
From nobody Tue May  5 08:38:06 2020
Return-Path: <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 195E03A087F for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  5 May 2020 08:38:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.989
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.989 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, HTTPS_HTTP_MISMATCH=0.1, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, T_SPF_PERMERROR=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=futurewei.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8hcxEKvAqsZP for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue,  5 May 2020 08:38:02 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from NAM11-DM6-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-dm6nam11on2118.outbound.protection.outlook.com [40.107.223.118]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E31283A082F for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Tue,  5 May 2020 08:37:57 -0700 (PDT)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=ng3PIkDPorQcqaAhgoLiUBQizS3Mj2khqE6aCgSe/4bwn/cx6ZEsb0OqGkJjMNGBY7FvRQE3xw607K/cCkeJjZqMpGpyt4SwmmEaPnWCoezdqt8hkqeI0snP/ggGEuyYpncS9tQ3U+8DDO1rsucZS5dwEdFK2KTXlbLatvlZN2ZMMEEJRiHz5pZU1qIr7sdbmuo7yMjxKLakkekcUCnc/7iya/qkNLocqBW3D3g/ic/5Q1rFfGtu2L39gE2BBX/eWKtqGkhfCgrpDQb2Jq7g6P+zkWDRogrXFBeFY83r5Qvmfne6z2Kcuh0X7P1SqqlkeHlhlvTw1kcutcImdPTWTw==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com;  s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=k84J1usb5XRDoncqE+TKaNzMqOq2yhUA3WfNPy3q8xE=; b=PQRq2RmR7NXNdF2j+dtpI4fGf69pbmkVceNuoYRcw//qjfY9P5wbyV1Ua8frDJS5VJxkRaPNXKbeWWYV0fP8P4c4c/9wJgx2w3GqeYrfr79VMUfJXXuf392mGIVt9jWdouEcPlRi8moyOayP/tD8kE42qEyCxZNZdA2sw8qmNw3DdAVFbDHFFbz8m3YUIViQjYMP0TQ89a4+XMaXKc0ZQdQBcm7y+oFDB4OOhln6ofPBWkNmEgIR3Z+SHIMwDtYSZNY/6I6wU8FcRVscceWLP/DcZ9fL2M3I3JtphFyScVbwDqb3OQoFMO8b9kb5t/ENSp6bfAs9gXBkdXRwA8qlqQ==
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=futurewei.com; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=futurewei.com; dkim=pass header.d=futurewei.com; arc=none
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=Futurewei.com; s=selector2; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=k84J1usb5XRDoncqE+TKaNzMqOq2yhUA3WfNPy3q8xE=; b=KPdwkIYGm3xIVLECSfoFXwWCBw6rsZK8Fo/yAHpvG48xIge3AQc28vrZVcF1CSLRQxZrsQtSr2XJbqaU5OH6aiCrbxomS/FQhzn1ljhiJxrNEkq7ga6VNkRlWRVUDft/whZV6lcbKC2qmkQy62XKYABHdDwZSeJuM6cPTdHBgY8=
Received: from SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:55::16) by SN6PR13MB2525.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:5e::26) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.2979.16; Tue, 5 May 2020 15:37:55 +0000
Received: from SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::5dac:54bb:275d:f2c5]) by SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::5dac:54bb:275d:f2c5%4]) with mapi id 15.20.2979.023; Tue, 5 May 2020 15:37:55 +0000
From: Linda Dunbar <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
To: "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF meetings
Thread-Index: AQHWItMI3sTRoI/sR06quN6A10+TDqiZoFtw
Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 15:37:55 +0000
Message-ID: <SN6PR13MB233492A2BC787C1D46CE154885A70@SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
References: <158857581528.28405.17372040856513106617@ietfa.amsl.com> <F6B7B63B-5C48-4E17-81E0-19B1CBC5133A@cooperw.in>
In-Reply-To: <F6B7B63B-5C48-4E17-81E0-19B1CBC5133A@cooperw.in>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
authentication-results: ietf.org; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;ietf.org; dmarc=none action=none header.from=futurewei.com;
x-originating-ip: [72.180.73.64]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: a72c08a8-429e-40c0-ac5e-08d7f10a4816
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: SN6PR13MB2525:
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <SN6PR13MB25258586F302AB926BBDD43C85A70@SN6PR13MB2525.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
x-ms-oob-tlc-oobclassifiers: OLM:9508;
x-forefront-prvs: 0394259C80
x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1
x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0;
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: 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
x-forefront-antispam-report: CIP:255.255.255.255; CTRY:; LANG:en; SCL:1; SRV:;  IPV:NLI; SFV:NSPM; H:SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com; PTR:; CAT:NONE;  SFTY:; SFS:(4636009)(366004)(346002)(396003)(136003)(39830400003)(376002)(33430700001)(8936002)(2906002)(44832011)(71200400001)(8676002)(33440700001)(9686003)(26005)(55016002)(64756008)(966005)(7696005)(76116006)(66446008)(66476007)(66556008)(6506007)(478600001)(66946007)(186003)(33656002)(316002)(52536014)(86362001)(5660300002)(6916009); DIR:OUT; SFP:1102; 
x-ms-exchange-antispam-messagedata: 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
x-ms-exchange-transport-forked: True
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_SN6PR13MB233492A2BC787C1D46CE154885A70SN6PR13MB2334namp_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: Futurewei.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: a72c08a8-429e-40c0-ac5e-08d7f10a4816
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 05 May 2020 15:37:55.6417 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 0fee8ff2-a3b2-4018-9c75-3a1d5591fedc
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-mailboxtype: HOSTED
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-userprincipalname: hbJSwkwnFsqiIgFoFUdY5Oc24PBtd6eWq5KUphxXcDogoAKi2LLrJW80SgO8XQyvGO/R+v21W37rv9u3Egcw4g==
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SN6PR13MB2525
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/ZRHoGfmofKFj1LflywejaNoQFM8>
Subject: [I2nsf] FW: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF meetings
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 05 May 2020 15:38:04 -0000

--_000_SN6PR13MB233492A2BC787C1D46CE154885A70SN6PR13MB2334namp_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I2NSF WG,

Please input your voice to the IETF survey on future Online meetings.

