would be much easier to read if you broke it into a bulleted list.
>>>>
>>>> The 3rd sentence is awkward. I suggest something like "The � field is used as described in section 5."
>>>>
>>>> Is there a word missing from the forth sentence?
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.2, 1st paragraph:
>>>>
>>>> s/ (re)directs/ redirects . Also, what gets redirected (i.e. what is the direct object of "redirects"?)
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.2, 3rd paragraph (2nd note)
>>>>
>>>> I can't parse this.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.2, BNF
>>>>
>>>> Is this the formal definition of authentication-request? The next paragraph suggests it is defined in a referenced document. If so, then the repeated definition creates confusion about which document is authoritative on the matter. (if the definition is repeated here as a courtesy, please say so explicitly)
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.2, 6th paragraph: "The client now sends�"
>>>>
>>>> s/now/then. Also, It seems like these sections jump back and forth between message definitions and a sequence of steps. I find that confusing. It would be better to keep the "sequence of steps" and the "message definitions" separate. But if you want each section to represent one or more steps in a sequence, then please add some context (e.g. "Once the widget completes the steps in section XXX, it then �" ). Keep in mind readers often jump directly to a section from the table of contents.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 3.3, 2nd paragraph:  "and SHALL be used to set state in the server accordingly, and it shall be used by the server"
>>>>
>>>> Is this new normative language, or a repeat of language from the SAML spec?
>>>>
>>>> -- section 4, 1st paragraph:
>>>>
>>>> I have difficulty parsing this.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 4, 2nd paragraph, final sentence:
>>>>
>>>> sentence fragment.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 5, 1st sentence: 'The "gs2-cb-flag" MUST use "n" '
>>>>
>>>> � MUST be set to "n"? (Or even better, 'the [actor] MUST set the [flag] to "n" '
>>>>
>>>> -- section 7 " This section will address�"
>>>>
>>>> Addresses ( unless you haven't addressed it yet)
>>>>
>>>> Also, does the GSS-API description introduce security considerations? If not, please say so.
>>>>
>>>> -- section 7.1, "� unless a client always verify the server identity� "
>>>>
>>>> s/verify/verifies
>>>>
>>>> -- section 7.3: "SASL servers should be aware that SAML IdPs will track - to some extent - user access to their services."
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure what it means for a server to be aware of this sort of thing. You are talking about people, not servers, right? What actions do you propose implementors take to mitigate this?
>>>>
>>>> -- section 7.4:
>>>>
>>>> s/you/users
>>>>
>>>> "By using the same identifier to log into every Relying Party, collusion between Relying Parties is possible."
>>>>
>>>> But this isn't the Relying Party's decision, it is? I think you mean to say, if the client (or user) does this, it create a vulnerability where the Relying Parties can collude�
>>>>
>>>> -- section 8:
>>>>
>>>> I suggest breaking each IANA requested action into its own subsection. Otherwise the second action looks like an afterthought, or a comment on the first.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>

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To: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Cc: "gen-art@ietf.org Review Team" <gen-art@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
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Ben,

Thanks for your thorough review!

Klaas

On Jan 5, 2012, at 11:32 PM, Ben Campbell wrote:

>=20
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on =
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at =
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments =
you may receive.
>=20
> Document: draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
> Reviewer: Ben Campbell
> Review Date: 2012-01-05
> IETF LC End Date:2012-01-05
> IESG Telechat date: (if known)
>=20
> Summary: This draft is on the right track for publication as a =
proposed standard. However, there are a few minor issues, and sufficient =
editorial issues to make the document difficult to understand.=20
>=20
> *** I noticed shortly before sending this that the authors submitted =
version 07 today. I have not reviewed that version--this review refers =
to version 06.
>=20
> Major issues:
>=20
> None
>=20
> Minor issues:
>=20
> -- section 3.2, last paragraph:  "=85 needs to correlate the TCP =
session from the SASL client with the SAML authentication."
>=20
> Please elaborate on this correlation
>=20
> -- section 4, 2nd paragraph: "The SAML Idenity Provider does not have =
a role in GSS-API, and is considered an internal matter for the OpenID =
mechanism."
>=20
> Please elaborate, as this is the only mention of OpenID in the draft. =
It seems out of context.  (If OpenID was in fact intended, please =
include a citation?)
>=20
> -- section 4, 3rd and 4th paragraph (paragraph a and b)
>=20
> These seem like protocol affecting differences. If so, they need =
elaboration, such as normative statements and formal definitions, or =
references to such.
>=20
> -- section 5, general:
>=20
> The section seems to need further elaboration or references
>=20
> -- section 6.1, step 5 (alt)
>=20
> Please describe the circumstances where the alternative step would =
occur. (also, please spell out "alternative")=20
>=20
> -- section 6.1, step 6: "The client now sends the URL to a browser for =
processing."
>=20
> Isn't that a question of software design rather than protocol? (unless =
you mean something more abstract by "browser", in which case it would =
help to say so.)
>=20
> Also, this section compresses the interaction with the identity =
provider. Why not show the details for those steps like the others? (If =
you mean them to be out of scope, then why give as much detail as you =
do?)
>=20
> -- section 6.2:
>=20
> The draft does not provide the decoding of the Base64 encoded parts =
like it did in 6.1, Without the decodes, the example is not very =
illuminating.
>=20
> -- section 7.4: "This is an option the user has to understand and =
decide to use if the IdP is supporting it."
>=20
> I doubt end users will read this spec. What does this mean for =
implementors?
>=20
>=20
>=20
> Nits/editorial comments:
>=20
> -- General:
>=20
> There are a lot of editorial and organizational issues, some of which =
created difficulty in understanding the authors' intent. I noted a =
number of these below, but I doubt I caught everything. I suggest this =
draft have another detailed proofreading and editing pass before it =
progresses.
>=20
> -- Pagination is strange throughout the document. (Mostly blank pages, =
etc.) It's worse in the PDF version, but still not right in the text =
version.
>=20
> -- section 1.1, 2nd paragraph:
>=20
> Repeating the SAML 2.0 citation here would be helpful.
>=20
> -- section 1.2, 1st paragraph
>=20
> The sentence structure makes it ambiguous whether the other side of =
the or should be just certificate validation, or TLS with cert =
validation.=20
>=20
> -- section 2, list starting in 2nd paragraph:
>=20
> Please leave a blank line between list items. Without it, you get a =
wall-of-text effect that's difficult to read.
>=20
> -- section 2, list item 3:
>=20
> Is "service provider" a well defined term as used here?
>=20
> -- section 2, paragraph after 1st numbered list: "This will be =
discussed below. The steps are shown from below:"
>=20
> Redundant sentences. Also, I assume the discussion has already been =
written, so "will be" is not correct.
>=20
> -- section 2, 2nd paragraph after 2nd numbered list: "=85 flow appears =
as follows:"
>=20
> Please explicitly mention the figure number. E.g. "=85 flow appears as =
shown in Figure XX."
>=20
> -- section 2, figure 2:
>=20
> The numbers in parentheses are confusing. We just saw a numbered list =
that sort of corresponds to this flow, but the numbers don't match up. I =
realize later sections refer back to these numbers, but without some =
mention of that, a reader is almost certainly going to try to correlate =
this to the previous list.
>=20
> -- section 3, 1st paragraph: "Recall section 5 of [RFC4422] for what =
needs to be described here."
>=20
> That reads like an author's "to do" note to himself. Has the needed =
description been completed, or does it still need to be described?
>=20
> -- section 3, 2nd paragraph: "The name of this mechanism "SAML20"."
>=20
> Missing word?
>=20
> -- "(via "gs2-header")"
>=20
> Missing word?
>=20
> -- section 3, 3rd paragraph: "The first mechanism message from the =
client to the server is the "initial-response" described below."
>=20
> Please explicitly mention section.=20
>=20
> -- section 3, 4th paragraph: "The second mechanism message is from the =
server to the client, the "authentication- request" described below."
>=20
> I can't parse this sentence--are there missing words? Also, please =
mention section instead of saying "below".
>=20
> -- section 3.1, first paragraph:
>=20
> Is "authorization identifier" the same as "IdP-Identifier"?
>=20
> -- section 3.1, ABNF
>=20
> Is this the authoritative definition for "initial-response"? If so, =
please mention that in the text. The including section does not mention =
"initial-response"
>=20
> -- section 3.1, last paragraph:
>=20
> Used as follows where, the rest of this paragraph? If so, then the =
"used as follows" clause is redundant. Also, the paragraph would be much =
easier to read if you broke it into a bulleted list.
>=20
> The 3rd sentence is awkward. I suggest something like "The =85 field =
is used as described in section 5."
>=20
> Is there a word missing from the forth sentence?=20
>=20
> -- section 3.2, 1st paragraph:
>=20
> s/ (re)directs/ redirects . Also, what gets redirected (i.e. what is =
the direct object of "redirects"?)
>=20
> -- section 3.2, 3rd paragraph (2nd note)
>=20
> I can't parse this.
>=20
> -- section 3.2, BNF
>=20
> Is this the formal definition of authentication-request? The next =
paragraph suggests it is defined in a referenced document. If so, then =
the repeated definition creates confusion about which document is =
authoritative on the matter. (if the definition is repeated here as a =
courtesy, please say so explicitly)
>=20
> -- section 3.2, 6th paragraph: "The client now sends=85"
>=20
> s/now/then. Also, It seems like these sections jump back and forth =
between message definitions and a sequence of steps. I find that =
confusing. It would be better to keep the "sequence of steps" and the =
"message definitions" separate. But if you want each section to =
represent one or more steps in a sequence, then please add some context =
(e.g. "Once the widget completes the steps in section XXX, it then =85" =
). Keep in mind readers often jump directly to a section from the table =
of contents.
>=20
> -- section 3.3, 2nd paragraph:  "and SHALL be used to set state in the =
server accordingly, and it shall be used by the server"
>=20
> Is this new normative language, or a repeat of language from the SAML =
spec?
>=20
> -- section 4, 1st paragraph:
>=20
> I have difficulty parsing this.
>=20
> -- section 4, 2nd paragraph, final sentence:
>=20
> sentence fragment.
>=20
> -- section 5, 1st sentence: 'The "gs2-cb-flag" MUST use "n" '
>=20
> =85 MUST be set to "n"? (Or even better, 'the [actor] MUST set the =
[flag] to "n" '
>=20
> -- section 7 " This section will address=85"
>=20
> Addresses ( unless you haven't addressed it yet)
>=20
> Also, does the GSS-API description introduce security considerations? =
If not, please say so.
>=20
> -- section 7.1, "=85 unless a client always verify the server =
identity=85 "
>=20
> s/verify/verifies
>=20
> -- section 7.3: "SASL servers should be aware that SAML IdPs will =
track - to some extent - user access to their services."
>=20
> I'm not sure what it means for a server to be aware of this sort of =
thing. You are talking about people, not servers, right? What actions do =
you propose implementors take to mitigate this?
>=20
> -- section 7.4:
>=20
> s/you/users
>=20
> "By using the same identifier to log into every Relying Party, =
collusion between Relying Parties is possible."
>=20
> But this isn't the Relying Party's decision, it is? I think you mean =
to say, if the client (or user) does this, it create a vulnerability =
where the Relying Parties can collude=85
>=20
> -- section 8:
>=20
> I suggest breaking each IANA requested action into its own subsection. =
Otherwise the second action looks like an afterthought, or a comment on =
the first.
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20
>=20


From klaas@cisco.com  Fri Jan  6 02:12:39 2012
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References: <3D6A7926-001A-409D-BC01-B45AD8C68AEC@nostrum.com> <E1CB18A3-CCFC-4039-AB7C-173639A31B23@cisco.com> <4F06C816.7040603@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, "gen-art@ietf.org Review Team" <gen-art@ietf.org>, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@MIT.EDU>, draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml.all@tools.ietf.org, "kitten-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <kitten-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
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Hi Stephen,

I think I'll be able to crank out a new version before the end of next =
week. I don't think that should stop Sam however from doing a security =
review as soon when he is up for it, most comments appear to be =
cosmetic.

Klaas


On Jan 6, 2012, at 11:08 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:

>=20
> Hi Klaas,
>=20
> Looks like those would justify a revised ID. If you've
> time to do that in the next week then please go ahead
> and shoot out a new version. IESG folk won't have
> started reviewing it before then probably and this
> review would probably generate a discuss or comment
> we'd want to fix anyway.
>=20
> Cheers,
> S.
>=20
> PS: I cc'd Sam Hartman who's the assigned secdir
> reviewer. Be good if you can let him know if you
> plan to do a new rev before he does his review.
>=20
> On 01/06/2012 09:53 AM, Klaas Wierenga wrote:
>> Ben,
>>=20
>> Thanks for your thorough review!
>>=20
>> Klaas
>>=20
>> On Jan 5, 2012, at 11:32 PM, Ben Campbell wrote:
>>=20
>>>=20
>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on =
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ =
at<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>=20
>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call =
comments you may receive.
>>>=20
>>> Document: draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-06
>>> Reviewer: Ben Campbell
>>> Review Date: 2012-01-05
>>> IETF LC End Date:2012-01-05
>>> IESG Telechat date: (if known)
>>>=20
>>> Summary: This draft is on the right track for publication as a =
proposed standard. However, there are a few minor issues, and sufficient =
editorial issues to make the document difficult to understand.
>>>=20
>>> *** I noticed shortly before sending this that the authors submitted =
version 07 today. I have not reviewed that version--this review refers =
to version 06.
>>>=20
>>> Major issues:
>>>=20
>>> None
>>>=20
>>> Minor issues:
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.2, last paragraph:  "=85 needs to correlate the TCP =
session from the SASL client with the SAML authentication."
>>>=20
>>> Please elaborate on this correlation
>>>=20
>>> -- section 4, 2nd paragraph: "The SAML Idenity Provider does not =
have a role in GSS-API, and is considered an internal matter for the =
OpenID mechanism."
>>>=20
>>> Please elaborate, as this is the only mention of OpenID in the =
draft. It seems out of context.  (If OpenID was in fact intended, please =
include a citation?)
>>>=20
>>> -- section 4, 3rd and 4th paragraph (paragraph a and b)
>>>=20
>>> These seem like protocol affecting differences. If so, they need =
elaboration, such as normative statements and formal definitions, or =
references to such.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 5, general:
>>>=20
>>> The section seems to need further elaboration or references
>>>=20
>>> -- section 6.1, step 5 (alt)
>>>=20
>>> Please describe the circumstances where the alternative step would =
occur. (also, please spell out "alternative")
>>>=20
>>> -- section 6.1, step 6: "The client now sends the URL to a browser =
for processing."
>>>=20
>>> Isn't that a question of software design rather than protocol? =
(unless you mean something more abstract by "browser", in which case it =
would help to say so.)
>>>=20
>>> Also, this section compresses the interaction with the identity =
provider. Why not show the details for those steps like the others? (If =
you mean them to be out of scope, then why give as much detail as you =
do?)
>>>=20
>>> -- section 6.2:
>>>=20
>>> The draft does not provide the decoding of the Base64 encoded parts =
like it did in 6.1, Without the decodes, the example is not very =
illuminating.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 7.4: "This is an option the user has to understand and =
decide to use if the IdP is supporting it."
>>>=20
>>> I doubt end users will read this spec. What does this mean for =
implementors?
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>=20
>>> -- General:
>>>=20
>>> There are a lot of editorial and organizational issues, some of =
which created difficulty in understanding the authors' intent. I noted a =
number of these below, but I doubt I caught everything. I suggest this =
draft have another detailed proofreading and editing pass before it =
progresses.
>>>=20
>>> -- Pagination is strange throughout the document. (Mostly blank =
pages, etc.) It's worse in the PDF version, but still not right in the =
text version.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 1.1, 2nd paragraph:
>>>=20
>>> Repeating the SAML 2.0 citation here would be helpful.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 1.2, 1st paragraph
>>>=20
>>> The sentence structure makes it ambiguous whether the other side of =
the or should be just certificate validation, or TLS with cert =
validation.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 2, list starting in 2nd paragraph:
>>>=20
>>> Please leave a blank line between list items. Without it, you get a =
wall-of-text effect that's difficult to read.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 2, list item 3:
>>>=20
>>> Is "service provider" a well defined term as used here?
>>>=20
>>> -- section 2, paragraph after 1st numbered list: "This will be =
discussed below. The steps are shown from below:"
>>>=20
>>> Redundant sentences. Also, I assume the discussion has already been =
written, so "will be" is not correct.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 2, 2nd paragraph after 2nd numbered list: "=85 flow =
appears as follows:"
>>>=20
>>> Please explicitly mention the figure number. E.g. "=85 flow appears =
as shown in Figure XX."
>>>=20
>>> -- section 2, figure 2:
>>>=20
>>> The numbers in parentheses are confusing. We just saw a numbered =
list that sort of corresponds to this flow, but the numbers don't match =
up. I realize later sections refer back to these numbers, but without =
some mention of that, a reader is almost certainly going to try to =
correlate this to the previous list.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3, 1st paragraph: "Recall section 5 of [RFC4422] for what =
needs to be described here."
>>>=20
>>> That reads like an author's "to do" note to himself. Has the needed =
description been completed, or does it still need to be described?
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3, 2nd paragraph: "The name of this mechanism "SAML20"."
>>>=20
>>> Missing word?
>>>=20
>>> -- "(via "gs2-header")"
>>>=20
>>> Missing word?
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3, 3rd paragraph: "The first mechanism message from the =
client to the server is the "initial-response" described below."
>>>=20
>>> Please explicitly mention section.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3, 4th paragraph: "The second mechanism message is from =
the server to the client, the "authentication- request" described =
below."
>>>=20
>>> I can't parse this sentence--are there missing words? Also, please =
mention section instead of saying "below".
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.1, first paragraph:
>>>=20
>>> Is "authorization identifier" the same as "IdP-Identifier"?
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.1, ABNF
>>>=20
>>> Is this the authoritative definition for "initial-response"? If so, =
please mention that in the text. The including section does not mention =
"initial-response"
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.1, last paragraph:
>>>=20
>>> Used as follows where, the rest of this paragraph? If so, then the =
"used as follows" clause is redundant. Also, the paragraph would be much =
easier to read if you broke it into a bulleted list.
>>>=20
>>> The 3rd sentence is awkward. I suggest something like "The =85 field =
is used as described in section 5."
>>>=20
>>> Is there a word missing from the forth sentence?
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.2, 1st paragraph:
>>>=20
>>> s/ (re)directs/ redirects . Also, what gets redirected (i.e. what is =
the direct object of "redirects"?)
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.2, 3rd paragraph (2nd note)
>>>=20
>>> I can't parse this.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.2, BNF
>>>=20
>>> Is this the formal definition of authentication-request? The next =
paragraph suggests it is defined in a referenced document. If so, then =
the repeated definition creates confusion about which document is =
authoritative on the matter. (if the definition is repeated here as a =
courtesy, please say so explicitly)
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.2, 6th paragraph: "The client now sends=85"
>>>=20
>>> s/now/then. Also, It seems like these sections jump back and forth =
between message definitions and a sequence of steps. I find that =
confusing. It would be better to keep the "sequence of steps" and the =
"message definitions" separate. But if you want each section to =
represent one or more steps in a sequence, then please add some context =
(e.g. "Once the widget completes the steps in section XXX, it then =85" =
). Keep in mind readers often jump directly to a section from the table =
of contents.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 3.3, 2nd paragraph:  "and SHALL be used to set state in =
the server accordingly, and it shall be used by the server"
>>>=20
>>> Is this new normative language, or a repeat of language from the =
SAML spec?
>>>=20
>>> -- section 4, 1st paragraph:
>>>=20
>>> I have difficulty parsing this.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 4, 2nd paragraph, final sentence:
>>>=20
>>> sentence fragment.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 5, 1st sentence: 'The "gs2-cb-flag" MUST use "n" '
>>>=20
>>> =85 MUST be set to "n"? (Or even better, 'the [actor] MUST set the =
[flag] to "n" '
>>>=20
>>> -- section 7 " This section will address=85"
>>>=20
>>> Addresses ( unless you haven't addressed it yet)
>>>=20
>>> Also, does the GSS-API description introduce security =
considerations? If not, please say so.
>>>=20
>>> -- section 7.1, "=85 unless a client always verify the server =
identity=85 "
>>>=20
>>> s/verify/verifies
>>>=20
>>> -- section 7.3: "SASL servers should be aware that SAML IdPs will =
track - to some extent - user access to their services."
>>>=20
>>> I'm not sure what it means for a server to be aware of this sort of =
thing. You are talking about people, not servers, right? What actions do =
you propose implementors take to mitigate this?
>>>=20
>>> -- section 7.4:
>>>=20
>>> s/you/users
>>>=20
>>> "By using the same identifier to log into every Relying Party, =
collusion between Relying Parties is possible."
>>>=20
>>> But this isn't the Relying Party's decision, it is? I think you mean =
to say, if the client (or user) does this, it create a vulnerability =
where the Relying Parties can collude=85
>>>=20
>>> -- section 8:
>>>=20
>>> I suggest breaking each IANA requested action into its own =
subsection. Otherwise the second action looks like an afterthought, or a =
comment on the first.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>=20


From mahoney@nostrum.com  Fri Jan  6 14:02:13 2012
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] A *new* batch of IETF LC reviews - 2012-01-05
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Hi all,

There has been a bit of shuffling of assignments - Alexey is taking over 
David's, and David is taking over Allyn's. Everything below has been 
updated.

Thanks,

Jean


On 1/5/12 6:43 PM, A. Jean Mahoney wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Here's the link to the new LC assignments:
> http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/reviewers-120105-lc.html
>
> The assignments are captured in the spreadsheets:
> http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art.html
> http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art-by-reviewer.html
>
> I've trimmed the spreadsheets to reflect 2012 assignments. Closed 
> assignments can be found here:
> http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/2011%20Assignments/
>
> And I have made the assignments in the review tool:
> http://art.tools.ietf.org/tools/art/genart/
>
> The standard template is included below.
>
> Happy new year!
>
> Jean
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
> you may receive.
>
> Document:
> Reviewer:
> Review Date:
> IETF LC End Date:
> IESG Telechat date: (if known)
>
> Summary:
>
> Major issues:
>
> Minor issues:
>
> Nits/editorial comments:
> _______________________________________________
> Gen-art mailing list
> Gen-art@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/gen-art


From adrian@olddog.co.uk  Sat Jan  7 12:59:05 2012
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From: "Adrian Farrel" <adrian@olddog.co.uk>
To: "'Stig Venaas'" <svenaas@cisco.com>, <housley@vigilsec.com>
Date: Sat, 7 Jan 2012 20:58:55 -0000
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Cc: iesg@ietf.org, 'General Area Review Team' <gen-art@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-pim-port.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: [Gen-art] Hello Russ ? [RE: Russ Housley's Discuss on draft-ietf-pim-port [Was: Gen-ART Telechat review of draft-ietf-pim-port-09.txt]]
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Russ,

Pingy pingy ping.

I've added to the informal agenda for 1/12/12

A

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Adrian Farrel [mailto:adrian@olddog.co.uk]
> Sent: 03 January 2012 22:08
> To: 'Stig Venaas'; 'Russ Housley'
> Cc: 'Suresh Krishnan'; 'draft-ietf-pim-port.all@tools.ietf.org'; 'General Area
> Review Team'
> Subject: RE: Russ Housley's Discuss on draft-ietf-pim-port [Was: Gen-ART
> Telechat review of draft-ietf-pim-port-09.txt]
> 
> In the hope that the change (acceptable to Suresh) will work for Russ, I have
> entered the RFC Editor note.
> 
> A
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Stig Venaas [mailto:svenaas@cisco.com]
> > Sent: 03 January 2012 17:27
> > To: Russ Housley
> > Cc: Suresh Krishnan; adrian@olddog.co.uk; draft-ietf-pim-
> port.all@tools.ietf.org;
> > General Area Review Team
> > Subject: Re: Russ's Discs on draft-ietf-pim-port [Was: Gen-ART Telechat
review
> of
> > draft-ietf-pim-port-09.txt]
> >
> > Russ, I've sent 3-4 emails in December asking if your discuss can be
> > resolved, but no response. I hope you can respond now.
> >
> > Stig
> >
> > On 11/28/2011 11:07 AM, Stig Venaas (svenaas) wrote:
> > > On 11/29/2011 10:18 AM, Suresh Krishnan wrote:
> > >  > Hi Stig,
> > >  >
> > >  >
> > >  > On 11/28/2011 12:59 PM, Stig Venaas wrote:
> > >  >>> Please note that the Connection ID AFI in the PORT Hello Option
> > > does not
> > >  >>> need to match the address family of PIM Hello message that carries
it.
> > >  >>> e.g. an IPv6 PIM Hello message could contain a PORT Hello Option with
a
> > >  >>> TCP Connection ID AFI of 1 (IPv4).
> > >  >>
> > >  >> While I am OK with this text, wouldn't it be better to add this to 3.1
> > >  >> and 3.2 where we formally define the hello options?
> > >  >>
> > >  >> My proposal would be:
> > >  >>
> > >  >> End of 3.1:
> > >  >>
> > >  >> OLD:
> > >  >> TCP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-family
> > >  >> of the address of the TCP Connection ID field. When this field is
> > >  >> 0, a mechanism outside the scope of this document is used to
> > >  >> obtain the addresses used to establish the TCP connection.
> > >  >>
> > >  >> NEW:
> > >  >> TCP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-family
> > >  >> of the address of the TCP Connection ID field. Note that this
> > >  >> value does not need to match the address-family of the PIM Hello
> > >  >> message that carries it. When this field is 0, a mechanism
> > >  >> outside the scope of this document is used to obtain the
> > >  >> addresses used to establish the TCP connection.
> > >  >>
> > >  >> End of 3.2:
> > >  >>
> > >  >> OLD:
> > >  >> SCTP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-
> > >  >> family of the address of the SCTP Connection ID field. When this
> > >  >> field is 0, a mechanism outside the scope of this document is used
> > >  >> to obtain the addresses used to establish the SCTP connection.
> > >  >>
> > >  >> NEW:
> > >  >> SCTP Connection ID AFI: The AFI value to describe the address-
> > >  >> family of the address of the SCTP Connection ID field. Note that
> > >  >> this value does not need to match the address-family of the PIM
> > >  >> Hello message that carries it. When this field is 0, a mechanism
> > >  >> outside the scope of this document is used to obtain the
> > >  >> addresses used to establish the SCTP connection.
> > >  >>
> > >  >> What do you think?
> > >  >
> > >  > This works great.
> > >
> > > Great, I hope we can then just add a note for the editor, and that the
> > > discuss can be cleared...
> > >
> > > Stig
> > >
> > >  >
> > >  > Thanks
> > >  > Suresh
> > >


From brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com  Sat Jan  7 15:12:05 2012
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Please see attached review.


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From david.black@emc.com  Tue Jan 10 18:44:43 2012
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From: <david.black@emc.com>
To: <ietf@cybernothing.org>, <msk@cloudmark.com>, <gen-art@ietf.org>, <ietf@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 21:44:16 -0500
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-AR=
T, please
see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you m=
ay receive.

Document: draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
Reviewer: David L. Black
Review Date: January 10, 2012
IETF LC End Date: January 18, 2011
IESG Telechat Date: January 19, 2011

Summary: This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described in=
 the review.

This draft specifies a method for redacting information from email abuse re=
ports
(e.g., hiding the local part [user] of an email address), while still allow=
ing
correlation of the redacted information across related abuse reports from t=
he same
source. The draft is short, clear, and well written.

There are two open issues:

[1] The first open issue is the absence of security guidance to ensure that=
 this
redaction technique effectively hides the redacted information.  The redact=
ion
technique is to concatenate a secret string (called the "redaction key") to=
 the
information to be redacted, apply "any hashing/digest algorithm", convert t=
he output
to base64 and use that base64 string to replace the redacted information.

There are two important ways in which this technique could fail to effectiv=
ely hide
the redacted information:
	- The secret string may inject insufficient entropy.
	- The hashing/digest algorithm may be weak.

To take an extreme example, if the secret string ("redaction key") consists=
 of a
single ASCII character, and a short email local part is being redacted, the=
n the
output is highly vulnerable to dictionary and brute force attacks because o=
nly 6 bits
of entropy are added (the result may look secure, but it's not).  Beyond th=
is extreme
example, this is a potentially real concern - e.g., applying the rule of th=
umb that
ASCII text contains 4-5 bits of entropy per character, the example in Appen=
dix A
uses a "redaction key" of "potatoes" that injects at most 40 bits of entrop=
y -
is that sufficient for email redaction purposes?

To take a silly example, if a CRC is used as the hash with that sort of sho=
rt input,
the result is not particularly difficult to invert.

I suggest a couple of changes:
1) Change "any hashing/digest algorithm" to require use of a secure hash, a=
nd
	explain what is meant by "secure hash" in the security considerations sect=
ion.
2) Require a minimum length of the "redaction key" string, and strongly sug=
gest
	(SHOULD) that it be randomly generated (e.g., by running sufficient output
	of an entropy-rich random number generator through a base64 converter).

For the latter change, figure out the amount of entropy that should be used
for redaction - the recommended string length will be larger because printa=
ble
ASCII is not entropy-dense (at best it's good for 6 bits of entropy in each
8-bit character, and human-written text such as this message has significan=
tly
less).

>From a pure security perspective, use of HMAC with specified secure hashes
(SHA2-family) and an approach of hashing the "redaction key" down to a bina=
ry
key for HMAC would be a stronger approach. I suggest that authors consider
approach, but  there may be practical usage concerns that suggest not adopt=
ing it.

[2] The second open issue is absence of security considerations for the red=
action
key.  The security considerations section needs to caution that the redacti=
on key
is a secret key that must be managed and protected as a secret key.  Disclo=
sure
of a redaction key removes the redaction from all reports that used that ke=
y.
As part of this, guidance should be provided on when and how to change the
redaction key in order to limit the effects of loss of secrecy for a single
redaction key.

Editorial Nit: I believe that "anonymization" is a better description of wh=
at
this draft is doing (as opposed to "redaction"), particularly as the result=
 is
intended to be correlatable via string match across reports from the same s=
ource.

idnits 2.12.13 didn't find any nits.

Thanks,
--David
----------------------------------------------------
David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA=A0 01748
+1 (508) 293-7953=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 FAX: +1 (508) 293-778=
6
david.black@emc.com=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
----------------------------------------------------


From msk@cloudmark.com  Tue Jan 10 20:40:45 2012
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From: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <msk@cloudmark.com>
To: "david.black@emc.com" <david.black@emc.com>, "ietf@cybernothing.org" <ietf@cybernothing.org>, "gen-art@ietf.org" <gen-art@ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 20:40:42 -0800
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: david.black@emc.com [mailto:david.black@emc.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2012 6:44 PM
> To: ietf@cybernothing.org; Murray S. Kucherawy; gen-art@ietf.org; ietf@ie=
tf.org
> Cc: david.black@emc.com; marf@ietf.org; presnick@qualcomm.com
> Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04

Hi David, thanks for the review.

> [1] The first open issue is the absence of security guidance to ensure th=
at this
> redaction technique effectively hides the redacted information.  The reda=
ction
> technique is to concatenate a secret string (called the "redaction key") =
to the
> information to be redacted, apply "any hashing/digest algorithm", convert=
 the output
> to base64 and use that base64 string to replace the redacted information.
> [...]
>=20
> I suggest a couple of changes:
> 1) Change "any hashing/digest algorithm" to require use of a secure hash,=
 and
> 	explain what is meant by "secure hash" in the security considerations se=
ction.
> 2) Require a minimum length of the "redaction key" string, and strongly s=
uggest
> 	(SHOULD) that it be randomly generated (e.g., by running sufficient outp=
ut
> 	of an entropy-rich random number generator through a base64 converter).
>=20
> For the latter change, figure out the amount of entropy that should be us=
ed
> for redaction - the recommended string length will be larger because prin=
table
> ASCII is not entropy-dense (at best it's good for 6 bits of entropy in ea=
ch
> 8-bit character, and human-written text such as this message has signific=
antly
> less).
>=20
> From a pure security perspective, use of HMAC with specified secure hashe=
s
> (SHA2-family) and an approach of hashing the "redaction key" down to a bi=
nary
> key for HMAC would be a stronger approach. I suggest that authors conside=
r
> approach, but there may be practical usage concerns that suggest not
> adopting it.

These are all good points.  My gut reaction is to say that this is all good=
 advice and entirely correct but probably goes a little far for the problem=
 space we're trying to address.  Thus, my inclination is to make the follow=
ing changes (subject to WG consensus):

- add all of this advice to Security Considerations, with forward reference=
s to it elsewhere in the document
- make a SHOULD suggestion as to the minimum redaction key length (instead =
of a requirement)
- make a SHOULD suggestion as to the type of hash to be used (instead of a =
requirement)

Would those be sufficient?

> [2] The second open issue is absence of security considerations for the r=
edaction
> key.  The security considerations section needs to caution that the redac=
tion key
> is a secret key that must be managed and protected as a secret key.
> Disclosure of a redaction key removes the redaction from all reports that=
 used
> that key. As part of this, guidance should be provided on when and how to=
 change
> the redaction key in order to limit the effects of loss of secrecy for a =
single
> redaction key.

Also a good point.  I don't think this is the right place to introduce advi=
ce about key rotation and the like as those are well-discussed concepts, so=
 instead Security Considerations can simply make reference to such material=
 elsewhere.  I'll go find some.  I know there's stuff like that in RFC6376 =
(DKIM) but I'm sure there are better ones.

> Editorial Nit: I believe that "anonymization" is a better description of =
what
> this draft is doing (as opposed to "redaction"), particularly as the resu=
lt is
> intended to be correlatable via string match across reports from the
> same source.

Fair enough.  We can add a sentence to that effect in the Introduction.

To the MARF working group: Please let me know if the above suggestions suff=
ice (reply only to the marf list, please).  I will summarize and have a new=
 version ready to publish when LC closes, and make sure David sees it aroun=
d the same time.

-MSK

From david.black@emc.com  Tue Jan 10 23:38:58 2012
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From: <david.black@emc.com>
To: <msk@cloudmark.com>, <ietf@cybernothing.org>, <gen-art@ietf.org>, <ietf@ietf.org>
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2012 02:38:26 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
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Hi Murray,

Thanks for the quick response.

> These are all good points.  My gut reaction is to say that this is all go=
od advice and entirely
> correct but probably goes a little far for the problem space we're trying=
 to address. =20

That sounds reasonable to me, and I like John Levine's suggestion to add ma=
terial to explain
more about the level of security that is appropriate for this problem space=
 and why.  In light
of such an explanation, an HMAC-based mechanism could well be overkill.

> - make a SHOULD suggestion as to the minimum redaction key length (instea=
d of a requirement)
> - make a SHOULD suggestion as to the type of hash to be used (instead of =
a requirement)

I have a hard time believing that the examples used in the review ("a" as t=
he redaction
key, CRC as the hash) are ever acceptable, and for that reason, I think a c=
ouple of MUSTs
would be in order to prohibit that sort of nonsense.  In particular:

	- I think there ought to be a MUST minimum length requirement
		on the redaction key string to prevent really short ones.
	- I think use of a secure hash ought to be a MUST to prevent
		use of CRC and other bad ideas.

That could be accompanied by additional guidance that may or may not be "SH=
OULDs", e.g.,
suggest a SHA2 hash as a good secure hash, suggest use of a longer string t=
han the
minimum requirement.

> > [2] The second open issue is absence of security considerations for the=
 redaction
> > key.  The security considerations section needs to caution that the red=
action key
> > is a secret key that must be managed and protected as a secret key.
> > Disclosure of a redaction key removes the redaction from all reports th=
at used
> > that key. As part of this, guidance should be provided on when and how =
to change
> > the redaction key in order to limit the effects of loss of secrecy for =
a single
> > redaction key.
>
> Also a good point.  I don't think this is the right place to introduce ad=
vice about key rotation and
> the like as those are well-discussed concepts, so instead Security Consid=
erations can simply make
> reference to such material elsewhere.  I'll go find some.  I know there's=
 stuff like that in RFC6376
> (DKIM) but I'm sure there are better ones.

That would be fine - introducing the concept of key rotation as a means to =
reduce the impact of key
compromise accompanied by a reference to a longer explanation elsewhere see=
ms reasonable.

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Murray S. Kucherawy [mailto:msk@cloudmark.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2012 11:41 PM
> To: Black, David; ietf@cybernothing.org; gen-art@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org
> Cc: marf@ietf.org; presnick@qualcomm.com
> Subject: RE: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
>=20
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: david.black@emc.com [mailto:david.black@emc.com]
> > Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2012 6:44 PM
> > To: ietf@cybernothing.org; Murray S. Kucherawy; gen-art@ietf.org; ietf@=
ietf.org
> > Cc: david.black@emc.com; marf@ietf.org; presnick@qualcomm.com
> > Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
>=20
> Hi David, thanks for the review.
>=20
> > [1] The first open issue is the absence of security guidance to ensure =
that this
> > redaction technique effectively hides the redacted information.  The re=
daction
> > technique is to concatenate a secret string (called the "redaction key"=
) to the
> > information to be redacted, apply "any hashing/digest algorithm", conve=
rt the output
> > to base64 and use that base64 string to replace the redacted informatio=
n.
> > [...]
> >
> > I suggest a couple of changes:
> > 1) Change "any hashing/digest algorithm" to require use of a secure has=
h, and
> > 	explain what is meant by "secure hash" in the security considerations =
section.
> > 2) Require a minimum length of the "redaction key" string, and strongly=
 suggest
> > 	(SHOULD) that it be randomly generated (e.g., by running sufficient ou=
tput
> > 	of an entropy-rich random number generator through a base64 converter)=
.
> >
> > For the latter change, figure out the amount of entropy that should be =
used
> > for redaction - the recommended string length will be larger because pr=
intable
> > ASCII is not entropy-dense (at best it's good for 6 bits of entropy in =
each
> > 8-bit character, and human-written text such as this message has signif=
icantly
> > less).
> >
> > From a pure security perspective, use of HMAC with specified secure has=
hes
> > (SHA2-family) and an approach of hashing the "redaction key" down to a =
binary
> > key for HMAC would be a stronger approach. I suggest that authors consi=
der
> > approach, but there may be practical usage concerns that suggest not
> > adopting it.
>=20
> These are all good points.  My gut reaction is to say that this is all go=
od advice and entirely
> correct but probably goes a little far for the problem space we're trying=
 to address.  Thus, my
> inclination is to make the following changes (subject to WG consensus):
>=20
> - add all of this advice to Security Considerations, with forward referen=
ces to it elsewhere in the
> document
> - make a SHOULD suggestion as to the minimum redaction key length (instea=
d of a requirement)
> - make a SHOULD suggestion as to the type of hash to be used (instead of =
a requirement)
>=20
> Would those be sufficient?
>=20
> > [2] The second open issue is absence of security considerations for the=
 redaction
> > key.  The security considerations section needs to caution that the red=
action key
> > is a secret key that must be managed and protected as a secret key.
> > Disclosure of a redaction key removes the redaction from all reports th=
at used
> > that key. As part of this, guidance should be provided on when and how =
to change
> > the redaction key in order to limit the effects of loss of secrecy for =
a single
> > redaction key.
>=20
> Also a good point.  I don't think this is the right place to introduce ad=
vice about key rotation and
> the like as those are well-discussed concepts, so instead Security Consid=
erations can simply make
> reference to such material elsewhere.  I'll go find some.  I know there's=
 stuff like that in RFC6376
> (DKIM) but I'm sure there are better ones.
>=20
> > Editorial Nit: I believe that "anonymization" is a better description o=
f what
> > this draft is doing (as opposed to "redaction"), particularly as the re=
sult is
> > intended to be correlatable via string match across reports from the
> > same source.
>=20
> Fair enough.  We can add a sentence to that effect in the Introduction.
>=20
> To the MARF working group: Please let me know if the above suggestions su=
ffice (reply only to the marf
> list, please).  I will summarize and have a new version ready to publish =
when LC closes, and make sure
> David sees it around the same time.
>=20
> -MSK


From paul.hoffman@vpnc.org  Wed Jan 11 11:02:48 2012
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
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On Jan 10, 2012, at 6:44 PM, <david.black@emc.com> <david.black@emc.com> =
wrote:

> [1] The first open issue is the absence of security guidance to ensure =
that this
> redaction technique effectively hides the redacted information.  The =
redaction
> technique is to concatenate a secret string (called the "redaction =
key") to the
> information to be redacted, apply "any hashing/digest algorithm", =
convert the output
> to base64 and use that base64 string to replace the redacted =
information.
>=20
> There are two important ways in which this technique could fail to =
effectively hide
> the redacted information:
> 	- The secret string may inject insufficient entropy.
> 	- The hashing/digest algorithm may be weak.
>=20
> To take an extreme example, if the secret string ("redaction key") =
consists of a
> single ASCII character, and a short email local part is being =
redacted, then the
> output is highly vulnerable to dictionary and brute force attacks =
because only 6 bits
> of entropy are added (the result may look secure, but it's not).  =
Beyond this extreme
> example, this is a potentially real concern - e.g., applying the rule =
of thumb that
> ASCII text contains 4-5 bits of entropy per character, the example in =
Appendix A
> uses a "redaction key" of "potatoes" that injects at most 40 bits of =
entropy -
> is that sufficient for email redaction purposes?
>=20
> To take a silly example, if a CRC is used as the hash with that sort =
of short input,
> the result is not particularly difficult to invert.
>=20
> I suggest a couple of changes:
> 1) Change "any hashing/digest algorithm" to require use of a secure =
hash, and
> 	explain what is meant by "secure hash" in the security =
considerations section.

Simply saying "any hash algorithm listed in [FIPS180-3]" is precise and =
sufficient.

> 2) Require a minimum length of the "redaction key" string, and =
strongly suggest
> 	(SHOULD) that it be randomly generated (e.g., by running =
sufficient output
> 	of an entropy-rich random number generator through a base64 =
converter).

Proposal: "The redaction key SHOULD be based on at least 64 bits of =
pseudo-random input that is converted to base64".

> [2] The second open issue is absence of security considerations for =
the redaction
> key.  The security considerations section needs to caution that the =
redaction key
> is a secret key that must be managed and protected as a secret key.  =
Disclosure
> of a redaction key removes the redaction from all reports that used =
that key.

Agree.

> As part of this, guidance should be provided on when and how to change =
the
> redaction key in order to limit the effects of loss of secrecy for a =
single
> redaction key.

Disagree, given that we have absolutely no idea how systems that use =
this will work operationally. Simply telling them "if it is no longer =
secret, you're hosed" is sufficient.

--Paul Hoffman


From sm@resistor.net  Wed Jan 11 11:50:41 2012
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Hi David,
At 18:44 10-01-2012, david.black@emc.com wrote:
>I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
>Gen-ART, please

I appreciate that you have spent your time and effort in performing 
the review.  I find the review useful.

> From a pure security perspective, use of HMAC with specified secure hashes
>(SHA2-family) and an approach of hashing the "redaction key" down to a binary
>key for HMAC would be a stronger approach. I suggest that authors consider
>approach, but  there may be practical usage concerns that suggest 
>not adopting it.
>
>[2] The second open issue is absence of security considerations for 
>the redaction
>key.  The security considerations section needs to caution that the 
>redaction key
>is a secret key that must be managed and protected as a secret 
>key.  Disclosure
>of a redaction key removes the redaction from all reports that used that key.
>As part of this, guidance should be provided on when and how to change the
>redaction key in order to limit the effects of loss of secrecy for a single
>redaction key.

The comments are from a security perspective.  To be candid, 
redaction is silly as the email folks know how to get around 
that.  The secret key does not even have to be broken; a cookie in 
the message would get you the information you want.  The cost of 
preserving the secrecy is not worth it in my opinion.

Regards,
-sm 


From david.black@emc.com  Wed Jan 11 12:52:16 2012
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Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
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Hi,

Thanks for the response - I appreciate the perspective.

> The comments are from a security perspective.  To be candid,
> redaction is silly as the email folks know how to get around
> that.  The secret key does not even have to be broken; a cookie in
> the message would get you the information you want.  The cost of
> preserving the secrecy is not worth it in my opinion.

At a minimum, I like John Levine's suggestion that the draft explain
the level of security required for redaction in practice.  Such an
explanation could help illuminate whether the secure hash (the
example in the draft uses SHA-1) is for obfuscation purposes
vs. actual security.

Absent such an explanation, I saw the use of a secure hash and inferred
the existence of actual security requirements.  If that was an incorrect
inference, then text should be added to the draft to avoid having
other readers make similarly incorrect inferences.

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: SM [mailto:sm@resistor.net]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2012 2:50 PM
> To: Black, David
> Cc: marf@ietf.org; gen-art@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
>=20
> Hi David,
> At 18:44 10-01-2012, david.black@emc.com wrote:
> >I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> >Gen-ART, please
>=20
> I appreciate that you have spent your time and effort in performing
> the review.  I find the review useful.
>=20
> > From a pure security perspective, use of HMAC with specified secure has=
hes
> >(SHA2-family) and an approach of hashing the "redaction key" down to a b=
inary
> >key for HMAC would be a stronger approach. I suggest that authors consid=
er
> >approach, but  there may be practical usage concerns that suggest
> >not adopting it.
> >
> >[2] The second open issue is absence of security considerations for
> >the redaction
> >key.  The security considerations section needs to caution that the
> >redaction key
> >is a secret key that must be managed and protected as a secret
> >key.  Disclosure
> >of a redaction key removes the redaction from all reports that used that=
 key.
> >As part of this, guidance should be provided on when and how to change t=
he
> >redaction key in order to limit the effects of loss of secrecy for a sin=
gle
> >redaction key.
>=20
> The comments are from a security perspective.  To be candid,
> redaction is silly as the email folks know how to get around
> that.  The secret key does not even have to be broken; a cookie in
> the message would get you the information you want.  The cost of
> preserving the secrecy is not worth it in my opinion.
>=20
> Regards,
> -sm
>=20


From sm@resistor.net  Wed Jan 11 13:16:38 2012
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Hi David,
At 12:51 11-01-2012, david.black@emc.com wrote:
>At a minimum, I like John Levine's suggestion that the draft explain
>the level of security required for redaction in practice.  Such an
>explanation could help illuminate whether the secure hash (the
>example in the draft uses SHA-1) is for obfuscation purposes
>vs. actual security.

It would help to have an explanation along the line of John Levine's 
suggestion.

>Absent such an explanation, I saw the use of a secure hash and inferred
>the existence of actual security requirements.  If that was an incorrect
>inference, then text should be added to the draft to avoid having
>other readers make similarly incorrect inferences.

Agreed.

Regards,
-sm  


From miguel.a.garcia@ericsson.com  Thu Jan 12 03:41:45 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-jiang-a6-to-historic-00.txt
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I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>

Please resolve these comments along with any other comments you may receive.

Document: draft-jiang-a6-to-historic-00.txt
Reviewer: Miguel Garcia <miguel.a.garcia@ericsson.com>
Review Date: 2012-01-12
IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-18
IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19

Summary: The document is ready for publication as Informational RFC.

The document is clear. The are no issues.

/Miguel
-- 
Miguel A. Garcia
+34-91-339-3608
Ericsson Spain

From mahoney@nostrum.com  Thu Jan 12 17:07:31 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] A *new* batch of IETF LC reviews - 2012-01-12
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Hi all,

Here's the link to the new LC assignments:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/reviewers-120112-lc.html

The assignments are captured in the spreadsheets:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art.html
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art-by-reviewer.html


And I have made the assignments in the review tool:
http://art.tools.ietf.org/tools/art/genart/

The standard template is included below.

Thanks,

Jean

-------------------------------------------------------------------

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
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<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
you may receive.

Document:
Reviewer:
Review Date:
IETF LC End Date:
IESG Telechat date: (if known)

Summary:

Major issues:

Minor issues:

Nits/editorial comments:

From mahoney@nostrum.com  Thu Jan 12 17:11:02 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Assignments for the 2012-01-19 telechat
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Hi all,

Assignments for the telechat can be found here:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/reviewers-120119-telechat.html

With the updated spreadsheets:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art.html
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art-by-reviewer.html

I've also updated the review tool:
http://art.tools.ietf.org/tools/art/genart/

For your convenience, the review boilerplate template is included below.

Note that reviews should ideally be posted to the gen-art mailing list
by COB on Tuesday:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/

Jean

-------------------------------------------------------------------

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
< http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

Document:
Reviewer:
Review Date:
IETF LC End Date:
IESG Telechat date: (if known)

Summary:

Major issues:

Minor issues:

Nits/editorial comments:

From ron.even.tlv@gmail.com  Thu Jan 12 23:20:25 2012
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From: "Roni Even" <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
To: "'Kireeti Kompella'" <kireeti@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review of draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
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Hi,
I looked at the 08 version and the major issues are addressed.
What about minor issue number 3?

Roni Even

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kireeti Kompella [mailto:kireeti@juniper.net]
> Sent: Friday, September 16, 2011 10:23 PM
> To: Roni Even
> Cc: Kireeti Kompella; draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn.all@tools.ietf.org;
> gen-art@ietf.org; IETF-Discussion list
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART LC review of draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
> 
> Hi Roni,
> 
> On Sep 7, 2011, at 4:37 , Roni Even wrote:
> 
> > I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> > Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
> you may receive.
> >
> > Document: draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
> > Reviewer: Roni Even
> > Review Date: 2011-9-7
> > IETF LC End Date: 2011-9-27
> > IESG Telechat date:
> >
> > Summary: This draft is not ready for publication as an informational
> RFC.
> >
> > Major issues:
> >
> > The IANA considerations section says:
> > "the values  already allocated are in Table 1 of Section 4.  The
> allocation policy  for new entries up to and including value 127 is
> "Standards Action".  The allocation policy for values 128 through 251
> is "First Come First Served".  The values from 252 through 255 are for
> "Experimental Use"."
> 
> Standards Action will be changed to Expert Review.
> 
> > Yet this is document is intended for Informational status which
> contradict the standard action. This is also true for the second
> registry defined.
> >
> > Is this document really an Informational one?
> 
> My only comment is that it is not Historic.
> 
> > Minor issues:
> >
> > 1.       In section  1.2.2 "Since "traditional" Layer 2 VPNs (i.e.,
> real Frame Relay circuits connecting sites) are indistinguishable from
> tunnel-based VPNs from  the customer's point-of-view, migrating from
> one to the other raises  few issues." What are the few issues?
> 
> A subtlety: "few issues" means not many, not deep; it's a careful way
> of saying, "just about no issues".  "A few issues" would require
> elaboration.
> 
> > 2.       In section 4 "L2VPN TLVs can be added to extend the
> information carried in the NLRI, using the format shown in Figure 2".
> How is the TLV carried in the NLRI, in which field, section 4.1 only
> talk about the structure of the TLV.
> 
> I'll take the figure from 3.2.2 of RFC 4761 and show where the TLVs go.
> 
> > 3.       Section 4.2 refers to section 4 but I am not sure where this
> mechanism in section 4 is.
> 
> Will clarify.
> 
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Nits/editorial comments:
> >
> > 1.       Section 3.1 is called network topology but the whole text is
> an example of a network topology. Maybe the title should be "Example of
> a network toplogy".
> 
> Sure.
> 
> > 2.       Section 5 starts with "As defined so far in the document .."
> But the using IP only is already discussed in previous sections.
> 
> Do you have a suggestion for rewording?
> 
> Thanks,
> Kireeti.
> 
> 
> >
> >
> > <ATT00001..txt>


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From: Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
To: Aaron Stone <aaron@serendipity.cx>
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Cc: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>, "gen-art@ietf.org Review Team" <gen-art@ietf.org>, Sieve mailing list <sieve@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] [sieve] Gen-ART Last Call Review of draft-ietf-sieve-include-13
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>>> -- section 3.1, paragraph 4: "Implementations MUST NOT generate errors =
for
>>> recursive inclusions at upload time, as this would force an upload orde=
ring
>>> requirement upon script authors / generators. =A0However, if an active =
script
>>> is replaced with a faulty script and would remain the active script, an
>>> error MUST be generated and the upload MUST fail."
>>>
>>> These two statements seem contradictory on a quick reading. =A0In
>>> particular, how can the latter assertion avoid an upload ordering
>>> requirement? Or do you mean faulty in some way other than being recursi=
ve?
>>
>> If you're replacing an active script, it has to be correct all the time,=
 and
>> uploads are atomic only on a per-script basis. There's a risk that if yo=
u're
>> uploading a set of scripts that include one another, at some intermediat=
e
>> stage while some scripts are uploaded but not others, they are in an inv=
alid
>> state. The managesieve spec says that scripts must be validated at uploa=
d
>> time. The language above is trying to say that you can upload all of the
>> scripts that may include one another in any order without generating err=
ors
>> immediately, however, if you're replacing an active script or a script
>> included by the active script, then you DO have to upload a correct scri=
pt
>> right from the get-go.
>>
>> Is this just a question of whether the script(s) are replacing active
>> scripts? That is, the license to create a transient invalid state is
>> suspended if if you are replacing an active script? If so, how would one=
 go
>> about updating a set of linked scripts when one or more of them replace
>> active scripts? Should one somehow deactivate the old ones, load all the
>> scripts, then activate them?
>
> Having written this out, I don't recall how an implementation would
> handle this. I haven't had luck tracking down maling list discussion
> on the topic. I'll have to chase up on this.

I don't think this is a real problem; the text just needs a little
tweaking.  Errors should still be generated at upload time for any
detectable script errors OTHER THAN recursion.  What this is meant to
deal with is a situation where, say, we have this:

main includes sub-a
   sub-a includes sub-b
      sub-b includes sub-c

...and we want to rewrite things and  change the structure thus:

main includes sub-a
main includes sub-c
   sub-c includes sub-b
     [sub-b no longer includes sub-c]

This would require that we update sub-b *before* we update sub-c, or
else we'd get an error at upload time.  The text is meant to block the
recursion error, so we can update the scripts in any order.  However,
if the script gets run in the middle of the updates and we hit a
recursion situation, we WILL get a runtime error.

That's all that text is meant to do.

That said, it would be wise for implementations to provide a way to do
an atomic update of a set of scripts, because, clearly, multiple
scrips in some indeterminate intermediate upload state could do very
weird (and perhaps bad) things, even if no errors are generated during
their execution.

I think this isn't a protocol requirement, but a
quality-of-implementation issue.  But I do think the document could
have a paragraph discussing this, and warning of the consequences.

Barry, document shepherd

From ben@nostrum.com  Fri Jan 13 08:58:30 2012
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] [sieve] Gen-ART Last Call Review of draft-ietf-sieve-include-13
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On Jan 13, 2012, at 9:13 AM, Barry Leiba wrote:

[=85]

>=20
> I think this isn't a protocol requirement, but a
> quality-of-implementation issue.  But I do think the document could
> have a paragraph discussing this, and warning of the consequences.

I concur that this is not so much a protocol issue as a documentation =
issue. I did not mean to imply things were broken; just that I found the =
intent to be unclear. I think such a paragraph would likely solve the =
issue.


Thanks!

Ben.


From kireeti@juniper.net  Fri Jan 13 09:37:39 2012
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From: Kireeti Kompella <kireeti@juniper.net>
To: Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jan 2012 09:35:41 -0800
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART LC review of draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
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On Jan 12, 2012, at 23:16 , Roni Even wrote:

> Hi,
> I looked at the 08 version and the major issues are addressed.
> What about minor issue number 3?

Good point!  I will fix (as Stewart suggests, maybe just remove the referen=
ce).

To your minor issue (2), I've clarified the structure.  Do you still want t=
o see how it fits into the NLRI?

Thanks,
Kireeti.

> Roni Even
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Kireeti Kompella [mailto:kireeti@juniper.net]
>> Sent: Friday, September 16, 2011 10:23 PM
>> To: Roni Even
>> Cc: Kireeti Kompella; draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn.all@tools.ietf.org;
>> gen-art@ietf.org; IETF-Discussion list
>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART LC review of draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
>>=20
>> Hi Roni,
>>=20
>> On Sep 7, 2011, at 4:37 , Roni Even wrote:
>>=20
>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>=20
>> Thanks!
>>=20
>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
>> you may receive.
>>>=20
>>> Document: draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
>>> Reviewer: Roni Even
>>> Review Date: 2011-9-7
>>> IETF LC End Date: 2011-9-27
>>> IESG Telechat date:
>>>=20
>>> Summary: This draft is not ready for publication as an informational
>> RFC.
>>>=20
>>> Major issues:
>>>=20
>>> The IANA considerations section says:
>>> "the values  already allocated are in Table 1 of Section 4.  The
>> allocation policy  for new entries up to and including value 127 is
>> "Standards Action".  The allocation policy for values 128 through 251
>> is "First Come First Served".  The values from 252 through 255 are for
>> "Experimental Use"."
>>=20
>> Standards Action will be changed to Expert Review.
>>=20
>>> Yet this is document is intended for Informational status which
>> contradict the standard action. This is also true for the second
>> registry defined.
>>>=20
>>> Is this document really an Informational one?
>>=20
>> My only comment is that it is not Historic.
>>=20
>>> Minor issues:
>>>=20
>>> 1.       In section  1.2.2 "Since "traditional" Layer 2 VPNs (i.e.,
>> real Frame Relay circuits connecting sites) are indistinguishable from
>> tunnel-based VPNs from  the customer's point-of-view, migrating from
>> one to the other raises  few issues." What are the few issues?
>>=20
>> A subtlety: "few issues" means not many, not deep; it's a careful way
>> of saying, "just about no issues".  "A few issues" would require
>> elaboration.
>>=20
>>> 2.       In section 4 "L2VPN TLVs can be added to extend the
>> information carried in the NLRI, using the format shown in Figure 2".
>> How is the TLV carried in the NLRI, in which field, section 4.1 only
>> talk about the structure of the TLV.
>>=20
>> I'll take the figure from 3.2.2 of RFC 4761 and show where the TLVs go.
>>=20
>>> 3.       Section 4.2 refers to section 4 but I am not sure where this
>> mechanism in section 4 is.
>>=20
>> Will clarify.
>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>>=20
>>> 1.       Section 3.1 is called network topology but the whole text is
>> an example of a network topology. Maybe the title should be "Example of
>> a network toplogy".
>>=20
>> Sure.
>>=20
>>> 2.       Section 5 starts with "As defined so far in the document .."
>> But the using IP only is already discussed in previous sections.
>>=20
>> Do you have a suggestion for rewording?
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>> Kireeti.
>>=20
>>=20
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> <ATT00001..txt>
>=20


From ron.even.tlv@gmail.com  Fri Jan 13 09:47:16 2012
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From: "Roni Even" <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
To: "'Kireeti Kompella'" <kireeti@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review of draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
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Hi,
I am OK with minor issue 2 now. 
Issue 3  was my only point
Roni

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kireeti Kompella [mailto:kireeti@juniper.net]
> Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 7:36 PM
> To: Roni Even
> Cc: Kireeti Kompella; draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn.all@tools.ietf.org;
> gen-art@ietf.org; IETF-Discussion list
> Subject: Re: Gen-ART LC review of draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
> 
> On Jan 12, 2012, at 23:16 , Roni Even wrote:
> 
> > Hi,
> > I looked at the 08 version and the major issues are addressed.
> > What about minor issue number 3?
> 
> Good point!  I will fix (as Stewart suggests, maybe just remove the
> reference).
> 
> To your minor issue (2), I've clarified the structure.  Do you still
> want to see how it fits into the NLRI?
> 
> Thanks,
> Kireeti.
> 
> > Roni Even
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Kireeti Kompella [mailto:kireeti@juniper.net]
> >> Sent: Friday, September 16, 2011 10:23 PM
> >> To: Roni Even
> >> Cc: Kireeti Kompella; draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn.all@tools.ietf.org;
> >> gen-art@ietf.org; IETF-Discussion list
> >> Subject: Re: Gen-ART LC review of draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
> >>
> >> Hi Roni,
> >>
> >> On Sep 7, 2011, at 4:37 , Roni Even wrote:
> >>
> >>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background
> on
> >> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> >> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> >>
> >> Thanks!
> >>
> >>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
> >>> comments
> >> you may receive.
> >>>
> >>> Document: draft-kompella-l2vpn-l2vpn-07
> >>> Reviewer: Roni Even
> >>> Review Date: 2011-9-7
> >>> IETF LC End Date: 2011-9-27
> >>> IESG Telechat date:
> >>>
> >>> Summary: This draft is not ready for publication as an
> informational
> >> RFC.
> >>>
> >>> Major issues:
> >>>
> >>> The IANA considerations section says:
> >>> "the values  already allocated are in Table 1 of Section 4.  The
> >> allocation policy  for new entries up to and including value 127 is
> >> "Standards Action".  The allocation policy for values 128 through
> 251
> >> is "First Come First Served".  The values from 252 through 255 are
> >> for "Experimental Use"."
> >>
> >> Standards Action will be changed to Expert Review.
> >>
> >>> Yet this is document is intended for Informational status which
> >> contradict the standard action. This is also true for the second
> >> registry defined.
> >>>
> >>> Is this document really an Informational one?
> >>
> >> My only comment is that it is not Historic.
> >>
> >>> Minor issues:
> >>>
> >>> 1.       In section  1.2.2 "Since "traditional" Layer 2 VPNs (i.e.,
> >> real Frame Relay circuits connecting sites) are indistinguishable
> >> from tunnel-based VPNs from  the customer's point-of-view, migrating
> >> from one to the other raises  few issues." What are the few issues?
> >>
> >> A subtlety: "few issues" means not many, not deep; it's a careful
> way
> >> of saying, "just about no issues".  "A few issues" would require
> >> elaboration.
> >>
> >>> 2.       In section 4 "L2VPN TLVs can be added to extend the
> >> information carried in the NLRI, using the format shown in Figure
> 2".
> >> How is the TLV carried in the NLRI, in which field, section 4.1 only
> >> talk about the structure of the TLV.
> >>
> >> I'll take the figure from 3.2.2 of RFC 4761 and show where the TLVs
> go.
> >>
> >>> 3.       Section 4.2 refers to section 4 but I am not sure where
> this
> >> mechanism in section 4 is.
> >>
> >> Will clarify.
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Nits/editorial comments:
> >>>
> >>> 1.       Section 3.1 is called network topology but the whole text
> is
> >> an example of a network topology. Maybe the title should be "Example
> >> of a network toplogy".
> >>
> >> Sure.
> >>
> >>> 2.       Section 5 starts with "As defined so far in the document
> .."
> >> But the using IP only is already discussed in previous sections.
> >>
> >> Do you have a suggestion for rewording?
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >> Kireeti.
> >>
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> <ATT00001..txt>
> >


From ben@nostrum.com  Fri Jan 13 14:00:10 2012
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
< http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-08
Reviewer: Ben Campbell
Review Date: 2012-01-13
IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19

Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a proposed =
standard. There are a few minor issues that should be considered first.

Note: This is incremental to my review of version 06 at last call. =
Version 08 is considerably improved and resolved most of my comments. =
But a few still remain. Quoted text below is from that previous review.

Major issues:

None


Minor issues:

> -- section 3.2, last paragraph:  "=85 needs to correlate the TCP =
session from the SASL client with the SAML authentication."
>=20
> Please elaborate on this correlation

The author added text, but the new text is about correlating response =
with request. The text I mentioned was about correlating a TCP =
connection to a SAML authentication.

> -- section 4, 3rd and 4th paragraph (paragraph a and b)
>=20
> These seem like protocol affecting differences. If so, they need =
elaboration, such as normative statements and formal definitions, or =
references to such.

I did not see a response to this comment.

> -- section 5, general:
>=20
> The section seems to need further elaboration or references

I did not see a response to this comment.

> Also, this section compresses the interaction with the identity =
provider. Why not show the details for those steps like the others? (If =
you mean them to be out of scope, then why give as much detail as you =
do?)
>=20

I did not see a response to this comment.



Nits/editorial comments:

> -- Pagination is strange throughout the document. (Mostly blank pages, =
etc.) It's worse in the PDF version, but still not right in the text =
version.

Pagination is still strange. I see a few mostly blank pages, diagrams =
split across page breaks, etc.

> -- section 3, 1st paragraph: "Recall section 5 of [RFC4422] for what =
needs to be described here."
>=20
> That reads like an author's "to do" note to himself. Has the needed =
description been completed, or does it still need to be described?

Partially fixed. I suggest s/"needs to be"/"is"

> -- section 3.1, first paragraph:
>=20
> Is "authorization identifier" the same as "IdP-Identifier"?

The paragraph has been updated, but I still have the question.=20

> -- section 3.3, 2nd paragraph:  "and SHALL be used to set state in the =
server accordingly, and it shall be used by the server"
>=20
> Is this new normative language, or a repeat of language from the SAML =
spec?
>=20

The author changed SHALL to MUST, which leads me to believe my comment =
was not clear. I did not object to SHALL. My concern was, with the =
reference to RFC4422, it was not clear if the text was introduction a =
new normative requirement, or just restating requirements from 4422. If =
the second, then it's important to make sure the reader knows which doc =
is authoritative. You can do that by keeping the language descriptive, =
or by explicitly (and strongly) attributing the language with something =
like 'RFC4433 says, "=85. SHALL=85."'

If, on the other hand, this is truly a new normative statement, then no =
change is needed.

> -- section 4, 1st paragraph:
>=20
> I have difficulty parsing this.

The text is updated, but I still have trouble parsing it. In particular, =
I'm not sure what you mean by the phrase "...and appropriate references =
of it not referenced elsewhere in this document=85".

> -- section 7=20
>=20
> Does the GSS-API description introduce security considerations? If =
not, please say so.
>=20

I did not see a response to this comment.


From ietfdbh@comcast.net  Fri Jan 13 15:30:08 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org, 'Steven Blake' <slblake@petri-meat.com>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
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Hi Tom,

If you change this to Experimental, then the Intro should have a
discussion of the experiment, including some guidance about how to
judge success. The current IESG has been a stickler on that point.

dbh 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tom Taylor [mailto:tom111.taylor@bell.net] 
> Sent: Sunday, January 01, 2012 2:49 PM
> To: Joel M. Halpern
> Cc: Mary Barnes; gen-art@ietf.org; Steven Blake; David 
> Harrington; draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour@tools.ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Review: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
> 
> Thanks for the review, Joel. Comments below, marked with [PTT].
> 
> On 31/12/2011 4:50 PM, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
> > I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background
on
> > Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> > <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> >
> > Please resolve these comments along with any other Last 
> Call comments
> > you may receive.
> >
> > Document: draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-08
> > PCN Boundary Node Behaviour for the Single Marking (SM) Mode of
> > Operation
> > Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
> > Review Date: 31-Dec-2011
> > IETF LC End Date: 13-Jan-2012
> > IESG Telechat date: N/A
> >
> > Summary: This documents is almost ready for publication as an
> > Informational RFC.
> >
> > Question: Given that the document defines a complex set of 
> behaviors,
> > which are mandatory for compliant systems, it seems that 
> this ought to
> > be Experimental rather than Informational. It describes 
> something that
> > could, in theory, later become standards track.
> 
> [PTT] OK, we've wobbled on this one, but we can follow your 
> suggestion.
> >
> > Major issues:
> > Section 2 on Assumed Core Network Behavior for SM, in the 
> third bullet,
> > states that the PCN-domain satisfies the conditions specified in
RFC
> > 5696. Unfortunately, look at RFC 5696 I can not tell what
conditions
> > these are. Is this supposed to be a reference to RFC 5559 
> instead? No
> > matter which document it is referencing, please be more 
> specific about
> > which section / conditions are meant.
> 
> [PTT] You are right that RFC 5696 isn't relevant. It's such a 
> long time 
> since that text was written that I can't recall what the 
> intention was. 
> My inclination at the moment is simply to delete the bullet.
> >
> > It would have been helpful if the early part of the 
> document indicated
> > that the edge node information about how to determine
> > ingress-egress-aggregates was described in section 5.
> > In conjunction with that, section 5.1.2, third paragraph, seems to
> > describe an option which does not seem to quite work. After 
> describing
> > how to use tunneling, and how to work with signaling, the 
> text refers to
> > inferring the ingress-egress-aggregate from the routing 
> information. In
> > the presence of multiple equal-cost domain exits (which 
> does occur in
> > reality), the routing table is not sufficient information 
> to make this
> > determination. Unless I am very confused (which does 
> happen) this seems
> > to be a serious hole in the specification.
> 
> [PTT] I'm not sure what the issue is here. As I understand 
> it, operators 
> don't assign packets randomly to a given path in the presence of 
> alternatives -- they choose one based on values in the packet
header. 
> The basic intent is that packets of a given microflow all follow the

> same path, to prevent unnecessary reordering and minimize jitter.
The 
> implication is that filters can be defined at the ingress nodes to 
> identify the packets in a given ingress-egress-aggregate 
> (i.e. flowing 
> from a specific ingress node to a specific egress node) based 
> on their 
> header contents. The filters to do the same job at egress nodes are
a 
> different problem, but they are not affected by ECMP.
> >
> > Minor issues:
> > Section 3.3.1 states that the "block" decision occurs when the CLE
> > (excess over total) rate exceeds the configured limit. 
> However, section
> > 3.3.2 states that the decision node must take further stapes if
the
> > excess rate is non-zero in further reports. Is this inconsistency
> > deliberate? If so, please explain. If not, please fix. (If it is
> > important to drive the excess rate to 0, then why is action only
> > initiated when the ratio is above a configured value, 
> rather than any
> > non-zero value? I can conceive of various reasons. But none 
> are stated.)
> 
> [PTT] We aren't driving the excess rate to zero, but to a 
> value equal to
> something less than (U - 1)/U. (The "something less" is because of 
> packet dropping at interior nodes.) The assumption is that (U 
> - 1)/U is 
> greater than CLE-limit. Conceptually, PCN uses two 
> thresholds. When the 
> CLE is below the first threshold, new flows are admitted. Above that

> threshold, they are blocked. When the CLE is above the second 
> threshold, 
> flows are terminated to bring them down to that threshold. In the SM

> mode of operation, the first threshold is specified directly on a 
> per-link basis by the value CLE-limit. The second threshold 
> is specified 
> by the same value (U - 1)/U for all links. With the CL mode 
> of operation 
> the second threshold is also specified directly for each link.
> >
> >
> > Nits/editorial comments:
> >
> >
> 


From Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr  Sat Jan 14 01:13:21 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
Reviewer: Francis Dupont
Review Date: 20120106
IETF LC End Date: 20120113
IESG Telechat date: unknown

Summary: Ready

Major issues: None

Minor issues: None

Nits/editorial comments:
 - in the whole document: behaviour -> behavior and signalling -> signaling
  (note the spelling of collocated is dubious too)

 - Abstract page 1: in the latter case -> in the first case

 - Abstract page 1: the usage is to not refer to RFC in the Abstract

 - ToC page 2: Acknowledgements -> Acknowledgments

 - 2 page 3: measures- -> measures (in general the document is at
 the limit of abuse of '-' character, here it is clearly a typo)

 - 6 page 6: Acknowledgements -> Acknowledgments

 - 6 page 6: I don't like the term 'generated', IMHO you can easily
  find a better/nicer term.

 - 7.2 page 7: C. Le Faucher, -> C., Le Faucheur,
                                   ^          ^

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

From karagian@cs.utwente.nl  Sat Jan 14 02:35:02 2012
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Hi Francis,

Thank you very much!

I will work out all your comments!

Best regards,
Georgios


________________________________________
Van: Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr [Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr]
Verzonden: zaterdag 14 januari 2012 10:13
Aan: gen-art@ietf.org
CC: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements.all@tools.ietf.org
Onderwerp: review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
Reviewer: Francis Dupont
Review Date: 20120106
IETF LC End Date: 20120113
IESG Telechat date: unknown

Summary: Ready

Major issues: None

Minor issues: None

Nits/editorial comments:
 - in the whole document: behaviour -> behavior and signalling -> signaling
  (note the spelling of collocated is dubious too)

 - Abstract page 1: in the latter case -> in the first case

 - Abstract page 1: the usage is to not refer to RFC in the Abstract

 - ToC page 2: Acknowledgements -> Acknowledgments

 - 2 page 3: measures- -> measures (in general the document is at
 the limit of abuse of '-' character, here it is clearly a typo)

 - 6 page 6: Acknowledgements -> Acknowledgments

 - 6 page 6: I don't like the term 'generated', IMHO you can easily
  find a better/nicer term.

 - 7.2 page 7: C. Le Faucher, -> C., Le Faucheur,
                                   ^          ^

Regards

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr=

From ietfdbh@comcast.net  Sat Jan 14 05:37:58 2012
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From: "David Harrington" <ietfdbh@comcast.net>
To: <karagian@cs.utwente.nl>, <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
References: <201201140913.q0E9DI3q060110@givry.fdupont.fr> <FF1A9612A94D5C4A81ED7DE1039AB80F2257A981@EXMBX04.ad.utwente.nl>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
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Thank you Francis.

Georgios, 
these are all minor editorial changes.
Please make them in your source, but do not submit a new revision yet.
I have scheduled this for telechat and IESG doesn't like moving
targets for telechats ;-) 
You may get changes requested by IESG.
When the document is sent to the RFC Editor they will ask for your
source file.

Thanks,
David Harrington
Director, IETF Transport Area
ietfdbh@comcast.net (preferred for ietf)
dbharrington@huaweisymantec.com
+1 603 828 1401 (cell)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: karagian@cs.utwente.nl [mailto:karagian@cs.utwente.nl] 
> Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2012 5:35 AM
> To: Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements.all@tools.ietf.org
> Subject: RE: review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
> 
> Hi Francis,
> 
> Thank you very much!
> 
> I will work out all your comments!
> 
> Best regards,
> Georgios
> 
> 
> ________________________________________
> Van: Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr [Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr]
> Verzonden: zaterdag 14 januari 2012 10:13
> Aan: gen-art@ietf.org
> CC: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements.all@tools.ietf.org
> Onderwerp: review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
> 
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> 
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
comments
> you may receive.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
> Reviewer: Francis Dupont
> Review Date: 20120106
> IETF LC End Date: 20120113
> IESG Telechat date: unknown
> 
> Summary: Ready
> 
> Major issues: None
> 
> Minor issues: None
> 
> Nits/editorial comments:
>  - in the whole document: behaviour -> behavior and 
> signalling -> signaling
>   (note the spelling of collocated is dubious too)
> 
>  - Abstract page 1: in the latter case -> in the first case
> 
>  - Abstract page 1: the usage is to not refer to RFC in the Abstract
> 
>  - ToC page 2: Acknowledgements -> Acknowledgments
> 
>  - 2 page 3: measures- -> measures (in general the document is at
>  the limit of abuse of '-' character, here it is clearly a typo)
> 
>  - 6 page 6: Acknowledgements -> Acknowledgments
> 
>  - 6 page 6: I don't like the term 'generated', IMHO you can easily
>   find a better/nicer term.
> 
>  - 7.2 page 7: C. Le Faucher, -> C., Le Faucheur,
>                                    ^          ^
> 
> Regards
> 
> Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr


From karagian@cs.utwente.nl  Sat Jan 14 05:52:47 2012
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From: <karagian@cs.utwente.nl>
To: <ietfdbh@comcast.net>, <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>, <gen-art@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
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Hi David,

Okay, thank you!

Best regards,
Georgios

________________________________________
Van: David Harrington [ietfdbh@comcast.net]
Verzonden: zaterdag 14 januari 2012 14:37
Aan: Karagiannis, G. (Georgios); Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr; gen-art@ietf.or=
g
CC: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements.all@tools.ietf.org
Onderwerp: RE: review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt

Thank you Francis.

Georgios,
these are all minor editorial changes.
Please make them in your source, but do not submit a new revision yet.
I have scheduled this for telechat and IESG doesn't like moving
targets for telechats ;-)
You may get changes requested by IESG.
When the document is sent to the RFC Editor they will ask for your
source file.

Thanks,
David Harrington
Director, IETF Transport Area
ietfdbh@comcast.net (preferred for ietf)
dbharrington@huaweisymantec.com
+1 603 828 1401 (cell)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: karagian@cs.utwente.nl [mailto:karagian@cs.utwente.nl]
> Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2012 5:35 AM
> To: Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr; gen-art@ietf.org
> Cc: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements.all@tools.ietf.org
> Subject: RE: review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
>
> Hi Francis,
>
> Thank you very much!
>
> I will work out all your comments!
>
> Best regards,
> Georgios
>
>
> ________________________________________
> Van: Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr [Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr]
> Verzonden: zaterdag 14 januari 2012 10:13
> Aan: gen-art@ietf.org
> CC: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements.all@tools.ietf.org
> Onderwerp: review of draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
>
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call
comments
> you may receive.
>
> Document: draft-ietf-pcn-signaling-requirements-07.txt
> Reviewer: Francis Dupont
> Review Date: 20120106
> IETF LC End Date: 20120113
> IESG Telechat date: unknown
>
> Summary: Ready
>
> Major issues: None
>
> Minor issues: None
>
> Nits/editorial comments:
>  - in the whole document: behaviour -> behavior and
> signalling -> signaling
>   (note the spelling of collocated is dubious too)
>
>  - Abstract page 1: in the latter case -> in the first case
>
>  - Abstract page 1: the usage is to not refer to RFC in the Abstract
>
>  - ToC page 2: Acknowledgements -> Acknowledgments
>
>  - 2 page 3: measures- -> measures (in general the document is at
>  the limit of abuse of '-' character, here it is clearly a typo)
>
>  - 6 page 6: Acknowledgements -> Acknowledgments
>
>  - 6 page 6: I don't like the term 'generated', IMHO you can easily
>   find a better/nicer term.
>
>  - 7.2 page 7: C. Le Faucher, -> C., Le Faucheur,
>                                    ^          ^
>
> Regards
>
> Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr=

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Sat Jan 14 09:22:56 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-09
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on=20
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at=20
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments=20
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-09
Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
Review Date: 2012=9601=9614
IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-18
IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19

Summary: This draft is ready for publication as a standard RFC, but a=20
couple of minor issues remain.

Major issues: None
Minor issues:

2.2. Base 64

Sorry for missing this earlier, but RFC 4648, Section 4 is a better=20
reference for base64. (Don't forget the section reference, because RFC=20
4648 has 2 base64 alphabets.)


In Section 4:

> spf-dns =3D "SPF-DNS:" : { "txt" / "spf" } [CFWS] ":" [CFWS]
> domain [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] quoted-string CRLF

I think you are still missing [CFWS] before "txt" and another one before=20
CRLF.

Also, you should use "(" and ")" instead of "{" and "}", as the two=20
latter are not valid according to ABNF syntax.

To summarize, I think you should use:

spf-dns =3D "SPF-DNS:" : [CFWS] ( "txt" / "spf" ) [CFWS] ":" [CFWS]
           domain [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF


Nits/editorial comments: None



From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Sat Jan 14 12:45:31 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on=20
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at=20
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments=20
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
Review Date: 2012=9601=9614
IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-17
IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19

Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a Proposed=20
Standard RFC.


Major issues:

In Section 3:

    The RID callback MUST contain a zero-length entity body
    and a 'RID-Callback-Token' entity header

[Minor issue] "header" --> "header field" (header is the collection of=20
all header fields).

    , itself containing a unique
    token generated by the receiving RID system.

I am missing ABNF for the new header field.


    RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
    authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and

Do you mean that a RID client must use X.509 certificates?

    authentication, as in [RFC2818].

I find the whole sentence to be confusing. Note that the rules of RFC=20
6125 for certificate verification are stricter than in RFC 2818 and this=20
sentence can be read as conflicting with the paragraph below which=20
requires use of RFC 6125. What are you trying to say here?


    RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
    RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
    verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from the
    DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the certificate,

I am confused: this is the first time DNS SRV records are mentioned
(BTW, they need a Normative Reference). Earlier text seem to suggest=20
that DNS SRV are not used to locate protocol endpoints. If RID is using=20
DNS SRV, then information about how it is used is missing from the document.

    as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].

RFC 6125 allows for various options and this paragraph doesn't seem to=20
cover all of them. I suggest you check Section 13.7.1.2.1 of RFC 6120=20
for an example of what should be specified (ignore XmppAddr identifier=20
type, as it is very XMPP specific). For X.509 SANs which are disallowed,=20
you should say so.


Minor issues: (ones issue listed above)

Nits/editorial comments: None


From brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com  Sat Jan 14 18:42:33 2012
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Cc: drc@cloudflare.com, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>, jiangsheng@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-jiang-a6-to-historic-00.txt
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Thanks for the review, Miguel.

Regards
   Brian Carpenter

On 2012-01-13 00:41, Miguel A. Garcia wrote:
> I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
> reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>
> 
> Please resolve these comments along with any other comments you may
> receive.
> 
> Document: draft-jiang-a6-to-historic-00.txt
> Reviewer: Miguel Garcia <miguel.a.garcia@ericsson.com>
> Review Date: 2012-01-12
> IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-18
> IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19
> 
> Summary: The document is ready for publication as Informational RFC.
> 
> The document is clear. The are no issues.
> 
> /Miguel

From msk@cloudmark.com  Sat Jan 14 20:49:30 2012
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From: "Murray S. Kucherawy" <msk@cloudmark.com>
To: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Jan 2012 20:49:32 -0800
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-09
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Hi Alexey, thanks for the review.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alexey Melnikov [mailto:alexey.melnikov@isode.com]
> Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2012 9:21 AM
> To: Hilda L. Fontana; Murray S. Kucherawy; Pete Resnick
> Cc: gen-art@ietf.org; The IESG
> Subject: Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-0=
9
>=20
> Document: draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-09
> Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
> Review Date: 2012-01-14
> IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-18
> IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19
>=20
> Summary: This draft is ready for publication as a standard RFC, but a
> couple of minor issues remain.
>=20
> Major issues: None
> Minor issues:
>=20
> 2.2. Base 64
>=20
> Sorry for missing this earlier, but RFC 4648, Section 4 is a better
> reference for base64. (Don't forget the section reference, because RFC
> 4648 has 2 base64 alphabets.)

I think that's reasonable.

> In Section 4:
>=20
> > spf-dns =3D "SPF-DNS:" : { "txt" / "spf" } [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] domain
> > [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] quoted-string CRLF
>=20
> I think you are still missing [CFWS] before "txt" and another one
> before CRLF.
>=20
> Also, you should use "(" and ")" instead of "{" and "}", as the two
> latter are not valid according to ABNF syntax.
>=20
> To summarize, I think you should use:
>=20
> spf-dns =3D "SPF-DNS:" : [CFWS] ( "txt" / "spf" ) [CFWS] ":" [CFWS]
>            domain [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF

Almost; the errant unquoted (and thus meaningless) colon before the CFWS ha=
s to come out too.  We'll do that for -10.

Thanks again,
-MSK

From elwynd@dial.pipex.com  Mon Jan 16 05:43:17 2012
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-netext-radius-pmip6-06
Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
Review Date: 16 January 2012
IETF LC End Date: 19 January 2012
IESG Telechat date: (if known) -

Summary: Almost ready with just some minor nits.

Major issues: -

Minor issues:
s4.1, IP4_HOA_ONLY_SUPPORTED: Is there need to discuss what happens  if
the MUST/MUST NOT conditions are not satisfied? 

Nits/editorial comments:
s1, last para: s/visitor/visited/

s2, Home AAA: s/to  mobile/to the mobile/

s3: Expand acronym PBU on first use.

s3, para 7 (before numbered list): s/Following/The following/

s3, para below figure 2: s/illustrates topology where MAG/illustrates a
topologywhere the MAG/

s4, general: It might be helpful to replace the text 'to be defined by
IANA' in the Type specification fields with the relevant '(TBDxx)' if
that is the format that is wanted eventually.

s4.1, para 1: "reserves a new capability bit" - I think two new bits are
reserved in this section.

s4.1, IP4_HOA_ONLY_SUPPORTED: Expand acronym HNP on first use.

s4.2: Expand acronyms NAI, PBA on first use.

s4.2, et seq, Length fields: The formula '>= 3 octets' is confusing.
Suggest 'In octets, including Type and Length fields (>= 3)'

s4.2: The abbreviated name used for this field is inconsistent:
MN-Identifier in para 1, MN-ID in last para.

s4.5, para 2 and s4.7, para 2: s/If included by VAAA/If included by the
VAAA/

s4.8/s4.9/s4.12/s4.13: Is the all-zeroes case specified by prefix length
zero or 16 octets of zeroes?  Not sure if an actual prefix of zero
length is meaningful here.

s4.8/s4.9: Need to specify how PrefixLength is represented (unsigned
integer).

s4.10: s/conveys 64 bits interface identifier/conveys an 8 octet long
interface identifier/ (for consistency with field definition in last
para.)

s4.11: s/contains 64 bits interface identifier/contains an 8 octet long
interface identifier/ (for consistency with field definition in last
para.)

s4.16, last line of figure: s/LMA IPv6/DHCP v6 server/

s5.1, bullet 1: s/Home-/Home/

s7: I am not sure if the various must's and may's ought to be MUST's and
MAY's.


From jouni.nospam@gmail.com  Mon Jan 16 06:13:11 2012
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Hi Elwyn,

Thanks you for you detailed review. See my comments/answers inline.


On Jan 16, 2012, at 3:44 PM, Elwyn Davies wrote:

> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> 
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
> you may receive.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-netext-radius-pmip6-06
> Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
> Review Date: 16 January 2012
> IETF LC End Date: 19 January 2012
> IESG Telechat date: (if known) -
> 
> Summary: Almost ready with just some minor nits.
> 
> Major issues: -
> 
> Minor issues:
> s4.1, IP4_HOA_ONLY_SUPPORTED: Is there need to discuss what happens  if
> the MUST/MUST NOT conditions are not satisfied? 

If you mean this part of the MUST/MUST NOT:

	When this bit is set the PMIP6_SUPPORTED flag MUST also be set,
	and the IP4_HOA_SUPPORTED flag MUST NOT be set.

If these conditions are not met, then e.g. AAA end points are misbehaving.
I could clarify that in case of client receiving a wrong combination it
treats the Access-Accept as an Access-Reject and in a case the AAA server
received a wrong combination answers with an Access-Reject.

Would this be ok?



> 
> Nits/editorial comments:
> s1, last para: s/visitor/visited/
> 
> s2, Home AAA: s/to  mobile/to the mobile/
> 
> s3: Expand acronym PBU on first use.
> 
> s3, para 7 (before numbered list): s/Following/The following/
> 
> s3, para below figure 2: s/illustrates topology where MAG/illustrates a
> topologywhere the MAG/
> 
> s4, general: It might be helpful to replace the text 'to be defined by
> IANA' in the Type specification fields with the relevant '(TBDxx)' if
> that is the format that is wanted eventually.
> 
> s4.1, para 1: "reserves a new capability bit" - I think two new bits are
> reserved in this section.
> 
> s4.1, IP4_HOA_ONLY_SUPPORTED: Expand acronym HNP on first use.
> 
> s4.2: Expand acronyms NAI, PBA on first use.
> 
> s4.2, et seq, Length fields: The formula '>= 3 octets' is confusing.
> Suggest 'In octets, including Type and Length fields (>= 3)'
> 
> s4.2: The abbreviated name used for this field is inconsistent:
> MN-Identifier in para 1, MN-ID in last para.
> 
> s4.5, para 2 and s4.7, para 2: s/If included by VAAA/If included by the
> VAAA/

Ack for all the above.

> 
> s4.8/s4.9/s4.12/s4.13: Is the all-zeroes case specified by prefix length
> zero or 16 octets of zeroes?  Not sure if an actual prefix of zero
> length is meaningful here.

Actually the prefix length should be 128 in this case. Thanks for 
spotting this.


> 
> s4.8/s4.9: Need to specify how PrefixLength is represented (unsigned
> integer).

See above.

> 
> s4.10: s/conveys 64 bits interface identifier/conveys an 8 octet long
> interface identifier/ (for consistency with field definition in last
> para.)
> 
> s4.11: s/contains 64 bits interface identifier/contains an 8 octet long
> interface identifier/ (for consistency with field definition in last
> para.)

I would say:

   ... conveys 64 bits (8 octets) interface identifier representing a
   particular MN's interface.

since IIDs are always discussed as "64 bits interface ids".


> 
> s4.16, last line of figure: s/LMA IPv6/DHCP v6 server/
> 
> s5.1, bullet 1: s/Home-/Home/

Ack.

> 
> s7: I am not sure if the various must's and may's ought to be MUST's and
> MAY's.
> 

Any specific example?

- Jouni


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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-AR=
T, please see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/Gen=
Artfaq>.

Please wait for direction from your document shepherd or AD before posting =
a new version of the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-netext-bulk-re-registration-09
Reviewer: Christer Holmberg
Review Date: 16 January 2012
IETF LC End Date: 17 January 2012
IESG Telechat date: 19 January 2012

Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits that s=
hould be fixed before publication.

Major issues: -

Minor issues: -

Nits/editorial comments:

- The document talks about mobile access gateways and local mobility anchor=
s, but I did not find any references to, and/or definitions of, those.

Regards,

Christer


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<div>I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on G=
en-ART, please see the FAQ at &lt;<a href=3D"http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/are=
a/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq"><font color=3D"#0000FF"><u>http://wiki.tools.iet=
f.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq</u></font></a>&gt;.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Please wait for direction from your document shepherd or AD before pos=
ting a new version of the draft.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Document: draft-ietf-netext-bulk-re-registration-09</div>
<div>Reviewer: Christer Holmberg</div>
<div>Review Date: 16 January 2012</div>
<div>IETF LC End Date: 17 January 2012</div>
<div>IESG Telechat date: 19 January 2012</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits t=
hat should be fixed before publication.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Major issues: -</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Minor issues: -</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Nits/editorial comments:</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>- The document talks about mobile access gateways and local mobility a=
nchors, but I did not find any references to, and/or definitions of, those.=
</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Regards,</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Christer</div>
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From elwynd@dial.pipex.com  Mon Jan 16 06:48:05 2012
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Hi.

That's what I call *a speedy response*!
Deleted the agreed ones.

On Mon, 2012-01-16 at 16:13 +0200, jouni korhonen wrote:
> .> 
> > Minor issues:
> > s4.1, IP4_HOA_ONLY_SUPPORTED: Is there need to discuss what happens  if
> > the MUST/MUST NOT conditions are not satisfied? 
> 
> If you mean this part of the MUST/MUST NOT:
> 
> 	When this bit is set the PMIP6_SUPPORTED flag MUST also be set,
> 	and the IP4_HOA_SUPPORTED flag MUST NOT be set.
> 
> If these conditions are not met, then e.g. AAA end points are misbehaving.
> I could clarify that in case of client receiving a wrong combination it
> treats the Access-Accept as an Access-Reject and in a case the AAA server
> received a wrong combination answers with an Access-Reject.
> 
> Would this be ok?
> 
That sounds fine.
> 
.
> > 
> > s4.8/s4.9/s4.12/s4.13: Is the all-zeroes case specified by prefix length
> > zero or 16 octets of zeroes?  Not sure if an actual prefix of zero
> > length is meaningful here.
> 
> Actually the prefix length should be 128 in this case. Thanks for 
> spotting this.
(or 32 for the IPv4 cases).

Fine.

> 
> 
> > 
> > s4.8/s4.9: Need to specify how PrefixLength is represented (unsigned
> > integer).
> 
> See above.
> 
> > 
> > s4.10: s/conveys 64 bits interface identifier/conveys an 8 octet long
> > interface identifier/ (for consistency with field definition in last
> > para.)
> > 
> > s4.11: s/contains 64 bits interface identifier/contains an 8 octet long
> > interface identifier/ (for consistency with field definition in last
> > para.)
> 
> I would say:
> 
>    ... conveys 64 bits (8 octets) interface identifier representing a
>    particular MN's interface.
> 
> since IIDs are always discussed as "64 bits interface ids".
True.  Actually it started out as just inserting 'a 64 bit (long)' until
I noticed that you use 8 octets in the fields definition. Suggest you go
with 'a 64 bit long interface identifier'
> .> 
> > s7: I am not sure if the various must's and may's ought to be MUST's and
> > MAY's.
> > 
e.g s7.1 "This interface must support the transfer of
   accounting records needed for service control and charging."
I couldn't decide whether this was a protocol requirement or statement
about what the implementation ought to do. 'must support' is ambiguous
and not being a RADIUS expert (and being too lazy today to go chase the
relevant spec) I wasn't sure whether this put any requirement on the
message structure or just required the user/implementer to send the
reklevant data using the facilities that were there.  In the second case
'must' is clearly fine. Similarly in 7.2.

Thinking about it, the 'may's' in ss5.2, 6.2 and 7.3 are correct.

Once again thanks for the speedy turnaround.

Regards,
Elwyn
> 
> Any specific example?
> 
> - Jouni
> 


From jouni.nospam@gmail.com  Mon Jan 16 06:58:13 2012
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Hi, 


On Jan 16, 2012, at 4:49 PM, Elwyn Davies wrote:


>>> s7: I am not sure if the various must's and may's ought to be MUST's and
>>> MAY's.
>>> 
> e.g s7.1 "This interface must support the transfer of
>   accounting records needed for service control and charging."
> I couldn't decide whether this was a protocol requirement or statement
> about what the implementation ought to do. 'must support' is ambiguous
> and not being a RADIUS expert (and being too lazy today to go chase the
> relevant spec) I wasn't sure whether this put any requirement on the
> message structure or just required the user/implementer to send the
> reklevant data using the facilities that were there.  In the second case
> 'must' is clearly fine. Similarly in 7.2.

Hmm.. it is about statement for the implementers. Those indirectly refer
to existing attributes so having a MUST there is probably a good idea.


> 
> Thinking about it, the 'may's' in ss5.2, 6.2 and 7.3 are correct.
> 

Ack.

- Jouni

> Once again thanks for the speedy turnaround.
> 
> Regards,
> Elwyn
>> 
>> Any specific example?
>> 
>> - Jouni
>> 
> 


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Hi Chris,

Thanks for the review.

These terms are from RFC-5213. The spec did point to the base specs. But,
will ensure we add the references to those terms at first usage. I=B9ll note
this comment.



