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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04
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On Sep 22, 2014, at 8:48 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi all
>=20
> Stephen, Paul, and Michael submitted version -04 about a month ago, =
and it has received no discussion so far.  The authors are of the =
opinion that the document is ready for publication, and it=92s time for =
the group to weigh in on this subject.
>=20
> This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please =
take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about its =
security, applicability, usefulness, and any other aspect you wish to =
discuss. For guidance on what to look for, let me quote the following =
from our charter:
>   The httpauth WG will be a short-lived working group that will =
document
>   a small number of HTTP user authentication schemes that might offer
>   security benefits, and that could, following experimentation, be
>   widely adopted as standards-track schemes for HTTP user
>   authentication. Each of these RFCs will be Informational or
>   Experimental, and should include a description of when use of its
>   mechanism is appropriate, via a use-case or other distinguishing
>   characteristics.=20
> The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 6th. Please send your =
reviews as replies to this message.
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Yoav & Matt

Hi.

This concludes WGLC for the HOBA draft. We=92ve had quite a few comments =
(thanks to Michael, Amos, Julian and Benjamin), most are editorial, but =
at least Amos=92s is substantial.

For convenience, I=92ve submitted tickets to cover the issues raised: =
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpauth/trac/query?component=3Dhoba

We=92ll leave it to the authors to work through the LC comments, and =
whatever needs discussion can be covered here on the mailing list, and =
if needed - in Honolulu.

Thanks again to everyone for taking the time to review this.

Yoav & Matt


--Apple-Mail=_63154DE3-40EC-46D7-A513-4757AFA9DA4A
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<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: =
after-white-space;"><br><div><div>On Sep 22, 2014, at 8:48 AM, Yoav Nir =
&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; =
wrote:</div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote =
type=3D"cite"><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html =
charset=3Dwindows-1252"><div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">Hi =
all<div><br></div><div>Stephen, Paul, and Michael submitted version -04 =
about a month ago, and it has received no discussion so far. &nbsp;The =
authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for publication, =
and it=92s time for the group to weigh in on this =
subject.</div><div><br></div><div>This mail begins working group last =
call for this document. Please take the time to read the draft and send =
comments to the list about its security, applicability, usefulness, and =
any other aspect you wish to discuss. For guidance on what to look for, =
let me quote the following from our charter:</div><div><pre =
style=3D"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); position: static; =
z-index: auto;">  The httpauth WG will be a short-lived working group =
that will document
  a small number of HTTP user authentication schemes that might offer
  security benefits, and that could, following experimentation, be
  widely adopted as standards-track schemes for HTTP user
  authentication. Each of these RFCs will be Informational or
  Experimental, and should include a description of when use of its
  mechanism is appropriate, via a use-case or other distinguishing
  characteristics. </pre><div>The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on =
October 6th. Please send your reviews as replies to this =
message.</div></div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div><br></div><div>Y=
oav &amp; =
Matt</div></div></blockquote></div><br><div>Hi.</div><div><br></div><div>T=
his concludes WGLC for the HOBA draft. We=92ve had quite a few comments =
(thanks to Michael, Amos, Julian and Benjamin), most are editorial, but =
at least Amos=92s is substantial.</div><div><br></div><div>For =
convenience, I=92ve submitted tickets to cover the issues =
raised:&nbsp;<a =
href=3D"http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpauth/trac/query?component=3Dhoba=
">http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpauth/trac/query?component=3Dhoba</a></=
div><div><br></div><div>We=92ll leave it to the authors to work through =
the LC comments, and whatever needs discussion can be covered here on =
the mailing list, and if needed - in =
Honolulu.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks again to everyone for taking =
the time to review this.</div><div><br></div><div>Yoav &amp; =
Matt</div><div><br></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_63154DE3-40EC-46D7-A513-4757AFA9DA4A--


From nobody Mon Oct  6 06:22:23 2014
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04
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Hi Michael,

Thanks for the detailed review. Reactions below and the changes
I've made can be seen at [1]. (Note [1] has changes from all the
various WGLC reviews. [2] is the diff vs. -04.)

   [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
   [2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt

I'll post the -05 once I figure we're closed out on WGLC comments
or after a day or two's silence or as instructed by the chairs.

On 22/09/14 23:26, Michael Sweet wrote:
> Comments for:
> 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04
> 
> - In section 1 (introduction), the following text is awkward to
> read:
> 
> Current HTTP authentication methods (Basic and Digest), as well as 
> username/password authentication using web forms, have been in use 
> for many years, but being based on passwords, are susceptible to 
> theft of server-side databases.
> 
> The following is my suggested rewording:
> 
> Current username/password authentication methods such as HTTP Basic, 
> HTTP Digest, and web forms have been in use for many years but are 
> susceptible to theft of server-side password databases.

Done.

> 
> - Also in section 1:
> 
> Session management with HOBA is identical to username/password 
> session management.  Typically, the session management tool (such as 
> PHP, Python CGI, and so on) inserts a session cookie into the output 
> to the browser.  HOBA does nothing to help or hurt session cookie 
> hijacking; TLS is still required for that.  If the authentication is 
> not bound to HTTP sessions, even TLS cannot help against all
> attacks.
> 
> might read better as:
> 
> HOBA session management is identical to username/password session 
> management, with a server-side session management tool or script 
> inserting a session cookie into the output to the browser.  HOBA 
> still requires TLS to prevent session cookie hijacking.

Also done.

> 
> - And here in section 1 aren't you talking about revoking keys?
> 
> o  Users are also likely to lose a private key, or the client's 
> memory of which key pair is associated with which origin, such as 
> when a user loses the computer or mobile device in which state is 
> stored.  HOBA allows for clients to tell servers to delete the 
> association between an existing CPK and an account.

Not really, but it's similar I suppose. The difference is that since
HOBA is origin-bound, a UA just needs to tell one server about that
public key so its more like a de-register rather than a revocation as
would be the case with PGP or X.509. That said, we didn't actually
define a de-register message so I've changed it thusly:

OLD:

   HOBA allows for clients to tell servers to delete the
   association between an existing CPK and an account.

NEW:

   HOBA implementations can, and probably ought, provide mechanisms
   for clients to tell servers to delete the association between an
   existing CPK and an account, but that will typically be done at
   the application layer and not using HOBA-defined messages.

In case it helps, with my code I provide a way to associate a
string with each UA for an account (e.g. "my ipad", "ff on laptop")
and those (and the associated public key binding to the account
on that origin) can be deleted, but that's just done using a
form and has no HOBA-specific protocol. Not sure how much of that
to include to be honest. I think the above NEW text should be ok
for an experimental RFC.

> 
> - This text in section 1 is also awkward/confusing:
> 
> o  Since there are always devices and applications in which state of 
> the art digital signature mechanism runtimes are significant, and 
> since HTTP authentication in theory requires that every HTTP request
> to a given realm have a signature in an "Authorization" header field,
> and since HOBA is a challenge response scheme, we also define a way
> in which HTTP servers can indicate the duration for which they will
> consider a given challenge value to be valid. As a consequence we
> also define a way for UAs to fetch a fresh challenge.
> 
> Perhaps reword as:
> 
> o  Digital signatures can be expensive to compute, so HOBA defines a 
> way for HTTP servers to indicate how long a given challenge value is 
> valid, and a way for UAs to fetch a fresh challenge at any time.

Done.

> 
> - Section 1.1, drop "in which this can be done" from the third line.

Done.

> - Section 1.2 is a mix of styles, 

Well, >1 author => >1 style:-)

> consider making it "Term:
> definition" throughout, and separate HOBA-js and HOBA-http.

Fair point. Tried to do that.

> - Section 1.2 is missing a reference to HTTP authentication
> specification (which do you mean?)

It's there later but I added another here to 7235.

> 
> - Section 1.2: The statement "This specification uses the Augmented
> Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234]" probably doesn't
> belong here, unless you want to define ABNF as a term (in which case
> make it ABNF: definition [RFC5234])

I think its useful to have a ref to 5234 but don't think we
need to define a term (we're not defining it anyway:-). I did
move that para up to just below the 2119 reference which may
help.

> 
> - Figure 1: Shouldn't the unreserved values actually be base64url
> values?
> 
> - Figure 2: Ditto here - base64url encoded?

Both are in the text, so its specified, but just not in the
ABNF. I'm not sure if putting it there would really be of
use though, but if someone wants to send me ABNF that does
that and if nobody has a problem with it, I'd be ok with
making that change. Personally, I prefer the ABNF as-is since
I'm guess its more readable now than it would be should we
try to define base64url encoded within the ABNF.

> 
> - Section 3: If this is a valid security concern, change to "the
> challenge MUST be unique for every HTTP 401 response ..."

That'd be fine with my code but I forget if we had a specific
reason for the SHOULD. I've made the change though since fewer
SHOULDs is better.

> 
> - Section 4, top of page 9: Something is missing betweem "from
> HTML5." and "is used".

Ah. The full stop shouldn't have been there;-)

I also added a note about IndexedDB as an alternative to localStorage
since the WebCrypto uses the latter.

> 
> - Section 4, not sure I like the raw URL references - better to make
> them informative or normative references (as appropriate). Also,
> since WebCrypto is not available I'm not sure it is appropriate to
> mention it here - maybe move this to an  appendix that outlines some
> potential future enhancements based on in-progress work.

I've started implementing with WebCrypto so it is available now
and shipping in chromium. I still have to turn it on via
about:config with FF, but its mostly there too. I think it's
better to leave that in.

> 
> - Section 3: Is it ".well-known/hoba/getChal" or
> ".well-known/hoba/getchal" (lowercase), as it appears in section
> 6.4?

Good catch. I've gone with getchal as that matches my code.

> - Section 8: If reuse of challenge values (section 3) stays a SHOULD
> NOT, then it should be added here in more detail as to why this can
> be problematic.

Fixed in section 3 now.

> 
> - Section 9.4: Extra "i" after "ok."

That's what I get for using vi:-)

> 
> - Section 10: Don't deleted sections go at the end to make the RFC
> Editor's job easier and to avoid broken references?

That's not a problem for them since we'll give them the xml.

Cheers,
S.


> 
> 
> 
>> On Sep 21, 2014, at 10:48 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi all
>> 
>> Stephen, Paul, and Michael submitted version -04 about a month ago,
>> and it has received no discussion so far.  The authors are of the
>> opinion that the document is ready for publication, and it’s time
>> for the group to weigh in on this subject.
>> 
>> This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please
>> take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about
>> its security, applicability, usefulness, and any other aspect you
>> wish to discuss. For guidance on what to look for, let me quote the
>> following from our charter: The httpauth WG will be a short-lived
>> working group that will document a small number of HTTP user
>> authentication schemes that might offer security benefits, and that
>> could, following experimentation, be widely adopted as
>> standards-track schemes for HTTP user authentication. Each of these
>> RFCs will be Informational or Experimental, and should include a
>> description of when use of its mechanism is appropriate, via a
>> use-case or other distinguishing characteristics.
>> 
>> The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 6th. Please send
>> your reviews as replies to this message.
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> 
>> Yoav & Matt _______________________________________________ 
>> http-auth mailing list http-auth@ietf.org 
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> 
> _________________________________________________________ Michael
> Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair
> 
> _______________________________________________ http-auth mailing
> list http-auth@ietf.org 
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> 
> 


From nobody Mon Oct  6 06:22:25 2014
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Hi Julian,

Thanks for the review.

As before an updated version is at [1], diff at [2].

   [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
   [2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt


On 23/09/14 08:10, Julian Reschke wrote:
> On 2014-09-22 07:48, Yoav Nir wrote:
>> ...
> 
> I had a look from an editorial and HTTP related angle (me no
> security person):
> 
> - it seems that the reference to RFC 7235 needs to be normative

Done.

> 
> - in the IANA sections, it would be helpful if the specification
> links would be more specific

Not sure what you mean there. I think "[[ this document ]]" is
fine for IANA and the RFC editor if that's what you mean, but if
you mean something else can you say?

> 
> - there's a "TBD" in Section 9.3

oops fixed - deleted the comment. I also added a requirement
that new entries here should already be used in some other
IETF standard - don't see any reason why HOBA should be
innovative in that respect.

> 
> - for the new IANA registries, I believe you ought to specify the
> actual format of the registry and/or provide a registration form

I don't think that's needed here really. If HOBA gets enough use
so that entries get added then I'd say that could be fixed when/if
the spec gets put on the standards track and I'm sure there'd be
more to fix then too.

> 
> - terminology confusion: Section 2 introduces the "authentication 
> scheme" (which seems to be about HOBA in general), but the actual
> HTTP authentication scheme is defined in Section 3.

I think that's ok, happy to correct if others feel its
confusing though (esp. if text changes suggested:-)

> - TODO in Acknowledgements: "[[ and any more to be added ]]"

Some more added now, I think I've added anyone who said
something technical;-)

> 
> Finally some comments on Section 3:
> 
> This describes behavior, but reads a bit strange as a formal
> definition of an auth scheme. For instance:
> 
>> If the "HOBA" scheme is listed, it MUST be followed by two or more 
>> auth-param values.
> 
> Replace by:
> 
> "The HOBA scheme has two REQUIRED attributes (...) and one OPTIONAL 
> attribute (realm) described below:"

Done.

> 
> Also, a full HTTP request/response exchange example might make this 
> simpler to understand.

I'll look at that later on, can probably generate it but don't have
time today. Noted it in the XML source.

Thanks again,
S.


> 
> Best regards, Julian
> 
> _______________________________________________ http-auth mailing
> list http-auth@ietf.org 
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> 
> 


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As before an updated version is at [1], diff at [2].

   [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
   [2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt

On 23/09/14 12:57, Julian Reschke wrote:
> On 2014-09-23 09:10, Julian Reschke wrote:
>> ...
> 
> Furthermore, Section 9.6 tries to IANA-register the header field
> "HOBAREG" which doesn't seem to be defined anywhere.

Oops again. Added text to section 6.1 for that. (I added it
late in response to Michael Sweet's good comment that something
like that was needed:-)

Just to check - in my code, once registration is successfully
completed, I add a HOBAREG header to the "last" HTTP response
that's part of registration with a value of "regok" but I think
we just need the presence of the header so that's all the spec
calls for right now. Happy to modify if folks think it better
to do something else or if there's a better way to write that
up.

Cheers,
S.

> 
> Best regards, Julian
> 
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> 
> 


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As before an updated version is at [1], diff at [2].

   [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
   [2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt

On 24/09/14 12:53, Julian Reschke wrote:
> ...also:
> 
>>    o  An "expires" attribute MUST be included that specifies the number
>>       of seconds from the time the HTTP response is emitted for which
>>       responses to this challenge can be accepted.
> 
> HTTP caching (RFC 7235) knows the "Expires" header field (taking a
> date), and the "max-age" cache-control directive (taking seconds). Maybe
> it would make sense to rename this one to "max-age" for consistency.

That sounds like a good change so I made that change to the spec and
my code (the latter's not yet committed btw, will be later)

Cheers,
S.


> 
> Best regards, Julian
> 
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> 
> 


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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1



Hi Amos,


> Looks like the HTTP specific part is almost a duplicate of RFC
> 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer authentication.

Well, except that HOBA does not produce bearer tokens, as that term
is usually understood - you need to use a private key to make one
and each signature will be different. (It is true that with the
max-age/expires parameter there is a server-defined window during
which HOBA is not that different, but a server can set max-age to
zero.)

> 
> One could re-write this specification by doing:
> 
> * reference Bearer specification, * add expires= and challenge=
> (code=?) parameters on www-auth header, * add a scope parameter
> value "hoba:origin", * prohibit token re-use/replay, * prohibit
> URI-query and payload delivery mechanisms * define section 5 and
> section 6 using RFC 6749 credential management parameters and
> mechanisms.
> 
> Doing so would avoid both the need to register a new
> authentication scheme, and "well-known" URI space.

I don't see that there's that much benefit in avoiding those
registrations myself and do see a lot of downside in being
entangled with oauth here. There's nothing wrong with oauth
but I don't think HOBA and oauth need to be entangled that
way. (When/if an oauth holder-of-key scheme is defined then
that might look a lot like HOBA I guess but that's not yet
defined I believe.)

Also, in an offlist mail, Amos suggested that we look at the
security considerations of 6750 since many of those might
apply here (esp with max-age!=0). So I've added text saying:

"When the max-age parameter is not zero, then a HOBA
signature is very similar to a bearer token, as it can
be replayed for a server-selected duration. Similarly,
for HOBA-js, signatures might be replayable depending
on the specific implementation. The security considerations
of [RFC6750] therefore apply in any case where the
HOBA signature can be replayed."

Thanks for the review,
Cheers,
S.

PS: As for the other WGLC mails, an updated version is at [1], diff
at [2].

   [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
   [2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt

> 
> Amos
>> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ http-auth mailing
> list http-auth@ietf.org 
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> 
> 
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Hi Ben,

Thanks for the comments. Responses below.

As for the other WGLC mails, an updated version is at [1], diff
at [2].

   [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
   [2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt

On 29/09/14 19:54, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Sep 2014, Yoav Nir wrote:
> 
>> Hi all
>>
>> Stephen, Paul, and Michael submitted version -04 about a month ago, and
>> it has received no discussion so far.  The authors are of the opinion
>> that the document is ready for publication, and it’s time for the group
>> to weigh in on this subject.
>>
>> This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about its security, applicability, usefulness, and any other aspect you wish to discuss. For guidance on what to look for, let me quote the following from our charter:
>>   The httpauth WG will be a short-lived working group that will document
>>   a small number of HTTP user authentication schemes that might offer
>>   security benefits, and that could, following experimentation, be
>>   widely adopted as standards-track schemes for HTTP user
>>   authentication. Each of these RFCs will be Informational or
>>   Experimental, and should include a description of when use of its
>>   mechanism is appropriate, via a use-case or other distinguishing
>>   characteristics.
>> The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 6th. Please send your
>> reviews as replies to this message.
> 
> I see a few places that could be unclear, and have a handful of editorial
> comments.
> 
> 
> In section 2,
> 
>    On receipt of a challenge (and optional realm) from a server, the
>    client marshals an HOBA to-be-signed (TBS) blob that includes a
>    client generated nonce, the web-origin, the realm, an identifier for
>    the CPK and the challenge string; and signs that hashed blob with the
>    private key corresponding to the CPK for that web-origin.
> 
> The client is supposed to marshal a blob, but then signs a hashed blob.
> How does the hashing happen (or is it part of the signature)?

Yes, its part of the signature, but you're correct, the text
could be read to be doing two hashes I guess (as DKIM does,
but HOBA does not), so I changed to just say "sign the blob."

> 
> 
> Still in section 2,
> 
>    The value that is sent over the network is the HOBA "client result"
>    which we now define.
> 
> It might be good to explicitly say that this is sent over the network by
> the client.

Added "by the UA"

> 
> 
> In section 3, we hear that the HOBA scheme "MUST be followed by two or
> more auth-param values."  It might be useful to include here an example of
> how those attributes are encoded.

There's an example in Appendix B and I've an action to try make
that a full HTTP request/response example as suggested by Julian.
I'll do that but not today.

I also added an example "max-age: 10" the challenge already says
its base64url encoded.

> 
> And the editorial bits:
> 
> 
> In section 3,
> 
>    the client to authenticate with HOBA.  Note that the HOBA auth-scheme
>    might not be the only one that the server includes in a WWW-
>    Authenticate.
> 
> I think that "a WWW-Authenticate header" is better grammar, unless this is
> some usage I'm not familiar with.

Done

> 
> 
> Still in section 3,
> 
>    When the "client response" is created, the UA encodes the HOBA
>    client-result (a string matching the HOBA-RES production in Figure 2
>    as an auth-param with the name "result" and returns that in the
>    Authorization header.
> 
> There is no matching close parenthesis.

Fixed.


> In section 4,
> 
>    storage.  For example, an implementation would store a dictionary
>    account identifier, public key, private key tuples in the origin's
>    localStorage for subsequent authentication requests.
> 
> I don't think the grammar is correct in the specification of the contents
> of the tuples stored in localStorage.

s/,/ and / once there fixed it.

> Also in section 4,
> 
>    available: WebCrypto (see http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI).  In
>    lieu of WebCrypto, JavaScript crypto libraries can be employed with
>    the known deficiencies of PRNG, and the general immaturity of those
>    libraries.

Fixed.

> 
> The grammar is not correct in this sentence.
> 
> 
> In section 5.1,
> 
>    In the CPK preparation phase, the client determines if it already has
>    a CPK for the web-origin it is going to.
> 
> Reading this, I want to ask "what is the client going to do?", that is,
> the language feels informal to the point of causing confusion.

Tweaked.

> In section 9.3,
> 
>    TBD, hopefully re-use and existing registry
> 
> s/and/an/

Fixed differently as a result of another comment.

> 
> 
> In section 9.4,
> 
>    "1" means a URI, such as a mailto: or acct: URI, but anything
>    conforming to [RFC3986] is ok.i
> 
> The trailing 'i' was already mentioned, but I would consider expanding out
> "okay" or using less-informal terminology.

Just a typo. Fixed.

> Throughout section 9 in general, the list entries are inconsistent about
> whether they end with a period or not.

I constantly do that unfortunately:-) I think I fixed it so
that those with sentences have a full stop and those that are
not do not.

Thanks,
S.




> 
> 
> -Ben
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> 


From nobody Mon Oct  6 06:30:09 2014
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04
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Hi Yoav,

On 06/10/14 09:04, Yoav Nir wrote:
> Hi.
> 
> This concludes WGLC for the HOBA draft. We’ve had quite a few
> comments (thanks to Michael, Amos, Julian and Benjamin), most are
> editorial, but at least Amos’s is substantial.
> 
> For convenience, I’ve submitted tickets to cover the issues raised:
> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/httpauth/trac/query?component=hoba

I think the batch of mails I just sent out cover all of
those. Since I mostly took on board folks comments I hope
we can close all of those after I post the -05 officially,
but we'll see I guess.

> We’ll leave it to the authors to work through the LC comments, and
> whatever needs discussion can be covered here on the mailing list,
> and if needed - in Honolulu.

I'd hope we might not even need that f2f time if we're
already done.

> 
> Thanks again to everyone for taking the time to review this.

Indeed, the reviews caught a few things and suggested some
good improvements.

Cheers,
S.


> 
> Yoav & Matt


From nobody Mon Oct  6 06:39:14 2014
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On 2014-10-06 15:22, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> ...
 >> - in the IANA sections, it would be helpful if the specification
>> links would be more specific
>
> Not sure what you mean there. I think "[[ this document ]]" is
> fine for IANA and the RFC editor if that's what you mean, but if
> you mean something else can you say?

I think it should state the specific section that thing being referenced 
is defined in.

> ...
>> - for the new IANA registries, I believe you ought to specify the
>> actual format of the registry and/or provide a registration form
>
> I don't think that's needed here really. If HOBA gets enough use
> so that entries get added then I'd say that could be fixed when/if
> the spec gets put on the standards track and I'm sure there'd be
> more to fix then too.
> ...

Well, at least you need to say what format the registry has; for 
instance, is the key a string? An integer?

> ...

Best regards, Julian


From nobody Mon Oct  6 06:59:23 2014
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Hiya,

On 06/10/14 14:39, Julian Reschke wrote:
> On 2014-10-06 15:22, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> ...
>>> - in the IANA sections, it would be helpful if the specification
>>> links would be more specific
>>
>> Not sure what you mean there. I think "[[ this document ]]" is
>> fine for IANA and the RFC editor if that's what you mean, but if
>> you mean something else can you say?
> 
> I think it should state the specific section that thing being referenced
> is defined in.

Fair enough. Done.

> 
>> ...
>>> - for the new IANA registries, I believe you ought to specify the
>>> actual format of the registry and/or provide a registration form
>>
>> I don't think that's needed here really. If HOBA gets enough use
>> so that entries get added then I'd say that could be fixed when/if
>> the spec gets put on the standards track and I'm sure there'd be
>> more to fix then too.
>> ...
> 
> Well, at least you need to say what format the registry has; for
> instance, is the key a string? An integer?

Ah gotcha. So you mean more like [1,2] are now? I can
tart up the presentation before I post (if you've some
example xml that'd be appreciated.)

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
[2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt



> 
>> ...
> 
> Best regards, Julian
> 
> 
> 


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From: Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04
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Stephen,

Changes look good.  A few follow-up comments below...