Regards
Sri





On 1/16/12 6:14 AM, "Christer Holmberg" <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
wrote:

> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-=
ART,
> please see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenA=
rtfaq
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq> >.
> =20
> Please wait for direction from your document shepherd or AD before postin=
g a
> new version of the draft.
> =20
> Document: draft-ietf-netext-bulk-re-registration-09
> Reviewer: Christer Holmberg
> Review Date: 16 January 2012
> IETF LC End Date: 17 January 2012
> IESG Telechat date: 19 January 2012
> =20
> Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits that
> should be fixed before publication.
> =20
> Major issues: -
> =20
> Minor issues: -
> =20
> Nits/editorial comments:
> =20
> - The document talks about mobile access gateways and local mobility anch=
ors,
> but I did not find any references to, and/or definitions of, those.
> =20
> Regards,
> =20
> Christer
> =20
>=20


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<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Re: Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-netext-bulk-re-registration-09</=
TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY>
<FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt=
'>Hi Chris,<BR>
<BR>
Thanks for the review. <BR>
<BR>
These terms are from RFC-5213. The spec did point to the base specs. But, w=
ill ensure we add the references to those terms at first usage. I&#8217;ll n=
ote this comment.<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
Regards<BR>
Sri<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
<BR>
On 1/16/12 6:14 AM, &quot;Christer Holmberg&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"christer.hol=
mberg@ericsson.com">christer.holmberg@ericsson.com</a>&gt; wrote:<BR>
<BR>
</SPAN></FONT><BLOCKQUOTE><SPAN STYLE=3D'font-size:11pt'><FONT FACE=3D"Courier =
New">I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Ge=
n-ART, please see the FAQ at &lt;<FONT COLOR=3D"#0000FF"><U><a href=3D"http://wi=
ki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq">http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/a=
rea/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq</a></U></FONT> &lt;<a href=3D"http://wiki.tools.ie=
tf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq">http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/tra=
c/wiki/GenArtfaq</a>&gt; &gt;.<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Please wait for direction from your document shepherd or AD before posting =
a new version of the draft.<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Document: draft-ietf-netext-bulk-re-registration-09<BR>
Reviewer: Christer Holmberg<BR>
Review Date: 16 January 2012<BR>
IETF LC End Date: 17 January 2012<BR>
IESG Telechat date: 19 January 2012<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits that s=
hould be fixed before publication.<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Major issues: -<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Minor issues: -<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Nits/editorial comments:<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
- The document talks about mobile access gateways and local mobility anchor=
s, but I did not find any references to, and/or definitions of, those.<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Regards,<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
Christer<BR>
&nbsp;<BR>
</FONT><FONT FACE=3D"Calibri, Verdana, Helvetica, Arial"><BR>
</FONT></SPAN></BLOCKQUOTE>
</BODY>
</HTML>


--B_3409547755_42844521--


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> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
> or AD before posting a new version of the draft.
>=20
> Document: draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt
> Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
> Review Date: 20120115
> IETF LC End Date: 20111130
> IESG Telechat date: 20120119
>=20
> Summary: This is an updated version of the review I did for Version =
16.
> The status is STILL 'almost ready'. I noticed one additional minor =
issue
> (s3, ITRs). I did not receive any explicit reponses to the comments in
> the previous review although some of the comments have been addressed
> and I have removed those comments. So...
>=20
> Given that this document is experimental, there don't appear to be any
> showstopping issues.  However, I found that having the functionality
> spread over several documents without a really clear overview did not
> make it easy to follow. There are a number of areas where topics =
appear
> unannounced in ways that are not immediately meaningful, and may or =
may
> not be clarified later in the document (especially the topics of
> multicast and anycast).
>=20
> There are areas of the detailed format description that are very dense=20=

> and difficult to follow, and the split of functionality between this=20=

> document and ALT does not help.  I got the distinct feeling that extra=20=

> bits of functionality had been shoe horned into this section over time=20=

> without really thinking through the system aspects.  However given =
that=20
> we are considering an experimental protocol this is not a major issue,=20=

> provided that it is cleaned up before becoming a real standard.
>=20
> Major issues: None.

This is good to know. Thanks for your comments Elwyn. See responses =
below. I have a new -20 diff file enclosed to make sure I reflected your =
comments. Please have a look and comment as soon as you can. Thanks.

> Minor issues:
> s3, Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR): "An ITR is a router which accepts an =
IP
> packet with a single IP header": Technically this rules out a site
> attached to an ITR using any form of IP tunneling (such as VPNs or IP
> mobility or 6-in-4 tunnels) through the ITR because a tunneled packet
> would already have more than one IP header. In practice, I think the
> qualifying statement in brackets immediately after the quoted =
statement
> clarifies the situation but this should be rewrittten to avoid
> ambiguity.

Fixed.

> s3, EID: "EIDs MUST NOT be used as RLOCs":  But the remainder of the
> definition goes on to talk about what must/must not happen when they =
are
> numerically equivalent. This is still somewhat confusing.

When they are numerically equivaldent does not mean they are the same =
definition. Remember there are two namespaces so 10.1.1.1 in one =
namespace serves a different purpose than 10.1.1.1 in the other =
namespace.

I made no change here because we revised this definition dozens of times =
to make the working group happy. So this definition is rough concensus.

> s3, Data Probe: Some clarification/explanation is needed regarding the=20=

> fact that a Data Probe uses an EID as its destination address in the=20=

> core, but EIDs are specifically described as not routable in the core=20=

> earlier in the document.  I understand that ALT puts caveats on the=20
> usability of Data Probes, but still potentially offers routability of=20=

> the EID over the alternative topology.  I think some reflection of =
this=20
> discussion would be helpful here.

I added to the definition that when Data Probes are used, the underlying =
routing system must advertise EIDs. This is not desirable but there are =
rare cases, it may be used.

> s4.1, item 4:  ETR "processes as a control message"... does this imply=20=

> anything about prioritization in the rest of the network?

No different than anything else and doesn't deserve a mention in my =
opinion.

> s5.3, LISP Nonce: What are the consequences of using the same nonce =
for=20
> 'too long'.. and how can an implementor decide what is too long?

A possible replay attack if a man-in-the-middle can guess a 24-bit or =
128-bit nonce.

> s6.1: "Implementations MUST be prepared to accept packets when either =
the
>    source port or destination UDP port is set to 4342 due to NATs
>    changing port number values."  I (still) don't understand this.  My=20=

> understanding was that these UDP packets are generated in the ITR with=20=

> globally routable RLOCs in the headers. Why are they going through =
NATs?
> Does this mean when only one of the ports is 4342? (but the previous
> comments still stands).

An ITR could be behind a NAT. And when it is its "local RLOC" is a =
private address. When the packet traverses a NAT, the source address =
will be changed to a global address. The outside world believes the =
source of the packet is the source RLOC which is globally reachable and =
advertised in the underlying routing system.

NATs also translate/change the source port of the outer header. So the =
if a LISP control packet is returning a reply to a request that had 4342 =
in the destination port, then the source port would be translated and =
the requester would not know the packet is a LISP control packet. So if =
the source port of the request is 4342, the replier can return that in =
the destination port of the reply without a NAT touching the port (while =
it is touching the other port).

> s5.3: Copying of TTL/Hop Count fields and Type of service fields: This=20=

> discussion is somewhat confusing.  Initially these are described as=20
> SHOULD mostly without any description of why one would not.  A couple =
of=20
> paragraphs later they become MUSTs with some minor and explicit=20
> exceptions.  This should be clarified.

We said should because we were being practical. Some implementations =
cannot copy the TTL and set it statically. We want those implementations =
to not violate the spec.

We use MUST later for the Type of Service field. When the TOS is copied, =
then the sub-parts MUST follow what the text says.

> s6.1, last para: "This main LISP specification is the authoritative=20
> source for message
>    format definitions for the Map-Request and Map-Reply messages." So=20=

> what spec is authoritative for Map-Register and Map-Notify?  It is =
later=20
> stated that this spec defines the message format of these messages=20
> (first paras of s6.1.6/6.1.7).  This seems pretty authoritative.  I=20
> suspect that this para could be dropped wlog.

I will fix this text. Thanks for finding this.

> s6.1.4: S bit: How do I find out how big the Mapping Protocol Data is =
in=20
> order to determine where the extra security fields are located?

This was commented on quite a bit and was used for CONS. Since the =
commenters won the argument to remove references to CONS, we will remove =
the Mapping Protocol Data part, which actually is not used by any =
implementations.

> s6.1.4: M priority/weight:  Multicast suddenly makes an appearance.  =
Not=20
> sure why?

Because we have to encode multicast priorities. And to get a mapping for =
an ETR to join an ITR, we use a Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange. I will =
add a reference to LISP-multicast for each reference to M priority and M =
weight.

> s10.3: How is a "route-returnability check" performed in LISP?

I added another sentence to the defintion of "Route-returnability".

> Nits/editorial comments:
> General: s/bytes/octets/

Changed throughout.

> General: Figures all need titles and numbers.

There are section titles for the figures. There are no figure numbers =
just like RFC 2460. I don't see the point since there is no text that =
back references the figures. And I think we wrote the text to =
sufficiently introduce the figures that are about to come up.

> s3: s/PA addresses are an an address/PA addresses are an address/
>=20
> s3, RLOC: Link to IPv4/v6 specifications needed.
>=20
> s3, EID-to-RLOC Database: "This has no negative implications."=20
> Justification?
>=20
> s3, Negative Mapping Entry: Needs cross-reference for Negative =
Map-Reply.

Changed all the above.

> s3, Data Probe: needs cross-reference(s)

I don't think it does because it is being defined here for the first =
time.

> s3, PITR: The alternative term PTR is now not used at all and can be
> removed.

Fixed.

> s4.1, item 7: Needs cross references.

Can you be more specific please. Are you asking for a reference for DNS =
names or for the Map-Reply or for something else?

> s5.1 and s5.2 Need references to base IP specifications and notes =
about=20
> the items that are defined in those specifications, and the =
equivalences=20
> between source/destination IP addresses and EIDs/RLOCs. (also applies =
to=20
> s6.1)

We did this in a later update. We put the references in 5.3 where we =
describe such fields.

> s5.3: This section should also refer to the various abbreviations used=20=

> in the figures (e.g., OH for Outer Header, etc).

It is expanded in the "Packet header descriptions:" part.

> s5.3, LSB: First mention of anycast addresses here.  Needs a cross=20
> reference or earlier introduction.

I have added a definition for anycast address in the Definition of Terms =
section.

> s6.x: Encodings of numeric fields not specified.

All fixed. New text enclosed. Please acknowledge. The -20 has not been =
posted. This is a work in progress -20 waiting Adrian's comments as =
well.

Dino


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<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"><title>wdiff draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt draft-ietf-lisp-20.txt</title></head><body>
<pre>
Network Working Group                                       D. Farinacci
Internet-Draft                                                 V. Fuller
Intended status: Experimental                                   D. Meyer
Expires: July <strike><font color="red" size="+1">8,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">19,</font></strong> 2012                                          D. Lewis
                                                           cisco Systems
                                                        January <strike><font color="red" size="+1">5,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">16,</font></strong> 2012

                 Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)
                           <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-19</font></strike>
                           <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-20</font></strong>

Abstract

   This draft describes a network layer based protocol that enables
   separation of IP addresses into two new numbering spaces: Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs).  No changes are
   required to either host protocol stacks or to the "core" of the
   Internet infrastructure.  LISP can be incrementally deployed, without
   a "flag day", and offers traffic engineering, multi-homing, and
   mobility benefits to early adopters, even when there are relatively
   few LISP-capable sites.

   Design and development of LISP was largely motivated by the problem
   statement produced by the October 2006 IAB Routing and Addressing
   Workshop.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July <strike><font color="red" size="+1">8,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">19,</font></strong> 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Definition of Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Basic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">13</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">14</font></strong>
     4.1.  Packet Flow Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">15</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">16</font></strong>
   5.  LISP Encapsulation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">17</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">18</font></strong>
     5.1.  LISP IPv4-in-IPv4 Header Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">18</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">19</font></strong>
     5.2.  LISP IPv6-in-IPv6 Header Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">18</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">19</font></strong>
     5.3.  Tunnel Header Field Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">20</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">21</font></strong>
     5.4.  Dealing with Large Encapsulated Packets  . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">24</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">25</font></strong>
       5.4.1.  A Stateless Solution to MTU Handling . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">24</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">25</font></strong>
       5.4.2.  A Stateful Solution to MTU Handling  . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">25</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">26</font></strong>
     5.5.  Using Virtualization and Segmentation with LISP  . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">25</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">26</font></strong>
   6.  EID-to-RLOC Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">27</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">28</font></strong>
     6.1.  LISP IPv4 and IPv6 Control Plane Packet Formats  . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">27</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">28</font></strong>
       6.1.1.  LISP Packet Type Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">29</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">30</font></strong>
       6.1.2.  Map-Request Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">29</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">30</font></strong>
       6.1.3.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Request Message  . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">32</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">33</font></strong>
       6.1.4.  Map-Reply Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">33</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">34</font></strong>
       6.1.5.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Reply Message  . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">37</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">38</font></strong>
       6.1.6.  Map-Register Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">39</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">40</font></strong>
       6.1.7.  Map-Notify Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">41</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">42</font></strong>
       6.1.8.  Encapsulated Control Message Format  . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">42</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">43</font></strong>
     6.2.  Routing Locator Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">44</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">45</font></strong>
     6.3.  Routing Locator Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">46</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">47</font></strong>
       6.3.1.  Echo Nonce Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">48</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">49</font></strong>
       6.3.2.  RLOC Probing Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">49</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">50</font></strong>
     6.4.  EID Reachability within a LISP Site  . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">50</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">51</font></strong>
     6.5.  Routing Locator Hashing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">51</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">52</font></strong>
     6.6.  Changing the Contents of EID-to-RLOC Mappings  . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">52</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">53</font></strong>
       6.6.1.  Clock Sweep  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">53</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">54</font></strong>
       6.6.2.  Solicit-Map-Request (SMR)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">53</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">54</font></strong>
       6.6.3.  Database Map Versioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">55</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">56</font></strong>
   7.  Router Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">56</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">57</font></strong>
   8.  Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">57</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">58</font></strong>
     8.1.  First-hop/Last-hop Tunnel Routers  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">58</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">59</font></strong>
     8.2.  Border/Edge Tunnel Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">58</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">59</font></strong>
     8.3.  ISP Provider-Edge (PE) Tunnel Routers  . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">59</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">60</font></strong>
     8.4.  LISP Functionality with Conventional NATs  . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">59</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">60</font></strong>
     8.5.  Packets Egressing a LISP Site  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">60</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">61</font></strong>
   9.  Traceroute Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">61</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">62</font></strong>
     9.1.  IPv6 Traceroute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">62</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">63</font></strong>
     9.2.  IPv4 Traceroute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">62</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">63</font></strong>
     9.3.  Traceroute using Mixed Locators  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">62</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">63</font></strong>
   10. Mobility Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">64</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">65</font></strong>
     10.1. Site Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">64</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">65</font></strong>
     10.2. Slow Endpoint Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">64</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">65</font></strong>
     10.3. Fast Endpoint Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">64</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">65</font></strong>
     10.4. Fast Network Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">66</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">67</font></strong>
     10.5. LISP Mobile Node Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">66</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">67</font></strong>
   11. Multicast Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">68</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">69</font></strong>
   12. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">69</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">70</font></strong>
   13. Network Management Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">71</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">72</font></strong>
   14. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">72</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">73</font></strong>
     14.1. LISP ACT and Flag Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">72</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">73</font></strong>
     14.2. LISP Address Type Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">72</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">73</font></strong>
     14.3. LISP UDP Port Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">72</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">73</font></strong>
     14.4. LISP Key ID Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">73</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">74</font></strong>
   15. Known Open Issues and Areas of Future Work . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">74</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">75</font></strong>
   16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">76</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">77</font></strong>
     16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">76</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">77</font></strong>
     16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">77</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">78</font></strong>
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">81</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">82</font></strong>
   Appendix B.  Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">83</font></strong>
     B.1.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-20.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">83</font></strong>
     B.2.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-18.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">83</font></strong>
     B.3.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-17.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-18.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">83</font></strong>
     B.4.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-16.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-17.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">83</font></strong>
     B.5.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-15.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-16.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">83</font></strong>
     B.6.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-14.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-15.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">83</font></strong>
     B.7.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-13.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-14.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.8.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-12.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-13.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
     B.9.  Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-11.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-12.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
     B.10. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-11.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
     B.11. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">86</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">87</font></strong>
     B.12. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-08.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
     B.13. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-07.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-08.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
     B.14. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-06.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-07.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">90</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">89</font></strong>
     B.15. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-05.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-06.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
     B.16. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-04.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-05.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
     B.17. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-03.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-04.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
     B.18. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-02.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-03.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
     B.19. Changes to <strike><font color="red" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-01.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-02.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">94</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">95</font></strong>
     B.20. Changes to <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-01.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
     B.21. Changes to</font></strong> draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">94</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">95</font></strong>
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red" size="+1">95</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">97</font></strong>

1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   This document describes the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol
   (LISP), which provides a set of functions for routers to exchange
   information used to map from non globally routeable Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs) to routeable Routing Locators (RLOCs).  It also
   defines a mechanism for these LISP routers to encapsulate IP packets
   addressed with EIDs for transmission across the&lt; Internet that uses
   RLOCs for routing and forwarding.

   Creation of LISP was initially motivated by discussions during the
   IAB-sponsored Routing and Addressing Workshop held in Amsterdam in
   October, 2006 (see [RFC4984]).  A key conclusion of the workshop was
   that the Internet routing and addressing system was not scaling well
   in the face of the explosive growth of new sites; one reason for this
   poor scaling is the increasing number of multi-homed and other sites
   that cannot be addressed as part of topologically- or provider-based
   aggregated prefixes.  Additional work that more completely described
   the problem statement may be found in [RADIR].

   A basic observation, made many years ago in early networking research
   such as that documented in [CHIAPPA] and [RFC4984], is that using a
   single address field for both identifying a device and for
   determining where it is topologically located in the network requires
   optimization along two conflicting axes: for routing to be efficient,
   the address must be assigned topologically; for collections of
   devices to be easily and effectively managed, without the need for
   renumbering in response to topological change (such as that caused by
   adding or removing attachment points to the network or by mobility
   events), the address must explicitly not be tied to the topology.

   The approach that LISP takes to solving the routing scalability
   problem is to replace IP addresses with two new types of numbers:
   Routing Locators (RLOCs), which are topologically assigned to network
   attachment points (and are therefore amenable to aggregation) and
   used for routing and forwarding of packets through the network; and
   Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs), which are assigned independently from
   the network topology, are used for numbering devices, and are
   aggregated along administrative boundaries.  LISP then defines
   functions for mapping between the two numbering spaces and for
   encapsulating traffic originated by devices using non-routeable EIDs
   for transport across a network infrastructure that routes and
   forwards using RLOCs.  Both RLOCs and EIDs are syntactically-
   identical to IP addresses; it is the semantics of how they are used
   that differs.

   This document describes the protocol that implements these functions.
   The database which stores the mappings between EIDs and RLOCs is
   explicitly a separate "module" to facilitate experimentation with a
   variety of approaches.  One database design that is being developed
   and prototyped as part of the LISP working group work is [ALT].
   Others that have been described but not implemented include [CONS],
   [EMACS], [NERD].  Finally, [LISP-MS], documents a general-purpose
   service interface for accessing a mapping database; this interface is
   intended to make the mapping database modular so that different
   approaches can be tried without the need to modify installed LISP
   capable devices in LISP sites.

   This experimental <strike><font color="red" size="+1">specification</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">specification, not yet recommended for Internet-
   scale deployment,</font></strong> has <strong><font color="green" size="+1">some</font></strong> areas that require additional experience
   and measurement.  Results of such work may lead to modifications and
   enhancements of protocol mechanisms defined in this document.  See
   Section 15 for specific, known issues that are in need of further
   work during development, implementation, and prototype deployment.

3.  Definition of Terms

   Provider Independent (PI) Addresses:   PI addresses are an address
      block assigned from a pool where blocks are not associated with
      any particular location in the network (e.g. from a particular
      service provider), and is therefore not topologically aggregatable
      in the routing system.

   Provider Assigned (PA) Addresses:   PA addresses are an <strike><font color="red" size="+1">an</font></strike> address block
      assigned to a site by each service provider to which a site
      connects.  Typically, each block is sub-block of a service
      provider Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] block and
      is aggregated into the larger block before being advertised into
      the global Internet.  Traditionally, IP multihoming has been
      implemented by each multi-homed site acquiring its own, globally-
      visible prefix.  LISP uses only topologically-assigned and
      aggregatable address blocks for RLOCs, eliminating this
      demonstrably non-scalable practice.

   Routing Locator (RLOC):   A RLOC is an IPv4 <strong><font color="green" size="+1">[RFC0791]</font></strong> or IPv6
      <strong><font color="green" size="+1">[RFC2460]</font></strong> address of an egress tunnel router (ETR).  A RLOC is the
      output of an <strike><font color="red" size="+1">EID-to-
      RLOC</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">EID-to-RLOC</font></strong> mapping lookup.  An EID maps to one or
      more RLOCs.  Typically, RLOCs are numbered from <strike><font color="red" size="+1">topologically-aggregatable</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">topologically-
      aggregatable</font></strong> blocks that are assigned to a site at each point to
      which it attaches to the global Internet; where the topology is
      defined by the connectivity of provider networks, RLOCs can be
      thought of as PA addresses.  Multiple RLOCs can be assigned to the
      same ETR device or to multiple ETR devices at a site.

   Endpoint ID (EID):   An EID is a 32-bit (for IPv4) or 128-bit (for
      IPv6) value used in the source and destination address fields of
      the first (most inner) LISP header of a packet.  The host obtains
      a destination EID the same way it obtains an destination address
      today, for example through a Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1034]
      lookup or Session Invitation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] exchange.
      The source EID is obtained via existing mechanisms used to set a
      host's "local" IP address.  An EID is allocated to a host from an
      EID-prefix block associated with the site where the host is
      located.  An EID can be used by a host to refer to other hosts.
      EIDs MUST NOT be used as LISP RLOCs.  Note that EID blocks MAY be
      assigned in a hierarchical manner, independent of the network
      topology, to facilitate scaling of the mapping database.  In
      addition, an EID block assigned to a site may have site-local
      structure (subnetting) for routing within the site; this structure
      is not visible to the global routing system.  In theory, the bit
      string that represents an EID for one device can represent an RLOC
      for a different device.  As the architecture is realized, if a
      given bit string is both an RLOC and an EID, it must refer to the
      same entity in both cases.  When used in discussions with other
      Locator/ID separation proposals, a LISP EID will be called a
      "LEID".  Throughout this document, any references to "EID" refers
      to an LEID.

   EID-prefix:   An EID-prefix is a power-of-two block of EIDs which are
      allocated to a site by an address allocation authority.  EID-
      prefixes are associated with a set of RLOC addresses which make up
      a "database mapping".  EID-prefix allocations can be broken up
      into smaller blocks when an RLOC set is to be associated with the
      larger EID-prefix block.  A globally routed address block (whether
      PI or PA) is not inherently an EID-prefix.  A globally routed
      address block MAY be used by its assignee as an EID block.  The
      converse is not supported.  That is, a site which receives an
      explicitly allocated EID-prefix may not use that EID-prefix as a
      globally routed prefix.  This would require coordination and
      cooperation with the entities managing the mapping infrastructure.
      Once this has been done, that block could be removed from the
      globally routed IP system, if other suitable transition and access
      mechanisms are in place.  Discussion of such transition and access
      mechanisms can be found in [INTERWORK] and [LISP-DEPLOY].

   End-system:   An end-system is an IPv4 or IPv6 device that originates
      packets with a single IPv4 or IPv6 header.  The end-system
      supplies an EID value for the destination address field of the IP
      header when communicating globally (i.e. outside of its routing
      domain).  An end-system can be a host computer, a switch or router
      device, or any network appliance.

   Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR):   An ITR is a router which accepts an IP
      packet <strike><font color="red" size="+1">with</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">from</font></strong> a <strike><font color="red" size="+1">single IP header (more precisely, an</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">LISP site (typically, the</font></strong> IP packet that does not
      contain a LISP header).  The router treats this <strike><font color="red" size="+1">"inner"</font></strike> IP destination
      address <strong><font color="green" size="+1">(which will be the part of the "inner" header)</font></strong> as an EID
      and performs an EID-to-RLOC mapping lookup.  The router then
      prepends an "outer" IP header with one of its globally-routable
      RLOCs in the source address field and the result of the mapping
      lookup in the destination address field.  Note that this
      destination RLOC MAY be an intermediate, proxy device that has
      better knowledge of the <strike><font color="red" size="+1">EID-
      to-RLOC</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">EID-to-RLOC</font></strong> mapping closer to the
      destination EID.  In general, an ITR receives IP packets from site
      end-systems on one side and sends LISP-encapsulated IP packets
      toward the Internet on the other side.

      Specifically, when a service provider prepends a LISP header for
      Traffic Engineering purposes, the router that does this is also
      regarded as an ITR.  The outer RLOC the ISP ITR uses can be based
      on the outer destination address (the originating ITR's supplied
      RLOC) or the inner destination address (the originating hosts
      supplied EID).

   TE-ITR:   A TE-ITR is an ITR that is deployed in a service provider
      network that prepends an additional LISP header for Traffic
      Engineering purposes.

   Egress Tunnel Router (ETR):   An ETR is a router that accepts an IP
      packet where the destination address in the "outer" IP header is
      one of its own RLOCs.  The router strips the "outer" header and
      forwards the packet based on the next IP header found.  In
      general, an ETR receives LISP-encapsulated IP packets from the
      Internet on one side and sends decapsulated IP packets to site
      end-systems on the other side.  ETR functionality does not have to
      be limited to a router device.  A server host can be the endpoint
      of a LISP tunnel as well.

   TE-ETR:   A TE-ETR is an ETR that is deployed in a service provider
      network that strips an outer LISP header for Traffic Engineering
      purposes.

   xTR:   A xTR is a reference to an ITR or ETR when direction of data
      flow is not part of the context description. xTR refers to the
      router that is the tunnel endpoint.  Used synonymously with the
      term "Tunnel Router".  For example, "An xTR can be located at the
      Customer Edge (CE) router", meaning both ITR and ETR functionality
      is at the CE router.

   LISP Router:   A LISP router is a router that performs the functions
      of any or all of ITR, ETR, PITR, or PETR.

   EID-to-RLOC Cache:   The EID-to-RLOC cache is a short-lived, on-
      demand table in an ITR that stores, tracks, and is responsible for
      timing-out and otherwise validating EID-to-RLOC mappings.  This
      cache is distinct from the full "database" of EID-to-RLOC
      mappings, it is dynamic, local to the ITR(s), and relatively small
      while the database is distributed, relatively static, and much
      more global in scope.

   EID-to-RLOC Database:   The EID-to-RLOC database is a global
      distributed database that contains all known EID-prefix to RLOC
      mappings.  Each potential ETR typically contains a small piece of
      the database: the EID-to-RLOC mappings for the EID prefixes
      "behind" the router.  These map to one of the router's own,
      globally-visible, IP addresses.  The same database mapping entries
      MUST be configured on all ETRs for a given site.  In a steady
      state the EID-prefixes for the site and the locator-set for each
      EID-prefix MUST be the same on all ETRs.  Procedures to enforce
      and/or verify this are outside the scope of this document.  Note
      that there MAY be transient conditions when the EID-prefix for the
      site and locator-set for each EID-prefix may not be the same on
      all ETRs.  This has no negative <strike><font color="red" size="+1">implications.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">implications since a partial set
      of locators can be used.</font></strong>

   Recursive Tunneling:   Recursive tunneling occurs when a packet has
      more than one LISP IP header.  Additional layers of tunneling MAY
      be employed to implement traffic engineering or other re-routing
      as needed.  When this is done, an additional "outer" LISP header
      is added and the original RLOCs are preserved in the "inner"
      header.  Any references to tunnels in this specification refers to
      dynamic encapsulating tunnels and they are never statically
      configured.

   Reencapsulating Tunnels:   Reencapsulating tunneling occurs when an
      ETR removes a LISP header, then acts as an ITR to prepend another
      LISP header.  Doing this allows a packet to be re-routed by the
      re-encapsulating router without adding the overhead of additional
      tunnel headers.  Any references to tunnels in this specification
      refers to dynamic encapsulating tunnels and they are never
      statically configured.  When using multiple mapping database
      systems, care must be taken to not create reencapsulation loops.

   LISP Header:   a term used in this document to refer to the outer
      IPv4 or IPv6 header, a UDP header, and a LISP-specific <strike><font color="red" size="+1">8-byte</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">8-octet</font></strong>
      header that follows the UDP header, an ITR prepends or an ETR
      strips.

   Address Family Identifier (AFI):   a term used to describe an address
      encoding in a packet.  An address family currently pertains to an
      IPv4 or IPv6 address.  See [AFI]/[AFI-REGISTRY] and [RFC3232] for
      details.  An AFI value of 0 used in this specification indicates
      an unspecified encoded address where the length of the address is
      0 <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> following the 16-bit AFI value of 0.

   Negative Mapping Entry:   A negative mapping entry, also known as a
      negative cache entry, is an EID-to-RLOC entry where an EID-prefix
      is advertised or stored with no RLOCs.  That is, the locator-set
      for the EID-to-RLOC entry is empty or has an encoded locator count
      of 0.  This type of entry could be used to describe a prefix from
      a non-LISP site, which is explicitly not in the mapping database.
      There are a set of well defined actions that are encoded in a
      Negative <strike><font color="red" size="+1">Map-Reply.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">Map-Reply (Section 6.1.5).</font></strong>

   Data Probe:   A data-probe is a LISP-encapsulated data packet where
      the inner header destination address equals the outer header
      destination address used to trigger a Map-Reply by a decapsulating
      ETR.  In addition, the original packet is decapsulated and
      delivered to the destination host if the destination EID is in the
      EID-prefix range configured on the ETR.  Otherwise, the packet is
      discarded.  A Data Probe is used in some of the mapping database
      designs to "probe" or request a Map-Reply from an ETR; in other
      cases, Map-Requests are used.  See each mapping database design
      for details.  <strong><font color="green" size="+1">When using Data Probes, by sending Map-Requests on
      the underlying routing system, EID-prefixes must be advertised.
      However, this is discouraged if the core is to scale by having
      less EID-prefixes stored in the core router's routing tables.</font></strong>

   Proxy ITR (PITR):   A PITR is <strike><font color="red" size="+1">also known as a PTR is</font></strike> defined and described in [INTERWORK], a
      PITR acts like an ITR but does so on behalf of non-LISP sites
      which send packets to destinations at LISP sites.

   Proxy ETR (PETR):   A PETR is defined and described in [INTERWORK], a
      PETR acts like an ETR but does so on behalf of LISP sites which
      send packets to destinations at non-LISP sites.

   Route-returnability:  is an assumption that the underlying routing
      system will deliver packets to the destination.  When combined
      with a nonce that is provided by a sender and returned by a
      receiver, this limits off-path data insertion.  <strong><font color="green" size="+1">A route-
      returnability check is verified when a message is sent with a
      nonce, another message is returned with the same nonce, and the
      destination of the original message appears as the source of the
      returned message.</font></strong>

   LISP site:  is a set of routers in an edge network that are under a
      single technical administration.  LISP routers which reside in the
      edge network are the demarcation points to separate the edge
      network from the core network.

   Client-side:  a term used in this document to indicate a connection
      initiation attempt by an EID.  The ITR(s) at the LISP site are the
      first to get involved in obtaining database map cache entries by
      sending Map-Request messages.

   Server-side:  a term used in this document to indicate a connection
      initiation attempt is being accepted for a destination EID.  The
      ETR(s) at the destination LISP site are the first to send Map-
      Replies to the source site initiating the connection.  The ETR(s)
      at this destination site can obtain mappings by gleaning
      information from Map-Requests, Data-Probes, or encapsulated
      packets.

   Locator Status Bits (LSBs):  Locator status bits are present in the
      LISP header.  They are used by ITRs to inform ETRs about the up/
      down status of all ETRs at the local site.  These bits are used as
      a hint to convey up/down router status and not path reachability
      status.  The LSBs can be verified by use of one of the Locator
      Reachability Algorithms described in Section 6.3.

   <strong><font color="green" size="+1">Anycast Address:  a term used in this document to refer to the same
      IPv4 or IPv6 address configured and used on multiple systems at
      the same time.  An EID or RLOC can be an anycast address in each
      of their own address spaces.</font></strong>

4.  Basic Overview

   One key concept of LISP is that end-systems (hosts) operate the same
   way they do today.  The IP addresses that hosts use for tracking
   sockets, connections, and for sending and receiving packets do not
   change.  In LISP terminology, these IP addresses are called Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs).

   Routers continue to forward packets based on IP destination
   addresses.  When a packet is LISP encapsulated, these addresses are
   referred to as Routing Locators (RLOCs).  Most routers along a path
   between two hosts will not change; they continue to perform routing/
   forwarding lookups on the destination addresses.  For routers between
   the source host and the ITR as well as routers from the ETR to the
   destination host, the destination address is an EID.  For the routers
   between the ITR and the ETR, the destination address is an RLOC.

   Another key LISP concept is the "Tunnel Router".  A tunnel router
   prepends LISP headers on host-originated packets and strips them
   prior to final delivery to their destination.  The IP addresses in
   this "outer header" are RLOCs.  During end-to-end packet exchange
   between two Internet hosts, an ITR prepends a new LISP header to each
   packet and an egress tunnel router strips the new header.  The ITR
   performs EID-to-RLOC lookups to determine the routing path to the
   ETR, which has the RLOC as one of its IP addresses.

   Some basic rules governing LISP are:

   o  End-systems (hosts) only send to addresses which are EIDs.  They
      don't know addresses are EIDs versus RLOCs but assume packets get
      to destinations, which in turn, LISP routers deliver packets to
      the destination the end-system has specified.  The procedure a
      host uses to send IP packets does not change.

   o  EIDs are always IP addresses assigned to hosts.

   o  LISP routers mostly deal with Routing Locator addresses.  See
      details later in Section 4.1 to clarify what is meant by "mostly".

   o  RLOCs are always IP addresses assigned to routers; preferably,
      topologically-oriented addresses from provider CIDR (Classless
      Inter-Domain Routing) blocks.

   o  When a router originates packets it may use as a source address
      either an EID or RLOC.  When acting as a host (e.g. when
      terminating a transport session such as SSH, TELNET, or SNMP), it
      may use an EID that is explicitly assigned for that purpose.  An
      EID that identifies the router as a host MUST NOT be used as an
      RLOC; an EID is only routable within the scope of a site.  A
      typical BGP configuration might demonstrate this "hybrid" EID/RLOC
      usage where a router could use its "host-like" EID to terminate
      iBGP sessions to other routers in a site while at the same time
      using RLOCs to terminate eBGP sessions to routers outside the
      site.

   o  Packets with EIDs in them are not expected to be delivered end-to-
      end in the absence of an EID-to-RLOC mapping operation.  They are
      expected to be used locally for intra-site communication or to be
      encapsulated for inter-site communication.

   o  EID prefixes are likely to be hierarchically assigned in a manner
      which is optimized for administrative convenience and to
      facilitate scaling of the EID-to-RLOC mapping database.  The
      hierarchy is based on a address allocation hierarchy which is
      independent of the network topology.

   o  EIDs may also be structured (subnetted) in a manner suitable for
      local routing within an autonomous system.

   An additional LISP header MAY be prepended to packets by a TE-ITR
   when re-routing of the path for a packet is desired.  A potential
   use-case for this would be an ISP router that needs to perform
   traffic engineering for packets flowing through its network.  In such
   a situation, termed Recursive Tunneling, an ISP transit acts as an
   additional ingress tunnel router and the RLOC it uses for the new
   prepended header would be either a TE-ETR within the ISP (along
   intra-ISP traffic engineered path) or a TE-ETR within another ISP (an
   inter-ISP traffic engineered path, where an agreement to build such a
   path exists).

   In order to avoid excessive packet overhead as well as possible
   encapsulation loops, this document mandates that a maximum of two
   LISP headers can be prepended to a packet.  For initial LISP
   deployments, it is assumed two headers is sufficient, where the first
   prepended header is used at a site for Location/Identity separation
   and second prepended header is used inside a service provider for
   Traffic Engineering purposes.

   Tunnel Routers can be placed fairly flexibly in a multi-AS topology.
   For example, the ITR for a particular end-to-end packet exchange
   might be the first-hop or default router within a site for the source
   host.  Similarly, the egress tunnel router might be the last-hop
   router directly-connected to the destination host.  Another example,
   perhaps for a VPN service out-sourced to an ISP by a site, the ITR
   could be the site's border router at the service provider attachment
   point.  Mixing and matching of site-operated, ISP-operated, and other
   tunnel routers is allowed for maximum flexibility.  See Section 8 for
   more details.

4.1.  Packet Flow Sequence

   This section provides an example of the unicast packet flow with the
   following conditions:

   o  Source host "host1.abc.example.com" is sending a packet to
      "host2.xyz.example.com", exactly what host1 would do if the site
      was not using LISP.

   o  Each site is multi-homed, so each tunnel router has an address
      (RLOC) assigned from the service provider address block for each
      provider to which that particular tunnel router is attached.

   o  The ITR(s) and ETR(s) are directly connected to the source and
      destination, respectively, but the source and destination can be
      located anywhere in LISP site.

   o  Map-Requests can be sent on the underlying routing system
      topology, to a mapping database system, or directly over an
      alternative topology [ALT].  A Map-Request is sent for an external
      destination when the destination is not found in the forwarding
      table or matches a default route.

   o  Map-Replies are sent on the underlying routing system topology.

   Client host1.abc.example.com wants to communicate with server
   host2.xyz.example.com:

   1.  host1.abc.example.com wants to open a TCP connection to
       host2.xyz.example.com.  It does a DNS lookup on
       host2.xyz.example.com.  An A/AAAA record is returned.  This
       address is the destination EID.  The locally-assigned address of
       host1.abc.example.com is used as the source EID.  An IPv4 or IPv6
       packet is built and forwarded through the LISP site as a normal
       IP packet until it reaches a LISP ITR.

   2.  The LISP ITR must be able to map the destination EID to an RLOC
       of one of the ETRs at the destination site.  The specific method
       used to do this is not described in this example.  See [ALT] or
       [CONS] for possible solutions.

   3.  The ITR will send a LISP Map-Request.  Map-Requests SHOULD be
       rate-limited.

   4.  When an alternate mapping system is not in use, the Map-Request
       packet is routed through the underlying routing system.
       Otherwise, the Map-Request packet is routed on an alternate
       logical topology, for example the [ALT] database mapping system.
       In either case, when the Map-Request arrives at one of the ETRs
       at the destination site, it will process the packet as a control
       message.

   5.  The ETR looks at the destination EID of the Map-Request and
       matches it against the prefixes in the ETR's configured EID-to-
       RLOC mapping database.  This is the list of EID-prefixes the ETR
       is supporting for the site it resides in.  If there is no match,
       the Map-Request is dropped.  Otherwise, a LISP Map-Reply is
       returned to the ITR.

   6.  The ITR receives the Map-Reply message, parses the message (to
       check for format validity) and stores the mapping information
       from the packet.  This information is stored in the ITR's EID-to-
       RLOC mapping cache.  Note that the map cache is an on-demand
       cache.  An ITR will manage its map cache in such a way that
       optimizes for its resource constraints.

   7.  Subsequent packets from host1.abc.example.com to
       host2.xyz.example.com will have a LISP header prepended by the
       ITR using the appropriate RLOC as the LISP header destination
       address learned from the ETR.  Note the packet MAY be sent to a
       different ETR than the one which returned the Map-Reply due to
       the source site's hashing policy or the destination site's
       locator-set policy.

   8.  The ETR receives these packets directly (since the destination
       address is one of its assigned IP addresses), checks the validity
       of the addresses, strips the LISP header, and forwards packets to
       the attached destination host.

   In order to defer the need for a mapping lookup in the reverse
   direction, an ETR MAY create a cache entry that maps the source EID
   (inner header source IP address) to the source RLOC (outer header
   source IP address) in a received LISP packet.  Such a cache entry is
   termed a "gleaned" mapping and only contains a single RLOC for the
   EID in question.  More complete information about additional RLOCs
   SHOULD be verified by sending a LISP Map-Request for that EID.  Both
   ITR and the ETR may also influence the decision the other makes in
   selecting an RLOC.  See Section 6 for more details.

5.  LISP Encapsulation Details

   Since additional tunnel headers are prepended, the packet becomes
   larger and can exceed the MTU of any link traversed from the ITR to
   the ETR.  It is RECOMMENDED in IPv4 that packets do not get
   fragmented as they are encapsulated by the ITR.  Instead, the packet
   is dropped and an ICMP Too Big message is returned to the source.

   This specification RECOMMENDS that implementations provide support
   for one of the proposed fragmentation and reassembly schemes.  Two
   existing schemes are detailed in Section 5.4.

   Since IPv4 or IPv6 addresses can be either EIDs or RLOCs, the LISP
   architecture supports IPv4 EIDs with IPv6 RLOCs (where the inner
   header is in IPv4 packet format and the other header is in IPv6
   packet format) or IPv6 EIDs with IPv4 RLOCs (where the inner header
   is in IPv6 packet format and the other header is in IPv4 packet
   format).  The next sub-sections illustrate packet formats for the
   homogeneous case (IPv4-in-IPv4 and IPv6-in-IPv6) but all 4
   combinations MUST be supported.

5.1.  LISP IPv4-in-IPv4 Header Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   OH  |  Time to Live | Protocol = 17 |         Header Checksum       |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                    Source Routing Locator                     |
    \  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                 Destination Routing Locator                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 4341        |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   L   |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
   I \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   S / |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
   P   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   IH  |  Time to Live |    Protocol   |         Header Checksum       |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                           Source EID                          |
    \  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                         Destination EID                       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

5.2.  LISP IPv6-in-IPv6 Header Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   |   |         Payload Length        | Next Header=17|   Hop Limit   |
   v   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
   O   +                                                               +
   u   |                                                               |
   t   +                     Source Routing Locator                    +
   e   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   H   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   d   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   ^   +                  Destination Routing Locator                  +
   |   |                                                               |
    \  +                                                               +
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 4341        |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   L   |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
   I \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   S / |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
   P   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /   |         Payload Length        |  Next Header  |   Hop Limit   |
   v   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
   I   +                                                               +
   n   |                                                               |
   n   +                          Source EID                           +
   e   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   H   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   d   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   ^   +                        Destination EID                        +
   \   |                                                               |
    \  +                                                               +
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

5.3.  Tunnel Header Field Descriptions

   Inner Header:  The inner header is the header on the datagram
      received from the originating host.  The source and destination IP
      addresses are EIDs, [RFC0791], [RFC2460].

   Outer Header:  The outer header is a new header prepended by an ITR.
      The address fields contain RLOCs obtained from the ingress
      router's EID-to-RLOC cache.  The IP protocol number is "UDP (17)"
      from [RFC0768].  The setting of the DF bit Flags field is
      according to rules in Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2.

   UDP Header:  The UDP header contains an ITR selected source port when
      encapsulating a packet.  See Section 6.5 for details on the hash
      algorithm used to select a source port based on the 5-tuple of the
      inner header.  The destination port MUST be set to the well-known
      IANA assigned port value 4341.

   UDP Checksum:  The UDP checksum field SHOULD be transmitted as zero
      by an ITR for either IPv4 [RFC0768] or IPv6 encapsulation
      [UDP-TUNNELS] [UDP-ZERO].  When a packet with a zero UDP checksum
      is received by an ETR, the ETR MUST accept the packet for
      decapsulation.  When an ITR transmits a non-zero value for the UDP
      checksum, it MUST send a correctly computed value in this field.
      When an ETR receives a packet with a non-zero UDP checksum, it MAY
      choose to verify the checksum value.  If it chooses to perform
      such verification, and the verification fails, the packet MUST be
      silently dropped.  If the ETR chooses not to perform the
      verification, or performs the verification successfully, the
      packet MUST be accepted for decapsulation.  The handling of UDP
      checksums for all tunneling protocols, including LISP, is under
      active discussion within the IETF.  When that discussion
      concludes, any necessary changes will be made to align LISP with
      the outcome of the broader discussion.

   UDP Length:  The UDP length field is set for an IPv4 encapsulated
      packet to be the sum of the inner header IPv4 Total Length plus
      the UDP and LISP header lengths.  For an IPv6 encapsulated packet,
      the UDP length field is the sum of the inner header IPv6 Payload
      Length, the size of the IPv6 header (40 <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes),</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets),</font></strong> and the size of
      the UDP and LISP headers.

   N: The N bit is the nonce-present bit.  When this bit is set to 1,
      the low-order 24-bits of the first 32-bits of the LISP header
      contains a Nonce.  See Section 6.3.1 for details.  Both N and V
      bits MUST NOT be set in the same packet.  If they are, a
      decapsulating ETR MUST treat the "Nonce/Map-Version" field as
      having a Nonce value present.

   L: The L bit is the Locator Status Bits field enabled bit.  When this
      bit is set to 1, the Locator Status Bits in the second 32-bits of
      the LISP header are in use.

     x 1 x x 0 x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                      Locator Status Bits                      |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   E: The E bit is the echo-nonce-request bit.  This bit MUST be ignored
      and has no meaning when the N bit is set to 0.  When the N bit is
      set to 1 and this bit is set to 1, means an ITR is requesting for
      the nonce value in the Nonce field to be echoed back in LISP
      encapsulated packets when the ITR is also an ETR.  See
      Section 6.3.1 for details.

   V: The V bit is the Map-Version present bit.  When this bit is set to
      1, the N bit MUST be 0.  Refer to Section 6.6.3 for more details.
      This bit indicates that the LISP header is encoded in this case
      as:

     0 x 0 1 x x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|  Source Map-Version   |   Dest Map-Version    |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   I: The I bit is the Instance ID bit.  See Section 5.5 for more
      details.  When this bit is set to 1, the Locator Status Bits field
      is reduced to 8-bits and the high-order 24-bits are used as an
      Instance ID.  If the L-bit is set to 0, then the low-order 8 bits
      are transmitted as zero and ignored on receipt.  The format of the
      LISP header would look like in this case:

     x x x x 1 x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                 Instance ID                   |     LSBs      |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   flags:  The flags field is a 3-bit field is reserved for future flag
      use.  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   LISP Nonce:  The LISP nonce field is a 24-bit value that is randomly
      generated by an ITR when the N-bit is set to 1.  Nonce generation
      algorithms are an implementation matter but are required to
      generate different nonces when sending to different destinations.
      However, the same nonce can be used for a period of time to the
      same destination.  The nonce is also used when the E-bit is set to
      request the nonce value to be echoed by the other side when
      packets are returned.  When the E-bit is clear but the N-bit is
      set, a remote ITR is either echoing a previously requested echo-
      nonce or providing a random nonce.  See Section 6.3.1 for more
      details.

   LISP Locator Status Bits (LSBs):  When the L-bit is also set, the
      locator status bits field in the LISP header is set by an ITR to
      indicate to an ETR the up/down status of the Locators in the
      source site.  Each RLOC in a Map-Reply is assigned an ordinal
      value from 0 to n-1 (when there are n RLOCs in a mapping entry).
      The Locator Status Bits are numbered from 0 to n-1 from the least
      significant bit of field.  The field is 32-bits when the I-bit is
      set to 0 and is 8 bits when the I-bit is set to 1.  When a Locator
      Status Bit is set to 1, the ITR is indicating to the ETR the RLOC
      associated with the bit ordinal has up status.  See Section 6.3
      for details on how an ITR can determine the status of the ETRs at
      the same site.  When a site has multiple EID-prefixes which result
      in multiple mappings (where each could have a different locator-
      set), the Locator Status Bits setting in an encapsulated packet
      MUST reflect the mapping for the EID-prefix that the inner-header
      source EID address matches.  If the LSB for an anycast locator is
      set to 1, then there is at least one RLOC with that address the
      ETR is considered 'up'.

   When doing ITR/PITR encapsulation:

   o  The outer header Time to Live field (or Hop Limit field, in case
      of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the inner header Time to Live
      field.

   o  The outer header Type of Service field (or the Traffic Class
      field, in the case of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the inner header
      Type of Service field (with one caveat, see below).

   When doing ETR/PETR decapsulation:

   o  The inner header Time to Live field (or Hop Limit field, in case
      of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the outer header Time to Live
      field, when the Time to Live field of the outer header is less
      than the Time to Live of the inner header.  Failing to perform
      this check can cause the Time to Live of the inner header to
      increment across encapsulation/decapsulation cycle.  This check is
      also performed when doing initial encapsulation when a packet
      comes to an ITR or PITR destined for a LISP site.

   o  The inner header Type of Service field (or the Traffic Class
      field, in the case of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the outer header
      Type of Service field (with one caveat, see below).

   Note if an ETR/PETR is also an ITR/PITR and choose to reencapsulate
   after decapsulating, the net effect of this is that the new outer
   header will carry the same Time to Live as the old outer header minus
   1.

   Copying the TTL serves two purposes: first, it preserves the distance
   the host intended the packet to travel; second, and more importantly,
   it provides for suppression of looping packets in the event there is
   a loop of concatenated tunnels due to misconfiguration.  See
   Section 9.3 for TTL exception handling for traceroute packets.

   The ECN field occupies bits 6 and 7 of both the IPv4 Type of Service
   field and the IPv6 Traffic Class field [RFC3168].  The ECN field
   requires special treatment in order to avoid discarding indications
   of congestion [RFC3168].  ITR encapsulation MUST copy the 2-bit ECN
   field from the inner header to the outer header.  Re-encapsulation
   MUST copy the 2-bit ECN field from the stripped outer header to the
   new outer header.  If the ECN field contains a congestion indication
   codepoint (the value is '11', the Congestion Experienced (CE)
   codepoint), then ETR decapsulation MUST copy the 2-bit ECN field from
   the stripped outer header to the surviving inner header that is used
   to forward the packet beyond the ETR.  These requirements preserve
   Congestion Experienced (CE) indications when a packet that uses ECN
   traverses a LISP tunnel and becomes marked with a CE indication due
   to congestion between the tunnel endpoints.

5.4.  Dealing with Large Encapsulated Packets

   This section proposes two mechanisms to deal with packets that exceed
   the path MTU between the ITR and ETR.

   It is left to the implementor to decide if the stateless or stateful
   mechanism should be implemented.  Both or neither can be used since
   it is a local decision in the ITR regarding how to deal with MTU
   issues, and sites can interoperate with differing mechanisms.

   Both stateless and stateful mechanisms also apply to Reencapsulating
   and Recursive Tunneling.  So any actions below referring to an ITR
   also apply to an TE-ITR.

5.4.1.  A Stateless Solution to MTU Handling

   An ITR stateless solution to handle MTU issues is described as
   follows:

   1.  Define an architectural constant S for the maximum size of a
       packet, in <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets,</font></strong> an ITR would like to receive from a source
       inside of its site.

   2.  Define L to be the maximum size, in <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets,</font></strong> a packet of size S
       would be after the ITR prepends the LISP header, UDP header, and
       outer network layer header of size H. Therefore, S + H = L.

   When an ITR receives a packet from a site-facing interface and adds H
   <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike>
   <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> worth of encapsulation to yield a packet size greater than L
   <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes,</font></strike>
   <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets,</font></strong> it resolves the MTU issue by first splitting the original
   packet into 2 equal-sized fragments.  A LISP header is then prepended
   to each fragment.  The size of the encapsulated fragments is then
   (S/2 + H), which is less than the ITR's estimate of the path MTU
   between the ITR and its correspondent ETR.

   When an ETR receives encapsulated fragments, it treats them as two
   individually encapsulated packets.  It strips the LISP headers then
   forwards each fragment to the destination host of the destination
   site.  The two fragments are reassembled at the destination host into
   the single IP datagram that was originated by the source host.  Note
   that reassembly can happen at the ETR if the encapsulated packet was
   fragmented at or after the ITR.

   This behavior is performed by the ITR when the source host originates
   a packet with the DF field of the IP header is set to 0.  When the DF
   field of the IP header is set to 1, or the packet is an IPv6 packet
   originated by the source host, the ITR will drop the packet when the
   size is greater than L, and sends an ICMP Too Big message to the
   source with a value of S, where S is (L - H).

   When the outer header encapsulation uses an IPv4 header, an
   implementation SHOULD set the DF bit to 1 so ETR fragment reassembly
   can be avoided.  An implementation MAY set the DF bit in such headers
   to 0 if it has good reason to believe there are unresolvable path MTU
   issues between the sending ITR and the receiving ETR.

   This specification RECOMMENDS that L be defined as 1500.

5.4.2.  A Stateful Solution to MTU Handling

   An ITR stateful solution to handle MTU issues is described as follows
   and was first introduced in [OPENLISP]:

   1.  The ITR will keep state of the effective MTU for each locator per
       mapping cache entry.  The effective MTU is what the core network
       can deliver along the path between ITR and ETR.

   2.  When an IPv6 encapsulated packet or an IPv4 encapsulated packet
       with DF bit set to 1, exceeds what the core network can deliver,
       one of the intermediate routers on the path will send an ICMP Too
       Big message to the ITR.  The ITR will parse the ICMP message to
       determine which locator is affected by the effective MTU change
       and then record the new effective MTU value in the mapping cache
       entry.

   3.  When a packet is received by the ITR from a source inside of the
       site and the size of the packet is greater than the effective MTU
       stored with the mapping cache entry associated with the
       destination EID the packet is for, the ITR will send an ICMP Too
       Big message back to the source.  The packet size advertised by
       the ITR in the ICMP Too Big message is the effective MTU minus
       the LISP encapsulation length.

   Even though this mechanism is stateful, it has advantages over the
   stateless IP fragmentation mechanism, by not involving the
   destination host with reassembly of ITR fragmented packets.

5.5.  Using Virtualization and Segmentation with LISP

   When multiple organizations inside of a LISP site are using private
   addresses [RFC1918] as EID-prefixes, their address spaces MUST remain
   segregated due to possible address duplication.  An Instance ID in
   the address encoding can aid in making the entire AFI based address
   unique.  See IANA Considerations Section 14.2 for details for
   possible address encodings.

   An Instance ID can be carried in a LISP encapsulated packet.  An ITR
   that prepends a LISP header, will copy a 24-bit value, used by the
   LISP router to uniquely identify the address space.  The value is
   copied to the Instance ID field of the LISP header and the I-bit is
   set to 1.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, the Instance ID from the LISP
   header is used as a table identifier to locate the forwarding table
   to use for the inner destination EID lookup.

   For example, a 802.1Q VLAN tag or VPN identifier could be used as a
   24-bit Instance ID.

6.  EID-to-RLOC Mapping

6.1.  LISP IPv4 and IPv6 Control Plane Packet Formats

   The following UDP packet formats are used by the LISP control-plane.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |  Time to Live | Protocol = 17 |         Header Checksum       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    Source Routing Locator                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                 Destination Routing Locator                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |           Source Port         |         Dest Port             |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         LISP Message                          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Payload Length        | Next Header=17|   Hop Limit   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +                     Source Routing Locator                    +
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +                  Destination Routing Locator                  +
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |           Source Port         |         Dest Port             |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         LISP Message                          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The LISP UDP-based messages are the Map-Request and Map-Reply
   messages.  When a UDP Map-Request is sent, the UDP source port is
   chosen by the sender and the destination UDP port number is set to
   4342.  When a UDP Map-Reply is sent, the source UDP port number is
   set to 4342 and the destination UDP port number is copied from the
   source port of either the Map-Request or the invoking data packet.
   Implementations MUST be prepared to accept packets when either the
   source port or destination UDP port is set to 4342 due to NATs
   changing port number values.

   The UDP Length field will reflect the length of the UDP header and
   the LISP Message payload.

   The UDP Checksum is computed and set to non-zero for Map-Request,
   Map-Reply, Map-Register and ECM control messages.  It MUST be checked
   on receipt and if the checksum fails, the packet MUST be dropped.

   The format of control messages includes the UDP header so the
   checksum and length fields can be used to protect and delimit message
   boundaries.

   <strike><font color="red" size="+1">This main LISP specification is the authoritative source for message
   format definitions for the Map-Request and Map-Reply messages.</font></strike>

6.1.1.  LISP Packet Type Allocations

   This section will be the authoritative source for allocating LISP
   Type <strike><font color="red" size="+1">values.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">values and for defining LISP control message formats.</font></strong>  Current
   allocations are:

       Reserved:                          0    b'0000'
       LISP Map-Request:                  1    b'0001'
       LISP Map-Reply:                    2    b'0010'
       LISP Map-Register:                 3    b'0011'
       LISP Map-Notify:                   4    b'0100'
       LISP Encapsulated Control Message: 8    b'1000'

6.1.2.  Map-Request Message Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=1 |A|M|P|S|p|s|    Reserved     |   IRC   | Record Count  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Source-EID-AFI        |   Source EID Address  ...     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         ITR-RLOC-AFI 1        |    ITR-RLOC Address 1  ...    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                              ...                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         ITR-RLOC-AFI n        |    ITR-RLOC Address n  ...    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |   Reserved    | EID mask-len  |        EID-prefix-AFI         |
   Rec +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                       EID-prefix  ...                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                   Map-Reply Record  ...                       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       <strike><font color="red" size="+1">|                     Mapping Protocol Data                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</font></strike>

   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   1 (Map-Request)

   A: This is an authoritative bit, which is set to 0 for UDP-based Map-
      Requests sent by an ITR.  Set to 1 when an ITR wants the
      destination site to return the Map-Reply rather than the mapping
      database system.

   M: This is the map-data-present bit, when set, it indicates a Map-
      Reply Record segment is included in the Map-Request.

   P: This is the probe-bit which indicates that a Map-Request SHOULD be
      treated as a locator reachability probe.  The receiver SHOULD
      respond with a Map-Reply with the probe-bit set, indicating the
      Map-Reply is a locator reachability probe reply, with the nonce
      copied from the Map-Request.  See Section 6.3.2 for more details.

   S: This is the Solicit-Map-Request (SMR) bit.  See Section 6.6.2 for
      details.

   p: This is the PITR bit.  This bit is set to 1 when a PITR sends a
      Map-Request.

   s: This is the SMR-invoked bit.  This bit is set to 1 when an xTR is
      sending a Map-Request in response to a received SMR-based Map-
      Request.

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   IRC:  This 5-bit field is the ITR-RLOC Count which encodes the
      additional number of (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC Address) fields
      present in this message.  At least one (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC-
      Address) pair MUST be encoded.  Multiple ITR-RLOC Address fields
      are used so a Map-Replier can select which destination address to
      use for a Map-Reply.  The IRC value ranges from 0 to 31.  For a
      value of 0, there is 1 ITR-RLOC address encoded, and for a value
      of 1, there are 2 ITR-RLOC addresses encoded and so on up to 31
      which encodes a total of 32 ITR-RLOC addresses.

   Record Count:  The number of records in this Map-Request message.  A
      record is comprised of the portion of the packet that is labeled
      'Rec' above and occurs the number of times equal to Record Count.
      For this version of the protocol, a receiver MUST accept and
      process Map-Requests that contain one or more records, but a
      sender MUST only send Map-Requests containing one record.  Support
      for requesting multiple EIDs in a single Map-Request message will
      be specified in a future version of the protocol.

   Nonce:  An <strike><font color="red" size="+1">8-byte</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">8-octet</font></strong> random value created by the sender of the Map-
      Request.  This nonce will be returned in the Map-Reply.  The
      security of the LISP mapping protocol depends critically on the
      strength of the nonce in the Map-Request message.  The nonce
      SHOULD be generated by a properly seeded pseudo-random (or strong
      random) source.  See [RFC4086] for advice on generating security-
      sensitive random data.

   Source-EID-AFI:  Address family of the "Source EID Address" field.

   Source EID Address:  This is the EID of the source host which
      originated the packet which is caused the Map-Request.  When Map-
      Requests are used for refreshing a map-cache entry or for RLOC-
      probing, an AFI value 0 is used and this field is of zero length.

   ITR-RLOC-AFI:  Address family of the "ITR-RLOC Address" field that
      follows this field.

   ITR-RLOC Address:  Used to give the ETR the option of selecting the
      destination address from any address family for the Map-Reply
      message.  This address MUST be a routable RLOC address of the
      sender of the Map-Request message.

   EID mask-len:  Mask length for EID prefix.

   EID-prefix-AFI:  Address family of EID-prefix according to [AFI]

   EID-prefix:  4 <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> if an IPv4 address-family, 16 <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> if an IPv6
      address-family.  When a Map-Request is sent by an ITR because a
      data packet is received for a destination where there is no
      mapping entry, the EID-prefix is set to the destination IP address
      of the data packet.  And the 'EID mask-len' is set to 32 or 128
      for IPv4 or IPv6, respectively.  When an xTR wants to query a site
      about the status of a mapping it already has cached, the EID-
      prefix used in the Map-Request has the same mask-length as the
      EID-prefix returned from the site when it sent a Map-Reply
      message.

   Map-Reply Record:  When the M bit is set, this field is the size of a
      single "Record" in the Map-Reply format.  This Map-Reply record
      contains the EID-to-RLOC mapping entry associated with the Source
      EID.  This allows the ETR which will receive this Map-Request to
      cache the data if it chooses to do so.

   <strike><font color="red" size="+1">Mapping Protocol Data:  This field is optional and present when the
      UDP length indicates there is enough space in the packet to
      include it.</font></strike>

6.1.3.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Request Message

   A Map-Request is sent from an ITR when it needs a mapping for an EID,
   wants to test an RLOC for reachability, or wants to refresh a mapping
   before TTL expiration.  For the initial case, the destination IP
   address used for the Map-Request is the data packet's destination
   address (i.e. the destination-EID) which had a mapping cache lookup
   failure.  For the latter two cases, the destination IP address used
   for the Map-Request is one of the RLOC addresses from the locator-set
   of the map cache entry.  The source address is either an IPv4 or IPv6
   RLOC address depending if the Map-Request is using an IPv4 versus
   IPv6 header, respectively.  In all cases, the UDP source port number
   for the Map-Request message is an ITR/PITR selected 16-bit value and
   the UDP destination port number is set to the well-known destination
   port number 4342.  A successful Map-Reply, which is one that has a
   nonce that matches an outstanding Map-Request nonce, will update the
   cached set of RLOCs associated with the EID prefix range.

   One or more Map-Request (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC-Address) fields MUST
   be filled in by the ITR.  The number of fields (minus 1) encoded MUST
   be placed in the IRC field.  The ITR MAY include all locally
   configured locators in this list or just provide one locator address
   from each address family it supports.  If the ITR erroneously
   provides no ITR-RLOC addresses, the Map-Replier MUST drop the Map-
   Request.

   Map-Requests can also be LISP encapsulated using UDP destination port
   4342 with a LISP type value set to "Encapsulated Control Message",
   when sent from an ITR to a Map-Resolver.  Likewise, Map-Requests are
   LISP encapsulated the same way from a Map-Server to an ETR.  Details
   on encapsulated Map-Requests and Map-Resolvers can be found in
   [LISP-MS].

   Map-Requests MUST be rate-limited.  It is RECOMMENDED that a Map-
   Request for the same EID-prefix be sent no more than once per second.

   An ITR that is configured with mapping database information (i.e. it
   is also an ETR) MAY optionally include those mappings in a Map-
   Request.  When an ETR configured to accept and verify such
   "piggybacked" mapping data receives such a Map-Request and it does
   not have this mapping in the map-cache, it MAY originate a "verifying
   Map-Request", addressed to the map-requesting ITR and the ETR MAY add
   a map-cache entry.  If the ETR has a map-cache entry that matches the
   "piggybacked" EID and the RLOC is in the locator-set for the entry,
   then it may send the "verifying Map-Request" directly to the
   originating Map-Request source.  If the RLOC is not in the locator-
   set, then the ETR MUST send the "verifying Map-Request" to the
   "piggybacked" EID.  Doing this forces the "verifying Map-Request" to
   go through the mapping database system to reach the authoritative
   source of information about that EID, guarding against RLOC-spoofing
   in in the "piggybacked" mapping data.

6.1.4.  Map-Reply Message Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=2 |P|E|S|          Reserved               | Record Count  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |       EID-prefix-AFI          |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       <strike><font color="red" size="+1">|                     Mapping Protocol Data                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</font></strike>

   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   2 (Map-Reply)

   P: This is the probe-bit which indicates that the Map-Reply is in
      response to a locator reachability probe Map-Request.  The nonce
      field MUST contain a copy of the nonce value from the original
      Map-Request.  See Section 6.3.2 for more details.

   E: Indicates that the ETR which sends this Map-Reply message is
      advertising that the site is enabled for the Echo-Nonce locator
      reachability algorithm.  See Section 6.3.1 for more details.

   S: This is the Security bit.  When set to 1 the <strike><font color="red" size="+1">field</font></strike> following <strike><font color="red" size="+1">the
      Mapping Protocol Data field</font></strike>
      <strong><font color="green" size="+1">authentication information</font></strong> will <strike><font color="red" size="+1">have</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">be appended to</font></strong> the <strike><font color="red" size="+1">following format.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">end of the Map-
      Reply.</font></strong>  The detailed format of the Authentication Data Content is
      for further study.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |    AD Type    |       Authentication Data Content . . .       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   Record Count:  The number of records in this reply message.  A record
      is comprised of that portion of the packet labeled 'Record' above
      and occurs the number of times equal to Record count.

   Nonce:  A 24-bit value set in a Data-Probe packet or a 64-bit value
      from the Map-Request is echoed in this Nonce field of the Map-
      Reply.  When a 24-bit value is supplied, it resides in the low-
      order 64 bits of the nonce field.

   Record TTL:  The time in minutes the recipient of the Map-Reply will
      store the mapping.  If the TTL is 0, the entry SHOULD be removed
      from the cache immediately.  If the value is 0xffffffff, the
      recipient can decide locally how long to store the mapping.

   Locator Count:  The number of Locator entries.  A locator entry
      comprises what is labeled above as 'Loc'.  The locator count can
      be 0 indicating there are no locators for the EID-prefix.

   EID mask-len:  Mask length for EID prefix.

   ACT:  This 3-bit field describes negative Map-Reply actions.  In any
      other message type, these bits are set to 0 and ignored on
      receipt.  These bits are used only when the 'Locator Count' field
      is set to 0.  The action bits are encoded only in Map-Reply
      messages.  The actions defined are used by an ITR or PITR when a
      destination EID matches a negative mapping cache entry.
      Unassigned values should cause a map-cache entry to be created
      and, when packets match this negative cache entry, they will be
      dropped.  The current assigned values are:

      (0) No-Action:  The map-cache is kept alive and no packet
         encapsulation occurs.

      (1) Natively-Forward:  The packet is not encapsulated or dropped
         but natively forwarded.

      (2) Send-Map-Request:  The packet invokes sending a Map-Request.

      (3) Drop:  A packet that matches this map-cache entry is dropped.
         An ICMP Unreachable message SHOULD be sent.

   A: The Authoritative bit, when sent is always set to 1 by an ETR.
      When a Map-Server is proxy Map-Replying [LISP-MS] for a LISP site,
      the Authoritative bit is set to 0.  This indicates to requesting
      ITRs that the Map-Reply was not originated by a LISP node managed
      at the site that owns the EID-prefix.

   Map-Version Number:  When this 12-bit value is non-zero the Map-Reply
      sender is informing the ITR what the version number is for the
      EID-record contained in the Map-Reply.  The ETR can allocate this
      number internally but MUST coordinate this value with other ETRs
      for the site.  When this value is 0, there is no versioning
      information conveyed.  The Map-Version Number can be included in
      Map-Request and Map-Register messages.  See Section 6.6.3 for more
      details.

   EID-prefix-AFI:  Address family of EID-prefix according to [AFI].

   EID-prefix:  4 <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> if an IPv4 address-family, 16 <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> if an IPv6
      address-family.

   Priority:  each RLOC is assigned a unicast priority.  Lower values
      are more preferable.  When multiple RLOCs have the same priority,
      they MAY be used in a load-split fashion.  A value of 255 means
      the RLOC MUST NOT be used for unicast forwarding.

   Weight:  when priorities are the same for multiple RLOCs, the weight
      indicates how to balance unicast traffic between them.  Weight is
      encoded as a relative weight of total unicast packets that match
      the mapping entry.  For example if there are 4 locators in a
      locator set, where the weights assigned are 30, 20, 20, and 10,
      the first locator will get 37.5% of the traffic, the 2nd and 3rd
      locators will get 25% of traffic and the 4th locator will get
      12.5% of the traffic.  If all weights for a locator-set are equal,
      receiver of the Map-Reply will decide how to load-split traffic.
      See Section 6.5 for a suggested hash algorithm to distribute load
      across locators with same priority and equal weight values.

   M Priority:  each RLOC is assigned a multicast priority used by an
      ETR in a receiver multicast site to select an ITR in a source
      multicast site for building multicast distribution trees.  A value
      of 255 means the RLOC MUST NOT be used for joining a multicast
      distribution tree.  <strong><font color="green" size="+1">For more details, see [MLISP].</font></strong>

   M Weight:  when priorities are the same for multiple RLOCs, the
      weight indicates how to balance building multicast distribution
      trees across multiple ITRs.  The weight is encoded as a relative
      weight (similar to the unicast Weights) of total number of trees
      built to the source site identified by the EID-prefix.  If all
      weights for a locator-set are equal, the receiver of the Map-Reply
      will decide how to distribute multicast state across ITRs.  <strong><font color="green" size="+1">For
      more details, see [MLISP].</font></strong>

   Unused Flags:  set to 0 when sending and ignored on receipt.

   L: when this bit is set, the locator is flagged as a local locator to
      the ETR that is sending the Map-Reply.  When a Map-Server is doing
      proxy Map-Replying [LISP-MS] for a LISP site, the L bit is set to
      0 for all locators in this locator-set.

   p: when this bit is set, an ETR informs the RLOC-probing ITR that the
      locator address, for which this bit is set, is the one being RLOC-
      probed and MAY be different from the source address of the Map-
      Reply.  An ITR that RLOC-probes a particular locator, MUST use
      this locator for retrieving the data structure used to store the
      fact that the locator is reachable.  The "p" bit is set for a
      single locator in the same locator set.  If an implementation sets
      more than one "p" bit erroneously, the receiver of the Map-Reply
      MUST select the first locator.  The "p" bit MUST NOT be set for
      locator-set records sent in Map-Request and Map-Register messages.

   R: set when the sender of a Map-Reply has a route to the locator in
      the locator data record.  This receiver may find this useful to
      know if the locator is up but not necessarily reachable from the
      receiver's point of view.  See also Section 6.4 for another way
      the R-bit may be used.

   Locator:  an IPv4 or IPv6 address (as encoded by the 'Loc-AFI' field)
      assigned to an ETR.  Note that the destination RLOC address MAY be
      an anycast address.  A source RLOC can be an anycast address as
      well.  The source or destination RLOC MUST NOT be the broadcast
      address (255.255.255.255 or any subnet broadcast address known to
      the router), and MUST NOT be a link-local multicast address.  The
      source RLOC MUST NOT be a multicast address.  The destination RLOC
      SHOULD be a multicast address if it is being mapped from a
      multicast destination EID.

   <strike><font color="red" size="+1">Mapping Protocol Data:  This field is optional and present when the
      UDP length indicates there is enough space in the packet to
      include it.</font></strike>

6.1.5.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Reply Message

   A Map-Reply returns an EID-prefix with a prefix length that is less
   than or equal to the EID being requested.  The EID being requested is
   either from the destination field of an IP header of a Data-Probe or
   the EID record of a Map-Request.  The RLOCs in the Map-Reply are
   globally-routable IP addresses of all ETRs for the LISP site.  Each
   RLOC conveys status reachability but does not convey path
   reachability from a requesters perspective.  Separate testing of path
   reachability is required, See Section 6.3 for details.

   Note that a Map-Reply may contain different EID-prefix granularity
   (prefix + length) than the Map-Request which triggers it.  This might
   occur if a Map-Request were for a prefix that had been returned by an
   earlier Map-Reply.  In such a case, the requester updates its cache
   with the new prefix information and granularity.  For example, a
   requester with two cached EID-prefixes that are covered by a Map-
   Reply containing one, less-specific prefix, replaces the entry with
   the less-specific EID-prefix.  Note that the reverse, replacement of
   one less-specific prefix with multiple more-specific prefixes, can
   also occur but not by removing the less-specific prefix rather by
   adding the more-specific prefixes which during a lookup will override
   the less-specific prefix.

   When an ETR is configured with overlapping EID-prefixes, a Map-
   Request with an EID that longest matches any EID-prefix MUST be
   returned in a single Map-Reply message.  For instance, if an ETR had
   database mapping entries for EID-prefixes:

     10.0.0.0/8
     10.1.0.0/16
     10.1.1.0/24
     10.1.2.0/24

   A Map-Request for EID 10.1.1.1 would cause a Map-Reply with a record
   count of 1 to be returned with a mapping record EID-prefix of
   10.1.1.0/24.

   A Map-Request for EID 10.1.5.5, would cause a Map-Reply with a record
   count of 3 to be returned with mapping records for EID-prefixes
   10.1.0.0/16, 10.1.1.0/24, and 10.1.2.0/24.

   Note that not all overlapping EID-prefixes need to be returned, only
   the more specifics (note in the second example above 10.0.0.0/8 was
   not returned for requesting EID 10.1.5.5) entries for the matching
   EID-prefix of the requesting EID.  When more than one EID-prefix is
   returned, all SHOULD use the same Time-to-Live value so they can all
   time out at the same time.  When a more specific EID-prefix is
   received later, its Time-to-Live value in the Map-Reply record can be
   stored even when other less specifics exist.  When a less specific
   EID-prefix is received later, its map-cache expiration time SHOULD be
   set to the minimum expiration time of any more specific EID-prefix in
   the map-cache.  This is done so the integrity of the EID-prefix set
   is wholly maintained so no more-specific entries are removed from the
   map-cache while keeping less-specific entries.

   Map-Replies SHOULD be sent for an EID-prefix no more often than once
   per second to the same requesting router.  For scalability, it is
   expected that aggregation of EID addresses into EID-prefixes will
   allow one Map-Reply to satisfy a mapping for the EID addresses in the
   prefix range thereby reducing the number of Map-Request messages.

   Map-Reply records can have an empty locator-set.  A negative Map-
   Reply is a Map-Reply with an empty locator-set.  Negative Map-Replies
   convey special actions by the sender to the ITR or PITR which have
   solicited the Map-Reply.  There are two primary applications for
   Negative Map-Replies.  The first is for a Map-Resolver to instruct an
   ITR or PITR when a destination is for a LISP site versus a non-LISP
   site.  And the other is to source quench Map-Requests which are sent
   for non-allocated EIDs.

   For each Map-Reply record, the list of locators in a locator-set MUST
   appear in the same order for each ETR that originates a Map-Reply
   message.  The locator-set MUST be sorted in order of ascending IP
   address where an IPv4 locator address is considered numerically 'less
   than' an IPv6 locator address.

   When sending a Map-Reply message, the destination address is copied
   from the one of the ITR-RLOC fields from the Map-Request.  The ETR
   can choose a locator address from one of the address families it
   supports.  For Data-Probes, the destination address of the Map-Reply
   is copied from the source address of the Data-Probe message which is
   invoking the reply.  The source address of the Map-Reply is one of
   the local IP addresses chosen to allow uRPF checks to succeed in the
   upstream service provider.  The destination port of a Map-Reply
   message is copied from the source port of the Map-Request or Data-
   Probe and the source port of the Map-Reply message is set to the
   well-known UDP port 4342.

6.1.5.1.  Traffic Redirection with Coarse EID-Prefixes

   When an ETR is misconfigured or compromised, it could return coarse
   EID-prefixes in Map-Reply messages it sends.  The EID-prefix could
   cover EID-prefixes which are allocated to other sites redirecting
   their traffic to the locators of the compromised site.

   To solve this problem, there are two basic solutions that could be
   used.  The first is to have Map-Servers proxy-map-reply on behalf of
   ETRs so their registered EID-prefixes are the ones returned in Map-
   Replies.  Since the interaction between an ETR and Map-Server is
   secured with shared-keys, it is easier for an ETR to detect
   misbehavior.  The second solution is to have ITRs and PITRs cache
   EID-prefixes with mask-lengths that are greater than or equal to a
   configured prefix length.  This limits the damage to a specific width
   of any EID-prefix advertised, but needs to be coordinated with the
   allocation of site prefixes.  These solutions can be used
   independently or at the same time.

   At the time of this writing, other approaches are being considered
   and researched.

6.1.6.  Map-Register Message Format

   The usage details of the Map-Register message can be found in
   specification [LISP-MS].  This section solely defines the message
   format.

   The message is sent in UDP with a destination UDP port of 4342 and a
   randomly selected UDP source port number.

   The Map-Register message format is:

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=3 |P|            Reserved               |M| Record Count  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |            Key ID             |  Authentication Data Length   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ~                     Authentication Data                       ~
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |        EID-prefix-AFI         |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   3 (Map-Register)

   P: This is the proxy-map-reply bit, when set to 1 an ETR sends a Map-
      Register message requesting for the Map-Server to proxy Map-Reply.
      The Map-Server will send non-authoritative Map-Replies on behalf
      of the ETR.  Details on this usage can be found in [LISP-MS].

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   M: This is the want-map-notify bit, when set to 1 an ETR is
      requesting for a Map-Notify message to be returned in response to
      sending a Map-Register message.  The Map-Notify message sent by a
      Map-Server is used to an acknowledge receipt of a Map-Register
      message.

   Record Count:  The number of records in this Map-Register message.  A
      record is comprised of that portion of the packet labeled 'Record'
      above and occurs the number of times equal to Record count.

   Nonce:  This <strike><font color="red" size="+1">8-byte</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">8-octet</font></strong> Nonce field is set to 0 in Map-Register
      messages.  Since the Map-Register message is authenticated, the
      nonce field is not currently used for any security function but
      may be in the future as part of an anti-replay solution.

   Key ID:  A configured ID to find the configured Message
      Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm and key value used for the
      authentication function.  See Section 14.4 for codepoint
      assignments.

   Authentication Data Length:  The length in <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> of the
      Authentication Data field that follows this field.  The length of
      the Authentication Data field is dependent on the Message
      Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm used.  The length field allows
      a device that doesn't know the MAC algorithm to correctly parse
      the packet.

   Authentication Data:  The message digest used from the output of the
      Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm.  The entire Map-
      Register payload is authenticated with this field preset to 0.
      After the MAC is computed, it is placed in this field.
      Implementations of this specification MUST include support for
      HMAC-SHA-1-96 [RFC2404] and support for HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC6234]
      is RECOMMENDED.

   The definition of the rest of the Map-Register can be found in the
   Map-Reply section.

6.1.7.  Map-Notify Message Format

   The usage details of the Map-Notify message can be found in
   specification [LISP-MS].  This section solely defines the message
   format.

   The message is sent inside a UDP packet with source and destination
   UDP ports equal to 4342.

   The Map-Notify message format is:

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=4 |              Reserved                 | Record Count  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |            Key ID             |  Authentication Data Length   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ~                     Authentication Data                       ~
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |         EID-prefix-AFI        |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   4 (Map-Notify)

   The Map-Notify message has the same contents as a Map-Register
   message.  See Map-Register section for field descriptions.

6.1.8.  Encapsulated Control Message Format

   An Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) is used to encapsulate control
   packets sent between xTRs and the mapping database system described
   in [LISP-MS].

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |                       IPv4 or IPv6 Header                     |
   OH  |                      (uses RLOC addresses)                    |
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 4342        |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   LH  |Type=8 |S|                  Reserved                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |                       IPv4 or IPv6 Header                     |
   IH  |                  (uses RLOC or EID addresses)                 |
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = yyyy        |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   LCM |                      LISP Control Message                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Packet header descriptions:

   OH:   The outer IPv4 or IPv6 header which uses RLOC addresses in the
      source and destination header address fields.

   UDP:   The outer UDP header with destination port 4342.  The source
      port is randomly allocated.  The checksum field MUST be non-zero.

   LH:   Type 8 is defined to be a "LISP Encapsulated Control Message"
      and what follows is either an IPv4 or IPv6 header as encoded by
      the first 4 bits after the reserved field.

   S:   This is the Security bit.  When set to 1 the field following the
      Reserved field will have the following format.  The detailed
      format of the Authentication Data Content is for further study.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |    AD Type    |       Authentication Data Content . . .       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   IH:   The inner IPv4 or IPv6 header which can use either RLOC or EID
      addresses in the header address fields.  When a Map-Request is
      encapsulated in this packet format the destination address in this
      header is an EID.

   UDP:   The inner UDP header where the port assignments depends on the
      control packet being encapsulated.  When the control packet is a
      Map-Request or Map-Register, the source port is ITR/PITR selected
      and the destination port is 4342.  When the control packet is a
      Map-Reply, the source port is 4342 and the destination port is
      assigned from the source port of the invoking Map-Request.  Port
      number 4341 MUST NOT be assigned to either port.  The checksum
      field MUST be non-zero.

   LCM:   The format is one of the control message formats described in
      this section.  At this time, only Map-Request messages are allowed
      to be encapsulated.  And in the future, PIM Join-Prune messages
      [MLISP] might be allowed.  Encapsulating other types of LISP
      control messages are for further study.  When Map-Requests are
      sent for RLOC-probing purposes (i.e the probe-bit is set), they
      MUST NOT be sent inside Encapsulated Control Messages.

6.2.  Routing Locator Selection

   Both client-side and server-side may need control over the selection
   of RLOCs for conversations between them.  This control is achieved by
   manipulating the Priority and Weight fields in EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply
   messages.  Alternatively, RLOC information MAY be gleaned from
   received tunneled packets or EID-to-RLOC Map-Request messages.

   The following enumerates different scenarios for choosing RLOCs and
   the controls that are available:

   o  Server-side returns one RLOC.  Client-side can only use one RLOC.
      Server-side has complete control of the selection.

   o  Server-side returns a list of RLOC where a subset of the list has
      the same best priority.  Client can only use the subset list
      according to the weighting assigned by the server-side.  In this
      case, the server-side controls both the subset list and load-
      splitting across its members.  The client-side can use RLOCs
      outside of the subset list if it determines that the subset list
      is unreachable (unless RLOCs are set to a Priority of 255).  Some
      sharing of control exists: the server-side determines the
      destination RLOC list and load distribution while the client-side
      has the option of using alternatives to this list if RLOCs in the
      list are unreachable.

   o  Server-side sets weight of 0 for the RLOC subset list.  In this
      case, the client-side can choose how the traffic load is spread
      across the subset list.  Control is shared by the server-side
      determining the list and the client determining load distribution.
      Again, the client can use alternative RLOCs if the server-provided
      list of RLOCs are unreachable.

   o  Either side (more likely on the server-side ETR) decides not to
      send a Map-Request.  For example, if the server-side ETR does not
      send Map-Requests, it gleans RLOCs from the client-side ITR,
      giving the client-side ITR responsibility for bidirectional RLOC
      reachability and preferability.  Server-side ETR gleaning of the
      client-side ITR RLOC is done by caching the inner header source
      EID and the outer header source RLOC of received packets.  The
      client-side ITR controls how traffic is returned and can alternate
      using an outer header source RLOC, which then can be added to the
      list the server-side ETR uses to return traffic.  Since no
      Priority or Weights are provided using this method, the server-
      side ETR MUST assume each client-side ITR RLOC uses the same best
      Priority with a Weight of zero.  In addition, since EID-prefix
      encoding cannot be conveyed in data packets, the EID-to-RLOC cache
      on tunnel routers can grow to be very large.

   o  A "gleaned" map-cache entry, one learned from the source RLOC of a
      received encapsulated packet, is only stored and used for a few
      seconds, pending verification.  Verification is performed by
      sending a Map-Request to the source EID (the inner header IP
      source address) of the received encapsulated packet.  A reply to
      this "verifying Map-Request" is used to fully populate the map-
      cache entry for the "gleaned" EID and is stored and used for the
      time indicated from the TTL field of a received Map-Reply.  When a
      verified map-cache entry is stored, data gleaning no longer occurs
      for subsequent packets which have a source EID that matches the
      EID-prefix of the verified entry.

   RLOCs that appear in EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply messages are assumed to be
   reachable when the R-bit for the locator record is set to 1.  When
   the R-bit is set to 0, an ITR or PITR MUST NOT encapsulate to the
   RLOC.  Neither the information contained in a Map-Reply or that
   stored in the mapping database system provides reachability
   information for RLOCs.  Note that reachability is not part of the
   mapping system and is determined using one or more of the Routing
   Locator Reachability Algorithms described in the next section.

6.3.  Routing Locator Reachability

   Several mechanisms for determining RLOC reachability are currently
   defined:

   1.  An ETR may examine the Locator Status Bits in the LISP header of
       an encapsulated data packet received from an ITR.  If the ETR is
       also acting as an ITR and has traffic to return to the original
       ITR site, it can use this status information to help select an
       RLOC.

   2.  An ITR may receive an ICMP Network or ICMP Host Unreachable
       message for an RLOC it is using.  This indicates that the RLOC is
       likely down.  Note, trusting ICMP messages may not be desirable
       but neither is ignoring them completely.  Implementations are
       encouraged to follow current best practices in treating these
       conditions.

   3.  An ITR which participates in the global routing system can
       determine that an RLOC is down if no BGP RIB route exists that
       matches the RLOC IP address.

   4.  An ITR may receive an ICMP Port Unreachable message from a
       destination host.  This occurs if an ITR attempts to use
       interworking [INTERWORK] and LISP-encapsulated data is sent to a
       non-LISP-capable site.

   5.  An ITR may receive a Map-Reply from an ETR in response to a
       previously sent Map-Request.  The RLOC source of the Map-Reply is
       likely up since the ETR was able to send the Map-Reply to the
       ITR.

   6.  When an ETR receives an encapsulated packet from an ITR, the
       source RLOC from the outer header of the packet is likely up.

   7.  An ITR/ETR pair can use the Locator Reachability Algorithms
       described in this section, namely Echo-Noncing or RLOC-Probing.

   When determining Locator up/down reachability by examining the
   Locator Status Bits from the LISP encapsulated data packet, an ETR
   will receive up to date status from an encapsulating ITR about
   reachability for all ETRs at the site.  CE-based ITRs at the source
   site can determine reachability relative to each other using the site
   IGP as follows:

   o  Under normal circumstances, each ITR will advertise a default
      route into the site IGP.

   o  If an ITR fails or if the upstream link to its PE fails, its
      default route will either time-out or be withdrawn.

   Each ITR can thus observe the presence or lack of a default route
   originated by the others to determine the Locator Status Bits it sets
   for them.

   RLOCs listed in a Map-Reply are numbered with ordinals 0 to n-1.  The
   Locator Status Bits in a LISP encapsulated packet are numbered from 0
   to n-1 starting with the least significant bit.  For example, if an
   RLOC listed in the 3rd position of the Map-Reply goes down (ordinal
   value 2), then all ITRs at the site will clear the 3rd least
   significant bit (xxxx x0xx) of the Locator Status Bits field for the
   packets they encapsulate.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, it will check for any change in
   the Locator Status Bits field.  When a bit goes from 1 to 0, the ETR
   if acting also as an ITR, will refrain from encapsulating packets to
   an RLOC that is indicated as down.  It will only resume using that
   RLOC if the corresponding Locator Status Bit returns to a value of 1.
   Locator Status Bits are associated with a locator-set per EID-prefix.
   Therefore, when a locator becomes unreachable, the Locator Status Bit
   that corresponds to that locator's position in the list returned by
   the last Map-Reply will be set to zero for that particular EID-
   prefix.

   When ITRs at the site are not deployed in CE routers, the IGP can
   still be used to determine the reachability of Locators provided they
   are injected into the IGP.  This is typically done when a /32 address
   is configured on a loopback interface.

   When ITRs receive ICMP Network or Host Unreachable messages as a
   method to determine unreachability, they will refrain from using
   Locators which are described in Locator lists of Map-Replies.
   However, using this approach is unreliable because many network
   operators turn off generation of ICMP Unreachable messages.

   If an ITR does receive an ICMP Network or Host Unreachable message,
   it MAY originate its own ICMP Unreachable message destined for the
   host that originated the data packet the ITR encapsulated.

   Also, BGP-enabled ITRs can unilaterally examine the RIB to see if a
   locator address from a locator-set in a mapping entry matches a
   prefix.  If it does not find one and BGP is running in the Default
   Free Zone (DFZ), it can decide to not use the locator even though the
   Locator Status Bits indicate the locator is up.  In this case, the
   path from the ITR to the ETR that is assigned the locator is not
   available.  More details are in [LOC-ID-ARCH].

   Optionally, an ITR can send a Map-Request to a Locator and if a Map-
   Reply is returned, reachability of the Locator has been determined.
   Obviously, sending such probes increases the number of control
   messages originated by tunnel routers for active flows, so Locators
   are assumed to be reachable when they are advertised.

   This assumption does create a dependency: Locator unreachability is
   detected by the receipt of ICMP Host Unreachable messages.  When an
   Locator has been determined to be unreachable, it is not used for
   active traffic; this is the same as if it were listed in a Map-Reply
   with priority 255.

   The ITR can test the reachability of the unreachable Locator by
   sending periodic Requests.  Both Requests and Replies MUST be rate-
   limited.  Locator reachability testing is never done with data
   packets since that increases the risk of packet loss for end-to-end
   sessions.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, it knows that it is reachable from
   the encapsulating ITR because that is how the packet arrived.  In
   most cases, the ETR can also reach the ITR but cannot assume this to
   be true due to the possibility of path asymmetry.  In the presence of
   unidirectional traffic flow from an ITR to an ETR, the ITR SHOULD NOT
   use the lack of return traffic as an indication that the ETR is
   unreachable.  Instead, it MUST use an alternate mechanisms to
   determine reachability.

6.3.1.  Echo Nonce Algorithm

   When data flows bidirectionally between locators from different
   sites, a data-plane mechanism called "nonce echoing" can be used to
   determine reachability between an ITR and ETR.  When an ITR wants to
   solicit a nonce echo, it sets the N and E bits and places a 24-bit
   nonce [RFC4086] in the LISP header of the next encapsulated data
   packet.

   When this packet is received by the ETR, the encapsulated packet is
   forwarded as normal.  When the ETR next sends a data packet to the
   ITR, it includes the nonce received earlier with the N bit set and E
   bit cleared.  The ITR sees this "echoed nonce" and knows the path to
   and from the ETR is up.

   The ITR will set the E-bit and N-bit for every packet it sends while
   in echo-nonce-request state.  The time the ITR waits to process the
   echoed nonce before it determines the path is unreachable is variable
   and a choice left for the implementation.

   If the ITR is receiving packets from the ETR but does not see the
   nonce echoed while being in echo-nonce-request state, then the path
   to the ETR is unreachable.  This decision may be overridden by other
   locator reachability algorithms.  Once the ITR determines the path to
   the ETR is down it can switch to another locator for that EID-prefix.

   Note that "ITR" and "ETR" are relative terms here.  Both devices MUST
   be implementing both ITR and ETR functionality for the echo nonce
   mechanism to operate.

   The ITR and ETR may both go into echo-nonce-request state at the same
   time.  The number of packets sent or the time during which echo nonce
   requests are sent is an implementation specific setting.  However,
   when an ITR is in echo-nonce-request state, it can echo the ETR's
   nonce in the next set of packets that it encapsulates and then
   subsequently, continue sending echo-nonce-request packets.

   This mechanism does not completely solve the forward path
   reachability problem as traffic may be unidirectional.  That is, the
   ETR receiving traffic at a site may not be the same device as an ITR
   which transmits traffic from that site or the site to site traffic is
   unidirectional so there is no ITR returning traffic.

   The echo-nonce algorithm is bilateral.  That is, if one side sets the
   E-bit and the other side is not enabled for echo-noncing, then the
   echoing of the nonce does not occur and the requesting side may
   regard the locator unreachable erroneously.  An ITR SHOULD only set
   the E-bit in a encapsulated data packet when it knows the ETR is
   enabled for echo-noncing.  This is conveyed by the E-bit in the Map-
   Reply message.

   Note that other locator reachability mechanisms are being researched
   and can be used to compliment or even override the Echo Nonce
   Algorithm.  See next section for an example of control-plane probing.

6.3.2.  RLOC Probing Algorithm

   RLOC Probing is a method that an ITR or PITR can use to determine the
   reachability status of one or more locators that it has cached in a
   map-cache entry.  The probe-bit of the Map-Request and Map-Reply
   messages are used for RLOC Probing.

   RLOC probing is done in the control-plane on a timer basis where an
   ITR or PITR will originate a Map-Request destined to a locator
   address from one of its own locator addresses.  A Map-Request used as
   an RLOC-probe is NOT encapsulated and NOT sent to a Map-Server or on
   the ALT like one would when soliciting mapping data.  The EID record
   encoded in the Map-Request is the EID-prefix of the map-cache entry
   cached by the ITR or PITR.  The ITR may include a mapping data record
   for its own database mapping information which contains the local
   EID-prefixes and RLOCs for its site.

   When an ETR receives a Map-Request message with the probe-bit set, it
   returns a Map-Reply with the probe-bit set.  The source address of
   the Map-Reply is set according to the procedure described in
   Section 6.1.5.  The Map-Reply SHOULD contain mapping data for the
   EID-prefix contained in the Map-Request.  This provides the
   opportunity for the ITR or PITR, which sent the RLOC-probe to get
   mapping updates if there were changes to the ETR's database mapping
   entries.

   There are advantages and disadvantages of RLOC Probing.  The greatest
   benefit of RLOC Probing is that it can handle many failure scenarios
   allowing the ITR to determine when the path to a specific locator is
   reachable or has become unreachable, thus providing a robust
   mechanism for switching to using another locator from the cached
   locator.  RLOC Probing can also provide rough RTT estimates between a
   pair of locators which can be useful for network management purposes
   as well as for selecting low delay paths.  The major disadvantage of
   RLOC Probing is in the number of control messages required and the
   amount of bandwidth used to obtain those benefits, especially if the
   requirement for failure detection times are very small.

   Continued research and testing will attempt to characterize the
   tradeoffs of failure detection times versus message overhead.

6.4.  EID Reachability within a LISP Site

   A site may be multihomed using two or more ETRs.  The hosts and
   infrastructure within a site will be addressed using one or more EID
   prefixes that are mapped to the RLOCs of the relevant ETRs in the
   mapping system.  One possible failure mode is for an ETR to lose
   reachability to one or more of the EID prefixes within its own site.
   When this occurs when the ETR sends Map-Replies, it can clear the
   R-bit associated with its own locator.  And when the ETR is also an
   ITR, it can clear its locator-status-bit in the encapsulation data
   header.

   It is recognized there are no simple solutions to the site
   partitioning problem because it is hard to know which part of the
   EID-prefix range is partitioned.  And which locators can reach any
   sub-ranges of the EID-prefixes.  This problem is under investigation
   with the expectation that experiments will tell us more.  Note, this
   is not a new problem introduced by the LISP architecture.  The
   problem exists today when a multi-homed site uses BGP to advertise
   its reachability upstream.

6.5.  Routing Locator Hashing

   When an ETR provides an EID-to-RLOC mapping in a Map-Reply message to
   a requesting ITR, the locator-set for the EID-prefix may contain
   different priority values for each locator address.  When more than
   one best priority locator exists, the ITR can decide how to load
   share traffic against the corresponding locators.

   The following hash algorithm may be used by an ITR to select a
   locator for a packet destined to an EID for the EID-to-RLOC mapping:

   1.  Either a source and destination address hash can be used or the
       traditional 5-tuple hash which includes the source and
       destination addresses, source and destination TCP, UDP, or SCTP
       port numbers and the IP protocol number field or IPv6 next-
       protocol fields of a packet a host originates from within a LISP
       site.  When a packet is not a TCP, UDP, or SCTP packet, the
       source and destination addresses only from the header are used to
       compute the hash.

   2.  Take the hash value and divide it by the number of locators
       stored in the locator-set for the EID-to-RLOC mapping.

   3.  The remainder will yield a value of 0 to "number of locators
       minus 1".  Use the remainder to select the locator in the
       locator-set.

   Note that when a packet is LISP encapsulated, the source port number
   in the outer UDP header needs to be set.  Selecting a hashed value
   allows core routers which are attached to Link Aggregation Groups
   (LAGs) to load-split the encapsulated packets across member links of
   such LAGs.  Otherwise, core routers would see a single flow, since
   packets have a source address of the ITR, for packets which are
   originated by different EIDs at the source site.  A suggested setting
   for the source port number computed by an ITR is a 5-tuple hash
   function on the inner header, as described above.

   Many core router implementations use a 5-tuple hash to decide how to
   balance packet load across members of a LAG.  The 5-tuple hash
   includes the source and destination addresses of the packet and the
   source and destination ports when the protocol number in the packet
   is TCP or UDP.  For this reason, UDP encoding is used for LISP
   encapsulation.

6.6.  Changing the Contents of EID-to-RLOC Mappings

   Since the LISP architecture uses a caching scheme to retrieve and
   store EID-to-RLOC mappings, the only way an ITR can get a more up-to-
   date mapping is to re-request the mapping.  However, the ITRs do not
   know when the mappings change and the ETRs do not keep track of which
   ITRs requested its mappings.  For scalability reasons, we want to
   maintain this approach but need to provide a way for ETRs change
   their mappings and inform the sites that are currently communicating
   with the ETR site using such mappings.

   When adding a new locator record in lexicographic order to the end of
   a locator-set, it is easy to update mappings.  We assume new mappings
   will maintain the same locator ordering as the old mapping but just
   have new locators appended to the end of the list.  So some ITRs can
   have a new mapping while other ITRs have only an old mapping that is
   used until they time out.  When an ITR has only an old mapping but
   detects bits set in the loc-status-bits that correspond to locators
   beyond the list it has cached, it simply ignores them.  However, this
   can only happen for locator addresses that are lexicographically
   greater than the locator addresses in the existing locator-set.

   When a locator record is inserted in the middle of a locator-set, to
   maintain lexicographic order, the SMR procedure in Section 6.6.2 is
   used to inform ITRs and PITRs of the new locator-status-bit mappings.

   When a locator record is removed from a locator-set, ITRs that have
   the mapping cached will not use the removed locator because the xTRs
   will set the loc-status-bit to 0.  So even if the locator is in the
   list, it will not be used.  For new mapping requests, the xTRs can
   set the locator AFI to 0 (indicating an unspecified address), as well
   as setting the corresponding loc-status-bit to 0.  This forces ITRs
   with old or new mappings to avoid using the removed locator.

   If many changes occur to a mapping over a long period of time, one
   will find empty record slots in the middle of the locator-set and new
   records appended to the locator-set.  At some point, it would be
   useful to compact the locator-set so the loc-status-bit settings can
   be efficiently packed.

   We propose here three approaches for locator-set compaction, one
   operational and two protocol mechanisms.  The operational approach
   uses a clock sweep method.  The protocol approaches use the concept
   of Solicit-Map-Requests and Map-Versioning.

6.6.1.  Clock Sweep

   The clock sweep approach uses planning in advance and the use of
   count-down TTLs to time out mappings that have already been cached.
   The default setting for an EID-to-RLOC mapping TTL is 24 hours.  So
   there is a 24 hour window to time out old mappings.  The following
   clock sweep procedure is used:

   1.  24 hours before a mapping change is to take effect, a network
       administrator configures the ETRs at a site to start the clock
       sweep window.

   2.  During the clock sweep window, ETRs continue to send Map-Reply
       messages with the current (unchanged) mapping records.  The TTL
       for these mappings is set to 1 hour.

   3.  24 hours later, all previous cache entries will have timed out,
       and any active cache entries will time out within 1 hour.  During
       this 1 hour window the ETRs continue to send Map-Reply messages
       with the current (unchanged) mapping records with the TTL set to
       1 minute.

   4.  At the end of the 1 hour window, the ETRs will send Map-Reply
       messages with the new (changed) mapping records.  So any active
       caches can get the new mapping contents right away if not cached,
       or in 1 minute if they had the mapping cached.  The new mappings
       are cached with a time to live equal to the TTL in the Map-Reply.

6.6.2.  Solicit-Map-Request (SMR)

   Soliciting a Map-Request is a selective way for ETRs, at the site
   where mappings change, to control the rate they receive requests for
   Map-Reply messages.  SMRs are also used to tell remote ITRs to update
   the mappings they have cached.

   Since the ETRs don't keep track of remote ITRs that have cached their
   mappings, they do not know which ITRs need to have their mappings
   updated.  As a result, an ETR will solicit Map-Requests (called an
   SMR message) from those sites to which it has been sending
   encapsulated data to for the last minute.  In particular, an ETR will
   send an SMR an ITR to which it has recently sent encapsulated data.

   An SMR message is simply a bit set in a Map-Request message.  An ITR
   or PITR will send a Map-Request when they receive an SMR message.
   Both the SMR sender and the Map-Request responder MUST rate-limited
   these messages.  Rate-limiting can be implemented as a global rate-
   limiter or one rate-limiter per SMR destination.

   The following procedure shows how a SMR exchange occurs when a site
   is doing locator-set compaction for an EID-to-RLOC mapping:

   1.  When the database mappings in an ETR change, the ETRs at the site
       begin to send Map-Requests with the SMR bit set for each locator
       in each map-cache entry the ETR caches.

   2.  A remote ITR which receives the SMR message will schedule sending
       a Map-Request message to the source locator address of the SMR
       message or to the mapping database system.  A newly allocated
       random nonce is selected and the EID-prefix used is the one
       copied from the SMR message.  If the source locator is the only
       locator in the cached locator-set, the remote ITR SHOULD send a
       Map-Request to the database mapping system just in case the
       single locator has changed and may no longer be reachable to
       accept the Map-Request.

   3.  The remote ITR MUST rate-limit the Map-Request until it gets a
       Map-Reply while continuing to use the cached mapping.  When Map
       Versioning is used, described in Section 6.6.3, an SMR sender can
       detect if an ITR is using the most up to date database mapping.

   4.  The ETRs at the site with the changed mapping will reply to the
       Map-Request with a Map-Reply message that has a nonce from the
       SMR-invoked Map-Request.  The Map-Reply messages SHOULD be rate
       limited.  This is important to avoid Map-Reply implosion.

   5.  The ETRs, at the site with the changed mapping, record the fact
       that the site that sent the Map-Request has received the new
       mapping data in the mapping cache entry for the remote site so
       the loc-status-bits are reflective of the new mapping for packets
       going to the remote site.  The ETR then stops sending SMR
       messages.

   Experimentation is in progress to determine the appropriate rate-
   limit parameters.

   For security reasons an ITR MUST NOT process unsolicited Map-Replies.
   To avoid map-cache entry corruption by a third-party, a sender of an
   SMR-based Map-Request MUST be verified.  If an ITR receives an SMR-
   based Map-Request and the source is not in the locator-set for the
   stored map-cache entry, then the responding Map-Request MUST be sent
   with an EID destination to the mapping database system.  Since the
   mapping database system is more secure to reach an authoritative ETR,
   it will deliver the Map-Request to the authoritative source of the
   mapping data.

   When an ITR receives an SMR-based Map-Request for which it does not
   have a cached mapping for the EID in the SMR message, it MAY not send
   a SMR-invoked Map-Request.  This scenario can occur when an ETR sends
   SMR messages to all locators in the locator-set it has stored in its
   map-cache but the remote ITRs that receive the SMR may not be sending
   packets to the site.  There is no point in updating the ITRs until
   they need to send, in which case, they will send Map-Requests to
   obtain a map-cache entry.

6.6.3.  Database Map Versioning

   When there is unidirectional packet flow between an ITR and ETR, and
   the EID-to-RLOC mappings change on the ETR, it needs to inform the
   ITR so encapsulation can stop to a removed locator and start to a new
   locator in the locator-set.

   An ETR, when it sends Map-Reply messages, conveys its own Map-Version
   number.  This is known as the Destination Map-Version Number.  ITRs
   include the Destination Map-Version Number in packets they
   encapsulate to the site.  When an ETR decapsulates a packet and
   detects the Destination Map-Version Number is less than the current
   version for its mapping, the SMR procedure described in Section 6.6.2
   occurs.

   An ITR, when it encapsulates packets to ETRs, can convey its own Map-
   Version number.  This is known as the Source Map-Version Number.
   When an ETR decapsulates a packet and detects the Source Map-Version
   Number is greater than the last Map-Version Number sent in a Map-
   Reply from the ITR's site, the ETR will send a Map-Request to one of
   the ETRs for the source site.

   A Map-Version Number is used as a sequence number per EID-prefix.  So
   values that are greater, are considered to be more recent.  A value
   of 0 for the Source Map-Version Number or the Destination Map-Version
   Number conveys no versioning information and an ITR does no
   comparison with previously received Map-Version Numbers.

   A Map-Version Number can be included in Map-Register messages as
   well.  This is a good way for the Map-Server can assure that all ETRs
   for a site registering to it will be Map-Version number synchronized.

   See [VERSIONING] for a more detailed analysis and description of
   Database Map Versioning.

7.  Router Performance Considerations

   LISP is designed to be very hardware-based forwarding friendly.  A
   few implementation techniques can be used to incrementally implement
   LISP:

   o  When a tunnel encapsulated packet is received by an ETR, the outer
      destination address may not be the address of the router.  This
      makes it challenging for the control plane to get packets from the
      hardware.  This may be mitigated by creating special FIB entries
      for the EID-prefixes of EIDs served by the ETR (those for which
      the router provides an RLOC translation).  These FIB entries are
      marked with a flag indicating that control plane processing should
      be performed.  The forwarding logic of testing for particular IP
      protocol number value is not necessary.  There are a few proven
      cases where no changes to existing deployed hardware were needed
      to support the LISP data-plane.

   o  On an ITR, prepending a new IP header consists of adding more
      <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike>
      <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> to a MAC rewrite string and prepending the string as part
      of the outgoing encapsulation procedure.  Routers that support GRE
      tunneling [RFC2784] or 6to4 tunneling [RFC3056] may already
      support this action.

   o  A packet's source address or interface the packet was received on
      can be used to select a VRF (Virtual Routing/Forwarding).  The
      VRF's routing table can be used to find EID-to-RLOC mappings.

   For performance issues related to map-cache management, see section
   Section 12.

8.  Deployment Scenarios

   This section will explore how and where ITRs and ETRs can be deployed
   and will discuss the pros and cons of each deployment scenario.  For
   a more detailed deployment recommendation, refer to [LISP-DEPLOY].

   There are two basic deployment trade-offs to consider: centralized
   versus distributed caches and flat, recursive, or re-encapsulating
   tunneling.  When deciding on centralized versus distributed caching,
   the following issues should be considered:

   o  Are the tunnel routers spread out so that the caches are spread
      across all the memories of each router?  A centralized cache is
      when an ITR keeps a cache for all the EIDs it is encapsulating to.
      The packet takes a direct path to the destination locator.  A
      distributed cache is when an ITR needs help from other re-
      encapsulating routers because it does not store all the cache
      entries for the EIDs is it encapsulating to.  So the packet takes
      a path through re-encapsulating routers that have a different set
      of cache entries.

   o  Should management "touch points" be minimized by choosing few
      tunnel routers, just enough for redundancy?

   o  In general, using more ITRs doesn't increase management load,
      since caches are built and stored dynamically.  On the other hand,
      more ETRs does require more management since EID-prefix-to-RLOC
      mappings need to be explicitly configured.

   When deciding on flat, recursive, or re-encapsulation tunneling, the
   following issues should be considered:

   o  Flat tunneling implements a single tunnel between source site and
      destination site.  This generally offers better paths between
      sources and destinations with a single tunnel path.

   o  Recursive tunneling is when tunneled traffic is again further
      encapsulated in another tunnel, either to implement VPNs or to
      perform Traffic Engineering.  When doing VPN-based tunneling, the
      site has some control since the site is prepending a new tunnel
      header.  In the case of TE-based tunneling, the site may have
      control if it is prepending a new tunnel header, but if the site's
      ISP is doing the TE, then the site has no control.  Recursive
      tunneling generally will result in suboptimal paths but at the
      benefit of steering traffic to resource available parts of the
      network.

   o  The technique of re-encapsulation ensures that packets only
      require one tunnel header.  So if a packet needs to be rerouted,
      it is first decapsulated by the ETR and then re-encapsulated with
      a new tunnel header using a new RLOC.

   The next sub-sections will survey where tunnel routers can reside in
   the network.

8.1.  First-hop/Last-hop Tunnel Routers

   By locating tunnel routers close to hosts, the EID-prefix set is at
   the granularity of an IP subnet.  So at the expense of more EID-
   prefix-to-RLOC sets for the site, the caches in each tunnel router
   can remain relatively small.  But caches always depend on the number
   of non-aggregated EID destination flows active through these tunnel
   routers.

   With more tunnel routers doing encapsulation, the increase in control
   traffic grows as well: since the EID-granularity is greater, more
   Map-Requests and Map-Replies are traveling between more routers.

   The advantage of placing the caches and databases at these stub
   routers is that the products deployed in this part of the network
   have better price-memory ratios then their core router counterparts.
   Memory is typically less expensive in these devices and fewer routes
   are stored (only IGP routes).  These devices tend to have excess
   capacity, both for forwarding and routing state.

   LISP functionality can also be deployed in edge switches.  These
   devices generally have layer-2 ports facing hosts and layer-3 ports
   facing the Internet.  Spare capacity is also often available in these
   devices as well.

8.2.  Border/Edge Tunnel Routers

   Using customer-edge (CE) routers for tunnel endpoints allows the EID
   space associated with a site to be reachable via a small set of RLOCs
   assigned to the CE routers for that site.  This is the default
   behavior envisioned in the rest of this specification.

   This offers the opposite benefit of the first-hop/last-hop tunnel
   router scenario: the number of mapping entries and network management
   touch points are reduced, allowing better scaling.

   One disadvantage is that less of the network's resources are used to
   reach host endpoints thereby centralizing the point-of-failure domain
   and creating network choke points at the CE router.

   Note that more than one CE router at a site can be configured with
   the same IP address.  In this case an RLOC is an anycast address.
   This allows resilience between the CE routers.  That is, if a CE
   router fails, traffic is automatically routed to the other routers
   using the same anycast address.  However, this comes with the
   disadvantage where the site cannot control the entrance point when
   the anycast route is advertised out from all border routers.  Another
   disadvantage of using anycast locators is the limited advertisement
   scope of /32 (or /128 for IPv6) routes.

8.3.  ISP Provider-Edge (PE) Tunnel Routers

   Use of ISP PE routers as tunnel endpoint routers is not the typical
   deployment scenario envisioned in the specification.  This section
   attempts to capture some of reasoning behind this preference of
   implementing LISP on CE routers.

   Use of ISP PE routers as tunnel endpoint routers gives an ISP, rather
   than a site, control over the location of the egress tunnel
   endpoints.  That is, the ISP can decide if the tunnel endpoints are
   in the destination site (in either CE routers or last-hop routers
   within a site) or at other PE edges.  The advantage of this case is
   that two tunnel headers can be avoided.  By having the PE be the
   first router on the path to encapsulate, it can choose a TE path
   first, and the ETR can decapsulate and re-encapsulate for a tunnel to
   the destination end site.

   An obvious disadvantage is that the end site has no control over
   where its packets flow or the RLOCs used.  Other disadvantages
   include the difficulty in synchronizing path liveness updates between
   CE and PE routers.

   As mentioned in earlier sections a combination of these scenarios is
   possible at the expense of extra packet header overhead, if both site
   and provider want control, then recursive or re-encapsulating tunnels
   are used.

8.4.  LISP Functionality with Conventional NATs

   LISP routers can be deployed behind Network Address Translator (NAT)
   devices to provide the same set of packet services hosts have today
   when they are addressed out of private address space.

   It is important to note that a locator address in any LISP control
   message MUST be a globally routable address and therefore SHOULD NOT
   contain [RFC1918] addresses.  If a LISP router is configured with
   private addresses, they MUST be used only in the outer IP header so
   the NAT device can translate properly.  Otherwise, EID addresses MUST
   be translated before encapsulation is performed.  Both NAT
   translation and LISP encapsulation functions could be co-located in
   the same device.

   More details on LISP address translation can be found in [INTERWORK].

8.5.  Packets Egressing a LISP Site

   When a LISP site is using two ITRs for redundancy, the failure of one
   ITR will likely shift outbound traffic to the second.  This second
   ITR's cache may not not be populated with the same EID-to-RLOC
   mapping entries as the first.  If this second ITR does not have these
   mappings, traffic will be dropped while the mappings are retrieved
   from the mapping system.  The retrieval of these messages may
   increase the load of requests being sent into the mapping system.
   Deployment and experimentation will determine whether this issue
   requires more attention.

9.  Traceroute Considerations

   When a source host in a LISP site initiates a traceroute to a
   destination host in another LISP site, it is highly desirable for it
   to see the entire path.  Since packets are encapsulated from ITR to
   ETR, the hop across the tunnel could be viewed as a single hop.
   However, LISP traceroute will provide the entire path so the user can
   see 3 distinct segments of the path from a source LISP host to a
   destination LISP host:

      Segment 1 (in source LISP site based on EIDs):

          source-host ---&gt; first-hop ... next-hop ---&gt; ITR

      Segment 2 (in the core network based on RLOCs):

          ITR ---&gt; next-hop ... next-hop ---&gt; ETR

      Segment 3 (in the destination LISP site based on EIDs):

          ETR ---&gt; next-hop ... last-hop ---&gt; destination-host

   For segment 1 of the path, ICMP Time Exceeded messages are returned
   in the normal manner as they are today.  The ITR performs a TTL
   decrement and test for 0 before encapsulating.  So the ITR hop is
   seen by the traceroute source has an EID address (the address of
   site-facing interface).

   For segment 2 of the path, ICMP Time Exceeded messages are returned
   to the ITR because the TTL decrement to 0 is done on the outer
   header, so the destination of the ICMP messages are to the ITR RLOC
   address, the source RLOC address of the encapsulated traceroute
   packet.  The ITR looks inside of the ICMP payload to inspect the
   traceroute source so it can return the ICMP message to the address of
   the traceroute client as well as retaining the core router IP address
   in the ICMP message.  This is so the traceroute client can display
   the core router address (the RLOC address) in the traceroute output.
   The ETR returns its RLOC address and responds to the TTL decrement to
   0 like the previous core routers did.

   For segment 3, the next-hop router downstream from the ETR will be
   decrementing the TTL for the packet that was encapsulated, sent into
   the core, decapsulated by the ETR, and forwarded because it isn't the
   final destination.  If the TTL is decremented to 0, any router on the
   path to the destination of the traceroute, including the next-hop
   router or destination, will send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the
   source EID of the traceroute client.  The ICMP message will be
   encapsulated by the local ITR and sent back to the ETR in the
   originated traceroute source site, where the packet will be delivered
   to the host.

9.1.  IPv6 Traceroute

   IPv6 traceroute follows the procedure described above since the
   entire traceroute data packet is included in ICMP Time Exceeded
   message payload.  Therefore, only the ITR needs to pay special
   attention for forwarding ICMP messages back to the traceroute source.

9.2.  IPv4 Traceroute

   For IPv4 traceroute, we cannot follow the above procedure since IPv4
   ICMP Time Exceeded messages only include the invoking IP header and 8
   <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes</font></strike>
   <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets</font></strong> that follow the IP header.  Therefore, when a core router
   sends an IPv4 Time Exceeded message to an ITR, all the ITR has in the
   ICMP payload is the encapsulated header it prepended followed by a
   UDP header.  The original invoking IP header, and therefore the
   identity of the traceroute source is lost.

   The solution we propose to solve this problem is to cache traceroute
   IPv4 headers in the ITR and to match them up with corresponding IPv4
   Time Exceeded messages received from core routers and the ETR.  The
   ITR will use a circular buffer for caching the IPv4 and UDP headers
   of traceroute packets.  It will select a 16-bit number as a key to
   find them later when the IPv4 Time Exceeded messages are received.
   When an ITR encapsulates an IPv4 traceroute packet, it will use the
   16-bit number as the UDP source port in the encapsulating header.
   When the ICMP Time Exceeded message is returned to the ITR, the UDP
   header of the encapsulating header is present in the ICMP payload
   thereby allowing the ITR to find the cached headers for the
   traceroute source.  The ITR puts the cached headers in the payload
   and sends the ICMP Time Exceeded message to the traceroute source
   retaining the source address of the original ICMP Time Exceeded
   message (a core router or the ETR of the site of the traceroute
   destination).

   The signature of a traceroute packet comes in two forms.  The first
   form is encoded as a UDP message where the destination port is
   inspected for a range of values.  The second form is encoded as an
   ICMP message where the IP identification field is inspected for a
   well-known value.

9.3.  Traceroute using Mixed Locators

   When either an IPv4 traceroute or IPv6 traceroute is originated and
   the ITR encapsulates it in the other address family header, you
   cannot get all 3 segments of the traceroute.  Segment 2 of the
   traceroute can not be conveyed to the traceroute source since it is
   expecting addresses from intermediate hops in the same address format
   for the type of traceroute it originated.  Therefore, in this case,
   segment 2 will make the tunnel look like one hop.  All the ITR has to
   do to make this work is to not copy the inner TTL to the outer,
   encapsulating header's TTL when a traceroute packet is encapsulated
   using an RLOC from a different address family.  This will cause no
   TTL decrement to 0 to occur in core routers between the ITR and ETR.

10.  Mobility Considerations

   There are several kinds of mobility of which only some might be of
   concern to LISP.  Essentially they are as follows.

10.1.  Site Mobility

   A site wishes to change its attachment points to the Internet, and
   its LISP Tunnel Routers will have new RLOCs when it changes upstream
   providers.  Changes in EID-RLOC mappings for sites are expected to be
   handled by configuration, outside of the LISP protocol.

10.2.  Slow Endpoint Mobility

   An individual endpoint wishes to move, but is not concerned about
   maintaining session continuity.  Renumbering is involved.  LISP can
   help with the issues surrounding renumbering [RFC4192] [LISA96] by
   decoupling the address space used by a site from the address spaces
   used by its ISPs.  [RFC4984]

10.3.  Fast Endpoint Mobility

   Fast endpoint mobility occurs when an endpoint moves relatively
   rapidly, changing its IP layer network attachment point.  Maintenance
   of session continuity is a goal.  This is where the Mobile IPv4
   [RFC5944] and Mobile IPv6 [RFC6275] [RFC4866] mechanisms are used,
   and primarily where interactions with LISP need to be explored.

   The problem is that as an endpoint moves, it may require changes to
   the mapping between its EID and a set of RLOCs for its new network
   location.  When this is added to the overhead of mobile IP binding
   updates, some packets might be delayed or dropped.

   In IPv4 mobility, when an endpoint is away from home, packets to it
   are encapsulated and forwarded via a home agent which resides in the
   home area the endpoint's address belongs to.  The home agent will
   encapsulate and forward packets either directly to the endpoint or to
   a foreign agent which resides where the endpoint has moved to.
   Packets from the endpoint may be sent directly to the correspondent
   node, may be sent via the foreign agent, or may be reverse-tunneled
   back to the home agent for delivery to the mobile node.  As the
   mobile node's EID or available RLOC changes, LISP EID-to-RLOC
   mappings are required for communication between the mobile node and
   the home agent, whether via foreign agent or not.  As a mobile
   endpoint changes networks, up to three LISP mapping changes may be
   required:

   o  The mobile node moves from an old location to a new visited
      network location and notifies its home agent that it has done so.
      The Mobile IPv4 control packets the mobile node sends pass through
      one of the new visited network's ITRs, which needs an EID-RLOC
      mapping for the home agent.

   o  The home agent might not have the EID-RLOC mappings for the mobile
      node's "care-of" address or its foreign agent in the new visited
      network, in which case it will need to acquire them.

   o  When packets are sent directly to the correspondent node, it may
      be that no traffic has been sent from the new visited network to
      the correspondent node's network, and the new visited network's
      ITR will need to obtain an EID-RLOC mapping for the correspondent
      node's site.

   In addition, if the IPv4 endpoint is sending packets from the new
   visited network using its original EID, then LISP will need to
   perform a route-returnability check on the new EID-RLOC mapping for
   that EID.

   In IPv6 mobility, packets can flow directly between the mobile node
   and the correspondent node in either direction.  The mobile node uses
   its "care-of" address (EID).  In this case, the route-returnability
   check would not be needed but one more LISP mapping lookup may be
   required instead:

   o  As above, three mapping changes may be needed for the mobile node
      to communicate with its home agent and to send packets to the
      correspondent node.

   o  In addition, another mapping will be needed in the correspondent
      node's ITR, in order for the correspondent node to send packets to
      the mobile node's "care-of" address (EID) at the new network
      location.

   When both endpoints are mobile the number of potential mapping
   lookups increases accordingly.

   As a mobile node moves there are not only mobility state changes in
   the mobile node, correspondent node, and home agent, but also state
   changes in the ITRs and ETRs for at least some EID-prefixes.

   The goal is to support rapid adaptation, with little delay or packet
   loss for the entire system.  Also IP mobility can be modified to
   require fewer mapping changes.  In order to increase overall system
   performance, there may be a need to reduce the optimization of one
   area in order to place fewer demands on another.

   In LISP, one possibility is to "glean" information.  When a packet
   arrives, the ETR could examine the EID-RLOC mapping and use that
   mapping for all outgoing traffic to that EID.  It can do this after
   performing a route-returnability check, to ensure that the new
   network location does have a internal route to that endpoint.
   However, this does not cover the case where an ITR (the node assigned
   the RLOC) at the mobile-node location has been compromised.

   Mobile IP packet exchange is designed for an environment in which all
   routing information is disseminated before packets can be forwarded.
   In order to allow the Internet to grow to support expected future
   use, we are moving to an environment where some information may have
   to be obtained after packets are in flight.  Modifications to IP
   mobility should be considered in order to optimize the behavior of
   the overall system.  Anything which decreases the number of new EID-
   RLOC mappings needed when a node moves, or maintains the validity of
   an EID-RLOC mapping for a longer time, is useful.

10.4.  Fast Network Mobility

   In addition to endpoints, a network can be mobile, possibly changing
   xTRs.  A "network" can be as small as a single router and as large as
   a whole site.  This is different from site mobility in that it is
   fast and possibly short-lived, but different from endpoint mobility
   in that a whole prefix is changing RLOCs.  However, the mechanisms
   are the same and there is no new overhead in LISP.  A map request for
   any endpoint will return a binding for the entire mobile prefix.

   If mobile networks become a more common occurrence, it may be useful
   to revisit the design of the mapping service and allow for dynamic
   updates of the database.

   The issue of interactions between mobility and LISP needs to be
   explored further.  Specific improvements to the entire system will
   depend on the details of mapping mechanisms.  Mapping mechanisms
   should be evaluated on how well they support session continuity for
   mobile nodes.

10.5.  LISP Mobile Node Mobility

   A mobile device can use the LISP infrastructure to achieve mobility
   by implementing the LISP encapsulation and decapsulation functions
   and acting as a simple ITR/ETR.  By doing this, such a "LISP mobile
   node" can use topologically-independent EID IP addresses that are not
   advertised into and do not impose a cost on the global routing
   system.  These EIDs are maintained at the edges of the mapping system
   (in LISP Map-Servers and Map-Resolvers) and are provided on demand to
   only the correspondents of the LISP mobile node.

   Refer to the LISP Mobility Architecture specification [LISP-MN] for
   more details.

11.  Multicast Considerations

   A multicast group address, as defined in the original Internet
   architecture is an identifier of a grouping of topologically
   independent receiver host locations.  The address encoding itself
   does not determine the location of the receiver(s).  The multicast
   routing protocol, and the network-based state the protocol creates,
   determines where the receivers are located.

   In the context of LISP, a multicast group address is both an EID and
   a Routing Locator.  Therefore, no specific semantic or action needs
   to be taken for a destination address, as it would appear in an IP
   header.  Therefore, a group address that appears in an inner IP
   header built by a source host will be used as the destination EID.
   The outer IP header (the destination Routing Locator address),
   prepended by a LISP router, will use the same group address as the
   destination Routing Locator.

   Having said that, only the source EID and source Routing Locator
   needs to be dealt with.  Therefore, an ITR merely needs to put its
   own IP address in the source Routing Locator field when prepending
   the outer IP header.  This source Routing Locator address, like any
   other Routing Locator address MUST be globally routable.

   Therefore, an EID-to-RLOC mapping does not need to be performed by an
   ITR when a received data packet is a multicast data packet or when
   processing a source-specific Join (either by IGMPv3 or PIM).  But the
   source Routing Locator is decided by the multicast routing protocol
   in a receiver site.  That is, an EID to Routing Locator translation
   is done at control-time.

   Another approach is to have the ITR not encapsulate a multicast
   packet and allow the host built packet to flow into the core even if
   the source address is allocated out of the EID namespace.  If the
   RPF-Vector TLV [RFC5496] is used by PIM in the core, then core
   routers can RPF to the ITR (the Locator address which is injected
   into core routing) rather than the host source address (the EID
   address which is not injected into core routing).

   To avoid any EID-based multicast state in the network core, the first
   approach is chosen for LISP-Multicast.  Details for LISP-Multicast
   and Interworking with non-LISP sites is described in specification
   [MLISP].

12.  Security Considerations

   It is believed that most of the security mechanisms will be part of
   the mapping database service when using control plane procedures for
   obtaining EID-to-RLOC mappings.  For data plane triggered mappings,
   as described in this specification, protection is provided against
   ETR spoofing by using Return-Routability (see Section 3) mechanisms
   evidenced by the use of a 24-bit Nonce field in the LISP
   encapsulation header and a 64-bit Nonce field in the LISP control
   message.

   The nonce, coupled with the ITR accepting only solicited Map-Replies
   provides a basic level of security, in many ways similar to the
   security experienced in the current Internet routing system.  It is
   hard for off-path attackers to launch attacks against these LISP
   mechanisms, as they do not have the nonce values.  Sending a large
   number of packets to accidentally find the right nonce value is
   possible, but would already by itself be a denial-of-service attack.
   On-path attackers can perform far more serious attacks, but on-path
   attackers can launch serious attacks in the current Internet as well,
   including eavesdropping, blocking or redirecting traffic.  See more
   discussion on this topic in Section 6.1.5.1.

   LISP does not rely on a PKI or a more heavy weight authentication
   system.  These systems challenge the scalability of LISP which was a
   primary design goal.

   DoS attack prevention will depend on implementations rate-limiting
   Map-Requests and Map-Replies to the control plane as well as rate-
   limiting the number of data-triggered Map-Replies.

   An incorrectly implemented or malicious ITR might choose to ignore
   the priority and weights provided by the ETR in its Map-Reply.  This
   traffic steering would be limited to the traffic that is sent by this
   ITR's site, and no more severe than if the site initiated a bandwidth
   DoS attack on (one of) the ETR's ingress links.  The ITR's site would
   typically gain no benefit from not respecting the weights, and would
   likely to receive better service by abiding by them.

   To deal with map-cache exhaustion attempts in an ITR/PITR, the
   implementation should consider putting a maximum cap on the number of
   entries stored with a reserve list for special or frequently accessed
   sites.  This should be a configuration policy control set by the
   network administrator who manages ITRs and PITRs.  When overlapping
   EID-prefixes occur across multiple map-cache entries, the integrity
   of the set must be wholly maintained.  So if a more-specific entry
   cannot be added due to reaching the maximum cap, then none of the
   less specifics should be stored in the map-cache.

   Given that the ITR/PITR maintains a cache of EID-to-RLOC mappings,
   cache sizing and maintenance is an issue to be kept in mind during
   implementation.  It is a good idea to have instrumentation in place
   to detect thrashing of the cache.  Implementation experimentation
   will be used to determine which cache management strategies work
   best.  In general, it is difficult to defend against cache trashing
   attacks.  It should be noted that an undersized cache in an ITR/PITR
   not only causes adverse affect on the site or region they support,
   but may also cause increased Map-Request load on the mapping system.

   "Piggybacked" mapping data discussed in Section 6.1.3 specifies how
   to handle such mappings and includes the possibility for an ETR to
   temporarily accept such a mapping before verification when running in
   "trusted" environments.  In such cases, there is a potential threat
   that a fake mapping could be inserted (even if only for a short
   period) into a map-cache.  As noted in Section 6.1.3, an ETR MUST be
   specifically configured to run in such a mode and might usefully only
   consider some specific ITRs as also running in that same trusted
   environment.

   There is a security risk implicit in the fact that ETRs generate the
   EID prefix to which they are responding.  An ETR can claim a shorter
   prefix than it is actually responsible for.  Various mechanisms to
   ameliorate or resolve this issue will be examined in the future,
   [LISP-SEC].

   Spoofing of inner header addresses of LISP encapsulated packets is
   possible like with any tunneling mechanism.  ITRs MUST verify the
   source address of a packet to be an EID that belongs to the site's
   EID-prefix range prior to encapsulation.  An ETR must only
   decapsulate and forward datagrams with an inner header destination
   that matches one of its EID-prefix ranges.  If, upon receipt and
   decapsulation, the destination EID of a datagram does not match one
   of the ETR's configured EID-prefixes, the ETR MUST drop the datagram.
   If a LISP encapsulated packet arrives at an ETR, it SHOULD compare
   the inner header source EID address and the outer header source RLOC
   address with the mapping that exists in the mapping database.  Then
   when spoofing attacks occur, the outer header source RLOC address can
   be used to trace back the attack to the source site, using existing
   operational tools.

   This experimental specification does not address automated key
   management (AKM).  BCP 107 provides guidance in this area.  In
   addition, at the time of this writing, substantial work is being
   undertaken to improve security of the routing system [KARP], [RPKI],
   [BGP-SEC], [LISP-SEC].  Future work on LISP should address BCP-107 as
   well as other open security considerations, which may require changes
   to this specification.

13.  Network Management Considerations

   Considerations for Network Management tools exist so the LISP
   protocol suite can be operationally managed.  The mechanisms can be
   found in [LISP-MIB] and [LISP-LIG].

14.  IANA Considerations

   This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
   Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the LISP
   specification, in accordance with BCP 26 and RFC 5226 [RFC5226].

   There are two name spaces in LISP that require registration:

   o  LISP IANA registry allocations should not be made for purposes
      unrelated to LISP routing or transport protocols.

   o  The following policies are used here with the meanings defined in
      BCP 26: "Specification Required", "IETF Review", "Experimental
      Use", "First Come First Served".

14.1.  LISP ACT and Flag Fields

   New ACT values (Section 6.1.4) can be allocated through IETF review
   or IESG approval.  Four values have already been allocated by this
   specification (Section 6.1.4).

   In addition, the LISP protocol has a number of flag and reserved
   fields, such as the LISP header flags field (Section 5.3).  New bits
   for flags can be taken into use from these fields through IETF review
   or IESG approval, but these need not be managed by IANA.

14.2.  LISP Address Type Codes

   LISP Address [LCAF] type codes have a range from 0 to 255.  New type
   codes MUST be allocated consecutively starting at 0.  Type Codes 0 -
   127 are to be assigned by IETF review or IESG approval.

   Type Codes 128 - 255 are available on a First Come First Served
   policy.

   This registry, initially empty, is constructed for future-use
   experimental work of LCAF values.  See [LCAF] for details for other
   possible unapproved address encodings.  The unapproved LCAF encodings
   are an area for further study and experimentation.

14.3.  LISP UDP Port Numbers

   The IANA registry has allocated UDP port numbers 4341 and 4342 for
   LISP data-plane and control-plane operation, respectively.

14.4.  LISP Key ID Numbers

   The following Key ID values are defined by this specification as used
   in any packet type that references a Key ID field:

       Name                 Number          Defined in
       -----------------------------------------------
       None                 0               n/a
       HMAC-SHA-1-96        1               [RFC2404]
       HMAC-SHA-256-128     2               [RFC6234]

15.  Known Open Issues and Areas of Future Work

   As an experimental specification, this work is, by definition,
   incomplete.  Specific areas where additional experience and work are
   needed include:

   o  At present, only [ALT] is defined for implementing a database of
      EID-to-RLOC mapping information.  Additional research on other
      mapping database systems is strongly encouraged.

   o  Failure and recovery of LISP site partitioning (see Section 6.4),
      in the presence of redundant configuration (see Section 8.5) needs
      further research and experimentation.

   o  The characteristics of map-cache management under exceptional
      conditions, such as denial-of-service attacks are not fully
      understood.  Further experience is needed to determine whether
      current caching methods are practical or in need of further
      development.  In particular, the performance, scaling and security
      characteristics of the map-cache will be discovered as part of
      this experiment.  Performance metrics to be observed are packet
      reordering associated with the LISP data probe and loss of the
      first packet in a flow associated with map-caching.  The impact of
      these upon TCP will be observed.  See Section 12 for additional
      thoughts and considerations.

   o  Preliminary work has been done to ensure that sites employing LISP
      can interconnect with the rest of the Internet.  This work is
      documented in <strike><font color="red" size="+1">[INTERWORK]</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">[INTERWORK],</font></strong> but further experimentation and
      experience is needed.

   o  At present, no mechanism for automated key management for message
      authentication is defined.  Addressing automated key management is
      necessary before this specification could be developed into a
      standards track RFC.  See Section 12 for further details regarding
      security considerations.

   o  In order to maintain security and stability, Internet Protocols
      typically isolate the control and data planes.  Therefore, user
      activity cannot cause control plane state to be created or
      destroyed.  LISP does not maintain this separation.  The degree to
      which the loss of separation impacts security and stability is a
      topic for experimental observation.

   o  LISP allows for different mapping database systems to be used.
      While only one [ALT] is currently well-defined, each mapping
      database will likely have some impact on the security of the EID-
      to-RLOC mappings.  How each mapping database system's security
      properties impact on LISP overall is for further study.

   <strong><font color="green" size="+1">o  An examination of the implications of LISP on Internet traffic,
      applications, routers, and security is needed.  This will help to
      understand the consequences for network stability, routing
      protocol function, routing scalability, migration and backward
      compatibility, and implementation scalability (as influenced by
      additional protocol components, additional state, and additional
      processing for encapsulation, decapsulation, liveness).

   Other LISP documents may also include open issues and areas for
   future work.</font></strong>

16.  References

16.1.  Normative References

   [ALT]      Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "LISP
              Alternative Topology (LISP-ALT)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-alt-09.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MS]  Farinacci, D. and V. Fuller, "LISP Map Server",
              draft-ietf-lisp-ms-12.txt (work in progress).

   [RFC0768]  Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
              August 1980.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2404]  Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
              ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [RFC3168]  Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
              RFC 3168, September 2001.

   [RFC3232]  Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by
              an On-line Database", RFC 3232, January 2002.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC5496]  Wijnands, IJ., Boers, A., and E. Rosen, "The Reverse Path
              Forwarding (RPF) Vector TLV", RFC 5496, March 2009.

   [RFC5944]  Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised",
              RFC 5944, November 2010.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, May 2011.

   [RFC6275]  Perkins, C., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
              in IPv6", RFC 6275, July 2011.

   [UDP-TUNNELS]
              Eubanks, M. and P. Chimento, "UDP Checksums for Tunneled
              Packets", draft-eubanks-chimento-6man-01.txt (work in
              progress), October 2010.

   [UDP-ZERO]
              Fairhurst, G. and M. Westerland, "IPv6 UDP Checksum
              Considerations", draft-ietf-6man-udpzero-04.txt (work in
              progress), October 2011.

   [VERSIONING]
              Iannone, L., Saucez, D., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Mapping
              Versioning", draft-ietf-lisp-map-versioning-05.txt (work
              in progress).

16.2.  Informative References

   [AFI]      IANA, "Address Family Indicators (AFIs)", ADDRESS FAMILY
              NUMBERS
              http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers.

   [AFI-REGISTRY]
              IANA, "Address Family Indicators (AFIs)", ADDRESS FAMILY
              NUMBER registry http://www.iana.org/assignments/
              address-family-numbers/
              address-family-numbers.xml#address-family-numbers-1.

   [BGP-SEC]  Lepinski, M., "An Overview of BGPSEC",
              draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00.txt (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [CHIAPPA]  Chiappa, J., "Endpoints and Endpoint names: A Proposed
              Enhancement to the Internet Architecture", Internet-
              Draft http://www.chiappa.net/~jnc/tech/endpoints.txt.

   [CONS]     Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., and D. Meyer, "LISP-CONS: A
              Content distribution Overlay Network  Service for LISP",
              draft-meyer-lisp-cons-04.txt (work in progress).

   [EMACS]    Brim, S., Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Curran, "EID
              Mappings Multicast Across Cooperating Systems for LISP",
              draft-curran-lisp-emacs-00.txt (work in progress).

   [INTERWORK]
              Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller,
              "Interworking LISP with IPv4 and IPv6",
              draft-ietf-lisp-interworking-02.txt (work in progress).

   [KARP]     Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
              Routing Protocols (KARP)Design Guidelines",
              draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-06.txt (work in progress),
              October 2011.

   [LCAF]     Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Snijders, "LISP Canonical
              Address Format", draft-farinacci-lisp-lcaf-06.txt (work in
              progress).

   [LISA96]   Lear, E., Katinsky, J., Coffin, J., and D. Tharp,
              "Renumbering: Threat or Menace?", Usenix .

   [LISP-DEPLOY]
              Jakab, L., Coras, F., Domingo-Pascual, J., and D. Lewis,
              "LISP Network Element Deployment Considerations",
              draft-ietf-lisp-deployment-02.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-LIG]
              Farinacci, D. and D. Meyer, "LISP Internet Groper (LIG)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-lig-06.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MAIN]
              Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis,
              "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)",
              draft-farinacci-lisp-12.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MIB]
              Schudel, G., Jain, A., and V. Moreno, "LISP MIB",
              draft-ietf-lisp-mib-02.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MN]  Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Lewis, D., and D. Meyer, "LISP
              Mobility Architecture", draft-meyer-lisp-mn-06.txt (work
              in progress).

   [LISP-SEC]
              Maino, F., Ermagon, V., Cabellos, A., Sausez, D., and O.

              Bonaventure, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-sec-00.txt (work in progress).

   [LOC-ID-ARCH]
              Meyer, D. and D. Lewis, "Architectural Implications of
              Locator/ID  Separation",
              draft-meyer-loc-id-implications-02.txt (work in progress).

   [MLISP]    Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., Zwiebel, J., and S. Venaas,
              "LISP for Multicast Environments",
              draft-ietf-lisp-multicast-10.txt (work in progress).

   [NERD]     Lear, E., "NERD: A Not-so-novel EID to RLOC Database",
              draft-lear-lisp-nerd-08.txt (work in progress).

   [OPENLISP]
              Iannone, L. and O. Bonaventure, "OpenLISP Implementation
              Report", draft-iannone-openlisp-implementation-01.txt
              (work in progress).

   [RADIR]    Narten, T., "Routing and Addressing Problem Statement",
              draft-narten-radir-problem-statement-05.txt (work in
              progress).

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC2784]  Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
              Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
              March 2000.

   [RFC3056]  Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
              via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC4192]  Baker, F., Lear, E., and R. Droms, "Procedures for
              Renumbering an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day", RFC 4192,
              September 2005.

   [RFC4866]  Arkko, J., Vogt, C., and W. Haddad, "Enhanced Route
              Optimization for Mobile IPv6", RFC 4866, May 2007.

   [RFC4984]  Meyer, D., Zhang, L., and K. Fall, "Report from the IAB
              Workshop on Routing and Addressing", RFC 4984,
              September 2007.

   [RPKI]     Lepinski, M., "An Infrastructure to Support Secure
              Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13.txt (work in
              progress), February 2011.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   An initial thank you goes to Dave Oran for planting the seeds for the
   initial ideas for LISP.  His consultation continues to provide value
   to the LISP authors.

   A special and appreciative thank you goes to Noel Chiappa for
   providing architectural impetus over the past decades on separation
   of location and identity, as well as detailed review of the LISP
   architecture and documents, coupled with enthusiasm for making LISP a
   practical and incremental transition for the Internet.

   The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge many people who have
   contributed discussion and ideas to the making of this proposal.
   They include Scott Brim, Andrew Partan, John Zwiebel, Jason Schiller,
   Lixia Zhang, Dorian Kim, Peter Schoenmaker, Vijay Gill, Geoff Huston,
   David Conrad, Mark Handley, Ron Bonica, Ted Seely, Mark Townsley,
   Chris Morrow, Brian Weis, Dave McGrew, Peter Lothberg, Dave Thaler,
   Eliot Lear, Shane Amante, Ved Kafle, Olivier Bonaventure, Luigi
   Iannone, Robin Whittle, Brian Carpenter, Joel Halpern, Terry
   Manderson, Roger Jorgensen, Ran Atkinson, Stig Venaas, Iljitsch van
   Beijnum, Roland Bless, Dana Blair, Bill Lynch, Marc Woolward, Damien
   Saucez, Damian Lezama, Attilla De Groot, Parantap Lahiri, David
   Black, Roque Gagliano, Isidor Kouvelas, Jesper Skriver, Fred Templin,
   Margaret Wasserman, Sam Hartman, Michael Hofling, Pedro Marques, Jari
   Arkko, Gregg Schudel, Srinivas Subramanian, Amit Jain, Xu Xiaohu,
   Dhirendra Trivedi, Yakov Rekhter, John Scudder, John Drake, Dimitri
   Papadimitriou, Ross Callon, Selina Heimlich, Job Snijders, Vina
   Ermagan, Albert Cabellos, Fabio Maino, Victor Moreno, Chris White,
   Clarence Filsfils, and Alia Atlas.

   This work originated in the Routing Research Group (RRG) of the IRTF.
   The individual submission [LISP-MAIN] was converted into this IETF
   LISP working group draft.

   The LISP working group would like to give a special thanks to Jari
   Arkko, the Internet Area AD at the time the set of LISP documents
   were being prepared for IESG last call, for his meticulous review and
   detail commentary on the 7 working group last call drafts progressing
   toward experimental RFCs.

Appendix B.  Document Change Log

B.1.  Changes to <strong><font color="green" size="+1">draft-ietf-lisp-20.txt

   o  Posted January 2012 for resolution to Adrian Farrel's comments and
      Elwyn Davies Gen-Art comments.

B.2.  Changes to</font></strong> draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt

   o  Posted January 2012 for Stephen Farrell's comment resolution.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.2.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.3.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-18.txt

   o  Posted December 2011 after reflecting comments from IANA.

   o  Create reference to sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 about DF bit setting
      from section 5.3.

   o  Inserted two references for Route-Returnability and on-path
      attacks in Security Considerations section.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.3.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.4.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-17.txt

   o  Posted December 2011 after IETF last call comments.

   o  Make Map-Notify port assignment be 4342 in both source and
      destination ports.  This change was agreed on and put in [LISP-MS]
      but was not updated in this spec.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.4.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.5.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-16.txt

   o  Posted October 2011 after AD review by Jari.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.5.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.6.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-15.txt

   o  Posted July 2011.  Fixing IDnits errors.

   o  Change description on how to select a source address for RLOC-
      probe Map-Replies to refer to the "EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply Message"
      section.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.6.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.7.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-14.txt

   o  Post working group last call and pre-IESG last call review.

   o  Indicate that an ICMP Unreachable message should be sent when a
      packet matches a drop-based negative map-cache entry.

   o  Indicate how a map-cache set of overlapping EID-prefixes must
      maintain integrity when the map-cache maximum cap is reached.

   o  Add Joel's description for the definition of an EID, that the bit
      string value can be an RLOC for another device in abstract but the
      architecture allows it to be an EID of one device and the same
      value as an RLOC for another device.

   o  In the "Tunnel Encapsulation Details" section, indicate that 4
      combinations of encapsulation are supported.

   o  Add what ETR should do for a Data-Probe when received for a
      destination EID outside of its EID-prefix range.  This was added
      in the Data Probe definition section.

   o  Added text indicating that more-specific EID-prefixes must not be
      removed when less-specific entries stay in the map-cache.  This is
      to preserve the integrity of the EID-prefix set.

   o  Add clarifying text in the Security Considerations section about
      how an ETR must not decapsulate and forward a packet that is not
      for its configured EID-prefix range.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.7.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.8.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-13.txt

   o  Posted June 2011 to complete working group last call.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Put Yakov suggested wording in the EID-prefix
      definition section to reference [INTERWORK] and [LISP-DEPLOY]
      about discussion on transition and access mechanisms.

   o  Change "ITRs" to "ETRs" in the Locator Status Bit definition
      section and data packet description section per Damien's comment.

   o  Remove the normative reference to [LISP-SEC] when describing the
      S-bit in the ECM and Map-Reply headers.

   o  Tracker item 54.  Added text from John Scudder in the "Packets
      Egressing a LISP Site" section.

   o  Add sentence to the "Reencapsulating Tunnel" definition about how
      reencapsulation loops can occur when not coordinating among
      multiple mapping database systems.

   o  Remove "In theory" from a sentence in the Security Considerations
      section.

   o  Remove Security Area Statement title and reword section with
      Eliot's provided text.  The text was agreed upon by LISP-WG chairs
      and Security ADs.

   o  Remove word "potential" from the over-claiming paragraph of the
      Security Considerations section per Stephen's request.

   o  Wordsmithing and other editorial comments from Alia.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.8.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.9.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-12.txt

   o  Posted April 2011.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Provided rewording how an EID-prefix can be
      reused in the definition section of "EID-prefix".

   o  Tracker item 95.  Change "eliminate" to "defer" in section 4.1.

   o  Tracker item 110.  Added that the Mapping Protocol Data field in
      the Map-Reply message is only used when needed by the particular
      Mapping Database System.

   o  Tracker item 111.  Indicate that if an LSB that is associated with
      an anycast address, that there is at least one RLOC that is up.

   o  Tracker item 108.  Make clear the R-bit does not define RLOC path
      reachability.

   o  Tracker item 107.  Indicate that weights are relative to each
      other versus requiring an addition of up to 100%.

   o  Tracker item 46.  Add a sentence how LISP products should be sized
      for the appropriate demand so cache thrashing is avoided.

   o  Change some references of RFC 5226 to [AFI] per Luigi.

   o  Per Luigi, make reference to "EID-AFI" consistent to "EID-prefix-
      AFI".

   o  Tracker item 66.  Indicate that appending locators to a locator-
      set is done when the added locators are lexicographically greater
      than the previous ones in the set.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Once again reword the definition of the EID-
      prefix to reflect recent comments.

   o  Tracker item 70.  Added text to security section on what the
      implications could be if an ITR does not obey priority and weights
      from a Map-Reply message.

   o  Tracker item 54.  Added text to the new section titled "Packets
      Egressing a LISP Site" to describe the implications when two or
      more ITRs exist at a site where only one ITR is used for egress
      traffic and when there is a shift of traffic to the others, how
      the map-cache will need to be populated in those new egress ITRs.

   o  Tracker item 33.  Make more clear in the Routing Locator Selection
      section what an ITR should do when it sees an R-bit of 0 in a
      locator-record of a Map-Reply.

   o  Tracker item 33.  Add paragraph to the EID Reachability section
      indicating that site partitioning is under investigation.

   o  Tracker item 58.  Added last paragraph of Security Considerations
      section about how to protect inner header EID address spoofing
      attacks.

   o  Add suggested Sam text to indicate that all security concerns need
      not be addressed for moving document to Experimental RFC status.
      Put this in a subsection of the Security Considerations section.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.9.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.10.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-11.txt

   o  Posted March 30, 2011.

   o  Change IANA URL.  The URL we had pointed to a general protocol
      numbers page.

   o  Added the "s" bit to the Map-Request to allow SMR-invoked Map-
      Requests to be sent to a MN ETR via the map-server.

   o  Generalize text for the definition of Reencapsuatling tunnels.

   o  Add paragraph suggested by Joel to explain how implementation
      experimentation will be used to determine the proper cache
      management techniques.

   o  Add Yakov provided text for the definition of "EID-to-RLOC
      "Database".

   o  Add reference in Section 8, Deployment Scenarios, to the
      draft-jakab-lisp-deploy-02.txt draft.

   o  Clarify sentence about no hardware changes needed to support LISP
      encapsulation.

   o  Add paragraph about what is the procedure when a locator is
      inserted in the middle of a locator-set.

   o  Add a definition for Locator Status Bits so we can emphasize they
      are used as a hint for router up/down status and not path
      reachability.

   o  Change "BGP RIB" to "RIB" per Clarence's comment.

   o  Fixed complaints by IDnits.

   o  Add subsection to Security Considerations section indicating how
      EID-prefix overclaiming in Map-Replies is for further study and
      add a reference to LISP-SEC.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.10.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.11.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt

   o  Posted March 2011.

   o  Add p-bit to Map-Request so there is documentary reasons to know
      when a PITR has sent a Map-Request to an ETR.

   o  Add Map-Notify message which is used to acknowledge a Map-Register
      message sent to a Map-Server.

   o  Add M-bit to the Map-Register message so an ETR that wants an
      acknowledgment for the Map-Register can request one.

   o  Add S-bit to the ECM and Map-Reply messages to describe security
      data that can be present in each message.  Then refer to
      [LISP-SEC] for expansive details.

   o  Add Network Management Considerations section and point to the MIB
      and LIG drafts.

   o  Remove the word "simple" per Yakov's comments.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.11.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.12.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt

   o  Posted October 2010.

   o  Add to IANA Consideration section about the use of LCAF Type
      values that accepted and maintained by the IANA registry and not
      the LCAF specification.

   o  Indicate that implementations should be able to receive LISP
      control messages when either UDP port is 4342, so they can be
      robust in the face of intervening NAT boxes.

   o  Add paragraph to SMR section to indicate that an ITR does not need
      to respond to an SMR-based Map-Request when it has no map-cache
      entry for the SMR source's EID-prefix.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.12.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.13.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-08.txt

   o  Posted August 2010.

   o  In section 6.1.6, remove statement about setting TTL to 0 in Map-
      Register messages.

   o  Clarify language in section 6.1.5 about Map-Replying to Data-
      Probes or Map-Requests.

   o  Indicate that outer TTL should only be copied to inner TTL when it
      is less than inner TTL.

   o  Indicate a source-EID for RLOC-probes are encoded with an AFI
      value of 0.

   o  Indicate that SMRs can have a global or per SMR destination rate-
      limiter.

   o  Add clarifications to the SMR procedures.

   o  Add definitions for "client-side" and 'server-side" terms used in
      this specification.

   o  Clear up language in section 6.4, last paragraph.

   o  Change ACT of value 0 to "no-action".  This is so we can RLOC-
      probe a PETR and have it return a Map-Reply with a locator-set of
      size 0.  The way it is spec'ed the map-cache entry has action
      "dropped".  Drop-action is set to 3.

   o  Add statement about normalizing locator weights.

   o  Clarify R-bit definition in the Map-Reply locator record.

   o  Add section on EID Reachability within a LISP site.

   o  Clarify another disadvantage of using anycast locators.

   o  Reworded Abstract.

   o  Change section 2.0 Introduction to remove obsolete information
      such as the LISP variant definitions.

   o  Change section 5 title from "Tunneling Details" to "LISP
      Encapsulation Details".

   o  Changes to section 5 to include results of network deployment
      experience with MTU.  Recommend that implementations use either
      the stateful or stateless handling.

   o  Make clarification wordsmithing to Section 7 and 8.

   o  Identify that if there is one locator in the locator-set of a map-
      cache entry, that an SMR from that locator should be responded to
      by sending the the SMR-invoked Map-Request to the database mapping
      system rather than to the RLOC itself (which may be unreachable).

   o  When describing Unicast and Multicast Weights indicate the the
      values are relative weights rather than percentages.  So it
      doesn't imply the sum of all locator weights in the locator-set
      need to be 100.

   o  Do some wordsmithing on copying TTL and TOS fields.

   o  Numerous wordsmithing changes from Dave Meyer.  He fine toothed
      combed the spec.

   o  Removed Section 14 "Prototype Plans and Status".  We felt this
      type of section is no longer appropriate for a protocol
      specification.

   o  Add clarification text for the IRC description per Damien's
      commentary.

   o  Remove text on copying nonce from SMR to SMR-invoked Map- Request
      per Vina's comment about a possible DoS vector.

   o  Clarify (S/2 + H) in the stateless MTU section.

   o  Add text to reflect Damien's comment about the description of the
      "ITR-RLOC Address" field in the Map-Request. that the list of RLOC
      addresses are local addresses of the Map-Requester.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.13.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.14.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-07.txt

   o  Posted April 2010.

   o  Added I-bit to data header so LSB field can also be used as an
      Instance ID field.  When this occurs, the LSB field is reduced to
      8-bits (from 32-bits).

   o  Added V-bit to the data header so the 24-bit nonce field can also
      be used for source and destination version numbers.

   o  Added Map-Version 12-bit value to the EID-record to be used in all
      of Map-Request, Map-Reply, and Map-Register messages.

   o  Added multiple ITR-RLOC fields to the Map-Request packet so an ETR
      can decide what address to select for the destination of a Map-
      Reply.

   o  Added L-bit (Local RLOC bit) and p-bit (Probe-Reply RLOC bit) to
      the Locator-Set record of an EID-record for a Map-Reply message.
      The L-bit indicates which RLOCs in the locator-set are local to
      the sender of the message.  The P-bit indicates which RLOC is the
      source of a RLOC-probe Reply (Map-Reply) message.

   o  Add reference to the LISP Canonical Address Format [LCAF] draft.

   o  Made editorial and clarification changes based on comments from
      Dhirendra Trivedi.

   o  Added wordsmithing comments from Joel Halpern on DF=1 setting.

   o  Add John Zwiebel clarification to Echo Nonce Algorithm section
      6.3.1.

   o  Add John Zwiebel comment about expanding on proxy-map-reply bit
      for Map-Register messages.

   o  Add NAT section per Ron Bonica comments.

   o  Fix IDnits issues per Ron Bonica.

   o  Added section on Virtualization and Segmentation to explain the
      use if the Instance ID field in the data header.

   o  There are too many P-bits, keep their scope to the packet format
      description and refer to them by name every where else in the
      spec.

   o  Scanned all occurrences of "should", "should not", "must" and
      "must not" and uppercased them.

   o  John Zwiebel offered text for section 4.1 to modernize the
      example.  Thanks Z!

   o  Make it more clear in the definition of "EID-to-RLOC Database"
      that all ETRs need to have the same database mapping.  This
      reflects a comment from John Scudder.

   o  Add a definition "Route-returnability" to the Definition of Terms
      section.

   o  In section 9.2, add text to describe what the signature of
      traceroute packets can look like.

   o  Removed references to Data Probe for introductory example.  Data-
      probes are still part of the LISP design but not encouraged.

   o  Added the definition for "LISP site" to the Definition of Terms"
      section.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.14.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.15.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-06.txt

   Editorial based changes:

   o  Posted December 2009.

   o  Fix typo for flags in LISP data header.  Changed from "4" to "5".

   o  Add text to indicate that Map-Register messages must contain a
      computed UDP checksum.

   o  Add definitions for PITR and PETR.

   o  Indicate an AFI value of 0 is an unspecified address.

   o  Indicate that the TTL field of a Map-Register is not used and set
      to 0 by the sender.  This change makes this spec consistent with
      [LISP-MS].

   o  Change "... yield a packet size of L <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes"</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets"</font></strong> to "... yield a
      packet size greater than L <strike><font color="red" size="+1">bytes".</font></strike> <strong><font color="green" size="+1">octets".</font></strong>

   o  Clarify section 6.1.5 on what addresses and ports are used in Map-
      Reply messages.

   o  Clarify that LSBs that go beyond the number of locators do not to
      be SMRed when the locator addresses are greater lexicographically
      than the locator in the existing locator-set.

   o  Add Gregg, Srini, and Amit to acknowledgment section.

   o  Clarify in the definition of a LISP header what is following the
      UDP header.

   o  Clarify "verifying Map-Request" text in section 6.1.3.

   o  Add Xu Xiaohu to the acknowledgment section for introducing the
      problem of overlapping EID-prefixes among multiple sites in an RRG
      email message.

   Design based changes:

   o  Use stronger language to have the outer IPv4 header set DF=1 so we
      can avoid fragment reassembly in an ETR or PETR.  This will also
      make IPv4 and IPv6 encapsulation have consistent behavior.

   o  Map-Requests should not be sent in ECM with the Probe bit is set.
      These type of Map-Requests are used as RLOC-probes and are sent
      directly to locator addresses in the underlying network.

   o  Add text in section 6.1.5 about returning all EID-prefixes in a
      Map-Reply sent by an ETR when there are overlapping EID-prefixes
      configure.

   o  Add text in a new subsection of section 6.1.5 about dealing with
      Map-Replies with coarse EID-prefixes.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.15.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.16.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-05.txt

   o  Posted September 2009.

   o  Added this Document Change Log appendix.

   o  Added section indicating that encapsulated Map-Requests must use
      destination UDP port 4342.

   o  Don't use AH in Map-Registers.  Put key-id, auth-length, and auth-
      data in Map-Register payload.

   o  Added Jari to acknowledgment section.

   o  State the source-EID is set to 0 when using Map-Requests to
      refresh or RLOC-probe.

   o  Make more clear what source-RLOC should be for a Map-Request.

   o  The LISP-CONS authors thought that the Type definitions for CONS
      should be removed from this specification.

   o  Removed nonce from Map-Register message, it wasn't used so no need
      for it.

   o  Clarify what to do for unspecified Action bits for negative Map-
      Replies.  Since No Action is a drop, make value 0 Drop.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.16.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.17.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-04.txt

   o  Posted September 2009.

   o  How do deal with record count greater than 1 for a Map-Request.
      Damien and Joel comment.  Joel suggests: 1) Specify that senders
      compliant with the current document will always set the count to
      1, and note that the count is included for future extensibility.
      2) Specify what a receiver compliant with the draft should do if
      it receives a request with a count greater than 1.  Presumably, it
      should send some error back?

   o  Add Fred Templin in acknowledgment section.

   o  Add Margaret and Sam to the acknowledgment section for their great
      comments.

   o  Say more about LAGs in the UDP section per Sam Hartman's comment.

   o  Sam wants to use MAY instead of SHOULD for ignoring checksums on
      ETR.  From the mailing list: "You'd need to word it as an ITR MAY
      send a zero checksum, an ETR MUST accept a 0 checksum and MAY
      ignore the checksum completely.  And of course we'd need to
      confirm that can actually be implemented.  In particular, hardware
      that verifies UDP checksums on receive needs to be checked to make
      sure it permits 0 checksums."

   o  Margaret wants a reference to
      http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-eubanks-chimento-6man-00.txt.

   o  Fix description in Map-Request section.  Where we describe Map-
      Reply Record, change "R-bit" to "M-bit".

   o  Add the mobility bit to Map-Replies.  So PITRs don't probe so
      often for MNs but often enough to get mapping updates.

   o  Indicate SHA1 can be used as well for Map-Registers.

   o  More Fred comments on MTU handling.

   o  Isidor comment about spec'ing better periodic Map-Registers.  Will
      be fixed in draft-ietf-lisp-ms-02.txt.

   o  Margaret's comment on gleaning: "The current specification does
      not make it clear how long gleaned map entries should be retained
      in the cache, nor does it make it clear how/ when they will be
      validated.  The LISP spec should, at the very least, include a
      (short) default lifetime for gleaned entries, require that they be
      validated within a short period of time, and state that a new
      gleaned entry should never overwrite an entry that was obtained
      from the mapping system.  The security implications of storing
      "gleaned" entries should also be explored in detail."

   o  Add section on RLOC-probing per working group feedback.

   o  Change "loc-reach-bits" to "loc-status-bits" per comment from
      Noel.

   o  Remove SMR-bit from data-plane.  Dino prefers to have it in the
      control plane only.

   o  Change LISP header to allow a "Research Bit" so the Nonce and LSB
      fields can be turned off and used for another future purpose.  For
      Luigi et al versioning convergence.

   o  Add a N-bit to the data header suggested by Noel.  Then the nonce
      field could be used when N is not 1.

   o  Clarify that when E-bit is 0, the nonce field can be an echoed
      nonce or a random nonce.  Comment from Jesper.

   o  Indicate when doing data-gleaning that a verifying Map-Request is
      sent to the source-EID of the gleaned data packet so we can avoid
      map-cache corruption by a 3rd party.  Comment from Pedro.

   o  Indicate that a verifying Map-Request, for accepting mapping data,
      should be sent over the ALT (or to the EID).

   o  Reference IPsec RFC 4302.  Comment from Sam and Brian Weis.

   o  Put E-bit in Map-Reply to tell ITRs that the ETR supports echo-
      noncing.  Comment by Pedro and Dino.

   o  Jesper made a comment to loosen the language about requiring the
      copy of inner TTL to outer TTL since the text to get mixed-AF
      traceroute to work would violate the "MUST" clause.  Changed from
      MUST to SHOULD in section 5.3.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.17.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.18.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-03.txt

   o  Posted July 2009.

   o  Removed loc-reach-bits longword from control packets per Damien
      comment.

   o  Clarifications in MTU text from Roque.

   o  Added text to indicate that the locator-set be sorted by locator
      address from Isidor.

   o  Clarification text from John Zwiebel in Echo-Nonce section.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.18.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.19.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-02.txt

   o  Posted July 2009.

   o  Encapsulation packet format change to add E-bit and make loc-
      reach-bits 32-bits in length.

   o  Added Echo-Nonce Algorithm section.

   o  Clarification how ECN bits are copied.

   o  Moved S-bit in Map-Request.

   o  Added P-bit in Map-Request and Map-Reply messages to anticipate
      RLOC-Probe Algorithm.

   o  Added to Mobility section to reference [LISP-MN].

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.19.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.20.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-01.txt

   o  Posted 2 days after draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt in May 2009.

   o  Defined LEID to be a "LISP EID".

   o  Indicate encapsulation use IPv4 DF=0.

   o  Added negative Map-Reply messages with drop, native-forward, and
      send-map-request actions.

   o  Added Proxy-Map-Reply bit to Map-Register.

<strike><font color="red" size="+1">B.20.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green" size="+1">B.21.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt

   o  Posted May 2009.

   o  Rename of draft-farinacci-lisp-12.txt.

   o  Acknowledgment to RRG.

Authors' Addresses

   Dino Farinacci
   cisco Systems
   Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: dino@cisco.com

   Vince Fuller
   cisco Systems
   Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: vaf@cisco.com

   Dave Meyer
   cisco Systems
   170 Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA
   USA

   Email: dmm@cisco.com

   Darrel Lewis
   cisco Systems
   170 Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA
   USA

   Email: darlewis@cisco.com
</pre>

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Network Working Group                                       D. Farinacci
Internet-Draft                                                 V. Fuller
Intended status: Experimental                                   D. Meyer
Expires: July 19, 2012                                          D. Lewis
                                                           cisco Systems
                                                        January 16, 2012


                 Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)
                           draft-ietf-lisp-20

Abstract

   This draft describes a network layer based protocol that enables
   separation of IP addresses into two new numbering spaces: Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs).  No changes are
   required to either host protocol stacks or to the "core" of the
   Internet infrastructure.  LISP can be incrementally deployed, without
   a "flag day", and offers traffic engineering, multi-homing, and
   mobility benefits to early adopters, even when there are relatively
   few LISP-capable sites.

   Design and development of LISP was largely motivated by the problem
   statement produced by the October 2006 IAB Routing and Addressing
   Workshop.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.




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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Definition of Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Basic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.1.  Packet Flow Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   5.  LISP Encapsulation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     5.1.  LISP IPv4-in-IPv4 Header Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     5.2.  LISP IPv6-in-IPv6 Header Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     5.3.  Tunnel Header Field Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     5.4.  Dealing with Large Encapsulated Packets  . . . . . . . . . 25
       5.4.1.  A Stateless Solution to MTU Handling . . . . . . . . . 25
       5.4.2.  A Stateful Solution to MTU Handling  . . . . . . . . . 26
     5.5.  Using Virtualization and Segmentation with LISP  . . . . . 26
   6.  EID-to-RLOC Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     6.1.  LISP IPv4 and IPv6 Control Plane Packet Formats  . . . . . 28
       6.1.1.  LISP Packet Type Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
       6.1.2.  Map-Request Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
       6.1.3.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Request Message  . . . . . . . . . 33
       6.1.4.  Map-Reply Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
       6.1.5.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Reply Message  . . . . . . . . . . 38
       6.1.6.  Map-Register Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
       6.1.7.  Map-Notify Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
       6.1.8.  Encapsulated Control Message Format  . . . . . . . . . 43
     6.2.  Routing Locator Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
     6.3.  Routing Locator Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
       6.3.1.  Echo Nonce Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
       6.3.2.  RLOC Probing Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
     6.4.  EID Reachability within a LISP Site  . . . . . . . . . . . 51
     6.5.  Routing Locator Hashing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
     6.6.  Changing the Contents of EID-to-RLOC Mappings  . . . . . . 53
       6.6.1.  Clock Sweep  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
       6.6.2.  Solicit-Map-Request (SMR)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
       6.6.3.  Database Map Versioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
   7.  Router Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
   8.  Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58



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     8.1.  First-hop/Last-hop Tunnel Routers  . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
     8.2.  Border/Edge Tunnel Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
     8.3.  ISP Provider-Edge (PE) Tunnel Routers  . . . . . . . . . . 60
     8.4.  LISP Functionality with Conventional NATs  . . . . . . . . 60
     8.5.  Packets Egressing a LISP Site  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
   9.  Traceroute Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
     9.1.  IPv6 Traceroute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
     9.2.  IPv4 Traceroute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
     9.3.  Traceroute using Mixed Locators  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
   10. Mobility Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
     10.1. Site Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
     10.2. Slow Endpoint Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
     10.3. Fast Endpoint Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
     10.4. Fast Network Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
     10.5. LISP Mobile Node Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
   11. Multicast Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
   12. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
   13. Network Management Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
   14. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
     14.1. LISP ACT and Flag Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
     14.2. LISP Address Type Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
     14.3. LISP UDP Port Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
     14.4. LISP Key ID Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
   15. Known Open Issues and Areas of Future Work . . . . . . . . . . 75
   16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
     16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
     16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
   Appendix B.  Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.1.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-20.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.2.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.3.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-18.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.4.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-17.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.5.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-16.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.6.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-15.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.7.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-14.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.8.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-13.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
     B.9.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-12.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
     B.10. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-11.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
     B.11. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
     B.12. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
     B.13. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-08.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
     B.14. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-07.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
     B.15. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-06.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
     B.16. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-05.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
     B.17. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-04.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
     B.18. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-03.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
     B.19. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-02.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 95



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     B.20. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-01.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
     B.21. Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
















































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1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].














































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2.  Introduction

   This document describes the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol
   (LISP), which provides a set of functions for routers to exchange
   information used to map from non globally routeable Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs) to routeable Routing Locators (RLOCs).  It also
   defines a mechanism for these LISP routers to encapsulate IP packets
   addressed with EIDs for transmission across the< Internet that uses
   RLOCs for routing and forwarding.

   Creation of LISP was initially motivated by discussions during the
   IAB-sponsored Routing and Addressing Workshop held in Amsterdam in
   October, 2006 (see [RFC4984]).  A key conclusion of the workshop was
   that the Internet routing and addressing system was not scaling well
   in the face of the explosive growth of new sites; one reason for this
   poor scaling is the increasing number of multi-homed and other sites
   that cannot be addressed as part of topologically- or provider-based
   aggregated prefixes.  Additional work that more completely described
   the problem statement may be found in [RADIR].

   A basic observation, made many years ago in early networking research
   such as that documented in [CHIAPPA] and [RFC4984], is that using a
   single address field for both identifying a device and for
   determining where it is topologically located in the network requires
   optimization along two conflicting axes: for routing to be efficient,
   the address must be assigned topologically; for collections of
   devices to be easily and effectively managed, without the need for
   renumbering in response to topological change (such as that caused by
   adding or removing attachment points to the network or by mobility
   events), the address must explicitly not be tied to the topology.

   The approach that LISP takes to solving the routing scalability
   problem is to replace IP addresses with two new types of numbers:
   Routing Locators (RLOCs), which are topologically assigned to network
   attachment points (and are therefore amenable to aggregation) and
   used for routing and forwarding of packets through the network; and
   Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs), which are assigned independently from
   the network topology, are used for numbering devices, and are
   aggregated along administrative boundaries.  LISP then defines
   functions for mapping between the two numbering spaces and for
   encapsulating traffic originated by devices using non-routeable EIDs
   for transport across a network infrastructure that routes and
   forwards using RLOCs.  Both RLOCs and EIDs are syntactically-
   identical to IP addresses; it is the semantics of how they are used
   that differs.

   This document describes the protocol that implements these functions.
   The database which stores the mappings between EIDs and RLOCs is



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   explicitly a separate "module" to facilitate experimentation with a
   variety of approaches.  One database design that is being developed
   and prototyped as part of the LISP working group work is [ALT].
   Others that have been described but not implemented include [CONS],
   [EMACS], [NERD].  Finally, [LISP-MS], documents a general-purpose
   service interface for accessing a mapping database; this interface is
   intended to make the mapping database modular so that different
   approaches can be tried without the need to modify installed LISP
   capable devices in LISP sites.

   This experimental specification, not yet recommended for Internet-
   scale deployment, has some areas that require additional experience
   and measurement.  Results of such work may lead to modifications and
   enhancements of protocol mechanisms defined in this document.  See
   Section 15 for specific, known issues that are in need of further
   work during development, implementation, and prototype deployment.



































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3.  Definition of Terms

   Provider Independent (PI) Addresses:   PI addresses are an address
      block assigned from a pool where blocks are not associated with
      any particular location in the network (e.g. from a particular
      service provider), and is therefore not topologically aggregatable
      in the routing system.

   Provider Assigned (PA) Addresses:   PA addresses are an address block
      assigned to a site by each service provider to which a site
      connects.  Typically, each block is sub-block of a service
      provider Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] block and
      is aggregated into the larger block before being advertised into
      the global Internet.  Traditionally, IP multihoming has been
      implemented by each multi-homed site acquiring its own, globally-
      visible prefix.  LISP uses only topologically-assigned and
      aggregatable address blocks for RLOCs, eliminating this
      demonstrably non-scalable practice.

   Routing Locator (RLOC):   A RLOC is an IPv4 [RFC0791] or IPv6
      [RFC2460] address of an egress tunnel router (ETR).  A RLOC is the
      output of an EID-to-RLOC mapping lookup.  An EID maps to one or
      more RLOCs.  Typically, RLOCs are numbered from topologically-
      aggregatable blocks that are assigned to a site at each point to
      which it attaches to the global Internet; where the topology is
      defined by the connectivity of provider networks, RLOCs can be
      thought of as PA addresses.  Multiple RLOCs can be assigned to the
      same ETR device or to multiple ETR devices at a site.

   Endpoint ID (EID):   An EID is a 32-bit (for IPv4) or 128-bit (for
      IPv6) value used in the source and destination address fields of
      the first (most inner) LISP header of a packet.  The host obtains
      a destination EID the same way it obtains an destination address
      today, for example through a Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1034]
      lookup or Session Invitation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] exchange.
      The source EID is obtained via existing mechanisms used to set a
      host's "local" IP address.  An EID is allocated to a host from an
      EID-prefix block associated with the site where the host is
      located.  An EID can be used by a host to refer to other hosts.
      EIDs MUST NOT be used as LISP RLOCs.  Note that EID blocks MAY be
      assigned in a hierarchical manner, independent of the network
      topology, to facilitate scaling of the mapping database.  In
      addition, an EID block assigned to a site may have site-local
      structure (subnetting) for routing within the site; this structure
      is not visible to the global routing system.  In theory, the bit
      string that represents an EID for one device can represent an RLOC
      for a different device.  As the architecture is realized, if a
      given bit string is both an RLOC and an EID, it must refer to the



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      same entity in both cases.  When used in discussions with other
      Locator/ID separation proposals, a LISP EID will be called a
      "LEID".  Throughout this document, any references to "EID" refers
      to an LEID.

   EID-prefix:   An EID-prefix is a power-of-two block of EIDs which are
      allocated to a site by an address allocation authority.  EID-
      prefixes are associated with a set of RLOC addresses which make up
      a "database mapping".  EID-prefix allocations can be broken up
      into smaller blocks when an RLOC set is to be associated with the
      larger EID-prefix block.  A globally routed address block (whether
      PI or PA) is not inherently an EID-prefix.  A globally routed
      address block MAY be used by its assignee as an EID block.  The
      converse is not supported.  That is, a site which receives an
      explicitly allocated EID-prefix may not use that EID-prefix as a
      globally routed prefix.  This would require coordination and
      cooperation with the entities managing the mapping infrastructure.
      Once this has been done, that block could be removed from the
      globally routed IP system, if other suitable transition and access
      mechanisms are in place.  Discussion of such transition and access
      mechanisms can be found in [INTERWORK] and [LISP-DEPLOY].

   End-system:   An end-system is an IPv4 or IPv6 device that originates
      packets with a single IPv4 or IPv6 header.  The end-system
      supplies an EID value for the destination address field of the IP
      header when communicating globally (i.e. outside of its routing
      domain).  An end-system can be a host computer, a switch or router
      device, or any network appliance.

   Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR):   An ITR is a router which accepts an IP
      packet from a LISP site (typically, the IP packet that does not
      contain a LISP header).  The router treats this IP destination
      address (which will be the part of the "inner" header) as an EID
      and performs an EID-to-RLOC mapping lookup.  The router then
      prepends an "outer" IP header with one of its globally-routable
      RLOCs in the source address field and the result of the mapping
      lookup in the destination address field.  Note that this
      destination RLOC MAY be an intermediate, proxy device that has
      better knowledge of the EID-to-RLOC mapping closer to the
      destination EID.  In general, an ITR receives IP packets from site
      end-systems on one side and sends LISP-encapsulated IP packets
      toward the Internet on the other side.

      Specifically, when a service provider prepends a LISP header for
      Traffic Engineering purposes, the router that does this is also
      regarded as an ITR.  The outer RLOC the ISP ITR uses can be based
      on the outer destination address (the originating ITR's supplied
      RLOC) or the inner destination address (the originating hosts



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      supplied EID).

   TE-ITR:   A TE-ITR is an ITR that is deployed in a service provider
      network that prepends an additional LISP header for Traffic
      Engineering purposes.

   Egress Tunnel Router (ETR):   An ETR is a router that accepts an IP
      packet where the destination address in the "outer" IP header is
      one of its own RLOCs.  The router strips the "outer" header and
      forwards the packet based on the next IP header found.  In
      general, an ETR receives LISP-encapsulated IP packets from the
      Internet on one side and sends decapsulated IP packets to site
      end-systems on the other side.  ETR functionality does not have to
      be limited to a router device.  A server host can be the endpoint
      of a LISP tunnel as well.

   TE-ETR:   A TE-ETR is an ETR that is deployed in a service provider
      network that strips an outer LISP header for Traffic Engineering
      purposes.

   xTR:   A xTR is a reference to an ITR or ETR when direction of data
      flow is not part of the context description. xTR refers to the
      router that is the tunnel endpoint.  Used synonymously with the
      term "Tunnel Router".  For example, "An xTR can be located at the
      Customer Edge (CE) router", meaning both ITR and ETR functionality
      is at the CE router.

   LISP Router:   A LISP router is a router that performs the functions
      of any or all of ITR, ETR, PITR, or PETR.

   EID-to-RLOC Cache:   The EID-to-RLOC cache is a short-lived, on-
      demand table in an ITR that stores, tracks, and is responsible for
      timing-out and otherwise validating EID-to-RLOC mappings.  This
      cache is distinct from the full "database" of EID-to-RLOC
      mappings, it is dynamic, local to the ITR(s), and relatively small
      while the database is distributed, relatively static, and much
      more global in scope.

   EID-to-RLOC Database:   The EID-to-RLOC database is a global
      distributed database that contains all known EID-prefix to RLOC
      mappings.  Each potential ETR typically contains a small piece of
      the database: the EID-to-RLOC mappings for the EID prefixes
      "behind" the router.  These map to one of the router's own,
      globally-visible, IP addresses.  The same database mapping entries
      MUST be configured on all ETRs for a given site.  In a steady
      state the EID-prefixes for the site and the locator-set for each
      EID-prefix MUST be the same on all ETRs.  Procedures to enforce
      and/or verify this are outside the scope of this document.  Note



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      that there MAY be transient conditions when the EID-prefix for the
      site and locator-set for each EID-prefix may not be the same on
      all ETRs.  This has no negative implications since a partial set
      of locators can be used.

   Recursive Tunneling:   Recursive tunneling occurs when a packet has
      more than one LISP IP header.  Additional layers of tunneling MAY
      be employed to implement traffic engineering or other re-routing
      as needed.  When this is done, an additional "outer" LISP header
      is added and the original RLOCs are preserved in the "inner"
      header.  Any references to tunnels in this specification refers to
      dynamic encapsulating tunnels and they are never statically
      configured.

   Reencapsulating Tunnels:   Reencapsulating tunneling occurs when an
      ETR removes a LISP header, then acts as an ITR to prepend another
      LISP header.  Doing this allows a packet to be re-routed by the
      re-encapsulating router without adding the overhead of additional
      tunnel headers.  Any references to tunnels in this specification
      refers to dynamic encapsulating tunnels and they are never
      statically configured.  When using multiple mapping database
      systems, care must be taken to not create reencapsulation loops.

   LISP Header:   a term used in this document to refer to the outer
      IPv4 or IPv6 header, a UDP header, and a LISP-specific 8-octet
      header that follows the UDP header, an ITR prepends or an ETR
      strips.

   Address Family Identifier (AFI):   a term used to describe an address
      encoding in a packet.  An address family currently pertains to an
      IPv4 or IPv6 address.  See [AFI]/[AFI-REGISTRY] and [RFC3232] for
      details.  An AFI value of 0 used in this specification indicates
      an unspecified encoded address where the length of the address is
      0 octets following the 16-bit AFI value of 0.

   Negative Mapping Entry:   A negative mapping entry, also known as a
      negative cache entry, is an EID-to-RLOC entry where an EID-prefix
      is advertised or stored with no RLOCs.  That is, the locator-set
      for the EID-to-RLOC entry is empty or has an encoded locator count
      of 0.  This type of entry could be used to describe a prefix from
      a non-LISP site, which is explicitly not in the mapping database.
      There are a set of well defined actions that are encoded in a
      Negative Map-Reply (Section 6.1.5).

   Data Probe:   A data-probe is a LISP-encapsulated data packet where
      the inner header destination address equals the outer header
      destination address used to trigger a Map-Reply by a decapsulating
      ETR.  In addition, the original packet is decapsulated and



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      delivered to the destination host if the destination EID is in the
      EID-prefix range configured on the ETR.  Otherwise, the packet is
      discarded.  A Data Probe is used in some of the mapping database
      designs to "probe" or request a Map-Reply from an ETR; in other
      cases, Map-Requests are used.  See each mapping database design
      for details.  When using Data Probes, by sending Map-Requests on
      the underlying routing system, EID-prefixes must be advertised.
      However, this is discouraged if the core is to scale by having
      less EID-prefixes stored in the core router's routing tables.

   Proxy ITR (PITR):   A PITR is defined and described in [INTERWORK], a
      PITR acts like an ITR but does so on behalf of non-LISP sites
      which send packets to destinations at LISP sites.

   Proxy ETR (PETR):   A PETR is defined and described in [INTERWORK], a
      PETR acts like an ETR but does so on behalf of LISP sites which
      send packets to destinations at non-LISP sites.

   Route-returnability:  is an assumption that the underlying routing
      system will deliver packets to the destination.  When combined
      with a nonce that is provided by a sender and returned by a
      receiver, this limits off-path data insertion.  A route-
      returnability check is verified when a message is sent with a
      nonce, another message is returned with the same nonce, and the
      destination of the original message appears as the source of the
      returned message.

   LISP site:  is a set of routers in an edge network that are under a
      single technical administration.  LISP routers which reside in the
      edge network are the demarcation points to separate the edge
      network from the core network.

   Client-side:  a term used in this document to indicate a connection
      initiation attempt by an EID.  The ITR(s) at the LISP site are the
      first to get involved in obtaining database map cache entries by
      sending Map-Request messages.

   Server-side:  a term used in this document to indicate a connection
      initiation attempt is being accepted for a destination EID.  The
      ETR(s) at the destination LISP site are the first to send Map-
      Replies to the source site initiating the connection.  The ETR(s)
      at this destination site can obtain mappings by gleaning
      information from Map-Requests, Data-Probes, or encapsulated
      packets.







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   Locator Status Bits (LSBs):  Locator status bits are present in the
      LISP header.  They are used by ITRs to inform ETRs about the up/
      down status of all ETRs at the local site.  These bits are used as
      a hint to convey up/down router status and not path reachability
      status.  The LSBs can be verified by use of one of the Locator
      Reachability Algorithms described in Section 6.3.

   Anycast Address:  a term used in this document to refer to the same
      IPv4 or IPv6 address configured and used on multiple systems at
      the same time.  An EID or RLOC can be an anycast address in each
      of their own address spaces.








































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4.  Basic Overview

   One key concept of LISP is that end-systems (hosts) operate the same
   way they do today.  The IP addresses that hosts use for tracking
   sockets, connections, and for sending and receiving packets do not
   change.  In LISP terminology, these IP addresses are called Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs).

   Routers continue to forward packets based on IP destination
   addresses.  When a packet is LISP encapsulated, these addresses are
   referred to as Routing Locators (RLOCs).  Most routers along a path
   between two hosts will not change; they continue to perform routing/
   forwarding lookups on the destination addresses.  For routers between
   the source host and the ITR as well as routers from the ETR to the
   destination host, the destination address is an EID.  For the routers
   between the ITR and the ETR, the destination address is an RLOC.

   Another key LISP concept is the "Tunnel Router".  A tunnel router
   prepends LISP headers on host-originated packets and strips them
   prior to final delivery to their destination.  The IP addresses in
   this "outer header" are RLOCs.  During end-to-end packet exchange
   between two Internet hosts, an ITR prepends a new LISP header to each
   packet and an egress tunnel router strips the new header.  The ITR
   performs EID-to-RLOC lookups to determine the routing path to the
   ETR, which has the RLOC as one of its IP addresses.

   Some basic rules governing LISP are:

   o  End-systems (hosts) only send to addresses which are EIDs.  They
      don't know addresses are EIDs versus RLOCs but assume packets get
      to destinations, which in turn, LISP routers deliver packets to
      the destination the end-system has specified.  The procedure a
      host uses to send IP packets does not change.

   o  EIDs are always IP addresses assigned to hosts.

   o  LISP routers mostly deal with Routing Locator addresses.  See
      details later in Section 4.1 to clarify what is meant by "mostly".

   o  RLOCs are always IP addresses assigned to routers; preferably,
      topologically-oriented addresses from provider CIDR (Classless
      Inter-Domain Routing) blocks.

   o  When a router originates packets it may use as a source address
      either an EID or RLOC.  When acting as a host (e.g. when
      terminating a transport session such as SSH, TELNET, or SNMP), it
      may use an EID that is explicitly assigned for that purpose.  An
      EID that identifies the router as a host MUST NOT be used as an



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      RLOC; an EID is only routable within the scope of a site.  A
      typical BGP configuration might demonstrate this "hybrid" EID/RLOC
      usage where a router could use its "host-like" EID to terminate
      iBGP sessions to other routers in a site while at the same time
      using RLOCs to terminate eBGP sessions to routers outside the
      site.

   o  Packets with EIDs in them are not expected to be delivered end-to-
      end in the absence of an EID-to-RLOC mapping operation.  They are
      expected to be used locally for intra-site communication or to be
      encapsulated for inter-site communication.

   o  EID prefixes are likely to be hierarchically assigned in a manner
      which is optimized for administrative convenience and to
      facilitate scaling of the EID-to-RLOC mapping database.  The
      hierarchy is based on a address allocation hierarchy which is
      independent of the network topology.

   o  EIDs may also be structured (subnetted) in a manner suitable for
      local routing within an autonomous system.

   An additional LISP header MAY be prepended to packets by a TE-ITR
   when re-routing of the path for a packet is desired.  A potential
   use-case for this would be an ISP router that needs to perform
   traffic engineering for packets flowing through its network.  In such
   a situation, termed Recursive Tunneling, an ISP transit acts as an
   additional ingress tunnel router and the RLOC it uses for the new
   prepended header would be either a TE-ETR within the ISP (along
   intra-ISP traffic engineered path) or a TE-ETR within another ISP (an
   inter-ISP traffic engineered path, where an agreement to build such a
   path exists).

   In order to avoid excessive packet overhead as well as possible
   encapsulation loops, this document mandates that a maximum of two
   LISP headers can be prepended to a packet.  For initial LISP
   deployments, it is assumed two headers is sufficient, where the first
   prepended header is used at a site for Location/Identity separation
   and second prepended header is used inside a service provider for
   Traffic Engineering purposes.

   Tunnel Routers can be placed fairly flexibly in a multi-AS topology.
   For example, the ITR for a particular end-to-end packet exchange
   might be the first-hop or default router within a site for the source
   host.  Similarly, the egress tunnel router might be the last-hop
   router directly-connected to the destination host.  Another example,
   perhaps for a VPN service out-sourced to an ISP by a site, the ITR
   could be the site's border router at the service provider attachment
   point.  Mixing and matching of site-operated, ISP-operated, and other



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   tunnel routers is allowed for maximum flexibility.  See Section 8 for
   more details.

4.1.  Packet Flow Sequence

   This section provides an example of the unicast packet flow with the
   following conditions:

   o  Source host "host1.abc.example.com" is sending a packet to
      "host2.xyz.example.com", exactly what host1 would do if the site
      was not using LISP.

   o  Each site is multi-homed, so each tunnel router has an address
      (RLOC) assigned from the service provider address block for each
      provider to which that particular tunnel router is attached.

   o  The ITR(s) and ETR(s) are directly connected to the source and
      destination, respectively, but the source and destination can be
      located anywhere in LISP site.

   o  Map-Requests can be sent on the underlying routing system
      topology, to a mapping database system, or directly over an
      alternative topology [ALT].  A Map-Request is sent for an external
      destination when the destination is not found in the forwarding
      table or matches a default route.

   o  Map-Replies are sent on the underlying routing system topology.

   Client host1.abc.example.com wants to communicate with server
   host2.xyz.example.com:

   1.  host1.abc.example.com wants to open a TCP connection to
       host2.xyz.example.com.  It does a DNS lookup on
       host2.xyz.example.com.  An A/AAAA record is returned.  This
       address is the destination EID.  The locally-assigned address of
       host1.abc.example.com is used as the source EID.  An IPv4 or IPv6
       packet is built and forwarded through the LISP site as a normal
       IP packet until it reaches a LISP ITR.

   2.  The LISP ITR must be able to map the destination EID to an RLOC
       of one of the ETRs at the destination site.  The specific method
       used to do this is not described in this example.  See [ALT] or
       [CONS] for possible solutions.

   3.  The ITR will send a LISP Map-Request.  Map-Requests SHOULD be
       rate-limited.





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   4.  When an alternate mapping system is not in use, the Map-Request
       packet is routed through the underlying routing system.
       Otherwise, the Map-Request packet is routed on an alternate
       logical topology, for example the [ALT] database mapping system.
       In either case, when the Map-Request arrives at one of the ETRs
       at the destination site, it will process the packet as a control
       message.

   5.  The ETR looks at the destination EID of the Map-Request and
       matches it against the prefixes in the ETR's configured EID-to-
       RLOC mapping database.  This is the list of EID-prefixes the ETR
       is supporting for the site it resides in.  If there is no match,
       the Map-Request is dropped.  Otherwise, a LISP Map-Reply is
       returned to the ITR.

   6.  The ITR receives the Map-Reply message, parses the message (to
       check for format validity) and stores the mapping information
       from the packet.  This information is stored in the ITR's EID-to-
       RLOC mapping cache.  Note that the map cache is an on-demand
       cache.  An ITR will manage its map cache in such a way that
       optimizes for its resource constraints.

   7.  Subsequent packets from host1.abc.example.com to
       host2.xyz.example.com will have a LISP header prepended by the
       ITR using the appropriate RLOC as the LISP header destination
       address learned from the ETR.  Note the packet MAY be sent to a
       different ETR than the one which returned the Map-Reply due to
       the source site's hashing policy or the destination site's
       locator-set policy.

   8.  The ETR receives these packets directly (since the destination
       address is one of its assigned IP addresses), checks the validity
       of the addresses, strips the LISP header, and forwards packets to
       the attached destination host.

   In order to defer the need for a mapping lookup in the reverse
   direction, an ETR MAY create a cache entry that maps the source EID
   (inner header source IP address) to the source RLOC (outer header
   source IP address) in a received LISP packet.  Such a cache entry is
   termed a "gleaned" mapping and only contains a single RLOC for the
   EID in question.  More complete information about additional RLOCs
   SHOULD be verified by sending a LISP Map-Request for that EID.  Both
   ITR and the ETR may also influence the decision the other makes in
   selecting an RLOC.  See Section 6 for more details.







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5.  LISP Encapsulation Details

   Since additional tunnel headers are prepended, the packet becomes
   larger and can exceed the MTU of any link traversed from the ITR to
   the ETR.  It is RECOMMENDED in IPv4 that packets do not get
   fragmented as they are encapsulated by the ITR.  Instead, the packet
   is dropped and an ICMP Too Big message is returned to the source.

   This specification RECOMMENDS that implementations provide support
   for one of the proposed fragmentation and reassembly schemes.  Two
   existing schemes are detailed in Section 5.4.

   Since IPv4 or IPv6 addresses can be either EIDs or RLOCs, the LISP
   architecture supports IPv4 EIDs with IPv6 RLOCs (where the inner
   header is in IPv4 packet format and the other header is in IPv6
   packet format) or IPv6 EIDs with IPv4 RLOCs (where the inner header
   is in IPv6 packet format and the other header is in IPv4 packet
   format).  The next sub-sections illustrate packet formats for the
   homogeneous case (IPv4-in-IPv4 and IPv6-in-IPv6) but all 4
   combinations MUST be supported.































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5.1.  LISP IPv4-in-IPv4 Header Format



        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   OH  |  Time to Live | Protocol =3D 17 |         Header Checksum       =
|
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                    Source Routing Locator                     |
    \  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                 Destination Routing Locator                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port =3D xxxx      |       Dest Port =3D 4341      =
  |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   L   |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
   I \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   S / |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
   P   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   IH  |  Time to Live |    Protocol   |         Header Checksum       |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                           Source EID                          |
    \  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                         Destination EID                       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+




5.2.  LISP IPv6-in-IPv6 Header Format



        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+



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   |   |         Payload Length        | Next Header=3D17|   Hop Limit   =
|
   v   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
   O   +                                                               +
   u   |                                                               |
   t   +                     Source Routing Locator                    +
   e   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   H   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   d   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   ^   +                  Destination Routing Locator                  +
   |   |                                                               |
    \  +                                                               +
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port =3D xxxx      |       Dest Port =3D 4341      =
  |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   L   |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
   I \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   S / |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
   P   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /   |         Payload Length        |  Next Header  |   Hop Limit   |
   v   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
   I   +                                                               +
   n   |                                                               |
   n   +                          Source EID                           +
   e   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   H   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   d   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   ^   +                        Destination EID                        +
   \   |                                                               |
    \  +                                                               +
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+





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5.3.  Tunnel Header Field Descriptions

   Inner Header:  The inner header is the header on the datagram
      received from the originating host.  The source and destination IP
      addresses are EIDs, [RFC0791], [RFC2460].

   Outer Header:  The outer header is a new header prepended by an ITR.
      The address fields contain RLOCs obtained from the ingress
      router's EID-to-RLOC cache.  The IP protocol number is "UDP (17)"
      from [RFC0768].  The setting of the DF bit Flags field is
      according to rules in Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2.

   UDP Header:  The UDP header contains an ITR selected source port when
      encapsulating a packet.  See Section 6.5 for details on the hash
      algorithm used to select a source port based on the 5-tuple of the
      inner header.  The destination port MUST be set to the well-known
      IANA assigned port value 4341.

   UDP Checksum:  The UDP checksum field SHOULD be transmitted as zero
      by an ITR for either IPv4 [RFC0768] or IPv6 encapsulation
      [UDP-TUNNELS] [UDP-ZERO].  When a packet with a zero UDP checksum
      is received by an ETR, the ETR MUST accept the packet for
      decapsulation.  When an ITR transmits a non-zero value for the UDP
      checksum, it MUST send a correctly computed value in this field.
      When an ETR receives a packet with a non-zero UDP checksum, it MAY
      choose to verify the checksum value.  If it chooses to perform
      such verification, and the verification fails, the packet MUST be
      silently dropped.  If the ETR chooses not to perform the
      verification, or performs the verification successfully, the
      packet MUST be accepted for decapsulation.  The handling of UDP
      checksums for all tunneling protocols, including LISP, is under
      active discussion within the IETF.  When that discussion
      concludes, any necessary changes will be made to align LISP with
      the outcome of the broader discussion.