> On Oct 6, 2014, at 9:22 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> ...
> Not really, but it's similar I suppose. The difference is that since
> HOBA is origin-bound, a UA just needs to tell one server about that
> public key so its more like a de-register rather than a revocation as
> would be the case with PGP or X.509. That said, we didn't actually
> define a de-register message so I've changed it thusly:
> 
> OLD:
> 
>   HOBA allows for clients to tell servers to delete the
>   association between an existing CPK and an account.
> 
> NEW:
> 
>   HOBA implementations can, and probably ought, provide mechanisms
>   for clients to tell servers to delete the association between an
>   existing CPK and an account, but that will typically be done at
>   the application layer and not using HOBA-defined messages.
> 

"and probably ought to" (add "to" on the end)?

But regardless, if HOBA doesn't define a mechanism then how can you claim it supports it?  Seems like you could define a well-known path for a POST that deletes the association on the server side, much as you already do for registration and challenges?

> In case it helps, with my code I provide a way to associate a
> string with each UA for an account (e.g. "my ipad", "ff on laptop")
> and those (and the associated public key binding to the account
> on that origin) can be deleted, but that's just done using a
> form and has no HOBA-specific protocol. Not sure how much of that
> to include to be honest. I think the above NEW text should be ok
> for an experimental RFC.

I think I'd feel more comfortable with either defining something or being up front about it not being defined after the list of things that HOBA does, e.g.:

    HOBA currently does not define a mechanism for deleting the association
    between an existing CPK and an account.  Such a mechanism can be
    implemented at the application layer.

(I almost want to add "and may be defined by a future version of this document", but I dislike prognostication in these kinds of documents...)

> ...
>> 
>> - Figure 1: Shouldn't the unreserved values actually be base64url
>> values?
>> 
>> - Figure 2: Ditto here - base64url encoded?
> 
> Both are in the text, so its specified, but just not in the
> ABNF. I'm not sure if putting it there would really be of
> use though, but if someone wants to send me ABNF that does
> that and if nobody has a problem with it, I'd be ok with
> making that change. Personally, I prefer the ABNF as-is since
> I'm guess its more readable now than it would be should we
> try to define base64url encoded within the ABNF.

This is fairly compact; values are just "1*base64urlchars":

    ; Characters for Base64URL encoding from Table 2 of RFC 4648
    base64urlchars = %x30-39             ; Digits
                     / %x41-5A           ; Uppercase letters
                     / %x61-7A           ; Lowercase letters
                     / "-" / "_" / "="   ; Special characters

_________________________________________________________
Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair


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On 2014-10-06 15:59, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>...
>>> ...
>>>> - for the new IANA registries, I believe you ought to specify the
>>>> actual format of the registry and/or provide a registration form
>>>
>>> I don't think that's needed here really. If HOBA gets enough use
>>> so that entries get added then I'd say that could be fixed when/if
>>> the spec gets put on the standards track and I'm sure there'd be
>>> more to fix then too.
>>> ...
>>
>> Well, at least you need to say what format the registry has; for
>> instance, is the key a string? An integer?
>
> Ah gotcha. So you mean more like [1,2] are now? I can
> tart up the presentation before I post (if you've some
> example xml that'd be appreciated.)
> ...

Looks good to me.

Best regards, Julian


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Hiya,

On 06/10/14 15:09, Michael Sweet wrote:
> Stephen,
> 
> Changes look good.  A few follow-up comments below...
> 
>> On Oct 6, 2014, at 9:22 AM, Stephen Farrell
>> <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote: ... Not really, but it's similar
>> I suppose. The difference is that since HOBA is origin-bound, a UA
>> just needs to tell one server about that public key so its more
>> like a de-register rather than a revocation as would be the case
>> with PGP or X.509. That said, we didn't actually define a
>> de-register message so I've changed it thusly:
>> 
>> OLD:
>> 
>> HOBA allows for clients to tell servers to delete the association
>> between an existing CPK and an account.
>> 
>> NEW:
>> 
>> HOBA implementations can, and probably ought, provide mechanisms 
>> for clients to tell servers to delete the association between an 
>> existing CPK and an account, but that will typically be done at the
>> application layer and not using HOBA-defined messages.
>> 
> 
> "and probably ought to" (add "to" on the end)?

Actually no, in my local flavour of Béarla [1], I think the text
is correct, but the RFC editor will fix to their preferred taste
anyway:-)

  [1] http://www.translate-irish.com/en/dictionary-irish-english/b%C3%A9arla

> But regardless, if HOBA doesn't define a mechanism then how can you
> claim it supports it? 

Right. I don't think we should claim it supports it, but that
it allows implementations to.

> Seems like you could define a well-known path
> for a POST that deletes the association on the server side, much as
> you already do for registration and challenges?

Hmm. I don't think so really. We define a way to kick-off and
end registration but not really how to do the "middle" bits which
is where the meat of the work will be. I think de-registering
is likely not something you'd do normally from the UA concerned.
In my case, I provided an a/c management form [2] for that.

   [2] https://hoba.ie/account.html

OTOH, I did actually do a .well-known like thing too in my code
as it was handy for debugging - there's an un-register button
on [3] so it'd not be hard to add if it was wanted. And I suppose
if browsers did adopt HOBA (some hope:-) then having this could
be good if a user wants to "forget" about a site. But since
broswers are not interested for now, that's not a strong argument.
And we could add it later.

   [3] https://hoba.ie/tech.html

But I think [2] or similar makes more sense than [3] in real use
so I'd still say that we should leave this out for now.

>> In case it helps, with my code I provide a way to associate a 
>> string with each UA for an account (e.g. "my ipad", "ff on
>> laptop") and those (and the associated public key binding to the
>> account on that origin) can be deleted, but that's just done using
>> a form and has no HOBA-specific protocol. Not sure how much of
>> that to include to be honest. I think the above NEW text should be
>> ok for an experimental RFC.
> 
> I think I'd feel more comfortable with either defining something or
> being up front about it not being defined after the list of things
> that HOBA does, e.g.:
> 
> HOBA currently does not define a mechanism for deleting the
> association between an existing CPK and an account.  Such a mechanism
> can be implemented at the application layer.

I've no problem putting that in. (So I did:-)

> 
> (I almost want to add "and may be defined by a future version of this
> document", but I dislike prognostication in these kinds of
> documents...)
> 
>> ...
>>> 
>>> - Figure 1: Shouldn't the unreserved values actually be
>>> base64url values?
>>> 
>>> - Figure 2: Ditto here - base64url encoded?
>> 
>> Both are in the text, so its specified, but just not in the ABNF.
>> I'm not sure if putting it there would really be of use though, but
>> if someone wants to send me ABNF that does that and if nobody has a
>> problem with it, I'd be ok with making that change. Personally, I
>> prefer the ABNF as-is since I'm guess its more readable now than it
>> would be should we try to define base64url encoded within the
>> ABNF.
> 
> This is fairly compact; values are just "1*base64urlchars":
> 
> ; Characters for Base64URL encoding from Table 2 of RFC 4648 
> base64urlchars = %x30-39             ; Digits / %x41-5A           ;
> Uppercase letters / %x61-7A           ; Lowercase letters / "-" / "_"
> / "="   ; Special characters

Ah, ok, added that too so. Be great if someone can check that
that's ok. Also is unreserved correct for realm or something
better? (Not sure, having checked 7235.)

Usual -05-pre at [4], diff vs. -04 at [5]

Cheers,
S.

[4] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
[5]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt



> 
> _________________________________________________________ Michael
> Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair
> 
> 
> 


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On 2014-10-06 15:22, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
> As before an updated version is at [1], diff at [2].
>
>     [1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
>     [2]
> https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
>
> On 23/09/14 12:57, Julian Reschke wrote:
>> On 2014-09-23 09:10, Julian Reschke wrote:
>>> ...
>>
>> Furthermore, Section 9.6 tries to IANA-register the header field
>> "HOBAREG" which doesn't seem to be defined anywhere.
>
> Oops again. Added text to section 6.1 for that. (I added it
> late in response to Michael Sweet's good comment that something
> like that was needed:-)
>
> Just to check - in my code, once registration is successfully
> completed, I add a HOBAREG header to the "last" HTTP response
> that's part of registration with a value of "regok" but I think
> we just need the presence of the header so that's all the spec
> calls for right now. Happy to modify if folks think it better
> to do something else or if there's a better way to write that
> up.

Wait. You can't just introduce a new HTTP header field (not HTTP header) 
in passing.

If you need a new header field, please have a separate section with a 
precise definition of what it is about, and when writing that, please 
follow the guidance in 
<http://svn.tools.ietf.org/svn/wg/httpbis/specs/rfc7231.html#considerations.for.new.header.fields>.

That being said; are you sure you need an additional header field?

Best regards, Julian


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Hiya,

On 06/10/14 16:04, Julian Reschke wrote:
>> 
> 
> Wait. You can't just introduce a new HTTP header field (not HTTP
> header) in passing.

Heh, I figured the header (field) police would catch up with me
at some point:-) And that's ok, better to do it right.

Can you tell me the difference here between a HTTP header field
and a HTTP header?

> If you need a new header field, please have a separate section with
> a precise definition of what it is about, and when writing that,
> please follow the guidance in 
> <http://svn.tools.ietf.org/svn/wg/httpbis/specs/rfc7231.html#considerations.for.new.header.fields>.

I'll look that over, but first...

>
> That being said; are you sure you need an additional header field?

I *think* we do. The issue is that the UA needs to know when
it can use HOBA which means it needs to know when it has succeeded
in registration. And since registration can be a multiple-exchange
application layer thing, we need a way to signal the successful end
of that back to the UA. So the earlier discussion with Michael ended
up with a header field that the server can put into the "last" HTTP
response that was needed for successful registration. If there's a
better/easier/more-correct way then to handle this then I'd be just
fine with that too, whatever it is.

Cheers,
S.



From nobody Mon Oct  6 08:32:55 2014
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On 2014-10-06 17:13, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
> Hiya,
>
> On 06/10/14 16:04, Julian Reschke wrote:
>>>
>>
>> Wait. You can't just introduce a new HTTP header field (not HTTP
>> header) in passing.
>
> Heh, I figured the header (field) police would catch up with me
> at some point:-) And that's ok, better to do it right.
>
> Can you tell me the difference here between a HTTP header field
> and a HTTP header?

The former is the terminology we use in the HTTP specs. The latter I 
don't know :-)

>> If you need a new header field, please have a separate section with
>> a precise definition of what it is about, and when writing that,
>> please follow the guidance in
>> <http://svn.tools.ietf.org/svn/wg/httpbis/specs/rfc7231.html#considerations.for.new.header.fields>.
>
> I'll look that over, but first...
>
>>
>> That being said; are you sure you need an additional header field?
>
> I *think* we do. The issue is that the UA needs to know when
> it can use HOBA which means it needs to know when it has succeeded
> in registration. And since registration can be a multiple-exchange
> application layer thing, we need a way to signal the successful end
> of that back to the UA. So the earlier discussion with Michael ended
> up with a header field that the server can put into the "last" HTTP
> response that was needed for successful registration. If there's a
> better/easier/more-correct way then to handle this then I'd be just
> fine with that too, whatever it is.
> ...

I believe it would be better not to return 2xx until authentication is 
finished; can't you just keep sending 403?

Best regards, Julian


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On 06/10/14 16:32, Julian Reschke wrote:
>> 
>> I *think* we do. The issue is that the UA needs to know when it can
>> use HOBA which means it needs to know when it has succeeded in
>> registration. And since registration can be a multiple-exchange 
>> application layer thing, we need a way to signal the successful
>> end of that back to the UA. So the earlier discussion with Michael
>> ended up with a header field that the server can put into the
>> "last" HTTP response that was needed for successful registration.
>> If there's a better/easier/more-correct way then to handle this
>> then I'd be just fine with that too, whatever it is. ...
> 
> I believe it would be better not to return 2xx until authentication
> is finished; can't you just keep sending 403?

I don't think so. One of the (IMO) core ideas of HOBA is to
better separate the handling of identifiers/identity-information
from keying material and public keys. Any real account registration
is where the former should be gathered, validated or whatever and
is an application layer concern. While we can kick that off via a
POST to .well-known/hoba/register we can't tell when its done based
on the answer to that, because there could (and likely would) be
all sorts of processes used to handle account creation that would
I think need to get a 200 OK really. So, yeah, I think we need that.

Anyway, I've taken a stab at adding the section concerned. Would
really appreciate it if you could take a peek at the new 6.1.1
in [1] (diff vs. -04 at [2] as usual.)

Thanks,
S.

[1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
[2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt


From jason.greene@redhat.com  Mon Oct  6 08:46:41 2014
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From: Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com>
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Subject: [http-auth] User directed logout
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I noticed a statement in reviewing the new mutual auth RFC:

"If a user explicitly requests to log out (via user interfaces),
 the client MUST forget the user's password, go to step 5 and
 reload the current resource without an authentication header."

This reminded me of a long standing issue with browser based =
authentication, in that brittle and browser specific hacks are required =
to get them to stop caching credentials in the case that a web =
application wishes to provide a =93log out=94 feature.

Has there been any consideration to resolving this in auth protocols =
(e.g. a user directed termination indicator of some sort)? I think this =
could be a good thing. Otherwise I don=92t see how the above text could =
actually be implemented?

--
Jason T. Greene
WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform Architect
JBoss, a division of Red Hat


From nobody Mon Oct  6 08:57:06 2014
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On 2014-10-06 17:45, Stephen Farrell wrote:
> ...
> I don't think so. One of the (IMO) core ideas of HOBA is to
> better separate the handling of identifiers/identity-information
> from keying material and public keys. Any real account registration
> is where the former should be gathered, validated or whatever and
> is an application layer concern. While we can kick that off via a
> POST to .well-known/hoba/register we can't tell when its done based
> on the answer to that, because there could (and likely would) be
> all sorts of processes used to handle account creation that would
> I think need to get a 200 OK really. So, yeah, I think we need that.
> ...

Why would these need a 200?

Anyway, I think this kind of shows that it would be good if the document 
actually contained a complete example of the message flow it's trying to 
describe.

> Anyway, I've taken a stab at adding the section concerned. Would
> really appreciate it if you could take a peek at the new 6.1.1
> in [1] (diff vs. -04 at [2] as usual.)
> ...

>  HOBAREG-val = "reg-ok" | "in-work"	
> 		
> 			Figure 3: HOBAREG Header Field Definition	

It's "/", not "|". Are the values meant to be case-insensitive? The ABNF 
says yes. (BTW there's also a mismatch with the values in prose).

I'd also spell it "Hobareg"; field names are case-insensitive, but we 
usually uppercase only the starting characters in documentation.

> 			Section 8.3.1 of [RFC7231] calls for documenting the following	
> 			details for this new header field:	
> 				
> 			o Only one single value is allowed in a HOBAREG header field.	
> 			Should more than one (a list) be encountered, that should be	
> 			interpreted as being the same as "in-work."	
> 				
> 			o The HOBAREG header field can only be used in HTTP responses.	
> 				
> 			o Since HOBAREG is only meant for responses it ought not appear in a	
> 			PUT request.	

True. Just state once it's a response header field only, then you don't 
need to mention that here.
  				
> 			o The HTTP response code does affect the interpretation of HOBAREG.	
> 			Registration is only considered to have succeeded if the reg-ok	
> 			value is seen in a 2xx response. 4xx and other errors means that	
> 			registration has failed regardless of the value of HOBAREG seen.	
> 			The request method has no influence on the interpretation of	
> 			HOBAREG.	
> 				
> 			o Intermediaries should never insert, delete or modify a HOBAREG	
> 			header field.	
> 				
> 			o It is not appropriate to list a HOBAREG in a Vary response header	
> 			field.	

Why?
		
> 			o HOBAREG is not allowed in trailers	

Why?
				
> 			o HOBAREG should not be preserved across re-directs.	

...follows from being a response header field.
				
> 			o HOBAREG itself discloses little security or privacy sensitive	
> 			information. If an attacker can somehow detect that a HOBAREG	
> 			header field is being added, then that attacker would know that	
> 			the UA is in the process of registration which could be	
> 			significant. However, it is likely that the set of messages	
> 			between the UA and server would expose this information in many	
> 			cases, regardless of whether or not TLS is used. Using TLS is	
> 			still however a good plan.

Best regards, Julian


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On 2014-10-06 17:56, Julian Reschke wrote:
> ...
>>             o It is not appropriate to list a HOBAREG in a Vary
>> response header
>>             field.
>
> Why?
> ...

Replying to myself: because it's not a request header field.

So...: just drop the considerations that apply to request header fields 
exclusively.


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Subject: Re: [http-auth] User directed logout
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On Oct 6, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com> =
wrote:

> I noticed a statement in reviewing the new mutual auth RFC:
>=20
> "If a user explicitly requests to log out (via user interfaces),
> the client MUST forget the user's password, go to step 5 and
> reload the current resource without an authentication header."
>=20
> This reminded me of a long standing issue with browser based =
authentication, in that brittle and browser specific hacks are required =
to get them to stop caching credentials in the case that a web =
application wishes to provide a =93log out=94 feature.
>=20
> Has there been any consideration to resolving this in auth protocols =
(e.g. a user directed termination indicator of some sort)? I think this =
could be a good thing. Otherwise I don=92t see how the above text could =
actually be implemented?
>=20

Hi, Jason.

When web applications offer a log-out, there is no way for them to tell =
the browser, because the browser=92s ability to cache previously-entered =
passwords is at a different layer than the HTML or javascript code that =
creates the web form. It may be possible to extend Javascript with an =
API to do this, but that would be something for W3C to do.=20

MutualAuth is at the HTTP layer. A browser can=92t support it without =
code changes. So the RFC can tell the browser vendor to delete the cache =
in certain cases. If the browser password cache is an external =
application or extension, it might not work.

Yoav



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Subject: Re: [http-auth] User directed logout
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FWIW, there are ways to prevent the password strings from being cached =
by the browser in the first place (autocomplete attribute, Javascript, =
etc.) and some OS's and browsers offer guest/privacy modes that will =
discard everything after the window/session is closed.  Not perfect, but =
I suspect any solution will need to be defined at multiple levels to =
cover all usage.


> On Oct 6, 2014, at 11:59 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>=20
>=20
> On Oct 6, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> I noticed a statement in reviewing the new mutual auth RFC:
>>=20
>> "If a user explicitly requests to log out (via user interfaces),
>> the client MUST forget the user's password, go to step 5 and
>> reload the current resource without an authentication header."
>>=20
>> This reminded me of a long standing issue with browser based =
authentication, in that brittle and browser specific hacks are required =
to get them to stop caching credentials in the case that a web =
application wishes to provide a =93log out=94 feature.
>>=20
>> Has there been any consideration to resolving this in auth protocols =
(e.g. a user directed termination indicator of some sort)? I think this =
could be a good thing. Otherwise I don=92t see how the above text could =
actually be implemented?
>>=20
>=20
> Hi, Jason.
>=20
> When web applications offer a log-out, there is no way for them to =
tell the browser, because the browser=92s ability to cache =
previously-entered passwords is at a different layer than the HTML or =
javascript code that creates the web form. It may be possible to extend =
Javascript with an API to do this, but that would be something for W3C =
to do.=20
>=20
> MutualAuth is at the HTTP layer. A browser can=92t support it without =
code changes. So the RFC can tell the browser vendor to delete the cache =
in certain cases. If the browser password cache is an external =
application or extension, it might not work.
>=20
> Yoav
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth

_________________________________________________________
Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair


From nobody Mon Oct  6 09:13:09 2014
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From: Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com>
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] User directed logout
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On Oct 6, 2014, at 10:59 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>=20
> On Oct 6, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com> =
wrote:
>=20
>> I noticed a statement in reviewing the new mutual auth RFC:
>>=20
>> "If a user explicitly requests to log out (via user interfaces),
>> the client MUST forget the user's password, go to step 5 and
>> reload the current resource without an authentication header."
>>=20
>> This reminded me of a long standing issue with browser based =
authentication, in that brittle and browser specific hacks are required =
to get them to stop caching credentials in the case that a web =
application wishes to provide a =93log out=94 feature.
>>=20
>> Has there been any consideration to resolving this in auth protocols =
(e.g. a user directed termination indicator of some sort)? I think this =
could be a good thing. Otherwise I don=92t see how the above text could =
actually be implemented?
>>=20
>=20
> Hi, Jason.
>=20
> When web applications offer a log-out, there is no way for them to =
tell the browser, because the browser=92s ability to cache =
previously-entered passwords is at a different layer than the HTML or =
javascript code that creates the web form. It may be possible to extend =
Javascript with an API to do this, but that would be something for W3C =
to do.=20

That=92s true for a client side logout mechanism, but it can also be =
server side in a similar a manner that applications can already control =
cookies and web sessions. A server vendor could provide an auth log-out =
call which would then cause the server, in an http response to include =
some credential discard indicator. The client side JS/html portion would =
then just perform an application specific POST to the server side code =
which calls the method.

This would also allow for certain server-side forced logout scenarios, =
such as a requirement that a user always re-enter their credentials =
after a set idle timeframe.

>=20
> MutualAuth is at the HTTP layer. A browser can=92t support it without =
code changes. So the RFC can tell the browser vendor to delete the cache =
in certain cases. If the browser password cache is an external =
application or extension, it might not work.

I think, but am not totally sure my above reply would address this.

--
Jason T. Greene
WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform Architect
JBoss, a division of Red Hat


From nobody Mon Oct  6 09:27:16 2014
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Hi Stephen,

On 6 Oct 2014, at 14:22, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:

>> - Figure 1: Shouldn't the unreserved values actually be base64url
>> values?
>>=20
>> - Figure 2: Ditto here - base64url encoded?
>=20
> Both are in the text, so its specified, but just not in the
> ABNF. I'm not sure if putting it there would really be of
> use though, but if someone wants to send me ABNF that does
> that and if nobody has a problem with it, I'd be ok with
> making that change. Personally, I prefer the ABNF as-is since
> I'm guess its more readable now than it would be should we
> try to define base64url encoded within the ABNF.

You can use ABNF prose:

base64url =3D <base-64 URL-safe encoded value, as defined in Section ...>

This preserves clarity, while avoiding the need to work on specific syntax.

I got confused by use of unreserved, just to discover later that a more spec=
ific syntax is actually used in several places.


From nobody Mon Oct  6 09:29:15 2014
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] User directed logout
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The issue referring to is a different scenario. I am referring to =
browser directed HTTP authentication (e.g. Basic & Digest today, mutual =
auth tomorrow), whereas you are referring to application authentication =
via form posting. So in this case there is no form, but a browser =
controlled user password pop-up. These aggressively cache passwords, to =
the extent that even a digest renogitiaton (due to nonce invalidation) =
still reuses the cached password. Aside from the hacks (which typically =
involve temporary switching of realms, or the evil user@fake-pass URL =
trick), the only reliable mechanism is to require the user exit the =
browser. However, as you know, browsers are very long running these days =
(especially on a mobile device), and asking users to quit them is just =
not a practical solution.
=20
On Oct 6, 2014, at 11:12 AM, Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com> wrote:

> FWIW, there are ways to prevent the password strings from being cached =
by the browser in the first place (autocomplete attribute, Javascript, =
etc.) and some OS's and browsers offer guest/privacy modes that will =
discard everything after the window/session is closed.  Not perfect, but =
I suspect any solution will need to be defined at multiple levels to =
cover all usage.
>=20
>=20
>> On Oct 6, 2014, at 11:59 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>=20
>>=20
>> On Oct 6, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com> =
wrote:
>>=20
>>> I noticed a statement in reviewing the new mutual auth RFC:
>>>=20
>>> "If a user explicitly requests to log out (via user interfaces),
>>> the client MUST forget the user's password, go to step 5 and
>>> reload the current resource without an authentication header."
>>>=20
>>> This reminded me of a long standing issue with browser based =
authentication, in that brittle and browser specific hacks are required =
to get them to stop caching credentials in the case that a web =
application wishes to provide a =93log out=94 feature.
>>>=20
>>> Has there been any consideration to resolving this in auth protocols =
(e.g. a user directed termination indicator of some sort)? I think this =
could be a good thing. Otherwise I don=92t see how the above text could =
actually be implemented?
>>>=20
>>=20
>> Hi, Jason.
>>=20
>> When web applications offer a log-out, there is no way for them to =
tell the browser, because the browser=92s ability to cache =
previously-entered passwords is at a different layer than the HTML or =
javascript code that creates the web form. It may be possible to extend =
Javascript with an API to do this, but that would be something for W3C =
to do.=20
>>=20
>> MutualAuth is at the HTTP layer. A browser can=92t support it without =
code changes. So the RFC can tell the browser vendor to delete the cache =
in certain cases. If the browser password cache is an external =
application or extension, it might not work.
>>=20
>> Yoav
>>=20
>>=20
>> _______________________________________________
>> http-auth mailing list
>> http-auth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>=20
> _________________________________________________________
> Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair
>=20

--
Jason T. Greene
WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform Architect
JBoss, a division of Red Hat


From nobody Mon Oct  6 09:31:51 2014
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] User directed logout
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On Oct 6, 2014, at 11:28 AM, Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com> =
wrote:
 These aggressively cache passwords, to the extent that even a digest =
renogitiaton (due to nonce invalidation) still reuses the cached =
password.=20

I should have qualified this to be =93some browsers=94. Not all are =
consistent.