   UDP Length:  The UDP length field is set for an IPv4 encapsulated
      packet to be the sum of the inner header IPv4 Total Length plus
      the UDP and LISP header lengths.  For an IPv6 encapsulated packet,
      the UDP length field is the sum of the inner header IPv6 Payload
      Length, the size of the IPv6 header (40 octets), and the size of
      the UDP and LISP headers.

   N: The N bit is the nonce-present bit.  When this bit is set to 1,
      the low-order 24-bits of the first 32-bits of the LISP header
      contains a Nonce.  See Section 6.3.1 for details.  Both N and V
      bits MUST NOT be set in the same packet.  If they are, a
      decapsulating ETR MUST treat the "Nonce/Map-Version" field as
      having a Nonce value present.



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   L: The L bit is the Locator Status Bits field enabled bit.  When this
      bit is set to 1, the Locator Status Bits in the second 32-bits of
      the LISP header are in use.


     x 1 x x 0 x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                      Locator Status Bits                      |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   E: The E bit is the echo-nonce-request bit.  This bit MUST be ignored
      and has no meaning when the N bit is set to 0.  When the N bit is
      set to 1 and this bit is set to 1, means an ITR is requesting for
      the nonce value in the Nonce field to be echoed back in LISP
      encapsulated packets when the ITR is also an ETR.  See
      Section 6.3.1 for details.

   V: The V bit is the Map-Version present bit.  When this bit is set to
      1, the N bit MUST be 0.  Refer to Section 6.6.3 for more details.
      This bit indicates that the LISP header is encoded in this case
      as:


     0 x 0 1 x x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|  Source Map-Version   |   Dest Map-Version    |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   I: The I bit is the Instance ID bit.  See Section 5.5 for more
      details.  When this bit is set to 1, the Locator Status Bits field
      is reduced to 8-bits and the high-order 24-bits are used as an
      Instance ID.  If the L-bit is set to 0, then the low-order 8 bits
      are transmitted as zero and ignored on receipt.  The format of the
      LISP header would look like in this case:













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     x x x x 1 x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                 Instance ID                   |     LSBs      |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   flags:  The flags field is a 3-bit field is reserved for future flag
      use.  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   LISP Nonce:  The LISP nonce field is a 24-bit value that is randomly
      generated by an ITR when the N-bit is set to 1.  Nonce generation
      algorithms are an implementation matter but are required to
      generate different nonces when sending to different destinations.
      However, the same nonce can be used for a period of time to the
      same destination.  The nonce is also used when the E-bit is set to
      request the nonce value to be echoed by the other side when
      packets are returned.  When the E-bit is clear but the N-bit is
      set, a remote ITR is either echoing a previously requested echo-
      nonce or providing a random nonce.  See Section 6.3.1 for more
      details.

   LISP Locator Status Bits (LSBs):  When the L-bit is also set, the
      locator status bits field in the LISP header is set by an ITR to
      indicate to an ETR the up/down status of the Locators in the
      source site.  Each RLOC in a Map-Reply is assigned an ordinal
      value from 0 to n-1 (when there are n RLOCs in a mapping entry).
      The Locator Status Bits are numbered from 0 to n-1 from the least
      significant bit of field.  The field is 32-bits when the I-bit is
      set to 0 and is 8 bits when the I-bit is set to 1.  When a Locator
      Status Bit is set to 1, the ITR is indicating to the ETR the RLOC
      associated with the bit ordinal has up status.  See Section 6.3
      for details on how an ITR can determine the status of the ETRs at
      the same site.  When a site has multiple EID-prefixes which result
      in multiple mappings (where each could have a different locator-
      set), the Locator Status Bits setting in an encapsulated packet
      MUST reflect the mapping for the EID-prefix that the inner-header
      source EID address matches.  If the LSB for an anycast locator is
      set to 1, then there is at least one RLOC with that address the
      ETR is considered 'up'.

   When doing ITR/PITR encapsulation:

   o  The outer header Time to Live field (or Hop Limit field, in case
      of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the inner header Time to Live
      field.




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   o  The outer header Type of Service field (or the Traffic Class
      field, in the case of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the inner header
      Type of Service field (with one caveat, see below).

   When doing ETR/PETR decapsulation:

   o  The inner header Time to Live field (or Hop Limit field, in case
      of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the outer header Time to Live
      field, when the Time to Live field of the outer header is less
      than the Time to Live of the inner header.  Failing to perform
      this check can cause the Time to Live of the inner header to
      increment across encapsulation/decapsulation cycle.  This check is
      also performed when doing initial encapsulation when a packet
      comes to an ITR or PITR destined for a LISP site.

   o  The inner header Type of Service field (or the Traffic Class
      field, in the case of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the outer header
      Type of Service field (with one caveat, see below).

   Note if an ETR/PETR is also an ITR/PITR and choose to reencapsulate
   after decapsulating, the net effect of this is that the new outer
   header will carry the same Time to Live as the old outer header minus
   1.

   Copying the TTL serves two purposes: first, it preserves the distance
   the host intended the packet to travel; second, and more importantly,
   it provides for suppression of looping packets in the event there is
   a loop of concatenated tunnels due to misconfiguration.  See
   Section 9.3 for TTL exception handling for traceroute packets.

   The ECN field occupies bits 6 and 7 of both the IPv4 Type of Service
   field and the IPv6 Traffic Class field [RFC3168].  The ECN field
   requires special treatment in order to avoid discarding indications
   of congestion [RFC3168].  ITR encapsulation MUST copy the 2-bit ECN
   field from the inner header to the outer header.  Re-encapsulation
   MUST copy the 2-bit ECN field from the stripped outer header to the
   new outer header.  If the ECN field contains a congestion indication
   codepoint (the value is '11', the Congestion Experienced (CE)
   codepoint), then ETR decapsulation MUST copy the 2-bit ECN field from
   the stripped outer header to the surviving inner header that is used
   to forward the packet beyond the ETR.  These requirements preserve
   Congestion Experienced (CE) indications when a packet that uses ECN
   traverses a LISP tunnel and becomes marked with a CE indication due
   to congestion between the tunnel endpoints.







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5.4.  Dealing with Large Encapsulated Packets

   This section proposes two mechanisms to deal with packets that exceed
   the path MTU between the ITR and ETR.

   It is left to the implementor to decide if the stateless or stateful
   mechanism should be implemented.  Both or neither can be used since
   it is a local decision in the ITR regarding how to deal with MTU
   issues, and sites can interoperate with differing mechanisms.

   Both stateless and stateful mechanisms also apply to Reencapsulating
   and Recursive Tunneling.  So any actions below referring to an ITR
   also apply to an TE-ITR.

5.4.1.  A Stateless Solution to MTU Handling

   An ITR stateless solution to handle MTU issues is described as
   follows:

   1.  Define an architectural constant S for the maximum size of a
       packet, in octets, an ITR would like to receive from a source
       inside of its site.

   2.  Define L to be the maximum size, in octets, a packet of size S
       would be after the ITR prepends the LISP header, UDP header, and
       outer network layer header of size H. Therefore, S + H =3D L.

   When an ITR receives a packet from a site-facing interface and adds H
   octets worth of encapsulation to yield a packet size greater than L
   octets, it resolves the MTU issue by first splitting the original
   packet into 2 equal-sized fragments.  A LISP header is then prepended
   to each fragment.  The size of the encapsulated fragments is then
   (S/2 + H), which is less than the ITR's estimate of the path MTU
   between the ITR and its correspondent ETR.

   When an ETR receives encapsulated fragments, it treats them as two
   individually encapsulated packets.  It strips the LISP headers then
   forwards each fragment to the destination host of the destination
   site.  The two fragments are reassembled at the destination host into
   the single IP datagram that was originated by the source host.  Note
   that reassembly can happen at the ETR if the encapsulated packet was
   fragmented at or after the ITR.

   This behavior is performed by the ITR when the source host originates
   a packet with the DF field of the IP header is set to 0.  When the DF
   field of the IP header is set to 1, or the packet is an IPv6 packet
   originated by the source host, the ITR will drop the packet when the
   size is greater than L, and sends an ICMP Too Big message to the



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   source with a value of S, where S is (L - H).

   When the outer header encapsulation uses an IPv4 header, an
   implementation SHOULD set the DF bit to 1 so ETR fragment reassembly
   can be avoided.  An implementation MAY set the DF bit in such headers
   to 0 if it has good reason to believe there are unresolvable path MTU
   issues between the sending ITR and the receiving ETR.

   This specification RECOMMENDS that L be defined as 1500.

5.4.2.  A Stateful Solution to MTU Handling

   An ITR stateful solution to handle MTU issues is described as follows
   and was first introduced in [OPENLISP]:

   1.  The ITR will keep state of the effective MTU for each locator per
       mapping cache entry.  The effective MTU is what the core network
       can deliver along the path between ITR and ETR.

   2.  When an IPv6 encapsulated packet or an IPv4 encapsulated packet
       with DF bit set to 1, exceeds what the core network can deliver,
       one of the intermediate routers on the path will send an ICMP Too
       Big message to the ITR.  The ITR will parse the ICMP message to
       determine which locator is affected by the effective MTU change
       and then record the new effective MTU value in the mapping cache
       entry.

   3.  When a packet is received by the ITR from a source inside of the
       site and the size of the packet is greater than the effective MTU
       stored with the mapping cache entry associated with the
       destination EID the packet is for, the ITR will send an ICMP Too
       Big message back to the source.  The packet size advertised by
       the ITR in the ICMP Too Big message is the effective MTU minus
       the LISP encapsulation length.

   Even though this mechanism is stateful, it has advantages over the
   stateless IP fragmentation mechanism, by not involving the
   destination host with reassembly of ITR fragmented packets.

5.5.  Using Virtualization and Segmentation with LISP

   When multiple organizations inside of a LISP site are using private
   addresses [RFC1918] as EID-prefixes, their address spaces MUST remain
   segregated due to possible address duplication.  An Instance ID in
   the address encoding can aid in making the entire AFI based address
   unique.  See IANA Considerations Section 14.2 for details for
   possible address encodings.




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   An Instance ID can be carried in a LISP encapsulated packet.  An ITR
   that prepends a LISP header, will copy a 24-bit value, used by the
   LISP router to uniquely identify the address space.  The value is
   copied to the Instance ID field of the LISP header and the I-bit is
   set to 1.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, the Instance ID from the LISP
   header is used as a table identifier to locate the forwarding table
   to use for the inner destination EID lookup.

   For example, a 802.1Q VLAN tag or VPN identifier could be used as a
   24-bit Instance ID.







































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6.  EID-to-RLOC Mapping

6.1.  LISP IPv4 and IPv6 Control Plane Packet Formats

   The following UDP packet formats are used by the LISP control-plane.


       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |  Time to Live | Protocol =3D 17 |         Header Checksum       =
|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    Source Routing Locator                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                 Destination Routing Locator                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |           Source Port         |         Dest Port             |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         LISP Message                          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Payload Length        | Next Header=3D17|   Hop Limit   =
|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +                     Source Routing Locator                    +
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |



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       +                  Destination Routing Locator                  +
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |           Source Port         |         Dest Port             |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         LISP Message                          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   The LISP UDP-based messages are the Map-Request and Map-Reply
   messages.  When a UDP Map-Request is sent, the UDP source port is
   chosen by the sender and the destination UDP port number is set to
   4342.  When a UDP Map-Reply is sent, the source UDP port number is
   set to 4342 and the destination UDP port number is copied from the
   source port of either the Map-Request or the invoking data packet.
   Implementations MUST be prepared to accept packets when either the
   source port or destination UDP port is set to 4342 due to NATs
   changing port number values.

   The UDP Length field will reflect the length of the UDP header and
   the LISP Message payload.

   The UDP Checksum is computed and set to non-zero for Map-Request,
   Map-Reply, Map-Register and ECM control messages.  It MUST be checked
   on receipt and if the checksum fails, the packet MUST be dropped.

   The format of control messages includes the UDP header so the
   checksum and length fields can be used to protect and delimit message
   boundaries.
















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6.1.1.  LISP Packet Type Allocations

   This section will be the authoritative source for allocating LISP
   Type values and for defining LISP control message formats.  Current
   allocations are:


       Reserved:                          0    b'0000'
       LISP Map-Request:                  1    b'0001'
       LISP Map-Reply:                    2    b'0010'
       LISP Map-Register:                 3    b'0011'
       LISP Map-Notify:                   4    b'0100'
       LISP Encapsulated Control Message: 8    b'1000'


6.1.2.  Map-Request Message Format



        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=3D1 |A|M|P|S|p|s|    Reserved     |   IRC   | Record Count  =
|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Source-EID-AFI        |   Source EID Address  ...     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         ITR-RLOC-AFI 1        |    ITR-RLOC Address 1  ...    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                              ...                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         ITR-RLOC-AFI n        |    ITR-RLOC Address n  ...    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |   Reserved    | EID mask-len  |        EID-prefix-AFI         |
   Rec +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                       EID-prefix  ...                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                   Map-Reply Record  ...                       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Packet field descriptions:






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   Type:   1 (Map-Request)

   A: This is an authoritative bit, which is set to 0 for UDP-based Map-
      Requests sent by an ITR.  Set to 1 when an ITR wants the
      destination site to return the Map-Reply rather than the mapping
      database system.

   M: This is the map-data-present bit, when set, it indicates a Map-
      Reply Record segment is included in the Map-Request.

   P: This is the probe-bit which indicates that a Map-Request SHOULD be
      treated as a locator reachability probe.  The receiver SHOULD
      respond with a Map-Reply with the probe-bit set, indicating the
      Map-Reply is a locator reachability probe reply, with the nonce
      copied from the Map-Request.  See Section 6.3.2 for more details.

   S: This is the Solicit-Map-Request (SMR) bit.  See Section 6.6.2 for
      details.

   p: This is the PITR bit.  This bit is set to 1 when a PITR sends a
      Map-Request.

   s: This is the SMR-invoked bit.  This bit is set to 1 when an xTR is
      sending a Map-Request in response to a received SMR-based Map-
      Request.

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   IRC:  This 5-bit field is the ITR-RLOC Count which encodes the
      additional number of (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC Address) fields
      present in this message.  At least one (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC-
      Address) pair MUST be encoded.  Multiple ITR-RLOC Address fields
      are used so a Map-Replier can select which destination address to
      use for a Map-Reply.  The IRC value ranges from 0 to 31.  For a
      value of 0, there is 1 ITR-RLOC address encoded, and for a value
      of 1, there are 2 ITR-RLOC addresses encoded and so on up to 31
      which encodes a total of 32 ITR-RLOC addresses.

   Record Count:  The number of records in this Map-Request message.  A
      record is comprised of the portion of the packet that is labeled
      'Rec' above and occurs the number of times equal to Record Count.
      For this version of the protocol, a receiver MUST accept and
      process Map-Requests that contain one or more records, but a
      sender MUST only send Map-Requests containing one record.  Support
      for requesting multiple EIDs in a single Map-Request message will
      be specified in a future version of the protocol.




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   Nonce:  An 8-octet random value created by the sender of the Map-
      Request.  This nonce will be returned in the Map-Reply.  The
      security of the LISP mapping protocol depends critically on the
      strength of the nonce in the Map-Request message.  The nonce
      SHOULD be generated by a properly seeded pseudo-random (or strong
      random) source.  See [RFC4086] for advice on generating security-
      sensitive random data.

   Source-EID-AFI:  Address family of the "Source EID Address" field.

   Source EID Address:  This is the EID of the source host which
      originated the packet which is caused the Map-Request.  When Map-
      Requests are used for refreshing a map-cache entry or for RLOC-
      probing, an AFI value 0 is used and this field is of zero length.

   ITR-RLOC-AFI:  Address family of the "ITR-RLOC Address" field that
      follows this field.

   ITR-RLOC Address:  Used to give the ETR the option of selecting the
      destination address from any address family for the Map-Reply
      message.  This address MUST be a routable RLOC address of the
      sender of the Map-Request message.

   EID mask-len:  Mask length for EID prefix.

   EID-prefix-AFI:  Address family of EID-prefix according to [AFI]

   EID-prefix:  4 octets if an IPv4 address-family, 16 octets if an IPv6
      address-family.  When a Map-Request is sent by an ITR because a
      data packet is received for a destination where there is no
      mapping entry, the EID-prefix is set to the destination IP address
      of the data packet.  And the 'EID mask-len' is set to 32 or 128
      for IPv4 or IPv6, respectively.  When an xTR wants to query a site
      about the status of a mapping it already has cached, the EID-
      prefix used in the Map-Request has the same mask-length as the
      EID-prefix returned from the site when it sent a Map-Reply
      message.

   Map-Reply Record:  When the M bit is set, this field is the size of a
      single "Record" in the Map-Reply format.  This Map-Reply record
      contains the EID-to-RLOC mapping entry associated with the Source
      EID.  This allows the ETR which will receive this Map-Request to
      cache the data if it chooses to do so.








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6.1.3.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Request Message

   A Map-Request is sent from an ITR when it needs a mapping for an EID,
   wants to test an RLOC for reachability, or wants to refresh a mapping
   before TTL expiration.  For the initial case, the destination IP
   address used for the Map-Request is the data packet's destination
   address (i.e. the destination-EID) which had a mapping cache lookup
   failure.  For the latter two cases, the destination IP address used
   for the Map-Request is one of the RLOC addresses from the locator-set
   of the map cache entry.  The source address is either an IPv4 or IPv6
   RLOC address depending if the Map-Request is using an IPv4 versus
   IPv6 header, respectively.  In all cases, the UDP source port number
   for the Map-Request message is an ITR/PITR selected 16-bit value and
   the UDP destination port number is set to the well-known destination
   port number 4342.  A successful Map-Reply, which is one that has a
   nonce that matches an outstanding Map-Request nonce, will update the
   cached set of RLOCs associated with the EID prefix range.

   One or more Map-Request (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC-Address) fields MUST
   be filled in by the ITR.  The number of fields (minus 1) encoded MUST
   be placed in the IRC field.  The ITR MAY include all locally
   configured locators in this list or just provide one locator address
   from each address family it supports.  If the ITR erroneously
   provides no ITR-RLOC addresses, the Map-Replier MUST drop the Map-
   Request.

   Map-Requests can also be LISP encapsulated using UDP destination port
   4342 with a LISP type value set to "Encapsulated Control Message",
   when sent from an ITR to a Map-Resolver.  Likewise, Map-Requests are
   LISP encapsulated the same way from a Map-Server to an ETR.  Details
   on encapsulated Map-Requests and Map-Resolvers can be found in
   [LISP-MS].

   Map-Requests MUST be rate-limited.  It is RECOMMENDED that a Map-
   Request for the same EID-prefix be sent no more than once per second.

   An ITR that is configured with mapping database information (i.e. it
   is also an ETR) MAY optionally include those mappings in a Map-
   Request.  When an ETR configured to accept and verify such
   "piggybacked" mapping data receives such a Map-Request and it does
   not have this mapping in the map-cache, it MAY originate a "verifying
   Map-Request", addressed to the map-requesting ITR and the ETR MAY add
   a map-cache entry.  If the ETR has a map-cache entry that matches the
   "piggybacked" EID and the RLOC is in the locator-set for the entry,
   then it may send the "verifying Map-Request" directly to the
   originating Map-Request source.  If the RLOC is not in the locator-
   set, then the ETR MUST send the "verifying Map-Request" to the
   "piggybacked" EID.  Doing this forces the "verifying Map-Request" to



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   go through the mapping database system to reach the authoritative
   source of information about that EID, guarding against RLOC-spoofing
   in in the "piggybacked" mapping data.

6.1.4.  Map-Reply Message Format



        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=3D2 |P|E|S|          Reserved               | Record Count  =
|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
   +-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |       EID-prefix-AFI          |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   2 (Map-Reply)

   P: This is the probe-bit which indicates that the Map-Reply is in
      response to a locator reachability probe Map-Request.  The nonce
      field MUST contain a copy of the nonce value from the original
      Map-Request.  See Section 6.3.2 for more details.

   E: Indicates that the ETR which sends this Map-Reply message is
      advertising that the site is enabled for the Echo-Nonce locator
      reachability algorithm.  See Section 6.3.1 for more details.






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   S: This is the Security bit.  When set to 1 the following
      authentication information will be appended to the end of the Map-
      Reply.  The detailed format of the Authentication Data Content is
      for further study.


     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |    AD Type    |       Authentication Data Content . . .       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   Record Count:  The number of records in this reply message.  A record
      is comprised of that portion of the packet labeled 'Record' above
      and occurs the number of times equal to Record count.

   Nonce:  A 24-bit value set in a Data-Probe packet or a 64-bit value
      from the Map-Request is echoed in this Nonce field of the Map-
      Reply.  When a 24-bit value is supplied, it resides in the low-
      order 64 bits of the nonce field.

   Record TTL:  The time in minutes the recipient of the Map-Reply will
      store the mapping.  If the TTL is 0, the entry SHOULD be removed
      from the cache immediately.  If the value is 0xffffffff, the
      recipient can decide locally how long to store the mapping.

   Locator Count:  The number of Locator entries.  A locator entry
      comprises what is labeled above as 'Loc'.  The locator count can
      be 0 indicating there are no locators for the EID-prefix.

   EID mask-len:  Mask length for EID prefix.

   ACT:  This 3-bit field describes negative Map-Reply actions.  In any
      other message type, these bits are set to 0 and ignored on
      receipt.  These bits are used only when the 'Locator Count' field
      is set to 0.  The action bits are encoded only in Map-Reply
      messages.  The actions defined are used by an ITR or PITR when a
      destination EID matches a negative mapping cache entry.
      Unassigned values should cause a map-cache entry to be created
      and, when packets match this negative cache entry, they will be
      dropped.  The current assigned values are:







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      (0) No-Action:  The map-cache is kept alive and no packet
         encapsulation occurs.

      (1) Natively-Forward:  The packet is not encapsulated or dropped
         but natively forwarded.

      (2) Send-Map-Request:  The packet invokes sending a Map-Request.

      (3) Drop:  A packet that matches this map-cache entry is dropped.
         An ICMP Unreachable message SHOULD be sent.

   A: The Authoritative bit, when sent is always set to 1 by an ETR.
      When a Map-Server is proxy Map-Replying [LISP-MS] for a LISP site,
      the Authoritative bit is set to 0.  This indicates to requesting
      ITRs that the Map-Reply was not originated by a LISP node managed
      at the site that owns the EID-prefix.

   Map-Version Number:  When this 12-bit value is non-zero the Map-Reply
      sender is informing the ITR what the version number is for the
      EID-record contained in the Map-Reply.  The ETR can allocate this
      number internally but MUST coordinate this value with other ETRs
      for the site.  When this value is 0, there is no versioning
      information conveyed.  The Map-Version Number can be included in
      Map-Request and Map-Register messages.  See Section 6.6.3 for more
      details.

   EID-prefix-AFI:  Address family of EID-prefix according to [AFI].

   EID-prefix:  4 octets if an IPv4 address-family, 16 octets if an IPv6
      address-family.

   Priority:  each RLOC is assigned a unicast priority.  Lower values
      are more preferable.  When multiple RLOCs have the same priority,
      they MAY be used in a load-split fashion.  A value of 255 means
      the RLOC MUST NOT be used for unicast forwarding.

   Weight:  when priorities are the same for multiple RLOCs, the weight
      indicates how to balance unicast traffic between them.  Weight is
      encoded as a relative weight of total unicast packets that match
      the mapping entry.  For example if there are 4 locators in a
      locator set, where the weights assigned are 30, 20, 20, and 10,
      the first locator will get 37.5% of the traffic, the 2nd and 3rd
      locators will get 25% of traffic and the 4th locator will get
      12.5% of the traffic.  If all weights for a locator-set are equal,
      receiver of the Map-Reply will decide how to load-split traffic.
      See Section 6.5 for a suggested hash algorithm to distribute load



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      across locators with same priority and equal weight values.

   M Priority:  each RLOC is assigned a multicast priority used by an
      ETR in a receiver multicast site to select an ITR in a source
      multicast site for building multicast distribution trees.  A value
      of 255 means the RLOC MUST NOT be used for joining a multicast
      distribution tree.  For more details, see [MLISP].

   M Weight:  when priorities are the same for multiple RLOCs, the
      weight indicates how to balance building multicast distribution
      trees across multiple ITRs.  The weight is encoded as a relative
      weight (similar to the unicast Weights) of total number of trees
      built to the source site identified by the EID-prefix.  If all
      weights for a locator-set are equal, the receiver of the Map-Reply
      will decide how to distribute multicast state across ITRs.  For
      more details, see [MLISP].

   Unused Flags:  set to 0 when sending and ignored on receipt.

   L: when this bit is set, the locator is flagged as a local locator to
      the ETR that is sending the Map-Reply.  When a Map-Server is doing
      proxy Map-Replying [LISP-MS] for a LISP site, the L bit is set to
      0 for all locators in this locator-set.

   p: when this bit is set, an ETR informs the RLOC-probing ITR that the
      locator address, for which this bit is set, is the one being RLOC-
      probed and MAY be different from the source address of the Map-
      Reply.  An ITR that RLOC-probes a particular locator, MUST use
      this locator for retrieving the data structure used to store the
      fact that the locator is reachable.  The "p" bit is set for a
      single locator in the same locator set.  If an implementation sets
      more than one "p" bit erroneously, the receiver of the Map-Reply
      MUST select the first locator.  The "p" bit MUST NOT be set for
      locator-set records sent in Map-Request and Map-Register messages.

   R: set when the sender of a Map-Reply has a route to the locator in
      the locator data record.  This receiver may find this useful to
      know if the locator is up but not necessarily reachable from the
      receiver's point of view.  See also Section 6.4 for another way
      the R-bit may be used.

   Locator:  an IPv4 or IPv6 address (as encoded by the 'Loc-AFI' field)
      assigned to an ETR.  Note that the destination RLOC address MAY be
      an anycast address.  A source RLOC can be an anycast address as
      well.  The source or destination RLOC MUST NOT be the broadcast
      address (255.255.255.255 or any subnet broadcast address known to
      the router), and MUST NOT be a link-local multicast address.  The
      source RLOC MUST NOT be a multicast address.  The destination RLOC



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      SHOULD be a multicast address if it is being mapped from a
      multicast destination EID.

6.1.5.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Reply Message

   A Map-Reply returns an EID-prefix with a prefix length that is less
   than or equal to the EID being requested.  The EID being requested is
   either from the destination field of an IP header of a Data-Probe or
   the EID record of a Map-Request.  The RLOCs in the Map-Reply are
   globally-routable IP addresses of all ETRs for the LISP site.  Each
   RLOC conveys status reachability but does not convey path
   reachability from a requesters perspective.  Separate testing of path
   reachability is required, See Section 6.3 for details.

   Note that a Map-Reply may contain different EID-prefix granularity
   (prefix + length) than the Map-Request which triggers it.  This might
   occur if a Map-Request were for a prefix that had been returned by an
   earlier Map-Reply.  In such a case, the requester updates its cache
   with the new prefix information and granularity.  For example, a
   requester with two cached EID-prefixes that are covered by a Map-
   Reply containing one, less-specific prefix, replaces the entry with
   the less-specific EID-prefix.  Note that the reverse, replacement of
   one less-specific prefix with multiple more-specific prefixes, can
   also occur but not by removing the less-specific prefix rather by
   adding the more-specific prefixes which during a lookup will override
   the less-specific prefix.

   When an ETR is configured with overlapping EID-prefixes, a Map-
   Request with an EID that longest matches any EID-prefix MUST be
   returned in a single Map-Reply message.  For instance, if an ETR had
   database mapping entries for EID-prefixes:

     10.0.0.0/8
     10.1.0.0/16
     10.1.1.0/24
     10.1.2.0/24

   A Map-Request for EID 10.1.1.1 would cause a Map-Reply with a record
   count of 1 to be returned with a mapping record EID-prefix of
   10.1.1.0/24.

   A Map-Request for EID 10.1.5.5, would cause a Map-Reply with a record
   count of 3 to be returned with mapping records for EID-prefixes
   10.1.0.0/16, 10.1.1.0/24, and 10.1.2.0/24.

   Note that not all overlapping EID-prefixes need to be returned, only
   the more specifics (note in the second example above 10.0.0.0/8 was
   not returned for requesting EID 10.1.5.5) entries for the matching



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   EID-prefix of the requesting EID.  When more than one EID-prefix is
   returned, all SHOULD use the same Time-to-Live value so they can all
   time out at the same time.  When a more specific EID-prefix is
   received later, its Time-to-Live value in the Map-Reply record can be
   stored even when other less specifics exist.  When a less specific
   EID-prefix is received later, its map-cache expiration time SHOULD be
   set to the minimum expiration time of any more specific EID-prefix in
   the map-cache.  This is done so the integrity of the EID-prefix set
   is wholly maintained so no more-specific entries are removed from the
   map-cache while keeping less-specific entries.

   Map-Replies SHOULD be sent for an EID-prefix no more often than once
   per second to the same requesting router.  For scalability, it is
   expected that aggregation of EID addresses into EID-prefixes will
   allow one Map-Reply to satisfy a mapping for the EID addresses in the
   prefix range thereby reducing the number of Map-Request messages.

   Map-Reply records can have an empty locator-set.  A negative Map-
   Reply is a Map-Reply with an empty locator-set.  Negative Map-Replies
   convey special actions by the sender to the ITR or PITR which have
   solicited the Map-Reply.  There are two primary applications for
   Negative Map-Replies.  The first is for a Map-Resolver to instruct an
   ITR or PITR when a destination is for a LISP site versus a non-LISP
   site.  And the other is to source quench Map-Requests which are sent
   for non-allocated EIDs.

   For each Map-Reply record, the list of locators in a locator-set MUST
   appear in the same order for each ETR that originates a Map-Reply
   message.  The locator-set MUST be sorted in order of ascending IP
   address where an IPv4 locator address is considered numerically 'less
   than' an IPv6 locator address.

   When sending a Map-Reply message, the destination address is copied
   from the one of the ITR-RLOC fields from the Map-Request.  The ETR
   can choose a locator address from one of the address families it
   supports.  For Data-Probes, the destination address of the Map-Reply
   is copied from the source address of the Data-Probe message which is
   invoking the reply.  The source address of the Map-Reply is one of
   the local IP addresses chosen to allow uRPF checks to succeed in the
   upstream service provider.  The destination port of a Map-Reply
   message is copied from the source port of the Map-Request or Data-
   Probe and the source port of the Map-Reply message is set to the
   well-known UDP port 4342.

6.1.5.1.  Traffic Redirection with Coarse EID-Prefixes

   When an ETR is misconfigured or compromised, it could return coarse
   EID-prefixes in Map-Reply messages it sends.  The EID-prefix could



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   cover EID-prefixes which are allocated to other sites redirecting
   their traffic to the locators of the compromised site.

   To solve this problem, there are two basic solutions that could be
   used.  The first is to have Map-Servers proxy-map-reply on behalf of
   ETRs so their registered EID-prefixes are the ones returned in Map-
   Replies.  Since the interaction between an ETR and Map-Server is
   secured with shared-keys, it is easier for an ETR to detect
   misbehavior.  The second solution is to have ITRs and PITRs cache
   EID-prefixes with mask-lengths that are greater than or equal to a
   configured prefix length.  This limits the damage to a specific width
   of any EID-prefix advertised, but needs to be coordinated with the
   allocation of site prefixes.  These solutions can be used
   independently or at the same time.

   At the time of this writing, other approaches are being considered
   and researched.

6.1.6.  Map-Register Message Format

   The usage details of the Map-Register message can be found in
   specification [LISP-MS].  This section solely defines the message
   format.

   The message is sent in UDP with a destination UDP port of 4342 and a
   randomly selected UDP source port number.

   The Map-Register message format is:























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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=3D3 |P|            Reserved               |M| Record Count  =
|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |            Key ID             |  Authentication Data Length   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ~                     Authentication Data                       ~
   +-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |        EID-prefix-AFI         |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   3 (Map-Register)

   P: This is the proxy-map-reply bit, when set to 1 an ETR sends a Map-
      Register message requesting for the Map-Server to proxy Map-Reply.
      The Map-Server will send non-authoritative Map-Replies on behalf
      of the ETR.  Details on this usage can be found in [LISP-MS].

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   M: This is the want-map-notify bit, when set to 1 an ETR is
      requesting for a Map-Notify message to be returned in response to
      sending a Map-Register message.  The Map-Notify message sent by a
      Map-Server is used to an acknowledge receipt of a Map-Register
      message.





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   Record Count:  The number of records in this Map-Register message.  A
      record is comprised of that portion of the packet labeled 'Record'
      above and occurs the number of times equal to Record count.

   Nonce:  This 8-octet Nonce field is set to 0 in Map-Register
      messages.  Since the Map-Register message is authenticated, the
      nonce field is not currently used for any security function but
      may be in the future as part of an anti-replay solution.

   Key ID:  A configured ID to find the configured Message
      Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm and key value used for the
      authentication function.  See Section 14.4 for codepoint
      assignments.

   Authentication Data Length:  The length in octets of the
      Authentication Data field that follows this field.  The length of
      the Authentication Data field is dependent on the Message
      Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm used.  The length field allows
      a device that doesn't know the MAC algorithm to correctly parse
      the packet.

   Authentication Data:  The message digest used from the output of the
      Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm.  The entire Map-
      Register payload is authenticated with this field preset to 0.
      After the MAC is computed, it is placed in this field.
      Implementations of this specification MUST include support for
      HMAC-SHA-1-96 [RFC2404] and support for HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC6234]
      is RECOMMENDED.

   The definition of the rest of the Map-Register can be found in the
   Map-Reply section.

6.1.7.  Map-Notify Message Format

   The usage details of the Map-Notify message can be found in
   specification [LISP-MS].  This section solely defines the message
   format.

   The message is sent inside a UDP packet with source and destination
   UDP ports equal to 4342.

   The Map-Notify message format is:









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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=3D4 |              Reserved                 | Record Count  =
|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |            Key ID             |  Authentication Data Length   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ~                     Authentication Data                       ~
   +-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |         EID-prefix-AFI        |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-> +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   4 (Map-Notify)

   The Map-Notify message has the same contents as a Map-Register
   message.  See Map-Register section for field descriptions.

6.1.8.  Encapsulated Control Message Format

   An Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) is used to encapsulate control
   packets sent between xTRs and the mapping database system described
   in [LISP-MS].










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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |                       IPv4 or IPv6 Header                     |
   OH  |                      (uses RLOC addresses)                    |
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port =3D xxxx      |       Dest Port =3D 4342      =
  |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   LH  |Type=3D8 |S|                  Reserved                           =
|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |                       IPv4 or IPv6 Header                     |
   IH  |                  (uses RLOC or EID addresses)                 |
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port =3D xxxx      |       Dest Port =3D yyyy      =
  |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   LCM |                      LISP Control Message                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Packet header descriptions:

   OH:   The outer IPv4 or IPv6 header which uses RLOC addresses in the
      source and destination header address fields.

   UDP:   The outer UDP header with destination port 4342.  The source
      port is randomly allocated.  The checksum field MUST be non-zero.

   LH:   Type 8 is defined to be a "LISP Encapsulated Control Message"
      and what follows is either an IPv4 or IPv6 header as encoded by
      the first 4 bits after the reserved field.

   S:   This is the Security bit.  When set to 1 the field following the
      Reserved field will have the following format.  The detailed
      format of the Authentication Data Content is for further study.












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     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |    AD Type    |       Authentication Data Content . . .       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   IH:   The inner IPv4 or IPv6 header which can use either RLOC or EID
      addresses in the header address fields.  When a Map-Request is
      encapsulated in this packet format the destination address in this
      header is an EID.

   UDP:   The inner UDP header where the port assignments depends on the
      control packet being encapsulated.  When the control packet is a
      Map-Request or Map-Register, the source port is ITR/PITR selected
      and the destination port is 4342.  When the control packet is a
      Map-Reply, the source port is 4342 and the destination port is
      assigned from the source port of the invoking Map-Request.  Port
      number 4341 MUST NOT be assigned to either port.  The checksum
      field MUST be non-zero.

   LCM:   The format is one of the control message formats described in
      this section.  At this time, only Map-Request messages are allowed
      to be encapsulated.  And in the future, PIM Join-Prune messages
      [MLISP] might be allowed.  Encapsulating other types of LISP
      control messages are for further study.  When Map-Requests are
      sent for RLOC-probing purposes (i.e the probe-bit is set), they
      MUST NOT be sent inside Encapsulated Control Messages.

6.2.  Routing Locator Selection

   Both client-side and server-side may need control over the selection
   of RLOCs for conversations between them.  This control is achieved by
   manipulating the Priority and Weight fields in EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply
   messages.  Alternatively, RLOC information MAY be gleaned from
   received tunneled packets or EID-to-RLOC Map-Request messages.

   The following enumerates different scenarios for choosing RLOCs and
   the controls that are available:

   o  Server-side returns one RLOC.  Client-side can only use one RLOC.
      Server-side has complete control of the selection.

   o  Server-side returns a list of RLOC where a subset of the list has
      the same best priority.  Client can only use the subset list
      according to the weighting assigned by the server-side.  In this
      case, the server-side controls both the subset list and load-
      splitting across its members.  The client-side can use RLOCs
      outside of the subset list if it determines that the subset list



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      is unreachable (unless RLOCs are set to a Priority of 255).  Some
      sharing of control exists: the server-side determines the
      destination RLOC list and load distribution while the client-side
      has the option of using alternatives to this list if RLOCs in the
      list are unreachable.

   o  Server-side sets weight of 0 for the RLOC subset list.  In this
      case, the client-side can choose how the traffic load is spread
      across the subset list.  Control is shared by the server-side
      determining the list and the client determining load distribution.
      Again, the client can use alternative RLOCs if the server-provided
      list of RLOCs are unreachable.

   o  Either side (more likely on the server-side ETR) decides not to
      send a Map-Request.  For example, if the server-side ETR does not
      send Map-Requests, it gleans RLOCs from the client-side ITR,
      giving the client-side ITR responsibility for bidirectional RLOC
      reachability and preferability.  Server-side ETR gleaning of the
      client-side ITR RLOC is done by caching the inner header source
      EID and the outer header source RLOC of received packets.  The
      client-side ITR controls how traffic is returned and can alternate
      using an outer header source RLOC, which then can be added to the
      list the server-side ETR uses to return traffic.  Since no
      Priority or Weights are provided using this method, the server-
      side ETR MUST assume each client-side ITR RLOC uses the same best
      Priority with a Weight of zero.  In addition, since EID-prefix
      encoding cannot be conveyed in data packets, the EID-to-RLOC cache
      on tunnel routers can grow to be very large.

   o  A "gleaned" map-cache entry, one learned from the source RLOC of a
      received encapsulated packet, is only stored and used for a few
      seconds, pending verification.  Verification is performed by
      sending a Map-Request to the source EID (the inner header IP
      source address) of the received encapsulated packet.  A reply to
      this "verifying Map-Request" is used to fully populate the map-
      cache entry for the "gleaned" EID and is stored and used for the
      time indicated from the TTL field of a received Map-Reply.  When a
      verified map-cache entry is stored, data gleaning no longer occurs
      for subsequent packets which have a source EID that matches the
      EID-prefix of the verified entry.

   RLOCs that appear in EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply messages are assumed to be
   reachable when the R-bit for the locator record is set to 1.  When
   the R-bit is set to 0, an ITR or PITR MUST NOT encapsulate to the
   RLOC.  Neither the information contained in a Map-Reply or that
   stored in the mapping database system provides reachability
   information for RLOCs.  Note that reachability is not part of the
   mapping system and is determined using one or more of the Routing



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   Locator Reachability Algorithms described in the next section.

6.3.  Routing Locator Reachability

   Several mechanisms for determining RLOC reachability are currently
   defined:

   1.  An ETR may examine the Locator Status Bits in the LISP header of
       an encapsulated data packet received from an ITR.  If the ETR is
       also acting as an ITR and has traffic to return to the original
       ITR site, it can use this status information to help select an
       RLOC.

   2.  An ITR may receive an ICMP Network or ICMP Host Unreachable
       message for an RLOC it is using.  This indicates that the RLOC is
       likely down.  Note, trusting ICMP messages may not be desirable
       but neither is ignoring them completely.  Implementations are
       encouraged to follow current best practices in treating these
       conditions.

   3.  An ITR which participates in the global routing system can
       determine that an RLOC is down if no BGP RIB route exists that
       matches the RLOC IP address.

   4.  An ITR may receive an ICMP Port Unreachable message from a
       destination host.  This occurs if an ITR attempts to use
       interworking [INTERWORK] and LISP-encapsulated data is sent to a
       non-LISP-capable site.

   5.  An ITR may receive a Map-Reply from an ETR in response to a
       previously sent Map-Request.  The RLOC source of the Map-Reply is
       likely up since the ETR was able to send the Map-Reply to the
       ITR.

   6.  When an ETR receives an encapsulated packet from an ITR, the
       source RLOC from the outer header of the packet is likely up.

   7.  An ITR/ETR pair can use the Locator Reachability Algorithms
       described in this section, namely Echo-Noncing or RLOC-Probing.

   When determining Locator up/down reachability by examining the
   Locator Status Bits from the LISP encapsulated data packet, an ETR
   will receive up to date status from an encapsulating ITR about
   reachability for all ETRs at the site.  CE-based ITRs at the source
   site can determine reachability relative to each other using the site
   IGP as follows:





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   o  Under normal circumstances, each ITR will advertise a default
      route into the site IGP.

   o  If an ITR fails or if the upstream link to its PE fails, its
      default route will either time-out or be withdrawn.

   Each ITR can thus observe the presence or lack of a default route
   originated by the others to determine the Locator Status Bits it sets
   for them.

   RLOCs listed in a Map-Reply are numbered with ordinals 0 to n-1.  The
   Locator Status Bits in a LISP encapsulated packet are numbered from 0
   to n-1 starting with the least significant bit.  For example, if an
   RLOC listed in the 3rd position of the Map-Reply goes down (ordinal
   value 2), then all ITRs at the site will clear the 3rd least
   significant bit (xxxx x0xx) of the Locator Status Bits field for the
   packets they encapsulate.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, it will check for any change in
   the Locator Status Bits field.  When a bit goes from 1 to 0, the ETR
   if acting also as an ITR, will refrain from encapsulating packets to
   an RLOC that is indicated as down.  It will only resume using that
   RLOC if the corresponding Locator Status Bit returns to a value of 1.
   Locator Status Bits are associated with a locator-set per EID-prefix.
   Therefore, when a locator becomes unreachable, the Locator Status Bit
   that corresponds to that locator's position in the list returned by
   the last Map-Reply will be set to zero for that particular EID-
   prefix.

   When ITRs at the site are not deployed in CE routers, the IGP can
   still be used to determine the reachability of Locators provided they
   are injected into the IGP.  This is typically done when a /32 address
   is configured on a loopback interface.

   When ITRs receive ICMP Network or Host Unreachable messages as a
   method to determine unreachability, they will refrain from using
   Locators which are described in Locator lists of Map-Replies.
   However, using this approach is unreliable because many network
   operators turn off generation of ICMP Unreachable messages.

   If an ITR does receive an ICMP Network or Host Unreachable message,
   it MAY originate its own ICMP Unreachable message destined for the
   host that originated the data packet the ITR encapsulated.

   Also, BGP-enabled ITRs can unilaterally examine the RIB to see if a
   locator address from a locator-set in a mapping entry matches a
   prefix.  If it does not find one and BGP is running in the Default
   Free Zone (DFZ), it can decide to not use the locator even though the



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   Locator Status Bits indicate the locator is up.  In this case, the
   path from the ITR to the ETR that is assigned the locator is not
   available.  More details are in [LOC-ID-ARCH].

   Optionally, an ITR can send a Map-Request to a Locator and if a Map-
   Reply is returned, reachability of the Locator has been determined.
   Obviously, sending such probes increases the number of control
   messages originated by tunnel routers for active flows, so Locators
   are assumed to be reachable when they are advertised.

   This assumption does create a dependency: Locator unreachability is
   detected by the receipt of ICMP Host Unreachable messages.  When an
   Locator has been determined to be unreachable, it is not used for
   active traffic; this is the same as if it were listed in a Map-Reply
   with priority 255.

   The ITR can test the reachability of the unreachable Locator by
   sending periodic Requests.  Both Requests and Replies MUST be rate-
   limited.  Locator reachability testing is never done with data
   packets since that increases the risk of packet loss for end-to-end
   sessions.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, it knows that it is reachable from
   the encapsulating ITR because that is how the packet arrived.  In
   most cases, the ETR can also reach the ITR but cannot assume this to
   be true due to the possibility of path asymmetry.  In the presence of
   unidirectional traffic flow from an ITR to an ETR, the ITR SHOULD NOT
   use the lack of return traffic as an indication that the ETR is
   unreachable.  Instead, it MUST use an alternate mechanisms to
   determine reachability.

6.3.1.  Echo Nonce Algorithm

   When data flows bidirectionally between locators from different
   sites, a data-plane mechanism called "nonce echoing" can be used to
   determine reachability between an ITR and ETR.  When an ITR wants to
   solicit a nonce echo, it sets the N and E bits and places a 24-bit
   nonce [RFC4086] in the LISP header of the next encapsulated data
   packet.

   When this packet is received by the ETR, the encapsulated packet is
   forwarded as normal.  When the ETR next sends a data packet to the
   ITR, it includes the nonce received earlier with the N bit set and E
   bit cleared.  The ITR sees this "echoed nonce" and knows the path to
   and from the ETR is up.

   The ITR will set the E-bit and N-bit for every packet it sends while
   in echo-nonce-request state.  The time the ITR waits to process the



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   echoed nonce before it determines the path is unreachable is variable
   and a choice left for the implementation.

   If the ITR is receiving packets from the ETR but does not see the
   nonce echoed while being in echo-nonce-request state, then the path
   to the ETR is unreachable.  This decision may be overridden by other
   locator reachability algorithms.  Once the ITR determines the path to
   the ETR is down it can switch to another locator for that EID-prefix.

   Note that "ITR" and "ETR" are relative terms here.  Both devices MUST
   be implementing both ITR and ETR functionality for the echo nonce
   mechanism to operate.

   The ITR and ETR may both go into echo-nonce-request state at the same
   time.  The number of packets sent or the time during which echo nonce
   requests are sent is an implementation specific setting.  However,
   when an ITR is in echo-nonce-request state, it can echo the ETR's
   nonce in the next set of packets that it encapsulates and then
   subsequently, continue sending echo-nonce-request packets.

   This mechanism does not completely solve the forward path
   reachability problem as traffic may be unidirectional.  That is, the
   ETR receiving traffic at a site may not be the same device as an ITR
   which transmits traffic from that site or the site to site traffic is
   unidirectional so there is no ITR returning traffic.

   The echo-nonce algorithm is bilateral.  That is, if one side sets the
   E-bit and the other side is not enabled for echo-noncing, then the
   echoing of the nonce does not occur and the requesting side may
   regard the locator unreachable erroneously.  An ITR SHOULD only set
   the E-bit in a encapsulated data packet when it knows the ETR is
   enabled for echo-noncing.  This is conveyed by the E-bit in the Map-
   Reply message.

   Note that other locator reachability mechanisms are being researched
   and can be used to compliment or even override the Echo Nonce
   Algorithm.  See next section for an example of control-plane probing.

6.3.2.  RLOC Probing Algorithm

   RLOC Probing is a method that an ITR or PITR can use to determine the
   reachability status of one or more locators that it has cached in a
   map-cache entry.  The probe-bit of the Map-Request and Map-Reply
   messages are used for RLOC Probing.

   RLOC probing is done in the control-plane on a timer basis where an
   ITR or PITR will originate a Map-Request destined to a locator
   address from one of its own locator addresses.  A Map-Request used as



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   an RLOC-probe is NOT encapsulated and NOT sent to a Map-Server or on
   the ALT like one would when soliciting mapping data.  The EID record
   encoded in the Map-Request is the EID-prefix of the map-cache entry
   cached by the ITR or PITR.  The ITR may include a mapping data record
   for its own database mapping information which contains the local
   EID-prefixes and RLOCs for its site.

   When an ETR receives a Map-Request message with the probe-bit set, it
   returns a Map-Reply with the probe-bit set.  The source address of
   the Map-Reply is set according to the procedure described in
   Section 6.1.5.  The Map-Reply SHOULD contain mapping data for the
   EID-prefix contained in the Map-Request.  This provides the
   opportunity for the ITR or PITR, which sent the RLOC-probe to get
   mapping updates if there were changes to the ETR's database mapping
   entries.

   There are advantages and disadvantages of RLOC Probing.  The greatest
   benefit of RLOC Probing is that it can handle many failure scenarios
   allowing the ITR to determine when the path to a specific locator is
   reachable or has become unreachable, thus providing a robust
   mechanism for switching to using another locator from the cached
   locator.  RLOC Probing can also provide rough RTT estimates between a
   pair of locators which can be useful for network management purposes
   as well as for selecting low delay paths.  The major disadvantage of
   RLOC Probing is in the number of control messages required and the
   amount of bandwidth used to obtain those benefits, especially if the
   requirement for failure detection times are very small.

   Continued research and testing will attempt to characterize the
   tradeoffs of failure detection times versus message overhead.

6.4.  EID Reachability within a LISP Site

   A site may be multihomed using two or more ETRs.  The hosts and
   infrastructure within a site will be addressed using one or more EID
   prefixes that are mapped to the RLOCs of the relevant ETRs in the
   mapping system.  One possible failure mode is for an ETR to lose
   reachability to one or more of the EID prefixes within its own site.
   When this occurs when the ETR sends Map-Replies, it can clear the
   R-bit associated with its own locator.  And when the ETR is also an
   ITR, it can clear its locator-status-bit in the encapsulation data
   header.

   It is recognized there are no simple solutions to the site
   partitioning problem because it is hard to know which part of the
   EID-prefix range is partitioned.  And which locators can reach any
   sub-ranges of the EID-prefixes.  This problem is under investigation
   with the expectation that experiments will tell us more.  Note, this



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   is not a new problem introduced by the LISP architecture.  The
   problem exists today when a multi-homed site uses BGP to advertise
   its reachability upstream.

6.5.  Routing Locator Hashing

   When an ETR provides an EID-to-RLOC mapping in a Map-Reply message to
   a requesting ITR, the locator-set for the EID-prefix may contain
   different priority values for each locator address.  When more than
   one best priority locator exists, the ITR can decide how to load
   share traffic against the corresponding locators.

   The following hash algorithm may be used by an ITR to select a
   locator for a packet destined to an EID for the EID-to-RLOC mapping:

   1.  Either a source and destination address hash can be used or the
       traditional 5-tuple hash which includes the source and
       destination addresses, source and destination TCP, UDP, or SCTP
       port numbers and the IP protocol number field or IPv6 next-
       protocol fields of a packet a host originates from within a LISP
       site.  When a packet is not a TCP, UDP, or SCTP packet, the
       source and destination addresses only from the header are used to
       compute the hash.

   2.  Take the hash value and divide it by the number of locators
       stored in the locator-set for the EID-to-RLOC mapping.

   3.  The remainder will yield a value of 0 to "number of locators
       minus 1".  Use the remainder to select the locator in the
       locator-set.

   Note that when a packet is LISP encapsulated, the source port number
   in the outer UDP header needs to be set.  Selecting a hashed value
   allows core routers which are attached to Link Aggregation Groups
   (LAGs) to load-split the encapsulated packets across member links of
   such LAGs.  Otherwise, core routers would see a single flow, since
   packets have a source address of the ITR, for packets which are
   originated by different EIDs at the source site.  A suggested setting
   for the source port number computed by an ITR is a 5-tuple hash
   function on the inner header, as described above.

   Many core router implementations use a 5-tuple hash to decide how to
   balance packet load across members of a LAG.  The 5-tuple hash
   includes the source and destination addresses of the packet and the
   source and destination ports when the protocol number in the packet
   is TCP or UDP.  For this reason, UDP encoding is used for LISP
   encapsulation.




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6.6.  Changing the Contents of EID-to-RLOC Mappings

   Since the LISP architecture uses a caching scheme to retrieve and
   store EID-to-RLOC mappings, the only way an ITR can get a more up-to-
   date mapping is to re-request the mapping.  However, the ITRs do not
   know when the mappings change and the ETRs do not keep track of which
   ITRs requested its mappings.  For scalability reasons, we want to
   maintain this approach but need to provide a way for ETRs change
   their mappings and inform the sites that are currently communicating
   with the ETR site using such mappings.

   When adding a new locator record in lexicographic order to the end of
   a locator-set, it is easy to update mappings.  We assume new mappings
   will maintain the same locator ordering as the old mapping but just
   have new locators appended to the end of the list.  So some ITRs can
   have a new mapping while other ITRs have only an old mapping that is
   used until they time out.  When an ITR has only an old mapping but
   detects bits set in the loc-status-bits that correspond to locators
   beyond the list it has cached, it simply ignores them.  However, this
   can only happen for locator addresses that are lexicographically
   greater than the locator addresses in the existing locator-set.

   When a locator record is inserted in the middle of a locator-set, to
   maintain lexicographic order, the SMR procedure in Section 6.6.2 is
   used to inform ITRs and PITRs of the new locator-status-bit mappings.

   When a locator record is removed from a locator-set, ITRs that have
   the mapping cached will not use the removed locator because the xTRs
   will set the loc-status-bit to 0.  So even if the locator is in the
   list, it will not be used.  For new mapping requests, the xTRs can
   set the locator AFI to 0 (indicating an unspecified address), as well
   as setting the corresponding loc-status-bit to 0.  This forces ITRs
   with old or new mappings to avoid using the removed locator.

   If many changes occur to a mapping over a long period of time, one
   will find empty record slots in the middle of the locator-set and new
   records appended to the locator-set.  At some point, it would be
   useful to compact the locator-set so the loc-status-bit settings can
   be efficiently packed.

   We propose here three approaches for locator-set compaction, one
   operational and two protocol mechanisms.  The operational approach
   uses a clock sweep method.  The protocol approaches use the concept
   of Solicit-Map-Requests and Map-Versioning.







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6.6.1.  Clock Sweep

   The clock sweep approach uses planning in advance and the use of
   count-down TTLs to time out mappings that have already been cached.
   The default setting for an EID-to-RLOC mapping TTL is 24 hours.  So
   there is a 24 hour window to time out old mappings.  The following
   clock sweep procedure is used:

   1.  24 hours before a mapping change is to take effect, a network
       administrator configures the ETRs at a site to start the clock
       sweep window.

   2.  During the clock sweep window, ETRs continue to send Map-Reply
       messages with the current (unchanged) mapping records.  The TTL
       for these mappings is set to 1 hour.

   3.  24 hours later, all previous cache entries will have timed out,
       and any active cache entries will time out within 1 hour.  During
       this 1 hour window the ETRs continue to send Map-Reply messages
       with the current (unchanged) mapping records with the TTL set to
       1 minute.

   4.  At the end of the 1 hour window, the ETRs will send Map-Reply
       messages with the new (changed) mapping records.  So any active
       caches can get the new mapping contents right away if not cached,
       or in 1 minute if they had the mapping cached.  The new mappings
       are cached with a time to live equal to the TTL in the Map-Reply.

6.6.2.  Solicit-Map-Request (SMR)

   Soliciting a Map-Request is a selective way for ETRs, at the site
   where mappings change, to control the rate they receive requests for
   Map-Reply messages.  SMRs are also used to tell remote ITRs to update
   the mappings they have cached.

   Since the ETRs don't keep track of remote ITRs that have cached their
   mappings, they do not know which ITRs need to have their mappings
   updated.  As a result, an ETR will solicit Map-Requests (called an
   SMR message) from those sites to which it has been sending
   encapsulated data to for the last minute.  In particular, an ETR will
   send an SMR an ITR to which it has recently sent encapsulated data.

   An SMR message is simply a bit set in a Map-Request message.  An ITR
   or PITR will send a Map-Request when they receive an SMR message.
   Both the SMR sender and the Map-Request responder MUST rate-limited
   these messages.  Rate-limiting can be implemented as a global rate-
   limiter or one rate-limiter per SMR destination.




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   The following procedure shows how a SMR exchange occurs when a site
   is doing locator-set compaction for an EID-to-RLOC mapping:

   1.  When the database mappings in an ETR change, the ETRs at the site
       begin to send Map-Requests with the SMR bit set for each locator
       in each map-cache entry the ETR caches.

   2.  A remote ITR which receives the SMR message will schedule sending
       a Map-Request message to the source locator address of the SMR
       message or to the mapping database system.  A newly allocated
       random nonce is selected and the EID-prefix used is the one
       copied from the SMR message.  If the source locator is the only
       locator in the cached locator-set, the remote ITR SHOULD send a
       Map-Request to the database mapping system just in case the
       single locator has changed and may no longer be reachable to
       accept the Map-Request.

   3.  The remote ITR MUST rate-limit the Map-Request until it gets a
       Map-Reply while continuing to use the cached mapping.  When Map
       Versioning is used, described in Section 6.6.3, an SMR sender can
       detect if an ITR is using the most up to date database mapping.

   4.  The ETRs at the site with the changed mapping will reply to the
       Map-Request with a Map-Reply message that has a nonce from the
       SMR-invoked Map-Request.  The Map-Reply messages SHOULD be rate
       limited.  This is important to avoid Map-Reply implosion.

   5.  The ETRs, at the site with the changed mapping, record the fact
       that the site that sent the Map-Request has received the new
       mapping data in the mapping cache entry for the remote site so
       the loc-status-bits are reflective of the new mapping for packets
       going to the remote site.  The ETR then stops sending SMR
       messages.

   Experimentation is in progress to determine the appropriate rate-
   limit parameters.

   For security reasons an ITR MUST NOT process unsolicited Map-Replies.
   To avoid map-cache entry corruption by a third-party, a sender of an
   SMR-based Map-Request MUST be verified.  If an ITR receives an SMR-
   based Map-Request and the source is not in the locator-set for the
   stored map-cache entry, then the responding Map-Request MUST be sent
   with an EID destination to the mapping database system.  Since the
   mapping database system is more secure to reach an authoritative ETR,
   it will deliver the Map-Request to the authoritative source of the
   mapping data.

   When an ITR receives an SMR-based Map-Request for which it does not



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   have a cached mapping for the EID in the SMR message, it MAY not send
   a SMR-invoked Map-Request.  This scenario can occur when an ETR sends
   SMR messages to all locators in the locator-set it has stored in its
   map-cache but the remote ITRs that receive the SMR may not be sending
   packets to the site.  There is no point in updating the ITRs until
   they need to send, in which case, they will send Map-Requests to
   obtain a map-cache entry.

6.6.3.  Database Map Versioning

   When there is unidirectional packet flow between an ITR and ETR, and
   the EID-to-RLOC mappings change on the ETR, it needs to inform the
   ITR so encapsulation can stop to a removed locator and start to a new
   locator in the locator-set.

   An ETR, when it sends Map-Reply messages, conveys its own Map-Version
   number.  This is known as the Destination Map-Version Number.  ITRs
   include the Destination Map-Version Number in packets they
   encapsulate to the site.  When an ETR decapsulates a packet and
   detects the Destination Map-Version Number is less than the current
   version for its mapping, the SMR procedure described in Section 6.6.2
   occurs.

   An ITR, when it encapsulates packets to ETRs, can convey its own Map-
   Version number.  This is known as the Source Map-Version Number.
   When an ETR decapsulates a packet and detects the Source Map-Version
   Number is greater than the last Map-Version Number sent in a Map-
   Reply from the ITR's site, the ETR will send a Map-Request to one of
   the ETRs for the source site.

   A Map-Version Number is used as a sequence number per EID-prefix.  So
   values that are greater, are considered to be more recent.  A value
   of 0 for the Source Map-Version Number or the Destination Map-Version
   Number conveys no versioning information and an ITR does no
   comparison with previously received Map-Version Numbers.

   A Map-Version Number can be included in Map-Register messages as
   well.  This is a good way for the Map-Server can assure that all ETRs
   for a site registering to it will be Map-Version number synchronized.

   See [VERSIONING] for a more detailed analysis and description of
   Database Map Versioning.









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7.  Router Performance Considerations

   LISP is designed to be very hardware-based forwarding friendly.  A
   few implementation techniques can be used to incrementally implement
   LISP:

   o  When a tunnel encapsulated packet is received by an ETR, the outer
      destination address may not be the address of the router.  This
      makes it challenging for the control plane to get packets from the
      hardware.  This may be mitigated by creating special FIB entries
      for the EID-prefixes of EIDs served by the ETR (those for which
      the router provides an RLOC translation).  These FIB entries are
      marked with a flag indicating that control plane processing should
      be performed.  The forwarding logic of testing for particular IP
      protocol number value is not necessary.  There are a few proven
      cases where no changes to existing deployed hardware were needed
      to support the LISP data-plane.

   o  On an ITR, prepending a new IP header consists of adding more
      octets to a MAC rewrite string and prepending the string as part
      of the outgoing encapsulation procedure.  Routers that support GRE
      tunneling [RFC2784] or 6to4 tunneling [RFC3056] may already
      support this action.

   o  A packet's source address or interface the packet was received on
      can be used to select a VRF (Virtual Routing/Forwarding).  The
      VRF's routing table can be used to find EID-to-RLOC mappings.

   For performance issues related to map-cache management, see section
   Section 12.





















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8.  Deployment Scenarios

   This section will explore how and where ITRs and ETRs can be deployed
   and will discuss the pros and cons of each deployment scenario.  For
   a more detailed deployment recommendation, refer to [LISP-DEPLOY].

   There are two basic deployment trade-offs to consider: centralized
   versus distributed caches and flat, recursive, or re-encapsulating
   tunneling.  When deciding on centralized versus distributed caching,
   the following issues should be considered:

   o  Are the tunnel routers spread out so that the caches are spread
      across all the memories of each router?  A centralized cache is
      when an ITR keeps a cache for all the EIDs it is encapsulating to.
      The packet takes a direct path to the destination locator.  A
      distributed cache is when an ITR needs help from other re-
      encapsulating routers because it does not store all the cache
      entries for the EIDs is it encapsulating to.  So the packet takes
      a path through re-encapsulating routers that have a different set
      of cache entries.

   o  Should management "touch points" be minimized by choosing few
      tunnel routers, just enough for redundancy?

   o  In general, using more ITRs doesn't increase management load,
      since caches are built and stored dynamically.  On the other hand,
      more ETRs does require more management since EID-prefix-to-RLOC
      mappings need to be explicitly configured.

   When deciding on flat, recursive, or re-encapsulation tunneling, the
   following issues should be considered:

   o  Flat tunneling implements a single tunnel between source site and
      destination site.  This generally offers better paths between
      sources and destinations with a single tunnel path.

   o  Recursive tunneling is when tunneled traffic is again further
      encapsulated in another tunnel, either to implement VPNs or to
      perform Traffic Engineering.  When doing VPN-based tunneling, the
      site has some control since the site is prepending a new tunnel
      header.  In the case of TE-based tunneling, the site may have
      control if it is prepending a new tunnel header, but if the site's
      ISP is doing the TE, then the site has no control.  Recursive
      tunneling generally will result in suboptimal paths but at the
      benefit of steering traffic to resource available parts of the
      network.





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   o  The technique of re-encapsulation ensures that packets only
      require one tunnel header.  So if a packet needs to be rerouted,
      it is first decapsulated by the ETR and then re-encapsulated with
      a new tunnel header using a new RLOC.

   The next sub-sections will survey where tunnel routers can reside in
   the network.

8.1.  First-hop/Last-hop Tunnel Routers

   By locating tunnel routers close to hosts, the EID-prefix set is at
   the granularity of an IP subnet.  So at the expense of more EID-
   prefix-to-RLOC sets for the site, the caches in each tunnel router
   can remain relatively small.  But caches always depend on the number
   of non-aggregated EID destination flows active through these tunnel
   routers.

   With more tunnel routers doing encapsulation, the increase in control
   traffic grows as well: since the EID-granularity is greater, more
   Map-Requests and Map-Replies are traveling between more routers.

   The advantage of placing the caches and databases at these stub
   routers is that the products deployed in this part of the network
   have better price-memory ratios then their core router counterparts.
   Memory is typically less expensive in these devices and fewer routes
   are stored (only IGP routes).  These devices tend to have excess
   capacity, both for forwarding and routing state.

   LISP functionality can also be deployed in edge switches.  These
   devices generally have layer-2 ports facing hosts and layer-3 ports
   facing the Internet.  Spare capacity is also often available in these
   devices as well.

8.2.  Border/Edge Tunnel Routers

   Using customer-edge (CE) routers for tunnel endpoints allows the EID
   space associated with a site to be reachable via a small set of RLOCs
   assigned to the CE routers for that site.  This is the default
   behavior envisioned in the rest of this specification.

   This offers the opposite benefit of the first-hop/last-hop tunnel
   router scenario: the number of mapping entries and network management
   touch points are reduced, allowing better scaling.

   One disadvantage is that less of the network's resources are used to
   reach host endpoints thereby centralizing the point-of-failure domain
   and creating network choke points at the CE router.




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   Note that more than one CE router at a site can be configured with
   the same IP address.  In this case an RLOC is an anycast address.
   This allows resilience between the CE routers.  That is, if a CE
   router fails, traffic is automatically routed to the other routers
   using the same anycast address.  However, this comes with the
   disadvantage where the site cannot control the entrance point when
   the anycast route is advertised out from all border routers.  Another
   disadvantage of using anycast locators is the limited advertisement
   scope of /32 (or /128 for IPv6) routes.

8.3.  ISP Provider-Edge (PE) Tunnel Routers

   Use of ISP PE routers as tunnel endpoint routers is not the typical
   deployment scenario envisioned in the specification.  This section
   attempts to capture some of reasoning behind this preference of
   implementing LISP on CE routers.

   Use of ISP PE routers as tunnel endpoint routers gives an ISP, rather
   than a site, control over the location of the egress tunnel
   endpoints.  That is, the ISP can decide if the tunnel endpoints are
   in the destination site (in either CE routers or last-hop routers
   within a site) or at other PE edges.  The advantage of this case is
   that two tunnel headers can be avoided.  By having the PE be the
   first router on the path to encapsulate, it can choose a TE path
   first, and the ETR can decapsulate and re-encapsulate for a tunnel to
   the destination end site.

   An obvious disadvantage is that the end site has no control over
   where its packets flow or the RLOCs used.  Other disadvantages
   include the difficulty in synchronizing path liveness updates between
   CE and PE routers.

   As mentioned in earlier sections a combination of these scenarios is
   possible at the expense of extra packet header overhead, if both site
   and provider want control, then recursive or re-encapsulating tunnels
   are used.

8.4.  LISP Functionality with Conventional NATs

   LISP routers can be deployed behind Network Address Translator (NAT)
   devices to provide the same set of packet services hosts have today
   when they are addressed out of private address space.

   It is important to note that a locator address in any LISP control
   message MUST be a globally routable address and therefore SHOULD NOT
   contain [RFC1918] addresses.  If a LISP router is configured with
   private addresses, they MUST be used only in the outer IP header so
   the NAT device can translate properly.  Otherwise, EID addresses MUST



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   be translated before encapsulation is performed.  Both NAT
   translation and LISP encapsulation functions could be co-located in
   the same device.

   More details on LISP address translation can be found in [INTERWORK].

8.5.  Packets Egressing a LISP Site

   When a LISP site is using two ITRs for redundancy, the failure of one
   ITR will likely shift outbound traffic to the second.  This second
   ITR's cache may not not be populated with the same EID-to-RLOC
   mapping entries as the first.  If this second ITR does not have these
   mappings, traffic will be dropped while the mappings are retrieved
   from the mapping system.  The retrieval of these messages may
   increase the load of requests being sent into the mapping system.
   Deployment and experimentation will determine whether this issue
   requires more attention.


































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9.  Traceroute Considerations

   When a source host in a LISP site initiates a traceroute to a
   destination host in another LISP site, it is highly desirable for it
   to see the entire path.  Since packets are encapsulated from ITR to
   ETR, the hop across the tunnel could be viewed as a single hop.
   However, LISP traceroute will provide the entire path so the user can
   see 3 distinct segments of the path from a source LISP host to a
   destination LISP host:


      Segment 1 (in source LISP site based on EIDs):

          source-host ---> first-hop ... next-hop ---> ITR

      Segment 2 (in the core network based on RLOCs):

          ITR ---> next-hop ... next-hop ---> ETR

      Segment 3 (in the destination LISP site based on EIDs):

          ETR ---> next-hop ... last-hop ---> destination-host

   For segment 1 of the path, ICMP Time Exceeded messages are returned
   in the normal manner as they are today.  The ITR performs a TTL
   decrement and test for 0 before encapsulating.  So the ITR hop is
   seen by the traceroute source has an EID address (the address of
   site-facing interface).

   For segment 2 of the path, ICMP Time Exceeded messages are returned
   to the ITR because the TTL decrement to 0 is done on the outer
   header, so the destination of the ICMP messages are to the ITR RLOC
   address, the source RLOC address of the encapsulated traceroute
   packet.  The ITR looks inside of the ICMP payload to inspect the
   traceroute source so it can return the ICMP message to the address of
   the traceroute client as well as retaining the core router IP address
   in the ICMP message.  This is so the traceroute client can display
   the core router address (the RLOC address) in the traceroute output.
   The ETR returns its RLOC address and responds to the TTL decrement to
   0 like the previous core routers did.

   For segment 3, the next-hop router downstream from the ETR will be
   decrementing the TTL for the packet that was encapsulated, sent into
   the core, decapsulated by the ETR, and forwarded because it isn't the
   final destination.  If the TTL is decremented to 0, any router on the
   path to the destination of the traceroute, including the next-hop
   router or destination, will send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the
   source EID of the traceroute client.  The ICMP message will be



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   encapsulated by the local ITR and sent back to the ETR in the
   originated traceroute source site, where the packet will be delivered
   to the host.

9.1.  IPv6 Traceroute

   IPv6 traceroute follows the procedure described above since the
   entire traceroute data packet is included in ICMP Time Exceeded
   message payload.  Therefore, only the ITR needs to pay special
   attention for forwarding ICMP messages back to the traceroute source.

9.2.  IPv4 Traceroute

   For IPv4 traceroute, we cannot follow the above procedure since IPv4
   ICMP Time Exceeded messages only include the invoking IP header and 8
   octets that follow the IP header.  Therefore, when a core router
   sends an IPv4 Time Exceeded message to an ITR, all the ITR has in the
   ICMP payload is the encapsulated header it prepended followed by a
   UDP header.  The original invoking IP header, and therefore the
   identity of the traceroute source is lost.

   The solution we propose to solve this problem is to cache traceroute
   IPv4 headers in the ITR and to match them up with corresponding IPv4
   Time Exceeded messages received from core routers and the ETR.  The
   ITR will use a circular buffer for caching the IPv4 and UDP headers
   of traceroute packets.  It will select a 16-bit number as a key to
   find them later when the IPv4 Time Exceeded messages are received.
   When an ITR encapsulates an IPv4 traceroute packet, it will use the
   16-bit number as the UDP source port in the encapsulating header.
   When the ICMP Time Exceeded message is returned to the ITR, the UDP
   header of the encapsulating header is present in the ICMP payload
   thereby allowing the ITR to find the cached headers for the
   traceroute source.  The ITR puts the cached headers in the payload
   and sends the ICMP Time Exceeded message to the traceroute source
   retaining the source address of the original ICMP Time Exceeded
   message (a core router or the ETR of the site of the traceroute
   destination).

   The signature of a traceroute packet comes in two forms.  The first
   form is encoded as a UDP message where the destination port is
   inspected for a range of values.  The second form is encoded as an
   ICMP message where the IP identification field is inspected for a
   well-known value.

9.3.  Traceroute using Mixed Locators

   When either an IPv4 traceroute or IPv6 traceroute is originated and
   the ITR encapsulates it in the other address family header, you



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   cannot get all 3 segments of the traceroute.  Segment 2 of the
   traceroute can not be conveyed to the traceroute source since it is
   expecting addresses from intermediate hops in the same address format
   for the type of traceroute it originated.  Therefore, in this case,
   segment 2 will make the tunnel look like one hop.  All the ITR has to
   do to make this work is to not copy the inner TTL to the outer,
   encapsulating header's TTL when a traceroute packet is encapsulated
   using an RLOC from a different address family.  This will cause no
   TTL decrement to 0 to occur in core routers between the ITR and ETR.










































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10.  Mobility Considerations

   There are several kinds of mobility of which only some might be of
   concern to LISP.  Essentially they are as follows.

10.1.  Site Mobility

   A site wishes to change its attachment points to the Internet, and
   its LISP Tunnel Routers will have new RLOCs when it changes upstream
   providers.  Changes in EID-RLOC mappings for sites are expected to be
   handled by configuration, outside of the LISP protocol.

10.2.  Slow Endpoint Mobility

   An individual endpoint wishes to move, but is not concerned about
   maintaining session continuity.  Renumbering is involved.  LISP can
   help with the issues surrounding renumbering [RFC4192] [LISA96] by
   decoupling the address space used by a site from the address spaces
   used by its ISPs.  [RFC4984]

10.3.  Fast Endpoint Mobility

   Fast endpoint mobility occurs when an endpoint moves relatively
   rapidly, changing its IP layer network attachment point.  Maintenance
   of session continuity is a goal.  This is where the Mobile IPv4
   [RFC5944] and Mobile IPv6 [RFC6275] [RFC4866] mechanisms are used,
   and primarily where interactions with LISP need to be explored.

   The problem is that as an endpoint moves, it may require changes to
   the mapping between its EID and a set of RLOCs for its new network
   location.  When this is added to the overhead of mobile IP binding
   updates, some packets might be delayed or dropped.

   In IPv4 mobility, when an endpoint is away from home, packets to it
   are encapsulated and forwarded via a home agent which resides in the
   home area the endpoint's address belongs to.  The home agent will
   encapsulate and forward packets either directly to the endpoint or to
   a foreign agent which resides where the endpoint has moved to.
   Packets from the endpoint may be sent directly to the correspondent
   node, may be sent via the foreign agent, or may be reverse-tunneled
   back to the home agent for delivery to the mobile node.  As the
   mobile node's EID or available RLOC changes, LISP EID-to-RLOC
   mappings are required for communication between the mobile node and
   the home agent, whether via foreign agent or not.  As a mobile
   endpoint changes networks, up to three LISP mapping changes may be
   required:





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   o  The mobile node moves from an old location to a new visited
      network location and notifies its home agent that it has done so.
      The Mobile IPv4 control packets the mobile node sends pass through
      one of the new visited network's ITRs, which needs an EID-RLOC
      mapping for the home agent.

   o  The home agent might not have the EID-RLOC mappings for the mobile
      node's "care-of" address or its foreign agent in the new visited
      network, in which case it will need to acquire them.

   o  When packets are sent directly to the correspondent node, it may
      be that no traffic has been sent from the new visited network to
      the correspondent node's network, and the new visited network's
      ITR will need to obtain an EID-RLOC mapping for the correspondent
      node's site.

   In addition, if the IPv4 endpoint is sending packets from the new
   visited network using its original EID, then LISP will need to
   perform a route-returnability check on the new EID-RLOC mapping for
   that EID.

   In IPv6 mobility, packets can flow directly between the mobile node
   and the correspondent node in either direction.  The mobile node uses
   its "care-of" address (EID).  In this case, the route-returnability
   check would not be needed but one more LISP mapping lookup may be
   required instead:

   o  As above, three mapping changes may be needed for the mobile node
      to communicate with its home agent and to send packets to the
      correspondent node.

   o  In addition, another mapping will be needed in the correspondent
      node's ITR, in order for the correspondent node to send packets to
      the mobile node's "care-of" address (EID) at the new network
      location.

   When both endpoints are mobile the number of potential mapping
   lookups increases accordingly.

   As a mobile node moves there are not only mobility state changes in
   the mobile node, correspondent node, and home agent, but also state
   changes in the ITRs and ETRs for at least some EID-prefixes.

   The goal is to support rapid adaptation, with little delay or packet
   loss for the entire system.  Also IP mobility can be modified to
   require fewer mapping changes.  In order to increase overall system
   performance, there may be a need to reduce the optimization of one
   area in order to place fewer demands on another.



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   In LISP, one possibility is to "glean" information.  When a packet
   arrives, the ETR could examine the EID-RLOC mapping and use that
   mapping for all outgoing traffic to that EID.  It can do this after
   performing a route-returnability check, to ensure that the new
   network location does have a internal route to that endpoint.
   However, this does not cover the case where an ITR (the node assigned
   the RLOC) at the mobile-node location has been compromised.

   Mobile IP packet exchange is designed for an environment in which all
   routing information is disseminated before packets can be forwarded.
   In order to allow the Internet to grow to support expected future
   use, we are moving to an environment where some information may have
   to be obtained after packets are in flight.  Modifications to IP
   mobility should be considered in order to optimize the behavior of
   the overall system.  Anything which decreases the number of new EID-
   RLOC mappings needed when a node moves, or maintains the validity of
   an EID-RLOC mapping for a longer time, is useful.

10.4.  Fast Network Mobility

   In addition to endpoints, a network can be mobile, possibly changing
   xTRs.  A "network" can be as small as a single router and as large as
   a whole site.  This is different from site mobility in that it is
   fast and possibly short-lived, but different from endpoint mobility
   in that a whole prefix is changing RLOCs.  However, the mechanisms
   are the same and there is no new overhead in LISP.  A map request for
   any endpoint will return a binding for the entire mobile prefix.

   If mobile networks become a more common occurrence, it may be useful
   to revisit the design of the mapping service and allow for dynamic
   updates of the database.

   The issue of interactions between mobility and LISP needs to be
   explored further.  Specific improvements to the entire system will
   depend on the details of mapping mechanisms.  Mapping mechanisms
   should be evaluated on how well they support session continuity for
   mobile nodes.

10.5.  LISP Mobile Node Mobility

   A mobile device can use the LISP infrastructure to achieve mobility
   by implementing the LISP encapsulation and decapsulation functions
   and acting as a simple ITR/ETR.  By doing this, such a "LISP mobile
   node" can use topologically-independent EID IP addresses that are not
   advertised into and do not impose a cost on the global routing
   system.  These EIDs are maintained at the edges of the mapping system
   (in LISP Map-Servers and Map-Resolvers) and are provided on demand to
   only the correspondents of the LISP mobile node.



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   Refer to the LISP Mobility Architecture specification [LISP-MN] for
   more details.

















































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11.  Multicast Considerations

   A multicast group address, as defined in the original Internet
   architecture is an identifier of a grouping of topologically
   independent receiver host locations.  The address encoding itself
   does not determine the location of the receiver(s).  The multicast
   routing protocol, and the network-based state the protocol creates,
   determines where the receivers are located.

   In the context of LISP, a multicast group address is both an EID and
   a Routing Locator.  Therefore, no specific semantic or action needs
   to be taken for a destination address, as it would appear in an IP
   header.  Therefore, a group address that appears in an inner IP
   header built by a source host will be used as the destination EID.
   The outer IP header (the destination Routing Locator address),
   prepended by a LISP router, will use the same group address as the
   destination Routing Locator.

   Having said that, only the source EID and source Routing Locator
   needs to be dealt with.  Therefore, an ITR merely needs to put its
   own IP address in the source Routing Locator field when prepending
   the outer IP header.  This source Routing Locator address, like any
   other Routing Locator address MUST be globally routable.

   Therefore, an EID-to-RLOC mapping does not need to be performed by an
   ITR when a received data packet is a multicast data packet or when
   processing a source-specific Join (either by IGMPv3 or PIM).  But the
   source Routing Locator is decided by the multicast routing protocol
   in a receiver site.  That is, an EID to Routing Locator translation
   is done at control-time.

   Another approach is to have the ITR not encapsulate a multicast
   packet and allow the host built packet to flow into the core even if
   the source address is allocated out of the EID namespace.  If the
   RPF-Vector TLV [RFC5496] is used by PIM in the core, then core
   routers can RPF to the ITR (the Locator address which is injected
   into core routing) rather than the host source address (the EID
   address which is not injected into core routing).

   To avoid any EID-based multicast state in the network core, the first
   approach is chosen for LISP-Multicast.  Details for LISP-Multicast
   and Interworking with non-LISP sites is described in specification
   [MLISP].








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12.  Security Considerations

   It is believed that most of the security mechanisms will be part of
   the mapping database service when using control plane procedures for
   obtaining EID-to-RLOC mappings.  For data plane triggered mappings,
   as described in this specification, protection is provided against
   ETR spoofing by using Return-Routability (see Section 3) mechanisms
   evidenced by the use of a 24-bit Nonce field in the LISP
   encapsulation header and a 64-bit Nonce field in the LISP control
   message.

   The nonce, coupled with the ITR accepting only solicited Map-Replies
   provides a basic level of security, in many ways similar to the
   security experienced in the current Internet routing system.  It is
   hard for off-path attackers to launch attacks against these LISP
   mechanisms, as they do not have the nonce values.  Sending a large
   number of packets to accidentally find the right nonce value is
   possible, but would already by itself be a denial-of-service attack.
   On-path attackers can perform far more serious attacks, but on-path
   attackers can launch serious attacks in the current Internet as well,
   including eavesdropping, blocking or redirecting traffic.  See more
   discussion on this topic in Section 6.1.5.1.

   LISP does not rely on a PKI or a more heavy weight authentication
   system.  These systems challenge the scalability of LISP which was a
   primary design goal.

   DoS attack prevention will depend on implementations rate-limiting
   Map-Requests and Map-Replies to the control plane as well as rate-
   limiting the number of data-triggered Map-Replies.

   An incorrectly implemented or malicious ITR might choose to ignore
   the priority and weights provided by the ETR in its Map-Reply.  This
   traffic steering would be limited to the traffic that is sent by this
   ITR's site, and no more severe than if the site initiated a bandwidth
   DoS attack on (one of) the ETR's ingress links.  The ITR's site would
   typically gain no benefit from not respecting the weights, and would
   likely to receive better service by abiding by them.

   To deal with map-cache exhaustion attempts in an ITR/PITR, the
   implementation should consider putting a maximum cap on the number of
   entries stored with a reserve list for special or frequently accessed
   sites.  This should be a configuration policy control set by the
   network administrator who manages ITRs and PITRs.  When overlapping
   EID-prefixes occur across multiple map-cache entries, the integrity
   of the set must be wholly maintained.  So if a more-specific entry
   cannot be added due to reaching the maximum cap, then none of the
   less specifics should be stored in the map-cache.



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   Given that the ITR/PITR maintains a cache of EID-to-RLOC mappings,
   cache sizing and maintenance is an issue to be kept in mind during
   implementation.  It is a good idea to have instrumentation in place
   to detect thrashing of the cache.  Implementation experimentation
   will be used to determine which cache management strategies work
   best.  In general, it is difficult to defend against cache trashing
   attacks.  It should be noted that an undersized cache in an ITR/PITR
   not only causes adverse affect on the site or region they support,
   but may also cause increased Map-Request load on the mapping system.

   "Piggybacked" mapping data discussed in Section 6.1.3 specifies how
   to handle such mappings and includes the possibility for an ETR to
   temporarily accept such a mapping before verification when running in
   "trusted" environments.  In such cases, there is a potential threat
   that a fake mapping could be inserted (even if only for a short
   period) into a map-cache.  As noted in Section 6.1.3, an ETR MUST be
   specifically configured to run in such a mode and might usefully only
   consider some specific ITRs as also running in that same trusted
   environment.

   There is a security risk implicit in the fact that ETRs generate the
   EID prefix to which they are responding.  An ETR can claim a shorter
   prefix than it is actually responsible for.  Various mechanisms to
   ameliorate or resolve this issue will be examined in the future,
   [LISP-SEC].

   Spoofing of inner header addresses of LISP encapsulated packets is
   possible like with any tunneling mechanism.  ITRs MUST verify the
   source address of a packet to be an EID that belongs to the site's
   EID-prefix range prior to encapsulation.  An ETR must only
   decapsulate and forward datagrams with an inner header destination
   that matches one of its EID-prefix ranges.  If, upon receipt and
   decapsulation, the destination EID of a datagram does not match one
   of the ETR's configured EID-prefixes, the ETR MUST drop the datagram.
   If a LISP encapsulated packet arrives at an ETR, it SHOULD compare
   the inner header source EID address and the outer header source RLOC
   address with the mapping that exists in the mapping database.  Then
   when spoofing attacks occur, the outer header source RLOC address can
   be used to trace back the attack to the source site, using existing
   operational tools.

   This experimental specification does not address automated key
   management (AKM).  BCP 107 provides guidance in this area.  In
   addition, at the time of this writing, substantial work is being
   undertaken to improve security of the routing system [KARP], [RPKI],
   [BGP-SEC], [LISP-SEC].  Future work on LISP should address BCP-107 as
   well as other open security considerations, which may require changes
   to this specification.



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13.  Network Management Considerations

   Considerations for Network Management tools exist so the LISP
   protocol suite can be operationally managed.  The mechanisms can be
   found in [LISP-MIB] and [LISP-LIG].














































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14.  IANA Considerations

   This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
   Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the LISP
   specification, in accordance with BCP 26 and RFC 5226 [RFC5226].

   There are two name spaces in LISP that require registration:

   o  LISP IANA registry allocations should not be made for purposes
      unrelated to LISP routing or transport protocols.

   o  The following policies are used here with the meanings defined in
      BCP 26: "Specification Required", "IETF Review", "Experimental
      Use", "First Come First Served".

14.1.  LISP ACT and Flag Fields

   New ACT values (Section 6.1.4) can be allocated through IETF review
   or IESG approval.  Four values have already been allocated by this
   specification (Section 6.1.4).

   In addition, the LISP protocol has a number of flag and reserved
   fields, such as the LISP header flags field (Section 5.3).  New bits
   for flags can be taken into use from these fields through IETF review
   or IESG approval, but these need not be managed by IANA.

14.2.  LISP Address Type Codes

   LISP Address [LCAF] type codes have a range from 0 to 255.  New type
   codes MUST be allocated consecutively starting at 0.  Type Codes 0 -
   127 are to be assigned by IETF review or IESG approval.

   Type Codes 128 - 255 are available on a First Come First Served
   policy.

   This registry, initially empty, is constructed for future-use
   experimental work of LCAF values.  See [LCAF] for details for other
   possible unapproved address encodings.  The unapproved LCAF encodings
   are an area for further study and experimentation.

14.3.  LISP UDP Port Numbers

   The IANA registry has allocated UDP port numbers 4341 and 4342 for
   LISP data-plane and control-plane operation, respectively.







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14.4.  LISP Key ID Numbers

   The following Key ID values are defined by this specification as used
   in any packet type that references a Key ID field:


       Name                 Number          Defined in
       -----------------------------------------------
       None                 0               n/a
       HMAC-SHA-1-96        1               [RFC2404]
       HMAC-SHA-256-128     2               [RFC6234]








































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15.  Known Open Issues and Areas of Future Work

   As an experimental specification, this work is, by definition,
   incomplete.  Specific areas where additional experience and work are
   needed include:

   o  At present, only [ALT] is defined for implementing a database of
      EID-to-RLOC mapping information.  Additional research on other
      mapping database systems is strongly encouraged.

   o  Failure and recovery of LISP site partitioning (see Section 6.4),
      in the presence of redundant configuration (see Section 8.5) needs
      further research and experimentation.

   o  The characteristics of map-cache management under exceptional
      conditions, such as denial-of-service attacks are not fully
      understood.  Further experience is needed to determine whether
      current caching methods are practical or in need of further
      development.  In particular, the performance, scaling and security
      characteristics of the map-cache will be discovered as part of
      this experiment.  Performance metrics to be observed are packet
      reordering associated with the LISP data probe and loss of the
      first packet in a flow associated with map-caching.  The impact of
      these upon TCP will be observed.  See Section 12 for additional
      thoughts and considerations.

   o  Preliminary work has been done to ensure that sites employing LISP
      can interconnect with the rest of the Internet.  This work is
      documented in [INTERWORK], but further experimentation and
      experience is needed.

   o  At present, no mechanism for automated key management for message
      authentication is defined.  Addressing automated key management is
      necessary before this specification could be developed into a
      standards track RFC.  See Section 12 for further details regarding
      security considerations.

   o  In order to maintain security and stability, Internet Protocols
      typically isolate the control and data planes.  Therefore, user
      activity cannot cause control plane state to be created or
      destroyed.  LISP does not maintain this separation.  The degree to
      which the loss of separation impacts security and stability is a
      topic for experimental observation.

   o  LISP allows for different mapping database systems to be used.
      While only one [ALT] is currently well-defined, each mapping
      database will likely have some impact on the security of the EID-
      to-RLOC mappings.  How each mapping database system's security



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      properties impact on LISP overall is for further study.

   o  An examination of the implications of LISP on Internet traffic,
      applications, routers, and security is needed.  This will help to
      understand the consequences for network stability, routing
      protocol function, routing scalability, migration and backward
      compatibility, and implementation scalability (as influenced by
      additional protocol components, additional state, and additional
      processing for encapsulation, decapsulation, liveness).

   Other LISP documents may also include open issues and areas for
   future work.







































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16.  References

16.1.  Normative References

   [ALT]      Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "LISP
              Alternative Topology (LISP-ALT)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-alt-09.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MS]  Farinacci, D. and V. Fuller, "LISP Map Server",
              draft-ietf-lisp-ms-12.txt (work in progress).

   [RFC0768]  Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
              August 1980.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2404]  Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
              ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [RFC3168]  Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
              RFC 3168, September 2001.

   [RFC3232]  Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by
              an On-line Database", RFC 3232, January 2002.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.




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   [RFC5496]  Wijnands, IJ., Boers, A., and E. Rosen, "The Reverse Path
              Forwarding (RPF) Vector TLV", RFC 5496, March 2009.

   [RFC5944]  Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised",
              RFC 5944, November 2010.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, May 2011.

   [RFC6275]  Perkins, C., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
              in IPv6", RFC 6275, July 2011.

   [UDP-TUNNELS]
              Eubanks, M. and P. Chimento, "UDP Checksums for Tunneled
              Packets", draft-eubanks-chimento-6man-01.txt (work in
              progress), October 2010.

   [UDP-ZERO]
              Fairhurst, G. and M. Westerland, "IPv6 UDP Checksum
              Considerations", draft-ietf-6man-udpzero-04.txt (work in
              progress), October 2011.

   [VERSIONING]
              Iannone, L., Saucez, D., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Mapping
              Versioning", draft-ietf-lisp-map-versioning-05.txt (work
              in progress).

16.2.  Informative References

   [AFI]      IANA, "Address Family Indicators (AFIs)", ADDRESS FAMILY
              NUMBERS
              http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers.

   [AFI-REGISTRY]
              IANA, "Address Family Indicators (AFIs)", ADDRESS FAMILY
              NUMBER registry http://www.iana.org/assignments/
              address-family-numbers/
              address-family-numbers.xml#address-family-numbers-1.

   [BGP-SEC]  Lepinski, M., "An Overview of BGPSEC",
              draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00.txt (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [CHIAPPA]  Chiappa, J., "Endpoints and Endpoint names: A Proposed
              Enhancement to the Internet Architecture", Internet-
              Draft http://www.chiappa.net/~jnc/tech/endpoints.txt.

   [CONS]     Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., and D. Meyer, "LISP-CONS: A



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              Content distribution Overlay Network  Service for LISP",
              draft-meyer-lisp-cons-04.txt (work in progress).

   [EMACS]    Brim, S., Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Curran, "EID
              Mappings Multicast Across Cooperating Systems for LISP",
              draft-curran-lisp-emacs-00.txt (work in progress).

   [INTERWORK]
              Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller,
              "Interworking LISP with IPv4 and IPv6",
              draft-ietf-lisp-interworking-02.txt (work in progress).

   [KARP]     Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
              Routing Protocols (KARP)Design Guidelines",
              draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-06.txt (work in progress),
              October 2011.

   [LCAF]     Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Snijders, "LISP Canonical
              Address Format", draft-farinacci-lisp-lcaf-06.txt (work in
              progress).

   [LISA96]   Lear, E., Katinsky, J., Coffin, J., and D. Tharp,
              "Renumbering: Threat or Menace?", Usenix .

   [LISP-DEPLOY]
              Jakab, L., Coras, F., Domingo-Pascual, J., and D. Lewis,
              "LISP Network Element Deployment Considerations",
              draft-ietf-lisp-deployment-02.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-LIG]
              Farinacci, D. and D. Meyer, "LISP Internet Groper (LIG)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-lig-06.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MAIN]
              Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis,
              "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)",
              draft-farinacci-lisp-12.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MIB]
              Schudel, G., Jain, A., and V. Moreno, "LISP MIB",
              draft-ietf-lisp-mib-02.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MN]  Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Lewis, D., and D. Meyer, "LISP
              Mobility Architecture", draft-meyer-lisp-mn-06.txt (work
              in progress).

   [LISP-SEC]
              Maino, F., Ermagon, V., Cabellos, A., Sausez, D., and O.



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              Bonaventure, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-sec-00.txt (work in progress).

   [LOC-ID-ARCH]
              Meyer, D. and D. Lewis, "Architectural Implications of
              Locator/ID  Separation",
              draft-meyer-loc-id-implications-02.txt (work in progress).

   [MLISP]    Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., Zwiebel, J., and S. Venaas,
              "LISP for Multicast Environments",
              draft-ietf-lisp-multicast-10.txt (work in progress).

   [NERD]     Lear, E., "NERD: A Not-so-novel EID to RLOC Database",
              draft-lear-lisp-nerd-08.txt (work in progress).

   [OPENLISP]
              Iannone, L. and O. Bonaventure, "OpenLISP Implementation
              Report", draft-iannone-openlisp-implementation-01.txt
              (work in progress).

   [RADIR]    Narten, T., "Routing and Addressing Problem Statement",
              draft-narten-radir-problem-statement-05.txt (work in
              progress).

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC2784]  Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
              Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
              March 2000.

   [RFC3056]  Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
              via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC4192]  Baker, F., Lear, E., and R. Droms, "Procedures for
              Renumbering an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day", RFC 4192,
              September 2005.

   [RFC4866]  Arkko, J., Vogt, C., and W. Haddad, "Enhanced Route
              Optimization for Mobile IPv6", RFC 4866, May 2007.

   [RFC4984]  Meyer, D., Zhang, L., and K. Fall, "Report from the IAB
              Workshop on Routing and Addressing", RFC 4984,



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              September 2007.

   [RPKI]     Lepinski, M., "An Infrastructure to Support Secure
              Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13.txt (work in
              progress), February 2011.














































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Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   An initial thank you goes to Dave Oran for planting the seeds for the
   initial ideas for LISP.  His consultation continues to provide value
   to the LISP authors.

   A special and appreciative thank you goes to Noel Chiappa for
   providing architectural impetus over the past decades on separation
   of location and identity, as well as detailed review of the LISP
   architecture and documents, coupled with enthusiasm for making LISP a
   practical and incremental transition for the Internet.

   The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge many people who have
   contributed discussion and ideas to the making of this proposal.
   They include Scott Brim, Andrew Partan, John Zwiebel, Jason Schiller,
   Lixia Zhang, Dorian Kim, Peter Schoenmaker, Vijay Gill, Geoff Huston,
   David Conrad, Mark Handley, Ron Bonica, Ted Seely, Mark Townsley,
   Chris Morrow, Brian Weis, Dave McGrew, Peter Lothberg, Dave Thaler,
   Eliot Lear, Shane Amante, Ved Kafle, Olivier Bonaventure, Luigi
   Iannone, Robin Whittle, Brian Carpenter, Joel Halpern, Terry
   Manderson, Roger Jorgensen, Ran Atkinson, Stig Venaas, Iljitsch van
   Beijnum, Roland Bless, Dana Blair, Bill Lynch, Marc Woolward, Damien
   Saucez, Damian Lezama, Attilla De Groot, Parantap Lahiri, David
   Black, Roque Gagliano, Isidor Kouvelas, Jesper Skriver, Fred Templin,
   Margaret Wasserman, Sam Hartman, Michael Hofling, Pedro Marques, Jari
   Arkko, Gregg Schudel, Srinivas Subramanian, Amit Jain, Xu Xiaohu,
   Dhirendra Trivedi, Yakov Rekhter, John Scudder, John Drake, Dimitri
   Papadimitriou, Ross Callon, Selina Heimlich, Job Snijders, Vina
   Ermagan, Albert Cabellos, Fabio Maino, Victor Moreno, Chris White,
   Clarence Filsfils, and Alia Atlas.

   This work originated in the Routing Research Group (RRG) of the IRTF.
   The individual submission [LISP-MAIN] was converted into this IETF
   LISP working group draft.

   The LISP working group would like to give a special thanks to Jari
   Arkko, the Internet Area AD at the time the set of LISP documents
   were being prepared for IESG last call, for his meticulous review and
   detail commentary on the 7 working group last call drafts progressing
   toward experimental RFCs.











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Appendix B.  Document Change Log

B.1.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-20.txt

   o  Posted January 2012 for resolution to Adrian Farrel's comments and
      Elwyn Davies Gen-Art comments.

B.2.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt

   o  Posted January 2012 for Stephen Farrell's comment resolution.

B.3.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-18.txt

   o  Posted December 2011 after reflecting comments from IANA.

   o  Create reference to sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 about DF bit setting
      from section 5.3.

   o  Inserted two references for Route-Returnability and on-path
      attacks in Security Considerations section.

B.4.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-17.txt

   o  Posted December 2011 after IETF last call comments.

   o  Make Map-Notify port assignment be 4342 in both source and
      destination ports.  This change was agreed on and put in [LISP-MS]
      but was not updated in this spec.

B.5.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-16.txt

   o  Posted October 2011 after AD review by Jari.

B.6.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-15.txt

   o  Posted July 2011.  Fixing IDnits errors.

   o  Change description on how to select a source address for RLOC-
      probe Map-Replies to refer to the "EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply Message"
      section.

B.7.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-14.txt

   o  Post working group last call and pre-IESG last call review.

   o  Indicate that an ICMP Unreachable message should be sent when a
      packet matches a drop-based negative map-cache entry.




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   o  Indicate how a map-cache set of overlapping EID-prefixes must
      maintain integrity when the map-cache maximum cap is reached.

   o  Add Joel's description for the definition of an EID, that the bit
      string value can be an RLOC for another device in abstract but the
      architecture allows it to be an EID of one device and the same
      value as an RLOC for another device.

   o  In the "Tunnel Encapsulation Details" section, indicate that 4
      combinations of encapsulation are supported.

   o  Add what ETR should do for a Data-Probe when received for a
      destination EID outside of its EID-prefix range.  This was added
      in the Data Probe definition section.

   o  Added text indicating that more-specific EID-prefixes must not be
      removed when less-specific entries stay in the map-cache.  This is
      to preserve the integrity of the EID-prefix set.

   o  Add clarifying text in the Security Considerations section about
      how an ETR must not decapsulate and forward a packet that is not
      for its configured EID-prefix range.

B.8.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-13.txt

   o  Posted June 2011 to complete working group last call.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Put Yakov suggested wording in the EID-prefix
      definition section to reference [INTERWORK] and [LISP-DEPLOY]
      about discussion on transition and access mechanisms.

   o  Change "ITRs" to "ETRs" in the Locator Status Bit definition
      section and data packet description section per Damien's comment.

   o  Remove the normative reference to [LISP-SEC] when describing the
      S-bit in the ECM and Map-Reply headers.

   o  Tracker item 54.  Added text from John Scudder in the "Packets
      Egressing a LISP Site" section.

   o  Add sentence to the "Reencapsulating Tunnel" definition about how
      reencapsulation loops can occur when not coordinating among
      multiple mapping database systems.

   o  Remove "In theory" from a sentence in the Security Considerations
      section.





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   o  Remove Security Area Statement title and reword section with
      Eliot's provided text.  The text was agreed upon by LISP-WG chairs
      and Security ADs.

   o  Remove word "potential" from the over-claiming paragraph of the
      Security Considerations section per Stephen's request.

   o  Wordsmithing and other editorial comments from Alia.

B.9.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-12.txt

   o  Posted April 2011.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Provided rewording how an EID-prefix can be
      reused in the definition section of "EID-prefix".

   o  Tracker item 95.  Change "eliminate" to "defer" in section 4.1.

   o  Tracker item 110.  Added that the Mapping Protocol Data field in
      the Map-Reply message is only used when needed by the particular
      Mapping Database System.

   o  Tracker item 111.  Indicate that if an LSB that is associated with
      an anycast address, that there is at least one RLOC that is up.

   o  Tracker item 108.  Make clear the R-bit does not define RLOC path
      reachability.

   o  Tracker item 107.  Indicate that weights are relative to each
      other versus requiring an addition of up to 100%.

   o  Tracker item 46.  Add a sentence how LISP products should be sized
      for the appropriate demand so cache thrashing is avoided.

   o  Change some references of RFC 5226 to [AFI] per Luigi.

   o  Per Luigi, make reference to "EID-AFI" consistent to "EID-prefix-
      AFI".

   o  Tracker item 66.  Indicate that appending locators to a locator-
      set is done when the added locators are lexicographically greater
      than the previous ones in the set.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Once again reword the definition of the EID-
      prefix to reflect recent comments.

   o  Tracker item 70.  Added text to security section on what the
      implications could be if an ITR does not obey priority and weights



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      from a Map-Reply message.

   o  Tracker item 54.  Added text to the new section titled "Packets
      Egressing a LISP Site" to describe the implications when two or
      more ITRs exist at a site where only one ITR is used for egress
      traffic and when there is a shift of traffic to the others, how
      the map-cache will need to be populated in those new egress ITRs.

   o  Tracker item 33.  Make more clear in the Routing Locator Selection
      section what an ITR should do when it sees an R-bit of 0 in a
      locator-record of a Map-Reply.

   o  Tracker item 33.  Add paragraph to the EID Reachability section
      indicating that site partitioning is under investigation.

   o  Tracker item 58.  Added last paragraph of Security Considerations
      section about how to protect inner header EID address spoofing
      attacks.

   o  Add suggested Sam text to indicate that all security concerns need
      not be addressed for moving document to Experimental RFC status.
      Put this in a subsection of the Security Considerations section.

B.10.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-11.txt

   o  Posted March 30, 2011.

   o  Change IANA URL.  The URL we had pointed to a general protocol
      numbers page.

   o  Added the "s" bit to the Map-Request to allow SMR-invoked Map-
      Requests to be sent to a MN ETR via the map-server.

   o  Generalize text for the definition of Reencapsuatling tunnels.

   o  Add paragraph suggested by Joel to explain how implementation
      experimentation will be used to determine the proper cache
      management techniques.

   o  Add Yakov provided text for the definition of "EID-to-RLOC
      "Database".

   o  Add reference in Section 8, Deployment Scenarios, to the
      draft-jakab-lisp-deploy-02.txt draft.

   o  Clarify sentence about no hardware changes needed to support LISP
      encapsulation.




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   o  Add paragraph about what is the procedure when a locator is
      inserted in the middle of a locator-set.

   o  Add a definition for Locator Status Bits so we can emphasize they
      are used as a hint for router up/down status and not path
      reachability.

   o  Change "BGP RIB" to "RIB" per Clarence's comment.

   o  Fixed complaints by IDnits.

   o  Add subsection to Security Considerations section indicating how
      EID-prefix overclaiming in Map-Replies is for further study and
      add a reference to LISP-SEC.

B.11.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt

   o  Posted March 2011.

   o  Add p-bit to Map-Request so there is documentary reasons to know
      when a PITR has sent a Map-Request to an ETR.

   o  Add Map-Notify message which is used to acknowledge a Map-Register
      message sent to a Map-Server.

   o  Add M-bit to the Map-Register message so an ETR that wants an
      acknowledgment for the Map-Register can request one.

   o  Add S-bit to the ECM and Map-Reply messages to describe security
      data that can be present in each message.  Then refer to
      [LISP-SEC] for expansive details.

   o  Add Network Management Considerations section and point to the MIB
      and LIG drafts.

   o  Remove the word "simple" per Yakov's comments.

B.12.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt

   o  Posted October 2010.

   o  Add to IANA Consideration section about the use of LCAF Type
      values that accepted and maintained by the IANA registry and not
      the LCAF specification.

   o  Indicate that implementations should be able to receive LISP
      control messages when either UDP port is 4342, so they can be
      robust in the face of intervening NAT boxes.



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   o  Add paragraph to SMR section to indicate that an ITR does not need
      to respond to an SMR-based Map-Request when it has no map-cache
      entry for the SMR source's EID-prefix.

B.13.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-08.txt

   o  Posted August 2010.

   o  In section 6.1.6, remove statement about setting TTL to 0 in Map-
      Register messages.

   o  Clarify language in section 6.1.5 about Map-Replying to Data-
      Probes or Map-Requests.

   o  Indicate that outer TTL should only be copied to inner TTL when it
      is less than inner TTL.

   o  Indicate a source-EID for RLOC-probes are encoded with an AFI
      value of 0.

   o  Indicate that SMRs can have a global or per SMR destination rate-
      limiter.

   o  Add clarifications to the SMR procedures.

   o  Add definitions for "client-side" and 'server-side" terms used in
      this specification.

   o  Clear up language in section 6.4, last paragraph.

   o  Change ACT of value 0 to "no-action".  This is so we can RLOC-
      probe a PETR and have it return a Map-Reply with a locator-set of
      size 0.  The way it is spec'ed the map-cache entry has action
      "dropped".  Drop-action is set to 3.

   o  Add statement about normalizing locator weights.

   o  Clarify R-bit definition in the Map-Reply locator record.

   o  Add section on EID Reachability within a LISP site.

   o  Clarify another disadvantage of using anycast locators.

   o  Reworded Abstract.

   o  Change section 2.0 Introduction to remove obsolete information
      such as the LISP variant definitions.




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   o  Change section 5 title from "Tunneling Details" to "LISP
      Encapsulation Details".

   o  Changes to section 5 to include results of network deployment
      experience with MTU.  Recommend that implementations use either
      the stateful or stateless handling.

   o  Make clarification wordsmithing to Section 7 and 8.

   o  Identify that if there is one locator in the locator-set of a map-
      cache entry, that an SMR from that locator should be responded to
      by sending the the SMR-invoked Map-Request to the database mapping
      system rather than to the RLOC itself (which may be unreachable).

   o  When describing Unicast and Multicast Weights indicate the the
      values are relative weights rather than percentages.  So it
      doesn't imply the sum of all locator weights in the locator-set
      need to be 100.

   o  Do some wordsmithing on copying TTL and TOS fields.

   o  Numerous wordsmithing changes from Dave Meyer.  He fine toothed
      combed the spec.

   o  Removed Section 14 "Prototype Plans and Status".  We felt this
      type of section is no longer appropriate for a protocol
      specification.

   o  Add clarification text for the IRC description per Damien's
      commentary.

   o  Remove text on copying nonce from SMR to SMR-invoked Map- Request
      per Vina's comment about a possible DoS vector.

   o  Clarify (S/2 + H) in the stateless MTU section.

   o  Add text to reflect Damien's comment about the description of the
      "ITR-RLOC Address" field in the Map-Request. that the list of RLOC
      addresses are local addresses of the Map-Requester.

B.14.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-07.txt

   o  Posted April 2010.

   o  Added I-bit to data header so LSB field can also be used as an
      Instance ID field.  When this occurs, the LSB field is reduced to
      8-bits (from 32-bits).




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   o  Added V-bit to the data header so the 24-bit nonce field can also
      be used for source and destination version numbers.

   o  Added Map-Version 12-bit value to the EID-record to be used in all
      of Map-Request, Map-Reply, and Map-Register messages.

   o  Added multiple ITR-RLOC fields to the Map-Request packet so an ETR
      can decide what address to select for the destination of a Map-
      Reply.

   o  Added L-bit (Local RLOC bit) and p-bit (Probe-Reply RLOC bit) to
      the Locator-Set record of an EID-record for a Map-Reply message.
      The L-bit indicates which RLOCs in the locator-set are local to
      the sender of the message.  The P-bit indicates which RLOC is the
      source of a RLOC-probe Reply (Map-Reply) message.

   o  Add reference to the LISP Canonical Address Format [LCAF] draft.

   o  Made editorial and clarification changes based on comments from
      Dhirendra Trivedi.

   o  Added wordsmithing comments from Joel Halpern on DF=3D1 setting.

   o  Add John Zwiebel clarification to Echo Nonce Algorithm section
      6.3.1.

   o  Add John Zwiebel comment about expanding on proxy-map-reply bit
      for Map-Register messages.

   o  Add NAT section per Ron Bonica comments.

   o  Fix IDnits issues per Ron Bonica.

   o  Added section on Virtualization and Segmentation to explain the
      use if the Instance ID field in the data header.

   o  There are too many P-bits, keep their scope to the packet format
      description and refer to them by name every where else in the
      spec.

   o  Scanned all occurrences of "should", "should not", "must" and
      "must not" and uppercased them.

   o  John Zwiebel offered text for section 4.1 to modernize the
      example.  Thanks Z!

   o  Make it more clear in the definition of "EID-to-RLOC Database"
      that all ETRs need to have the same database mapping.  This



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      reflects a comment from John Scudder.

   o  Add a definition "Route-returnability" to the Definition of Terms
      section.

   o  In section 9.2, add text to describe what the signature of
      traceroute packets can look like.

   o  Removed references to Data Probe for introductory example.  Data-
      probes are still part of the LISP design but not encouraged.

   o  Added the definition for "LISP site" to the Definition of Terms"
      section.

B.15.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-06.txt

   Editorial based changes:

   o  Posted December 2009.

   o  Fix typo for flags in LISP data header.  Changed from "4" to "5".

   o  Add text to indicate that Map-Register messages must contain a
      computed UDP checksum.

   o  Add definitions for PITR and PETR.

   o  Indicate an AFI value of 0 is an unspecified address.

   o  Indicate that the TTL field of a Map-Register is not used and set
      to 0 by the sender.  This change makes this spec consistent with
      [LISP-MS].

   o  Change "... yield a packet size of L octets" to "... yield a
      packet size greater than L octets".

   o  Clarify section 6.1.5 on what addresses and ports are used in Map-
      Reply messages.

   o  Clarify that LSBs that go beyond the number of locators do not to
      be SMRed when the locator addresses are greater lexicographically
      than the locator in the existing locator-set.

   o  Add Gregg, Srini, and Amit to acknowledgment section.

   o  Clarify in the definition of a LISP header what is following the
      UDP header.




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   o  Clarify "verifying Map-Request" text in section 6.1.3.

   o  Add Xu Xiaohu to the acknowledgment section for introducing the
      problem of overlapping EID-prefixes among multiple sites in an RRG
      email message.

   Design based changes:

   o  Use stronger language to have the outer IPv4 header set DF=3D1 so =
we
      can avoid fragment reassembly in an ETR or PETR.  This will also
      make IPv4 and IPv6 encapsulation have consistent behavior.

   o  Map-Requests should not be sent in ECM with the Probe bit is set.
      These type of Map-Requests are used as RLOC-probes and are sent
      directly to locator addresses in the underlying network.

   o  Add text in section 6.1.5 about returning all EID-prefixes in a
      Map-Reply sent by an ETR when there are overlapping EID-prefixes
      configure.

   o  Add text in a new subsection of section 6.1.5 about dealing with
      Map-Replies with coarse EID-prefixes.

B.16.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-05.txt

   o  Posted September 2009.

   o  Added this Document Change Log appendix.

   o  Added section indicating that encapsulated Map-Requests must use
      destination UDP port 4342.

   o  Don't use AH in Map-Registers.  Put key-id, auth-length, and auth-
      data in Map-Register payload.

   o  Added Jari to acknowledgment section.

   o  State the source-EID is set to 0 when using Map-Requests to
      refresh or RLOC-probe.

   o  Make more clear what source-RLOC should be for a Map-Request.

   o  The LISP-CONS authors thought that the Type definitions for CONS
      should be removed from this specification.

   o  Removed nonce from Map-Register message, it wasn't used so no need
      for it.




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   o  Clarify what to do for unspecified Action bits for negative Map-
      Replies.  Since No Action is a drop, make value 0 Drop.

B.17.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-04.txt

   o  Posted September 2009.

   o  How do deal with record count greater than 1 for a Map-Request.
      Damien and Joel comment.  Joel suggests: 1) Specify that senders
      compliant with the current document will always set the count to
      1, and note that the count is included for future extensibility.
      2) Specify what a receiver compliant with the draft should do if
      it receives a request with a count greater than 1.  Presumably, it
      should send some error back?

   o  Add Fred Templin in acknowledgment section.

   o  Add Margaret and Sam to the acknowledgment section for their great
      comments.

   o  Say more about LAGs in the UDP section per Sam Hartman's comment.

   o  Sam wants to use MAY instead of SHOULD for ignoring checksums on
      ETR.  =46rom the mailing list: "You'd need to word it as an ITR =
MAY
      send a zero checksum, an ETR MUST accept a 0 checksum and MAY
      ignore the checksum completely.  And of course we'd need to
      confirm that can actually be implemented.  In particular, hardware
      that verifies UDP checksums on receive needs to be checked to make
      sure it permits 0 checksums."

   o  Margaret wants a reference to
      http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-eubanks-chimento-6man-00.txt.

   o  Fix description in Map-Request section.  Where we describe Map-
      Reply Record, change "R-bit" to "M-bit".

   o  Add the mobility bit to Map-Replies.  So PITRs don't probe so
      often for MNs but often enough to get mapping updates.

   o  Indicate SHA1 can be used as well for Map-Registers.

   o  More Fred comments on MTU handling.

   o  Isidor comment about spec'ing better periodic Map-Registers.  Will
      be fixed in draft-ietf-lisp-ms-02.txt.

   o  Margaret's comment on gleaning: "The current specification does
      not make it clear how long gleaned map entries should be retained



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      in the cache, nor does it make it clear how/ when they will be
      validated.  The LISP spec should, at the very least, include a
      (short) default lifetime for gleaned entries, require that they be
      validated within a short period of time, and state that a new
      gleaned entry should never overwrite an entry that was obtained
      from the mapping system.  The security implications of storing
      "gleaned" entries should also be explored in detail."

   o  Add section on RLOC-probing per working group feedback.

   o  Change "loc-reach-bits" to "loc-status-bits" per comment from
      Noel.

   o  Remove SMR-bit from data-plane.  Dino prefers to have it in the
      control plane only.

   o  Change LISP header to allow a "Research Bit" so the Nonce and LSB
      fields can be turned off and used for another future purpose.  For
      Luigi et al versioning convergence.

   o  Add a N-bit to the data header suggested by Noel.  Then the nonce
      field could be used when N is not 1.

   o  Clarify that when E-bit is 0, the nonce field can be an echoed
      nonce or a random nonce.  Comment from Jesper.

   o  Indicate when doing data-gleaning that a verifying Map-Request is
      sent to the source-EID of the gleaned data packet so we can avoid
      map-cache corruption by a 3rd party.  Comment from Pedro.

   o  Indicate that a verifying Map-Request, for accepting mapping data,
      should be sent over the ALT (or to the EID).

   o  Reference IPsec RFC 4302.  Comment from Sam and Brian Weis.

   o  Put E-bit in Map-Reply to tell ITRs that the ETR supports echo-
      noncing.  Comment by Pedro and Dino.

   o  Jesper made a comment to loosen the language about requiring the
      copy of inner TTL to outer TTL since the text to get mixed-AF
      traceroute to work would violate the "MUST" clause.  Changed from
      MUST to SHOULD in section 5.3.

B.18.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-03.txt

   o  Posted July 2009.





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   o  Removed loc-reach-bits longword from control packets per Damien
      comment.

   o  Clarifications in MTU text from Roque.

   o  Added text to indicate that the locator-set be sorted by locator
      address from Isidor.

   o  Clarification text from John Zwiebel in Echo-Nonce section.

B.19.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-02.txt

   o  Posted July 2009.

   o  Encapsulation packet format change to add E-bit and make loc-
      reach-bits 32-bits in length.

   o  Added Echo-Nonce Algorithm section.

   o  Clarification how ECN bits are copied.

   o  Moved S-bit in Map-Request.

   o  Added P-bit in Map-Request and Map-Reply messages to anticipate
      RLOC-Probe Algorithm.

   o  Added to Mobility section to reference [LISP-MN].

B.20.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-01.txt

   o  Posted 2 days after draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt in May 2009.

   o  Defined LEID to be a "LISP EID".

   o  Indicate encapsulation use IPv4 DF=3D0.

   o  Added negative Map-Reply messages with drop, native-forward, and
      send-map-request actions.

   o  Added Proxy-Map-Reply bit to Map-Register.

B.21.  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt

   o  Posted May 2009.

   o  Rename of draft-farinacci-lisp-12.txt.





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   o  Acknowledgment to RRG.


















































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Authors' Addresses

   Dino Farinacci
   cisco Systems
   Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: dino@cisco.com


   Vince Fuller
   cisco Systems
   Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: vaf@cisco.com


   Dave Meyer
   cisco Systems
   170 Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA
   USA

   Email: dmm@cisco.com


   Darrel Lewis
   cisco Systems
   170 Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA
   USA

   Email: darlewis@cisco.com















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Hi, Alexey,

Thanks for the review; questions and comments thereon inline...

On Jan 14, 2012, at 9:45 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on =
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at =
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments =
you may receive.
>=20
> Document: draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
> Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
> Review Date: 2012=9601=9614
> IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-17
> IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19
>=20
> Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a Proposed =
Standard RFC.
>=20
>=20
> Major issues:
>=20
> In Section 3:
>=20
>   The RID callback MUST contain a zero-length entity body
>   and a 'RID-Callback-Token' entity header
>=20
> [Minor issue] "header" --> "header field" (header is the collection of =
all header fields).
>=20
>   , itself containing a unique
>   token generated by the receiving RID system.
>=20
> I am missing ABNF for the new header field.

Seems a little superfluous... it's an opaque string, but I suppose we =
should point out it doesn't contain \r or \n... Will add.

>   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>   authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>=20
> Do you mean that a RID client must use X.509 certificates?

Well, each RID system (HTTP client or server) is identified by an X.509 =
certificate (hence "mutual"); how can I make this clearer?

>   authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>=20
> I find the whole sentence to be confusing. Note that the rules of RFC =
6125 for certificate verification are stricter than in RFC 2818 and this =
sentence can be read as conflicting with the paragraph below which =
requires use of RFC 6125. What are you trying to say here?

The intention here is "Use current best practices as would be supported =
by off-the-shelf HTTP/1.1 and TLS 1.1 implementations to provide mutual =
authentication." "Current best practices", however, seems to be =
something of a moving target.

I cite 2818 as it is the current binding between HTTP/1.1 and TLS. I =
cite 6125 solely for certificate verification.=20

>   RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
>   RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
>   verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from the
>   DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the =
certificate,
>=20
> I am confused: this is the first time DNS SRV records are mentioned
> (BTW, they need a Normative Reference). Earlier text seem to suggest =
that DNS SRV are not used to locate protocol endpoints. If RID is using =
DNS SRV, then information about how it is used is missing from the =
document.

It doesn't. Was trying to point out here that SRV must be matched if =
(for deployment-specific reasons) it was present. This is simply a poor =
attempt at citing 6125.

>   as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
>=20
> RFC 6125 allows for various options and this paragraph doesn't seem to =
cover all of them. I suggest you check Section 13.7.1.2.1 of RFC 6120 =
for an example of what should be specified (ignore XmppAddr identifier =
type, as it is very XMPP specific). For X.509 SANs which are disallowed, =
you should say so.

Will do. (6125 is missing something here, a guide for using it in other =
specs...)

Best regards,

Brian=

From mccap@petoni.org  Wed Jan 18 01:54:33 2012
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
< http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-ospf-multi-instance-08
Reviewer: Peter McCann
Review Date: 2012-01-18
IETF LC End Date:
IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19

Summary: Ready

Major issues: None

Minor issues: None

Nits/editorial comments:

Section 3.2:
   compatibility the base OSPF
SHOULD BE:
   compatibility with the base OSPF

   This is IPv4 instance
SHOULD BE:
   This IPv4 instance

From acee.lindem@ericsson.com  Wed Jan 18 04:17:24 2012
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From: Acee Lindem <acee.lindem@ericsson.com>
To: Pete McCann <mccap@petoni.org>
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Hi Pete,=20
Thanks for the review and editorial comments. These will be incorporated in=
 the -09 version of the draft.=20
Thanks,
Acee=20
On Jan 18, 2012, at 4:54 AM, Pete McCann wrote:

> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> < http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
> or AD before posting a new version of the draft.
>=20
> Document: draft-ietf-ospf-multi-instance-08
> Reviewer: Peter McCann
> Review Date: 2012-01-18
> IETF LC End Date:
> IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19
>=20
> Summary: Ready
>=20
> Major issues: None
>=20
> Minor issues: None
>=20
> Nits/editorial comments:
>=20
> Section 3.2:
>   compatibility the base OSPF
> SHOULD BE:
>   compatibility with the base OSPF
>=20
>   This is IPv4 instance
> SHOULD BE:
>   This IPv4 instance


From simon@josefsson.org  Wed Jan 18 05:23:28 2012
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From: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
To: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> writes:

> -- section 4, 3rd and 4th paragraph (paragraph a and b)
>
> These seem like protocol affecting differences. If so, they need
> elaboration, such as normative statements and formal definitions, or
> references to such.
>
> -- section 5, general:
>
> The section seems to need further elaboration or references

Hello Ben.  Thank you for your review.  Klaas pointed me at this part
and I will try to work this out with you.

Re section 4 I believe your comment is based on a misunderstanding.  Let
me try to explain what the intention is, and we can work out how to fix
the text if needed.  What is described in paragraph a) and b) are the
protocol requirements that (implicitely) follow from GS2.  There is
nothing particular to this protocol in there.  Let's take a step back:

The purpose of GS2 is to map any GSS-API mechanism into a SASL
mechanism.  However, SASL-SAML is defined as a SASL mechanism (because
SASL implementers wants it that way).  The point of section 4 is to turn
this SASL mechanism into a GSS-API mechanism that, after the SAML
GSS-API mechanism is used via GS2, becomes identical to the SAML
mechanism defined in the rest of the SASL-SAML document.  This is a bit
convuleted to describe, but this is the gist of it.

(It would have been simpler to specify a SAML GSS-API mechanism and then
let GS2 convert it to SASL automatically, but some SASL people doesn't
want anything to do with GSS-API so this is a compromise to allow them
to implement SAML-SASL without touching GSS-API.)

I'm thinking that perhaps the above explanation would be useful to have
in the document, to give some background.  If you agree, I propose to
resolve your section 4 comment by making this change:

OLD:
  The SAML SASL mechanism is actually also a GSS-API mechanism.  The
  SAML user takes the role of the GSS-API Initiator and the SAML

NEW:
  This section specify a GSS-API mechanism that when used via the GS2
  bridge to SASL behave like the SASL mechanism defined in this
  document.  Thus, it can loosely be said that the SAML SASL mechanism
  is also a GSS-API mechanism.

  The SAML user takes the role of the GSS-API Initiator and the SAML

Does this resolve your concern re section 4?

Re your section 5 comment, I tend to agree.  The section is quite brief
because it was ripped out of section 3.1.  I propose that we simply
collapse this section back into 3.1 where it makes more sense.  Thus:

OLD:
      - See Section 5 for the channel binding "gs2-cb-flag" field.

NEW:
      - The "gs2-cb-flag" MUST be set to "n" because channel binding
        data cannot be integrity protected by the SAML negotiation.
        (Note: In theory channel binding data could be inserted in the
        SAML flow by the client and verified by the server, but that is
        currently not supported in SAML.)

And then remove section 5 completely.  Section 3 and in particular
section 3.1 already contains the relevant references and provides the
context where the statements make sense.

What do you think?

Thanks,
/Simon

From simon@josefsson.org  Wed Jan 18 05:29:39 2012
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Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> writes:

>> -- section 7 
>> 
>> Does the GSS-API description introduce security considerations? If
>> not, please say so.
>> 
>
> I did not see a response to this comment.

I missed this in my last e-mail.  I propose we add another sub-section
of the security considerations like this:

7.5. GSS-API specific security considerations

   Security issues inherent in GSS-API (RFC 2743) and GS2 (RFC 5801)
   apply to the SAML GSS-API mechanism defined in this document.
   Further, and as discussed in section 4, proper TLS server identity
   verification is critical to the security of the mechanism.

I believe this should cover the relevant security considerations.  Of
course, having more implementation experience with the SAML mechanism
used as a GSS-API mechanism may help to identify further security
considerations for the GSS-API mechanism.  However, I don't believe that
is a show-stopper that prevent publication now.

/Simon

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Wed Jan 18 06:38:32 2012
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Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 17/01/2012 10:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
> Hi, Alexey,
>
> Thanks for the review; questions and comments thereon inline...
>
> On Jan 14, 2012, at 9:45 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>
>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-=
ART, please see the FAQ at<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/Gen=
Artfaq>.
>>
>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you=
 may receive.
>>
>> Document: draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
>> Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
>> Review Date: 2012=9601=9614
>> IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-17
>> IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19
>>
>> Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a Proposed Standar=
d RFC.
>>
>>
>> Major issues:
>>
>> In Section 3:
>>
>>    The RID callback MUST contain a zero-length entity body
>>    and a 'RID-Callback-Token' entity header
>>
>> [Minor issue] "header" -->  "header field" (header is the collection of a=
ll header fields).
>>
>>    , itself containing a unique
>>    token generated by the receiving RID system.
>>
>> I am missing ABNF for the new header field.
> Seems a little superfluous... it's an opaque string, but I suppose we shou=
ld point out it doesn't contain \r or \n...
Saying it is an opaque string is Ok, but you don't even specify which=20
characters are allowed in it.
>   Will add.
Thanks.
>>    RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>>    authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>>
>> Do you mean that a RID client must use X.509 certificates?
> Well, each RID system (HTTP client or server) is identified by an X.509 ce=
rtificate (hence "mutual"); how can I make this clearer?
>
>>    authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>>
>> I find the whole sentence to be confusing. Note that the rules of RFC 612=
5 for certificate verification are stricter than in RFC 2818 and this senten=
ce can be read as conflicting with the paragraph below which requires use of=
 RFC 6125. What are you trying to say here?
> The intention here is "Use current best practices as would be supported by=
 off-the-shelf HTTP/1.1 and TLS 1.1 implementations to provide mutual authen=
tication." "Current best practices", however, seems to be something of a mov=
ing target.
>
> I cite 2818 as it is the current binding between HTTP/1.1 and TLS. I cite =
6125 solely for certificate verification.
How about something like this:

OLD:
   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
   authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
   authentication, as in [RFC2818].

NEW:
   RID systems MUST use HTTP over TLS as specified in [RFC2818], with=20
the exception
   of server TLS identity verification which is detailed below.
   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
   X.509 authentication. TLS provides for transport confidentiality,
   identification, and authentication.
>>    RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
>>    RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
>>    verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from the
>>    DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the certificate,
>>
>> I am confused: this is the first time DNS SRV records are mentioned
>> (BTW, they need a Normative Reference). Earlier text seem to suggest that=
 DNS SRV are not used to locate protocol endpoints. If RID is using DNS SRV,=
 then information about how it is used is missing from the document.
> It doesn't. Was trying to point out here that SRV must be matched if (for =
deployment-specific reasons) it was present. This is simply a poor attempt a=
t citing 6125.
SRV-ID are really only applicable to protocols which are using DNS SRV.=20
So I would have prohibited them... But if you want to keep using them,=20
you need to specify what is the service name you would expect in them.
>>    as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
>>
>> RFC 6125 allows for various options and this paragraph doesn't seem to co=
ver all of them. I suggest you check Section 13.7.1.2.1 of RFC 6120 for an e=
xample of what should be specified (ignore XmppAddr identifier type, as it i=
s very XMPP specific). For X.509 SANs which are disallowed, you should say s=
o.
> Will do. (6125 is missing something here, a guide for using it in other sp=
ecs...)
>
> Best regards,
>
> Brian


From stpeter@stpeter.im  Wed Jan 18 08:14:04 2012
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Cc: draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation.all@tools.ietf.org, Mykyta Yevstifeyev <evnikita2@gmail.com>, gen-art@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] GenART review of draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation-00
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Mykyta, your continued involvement would be helpful.

Martin, here is my perspective...

On 12/17/11 7:46 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
> My concerns over motivation could be addressed by changing the
> introduction to remove the dependency on [W3C-PUBRULES] and providing
> a generic motivation.

That was done in version -01:

http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation-01.txt

> More inline.
> 
> On 17 December 2011 17:20, Mykyta Yevstifeyev <evnikita2@gmail.com> wrote:
>> The Intended status is Informational.
> 
> That much is clear from the first page of the draft.  I can't see any
> reason for why Informational was chosen over Proposed Standard.  Can
> you share one?

Mykyta might have been following the example of several other in-process
registration requests:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ohye-canonical-link-relation/

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-amundsen-item-and-collection-link-relations/

>>> There are some minor issues.
>>>
>>> Minor Issues:
>>> The semantics of the relation type are quite clear, though the
>>> introduction does not make a particularly compelling case for an RFC.
>>> The registration requirements of RFC 5988 require little more than the
>>> creation of a specification; that specification could be created
>>> anywhere (say, in [W3C-PUBRULES]).  I find the motivations described
>>> in the introduction to be not compelling.
>>
>> Publishing an RFC is an ideal way to accomplish RFC 5226 requirements
>> for Specification Required, I think; additionally, whereas it is easy
>> to initiate this work in IETF, it is not so easy to do this in W3C.
> 
> "It is easy" is not an especially good reason.

Martin, is there *harm* in completing these registrations via
informational RFCs?

Note that we typically do the same with URN Namespace registrations, see
these recent examples:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6288/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6289/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6338/
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6453/

>>> A more generic description would help.  A superficial reading might
>>> infer that the W3C is the only potential customer of this work,
>>> although it's clear that any organization that concerns itself with
>>> IPR rights (IETF included) might use it. It would be better if the
>>> specific use case were kept as an example, rather than the primary
>>> motivation.
>>
>> I provide the description of W3C use to demonstrate the current use of
>> relation type, and this description in no way means that other
>> organizations cannot use it.
> 
> My point is that the document should not focus on one single use case
> in one document. It should establish the usefulness of the relation
> type for a class of use cases and use the specific instance as an
> example only. The way the document is written it barely even hints at
> other uses.

Martin, I think this issue was addressed in version -01. BTW the latest
version is -02:

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation/

>>> Nits:
>>> Including explanatory statements is unnecessary and distracting.
>>
>> I see no harm in them.
> 
> Extra words that don't contribute to understanding the message are
> harmful.  I don't think these help.

Martin, please check version -02 to see if your concern has been
addressed. The explanatory text is much less prolix than it was previously.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/



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On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> On 17/01/2012 10:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>> Hi, Alexey,
>>=20
>> Thanks for the review; questions and comments thereon inline...
>>=20
>> On Jan 14, 2012, at 9:45 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>=20
>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on =
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ =
at<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>>=20
>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call =
comments you may receive.
>>>=20
>>> Document: draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
>>> Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
>>> Review Date: 2012=9601=9614
>>> IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-17
>>> IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19
>>>=20
>>> Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a Proposed =
Standard RFC.
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Major issues:
>>>=20
>>> In Section 3:
>>>=20
>>>   The RID callback MUST contain a zero-length entity body
>>>   and a 'RID-Callback-Token' entity header
>>>=20
>>> [Minor issue] "header" -->  "header field" (header is the collection =
of all header fields).
>>>=20
>>>   , itself containing a unique
>>>   token generated by the receiving RID system.
>>>=20
>>> I am missing ABNF for the new header field.
>> Seems a little superfluous... it's an opaque string, but I suppose we =
should point out it doesn't contain \r or \n...
> Saying it is an opaque string is Ok, but you don't even specify which =
characters are allowed in it.
>>  Will add.
> Thanks.

Hm. Good point; also didn't mention a maximum length. Fixed in -07, =
defined as 1*255(VCHAR).

>>>   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with =
mutual
>>>   authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>>>=20
>>> Do you mean that a RID client must use X.509 certificates?
>> Well, each RID system (HTTP client or server) is identified by an =
X.509 certificate (hence "mutual"); how can I make this clearer?
>>=20
>>>   authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>>>=20
>>> I find the whole sentence to be confusing. Note that the rules of =
RFC 6125 for certificate verification are stricter than in RFC 2818 and =
this sentence can be read as conflicting with the paragraph below which =
requires use of RFC 6125. What are you trying to say here?
>> The intention here is "Use current best practices as would be =
supported by off-the-shelf HTTP/1.1 and TLS 1.1 implementations to =
provide mutual authentication." "Current best practices", however, seems =
to be something of a moving target.
>>=20
>> I cite 2818 as it is the current binding between HTTP/1.1 and TLS. I =
cite 6125 solely for certificate verification.
> How about something like this:
>=20
> OLD:
>  RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>  authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>  authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>=20
> NEW:
>  RID systems MUST use HTTP over TLS as specified in [RFC2818], with =
the exception
>  of server TLS identity verification which is detailed below.

Ah. Okay, now I understand the issue...=20

>  RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>  X.509 authentication. TLS provides for transport confidentiality,
>  identification, and authentication.

The language has changed in -07 to the following; would this be =
acceptable?

   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
   authentication for confidentiality, identification, and
   authentication, as in [RFC2818], when transporting RID messages over
   HTTPS.  RID systems MUST use mutual authentication; that is, both RID
   systems acting as HTTPS clients and RID systems acting as HTTPS
   servers MUST be identified by an X.509 certificate [RFC5280].  Mutual
   authentication requires full path validation on each certificate, as
   defined in [RFC5280].

>>>   RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
>>>   RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
>>>   verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from =
the
>>>   DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the =
certificate,
>>>=20
>>> I am confused: this is the first time DNS SRV records are mentioned
>>> (BTW, they need a Normative Reference). Earlier text seem to suggest =
that DNS SRV are not used to locate protocol endpoints. If RID is using =
DNS SRV, then information about how it is used is missing from the =
document.
>> It doesn't. Was trying to point out here that SRV must be matched if =
(for deployment-specific reasons) it was present. This is simply a poor =
attempt at citing 6125.
> SRV-ID are really only applicable to protocols which are using DNS =
SRV. So I would have prohibited them... But if you want to keep using =
them, you need to specify what is the service name you would expect in =
them.

Indeed. We don't, so, removed. Thanks for the clarification.

Actually, since the binding between RID and a PKI is better defined in =
rfc6045-bis, 6046-bis now refers to it, as follows:

   Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as detailed
   in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].

Would this address the concern?

Many thanks, best regards,

Brian

>>>   as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
>>>=20
>>> RFC 6125 allows for various options and this paragraph doesn't seem =
to cover all of them. I suggest you check Section 13.7.1.2.1 of RFC 6120 =
for an example of what should be specified (ignore XmppAddr identifier =
type, as it is very XMPP specific). For X.509 SANs which are disallowed, =
you should say so.
>> Will do. (6125 is missing something here, a guide for using it in =
other specs...)
>>=20
>> Best regards,
>>=20
>> Brian


From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Wed Jan 18 09:44:12 2012
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From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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Hi Brian,

On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>> On 17/01/2012 10:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>> Hi, Alexey,
>>>
>>> Thanks for the review; questions and comments thereon inline...
>>>
>>> On Jan 14, 2012, at 9:45 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>
>>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Ge=
n-ART, please see the FAQ at<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/G=
enArtfaq>.
>>>>
>>>> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments y=
ou may receive.
>>>>
>>>> Document: draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
>>>> Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
>>>> Review Date: 2012=9601=9614
>>>> IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-17
>>>> IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19
>>>>
>>>> Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a Proposed Stand=
ard RFC.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Major issues:
>>>>
>>>> In Section 3:
>>>>
>>>>    The RID callback MUST contain a zero-length entity body
>>>>    and a 'RID-Callback-Token' entity header
>>>>
>>>> [Minor issue] "header" -->   "header field" (header is the collection o=
f all header fields).
>>>>
>>>>    , itself containing a unique
>>>>    token generated by the receiving RID system.
>>>>
>>>> I am missing ABNF for the new header field.
>>> Seems a little superfluous... it's an opaque string, but I suppose we sh=
ould point out it doesn't contain \r or \n...
>> Saying it is an opaque string is Ok, but you don't even specify which cha=
racters are allowed in it.
>>>   Will add.
>> Thanks.
> Hm. Good point; also didn't mention a maximum length. Fixed in -07, define=
d as 1*255(VCHAR).
I think this issue is resolved.
>>>>    RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>>>>    authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>>>>
>>>> Do you mean that a RID client must use X.509 certificates?
>>> Well, each RID system (HTTP client or server) is identified by an X.509 =
certificate (hence "mutual"); how can I make this clearer?
>>>
>>>>    authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>>>>
>>>> I find the whole sentence to be confusing. Note that the rules of RFC 6=
125 for certificate verification are stricter than in RFC 2818 and this sent=
ence can be read as conflicting with the paragraph below which requires use =
of RFC 6125. What are you trying to say here?
>>> The intention here is "Use current best practices as would be supported =
by off-the-shelf HTTP/1.1 and TLS 1.1 implementations to provide mutual auth=
entication." "Current best practices", however, seems to be something of a m=
oving target.
>>>
>>> I cite 2818 as it is the current binding between HTTP/1.1 and TLS. I cit=
e 6125 solely for certificate verification.
>> How about something like this:
>>
>> OLD:
>>   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>>   authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>>   authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>>
>> NEW:
>>   RID systems MUST use HTTP over TLS as specified in [RFC2818], with the =
exception
>>   of server TLS identity verification which is detailed below.
> Ah. Okay, now I understand the issue...
This is only one of them...
>>   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>>   X.509 authentication. TLS provides for transport confidentiality,
>>   identification, and authentication.
> The language has changed in -07 to the following; would this be acceptable=
?
>
>     RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>     authentication for confidentiality, identification, and
>     authentication, as in [RFC2818],
Part of the issue with this text is that reads as if "mutual=20
authentication" results in "confidentiality, identification and=20
authentication". TLS does, that is why I split the sentence into=20
multiple. Also RFC 2818 is a wrong reference because it doesn't even=20
mention confidentiality.
I am hoping this is not nitpicking, but I think using simpler sentences=20
clearer.
> when transporting RID messages over
>     HTTPS.
The rest looks good to me:
> RID systems MUST use mutual authentication; that is, both RID
>     systems acting as HTTPS clients and RID systems acting as HTTPS
>     servers MUST be identified by an X.509 certificate [RFC5280].  Mutual
>     authentication requires full path validation on each certificate, as
>     defined in [RFC5280].
>
>>>>    RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
>>>>    RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
>>>>    verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from the
>>>>    DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the certificate=
,
>>>>
>>>> I am confused: this is the first time DNS SRV records are mentioned
>>>> (BTW, they need a Normative Reference). Earlier text seem to suggest th=
at DNS SRV are not used to locate protocol endpoints. If RID is using DNS SR=
V, then information about how it is used is missing from the document.
>>> It doesn't. Was trying to point out here that SRV must be matched if (fo=
r deployment-specific reasons) it was present. This is simply a poor attempt=
 at citing 6125.
>> SRV-ID are really only applicable to protocols which are using DNS SRV. S=
o I would have prohibited them... But if you want to keep using them, you ne=
ed to specify what is the service name you would expect in them.
> Indeed. We don't, so, removed. Thanks for the clarification.
>
> Actually, since the binding between RID and a PKI is better defined in rfc=
6045-bis, 6046-bis now refers to it, as follows:
>
>     Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as detailed
>     in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>
> Would this address the concern?
Let me check.
> Many thanks, best regards,
>
> Brian
>
>>>>    as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
>>>>
>>>> RFC 6125 allows for various options and this paragraph doesn't seem to =
cover all of them. I suggest you check Section 13.7.1.2.1 of RFC 6120 for an=
 example of what should be specified (ignore XmppAddr identifier type, as it=
 is very XMPP specific). For X.509 SANs which are disallowed, you should say=
 so.
>>> Will do. (6125 is missing something here, a guide for using it in other =
specs...)
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>>
>>> Brian


From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Wed Jan 18 10:01:50 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 18/01/2012 17:43, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> Hi Brian,
>
> On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
  [...]
>>>>>    RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
>>>>>    RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
>>>>>    verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from 
>>>>> the
>>>>>    DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the 
>>>>> certificate,
>>>>>
>>>>> I am confused: this is the first time DNS SRV records are mentioned
>>>>> (BTW, they need a Normative Reference). Earlier text seem to 
>>>>> suggest that DNS SRV are not used to locate protocol endpoints. If 
>>>>> RID is using DNS SRV, then information about how it is used is 
>>>>> missing from the document.
>>>> It doesn't. Was trying to point out here that SRV must be matched 
>>>> if (for deployment-specific reasons) it was present. This is simply 
>>>> a poor attempt at citing 6125.
>>> SRV-ID are really only applicable to protocols which are using DNS 
>>> SRV. So I would have prohibited them... But if you want to keep 
>>> using them, you need to specify what is the service name you would 
>>> expect in them.
>> Indeed. We don't, so, removed. Thanks for the clarification.
>>
>> Actually, since the binding between RID and a PKI is better defined 
>> in rfc6045-bis, 6046-bis now refers to it, as follows:
>>
>>     Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as detailed
>>     in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>>
>> Would this address the concern?
> Let me check.

So the text in rfc6045bis seems to suggest that all server certificates 
will be verified based on some prior arrangement. Is my understanding 
correct?

>> Many thanks, best regards,
>>
>> Brian
>>
>>>>>    as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
>>>>>
>>>>> RFC 6125 allows for various options and this paragraph doesn't 
>>>>> seem to cover all of them. I suggest you check Section 13.7.1.2.1 
>>>>> of RFC 6120 for an example of what should be specified (ignore 
>>>>> XmppAddr identifier type, as it is very XMPP specific). For X.509 
>>>>> SANs which are disallowed, you should say so.
>>>> Will do. (6125 is missing something here, a guide for using it in 
>>>> other specs...)
>>>>
>>>> Best regards,
>>>>
>>>> Brian


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Hi Ben,

On Jan 13, 2012, at 11:00 PM, Ben Campbell wrote:

> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> < http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
> or AD before posting a new version of the draft.
>=20
> Document: draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-08
> Reviewer: Ben Campbell
> Review Date: 2012-01-13
> IESG Telechat date: 2012-01-19
>=20
> Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a proposed =
standard. There are a few minor issues that should be considered first.
>=20
> Note: This is incremental to my review of version 06 at last call. =
Version 08 is considerably improved and resolved most of my comments. =
But a few still remain. Quoted text below is from that previous review.

Yes, should have informed you about those changes before. I was going to =
wait until I had also incorporated Simon's additions, but I realize that =
may have been confusing.

>=20
> Major issues:
>=20
> None
>=20
>=20
> Minor issues:
>=20
>> -- section 3.2, last paragraph:  "=85 needs to correlate the TCP =
session from the SASL client with the SAML authentication."
>>=20
>> Please elaborate on this correlation
>=20
> The author added text, but the new text is about correlating response =
with request. The text I mentioned was about correlating a TCP =
connection to a SAML authentication.

ah ok, but the intention of the text really is to talk about correlating =
the session that the SASL client maintains with the SASL server and the =
SAML session that the SAML client has with the SAML server. Would you be =
ok with changing the wording to that extent? So:

"Also, the SASL server needs to correlate the
   session it has with the SASL client and the SAML authentication by
   comparing the ID of the SAML authentication request it has issued =
with the one it receives in the SAML authentication statement"

>=20
>> -- section 4, 3rd and 4th paragraph (paragraph a and b)
>>=20
>> These seem like protocol affecting differences. If so, they need =
elaboration, such as normative statements and formal definitions, or =
references to such.
>=20
> I did not see a response to this comment.

see Simon's comments

>=20
>> -- section 5, general:
>>=20
>> The section seems to need further elaboration or references
>=20
> I did not see a response to this comment.
>=20

idem

>> Also, this section compresses the interaction with the identity =
provider. Why not show the details for those steps like the others? (If =
you mean them to be out of scope, then why give as much detail as you =
do?)
>>=20
>=20
> I did not see a response to this comment.

I want to give enough details for implementers to understand the full =
flow, even though those steps are out-of-scope for this specification. I =
thought the [ ] brackets would convey that, do you think it is clearer =
to leave that part out altogether?

>=20
> Nits/editorial comments:
>=20
>> -- Pagination is strange throughout the document. (Mostly blank =
pages, etc.) It's worse in the PDF version, but still not right in the =
text version.
>=20
> Pagination is still strange. I see a few mostly blank pages, diagrams =
split across page breaks, etc.

hmm, strange, I removed some empty lines and in my version it nicely =
broke on session headings, but I'll double check all generated versions =
next iteration.=20

>=20
>> -- section 3, 1st paragraph: "Recall section 5 of [RFC4422] for what =
needs to be described here."
>>=20
>> That reads like an author's "to do" note to himself. Has the needed =
description been completed, or does it still need to be described?
>=20
> Partially fixed. I suggest s/"needs to be"/"is"

ok, will do

>=20
>> -- section 3.1, first paragraph:
>>=20
>> Is "authorization identifier" the same as "IdP-Identifier"?
>=20
> The paragraph has been updated, but I still have the question.=20

It is not, I will add text on that

>=20
>> -- section 3.3, 2nd paragraph:  "and SHALL be used to set state in =
the server accordingly, and it shall be used by the server"
>>=20
>> Is this new normative language, or a repeat of language from the SAML =
spec?
>>=20
>=20
> The author changed SHALL to MUST, which leads me to believe my comment =
was not clear. I did not object to SHALL. My concern was, with the =
reference to RFC4422, it was not clear if the text was introduction a =
new normative requirement, or just restating requirements from 4422. If =
the second, then it's important to make sure the reader knows which doc =
is authoritative. You can do that by keeping the language descriptive, =
or by explicitly (and strongly) attributing the language with something =
like 'RFC4433 says, "=85. SHALL=85."'
>=20
> If, on the other hand, this is truly a new normative statement, then =
no change is needed.

right, now I get it. It is indeed intended in the 4422 sense, so I will =
take your suggestion

>=20
>> -- section 4, 1st paragraph:
>>=20
>> I have difficulty parsing this.
>=20
> The text is updated, but I still have trouble parsing it. In =
particular, I'm not sure what you mean by the phrase "...and appropriate =
references of it not referenced elsewhere in this document=85".

OK, I propose to just change it to:

"This section and its sub-sections are not required for SASL
   implementors, but this section MUST be observed to implement the GSS-
   API mechanism discussed below."


>> -- section 7=20
>>=20
>> Does the GSS-API description introduce security considerations? If =
not, please say so.
>>=20
>=20
> I did not see a response to this comment.

see response Simon.

Klaas

>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Ietf mailing list
> Ietf@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf


From trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch  Thu Jan 19 01:45:36 2012
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Hi Alexey,

Thanks for helping me work through these... one more round on open =
issues, inline below:

On Jan 18, 2012, at 6:43 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> Hi Brian,
>=20
> On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>> On 17/01/2012 10:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>> On Jan 14, 2012, at 9:45 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>>=20
>>>>>   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with =
mutual
>>>>>   authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, =
and
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Do you mean that a RID client must use X.509 certificates?
>>>> Well, each RID system (HTTP client or server) is identified by an =
X.509 certificate (hence "mutual"); how can I make this clearer?
>>>>=20
>>>>>   authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>>>>>=20
>>>>> I find the whole sentence to be confusing. Note that the rules of =
RFC 6125 for certificate verification are stricter than in RFC 2818 and =
this sentence can be read as conflicting with the paragraph below which =
requires use of RFC 6125. What are you trying to say here?
>>>> The intention here is "Use current best practices as would be =
supported by off-the-shelf HTTP/1.1 and TLS 1.1 implementations to =
provide mutual authentication." "Current best practices", however, seems =
to be something of a moving target.
>>>>=20
>>>> I cite 2818 as it is the current binding between HTTP/1.1 and TLS. =
I cite 6125 solely for certificate verification.
>>> How about something like this:
>>>=20
>>> OLD:
>>>  RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with =
mutual
>>>  authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>>>  authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>>>=20
>>> NEW:
>>>  RID systems MUST use HTTP over TLS as specified in [RFC2818], with =
the exception
>>>  of server TLS identity verification which is detailed below.
>> Ah. Okay, now I understand the issue...
> This is only one of them...
>>>  RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with =
mutual
>>>  X.509 authentication. TLS provides for transport confidentiality,
>>>  identification, and authentication.
>> The language has changed in -07 to the following; would this be =
acceptable?
>>=20
>>    RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with =
mutual
>>    authentication for confidentiality, identification, and
>>    authentication, as in [RFC2818],
> Part of the issue with this text is that reads as if "mutual =
authentication" results in "confidentiality, identification and =
authentication". TLS does, that is why I split the sentence into =
multiple. Also RFC 2818 is a wrong reference because it doesn't even =
mention confidentiality.
> I am hoping this is not nitpicking, but I think using simpler =
sentences clearer.

Absolutely.

>> when transporting RID messages over
>>    HTTPS.
> The rest looks good to me:
>> RID systems MUST use mutual authentication; that is, both RID
>>    systems acting as HTTPS clients and RID systems acting as HTTPS
>>    servers MUST be identified by an X.509 certificate [RFC5280].  =
Mutual
>>    authentication requires full path validation on each certificate, =
as
>>    defined in [RFC5280].

So, how about the following:

   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher for
   confidentiality, identification, and authentication, as in=20
   Section 2 of [RFC2818]. RID systems MUST use mutual authentication;=20=

   that is, both RID systems acting as HTTPS clients and RID systems=20
   acting as HTTPS servers MUST be identified by an X.509 certificate=20
   [RFC5280].  Mutual authentication requires full path validation on=20
   each certificate, as defined in [RFC5280].

Many thanks, best regards,

Brian=

From trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch  Thu Jan 19 01:48:20 2012
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On Jan 18, 2012, at 7:01 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> On 18/01/2012 17:43, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>> Hi Brian,
>>=20
>> On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>=20
>>> Actually, since the binding between RID and a PKI is better defined =
in rfc6045-bis, 6046-bis now refers to it, as follows:
>>>=20
>>>    Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as =
detailed
>>>    in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>>>=20
>>> Would this address the concern?
>> Let me check.
>=20
> So the text in rfc6045bis seems to suggest that all server =
certificates will be verified based on some prior arrangement. Is my =
understanding correct?

Yes; in essence, a RID consortium is "closed".

Cheers,

Brian=

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Thu Jan 19 04:07:52 2012
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On 19/01/2012 09:45, Brian Trammell wrote:
> Hi Alexey,
Hi Brian,
> Thanks for helping me work through these... one more round on open issues, inline below:
>
> On Jan 18, 2012, at 6:43 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>
>> Hi Brian,
>>
>> On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>> On 17/01/2012 10:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>>> On Jan 14, 2012, at 9:45 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>    RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>>>>>>    authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Do you mean that a RID client must use X.509 certificates?
>>>>> Well, each RID system (HTTP client or server) is identified by an X.509 certificate (hence "mutual"); how can I make this clearer?
>>>>>
>>>>>>    authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I find the whole sentence to be confusing. Note that the rules of RFC 6125 for certificate verification are stricter than in RFC 2818 and this sentence can be read as conflicting with the paragraph below which requires use of RFC 6125. What are you trying to say here?
>>>>> The intention here is "Use current best practices as would be supported by off-the-shelf HTTP/1.1 and TLS 1.1 implementations to provide mutual authentication." "Current best practices", however, seems to be something of a moving target.
>>>>>
>>>>> I cite 2818 as it is the current binding between HTTP/1.1 and TLS. I cite 6125 solely for certificate verification.
>>>> How about something like this:
>>>>
>>>> OLD:
>>>>   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>>>>   authentication for transport confidentiality, identification, and
>>>>   authentication, as in [RFC2818].
>>>>
>>>> NEW:
>>>>   RID systems MUST use HTTP over TLS as specified in [RFC2818], with the exception
>>>>   of server TLS identity verification which is detailed below.
>>> Ah. Okay, now I understand the issue...
>> This is only one of them...
>>>>   RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>>>>   X.509 authentication. TLS provides for transport confidentiality,
>>>>   identification, and authentication.
>>> The language has changed in -07 to the following; would this be acceptable?
>>>
>>>     RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher with mutual
>>>     authentication for confidentiality, identification, and
>>>     authentication, as in [RFC2818],
>> Part of the issue with this text is that reads as if "mutual authentication" results in "confidentiality, identification and authentication". TLS does, that is why I split the sentence into multiple. Also RFC 2818 is a wrong reference because it doesn't even mention confidentiality.
>> I am hoping this is not nitpicking, but I think using simpler sentences clearer.
> Absolutely.
>
>>> when transporting RID messages over
>>>     HTTPS.
>> The rest looks good to me:
>>> RID systems MUST use mutual authentication; that is, both RID
>>>     systems acting as HTTPS clients and RID systems acting as HTTPS
>>>     servers MUST be identified by an X.509 certificate [RFC5280].  Mutual
>>>     authentication requires full path validation on each certificate, as
>>>     defined in [RFC5280].
> So, how about the following:
>
>     RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher for
>     confidentiality, identification, and authentication, as in
>     Section 2 of [RFC2818].
I am Ok with your latest proposal, but if you want to make me 
super-happy ;-), I suggest you make "as in Section 2 ..." a separate 
sentence (E.g. "Use of HTTP over TLS is specified in Section 2...", or 
at least insert the word "specified" after "as".
> RID systems MUST use mutual authentication;
>     that is, both RID systems acting as HTTPS clients and RID systems
>     acting as HTTPS servers MUST be identified by an X.509 certificate
>     [RFC5280].  Mutual authentication requires full path validation on
>     each certificate, as defined in [RFC5280].
>
> Many thanks, best regards,
Thanks for working with me on this.
>
> Brian


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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On Jan 19, 2012, at 1:07 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

>>>>=20
>> So, how about the following:
>>=20
>>    RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher for
>>    confidentiality, identification, and authentication, as in
>>    Section 2 of [RFC2818].
> I am Ok with your latest proposal, but if you want to make me =
super-happy ;-), I suggest you make "as in Section 2 ..." a separate =
sentence (E.g. "Use of HTTP over TLS is specified in Section 2...", or =
at least insert the word "specified" after "as".

Hi, Alexey,

I can do that:

    <t>RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 <xref target=3D"RFC4346"/> =
or higher
    for confidentiality, identification, and authentication, when =
sending RID
    messages over HTTPS. HTTPS is specified in Section 2 of <xref
    target=3D"RFC2818"/>. RID systems MUST use mutual authentication; =
that is,
    both RID systems acting as HTTPS clients and RID systems acting as =
HTTPS
    servers MUST be identified by an <xref target=3D"RFC5280">X.509
    certificate</xref>. Mutual authentication requires full path =
validation on
    each certificate, as defined in <xref target=3D"RFC5280"/>.</t>

Cheers,

Brian=

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Thu Jan 19 05:07:45 2012
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Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, gen-art@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 19/01/2012 12:45, Brian Trammell wrote:
> On Jan 19, 2012, at 1:07 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>
>>> So, how about the following:
>>>
>>>     RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1 [RFC4346] or higher for
>>>     confidentiality, identification, and authentication, as in
>>>     Section 2 of [RFC2818].
>> I am Ok with your latest proposal, but if you want to make me super-happy ;-), I suggest you make "as in Section 2 ..." a separate sentence (E.g. "Use of HTTP over TLS is specified in Section 2...", or at least insert the word "specified" after "as".
> Hi, Alexey,
>
> I can do that:
>
>      <t>RID systems MUST use TLS version 1.1<xref target="RFC4346"/>  or higher
>      for confidentiality, identification, and authentication, when sending RID
>      messages over HTTPS. HTTPS is specified in Section 2 of<xref
>      target="RFC2818"/>. RID systems MUST use mutual authentication; that is,
>      both RID systems acting as HTTPS clients and RID systems acting as HTTPS
>      servers MUST be identified by an<xref target="RFC5280">X.509
>      certificate</xref>. Mutual authentication requires full path validation on
>      each certificate, as defined in<xref target="RFC5280"/>.</t>
Perfect, thanks :-).


From miguel.a.garcia@ericsson.com  Thu Jan 19 05:46:05 2012
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Cc: General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>
Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-6man-3627-historic-01.txt
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I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>

Please resolve these comments along with any other comments you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-6man-3627-historic-01.txt
Reviewer: Miguel Garcia <miguel.a.garcia@ericsson.com>
Review Date: 2011-01-19
IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-24

Summary: The document is ready for publication as an informational RFC.

There are no issues with this draft.

/Miguel
-- 
Miguel A. Garcia
+34-91-339-3608
Ericsson Spain

From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Jan 19 08:53:29 2012
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Cc: cyrus@daboo.name, gen-art@ietf.org, arnaud.quillaud@oracle.com, ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-daboo-webdav-sync-06
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Hi David,

The text changes that Cyrus proposed have been incorporated into a
revised I-D:

http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-daboo-webdav-sync-07

Please let us know if the new version accurately reflects your
discussion with the authors.

Thanks!

Peter

On 1/2/12 12:55 PM, david.black@emc.com wrote:
> Hi Cyrus,
> 
> The proposed changes for the two major issues look good to me:
> 
> [1] I'm pleased that the concern about adding elements turned out to be a wording issue.
> 
> [2] Your proposed new text is fine - it provides adequate notice/warning about possible
> collection inconsistency, so I'm ok with not providing pseudo-code.
> 
> I'll leave the Downref issue ([3]) for you and Peter to work out with the IESG, and I'm
> fine with continued use of your name in the examples if that's common practice.
> 
> Thanks,
> --David
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Cyrus Daboo [mailto:cyrus@daboo.name]
>> Sent: Monday, January 02, 2012 2:44 PM
>> To: Black, David; arnaud.quillaud@oracle.com; gen-art@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org
>> Cc: stpeter@stpeter.im
>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-daboo-webdav-sync-06
>>
>> Hi David,
>> Thank you for your review. Comments inline:
>>
>> --On December 27, 2011 11:07:49 PM -0500 david.black@emc.com wrote:
>>
>>> [1] -Major- Section 3.5 does not appear to cover the case reporting added
>>> elements on a subsequent synchronization.  The problem may be that the
>>> word "changed" as used in Section 3.5.1 is assumed to cover adding an
>>> element - if so, that's not a good assumption, and the addition case
>>> should be explicitly called out in the title and body of Section 3.5.1.
>>
>> The first sentence of 3.5.1 is:
>>
>>     A member URL MUST be reported as changed if it has been mapped as a
>>     member of the target collection since the request sync-token was
>>     generated.
>>
>> The term "mapped" implies creation/addition of a new resource in this case.
>> That may not be obvious to anyone who is not intimately familiar with
>> WebDAV terminology here, so I propose changing that to:
>>
>>     A member URL MUST be reported as changed if it has been newly mapped as
>>     a member of the target collection since the request sync-token was
>>     generated (e.g., when a new resource has been created as a child of the
>>     collection).
>>
>>> [2] -Major- The operations to retrieve changed members of a collection
>>> are not atomic wrt the operation that obtains a report on what has
>>> changed; collection changes can occur between retrieving the report and
>>> retrieving the changed elements or while retrieving the changed elements.
>>> For this reason, simply obtaining a change report and then retrieving the
>>> elements that have changed according to the report may not result in a
>>> consistent (e.g., as of a point in time) copy of a collection.  I believe
>>> that this absence of atomicity is a WebDAV "feature", as opposed to a
>>> "bug", but I believe that this behavior and what to do about it should be
>>> discussed in the draft.  I suggest the following, possibly to the end of
>>> section 3.1
>>>
>>> i) Add a sentence or two to warn that obtaining a change report and then
>>> retrieving the changed elements may not result in a consistent local
>>> version of the collection if nothing else is done because changes may
>>> have occurred in the interim.
>>>
>>> ii Add a discussion of how to ensure that a local copy of the collection
>>> is consistent. The basic idea is to re-presented the sync token for that
>>> copy to the server after the changed elements have been retrieved; the
>>> local copy is consistent if the server reports that there have been no
>>> changes.  Some pseudo-code may help, e.g.:
>>>
>>> 	GetSyncCollectionReport(in token, out newtoken, out report);
>>> 	while (ReportHasChangedItems(report) {
>>> 		GetChangedItems(report)
>>> 		token = newtoken;
>>> 		GetSyncCollectionReport(in token, out newtoken, out report);
>>> 	}
>>>
>>> Actual code should include a counter that counts the number of iterations
>>> of the while loop and exits with an error if the number of iterations
>>> exceeds some limit; that error exit implies that the collection is
>>> (currently) changing too rapidly to obtain a consistent local version.
>>
>> Good point. I agree that this deserves some additional text to clarify this
>> situation. However, I would rather not go into too much detail of how
>> clients "re-sync" in cases like this as there are a bunch of different ways
>> that could happen each of which depends on exactly what the client is
>> trying to do (e.g., in a lot of cases clients will be doing two-way syncs
>> so will need to reconcile server and local changes within the loop you
>> propose above - the details of that are not in scope for this
>> specification). What I propose is the addition of the following paragraph
>> to the end of Section 3.1:
>>
>>     Typically, a client will use the synchronization report to retrieve the
>>     list of changes, and will follow that with requests to retrieve the
>>     content of changed resources. It is possible that additional changes to
>>     the collection could occur between the time of the synchronization
>>     report and resource content retrieval, which could result in an
>>     inconsistent view of the collection. When clients use this method of
>>     synchronization, they need to be aware that such additional changes
>>     could occur, and track them through normal means (e.g., differences
>>     between the ETag values returned in the synchronization report and
>>     those returned when actually fetching resource content), conditional
>>     requests as described in Section 5, or repeating the synchronization
>>     process until no changes are returned.
>>
>>> [3] -Minor- idnits 2.12.12  reports a Downref to RFC 5842.  Please
>>> consult your Area Director (Peter Saint-Andre) to determine what to do
>>> about this Downref (it requires attention, but may not require changes to
>>> the draft).
>>
>> Working with IESG on this one.
>>
>>> Nit: I suggest not using the author's own name (cyrusdaboo) in the
>>> examples.  Someone may copy the code from the resulting RFC.
>>
>> This has been common practice in most of the other CalDAV/CardDAV RFCs I
>> have worked on and has not been the source of any problems, so I would
>> rather leave this unchanged. If there is an official IETF policy on using
>> "real names" in examples, then I would be happy to change to follow that,
>> but I am not aware of anything like that.
>>
>>> Nit: idnits 2.12.12 reports that draft-ietf-vcarddav-carddav has been
>>> published as RFC 6352; the RFC Editor will correct this if a new version
>>> of the draft is not required for other reasons.
>>
>> Fixed in my working copy.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Cyrus Daboo
>>
> 


From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Thu Jan 19 09:32:01 2012
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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Hi Brian,

On 19/01/2012 09:48, Brian Trammell wrote:
> On Jan 18, 2012, at 7:01 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>> On 18/01/2012 17:43, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>> Hi Brian,
>>>
>>> On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Actually, since the binding between RID and a PKI is better defined in rfc6045-bis, 6046-bis now refers to it, as follows:
>>>>
>>>>     Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as detailed
>>>>     in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>>>>
>>>> Would this address the concern?
>>> Let me check.
>> So the text in rfc6045bis seems to suggest that all server certificates will be verified based on some prior arrangement. Is my understanding correct?
> Yes; in essence, a RID consortium is "closed".
I think that this approach is unwise, because this wouldn't scale. But 
if nobody else see a problem with this, I will let it go.


From stpeter@stpeter.im  Thu Jan 19 11:34:41 2012
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From: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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References: <4F11E975.9070307@isode.com> <10722E0B-059E-4800-84C0-B330F397B63A@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F16D95A.3000006@isode.com> <89E47BB4-C228-4700-94C4-3F4ED03F99A2@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1704DE.1090208@isode.com> <4F170904.2000603@isode.com> <60243B0C-A3FF-4B51-AFF8-27C34158E02E@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F185391.9050005@isode.com>
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 1/19/12 10:32 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> Hi Brian,
> 
> On 19/01/2012 09:48, Brian Trammell wrote:
>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 7:01 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>> On 18/01/2012 17:43, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>> Hi Brian,
>>>>
>>>> On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Actually, since the binding between RID and a PKI is better defined
>>>>> in rfc6045-bis, 6046-bis now refers to it, as follows:
>>>>>
>>>>>     Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as
>>>>> detailed
>>>>>     in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>>>>>
>>>>> Would this address the concern?
>>>> Let me check.
>>> So the text in rfc6045bis seems to suggest that all server
>>> certificates will be verified based on some prior arrangement. Is my
>>> understanding correct?
>> Yes; in essence, a RID consortium is "closed".
> I think that this approach is unwise, because this wouldn't scale. But
> if nobody else see a problem with this, I will let it go.

I have a problem with it.

Version -05 said:

   Each RID consortium SHOULD use a trusted public key infrastructure
   (PKI) to manage identities for RID systems participating in TLS
   connections.  At minimum, each RID system MUST trust a set of X.509
   Issuer identities ("Certificate Authorities") [RFC5280] to directly
   authenticate RID system peers with which it is willing to exchange
   information, and/or a specific white list of X.509 Subject identities
   of RID system peers.

   RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
   RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
   verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from the
   DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the certificate,
   as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].

In version -06, that was replaced with:

   Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as detailed
   in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].

As far as I can see, a RID system is not the same as a RID consortium.
Even if every RID system is a member of such a consortium, it seems like
a bad idea to leave the authentication rules up to the consortium,
without providing any sort of guidance. Version -05 at least pointed to
RFC 6125. Since 6046bis is the HTTPS/TLS binding only, it might be more
appropriate to point to RFC 2818 here instead of RFC 6125, but I think
we need to say *something* about how authentication works (matching of
endpoint identities and such) instead of hoping that consortia get the
security right.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/



From trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch  Thu Jan 19 14:05:51 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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Hi, Peter, Alexey, all,

On Jan 19, 2012, at 8:34 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:

> On 1/19/12 10:32 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>> Hi Brian,
>>=20
>> On 19/01/2012 09:48, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 7:01 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>> On 18/01/2012 17:43, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>> Hi Brian,
>>>>>=20
>>>>> On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Actually, since the binding between RID and a PKI is better =
defined
>>>>>> in rfc6045-bis, 6046-bis now refers to it, as follows:
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>    Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as
>>>>>> detailed
>>>>>>    in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>> Would this address the concern?
>>>>> Let me check.
>>>> So the text in rfc6045bis seems to suggest that all server
>>>> certificates will be verified based on some prior arrangement. Is =
my
>>>> understanding correct?
>>> Yes; in essence, a RID consortium is "closed".
>> I think that this approach is unwise, because this wouldn't scale. =
But
>> if nobody else see a problem with this, I will let it go.
>=20
> I have a problem with it.
>=20
> Version -05 said:
>=20
>   Each RID consortium SHOULD use a trusted public key infrastructure
>   (PKI) to manage identities for RID systems participating in TLS
>   connections.  At minimum, each RID system MUST trust a set of X.509
>   Issuer identities ("Certificate Authorities") [RFC5280] to directly
>   authenticate RID system peers with which it is willing to exchange
>   information, and/or a specific white list of X.509 Subject =
identities
>   of RID system peers.
>=20
>   RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
>   RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
>   verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from the
>   DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the =
certificate,
>   as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
>=20
> In version -06, that was replaced with:
>=20
>   Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as detailed
>   in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>=20
> As far as I can see, a RID system is not the same as a RID consortium.
> Even if every RID system is a member of such a consortium, it seems =
like
> a bad idea to leave the authentication rules up to the consortium,
> without providing any sort of guidance. Version -05 at least pointed =
to
> RFC 6125. Since 6046bis is the HTTPS/TLS binding only, it might be =
more
> appropriate to point to RFC 2818 here instead of RFC 6125, but I think
> we need to say *something* about how authentication works (matching of
> endpoint identities and such) instead of hoping that consortia get the
> security right.


Okay; how about the following (including Alexey's comments from the =
previous review, and pointing more specifically to 6125)

    <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that =
stored
    in the certificate presented, as in section 6 of <xref =
target=3D"rfc6125"/>.
    As RID systems are identified not by URI and RID does not use DNS =
SRV
    records, they are identified solely by their DNS Domain Names; see =
Section
    6.4 of <xref target=3D"rfc6125"/>. General information on the use of =
PKI
    with RID systems is detailed in Section 9.3 of <xref
    target=3D"I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>

Cheers,

Brian



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From mahoney@nostrum.com  Thu Jan 19 15:12:30 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] A *new* batch of IETF LC reviews - 2012-01-19
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Hi all,

Here's the link to the new LC assignments:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/reviewers-120119-lc.html

The assignments are captured in the spreadsheets:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art.html
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art-by-reviewer.html


And I have made the assignments in the review tool:
http://art.tools.ietf.org/tools/art/genart/

The standard template is included below.

Thanks,

Jean

-------------------------------------------------------------------

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
you may receive.

Document:
Reviewer:
Review Date:
IETF LC End Date:
IESG Telechat date: (if known)

Summary:

Major issues:

Minor issues:

Nits/editorial comments:

From elwynd@dial.pipex.com  Thu Jan 19 15:42:17 2012
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-art telechat review - draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt
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Hi, Dino.

I have had a look at the attached version -20  docs.

Several of the fixes seem to have gone awry, and there are various cases 
where I think there is still discussion needed.

I also spotted a couple more issues:
- I don't know how an ETR can do a return routability check - see 
discussion below
- How does an ITR know a locator is anycast - see right at the end.

Regards,
Elwyn

On 16/01/12 19:50, Dino Farinacci wrote:
>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>>
>> Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
>> or AD before posting a new version of the draft.
>>
>> Document: draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt
>> Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
>> Review Date: 20120115
>> IETF LC End Date: 20111130
>> IESG Telechat date: 20120119
>>
>> Summary: This is an updated version of the review I did for Version 16.
>> The status is STILL 'almost ready'. I noticed one additional minor issue
>> (s3, ITRs). I did not receive any explicit reponses to the comments in
>> the previous review although some of the comments have been addressed
>> and I have removed those comments. So...
>>
>> Given that this document is experimental, there don't appear to be any
>> showstopping issues.  However, I found that having the functionality
>> spread over several documents without a really clear overview did not
>> make it easy to follow. There are a number of areas where topics appear
>> unannounced in ways that are not immediately meaningful, and may or may
>> not be clarified later in the document (especially the topics of
>> multicast and anycast).
>>
>> There are areas of the detailed format description that are very dense
>> and difficult to follow, and the split of functionality between this
>> document and ALT does not help.  I got the distinct feeling that extra
>> bits of functionality had been shoe horned into this section over time
>> without really thinking through the system aspects.  However given that
>> we are considering an experimental protocol this is not a major issue,
>> provided that it is cleaned up before becoming a real standard.
>>
>> Major issues: None.
> This is good to know. Thanks for your comments Elwyn. See responses below. I have a new -20 diff file enclosed to make sure I reflected your comments. Please have a look and comment as soon as you can. Thanks.
>
>> Minor issues:
>> s3, Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR): "An ITR is a router which accepts an IP
>> packet with a single IP header": Technically this rules out a site
>> attached to an ITR using any form of IP tunneling (such as VPNs or IP
>> mobility or 6-in-4 tunnels) through the ITR because a tunneled packet
>> would already have more than one IP header. In practice, I think the
>> qualifying statement in brackets immediately after the quoted statement
>> clarifies the situation but this should be rewrittten to avoid
>> ambiguity.
> Fixed.
Hmm.  You have substituted '(more precisely, an IP packet that does not 
contain a LISP header)' by '(typically, the IP packet that does not 
contain an IP header)'.  These are definitely not the same.  Are there 
circumstances where an IP packet coming out of a LISP site would already 
contain a LISP header.  That was not my understanding.  If this is not 
correct then what you have now is even more confusing.  Also in the next 
sentence, the phrase 'this IP destination address' no longer makes sense.
>> s3, EID: "EIDs MUST NOT be used as RLOCs":  But the remainder of the
>> definition goes on to talk about what must/must not happen when they are
>> numerically equivalent. This is still somewhat confusing.
> When they are numerically equivaldent does not mean they are the same definition. Remember there are two namespaces so 10.1.1.1 in one namespace serves a different purpose than 10.1.1.1 in the other namespace.
>
> I made no change here because we revised this definition dozens of times to make the working group happy. So this definition is rough concensus.
Doubtless it is rough concensus, but the piece we are discussing is not 
part of the definition as such.  The point is that seen from point of 
view of the bits on the wire, RLOCs and EIDs are indistinguishable, and 
the later text implies that the same bit pattern can be either depending 
on context.  I think what you need to say is 'It is important that a 
value specified as an EID is only used in contexts where an EID is 
required and never in contexts where an RLOC is required (and vice 
versa).  Since the same bit pattern could be valid for either as 
explained later, it is vital that this logical distinction is maintained 
in implementations.'  I note that there is a context (called out below) 
where the EID is used in a context where an RLOC would normally be expected.
>
>> s3, Data Probe: Some clarification/explanation is needed regarding the
>> fact that a Data Probe uses an EID as its destination address in the
>> core, but EIDs are specifically described as not routable in the core
>> earlier in the document. I understand that ALT puts caveats on the
>> usability of Data Probes, but still potentially offers routability of
>> the EID over the alternative topology. I think some reflection of this
>> discussion would be helpful here.
>
> I added to the definition that when Data Probes are used, the 
> underlying routing system must advertise EIDs. This is not desirable 
> but there are rare cases, it may be used.
I think your new text compounds the problem.  It explicitly contradicts 
earlier statements that EIDs are not globally routable.  ALT moves the 
EID routing problem to a separated overlay network which sidesteps the 
problem, but the new words effectively change a MUST NOT into a MAY.  As 
I said previously, there are words in ALT that probably need to be 
reproduced here.
>
>> s4.1, item 4: ETR "processes as a control message"... does this imply
>> anything about prioritization in the rest of the network?
>
> No different than anything else and doesn't deserve a mention in my 
> opinion.
Maybe not, but why is that the only traditional use of prioritisation 
for IP packets was for router control messages.  It strikes me that 
Map-Requests and Map-Replies need to get quickly to the front of the 
queues in the routers they arrive at like BGP messages when travelling 
on the underlying routing topology.
>
>> s5.3, LISP Nonce: What are the consequences of using the same nonce for
>> 'too long'.. and how can an implementor decide what is too long?
>
> A possible replay attack if a man-in-the-middle can guess a 24-bit or 
> 128-bit nonce.
Guidance to implementers is required.  OK, maybe you don't know yet 'cos 
its an experiment, but the draft ought to state that guidance will be 
given after experiments, if only as a reminder to somebody turning this 
into a standard.
>
>> s6.1: "Implementations MUST be prepared to accept packets when either the
>> source port or destination UDP port is set to 4342 due to NATs
>> changing port number values." I (still) don't understand this. My
>> understanding was that these UDP packets are generated in the ITR with
>> globally routable RLOCs in the headers. Why are they going through NATs?
>> Does this mean when only one of the ports is 4342? (but the previous
>> comments still stands).
>
> An ITR could be behind a NAT. And when it is its "local RLOC" is a 
> private address. When the packet traverses a NAT, the source address 
> will be changed to a global address. The outside world believes the 
> source of the packet is the source RLOC which is globally reachable 
> and advertised in the underlying routing system.
Is the problem a missing 'not'?
> when either the
> source port or destination UDP port is ***not*** (?) set to 4342 due 
> to NATs
> changing port number values.

>
> NATs also translate/change the source port of the outer header. So the 
> if a LISP control packet is returning a reply to a request that had 
> 4342 in the destination port, then the source port would be translated 
> and the requester would not know the packet is a LISP control packet. 
> So if the source port of the request is 4342, the replier can return 
> that in the destination port of the reply without a NAT touching the 
> port (while it is touching the other port).
>
>> s5.3: Copying of TTL/Hop Count fields and Type of service fields: This
>> discussion is somewhat confusing. Initially these are described as
>> SHOULD mostly without any description of why one would not. A couple of
>> paragraphs later they become MUSTs with some minor and explicit
>> exceptions. This should be clarified.
>
> We said should because we were being practical. Some implementations 
> cannot copy the TTL and set it statically. We want those 
> implementations to not violate the spec.
>
> We use MUST later for the Type of Service field. When the TOS is 
> copied, then the sub-parts MUST follow what the text says.
>
OK.  That is correct.   Its possible there is a better wording than 
'caveat' but I can't think of a short form.  Caveat tends to make me 
think of get outs, whereas what you are doing is making it more strict 
for the ECN case. Leave it be.
>> s6.1, last para: "This main LISP specification is the authoritative
>> source for message
>> format definitions for the Map-Request and Map-Reply messages." So
>> what spec is authoritative for Map-Register and Map-Notify? It is later
>> stated that this spec defines the message format of these messages
>> (first paras of s6.1.6/6.1.7). This seems pretty authoritative. I
>> suspect that this para could be dropped wlog.
>
> I will fix this text. Thanks for finding this.
>
>> s6.1.4: S bit: How do I find out how big the Mapping Protocol Data is in
>> order to determine where the extra security fields are located?
>
> This was commented on quite a bit and was used for CONS. Since the 
> commenters won the argument to remove references to CONS, we will 
> remove the Mapping Protocol Data part, which actually is not used by 
> any implementations.
OK.. But, should it go from s6.1.2 as well?
>
>> s6.1.4: M priority/weight: Multicast suddenly makes an appearance. Not
>> sure why?
>
> Because we have to encode multicast priorities. And to get a mapping 
> for an ETR to join an ITR, we use a Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange. I 
> will add a reference to LISP-multicast for each reference to M 
> priority and M weight.
>
>> s10.3: How is a "route-returnability check" performed in LISP?
>
> I added another sentence to the defintion of "Route-returnability".
The new sentence tells the principle of what messages to send - but 
where to send them?  The problem in my mind is that it is apparently the 
ETR performing the check.  Is the check sent to the ITR or the original 
source (EID)?  If to the original source, why should that source believe 
it ought to answer this ETR (which will have to have an EID that the 
return message is sent) when it has never heard from the ETR and has no 
idea whether the ETR is a kosher node?  If the source is behind a 
firewall or NAT there is a good chance the message will never arrive.  
This case differs from the standard route returnability case where 
messages are always end-to-end.
>
>> Nits/editorial comments:
>> General: s/bytes/octets/
>
> Changed throughout.
>
>> General: Figures all need titles and numbers.
>
> There are section titles for the figures. There are no figure numbers 
> just like RFC 2460. I don't see the point since there is no text that 
> back references the figures. And I think we wrote the text to 
> sufficiently introduce the figures that are about to come up.
You can discuss this one with the RFC Editor.
>
>> s3: s/PA addresses are an an address/PA addresses are an address/
>>
>> s3, RLOC: Link to IPv4/v6 specifications needed.
>>
>> s3, EID-to-RLOC Database: "This has no negative implications."
>> Justification?
>>
>> s3, Negative Mapping Entry: Needs cross-reference for Negative Map-Reply.
>
> Changed all the above.
>
>> s3, Data Probe: needs cross-reference(s)
>
> I don't think it does because it is being defined here for the first time.
See discussion above. ALT?
>
>> s3, PITR: The alternative term PTR is now not used at all and can be
>> removed.
>
> Fixed.
>
>> s4.1, item 7: Needs cross references.
>
> Can you be more specific please. Are you asking for a reference for 
> DNS names or for the Map-Reply or for something else?
No.  To the piece that tells about the policies (Section 6.5).
>
>> s5.1 and s5.2 Need references to base IP specifications and notes about
>> the items that are defined in those specifications, and the equivalences
>> between source/destination IP addresses and EIDs/RLOCs. (also applies to
>> s6.1)
>
> We did this in a later update. We put the references in 5.3 where we 
> describe such fields.
Fine.

>
>> s5.3: This section should also refer to the various abbreviations used
>> in the figures (e.g., OH for Outer Header, etc).
>
> It is expanded in the "Packet header descriptions:" part.
>
True but hardly 'first use'.  All it needs is s/Inner header/Inner 
Header (IH)/ and similarly for OH in s5.3. Plus a definition of IHL 
(internet header length).
>> s5.3, LSB: First mention of anycast addresses here. Needs a cross
>> reference or earlier introduction.
>
> I have added a definition for anycast address in the Definition of 
> Terms section.
>
>> s6.x: Encodings of numeric fields not specified.
>
> All fixed. New text enclosed. Please acknowledge. The -20 has not been 
> posted. This is a work in progress -20 waiting Adrian's comments as well.
>
> Dino
>

EXTRA INTRODUCED NIT and EXTRA ISSUE SPOTTED:
s4, first bullet: "get to destination, which in turn, LISP routers 
deliver" has got garbled.  I think something like the following was 
intended:
     assume packets get to their intended destinations.  In a system 
where LISP is deployed, LISP routers intercept EID addressed packets and 
assist in delivering them across the network core where EIDs cannot be 
routed.

s5.3, LISP Locator Status Bits, last sentence:    "If the LSB for an 
anycast locator.." How does the ITR know it is an anycast locator?  They 
are indistinguishable for any other IP address in most cases.
>
>
>
>


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    Hi, Dino.<br>
    <br>
    I have had a look at the attached version -20&nbsp; docs.&nbsp; <br>
    <br>
    Several of the fixes seem to have gone awry, and there are various
    cases where I think there is still discussion needed.<br>
    <br>
    I also spotted a couple more issues:<br>
    - I don't know how an ETR can do a return routability check - see
    discussion below<br>
    - How does an ITR know a locator is anycast - see right at the end.<br>
    <br>
    Regards,<br>
    Elwyn<br>
    <br>
    On 16/01/12 19:50, Dino Farinacci wrote:
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq">&lt;http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq&gt;</a>.

Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

Document: draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt
Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
Review Date: 20120115
IETF LC End Date: 20111130
IESG Telechat date: 20120119

Summary: This is an updated version of the review I did for Version 16.
The status is STILL 'almost ready'. I noticed one additional minor issue
(s3, ITRs). I did not receive any explicit reponses to the comments in
the previous review although some of the comments have been addressed
and I have removed those comments. So...

Given that this document is experimental, there don't appear to be any
showstopping issues.  However, I found that having the functionality
spread over several documents without a really clear overview did not
make it easy to follow. There are a number of areas where topics appear
unannounced in ways that are not immediately meaningful, and may or may
not be clarified later in the document (especially the topics of
multicast and anycast).

There are areas of the detailed format description that are very dense 
and difficult to follow, and the split of functionality between this 
document and ALT does not help.  I got the distinct feeling that extra 
bits of functionality had been shoe horned into this section over time 
without really thinking through the system aspects.  However given that 
we are considering an experimental protocol this is not a major issue, 
provided that it is cleaned up before becoming a real standard.

Major issues: None.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
This is good to know. Thanks for your comments Elwyn. See responses below. I have a new -20 diff file enclosed to make sure I reflected your comments. Please have a look and comment as soon as you can. Thanks.

</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">Minor issues:
s3, Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR): "An ITR is a router which accepts an IP
packet with a single IP header": Technically this rules out a site
attached to an ITR using any form of IP tunneling (such as VPNs or IP
mobility or 6-in-4 tunnels) through the ITR because a tunneled packet
would already have more than one IP header. In practice, I think the
qualifying statement in brackets immediately after the quoted statement
clarifies the situation but this should be rewrittten to avoid
ambiguity.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
Fixed.
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    Hmm.&nbsp; You have substituted '(more precisely, an IP packet that does
    not contain a LISP header)' by '(typically, the IP packet that does
    not contain an IP header)'.&nbsp; These are definitely not the same.&nbsp; Are
    there circumstances where an IP packet coming out of a LISP site
    would already contain a LISP header.&nbsp; That was not my
    understanding.&nbsp; If this is not correct then what you have now is
    even more confusing.&nbsp; Also in the next sentence, the phrase 'this IP
    destination address' no longer makes sense. <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite">
      <pre wrap="">
</pre>
      <blockquote type="cite">
        <pre wrap="">s3, EID: "EIDs MUST NOT be used as RLOCs":  But the remainder of the
definition goes on to talk about what must/must not happen when they are
numerically equivalent. This is still somewhat confusing.
</pre>
      </blockquote>
      <pre wrap="">
When they are numerically equivaldent does not mean they are the same definition. Remember there are two namespaces so 10.1.1.1 in one namespace serves a different purpose than 10.1.1.1 in the other namespace.

I made no change here because we revised this definition dozens of times to make the working group happy. So this definition is rough concensus.
</pre>
    </blockquote>
    Doubtless it is rough concensus, but the piece we are discussing is
    not part of the definition as such.&nbsp; The point is that seen from
    point of view of the bits on the wire, RLOCs and EIDs are
    indistinguishable, and the later text implies that the same bit
    pattern can be either depending on context.&nbsp; I think what you need
    to say is 'It is important that a value specified as an EID is only
    used in contexts where an EID is required and never in contexts
    where an RLOC is required (and vice versa).&nbsp; Since the same bit
    pattern could be valid for either as explained later, it is vital
    that this logical distinction is maintained in implementations.'&nbsp; I
    note that there is a context (called out below) where the EID is
    used in a context where an RLOC would normally be expected.<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s3, Data Probe: Some
        clarification/explanation is needed regarding the <br>
        fact that a Data Probe uses an EID as its destination address in
        the <br>
        core, but EIDs are specifically described as not routable in the
        core <br>
        earlier in the document. I understand that ALT puts caveats on
        the <br>
        usability of Data Probes, but still potentially offers
        routability of <br>
        the EID over the alternative topology. I think some reflection
        of this <br>
        discussion would be helpful here.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      I added to the definition that when Data Probes are used, the
      underlying routing system must advertise EIDs. This is not
      desirable but there are rare cases, it may be used.<br>
    </blockquote>
    I think your new text compounds the problem.&nbsp; It explicitly
    contradicts earlier statements that EIDs are not globally routable.&nbsp;
    ALT moves the EID routing problem to a separated overlay network
    which sidesteps the problem, but the new words effectively change a
    MUST NOT into a MAY.&nbsp; As I said previously, there are words in ALT
    that probably need to be reproduced here.&nbsp; <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s4.1, item 4: ETR "processes as a control
        message"... does this imply <br>
        anything about prioritization in the rest of the network?<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      No different than anything else and doesn't deserve a mention in
      my opinion.<br>
    </blockquote>
    Maybe not, but why is that the only traditional use of
    prioritisation for IP packets was for router control messages.&nbsp; It
    strikes me that Map-Requests and Map-Replies need to get quickly to
    the front of the queues in the routers they arrive at like BGP
    messages when travelling on the underlying routing topology.<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s5.3, LISP Nonce: What are the
        consequences of using the same nonce for <br>
        'too long'.. and how can an implementor decide what is too long?<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      A possible replay attack if a man-in-the-middle can guess a 24-bit
      or 128-bit nonce.<br>
    </blockquote>
    Guidance to implementers is required.&nbsp; OK, maybe you don't know yet
    'cos its an experiment, but the draft ought to state that guidance
    will be given after experiments, if only as a reminder to somebody
    turning this into a standard.<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s6.1: "Implementations MUST be prepared to
        accept packets when either the<br>
        source port or destination UDP port is set to 4342 due to NATs<br>
        changing port number values." I (still) don't understand this.
        My <br>
        understanding was that these UDP packets are generated in the
        ITR with <br>
        globally routable RLOCs in the headers. Why are they going
        through NATs?<br>
        Does this mean when only one of the ports is 4342? (but the
        previous<br>
        comments still stands).<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      An ITR could be behind a NAT. And when it is its "local RLOC" is a
      private address. When the packet traverses a NAT, the source
      address will be changed to a global address. The outside world
      believes the source of the packet is the source RLOC which is
      globally reachable and advertised in the underlying routing
      system.<br>
    </blockquote>
    Is the problem a missing 'not'? <br>
    <blockquote type="cite">when either the<br>
      source port or destination UDP port is ***not*** (?) set to 4342
      due to NATs<br>
      changing port number values.</blockquote>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      NATs also translate/change the source port of the outer header. So
      the if a LISP control packet is returning a reply to a request
      that had 4342 in the destination port, then the source port would
      be translated and the requester would not know the packet is a
      LISP control packet. So if the source port of the request is 4342,
      the replier can return that in the destination port of the reply
      without a NAT touching the port (while it is touching the other
      port).<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s5.3: Copying of TTL/Hop Count fields and
        Type of service fields: This <br>
        discussion is somewhat confusing. Initially these are described
        as <br>
        SHOULD mostly without any description of why one would not. A
        couple of <br>
        paragraphs later they become MUSTs with some minor and explicit
        <br>
        exceptions. This should be clarified.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      We said should because we were being practical. Some
      implementations cannot copy the TTL and set it statically. We want
      those implementations to not violate the spec.<br>
      <br>
      We use MUST later for the Type of Service field. When the TOS is
      copied, then the sub-parts MUST follow what the text says.<br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    OK.&nbsp; That is correct.&nbsp;&nbsp; Its possible there is a better wording than
    'caveat' but I can't think of a short form.&nbsp; Caveat tends to make me
    think of get outs, whereas what you are doing is making it more
    strict for the ECN case. Leave it be. <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">s6.1, last para: "This main LISP
        specification is the authoritative <br>
        source for message<br>
        format definitions for the Map-Request and Map-Reply messages."
        So <br>
        what spec is authoritative for Map-Register and Map-Notify? It
        is later <br>
        stated that this spec defines the message format of these
        messages <br>
        (first paras of s6.1.6/6.1.7). This seems pretty authoritative.
        I <br>
        suspect that this para could be dropped wlog.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      I will fix this text. Thanks for finding this.<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s6.1.4: S bit: How do I find out how big
        the Mapping Protocol Data is in <br>
        order to determine where the extra security fields are located?<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      This was commented on quite a bit and was used for CONS. Since the
      commenters won the argument to remove references to CONS, we will
      remove the Mapping Protocol Data part, which actually is not used
      by any implementations.<br>
    </blockquote>
    OK.. But, should it go from s6.1.2 as well?<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s6.1.4: M priority/weight: Multicast
        suddenly makes an appearance. Not <br>
        sure why?<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Because we have to encode multicast priorities. And to get a
      mapping for an ETR to join an ITR, we use a Map-Request/Map-Reply
      exchange. I will add a reference to LISP-multicast for each
      reference to M priority and M weight.<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s10.3: How is a "route-returnability
        check" performed in LISP?<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      I added another sentence to the defintion of
      "Route-returnability".<br>
    </blockquote>
    The new sentence tells the principle of what messages to send - but
    where to send them?&nbsp; The problem in my mind is that it is apparently
    the ETR performing the check.&nbsp; Is the check sent to the ITR or the
    original source (EID)?&nbsp; If to the original source, why should that
    source believe it ought to answer this ETR (which will have to have
    an EID that the return message is sent) when it has never heard from
    the ETR and has no idea whether the ETR is a kosher node?&nbsp; If the
    source is behind a firewall or NAT there is a good chance the
    message will never arrive.&nbsp; This case differs from the standard
    route returnability case where messages are always end-to-end. &nbsp; <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">Nits/editorial comments:<br>
        General: s/bytes/octets/<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Changed throughout.<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">General: Figures all need titles and
        numbers.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      There are section titles for the figures. There are no figure
      numbers just like RFC 2460. I don't see the point since there is
      no text that back references the figures. And I think we wrote the
      text to sufficiently introduce the figures that are about to come
      up.<br>
    </blockquote>
    You can discuss this one with the RFC Editor.<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s3: s/PA addresses are an an address/PA
        addresses are an address/<br>
        <br>
        s3, RLOC: Link to IPv4/v6 specifications needed.<br>
        <br>
        s3, EID-to-RLOC Database: "This has no negative implications." <br>
        Justification?<br>
        <br>
        s3, Negative Mapping Entry: Needs cross-reference for Negative
        Map-Reply.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Changed all the above.<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s3, Data Probe: needs cross-reference(s)<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      I don't think it does because it is being defined here for the
      first time.<br>
    </blockquote>
    See discussion above. ALT?<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s3, PITR: The alternative term PTR is now
        not used at all and can be<br>
        removed.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Fixed.<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s4.1, item 7: Needs cross references.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      Can you be more specific please. Are you asking for a reference
      for DNS names or for the Map-Reply or for something else?<br>
    </blockquote>
    No.&nbsp; To the piece that tells about the policies (Section 6.5). <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s5.1 and s5.2 Need references to base IP
        specifications and notes about <br>
        the items that are defined in those specifications, and the
        equivalences <br>
        between source/destination IP addresses and EIDs/RLOCs. (also
        applies to <br>
        s6.1)<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      We did this in a later update. We put the references in 5.3 where
      we describe such fields.<br>
    </blockquote>
    Fine.<br>
    <br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s5.3: This section should also refer to
        the various abbreviations used <br>
        in the figures (e.g., OH for Outer Header, etc).<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      It is expanded in the "Packet header descriptions:" part.<br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    True but hardly 'first use'.&nbsp; All it needs is s/Inner header/Inner
    Header (IH)/ and similarly for OH in s5.3. Plus a definition of IHL
    (internet header length).<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite">
      <blockquote type="cite">s5.3, LSB: First mention of anycast
        addresses here. Needs a cross <br>
        reference or earlier introduction.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      I have added a definition for anycast address in the Definition of
      Terms section.<br>
      <br>
      <blockquote type="cite">s6.x: Encodings of numeric fields not
        specified.<br>
      </blockquote>
      <br>
      All fixed. New text enclosed. Please acknowledge. The -20 has not
      been posted. This is a work in progress -20 waiting Adrian's
      comments as well.<br>
      <br>
      Dino<br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
    EXTRA INTRODUCED NIT and EXTRA ISSUE SPOTTED:<br>
    s4, first bullet: "get to destination, which in turn, LISP routers
    deliver" has got garbled.&nbsp; I think something like the following was
    intended:<br>
    &nbsp; &nbsp; assume packets get to their intended destinations.&nbsp; In a system
    where LISP is deployed, LISP routers intercept EID addressed packets
    and assist in delivering them across the network core where EIDs
    cannot be routed.<br>
    <br>
    s5.3, LISP Locator Status Bits, last sentence:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; "If the LSB for an
    anycast locator.." How does the ITR know it is an anycast locator?&nbsp;
    They are indistinguishable for any other IP address in most cases.<br>
    <blockquote
      cite="mid:1413A7D9-03E0-4746-AE07-21BA75469269@cisco.com"
      type="cite"><br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <br>
      <br>
    </blockquote>
    <br>
  </body>
</html>

--------------070901050006050203030700--

From david.black@emc.com  Thu Jan 19 16:10:46 2012
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To: <ietf@cybernothing.org>, <msk@cloudmark.com>, <gen-art@ietf.org>, <ietf@ietf.org>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2012 19:10:24 -0500
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-05
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Based on discussion with the authors, the -05 version of this draft resolve=
s the
issues raised in the Gen-ART review of the -04 version.  An important eleme=
nt of
the approach taken to issue [1] has been to explain why the security requir=
ements
for redaction are significantly weaker than the strength of the secure hash=
es
that are suggested by the draft.