=97
Jason T. Greene
WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform Architect
JBoss, a division of Red Hat


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From: Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com>
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References: <578F9F37-D924-4DD9-B355-297438019B10@redhat.com> <009C6C3A-FDB2-4CA3-95DD-4D01AD05CBD8@gmail.com> <B73A5F2E-B57C-451E-97C2-B1E90CDDA7BF@apple.com> <E719C99C-BAF4-4C6D-8F92-ED0E96F668E1@redhat.com>
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Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/http-auth/GUGWc51p4wuUr94Kx7THpvdWT6U
Cc: IETF HTTP Auth <http-auth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [http-auth] User directed logout
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Perhaps we could add a "no-cache" parameter for the HTTP Basic and HTTP =
Digest updates?  That would only work for newer browsers, but at least =
it allows the server to indicate it doesn't want the client to cache the =
username and password for future challenges?


> On Oct 6, 2014, at 12:28 PM, Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com> =
wrote:
>=20
> The issue referring to is a different scenario. I am referring to =
browser directed HTTP authentication (e.g. Basic & Digest today, mutual =
auth tomorrow), whereas you are referring to application authentication =
via form posting. So in this case there is no form, but a browser =
controlled user password pop-up. These aggressively cache passwords, to =
the extent that even a digest renogitiaton (due to nonce invalidation) =
still reuses the cached password. Aside from the hacks (which typically =
involve temporary switching of realms, or the evil user@fake-pass URL =
trick), the only reliable mechanism is to require the user exit the =
browser. However, as you know, browsers are very long running these days =
(especially on a mobile device), and asking users to quit them is just =
not a practical solution.
>=20
> On Oct 6, 2014, at 11:12 AM, Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com> wrote:
>=20
>> FWIW, there are ways to prevent the password strings from being =
cached by the browser in the first place (autocomplete attribute, =
Javascript, etc.) and some OS's and browsers offer guest/privacy modes =
that will discard everything after the window/session is closed.  Not =
perfect, but I suspect any solution will need to be defined at multiple =
levels to cover all usage.
>>=20
>>=20
>>> On Oct 6, 2014, at 11:59 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> On Oct 6, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com> =
wrote:
>>>=20
>>>> I noticed a statement in reviewing the new mutual auth RFC:
>>>>=20
>>>> "If a user explicitly requests to log out (via user interfaces),
>>>> the client MUST forget the user's password, go to step 5 and
>>>> reload the current resource without an authentication header."
>>>>=20
>>>> This reminded me of a long standing issue with browser based =
authentication, in that brittle and browser specific hacks are required =
to get them to stop caching credentials in the case that a web =
application wishes to provide a =93log out=94 feature.
>>>>=20
>>>> Has there been any consideration to resolving this in auth =
protocols (e.g. a user directed termination indicator of some sort)? I =
think this could be a good thing. Otherwise I don=92t see how the above =
text could actually be implemented?
>>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> Hi, Jason.
>>>=20
>>> When web applications offer a log-out, there is no way for them to =
tell the browser, because the browser=92s ability to cache =
previously-entered passwords is at a different layer than the HTML or =
javascript code that creates the web form. It may be possible to extend =
Javascript with an API to do this, but that would be something for W3C =
to do.=20
>>>=20
>>> MutualAuth is at the HTTP layer. A browser can=92t support it =
without code changes. So the RFC can tell the browser vendor to delete =
the cache in certain cases. If the browser password cache is an external =
application or extension, it might not work.
>>>=20
>>> Yoav
>>>=20
>>>=20
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> http-auth mailing list
>>> http-auth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>>=20
>> _________________________________________________________
>> Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair
>>=20
>=20
> --
> Jason T. Greene
> WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform Architect
> JBoss, a division of Red Hat
>=20

_________________________________________________________
Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair


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> > When web applications offer a log-out, there is no way for them to tell the browser, because the browser’s ability to cache previously-entered passwords is at a different layer than the HTML or javascript code that creates the web form. It may be possible to extend Javascript with an API to do this, but that would be something for W3C to do. 
> 
> That’s true for a client side logout mechanism, but it can also be server side in a similar a manner that applications can already control cookies and web sessions. A server vendor could provide an auth log-out call which would then cause the server, in an http response to include some credential discard indicator. The client side JS/html portion would then just perform an application specific POST to the server side code which calls the method.
> 
> This would also allow for certain server-side forced logout scenarios, such as a requirement that a user always re-enter their credentials after a set idle timeframe.


FWIW, I think this is exactly what is needed in all HTTP auth methods.
This is how cookie-based authentication systems currently handle log
outs, so web developers won't see a major shift in their approach if
they can simply add some indication to a response header that clients
should forget session credentials. 


tim


From nobody Mon Oct  6 09:33:49 2014
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04
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Hi,

> On 6 Oct 2014, at 14:39, Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de> wrote:
>=20
>> On 2014-10-06 15:22, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> ...
> >> - in the IANA sections, it would be helpful if the specification
>>> links would be more specific
>>=20
>> Not sure what you mean there. I think "[[ this document ]]" is
>> fine for IANA and the RFC editor if that's what you mean, but if
>> you mean something else can you say?
>=20
> I think it should state the specific section that thing being referenced i=
s defined in.
>=20
>> ...
>>> - for the new IANA registries, I believe you ought to specify the
>>> actual format of the registry and/or provide a registration form
>>=20
>> I don't think that's needed here really. If HOBA gets enough use
>> so that entries get added then I'd say that could be fixed when/if
>> the spec gets put on the standards track and I'm sure there'd be
>> more to fix then too.
>> ...
>=20
> Well, at least you need to say what format the registry has; for instance,=
 is the key a string? An integer?

Agreed. Syntaxes are described by various ABNF pieces, but I don't think thi=
s would be clear for IANA.


From nobody Mon Oct  6 09:54:05 2014
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From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04
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Thanks again for your help with this. Its mysterious stuff
for me;-)

On 06/10/14 16:56, Julian Reschke wrote:
> 
>>             o HOBAREG is not allowed in trailers   
> 
> Why?

Dunno to be honest. But in looking at 4.1 of 7130 I guess
it seems better to say its allowed.

Think I've made the other changes you recommended.

Cheers,
S.

[1] https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
[2]
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04.txt&url2=https://down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/misc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt


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On Oct 6, 2014, at 7:31 PM, Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com> wrote:

> Perhaps we could add a "no-cache" parameter for the HTTP Basic and =
HTTP Digest updates?  That would only work for newer browsers, but at =
least it allows the server to indicate it doesn't want the client to =
cache the username and password for future challenges?

If websites started doing that, I=92d get a password manager browser =
extension that overrode this.=20=


From nobody Mon Oct  6 10:45:07 2014
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> > Perhaps we could add a "no-cache" parameter for the HTTP Basic and HTTP Digest updates?  That would only work for newer browsers, but at least it allows the server to indicate it doesn't want the client to cache the username and password for future challenges?
> 
> If websites started doing that, I’d get a password manager browser extension that overrode this. 


I agree this doesn't seem as useful to me either. Nor does it address
the major outstanding issue in HTTP auth, being the lack of explicit
log out.

tim


From nobody Mon Oct  6 10:49:15 2014
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Hi Alexey,

On 06/10/14 17:45, Alexey Melnikov wrote:
> Hi,
> 
>> On 6 Oct 2014, at 14:39, Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> On 2014-10-06 15:22, Stephen Farrell wrote: ...
>>>> - in the IANA sections, it would be helpful if the
>>>> specification links would be more specific
>>> 
>>> Not sure what you mean there. I think "[[ this document ]]" is 
>>> fine for IANA and the RFC editor if that's what you mean, but if 
>>> you mean something else can you say?
>> 
>> I think it should state the specific section that thing being
>> referenced is defined in.
>> 
>>> ...
>>>> - for the new IANA registries, I believe you ought to specify
>>>> the actual format of the registry and/or provide a registration
>>>> form
>>> 
>>> I don't think that's needed here really. If HOBA gets enough use 
>>> so that entries get added then I'd say that could be fixed
>>> when/if the spec gets put on the standards track and I'm sure
>>> there'd be more to fix then too. ...
>> 
>> Well, at least you need to say what format the registry has; for
>> instance, is the key a string? An integer?
> 
> Agreed. Syntaxes are described by various ABNF pieces, but I don't
> think this would be clear for IANA.

As you said in your offlist mail, this is a bit OBE, so I hope
we're good to go on that part now.

Still wondering if unreserved is best for realm.

Cheers,
S.

> 
> 


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From: Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com>
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Date: Tue, 07 Oct 2014 09:36:18 -0400
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References: <8A2A44BA-D6DC-4588-A456-0796208F4BBD@gmail.com> <8BBF035E-1E19-494B-AAFE-F43E0FE2D017@apple.com> <54329781.7040308@cs.tcd.ie> <8E940011-3E25-4BDF-A8B3-9CF075A1C7D8@apple.com> <5432AA6B.60907@cs.tcd.ie>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-04
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Stephen,

> On Oct 6, 2014, at 10:42 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>> ...
>> I think I'd feel more comfortable with either defining something or
>> being up front about it not being defined after the list of things
>> that HOBA does, e.g.:
>> 
>> HOBA currently does not define a mechanism for deleting the
>> association between an existing CPK and an account.  Such a mechanism
>> can be implemented at the application layer.
> 
> I've no problem putting that in. (So I did:-)

OK, so my only remaining nit here is that it is still part of the list of things that HOBA provides.  I suggest just moving this bullet to be a paragraph following the list.

_________________________________________________________
Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair


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On 07/10/14 14:36, Michael Sweet wrote:
> Stephen,
> 
>> On Oct 6, 2014, at 10:42 AM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>> ...
>>> I think I'd feel more comfortable with either defining something or
>>> being up front about it not being defined after the list of things
>>> that HOBA does, e.g.:
>>>
>>> HOBA currently does not define a mechanism for deleting the
>>> association between an existing CPK and an account.  Such a mechanism
>>> can be implemented at the application layer.
>>
>> I've no problem putting that in. (So I did:-)
> 
> OK, so my only remaining nit here is that it is still part of the list of things that HOBA provides.  I suggest just moving this bullet to be a paragraph following the list.

Fair point. Done at usual places.

S.

PS: Chairs - I plan to submit -05 late today my TZ if no
more stuff arises. Yell at me if that's a bad plan.




> _________________________________________________________
> Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair
> 
> 
> 


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Hi all

Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.  The =
authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for publication, =
and it=92s time for the group to weigh in on this subject.

This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please take =
the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about its =
security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish to =
discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended status =
of this document is standards track, and it describes slight =
modifications to a protocol that is widely implemented and deployed.

The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send your =
reviews as replies to this message.

Thanks,

Yoav & Matt=


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Since I got such good reviews for HOBA I thought I'd try
reciprocate:-)

I think this is basically ready to go forward. There're
some things could be improved but nothing fatal.

Cheers,
S.


things that might be worth chatting about:
-----------------------------------------

- 3.3: domain parameter - is there a security
consideration or even a MUST needed about use
of TLS being consistent across all these
off-host URIs?

- 3.3, "domain": Is "responding server" not a
bit ambiguous?  That might be better to refer
to the web origin or maybe be specific about
the host/port/scheme bits you do mean if 2617
dictates that.

- 3.3, "nonce": the example given will repeat
within the same second with a 1-second
granularity time-stamp so seems like a bad
example to me. A better example could easily be
generated I bet, e.g. using HMAC-SHA256 maybe.

- 3.4: login failure being logged - is there
text saying to be careful in what you log so
that you won't put a cleartext password (e.g.
entered into the username field) into the log?

- 3.4.4: What is "H" here - is it the same as
something else or what? I think you need to say
which hash alg to use there. The same point
comes up elsewhere too, I've noted some below.

- 3.4.6: Do you need to say if Method is upper
case or what?

- 3.5, "rspauth": Same "What is H?" question
applies here I think.

- 5.12: I think this should be much more
prominent since this section describes what
actually happens - this is the threat to be
most worried about.

- 5.13: I didn't see it stated that users often
re-use passwords over >1 site (on average 8
apparently) so even if someone does a great job
with their implementation they remain
vulnerable to all the other crappy sites out
there using passwords.

minor things and nits:
---------------------

- 3.3, para 1: s/and include/and includes/

- 3.3, "nonce": is the should be unique there
sufficient? It's always nice to say when its ok
to not do what a SHOULD says but you don't.
(Not a big deal though.)

- 3.3, "nonce": "private-key" is a bad term to
use there, "secret-data" would be better.  You
also don't say what "H" might be - yes, it is
obvious but sure that's the kind of comment you
expect here right:-)

- 3,3, "stale": I think TRUE and FALSE here are
case insensitive, is that right? Would it be
good to say?

- 3.3, "algorithm": is the text at end starting
with "i.e., the digest..." misplaced? Should it
come before the example?

- 3,3, "userhash": s/Valid value/Valid values/
and I note you use lowercase for true and false
here but earlier used uppercase - why?

- 3.4, cnonce: ".in 3" before this is some kind
of nroff glitch I guess,

- 3.4.2, s/herin/herein/

- 5.2, 2nd para, maybe s/it is intended/it was
intended/ would be better?

- 5.2, referring to SHTTP seems silly, its dead
as a do-do isn't it?

- 5.8, the MD5 specific point is no longer
quote correct given the other hash functions
added here


On 07/10/14 18:34, Yoav Nir wrote:
> Hi all
> 
> Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.  The
> authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for
> publication, and it’s time for the group to weigh in on this
> subject.
> 
> This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please
> take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about
> its security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish
> to discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended
> status of this document is standards track, and it describes slight
> modifications to a protocol that is widely implemented and deployed.
> 
> The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send
> your reviews as replies to this message.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Yoav & Matt _______________________________________________ http-auth
> mailing list http-auth@ietf.org 
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> 
> 


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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Authentication Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : HTTP Origin-Bound Authentication (HOBA)
        Authors         : Stephen Farrell
                          Paul Hoffman
                          Michael Thomas
	Filename        : draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05.txt
	Pages           : 24
	Date            : 2014-10-07

Abstract:
   HTTP Origin-Bound Authentication (HOBA) is a design for an HTTP
   authentication method with credentials that are not vulnerable to
   phishing attacks, and that does not require any server-side password
   database.  The design can also be used in Javascript-based
   authentication embedded in HTML.  HOBA is an alternative to HTTP
   authentication schemes that require passwords.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-05


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Thu Oct  9 02:55:42 2014
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Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 10:55:37 +0100
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From: Cameron Jones <cmhjones@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] User directed logout
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On Mon, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:59 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> On Oct 6, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Jason Greene <jason.greene@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> > I noticed a statement in reviewing the new mutual auth RFC:
> >
> > "If a user explicitly requests to log out (via user interfaces),
> > the client MUST forget the user's password, go to step 5 and
> > reload the current resource without an authentication header."
> >
> > This reminded me of a long standing issue with browser based
> authentication, in that brittle and browser specific hacks are required t=
o
> get them to stop caching credentials in the case that a web application
> wishes to provide a =E2=80=9Clog out=E2=80=9D feature.
> >
> > Has there been any consideration to resolving this in auth protocols
> (e.g. a user directed termination indicator of some sort)? I think this
> could be a good thing. Otherwise I don=E2=80=99t see how the above text c=
ould
> actually be implemented?
> >
>
> Hi, Jason.
>
> When web applications offer a log-out, there is no way for them to tell
> the browser, because the browser=E2=80=99s ability to cache previously-en=
tered
> passwords is at a different layer than the HTML or javascript code that
> creates the web form. It may be possible to extend Javascript with an API
> to do this, but that would be something for W3C to do.
>
>
The Form HTTP Extensions specification defines some new controls within
HTML for a high level hook into providing logout functionality over HTTP
authentication. There is also frequent discussions about providing a
Javascript API but an actual specification is still pending.

http://www.w3.org/TR/form-http-extensions/

Thanks,
Cameron Jones



> MutualAuth is at the HTTP layer. A browser can=E2=80=99t support it witho=
ut code
> changes. So the RFC can tell the browser vendor to delete the cache in
> certain cases. If the browser password cache is an external application o=
r
> extension, it might not work.
>
> Yoav
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>

--001a11c3e5ee2decfa0504fa6fe9
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On M=
on, Oct 6, 2014 at 4:59 PM, Yoav Nir <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailt=
o:ynir.ietf@gmail.com" target=3D"_blank">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>=
 wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.=
8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D=
""><br>
On Oct 6, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Jason Greene &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:jason.greene=
@redhat.com">jason.greene@redhat.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; I noticed a statement in reviewing the new mutual auth RFC:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; &quot;If a user explicitly requests to log out (via user interfaces),<=
br>
&gt; the client MUST forget the user&#39;s password, go to step 5 and<br>
&gt; reload the current resource without an authentication header.&quot;<br=
>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This reminded me of a long standing issue with browser based authentic=
ation, in that brittle and browser specific hacks are required to get them =
to stop caching credentials in the case that a web application wishes to pr=
ovide a =E2=80=9Clog out=E2=80=9D feature.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Has there been any consideration to resolving this in auth protocols (=
e.g. a user directed termination indicator of some sort)? I think this coul=
d be a good thing. Otherwise I don=E2=80=99t see how the above text could a=
ctually be implemented?<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
</span>Hi, Jason.<br>
<br>
When web applications offer a log-out, there is no way for them to tell the=
 browser, because the browser=E2=80=99s ability to cache previously-entered=
 passwords is at a different layer than the HTML or javascript code that cr=
eates the web form. It may be possible to extend Javascript with an API to =
do this, but that would be something for W3C to do.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The Form HTTP Extensions specification=
 defines some new controls within HTML for a high level hook into providing=
 logout functionality over HTTP authentication. There is also frequent disc=
ussions about providing a Javascript API but an actual specification is sti=
ll pending.<br><br><a href=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/form-http-extensions/">h=
ttp://www.w3.org/TR/form-http-extensions/</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>=
Thanks,<br>Cameron Jones<br></div><div><br>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D=
"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(2=
04,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
MutualAuth is at the HTTP layer. A browser can=E2=80=99t support it without=
 code changes. So the RFC can tell the browser vendor to delete the cache i=
n certain cases. If the browser password cache is an external application o=
r extension, it might not work.<br>
<span class=3D""><font color=3D"#888888"><br>
Yoav<br>
</font></span><div class=3D""><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
http-auth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org">http-auth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a11c3e5ee2decfa0504fa6fe9--


From nobody Sat Oct 11 11:12:17 2014
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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
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Thanks for your review and comments, Stephen.

Please, see my reply inline...

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
> Since I got such good reviews for HOBA I thought I'd try
> reciprocate:-)
>
> I think this is basically ready to go forward. There're
> some things could be improved but nothing fatal.
>
> Cheers,
> S.
>
>
> things that might be worth chatting about:
> -----------------------------------------
>
> - 3.3: domain parameter - is there a security
> consideration or even a MUST needed about use
> of TLS being consistent across all these
> off-host URIs?
>
>
See section 5.1



> - 3.3, "domain": Is "responding server" not a
> bit ambiguous?  That might be better to refer
> to the web origin or maybe be specific about
> the host/port/scheme bits you do mean if 2617
> dictates that.
>
>
The term "server being accessed" was used earlier in that same paragraph. I
will replace "responding server" with "server being accessed"; are you ok
with that?



> - 3.3, "nonce": the example given will repeat
> within the same second with a 1-second
> granularity time-stamp so seems like a bad
> example to me. A better example could easily be
> generated I bet, e.g. using HMAC-SHA256 maybe.
>
>
You are assuming that the time-stamp does not include milliseconds; right?



> - 3.4: login failure being logged - is there
> text saying to be careful in what you log so
> that you won't put a cleartext password (e.g.
> entered into the username field) into the log?
>
>
Can you propose some text?



> - 3.4.4: What is "H" here - is it the same as
> something else or what? I think you need to say
> which hash alg to use there. The same point
> comes up elsewhere too, I've noted some below.
>
>
This should be the same algorithm used to protect the credentials. I will
clarify that.
The H() notation is defined in section 3.3 under the 'algorithm" parameter
definition.



> - 3.4.6: Do you need to say if Method is upper
> case or what?
>
>
Ok.



> - 3.5, "rspauth": Same "What is H?" question
> applies here I think.
>
> - 5.12: I think this should be much more
> prominent since this section describes what
> actually happens - this is the threat to be
> most worried about.
>
>
What do you mean by "more prominent"?
If I move this section to be section 5.2, would that be prominent enough
for you?



> - 5.13: I didn't see it stated that users often
> re-use passwords over >1 site (on average 8
> apparently) so even if someone does a great job
> with their implementation they remain
> vulnerable to all the other crappy sites out
> there using passwords.
>
>
I can add some text around that.




> minor things and nits:
> ---------------------
>
> - 3.3, para 1: s/and include/and includes/
>
> Ok


> - 3.3, "nonce": is the should be unique there
> sufficient? It's always nice to say when its ok
> to not do what a SHOULD says but you don't.
> (Not a big deal though.)
>
> - 3.3, "nonce": "private-key" is a bad term to
> use there, "secret-data" would be better.  You
> also don't say what "H" might be - yes, it is
> obvious but sure that's the kind of comment you
> expect here right:-)
>
> Ok



> - 3,3, "stale": I think TRUE and FALSE here are
> case insensitive, is that right? Would it be
> good to say?
>
>
The parameter is already defined as "A case-insensitive flag,"



> - 3.3, "algorithm": is the text at end starting
> with "i.e., the digest..." misplaced? Should it
> come before the example?
>
>
No. This text should be more generic, and aligned with the text above the
example; I will fix that.



> - 3,3, "userhash": s/Valid value/Valid values/
> and I note you use lowercase for true and false
> here but earlier used uppercase - why?
>
>
Lowercase values are consistently used for this parameter already.