Thanks,
--David

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Black, David
> Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2012 9:44 PM
> To: ietf@cybernothing.org; Murray S. Kucherawy; gen-art@ietf.org; ietf@ie=
tf.org
> Cc: Black, David; marf@ietf.org; presnick@qualcomm.com
> Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
>=20
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-=
ART, please
> see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you=
 may receive.
>=20
> Document: draft-ietf-marf-redaction-04
> Reviewer: David L. Black
> Review Date: January 10, 2012
> IETF LC End Date: January 18, 2011
> IESG Telechat Date: January 19, 2011
>=20
> Summary: This draft is on the right track but has open issues, described =
in the review.
>=20
> This draft specifies a method for redacting information from email abuse =
reports
> (e.g., hiding the local part [user] of an email address), while still all=
owing
> correlation of the redacted information across related abuse reports from=
 the same
> source. The draft is short, clear, and well written.
>=20
> There are two open issues:
>=20
> [1] The first open issue is the absence of security guidance to ensure th=
at this
> redaction technique effectively hides the redacted information.  The reda=
ction
> technique is to concatenate a secret string (called the "redaction key") =
to the
> information to be redacted, apply "any hashing/digest algorithm", convert=
 the output
> to base64 and use that base64 string to replace the redacted information.
>=20
> There are two important ways in which this technique could fail to effect=
ively hide
> the redacted information:
> 	- The secret string may inject insufficient entropy.
> 	- The hashing/digest algorithm may be weak.
>=20
> To take an extreme example, if the secret string ("redaction key") consis=
ts of a
> single ASCII character, and a short email local part is being redacted, t=
hen the
> output is highly vulnerable to dictionary and brute force attacks because=
 only 6 bits
> of entropy are added (the result may look secure, but it's not).  Beyond =
this extreme
> example, this is a potentially real concern - e.g., applying the rule of =
thumb that
> ASCII text contains 4-5 bits of entropy per character, the example in App=
endix A
> uses a "redaction key" of "potatoes" that injects at most 40 bits of entr=
opy -
> is that sufficient for email redaction purposes?
>=20
> To take a silly example, if a CRC is used as the hash with that sort of s=
hort input,
> the result is not particularly difficult to invert.
>=20
> I suggest a couple of changes:
> 1) Change "any hashing/digest algorithm" to require use of a secure hash,=
 and
> 	explain what is meant by "secure hash" in the security considerations se=
ction.
> 2) Require a minimum length of the "redaction key" string, and strongly s=
uggest
> 	(SHOULD) that it be randomly generated (e.g., by running sufficient outp=
ut
> 	of an entropy-rich random number generator through a base64 converter).
>=20
> For the latter change, figure out the amount of entropy that should be us=
ed
> for redaction - the recommended string length will be larger because prin=
table
> ASCII is not entropy-dense (at best it's good for 6 bits of entropy in ea=
ch
> 8-bit character, and human-written text such as this message has signific=
antly
> less).
>=20
> From a pure security perspective, use of HMAC with specified secure hashe=
s
> (SHA2-family) and an approach of hashing the "redaction key" down to a bi=
nary
> key for HMAC would be a stronger approach. I suggest that authors conside=
r
> approach, but  there may be practical usage concerns that suggest not ado=
pting it.
>=20
> [2] The second open issue is absence of security considerations for the r=
edaction
> key.  The security considerations section needs to caution that the redac=
tion key
> is a secret key that must be managed and protected as a secret key.  Disc=
losure
> of a redaction key removes the redaction from all reports that used that =
key.
> As part of this, guidance should be provided on when and how to change th=
e
> redaction key in order to limit the effects of loss of secrecy for a sing=
le
> redaction key.
>=20
> Editorial Nit: I believe that "anonymization" is a better description of =
what
> this draft is doing (as opposed to "redaction"), particularly as the resu=
lt is
> intended to be correlatable via string match across reports from the same=
 source.
>=20
> idnits 2.12.13 didn't find any nits.
>=20
> Thanks,
> --David
> ----------------------------------------------------
> David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer
> EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA=A0 01748
> +1 (508) 293-7953=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 FAX: +1 (508) 293-7=
786
> david.black@emc.com=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0=A0 Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
> ----------------------------------------------------


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I cleared.


On Jan 19, 2012, at 5:54 PM, <david.black@emc.com> <david.black@emc.com> =
wrote:

> Hi Peter,
>=20
> Yes, the new -07 of this draft is fine, as it resolves issues [1] and =
[2] as agreed
> with the authors, and also resolves issue [3] by changing RFC 5842 =
from a normative
> reference to an informative reference. That change is fine with me, as =
the references
> to RFC 5842 are all for examples that explain some of the =
synchronization functionality
> - it is not necessary to implement any of the requests listed as being =
specified in
> RFC 5842 in order to implement the synchronization functionality.
>=20
> Thanks,
> --David
>=20
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Peter Saint-Andre [mailto:stpeter@stpeter.im]
>> Sent: Thursday, January 19, 2012 11:53 AM
>> To: Black, David
>> Cc: cyrus@daboo.name; arnaud.quillaud@oracle.com; gen-art@ietf.org; =
ietf@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-daboo-webdav-sync-06
>>=20
>> Hi David,
>>=20
>> The text changes that Cyrus proposed have been incorporated into a
>> revised I-D:
>>=20
>> http://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-daboo-webdav-sync-07
>>=20
>> Please let us know if the new version accurately reflects your
>> discussion with the authors.
>>=20
>> Thanks!
>>=20
>> Peter
>>=20
>> On 1/2/12 12:55 PM, david.black@emc.com wrote:
>>> Hi Cyrus,
>>>=20
>>> The proposed changes for the two major issues look good to me:
>>>=20
>>> [1] I'm pleased that the concern about adding elements turned out to =
be a wording issue.
>>>=20
>>> [2] Your proposed new text is fine - it provides adequate =
notice/warning about possible
>>> collection inconsistency, so I'm ok with not providing pseudo-code.
>>>=20
>>> I'll leave the Downref issue ([3]) for you and Peter to work out =
with the IESG, and I'm
>>> fine with continued use of your name in the examples if that's =
common practice.
>>>=20
>>> Thanks,
>>> --David
>>>=20
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Cyrus Daboo [mailto:cyrus@daboo.name]
>>>> Sent: Monday, January 02, 2012 2:44 PM
>>>> To: Black, David; arnaud.quillaud@oracle.com; gen-art@ietf.org; =
ietf@ietf.org
>>>> Cc: stpeter@stpeter.im
>>>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-daboo-webdav-sync-06
>>>>=20
>>>> Hi David,
>>>> Thank you for your review. Comments inline:
>>>>=20
>>>> --On December 27, 2011 11:07:49 PM -0500 david.black@emc.com wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>> [1] -Major- Section 3.5 does not appear to cover the case =
reporting added
>>>>> elements on a subsequent synchronization.  The problem may be that =
the
>>>>> word "changed" as used in Section 3.5.1 is assumed to cover adding =
an
>>>>> element - if so, that's not a good assumption, and the addition =
case
>>>>> should be explicitly called out in the title and body of Section =
3.5.1.
>>>>=20
>>>> The first sentence of 3.5.1 is:
>>>>=20
>>>>    A member URL MUST be reported as changed if it has been mapped =
as a
>>>>    member of the target collection since the request sync-token was
>>>>    generated.
>>>>=20
>>>> The term "mapped" implies creation/addition of a new resource in =
this case.
>>>> That may not be obvious to anyone who is not intimately familiar =
with
>>>> WebDAV terminology here, so I propose changing that to:
>>>>=20
>>>>    A member URL MUST be reported as changed if it has been newly =
mapped as
>>>>    a member of the target collection since the request sync-token =
was
>>>>    generated (e.g., when a new resource has been created as a child =
of the
>>>>    collection).
>>>>=20
>>>>> [2] -Major- The operations to retrieve changed members of a =
collection
>>>>> are not atomic wrt the operation that obtains a report on what has
>>>>> changed; collection changes can occur between retrieving the =
report and
>>>>> retrieving the changed elements or while retrieving the changed =
elements.
>>>>> For this reason, simply obtaining a change report and then =
retrieving the
>>>>> elements that have changed according to the report may not result =
in a
>>>>> consistent (e.g., as of a point in time) copy of a collection.  I =
believe
>>>>> that this absence of atomicity is a WebDAV "feature", as opposed =
to a
>>>>> "bug", but I believe that this behavior and what to do about it =
should be
>>>>> discussed in the draft.  I suggest the following, possibly to the =
end of
>>>>> section 3.1
>>>>>=20
>>>>> i) Add a sentence or two to warn that obtaining a change report =
and then
>>>>> retrieving the changed elements may not result in a consistent =
local
>>>>> version of the collection if nothing else is done because changes =
may
>>>>> have occurred in the interim.
>>>>>=20
>>>>> ii Add a discussion of how to ensure that a local copy of the =
collection
>>>>> is consistent. The basic idea is to re-presented the sync token =
for that
>>>>> copy to the server after the changed elements have been retrieved; =
the
>>>>> local copy is consistent if the server reports that there have =
been no
>>>>> changes.  Some pseudo-code may help, e.g.:
>>>>>=20
>>>>> 	GetSyncCollectionReport(in token, out newtoken, out report);
>>>>> 	while (ReportHasChangedItems(report) {
>>>>> 		GetChangedItems(report)
>>>>> 		token =3D newtoken;
>>>>> 		GetSyncCollectionReport(in token, out newtoken, out =
report);
>>>>> 	}
>>>>>=20
>>>>> Actual code should include a counter that counts the number of =
iterations
>>>>> of the while loop and exits with an error if the number of =
iterations
>>>>> exceeds some limit; that error exit implies that the collection is
>>>>> (currently) changing too rapidly to obtain a consistent local =
version.
>>>>=20
>>>> Good point. I agree that this deserves some additional text to =
clarify this
>>>> situation. However, I would rather not go into too much detail of =
how
>>>> clients "re-sync" in cases like this as there are a bunch of =
different ways
>>>> that could happen each of which depends on exactly what the client =
is
>>>> trying to do (e.g., in a lot of cases clients will be doing two-way =
syncs
>>>> so will need to reconcile server and local changes within the loop =
you
>>>> propose above - the details of that are not in scope for this
>>>> specification). What I propose is the addition of the following =
paragraph
>>>> to the end of Section 3.1:
>>>>=20
>>>>    Typically, a client will use the synchronization report to =
retrieve the
>>>>    list of changes, and will follow that with requests to retrieve =
the
>>>>    content of changed resources. It is possible that additional =
changes to
>>>>    the collection could occur between the time of the =
synchronization
>>>>    report and resource content retrieval, which could result in an
>>>>    inconsistent view of the collection. When clients use this =
method of
>>>>    synchronization, they need to be aware that such additional =
changes
>>>>    could occur, and track them through normal means (e.g., =
differences
>>>>    between the ETag values returned in the synchronization report =
and
>>>>    those returned when actually fetching resource content), =
conditional
>>>>    requests as described in Section 5, or repeating the =
synchronization
>>>>    process until no changes are returned.
>>>>=20
>>>>> [3] -Minor- idnits 2.12.12  reports a Downref to RFC 5842.  Please
>>>>> consult your Area Director (Peter Saint-Andre) to determine what =
to do
>>>>> about this Downref (it requires attention, but may not require =
changes to
>>>>> the draft).
>>>>=20
>>>> Working with IESG on this one.
>>>>=20
>>>>> Nit: I suggest not using the author's own name (cyrusdaboo) in the
>>>>> examples.  Someone may copy the code from the resulting RFC.
>>>>=20
>>>> This has been common practice in most of the other CalDAV/CardDAV =
RFCs I
>>>> have worked on and has not been the source of any problems, so I =
would
>>>> rather leave this unchanged. If there is an official IETF policy on =
using
>>>> "real names" in examples, then I would be happy to change to follow =
that,
>>>> but I am not aware of anything like that.
>>>>=20
>>>>> Nit: idnits 2.12.12 reports that draft-ietf-vcarddav-carddav has =
been
>>>>> published as RFC 6352; the RFC Editor will correct this if a new =
version
>>>>> of the draft is not required for other reasons.
>>>>=20
>>>> Fixed in my working copy.
>>>>=20
>>>>=20
>>>> --
>>>> Cyrus Daboo
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>=20
>=20


From mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com  Fri Jan 20 10:46:21 2012
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-discard-prefix-02.txt
Reviewer:  Mary Barnes
Review Date:  20 Jan 2012
IETF LC End Date:  23 Jan 2012


Summary:  Ready.

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Thanks

On Jan 20, 2012, at 10:46 AM, Mary Barnes wrote:

> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
> 
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
> you may receive.
> 
> Document: draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-discard-prefix-02.txt
> Reviewer:  Mary Barnes
> Review Date:  20 Jan 2012
> IETF LC End Date:  23 Jan 2012
> 
> 
> Summary:  Ready.


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> Hi, Dino.
>=20
> I have had a look at the attached version -20  docs. =20
>=20
> Several of the fixes seem to have gone awry, and there are various =
cases where I think there is still discussion needed.

Okay, I will fix them. See my comments inline.

> I also spotted a couple more issues:
> - I don't know how an ETR can do a return routability check - see =
discussion below

When it is using a mapping from a received Map-Request, the fact that it =
verifies it with a Map-Request to the source is doing a route =
returnability check because the nonce it chooses is echoed back in the =
Map-Reply.

> - How does an ITR know a locator is anycast - see right at the end.

It doesn't care, it is just an address that it encapsulates to. That is =
the beauty of anycast, because it is operational solution and not a =
protocol solution.

> Regards,
> Elwyn

See responses inline.

> On 16/01/12 19:50, Dino Farinacci wrote:
>>> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
>>> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
>>>=20
>>> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>
>>> .
>>>=20
>>> Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
>>> or AD before posting a new version of the draft.
>>>=20
>>> Document: draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt
>>> Reviewer: Elwyn Davies
>>> Review Date: 20120115
>>> IETF LC End Date: 20111130
>>> IESG Telechat date: 20120119
>>>=20
>>> Summary: This is an updated version of the review I did for Version =
16.
>>> The status is STILL 'almost ready'. I noticed one additional minor =
issue
>>> (s3, ITRs). I did not receive any explicit reponses to the comments =
in
>>> the previous review although some of the comments have been =
addressed
>>> and I have removed those comments. So...
>>>=20
>>> Given that this document is experimental, there don't appear to be =
any
>>> showstopping issues.  However, I found that having the functionality
>>> spread over several documents without a really clear overview did =
not
>>> make it easy to follow. There are a number of areas where topics =
appear
>>> unannounced in ways that are not immediately meaningful, and may or =
may
>>> not be clarified later in the document (especially the topics of
>>> multicast and anycast).
>>>=20
>>> There are areas of the detailed format description that are very =
dense=20
>>> and difficult to follow, and the split of functionality between this=20=

>>> document and ALT does not help.  I got the distinct feeling that =
extra=20
>>> bits of functionality had been shoe horned into this section over =
time=20
>>> without really thinking through the system aspects.  However given =
that=20
>>> we are considering an experimental protocol this is not a major =
issue,=20
>>> provided that it is cleaned up before becoming a real standard.
>>>=20
>>> Major issues: None.
>>>=20
>> This is good to know. Thanks for your comments Elwyn. See responses =
below. I have a new -20 diff file enclosed to make sure I reflected your =
comments. Please have a look and comment as soon as you can. Thanks.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> Minor issues:
>>> s3, Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR): "An ITR is a router which accepts =
an IP
>>> packet with a single IP header": Technically this rules out a site
>>> attached to an ITR using any form of IP tunneling (such as VPNs or =
IP
>>> mobility or 6-in-4 tunnels) through the ITR because a tunneled =
packet
>>> would already have more than one IP header. In practice, I think the
>>> qualifying statement in brackets immediately after the quoted =
statement
>>> clarifies the situation but this should be rewrittten to avoid
>>> ambiguity.
>>>=20
>> Fixed.
>>=20
> Hmm.  You have substituted '(more precisely, an IP packet that does =
not contain a LISP header)' by '(typically, the IP packet that does not =
contain an IP header)'.  These are definitely not the same.  Are there =
circumstances where an IP packet coming out of a LISP site would already =
contain a LISP header.  That was not my understanding.  If this is not =
correct then what you have now is even more confusing.  Also in the next =
sentence, the phrase 'this IP     destination address' no longer makes =
sense.=20

I will fix.

>>> s3, EID: "EIDs MUST NOT be used as RLOCs":  But the remainder of the
>>> definition goes on to talk about what must/must not happen when they =
are
>>> numerically equivalent. This is still somewhat confusing.
>>>=20
>> When they are numerically equivaldent does not mean they are the same =
definition. Remember there are two namespaces so 10.1.1.1 in one =
namespace serves a different purpose than 10.1.1.1 in the other =
namespace.
>>=20
>> I made no change here because we revised this definition dozens of =
times to make the working group happy. So this definition is rough =
concensus.
>>=20
> Doubtless it is rough concensus, but the piece we are discussing is =
not part of the definition as such.  The point is that seen from point =
of view of the bits on the wire, RLOCs and EIDs are indistinguishable, =
and the later text implies that the same bit pattern can be either =
depending on context.  I think what you need to say is 'It is=20

This is not true. The destination address in an IP header of a packet =
that is a UDP packet with destination port 4341 defines that address as =
an RLOC. Any other address *anywhere* is an EID.

> important that a value specified as an EID is only used in contexts =
where an EID is required and never in contexts     where an RLOC is =
required (and vice versa).  Since the same bit pattern could be valid =
for either as explained later, it is vital that this logical distinction =
is maintained in implementations.'  I note that there is a context =
(called out below) where the EID is used in a context where an RLOC =
would normally be expected.

Yes, but what you state is not specific enough to give enough value to =
the meaning. It will just raise more questions and we don't want to =
identify all cases where EIDs are used and RLOCs are used. There are =
just too many cases and that is what the rest of the spec is for.

The text you provide requires necessary details so by itself it as well =
creates confusion.

>>> s3, Data Probe: Some clarification/explanation is needed regarding =
the=20
>>> fact that a Data Probe uses an EID as its destination address in the=20=

>>> core, but EIDs are specifically described as not routable in the =
core=20
>>> earlier in the document. I understand that ALT puts caveats on the=20=

>>> usability of Data Probes, but still potentially offers routability =
of=20
>>> the EID over the alternative topology. I think some reflection of =
this=20
>>> discussion would be helpful here.
>>=20
>> I added to the definition that when Data Probes are used, the =
underlying routing system must advertise EIDs. This is not desirable but =
there are rare cases, it may be used.
> I think your new text compounds the problem.  It explicitly =
contradicts earlier statements that EIDs are not=20

No, it speaks the truth.

> globally routable.  ALT moves the EID routing problem to a separated =
overlay network which sidesteps the problem, but the new words =
effectively change a MUST NOT into a MAY.  As I said previously, there =
are words in ALT that probably need to be reproduced here. =20

Data Probes are not used in the ALT. So I do not know why you are saying =
this.

>>> s4.1, item 4: ETR "processes as a control message"... does this =
imply=20
>>> anything about prioritization in the rest of the network?
>>=20
>> No different than anything else and doesn't deserve a mention in my =
opinion.
> Maybe not, but why is that the only traditional use of prioritisation =
for IP packets was for router control messages.  It strikes me that =
Map-Requests and Map-Replies need to get quickly to the front of the =
queues in the routers they arrive at like BGP messages when travelling =
on the underlying routing topology.

Yes, please suggest text. I do not know what you want.

>>> s5.3, LISP Nonce: What are the consequences of using the same nonce =
for=20
>>> 'too long'.. and how can an implementor decide what is too long?
>>=20
>> A possible replay attack if a man-in-the-middle can guess a 24-bit or =
128-bit nonce.
> Guidance to implementers is required.  OK, maybe you don't know yet =
'cos its an experiment, but the draft ought to state that guidance will =
be given after experiments, if only as a reminder to somebody turning =
this into a standard.

Please provide text.

>>> s6.1: "Implementations MUST be prepared to accept packets when =
either the
>>> source port or destination UDP port is set to 4342 due to NATs
>>> changing port number values." I (still) don't understand this. My=20
>>> understanding was that these UDP packets are generated in the ITR =
with=20
>>> globally routable RLOCs in the headers. Why are they going through =
NATs?
>>> Does this mean when only one of the ports is 4342? (but the previous
>>> comments still stands).
>>=20
>> An ITR could be behind a NAT. And when it is its "local RLOC" is a =
private address. When the packet traverses a NAT, the source address =
will be changed to a global address. The outside world believes the =
source of the packet is the source RLOC which is globally reachable and =
advertised in the underlying routing system.
> Is the problem a missing 'not'?=20

I do not understand what you are saying. Can you please be more specific =
in your comments. Sigh.

>> when either the
>> source port or destination UDP port is ***not*** (?) set to 4342 due =
to NATs
>> changing port number values.
>=20
>>=20
>> NATs also translate/change the source port of the outer header. So =
the if a LISP control packet is returning a reply to a request that had =
4342 in the destination port, then the source port would be translated =
and the requester would not know the packet is a LISP control packet. So =
if the source port of the request is 4342, the replier can return that =
in the destination port of the reply without a NAT touching the port =
(while it is touching the other port).
>>=20
>>> s5.3: Copying of TTL/Hop Count fields and Type of service fields: =
This=20
>>> discussion is somewhat confusing. Initially these are described as=20=

>>> SHOULD mostly without any description of why one would not. A couple =
of=20
>>> paragraphs later they become MUSTs with some minor and explicit=20
>>> exceptions. This should be clarified.
>>=20
>> We said should because we were being practical. Some implementations =
cannot copy the TTL and set it statically. We want those implementations =
to not violate the spec.
>>=20
>> We use MUST later for the Type of Service field. When the TOS is =
copied, then the sub-parts MUST follow what the text says.
>>=20
> OK.  That is correct.   Its possible there is a better wording than =
'caveat' but I can't think of a short form.  Caveat tends to make me =
think of get outs, whereas what you are doing is making it more strict =
for the ECN case. Leave it be.=20

How about the word "exception"?

>>> s6.1, last para: "This main LISP specification is the authoritative=20=

>>> source for message
>>> format definitions for the Map-Request and Map-Reply messages." So=20=

>>> what spec is authoritative for Map-Register and Map-Notify? It is =
later=20
>>> stated that this spec defines the message format of these messages=20=

>>> (first paras of s6.1.6/6.1.7). This seems pretty authoritative. I=20
>>> suspect that this para could be dropped wlog.
>>=20
>> I will fix this text. Thanks for finding this.
>>=20
>>> s6.1.4: S bit: How do I find out how big the Mapping Protocol Data =
is in=20
>>> order to determine where the extra security fields are located?
>>=20
>> This was commented on quite a bit and was used for CONS. Since the =
commenters won the argument to remove references to CONS, we will remove =
the Mapping Protocol Data part, which actually is not used by any =
implementations.
> OK.. But, should it go from s6.1.2 as well?

We have removed this from the spec.

>>> s6.1.4: M priority/weight: Multicast suddenly makes an appearance. =
Not=20
>>> sure why?
>>=20
>> Because we have to encode multicast priorities. And to get a mapping =
for an ETR to join an ITR, we use a Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange. I =
will add a reference to LISP-multicast for each reference to M priority =
and M weight.
>>=20
>>> s10.3: How is a "route-returnability check" performed in LISP?
>>=20
>> I added another sentence to the defintion of "Route-returnability".
> The new sentence tells the principle of what messages to send - but =
where to send them?  The problem in my mind is that it is apparently the =
ETR performing the check.  Is the check sent to the ITR or the original =
source (EID)?  If=20

The ITR too.

> to the original source, why should that source believe it ought to =
answer this ETR (which will have to have an EID that the return message =
is sent) when it has never heard from the ETR and has no idea whether =
the ETR is a kosher node?  If the source is behind a firewall or NAT =
there is a good chance the message will never arrive.  This case differs =
from the standard route returnability case where messages are always =
end-to-end.  =20

When the ITR sends a Map-Request, it expects an answer, when it gets an =
answer with the nonce it created, it will accept the response. If you =
want stronger security, the ITR puts a one-time-key in the Map-Request =
and the ETR will sign the Map-Reply via the procedures in =
draft-ietf-lisp-sec-01.

>>> Nits/editorial comments:
>>> General: s/bytes/octets/
>>=20
>> Changed throughout.
>>=20
>>> General: Figures all need titles and numbers.
>>=20
>> There are section titles for the figures. There are no figure numbers =
just like RFC 2460. I don't see the point since there is no text that =
back references the figures. And I think we wrote the text to =
sufficiently introduce the figures that are about to come up.
> You can discuss this one with the RFC Editor.
>>=20
>>> s3: s/PA addresses are an an address/PA addresses are an address/
>>>=20
>>> s3, RLOC: Link to IPv4/v6 specifications needed.
>>>=20
>>> s3, EID-to-RLOC Database: "This has no negative implications."=20
>>> Justification?
>>>=20
>>> s3, Negative Mapping Entry: Needs cross-reference for Negative =
Map-Reply.
>>=20
>> Changed all the above.
>>=20
>>> s3, Data Probe: needs cross-reference(s)
>>=20
>> I don't think it does because it is being defined here for the first =
time.
> See discussion above. ALT?

That did not make this a clear comment at all.  ;-)

>>> s3, PITR: The alternative term PTR is now not used at all and can be
>>> removed.
>>=20
>> Fixed.
>>=20
>>> s4.1, item 7: Needs cross references.
>>=20
>> Can you be more specific please. Are you asking for a reference for =
DNS names or for the Map-Reply or for something else?
> No.  To the piece that tells about the policies (Section 6.5).=20

Rather than get this wrong. Can you tell me the exact text that needs a =
reference to where? I want to avoid the back and forth on this thread.

>>=20
>>> s5.1 and s5.2 Need references to base IP specifications and notes =
about=20
>>> the items that are defined in those specifications, and the =
equivalences=20
>>> between source/destination IP addresses and EIDs/RLOCs. (also =
applies to=20
>>> s6.1)
>>=20
>> We did this in a later update. We put the references in 5.3 where we =
describe such fields.
> Fine.
>=20
>>=20
>>> s5.3: This section should also refer to the various abbreviations =
used=20
>>> in the figures (e.g., OH for Outer Header, etc).
>>=20
>> It is expanded in the "Packet header descriptions:" part.
>>=20
> True but hardly 'first use'.  All it needs is s/Inner header/Inner =
Header (IH)/ and similarly for OH in s5.3. Plus a definition of IHL =
(internet header length).

Done. Thanks for being specific. IHL is covered by the reference to RFC =
791.

>>> s5.3, LSB: First mention of anycast addresses here. Needs a cross=20
>>> reference or earlier introduction.
>>=20
>> I have added a definition for anycast address in the Definition of =
Terms section.
>>=20
>>> s6.x: Encodings of numeric fields not specified.
>>=20
>> All fixed. New text enclosed. Please acknowledge. The -20 has not =
been posted. This is a work in progress -20 waiting Adrian's comments as =
well.
>>=20
>> Dino
>>=20
>=20
> EXTRA INTRODUCED NIT and EXTRA ISSUE SPOTTED:
> s4, first bullet: "get to destination, which in turn, LISP routers =
deliver" has got garbled.  I think something like the following was =
intended:
>     assume packets get to their intended destinations.  In a system =
where LISP is deployed, LISP routers intercept EID addressed packets and =
assist in delivering them across the network core where EIDs cannot be =
routed.

I adde this text. Thanks.

> s5.3, LISP Locator Status Bits, last sentence:    "If the LSB for an =
anycast locator.." How does the ITR know it is an anycast locator?  They =
are indistinguishable for any other IP address in most cases.

It is stating what happens if the LSB is for an anycast locator. The ITR =
doesn't care if it is anycast or anything else because they are =
indistinguishable.

Thanks,
Dino


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<pre>
Network Working Group                                       D. Farinacci
Internet-Draft                                                 V. Fuller
Intended status: Experimental                                   D. Meyer
Expires: July <strike><font color="red">8,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">24,</font></strong> 2012                                          D. Lewis
                                                           cisco Systems
                                                        January <strike><font color="red">5,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">21,</font></strong> 2012

                 Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)
                           <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-19</font></strike>
                           <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-20</font></strong>

Abstract

   This draft describes a network layer based protocol that enables
   separation of IP addresses into two new numbering spaces: Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs).  No changes are
   required to either host protocol stacks or to the "core" of the
   Internet infrastructure.  LISP can be incrementally deployed, without
   a "flag day", and offers traffic engineering, multi-homing, and
   mobility benefits to early adopters, even when there are relatively
   few LISP-capable sites.

   Design and development of LISP was largely motivated by the problem
   statement produced by the October 2006 IAB Routing and Addressing
   Workshop.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July <strike><font color="red">8,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">24,</font></strong> 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Definition of Terms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   4.  Basic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">13</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">14</font></strong>
     4.1.  Packet Flow Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">15</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">16</font></strong>
   5.  LISP Encapsulation Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">17</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">18</font></strong>
     5.1.  LISP IPv4-in-IPv4 Header Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">18</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">19</font></strong>
     5.2.  LISP IPv6-in-IPv6 Header Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">18</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">19</font></strong>
     5.3.  Tunnel Header Field Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">20</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">21</font></strong>
     5.4.  Dealing with Large Encapsulated Packets  . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">24</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">25</font></strong>
       5.4.1.  A Stateless Solution to MTU Handling . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">24</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">25</font></strong>
       5.4.2.  A Stateful Solution to MTU Handling  . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">25</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">26</font></strong>
     5.5.  Using Virtualization and Segmentation with LISP  . . . . . <strike><font color="red">25</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">26</font></strong>
   6.  EID-to-RLOC Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">27</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">28</font></strong>
     6.1.  LISP IPv4 and IPv6 Control Plane Packet Formats  . . . . . <strike><font color="red">27</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">28</font></strong>
       6.1.1.  LISP Packet Type Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">29</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">30</font></strong>
       6.1.2.  Map-Request Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">29</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">30</font></strong>
       6.1.3.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Request Message  . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">32</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">33</font></strong>
       6.1.4.  Map-Reply Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">33</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">34</font></strong>
       6.1.5.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Reply Message  . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">37</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">38</font></strong>
       6.1.6.  Map-Register Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">39</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">40</font></strong>
       6.1.7.  Map-Notify Message Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">41</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">42</font></strong>
       6.1.8.  Encapsulated Control Message Format  . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">42</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">43</font></strong>
     6.2.  Routing Locator Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">44</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">45</font></strong>
     6.3.  Routing Locator Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">46</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">47</font></strong>
       6.3.1.  Echo Nonce Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">48</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">49</font></strong>
       6.3.2.  RLOC Probing Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">49</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">50</font></strong>
     6.4.  EID Reachability within a LISP Site  . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">50</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">51</font></strong>
     6.5.  Routing Locator Hashing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">51</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">52</font></strong>
     6.6.  Changing the Contents of EID-to-RLOC Mappings  . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">52</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">53</font></strong>
       6.6.1.  Clock Sweep  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">53</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">54</font></strong>
       6.6.2.  Solicit-Map-Request (SMR)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">53</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">54</font></strong>
       6.6.3.  Database Map Versioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">55</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">56</font></strong>
   7.  Router Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">56</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">57</font></strong>
   8.  Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">57</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">58</font></strong>
     8.1.  First-hop/Last-hop Tunnel Routers  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">58</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">59</font></strong>
     8.2.  Border/Edge Tunnel Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">58</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">59</font></strong>
     8.3.  ISP Provider-Edge (PE) Tunnel Routers  . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">59</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">60</font></strong>
     8.4.  LISP Functionality with Conventional NATs  . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">59</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">60</font></strong>
     8.5.  Packets Egressing a LISP Site  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">60</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">61</font></strong>
   9.  Traceroute Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">61</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">62</font></strong>
     9.1.  IPv6 Traceroute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">62</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">63</font></strong>
     9.2.  IPv4 Traceroute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">62</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">63</font></strong>
     9.3.  Traceroute using Mixed Locators  . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">62</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">63</font></strong>
   10. Mobility Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">64</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">65</font></strong>
     10.1. Site Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">64</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">65</font></strong>
     10.2. Slow Endpoint Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">64</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">65</font></strong>
     10.3. Fast Endpoint Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">64</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">65</font></strong>
     10.4. Fast Network Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">66</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">67</font></strong>
     10.5. LISP Mobile Node Mobility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">66</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">67</font></strong>
   11. Multicast Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">68</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">69</font></strong>
   12. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">69</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">70</font></strong>
   13. Network Management Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">71</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">72</font></strong>
   14. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">72</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">73</font></strong>
     14.1. LISP ACT and Flag Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">72</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">73</font></strong>
     14.2. LISP Address Type Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">72</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">73</font></strong>
     14.3. LISP UDP Port Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">72</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">73</font></strong>
     14.4. LISP Key ID Numbers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">73</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">74</font></strong>
   15. Known Open Issues and Areas of Future Work . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">74</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">75</font></strong>
   16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">76</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">77</font></strong>
     16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">76</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">77</font></strong>
     16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">77</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">78</font></strong>
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">81</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">82</font></strong>
   Appendix B.  Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">83</font></strong>
     B.1.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-20.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">83</font></strong>
     B.2.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-18.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">83</font></strong>
     B.3.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-17.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-18.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">83</font></strong>
     B.4.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-16.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-17.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">83</font></strong>
     B.5.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-15.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-16.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">83</font></strong>
     B.6.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-14.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-15.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">82</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">83</font></strong>
     B.7.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-13.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-14.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
     B.8.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-12.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-13.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
     B.9.  Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-11.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-12.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
     B.10. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-11.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
     B.11. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">86</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">87</font></strong>
     B.12. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-08.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
     B.13. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-07.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-08.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
     B.14. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-06.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-07.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
     B.15. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-05.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-06.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
     B.16. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-04.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-05.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
     B.17. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-03.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-04.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
     B.18. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-02.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-03.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">94</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">95</font></strong>
     B.19. Changes to <strike><font color="red">draft-ietf-lisp-01.txt</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-02.txt</font></strong>  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">94</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">95</font></strong>
     B.20. Changes to <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-01.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
     B.21. Changes to</font></strong> draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt  . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">94</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">96</font></strong>
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <strike><font color="red">95</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">97</font></strong>

1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   This document describes the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol
   (LISP), which provides a set of functions for routers to exchange
   information used to map from non globally routeable Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs) to routeable Routing Locators (RLOCs).  It also
   defines a mechanism for these LISP routers to encapsulate IP packets
   addressed with EIDs for transmission across the&lt; Internet that uses
   RLOCs for routing and forwarding.

   Creation of LISP was initially motivated by discussions during the
   IAB-sponsored Routing and Addressing Workshop held in Amsterdam in
   October, 2006 (see [RFC4984]).  A key conclusion of the workshop was
   that the Internet routing and addressing system was not scaling well
   in the face of the explosive growth of new sites; one reason for this
   poor scaling is the increasing number of multi-homed and other sites
   that cannot be addressed as part of topologically- or provider-based
   aggregated prefixes.  Additional work that more completely described
   the problem statement may be found in [RADIR].

   A basic observation, made many years ago in early networking research
   such as that documented in [CHIAPPA] and [RFC4984], is that using a
   single address field for both identifying a device and for
   determining where it is topologically located in the network requires
   optimization along two conflicting axes: for routing to be efficient,
   the address must be assigned topologically; for collections of
   devices to be easily and effectively managed, without the need for
   renumbering in response to topological change (such as that caused by
   adding or removing attachment points to the network or by mobility
   events), the address must explicitly not be tied to the topology.

   The approach that LISP takes to solving the routing scalability
   problem is to replace IP addresses with two new types of numbers:
   Routing Locators (RLOCs), which are topologically assigned to network
   attachment points (and are therefore amenable to aggregation) and
   used for routing and forwarding of packets through the network; and
   Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs), which are assigned independently from
   the network topology, are used for numbering devices, and are
   aggregated along administrative boundaries.  LISP then defines
   functions for mapping between the two numbering spaces and for
   encapsulating traffic originated by devices using non-routeable EIDs
   for transport across a network infrastructure that routes and
   forwards using RLOCs.  Both RLOCs and EIDs are syntactically-
   identical to IP addresses; it is the semantics of how they are used
   that differs.

   This document describes the protocol that implements these functions.
   The database which stores the mappings between EIDs and RLOCs is
   explicitly a separate "module" to facilitate experimentation with a
   variety of approaches.  One database design that is being developed
   and prototyped as part of the LISP working group work is [ALT].
   Others that have been described but not implemented include [CONS],
   [EMACS], [NERD].  Finally, [LISP-MS], documents a general-purpose
   service interface for accessing a mapping database; this interface is
   intended to make the mapping database modular so that different
   approaches can be tried without the need to modify installed LISP
   capable devices in LISP sites.

   This experimental specification has areas that require additional
   experience and measurement.  <strong><font color="green">It is NOT RECOMMENDED for deployment
   beyond experimental situations.</font></strong>  Results of <strike><font color="red">such work</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">experimentation</font></strong> may lead
   to modifications and enhancements of protocol mechanisms defined in
   this document.  See Section 15 for specific, known issues that are in
   need of further work during development, implementation, and <strike><font color="red">prototype
   deployment.</font></strike>
   <strong><font color="green">experimentation.

   An examination of the implications of LISP on Internet traffic,
   applications, routers, and security is for future study.  This
   analysis will explain what role LISP can play in scalable routing and
   will also look at scalability and levels of state required for
   encapsulation, decapsulation, liveness, and so on.</font></strong>

3.  Definition of Terms

   Provider Independent (PI) Addresses:   PI addresses are an address
      block assigned from a pool where blocks are not associated with
      any particular location in the network (e.g. from a particular
      service provider), and is therefore not topologically aggregatable
      in the routing system.

   Provider Assigned (PA) Addresses:   PA addresses are an <strike><font color="red">an</font></strike> address block
      assigned to a site by each service provider to which a site
      connects.  Typically, each block is sub-block of a service
      provider Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) [RFC4632] block and
      is aggregated into the larger block before being advertised into
      the global Internet.  Traditionally, IP multihoming has been
      implemented by each multi-homed site acquiring its own, globally-
      visible prefix.  LISP uses only topologically-assigned and
      aggregatable address blocks for RLOCs, eliminating this
      demonstrably non-scalable practice.

   Routing Locator (RLOC):   A RLOC is an IPv4 <strong><font color="green">[RFC0791]</font></strong> or IPv6
      <strong><font color="green">[RFC2460]</font></strong> address of an egress tunnel router (ETR).  A RLOC is the
      output of an <strike><font color="red">EID-to-
      RLOC</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">EID-to-RLOC</font></strong> mapping lookup.  An EID maps to one or
      more RLOCs.  Typically, RLOCs are numbered from <strike><font color="red">topologically-aggregatable</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">topologically-
      aggregatable</font></strong> blocks that are assigned to a site at each point to
      which it attaches to the global Internet; where the topology is
      defined by the connectivity of provider networks, RLOCs can be
      thought of as PA addresses.  Multiple RLOCs can be assigned to the
      same ETR device or to multiple ETR devices at a site.

   Endpoint ID (EID):   An EID is a 32-bit (for IPv4) or 128-bit (for
      IPv6) value used in the source and destination address fields of
      the first (most inner) LISP header of a packet.  The host obtains
      a destination EID the same way it obtains an destination address
      today, for example through a Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1034]
      lookup or Session Invitation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] exchange.
      The source EID is obtained via existing mechanisms used to set a
      host's "local" IP address.  An EID <strong><font color="green">used on the public Internet
      must have the same properties as any other IP address used in that
      manner; this means, among other things, that it must be globally
      unique.  An EID</font></strong> is allocated to a host from an EID-prefix block
      associated with the site where the host is located.  An EID can be
      used by a host to refer to other hosts.  EIDs MUST NOT be used as
      LISP RLOCs.  Note that EID blocks MAY be assigned in a
      hierarchical manner, independent of the network topology, to
      facilitate scaling of the mapping database.  In addition, an EID
      block assigned to a site may have site-local structure
      (subnetting) for routing within the site; this structure is not
      visible to the global routing system.  In theory, the bit string
      that represents an EID for one device can represent an RLOC for a
      different device.  As the architecture is realized, if a given bit
      string is both an RLOC and an EID, it must refer to the same
      entity in both cases.  When used in discussions with other
      Locator/ID separation proposals, a LISP EID will be called a
      "LEID".  Throughout this document, any references to "EID" refers
      to an LEID.

   EID-prefix:   An EID-prefix is a power-of-two block of EIDs which are
      allocated to a site by an address allocation authority.  EID-
      prefixes are associated with a set of RLOC addresses which make up
      a "database mapping".  EID-prefix allocations can be broken up
      into smaller blocks when an RLOC set is to be associated with the
      larger EID-prefix block.  A globally routed address block (whether
      PI or PA) is not inherently an EID-prefix.  A globally routed
      address block MAY be used by its assignee as an EID block.  The
      converse is not supported.  That is, a site which receives an
      explicitly allocated EID-prefix may not use that EID-prefix as a
      globally routed prefix.  This would require coordination and
      cooperation with the entities managing the mapping infrastructure.
      Once this has been done, that block could be removed from the
      globally routed IP system, if other suitable transition and access
      mechanisms are in place.  Discussion of such transition and access
      mechanisms can be found in [INTERWORK] and [LISP-DEPLOY].

   End-system:   An end-system is an IPv4 or IPv6 device that originates
      packets with a single IPv4 or IPv6 header.  The end-system
      supplies an EID value for the destination address field of the IP
      header when communicating globally (i.e. outside of its routing
      domain).  An end-system can be a host computer, a switch or router
      device, or any network appliance.

   Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR):   An ITR is a router <strike><font color="red">which accepts an IP
      packet with a single IP header (more precisely, an IP packet</font></strike> that
      <strike><font color="red">does not contain</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">resides in</font></strong> a
      LISP <strike><font color="red">header).</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">site.  Packets sent by sources inside of the LISP site to
      destinations outside of the site are candidates for encapsulation
      by the ITR.</font></strong>  The <strike><font color="red">router</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">ITR</font></strong> treats <strike><font color="red">this "inner"</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">the</font></strong> IP destination address as an EID
      and performs an EID-to-RLOC mapping lookup.  The router then
      prepends an "outer" IP header with one of its globally-routable
      RLOCs in the source address field and the result of the mapping
      lookup in the destination address field.  Note that this
      destination RLOC MAY be an intermediate, proxy device that has
      better knowledge of the <strike><font color="red">EID-
      to-RLOC</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">EID-to-RLOC</font></strong> mapping closer to the
      destination EID.  In general, an ITR receives IP packets from site
      end-systems on one side and sends LISP-encapsulated IP packets
      toward the Internet on the other side.

      Specifically, when a service provider prepends a LISP header for
      Traffic Engineering purposes, the router that does this is also
      regarded as an ITR.  The outer RLOC the ISP ITR uses can be based
      on the outer destination address (the originating ITR's supplied
      RLOC) or the inner destination address (the originating hosts
      supplied EID).

   TE-ITR:   A TE-ITR is an ITR that is deployed in a service provider
      network that prepends an additional LISP header for Traffic
      Engineering purposes.

   Egress Tunnel Router (ETR):   An ETR is a router that accepts an IP
      packet where the destination address in the "outer" IP header is
      one of its own RLOCs.  The router strips the "outer" header and
      forwards the packet based on the next IP header found.  In
      general, an ETR receives LISP-encapsulated IP packets from the
      Internet on one side and sends decapsulated IP packets to site
      end-systems on the other side.  ETR functionality does not have to
      be limited to a router device.  A server host can be the endpoint
      of a LISP tunnel as well.

   TE-ETR:   A TE-ETR is an ETR that is deployed in a service provider
      network that strips an outer LISP header for Traffic Engineering
      purposes.

   xTR:   A xTR is a reference to an ITR or ETR when direction of data
      flow is not part of the context description. xTR refers to the
      router that is the tunnel endpoint.  Used synonymously with the
      term "Tunnel Router".  For example, "An xTR can be located at the
      Customer Edge (CE) router", meaning both ITR and ETR functionality
      is at the CE router.

   LISP Router:   A LISP router is a router that performs the functions
      of any or all of ITR, ETR, PITR, or PETR.

   EID-to-RLOC Cache:   The EID-to-RLOC cache is a short-lived, on-
      demand table in an ITR that stores, tracks, and is responsible for
      timing-out and otherwise validating EID-to-RLOC mappings.  This
      cache is distinct from the full "database" of EID-to-RLOC
      mappings, it is dynamic, local to the ITR(s), and relatively small
      while the database is distributed, relatively static, and much
      more global in scope.

   EID-to-RLOC Database:   The EID-to-RLOC database is a global
      distributed database that contains all known EID-prefix to RLOC
      mappings.  Each potential ETR typically contains a small piece of
      the database: the EID-to-RLOC mappings for the EID prefixes
      "behind" the router.  These map to one of the router's own,
      globally-visible, IP addresses.  The same database mapping entries
      MUST be configured on all ETRs for a given site.  In a steady
      state the EID-prefixes for the site and the locator-set for each
      EID-prefix MUST be the same on all ETRs.  Procedures to enforce
      and/or verify this are outside the scope of this document.  Note
      that there MAY be transient conditions when the EID-prefix for the
      site and locator-set for each EID-prefix may not be the same on
      all ETRs.  This has no negative <strike><font color="red">implications.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">implications since a partial set
      of locators can be used.</font></strong>

   Recursive Tunneling:   Recursive tunneling occurs when a packet has
      more than one LISP IP header.  Additional layers of tunneling MAY
      be employed to implement traffic engineering or other re-routing
      as needed.  When this is done, an additional "outer" LISP header
      is added and the original RLOCs are preserved in the "inner"
      header.  Any references to tunnels in this specification refers to
      dynamic encapsulating tunnels and they are never statically
      configured.

   Reencapsulating Tunnels:   Reencapsulating tunneling occurs when an
      ETR removes a LISP header, then acts as an ITR to prepend another
      LISP header.  Doing this allows a packet to be re-routed by the
      re-encapsulating router without adding the overhead of additional
      tunnel headers.  Any references to tunnels in this specification
      refers to dynamic encapsulating tunnels and they are never
      statically configured.  When using multiple mapping database
      systems, care must be taken to not create reencapsulation loops.

   LISP Header:   a term used in this document to refer to the outer
      IPv4 or IPv6 header, a UDP header, and a LISP-specific <strike><font color="red">8-byte</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">8-octet</font></strong>
      header that follows the UDP header, an ITR prepends or an ETR
      strips.

   Address Family Identifier (AFI):   a term used to describe an address
      encoding in a packet.  An address family currently pertains to an
      IPv4 or IPv6 address.  See [AFI]/[AFI-REGISTRY] and [RFC3232] for
      details.  An AFI value of 0 used in this specification indicates
      an unspecified encoded address where the length of the address is
      0 <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> following the 16-bit AFI value of 0.

   Negative Mapping Entry:   A negative mapping entry, also known as a
      negative cache entry, is an EID-to-RLOC entry where an EID-prefix
      is advertised or stored with no RLOCs.  That is, the locator-set
      for the EID-to-RLOC entry is empty or has an encoded locator count
      of 0.  This type of entry could be used to describe a prefix from
      a non-LISP site, which is explicitly not in the mapping database.
      There are a set of well defined actions that are encoded in a
      Negative <strike><font color="red">Map-Reply.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">Map-Reply (Section 6.1.5).</font></strong>

   Data Probe:   A data-probe is a LISP-encapsulated data packet where
      the inner header destination address equals the outer header
      destination address used to trigger a Map-Reply by a decapsulating
      ETR.  In addition, the original packet is decapsulated and
      delivered to the destination host if the destination EID is in the
      EID-prefix range configured on the ETR.  Otherwise, the packet is
      discarded.  A Data Probe is used in some of the mapping database
      designs to "probe" or request a Map-Reply from an ETR; in other
      cases, Map-Requests are used.  See each mapping database design
      for details.  <strong><font color="green">When using Data Probes, by sending Map-Requests on
      the underlying routing system, EID-prefixes must be advertised.
      However, this is discouraged if the core is to scale by having
      less EID-prefixes stored in the core router's routing tables.</font></strong>

   Proxy ITR (PITR):   A PITR is <strike><font color="red">also known as a PTR is</font></strike> defined and described in [INTERWORK], a
      PITR acts like an ITR but does so on behalf of non-LISP sites
      which send packets to destinations at LISP sites.

   Proxy ETR (PETR):   A PETR is defined and described in [INTERWORK], a
      PETR acts like an ETR but does so on behalf of LISP sites which
      send packets to destinations at non-LISP sites.

   Route-returnability:  is an assumption that the underlying routing
      system will deliver packets to the destination.  When combined
      with a nonce that is provided by a sender and returned by a
      receiver, this limits off-path data insertion.  <strong><font color="green">A route-
      returnability check is verified when a message is sent with a
      nonce, another message is returned with the same nonce, and the
      destination of the original message appears as the source of the
      returned message.</font></strong>

   LISP site:  is a set of routers in an edge network that are under a
      single technical administration.  LISP routers which reside in the
      edge network are the demarcation points to separate the edge
      network from the core network.

   Client-side:  a term used in this document to indicate a connection
      initiation attempt by an EID.  The ITR(s) at the LISP site are the
      first to get involved in obtaining database map cache entries by
      sending Map-Request messages.

   Server-side:  a term used in this document to indicate a connection
      initiation attempt is being accepted for a destination EID.  The
      ETR(s) at the destination LISP site are the first to send Map-
      Replies to the source site initiating the connection.  The ETR(s)
      at this destination site can obtain mappings by gleaning
      information from Map-Requests, Data-Probes, or encapsulated
      packets.

   Locator Status Bits (LSBs):  Locator status bits are present in the
      LISP header.  They are used by ITRs to inform ETRs about the up/
      down status of all ETRs at the local site.  These bits are used as
      a hint to convey up/down router status and not path reachability
      status.  The LSBs can be verified by use of one of the Locator
      Reachability Algorithms described in Section 6.3.

   <strong><font color="green">Anycast Address:  a term used in this document to refer to the same
      IPv4 or IPv6 address configured and used on multiple systems at
      the same time.  An EID or RLOC can be an anycast address in each
      of their own address spaces.</font></strong>

4.  Basic Overview

   One key concept of LISP is that end-systems (hosts) operate the same
   way they do today.  The IP addresses that hosts use for tracking
   sockets, connections, and for sending and receiving packets do not
   change.  In LISP terminology, these IP addresses are called Endpoint
   Identifiers (EIDs).

   Routers continue to forward packets based on IP destination
   addresses.  When a packet is LISP encapsulated, these addresses are
   referred to as Routing Locators (RLOCs).  Most routers along a path
   between two hosts will not change; they continue to perform routing/
   forwarding lookups on the destination addresses.  For routers between
   the source host and the ITR as well as routers from the ETR to the
   destination host, the destination address is an EID.  For the routers
   between the ITR and the ETR, the destination address is an RLOC.

   Another key LISP concept is the "Tunnel Router".  A tunnel router
   prepends LISP headers on host-originated packets and strips them
   prior to final delivery to their destination.  The IP addresses in
   this "outer header" are RLOCs.  During end-to-end packet exchange
   between two Internet hosts, an ITR prepends a new LISP header to each
   packet and an egress tunnel router strips the new header.  The ITR
   performs EID-to-RLOC lookups to determine the routing path to the
   ETR, which has the RLOC as one of its IP addresses.

   Some basic rules governing LISP are:

   o  End-systems (hosts) only send to addresses which are EIDs.  They
      don't know addresses are EIDs versus RLOCs but assume packets get
      to <strike><font color="red">destinations, which in turn,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">their intended destinations.  In a system where LISP is
      deployed,</font></strong> LISP routers <strike><font color="red">deliver</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">intercept EID addressed</font></strong> packets <strike><font color="red">to
      the destination</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">and assist
      in delivering them across</font></strong> the <strike><font color="red">end-system has specified.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">network core where EIDs cannot be
      routed.</font></strong>  The procedure a host uses to send IP packets does not
      change.

   o  EIDs are always IP addresses assigned to hosts.

   o  LISP routers mostly deal with Routing Locator addresses.  See
      details later in Section 4.1 to clarify what is meant by "mostly".

   o  RLOCs are always IP addresses assigned to routers; preferably,
      topologically-oriented addresses from provider CIDR (Classless
      Inter-Domain Routing) blocks.

   o  When a router originates packets it may use as a source address
      either an EID or RLOC.  When acting as a host (e.g. when
      terminating a transport session such as SSH, TELNET, or SNMP), it
      may use an EID that is explicitly assigned for that purpose.  An
      EID that identifies the router as a host MUST NOT be used as an
      RLOC; an EID is only routable within the scope of a site.  A
      typical BGP configuration might demonstrate this "hybrid" EID/RLOC
      usage where a router could use its "host-like" EID to terminate
      iBGP sessions to other routers in a site while at the same time
      using RLOCs to terminate eBGP sessions to routers outside the
      site.

   o  Packets with EIDs in them are not expected to be delivered end-to-
      end in the absence of an EID-to-RLOC mapping operation.  They are
      expected to be used locally for intra-site communication or to be
      encapsulated for inter-site communication.

   o  EID prefixes are likely to be hierarchically assigned in a manner
      which is optimized for administrative convenience and to
      facilitate scaling of the EID-to-RLOC mapping database.  The
      hierarchy is based on a address allocation hierarchy which is
      independent of the network topology.

   o  EIDs may also be structured (subnetted) in a manner suitable for
      local routing within an autonomous system.

   An additional LISP header MAY be prepended to packets by a TE-ITR
   when re-routing of the path for a packet is desired.  A potential
   use-case for this would be an ISP router that needs to perform
   traffic engineering for packets flowing through its network.  In such
   a situation, termed Recursive Tunneling, an ISP transit acts as an
   additional ingress tunnel router and the RLOC it uses for the new
   prepended header would be either a TE-ETR within the ISP (along
   intra-ISP traffic engineered path) or a TE-ETR within another ISP (an
   inter-ISP traffic engineered path, where an agreement to build such a
   path exists).

   In order to avoid excessive packet overhead as well as possible
   encapsulation loops, this document mandates that a maximum of two
   LISP headers can be prepended to a packet.  For initial LISP
   deployments, it is assumed two headers is sufficient, where the first
   prepended header is used at a site for Location/Identity separation
   and second prepended header is used inside a service provider for
   Traffic Engineering purposes.

   Tunnel Routers can be placed fairly flexibly in a multi-AS topology.
   For example, the ITR for a particular end-to-end packet exchange
   might be the first-hop or default router within a site for the source
   host.  Similarly, the egress tunnel router might be the last-hop
   router directly-connected to the destination host.  Another example,
   perhaps for a VPN service out-sourced to an ISP by a site, the ITR
   could be the site's border router at the service provider attachment
   point.  Mixing and matching of site-operated, ISP-operated, and other
   tunnel routers is allowed for maximum flexibility.  See Section 8 for
   more details.

4.1.  Packet Flow Sequence

   This section provides an example of the unicast packet flow with the
   following conditions:

   o  Source host "host1.abc.example.com" is sending a packet to
      "host2.xyz.example.com", exactly what host1 would do if the site
      was not using LISP.

   o  Each site is multi-homed, so each tunnel router has an address
      (RLOC) assigned from the service provider address block for each
      provider to which that particular tunnel router is attached.

   o  The ITR(s) and ETR(s) are directly connected to the source and
      destination, respectively, but the source and destination can be
      located anywhere in LISP site.

   o  Map-Requests can be sent on the underlying routing system
      topology, to a mapping database system, or directly over an
      alternative topology [ALT].  A Map-Request is sent for an external
      destination when the destination is not found in the forwarding
      table or matches a default route.

   o  Map-Replies are sent on the underlying routing system topology.

   Client host1.abc.example.com wants to communicate with server
   host2.xyz.example.com:

   1.  host1.abc.example.com wants to open a TCP connection to
       host2.xyz.example.com.  It does a DNS lookup on
       host2.xyz.example.com.  An A/AAAA record is returned.  This
       address is the destination EID.  The locally-assigned address of
       host1.abc.example.com is used as the source EID.  An IPv4 or IPv6
       packet is built and forwarded through the LISP site as a normal
       IP packet until it reaches a LISP ITR.

   2.  The LISP ITR must be able to map the destination EID to an RLOC
       of one of the ETRs at the destination site.  The specific method
       used to do this is not described in this example.  See [ALT] or
       [CONS] for possible solutions.

   3.  The ITR will send a LISP Map-Request.  Map-Requests SHOULD be
       rate-limited.

   4.  When an alternate mapping system is not in use, the Map-Request
       packet is routed through the underlying routing system.
       Otherwise, the Map-Request packet is routed on an alternate
       logical topology, for example the [ALT] database mapping system.
       In either case, when the Map-Request arrives at one of the ETRs
       at the destination site, it will process the packet as a control
       message.

   5.  The ETR looks at the destination EID of the Map-Request and
       matches it against the prefixes in the ETR's configured EID-to-
       RLOC mapping database.  This is the list of EID-prefixes the ETR
       is supporting for the site it resides in.  If there is no match,
       the Map-Request is dropped.  Otherwise, a LISP Map-Reply is
       returned to the ITR.

   6.  The ITR receives the Map-Reply message, parses the message (to
       check for format validity) and stores the mapping information
       from the packet.  This information is stored in the ITR's EID-to-
       RLOC mapping cache.  Note that the map cache is an on-demand
       cache.  An ITR will manage its map cache in such a way that
       optimizes for its resource constraints.

   7.  Subsequent packets from host1.abc.example.com to
       host2.xyz.example.com will have a LISP header prepended by the
       ITR using the appropriate RLOC as the LISP header destination
       address learned from the ETR.  Note the packet MAY be sent to a
       different ETR than the one which returned the Map-Reply due to
       the source site's hashing policy or the destination site's
       locator-set policy.

   8.  The ETR receives these packets directly (since the destination
       address is one of its assigned IP addresses), checks the validity
       of the addresses, strips the LISP header, and forwards packets to
       the attached destination host.

   In order to defer the need for a mapping lookup in the reverse
   direction, an ETR MAY create a cache entry that maps the source EID
   (inner header source IP address) to the source RLOC (outer header
   source IP address) in a received LISP packet.  Such a cache entry is
   termed a "gleaned" mapping and only contains a single RLOC for the
   EID in question.  More complete information about additional RLOCs
   SHOULD be verified by sending a LISP Map-Request for that EID.  Both
   ITR and the ETR may also influence the decision the other makes in
   selecting an RLOC.  See Section 6 for more details.

5.  LISP Encapsulation Details

   Since additional tunnel headers are prepended, the packet becomes
   larger and can exceed the MTU of any link traversed from the ITR to
   the ETR.  It is RECOMMENDED in IPv4 that packets do not get
   fragmented as they are encapsulated by the ITR.  Instead, the packet
   is dropped and an ICMP Too Big message is returned to the source.

   This specification RECOMMENDS that implementations provide support
   for one of the proposed fragmentation and reassembly schemes.  Two
   existing schemes are detailed in Section 5.4.

   Since IPv4 or IPv6 addresses can be either EIDs or RLOCs, the LISP
   architecture supports IPv4 EIDs with IPv6 RLOCs (where the inner
   header is in IPv4 packet format and the other header is in IPv6
   packet format) or IPv6 EIDs with IPv4 RLOCs (where the inner header
   is in IPv6 packet format and the other header is in IPv4 packet
   format).  The next sub-sections illustrate packet formats for the
   homogeneous case (IPv4-in-IPv4 and IPv6-in-IPv6) but all 4
   combinations MUST be supported.

5.1.  LISP IPv4-in-IPv4 Header Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   OH  |  Time to Live | Protocol = 17 |         Header Checksum       |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                    Source Routing Locator                     |
    \  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                 Destination Routing Locator                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 4341        |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   L   |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
   I \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   S / |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
   P   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   IH  |  Time to Live |    Protocol   |         Header Checksum       |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                           Source EID                          |
    \  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                         Destination EID                       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

5.2.  LISP IPv6-in-IPv6 Header Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   |   |         Payload Length        | Next Header=17|   Hop Limit   |
   v   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
   O   +                                                               +
   u   |                                                               |
   t   +                     Source Routing Locator                    +
   e   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   H   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   d   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   ^   +                  Destination Routing Locator                  +
   |   |                                                               |
    \  +                                                               +
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 4341        |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   L   |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
   I \ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   S / |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
   P   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
    /  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /   |         Payload Length        |  Next Header  |   Hop Limit   |
   v   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
   I   +                                                               +
   n   |                                                               |
   n   +                          Source EID                           +
   e   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   H   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   d   |                                                               |
   r   +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
   ^   +                        Destination EID                        +
   \   |                                                               |
    \  +                                                               +
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

5.3.  Tunnel Header Field Descriptions

   Inner <strike><font color="red">Header:</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">Header (IH):</font></strong>  The inner header is the header on the datagram
      received from the originating host.  The source and destination IP
      addresses are EIDs, [RFC0791], [RFC2460].

   Outer Header: <strong><font color="green">(OH)</font></strong>  The outer header is a new header prepended by an
      ITR.  The address fields contain RLOCs obtained from the ingress
      router's EID-to-RLOC cache.  The IP protocol number is "UDP (17)"
      from [RFC0768].  The setting of the DF bit Flags field is
      according to rules in Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2.

   UDP Header:  The UDP header contains an ITR selected source port when
      encapsulating a packet.  See Section 6.5 for details on the hash
      algorithm used to select a source port based on the 5-tuple of the
      inner header.  The destination port MUST be set to the well-known
      IANA assigned port value 4341.

   UDP Checksum:  The UDP checksum field SHOULD be transmitted as zero
      by an ITR for either IPv4 [RFC0768] or IPv6 encapsulation
      [UDP-TUNNELS] [UDP-ZERO].  When a packet with a zero UDP checksum
      is received by an ETR, the ETR MUST accept the packet for
      decapsulation.  When an ITR transmits a non-zero value for the UDP
      checksum, it MUST send a correctly computed value in this field.
      When an ETR receives a packet with a non-zero UDP checksum, it MAY
      choose to verify the checksum value.  If it chooses to perform
      such verification, and the verification fails, the packet MUST be
      silently dropped.  If the ETR chooses not to perform the
      verification, or performs the verification successfully, the
      packet MUST be accepted for decapsulation.  The handling of UDP
      checksums for all tunneling protocols, including LISP, is under
      active discussion within the IETF.  When that discussion
      concludes, any necessary changes will be made to align LISP with
      the outcome of the broader discussion.

   UDP Length:  The UDP length field is set for an IPv4 encapsulated
      packet to be the sum of the inner header IPv4 Total Length plus
      the UDP and LISP header lengths.  For an IPv6 encapsulated packet,
      the UDP length field is the sum of the inner header IPv6 Payload
      Length, the size of the IPv6 header (40 <strike><font color="red">bytes),</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets),</font></strong> and the size of
      the UDP and LISP headers.

   N: The N bit is the nonce-present bit.  When this bit is set to 1,
      the low-order 24-bits of the first 32-bits of the LISP header
      contains a Nonce.  See Section 6.3.1 for details.  Both N and V
      bits MUST NOT be set in the same packet.  If they are, a
      decapsulating ETR MUST treat the "Nonce/Map-Version" field as
      having a Nonce value present.

   L: The L bit is the Locator Status Bits field enabled bit.  When this
      bit is set to 1, the Locator Status Bits in the second 32-bits of
      the LISP header are in use.

     x 1 x x 0 x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                      Locator Status Bits                      |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   E: The E bit is the echo-nonce-request bit.  This bit MUST be ignored
      and has no meaning when the N bit is set to 0.  When the N bit is
      set to 1 and this bit is set to 1, means an ITR is requesting for
      the nonce value in the Nonce field to be echoed back in LISP
      encapsulated packets when the ITR is also an ETR.  See
      Section 6.3.1 for details.

   V: The V bit is the Map-Version present bit.  When this bit is set to
      1, the N bit MUST be 0.  Refer to Section 6.6.3 for more details.
      This bit indicates that the LISP header is encoded in this case
      as:

     0 x 0 1 x x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|  Source Map-Version   |   Dest Map-Version    |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                 Instance ID/Locator Status Bits               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   I: The I bit is the Instance ID bit.  See Section 5.5 for more
      details.  When this bit is set to 1, the Locator Status Bits field
      is reduced to 8-bits and the high-order 24-bits are used as an
      Instance ID.  If the L-bit is set to 0, then the low-order 8 bits
      are transmitted as zero and ignored on receipt.  The format of the
      LISP header would look like in this case:

     x x x x 1 x x x
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |N|L|E|V|I|flags|            Nonce/Map-Version                  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                 Instance ID                   |     LSBs      |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   flags:  The flags field is a 3-bit field is reserved for future flag
      use.  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   LISP Nonce:  The LISP nonce field is a 24-bit value that is randomly
      generated by an ITR when the N-bit is set to 1.  Nonce generation
      algorithms are an implementation matter but are required to
      generate different nonces when sending to different destinations.
      However, the same nonce can be used for a period of time to the
      same destination.  The nonce is also used when the E-bit is set to
      request the nonce value to be echoed by the other side when
      packets are returned.  When the E-bit is clear but the N-bit is
      set, a remote ITR is either echoing a previously requested echo-
      nonce or providing a random nonce.  See Section 6.3.1 for more
      details.

   LISP Locator Status Bits (LSBs):  When the L-bit is also set, the
      locator status bits field in the LISP header is set by an ITR to
      indicate to an ETR the up/down status of the Locators in the
      source site.  Each RLOC in a Map-Reply is assigned an ordinal
      value from 0 to n-1 (when there are n RLOCs in a mapping entry).
      The Locator Status Bits are numbered from 0 to n-1 from the least
      significant bit of field.  The field is 32-bits when the I-bit is
      set to 0 and is 8 bits when the I-bit is set to 1.  When a Locator
      Status Bit is set to 1, the ITR is indicating to the ETR the RLOC
      associated with the bit ordinal has up status.  See Section 6.3
      for details on how an ITR can determine the status of the ETRs at
      the same site.  When a site has multiple EID-prefixes which result
      in multiple mappings (where each could have a different locator-
      set), the Locator Status Bits setting in an encapsulated packet
      MUST reflect the mapping for the EID-prefix that the inner-header
      source EID address matches.  If the LSB for an anycast locator is
      set to 1, then there is at least one RLOC with that address the
      ETR is considered 'up'.

   When doing ITR/PITR encapsulation:

   o  The outer header Time to Live field (or Hop Limit field, in case
      of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the inner header Time to Live
      field.

   o  The outer header Type of Service field (or the Traffic Class
      field, in the case of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the inner header
      Type of Service field (with one <strike><font color="red">caveat,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">exception,</font></strong> see below).

   When doing ETR/PETR decapsulation:

   o  The inner header Time to Live field (or Hop Limit field, in case
      of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the outer header Time to Live
      field, when the Time to Live field of the outer header is less
      than the Time to Live of the inner header.  Failing to perform
      this check can cause the Time to Live of the inner header to
      increment across encapsulation/decapsulation cycle.  This check is
      also performed when doing initial encapsulation when a packet
      comes to an ITR or PITR destined for a LISP site.

   o  The inner header Type of Service field (or the Traffic Class
      field, in the case of IPv6) SHOULD be copied from the outer header
      Type of Service field (with one <strike><font color="red">caveat,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">exception,</font></strong> see below).

   Note if an ETR/PETR is also an ITR/PITR and choose to reencapsulate
   after decapsulating, the net effect of this is that the new outer
   header will carry the same Time to Live as the old outer header minus
   1.

   Copying the TTL serves two purposes: first, it preserves the distance
   the host intended the packet to travel; second, and more importantly,
   it provides for suppression of looping packets in the event there is
   a loop of concatenated tunnels due to misconfiguration.  See
   Section 9.3 for TTL exception handling for traceroute packets.

   The ECN field occupies bits 6 and 7 of both the IPv4 Type of Service
   field and the IPv6 Traffic Class field [RFC3168].  The ECN field
   requires special treatment in order to avoid discarding indications
   of congestion [RFC3168].  ITR encapsulation MUST copy the 2-bit ECN
   field from the inner header to the outer header.  Re-encapsulation
   MUST copy the 2-bit ECN field from the stripped outer header to the
   new outer header.  If the ECN field contains a congestion indication
   codepoint (the value is '11', the Congestion Experienced (CE)
   codepoint), then ETR decapsulation MUST copy the 2-bit ECN field from
   the stripped outer header to the surviving inner header that is used
   to forward the packet beyond the ETR.  These requirements preserve
   Congestion Experienced (CE) indications when a packet that uses ECN
   traverses a LISP tunnel and becomes marked with a CE indication due
   to congestion between the tunnel endpoints.

5.4.  Dealing with Large Encapsulated Packets

   This section proposes two mechanisms to deal with packets that exceed
   the path MTU between the ITR and ETR.

   It is left to the implementor to decide if the stateless or stateful
   mechanism should be implemented.  Both or neither can be used since
   it is a local decision in the ITR regarding how to deal with MTU
   issues, and sites can interoperate with differing mechanisms.

   Both stateless and stateful mechanisms also apply to Reencapsulating
   and Recursive Tunneling.  So any actions below referring to an ITR
   also apply to an TE-ITR.

5.4.1.  A Stateless Solution to MTU Handling

   An ITR stateless solution to handle MTU issues is described as
   follows:

   1.  Define an architectural constant S for the maximum size of a
       packet, in <strike><font color="red">bytes,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets,</font></strong> an ITR would like to receive from a source
       inside of its site.

   2.  Define L to be the maximum size, in <strike><font color="red">bytes,</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets,</font></strong> a packet of size S
       would be after the ITR prepends the LISP header, UDP header, and
       outer network layer header of size H. Therefore, S + H = L.

   When an ITR receives a packet from a site-facing interface and adds H
   <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike>
   <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> worth of encapsulation to yield a packet size greater than L
   <strike><font color="red">bytes,</font></strike>
   <strong><font color="green">octets,</font></strong> it resolves the MTU issue by first splitting the original
   packet into 2 equal-sized fragments.  A LISP header is then prepended
   to each fragment.  The size of the encapsulated fragments is then
   (S/2 + H), which is less than the ITR's estimate of the path MTU
   between the ITR and its correspondent ETR.

   When an ETR receives encapsulated fragments, it treats them as two
   individually encapsulated packets.  It strips the LISP headers then
   forwards each fragment to the destination host of the destination
   site.  The two fragments are reassembled at the destination host into
   the single IP datagram that was originated by the source host.  Note
   that reassembly can happen at the ETR if the encapsulated packet was
   fragmented at or after the ITR.

   This behavior is performed by the ITR when the source host originates
   a packet with the DF field of the IP header is set to 0.  When the DF
   field of the IP header is set to 1, or the packet is an IPv6 packet
   originated by the source host, the ITR will drop the packet when the
   size is greater than L, and sends an ICMP Too Big message to the
   source with a value of S, where S is (L - H).

   When the outer header encapsulation uses an IPv4 header, an
   implementation SHOULD set the DF bit to 1 so ETR fragment reassembly
   can be avoided.  An implementation MAY set the DF bit in such headers
   to 0 if it has good reason to believe there are unresolvable path MTU
   issues between the sending ITR and the receiving ETR.

   This specification RECOMMENDS that L be defined as 1500.

5.4.2.  A Stateful Solution to MTU Handling

   An ITR stateful solution to handle MTU issues is described as follows
   and was first introduced in [OPENLISP]:

   1.  The ITR will keep state of the effective MTU for each locator per
       mapping cache entry.  The effective MTU is what the core network
       can deliver along the path between ITR and ETR.

   2.  When an IPv6 encapsulated packet or an IPv4 encapsulated packet
       with DF bit set to 1, exceeds what the core network can deliver,
       one of the intermediate routers on the path will send an ICMP Too
       Big message to the ITR.  The ITR will parse the ICMP message to
       determine which locator is affected by the effective MTU change
       and then record the new effective MTU value in the mapping cache
       entry.

   3.  When a packet is received by the ITR from a source inside of the
       site and the size of the packet is greater than the effective MTU
       stored with the mapping cache entry associated with the
       destination EID the packet is for, the ITR will send an ICMP Too
       Big message back to the source.  The packet size advertised by
       the ITR in the ICMP Too Big message is the effective MTU minus
       the LISP encapsulation length.

   Even though this mechanism is stateful, it has advantages over the
   stateless IP fragmentation mechanism, by not involving the
   destination host with reassembly of ITR fragmented packets.

5.5.  Using Virtualization and Segmentation with LISP

   When multiple organizations inside of a LISP site are using private
   addresses [RFC1918] as EID-prefixes, their address spaces MUST remain
   segregated due to possible address duplication.  An Instance ID in
   the address encoding can aid in making the entire AFI based address
   unique.  See IANA Considerations Section 14.2 for details for
   possible address encodings.

   An Instance ID can be carried in a LISP encapsulated packet.  An ITR
   that prepends a LISP header, will copy a 24-bit value, used by the
   LISP router to uniquely identify the address space.  The value is
   copied to the Instance ID field of the LISP header and the I-bit is
   set to 1.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, the Instance ID from the LISP
   header is used as a table identifier to locate the forwarding table
   to use for the inner destination EID lookup.

   For example, a 802.1Q VLAN tag or VPN identifier could be used as a
   24-bit Instance ID.

6.  EID-to-RLOC Mapping

6.1.  LISP IPv4 and IPv6 Control Plane Packet Formats

   The following UDP packet formats are used by the LISP control-plane.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Version|  IHL  |Type of Service|          Total Length         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Identification        |Flags|      Fragment Offset    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |  Time to Live | Protocol = 17 |         Header Checksum       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    Source Routing Locator                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                 Destination Routing Locator                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |           Source Port         |         Dest Port             |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         LISP Message                          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Version| Traffic Class |           Flow Label                  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Payload Length        | Next Header=17|   Hop Limit   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +                     Source Routing Locator                    +
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +                  Destination Routing Locator                  +
       |                                                               |
       +                                                               +
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |           Source Port         |         Dest Port             |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         LISP Message                          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   The LISP UDP-based messages are the Map-Request and Map-Reply
   messages.  When a UDP Map-Request is sent, the UDP source port is
   chosen by the sender and the destination UDP port number is set to
   4342.  When a UDP Map-Reply is sent, the source UDP port number is
   set to 4342 and the destination UDP port number is copied from the
   source port of either the Map-Request or the invoking data packet.
   Implementations MUST be prepared to accept packets when either the
   source port or destination UDP port is set to 4342 due to NATs
   changing port number values.

   The UDP Length field will reflect the length of the UDP header and
   the LISP Message payload.

   The UDP Checksum is computed and set to non-zero for Map-Request,
   Map-Reply, Map-Register and ECM control messages.  It MUST be checked
   on receipt and if the checksum fails, the packet MUST be dropped.

   The format of control messages includes the UDP header so the
   checksum and length fields can be used to protect and delimit message
   boundaries.

   <strike><font color="red">This main LISP specification is the authoritative source for message
   format definitions for the Map-Request and Map-Reply messages.</font></strike>

6.1.1.  LISP Packet Type Allocations

   This section will be the authoritative source for allocating LISP
   Type <strike><font color="red">values.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">values and for defining LISP control message formats.</font></strong>  Current
   allocations are:

       Reserved:                          0    b'0000'
       LISP Map-Request:                  1    b'0001'
       LISP Map-Reply:                    2    b'0010'
       LISP Map-Register:                 3    b'0011'
       LISP Map-Notify:                   4    b'0100'
       LISP Encapsulated Control Message: 8    b'1000'

6.1.2.  Map-Request Message Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=1 |A|M|P|S|p|s|    Reserved     |   IRC   | Record Count  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         Source-EID-AFI        |   Source EID Address  ...     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         ITR-RLOC-AFI 1        |    ITR-RLOC Address 1  ...    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                              ...                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         ITR-RLOC-AFI n        |    ITR-RLOC Address n  ...    |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |   Reserved    | EID mask-len  |        EID-prefix-AFI         |
   Rec +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |                       EID-prefix  ...                         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                   Map-Reply Record  ...                       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       <strike><font color="red">|                     Mapping Protocol Data                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</font></strike>

   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   1 (Map-Request)

   A: This is an authoritative bit, which is set to 0 for UDP-based Map-
      Requests sent by an ITR.  Set to 1 when an ITR wants the
      destination site to return the Map-Reply rather than the mapping
      database system.

   M: This is the map-data-present bit, when set, it indicates a Map-
      Reply Record segment is included in the Map-Request.

   P: This is the probe-bit which indicates that a Map-Request SHOULD be
      treated as a locator reachability probe.  The receiver SHOULD
      respond with a Map-Reply with the probe-bit set, indicating the
      Map-Reply is a locator reachability probe reply, with the nonce
      copied from the Map-Request.  See Section 6.3.2 for more details.

   S: This is the Solicit-Map-Request (SMR) bit.  See Section 6.6.2 for
      details.

   p: This is the PITR bit.  This bit is set to 1 when a PITR sends a
      Map-Request.

   s: This is the SMR-invoked bit.  This bit is set to 1 when an xTR is
      sending a Map-Request in response to a received SMR-based Map-
      Request.

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   IRC:  This 5-bit field is the ITR-RLOC Count which encodes the
      additional number of (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC Address) fields
      present in this message.  At least one (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC-
      Address) pair MUST be encoded.  Multiple ITR-RLOC Address fields
      are used so a Map-Replier can select which destination address to
      use for a Map-Reply.  The IRC value ranges from 0 to 31.  For a
      value of 0, there is 1 ITR-RLOC address encoded, and for a value
      of 1, there are 2 ITR-RLOC addresses encoded and so on up to 31
      which encodes a total of 32 ITR-RLOC addresses.

   Record Count:  The number of records in this Map-Request message.  A
      record is comprised of the portion of the packet that is labeled
      'Rec' above and occurs the number of times equal to Record Count.
      For this version of the protocol, a receiver MUST accept and
      process Map-Requests that contain one or more records, but a
      sender MUST only send Map-Requests containing one record.  Support
      for requesting multiple EIDs in a single Map-Request message will
      be specified in a future version of the protocol.

   Nonce:  An <strike><font color="red">8-byte</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">8-octet</font></strong> random value created by the sender of the Map-
      Request.  This nonce will be returned in the Map-Reply.  The
      security of the LISP mapping protocol depends critically on the
      strength of the nonce in the Map-Request message.  The nonce
      SHOULD be generated by a properly seeded pseudo-random (or strong
      random) source.  See [RFC4086] for advice on generating security-
      sensitive random data.

   Source-EID-AFI:  Address family of the "Source EID Address" field.

   Source EID Address:  This is the EID of the source host which
      originated the packet which is caused the Map-Request.  When Map-
      Requests are used for refreshing a map-cache entry or for RLOC-
      probing, an AFI value 0 is used and this field is of zero length.

   ITR-RLOC-AFI:  Address family of the "ITR-RLOC Address" field that
      follows this field.

   ITR-RLOC Address:  Used to give the ETR the option of selecting the
      destination address from any address family for the Map-Reply
      message.  This address MUST be a routable RLOC address of the
      sender of the Map-Request message.

   EID mask-len:  Mask length for EID prefix.

   EID-prefix-AFI:  Address family of EID-prefix according to [AFI]

   EID-prefix:  4 <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> if an IPv4 address-family, 16 <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> if an IPv6
      address-family.  When a Map-Request is sent by an ITR because a
      data packet is received for a destination where there is no
      mapping entry, the EID-prefix is set to the destination IP address
      of the data packet.  And the 'EID mask-len' is set to 32 or 128
      for IPv4 or IPv6, respectively.  When an xTR wants to query a site
      about the status of a mapping it already has cached, the EID-
      prefix used in the Map-Request has the same mask-length as the
      EID-prefix returned from the site when it sent a Map-Reply
      message.

   Map-Reply Record:  When the M bit is set, this field is the size of a
      single "Record" in the Map-Reply format.  This Map-Reply record
      contains the EID-to-RLOC mapping entry associated with the Source
      EID.  This allows the ETR which will receive this Map-Request to
      cache the data if it chooses to do so.

   <strike><font color="red">Mapping Protocol Data:  This field is optional and present when the
      UDP length indicates there is enough space in the packet to
      include it.</font></strike>

6.1.3.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Request Message

   A Map-Request is sent from an ITR when it needs a mapping for an EID,
   wants to test an RLOC for reachability, or wants to refresh a mapping
   before TTL expiration.  For the initial case, the destination IP
   address used for the Map-Request is the data packet's destination
   address (i.e. the destination-EID) which had a mapping cache lookup
   failure.  For the latter two cases, the destination IP address used
   for the Map-Request is one of the RLOC addresses from the locator-set
   of the map cache entry.  The source address is either an IPv4 or IPv6
   RLOC address depending if the Map-Request is using an IPv4 versus
   IPv6 header, respectively.  In all cases, the UDP source port number
   for the Map-Request message is an ITR/PITR selected 16-bit value and
   the UDP destination port number is set to the well-known destination
   port number 4342.  A successful Map-Reply, which is one that has a
   nonce that matches an outstanding Map-Request nonce, will update the
   cached set of RLOCs associated with the EID prefix range.

   One or more Map-Request (ITR-RLOC-AFI, ITR-RLOC-Address) fields MUST
   be filled in by the ITR.  The number of fields (minus 1) encoded MUST
   be placed in the IRC field.  The ITR MAY include all locally
   configured locators in this list or just provide one locator address
   from each address family it supports.  If the ITR erroneously
   provides no ITR-RLOC addresses, the Map-Replier MUST drop the Map-
   Request.

   Map-Requests can also be LISP encapsulated using UDP destination port
   4342 with a LISP type value set to "Encapsulated Control Message",
   when sent from an ITR to a Map-Resolver.  Likewise, Map-Requests are
   LISP encapsulated the same way from a Map-Server to an ETR.  Details
   on encapsulated Map-Requests and Map-Resolvers can be found in
   [LISP-MS].

   Map-Requests MUST be rate-limited.  It is RECOMMENDED that a Map-
   Request for the same EID-prefix be sent no more than once per second.

   An ITR that is configured with mapping database information (i.e. it
   is also an ETR) MAY optionally include those mappings in a Map-
   Request.  When an ETR configured to accept and verify such
   "piggybacked" mapping data receives such a Map-Request and it does
   not have this mapping in the map-cache, it MAY originate a "verifying
   Map-Request", addressed to the map-requesting ITR and the ETR MAY add
   a map-cache entry.  If the ETR has a map-cache entry that matches the
   "piggybacked" EID and the RLOC is in the locator-set for the entry,
   then it may send the "verifying Map-Request" directly to the
   originating Map-Request source.  If the RLOC is not in the locator-
   set, then the ETR MUST send the "verifying Map-Request" to the
   "piggybacked" EID.  Doing this forces the "verifying Map-Request" to
   go through the mapping database system to reach the authoritative
   source of information about that EID, guarding against RLOC-spoofing
   in in the "piggybacked" mapping data.

6.1.4.  Map-Reply Message Format

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=2 |P|E|S|          Reserved               | Record Count  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |       EID-prefix-AFI          |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       <strike><font color="red">|                     Mapping Protocol Data                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+</font></strike>

   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   2 (Map-Reply)

   P: This is the probe-bit which indicates that the Map-Reply is in
      response to a locator reachability probe Map-Request.  The nonce
      field MUST contain a copy of the nonce value from the original
      Map-Request.  See Section 6.3.2 for more details.

   E: Indicates that the ETR which sends this Map-Reply message is
      advertising that the site is enabled for the Echo-Nonce locator
      reachability algorithm.  See Section 6.3.1 for more details.

   S: This is the Security bit.  When set to 1 the <strike><font color="red">field</font></strike> following <strike><font color="red">the
      Mapping Protocol Data field</font></strike>
      <strong><font color="green">authentication information</font></strong> will <strike><font color="red">have</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">be appended to</font></strong> the <strike><font color="red">following format.</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">end of the Map-
      Reply.</font></strong>  The detailed format of the Authentication Data Content is
      for further study.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |    AD Type    |       Authentication Data Content . . .       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   Record Count:  The number of records in this reply message.  A record
      is comprised of that portion of the packet labeled 'Record' above
      and occurs the number of times equal to Record count.

   Nonce:  A 24-bit value set in a Data-Probe packet or a 64-bit value
      from the Map-Request is echoed in this Nonce field of the Map-
      Reply.  When a 24-bit value is supplied, it resides in the low-
      order 64 bits of the nonce field.

   Record TTL:  The time in minutes the recipient of the Map-Reply will
      store the mapping.  If the TTL is 0, the entry SHOULD be removed
      from the cache immediately.  If the value is 0xffffffff, the
      recipient can decide locally how long to store the mapping.

   Locator Count:  The number of Locator entries.  A locator entry
      comprises what is labeled above as 'Loc'.  The locator count can
      be 0 indicating there are no locators for the EID-prefix.

   EID mask-len:  Mask length for EID prefix.

   ACT:  This 3-bit field describes negative Map-Reply actions.  In any
      other message type, these bits are set to 0 and ignored on
      receipt.  These bits are used only when the 'Locator Count' field
      is set to 0.  The action bits are encoded only in Map-Reply
      messages.  The actions defined are used by an ITR or PITR when a
      destination EID matches a negative mapping cache entry.
      Unassigned values should cause a map-cache entry to be created
      and, when packets match this negative cache entry, they will be
      dropped.  The current assigned values are:

      (0) No-Action:  The map-cache is kept alive and no packet
         encapsulation occurs.

      (1) Natively-Forward:  The packet is not encapsulated or dropped
         but natively forwarded.

      (2) Send-Map-Request:  The packet invokes sending a Map-Request.

      (3) Drop:  A packet that matches this map-cache entry is dropped.
         An ICMP Unreachable message SHOULD be sent.

   A: The Authoritative bit, when sent is always set to 1 by an ETR.
      When a Map-Server is proxy Map-Replying [LISP-MS] for a LISP site,
      the Authoritative bit is set to 0.  This indicates to requesting
      ITRs that the Map-Reply was not originated by a LISP node managed
      at the site that owns the EID-prefix.

   Map-Version Number:  When this 12-bit value is non-zero the Map-Reply
      sender is informing the ITR what the version number is for the
      EID-record contained in the Map-Reply.  The ETR can allocate this
      number internally but MUST coordinate this value with other ETRs
      for the site.  When this value is 0, there is no versioning
      information conveyed.  The Map-Version Number can be included in
      Map-Request and Map-Register messages.  See Section 6.6.3 for more
      details.

   EID-prefix-AFI:  Address family of EID-prefix according to [AFI].

   EID-prefix:  4 <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> if an IPv4 address-family, 16 <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> if an IPv6
      address-family.

   Priority:  each RLOC is assigned a unicast priority.  Lower values
      are more preferable.  When multiple RLOCs have the same priority,
      they MAY be used in a load-split fashion.  A value of 255 means
      the RLOC MUST NOT be used for unicast forwarding.

   Weight:  when priorities are the same for multiple RLOCs, the weight
      indicates how to balance unicast traffic between them.  Weight is
      encoded as a relative weight of total unicast packets that match
      the mapping entry.  For example if there are 4 locators in a
      locator set, where the weights assigned are 30, 20, 20, and 10,
      the first locator will get 37.5% of the traffic, the 2nd and 3rd
      locators will get 25% of traffic and the 4th locator will get
      12.5% of the traffic.  If all weights for a locator-set are equal,
      receiver of the Map-Reply will decide how to load-split traffic.
      See Section 6.5 for a suggested hash algorithm to distribute load
      across locators with same priority and equal weight values.

   M Priority:  each RLOC is assigned a multicast priority used by an
      ETR in a receiver multicast site to select an ITR in a source
      multicast site for building multicast distribution trees.  A value
      of 255 means the RLOC MUST NOT be used for joining a multicast
      distribution tree.  <strong><font color="green">For more details, see [MLISP].</font></strong>

   M Weight:  when priorities are the same for multiple RLOCs, the
      weight indicates how to balance building multicast distribution
      trees across multiple ITRs.  The weight is encoded as a relative
      weight (similar to the unicast Weights) of total number of trees
      built to the source site identified by the EID-prefix.  If all
      weights for a locator-set are equal, the receiver of the Map-Reply
      will decide how to distribute multicast state across ITRs.  <strong><font color="green">For
      more details, see [MLISP].</font></strong>

   Unused Flags:  set to 0 when sending and ignored on receipt.

   L: when this bit is set, the locator is flagged as a local locator to
      the ETR that is sending the Map-Reply.  When a Map-Server is doing
      proxy Map-Replying [LISP-MS] for a LISP site, the L bit is set to
      0 for all locators in this locator-set.

   p: when this bit is set, an ETR informs the RLOC-probing ITR that the
      locator address, for which this bit is set, is the one being RLOC-
      probed and MAY be different from the source address of the Map-
      Reply.  An ITR that RLOC-probes a particular locator, MUST use
      this locator for retrieving the data structure used to store the
      fact that the locator is reachable.  The "p" bit is set for a
      single locator in the same locator set.  If an implementation sets
      more than one "p" bit erroneously, the receiver of the Map-Reply
      MUST select the first locator.  The "p" bit MUST NOT be set for
      locator-set records sent in Map-Request and Map-Register messages.

   R: set when the sender of a Map-Reply has a route to the locator in
      the locator data record.  This receiver may find this useful to
      know if the locator is up but not necessarily reachable from the
      receiver's point of view.  See also Section 6.4 for another way
      the R-bit may be used.

   Locator:  an IPv4 or IPv6 address (as encoded by the 'Loc-AFI' field)
      assigned to an ETR.  Note that the destination RLOC address MAY be
      an anycast address.  A source RLOC can be an anycast address as
      well.  The source or destination RLOC MUST NOT be the broadcast
      address (255.255.255.255 or any subnet broadcast address known to
      the router), and MUST NOT be a link-local multicast address.  The
      source RLOC MUST NOT be a multicast address.  The destination RLOC
      SHOULD be a multicast address if it is being mapped from a
      multicast destination EID.

   <strike><font color="red">Mapping Protocol Data:  This field is optional and present when the
      UDP length indicates there is enough space in the packet to
      include it.</font></strike>

6.1.5.  EID-to-RLOC UDP Map-Reply Message

   A Map-Reply returns an EID-prefix with a prefix length that is less
   than or equal to the EID being requested.  The EID being requested is
   either from the destination field of an IP header of a Data-Probe or
   the EID record of a Map-Request.  The RLOCs in the Map-Reply are
   globally-routable IP addresses of all ETRs for the LISP site.  Each
   RLOC conveys status reachability but does not convey path
   reachability from a requesters perspective.  Separate testing of path
   reachability is required, See Section 6.3 for details.

   Note that a Map-Reply may contain different EID-prefix granularity
   (prefix + length) than the Map-Request which triggers it.  This might
   occur if a Map-Request were for a prefix that had been returned by an
   earlier Map-Reply.  In such a case, the requester updates its cache
   with the new prefix information and granularity.  For example, a
   requester with two cached EID-prefixes that are covered by a Map-
   Reply containing one, less-specific prefix, replaces the entry with
   the less-specific EID-prefix.  Note that the reverse, replacement of
   one less-specific prefix with multiple more-specific prefixes, can
   also occur but not by removing the less-specific prefix rather by
   adding the more-specific prefixes which during a lookup will override
   the less-specific prefix.

   When an ETR is configured with overlapping EID-prefixes, a Map-
   Request with an EID that longest matches any EID-prefix MUST be
   returned in a single Map-Reply message.  For instance, if an ETR had
   database mapping entries for EID-prefixes:

     10.0.0.0/8
     10.1.0.0/16
     10.1.1.0/24
     10.1.2.0/24

   A Map-Request for EID 10.1.1.1 would cause a Map-Reply with a record
   count of 1 to be returned with a mapping record EID-prefix of
   10.1.1.0/24.