> - 3.4, cnonce: ".in 3" before this is some kind
> of nroff glitch I guess,
>
> Yes



> - 3.4.2, s/herin/herein/
>
>
Ok



> - 5.2, 2nd para, maybe s/it is intended/it was
> intended/ would be better?
>
>
Ok



> - 5.2, referring to SHTTP seems silly, its dead
> as a do-do isn't it?
>
>
Ok



> - 5.8, the MD5 specific point is no longer
> quote correct given the other hash functions
> added here
>
>
Ok



Regards,
 Rifaat



>
> On 07/10/14 18:34, Yoav Nir wrote:
> > Hi all
> >
> > Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.  The
> > authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for
> > publication, and it's time for the group to weigh in on this
> > subject.
> >
> > This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please
> > take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about
> > its security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish
> > to discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended
> > status of this document is standards track, and it describes slight
> > modifications to a protocol that is widely implemented and deployed.
> >
> > The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send
> > your reviews as replies to this message.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Yoav & Matt _______________________________________________ http-auth
> > mailing list http-auth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> >
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>

--001a11c34238abf3c00505299a36
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks for your review and comments, Stephen.<div><br></di=
v><div>Please, see my reply inline...</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</di=
v><div>&nbsp;Rifaat</div><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div=
 class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Stephen Farrell <spa=
n dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_b=
lank">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;bo=
rder-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">=
<br>
Since I got such good reviews for HOBA I thought I&#39;d try<br>
reciprocate:-)<br>
<br>
I think this is basically ready to go forward. There&#39;re<br>
some things could be improved but nothing fatal.<br>
<br>
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<br>
<br>
things that might be worth chatting about:<br>
-----------------------------------------<br>
<br>
- 3.3: domain parameter - is there a security<br>
consideration or even a MUST needed about use<br>
of TLS being consistent across all these<br>
off-host URIs?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>See section 5.1</div><div><br></div><d=
iv>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0p=
x 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-lef=
t-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
- 3.3, &quot;domain&quot;: Is &quot;responding server&quot; not a<br>
bit ambiguous?&nbsp; That might be better to refer<br>
to the web origin or maybe be specific about<br>
the host/port/scheme bits you do mean if 2617<br>
dictates that.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The term &quot;server being accessed&q=
uot; was used earlier in that same paragraph. I will replace &quot;respondi=
ng server&quot; with &quot;server being accessed&quot;; are you ok with tha=
t?</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rg=
b(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
- 3.3, &quot;nonce&quot;: the example given will repeat<br>
within the same second with a 1-second<br>
granularity time-stamp so seems like a bad<br>
example to me. A better example could easily be<br>
generated I bet, e.g. using HMAC-SHA256 maybe.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>You are assuming that the time-stamp d=
oes not include milliseconds; right?</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;pa=
dding-left:1ex">
- 3.4: login failure being logged - is there<br>
text saying to be careful in what you log so<br>
that you won&#39;t put a cleartext password (e.g.<br>
entered into the username field) into the log?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Can you propose some text?</div><div><=
br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)=
;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
- 3.4.4: What is &quot;H&quot; here - is it the same as<br>
something else or what? I think you need to say<br>
which hash alg to use there. The same point<br>
comes up elsewhere too, I&#39;ve noted some below.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This should be the same algorithm used=
 to protect the credentials. I will clarify that.</div><div>The H() notatio=
n is defined in section 3.3 under the &#39;algorithm&quot; parameter defini=
tion.</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote=
" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color=
:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
- 3.4.6: Do you need to say if Method is upper<br>
case or what?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok.</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</d=
iv><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bord=
er-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:soli=
d;padding-left:1ex">
- 3.5, &quot;rspauth&quot;: Same &quot;What is H?&quot; question<br>
applies here I think.<br>
<br>
- 5.12: I think this should be much more<br>
prominent since this section describes what<br>
actually happens - this is the threat to be<br>
most worried about.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>What do you mean by &quot;more promine=
nt&quot;?&nbsp;</div><div>If I move this section to be section 5.2, would t=
hat be prominent enough for you?</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;<br></div><=
blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l=
eft-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;pa=
dding-left:1ex">
- 5.13: I didn&#39;t see it stated that users often<br>
re-use passwords over &gt;1 site (on average 8<br>
apparently) so even if someone does a great job<br>
with their implementation they remain<br>
vulnerable to all the other crappy sites out<br>
there using passwords.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I can add some text around that.</div>=
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-c=
olor:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
minor things and nits:<br>
---------------------<br>
<br>
- 3.3, para 1: s/and include/and includes/<br>
<br></blockquote><div>Ok</div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_q=
uote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-c=
olor:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
- 3.3, &quot;nonce&quot;: is the should be unique there<br>
sufficient? It&#39;s always nice to say when its ok<br>
to not do what a SHOULD says but you don&#39;t.<br>
(Not a big deal though.)<br>
<br>
- 3.3, &quot;nonce&quot;: &quot;private-key&quot; is a bad term to<br>
use there, &quot;secret-data&quot; would be better.&nbsp; You<br>
also don&#39;t say what &quot;H&quot; might be - yes, it is<br>
obvious but sure that&#39;s the kind of comment you<br>
expect here right:-)<br>
<br></blockquote><div>Ok</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote c=
lass=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1p=
x;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1=
ex">
- 3,3, &quot;stale&quot;: I think TRUE and FALSE here are<br>
case insensitive, is that right? Would it be<br>
good to say?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The parameter is already defined as &q=
uot;<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap">A case-insensitiv=
e flag,</span>&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;bo=
rder-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
- 3.3, &quot;algorithm&quot;: is the text at end starting<br>
with &quot;i.e., the digest...&quot; misplaced? Should it<br>
come before the example?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No. This text should be more generic, =
and aligned with the text above the example; I will fix that.</div><div><br=
></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);b=
order-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
- 3,3, &quot;userhash&quot;: s/Valid value/Valid values/<br>
and I note you use lowercase for true and false<br>
here but earlier used uppercase - why?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Lowercase values are consistently used=
 for this parameter already.&nbsp;</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><bl=
ockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-lef=
t-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">
- 3.4, cnonce: &quot;.in 3&quot; before this is some kind<br>
of nroff glitch I guess,<br>
<br></blockquote><div>Yes</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1=
px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:=
1ex">
- 3.4.2, s/herin/herein/<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid=
;padding-left:1ex">
- 5.2, 2nd para, maybe s/it is intended/it was<br>
intended/ would be better?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid=
;padding-left:1ex">
- 5.2, referring to SHTTP seems silly, its dead<br>
as a do-do isn&#39;t it?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</di=
v><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;borde=
r-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid=
;padding-left:1ex">
- 5.8, the MD5 specific point is no longer<br>
quote correct given the other hash functions<br>
added here<br>
<div><div><br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok</div><div><br=
></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>&nbsp;Rifaat</=
div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=
=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(20=
4,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div>
<br>
On 07/10/14 18:34, Yoav Nir wrote:<br>
&gt; Hi all<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.&nbsp; T=
he<br>
&gt; authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for<br>
&gt; publication, and it&rsquo;s time for the group to weigh in on this<br>
&gt; subject.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please<br>
&gt; take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about<br=
>
&gt; its security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish<br=
>
&gt; to discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended<b=
r>
&gt; status of this document is standards track, and it describes slight<br=
>
&gt; modifications to a protocol that is widely implemented and deployed.<b=
r>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send<br>
&gt; your reviews as replies to this message.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Yoav &amp; Matt _______________________________________________ http-a=
uth<br>
&gt; mailing list <a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">h=
ttp-auth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
http-auth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">http-auth@ietf.org<=
/a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

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On 11/10/14 19:12, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
> Thanks for your review and comments, Stephen.

No probs.

> 
> Please, see my reply inline...
> 
> Regards,
>  Rifaat
> 
> 
> On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
> wrote:
> 
>>
>> Since I got such good reviews for HOBA I thought I'd try
>> reciprocate:-)
>>
>> I think this is basically ready to go forward. There're
>> some things could be improved but nothing fatal.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> S.
>>
>>
>> things that might be worth chatting about:
>> -----------------------------------------
>>
>> - 3.3: domain parameter - is there a security
>> consideration or even a MUST needed about use
>> of TLS being consistent across all these
>> off-host URIs?
>>
>>
> See section 5.1

I don't think its there. What you might want to say is
that all URIs in the domain param list SHOULD all use
the same scheme (https or http), but that mixing them
is a bad idea

> 
> 
> 
>> - 3.3, "domain": Is "responding server" not a
>> bit ambiguous?  That might be better to refer
>> to the web origin or maybe be specific about
>> the host/port/scheme bits you do mean if 2617
>> dictates that.
>>
>>
> The term "server being accessed" was used earlier in that same paragraph. I
> will replace "responding server" with "server being accessed"; are you ok
> with that?

I'm ok either way, but it's a bit ambiguous compared
to the web-origin maybe - since 2617 pre-dates the SOP
I'm not sure if they're totally consistent

>> - 3.3, "nonce": the example given will repeat
>> within the same second with a 1-second
>> granularity time-stamp so seems like a bad
>> example to me. A better example could easily be
>> generated I bet, e.g. using HMAC-SHA256 maybe.
>>
>>
> You are assuming that the time-stamp does not include milliseconds; right?

Right. As is often the case. And 1ms is still relatively
long or maybe will be considered so in future. Maybe just
say that a timestamp with micro- or nano-seconds is good.

> 
> 
> 
>> - 3.4: login failure being logged - is there
>> text saying to be careful in what you log so
>> that you won't put a cleartext password (e.g.
>> entered into the username field) into the log?
>>
>>
> Can you propose some text?

How about:

"Be careful in what you log so that you won't put
a cleartext password (e.g. entered into the username
field) into the log."

:-)

> 
> 
> 
>> - 3.4.4: What is "H" here - is it the same as
>> something else or what? I think you need to say
>> which hash alg to use there. The same point
>> comes up elsewhere too, I've noted some below.
>>
>>
> This should be the same algorithm used to protect the credentials. I will
> clarify that.
> The H() notation is defined in section 3.3 under the 'algorithm" parameter
> definition.
> 
> 
> 
>> - 3.4.6: Do you need to say if Method is upper
>> case or what?
>>
>>
> Ok.
> 
> 
> 
>> - 3.5, "rspauth": Same "What is H?" question
>> applies here I think.
>>
>> - 5.12: I think this should be much more
>> prominent since this section describes what
>> actually happens - this is the threat to be
>> most worried about.
>>
>>
> What do you mean by "more prominent"?
> If I move this section to be section 5.2, would that be prominent enough
> for you?

Right. Were it me I'd say it in the abstract and intro
as well.

I think the rest is fine. (And to be clear I think the draft is
good enough already, we're just polishing here I reckon.)

Cheers,
S.

> 
> 
> 
>> - 5.13: I didn't see it stated that users often
>> re-use passwords over >1 site (on average 8
>> apparently) so even if someone does a great job
>> with their implementation they remain
>> vulnerable to all the other crappy sites out
>> there using passwords.
>>
>>
> I can add some text around that.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> minor things and nits:
>> ---------------------
>>
>> - 3.3, para 1: s/and include/and includes/
>>
>> Ok
> 
> 
>> - 3.3, "nonce": is the should be unique there
>> sufficient? It's always nice to say when its ok
>> to not do what a SHOULD says but you don't.
>> (Not a big deal though.)
>>
>> - 3.3, "nonce": "private-key" is a bad term to
>> use there, "secret-data" would be better.  You
>> also don't say what "H" might be - yes, it is
>> obvious but sure that's the kind of comment you
>> expect here right:-)
>>
>> Ok
> 
> 
> 
>> - 3,3, "stale": I think TRUE and FALSE here are
>> case insensitive, is that right? Would it be
>> good to say?
>>
>>
> The parameter is already defined as "A case-insensitive flag,"
> 
> 
> 
>> - 3.3, "algorithm": is the text at end starting
>> with "i.e., the digest..." misplaced? Should it
>> come before the example?
>>
>>
> No. This text should be more generic, and aligned with the text above the
> example; I will fix that.
> 
> 
> 
>> - 3,3, "userhash": s/Valid value/Valid values/
>> and I note you use lowercase for true and false
>> here but earlier used uppercase - why?
>>
>>
> Lowercase values are consistently used for this parameter already.
> 
> 
> 
>> - 3.4, cnonce: ".in 3" before this is some kind
>> of nroff glitch I guess,
>>
>> Yes
> 
> 
> 
>> - 3.4.2, s/herin/herein/
>>
>>
> Ok
> 
> 
> 
>> - 5.2, 2nd para, maybe s/it is intended/it was
>> intended/ would be better?
>>
>>
> Ok
> 
> 
> 
>> - 5.2, referring to SHTTP seems silly, its dead
>> as a do-do isn't it?
>>
>>
> Ok
> 
> 
> 
>> - 5.8, the MD5 specific point is no longer
>> quote correct given the other hash functions
>> added here
>>
>>
> Ok
> 
> 
> 
> Regards,
>  Rifaat
> 
> 
> 
>>
>> On 07/10/14 18:34, Yoav Nir wrote:
>>> Hi all
>>>
>>> Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.  The
>>> authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for
>>> publication, and it's time for the group to weigh in on this
>>> subject.
>>>
>>> This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please
>>> take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about
>>> its security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish
>>> to discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended
>>> status of this document is standards track, and it describes slight
>>> modifications to a protocol that is widely implemented and deployed.
>>>
>>> The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send
>>> your reviews as replies to this message.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Yoav & Matt _______________________________________________ http-auth
>>> mailing list http-auth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>>>
>>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> http-auth mailing list
>> http-auth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>>
> 


From nobody Sat Oct 11 12:42:33 2014
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References: <8490DD1D-3C9C-48E2-83B7-F44CCD439CCC@gmail.com> <5434609C.3090603@cs.tcd.ie> <CAGL6epJYfd-uKFo5Sc2xw=JYoBqCVBacfkoYhzf=+tqWfLHXfQ@mail.gmail.com> <54398549.4040701@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2014 15:42:25 -0400
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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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--001a1132e99a6d886205052addd7
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
wrote:

>
>
>
> On 11/10/14 19:12, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
> > Thanks for your review and comments, Stephen.
>
> No probs.
>
> >
> > Please, see my reply inline...
> >
> > Regards,
> >  Rifaat
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Stephen Farrell <
> stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
> > wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Since I got such good reviews for HOBA I thought I'd try
> >> reciprocate:-)
> >>
> >> I think this is basically ready to go forward. There're
> >> some things could be improved but nothing fatal.
> >>
> >> Cheers,
> >> S.
> >>
> >>
> >> things that might be worth chatting about:
> >> -----------------------------------------
> >>
> >> - 3.3: domain parameter - is there a security
> >> consideration or even a MUST needed about use
> >> of TLS being consistent across all these
> >> off-host URIs?
> >>
> >>
> > See section 5.1
>
> I don't think its there. What you might want to say is
> that all URIs in the domain param list SHOULD all use
> the same scheme (https or http), but that mixing them
> is a bad idea
>
>
Ok.



> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3.3, "domain": Is "responding server" not a
> >> bit ambiguous?  That might be better to refer
> >> to the web origin or maybe be specific about
> >> the host/port/scheme bits you do mean if 2617
> >> dictates that.
> >>
> >>
> > The term "server being accessed" was used earlier in that same
> paragraph. I
> > will replace "responding server" with "server being accessed"; are you ok
> > with that?
>
> I'm ok either way, but it's a bit ambiguous compared
> to the web-origin maybe - since 2617 pre-dates the SOP
> I'm not sure if they're totally consistent
>
>
Ok



> >> - 3.3, "nonce": the example given will repeat
> >> within the same second with a 1-second
> >> granularity time-stamp so seems like a bad
> >> example to me. A better example could easily be
> >> generated I bet, e.g. using HMAC-SHA256 maybe.
> >>
> >>
> > You are assuming that the time-stamp does not include milliseconds;
> right?
>
> Right. As is often the case. And 1ms is still relatively
> long or maybe will be considered so in future. Maybe just
> say that a timestamp with micro- or nano-seconds is good.
>
>
Ok



> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3.4: login failure being logged - is there
> >> text saying to be careful in what you log so
> >> that you won't put a cleartext password (e.g.
> >> entered into the username field) into the log?
> >>
> >>
> > Can you propose some text?
>
> How about:
>
> "Be careful in what you log so that you won't put
> a cleartext password (e.g. entered into the username
> field) into the log."
>
> :-)
>
>
Sure :)



> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3.4.4: What is "H" here - is it the same as
> >> something else or what? I think you need to say
> >> which hash alg to use there. The same point
> >> comes up elsewhere too, I've noted some below.
> >>
> >>
> > This should be the same algorithm used to protect the credentials. I will
> > clarify that.
> > The H() notation is defined in section 3.3 under the 'algorithm"
> parameter
> > definition.
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3.4.6: Do you need to say if Method is upper
> >> case or what?
> >>
> >>
> > Ok.
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3.5, "rspauth": Same "What is H?" question
> >> applies here I think.
> >>
> >> - 5.12: I think this should be much more
> >> prominent since this section describes what
> >> actually happens - this is the threat to be
> >> most worried about.
> >>
> >>
> > What do you mean by "more prominent"?
> > If I move this section to be section 5.2, would that be prominent enough
> > for you?
>
> Right. Were it me I'd say it in the abstract and intro
> as well.
>
>
I will move it to section 5.2



> I think the rest is fine. (And to be clear I think the draft is
> good enough already, we're just polishing here I reckon.)
>
>
Great. Thanks again for your careful review; I appreciate that.

Regards,
 Rifaat




> Cheers,
> S.
>
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 5.13: I didn't see it stated that users often
> >> re-use passwords over >1 site (on average 8
> >> apparently) so even if someone does a great job
> >> with their implementation they remain
> >> vulnerable to all the other crappy sites out
> >> there using passwords.
> >>
> >>
> > I can add some text around that.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> minor things and nits:
> >> ---------------------
> >>
> >> - 3.3, para 1: s/and include/and includes/
> >>
> >> Ok
> >
> >
> >> - 3.3, "nonce": is the should be unique there
> >> sufficient? It's always nice to say when its ok
> >> to not do what a SHOULD says but you don't.
> >> (Not a big deal though.)
> >>
> >> - 3.3, "nonce": "private-key" is a bad term to
> >> use there, "secret-data" would be better.  You
> >> also don't say what "H" might be - yes, it is
> >> obvious but sure that's the kind of comment you
> >> expect here right:-)
> >>
> >> Ok
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3,3, "stale": I think TRUE and FALSE here are
> >> case insensitive, is that right? Would it be
> >> good to say?
> >>
> >>
> > The parameter is already defined as "A case-insensitive flag,"
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3.3, "algorithm": is the text at end starting
> >> with "i.e., the digest..." misplaced? Should it
> >> come before the example?
> >>
> >>
> > No. This text should be more generic, and aligned with the text above the
> > example; I will fix that.
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3,3, "userhash": s/Valid value/Valid values/
> >> and I note you use lowercase for true and false
> >> here but earlier used uppercase - why?
> >>
> >>
> > Lowercase values are consistently used for this parameter already.
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3.4, cnonce: ".in 3" before this is some kind
> >> of nroff glitch I guess,
> >>
> >> Yes
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 3.4.2, s/herin/herein/
> >>
> >>
> > Ok
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 5.2, 2nd para, maybe s/it is intended/it was
> >> intended/ would be better?
> >>
> >>
> > Ok
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 5.2, referring to SHTTP seems silly, its dead
> >> as a do-do isn't it?
> >>
> >>
> > Ok
> >
> >
> >
> >> - 5.8, the MD5 specific point is no longer
> >> quote correct given the other hash functions
> >> added here
> >>
> >>
> > Ok
> >
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> >  Rifaat
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >> On 07/10/14 18:34, Yoav Nir wrote:
> >>> Hi all
> >>>
> >>> Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.  The
> >>> authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for
> >>> publication, and it's time for the group to weigh in on this
> >>> subject.
> >>>
> >>> This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please
> >>> take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about
> >>> its security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish
> >>> to discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended
> >>> status of this document is standards track, and it describes slight
> >>> modifications to a protocol that is widely implemented and deployed.
> >>>
> >>> The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send
> >>> your reviews as replies to this message.
> >>>
> >>> Thanks,
> >>>
> >>> Yoav & Matt _______________________________________________ http-auth
> >>> mailing list http-auth@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> http-auth mailing list
> >> http-auth@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
> >>
> >
>

--001a1132e99a6d886205052addd7
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Sat, Oct 11, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Stephen Farrell <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;=
<a href=3D"mailto:stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie" target=3D"_blank">stephen.farr=
ell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" st=
yle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span=
 class=3D""><br>
<br>
<br>
On 11/10/14 19:12, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:<br>
&gt; Thanks for your review and comments, Stephen.<br>
<br>
</span>No probs.<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Please, see my reply inline...<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt;=A0 Rifaat<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Stephen Farrell &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:=
stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie">stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie</a>&gt;<br>
&gt; wrote:<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Since I got such good reviews for HOBA I thought I&#39;d try<br>
&gt;&gt; reciprocate:-)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; I think this is basically ready to go forward. There&#39;re<br>
&gt;&gt; some things could be improved but nothing fatal.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Cheers,<br>
&gt;&gt; S.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; things that might be worth chatting about:<br>
&gt;&gt; -----------------------------------------<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.3: domain parameter - is there a security<br>
&gt;&gt; consideration or even a MUST needed about use<br>
&gt;&gt; of TLS being consistent across all these<br>
&gt;&gt; off-host URIs?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; See section 5.1<br>
<br>
</span>I don&#39;t think its there. What you might want to say is<br>
that all URIs in the domain param list SHOULD all use<br>
the same scheme (https or http), but that mixing them<br>
is a bad idea<br>
<span class=3D""><br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok.</div><div>=
<br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0=
 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.3, &quot;domain&quot;: Is &quot;responding server&quot; not a<=
br>
&gt;&gt; bit ambiguous?=A0 That might be better to refer<br>
&gt;&gt; to the web origin or maybe be specific about<br>
&gt;&gt; the host/port/scheme bits you do mean if 2617<br>
&gt;&gt; dictates that.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; The term &quot;server being accessed&quot; was used earlier in that sa=
me paragraph. I<br>
&gt; will replace &quot;responding server&quot; with &quot;server being acc=
essed&quot;; are you ok<br>
&gt; with that?<br>
<br>
</span>I&#39;m ok either way, but it&#39;s a bit ambiguous compared<br>
to the web-origin maybe - since 2617 pre-dates the SOP<br>
I&#39;m not sure if they&#39;re totally consistent<br>
<span class=3D""><br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok</div><div><=
br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt;&gt; - 3.3, &quot;nonce&quot;: the example given will repeat<br>
&gt;&gt; within the same second with a 1-second<br>
&gt;&gt; granularity time-stamp so seems like a bad<br>
&gt;&gt; example to me. A better example could easily be<br>
&gt;&gt; generated I bet, e.g. using HMAC-SHA256 maybe.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; You are assuming that the time-stamp does not include milliseconds; ri=
ght?<br>
<br>
</span>Right. As is often the case. And 1ms is still relatively<br>
long or maybe will be considered so in future. Maybe just<br>
say that a timestamp with micro- or nano-seconds is good.<br>
<span class=3D""><br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ok</div><div><=
br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 =
0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D"">
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.4: login failure being logged - is there<br>
&gt;&gt; text saying to be careful in what you log so<br>
&gt;&gt; that you won&#39;t put a cleartext password (e.g.<br>
&gt;&gt; entered into the username field) into the log?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; Can you propose some text?<br>
<br>
</span>How about:<br>
<span class=3D""><br>
&quot;Be careful in what you log so that you won&#39;t put<br>
a cleartext password (e.g. entered into the username<br>
</span>field) into the log.&quot;<br>
<br>
:-)<br>
<span class=3D""><br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sure :)</div><=
div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"marg=
in:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span class=3D""=
>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.4.4: What is &quot;H&quot; here - is it the same as<br>
&gt;&gt; something else or what? I think you need to say<br>
&gt;&gt; which hash alg to use there. The same point<br>
&gt;&gt; comes up elsewhere too, I&#39;ve noted some below.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; This should be the same algorithm used to protect the credentials. I w=
ill<br>
&gt; clarify that.<br>
&gt; The H() notation is defined in section 3.3 under the &#39;algorithm&qu=
ot; parameter<br>
&gt; definition.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.4.6: Do you need to say if Method is upper<br>
&gt;&gt; case or what?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; Ok.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.5, &quot;rspauth&quot;: Same &quot;What is H?&quot; question<b=
r>
&gt;&gt; applies here I think.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 5.12: I think this should be much more<br>
&gt;&gt; prominent since this section describes what<br>
&gt;&gt; actually happens - this is the threat to be<br>
&gt;&gt; most worried about.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; What do you mean by &quot;more prominent&quot;?<br>
&gt; If I move this section to be section 5.2, would that be prominent enou=
gh<br>
&gt; for you?<br>
<br>
</span>Right. Were it me I&#39;d say it in the abstract and intro<br>
as well.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I will move it to section 5.2</div><di=
v><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin=
:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
I think the rest is fine. (And to be clear I think the draft is<br>
good enough already, we&#39;re just polishing here I reckon.)<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Great. Thanks again for your careful r=
eview; I appreciate that.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=A0Ri=
faat</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"=
gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-=
left:1ex">
Cheers,<br>
S.<br>
<div class=3D"HOEnZb"><div class=3D"h5"><br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 5.13: I didn&#39;t see it stated that users often<br>
&gt;&gt; re-use passwords over &gt;1 site (on average 8<br>
&gt;&gt; apparently) so even if someone does a great job<br>
&gt;&gt; with their implementation they remain<br>
&gt;&gt; vulnerable to all the other crappy sites out<br>
&gt;&gt; there using passwords.<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; I can add some text around that.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; minor things and nits:<br>
&gt;&gt; ---------------------<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.3, para 1: s/and include/and includes/<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Ok<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.3, &quot;nonce&quot;: is the should be unique there<br>
&gt;&gt; sufficient? It&#39;s always nice to say when its ok<br>
&gt;&gt; to not do what a SHOULD says but you don&#39;t.<br>
&gt;&gt; (Not a big deal though.)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.3, &quot;nonce&quot;: &quot;private-key&quot; is a bad term to=
<br>
&gt;&gt; use there, &quot;secret-data&quot; would be better.=A0 You<br>
&gt;&gt; also don&#39;t say what &quot;H&quot; might be - yes, it is<br>
&gt;&gt; obvious but sure that&#39;s the kind of comment you<br>
&gt;&gt; expect here right:-)<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Ok<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3,3, &quot;stale&quot;: I think TRUE and FALSE here are<br>
&gt;&gt; case insensitive, is that right? Would it be<br>
&gt;&gt; good to say?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; The parameter is already defined as &quot;A case-insensitive flag,&quo=
t;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.3, &quot;algorithm&quot;: is the text at end starting<br>
&gt;&gt; with &quot;i.e., the digest...&quot; misplaced? Should it<br>
&gt;&gt; come before the example?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; No. This text should be more generic, and aligned with the text above =
the<br>
&gt; example; I will fix that.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3,3, &quot;userhash&quot;: s/Valid value/Valid values/<br>
&gt;&gt; and I note you use lowercase for true and false<br>
&gt;&gt; here but earlier used uppercase - why?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; Lowercase values are consistently used for this parameter already.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.4, cnonce: &quot;.in 3&quot; before this is some kind<br>
&gt;&gt; of nroff glitch I guess,<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; Yes<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 3.4.2, s/herin/herein/<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; Ok<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 5.2, 2nd para, maybe s/it is intended/it was<br>
&gt;&gt; intended/ would be better?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; Ok<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 5.2, referring to SHTTP seems silly, its dead<br>
&gt;&gt; as a do-do isn&#39;t it?<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; Ok<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; - 5.8, the MD5 specific point is no longer<br>
&gt;&gt; quote correct given the other hash functions<br>
&gt;&gt; added here<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt; Ok<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Regards,<br>
&gt;=A0 Rifaat<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; On 07/10/14 18:34, Yoav Nir wrote:<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Hi all<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.=
=A0 The<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; publication, and it&#39;s time for the group to weigh in on th=
is<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; subject.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; This mail begins working group last call for this document. Pl=
ease<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list =
about<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; its security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you=
 wish<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; to discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the in=
tended<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; status of this document is standards track, and it describes s=
light<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; modifications to a protocol that is widely implemented and dep=
loyed.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please s=
end<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; your reviews as replies to this message.<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; Yoav &amp; Matt ______________________________________________=
_ http-auth<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; mailing list <a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org">http-auth@i=
etf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" ta=
rget=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt;&gt; http-auth mailing list<br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org">http-auth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt;&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=
=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
&gt;&gt;<br>
&gt;<br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1132e99a6d886205052addd7--


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Hi

Just a reminder. We=92ve had one good review from Stephen, but we would =
like to have more, especially with this being standards track.

We=92ve had plenty of good discussion previously, so at this point a =
=93looks good=94, =93stick a fork in it - it=92s done=94, or a =93it=92s =
ready=94 is welcome.=20

Thanks

Yoav & Matt

On Oct 7, 2014, at 8:33 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi all
>=20
> Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.  The =
authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for publication, =
and it=92s time for the group to weigh in on this subject.
>=20
> This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please =
take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about its =
security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish to =
discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended status =
of this document is standards track, and it describes slight =
modifications to a protocol that is widely deployed=20
>=20
> The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send your =
reviews as replies to this message.
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Yoav & Matt


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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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Some quick (editorial) feedback:

- Section 3.1 (Overall Operation) mentions the password being hashed and =
never sent in the clear, but never says anything about the new optional =
username hashing support - might be worth a short mention that the =
server can advertise support for and the client can send hashes instead =
of plain text usernames as well.

- Section 3.2 (Representation of Digest Values) uses "not recommended" =
at the end of the first paragraph. Is this a RFC 2119 "NOT RECOMMENDED"? =
Probably also want a reference to RFC 2617 for backwards compatibility?

- Also in Section 3.2, editorial issue at end of second paragraph; =
suggest rewording as "MD5 digests are represented as 32 hexadecimal =
characters while SHA-256 and SHA-512/256 are represented as 64 =
hexadecimal characters."

- Section 3.3 editorial, suggest: '... the server responds with a "401 =
Unauthorized" status code and a WWW-Authenticate header with Digest =
scheme as per the framework defined above. The value of the header =
includes some or all of the following parameters:'

- Section 3.3 (domain): "should" should be "SHOULD" in the second =
paragraph about proxies.

- Section 3.3 (none): Break out note: as a separate paragraph instead of =
burying it in parenthesis?

- Section 3.3 (opaque): Both "should" and "recommended" are 2119 =
terms...

- Section 3.3 (stale): Drop comma after "flag"

- Section 3.3 (stale): "may", "should", "must" are all 2119 terms...

- Section 3.3 (charset): "optional" should be "OPTIONAL"

- Section 3.3 (userhash): "optional" should be "OPTIONAL", "Valid =
values" (plural)

- Section 3.3: Can we sort the list of parameters?

- Section 3.4 (The Authorization Request Header): How many times is the =
client expected to retry the request? At least once? Might be good to =
say something here.

- Section 3.4 (between qop and nc): Looks like a bad 'roff command (".in =
3")???

- Section 3.4 (userhash): "optional" should be "OPTIONAL", "Valid =
values" (plural)

- Section 3.4.6 (Various Considerations): "must" and "may" used in =
second paragraph.

- Section 3.4.6 (Various Considerations): "should" used in third =
paragraph. Maybe reword the first sentence as "Authenticated =
transactions can interact with shared caches."

- Section 3.5 (nextnonce): "may", "should", and "must" used.

- Section 3.6 (Digest Operation): "may", "must", and "should" used.

- Section 3.7 and later: Search for "may", "must", "optional", =
"recommended", and "should".


On Oct 7, 2014, at 1:34 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi all
>=20
> Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.  The =
authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for publication, =
and it=92s time for the group to weigh in on this subject.
>=20
> This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please =
take the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about its =
security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish to =
discuss. Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended status =
of this document is standards track, and it describes slight =
modifications to a protocol that is widely implemented and deployed.
>=20
> The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send your =
reviews as replies to this message.
>=20
> Thanks,
>=20
> Yoav & Matt
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth

_________________________________________________________
Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair


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From nobody Tue Oct 14 10:49:34 2014
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Subject: [http-auth] draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08: comments
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Hi,

The following are a few comments concerning draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08.

Thanks,
Brett

----

General comment: The draft is vague concerning quoted strings and the
related backward compatibility with RFC 2617.  The draft occasionally uses
non normative statements to indicate that something is a quoted string;
however it isn't clear in relation to RFC 7235 and RFC 2617 what the
normative syntax actually is.  For backward compatibility reasons, the
draft should likely normatively comply with RFC 2617 concerning when to
add quotes.  However from a RFC 7235 perspective, the draft potentially
could recommend leniency during receive (concerning extraneous or missing
quotes) if that is the intent.

Section 3.4: Extraneous ".in 3".

Section 3.4: "cnonce" does not align with the other parameters.

Section 3.4.1: There is an opening '<' before KD without closing '>' after
KD's closing parenthesis.

Section 3.4.5: To comply with RFC 7235 section 2.2 (and RFC 2617), the
first example should have the realm value within quoted string:
realm="myhost@testrealm.com".

Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character set is if
the parameter is not present?  Excluding simplicity, is there a reason why
charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate and a
single entry within Authorization?


From nobody Tue Oct 14 13:03:42 2014
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To: Cameron Jones <cmhjones@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] User directed logout
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On Oct 9, 2014, at 4:55 AM, Cameron Jones <cmhjones@gmail.com> wrote:
> The Form HTTP Extensions specification defines some new controls =
within HTML for a high level hook into providing logout functionality =
over HTTP authentication. There is also frequent discussions about =
providing a Javascript API but an actual specification is still pending.
>=20
> http://www.w3.org/TR/form-http-extensions/
>=20
> Thanks,
> Cameron Jones

Interesting. I am hopeful this will be ratified, and that vendors will =
opt to include it. There really should be a JS API for XHR as well, =
although I suppose the form will be well enough since it can be hidden =
and submitted on behalf of the user.

--
Jason T. Greene
WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform Architect
JBoss, a division of Red Hat


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Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2014 15:23:57 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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  This message is in MIME format.  The first part should be readable text,
  while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools.

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On Tue, 14 Oct 2014, Yoav Nir wrote:

> Hi
>
> Just a reminder. We=92ve had one good review from Stephen, but we would l=
ike to have more, especially with this being standards track.
>
> We=92ve had plenty of good discussion previously, so at this point a
> =93looks good=94, =93stick a fork in it - it=92s done=94, or a =93it=92s =
ready=94 is
> welcome.

Here are some more comments.  (I tried to skip things that had already
been mentioned in previous messages.)

This specification gives a lot of implementation freedom for servers
generating the 'nonce' values, leaving it unspecified whether an explicit
list of valid nonces is retained or the validity/freshness of a nonce can
be verified in some other way.  It seems like it should be desirable for
it to be impossible for an attacker to guess values (not already observed)
that would be considered as valid 'nonce' values by the server.  I have
seen this "un-guessability" requirement explicitly stated in other
documents, so it may be appropriate here.  (The given example with a hash
of timestamp and private key satisfies the unguessability requirement.)

It seems like the existence of the 'stale' flag might give a little bit of
leverage to online attackers, who could observe a single nonce and
continue to use it to determine whether a trial password is valid, even
after that nonce's validity period ends.  That said, given that there's an
offline attack if the attacker can observe a successful exchange, worrying
about an online guessing attack may not be worthwhile...

The text about the qop and cnonce in the reply might be harder to
understand than is necessary.  My understanding just from reading the
document is that the flow is as follows: the server might send a list of
qops in its WWW-Authenticate response header.  If it does, the client MUST
reply with both a qop and a cnonce in its subsequent request, and the qop
must be one of the items from the server's list.  (Thus, if the server
sends a list with no entries that the client understands, the client can't
do anything.)  If the server does not send a list of qops, the client
sends neither a qop nor a cnonce.  On the other hand, maybe the bit at the
top about "the request includes some or all of the following parameters"
means that the client can omit the qop despite the normative language
("Its value MUST be").  Given that I'm still not sure, things could
probably be more clear.

The examples for 'nc' all are eight hex digits, with leading zeros.  Is it
a requirement that this field always has this field width?  If so, the
document should say that.  It may otherwise be worth some text about the
treatment of leading zeros.

Should the example use www.example.org instead of www.nowhere.org?

In 3.6, can you point me to some previous list traffic where the "easily
and safely" bit about putting state in 'nonce' instead of 'opaque' is
justified?  I don't think the explanatory text needs to be in the final
document, I just want to know that the text is in fact justified.

Can you give guidance on the length of nonce and cnonce?  The examples all
seem to be using hash output for the nonce field, which should be a
perfectly fine way to do it, but the hash construction is not required.
Furthermore, one of the examples has only an 8-character (hex) cnonce
whereas the other has 256 bits (?) worth.  The 32-bit one seems like it
might be a little too short for comfort....



More minor editorial issues:

In 3.4.2, I would move "herein called cnonce-prime" to be right after
"client nonce value" (that is, before "to construct A1"), to avoid
possible confusion.

In 3.5, isn't it the response (not the request) whose parameters are being
itemized?  (The text currently has "The request includes some or all of
the following parameters:".)

In 3.6, only MD5 is mentioned, but this document uses more hashes.

Also in 3.6, there's an internal reference to "3.6 below" which looks like
it should be 3.8 instead.

The third paragraph of 5.4 has an extra blank line in the middle of it.

5.6 is given the header "online dictionary attacks", but what is being
described seems more like an offline attack than an online one, to me.

In 5.9 and 5.10, if I was writing this, I'm not sure I'd use the phrase
"chosen plaintext attack" to describe something that seems to just be "the
attacker forces the client to use a particular nonce".  It's not exactly
wrong, though, so this is probably just a matter of taste where I should
not try to force my opinion onto everyone.


-Ben
---559023410-164705154-1413573837=:27826--


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Hello Benjamin,

wrong mail address. Again...

as I am responsible for the examples, let me answer the related points.

Benjamin Kaduk:

> Should the example use www.example.org instead of www.nowhere.org?

In there current state the examples are not correct. My plan for the =
correction is to use Mufasa and testrealm@host.com like in rfc2617. =
Would this be better?

> Can you give guidance on the length of nonce and cnonce?  The examples =
all
> seem to be using hash output for the nonce field, which should be a
> perfectly fine way to do it, but the hash construction is not =
required.
> Furthermore, one of the examples has only an 8-character (hex) cnonce
> whereas the other has 256 bits (?) worth.  The 32-bit one seems like =
it
> might be a little too short for comfort....

Actually the cnonce and nonce can be any character. So to point this out =
my suggestion would be some base64 values with 256 bit. Or maybe base64 =
for the MD5 and utf8 for SHAs to make the point clear?

Regards,
Sophie=


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To: Sophie Bremer <sophie.bremer@netzkonform.de>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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I think testrealm@example.com would be more in line with RFC guidelines...

Sent from my iPhone

> On Oct 18, 2014, at 11:12 AM, Sophie Bremer <sophie.bremer@netzkonform.de>=
 wrote:
>=20
> Hello Benjamin,
>=20
> wrong mail address. Again...
>=20
> as I am responsible for the examples, let me answer the related points.
>=20
> Benjamin Kaduk:
>=20
>> Should the example use www.example.org instead of www.nowhere.org?
>=20
> In there current state the examples are not correct. My plan for the corre=
ction is to use Mufasa and testrealm@host.com like in rfc2617. Would this be=
 better?
>=20
>> Can you give guidance on the length of nonce and cnonce?  The examples al=
l
>> seem to be using hash output for the nonce field, which should be a
>> perfectly fine way to do it, but the hash construction is not required.
>> Furthermore, one of the examples has only an 8-character (hex) cnonce
>> whereas the other has 256 bits (?) worth.  The 32-bit one seems like it
>> might be a little too short for comfort....
>=20
> Actually the cnonce and nonce can be any character. So to point this out m=
y suggestion would be some base64 values with 256 bit. Or maybe base64 for t=
he MD5 and utf8 for SHAs to make the point clear?
>=20
> Regards,
> Sophie
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth


From nobody Sat Oct 18 19:22:48 2014
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Date: Sat, 18 Oct 2014 22:22:35 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Sophie Bremer <sophie.bremer@netzkonform.de>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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On Sat, 18 Oct 2014, Sophie Bremer wrote:

> Hello Benjamin,
>
> wrong mail address. Again...
>
> as I am responsible for the examples, let me answer the related points.
>
> Benjamin Kaduk:
>
> > Should the example use www.example.org instead of www.nowhere.org?
>
> In there current state the examples are not correct. My plan for the
> correction is to use Mufasa and testrealm@host.com like in rfc2617.
> Would this be better?

I agree with Mike Sweet that we should be using the RFC 2606 names.

> > Can you give guidance on the length of nonce and cnonce?  The examples all
> > seem to be using hash output for the nonce field, which should be a
> > perfectly fine way to do it, but the hash construction is not required.
> > Furthermore, one of the examples has only an 8-character (hex) cnonce
> > whereas the other has 256 bits (?) worth.  The 32-bit one seems like it
> > might be a little too short for comfort....
>
> Actually the cnonce and nonce can be any character. So to point this out
> my suggestion would be some base64 values with 256 bit. Or maybe base64
> for the MD5 and utf8 for SHAs to make the point clear?

That would be helpful.

What I am really interested in is some discussion of, if not how the
nonces perform their cryptographic purpose(s), how long they need to be in
order to have the desired effect [of preventing chosen-plaintext attacks).
I'm not enough of a cryptographer to be able to say with any confidence
what the lengths should be.

-Ben


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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Brett Tate <brett@broadsoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08: comments
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--001a1133c9dc19884b0505bf61d7
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Thanks Brett,

Please, see my reply inline...

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 1:49 PM, Brett Tate <brett@broadsoft.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> The following are a few comments concerning draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08.
>
> Thanks,
> Brett
>
> ----
>
> General comment: The draft is vague concerning quoted strings and the
> related backward compatibility with RFC 2617.  The draft occasionally uses
> non normative statements to indicate that something is a quoted string;
> however it isn't clear in relation to RFC 7235 and RFC 2617 what the
> normative syntax actually is.  For backward compatibility reasons, the
> draft should likely normatively comply with RFC 2617 concerning when to
> add quotes.  However from a RFC 7235 perspective, the draft potentially
> could recommend leniency during receive (concerning extraneous or missing
> quotes) if that is the intent.
>
>
Would you be able to propose some text?



> Section 3.4: Extraneous ".in 3".
>
> Section 3.4: "cnonce" does not align with the other parameters.
>
> Section 3.4.1: There is an opening '<' before KD without closing '>' after
> KD's closing parenthesis.
>
> Section 3.4.5: To comply with RFC 7235 section 2.2 (and RFC 2617), the
> first example should have the realm value within quoted string:
> realm="myhost@testrealm.com".
>
> Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character set is if
> the parameter is not present?  Excluding simplicity, is there a reason why
> charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate and a
> single entry within Authorization?
>
>
I will defer this to the i18n experts that suggested UTF-8 as the only
value to be supported.

Regards,
 Rifaat




> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks Brett,<div><br></div><div>Please, see my reply inli=
ne...</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=A0Rifaat</div><div><br><=
/div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct =
14, 2014 at 1:49 PM, Brett Tate <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:bre=
tt@broadsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">brett@broadsoft.com</a>&gt;</span> wrot=
e:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-l=
eft:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
<br>
The following are a few comments concerning draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08.<=
br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
Brett<br>
<br>
----<br>
<br>
General comment: The draft is vague concerning quoted strings and the<br>
related backward compatibility with RFC 2617.=A0 The draft occasionally use=
s<br>
non normative statements to indicate that something is a quoted string;<br>
however it isn&#39;t clear in relation to RFC 7235 and RFC 2617 what the<br=
>
normative syntax actually is.=A0 For backward compatibility reasons, the<br=
>
draft should likely normatively comply with RFC 2617 concerning when to<br>
add quotes.=A0 However from a RFC 7235 perspective, the draft potentially<b=
r>
could recommend leniency during receive (concerning extraneous or missing<b=
r>
quotes) if that is the intent.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Would you be able to propose some text=
?</div><div><br></div><div>=A0<br></div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Section 3.4: Extraneous &quot;.in 3&quot;.<br>
<br>
Section 3.4: &quot;cnonce&quot; does not align with the other parameters.<b=
r>
<br>
Section 3.4.1: There is an opening &#39;&lt;&#39; before KD without closing=
 &#39;&gt;&#39; after<br>
KD&#39;s closing parenthesis.<br>
<br>
Section 3.4.5: To comply with RFC 7235 section 2.2 (and RFC 2617), the<br>
first example should have the realm value within quoted string:<br>
realm=3D&quot;<a href=3D"mailto:myhost@testrealm.com">myhost@testrealm.com<=
/a>&quot;.<br>
<br>
Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character set is if<br=
>
the parameter is not present?=A0 Excluding simplicity, is there a reason wh=
y<br>
charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate and a<br>
single entry within Authorization?<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I will defer this to the i18n experts =
that suggested UTF-8 as the only value to be supported.<br></div><div><br><=
/div><div>Regards,</div><div>=A0Rifaat</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><=
div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;b=
order-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
_______________________________________________<br>
http-auth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org">http-auth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--001a1133c9dc19884b0505bf61d7--


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Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 00:55:16 -0400
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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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Thanks Michael,

I will address these comments in the next version of the draft.

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 10:53 AM, Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com> wrote:

> Some quick (editorial) feedback:
>
> - Section 3.1 (Overall Operation) mentions the password being hashed and
> never sent in the clear, but never says anything about the new optional
> username hashing support - might be worth a short mention that the server
> can advertise support for and the client can send hashes instead of plain
> text usernames as well.
>
> - Section 3.2 (Representation of Digest Values) uses "not recommended" at
> the end of the first paragraph. Is this a RFC 2119 "NOT RECOMMENDED"?
> Probably also want a reference to RFC 2617 for backwards compatibility?
>
> - Also in Section 3.2, editorial issue at end of second paragraph; suggest
> rewording as "MD5 digests are represented as 32 hexadecimal characters
> while SHA-256 and SHA-512/256 are represented as 64 hexadecimal characters."
>
> - Section 3.3 editorial, suggest: '... the server responds with a "401
> Unauthorized" status code and a WWW-Authenticate header with Digest scheme
> as per the framework defined above. The value of the header includes some
> or all of the following parameters:'
>
> - Section 3.3 (domain): "should" should be "SHOULD" in the second
> paragraph about proxies.
>
> - Section 3.3 (none): Break out note: as a separate paragraph instead of
> burying it in parenthesis?
>
> - Section 3.3 (opaque): Both "should" and "recommended" are 2119 terms...
>
> - Section 3.3 (stale): Drop comma after "flag"
>
> - Section 3.3 (stale): "may", "should", "must" are all 2119 terms...
>
> - Section 3.3 (charset): "optional" should be "OPTIONAL"
>
> - Section 3.3 (userhash): "optional" should be "OPTIONAL", "Valid values"
> (plural)
>
> - Section 3.3: Can we sort the list of parameters?
>
> - Section 3.4 (The Authorization Request Header): How many times is the
> client expected to retry the request? At least once? Might be good to say
> something here.
>
> - Section 3.4 (between qop and nc): Looks like a bad 'roff command (".in
> 3")???
>
> - Section 3.4 (userhash): "optional" should be "OPTIONAL", "Valid values"
> (plural)
>
> - Section 3.4.6 (Various Considerations): "must" and "may" used in second
> paragraph.
>
> - Section 3.4.6 (Various Considerations): "should" used in third
> paragraph. Maybe reword the first sentence as "Authenticated transactions
> can interact with shared caches."
>
> - Section 3.5 (nextnonce): "may", "should", and "must" used.
>
> - Section 3.6 (Digest Operation): "may", "must", and "should" used.
>
> - Section 3.7 and later: Search for "may", "must", "optional",
> "recommended", and "should".
>
>
> On Oct 7, 2014, at 1:34 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Hi all
> >
> > Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.  The
> authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for publication, and
> it's time for the group to weigh in on this subject.
> >
> > This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please take
> the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about its
> security, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish to discuss.
> Keep in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended status of this
> document is standards track, and it describes slight modifications to a
> protocol that is widely implemented and deployed.
> >
> > The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send your
> reviews as replies to this message.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Yoav & Matt
> > _______________________________________________
> > http-auth mailing list
> > http-auth@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>
> _________________________________________________________
> Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks Michael,<div><br></div><div>I will address these co=
mments in the next version of the draft.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,<=
/div><div>&nbsp;Rifaat</div><div><br></div></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"=
><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 10:53 AM, Michael S=
weet <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:msweet@apple.com" target=3D"_b=
lank">msweet@apple.com</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_=
quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1=
ex">Some quick (editorial) feedback:<br>
<br>
- Section 3.1 (Overall Operation) mentions the password being hashed and ne=
ver sent in the clear, but never says anything about the new optional usern=
ame hashing support - might be worth a short mention that the server can ad=
vertise support for and the client can send hashes instead of plain text us=
ernames as well.<br>
<br>
- Section 3.2 (Representation of Digest Values) uses &quot;not recommended&=
quot; at the end of the first paragraph. Is this a RFC 2119 &quot;NOT RECOM=
MENDED&quot;? Probably also want a reference to RFC 2617 for backwards comp=
atibility?<br>
<br>
- Also in Section 3.2, editorial issue at end of second paragraph; suggest =
rewording as &quot;MD5 digests are represented as 32 hexadecimal characters=
 while SHA-256 and SHA-512/256 are represented as 64 hexadecimal characters=
.&quot;<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3 editorial, suggest: &#39;... the server responds with a &quot=
;401 Unauthorized&quot; status code and a WWW-Authenticate header with Dige=
st scheme as per the framework defined above. The value of the header inclu=
des some or all of the following parameters:&#39;<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3 (domain): &quot;should&quot; should be &quot;SHOULD&quot; in =
the second paragraph about proxies.<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3 (none): Break out note: as a separate paragraph instead of bu=
rying it in parenthesis?<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3 (opaque): Both &quot;should&quot; and &quot;recommended&quot;=
 are 2119 terms...<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3 (stale): Drop comma after &quot;flag&quot;<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3 (stale): &quot;may&quot;, &quot;should&quot;, &quot;must&quot=
; are all 2119 terms...<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3 (charset): &quot;optional&quot; should be &quot;OPTIONAL&quot=
;<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3 (userhash): &quot;optional&quot; should be &quot;OPTIONAL&quo=
t;, &quot;Valid values&quot; (plural)<br>
<br>
- Section 3.3: Can we sort the list of parameters?<br>
<br>
- Section 3.4 (The Authorization Request Header): How many times is the cli=
ent expected to retry the request? At least once? Might be good to say some=
thing here.<br>
<br>
- Section 3.4 (between qop and nc): Looks like a bad &#39;roff command (&qu=
ot;.in 3&quot;)???<br>
<br>
- Section 3.4 (userhash): &quot;optional&quot; should be &quot;OPTIONAL&quo=
t;, &quot;Valid values&quot; (plural)<br>
<br>
- Section 3.4.6 (Various Considerations): &quot;must&quot; and &quot;may&qu=
ot; used in second paragraph.<br>
<br>
- Section 3.4.6 (Various Considerations): &quot;should&quot; used in third =
paragraph. Maybe reword the first sentence as &quot;Authenticated transacti=
ons can interact with shared caches.&quot;<br>
<br>
- Section 3.5 (nextnonce): &quot;may&quot;, &quot;should&quot;, and &quot;m=
ust&quot; used.<br>
<br>
- Section 3.6 (Digest Operation): &quot;may&quot;, &quot;must&quot;, and &q=
uot;should&quot; used.<br>
<br>
- Section 3.7 and later: Search for &quot;may&quot;, &quot;must&quot;, &quo=
t;optional&quot;, &quot;recommended&quot;, and &quot;should&quot;.<br>
<div><div class=3D"h5"><br>
<br>
On Oct 7, 2014, at 1:34 PM, Yoav Nir &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.=
com">ynir.ietf@gmail.com</a>&gt; wrote:<br>
<br>
&gt; Hi all<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Rifaat, David and Sophie have submitted version -08 in August.&nbsp; T=
he authors are of the opinion that the document is ready for publication, a=
nd it&rsquo;s time for the group to weigh in on this subject.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; This mail begins working group last call for this document. Please tak=
e the time to read the draft and send comments to the list about its securi=
ty, applicability, clarity, and any other aspect you wish to discuss. Keep =
in mind that unlike the HOBA document, the intended status of this document=
 is standards track, and it describes slight modifications to a protocol th=
at is widely implemented and deployed.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; The WGLC is two weeks long, and ends on October 21st. Please send your=
 reviews as replies to this message.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Thanks,<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Yoav &amp; Matt<br>
&gt; _______________________________________________<br>
&gt; http-auth mailing list<br>
&gt; <a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org">http-auth@ietf.org</a><br>
&gt; <a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=3D"=
_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
<br>
</div></div>_________________________________________________________<br>
Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair<br>
<br>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
http-auth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org">http-auth@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>

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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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Thanks Ben,

Please, see my reply inline...