   A Map-Request for EID 10.1.5.5, would cause a Map-Reply with a record
   count of 3 to be returned with mapping records for EID-prefixes
   10.1.0.0/16, 10.1.1.0/24, and 10.1.2.0/24.

   Note that not all overlapping EID-prefixes need to be returned, only
   the more specifics (note in the second example above 10.0.0.0/8 was
   not returned for requesting EID 10.1.5.5) entries for the matching
   EID-prefix of the requesting EID.  When more than one EID-prefix is
   returned, all SHOULD use the same Time-to-Live value so they can all
   time out at the same time.  When a more specific EID-prefix is
   received later, its Time-to-Live value in the Map-Reply record can be
   stored even when other less specifics exist.  When a less specific
   EID-prefix is received later, its map-cache expiration time SHOULD be
   set to the minimum expiration time of any more specific EID-prefix in
   the map-cache.  This is done so the integrity of the EID-prefix set
   is wholly maintained so no more-specific entries are removed from the
   map-cache while keeping less-specific entries.

   Map-Replies SHOULD be sent for an EID-prefix no more often than once
   per second to the same requesting router.  For scalability, it is
   expected that aggregation of EID addresses into EID-prefixes will
   allow one Map-Reply to satisfy a mapping for the EID addresses in the
   prefix range thereby reducing the number of Map-Request messages.

   Map-Reply records can have an empty locator-set.  A negative Map-
   Reply is a Map-Reply with an empty locator-set.  Negative Map-Replies
   convey special actions by the sender to the ITR or PITR which have
   solicited the Map-Reply.  There are two primary applications for
   Negative Map-Replies.  The first is for a Map-Resolver to instruct an
   ITR or PITR when a destination is for a LISP site versus a non-LISP
   site.  And the other is to source quench Map-Requests which are sent
   for non-allocated EIDs.

   For each Map-Reply record, the list of locators in a locator-set MUST
   appear in the same order for each ETR that originates a Map-Reply
   message.  The locator-set MUST be sorted in order of ascending IP
   address where an IPv4 locator address is considered numerically 'less
   than' an IPv6 locator address.

   When sending a Map-Reply message, the destination address is copied
   from the one of the ITR-RLOC fields from the Map-Request.  The ETR
   can choose a locator address from one of the address families it
   supports.  For Data-Probes, the destination address of the Map-Reply
   is copied from the source address of the Data-Probe message which is
   invoking the reply.  The source address of the Map-Reply is one of
   the local IP addresses chosen to allow uRPF checks to succeed in the
   upstream service provider.  The destination port of a Map-Reply
   message is copied from the source port of the Map-Request or Data-
   Probe and the source port of the Map-Reply message is set to the
   well-known UDP port 4342.

6.1.5.1.  Traffic Redirection with Coarse EID-Prefixes

   When an ETR is misconfigured or compromised, it could return coarse
   EID-prefixes in Map-Reply messages it sends.  The EID-prefix could
   cover EID-prefixes which are allocated to other sites redirecting
   their traffic to the locators of the compromised site.

   To solve this problem, there are two basic solutions that could be
   used.  The first is to have Map-Servers proxy-map-reply on behalf of
   ETRs so their registered EID-prefixes are the ones returned in Map-
   Replies.  Since the interaction between an ETR and Map-Server is
   secured with shared-keys, it is easier for an ETR to detect
   misbehavior.  The second solution is to have ITRs and PITRs cache
   EID-prefixes with mask-lengths that are greater than or equal to a
   configured prefix length.  This limits the damage to a specific width
   of any EID-prefix advertised, but needs to be coordinated with the
   allocation of site prefixes.  These solutions can be used
   independently or at the same time.

   At the time of this writing, other approaches are being considered
   and researched.

6.1.6.  Map-Register Message Format

   The usage details of the Map-Register message can be found in
   specification [LISP-MS].  This section solely defines the message
   format.

   The message is sent in UDP with a destination UDP port of 4342 and a
   randomly selected UDP source port number.

   The Map-Register message format is:

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=3 |P|            Reserved               |M| Record Count  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |            Key ID             |  Authentication Data Length   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ~                     Authentication Data                       ~
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |        EID-prefix-AFI         |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   3 (Map-Register)

   P: This is the proxy-map-reply bit, when set to 1 an ETR sends a Map-
      Register message requesting for the Map-Server to proxy Map-Reply.
      The Map-Server will send non-authoritative Map-Replies on behalf
      of the ETR.  Details on this usage can be found in [LISP-MS].

   Reserved:  It MUST be set to 0 on transmit and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   M: This is the want-map-notify bit, when set to 1 an ETR is
      requesting for a Map-Notify message to be returned in response to
      sending a Map-Register message.  The Map-Notify message sent by a
      Map-Server is used to an acknowledge receipt of a Map-Register
      message.

   Record Count:  The number of records in this Map-Register message.  A
      record is comprised of that portion of the packet labeled 'Record'
      above and occurs the number of times equal to Record count.

   Nonce:  This <strike><font color="red">8-byte</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">8-octet</font></strong> Nonce field is set to 0 in Map-Register
      messages.  Since the Map-Register message is authenticated, the
      nonce field is not currently used for any security function but
      may be in the future as part of an anti-replay solution.

   Key ID:  A configured ID to find the configured Message
      Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm and key value used for the
      authentication function.  See Section 14.4 for codepoint
      assignments.

   Authentication Data Length:  The length in <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> of the
      Authentication Data field that follows this field.  The length of
      the Authentication Data field is dependent on the Message
      Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm used.  The length field allows
      a device that doesn't know the MAC algorithm to correctly parse
      the packet.

   Authentication Data:  The message digest used from the output of the
      Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm.  The entire Map-
      Register payload is authenticated with this field preset to 0.
      After the MAC is computed, it is placed in this field.
      Implementations of this specification MUST include support for
      HMAC-SHA-1-96 [RFC2404] and support for HMAC-SHA-256-128 [RFC6234]
      is RECOMMENDED.

   The definition of the rest of the Map-Register can be found in the
   Map-Reply section.

6.1.7.  Map-Notify Message Format

   The usage details of the Map-Notify message can be found in
   specification [LISP-MS].  This section solely defines the message
   format.

   The message is sent inside a UDP packet with source and destination
   UDP ports equal to 4342.

   The Map-Notify message format is:

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Type=4 |              Reserved                 | Record Count  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         Nonce . . .                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         . . . Nonce                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |            Key ID             |  Authentication Data Length   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       ~                     Authentication Data                       ~
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   |                          Record  TTL                          |
   |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   R   | Locator Count | EID mask-len  | ACT |A|      Reserved         |
   e   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   c   | Rsvd  |  Map-Version Number   |         EID-prefix-AFI        |
   o   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   r   |                          EID-prefix                           |
   d   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  /|    Priority   |    Weight     |  M Priority   |   M Weight    |
   | L +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | o |        Unused Flags     |L|p|R|           Loc-AFI             |
   | c +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  \|                             Locator                           |
   +-&gt; +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Packet field descriptions:

   Type:   4 (Map-Notify)

   The Map-Notify message has the same contents as a Map-Register
   message.  See Map-Register section for field descriptions.

6.1.8.  Encapsulated Control Message Format

   An Encapsulated Control Message (ECM) is used to encapsulate control
   packets sent between xTRs and the mapping database system described
   in [LISP-MS].

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |                       IPv4 or IPv6 Header                     |
   OH  |                      (uses RLOC addresses)                    |
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = 4342        |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   LH  |Type=8 |S|                  Reserved                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |                       IPv4 or IPv6 Header                     |
   IH  |                  (uses RLOC or EID addresses)                 |
     \ |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     / |       Source Port = xxxx      |       Dest Port = yyyy        |
   UDP +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     \ |           UDP Length          |        UDP Checksum           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   LCM |                      LISP Control Message                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Packet header descriptions:

   OH:   The outer IPv4 or IPv6 header which uses RLOC addresses in the
      source and destination header address fields.

   UDP:   The outer UDP header with destination port 4342.  The source
      port is randomly allocated.  The checksum field MUST be non-zero.

   LH:   Type 8 is defined to be a "LISP Encapsulated Control Message"
      and what follows is either an IPv4 or IPv6 header as encoded by
      the first 4 bits after the reserved field.

   S:   This is the Security bit.  When set to 1 the field following the
      Reserved field will have the following format.  The detailed
      format of the Authentication Data Content is for further study.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |    AD Type    |       Authentication Data Content . . .       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   IH:   The inner IPv4 or IPv6 header which can use either RLOC or EID
      addresses in the header address fields.  When a Map-Request is
      encapsulated in this packet format the destination address in this
      header is an EID.

   UDP:   The inner UDP header where the port assignments depends on the
      control packet being encapsulated.  When the control packet is a
      Map-Request or Map-Register, the source port is ITR/PITR selected
      and the destination port is 4342.  When the control packet is a
      Map-Reply, the source port is 4342 and the destination port is
      assigned from the source port of the invoking Map-Request.  Port
      number 4341 MUST NOT be assigned to either port.  The checksum
      field MUST be non-zero.

   LCM:   The format is one of the control message formats described in
      this section.  At this time, only Map-Request messages are allowed
      to be encapsulated.  And in the future, PIM Join-Prune messages
      [MLISP] might be allowed.  Encapsulating other types of LISP
      control messages are for further study.  When Map-Requests are
      sent for RLOC-probing purposes (i.e the probe-bit is set), they
      MUST NOT be sent inside Encapsulated Control Messages.

6.2.  Routing Locator Selection

   Both client-side and server-side may need control over the selection
   of RLOCs for conversations between them.  This control is achieved by
   manipulating the Priority and Weight fields in EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply
   messages.  Alternatively, RLOC information MAY be gleaned from
   received tunneled packets or EID-to-RLOC Map-Request messages.

   The following enumerates different scenarios for choosing RLOCs and
   the controls that are available:

   o  Server-side returns one RLOC.  Client-side can only use one RLOC.
      Server-side has complete control of the selection.

   o  Server-side returns a list of RLOC where a subset of the list has
      the same best priority.  Client can only use the subset list
      according to the weighting assigned by the server-side.  In this
      case, the server-side controls both the subset list and load-
      splitting across its members.  The client-side can use RLOCs
      outside of the subset list if it determines that the subset list
      is unreachable (unless RLOCs are set to a Priority of 255).  Some
      sharing of control exists: the server-side determines the
      destination RLOC list and load distribution while the client-side
      has the option of using alternatives to this list if RLOCs in the
      list are unreachable.

   o  Server-side sets weight of 0 for the RLOC subset list.  In this
      case, the client-side can choose how the traffic load is spread
      across the subset list.  Control is shared by the server-side
      determining the list and the client determining load distribution.
      Again, the client can use alternative RLOCs if the server-provided
      list of RLOCs are unreachable.

   o  Either side (more likely on the server-side ETR) decides not to
      send a Map-Request.  For example, if the server-side ETR does not
      send Map-Requests, it gleans RLOCs from the client-side ITR,
      giving the client-side ITR responsibility for bidirectional RLOC
      reachability and preferability.  Server-side ETR gleaning of the
      client-side ITR RLOC is done by caching the inner header source
      EID and the outer header source RLOC of received packets.  The
      client-side ITR controls how traffic is returned and can alternate
      using an outer header source RLOC, which then can be added to the
      list the server-side ETR uses to return traffic.  Since no
      Priority or Weights are provided using this method, the server-
      side ETR MUST assume each client-side ITR RLOC uses the same best
      Priority with a Weight of zero.  In addition, since EID-prefix
      encoding cannot be conveyed in data packets, the EID-to-RLOC cache
      on tunnel routers can grow to be very large.

   o  A "gleaned" map-cache entry, one learned from the source RLOC of a
      received encapsulated packet, is only stored and used for a few
      seconds, pending verification.  Verification is performed by
      sending a Map-Request to the source EID (the inner header IP
      source address) of the received encapsulated packet.  A reply to
      this "verifying Map-Request" is used to fully populate the map-
      cache entry for the "gleaned" EID and is stored and used for the
      time indicated from the TTL field of a received Map-Reply.  When a
      verified map-cache entry is stored, data gleaning no longer occurs
      for subsequent packets which have a source EID that matches the
      EID-prefix of the verified entry.

   RLOCs that appear in EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply messages are assumed to be
   reachable when the R-bit for the locator record is set to 1.  When
   the R-bit is set to 0, an ITR or PITR MUST NOT encapsulate to the
   RLOC.  Neither the information contained in a Map-Reply or that
   stored in the mapping database system provides reachability
   information for RLOCs.  Note that reachability is not part of the
   mapping system and is determined using one or more of the Routing
   Locator Reachability Algorithms described in the next section.

6.3.  Routing Locator Reachability

   Several mechanisms for determining RLOC reachability are currently
   defined:

   1.  An ETR may examine the Locator Status Bits in the LISP header of
       an encapsulated data packet received from an ITR.  If the ETR is
       also acting as an ITR and has traffic to return to the original
       ITR site, it can use this status information to help select an
       RLOC.

   2.  An ITR may receive an ICMP Network or ICMP Host Unreachable
       message for an RLOC it is using.  This indicates that the RLOC is
       likely down.  Note, trusting ICMP messages may not be desirable
       but neither is ignoring them completely.  Implementations are
       encouraged to follow current best practices in treating these
       conditions.

   3.  An ITR which participates in the global routing system can
       determine that an RLOC is down if no BGP RIB route exists that
       matches the RLOC IP address.

   4.  An ITR may receive an ICMP Port Unreachable message from a
       destination host.  This occurs if an ITR attempts to use
       interworking [INTERWORK] and LISP-encapsulated data is sent to a
       non-LISP-capable site.

   5.  An ITR may receive a Map-Reply from an ETR in response to a
       previously sent Map-Request.  The RLOC source of the Map-Reply is
       likely up since the ETR was able to send the Map-Reply to the
       ITR.

   6.  When an ETR receives an encapsulated packet from an ITR, the
       source RLOC from the outer header of the packet is likely up.

   7.  An ITR/ETR pair can use the Locator Reachability Algorithms
       described in this section, namely Echo-Noncing or RLOC-Probing.

   When determining Locator up/down reachability by examining the
   Locator Status Bits from the LISP encapsulated data packet, an ETR
   will receive up to date status from an encapsulating ITR about
   reachability for all ETRs at the site.  CE-based ITRs at the source
   site can determine reachability relative to each other using the site
   IGP as follows:

   o  Under normal circumstances, each ITR will advertise a default
      route into the site IGP.

   o  If an ITR fails or if the upstream link to its PE fails, its
      default route will either time-out or be withdrawn.

   Each ITR can thus observe the presence or lack of a default route
   originated by the others to determine the Locator Status Bits it sets
   for them.

   RLOCs listed in a Map-Reply are numbered with ordinals 0 to n-1.  The
   Locator Status Bits in a LISP encapsulated packet are numbered from 0
   to n-1 starting with the least significant bit.  For example, if an
   RLOC listed in the 3rd position of the Map-Reply goes down (ordinal
   value 2), then all ITRs at the site will clear the 3rd least
   significant bit (xxxx x0xx) of the Locator Status Bits field for the
   packets they encapsulate.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, it will check for any change in
   the Locator Status Bits field.  When a bit goes from 1 to 0, the ETR
   if acting also as an ITR, will refrain from encapsulating packets to
   an RLOC that is indicated as down.  It will only resume using that
   RLOC if the corresponding Locator Status Bit returns to a value of 1.
   Locator Status Bits are associated with a locator-set per EID-prefix.
   Therefore, when a locator becomes unreachable, the Locator Status Bit
   that corresponds to that locator's position in the list returned by
   the last Map-Reply will be set to zero for that particular EID-
   prefix.

   When ITRs at the site are not deployed in CE routers, the IGP can
   still be used to determine the reachability of Locators provided they
   are injected into the IGP.  This is typically done when a /32 address
   is configured on a loopback interface.

   When ITRs receive ICMP Network or Host Unreachable messages as a
   method to determine unreachability, they will refrain from using
   Locators which are described in Locator lists of Map-Replies.
   However, using this approach is unreliable because many network
   operators turn off generation of ICMP Unreachable messages.

   If an ITR does receive an ICMP Network or Host Unreachable message,
   it MAY originate its own ICMP Unreachable message destined for the
   host that originated the data packet the ITR encapsulated.

   Also, BGP-enabled ITRs can unilaterally examine the RIB to see if a
   locator address from a locator-set in a mapping entry matches a
   prefix.  If it does not find one and BGP is running in the Default
   Free Zone (DFZ), it can decide to not use the locator even though the
   Locator Status Bits indicate the locator is up.  In this case, the
   path from the ITR to the ETR that is assigned the locator is not
   available.  More details are in [LOC-ID-ARCH].

   Optionally, an ITR can send a Map-Request to a Locator and if a Map-
   Reply is returned, reachability of the Locator has been determined.
   Obviously, sending such probes increases the number of control
   messages originated by tunnel routers for active flows, so Locators
   are assumed to be reachable when they are advertised.

   This assumption does create a dependency: Locator unreachability is
   detected by the receipt of ICMP Host Unreachable messages.  When an
   Locator has been determined to be unreachable, it is not used for
   active traffic; this is the same as if it were listed in a Map-Reply
   with priority 255.

   The ITR can test the reachability of the unreachable Locator by
   sending periodic Requests.  Both Requests and Replies MUST be rate-
   limited.  Locator reachability testing is never done with data
   packets since that increases the risk of packet loss for end-to-end
   sessions.

   When an ETR decapsulates a packet, it knows that it is reachable from
   the encapsulating ITR because that is how the packet arrived.  In
   most cases, the ETR can also reach the ITR but cannot assume this to
   be true due to the possibility of path asymmetry.  In the presence of
   unidirectional traffic flow from an ITR to an ETR, the ITR SHOULD NOT
   use the lack of return traffic as an indication that the ETR is
   unreachable.  Instead, it MUST use an alternate mechanisms to
   determine reachability.

6.3.1.  Echo Nonce Algorithm

   When data flows bidirectionally between locators from different
   sites, a data-plane mechanism called "nonce echoing" can be used to
   determine reachability between an ITR and ETR.  When an ITR wants to
   solicit a nonce echo, it sets the N and E bits and places a 24-bit
   nonce [RFC4086] in the LISP header of the next encapsulated data
   packet.

   When this packet is received by the ETR, the encapsulated packet is
   forwarded as normal.  When the ETR next sends a data packet to the
   ITR, it includes the nonce received earlier with the N bit set and E
   bit cleared.  The ITR sees this "echoed nonce" and knows the path to
   and from the ETR is up.

   The ITR will set the E-bit and N-bit for every packet it sends while
   in echo-nonce-request state.  The time the ITR waits to process the
   echoed nonce before it determines the path is unreachable is variable
   and a choice left for the implementation.

   If the ITR is receiving packets from the ETR but does not see the
   nonce echoed while being in echo-nonce-request state, then the path
   to the ETR is unreachable.  This decision may be overridden by other
   locator reachability algorithms.  Once the ITR determines the path to
   the ETR is down it can switch to another locator for that EID-prefix.

   Note that "ITR" and "ETR" are relative terms here.  Both devices MUST
   be implementing both ITR and ETR functionality for the echo nonce
   mechanism to operate.

   The ITR and ETR may both go into echo-nonce-request state at the same
   time.  The number of packets sent or the time during which echo nonce
   requests are sent is an implementation specific setting.  However,
   when an ITR is in echo-nonce-request state, it can echo the ETR's
   nonce in the next set of packets that it encapsulates and then
   subsequently, continue sending echo-nonce-request packets.

   This mechanism does not completely solve the forward path
   reachability problem as traffic may be unidirectional.  That is, the
   ETR receiving traffic at a site may not be the same device as an ITR
   which transmits traffic from that site or the site to site traffic is
   unidirectional so there is no ITR returning traffic.

   The echo-nonce algorithm is bilateral.  That is, if one side sets the
   E-bit and the other side is not enabled for echo-noncing, then the
   echoing of the nonce does not occur and the requesting side may
   regard the locator unreachable erroneously.  An ITR SHOULD only set
   the E-bit in a encapsulated data packet when it knows the ETR is
   enabled for echo-noncing.  This is conveyed by the E-bit in the Map-
   Reply message.

   Note that other locator reachability mechanisms are being researched
   and can be used to compliment or even override the Echo Nonce
   Algorithm.  See next section for an example of control-plane probing.

6.3.2.  RLOC Probing Algorithm

   RLOC Probing is a method that an ITR or PITR can use to determine the
   reachability status of one or more locators that it has cached in a
   map-cache entry.  The probe-bit of the Map-Request and Map-Reply
   messages are used for RLOC Probing.

   RLOC probing is done in the control-plane on a timer basis where an
   ITR or PITR will originate a Map-Request destined to a locator
   address from one of its own locator addresses.  A Map-Request used as
   an RLOC-probe is NOT encapsulated and NOT sent to a Map-Server or on
   the ALT like one would when soliciting mapping data.  The EID record
   encoded in the Map-Request is the EID-prefix of the map-cache entry
   cached by the ITR or PITR.  The ITR may include a mapping data record
   for its own database mapping information which contains the local
   EID-prefixes and RLOCs for its site.

   When an ETR receives a Map-Request message with the probe-bit set, it
   returns a Map-Reply with the probe-bit set.  The source address of
   the Map-Reply is set according to the procedure described in
   Section 6.1.5.  The Map-Reply SHOULD contain mapping data for the
   EID-prefix contained in the Map-Request.  This provides the
   opportunity for the ITR or PITR, which sent the RLOC-probe to get
   mapping updates if there were changes to the ETR's database mapping
   entries.

   There are advantages and disadvantages of RLOC Probing.  The greatest
   benefit of RLOC Probing is that it can handle many failure scenarios
   allowing the ITR to determine when the path to a specific locator is
   reachable or has become unreachable, thus providing a robust
   mechanism for switching to using another locator from the cached
   locator.  RLOC Probing can also provide rough RTT estimates between a
   pair of locators which can be useful for network management purposes
   as well as for selecting low delay paths.  The major disadvantage of
   RLOC Probing is in the number of control messages required and the
   amount of bandwidth used to obtain those benefits, especially if the
   requirement for failure detection times are very small.

   Continued research and testing will attempt to characterize the
   tradeoffs of failure detection times versus message overhead.

6.4.  EID Reachability within a LISP Site

   A site may be multihomed using two or more ETRs.  The hosts and
   infrastructure within a site will be addressed using one or more EID
   prefixes that are mapped to the RLOCs of the relevant ETRs in the
   mapping system.  One possible failure mode is for an ETR to lose
   reachability to one or more of the EID prefixes within its own site.
   When this occurs when the ETR sends Map-Replies, it can clear the
   R-bit associated with its own locator.  And when the ETR is also an
   ITR, it can clear its locator-status-bit in the encapsulation data
   header.

   It is recognized there are no simple solutions to the site
   partitioning problem because it is hard to know which part of the
   EID-prefix range is partitioned.  And which locators can reach any
   sub-ranges of the EID-prefixes.  This problem is under investigation
   with the expectation that experiments will tell us more.  Note, this
   is not a new problem introduced by the LISP architecture.  The
   problem exists today when a multi-homed site uses BGP to advertise
   its reachability upstream.

6.5.  Routing Locator Hashing

   When an ETR provides an EID-to-RLOC mapping in a Map-Reply message to
   a requesting ITR, the locator-set for the EID-prefix may contain
   different priority values for each locator address.  When more than
   one best priority locator exists, the ITR can decide how to load
   share traffic against the corresponding locators.

   The following hash algorithm may be used by an ITR to select a
   locator for a packet destined to an EID for the EID-to-RLOC mapping:

   1.  Either a source and destination address hash can be used or the
       traditional 5-tuple hash which includes the source and
       destination addresses, source and destination TCP, UDP, or SCTP
       port numbers and the IP protocol number field or IPv6 next-
       protocol fields of a packet a host originates from within a LISP
       site.  When a packet is not a TCP, UDP, or SCTP packet, the
       source and destination addresses only from the header are used to
       compute the hash.

   2.  Take the hash value and divide it by the number of locators
       stored in the locator-set for the EID-to-RLOC mapping.

   3.  The remainder will yield a value of 0 to "number of locators
       minus 1".  Use the remainder to select the locator in the
       locator-set.

   Note that when a packet is LISP encapsulated, the source port number
   in the outer UDP header needs to be set.  Selecting a hashed value
   allows core routers which are attached to Link Aggregation Groups
   (LAGs) to load-split the encapsulated packets across member links of
   such LAGs.  Otherwise, core routers would see a single flow, since
   packets have a source address of the ITR, for packets which are
   originated by different EIDs at the source site.  A suggested setting
   for the source port number computed by an ITR is a 5-tuple hash
   function on the inner header, as described above.

   Many core router implementations use a 5-tuple hash to decide how to
   balance packet load across members of a LAG.  The 5-tuple hash
   includes the source and destination addresses of the packet and the
   source and destination ports when the protocol number in the packet
   is TCP or UDP.  For this reason, UDP encoding is used for LISP
   encapsulation.

6.6.  Changing the Contents of EID-to-RLOC Mappings

   Since the LISP architecture uses a caching scheme to retrieve and
   store EID-to-RLOC mappings, the only way an ITR can get a more up-to-
   date mapping is to re-request the mapping.  However, the ITRs do not
   know when the mappings change and the ETRs do not keep track of which
   ITRs requested its mappings.  For scalability reasons, we want to
   maintain this approach but need to provide a way for ETRs change
   their mappings and inform the sites that are currently communicating
   with the ETR site using such mappings.

   When adding a new locator record in lexicographic order to the end of
   a locator-set, it is easy to update mappings.  We assume new mappings
   will maintain the same locator ordering as the old mapping but just
   have new locators appended to the end of the list.  So some ITRs can
   have a new mapping while other ITRs have only an old mapping that is
   used until they time out.  When an ITR has only an old mapping but
   detects bits set in the loc-status-bits that correspond to locators
   beyond the list it has cached, it simply ignores them.  However, this
   can only happen for locator addresses that are lexicographically
   greater than the locator addresses in the existing locator-set.

   When a locator record is inserted in the middle of a locator-set, to
   maintain lexicographic order, the SMR procedure in Section 6.6.2 is
   used to inform ITRs and PITRs of the new locator-status-bit mappings.

   When a locator record is removed from a locator-set, ITRs that have
   the mapping cached will not use the removed locator because the xTRs
   will set the loc-status-bit to 0.  So even if the locator is in the
   list, it will not be used.  For new mapping requests, the xTRs can
   set the locator AFI to 0 (indicating an unspecified address), as well
   as setting the corresponding loc-status-bit to 0.  This forces ITRs
   with old or new mappings to avoid using the removed locator.

   If many changes occur to a mapping over a long period of time, one
   will find empty record slots in the middle of the locator-set and new
   records appended to the locator-set.  At some point, it would be
   useful to compact the locator-set so the loc-status-bit settings can
   be efficiently packed.

   We propose here three approaches for locator-set compaction, one
   operational and two protocol mechanisms.  The operational approach
   uses a clock sweep method.  The protocol approaches use the concept
   of Solicit-Map-Requests and Map-Versioning.

6.6.1.  Clock Sweep

   The clock sweep approach uses planning in advance and the use of
   count-down TTLs to time out mappings that have already been cached.
   The default setting for an EID-to-RLOC mapping TTL is 24 hours.  So
   there is a 24 hour window to time out old mappings.  The following
   clock sweep procedure is used:

   1.  24 hours before a mapping change is to take effect, a network
       administrator configures the ETRs at a site to start the clock
       sweep window.

   2.  During the clock sweep window, ETRs continue to send Map-Reply
       messages with the current (unchanged) mapping records.  The TTL
       for these mappings is set to 1 hour.

   3.  24 hours later, all previous cache entries will have timed out,
       and any active cache entries will time out within 1 hour.  During
       this 1 hour window the ETRs continue to send Map-Reply messages
       with the current (unchanged) mapping records with the TTL set to
       1 minute.

   4.  At the end of the 1 hour window, the ETRs will send Map-Reply
       messages with the new (changed) mapping records.  So any active
       caches can get the new mapping contents right away if not cached,
       or in 1 minute if they had the mapping cached.  The new mappings
       are cached with a time to live equal to the TTL in the Map-Reply.

6.6.2.  Solicit-Map-Request (SMR)

   Soliciting a Map-Request is a selective way for ETRs, at the site
   where mappings change, to control the rate they receive requests for
   Map-Reply messages.  SMRs are also used to tell remote ITRs to update
   the mappings they have cached.

   Since the ETRs don't keep track of remote ITRs that have cached their
   mappings, they do not know which ITRs need to have their mappings
   updated.  As a result, an ETR will solicit Map-Requests (called an
   SMR message) from those sites to which it has been sending
   encapsulated data to for the last minute.  In particular, an ETR will
   send an SMR an ITR to which it has recently sent encapsulated data.

   An SMR message is simply a bit set in a Map-Request message.  An ITR
   or PITR will send a Map-Request when they receive an SMR message.
   Both the SMR sender and the Map-Request responder MUST rate-limited
   these messages.  Rate-limiting can be implemented as a global rate-
   limiter or one rate-limiter per SMR destination.

   The following procedure shows how a SMR exchange occurs when a site
   is doing locator-set compaction for an EID-to-RLOC mapping:

   1.  When the database mappings in an ETR change, the ETRs at the site
       begin to send Map-Requests with the SMR bit set for each locator
       in each map-cache entry the ETR caches.

   2.  A remote ITR which receives the SMR message will schedule sending
       a Map-Request message to the source locator address of the SMR
       message or to the mapping database system.  A newly allocated
       random nonce is selected and the EID-prefix used is the one
       copied from the SMR message.  If the source locator is the only
       locator in the cached locator-set, the remote ITR SHOULD send a
       Map-Request to the database mapping system just in case the
       single locator has changed and may no longer be reachable to
       accept the Map-Request.

   3.  The remote ITR MUST rate-limit the Map-Request until it gets a
       Map-Reply while continuing to use the cached mapping.  When Map
       Versioning is used, described in Section 6.6.3, an SMR sender can
       detect if an ITR is using the most up to date database mapping.

   4.  The ETRs at the site with the changed mapping will reply to the
       Map-Request with a Map-Reply message that has a nonce from the
       SMR-invoked Map-Request.  The Map-Reply messages SHOULD be rate
       limited.  This is important to avoid Map-Reply implosion.

   5.  The ETRs, at the site with the changed mapping, record the fact
       that the site that sent the Map-Request has received the new
       mapping data in the mapping cache entry for the remote site so
       the loc-status-bits are reflective of the new mapping for packets
       going to the remote site.  The ETR then stops sending SMR
       messages.

   Experimentation is in progress to determine the appropriate rate-
   limit parameters.

   For security reasons an ITR MUST NOT process unsolicited Map-Replies.
   To avoid map-cache entry corruption by a third-party, a sender of an
   SMR-based Map-Request MUST be verified.  If an ITR receives an SMR-
   based Map-Request and the source is not in the locator-set for the
   stored map-cache entry, then the responding Map-Request MUST be sent
   with an EID destination to the mapping database system.  Since the
   mapping database system is more secure to reach an authoritative ETR,
   it will deliver the Map-Request to the authoritative source of the
   mapping data.

   When an ITR receives an SMR-based Map-Request for which it does not
   have a cached mapping for the EID in the SMR message, it MAY not send
   a SMR-invoked Map-Request.  This scenario can occur when an ETR sends
   SMR messages to all locators in the locator-set it has stored in its
   map-cache but the remote ITRs that receive the SMR may not be sending
   packets to the site.  There is no point in updating the ITRs until
   they need to send, in which case, they will send Map-Requests to
   obtain a map-cache entry.

6.6.3.  Database Map Versioning

   When there is unidirectional packet flow between an ITR and ETR, and
   the EID-to-RLOC mappings change on the ETR, it needs to inform the
   ITR so encapsulation can stop to a removed locator and start to a new
   locator in the locator-set.

   An ETR, when it sends Map-Reply messages, conveys its own Map-Version
   number.  This is known as the Destination Map-Version Number.  ITRs
   include the Destination Map-Version Number in packets they
   encapsulate to the site.  When an ETR decapsulates a packet and
   detects the Destination Map-Version Number is less than the current
   version for its mapping, the SMR procedure described in Section 6.6.2
   occurs.

   An ITR, when it encapsulates packets to ETRs, can convey its own Map-
   Version number.  This is known as the Source Map-Version Number.
   When an ETR decapsulates a packet and detects the Source Map-Version
   Number is greater than the last Map-Version Number sent in a Map-
   Reply from the ITR's site, the ETR will send a Map-Request to one of
   the ETRs for the source site.

   A Map-Version Number is used as a sequence number per EID-prefix.  So
   values that are greater, are considered to be more recent.  A value
   of 0 for the Source Map-Version Number or the Destination Map-Version
   Number conveys no versioning information and an ITR does no
   comparison with previously received Map-Version Numbers.

   A Map-Version Number can be included in Map-Register messages as
   well.  This is a good way for the Map-Server can assure that all ETRs
   for a site registering to it will be Map-Version number synchronized.

   See [VERSIONING] for a more detailed analysis and description of
   Database Map Versioning.

7.  Router Performance Considerations

   LISP is designed to be very hardware-based forwarding friendly.  A
   few implementation techniques can be used to incrementally implement
   LISP:

   o  When a tunnel encapsulated packet is received by an ETR, the outer
      destination address may not be the address of the router.  This
      makes it challenging for the control plane to get packets from the
      hardware.  This may be mitigated by creating special FIB entries
      for the EID-prefixes of EIDs served by the ETR (those for which
      the router provides an RLOC translation).  These FIB entries are
      marked with a flag indicating that control plane processing should
      be performed.  The forwarding logic of testing for particular IP
      protocol number value is not necessary.  There are a few proven
      cases where no changes to existing deployed hardware were needed
      to support the LISP data-plane.

   o  On an ITR, prepending a new IP header consists of adding more
      <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike>
      <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> to a MAC rewrite string and prepending the string as part
      of the outgoing encapsulation procedure.  Routers that support GRE
      tunneling [RFC2784] or 6to4 tunneling [RFC3056] may already
      support this action.

   o  A packet's source address or interface the packet was received on
      can be used to select a VRF (Virtual Routing/Forwarding).  The
      VRF's routing table can be used to find EID-to-RLOC mappings.

   For performance issues related to map-cache management, see section
   Section 12.

8.  Deployment Scenarios

   This section will explore how and where ITRs and ETRs can be deployed
   and will discuss the pros and cons of each deployment scenario.  For
   a more detailed deployment recommendation, refer to [LISP-DEPLOY].

   There are two basic deployment trade-offs to consider: centralized
   versus distributed caches and flat, recursive, or re-encapsulating
   tunneling.  When deciding on centralized versus distributed caching,
   the following issues should be considered:

   o  Are the tunnel routers spread out so that the caches are spread
      across all the memories of each router?  A centralized cache is
      when an ITR keeps a cache for all the EIDs it is encapsulating to.
      The packet takes a direct path to the destination locator.  A
      distributed cache is when an ITR needs help from other re-
      encapsulating routers because it does not store all the cache
      entries for the EIDs is it encapsulating to.  So the packet takes
      a path through re-encapsulating routers that have a different set
      of cache entries.

   o  Should management "touch points" be minimized by choosing few
      tunnel routers, just enough for redundancy?

   o  In general, using more ITRs doesn't increase management load,
      since caches are built and stored dynamically.  On the other hand,
      more ETRs does require more management since EID-prefix-to-RLOC
      mappings need to be explicitly configured.

   When deciding on flat, recursive, or re-encapsulation tunneling, the
   following issues should be considered:

   o  Flat tunneling implements a single tunnel between source site and
      destination site.  This generally offers better paths between
      sources and destinations with a single tunnel path.

   o  Recursive tunneling is when tunneled traffic is again further
      encapsulated in another tunnel, either to implement VPNs or to
      perform Traffic Engineering.  When doing VPN-based tunneling, the
      site has some control since the site is prepending a new tunnel
      header.  In the case of TE-based tunneling, the site may have
      control if it is prepending a new tunnel header, but if the site's
      ISP is doing the TE, then the site has no control.  Recursive
      tunneling generally will result in suboptimal paths but at the
      benefit of steering traffic to resource available parts of the
      network.

   o  The technique of re-encapsulation ensures that packets only
      require one tunnel header.  So if a packet needs to be rerouted,
      it is first decapsulated by the ETR and then re-encapsulated with
      a new tunnel header using a new RLOC.

   The next sub-sections will survey where tunnel routers can reside in
   the network.

8.1.  First-hop/Last-hop Tunnel Routers

   By locating tunnel routers close to hosts, the EID-prefix set is at
   the granularity of an IP subnet.  So at the expense of more EID-
   prefix-to-RLOC sets for the site, the caches in each tunnel router
   can remain relatively small.  But caches always depend on the number
   of non-aggregated EID destination flows active through these tunnel
   routers.

   With more tunnel routers doing encapsulation, the increase in control
   traffic grows as well: since the EID-granularity is greater, more
   Map-Requests and Map-Replies are traveling between more routers.

   The advantage of placing the caches and databases at these stub
   routers is that the products deployed in this part of the network
   have better price-memory ratios then their core router counterparts.
   Memory is typically less expensive in these devices and fewer routes
   are stored (only IGP routes).  These devices tend to have excess
   capacity, both for forwarding and routing state.

   LISP functionality can also be deployed in edge switches.  These
   devices generally have layer-2 ports facing hosts and layer-3 ports
   facing the Internet.  Spare capacity is also often available in these
   devices as well.

8.2.  Border/Edge Tunnel Routers

   Using customer-edge (CE) routers for tunnel endpoints allows the EID
   space associated with a site to be reachable via a small set of RLOCs
   assigned to the CE routers for that site.  This is the default
   behavior envisioned in the rest of this specification.

   This offers the opposite benefit of the first-hop/last-hop tunnel
   router scenario: the number of mapping entries and network management
   touch points are reduced, allowing better scaling.

   One disadvantage is that less of the network's resources are used to
   reach host endpoints thereby centralizing the point-of-failure domain
   and creating network choke points at the CE router.

   Note that more than one CE router at a site can be configured with
   the same IP address.  In this case an RLOC is an anycast address.
   This allows resilience between the CE routers.  That is, if a CE
   router fails, traffic is automatically routed to the other routers
   using the same anycast address.  However, this comes with the
   disadvantage where the site cannot control the entrance point when
   the anycast route is advertised out from all border routers.  Another
   disadvantage of using anycast locators is the limited advertisement
   scope of /32 (or /128 for IPv6) routes.

8.3.  ISP Provider-Edge (PE) Tunnel Routers

   Use of ISP PE routers as tunnel endpoint routers is not the typical
   deployment scenario envisioned in the specification.  This section
   attempts to capture some of reasoning behind this preference of
   implementing LISP on CE routers.

   Use of ISP PE routers as tunnel endpoint routers gives an ISP, rather
   than a site, control over the location of the egress tunnel
   endpoints.  That is, the ISP can decide if the tunnel endpoints are
   in the destination site (in either CE routers or last-hop routers
   within a site) or at other PE edges.  The advantage of this case is
   that two tunnel headers can be avoided.  By having the PE be the
   first router on the path to encapsulate, it can choose a TE path
   first, and the ETR can decapsulate and re-encapsulate for a tunnel to
   the destination end site.

   An obvious disadvantage is that the end site has no control over
   where its packets flow or the RLOCs used.  Other disadvantages
   include the difficulty in synchronizing path liveness updates between
   CE and PE routers.

   As mentioned in earlier sections a combination of these scenarios is
   possible at the expense of extra packet header overhead, if both site
   and provider want control, then recursive or re-encapsulating tunnels
   are used.

8.4.  LISP Functionality with Conventional NATs

   LISP routers can be deployed behind Network Address Translator (NAT)
   devices to provide the same set of packet services hosts have today
   when they are addressed out of private address space.

   It is important to note that a locator address in any LISP control
   message MUST be a globally routable address and therefore SHOULD NOT
   contain [RFC1918] addresses.  If a LISP router is configured with
   private addresses, they MUST be used only in the outer IP header so
   the NAT device can translate properly.  Otherwise, EID addresses MUST
   be translated before encapsulation is performed.  Both NAT
   translation and LISP encapsulation functions could be co-located in
   the same device.

   More details on LISP address translation can be found in [INTERWORK].

8.5.  Packets Egressing a LISP Site

   When a LISP site is using two ITRs for redundancy, the failure of one
   ITR will likely shift outbound traffic to the second.  This second
   ITR's cache may not not be populated with the same EID-to-RLOC
   mapping entries as the first.  If this second ITR does not have these
   mappings, traffic will be dropped while the mappings are retrieved
   from the mapping system.  The retrieval of these messages may
   increase the load of requests being sent into the mapping system.
   Deployment and experimentation will determine whether this issue
   requires more attention.

9.  Traceroute Considerations

   When a source host in a LISP site initiates a traceroute to a
   destination host in another LISP site, it is highly desirable for it
   to see the entire path.  Since packets are encapsulated from ITR to
   ETR, the hop across the tunnel could be viewed as a single hop.
   However, LISP traceroute will provide the entire path so the user can
   see 3 distinct segments of the path from a source LISP host to a
   destination LISP host:

      Segment 1 (in source LISP site based on EIDs):

          source-host ---&gt; first-hop ... next-hop ---&gt; ITR

      Segment 2 (in the core network based on RLOCs):

          ITR ---&gt; next-hop ... next-hop ---&gt; ETR

      Segment 3 (in the destination LISP site based on EIDs):

          ETR ---&gt; next-hop ... last-hop ---&gt; destination-host

   For segment 1 of the path, ICMP Time Exceeded messages are returned
   in the normal manner as they are today.  The ITR performs a TTL
   decrement and test for 0 before encapsulating.  So the ITR hop is
   seen by the traceroute source has an EID address (the address of
   site-facing interface).

   For segment 2 of the path, ICMP Time Exceeded messages are returned
   to the ITR because the TTL decrement to 0 is done on the outer
   header, so the destination of the ICMP messages are to the ITR RLOC
   address, the source RLOC address of the encapsulated traceroute
   packet.  The ITR looks inside of the ICMP payload to inspect the
   traceroute source so it can return the ICMP message to the address of
   the traceroute client as well as retaining the core router IP address
   in the ICMP message.  This is so the traceroute client can display
   the core router address (the RLOC address) in the traceroute output.
   The ETR returns its RLOC address and responds to the TTL decrement to
   0 like the previous core routers did.

   For segment 3, the next-hop router downstream from the ETR will be
   decrementing the TTL for the packet that was encapsulated, sent into
   the core, decapsulated by the ETR, and forwarded because it isn't the
   final destination.  If the TTL is decremented to 0, any router on the
   path to the destination of the traceroute, including the next-hop
   router or destination, will send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the
   source EID of the traceroute client.  The ICMP message will be
   encapsulated by the local ITR and sent back to the ETR in the
   originated traceroute source site, where the packet will be delivered
   to the host.

9.1.  IPv6 Traceroute

   IPv6 traceroute follows the procedure described above since the
   entire traceroute data packet is included in ICMP Time Exceeded
   message payload.  Therefore, only the ITR needs to pay special
   attention for forwarding ICMP messages back to the traceroute source.

9.2.  IPv4 Traceroute

   For IPv4 traceroute, we cannot follow the above procedure since IPv4
   ICMP Time Exceeded messages only include the invoking IP header and 8
   <strike><font color="red">bytes</font></strike>
   <strong><font color="green">octets</font></strong> that follow the IP header.  Therefore, when a core router
   sends an IPv4 Time Exceeded message to an ITR, all the ITR has in the
   ICMP payload is the encapsulated header it prepended followed by a
   UDP header.  The original invoking IP header, and therefore the
   identity of the traceroute source is lost.

   The solution we propose to solve this problem is to cache traceroute
   IPv4 headers in the ITR and to match them up with corresponding IPv4
   Time Exceeded messages received from core routers and the ETR.  The
   ITR will use a circular buffer for caching the IPv4 and UDP headers
   of traceroute packets.  It will select a 16-bit number as a key to
   find them later when the IPv4 Time Exceeded messages are received.
   When an ITR encapsulates an IPv4 traceroute packet, it will use the
   16-bit number as the UDP source port in the encapsulating header.
   When the ICMP Time Exceeded message is returned to the ITR, the UDP
   header of the encapsulating header is present in the ICMP payload
   thereby allowing the ITR to find the cached headers for the
   traceroute source.  The ITR puts the cached headers in the payload
   and sends the ICMP Time Exceeded message to the traceroute source
   retaining the source address of the original ICMP Time Exceeded
   message (a core router or the ETR of the site of the traceroute
   destination).

   The signature of a traceroute packet comes in two forms.  The first
   form is encoded as a UDP message where the destination port is
   inspected for a range of values.  The second form is encoded as an
   ICMP message where the IP identification field is inspected for a
   well-known value.

9.3.  Traceroute using Mixed Locators

   When either an IPv4 traceroute or IPv6 traceroute is originated and
   the ITR encapsulates it in the other address family header, you
   cannot get all 3 segments of the traceroute.  Segment 2 of the
   traceroute can not be conveyed to the traceroute source since it is
   expecting addresses from intermediate hops in the same address format
   for the type of traceroute it originated.  Therefore, in this case,
   segment 2 will make the tunnel look like one hop.  All the ITR has to
   do to make this work is to not copy the inner TTL to the outer,
   encapsulating header's TTL when a traceroute packet is encapsulated
   using an RLOC from a different address family.  This will cause no
   TTL decrement to 0 to occur in core routers between the ITR and ETR.

10.  Mobility Considerations

   There are several kinds of mobility of which only some might be of
   concern to LISP.  Essentially they are as follows.

10.1.  Site Mobility

   A site wishes to change its attachment points to the Internet, and
   its LISP Tunnel Routers will have new RLOCs when it changes upstream
   providers.  Changes in EID-RLOC mappings for sites are expected to be
   handled by configuration, outside of the LISP protocol.

10.2.  Slow Endpoint Mobility

   An individual endpoint wishes to move, but is not concerned about
   maintaining session continuity.  Renumbering is involved.  LISP can
   help with the issues surrounding renumbering [RFC4192] [LISA96] by
   decoupling the address space used by a site from the address spaces
   used by its ISPs.  [RFC4984]

10.3.  Fast Endpoint Mobility

   Fast endpoint mobility occurs when an endpoint moves relatively
   rapidly, changing its IP layer network attachment point.  Maintenance
   of session continuity is a goal.  This is where the Mobile IPv4
   [RFC5944] and Mobile IPv6 [RFC6275] [RFC4866] mechanisms are used,
   and primarily where interactions with LISP need to be explored.

   The problem is that as an endpoint moves, it may require changes to
   the mapping between its EID and a set of RLOCs for its new network
   location.  When this is added to the overhead of mobile IP binding
   updates, some packets might be delayed or dropped.

   In IPv4 mobility, when an endpoint is away from home, packets to it
   are encapsulated and forwarded via a home agent which resides in the
   home area the endpoint's address belongs to.  The home agent will
   encapsulate and forward packets either directly to the endpoint or to
   a foreign agent which resides where the endpoint has moved to.
   Packets from the endpoint may be sent directly to the correspondent
   node, may be sent via the foreign agent, or may be reverse-tunneled
   back to the home agent for delivery to the mobile node.  As the
   mobile node's EID or available RLOC changes, LISP EID-to-RLOC
   mappings are required for communication between the mobile node and
   the home agent, whether via foreign agent or not.  As a mobile
   endpoint changes networks, up to three LISP mapping changes may be
   required:

   o  The mobile node moves from an old location to a new visited
      network location and notifies its home agent that it has done so.
      The Mobile IPv4 control packets the mobile node sends pass through
      one of the new visited network's ITRs, which needs an EID-RLOC
      mapping for the home agent.

   o  The home agent might not have the EID-RLOC mappings for the mobile
      node's "care-of" address or its foreign agent in the new visited
      network, in which case it will need to acquire them.

   o  When packets are sent directly to the correspondent node, it may
      be that no traffic has been sent from the new visited network to
      the correspondent node's network, and the new visited network's
      ITR will need to obtain an EID-RLOC mapping for the correspondent
      node's site.

   In addition, if the IPv4 endpoint is sending packets from the new
   visited network using its original EID, then LISP will need to
   perform a route-returnability check on the new EID-RLOC mapping for
   that EID.

   In IPv6 mobility, packets can flow directly between the mobile node
   and the correspondent node in either direction.  The mobile node uses
   its "care-of" address (EID).  In this case, the route-returnability
   check would not be needed but one more LISP mapping lookup may be
   required instead:

   o  As above, three mapping changes may be needed for the mobile node
      to communicate with its home agent and to send packets to the
      correspondent node.

   o  In addition, another mapping will be needed in the correspondent
      node's ITR, in order for the correspondent node to send packets to
      the mobile node's "care-of" address (EID) at the new network
      location.

   When both endpoints are mobile the number of potential mapping
   lookups increases accordingly.

   As a mobile node moves there are not only mobility state changes in
   the mobile node, correspondent node, and home agent, but also state
   changes in the ITRs and ETRs for at least some EID-prefixes.

   The goal is to support rapid adaptation, with little delay or packet
   loss for the entire system.  Also IP mobility can be modified to
   require fewer mapping changes.  In order to increase overall system
   performance, there may be a need to reduce the optimization of one
   area in order to place fewer demands on another.

   In LISP, one possibility is to "glean" information.  When a packet
   arrives, the ETR could examine the EID-RLOC mapping and use that
   mapping for all outgoing traffic to that EID.  It can do this after
   performing a route-returnability check, to ensure that the new
   network location does have a internal route to that endpoint.
   However, this does not cover the case where an ITR (the node assigned
   the RLOC) at the mobile-node location has been compromised.

   Mobile IP packet exchange is designed for an environment in which all
   routing information is disseminated before packets can be forwarded.
   In order to allow the Internet to grow to support expected future
   use, we are moving to an environment where some information may have
   to be obtained after packets are in flight.  Modifications to IP
   mobility should be considered in order to optimize the behavior of
   the overall system.  Anything which decreases the number of new EID-
   RLOC mappings needed when a node moves, or maintains the validity of
   an EID-RLOC mapping for a longer time, is useful.

10.4.  Fast Network Mobility

   In addition to endpoints, a network can be mobile, possibly changing
   xTRs.  A "network" can be as small as a single router and as large as
   a whole site.  This is different from site mobility in that it is
   fast and possibly short-lived, but different from endpoint mobility
   in that a whole prefix is changing RLOCs.  However, the mechanisms
   are the same and there is no new overhead in LISP.  A map request for
   any endpoint will return a binding for the entire mobile prefix.

   If mobile networks become a more common occurrence, it may be useful
   to revisit the design of the mapping service and allow for dynamic
   updates of the database.

   The issue of interactions between mobility and LISP needs to be
   explored further.  Specific improvements to the entire system will
   depend on the details of mapping mechanisms.  Mapping mechanisms
   should be evaluated on how well they support session continuity for
   mobile nodes.

10.5.  LISP Mobile Node Mobility

   A mobile device can use the LISP infrastructure to achieve mobility
   by implementing the LISP encapsulation and decapsulation functions
   and acting as a simple ITR/ETR.  By doing this, such a "LISP mobile
   node" can use topologically-independent EID IP addresses that are not
   advertised into and do not impose a cost on the global routing
   system.  These EIDs are maintained at the edges of the mapping system
   (in LISP Map-Servers and Map-Resolvers) and are provided on demand to
   only the correspondents of the LISP mobile node.

   Refer to the LISP Mobility Architecture specification [LISP-MN] for
   more details.

11.  Multicast Considerations

   A multicast group address, as defined in the original Internet
   architecture is an identifier of a grouping of topologically
   independent receiver host locations.  The address encoding itself
   does not determine the location of the receiver(s).  The multicast
   routing protocol, and the network-based state the protocol creates,
   determines where the receivers are located.

   In the context of LISP, a multicast group address is both an EID and
   a Routing Locator.  Therefore, no specific semantic or action needs
   to be taken for a destination address, as it would appear in an IP
   header.  Therefore, a group address that appears in an inner IP
   header built by a source host will be used as the destination EID.
   The outer IP header (the destination Routing Locator address),
   prepended by a LISP router, will use the same group address as the
   destination Routing Locator.

   Having said that, only the source EID and source Routing Locator
   needs to be dealt with.  Therefore, an ITR merely needs to put its
   own IP address in the source Routing Locator field when prepending
   the outer IP header.  This source Routing Locator address, like any
   other Routing Locator address MUST be globally routable.

   Therefore, an EID-to-RLOC mapping does not need to be performed by an
   ITR when a received data packet is a multicast data packet or when
   processing a source-specific Join (either by IGMPv3 or PIM).  But the
   source Routing Locator is decided by the multicast routing protocol
   in a receiver site.  That is, an EID to Routing Locator translation
   is done at control-time.

   Another approach is to have the ITR not encapsulate a multicast
   packet and allow the host built packet to flow into the core even if
   the source address is allocated out of the EID namespace.  If the
   RPF-Vector TLV [RFC5496] is used by PIM in the core, then core
   routers can RPF to the ITR (the Locator address which is injected
   into core routing) rather than the host source address (the EID
   address which is not injected into core routing).

   To avoid any EID-based multicast state in the network core, the first
   approach is chosen for LISP-Multicast.  Details for LISP-Multicast
   and Interworking with non-LISP sites is described in specification
   [MLISP].

12.  Security Considerations

   It is believed that most of the security mechanisms will be part of
   the mapping database service when using control plane procedures for
   obtaining EID-to-RLOC mappings.  For data plane triggered mappings,
   as described in this specification, protection is provided against
   ETR spoofing by using Return-Routability (see Section 3) mechanisms
   evidenced by the use of a 24-bit Nonce field in the LISP
   encapsulation header and a 64-bit Nonce field in the LISP control
   message.

   The nonce, coupled with the ITR accepting only solicited Map-Replies
   provides a basic level of security, in many ways similar to the
   security experienced in the current Internet routing system.  It is
   hard for off-path attackers to launch attacks against these LISP
   mechanisms, as they do not have the nonce values.  Sending a large
   number of packets to accidentally find the right nonce value is
   possible, but would already by itself be a denial-of-service attack.
   On-path attackers can perform far more serious attacks, but on-path
   attackers can launch serious attacks in the current Internet as well,
   including eavesdropping, blocking or redirecting traffic.  See more
   discussion on this topic in Section 6.1.5.1.

   LISP does not rely on a PKI or a more heavy weight authentication
   system.  These systems challenge the scalability of LISP which was a
   primary design goal.

   DoS attack prevention will depend on implementations rate-limiting
   Map-Requests and Map-Replies to the control plane as well as rate-
   limiting the number of data-triggered Map-Replies.

   An incorrectly implemented or malicious ITR might choose to ignore
   the priority and weights provided by the ETR in its Map-Reply.  This
   traffic steering would be limited to the traffic that is sent by this
   ITR's site, and no more severe than if the site initiated a bandwidth
   DoS attack on (one of) the ETR's ingress links.  The ITR's site would
   typically gain no benefit from not respecting the weights, and would
   likely to receive better service by abiding by them.

   To deal with map-cache exhaustion attempts in an ITR/PITR, the
   implementation should consider putting a maximum cap on the number of
   entries stored with a reserve list for special or frequently accessed
   sites.  This should be a configuration policy control set by the
   network administrator who manages ITRs and PITRs.  When overlapping
   EID-prefixes occur across multiple map-cache entries, the integrity
   of the set must be wholly maintained.  So if a more-specific entry
   cannot be added due to reaching the maximum cap, then none of the
   less specifics should be stored in the map-cache.

   Given that the ITR/PITR maintains a cache of EID-to-RLOC mappings,
   cache sizing and maintenance is an issue to be kept in mind during
   implementation.  It is a good idea to have instrumentation in place
   to detect thrashing of the cache.  Implementation experimentation
   will be used to determine which cache management strategies work
   best.  In general, it is difficult to defend against cache trashing
   attacks.  It should be noted that an undersized cache in an ITR/PITR
   not only causes adverse affect on the site or region they support,
   but may also cause increased Map-Request load on the mapping system.

   "Piggybacked" mapping data discussed in Section 6.1.3 specifies how
   to handle such mappings and includes the possibility for an ETR to
   temporarily accept such a mapping before verification when running in
   "trusted" environments.  In such cases, there is a potential threat
   that a fake mapping could be inserted (even if only for a short
   period) into a map-cache.  As noted in Section 6.1.3, an ETR MUST be
   specifically configured to run in such a mode and might usefully only
   consider some specific ITRs as also running in that same trusted
   environment.

   There is a security risk implicit in the fact that ETRs generate the
   EID prefix to which they are responding.  An ETR can claim a shorter
   prefix than it is actually responsible for.  Various mechanisms to
   ameliorate or resolve this issue will be examined in the future,
   [LISP-SEC].

   Spoofing of inner header addresses of LISP encapsulated packets is
   possible like with any tunneling mechanism.  ITRs MUST verify the
   source address of a packet to be an EID that belongs to the site's
   EID-prefix range prior to encapsulation.  An ETR must only
   decapsulate and forward datagrams with an inner header destination
   that matches one of its EID-prefix ranges.  If, upon receipt and
   decapsulation, the destination EID of a datagram does not match one
   of the ETR's configured EID-prefixes, the ETR MUST drop the datagram.
   If a LISP encapsulated packet arrives at an ETR, it SHOULD compare
   the inner header source EID address and the outer header source RLOC
   address with the mapping that exists in the mapping database.  Then
   when spoofing attacks occur, the outer header source RLOC address can
   be used to trace back the attack to the source site, using existing
   operational tools.

   This experimental specification does not address automated key
   management (AKM).  BCP 107 provides guidance in this area.  In
   addition, at the time of this writing, substantial work is being
   undertaken to improve security of the routing system [KARP], [RPKI],
   [BGP-SEC], [LISP-SEC].  Future work on LISP should address BCP-107 as
   well as other open security considerations, which may require changes
   to this specification.

13.  Network Management Considerations

   Considerations for Network Management tools exist so the LISP
   protocol suite can be operationally managed.  The mechanisms can be
   found in [LISP-MIB] and [LISP-LIG].

14.  IANA Considerations

   This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
   Authority (IANA) regarding registration of values related to the LISP
   specification, in accordance with BCP 26 and RFC 5226 [RFC5226].

   There are <strike><font color="red">two</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">four</font></strong> name spaces in LISP that require registration:

   o  LISP IANA registry allocations should not be made for purposes
      unrelated to LISP routing or transport protocols.

   o  The following policies are used here with the meanings defined in
      BCP 26: "Specification Required", "IETF Review", "Experimental
      Use", "First Come First Served".

14.1.  LISP ACT and Flag Fields

   New ACT values (Section 6.1.4) can be allocated through IETF review
   or IESG approval.  Four values have already been allocated by this
   specification (Section 6.1.4).

   In addition, the LISP protocol has a number of flag and reserved
   fields, such as the LISP header flags field (Section 5.3).  New bits
   for flags can be taken into use from these fields through IETF review
   or IESG approval, but these need not be managed by IANA.

14.2.  LISP Address Type Codes

   LISP Address [LCAF] type codes have a range from 0 to 255.  New type
   codes MUST be allocated consecutively starting at 0.  Type Codes 0 -
   127 are to be assigned by IETF review or IESG approval.

   Type Codes 128 - 255 are available on a First Come First Served
   policy.

   This registry, initially empty, is constructed for future-use
   experimental work of LCAF values.  See [LCAF] for details for other
   possible unapproved address encodings.  The unapproved LCAF encodings
   are an area for further study and experimentation.

14.3.  LISP UDP Port Numbers

   The IANA registry has allocated UDP port numbers 4341 and 4342 for
   LISP data-plane and control-plane operation, respectively.

14.4.  LISP Key ID Numbers

   The following Key ID values are defined by this specification as used
   in any packet type that references a Key ID field:

       Name                 Number          Defined in
       -----------------------------------------------
       None                 0               n/a
       HMAC-SHA-1-96        1               [RFC2404]
       HMAC-SHA-256-128     2               [RFC6234]

15.  Known Open Issues and Areas of Future Work

   As an experimental specification, this work is, by definition,
   incomplete.  Specific areas where additional experience and work are
   needed include:

   o  At present, only [ALT] is defined for implementing a database of
      EID-to-RLOC mapping information.  Additional research on other
      mapping database systems is strongly encouraged.

   o  Failure and recovery of LISP site partitioning (see Section 6.4),
      in the presence of redundant configuration (see Section 8.5) needs
      further research and experimentation.

   o  The characteristics of map-cache management under exceptional
      conditions, such as denial-of-service attacks are not fully
      understood.  Further experience is needed to determine whether
      current caching methods are practical or in need of further
      development.  In particular, the performance, scaling and security
      characteristics of the map-cache will be discovered as part of
      this experiment.  Performance metrics to be observed are packet
      reordering associated with the LISP data probe and loss of the
      first packet in a flow associated with map-caching.  The impact of
      these upon TCP will be observed.  See Section 12 for additional
      thoughts and considerations.

   o  Preliminary work has been done to ensure that sites employing LISP
      can interconnect with the rest of the Internet.  This work is
      documented in <strike><font color="red">[INTERWORK]</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">[INTERWORK],</font></strong> but further experimentation and
      experience is needed.

   o  At present, no mechanism for automated key management for message
      authentication is defined.  Addressing automated key management is
      necessary before this specification could be developed into a
      standards track RFC.  See Section 12 for further details regarding
      security considerations.

   o  In order to maintain security and stability, Internet Protocols
      typically isolate the control and data planes.  Therefore, user
      activity cannot cause control plane state to be created or
      destroyed.  LISP does not maintain this separation.  The degree to
      which the loss of separation impacts security and stability is a
      topic for experimental observation.

   o  LISP allows for different mapping database systems to be used.
      While only one [ALT] is currently well-defined, each mapping
      database will likely have some impact on the security of the EID-
      to-RLOC mappings.  How each mapping database system's security
      properties impact on LISP overall is for further study.

   <strong><font color="green">o  An examination of the implications of LISP on Internet traffic,
      applications, routers, and security is needed.  This will help to
      understand the consequences for network stability, routing
      protocol function, routing scalability, migration and backward
      compatibility, and implementation scalability (as influenced by
      additional protocol components, additional state, and additional
      processing for encapsulation, decapsulation, liveness).

   Other LISP documents may also include open issues and areas for
   future work.</font></strong>

16.  References

16.1.  Normative References

   [ALT]      Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "LISP
              Alternative Topology (LISP-ALT)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-alt-09.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MS]  Farinacci, D. and V. Fuller, "LISP Map Server",
              draft-ietf-lisp-ms-12.txt (work in progress).

   [RFC0768]  Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
              August 1980.

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2404]  Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
              ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

   [RFC3168]  Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
              RFC 3168, September 2001.

   [RFC3232]  Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by
              an On-line Database", RFC 3232, January 2002.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
              Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, August 2006.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC5496]  Wijnands, IJ., Boers, A., and E. Rosen, "The Reverse Path
              Forwarding (RPF) Vector TLV", RFC 5496, March 2009.

   [RFC5944]  Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised",
              RFC 5944, November 2010.

   [RFC6234]  Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, May 2011.

   [RFC6275]  Perkins, C., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
              in IPv6", RFC 6275, July 2011.

   [UDP-TUNNELS]
              Eubanks, M. and P. Chimento, "UDP Checksums for Tunneled
              Packets", draft-eubanks-chimento-6man-01.txt (work in
              progress), October 2010.

   [UDP-ZERO]
              Fairhurst, G. and M. Westerland, "IPv6 UDP Checksum
              Considerations", draft-ietf-6man-udpzero-04.txt (work in
              progress), October 2011.

   [VERSIONING]
              Iannone, L., Saucez, D., and O. Bonaventure, "LISP Mapping
              Versioning", draft-ietf-lisp-map-versioning-05.txt (work
              in progress).

16.2.  Informative References

   [AFI]      IANA, "Address Family Indicators (AFIs)", ADDRESS FAMILY
              NUMBERS
              http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers.

   [AFI-REGISTRY]
              IANA, "Address Family Indicators (AFIs)", ADDRESS FAMILY
              NUMBER registry http://www.iana.org/assignments/
              address-family-numbers/
              address-family-numbers.xml#address-family-numbers-1.

   [BGP-SEC]  Lepinski, M., "An Overview of BGPSEC",
              draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00.txt (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [CHIAPPA]  Chiappa, J., "Endpoints and Endpoint names: A Proposed
              Enhancement to the Internet Architecture", Internet-
              Draft http://www.chiappa.net/~jnc/tech/endpoints.txt.

   [CONS]     Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., and D. Meyer, "LISP-CONS: A
              Content distribution Overlay Network  Service for LISP",
              draft-meyer-lisp-cons-04.txt (work in progress).

   [EMACS]    Brim, S., Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Curran, "EID
              Mappings Multicast Across Cooperating Systems for LISP",
              draft-curran-lisp-emacs-00.txt (work in progress).

   [INTERWORK]
              Lewis, D., Meyer, D., Farinacci, D., and V. Fuller,
              "Interworking LISP with IPv4 and IPv6",
              draft-ietf-lisp-interworking-02.txt (work in progress).

   [KARP]     Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
              Routing Protocols (KARP)Design Guidelines",
              draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-06.txt (work in progress),
              October 2011.

   [LCAF]     Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., and J. Snijders, "LISP Canonical
              Address Format", draft-farinacci-lisp-lcaf-06.txt (work in
              progress).

   [LISA96]   Lear, E., Katinsky, J., Coffin, J., and D. Tharp,
              "Renumbering: Threat or Menace?", Usenix .

   [LISP-DEPLOY]
              Jakab, L., Coras, F., Domingo-Pascual, J., and D. Lewis,
              "LISP Network Element Deployment Considerations",
              draft-ietf-lisp-deployment-02.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-LIG]
              Farinacci, D. and D. Meyer, "LISP Internet Groper (LIG)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-lig-06.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MAIN]
              Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis,
              "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)",
              draft-farinacci-lisp-12.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MIB]
              Schudel, G., Jain, A., and V. Moreno, "LISP MIB",
              draft-ietf-lisp-mib-02.txt (work in progress).

   [LISP-MN]  Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Lewis, D., and D. Meyer, "LISP
              Mobility Architecture", draft-meyer-lisp-mn-06.txt (work
              in progress).

   [LISP-SEC]
              Maino, F., Ermagon, V., Cabellos, A., Sausez, D., and O.

              Bonaventure, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)",
              draft-ietf-lisp-sec-00.txt (work in progress).

   [LOC-ID-ARCH]
              Meyer, D. and D. Lewis, "Architectural Implications of
              Locator/ID  Separation",
              draft-meyer-loc-id-implications-02.txt (work in progress).

   [MLISP]    Farinacci, D., Meyer, D., Zwiebel, J., and S. Venaas,
              "LISP for Multicast Environments",
              draft-ietf-lisp-multicast-10.txt (work in progress).

   [NERD]     Lear, E., "NERD: A Not-so-novel EID to RLOC Database",
              draft-lear-lisp-nerd-08.txt (work in progress).

   [OPENLISP]
              Iannone, L. and O. Bonaventure, "OpenLISP Implementation
              Report", draft-iannone-openlisp-implementation-01.txt
              (work in progress).

   [RADIR]    Narten, T., "Routing and Addressing Problem Statement",
              draft-narten-radir-problem-statement-05.txt (work in
              progress).

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC2784]  Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
              Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
              March 2000.

   [RFC3056]  Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
              via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC4192]  Baker, F., Lear, E., and R. Droms, "Procedures for
              Renumbering an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day", RFC 4192,
              September 2005.

   [RFC4866]  Arkko, J., Vogt, C., and W. Haddad, "Enhanced Route
              Optimization for Mobile IPv6", RFC 4866, May 2007.

   [RFC4984]  Meyer, D., Zhang, L., and K. Fall, "Report from the IAB
              Workshop on Routing and Addressing", RFC 4984,
              September 2007.

   [RPKI]     Lepinski, M., "An Infrastructure to Support Secure
              Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-13.txt (work in
              progress), February 2011.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   An initial thank you goes to Dave Oran for planting the seeds for the
   initial ideas for LISP.  His consultation continues to provide value
   to the LISP authors.

   A special and appreciative thank you goes to Noel Chiappa for
   providing architectural impetus over the past decades on separation
   of location and identity, as well as detailed review of the LISP
   architecture and documents, coupled with enthusiasm for making LISP a
   practical and incremental transition for the Internet.

   The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge many people who have
   contributed discussion and ideas to the making of this proposal.
   They include Scott Brim, Andrew Partan, John Zwiebel, Jason Schiller,
   Lixia Zhang, Dorian Kim, Peter Schoenmaker, Vijay Gill, Geoff Huston,
   David Conrad, Mark Handley, Ron Bonica, Ted Seely, Mark Townsley,
   Chris Morrow, Brian Weis, Dave McGrew, Peter Lothberg, Dave Thaler,
   Eliot Lear, Shane Amante, Ved Kafle, Olivier Bonaventure, Luigi
   Iannone, Robin Whittle, Brian Carpenter, Joel Halpern, Terry
   Manderson, Roger Jorgensen, Ran Atkinson, Stig Venaas, Iljitsch van
   Beijnum, Roland Bless, Dana Blair, Bill Lynch, Marc Woolward, Damien
   Saucez, Damian Lezama, Attilla De Groot, Parantap Lahiri, David
   Black, Roque Gagliano, Isidor Kouvelas, Jesper Skriver, Fred Templin,
   Margaret Wasserman, Sam Hartman, Michael Hofling, Pedro Marques, Jari
   Arkko, Gregg Schudel, Srinivas Subramanian, Amit Jain, Xu Xiaohu,
   Dhirendra Trivedi, Yakov Rekhter, John Scudder, John Drake, Dimitri
   Papadimitriou, Ross Callon, Selina Heimlich, Job Snijders, Vina
   Ermagan, Albert Cabellos, Fabio Maino, Victor Moreno, Chris White,
   Clarence Filsfils, and Alia Atlas.

   This work originated in the Routing Research Group (RRG) of the IRTF.
   The individual submission [LISP-MAIN] was converted into this IETF
   LISP working group draft.

   The LISP working group would like to give a special thanks to Jari
   Arkko, the Internet Area AD at the time the set of LISP documents
   were being prepared for IESG last call, for his meticulous review and
   detail commentary on the 7 working group last call drafts progressing
   toward experimental RFCs.

Appendix B.  Document Change Log

B.1.  Changes to <strong><font color="green">draft-ietf-lisp-20.txt

   o  Posted January 2012 for resolution to Adrian Farrel's security
      comments as well as additions to the end of section 2, Elwyn
      Davies Gen-Art comments, and Ralph Droms' IANA and EID definition
      comments.

B.2.  Changes to</font></strong> draft-ietf-lisp-19.txt

   o  Posted January 2012 for Stephen Farrell's comment resolution.

<strike><font color="red">B.2.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.3.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-18.txt

   o  Posted December 2011 after reflecting comments from IANA.

   o  Create reference to sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 about DF bit setting
      from section 5.3.

   o  Inserted two references for Route-Returnability and on-path
      attacks in Security Considerations section.

<strike><font color="red">B.3.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.4.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-17.txt

   o  Posted December 2011 after IETF last call comments.

   o  Make Map-Notify port assignment be 4342 in both source and
      destination ports.  This change was agreed on and put in [LISP-MS]
      but was not updated in this spec.

<strike><font color="red">B.4.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.5.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-16.txt

   o  Posted October 2011 after AD review by Jari.

<strike><font color="red">B.5.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.6.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-15.txt

   o  Posted July 2011.  Fixing IDnits errors.

   o  Change description on how to select a source address for RLOC-
      probe Map-Replies to refer to the "EID-to-RLOC Map-Reply Message"
      section.

<strike><font color="red">B.6.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.7.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-14.txt

   o  Post working group last call and pre-IESG last call review.

   o  Indicate that an ICMP Unreachable message should be sent when a
      packet matches a drop-based negative map-cache entry.

   o  Indicate how a map-cache set of overlapping EID-prefixes must
      maintain integrity when the map-cache maximum cap is reached.

   o  Add Joel's description for the definition of an EID, that the bit
      string value can be an RLOC for another device in abstract but the
      architecture allows it to be an EID of one device and the same
      value as an RLOC for another device.

   o  In the "Tunnel Encapsulation Details" section, indicate that 4
      combinations of encapsulation are supported.

   o  Add what ETR should do for a Data-Probe when received for a
      destination EID outside of its EID-prefix range.  This was added
      in the Data Probe definition section.

   o  Added text indicating that more-specific EID-prefixes must not be
      removed when less-specific entries stay in the map-cache.  This is
      to preserve the integrity of the EID-prefix set.

   o  Add clarifying text in the Security Considerations section about
      how an ETR must not decapsulate and forward a packet that is not
      for its configured EID-prefix range.

<strike><font color="red">B.7.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.8.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-13.txt

   o  Posted June 2011 to complete working group last call.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Put Yakov suggested wording in the EID-prefix
      definition section to reference [INTERWORK] and [LISP-DEPLOY]
      about discussion on transition and access mechanisms.

   o  Change "ITRs" to "ETRs" in the Locator Status Bit definition
      section and data packet description section per Damien's comment.

   o  Remove the normative reference to [LISP-SEC] when describing the
      S-bit in the ECM and Map-Reply headers.

   o  Tracker item 54.  Added text from John Scudder in the "Packets
      Egressing a LISP Site" section.

   o  Add sentence to the "Reencapsulating Tunnel" definition about how
      reencapsulation loops can occur when not coordinating among
      multiple mapping database systems.

   o  Remove "In theory" from a sentence in the Security Considerations
      section.

   o  Remove Security Area Statement title and reword section with
      Eliot's provided text.  The text was agreed upon by LISP-WG chairs
      and Security ADs.

   o  Remove word "potential" from the over-claiming paragraph of the
      Security Considerations section per Stephen's request.

   o  Wordsmithing and other editorial comments from Alia.

<strike><font color="red">B.8.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.9.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-12.txt

   o  Posted April 2011.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Provided rewording how an EID-prefix can be
      reused in the definition section of "EID-prefix".

   o  Tracker item 95.  Change "eliminate" to "defer" in section 4.1.

   o  Tracker item 110.  Added that the Mapping Protocol Data field in
      the Map-Reply message is only used when needed by the particular
      Mapping Database System.

   o  Tracker item 111.  Indicate that if an LSB that is associated with
      an anycast address, that there is at least one RLOC that is up.

   o  Tracker item 108.  Make clear the R-bit does not define RLOC path
      reachability.

   o  Tracker item 107.  Indicate that weights are relative to each
      other versus requiring an addition of up to 100%.

   o  Tracker item 46.  Add a sentence how LISP products should be sized
      for the appropriate demand so cache thrashing is avoided.

   o  Change some references of RFC 5226 to [AFI] per Luigi.

   o  Per Luigi, make reference to "EID-AFI" consistent to "EID-prefix-
      AFI".

   o  Tracker item 66.  Indicate that appending locators to a locator-
      set is done when the added locators are lexicographically greater
      than the previous ones in the set.

   o  Tracker item 87.  Once again reword the definition of the EID-
      prefix to reflect recent comments.

   o  Tracker item 70.  Added text to security section on what the
      implications could be if an ITR does not obey priority and weights
      from a Map-Reply message.

   o  Tracker item 54.  Added text to the new section titled "Packets
      Egressing a LISP Site" to describe the implications when two or
      more ITRs exist at a site where only one ITR is used for egress
      traffic and when there is a shift of traffic to the others, how
      the map-cache will need to be populated in those new egress ITRs.

   o  Tracker item 33.  Make more clear in the Routing Locator Selection
      section what an ITR should do when it sees an R-bit of 0 in a
      locator-record of a Map-Reply.

   o  Tracker item 33.  Add paragraph to the EID Reachability section
      indicating that site partitioning is under investigation.

   o  Tracker item 58.  Added last paragraph of Security Considerations
      section about how to protect inner header EID address spoofing
      attacks.

   o  Add suggested Sam text to indicate that all security concerns need
      not be addressed for moving document to Experimental RFC status.
      Put this in a subsection of the Security Considerations section.

<strike><font color="red">B.9.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.10.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-11.txt

   o  Posted March 30, 2011.

   o  Change IANA URL.  The URL we had pointed to a general protocol
      numbers page.

   o  Added the "s" bit to the Map-Request to allow SMR-invoked Map-
      Requests to be sent to a MN ETR via the map-server.

   o  Generalize text for the definition of Reencapsuatling tunnels.

   o  Add paragraph suggested by Joel to explain how implementation
      experimentation will be used to determine the proper cache
      management techniques.

   o  Add Yakov provided text for the definition of "EID-to-RLOC
      "Database".

   o  Add reference in Section 8, Deployment Scenarios, to the
      draft-jakab-lisp-deploy-02.txt draft.

   o  Clarify sentence about no hardware changes needed to support LISP
      encapsulation.

   o  Add paragraph about what is the procedure when a locator is
      inserted in the middle of a locator-set.

   o  Add a definition for Locator Status Bits so we can emphasize they
      are used as a hint for router up/down status and not path
      reachability.

   o  Change "BGP RIB" to "RIB" per Clarence's comment.

   o  Fixed complaints by IDnits.

   o  Add subsection to Security Considerations section indicating how
      EID-prefix overclaiming in Map-Replies is for further study and
      add a reference to LISP-SEC.

<strike><font color="red">B.10.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.11.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt

   o  Posted March 2011.

   o  Add p-bit to Map-Request so there is documentary reasons to know
      when a PITR has sent a Map-Request to an ETR.

   o  Add Map-Notify message which is used to acknowledge a Map-Register
      message sent to a Map-Server.

   o  Add M-bit to the Map-Register message so an ETR that wants an
      acknowledgment for the Map-Register can request one.

   o  Add S-bit to the ECM and Map-Reply messages to describe security
      data that can be present in each message.  Then refer to
      [LISP-SEC] for expansive details.

   o  Add Network Management Considerations section and point to the MIB
      and LIG drafts.

   o  Remove the word "simple" per Yakov's comments.

<strike><font color="red">B.11.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.12.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt

   o  Posted October 2010.

   o  Add to IANA Consideration section about the use of LCAF Type
      values that accepted and maintained by the IANA registry and not
      the LCAF specification.

   o  Indicate that implementations should be able to receive LISP
      control messages when either UDP port is 4342, so they can be
      robust in the face of intervening NAT boxes.

   o  Add paragraph to SMR section to indicate that an ITR does not need
      to respond to an SMR-based Map-Request when it has no map-cache
      entry for the SMR source's EID-prefix.

<strike><font color="red">B.12.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.13.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-08.txt

   o  Posted August 2010.

   o  In section 6.1.6, remove statement about setting TTL to 0 in Map-
      Register messages.

   o  Clarify language in section 6.1.5 about Map-Replying to Data-
      Probes or Map-Requests.

   o  Indicate that outer TTL should only be copied to inner TTL when it
      is less than inner TTL.

   o  Indicate a source-EID for RLOC-probes are encoded with an AFI
      value of 0.

   o  Indicate that SMRs can have a global or per SMR destination rate-
      limiter.

   o  Add clarifications to the SMR procedures.

   o  Add definitions for "client-side" and 'server-side" terms used in
      this specification.

   o  Clear up language in section 6.4, last paragraph.

   o  Change ACT of value 0 to "no-action".  This is so we can RLOC-
      probe a PETR and have it return a Map-Reply with a locator-set of
      size 0.  The way it is spec'ed the map-cache entry has action
      "dropped".  Drop-action is set to 3.

   o  Add statement about normalizing locator weights.

   o  Clarify R-bit definition in the Map-Reply locator record.

   o  Add section on EID Reachability within a LISP site.

   o  Clarify another disadvantage of using anycast locators.

   o  Reworded Abstract.

   o  Change section 2.0 Introduction to remove obsolete information
      such as the LISP variant definitions.

   o  Change section 5 title from "Tunneling Details" to "LISP
      Encapsulation Details".

   o  Changes to section 5 to include results of network deployment
      experience with MTU.  Recommend that implementations use either
      the stateful or stateless handling.

   o  Make clarification wordsmithing to Section 7 and 8.

   o  Identify that if there is one locator in the locator-set of a map-
      cache entry, that an SMR from that locator should be responded to
      by sending the the SMR-invoked Map-Request to the database mapping
      system rather than to the RLOC itself (which may be unreachable).

   o  When describing Unicast and Multicast Weights indicate the the
      values are relative weights rather than percentages.  So it
      doesn't imply the sum of all locator weights in the locator-set
      need to be 100.

   o  Do some wordsmithing on copying TTL and TOS fields.

   o  Numerous wordsmithing changes from Dave Meyer.  He fine toothed
      combed the spec.

   o  Removed Section 14 "Prototype Plans and Status".  We felt this
      type of section is no longer appropriate for a protocol
      specification.

   o  Add clarification text for the IRC description per Damien's
      commentary.

   o  Remove text on copying nonce from SMR to SMR-invoked Map- Request
      per Vina's comment about a possible DoS vector.

   o  Clarify (S/2 + H) in the stateless MTU section.

   o  Add text to reflect Damien's comment about the description of the
      "ITR-RLOC Address" field in the Map-Request. that the list of RLOC
      addresses are local addresses of the Map-Requester.

<strike><font color="red">B.13.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.14.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-07.txt

   o  Posted April 2010.

   o  Added I-bit to data header so LSB field can also be used as an
      Instance ID field.  When this occurs, the LSB field is reduced to
      8-bits (from 32-bits).

   o  Added V-bit to the data header so the 24-bit nonce field can also
      be used for source and destination version numbers.

   o  Added Map-Version 12-bit value to the EID-record to be used in all
      of Map-Request, Map-Reply, and Map-Register messages.

   o  Added multiple ITR-RLOC fields to the Map-Request packet so an ETR
      can decide what address to select for the destination of a Map-
      Reply.

   o  Added L-bit (Local RLOC bit) and p-bit (Probe-Reply RLOC bit) to
      the Locator-Set record of an EID-record for a Map-Reply message.
      The L-bit indicates which RLOCs in the locator-set are local to
      the sender of the message.  The P-bit indicates which RLOC is the
      source of a RLOC-probe Reply (Map-Reply) message.

   o  Add reference to the LISP Canonical Address Format [LCAF] draft.

   o  Made editorial and clarification changes based on comments from
      Dhirendra Trivedi.

   o  Added wordsmithing comments from Joel Halpern on DF=1 setting.

   o  Add John Zwiebel clarification to Echo Nonce Algorithm section
      6.3.1.

   o  Add John Zwiebel comment about expanding on proxy-map-reply bit
      for Map-Register messages.

   o  Add NAT section per Ron Bonica comments.

   o  Fix IDnits issues per Ron Bonica.

   o  Added section on Virtualization and Segmentation to explain the
      use if the Instance ID field in the data header.

   o  There are too many P-bits, keep their scope to the packet format
      description and refer to them by name every where else in the
      spec.

   o  Scanned all occurrences of "should", "should not", "must" and
      "must not" and uppercased them.

   o  John Zwiebel offered text for section 4.1 to modernize the
      example.  Thanks Z!

   o  Make it more clear in the definition of "EID-to-RLOC Database"
      that all ETRs need to have the same database mapping.  This
      reflects a comment from John Scudder.

   o  Add a definition "Route-returnability" to the Definition of Terms
      section.

   o  In section 9.2, add text to describe what the signature of
      traceroute packets can look like.

   o  Removed references to Data Probe for introductory example.  Data-
      probes are still part of the LISP design but not encouraged.

   o  Added the definition for "LISP site" to the Definition of Terms"
      section.

<strike><font color="red">B.14.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.15.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-06.txt

   Editorial based changes:

   o  Posted December 2009.

   o  Fix typo for flags in LISP data header.  Changed from "4" to "5".

   o  Add text to indicate that Map-Register messages must contain a
      computed UDP checksum.

   o  Add definitions for PITR and PETR.

   o  Indicate an AFI value of 0 is an unspecified address.

   o  Indicate that the TTL field of a Map-Register is not used and set
      to 0 by the sender.  This change makes this spec consistent with
      [LISP-MS].

   o  Change "... yield a packet size of L <strike><font color="red">bytes"</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets"</font></strong> to "... yield a
      packet size greater than L <strike><font color="red">bytes".</font></strike> <strong><font color="green">octets".</font></strong>

   o  Clarify section 6.1.5 on what addresses and ports are used in Map-
      Reply messages.

   o  Clarify that LSBs that go beyond the number of locators do not to
      be SMRed when the locator addresses are greater lexicographically
      than the locator in the existing locator-set.

   o  Add Gregg, Srini, and Amit to acknowledgment section.

   o  Clarify in the definition of a LISP header what is following the
      UDP header.

   o  Clarify "verifying Map-Request" text in section 6.1.3.

   o  Add Xu Xiaohu to the acknowledgment section for introducing the
      problem of overlapping EID-prefixes among multiple sites in an RRG
      email message.

   Design based changes:

   o  Use stronger language to have the outer IPv4 header set DF=1 so we
      can avoid fragment reassembly in an ETR or PETR.  This will also
      make IPv4 and IPv6 encapsulation have consistent behavior.

   o  Map-Requests should not be sent in ECM with the Probe bit is set.
      These type of Map-Requests are used as RLOC-probes and are sent
      directly to locator addresses in the underlying network.

   o  Add text in section 6.1.5 about returning all EID-prefixes in a
      Map-Reply sent by an ETR when there are overlapping EID-prefixes
      configure.

   o  Add text in a new subsection of section 6.1.5 about dealing with
      Map-Replies with coarse EID-prefixes.

<strike><font color="red">B.15.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.16.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-05.txt

   o  Posted September 2009.

   o  Added this Document Change Log appendix.

   o  Added section indicating that encapsulated Map-Requests must use
      destination UDP port 4342.

   o  Don't use AH in Map-Registers.  Put key-id, auth-length, and auth-
      data in Map-Register payload.

   o  Added Jari to acknowledgment section.

   o  State the source-EID is set to 0 when using Map-Requests to
      refresh or RLOC-probe.

   o  Make more clear what source-RLOC should be for a Map-Request.

   o  The LISP-CONS authors thought that the Type definitions for CONS
      should be removed from this specification.

   o  Removed nonce from Map-Register message, it wasn't used so no need
      for it.

   o  Clarify what to do for unspecified Action bits for negative Map-
      Replies.  Since No Action is a drop, make value 0 Drop.

<strike><font color="red">B.16.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.17.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-04.txt

   o  Posted September 2009.

   o  How do deal with record count greater than 1 for a Map-Request.
      Damien and Joel comment.  Joel suggests: 1) Specify that senders
      compliant with the current document will always set the count to
      1, and note that the count is included for future extensibility.
      2) Specify what a receiver compliant with the draft should do if
      it receives a request with a count greater than 1.  Presumably, it
      should send some error back?

   o  Add Fred Templin in acknowledgment section.

   o  Add Margaret and Sam to the acknowledgment section for their great
      comments.

   o  Say more about LAGs in the UDP section per Sam Hartman's comment.

   o  Sam wants to use MAY instead of SHOULD for ignoring checksums on
      ETR.  From the mailing list: "You'd need to word it as an ITR MAY
      send a zero checksum, an ETR MUST accept a 0 checksum and MAY
      ignore the checksum completely.  And of course we'd need to
      confirm that can actually be implemented.  In particular, hardware
      that verifies UDP checksums on receive needs to be checked to make
      sure it permits 0 checksums."

   o  Margaret wants a reference to
      http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-eubanks-chimento-6man-00.txt.

   o  Fix description in Map-Request section.  Where we describe Map-
      Reply Record, change "R-bit" to "M-bit".

   o  Add the mobility bit to Map-Replies.  So PITRs don't probe so
      often for MNs but often enough to get mapping updates.

   o  Indicate SHA1 can be used as well for Map-Registers.

   o  More Fred comments on MTU handling.

   o  Isidor comment about spec'ing better periodic Map-Registers.  Will
      be fixed in draft-ietf-lisp-ms-02.txt.

   o  Margaret's comment on gleaning: "The current specification does
      not make it clear how long gleaned map entries should be retained
      in the cache, nor does it make it clear how/ when they will be
      validated.  The LISP spec should, at the very least, include a
      (short) default lifetime for gleaned entries, require that they be
      validated within a short period of time, and state that a new
      gleaned entry should never overwrite an entry that was obtained
      from the mapping system.  The security implications of storing
      "gleaned" entries should also be explored in detail."

   o  Add section on RLOC-probing per working group feedback.

   o  Change "loc-reach-bits" to "loc-status-bits" per comment from
      Noel.

   o  Remove SMR-bit from data-plane.  Dino prefers to have it in the
      control plane only.

   o  Change LISP header to allow a "Research Bit" so the Nonce and LSB
      fields can be turned off and used for another future purpose.  For
      Luigi et al versioning convergence.

   o  Add a N-bit to the data header suggested by Noel.  Then the nonce
      field could be used when N is not 1.

   o  Clarify that when E-bit is 0, the nonce field can be an echoed
      nonce or a random nonce.  Comment from Jesper.

   o  Indicate when doing data-gleaning that a verifying Map-Request is
      sent to the source-EID of the gleaned data packet so we can avoid
      map-cache corruption by a 3rd party.  Comment from Pedro.

   o  Indicate that a verifying Map-Request, for accepting mapping data,
      should be sent over the ALT (or to the EID).

   o  Reference IPsec RFC 4302.  Comment from Sam and Brian Weis.

   o  Put E-bit in Map-Reply to tell ITRs that the ETR supports echo-
      noncing.  Comment by Pedro and Dino.

   o  Jesper made a comment to loosen the language about requiring the
      copy of inner TTL to outer TTL since the text to get mixed-AF
      traceroute to work would violate the "MUST" clause.  Changed from
      MUST to SHOULD in section 5.3.

<strike><font color="red">B.17.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.18.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-03.txt

   o  Posted July 2009.

   o  Removed loc-reach-bits longword from control packets per Damien
      comment.

   o  Clarifications in MTU text from Roque.

   o  Added text to indicate that the locator-set be sorted by locator
      address from Isidor.

   o  Clarification text from John Zwiebel in Echo-Nonce section.

<strike><font color="red">B.18.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.19.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-02.txt

   o  Posted July 2009.

   o  Encapsulation packet format change to add E-bit and make loc-
      reach-bits 32-bits in length.

   o  Added Echo-Nonce Algorithm section.

   o  Clarification how ECN bits are copied.

   o  Moved S-bit in Map-Request.

   o  Added P-bit in Map-Request and Map-Reply messages to anticipate
      RLOC-Probe Algorithm.

   o  Added to Mobility section to reference [LISP-MN].

<strike><font color="red">B.19.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.20.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-01.txt

   o  Posted 2 days after draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt in May 2009.

   o  Defined LEID to be a "LISP EID".

   o  Indicate encapsulation use IPv4 DF=0.

   o  Added negative Map-Reply messages with drop, native-forward, and
      send-map-request actions.

   o  Added Proxy-Map-Reply bit to Map-Register.

<strike><font color="red">B.20.</font></strike>

<strong><font color="green">B.21.</font></strong>  Changes to draft-ietf-lisp-00.txt

   o  Posted May 2009.

   o  Rename of draft-farinacci-lisp-12.txt.

   o  Acknowledgment to RRG.

Authors' Addresses

   Dino Farinacci
   cisco Systems
   Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: dino@cisco.com

   Vince Fuller
   cisco Systems
   Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: vaf@cisco.com

   Dave Meyer
   cisco Systems
   170 Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA
   USA

   Email: dmm@cisco.com

   Darrel Lewis
   cisco Systems
   170 Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA
   USA

   Email: darlewis@cisco.com
</pre>

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From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Sun Jan 22 09:30:07 2012
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document: draft-ishikawa-yrpunl-ucode-urn-01.txt
Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
Review Date: 22 Jan 2012
IETF LC End Date: 14 Feb 2012
On IESG Agenda: 16 Feb 2012

Summary: The document is ready to be published as an Informational RFC.


From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Mon Jan 23 05:19:18 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 19/01/2012 22:05, Brian Trammell wrote:
> Hi, Peter, Alexey, all,

Hi Brian,
> On Jan 19, 2012, at 8:34 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>
>> On 1/19/12 10:32 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>> Hi Brian,
>>>
>>> On 19/01/2012 09:48, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 7:01 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>> On 18/01/2012 17:43, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Brian,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 18/01/2012 16:16, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>>>>> On Jan 18, 2012, at 3:38 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Actually, since the binding between RID and a PKI is better defined
>>>>>>> in rfc6045-bis, 6046-bis now refers to it, as follows:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>     Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as
>>>>>>> detailed
>>>>>>>     in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Would this address the concern?
>>>>>> Let me check.
>>>>> So the text in rfc6045bis seems to suggest that all server
>>>>> certificates will be verified based on some prior arrangement. Is my
>>>>> understanding correct?
>>>> Yes; in essence, a RID consortium is "closed".
>>> I think that this approach is unwise, because this wouldn't scale. But
>>> if nobody else see a problem with this, I will let it go.
>> I have a problem with it.
>>
>> Version -05 said:
>>
>>    Each RID consortium SHOULD use a trusted public key infrastructure
>>    (PKI) to manage identities for RID systems participating in TLS
>>    connections.  At minimum, each RID system MUST trust a set of X.509
>>    Issuer identities ("Certificate Authorities") [RFC5280] to directly
>>    authenticate RID system peers with which it is willing to exchange
>>    information, and/or a specific white list of X.509 Subject identities
>>    of RID system peers.
>>
>>    RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a
>>    RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by
>>    verifying the fully-qualified domain name and service name from the
>>    DNS SRV record, if available, against that stored in the certificate,
>>    as in Section 6 of [RFC6125].
>>
>> In version -06, that was replaced with:
>>
>>    Each RID system SHOULD authenticate its peers via a PKI as detailed
>>    in Section 9.3 of [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis].
>>
>> As far as I can see, a RID system is not the same as a RID consortium.
>> Even if every RID system is a member of such a consortium, it seems like
>> a bad idea to leave the authentication rules up to the consortium,
>> without providing any sort of guidance. Version -05 at least pointed to
>> RFC 6125. Since 6046bis is the HTTPS/TLS binding only, it might be more
>> appropriate to point to RFC 2818 here instead of RFC 6125, but I think
>> we need to say *something* about how authentication works (matching of
>> endpoint identities and such) instead of hoping that consortia get the
>> security right.
>
> Okay; how about the following (including Alexey's comments from the previous review, and pointing more specifically to 6125)
>
>      <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that stored
>      in the certificate presented, as in section 6 of<xref target="rfc6125"/>.
>      As RID systems are identified not by URI and RID does not use DNS SRV
>      records, they are identified solely by their DNS Domain Names; see Section
>      6.4 of<xref target="rfc6125"/>.
(I think you are saying that [using RFC 6125 terminology] DNS-IDs are 
supported, but SRV-IDs or URI-IDs aren't.)

This is better, but I think you need to say a bit more. Are CN-IDs 
allowed? Are wildcards allowed?

Another example of the document that describes
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-email-tls-certs-00

> General information on the use of PKI
>      with RID systems is detailed in Section 9.3 of<xref
>      target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>


From trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch  Mon Jan 23 06:22:46 2012
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To: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Hi, Alexey,

one more round (hopefully) :) ...

On Jan 23, 2012, at 2:19 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

>>=20
>> Okay; how about the following (including Alexey's comments from the =
previous review, and pointing more specifically to 6125)
>>=20
>>     <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against =
that stored
>>     in the certificate presented, as in section 6 of<xref =
target=3D"rfc6125"/>.
>>     As RID systems are identified not by URI and RID does not use DNS =
SRV
>>     records, they are identified solely by their DNS Domain Names; =
see Section
>>     6.4 of<xref target=3D"rfc6125"/>.
> (I think you are saying that [using RFC 6125 terminology] DNS-IDs are =
supported, but SRV-IDs or URI-IDs aren't.)