Regards,
 Rifaat



On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 3:23 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:

> On Tue, 14 Oct 2014, Yoav Nir wrote:
>
> > Hi
> >
> > Just a reminder. We've had one good review from Stephen, but we would
> like to have more, especially with this being standards track.
> >
> > We've had plenty of good discussion previously, so at this point a
> > "looks good", "stick a fork in it - it's done", or a "it's ready" is
> > welcome.
>
> Here are some more comments.  (I tried to skip things that had already
> been mentioned in previous messages.)
>
> This specification gives a lot of implementation freedom for servers
> generating the 'nonce' values, leaving it unspecified whether an explicit
> list of valid nonces is retained or the validity/freshness of a nonce can
> be verified in some other way.  It seems like it should be desirable for
> it to be impossible for an attacker to guess values (not already observed)
> that would be considered as valid 'nonce' values by the server.  I have
> seen this "un-guessability" requirement explicitly stated in other
> documents, so it may be appropriate here.  (The given example with a hash
> of timestamp and private key satisfies the unguessability requirement.)
>
>
I am not sure how to address this comment.
Yes, the text considers the 'nonce' values as implementation details; are
you suggesting that we make some normative text around that instead?



> It seems like the existence of the 'stale' flag might give a little bit of
> leverage to online attackers, who could observe a single nonce and
> continue to use it to determine whether a trial password is valid, even
> after that nonce's validity period ends.  That said, given that there's an
> offline attack if the attacker can observe a successful exchange, worrying
> about an online guessing attack may not be worthwhile...
>
> The text about the qop and cnonce in the reply might be harder to
> understand than is necessary.  My understanding just from reading the
> document is that the flow is as follows: the server might send a list of
> qops in its WWW-Authenticate response header.


Actually, the text requires all servers to use this parameter:


qop
      This parameter MUST be used by all implementations compliant with
      this version of the Digest scheme.




>   If it does, the client MUST
> reply with both a qop and a cnonce in its subsequent request, and the qop
> must be one of the items from the server's list.  (Thus, if the server
> sends a list with no entries that the client understands, the client can't
> do anything.)  If the server does not send a list of qops, the client
> sends neither a qop nor a cnonce.  On the other hand, maybe the bit at the
> top about "the request includes some or all of the following parameters"
> means that the client can omit the qop despite the normative language
> ("Its value MUST be").  Given that I'm still not sure, things could
> probably be more clear.
>
>
No, the quoted text just means some of the parameters used by the client or
server are optional.
The details of the parameter will indicate which is required and which is
optional.



> The examples for 'nc' all are eight hex digits, with leading zeros.  Is it
> a requirement that this field always has this field width?  If so, the
> document should say that.  It may otherwise be worth some text about the
> treatment of leading zeros.
>
> Should the example use www.example.org instead of www.nowhere.org?
>
> In 3.6, can you point me to some previous list traffic where the "easily
> and safely" bit about putting state in 'nonce' instead of 'opaque' is
> justified?  I don't think the explanatory text needs to be in the final
> document, I just want to know that the text is in fact justified.
>
>
That would have been done during the work on RFC2617, not this draft,
because this text was copied from RFC2617.



> Can you give guidance on the length of nonce and cnonce?  The examples all
> seem to be using hash output for the nonce field, which should be a
> perfectly fine way to do it, but the hash construction is not required.
> Furthermore, one of the examples has only an 8-character (hex) cnonce
> whereas the other has 256 bits (?) worth.  The 32-bit one seems like it
> might be a little too short for comfort....
>
>
>
> More minor editorial issues:
>
>
I will address these in the next version of the draft.


Regards,
 Rifaat



> In 3.4.2, I would move "herein called cnonce-prime" to be right after
> "client nonce value" (that is, before "to construct A1"), to avoid
> possible confusion.
>
> In 3.5, isn't it the response (not the request) whose parameters are being
> itemized?  (The text currently has "The request includes some or all of
> the following parameters:".)
>
> In 3.6, only MD5 is mentioned, but this document uses more hashes.
>
> Also in 3.6, there's an internal reference to "3.6 below" which looks like
> it should be 3.8 instead.
>
> The third paragraph of 5.4 has an extra blank line in the middle of it.
>
> 5.6 is given the header "online dictionary attacks", but what is being
> described seems more like an offline attack than an online one, to me.
>
> In 5.9 and 5.10, if I was writing this, I'm not sure I'd use the phrase
> "chosen plaintext attack" to describe something that seems to just be "the
> attacker forces the client to use a particular nonce".  It's not exactly
> wrong, though, so this is probably just a matter of taste where I should
> not try to force my opinion onto everyone.
>
>
> -Ben
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>
>

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<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks Ben,<div><br></div><div>Please, see my reply inline=
...</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>&nbsp;Rifaat</div><div><br>=
</div><div><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 3:23 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:kaduk@mit.edu" target=3D"_blank">kaduk@mit.edu</a>&gt;</sp=
an> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px=
 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left=
-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>On Tue, 14 Oct 2014, Yoav Nir wrote:<b=
r>
<br>
&gt; Hi<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Just a reminder. We&rsquo;ve had one good review from Stephen, but we =
would like to have more, especially with this being standards track.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; We&rsquo;ve had plenty of good discussion previously, so at this point=
 a<br>
&gt; &ldquo;looks good&rdquo;, &ldquo;stick a fork in it - it&rsquo;s done&=
rdquo;, or a &ldquo;it&rsquo;s ready&rdquo; is<br>
&gt; welcome.<br>
<br>
</span>Here are some more comments.&nbsp; (I tried to skip things that had =
already<br>
been mentioned in previous messages.)<br>
<br>
This specification gives a lot of implementation freedom for servers<br>
generating the &#39;nonce&#39; values, leaving it unspecified whether an ex=
plicit<br>
list of valid nonces is retained or the validity/freshness of a nonce can<b=
r>
be verified in some other way.&nbsp; It seems like it should be desirable f=
or<br>
it to be impossible for an attacker to guess values (not already observed)<=
br>
that would be considered as valid &#39;nonce&#39; values by the server.&nbs=
p; I have<br>
seen this &quot;un-guessability&quot; requirement explicitly stated in othe=
r<br>
documents, so it may be appropriate here.&nbsp; (The given example with a h=
ash<br>
of timestamp and private key satisfies the unguessability requirement.)<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am not sure how to address this comm=
ent.</div><div>Yes, the text considers the &#39;nonce&#39; values as implem=
entation details; are you suggesting that we make some normative text aroun=
d that instead?</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-=
left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
It seems like the existence of the &#39;stale&#39; flag might give a little=
 bit of<br>
leverage to online attackers, who could observe a single nonce and<br>
continue to use it to determine whether a trial password is valid, even<br>
after that nonce&#39;s validity period ends.&nbsp; That said, given that th=
ere&#39;s an<br>
offline attack if the attacker can observe a successful exchange, worrying<=
br>
about an online guessing attack may not be worthwhile...<br>
<br>
The text about the qop and cnonce in the reply might be harder to<br>
understand than is necessary.&nbsp; My understanding just from reading the<=
br>
document is that the flow is as follows: the server might send a list of<br=
>
qops in its WWW-Authenticate response header.</blockquote><div><br></div><d=
iv>Actually, the text requires all servers to use this parameter:</div><div=
><pre class=3D"" style=3D"font-size:1em;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:0px;co=
lor:rgb(0,0,0)"><br></pre><pre class=3D"" style=3D"font-size:1em;margin-top=
:0px;margin-bottom:0px;color:rgb(0,0,0)">qop
      This parameter MUST be used by all implementations compliant with
      this version of the Digest scheme.</pre></div><div><br></div><div>&nb=
sp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8e=
x;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-styl=
e:solid;padding-left:1ex">&nbsp; If it does, the client MUST<br>
reply with both a qop and a cnonce in its subsequent request, and the qop<b=
r>
must be one of the items from the server&#39;s list.&nbsp; (Thus, if the se=
rver<br>
sends a list with no entries that the client understands, the client can&#3=
9;t<br>
do anything.)&nbsp; If the server does not send a list of qops, the client<=
br>
sends neither a qop nor a cnonce.&nbsp; On the other hand, maybe the bit at=
 the<br>
top about &quot;the request includes some or all of the following parameter=
s&quot;<br>
means that the client can omit the qop despite the normative language<br>
(&quot;Its value MUST be&quot;).&nbsp; Given that I&#39;m still not sure, t=
hings could<br>
probably be more clear.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>No, the quoted text just means some of=
 the parameters used by the client or server are optional.</div><div>The de=
tails of the parameter will indicate which is required and which is optiona=
l.</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rg=
b(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
The examples for &#39;nc&#39; all are eight hex digits, with leading zeros.=
&nbsp; Is it<br>
a requirement that this field always has this field width?&nbsp; If so, the=
<br>
document should say that.&nbsp; It may otherwise be worth some text about t=
he<br>
treatment of leading zeros.<br>
<br>
Should the example use <a href=3D"http://www.example.org" target=3D"_blank"=
>www.example.org</a> instead of <a href=3D"http://www.nowhere.org" target=
=3D"_blank">www.nowhere.org</a>?<br>
<br>
In 3.6, can you point me to some previous list traffic where the &quot;easi=
ly<br>
and safely&quot; bit about putting state in &#39;nonce&#39; instead of &#39=
;opaque&#39; is<br>
justified?&nbsp; I don&#39;t think the explanatory text needs to be in the =
final<br>
document, I just want to know that the text is in fact justified.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That would have been done during the w=
ork on RFC2617, not this draft, because this text was copied from RFC2617.<=
/div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" styl=
e=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(2=
04,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
Can you give guidance on the length of nonce and cnonce?&nbsp; The examples=
 all<br>
seem to be using hash output for the nonce field, which should be a<br>
perfectly fine way to do it, but the hash construction is not required.<br>
Furthermore, one of the examples has only an 8-character (hex) cnonce<br>
whereas the other has 256 bits (?) worth.&nbsp; The 32-bit one seems like i=
t<br>
might be a little too short for comfort....<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
More minor editorial issues:<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I will address these in the next versi=
on of the draft.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div=
>&nbsp;Rifaat</div><div><br></div><div>&nbsp;</div><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-le=
ft-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
In 3.4.2, I would move &quot;herein called cnonce-prime&quot; to be right a=
fter<br>
&quot;client nonce value&quot; (that is, before &quot;to construct A1&quot;=
), to avoid<br>
possible confusion.<br>
<br>
In 3.5, isn&#39;t it the response (not the request) whose parameters are be=
ing<br>
itemized?&nbsp; (The text currently has &quot;The request includes some or =
all of<br>
the following parameters:&quot;.)<br>
<br>
In 3.6, only MD5 is mentioned, but this document uses more hashes.<br>
<br>
Also in 3.6, there&#39;s an internal reference to &quot;3.6 below&quot; whi=
ch looks like<br>
it should be 3.8 instead.<br>
<br>
The third paragraph of 5.4 has an extra blank line in the middle of it.<br>
<br>
5.6 is given the header &quot;online dictionary attacks&quot;, but what is =
being<br>
described seems more like an offline attack than an online one, to me.<br>
<br>
In 5.9 and 5.10, if I was writing this, I&#39;m not sure I&#39;d use the ph=
rase<br>
&quot;chosen plaintext attack&quot; to describe something that seems to jus=
t be &quot;the<br>
attacker forces the client to use a particular nonce&quot;.&nbsp; It&#39;s =
not exactly<br>
wrong, though, so this is probably just a matter of taste where I should<br=
>
not try to force my opinion onto everyone.<br>
<br>
<br>
-Ben<br>_______________________________________________<br>
http-auth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">http-auth@ietf.org<=
/a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--089e0160a638ed5d670505c0c6de--


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Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2014 12:02:06 -0400 (EDT)
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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On Sun, 19 Oct 2014, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:

> On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 3:23 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> > This specification gives a lot of implementation freedom for servers
> > generating the 'nonce' values, leaving it unspecified whether an explicit
> > list of valid nonces is retained or the validity/freshness of a nonce can
> > be verified in some other way.  It seems like it should be desirable for
> > it to be impossible for an attacker to guess values (not already observed)
> > that would be considered as valid 'nonce' values by the server.  I have
> > seen this "un-guessability" requirement explicitly stated in other
> > documents, so it may be appropriate here.  (The given example with a hash
> > of timestamp and private key satisfies the unguessability requirement.)
> >
> >
> I am not sure how to address this comment.
> Yes, the text considers the 'nonce' values as implementation details; are
> you suggesting that we make some normative text around that instead?

I don't think there needs to be anything normative.

The current version sort-of states the purpose of the nonces, noting that
the cnonce value is used to avoid chosen plaintext attacks, and I guess
it's implicit that the 'nonce' field is used to prove the freshness of the
client response.

I would like (but do not attempt to require) to see the document say
something more explicit, like "the cnonce value is used by both client and
server to avoid chosen plaintext attacks [...].  To fulfil this purpose,
the attacker must not be able to guess a cnonce value that will be chosen
by the client; a cnonce containing at least N bits of random input in each
cnonce is believed to be sufficient for this purpose." or "A server
specified data string which should be uniquely generated each time a 401
reponse is made.  This value is used to prove the freshness of the client
response; in order to fulfil this purpose, an attacker must not be able to
guess nonce values which will be accepted as valid by the server (that
have not actually been sent by the server).  Including at least M bits of
private random data in the generation of the nonce (such as from a private
key included in a hash calculation) is believed to be sufficient for this
purpose."  These forms give both the motivation for including the field,
and guidance on how much randomness must be used in order to succeed at
that purpose.

(Well, they would if values of 'N' and 'M' were given.  From an informal
survey of existing cryptographic usage, 160 and 128, respectively, ought
to be sufficient, but may (or may not) be overkill.)

> > The text about the qop and cnonce in the reply might be harder to
> > understand than is necessary.  My understanding just from reading the
> > document is that the flow is as follows: the server might send a list of
> > qops in its WWW-Authenticate response header.
>
>
> Actually, the text requires all servers to use this parameter:
>
>
> qop
>       This parameter MUST be used by all implementations compliant with
>       this version of the Digest scheme.

Oh, right, my mistake.


> > The examples for 'nc' all are eight hex digits, with leading zeros.  Is it
> > a requirement that this field always has this field width?  If so, the
> > document should say that.  It may otherwise be worth some text about the
> > treatment of leading zeros.
> >
> > Should the example use www.example.org instead of www.nowhere.org?
> >
> > In 3.6, can you point me to some previous list traffic where the "easily
> > and safely" bit about putting state in 'nonce' instead of 'opaque' is
> > justified?  I don't think the explanatory text needs to be in the final
> > document, I just want to know that the text is in fact justified.
> >
> >
> That would have been done during the work on RFC2617, not this draft,
> because this text was copied from RFC2617.

Hmm, that is fifteen years old already; perhaps it should be revisited in
case there were developments in the interim that affect its validity.

-Ben


From nobody Wed Oct 22 06:34:38 2014
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Subject: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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Hi,
Some notes/comments from reviewing the document.

The definition of "stale" says:

       The server should only set stale to
       TRUE if it receives a request for which the nonce is invalid but
       with a valid digest for that nonce (indicating that the client
       knows the correct username/password).

I think this is encouraging DoS on servers. I think it would be better 
if the check for staleness is done without computing the hash on the 
server side.

       The notation unq(X) means the value of the quoted-string X without
       the surrounding quotes.

"Without the quotes" or "without the quotes and with quoting slashes 
removed"? I.e., what is used for a value "abc\"def"?

In 3.4.2 - is the definition of A1 for "MD5-sess" backward compatible 
with RFC 2617?


Nonce-prime/cnonce-prime - are these limited to the same TCP connection?


Should RFC 5198 (Net Unicode) be recommended for use on top of NFC? For 
example, it discourages use of Unicode Control characters.

Is it Ok to fail authentication if a username is not in NFC? If yes, it 
would be good to mention how the server should respond in such case.


From nobody Wed Oct 22 08:24:44 2014
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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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To: IETF HTTP Auth <http-auth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08
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Hi

The WGLC for draft-ietf-httpauth-digest is done.

Some comments have been made, and the discussion is still on-going. =
That=E2=80=99s OK, and please keep the discussion going. There is no =
deadline for the discussion at this time.

I would like to call the authors=E2=80=99 attention to another deadline. =
EOD Monday, 27-October is the Internet draft submission cutoff.  I would =
like to encourage the authors to submit a draft with all points that =
have been resolved in discussion at that time. There is no reason to =
stop the discussion, though, as draft submission will again be open two =
weeks later, on November 10th.

We have not yet finalized the agenda for the meeting. We will obviously =
spend time on the Basic draft, but if at that time there are still open =
issues for Digest, we will definitely spend as much time as needed on =
those.

Thanks

Matt & Yoav


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From: Brett Tate <brett@broadsoft.com>
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Hi Rifaat,

Reply is line.

> > General comment: The draft is vague concerning quoted strings and the
> > related backward compatibility with RFC 2617.=C2=A0 The draft occasiona=
lly
uses
> > non normative statements to indicate that something is a quoted
string;
> > however it isn't clear in relation to RFC 7235 and RFC 2617 what the
> > normative syntax actually is.=C2=A0 For backward compatibility reasons,=
 the
> > draft should likely normatively comply with RFC 2617 concerning when
to
> > add quotes.=C2=A0 However from a RFC 7235 perspective, the draft
potentially
> > could recommend leniency during receive (concerning extraneous or
missing
> > quotes) if that is the intent.
>
> Would you be able to propose some text?

The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.3.

"For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string
syntax values for the following parameters: realm, domain, nonce, opaque,
and qop.

For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string
syntax values for the following parameters: stale and algorithm."

The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.4.

"For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string
syntax for the following parameters: username, realm, nonce, uri,
response, cnonce, and opaque.

For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string
syntax for the following parameters: algorithm, qop, and nc."

The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.5.

"For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string
syntax for the following parameters: nextnonce, rspauth, and cnonce.

For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string
syntax for the following parameters: qop and nc."

The following is a related comments.

Concerning the "nc" definition, should mention that it MUST be exactly 8
hexidecimal digits (for historical reasons).


> > Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character set is
if
> > the parameter is not present?=C2=A0 Excluding simplicity, is there a re=
ason
why
> > charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate and a
> > single entry within Authorization?
>
> I will defer this to the i18n experts that suggested UTF-8 as the only
value to be supported.

Based upon RFC 2831 which originally attempted to add charset as a digest
auth parameter, it looks like they interpetted things as ISO 8859-1 was
the default.  Even if draft-ietf-httpauth-digest wants to declare UTF-8 as
being the default, it should potentially declare and discuss since it is
potentially a backward compatibility issue.


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From: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Brett Tate <brett@broadsoft.com>, Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>,  Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@greenbytes.de>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08: comments
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--089e01176919889892050652b84a
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:31 PM, Brett Tate <brett@broadsoft.com> wrote:

> Hi Rifaat,
>
> Reply is line.
>
> > > General comment: The draft is vague concerning quoted strings and the
> > > related backward compatibility with RFC 2617.  The draft occasionally
> uses
> > > non normative statements to indicate that something is a quoted
> string;
> > > however it isn't clear in relation to RFC 7235 and RFC 2617 what the
> > > normative syntax actually is.  For backward compatibility reasons, the
> > > draft should likely normatively comply with RFC 2617 concerning when
> to
> > > add quotes.  However from a RFC 7235 perspective, the draft
> potentially
> > > could recommend leniency during receive (concerning extraneous or
> missing
> > > quotes) if that is the intent.
> >
> > Would you be able to propose some text?
>
> The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.3.
>
> "For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string
> syntax values for the following parameters: realm, domain, nonce, opaque,
> and qop.
>
> For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string
> syntax values for the following parameters: stale and algorithm."
>
> The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.4.
>
> "For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string
> syntax for the following parameters: username, realm, nonce, uri,
> response, cnonce, and opaque.
>
> For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string
> syntax for the following parameters: algorithm, qop, and nc."
>
> The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.5.
>
> "For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string
> syntax for the following parameters: nextnonce, rspauth, and cnonce.
>
> For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string
> syntax for the following parameters: qop and nc."
>
> The following is a related comments.
>
> Concerning the "nc" definition, should mention that it MUST be exactly 8
> hexidecimal digits (for historical reasons).
>
>
I am fine with the above proposed text.
If I do not see any objection to these changes, I will add it to the next
version of the draft.


> > > Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character set is
> if
> > > the parameter is not present?  Excluding simplicity, is there a reason
> why
> > > charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate and a
> > > single entry within Authorization?
> >
> > I will defer this to the i18n experts that suggested UTF-8 as the only
> value to be supported.
>
> Based upon RFC 2831 which originally attempted to add charset as a digest
> auth parameter, it looks like they interpetted things as ISO 8859-1 was
> the default.  Even if draft-ietf-httpauth-digest wants to declare UTF-8 as
> being the default, it should potentially declare and discuss since it is
> potentially a backward compatibility issue.
>
>
Julian,

Do you have any thoughts on this?

Regards,
 Rifaat


> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>

--089e01176919889892050652b84a
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quo=
te">On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 7:31 PM, Brett Tate <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a hr=
ef=3D"mailto:brett@broadsoft.com" target=3D"_blank">brett@broadsoft.com</a>=
&gt;</span> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px=
 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);bor=
der-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Rifaat,<br>
<br>
Reply is line.<br>
<span><br>
&gt; &gt; General comment: The draft is vague concerning quoted strings and=
 the<br>
&gt; &gt; related backward compatibility with RFC 2617.=A0 The draft occasi=
onally<br>
uses<br>
&gt; &gt; non normative statements to indicate that something is a quoted<b=
r>
string;<br>
&gt; &gt; however it isn&#39;t clear in relation to RFC 7235 and RFC 2617 w=
hat the<br>
&gt; &gt; normative syntax actually is.=A0 For backward compatibility reaso=
ns, the<br>
&gt; &gt; draft should likely normatively comply with RFC 2617 concerning w=
hen<br>
to<br>
&gt; &gt; add quotes.=A0 However from a RFC 7235 perspective, the draft<br>
potentially<br>
&gt; &gt; could recommend leniency during receive (concerning extraneous or=
<br>
missing<br>
&gt; &gt; quotes) if that is the intent.<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; Would you be able to propose some text?<br>
<br>
</span>The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.3.<br>
<br>
&quot;For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string=
<br>
syntax values for the following parameters: realm, domain, nonce, opaque,<b=
r>
and qop.<br>
<br>
For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string<br>
syntax values for the following parameters: stale and algorithm.&quot;<br>
<br>
The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.4.<br>
<br>
&quot;For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string=
<br>
syntax for the following parameters: username, realm, nonce, uri,<br>
response, cnonce, and opaque.<br>
<br>
For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string<br>
syntax for the following parameters: algorithm, qop, and nc.&quot;<br>
<br>
The following two paragraphs can be added to section 3.5.<br>
<br>
&quot;For historical reasons, a sender MUST only generate the quoted-string=
<br>
syntax for the following parameters: nextnonce, rspauth, and cnonce.<br>
<br>
For historical reasons, a sender MUST NOT generate the quoted-string<br>
syntax for the following parameters: qop and nc.&quot;<br>
<br>
The following is a related comments.<br>
<br>
Concerning the &quot;nc&quot; definition, should mention that it MUST be ex=
actly 8<br>
hexidecimal digits (for historical reasons).<br>
<span><br></span></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I am fine with the above =
proposed text.</div><div>If I do not see any objection to these changes, I =
will add it to the next version of the draft.</div><div><br></div><blockquo=
te class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-widt=
h:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-le=
ft:1ex"><span><br>
&gt; &gt; Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character se=
t is<br>
if<br>
&gt; &gt; the parameter is not present?=A0 Excluding simplicity, is there a=
 reason<br>
why<br>
&gt; &gt; charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate =
and a<br>
&gt; &gt; single entry within Authorization?<br>
&gt;<br>
&gt; I will defer this to the i18n experts that suggested UTF-8 as the only=
<br>
value to be supported.<br>
<br>
</span>Based upon RFC 2831 which originally attempted to add charset as a d=
igest<br>
auth parameter, it looks like they interpetted things as ISO 8859-1 was<br>
the default.=A0 Even if draft-ietf-httpauth-digest wants to declare UTF-8 a=
s<br>
being the default, it should potentially declare and discuss since it is<br=
>
potentially a backward compatibility issue.<br>
<div><div><br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Julian,</div><di=
v><br></div><div>Do you have any thoughts on this?</div><div><br></div><div=
>Regards,<br></div><div>=A0Rifaat</div><div>=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"g=
mail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-=
left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>=
<div>
_______________________________________________<br>
http-auth mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:http-auth@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">http-auth@ietf.org<=
/a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth" target=3D"_blan=
k">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth</a><br>
</div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div>

--089e01176919889892050652b84a--


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On 2014-10-26 13:40, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
> ...
>     > > Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character set is
>     if
>     > > the parameter is not present?  Excluding simplicity, is there a reason
>     why
>     > > charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate and a
>     > > single entry within Authorization?
>     >
>     > I will defer this to the i18n experts that suggested UTF-8 as the only
>     value to be supported.
>
>     Based upon RFC 2831 which originally attempted to add charset as a
>     digest
>     auth parameter, it looks like they interpetted things as ISO 8859-1 was
>     the default.  Even if draft-ietf-httpauth-digest wants to declare
>     UTF-8 as
>     being the default, it should potentially declare and discuss since it is
>     potentially a backward compatibility issue.
>
>
> Julian,
>
> Do you have any thoughts on this?
> ...

There was no default in RFC 2617, and thus we can't pretend there is one.

Best regards, Julian


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--089e0141a5209d174a05066065fd
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1

Thanks Julian,

I also could not find any mention of ISO 8859-1 in RFC2069.

I am not sure how RFC2831 came to the following conclusion in the
definition of the charset parameter:
"The directive is needed for backwards compatibility with HTTP Digest,
which only supports ISO 8859-1."

I am not planning on changing the definition of charset to mention ISO
8859-1 in this draft.

Regards,
 Rifaat

On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 7:24 PM, Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>
wrote:

> On 2014-10-26 13:40, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wrote:
>
>> ...
>>     > > Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character
>> set is
>>     if
>>     > > the parameter is not present?  Excluding simplicity, is there a
>> reason
>>     why
>>     > > charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate
>> and a
>>     > > single entry within Authorization?
>>     >
>>     > I will defer this to the i18n experts that suggested UTF-8 as the
>> only
>>     value to be supported.
>>
>>     Based upon RFC 2831 which originally attempted to add charset as a
>>     digest
>>     auth parameter, it looks like they interpetted things as ISO 8859-1
>> was
>>     the default.  Even if draft-ietf-httpauth-digest wants to declare
>>     UTF-8 as
>>     being the default, it should potentially declare and discuss since it
>> is
>>     potentially a backward compatibility issue.
>>
>>
>> Julian,
>>
>> Do you have any thoughts on this?
>> ...
>>
>
> There was no default in RFC 2617, and thus we can't pretend there is one.
>
> Best regards, Julian
>

--089e0141a5209d174a05066065fd
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Thanks Julian,<div><br></div><div>I also could not find an=
y mention of ISO 8859-1 in RFC2069.</div><div><br></div><div>I am not sure =
how RFC2831 came to the following conclusion in the definition of the chars=
et parameter:</div><div>&quot;<span style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);white-space:p=
re-wrap">The directive is needed for backwards</span><span style=3D"color:r=
gb(0,0,0);white-space:pre-wrap"> compatibility with HTTP Digest, which only=
 supports ISO 8859-1.</span>&quot;</div><div><br></div><div>I am not planni=
ng on changing the definition of charset to mention ISO 8859-1 in this draf=
t.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>=A0Rifaat</div></div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at =
7:24 PM, Julian Reschke <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:julian.resc=
hke@gmx.de" target=3D"_blank">julian.reschke@gmx.de</a>&gt;</span> wrote:<b=
r><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:=
1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On 2014-10-26 13:40, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef wr=
ote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
...<span class=3D""><br>
=A0 =A0 &gt; &gt; Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default char=
acter set is<br>
=A0 =A0 if<br>
=A0 =A0 &gt; &gt; the parameter is not present?=A0 Excluding simplicity, is=
 there a reason<br>
=A0 =A0 why<br>
=A0 =A0 &gt; &gt; charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authe=
nticate and a<br>
=A0 =A0 &gt; &gt; single entry within Authorization?<br>
=A0 =A0 &gt;<br>
=A0 =A0 &gt; I will defer this to the i18n experts that suggested UTF-8 as =
the only<br>
=A0 =A0 value to be supported.<br>
<br>
=A0 =A0 Based upon RFC 2831 which originally attempted to add charset as a<=
br>
=A0 =A0 digest<br>
=A0 =A0 auth parameter, it looks like they interpetted things as ISO 8859-1=
 was<br>
=A0 =A0 the default.=A0 Even if draft-ietf-httpauth-digest wants to declare=
<br>
=A0 =A0 UTF-8 as<br>
=A0 =A0 being the default, it should potentially declare and discuss since =
it is<br>
=A0 =A0 potentially a backward compatibility issue.<br>
<br>
<br>
Julian,<br>
<br>
Do you have any thoughts on this?<br></span>
...<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
There was no default in RFC 2617, and thus we can&#39;t pretend there is on=
e.<br>
<br>
Best regards, Julian<br>
</blockquote></div><br></div>

--089e0141a5209d174a05066065fd--


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To: Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>,  Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@greenbytes.de>, draft-ietf-httpauth-digest@tools.ietf.org, http-auth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] draft-ietf-httpauth-digest-08: comments
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> >>> Section 4: Should the draft mention what the default character set
is
> >>> if the parameter is not present?  Excluding simplicity, is there a
reason
> >>> why charset was not defined as a quoted list within WWW-Authenticate
> >>> and a single entry within Authorization?
> > >
> > > I will defer this to the i18n experts that suggested UTF-8 as the
only
> > > value to be supported.
> >
> >     Based upon RFC 2831 which originally attempted to add charset as a
> >     digest
> >     auth parameter, it looks like they interpetted things as ISO
8859-1 was
> >     the default.  Even if draft-ietf-httpauth-digest wants to declare
> >     UTF-8 as
> >     being the default, it should potentially declare and discuss since
it is
> >     potentially a backward compatibility issue.
> >
> >
> > Julian,
> >
> > Do you have any thoughts on this?
> > ...
>
> There was no default in RFC 2617, and thus we can't pretend there is
one.
>
> Best regards, Julian

I assume RFC 2831 mentioned a default of ISO-8859-1 because of RFC 2616.

Thanks,
Brett


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On 2014-10-27 11:36, Brett Tate wrote:
> ...
>> There was no default in RFC 2617, and thus we can't pretend there is
> one.
>>
>> Best regards, Julian
>
> I assume RFC 2831 mentioned a default of ISO-8859-1 because of RFC 2616.
> ...

RFC 2616 and 2617 do not have a default encoding -- that's part of the 
problem.

Best regards, Julian


From nobody Mon Oct 27 04:07:53 2014
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> >> There was no default in RFC 2617, and thus we can't pretend
> >> there is one.
> >>
> >> Best regards, Julian
> >
> > I assume RFC 2831 mentioned a default of ISO-8859-1 because of RFC
2616.
> > ...
>
> RFC 2616 and 2617 do not have a default encoding -- that's part of the
> problem.

They may have used the TEXT rule since quoted-string contained TEXT.

   The TEXT rule is only used for descriptive field contents and values
   that are not intended to be interpreted by the message parser. Words
   of *TEXT MAY contain characters from character sets other than ISO-
   8859-1 [22] only when encoded according to the rules of RFC 2047
   [14].

       TEXT           = <any OCTET except CTLs,
                        but including LWS>

       message-header = field-name ":" [ field-value ]
       field-name     = token
       field-value    = *( field-content | LWS )
       field-content  = <the OCTETs making up the field-value
                        and consisting of either *TEXT or combinations
                        of token, separators, and quoted-string>

       quoted-string  = ( <"> *(qdtext | quoted-pair ) <"> )
       qdtext         = <any TEXT except <">>


From nobody Mon Oct 27 04:17:15 2014
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On 2014-10-27 12:07, Brett Tate wrote:
>>>> There was no default in RFC 2617, and thus we can't pretend
>>>> there is one.
>>>>
>>>> Best regards, Julian
>>>
>>> I assume RFC 2831 mentioned a default of ISO-8859-1 because of RFC
> 2616.
>>> ...
>>
>> RFC 2616 and 2617 do not have a default encoding -- that's part of the
>> problem.
>
> They may have used the TEXT rule since quoted-string contained TEXT.

I'm aware of that text (and it was removed in RFC 7230).

I don't believe it covers Basic authentication, and even if it did, it 
wasn't implemented that way.

Best regards, Julian


From nobody Mon Oct 27 04:26:34 2014
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> On 2014-10-27 12:07, Brett Tate wrote:
> >>>> There was no default in RFC 2617, and thus we can't pretend there
> >>>> is one.
> >>>>
> >>>> Best regards, Julian
> >>>
> >>> I assume RFC 2831 mentioned a default of ISO-8859-1 because of RFC
> > 2616.
> >>> ...
> >>
> >> RFC 2616 and 2617 do not have a default encoding -- that's part of
> >> the problem.
> >
> > They may have used the TEXT rule since quoted-string contained TEXT.
>
> I'm aware of that text (and it was removed in RFC 7230).
>
> I don't believe it covers Basic authentication, and even if it did, it
> wasn't
> implemented that way.
>
> Best regards, Julian

If it matters, RFC 7230 section 3.2.4 indicates the following.

"Historically, HTTP has allowed field content with text in the
  ISO-8859-1 charset [ISO-8859-1], supporting other charsets only
  through use of [RFC2047] encoding.  In practice, most HTTP header
  field values use only a subset of the US-ASCII charset [USASCII].
  Newly defined header fields SHOULD limit their field values to
  US-ASCII octets.  A recipient SHOULD treat other octets in field
  content (obs-text) as opaque data."

Thanks,
Brett


From nobody Mon Oct 27 06:38:12 2014
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Subject: [http-auth] I-D Action: draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
 This draft is a work item of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Authentication Working Group of the IETF.

        Title           : The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme
        Author          : Julian F. Reschke
	Filename        : draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02.txt
	Pages           : 14
	Date            : 2014-10-27

Abstract:
   This document defines the "Basic" Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
   Authentication Scheme, which transmits credentials as userid/password
   pairs, obfuscated by the use of Base64 encoding.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/


From nobody Mon Oct 27 09:12:41 2014
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Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 10:12:10 -0600
From: Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <peter@andyet.net>
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Subject: [http-auth] UTF-8, usernames, passwords
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Over in the PRECIS working group, we've been trying to harmonize the 
username and password definitions from "saslprepbis" (which is intended 
to apply to more than just SASL) with the updated spec for basic auth:

http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis/
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update/

See for instance this thread:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00705.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00704.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00861.html
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00869.html

Although we've gotten closer to harmony and I've been working to adjust 
draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis as needed, we're not there yet.

USERNAMES

UTF-8: both saslprepbis and basicauth specify UTF-8 (for basicauth, when 
the new 'charset' parameter is used)

Unicode normalization: NFC

Width mapping: not specified in basicauth, whereas saslprepbis specifies 
that fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST be mapped to their 
decomposition mappings (is this something that basicauth might specify?)

The major gap appears to be the allowable characters:

- saslprepbis limits username characters to those allowed by the PRECIS 
IdentifierClass, essentially letters and digits and ASCII7 characters, 
along with single space characters separating parts of a string.

- basicauth might (at least based on what I understand) allow a wider 
range of characters, such as multiple spaces in a row or even symbols 
outside the ASCII7 range (see discussion thread above for examples)

As to the space issue, we might be able to work around this by defining 
an application-layer construct in basicauth that reuses the "userpart" 
rule from saslprepbis.

However, for allowable characters if we want to allow basically any 
character in basicauth usernames then in PRECIS terms we'd need to make 
a profile of the FreeformClass, not the IdentifierClass. IMHO that would 
be less than ideal and likely violate the principle of least user 
astonishment ("why does this username work for the web but not email?").

PASSWORDS

Here saslprepbis and basicauth are closer together. In fact the only 
gaps might be:

- width mapping: saslprepbis says MUST NOT perform width mapping, 
whereas basicauth doesn't say anything about that

- spaces: in SASLprep and also saslprepbis, non-ASCII spaces are mapped 
to ASCII space, whereas basicauth doesn't say anything about that

For both usernames and passwords in basicauth, we might want to say 
something about bidi characters.

Is there a way that we can come to agreement on these issues? Do we 
perhaps need time at the next IETF meeting, or a conf call of some kind, 
to make progress?

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/


From nobody Mon Oct 27 17:53:19 2014
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From: Yutaka OIWA <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 09:52:54 +0900
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Dear all,

As an author of another PRECIS draft for HTTP authentication
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-oiwa-precis-httpauthprep-00),
I personally feel that limiting allowing characters to
IdentifierClass is feasible and reasonable.
It includes all "sensible IMO" characters for identifiers,
is binary compatible with all printable ASCII characters,
and is character-set compatible with ISO-8859-1 set.
It will not exclude any printable characters which is currently
officially allowed in the spec.

We should allow any number of "ASCII SPACE" U+0020
between printable characters for backward compatibility,
and should not forbid any printable ASCII characters
(except some schema-dependent "forbidden-by-protocol"
character like colon <:> in basic).
I strongly believe we should forbid any control characters.
In both Peter's and my proposals, SPACEs in the
beginning and the tail of the string is not allowed,
which can be a target to discuss.

I'm currently trying to seek for possible merger of
my proposal into saslprepbis, to reduce number of
profiles to implement.


-- 
Yutaka OIWA, Ph.D.
           Senior Researcher, Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC)
    National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
                      Mail addresses: <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>, <yutaka@oiwa.jp>
OpenPGP: id[440546B5] fp[7C9F 723A 7559 3246 229D  3139 8677 9BD2 4405 46B5]



2014-10-28 1:12 GMT+09:00 Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <peter@andyet.net>:
> Over in the PRECIS working group, we've been trying to harmonize the
> username and password definitions from "saslprepbis" (which is intended to
> apply to more than just SASL) with the updated spec for basic auth:
>
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis/
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update/
>
> See for instance this thread:
>
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00705.html
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00704.html
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00861.html
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00869.html
>
> Although we've gotten closer to harmony and I've been working to adjust
> draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis as needed, we're not there yet.
>
> USERNAMES
>
> UTF-8: both saslprepbis and basicauth specify UTF-8 (for basicauth, when the
> new 'charset' parameter is used)
>
> Unicode normalization: NFC
>
> Width mapping: not specified in basicauth, whereas saslprepbis specifies
> that fullwidth and halfwidth characters MUST be mapped to their
> decomposition mappings (is this something that basicauth might specify?)
>
> The major gap appears to be the allowable characters:
>
> - saslprepbis limits username characters to those allowed by the PRECIS
> IdentifierClass, essentially letters and digits and ASCII7 characters, along
> with single space characters separating parts of a string.
>
> - basicauth might (at least based on what I understand) allow a wider range
> of characters, such as multiple spaces in a row or even symbols outside the
> ASCII7 range (see discussion thread above for examples)
>
> As to the space issue, we might be able to work around this by defining an
> application-layer construct in basicauth that reuses the "userpart" rule
> from saslprepbis.
>
> However, for allowable characters if we want to allow basically any
> character in basicauth usernames then in PRECIS terms we'd need to make a
> profile of the FreeformClass, not the IdentifierClass. IMHO that would be
> less than ideal and likely violate the principle of least user astonishment
> ("why does this username work for the web but not email?").
>
> PASSWORDS
>
> Here saslprepbis and basicauth are closer together. In fact the only gaps
> might be:
>
> - width mapping: saslprepbis says MUST NOT perform width mapping, whereas
> basicauth doesn't say anything about that
>
> - spaces: in SASLprep and also saslprepbis, non-ASCII spaces are mapped to
> ASCII space, whereas basicauth doesn't say anything about that
>
> For both usernames and passwords in basicauth, we might want to say
> something about bidi characters.
>
> Is there a way that we can come to agreement on these issues? Do we perhaps
> need time at the next IETF meeting, or a conf call of some kind, to make
> progress?
>
> Peter
>
> --
> Peter Saint-Andre
> https://andyet.com/
>
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth


From nobody Mon Oct 27 18:05:23 2014
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Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 19:04:10 -0600
From: Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <peter@andyet.net>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] UTF-8, usernames, passwords
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On 10/27/14, 6:52 PM, Yutaka OIWA wrote:
> Dear all,
>
> As an author of another PRECIS draft for HTTP authentication
> (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-oiwa-precis-httpauthprep-00),
> I personally feel that limiting allowing characters to
> IdentifierClass is feasible and reasonable.
> It includes all "sensible IMO" characters for identifiers,
> is binary compatible with all printable ASCII characters,
> and is character-set compatible with ISO-8859-1 set.
> It will not exclude any printable characters which is currently
> officially allowed in the spec.
>
> We should allow any number of "ASCII SPACE" U+0020
> between printable characters for backward compatibility,

Actually that is allowed by the current rule in saslprepbis:

    username   = userpart [1*(1*SP userpart)]

> and should not forbid any printable ASCII characters
> (except some schema-dependent "forbidden-by-protocol"
> character like colon <:> in basic).
> I strongly believe we should forbid any control characters.
> In both Peter's and my proposals, SPACEs in the
> beginning and the tail of the string is not allowed,
> which can be a target to discuss.
>
> I'm currently trying to seek for possible merger of
> my proposal into saslprepbis, to reduce number of
> profiles to implement.

Yes, that is a good goal.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/


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From: Yutaka OIWA <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 15:17:03 +0900
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] UTF-8, usernames, passwords
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> Actually that is allowed by the current rule in saslprepbis:

>   username   = userpart [1*(1*SP userpart)]


Yes.  I intended that two profile specs are consistent on this.

Sorry for possible confusions, and thank you for clarification.



2014-10-28 10:04 GMT+09:00 Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <peter@andyet.net>:
> On 10/27/14, 6:52 PM, Yutaka OIWA wrote:
>>
>> Dear all,
>>
>> As an author of another PRECIS draft for HTTP authentication
>> (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-oiwa-precis-httpauthprep-00),
>> I personally feel that limiting allowing characters to
>> IdentifierClass is feasible and reasonable.
>> It includes all "sensible IMO" characters for identifiers,
>> is binary compatible with all printable ASCII characters,
>> and is character-set compatible with ISO-8859-1 set.
>> It will not exclude any printable characters which is currently
>> officially allowed in the spec.
>>
>> We should allow any number of "ASCII SPACE" U+0020
>> between printable characters for backward compatibility,
>
>
> Actually that is allowed by the current rule in saslprepbis:
>
>    username   = userpart [1*(1*SP userpart)]
>
>> and should not forbid any printable ASCII characters
>> (except some schema-dependent "forbidden-by-protocol"
>> character like colon <:> in basic).
>> I strongly believe we should forbid any control characters.
>> In both Peter's and my proposals, SPACEs in the
>> beginning and the tail of the string is not allowed,
>> which can be a target to discuss.
>>
>> I'm currently trying to seek for possible merger of
>> my proposal into saslprepbis, to reduce number of
>> profiles to implement.
>
>
> Yes, that is a good goal.
>
>
> Peter
>
> --
> Peter Saint-Andre
> https://andyet.com/


From nobody Tue Oct 28 01:49:46 2014
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On 2014-10-27 17:12, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
> ...
> Is there a way that we can come to agreement on these issues? Do we
> perhaps need time at the next IETF meeting, or a conf call of some kind,
> to make progress?
>
> Peter

It's an interesting suggestion, but I just don't see how we can test it 
against reality -- right now people can put whatever they want into 
userids and passwords, and thus it's possible that these edge cases 
exist in practice.

I'd be ok with informative text that warns against certain character 
ranges (if we can do it quickly, are not blocked by the reference, and 
the rational actually makes sense :-).

Best regards, Julian


From nobody Tue Oct 28 06:42:40 2014
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Hi there,

as you can see, I managed to create a version that closes the remaining 
issues.

That being said:

a) the new text about re-using credentials 
(<http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02.html#reusing.credentials>) 
needs review (optimally from implementers)

b) I'm still not too happy with the document organization now that that 
charset parameter is included; I'd appreciate feedback on this...

Best regards, Julian



On 2014-10-27 14:37, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
 >
 > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts 
directories.
 >   This draft is a work item of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
Authentication Working Group of the IETF.
 >
 >          Title           : The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme
 >          Author          : Julian F. Reschke
 >     Filename        : draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02.txt
 >     Pages           : 14
 >     Date            : 2014-10-27
 >
 > Abstract:
 >     This document defines the "Basic" Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
 >     Authentication Scheme, which transmits credentials as userid/password
 >     pairs, obfuscated by the use of Base64 encoding.
 >
 >
 > The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
 > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update/
 >
 > There's also a htmlized version available at:
 > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02
 >
 > A diff from the previous version is available at:
 > http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02
 >
 >
 > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of 
submission
 > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
 >
 > Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
 > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
 >
 > _______________________________________________
 > http-auth mailing list
 > http-auth@ietf.org
 > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth


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On 10/28/14, 2:49 AM, Julian Reschke wrote:
> On 2014-10-27 17:12, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
>> ...
>> Is there a way that we can come to agreement on these issues? Do we
>> perhaps need time at the next IETF meeting, or a conf call of some kind,
>> to make progress?
>>
>> Peter
>
> It's an interesting suggestion, but I just don't see how we can test it
> against reality -- right now people can put whatever they want into
> userids and passwords, and thus it's possible that these edge cases
> exist in practice.
>
> I'd be ok with informative text that warns against certain character
> ranges (if we can do it quickly, are not blocked by the reference, and
> the rational actually makes sense :-).

I would like to avoid having two PRECIS profiles for usernames, one for 
HTTP usernames and one for non-HTTP usernames.

However, if the HTTPAUTH WG truly wants to say "anything goes" for 
usernames, then we're treating both HTTPAUTH usernames and HTTPAUTH 
passwords as we treat passwords in saslprepbis - i.e., as freeform 
strings. And if that's consistent with traditional usage for HTTPAUTH 
then so be it.

But in that case HTTPAUTH usernames aren't intended to be more 
restricted in any sense, they're not intended to be "safe" strings with 
a limited range of characters, they're not intended to reduce the 
possibility of user confusion caused by visually similar characters and 
characters that are more "expressive" (e.g., symbol characters), and 
IMHO they're not taking into account the lessons of i18n usability at all.

(We could possibly say that HTTPAUTH applications MAY use the PRECIS 
PasswordFreeformClass profile from saslprepbis for both HTTPAUTH 
usernames and HTTPAUTH passwords, but I leave that up to the HTTPAUTH WG.)