I can say that directly then.

> This is better, but I think you need to say a bit more. Are CN-IDs =
allowed? Are wildcards allowed?

Here, I'm a little unclear on the implications this has for =
implementation: is it reasonable to assume that all implementations that =
support TLS 1.1 should not require CN-IDs for backward compatibility?

> Another example of the document that describes
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-email-tls-certs-00

Thanks for the example. Here's what I've come up with for now...

    <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that =
stored
    in the certificate presented. All RID systems MUST be identified by =
a
    certificate containing a <xref target=3D"RFC5280">DNS-ID =
identifier</xref>
    as in section 6.4 of <xref target=3D"RFC6125"/>. Certificates =
identifying
    RID systems MAY additionally contain a CN-ID identifier, to allow =
backward
    compatibility with older PKI implementations. Wildcards MUST NOT =
appear in
    the DNS-ID or CN-ID of a certificate identifying a RID system. =
Additional
    general information on the use of PKI with RID systems is detailed =
in
    Section 9.3 of <xref target=3D"I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>

(The text about CN-IDs would be removed if the assumption that TLS 1.1 =
implies no need for CN-ID, as above)

Thanks,

Brian


From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Mon Jan 23 07:32:50 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 23/01/2012 14:22, Brian Trammell wrote:
> Hi, Alexey,
Hi Brian,
> one more round (hopefully) :) ...
>
> On Jan 23, 2012, at 2:19 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>
>>> Okay; how about the following (including Alexey's comments from the previous review, and pointing more specifically to 6125)
>>>
>>>      <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that stored
>>>      in the certificate presented, as in section 6 of<xref target="rfc6125"/>.
>>>      As RID systems are identified not by URI and RID does not use DNS SRV
>>>      records, they are identified solely by their DNS Domain Names; see Section
>>>      6.4 of<xref target="rfc6125"/>.
>> (I think you are saying that [using RFC 6125 terminology] DNS-IDs are supported, but SRV-IDs or URI-IDs aren't.)
> I can say that directly then.
That would be good, thanks.

>> This is better, but I think you need to say a bit more. Are CN-IDs allowed? Are wildcards allowed?
> Here, I'm a little unclear on the implications this has for implementation: is it reasonable to assume that all implementations that support TLS 1.1 should not require CN-IDs for backward compatibility?

There is no direct correlation. But you should keep away from CN-IDs in 
new protocols, if you can. RFC 6125 goes into details why CN-ID don't 
necessarily work.
In reality though, you might have to support CN-IDs if you are using 
existing Certificate Authorities, as opposed to creating your own ones.

>> Another example of the document that describes
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-email-tls-certs-00
> Thanks for the example. Here's what I've come up with for now...
>
>      <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that stored
>      in the certificate presented. All RID systems MUST be identified by a
>      certificate containing a<xref target="RFC5280">DNS-ID identifier</xref>
>      as in section 6.4 of<xref target="RFC6125"/>. Certificates identifying
>      RID systems MAY additionally contain a CN-ID identifier, to allow backward
>      compatibility with older PKI implementations. Wildcards MUST NOT appear in
>      the DNS-ID or CN-ID of a certificate identifying a RID system. Additional
>      general information on the use of PKI with RID systems is detailed in
>      Section 9.3 of<xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>
>
> (The text about CN-IDs would be removed if the assumption that TLS 1.1 implies no need for CN-ID, as above)
This looks Ok (with or without CN-ID). I am a bit undecided about CN-ID.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Brian
>


From trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch  Mon Jan 23 08:12:12 2012
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To: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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Hi, Alexey,

I can take the CN-ID question to the MILE WG on this. In any case, is it =
clear enough from this language that CN-ID is a "compatibility-only" =
feature?

Cheers,

Brian

On Jan 23, 2012, at 4:32 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> On 23/01/2012 14:22, Brian Trammell wrote:
>> Hi, Alexey,
> Hi Brian,
>> one more round (hopefully) :) ...
>>=20
>> On Jan 23, 2012, at 2:19 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>=20
>>>> Okay; how about the following (including Alexey's comments from the =
previous review, and pointing more specifically to 6125)
>>>>=20
>>>>     <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against =
that stored
>>>>     in the certificate presented, as in section 6 of<xref =
target=3D"rfc6125"/>.
>>>>     As RID systems are identified not by URI and RID does not use =
DNS SRV
>>>>     records, they are identified solely by their DNS Domain Names; =
see Section
>>>>     6.4 of<xref target=3D"rfc6125"/>.
>>> (I think you are saying that [using RFC 6125 terminology] DNS-IDs =
are supported, but SRV-IDs or URI-IDs aren't.)
>> I can say that directly then.
> That would be good, thanks.
>=20
>>> This is better, but I think you need to say a bit more. Are CN-IDs =
allowed? Are wildcards allowed?
>> Here, I'm a little unclear on the implications this has for =
implementation: is it reasonable to assume that all implementations that =
support TLS 1.1 should not require CN-IDs for backward compatibility?
>=20
> There is no direct correlation. But you should keep away from CN-IDs =
in new protocols, if you can. RFC 6125 goes into details why CN-ID don't =
necessarily work.
> In reality though, you might have to support CN-IDs if you are using =
existing Certificate Authorities, as opposed to creating your own ones.
>=20
>>> Another example of the document that describes
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-email-tls-certs-00
>> Thanks for the example. Here's what I've come up with for now...
>>=20
>>     <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against =
that stored
>>     in the certificate presented. All RID systems MUST be identified =
by a
>>     certificate containing a<xref target=3D"RFC5280">DNS-ID =
identifier</xref>
>>     as in section 6.4 of<xref target=3D"RFC6125"/>. Certificates =
identifying
>>     RID systems MAY additionally contain a CN-ID identifier, to allow =
backward
>>     compatibility with older PKI implementations. Wildcards MUST NOT =
appear in
>>     the DNS-ID or CN-ID of a certificate identifying a RID system. =
Additional
>>     general information on the use of PKI with RID systems is =
detailed in
>>     Section 9.3 of<xref target=3D"I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>
>>=20
>> (The text about CN-IDs would be removed if the assumption that TLS =
1.1 implies no need for CN-ID, as above)
> This looks Ok (with or without CN-ID). I am a bit undecided about =
CN-ID.
>>=20
>> Thanks,
>>=20
>> Brian
>>=20


From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Mon Jan 23 08:17:17 2012
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 23/01/2012 16:12, Brian Trammell wrote:
> Hi, Alexey,
Hi Brian,
> I can take the CN-ID question to the MILE WG on this.
Sounds like a good idea.
> In any case, is it clear enough from this language that CN-ID is a "compatibility-only" feature?
I think your text is clear enough.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Brian
>
> On Jan 23, 2012, at 4:32 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>
>> On 23/01/2012 14:22, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>> Hi, Alexey,
>> Hi Brian,
>>> one more round (hopefully) :) ...
>>>
>>> On Jan 23, 2012, at 2:19 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>
>>>>> Okay; how about the following (including Alexey's comments from the previous review, and pointing more specifically to 6125)
>>>>>
>>>>>      <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that stored
>>>>>      in the certificate presented, as in section 6 of<xref target="rfc6125"/>.
>>>>>      As RID systems are identified not by URI and RID does not use DNS SRV
>>>>>      records, they are identified solely by their DNS Domain Names; see Section
>>>>>      6.4 of<xref target="rfc6125"/>.
>>>> (I think you are saying that [using RFC 6125 terminology] DNS-IDs are supported, but SRV-IDs or URI-IDs aren't.)
>>> I can say that directly then.
>> That would be good, thanks.
>>
>>>> This is better, but I think you need to say a bit more. Are CN-IDs allowed? Are wildcards allowed?
>>> Here, I'm a little unclear on the implications this has for implementation: is it reasonable to assume that all implementations that support TLS 1.1 should not require CN-IDs for backward compatibility?
>> There is no direct correlation. But you should keep away from CN-IDs in new protocols, if you can. RFC 6125 goes into details why CN-ID don't necessarily work.
>> In reality though, you might have to support CN-IDs if you are using existing Certificate Authorities, as opposed to creating your own ones.
>>
>>>> Another example of the document that describes
>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-email-tls-certs-00
>>> Thanks for the example. Here's what I've come up with for now...
>>>
>>>      <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that stored
>>>      in the certificate presented. All RID systems MUST be identified by a
>>>      certificate containing a<xref target="RFC5280">DNS-ID identifier</xref>
>>>      as in section 6.4 of<xref target="RFC6125"/>. Certificates identifying
>>>      RID systems MAY additionally contain a CN-ID identifier, to allow backward
>>>      compatibility with older PKI implementations. Wildcards MUST NOT appear in
>>>      the DNS-ID or CN-ID of a certificate identifying a RID system. Additional
>>>      general information on the use of PKI with RID systems is detailed in
>>>      Section 9.3 of<xref target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>
>>>
>>> (The text about CN-IDs would be removed if the assumption that TLS 1.1 implies no need for CN-ID, as above)
>> This looks Ok (with or without CN-ID). I am a bit undecided about CN-ID.
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Brian
>>>


From ben@nostrum.com  Mon Jan 23 14:24:13 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-vbr-audio-04
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on =
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at =
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments =
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-vbr-audio-04
Reviewer: Ben Campbell
Review Date: 2012-01-23
IETF LC End Date: 2012-01-23

Summary: This draft is ready for publication as a proposed standard.

Note: I performed a gen-art review on revision 3 of this draft in a =
previous last call. My understanding is that the draft has been last =
called again due to the change from BCP to PS. I had no substantive =
concerns in that version, and see no new substantive concerns in this =
version.

Major issues: None

Minor issues: None

Nits/editorial comments:

-- The draft status still says BCP

-- section 5, 1st paragraph, 2nd to last sentence: "...but the amount of =
padding needed to hide the variation in packet size will depend on the=20=

codec), codec and the sophistication of the attacker),... "

Perhaps we should just assume the attacker is reasonably sophisticated =
by current standards? I assume you don't expect an implementer to guess =
how sophisticated a potential attack may be in advance--unless that is =
somehow a function of the value of the content?=

From martin.thomson@gmail.com  Mon Jan 23 15:52:22 2012
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Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2012 10:52:19 +1100
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Mykyta Yevstifeyev <evnikita2@gmail.com>, draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] GenART review of draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation-00
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Hi Peter,

-02 is a marked improvement over the version I reviewed.  All my concerns
were addressed.

--Martin

On Jan 18, 2012 8:14 AM, "Peter Saint-Andre" <stpeter@stpeter.im> wrote:
>
> Martin, here is my perspective...
>
> On 12/17/11 ?:46 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
> > "It is easy" is not an especially good reason.
>
> Martin, is there *harm* in completing these registrations via
> informational RFCs?

I don't find that reason any more compelling. How about: "this is the one
we chose and there isn't a good reason to choose either, so this will do"?
Which is probably what you meant anyhow...

--0015175cd13096784e04b73ab836
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<p>Hi Peter,</p>
<p>-02 is a marked improvement over the version I reviewed.=C2=A0 All my co=
ncerns were addressed.</p>
<p>--Martin</p>
<p>On Jan 18, 2012 8:14 AM, &quot;Peter Saint-Andre&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"ma=
ilto:stpeter@stpeter.im">stpeter@stpeter.im</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Martin, here is my perspective...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On 12/17/11 ?:46 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: <br>
&gt; &gt; &quot;It is easy&quot; is not an especially good reason.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Martin, is there *harm* in completing these registrations via<br>
&gt; informational RFCs?</p>
<p>I don&#39;t find that reason any more compelling. How about: &quot;this =
is the one we chose and there isn&#39;t a good reason to choose either, so =
this will do&quot;? Which is probably what you meant anyhow...<br>
</p>

--0015175cd13096784e04b73ab836--

From stpeter@stpeter.im  Mon Jan 23 15:54:28 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Mykyta Yevstifeyev <evnikita2@gmail.com>, draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] GenART review of draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation-00
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On 1/23/12 4:52 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
> Hi Peter,
> 
> -02 is a marked improvement over the version I reviewed.  All my
> concerns were addressed.
> 
> --Martin
> 
> On Jan 18, 2012 8:14 AM, "Peter Saint-Andre" <stpeter@stpeter.im
> <mailto:stpeter@stpeter.im>> wrote:
>>
>> Martin, here is my perspective...
>>
>> On 12/17/11 ?:46 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
>> > "It is easy" is not an especially good reason.
>>
>> Martin, is there *harm* in completing these registrations via
>> informational RFCs?
> 
> I don't find that reason any more compelling. How about: "this is the
> one we chose and there isn't a good reason to choose either, so this
> will do"? Which is probably what you meant anyhow...

How about: "everyone else was doing it that way so the author didn't see
a good reason to buck the trend"?




From trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch  Tue Jan 24 01:25:22 2012
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To: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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Hi, Alexey,

So far only one voice on the WG list, stating no need for CN-ID. =
However, on thinking about it a bit further, if you happen to have an =
older PKI built out, and you're still using it, you've probably got a =
large investment in it, and it probably makes sense to allow you to use =
it for RID too...

So, I'd suggest the following language to grudgingly allow such a thing:

The use of CN-ID identifiers in certificates identifying RID systems
is NOT RECOMMENDED, and CN-ID identifiers MUST be ignored by PKI
implementations which can use DNS-ID identifiers. However, CN-ID =0D
identifiers MAY be used when the RID consortium to which the system=20
belongs uses an older, existing PKI implementation.=20

Thoughts?

Thanks for all your help, and cheers,

Brian

On Jan 23, 2012, at 5:17 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:

> On 23/01/2012 16:12, Brian Trammell wrote:
>> Hi, Alexey,
> Hi Brian,
>> I can take the CN-ID question to the MILE WG on this.
> Sounds like a good idea.
>> In any case, is it clear enough from this language that CN-ID is a =
"compatibility-only" feature?
> I think your text is clear enough.
>>=20
>> Cheers,
>>=20
>> Brian
>>=20
>> On Jan 23, 2012, at 4:32 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>=20
>>> On 23/01/2012 14:22, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>> Hi, Alexey,
>>> Hi Brian,
>>>> one more round (hopefully) :) ...
>>>>=20
>>>> On Jan 23, 2012, at 2:19 PM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>>>=20
>>>>>> Okay; how about the following (including Alexey's comments from =
the previous review, and pointing more specifically to 6125)
>>>>>>=20
>>>>>>     <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers =
against that stored
>>>>>>     in the certificate presented, as in section 6 of<xref =
target=3D"rfc6125"/>.
>>>>>>     As RID systems are identified not by URI and RID does not use =
DNS SRV
>>>>>>     records, they are identified solely by their DNS Domain =
Names; see Section
>>>>>>     6.4 of<xref target=3D"rfc6125"/>.
>>>>> (I think you are saying that [using RFC 6125 terminology] DNS-IDs =
are supported, but SRV-IDs or URI-IDs aren't.)
>>>> I can say that directly then.
>>> That would be good, thanks.
>>>=20
>>>>> This is better, but I think you need to say a bit more. Are CN-IDs =
allowed? Are wildcards allowed?
>>>> Here, I'm a little unclear on the implications this has for =
implementation: is it reasonable to assume that all implementations that =
support TLS 1.1 should not require CN-IDs for backward compatibility?
>>> There is no direct correlation. But you should keep away from CN-IDs =
in new protocols, if you can. RFC 6125 goes into details why CN-ID don't =
necessarily work.
>>> In reality though, you might have to support CN-IDs if you are using =
existing Certificate Authorities, as opposed to creating your own ones.
>>>=20
>>>>> Another example of the document that describes
>>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-email-tls-certs-00
>>>> Thanks for the example. Here's what I've come up with for now...
>>>>=20
>>>>     <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against =
that stored
>>>>     in the certificate presented. All RID systems MUST be =
identified by a
>>>>     certificate containing a<xref target=3D"RFC5280">DNS-ID =
identifier</xref>
>>>>     as in section 6.4 of<xref target=3D"RFC6125"/>. Certificates =
identifying
>>>>     RID systems MAY additionally contain a CN-ID identifier, to =
allow backward
>>>>     compatibility with older PKI implementations. Wildcards MUST =
NOT appear in
>>>>     the DNS-ID or CN-ID of a certificate identifying a RID system. =
Additional
>>>>     general information on the use of PKI with RID systems is =
detailed in
>>>>     Section 9.3 of<xref target=3D"I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>
>>>>=20
>>>> (The text about CN-IDs would be removed if the assumption that TLS =
1.1 implies no need for CN-ID, as above)
>>> This looks Ok (with or without CN-ID). I am a bit undecided about =
CN-ID.
>>>> Thanks,
>>>>=20
>>>> Brian
>>>>=20


From ron.even.tlv@gmail.com  Tue Jan 24 03:17:56 2012
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From: "Roni Even" <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
To: <draft-harkins-ipsecme-spsk-auth.all@tools.ietf.org>
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2012 13:13:55 +0200
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review of draft-harkins-ipsecme-spsk-auth-06
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

 

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you
may receive.

 

Document: draft-harkins-ipsecme-spsk-auth-06

Reviewer: Roni Even

Review Date:2012-1-24

IETF LC End Date: 2012-2-14

IESG Telechat date:

 

Summary: This draft is ready for publication as an Experimental RFC.

 

Major issues:

 

 

Minor issues:

 

 

Nits/editorial comments:

 

1.       Section 2 bullet 3 "Securty"?

2.       In section 4.1 "The inverse function is defined such that the sum
of an element and  its inverse is "0":" . This looks like a zero to me and I
assume you meant the letter "o"

 

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>I am the =
assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, =
please see the FAQ at &lt;<a =
href=3D"http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq" =
target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq=
</a>&gt;.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal>Please resolve these comments along with any other =
Last Call comments you may receive.<o:p></o:p></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Document: =
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>draft-harki=
ns-ipsecme-spsk-auth-06<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Reviewer: =
Roni Even</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Review =
Date:2012&#8211;1&#8211;24<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>IETF LC =
End Date: 2012&#8211;2&#8211;14<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>IESG =
Telechat date:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Summary: =
This draft is ready for publication as an </span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Experimenta=
l </span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>RFC.<o:p></=
o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Major =
issues:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Minor =
issues:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Nits/editor=
ial comments:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo5'><![if !supportLists]><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>1.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span dir=3DLTR></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Section 2 =
bullet 3 &#8220;Securty&#8221;?<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText =
style=3D'margin-left:.5in;text-indent:-.25in;mso-list:l0 level1 =
lfo5'><![if !supportLists]><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><span =
style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>2.<span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New =
Roman"'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; =
</span></span></span><![endif]><span dir=3DLTR></span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>In section =
4.1 &#8220;The inverse function is defined such that the sum of an =
element and&nbsp; its inverse is &quot;0&quot;:&#8221; . This looks like =
a zero to me and I assume you meant the letter =
&#8220;o&#8221;<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
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From stpeter@stpeter.im  Tue Jan 24 08:45:33 2012
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Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2012 09:45:30 -0700
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 1/24/12 2:25 AM, Brian Trammell wrote:
> Hi, Alexey,
> 
> So far only one voice on the WG list, stating no need for CN-ID. However, on thinking about it a bit further, if you happen to have an older PKI built out, and you're still using it, you've probably got a large investment in it, and it probably makes sense to allow you to use it for RID too...
> 
> So, I'd suggest the following language to grudgingly allow such a thing:
> 
> The use of CN-ID identifiers in certificates identifying RID systems
> is NOT RECOMMENDED, and CN-ID identifiers MUST be ignored by PKI
> implementations which can use DNS-ID identifiers. However, CN-ID 
> identifiers MAY be used when the RID consortium to which the system 
> belongs uses an older, existing PKI implementation. 

Brian, first of all, thanks for working with us on this topic. As you
can see from the length of RFC 6125 (which didn't start out that big!),
there's more complexity here than meets the eye.

I think the mix of "NOT RECOMMENDED, MUST be ignored by some, but MAY be
used by others" might be a bit confusing to those who implement and
deploy RID. Also, RFC 6125 makes a distinction between cert generation
and cert checking, which gets obscured by the word "use". Thus I might
make the following suggestion:

   The inclusion of Common Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying
   RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.  A PKI implementation that
   understands DNS-IDs SHOULD ignore CN-IDs when checking server
   certificates. However, because many existing PKI implementations
   still include CN-IDs when generating certificates, RID consortiums
   might want to continue supporting them during certificate checking.

This removes the normative force from the text about existing PKI
implementations, while still encouraging use of DNS-IDs.

Let us know what you think.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/



From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Tue Jan 24 08:59:40 2012
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From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 24/01/2012 16:45, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> On 1/24/12 2:25 AM, Brian Trammell wrote:
>> Hi, Alexey,
>>
>> So far only one voice on the WG list, stating no need for CN-ID. However, on thinking about it a bit further, if you happen to have an older PKI built out, and you're still using it, you've probably got a large investment in it, and it probably makes sense to allow you to use it for RID too...
>>
>> So, I'd suggest the following language to grudgingly allow such a thing:
>>
>> The use of CN-ID identifiers in certificates identifying RID systems
>> is NOT RECOMMENDED, and CN-ID identifiers MUST be ignored by PKI
>> implementations which can use DNS-ID identifiers. However, CN-ID
>> identifiers MAY be used when the RID consortium to which the system
>> belongs uses an older, existing PKI implementation.
> Brian, first of all, thanks for working with us on this topic. As you
> can see from the length of RFC 6125 (which didn't start out that big!),
> there's more complexity here than meets the eye.
>
> I think the mix of "NOT RECOMMENDED, MUST be ignored by some, but MAY be
> used by others" might be a bit confusing to those who implement and
> deploy RID. Also, RFC 6125 makes a distinction between cert generation
> and cert checking, which gets obscured by the word "use". Thus I might
> make the following suggestion:
>
>     The inclusion of Common Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying
>     RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.  A PKI implementation that
>     understands DNS-IDs SHOULD ignore CN-IDs when checking server
>     certificates.
I thought RFC 6125 has a rule saying that CN-IDs are ignored in presence 
of DNS-IDs? I would just rather reference RFC 6125, or at least be clear 
that this is defined there (using "as specified in RFC 6125").

The rest of your proposal looks fine.
> However, because many existing PKI implementations
>     still include CN-IDs when generating certificates, RID consortiums
>     might want to continue supporting them during certificate checking.
>
> This removes the normative force from the text about existing PKI
> implementations, while still encouraging use of DNS-IDs.
>
> Let us know what you think.
>
> Peter
>


From stpeter@stpeter.im  Tue Jan 24 09:10:36 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 1/24/12 9:59 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> On 24/01/2012 16:45, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>> On 1/24/12 2:25 AM, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>> Hi, Alexey,
>>>
>>> So far only one voice on the WG list, stating no need for CN-ID.
>>> However, on thinking about it a bit further, if you happen to have an
>>> older PKI built out, and you're still using it, you've probably got a
>>> large investment in it, and it probably makes sense to allow you to
>>> use it for RID too...
>>>
>>> So, I'd suggest the following language to grudgingly allow such a thing:
>>>
>>> The use of CN-ID identifiers in certificates identifying RID systems
>>> is NOT RECOMMENDED, and CN-ID identifiers MUST be ignored by PKI
>>> implementations which can use DNS-ID identifiers. However, CN-ID
>>> identifiers MAY be used when the RID consortium to which the system
>>> belongs uses an older, existing PKI implementation.
>> Brian, first of all, thanks for working with us on this topic. As you
>> can see from the length of RFC 6125 (which didn't start out that big!),
>> there's more complexity here than meets the eye.
>>
>> I think the mix of "NOT RECOMMENDED, MUST be ignored by some, but MAY be
>> used by others" might be a bit confusing to those who implement and
>> deploy RID. Also, RFC 6125 makes a distinction between cert generation
>> and cert checking, which gets obscured by the word "use". Thus I might
>> make the following suggestion:
>>
>>     The inclusion of Common Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying
>>     RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.  A PKI implementation that
>>     understands DNS-IDs SHOULD ignore CN-IDs when checking server
>>     certificates.
> I thought RFC 6125 has a rule saying that CN-IDs are ignored in presence
> of DNS-IDs? I would just rather reference RFC 6125, or at least be clear
> that this is defined there (using "as specified in RFC 6125").

Yes, so you're right: just reference the rules from RFC 6125.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/



From kathleen.moriarty@emc.com  Tue Jan 24 10:00:22 2012
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From: <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>
To: <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>, <stpeter@stpeter.im>
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2012 12:59:55 -0500
Thread-Topic: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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References: <4F11E975.9070307@isode.com> <10722E0B-059E-4800-84C0-B330F397B63A@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F16D95A.3000006@isode.com> <89E47BB4-C228-4700-94C4-3F4ED03F99A2@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1704DE.1090208@isode.com> <4F170904.2000603@isode.com> <60243B0C-A3FF-4B51-AFF8-27C34158E02E@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F185391.9050005@isode.com> <4F18704B.4010309@stpeter.im> <C36BCAAE-5F03-4514-8F18-34A5476C3F8E@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D5E5A.6090505@isode.com> <5ED8B1A1-11AF-4416-9940-63C75358FFF3@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D7DA7.8060600@isode.com> <BAE06AC9-65DE-451E-8DE2-462CCC0B479C@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D8808.9090203@isode.com> <48460543-BDED-4B54-B1A7-07D210968A08@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1EE02A.5070800@stpeter.im> <4F1EE379.7080505@isode.com>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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I agree, the guidance in RFC6125 Section 2.4 is pretty clear and should jus=
t be referenced if we go this route.  I do have a question out to a practit=
ioner to see if we need to allow anything other than DNS-IDs.  She did say =
support is good in CAs, maybe it is OK to require DNS-IDs.  She will be pos=
ting to MILE later today.  Are there any CAs that do not support this yet? =
 RFC6125 says this is to support older CAs, but has this changed?  RFC6125 =
was only published in March, so it may still be important. =20

Thanks,
Kathleen

-----Original Message-----
From: gen-art-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:gen-art-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf =
Of Alexey Melnikov
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2012 12:00 PM
To: Peter Saint-Andre
Cc: gen-art@ietf.org; Moriarty, Kathleen; The IESG; Brian Trammell
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-=
bis-05

On 24/01/2012 16:45, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> On 1/24/12 2:25 AM, Brian Trammell wrote:
>> Hi, Alexey,
>>
>> So far only one voice on the WG list, stating no need for CN-ID. However=
, on thinking about it a bit further, if you happen to have an older PKI bu=
ilt out, and you're still using it, you've probably got a large investment =
in it, and it probably makes sense to allow you to use it for RID too...
>>
>> So, I'd suggest the following language to grudgingly allow such a thing:
>>
>> The use of CN-ID identifiers in certificates identifying RID systems
>> is NOT RECOMMENDED, and CN-ID identifiers MUST be ignored by PKI
>> implementations which can use DNS-ID identifiers. However, CN-ID
>> identifiers MAY be used when the RID consortium to which the system
>> belongs uses an older, existing PKI implementation.
> Brian, first of all, thanks for working with us on this topic. As you
> can see from the length of RFC 6125 (which didn't start out that big!),
> there's more complexity here than meets the eye.
>
> I think the mix of "NOT RECOMMENDED, MUST be ignored by some, but MAY be
> used by others" might be a bit confusing to those who implement and
> deploy RID. Also, RFC 6125 makes a distinction between cert generation
> and cert checking, which gets obscured by the word "use". Thus I might
> make the following suggestion:
>
>     The inclusion of Common Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying
>     RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.  A PKI implementation that
>     understands DNS-IDs SHOULD ignore CN-IDs when checking server
>     certificates.
I thought RFC 6125 has a rule saying that CN-IDs are ignored in presence=20
of DNS-IDs? I would just rather reference RFC 6125, or at least be clear=20
that this is defined there (using "as specified in RFC 6125").

The rest of your proposal looks fine.
> However, because many existing PKI implementations
>     still include CN-IDs when generating certificates, RID consortiums
>     might want to continue supporting them during certificate checking.
>
> This removes the normative force from the text about existing PKI
> implementations, while still encouraging use of DNS-IDs.
>
> Let us know what you think.
>
> Peter
>

_______________________________________________
Gen-art mailing list
Gen-art@ietf.org
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From trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch  Tue Jan 24 11:17:28 2012
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References: <4F11E975.9070307@isode.com> <10722E0B-059E-4800-84C0-B330F397B63A@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F16D95A.3000006@isode.com> <89E47BB4-C228-4700-94C4-3F4ED03F99A2@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1704DE.1090208@isode.com> <4F170904.2000603@isode.com> <60243B0C-A3FF-4B51-AFF8-27C34158E02E@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F185391.9050005@isode.com> <4F18704B.4010309@stpeter.im> <C36BCAAE-5F03-4514-8F18-34A5476C3F8E@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D5E5A.6090505@isode.com> <5ED8B1A1-11AF-4416-9940-63C75358FFF3@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D7DA7.8060600@isode.com> <BAE06AC9-65DE-451E-8DE2-462CCC0B479C@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D8808.9090203@isode.com> <48460543-BDED-4B54-B1A7-07D210968A08@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1EE02A.5070800@stpeter.im> <4F1EE379.7080505@isode.com> <4F1EE5FE.9090702@stpeter.im>
To: Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
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Hi, Peter, Alexey, all,

Thanks for the suggestion on fixing the ambiguity in "use" -- that was =
bothering me a bit, too...

Okay, so how about straight NOT RECOMMENDED, which would make the whole =
paragraph:

    <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that =
stored
    in the certificate presented. All RID systems MUST be identified by =
a
    certificate containing a <xref target=3D"RFC5280">DNS-ID =
identifier</xref>
    as in section 6.4 of <xref target=3D"RFC6125"/>. The inclusion of =
Common
    Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying RID systems is NOT =
RECOMMENDED.
    Wildcards MUST NOT appear in the DNS-ID or CN-ID of a certificate
    identifying a RID system. Additional general information on the use =
of PKI
    with RID systems is detailed in Section 9.3 of <xref
    target=3D"I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>

And we let people who really, really need to support CN-ID read between =
the lines. Thoughts?

Cheers,

Brian

On Jan 24, 2012, at 6:10 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:

> On 1/24/12 9:59 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>> On 24/01/2012 16:45, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>>> On 1/24/12 2:25 AM, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>> Hi, Alexey,
>>>>=20
>>>> So far only one voice on the WG list, stating no need for CN-ID.
>>>> However, on thinking about it a bit further, if you happen to have =
an
>>>> older PKI built out, and you're still using it, you've probably got =
a
>>>> large investment in it, and it probably makes sense to allow you to
>>>> use it for RID too...
>>>>=20
>>>> So, I'd suggest the following language to grudgingly allow such a =
thing:
>>>>=20
>>>> The use of CN-ID identifiers in certificates identifying RID =
systems
>>>> is NOT RECOMMENDED, and CN-ID identifiers MUST be ignored by PKI
>>>> implementations which can use DNS-ID identifiers. However, CN-ID
>>>> identifiers MAY be used when the RID consortium to which the system
>>>> belongs uses an older, existing PKI implementation.
>>> Brian, first of all, thanks for working with us on this topic. As =
you
>>> can see from the length of RFC 6125 (which didn't start out that =
big!),
>>> there's more complexity here than meets the eye.
>>>=20
>>> I think the mix of "NOT RECOMMENDED, MUST be ignored by some, but =
MAY be
>>> used by others" might be a bit confusing to those who implement and
>>> deploy RID. Also, RFC 6125 makes a distinction between cert =
generation
>>> and cert checking, which gets obscured by the word "use". Thus I =
might
>>> make the following suggestion:
>>>=20
>>>    The inclusion of Common Names (CN-IDs) in certificates =
identifying
>>>    RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.  A PKI implementation that
>>>    understands DNS-IDs SHOULD ignore CN-IDs when checking server
>>>    certificates.
>> I thought RFC 6125 has a rule saying that CN-IDs are ignored in =
presence
>> of DNS-IDs? I would just rather reference RFC 6125, or at least be =
clear
>> that this is defined there (using "as specified in RFC 6125").
>=20
> Yes, so you're right: just reference the rules from RFC 6125.
>=20
> Peter
>=20
> --=20
> Peter Saint-Andre
> https://stpeter.im/
>=20


From ben@nostrum.com  Tue Jan 24 13:16:27 2012
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Hi Aaron,

Based on discussion and revision 14, I think all my concerns are =
resolved save one (which I think is pretty much editorial at this =
point):

On Dec 19, 2011, at 2:46 PM, Ben Campbell wrote:

[=85]

>=20
>=20
>> =20
>> -- section 3.4.1, paragraph 5: "If a "global" command is given the =
name of a variable that has previously been defined in the immediate =
script with "set", an error MUST be generated either when the script is =
uploaded or at execution time."
>>=20
>> Does this conflict with the previous statement that it is okay for a =
global and a private variable to have the same name?
>>=20
>> It doesn't conflict, because those variables live in separate =
namespaces. The effect of the global command is to bind the two names. =
An error is generated rather than specifying if the local overwrites the =
global value, or the global overwrites the local value.
>=20
> I take this to mean you can have a global and a local variable with =
the same name, but not if they are in the same script, right? If so, =
then it would help to add that qualification to the 2nd paragraph in =
3.4. As it is, it says implementation MUST allow a global and non-global =
variable to have the same name with no interaction, and doesn't exclude =
it from happening in the same script.

I think there's still a potential confusion here. If this was addressed =
in revision 14, I missed it.

Thanks!

Ben.=

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<html><head></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; =
"><div>Hi Aaron,</div><div><br></div><div>Based on discussion and =
revision 14, I think all my concerns are resolved save one (which I =
think is pretty much editorial at this point):</div><br><div><div>On Dec =
19, 2011, at 2:46 PM, Ben Campbell =
wrote:</div><div><br></div><div>[=85]</div><br><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: =
space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><div><div><font =
class=3D"Apple-style-span" =
color=3D"#000000"><br></font></div><br><blockquote type=3D"cite"><div =
class=3D"gmail_quote">

<div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin-top: =
0px; margin-right: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; margin-left: 0.8ex; =
border-left-width: 1px; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); =
border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex; position: static; z-index: =
auto; ">
-- section 3.4.1, paragraph 5: "If a "global" command is given the name =
of a variable that has previously been defined in the immediate script =
with "set", an error MUST be generated either when the script is =
uploaded or at execution time."<br>



<br>
Does this conflict with the previous statement that it is okay for a =
global and a private variable to have the same =
name?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It doesn't conflict, because =
those variables live in separate namespaces. The effect of the global =
command is to bind the two names. An error is generated rather than =
specifying if the local overwrites the global value, or the global =
overwrites the local =
value.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I take this to mean =
you can have a global and a local variable with the same name, but not =
if they are in the same script, right? If so, then it would help to add =
that qualification to the 2nd paragraph in 3.4. As it is, it says =
implementation MUST allow a global and non-global variable to have the =
same name with no interaction, and doesn't exclude it from happening in =
the same script.</div></div></div></blockquote><br></div><div>I think =
there's still a potential confusion here. If this was addressed in =
revision 14, I missed =
it.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks!</div><div><br></div><div>Ben.</div></=
body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_78C21AAD-9F65-4D04-A206-7C0FC4E7139D--

From ben@estacado.net  Tue Jan 24 13:58:50 2012
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From: Ben Campbell <ben@estacado.net>
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To: "Henderson, Thomas R" <thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com>
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Cc: tcpm-chairs@tools.ietf.org, gurtov@ee.oulu.fi, draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc3782-bis@tools.ietf.org, floyd@acm.org, "gen-art@ietf.org Review Team" <gen-art@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>, Yoshifumi Nishida <nishida@sfc.wide.ad.jp>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] new version of draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc3782-bis posted
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(Adding Gen-ART to the CC List)

Hi Tom,

Thanks for the response. Further comments inline. I've removed sections =
that don't seem to need further comment.


On Jan 20, 2012, at 5:58 PM, Henderson, Thomas R wrote:

[=85]


>>=20
>> -- Appendix A refers the reader back to RFC 3782 for additional=20
>> information. But this draft purports to obsolete that RFC. If there =
is=20
>> important info in it that is not covered by this draft, then it=20
>> doesn't really obsolete it. Is there a reason that information was =
not=20
>> brought forward into this draft?
>=20
> This Appendix was written as a result of comments from the WG review, =
with the intention to consolidate the informational material for the =
sake of clarity.  The current version (-05) keeps this appendix as is =
since it was addressing previous WG comments.

I guess my point was not the existence of the Appendix so much as the =
references to information in an RFC to be obsoleted by this draft, where =
ever it might occur. I guess these are informational reference, so they =
are by definition not necessary to fully understand this draft.  But it =
still seems odd to me to reference information in a RFC obsoleted by =
this one, rather than pull the material forward (perhaps in an =
appendix). I tend to read "obsolete" to mean there's really no reason to =
ever read it other than historical ones. That is, for most practical =
reasons, we could pretend it no longer existed. I realize this is a =
point of process more than a content issue, so if others are okay with =
it, I will back away :-)

>=20
>>=20
>> -- There is very little 2119 normative language. On a quick scan, I=20=

>> see one capitalized SHOULD NOT and one MAY. Yet it seems like there=20=

>> are other statements that are just as important for correct behavior=20=

>> as those. For the sake of consistency, it might be easiest to just=20
>> drop
>> 2119 language entirely.
>=20
> I have followed your suggestion; the draft now says:
>=20
>  Note that this specification
>  avoids the use of the key words defined in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] since
>  it mainly provides sender-side implementation guidance for
>  performance improvement, and does not affect interoperability.
>=20

That works for me--except there's a vestigial SHOULD in section 5. (and =
a 2119 reference for the purpose of saying you aren't using it. I see =
nothing wrong with that, but it spins IDNits for a loop :-)  )

[ AD comment sections removed]





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From: "Henderson, Thomas R" <thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com>
To: "'Ben Campbell'" <ben@estacado.net>
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2012 23:29:48 -0800
Thread-Topic: new version of draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc3782-bis posted
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Ben, thanks for following up-- inline below.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ben Campbell [mailto:ben@estacado.net]
> Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2012 1:58 PM
> To: Henderson, Thomas R
> Cc: Russ Housley; David Harrington; tcpm-chairs@tools.ietf.org; draft-
> ietf-tcpm-rfc3782-bis@tools.ietf.org; The IESG; floyd@acm.org;
> Yoshifumi Nishida; gurtov@ee.oulu.fi; gen-art@ietf.org Review Team
> Subject: Re: new version of draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc3782-bis posted
>=20
> (Adding Gen-ART to the CC List)
>=20
> Hi Tom,
>=20
> Thanks for the response. Further comments inline. I've removed sections
> that don't seem to need further comment.
>=20
>=20
> On Jan 20, 2012, at 5:58 PM, Henderson, Thomas R wrote:
>=20
> [...]
>=20
>=20
> >>
> >> -- Appendix A refers the reader back to RFC 3782 for additional
> >> information. But this draft purports to obsolete that RFC. If there
> is
> >> important info in it that is not covered by this draft, then it
> >> doesn't really obsolete it. Is there a reason that information was
> not
> >> brought forward into this draft?
> >
> > This Appendix was written as a result of comments from the WG review,
> with the intention to consolidate the informational material for the
> sake of clarity.  The current version (-05) keeps this appendix as is
> since it was addressing previous WG comments.
>=20
> I guess my point was not the existence of the Appendix so much as the
> references to information in an RFC to be obsoleted by this draft,
> where ever it might occur. I guess these are informational reference,
> so they are by definition not necessary to fully understand this draft.
> But it still seems odd to me to reference information in a RFC
> obsoleted by this one, rather than pull the material forward (perhaps
> in an appendix). I tend to read "obsolete" to mean there's really no
> reason to ever read it other than historical ones. That is, for most
> practical reasons, we could pretend it no longer existed. I realize
> this is a point of process more than a content issue, so if others are
> okay with it, I will back away :-)

My interpretation was that obsolete referred to the current validity of the=
 specification aspects, but not that the obsolete RFC couldn't be referred =
to for informational purposes.=20

I don't care strongly; perhaps others could advise on a course of action he=
re.=20

>=20
> >
> >>
> >> -- There is very little 2119 normative language. On a quick scan, I
> >> see one capitalized SHOULD NOT and one MAY. Yet it seems like there
> >> are other statements that are just as important for correct behavior
> >> as those. For the sake of consistency, it might be easiest to just
> >> drop
> >> 2119 language entirely.
> >
> > I have followed your suggestion; the draft now says:
> >
> >  Note that this specification
> >  avoids the use of the key words defined in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] since
> >  it mainly provides sender-side implementation guidance for
> >  performance improvement, and does not affect interoperability.
> >
>=20
> That works for me--except there's a vestigial SHOULD in section 5. (and
> a 2119 reference for the purpose of saying you aren't using it. I see
> nothing wrong with that, but it spins IDNits for a loop :-)  )
>=20

The vestigial SHOULD is intentional; it is within a quoted sentence from RF=
C 5681 so I am hesitant to change it for the sake of making idnits happy (u=
nder the assumption that the RFC editor can later ignore this nit).

- Tom=20


From ben@estacado.net  Wed Jan 25 06:42:55 2012
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Cc: "tcpm-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <tcpm-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, "gurtov@ee.oulu.fi" <gurtov@ee.oulu.fi>, "draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc3782-bis@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc3782-bis@tools.ietf.org>, "floyd@acm.org" <floyd@acm.org>, "gen-art@ietf.org Review Team" <gen-art@ietf.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, David Harrington <ietfdbh@comcast.net>, Yoshifumi Nishida <nishida@sfc.wide.ad.jp>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] new version of draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc3782-bis posted
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On Jan 25, 2012, at 1:29 AM, Henderson, Thomas R wrote:

[=85]

>> I guess my point was not the existence of the Appendix so much as the
>> references to information in an RFC to be obsoleted by this draft,
>> where ever it might occur. I guess these are informational reference,
>> so they are by definition not necessary to fully understand this =
draft.
>> But it still seems odd to me to reference information in a RFC
>> obsoleted by this one, rather than pull the material forward (perhaps
>> in an appendix). I tend to read "obsolete" to mean there's really no
>> reason to ever read it other than historical ones. That is, for most
>> practical reasons, we could pretend it no longer existed. I realize
>> this is a point of process more than a content issue, so if others =
are
>> okay with it, I will back away :-)
>=20
> My interpretation was that obsolete referred to the current validity =
of the specification aspects, but not that the obsolete RFC couldn't be =
referred to for informational purposes.=20
>=20
> I don't care strongly; perhaps others could advise on a course of =
action here.=20
>=20


=46rom separate email, I gather the aforementioned  "others" share your =
viewpoint. So at this point I suggest leaving it as-is.

>>=20
>> That works for me--except there's a vestigial SHOULD in section 5. =
(and
>> a 2119 reference for the purpose of saying you aren't using it. I see
>> nothing wrong with that, but it spins IDNits for a loop :-)  )
>>=20
>=20
> The vestigial SHOULD is intentional; it is within a quoted sentence =
from RFC 5681 so I am hesitant to change it for the sake of making =
idnits happy (under the assumption that the RFC editor can later ignore =
this nit).
>=20

You are absolutely right--I was globally searching for 2119 words, and =
missed the context. Sorry for the confusion.




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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Mykyta Yevstifeyev <evnikita2@gmail.com>, draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] GenART review of draft-yevstifeyev-disclosure-relation-00
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On 1/23/12 4:54 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> On 1/23/12 4:52 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
>> Hi Peter,
>>
>> -02 is a marked improvement over the version I reviewed.  All my
>> concerns were addressed.
>>
>> --Martin
>>
>> On Jan 18, 2012 8:14 AM, "Peter Saint-Andre" <stpeter@stpeter.im
>> <mailto:stpeter@stpeter.im>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Martin, here is my perspective...
>>>
>>> On 12/17/11 ?:46 PM, Martin Thomson wrote:
>>>> "It is easy" is not an especially good reason.
>>>
>>> Martin, is there *harm* in completing these registrations via
>>> informational RFCs?
>>
>> I don't find that reason any more compelling. How about: "this is the
>> one we chose and there isn't a good reason to choose either, so this
>> will do"? Which is probably what you meant anyhow...
> 
> How about: "everyone else was doing it that way so the author didn't see
> a good reason to buck the trend"?

In any case, I see no reason to hold up publication of this I-D given
(1) that we have two other I-Ds taking the same path and (2) you said:

"-02 is a marked improvement over the version I reviewed.  All my
concerns were addressed."

I'm going to ask Russ to clear his DISCUSS.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://stpeter.im/



From stpeter@stpeter.im  Wed Jan 25 15:18:00 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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For greater clarity, I'd change "as in section 6.4" to "as defined in
section 6.4" -- "as in" sounds like section 6.4 is one possible way
you'd define the term. :)

Thanks!

Peter

On 1/24/12 12:17 PM, Brian Trammell wrote:
> Hi, Peter, Alexey, all,
> 
> Thanks for the suggestion on fixing the ambiguity in "use" -- that was bothering me a bit, too...
> 
> Okay, so how about straight NOT RECOMMENDED, which would make the whole paragraph:
> 
>     <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that stored
>     in the certificate presented. All RID systems MUST be identified by a
>     certificate containing a <xref target="RFC5280">DNS-ID identifier</xref>
>     as in section 6.4 of <xref target="RFC6125"/>. The inclusion of Common
>     Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.
>     Wildcards MUST NOT appear in the DNS-ID or CN-ID of a certificate
>     identifying a RID system. Additional general information on the use of PKI
>     with RID systems is detailed in Section 9.3 of <xref
>     target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>
> 
> And we let people who really, really need to support CN-ID read between the lines. Thoughts?
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Brian
> 
> On Jan 24, 2012, at 6:10 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
> 
>> On 1/24/12 9:59 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>> On 24/01/2012 16:45, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>>>> On 1/24/12 2:25 AM, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>>> Hi, Alexey,
>>>>>
>>>>> So far only one voice on the WG list, stating no need for CN-ID.
>>>>> However, on thinking about it a bit further, if you happen to have an
>>>>> older PKI built out, and you're still using it, you've probably got a
>>>>> large investment in it, and it probably makes sense to allow you to
>>>>> use it for RID too...
>>>>>
>>>>> So, I'd suggest the following language to grudgingly allow such a thing:
>>>>>
>>>>> The use of CN-ID identifiers in certificates identifying RID systems
>>>>> is NOT RECOMMENDED, and CN-ID identifiers MUST be ignored by PKI
>>>>> implementations which can use DNS-ID identifiers. However, CN-ID
>>>>> identifiers MAY be used when the RID consortium to which the system
>>>>> belongs uses an older, existing PKI implementation.
>>>> Brian, first of all, thanks for working with us on this topic. As you
>>>> can see from the length of RFC 6125 (which didn't start out that big!),
>>>> there's more complexity here than meets the eye.
>>>>
>>>> I think the mix of "NOT RECOMMENDED, MUST be ignored by some, but MAY be
>>>> used by others" might be a bit confusing to those who implement and
>>>> deploy RID. Also, RFC 6125 makes a distinction between cert generation
>>>> and cert checking, which gets obscured by the word "use". Thus I might
>>>> make the following suggestion:
>>>>
>>>>    The inclusion of Common Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying
>>>>    RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.  A PKI implementation that
>>>>    understands DNS-IDs SHOULD ignore CN-IDs when checking server
>>>>    certificates.
>>> I thought RFC 6125 has a rule saying that CN-IDs are ignored in presence
>>> of DNS-IDs? I would just rather reference RFC 6125, or at least be clear
>>> that this is defined there (using "as specified in RFC 6125").

From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Thu Jan 26 11:02:53 2012
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To: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
References: <4F11E975.9070307@isode.com> <10722E0B-059E-4800-84C0-B330F397B63A@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F16D95A.3000006@isode.com> <89E47BB4-C228-4700-94C4-3F4ED03F99A2@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1704DE.1090208@isode.com> <4F170904.2000603@isode.com> <60243B0C-A3FF-4B51-AFF8-27C34158E02E@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F185391.9050005@isode.com> <4F18704B.4010309@stpeter.im> <C36BCAAE-5F03-4514-8F18-34A5476C3F8E@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D5E5A.6090505@isode.com> <5ED8B1A1-11AF-4416-9940-63C75358FFF3@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D7DA7.8060600@isode.com> <BAE06AC9-65DE-451E-8DE2-462CCC0B479C@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1D8808.9090203@isode.com> <48460543-BDED-4B54-B1A7-07D210968A08@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <4F1EE02A.5070800@stpeter.im> <4F1EE379.7080505@isode.com> <4F1EE5FE.9090702@stpeter.im> <D2D1AC5F-6510-4AD8-A7C0-EF9FDB018774@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty@emc.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, Peter Saint-Andre <stpeter@stpeter.im>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART last call review of draft-ietf-mile-rfc6046-bis-05
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On 24/01/2012 19:17, Brian Trammell wrote:
> Hi, Peter, Alexey, all,
Hi Brian,
> Thanks for the suggestion on fixing the ambiguity in "use" -- that was bothering me a bit, too...
>
> Okay, so how about straight NOT RECOMMENDED, which would make the whole paragraph:
>
>      <t>RID systems MUST verify the identity of their peers against that stored
>      in the certificate presented. All RID systems MUST be identified by a
>      certificate containing a<xref target="RFC5280">DNS-ID identifier</xref>
>      as in section 6.4 of<xref target="RFC6125"/>. The inclusion of Common
>      Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.
>      Wildcards MUST NOT appear in the DNS-ID or CN-ID of a certificate
>      identifying a RID system. Additional general information on the use of PKI
>      with RID systems is detailed in Section 9.3 of<xref
>      target="I-D.ietf-mile-rfc6045-bis"/>.</t>
>
> And we let people who really, really need to support CN-ID read between the lines. Thoughts?
Your text basically says that DNS-ID are mandatory to include and use. 
RFC 6125 requires for DNS-ID to take precedence over CN-ID, if both are 
present. I don't think this leave any space for older PKI systems that 
only include CN-IDs. If you want to allow for them, I think you need to 
make the requirement on having DNS-ID a SHOULD (for example. Other ways 
might be possible.)

But otherwise I am Ok with your text.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Brian
>
> On Jan 24, 2012, at 6:10 PM, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>
>> On 1/24/12 9:59 AM, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
>>> On 24/01/2012 16:45, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
>>>> On 1/24/12 2:25 AM, Brian Trammell wrote:
>>>>> Hi, Alexey,
>>>>>
>>>>> So far only one voice on the WG list, stating no need for CN-ID.
>>>>> However, on thinking about it a bit further, if you happen to have an
>>>>> older PKI built out, and you're still using it, you've probably got a
>>>>> large investment in it, and it probably makes sense to allow you to
>>>>> use it for RID too...
>>>>>
>>>>> So, I'd suggest the following language to grudgingly allow such a thing:
>>>>>
>>>>> The use of CN-ID identifiers in certificates identifying RID systems
>>>>> is NOT RECOMMENDED, and CN-ID identifiers MUST be ignored by PKI
>>>>> implementations which can use DNS-ID identifiers. However, CN-ID
>>>>> identifiers MAY be used when the RID consortium to which the system
>>>>> belongs uses an older, existing PKI implementation.
>>>> Brian, first of all, thanks for working with us on this topic. As you
>>>> can see from the length of RFC 6125 (which didn't start out that big!),
>>>> there's more complexity here than meets the eye.
>>>>
>>>> I think the mix of "NOT RECOMMENDED, MUST be ignored by some, but MAY be
>>>> used by others" might be a bit confusing to those who implement and
>>>> deploy RID. Also, RFC 6125 makes a distinction between cert generation
>>>> and cert checking, which gets obscured by the word "use". Thus I might
>>>> make the following suggestion:
>>>>
>>>>     The inclusion of Common Names (CN-IDs) in certificates identifying
>>>>     RID systems is NOT RECOMMENDED.  A PKI implementation that
>>>>     understands DNS-IDs SHOULD ignore CN-IDs when checking server
>>>>     certificates.
>>> I thought RFC 6125 has a rule saying that CN-IDs are ignored in presence
>>> of DNS-IDs? I would just rather reference RFC 6125, or at least be clear
>>> that this is defined there (using "as specified in RFC 6125").
>> Yes, so you're right: just reference the rules from RFC 6125.
>>
>> Peter
>>
>> -- 
>> Peter Saint-Andre
>> https://stpeter.im/
>>


From rbarnes@bbn.com  Thu Jan 26 13:11:46 2012
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on=20
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at=20
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments=20
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-payload-rtp-klv-02
Reviewer: Richard Barnes
Review Date: 26 Jan 2011
IETF LC End Date: 27 Jan 2011
IESG Telechat date: (if known) -

Summary:=20
Mostly ready, with a couple of minor comments

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D MINOR =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

Section 6.1.: Given that the KLV format can carry a variety of data =
types, would it be helpful for this type to have one or more parameters =
to describe what types of KLVs might be in the stream?

Section 8, "appropriate caution and security practices": It could be =
helpful to note here that it is dangerous for implementations to accept =
active content from streams that lack authenticity or integrity =
protection, since this could make them vulnerable to attacks using =
spoofed packets.


=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D EDITORIAL =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

Section 4: It would be helpful to note a little more explicitly that a =
KLVunit is a sequence of KLVs, without any overall framing (thus the =
requirement for the marker bit / timestamp to distinguish).

Section 4.2., last paragraph: It would be helpful to note explicitly =
what this paragraph implies: A receiver MUST consider a KLV unit to be =
completed when it receives either a packet with m=3D1 or a packet with a =
new timestamp.  In the former case, the packet payload is included in =
the KLVunit; in the latter case, it is not.

Section 4.3.1.1., "are left to each implementation": It could be helpful =
to point to some ways that KLV recovery is done, as guidance to =
implementors. (Provided this can be done without IPR concerns.)

Section 8, "The main security considerations ... alternatives may =
exist": This chunk of text doesn't really add anything beyond the normal =
security considerations for RTP.  Suggest just adding an appropriate =
reference to standard RTP security practices.

Section 8, "Receivers are encouraged to place limits...": Suggest =
changing "are encouraged to" to "SHOULD".



From mahoney@nostrum.com  Thu Jan 26 15:07:16 2012
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Hi all,

Here's the link to the new LC assignments:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/reviewers-120126-lc.html

The assignments are captured in the spreadsheets:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art.html
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And I have made the assignments in the review tool:
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The standard template is included below.

Thanks,

Jean

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Document:
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Major issues:

Minor issues:

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From mahoney@nostrum.com  Thu Jan 26 15:18:28 2012
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Hi all,

Assignments for the telechat can be found here:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/reviewers-120202-telechat.html

With the updated spreadsheets:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art.html
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/dav/genart/gen-art-by-reviewer.html

I've also updated the review tool:
http://art.tools.ietf.org/tools/art/genart/

For your convenience, the review boilerplate template is included below.

Note that reviews should ideally be posted to the gen-art mailing list
by COB on Tuesday:
http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/

Jean

-------------------------------------------------------------------

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Document:
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Summary:

Major issues:

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Nits/editorial comments:

From jmh@joelhalpern.com  Thu Jan 26 15:19:30 2012
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Subject: [Gen-art]   Review: draft-ietf-sieve-convert-06
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-sieve-convert-06
     Sieve Extension for Converting Messages Before Delivery
Reviewer: Joel M. Halpern
Review Date: 26-Jan-2012
IETF LC End Date: 8-Feb-2012
IESG Telechat date: ?

Summary: This document is still ready for publication as a Proposed Standard

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From Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr  Fri Jan 27 04:18:51 2012
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From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>
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In-reply-to: Your message of Fri, 27 Jan 2012 09:23:16 +0100. <7AAF5787-51FA-4046-93CA-50CA23E65E09@nic.cz> 
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 In your previous mail you wrote:

>  > Minor issues: not a real issue but I am not convinced there is a real
>  > crypto reason to give up SHA-1. At the first view the attack against
>  > SSHFP is a pre-image one, but:
>  > - I leave the question to cryptographers of the security directorate
>  > - there are many not-crypto reasons to move from SHA-1 to SHA-256
>  
>  Hi,
>  
>  I have added some text there:
>  
>            ECDSA public key fingerprints MUST use the SHA-256 algorithm
>            for the fingerprint as using the SHA-1 algorithm would
>            weaken the security of the key, which itself can use only
>            SHA-2 family of algorithms RFC 5656 (Section 3.1.1).

=> I am afraid it is another not-crypto reason...

>  But I am also not a cryptographer,

=> I am not a cryptographer too (I just worked with cryptographers,
military cryptographers exactly, i.e., the worst kind of
cryptographers :-)

>  so it's just my guts telling me
>  that if a key is allowed to use only SHA-2, we should keep it in sync
>  here.

=> the 2 ideas are:
 - keep the requirement (i.e., it is the right one and even there could
  be no good crypto reasons)
 - get a wording for the justification which doesn't make cryptographers
  too unhappy (they won't be really happy anyway: this is a part of
  being cryptographers :-)

Of course for the second part the best should be to get a feedback
from the crypto (oops, the security) directorate.

Thanks

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

From ondrej.sury@nic.cz  Fri Jan 27 00:23:18 2012
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Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, draft-os-ietf-sshfp-ecdsa-sha2.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] review of draft-os-ietf-sshfp-ecdsa-sha2-04.txt
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On 15. 12. 2011, at 17:39, Francis Dupont wrote:

> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on=20=

> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at=20
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>=20
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments=20=

> you may receive.
>=20
> Document: draft-os-ietf-sshfp-ecdsa-sha2-04.txt
> Reviewer: Francis Dupont
> Review Date: 20111210
> IETF LC End Date: 20120103
> IESG Telechat date: unknown
>=20
> Summary: Ready
>=20
> Major issues: None
>=20
> Minor issues: not a real issue but I am not convinced there is a real
> crypto reason to give up SHA-1. At the first view the attack against
> SSHFP is a pre-image one, but:
> - I leave the question to cryptographers of the security directorate
> - there are many not-crypto reasons to move from SHA-1 to SHA-256

Hi,

I have added some text there:

          ECDSA public key fingerprints MUST use the SHA-256 algorithm
          for the fingerprint as using the SHA-1 algorithm would
          weaken the security of the key, which itself can use only
          SHA-2 family of algorithms RFC 5656 (Section 3.1.1).

But I am also not a cryptographer, so it's just my guts telling me
that if a key is allowed to use only SHA-2, we should keep it in sync
here.

> - IMHO the 'OpenSSH' format is just the PEM format

I have added a reference to RFC 4716 there.

> - 3.2.1 page 4: this is the MUST I am not convinced by the =
justification
> (BTW I suggest to fix the justification if it is too wrong, and
>  to keep the MUST)

Well, I don't think I have received secdir review, I'll solve it there
if you don't mind.

> - 7 page 8: BTW I like the disclaimer:
>   ... Regardless of whether or not the attacks on SHA-1 will
>   affect SSHFP, it is believed (at the time of this writing) that SHA-
>   256 is the better choice for use in SSHFP records.

Well, thanks goes to authors of RFC 5702 :)

> [...]
All your other comments not mentioned here are fixed.

--
 Ond=C5=99ej Sur=C3=BD
 vedouc=C3=AD v=C3=BDzkumu/Head of R&D department
 -------------------------------------------
 CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laborato=C5=99e CZ.NIC
 Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
 mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
 tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
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Subject: [Gen-art] Updated draft-os-ietf-sshfp-ecdsa-sha2-06.txt
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Hi,

since I have received many comments about this block:
>>           ECDSA public key fingerprints MUST use the SHA-256 =
algorithm
>>           for the fingerprint as using the SHA-1 algorithm would
>>           weaken the security of the key, which itself can use only
>>           SHA-2 family of algorithms RFC 5656 (Section 3.1.1).


I have removed it from the draft version -06 and kept only the part in
Implementation Considerations:

4.1.  Support for SHA-256 fingerprints

   SSHFP-aware Secure Shell implementations SHOULD support the SHA-256
   fingerprints for verification of the public key.  Secure Shell
   implementations which support SHA-256 fingerprints MUST prefer a SHA-
   256 fingerprint over SHA-1 if both are available for a server.  If
   the SHA-256 fingerprint is tested and does not match the key SSH
   public key received from the SSH server key, then the key MUST be
   rejected rather than testing the alternative SHA-1 fingerprint.

and Security Considerations

   Users of SSHFP are encouraged to deploy SHA-256 as soon as
   implementations allow for it.  SHA-2 family of algorithms is widely
   believed to be more resilient to attack than SHA-1, and confidence in
   SHA-1's strength is being eroded by recently announced attacks [IACR
   2007/474].  Regardless of whether or not the attacks on SHA-1 will
   affect SSHFP, it is believed (at the time of this writing) that SHA-
   256 is the better choice for use in SSHFP records.

I believe that now all concerns are solved, but I haven't got the review
from secdir yet.

O.
--
 Ond=C5=99ej Sur=C3=BD
 vedouc=C3=AD v=C3=BDzkumu/Head of R&D department
 -------------------------------------------
 CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o.    --    Laborato=C5=99e CZ.NIC
 Americka 23, 120 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic
 mailto:ondrej.sury@nic.cz    http://nic.cz/
 tel:+420.222745110       fax:+420.222745112
 -------------------------------------------


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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you
may receive.

 

Document: draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-04

Reviewer: Roni Even

Review Date:2012-1-29

IETF LC End Date: 2012-2-7

IESG Telechat date:

 

Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as an Informational RFC.

 

Major issues:

 

The first IANA action is to update
http://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.txt which requires
standard action for adding values.

 

 

Minor issues:

The important note in section 6 talks about the values in the examples. I am
wondering why not update the document with the correct values after the IANA
assignments by the RFC editor.

 

Nits/editorial comments:

 

 


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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue =
vlink=3Dpurple><div class=3DWordSection1><p class=3DMsoNormal>I am the =
assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-ART, =
please see the FAQ at &lt;<a =
href=3D"http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq" =
target=3D"_blank">http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq=
</a>&gt;.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoNormal>Please resolve these =
comments along with any other Last Call comments you may =
receive.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Document: =
</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>draft-ietf-=
dnsext-ecdsa-04<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Reviewer: =
Roni Even<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Review =
Date:2012&#8211;1&#8211;29<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>IETF LC =
End Date: 2012&#8211;2&#8211;7<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>IESG =
Telechat date:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Summary: =
This draft is almost ready for publication as an </span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Information=
al RFC</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Major =
issues:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>The first =
IANA action is to update</span> <a =
href=3D"http://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.txt">http=
://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.txt</a> <span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>which =
requires standard action for adding values.</span><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p></o:p>=
</span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Minor =
issues:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>The =
important note in section 6 talks about the values in the examples. I am =
wondering why not update the document with the correct values after the =
IANA assignments by the RFC editor.<o:p></o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'>Nits/editor=
ial comments:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=3DMsoPlainText><span =
style=3D'font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"'><o:p>&nbsp;=
</o:p></span></p><p =
class=3DMsoNormal><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p></div></body></html>
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Subject: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on 
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments 
you may receive.

Document: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt
Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
Review Date: 29 Jan 2012
IETF LC End Date: 7 Feb 2012
IESG Telechat date: (if known) -

Summary: Mostly ready, with a couple of things that should be addressed.

Major Issues:

I have 2 issues in section 3:

3.  The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field

    If the protected resource request does not include authentication
    credentials or does not contain an access token that enables access
    to the protected resource, the resource server MUST include the HTTP
    "WWW-Authenticate" response header field; it MAY include it in
    response to other conditions as well.  The "WWW-Authenticate" header
    field uses the framework defined by HTTP/1.1, Part 7
    [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth] as follows:

    challenge       = "Bearer" [ 1*SP 1#param ]

    param           = realm / scope /
                      error / error-desc / error-uri /
                      auth-param

    scope           = "scope" "=" quoted-string
    error           = "error" "=" quoted-string
    error-desc      = "error_description" "=" quoted-string
    error-uri       = "error_uri" "=" quoted-string

1). I am agreeing with Julian about redefinition of ABNF from HTTPBis 
documents. I believe there is a proposal to fix that but the new draft 
hasn't been posted yet.

2). My 2nd major issue is about the following paragraph:

    The "scope" attribute is a space-delimited list of scope values
    indicating the required scope of the access token for accessing the
    requested resource.  In some cases, the "scope" value will be used
    when requesting a new access token with sufficient scope of access to
    utilize the protected resource.  The "scope" attribute MUST NOT
    appear more than once.  The "scope" value is intended for
    programmatic use and is not meant to be displayed to end users.

I don't think this provide enough information about what this is,
how it is to be used and which values are allowed. As this is not meant 
to be displayed to end users, then you need to say what values are 
allowed and which entity can allocate them. Is there a registry for 
these tokens, e.g. an IANA registry?


Minor Issues:

1).
2.2.  Form-Encoded Body Parameter

    When sending the access token in the HTTP request entity-body, the
    client adds the access token to the request body using the
    "access_token" parameter.  The client MUST NOT use this method unless
    all of the following conditions are met:

    o  The HTTP request entity-body is single-part.

    o  The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
       "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
       HTML 4.01 [W3C.REC-html401-19991224].

    o  The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type" header
       field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".

I would combine the first and the third bullet into a single statement,
because they seem to be a bit confusing while being read separately.
(I.e., is it possible to have Content-Type of 
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" with something which is multipart?)

2).
Section "3.1.  Error Codes"

I recommend creating an IANA registry for these or explain why one is 
not needed.

3).
4.2.  Threat Mitigation

    To protect against token disclosure, confidentiality protection MUST
    be applied using TLS [RFC5246] with a ciphersuite that provides
    confidentiality and integrity protection.  This requires that the
    communication interaction between the client and the authorization
    server, as well as the interaction between the client and the
    resource server, utilize confidentiality and integrity protection.
    Since TLS is mandatory to implement and to use with this
    specification, it is the preferred approach for preventing token
    disclosure via the communication channel.  For those cases where the
    client is prevented from observing the contents of the token, token
    encryption MUST be applied in addition to the usage of TLS
    protection.  As a further defense against token disclosure, the
    client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making requests
    to protected resources.

and

    To deal with token capture and replay, the following recommendations
    are made: First, the lifetime of the token MUST be limited; one means
    of achieving this is by putting a validity time field inside the
    protected part of the token.  Note that using short-lived (one hour
    or less) tokens reduces the impact of them being leaked.  Second,
    confidentiality protection of the exchanges between the client and
    the authorization server and between the client and the resource
    server MUST be applied.  As a consequence, no eavesdropper along the
    communication path is able to observe the token exchange.
    Consequently, such an on-path adversary cannot replay the token.
    Furthermore, when presenting the token to a resource server, the
    client MUST verify the identity of that resource server, as per
    Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service
    Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)
    Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
    [RFC6125].

Firstly, I would move the RFC 6125 reference to the first paragraph 
quoted above (but see below). Secondly, you should either normatively 
reference RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS) instead of RFC 6125, or you need to 
provide more information about how RFC 6125 is to be used, because it 
has several options which need to be described (use of SRV-IDs, URI-IDs, 
DNS-IDs, use of wildcards). I suspect you should just reference RFC 2818.


Nits:

2.2.  Form-Encoded Body Parameter

    o  The content to be encoded in the entity-body MUST consist entirely
       of ASCII characters.

ASCII needs a reference.


ID-nits reports:

   == The document seems to lack the recommended RFC 2119 boilerplate, 
even if
      it appears to use RFC 2119 keywords -- however, there's a 
paragraph with
      a matching beginning. Boilerplate error?

      (The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the
      ID-Checklist requires).
   == Using lowercase 'not' together with uppercase 'MUST', 'SHALL', 
'SHOULD',
      or 'RECOMMENDED' is not an accepted usage according to RFC 2119. 
Please
      use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is 
what you
      mean).

and:

      Found 'MUST not' in this paragraph:

      o  Stated that bearer tokens MUST not be stored in cookies that can
      be sent in the clear in the Threat Mitigation section.

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From Michael.Jones@microsoft.com  Sun Jan 29 21:20:32 2012
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From: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones@microsoft.com>
To: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>, General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, IETF-Discussion Discussion <ietf@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer.all@tools.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt
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Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 05:20:15 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt
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Thanks for your useful feedback, Alexey.  Below, I'll respond to each of yo=
ur comments.  I've also added the OAuth working group to the thread, so the=
y are aware of them as well and can participate in the discussion.

About your first issue with the WWW-Authenticate ABNF, I am already working=
 with Julian, Mark Nottingham, and the chairs to resolve this issue.  Expec=
t to see a proposal for review by the working group shortly.

About your comments on scope:  OAuth 2.0 (both the Core and Bearer specs) i=
s designed to be deployed in diverse and non-interoperable application cont=
exts, meeting a variety of application needs.  In those various settings, w=
hich are often distinct and potentially non-interoperable, parameters such =
as scope, realm, etc. may have very different meanings.  This is not a bug;=
 it is a feature, because it allows the OAuth pattern to meet the needs of =
numerous, often distinct, application environments.  For that reason, a reg=
istry of scope (or realm) parameters would be ill-advised and counterproduc=
tive.  It's perfectly OK and expected for a scope value such as "email" to =
have one meaning in one application context and a different meaning in a di=
fferent, but distinct application context.  Trying to impose a single meani=
ng on particular scope values across distinct application contexts is both =
unnecessary and could break many existing deployments.  That being said, we=
 fully expect interoperability profiles to emerge that define interoperable=
 sets of scope values within particular application contexts.  (The OpenID =
Connect specifications are one such set of profiles.)  But these meanings w=
ill always be context-specific - not global in scope.

About your first minor issue, I'll reorder the bullets so the statement abo=
ut the entity-body being single part is followed by the statement about it =
using application/x-www-form-urlencoded, so they will be read together.

About your second minor issue on error codes, the error codes registry alre=
ady exists, but is in the OAuth Core spec.  See http://tools.ietf.org/html/=
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23#section-11.4.

About your third minor issue on RFC 6125 versus RFC 2818, you'll find that,=
 per the history entries, a previous reference to RFC 2818 was changed to R=
FC 6125 in draft 14 at the request of Security Area Director Stephen Farrel=
l.  If you'd like to see this reference reintroduced, I'd request that you =
work with Stephen on specific alternative proposed wording that is acceptab=
le to both of you.

Finally, I'll address both of your nits in the manner you suggested.

				Thanks again,
				-- Mike

-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ietf-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Ale=
xey Melnikov
Sent: Sunday, January 29, 2012 8:38 AM
To: General Area Review Team; IETF-Discussion Discussion; draft-ietf-oauth-=
v2-bearer.all@tools.ietf.org
Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Gen-AR=
T, please see the FAQ at <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/Gen=
Artfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you m=
ay receive.

Document: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt
Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
Review Date: 29 Jan 2012
IETF LC End Date: 7 Feb 2012
IESG Telechat date: (if known) -

Summary: Mostly ready, with a couple of things that should be addressed.

Major Issues:

I have 2 issues in section 3:

3.  The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field

    If the protected resource request does not include authentication
    credentials or does not contain an access token that enables access
    to the protected resource, the resource server MUST include the HTTP
    "WWW-Authenticate" response header field; it MAY include it in
    response to other conditions as well.  The "WWW-Authenticate" header
    field uses the framework defined by HTTP/1.1, Part 7
    [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth] as follows:

    challenge       =3D "Bearer" [ 1*SP 1#param ]

    param           =3D realm / scope /
                      error / error-desc / error-uri /
                      auth-param

    scope           =3D "scope" "=3D" quoted-string
    error           =3D "error" "=3D" quoted-string
    error-desc      =3D "error_description" "=3D" quoted-string
    error-uri       =3D "error_uri" "=3D" quoted-string

1). I am agreeing with Julian about redefinition of ABNF from HTTPBis docum=
ents. I believe there is a proposal to fix that but the new draft hasn't be=
en posted yet.

2). My 2nd major issue is about the following paragraph:

    The "scope" attribute is a space-delimited list of scope values
    indicating the required scope of the access token for accessing the
    requested resource.  In some cases, the "scope" value will be used
    when requesting a new access token with sufficient scope of access to
    utilize the protected resource.  The "scope" attribute MUST NOT
    appear more than once.  The "scope" value is intended for
    programmatic use and is not meant to be displayed to end users.

I don't think this provide enough information about what this is, how it is=
 to be used and which values are allowed. As this is not meant to be displa=
yed to end users, then you need to say what values are allowed and which en=
tity can allocate them. Is there a registry for these tokens, e.g. an IANA =
registry?


Minor Issues:

1).
2.2.  Form-Encoded Body Parameter

    When sending the access token in the HTTP request entity-body, the
    client adds the access token to the request body using the
    "access_token" parameter.  The client MUST NOT use this method unless
    all of the following conditions are met:

    o  The HTTP request entity-body is single-part.

    o  The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
       "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
       HTML 4.01 [W3C.REC-html401-19991224].

    o  The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type" header
       field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".

I would combine the first and the third bullet into a single statement, bec=
ause they seem to be a bit confusing while being read separately.
(I.e., is it possible to have Content-Type of "application/x-www-form-urlen=
coded" with something which is multipart?)

2).
Section "3.1.  Error Codes"

I recommend creating an IANA registry for these or explain why one is not n=
eeded.

3).
4.2.  Threat Mitigation

    To protect against token disclosure, confidentiality protection MUST
    be applied using TLS [RFC5246] with a ciphersuite that provides
    confidentiality and integrity protection.  This requires that the
    communication interaction between the client and the authorization
    server, as well as the interaction between the client and the
    resource server, utilize confidentiality and integrity protection.
    Since TLS is mandatory to implement and to use with this
    specification, it is the preferred approach for preventing token
    disclosure via the communication channel.  For those cases where the
    client is prevented from observing the contents of the token, token
    encryption MUST be applied in addition to the usage of TLS
    protection.  As a further defense against token disclosure, the
    client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making requests
    to protected resources.

and

    To deal with token capture and replay, the following recommendations
    are made: First, the lifetime of the token MUST be limited; one means
    of achieving this is by putting a validity time field inside the
    protected part of the token.  Note that using short-lived (one hour
    or less) tokens reduces the impact of them being leaked.  Second,
    confidentiality protection of the exchanges between the client and
    the authorization server and between the client and the resource
    server MUST be applied.  As a consequence, no eavesdropper along the
    communication path is able to observe the token exchange.
    Consequently, such an on-path adversary cannot replay the token.
    Furthermore, when presenting the token to a resource server, the
    client MUST verify the identity of that resource server, as per
    Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service
    Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)
    Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
    [RFC6125].

Firstly, I would move the RFC 6125 reference to the first paragraph quoted =
above (but see below). Secondly, you should either normatively reference RF=
C 2818 (HTTP over TLS) instead of RFC 6125, or you need to provide more inf=
ormation about how RFC 6125 is to be used, because it has several options w=
hich need to be described (use of SRV-IDs, URI-IDs, DNS-IDs, use of wildcar=
ds). I suspect you should just reference RFC 2818.


Nits:

2.2.  Form-Encoded Body Parameter

    o  The content to be encoded in the entity-body MUST consist entirely
       of ASCII characters.

ASCII needs a reference.


ID-nits reports:

   =3D=3D The document seems to lack the recommended RFC 2119 boilerplate, =
even if
      it appears to use RFC 2119 keywords -- however, there's a paragraph w=
ith
      a matching beginning. Boilerplate error?

      (The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the
      ID-Checklist requires).
   =3D=3D Using lowercase 'not' together with uppercase 'MUST', 'SHALL', 'S=
HOULD',
      or 'RECOMMENDED' is not an accepted usage according to RFC 2119.=20
Please
      use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is what =
you
      mean).

and:

      Found 'MUST not' in this paragraph:

      o  Stated that bearer tokens MUST not be stored in cookies that can
      be sent in the clear in the Threat Mitigation section.
_______________________________________________
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From ogud@ogud.com  Mon Jan 30 13:53:48 2012
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Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 16:53:25 -0500
From: Olafur Gudmundsson <ogud@ogud.com>
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART LC review of draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-04
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On 29/01/2012 11:12, Roni Even wrote:
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
> Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
> <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
>
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
> you may receive.
>
> Document: draft-ietf-dnsext-ecdsa-04
>
> Reviewer: Roni Even
>
> Review Date:2012𢴐9
>
> IETF LC End Date: 2012𣈁
>
> IESG Telechat date:
>
> Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as an Informational RFC.
>
> Major issues:
>
> The first IANA action is to update
> http://www.iana.org/assignments/ds-rr-types/ds-rr-types.txt which
> requires standard action for adding values.
>

Grrrrrr, my fault, overlooked that the editors put this text in the
header of the document.
WG LC was for standards track document.

Please treat this document as standards track.

> Minor issues:
>
> The important note in section 6 talks about the values in the examples.
> I am wondering why not update the document with the correct values after
> the IANA assignments by the RFC editor.

Yes, once we have the IANA assigned values we will furnish the 
RFC-editor with better examples.


>
> Nits/editorial comments:
>
>
>
thanks for the review

	Olafur (document pusher)

From martin.thomson@gmail.com  Mon Jan 30 17:00:48 2012
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Subject: Re: [Gen-art] GenART Review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-mib-management-overview-05
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Hi Dan,

Looks good to me.  -06 is good to go from my perspective.

--Martin

On 30 January 2012 13:37, Daniel King <daniel@olddog.co.uk> wrote:
>
> Dear Martin,
>
> Thank you for your review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-mib-management-overview-0=
5. We have endeavoured to address your comments in our new version (06 atta=
ched). The comments that had specific actions or required updates are summa=
rised below. If you can email me (us) back to let us know you are happy or =
unhappy with our updates it would be appreciated.
>
> MT =E2=80=93 Comment 1: It's probably OK for an audience of MPLS & networ=
k management experts, but this document relies heavily on assumed knowledge=
.=C2=A0 I found this draft to be nigh on indecipherable.=C2=A0 I have no te=
chnical comments for that reason.
>
> DK: Ok.
>
> MT =E2=80=93 =C2=A0Comment 2: Reading through the introduction and gap an=
alysis, it seemed like the intent of the draft is to outline requirements f=
or MPLS-TP MIBs, not to describe the additions.=C2=A0 It was a little surpr=
ising to see Section 6 launch straight into a definition of new branches, a=
lmost as if they already exist.
>
> DK: This OID structure is proposed in draft-ietf-mpls-tp-te-mib-01. We ha=
ve clarified the text for Section 6 to include =E2=80=9CThe MPLS-TP MIB OID=
 tree as proposed in [MPLS-TP-TE-MIB] has the following structure:=E2=80=9D
>
> MT =E2=80=93 Comment 3:=C2=A0 If this is simply an initial outline, or a =
plan, or agreed requirements, then that could be made clearer.=C2=A0 As it =
is, it reads as though it were a done deal.=C2=A0 Later parts are clearer a=
bout this ("a new MIB module will be...").=C2=A0 Making this more consisten=
tly stated as requirements, promises or plans there is less confusion about=
 existence, and fewer problems if the plan changes.
>
> DK: Absolutely, where relevant the text now reads =E2=80=9Cwhere addition=
al MIB modules are necessary=E2=80=9D and/or =E2=80=9CA new MIB module is r=
equired to=E2=80=9D, or equivalent.
>
> MT =E2=80=93 Comment 4: If the first paragraph of the security considerat=
ions is true, then this would be great.=C2=A0 And that paragraph is then al=
l that is necessary.=C2=A0 The later paragraphs don't really add any value.=
=C2=A0 Truisms (new MIBs will include security considerations), appeal for =
SNMPv3, and a description of access control best practice are not really ne=
eded.=C2=A0 Do these new objects change the dynamics in a way that requires=
 new operational practices?=C2=A0 I suspect not.
>
> DK: We kept the SNMP boilerplate security code for best practice. We felt=
 the existing Security text did not further edits.
>
> MT =E2=80=93 Comment 5: This document has a very high density of acronyms=
, as well as other symbols.=C2=A0 Providing expansions of acronyms on first=
 use (e.g. FEC) and providing some context for less frequently used symbols=
 would help casual readers.=C2=A0 With such a high density, it might even b=
e easier to use expansions by default for less commonly used labels.
>
> DK: Agreed, we expanded on some of the lesser known acronyms (FEC, OID, e=
t al.), but still avoiding expanding the well-known candidates (MPLS, etc.)
>
> MT =E2=80=93 Comment 6: Bullet 5 Section 4.2.6 contains a number of stran=
ge, one-bullet lists.=C2=A0 Try <list style=3D"none"> if the intent is to i=
ndent these notes.=C2=A0 If the intent is that these items are part of a la=
rger list, then try sub-sections.
>
> DK: Fixed.
>
> MT =E2=80=93 Comment 7: The diagram in Section 4.2.10 didn't help me unde=
rstand the relationships at all.=C2=A0 The text was much easier to follow.
>
> DK: Ah, we like it and had positive comments from others so we kept the f=
igure. It is busy but adds value by showing the directional interrelations,=
 the text does enhance. Hopefully once you read the text the figure becomes=
 more useful.
>
> MT =E2=80=93 Comment 8: Some references (RFC6370) need to be updated.
>
> DK: Fixed.
>
> Again, thanks for your time and review. Once you send me an echo-response=
 to confirm you are happy with these updates to address the relevant commen=
ts, we will format, check against submission tool and then upload the new v=
ersion.
>
> Br, Dan.

From mccap@petoni.org  Mon Jan 30 18:47:46 2012
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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
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Document: draft-nottingham-http-new-status-03
Reviewer: Peter McCann
Review Date: 2012-01-30
IETF LC End Date:
IESG Telechat date: 2012-02-02

Summary: Ready

Major issues: none

Minor issues: none

Nits/editorial comments:

Section 6.1:
   does so by identify clients
SHOULD BE
   does so by identifying clients

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I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
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Document: draft-ietf-radext-radsec-11
Reviewer: Peter McCann
Review Date: 2012-01-30
IETF LC End Date:
IESG Telechat date: 2012-02-02

Summary: 2 minor issues

Major issues: none

Minor issues:

Section 2.4:
   In TLS-X.509 with PKI infrastructure, a client is uniquely identified
   by the serial number of the tuple (presented client
   certificate;Issuer).
SHOULD BE:
   In TLS-X.509 with PKI infrastructure, a client is uniquely identified
   by the tuple (serial number of presented client certificate;Issuer).

Because RADIUS supports the Disconnect Request (server-to-client) message,
it seems that there is some requirement to keep the TLS session open for the
duration of the access that was authorized.  Otherwise, the server would not be
able to send such a packet to the client without initiating its own
TLS connection
which may not be possible or desirable.  Is this aspect of the specification
inherited from the referenced TCP specification?  It may be helpful to
add a paragraph
about this issue.

Nits/editorial comments:

Section 2.3:
   x.y.z
Did you mean to fill in a real section number here?

   Note Section 3.4 (1) )
Missing open paren?

From mnot@mnot.net  Mon Jan 30 19:19:37 2012
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On 31/01/2012, at 1:47 PM, Pete McCann wrote:

> does so by identify clients

Incorporated in our working draft - thanks!

--
Mark Nottingham   http://www.mnot.net/




From alexey.melnikov@isode.com  Tue Jan 31 02:33:46 2012
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Cc: General Area Review Team <gen-art@ietf.org>, "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer.all@tools.ietf.org>, IETF-Discussion Discussion <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt
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On 30/01/2012 05:20, Mike Jones wrote:
> Thanks for your useful feedback, Alexey.
Hi Mike,
>    Below, I'll respond to each of your comments.  I've also added the O=
Auth working group to the thread, so they are aware of them as well and c=
an participate in the discussion.
>
> About your first issue with the WWW-Authenticate ABNF, I am already wor=
king with Julian, Mark Nottingham, and the chairs to resolve this issue. =
 Expect to see a proposal for review by the working group shortly.
Ok, I will have a look.
> About your comments on scope:  OAuth 2.0 (both the Core and Bearer spec=
s) is designed to be deployed in diverse and non-interoperable applicatio=
n contexts, meeting a variety of application needs.  In those various set=
tings, which are often distinct and potentially non-interoperable, parame=
ters such as scope, realm, etc. may have very different meanings.  This i=
s not a bug; it is a feature, because it allows the OAuth pattern to meet=
 the needs of numerous, often distinct, application environments.  For th=
at reason, a registry of scope (or realm) parameters would be ill-advised=
 and counterproductive.  It's perfectly OK and expected for a scope value=
 such as "email" to have one meaning in one application context and a dif=
ferent meaning in a different, but distinct application context.  Trying =
to impose a single meaning on particular scope values across distinct app=
lication contexts is both unnecessary and could break many existing deplo=
yments.  That being said, we fully expect
> interoperability profiles to emerge that define interoperable sets of s=
cope values within particular application contexts.  (The OpenID Connect =
specifications are one such set of profiles.)  But these meanings will al=
ways be context-specific - not global in scope.
The way "scope" is currently defined in the document is completely=20
useless. You don't have a single example in the document. You don't say=20
how the semantics of the value differs from realm. You don't say that=20
its values are deployment specific and can be profiled in future=20
documents. Please say something about these issues in the document (your =

explanation above would work.)
> About your first minor issue, I'll reorder the bullets so the statement=
 about the entity-body being single part is followed by the statement abo=
ut it using application/x-www-form-urlencoded, so they will be read toget=
her.
Ok.
> About your second minor issue on error codes, the error codes registry =
already exists, but is in the OAuth Core spec.  Seehttp://tools.ietf.org/=
html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-23#section-11.4.
Can you please make this clear in the document (by adding a reference)?
> About your third minor issue on RFC 6125 versus RFC 2818, you'll find t=
hat, per the history entries, a previous reference to RFC 2818 was change=
d to RFC 6125 in draft 14 at the request of Security Area Director Stephe=
n Farrell.  If you'd like to see this reference reintroduced, I'd request=
 that you work with Stephen on specific alternative proposed wording that=
 is acceptable to both of you.
Ok, I can work with Stephen and Peter Saint-Andre (RFC 6125 co-author) on=
 some text.

> Finally, I'll address both of your nits in the manner you suggested.
These are fixed in -16, thanks.
>
> 				Thanks again,
> 				-- Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From:ietf-bounces@ietf.org  [mailto:ietf-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of=
 Alexey Melnikov
> Sent: Sunday, January 29, 2012 8:38 AM
> To: General Area Review Team; IETF-Discussion Discussion;draft-ietf-oau=
th-v2-bearer.all@tools.ietf.org
> Subject: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt
>
> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on Ge=
n-ART, please see the FAQ at<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wik=
i/GenArtfaq>.
>
> Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments y=
ou may receive.
>
> Document: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-bearer-15.txt
> Reviewer: Alexey Melnikov
> Review Date: 29 Jan 2012
> IETF LC End Date: 7 Feb 2012
> IESG Telechat date: (if known) -
>
> Summary: Mostly ready, with a couple of things that should be addressed=
=2E
>
> Major Issues:
>
> I have 2 issues in section 3:
>
> 3.  The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field
>
>      If the protected resource request does not include authentication
>      credentials or does not contain an access token that enables acces=
s
>      to the protected resource, the resource server MUST include the HT=
TP
>      "WWW-Authenticate" response header field; it MAY include it in
>      response to other conditions as well.  The "WWW-Authenticate" head=
er
>      field uses the framework defined by HTTP/1.1, Part 7
>      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth] as follows:
>
>      challenge       =3D "Bearer" [ 1*SP 1#param ]
>
>      param           =3D realm / scope /
>                        error / error-desc / error-uri /
>                        auth-param
>
>      scope           =3D "scope" "=3D" quoted-string
>      error           =3D "error" "=3D" quoted-string
>      error-desc      =3D "error_description" "=3D" quoted-string
>      error-uri       =3D "error_uri" "=3D" quoted-string
>
> 1). I am agreeing with Julian about redefinition of ABNF from HTTPBis d=
ocuments. I believe there is a proposal to fix that but the new draft has=
n't been posted yet.
>
> 2). My 2nd major issue is about the following paragraph:
>
>      The "scope" attribute is a space-delimited list of scope values
>      indicating the required scope of the access token for accessing th=
e
>      requested resource.  In some cases, the "scope" value will be used=

>      when requesting a new access token with sufficient scope of access=
 to
>      utilize the protected resource.  The "scope" attribute MUST NOT
>      appear more than once.  The "scope" value is intended for
>      programmatic use and is not meant to be displayed to end users.
>
> I don't think this provide enough information about what this is, how i=
t is to be used and which values are allowed. As this is not meant to be =
displayed to end users, then you need to say what values are allowed and =
which entity can allocate them. Is there a registry for these tokens, e.g=
=2E an IANA registry?
>
>
> Minor Issues:
>
> 1).
> 2.2.  Form-Encoded Body Parameter
>
>      When sending the access token in the HTTP request entity-body, the=

>      client adds the access token to the request body using the
>      "access_token" parameter.  The client MUST NOT use this method unl=
ess
>      all of the following conditions are met:
>
>      o  The HTTP request entity-body is single-part.
>
>      o  The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
>         "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
>         HTML 4.01 [W3C.REC-html401-19991224].
>
>      o  The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type" head=
er
>         field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".
>
> I would combine the first and the third bullet into a single statement,=
 because they seem to be a bit confusing while being read separately.
> (I.e., is it possible to have Content-Type of "application/x-www-form-u=
rlencoded" with something which is multipart?)
>
> 2).
> Section "3.1.  Error Codes"
>
> I recommend creating an IANA registry for these or explain why one is n=
ot needed.
>
> 3).
> 4.2.  Threat Mitigation
>
>      To protect against token disclosure, confidentiality protection MU=
ST
>      be applied using TLS [RFC5246] with a ciphersuite that provides
>      confidentiality and integrity protection.  This requires that the
>      communication interaction between the client and the authorization=

>      server, as well as the interaction between the client and the
>      resource server, utilize confidentiality and integrity protection.=

>      Since TLS is mandatory to implement and to use with this
>      specification, it is the preferred approach for preventing token
>      disclosure via the communication channel.  For those cases where t=
he
>      client is prevented from observing the contents of the token, toke=
n
>      encryption MUST be applied in addition to the usage of TLS
>      protection.  As a further defense against token disclosure, the
>      client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making request=
s
>      to protected resources.
>
> and
>
>      To deal with token capture and replay, the following recommendatio=
ns
>      are made: First, the lifetime of the token MUST be limited; one me=
ans
>      of achieving this is by putting a validity time field inside the
>      protected part of the token.  Note that using short-lived (one hou=
r
>      or less) tokens reduces the impact of them being leaked.  Second,
>      confidentiality protection of the exchanges between the client and=

>      the authorization server and between the client and the resource
>      server MUST be applied.  As a consequence, no eavesdropper along t=
he
>      communication path is able to observe the token exchange.
>      Consequently, such an on-path adversary cannot replay the token.
>      Furthermore, when presenting the token to a resource server, the
>      client MUST verify the identity of that resource server, as per
>      Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Servic=
e
>      Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PK=
IX)
>      Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)
>      [RFC6125].
>
> Firstly, I would move the RFC 6125 reference to the first paragraph quo=
ted above (but see below). Secondly, you should either normatively refere=
nce RFC 2818 (HTTP over TLS) instead of RFC 6125, or you need to provide =
more information about how RFC 6125 is to be used, because it has several=
 options which need to be described (use of SRV-IDs, URI-IDs, DNS-IDs, us=
e of wildcards). I suspect you should just reference RFC 2818.
>
>
> Nits:
>
> 2.2.  Form-Encoded Body Parameter
>
>      o  The content to be encoded in the entity-body MUST consist entir=
ely
>         of ASCII characters.
>
> ASCII needs a reference.
>
>
> ID-nits reports:
>
>     =3D=3D The document seems to lack the recommended RFC 2119 boilerpl=
ate, even if
>        it appears to use RFC 2119 keywords -- however, there's a paragr=
aph with
>        a matching beginning. Boilerplate error?
>
>        (The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which =
the
>        ID-Checklist requires).
>     =3D=3D Using lowercase 'not' together with uppercase 'MUST', 'SHALL=
', 'SHOULD',
>        or 'RECOMMENDED' is not an accepted usage according to RFC 2119.=

> Please
>        use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is =
what you
>        mean).
>
> and:
>
>        Found 'MUST not' in this paragraph:
>
>        o  Stated that bearer tokens MUST not be stored in cookies that =
can
>        be sent in the clear in the Threat Mitigation section.
> _______________________________________________
> Ietf mailing list
> Ietf@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
>
>




From stefan.winter@restena.lu  Mon Jan 30 23:41:50 2012
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Hello,

thanks for your review!

> Minor issues:
>=20
> Section 2.4:
>    In TLS-X.509 with PKI infrastructure, a client is uniquely identifie=
d
>    by the serial number of the tuple (presented client
>    certificate;Issuer).
> SHOULD BE:
>    In TLS-X.509 with PKI infrastructure, a client is uniquely identifie=
d
>    by the tuple (serial number of presented client certificate;Issuer).=


Right, thanks for spotting; fixed now in my working copy.

> Because RADIUS supports the Disconnect Request (server-to-client) messa=
ge,
> it seems that there is some requirement to keep the TLS session open fo=
r the
> duration of the access that was authorized.  Otherwise, the server woul=
d not be
> able to send such a packet to the client without initiating its own
> TLS connection
> which may not be possible or desirable.  Is this aspect of the specific=
ation
> inherited from the referenced TCP specification?  It may be helpful to
> add a paragraph
> about this issue.

Dynamic Authoirzation traffic is only very loosely coupled with the
corresponding authentication traffic. In particular, RFC5176 states that
a DynAuth Client (i.e. the one that would initiate the DM message) may
or may not be co-located with the RADIUS server which handled the
authentication.
There's a recommendation that a DynAuth client should not send its
traffic directly to the NAS and instead route it via the RADIUS server.
If that recommendation is followed, it may make sense to re-use the same
TLS session to send the packets indeed.
But it is certainly not a *requirement* that these types of traffic are
"bundled" together, or even just take the same path.

It's true that there may be some operational hassle in setting up a TLS
session in the reverse direction if the original TLS session doesn't
exist any more. RADIUS/TLS shares this fate with all the other
transports though (in RADIUS/UDP, getting in the reverse direction
through a firewall, possibly combined with traversing NAT is "fun"; same
goes for RADIUS/TCP). So, nothing "new" here IMHO.

> Nits/editorial comments:
>=20
> Section 2.3:
>    x.y.z
> Did you mean to fill in a real section number here?

Right, for TLS 1.2 that would be RFC6066, section 6.

I have updated the text to state:

          +  Implementations SHOULD indicate their trusted Certification
             Authorities.  For TLS 1.2, this is done using [RFC5246]
             section 7.4.4 "certificate authorities" (server side) and
             [RFC6066] Section 6 "Trusted CA Indication" (client side).
             See also Section 3.2.

I'm wondering if I should also include exact pointers to the TLS 1.1
equivalents. After all TLS 1.1 is fading out anyway, so I could imagine
to leave that as the famous "exercise to the reader" if he wants to use
TLS 1.1 still. I wouldn't mind adding them explicitly though; just let
me know what you think is preferable.

>    Note Section 3.4 (1) )
> Missing open paren?

Right. Fixed to:

   4.  start exchanging RADIUS datagrams (note Section 3.4 (1) ).  The
       shared secret to compute the (obsolete) MD5 integrity checks and
       attribute encryption MUST be "radsec" (see Section 3.4 (2) ).

Greetings,

Stefan Winter

--=20
Stefan WINTER
Ingenieur de Recherche
Fondation RESTENA - R=E9seau T=E9l=E9informatique de l'Education National=
e et
de la Recherche
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
L-1359 Luxembourg

Tel: +352 424409 1
Fax: +352 422473


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