If the HTTPAUTH WG and the responsible AD and the IAB i18n directorate 
and the IETF community and the IESG are all fine with that approach, 
then I'm not going to raise objections, but I'm also not going to 
continue putting time and energy into finding a compromise or 
harmonizing saslprepbis usernames with HTTPAUTH "usernames", because 
despite having the same name these entities are fundamentally different 
from each other and it's silly to consider them the same in any way.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/


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On 2014-10-28 16:24, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
> ...
> I would like to avoid having two PRECIS profiles for usernames, one for
> HTTP usernames and one for non-HTTP usernames.
>
> However, if the HTTPAUTH WG truly wants to say "anything goes" for
> usernames, then we're treating both HTTPAUTH usernames and HTTPAUTH
> passwords as we treat passwords in saslprepbis - i.e., as freeform
> strings. And if that's consistent with traditional usage for HTTPAUTH
> then so be it.
>
> But in that case HTTPAUTH usernames aren't intended to be more
> restricted in any sense, they're not intended to be "safe" strings with
> a limited range of characters, they're not intended to reduce the
> possibility of user confusion caused by visually similar characters and
> characters that are more "expressive" (e.g., symbol characters), and
> IMHO they're not taking into account the lessons of i18n usability at all.
>
> (We could possibly say that HTTPAUTH applications MAY use the PRECIS
> PasswordFreeformClass profile from saslprepbis for both HTTPAUTH
> usernames and HTTPAUTH passwords, but I leave that up to the HTTPAUTH WG.)
>
> If the HTTPAUTH WG and the responsible AD and the IAB i18n directorate
> and the IETF community and the IESG are all fine with that approach,
> then I'm not going to raise objections, but I'm also not going to
> continue putting time and energy into finding a compromise or
> harmonizing saslprepbis usernames with HTTPAUTH "usernames", because
> despite having the same name these entities are fundamentally different
> from each other and it's silly to consider them the same in any way.
> ...

Understood.

The main issue I have is that this WG seems to be very limited in it's 
capacity to review specs, discuss changes, and also doesn't seem to have 
any participation from HTTP client/server implementers.

(I'd love to be proved otherwise, btw)

With that in mind, I'm very very reluctant to add new normative 
requirements to something that most people consider "legacy code".

Best regards, Julian


From nobody Tue Oct 28 08:32:05 2014
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On 10/28/14, 9:28 AM, Julian Reschke wrote:
> On 2014-10-28 16:24, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
>> ...
>> I would like to avoid having two PRECIS profiles for usernames, one for
>> HTTP usernames and one for non-HTTP usernames.
>>
>> However, if the HTTPAUTH WG truly wants to say "anything goes" for
>> usernames, then we're treating both HTTPAUTH usernames and HTTPAUTH
>> passwords as we treat passwords in saslprepbis - i.e., as freeform
>> strings. And if that's consistent with traditional usage for HTTPAUTH
>> then so be it.
>>
>> But in that case HTTPAUTH usernames aren't intended to be more
>> restricted in any sense, they're not intended to be "safe" strings with
>> a limited range of characters, they're not intended to reduce the
>> possibility of user confusion caused by visually similar characters and
>> characters that are more "expressive" (e.g., symbol characters), and
>> IMHO they're not taking into account the lessons of i18n usability at
>> all.
>>
>> (We could possibly say that HTTPAUTH applications MAY use the PRECIS
>> PasswordFreeformClass profile from saslprepbis for both HTTPAUTH
>> usernames and HTTPAUTH passwords, but I leave that up to the HTTPAUTH
>> WG.)
>>
>> If the HTTPAUTH WG and the responsible AD and the IAB i18n directorate
>> and the IETF community and the IESG are all fine with that approach,
>> then I'm not going to raise objections, but I'm also not going to
>> continue putting time and energy into finding a compromise or
>> harmonizing saslprepbis usernames with HTTPAUTH "usernames", because
>> despite having the same name these entities are fundamentally different
>> from each other and it's silly to consider them the same in any way.
>> ...
>
> Understood.
>
> The main issue I have is that this WG seems to be very limited in it's
> capacity to review specs, discuss changes, and also doesn't seem to have
> any participation from HTTP client/server implementers.
>
> (I'd love to be proved otherwise, btw)
>
> With that in mind, I'm very very reluctant to add new normative
> requirements to something that most people consider "legacy code".

Understood as well. :-)

So, the most that I think we can do is to say "traditionally anything 
goes for HTTPAUTH usernames and passwords, but it you want to do 
something a bit more sensible from the perspective of 
internationalization then you might apply the username and password 
profiles from saslsprepbis" with merely an informational reference to 
the latter specification.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/


From nobody Tue Oct 28 08:35:27 2014
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On 2014-10-28 16:32, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
> Understood as well. :-)
>
> So, the most that I think we can do is to say "traditionally anything
> goes for HTTPAUTH usernames and passwords, but it you want to do
> something a bit more sensible from the perspective of
> internationalization then you might apply the username and password
> profiles from saslsprepbis" with merely an informational reference to
> the latter specification.

Sounds reasonable to me.

Questions:

1) What is the schedule for this spec?

2) Who do you think the audience for this advice is? Not the User-Agent 
implementer, I guess, because she can't afford rejecting credentials 
that might be used in practice. HTTP server implementers might not have 
control over the userid/password system used. So how exactly would we 
phrase this?

Best regards, Julian


From nobody Tue Oct 28 08:51:44 2014
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From: Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <peter@andyet.net>
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To: Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>,  "http-auth@ietf.org" <http-auth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] UTF-8, usernames, passwords
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On 10/28/14, 9:35 AM, Julian Reschke wrote:
> On 2014-10-28 16:32, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
>> Understood as well. :-)
>>
>> So, the most that I think we can do is to say "traditionally anything
>> goes for HTTPAUTH usernames and passwords, but it you want to do
>> something a bit more sensible from the perspective of
>> internationalization then you might apply the username and password
>> profiles from saslsprepbis" with merely an informational reference to
>> the latter specification.
>
> Sounds reasonable to me.
>
> Questions:
>
> 1) What is the schedule for this spec?

Aside from the issue of coordination with the HTTPAUTH WG, I think it is 
ready for WGLC.

> 2) Who do you think the audience for this advice is? Not the User-Agent
> implementer, I guess, because she can't afford rejecting credentials
> that might be used in practice. HTTP server implementers might not have
> control over the userid/password system used. So how exactly would we
> phrase this?

Good point. It seems to be advice for operators, although operators 
can't put the advice into practice unless HTTP server implementers offer 
the feature.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/


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Subject: Re: [http-auth] UTF-8, usernames, passwords
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Julian,

> ...
> Understood.
>=20
> The main issue I have is that this WG seems to be very limited in it's =
capacity to review specs, discuss changes, and also doesn't seem to have =
any participation from HTTP client/server implementers.
>=20
> (I'd love to be proved otherwise, btw)

Well, CUPS is a HTTP client/server implementation and I'm here... :)

> With that in mind, I'm very very reluctant to add new normative =
requirements to something that most people consider "legacy code".

While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and =
other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings =
was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.  Any limits should be =
recommendations at this point.

_________________________________________________________
Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair


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Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 10:32:19 -0600
From: Peter Saint-Andre - &yet <peter@andyet.net>
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] UTF-8, usernames, passwords
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On 10/28/14, 10:12 AM, Michael Sweet wrote:
> Julian,
>
>> ...
>> Understood.
>>
>> The main issue I have is that this WG seems to be very limited in it's capacity to review specs, discuss changes, and also doesn't seem to have any participation from HTTP client/server implementers.
>>
>> (I'd love to be proved otherwise, btw)
>
> Well, CUPS is a HTTP client/server implementation and I'm here... :)

That's good to know. :-)

>> With that in mind, I'm very very reluctant to add new normative requirements to something that most people consider "legacy code".
>
> While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.  Any limits should be recommendations at this point.

Perhaps even only a suggestion, not a recommendation.

Peter

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From: Yutaka OIWA <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>
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Dear Julian,

> 2) Who do you think the audience for this advice is?
> Not the User-Agent implementer, I guess, because
> she can't afford rejecting credentials that might be used in practice.

It may be not in a focus of httpauth WG (mainly PRECIS WG),
but I think IETF should finally convince User-Agent implementors
to handle it, because without that UTF-8 strings are very fragile for
interoperability.

Please also consider that PRECIS IdentifierClass will NOT
reject any printable strings which are currently officially
used without i18n extensions.

I understand the scope of Basic-auth-update which will
be compatible with existing implementations with
ad-hoc UTF-8 uses.  My personal guess is that
introduction of PRECIS will not be very harmful in reality:
as far as the spec does not enforce use of PRECIS profile
as MUST requirements, they will continue to send
forbidden characters (at least printable ones such as
dingbat figures) as is if they need, and they will continue to
work with current poor interoperability level.
PRECIS profile will add better interoperability between
supported clients and supported range of characters.


> HTTP server implementers might not have control over
> the userid/password system used. So how exactly would we phrase this?

Current httpauthprep have an implementation advices, and
if merged, I guess (I want) saslprepbis will have them, too.

My proposal is that only the clients with Unicode character
handling capabilities will do that, and servers SHOULD NOT
process it in any way (consider cases other than Basic auth).
Clients handling only octet-encoded credentials MAY
assume that these are already properly processed and
MAY omit any online processing.

2014-10-29 0:35 GMT+09:00 Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>:
> On 2014-10-28 16:32, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
>>
>> Understood as well. :-)
>>
>> So, the most that I think we can do is to say "traditionally anything
>> goes for HTTPAUTH usernames and passwords, but it you want to do
>> something a bit more sensible from the perspective of
>> internationalization then you might apply the username and password
>> profiles from saslsprepbis" with merely an informational reference to
>> the latter specification.
>
>
> Sounds reasonable to me.
>
> Questions:
>
> 1) What is the schedule for this spec?
>
> 2) Who do you think the audience for this advice is? Not the User-Agent
> implementer, I guess, because she can't afford rejecting credentials that
> might be used in practice. HTTP server implementers might not have control
> over the userid/password system used. So how exactly would we phrase this?
>
> Best regards, Julian
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth


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Dear Michael,

> While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and
> other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings
> was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.
> Any limits should be recommendations at this point.

Specifically, PRECIS IdentifierClass will not restrict any printable strings
which are officially allowed in the current spec (ASCII or ISO-8859-1).
It will expand it to a sensible set of Unicode characters,
only when any new authentication scheme or extensions
(like Julian's for Basic auth) is deployed.
(We're explicitly rejecting some control characters
 like LF or CR, but I guess these are not real problems.)

So, it is the *first* definition for the handling of Unicode
characters in HTTP authentication, and it is the time to do it.
If we don't do it for right now,
UTF-8 interoperability will be very poor for next 25 years.

I am also carefully considering about existing implementations
which have ad-hoc handling of UTF-8 strings.
They are not aligned with existing specifications,
and they will be useful as it is, although
maybe it will not strictly aligned to new specifications,
if users force them to offense the new spec.
For this, good choices of normativeness level are important.


2014-10-29 1:12 GMT+09:00 Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com>:
> Julian,
>
>> ...
>> Understood.
>>
>> The main issue I have is that this WG seems to be very limited in it's capacity to review specs, discuss changes, and also doesn't seem to have any participation from HTTP client/server implementers.
>>
>> (I'd love to be proved otherwise, btw)
>
> Well, CUPS is a HTTP client/server implementation and I'm here... :)
>
>> With that in mind, I'm very very reluctant to add new normative requirements to something that most people consider "legacy code".
>
> While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.  Any limits should be recommendations at this point.
>
> _________________________________________________________
> Michael Sweet, Senior Printing System Engineer, PWG Chair
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>


From nobody Wed Oct 29 08:10:30 2014
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Subject: Re: [http-auth] I-D Action: draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02.txt
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Hi there,

as you can see, I managed to create a version that closes the remaining 
issues.

That being said:

a) the new text about re-using credentials 
(<http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02.html#reusing.credentials>) 
needs review (optimally from implementers)

b) I'm still not too happy with the document organization now that that 
charset parameter is included; I'd appreciate feedback on this...

Best regards, Julian



On 2014-10-27 14:37, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>   This draft is a work item of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Authentication Working Group of the IETF.
>
>          Title           : The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme
>          Author          : Julian F. Reschke
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02.txt
> 	Pages           : 14
> 	Date            : 2014-10-27
>
> Abstract:
>     This document defines the "Basic" Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
>     Authentication Scheme, which transmits credentials as userid/password
>     pairs, obfuscated by the use of Base64 encoding.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-httpauth-basicauth-update-02
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
> _______________________________________________
> http-auth mailing list
> http-auth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-auth
>


-- 
<green/>bytes GmbH, Hafenweg 16, D-48155 Münster, Germany
Amtsgericht Münster: HRB5782


From nobody Wed Oct 29 08:51:23 2014
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On 2014-10-28 23:26, Yutaka OIWA wrote:
> Dear Julian,
>
>> 2) Who do you think the audience for this advice is?
>> Not the User-Agent implementer, I guess, because
>> she can't afford rejecting credentials that might be used in practice.
>
> It may be not in a focus of httpauth WG (mainly PRECIS WG),
> but I think IETF should finally convince User-Agent implementors
> to handle it, because without that UTF-8 strings are very fragile for
> interoperability.
> ...

I'm sorry but this really sounds like wishful thinking. Do you seriously 
believe that user agent implementors will start blocking certain 
characters when there's a slim chance that they might be used in 
practice already?

> Please also consider that PRECIS IdentifierClass will NOT
> reject any printable strings which are currently officially
> used without i18n extensions.

The problem here is that due to the vagueness of RFC 2617, there 
currently is no limit to what can be used (well, maybe except control 
characters).

 > ...

Best regards, Julian


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On 2014-10-28 23:41, Yutaka OIWA wrote:
> Dear Michael,
>
>> While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and
>> other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings
>> was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.
>> Any limits should be recommendations at this point.
>
> Specifically, PRECIS IdentifierClass will not restrict any printable strings
> which are officially allowed in the current spec (ASCII or ISO-8859-1).

You are reading the current spec differently than many UA implementors.

> It will expand it to a sensible set of Unicode characters,
> only when any new authentication scheme or extensions
> (like Julian's for Basic auth) is deployed.
> (We're explicitly rejecting some control characters
>   like LF or CR, but I guess these are not real problems.)
>
> So, it is the *first* definition for the handling of Unicode
> characters in HTTP authentication, and it is the time to do it.

It may be the first definition, but these characters are already in use 
in credentials, and we can't turn the clock back.

> If we don't do it for right now,
> UTF-8 interoperability will be very poor for next 25 years.
>
> I am also carefully considering about existing implementations
> which have ad-hoc handling of UTF-8 strings.
> They are not aligned with existing specifications,
> and they will be useful as it is, although
> maybe it will not strictly aligned to new specifications,
> if users force them to offense the new spec.
> For this, good choices of normativeness level are important.

This is something where the spec will have little impact on reality, no 
matter what amount of normativeness we put in. Explaining the problem 
space and giving recommendations seems like a good idea to me; 
everything else IMHO is pointless.

Best regards, Julian


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Subject: Re: [http-auth] UTF-8, usernames, passwords
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Dear Julian,

I'll separate some long answers to a few mails.

2014-10-30 0:55 GMT+09:00 Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>:
> On 2014-10-28 23:41, Yutaka OIWA wrote:

>> If we don't do it for right now,
>> UTF-8 interoperability will be very poor for next 25 years.
>>
>> I am also carefully considering about existing implementations
>> which have ad-hoc handling of UTF-8 strings.
>> They are not aligned with existing specifications,
>> and they will be useful as it is, although
>> maybe it will not strictly aligned to new specifications,
>> if users force them to offense the new spec.
>> For this, good choices of normativeness level are important.
>
>
> This is something where the spec will have little impact on reality, no
> matter what amount of normativeness we put in. Explaining the problem space
> and giving recommendations seems like a good idea to me; everything else
> IMHO is pointless.

For Basic and Digest, I agree "recommendation-level" is a good
choice, because these aim for "ad-hoc" compatibility
with working implementations without new extensions.
I think it's the correct level of "normativeness" for these.
If my word "normativeness" looks like limited to more stronger things,
I apologize for confusion.

I believe, at the same time, the "correct" thing to do
if we had had no historical restrictions, is a SHOULD level, and
I'll use it in SHOULD level for my own proposal, because it is
experimental and we can expect only new deployments without
existing encoded credentials.

-- 
Yutaka OIWA, Ph.D.
           Senior Researcher, Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC)
    National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
                      Mail addresses: <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>, <yutaka@oiwa.jp>
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From: Yutaka OIWA <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 08:20:22 +0900
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2014-10-30 0:55 GMT+09:00 Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>:
> On 2014-10-28 23:41, Yutaka OIWA wrote:

>> It will expand it to a sensible set of Unicode characters,
>> only when any new authentication scheme or extensions
>> (like Julian's for Basic auth) is deployed.
>> (We're explicitly rejecting some control characters
>>   like LF or CR, but I guess these are not real problems.)
>>
>> So, it is the *first* definition for the handling of Unicode
>> characters in HTTP authentication, and it is the time to do it.
>
>
> It may be the first definition, but these characters are already in use in
> credentials, and we can't turn the clock back.

First, the IdentifierClass is still quite conservative in what is
actually allowed, so I am quite optimistic in believing that
the actually rejected credentials with a new rule is either
virtually nothing or (even if it is existing) quite rare.

I first proposed to PRECIS to use more broader set of
characters for HTTP authentications,
(although it was not correctly mentioned in the spec)
but I was once convinced during PRECIS WG discussions
to use the current set of allowed characters.
Peter should possibly have better examples of allowed and
disallowed strings than me.

Second, for Basic and Digest, we may use it only as a
definitions of good, safe characters and say something like
"for use of characters inside this set we can guarantee
interoperability between supported clients,
but use of characters outside of this set may cause some
unwanted interoperability problems by the nature of
Unicode character sets (but it will work as currently it is)."

-- 
Yutaka OIWA, Ph.D.
           Senior Researcher, Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC)
    National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
                      Mail addresses: <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>, <yutaka@oiwa.jp>
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From: Yutaka OIWA <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>
Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 08:25:49 +0900
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Dear Julian,

2014-10-30 0:55 GMT+09:00 Julian Reschke <julian.reschke@gmx.de>:
> On 2014-10-28 23:41, Yutaka OIWA wrote:
>>
>> Dear Michael,
>>
>>> While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and
>>> other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings
>>> was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.
>>> Any limits should be recommendations at this point.
>>
>>
>> Specifically, PRECIS IdentifierClass will not restrict any printable
>> strings
>> which are officially allowed in the current spec (ASCII or ISO-8859-1).
>
>
> You are reading the current spec differently than many UA implementors.

I understand (as I mentioned in many earlier mails) that
many UA implementors have already started to send
non-ISO-8859-1 characters in several ad-hoc ways, as
anyway users were inputting these characters to UI,
and they must do something on that.
I'm NOT ignoring that fact completely.
But it was and it is still working as ad-hoc, and
no interoperability is guaranteed at all.

As a Japanese EUC-environment user,
I really used un-interoperable situations for
for 15+ years (where most servers require SJIS inputs.)
Actually, Japanese were for-a-long-time having problems
on such things, so most of them are quite trained with
using ASCII-only identifiers (actually I guess we're
less requiring identifier i18n than European users).

Harmonizing to UTF-8 in both ad-hoc implementation levels
and well-defined spec level is really a good movement for me.
What I wanted to say is that the current situation is still
ad-hoc, and it is mostly working with a luck.
I'm really happy with basic-auth-update because only with it
such situations will have truely, guaranteed interoperability.

-- 
Yutaka OIWA, Ph.D.
           Senior Researcher, Research Institute for Secure Systems (RISEC)
    National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST)
                      Mail addresses: <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>, <yutaka@oiwa.jp>
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On 10/29/14, 9:55 AM, Julian Reschke wrote:
> On 2014-10-28 23:41, Yutaka OIWA wrote:
>> Dear Michael,
>>
>>> While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and
>>> other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings
>>> was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.
>>> Any limits should be recommendations at this point.
>>
>> Specifically, PRECIS IdentifierClass will not restrict any printable
>> strings
>> which are officially allowed in the current spec (ASCII or ISO-8859-1).
>
> You are reading the current spec differently than many UA implementors.
>
>> It will expand it to a sensible set of Unicode characters,
>> only when any new authentication scheme or extensions
>> (like Julian's for Basic auth) is deployed.
>> (We're explicitly rejecting some control characters
>>   like LF or CR, but I guess these are not real problems.)
>>
>> So, it is the *first* definition for the handling of Unicode
>> characters in HTTP authentication, and it is the time to do it.
>
> It may be the first definition, but these characters are already in use
> in credentials, and we can't turn the clock back.
>
>> If we don't do it for right now,
>> UTF-8 interoperability will be very poor for next 25 years.
>>
>> I am also carefully considering about existing implementations
>> which have ad-hoc handling of UTF-8 strings.
>> They are not aligned with existing specifications,
>> and they will be useful as it is, although
>> maybe it will not strictly aligned to new specifications,
>> if users force them to offense the new spec.
>> For this, good choices of normativeness level are important.
>
> This is something where the spec will have little impact on reality, no
> matter what amount of normativeness we put in. Explaining the problem
> space and giving recommendations seems like a good idea to me;
> everything else IMHO is pointless.

Totally naïve question: can we tie better i18n behavior to use of the 
charset authentication parameter? Unmodified code won't advertise that 
param, but modified and updated code will. Most of the expectations 
around that param are already pretty heavy (UTF-8 and especially NFC), 
so adding a few more constraints might not be a significant burden.

But I am coming into this conversation from the outside, so I freely 
admit that I might be missing a whole lot of context...

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/


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On 2014-10-30 00:27, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
> ...
> Totally naïve question: can we tie better i18n behavior to use of the
> charset authentication parameter? Unmodified code won't advertise that
> param, but modified and updated code will. Most of the expectations
> around that param are already pretty heavy (UTF-8 and especially NFC),
> so adding a few more constraints might not be a significant burden.
> ...

The expectations aren't heavy at all; these are implemented already.

The new constraints we speak of however are usually beyond the control 
of those who implement Basic auth (they usually do not implement 
userid/password storage but just interface to it).

> ...

Best regards, Julian


From nobody Thu Oct 30 10:46:30 2014
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Subject: [http-auth] Agenda for HTTP-AUTH at IETF-91
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We have submitted a draft agenda for the working group session at IETF 91.

Our top priority is to work through all open issues in the Basic and
Digest update documents. In particular, the UTF-8 username and
password discussion on the list recently has very productive and we
have devoted some time at IETF 91 to help ensure that this discussion
is successfully resolved by the end of the meeting.

With regards to the experimental documents, we will be sending HOBA to
the IESG shortly after a successful last call. We will be devoting a
bit of meeting time to SCRAM at IETF 91. Our plan is then to focus
working group attention on the Mutual Auth document suite to produce
discussion on these documents not long after IETF 91.

Thanks,
- Matt and Yoav

===============================

Session: HTTPAUTH
Date: Friday, November 14 - 1150-1320 Afternoon Session I
Location: Coral 2

Chair's Presentation
10 min

Internationalized Strings and HTTPAUTH
(Precis-related discussion)
15 min

Basic Update
20 min

Digest Update
20 min

SCRAM
15 min

Open Microphone
10 min


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On 2014/10/29 01:32, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
> On 10/28/14, 10:12 AM, Michael Sweet wrote:
>> Julian,

>>> With that in mind, I'm very very reluctant to add new normative
>>> requirements to something that most people consider "legacy code".
>>
>> While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and
>> other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings
>> was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.  Any limits should
>> be recommendations at this point.
>
> Perhaps even only a suggestion, not a recommendation.

I think there should be strong recommendations to tightly control the 
identifiers that are allowed, even if the protocol may allow more, and 
to carefully test any kind of processing (rejection, normalization,...) 
to make sure different parts of an infrastructure are in sync. 
Otherwise, things like 
https://labs.spotify.com/2013/06/18/creative-usernames/ will happen.

This should be part of a security section in every HTTP authentication 
related document that uses IDs or passwords or something similar.

Regards,   Martin.


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On 10/30/14, 6:04 PM, "Martin J. Dürst" wrote:
> On 2014/10/29 01:32, Peter Saint-Andre - &yet wrote:
>> On 10/28/14, 10:12 AM, Michael Sweet wrote:
>>> Julian,
>
>>>> With that in mind, I'm very very reluctant to add new normative
>>>> requirements to something that most people consider "legacy code".
>>>
>>> While HTTP Basic authentication is still widely used for printing and
>>> other "embedded" solutions, the time for limiting the username strings
>>> was almost 25 years ago when it was first defined.  Any limits should
>>> be recommendations at this point.
>>
>> Perhaps even only a suggestion, not a recommendation.
>
> I think there should be strong recommendations to tightly control the
> identifiers that are allowed, even if the protocol may allow more, and
> to carefully test any kind of processing (rejection, normalization,...)
> to make sure different parts of an infrastructure are in sync.
> Otherwise, things like
> https://labs.spotify.com/2013/06/18/creative-usernames/ will happen.

Yes, that is one of my favorite examples. If only I had a way to 
communicate with that team to let them know that the XMPP nodeprep 
definition is not specified in an ancient I-D but in RFC 6122...

> This should be part of a security section in every HTTP authentication
> related document that uses IDs or passwords or something similar.

Agreed.

Peter

-- 
Peter Saint-Andre
https://andyet.com/