Linda Dunbar


Begin forwarded message:

From: IETF Executive Director <exec-director@ietf.org<mailto:exec-director@=
ietf.org>>
Subject: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF meetings
Date: May 4, 2020 at 3:03:35 AM EDT
To: "IETF Announcement List" <ietf-announce@ietf.org<mailto:ietf-announce@i=
etf.org>>
Reply-To: ietf108planning@ietf.org<mailto:ietf108planning@ietf.org>

This is a reminder that we need the IETF community to help us plan for the =
possibility that one or more upcoming IETF meetings in 2020 and possibly 20=
21 may not be able to go ahead in person.  You can help us with this by fil=
ling out the following survey:

                https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/5328FFJ<https://nam11.safeli=
nks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.surveymonkey.com%2Fr%2F=
5328FFJ&data=3D02%7C01%7Clinda.dunbar%40futurewei.com%7Cea821a1496c2424c050=
308d7f0ea3f9a%7C0fee8ff2a3b240189c753a1d5591fedc%7C1%7C0%7C6372427612051520=
68&sdata=3DLK9HLtrm8QPKzJQ7Wv6twcvZ4GLTlIIo6UJDVOS3x6Q%3D&reserved=3D0>

So far we have 114 responses and we would ideally like 500 or more.

The survey contains the following pages and will take 15-20 minutes to comp=
lete:

1. Welcome
2. Online IETF 107 and the subsequent virtual interims
3. Replacing a cancelled in-person meeting
4. Online meeting format and timezone
5. Replicating humming
6. Replicating the hallway environment
7. Fees
8. Thanks and anything else

We run the survey in anonymous mode which means that we only see data that =
you explicitly provide.

Thank you in advance for your help.

--
Alissa Cooper, IETF Chair
Jay Daley, IETF Executive Director
Colin Perkins, IRTF Chair

_______________________________________________
IETF-Announce mailing list
IETF-Announce@ietf.org<mailto:IETF-Announce@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce


--_000_SN6PR13MB233492A2BC787C1D46CE154885A70SN6PR13MB2334namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Microsoft Word 15 (filtered medium)">
<style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
	{font-family:Helvetica;
	panose-1:2 11 6 4 2 2 2 2 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0in;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:blue;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:purple;
	text-decoration:underline;}
p.msonormal0, li.msonormal0, div.msonormal0
	{mso-style-name:msonormal;
	mso-margin-top-alt:auto;
	margin-right:0in;
	mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
	margin-left:0in;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}
span.apple-tab-span
	{mso-style-name:apple-tab-span;}
span.EmailStyle20
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"blue" vlink=3D"purple">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">I2NSF WG, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Please input your voice to the IETF survey on future=
 Online meetings.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Linda Dunbar<o:p></o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><br>
<br>
<o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style=3D"margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Begin forwarded message:<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,=
sans-serif">From: </span>
</b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,sans-serif">IETF Execu=
tive Director &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:exec-director@ietf.org">exec-director@i=
etf.org</a>&gt;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,=
sans-serif">Subject: Reminder: Survey on planning for possible online IETF =
meetings</span></b><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,=
sans-serif">Date: </span>
</b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,sans-serif">May 4, 202=
0 at 3:03:35 AM EDT</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,=
sans-serif">To: </span>
</b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,sans-serif">&quot;IETF=
 Announcement List&quot; &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:ietf-announce@ietf.org">ietf=
-announce@ietf.org</a>&gt;</span><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,=
sans-serif">Reply-To:
</span></b><span style=3D"font-family:&quot;Helvetica&quot;,sans-serif"><a =
href=3D"mailto:ietf108planning@ietf.org">ietf108planning@ietf.org</a></span=
><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">This is a reminder that we need the IETF community t=
o help us plan for the possibility that one or more upcoming IETF meetings =
in 2020 and possibly 2021 may not be able to go ahead in person. &nbsp;You =
can help us with this by filling out the
 following survey: <br>
<br>
<span class=3D"apple-tab-span">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n=
bsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span><a href=3D"https://na=
m11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.surveymonkey.=
com%2Fr%2F5328FFJ&amp;data=3D02%7C01%7Clinda.dunbar%40futurewei.com%7Cea821=
a1496c2424c050308d7f0ea3f9a%7C0fee8ff2a3b240189c753a1d5591fedc%7C1%7C0%7C63=
7242761205152068&amp;sdata=3DLK9HLtrm8QPKzJQ7Wv6twcvZ4GLTlIIo6UJDVOS3x6Q%3D=
&amp;reserved=3D0">https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/5328FFJ</a><br>
<br>
So far we have 114 responses and we would ideally like 500 or more.<br>
<br>
The survey contains the following pages and will take 15-20 minutes to comp=
lete:<br>
<br>
1. Welcome<br>
2. Online IETF 107 and the subsequent virtual interims<br>
3. Replacing a cancelled in-person meeting<br>
4. Online meeting format and timezone<br>
5. Replicating humming<br>
6. Replicating the hallway environment<br>
7. Fees<br>
8. Thanks and anything else<br>
<br>
We run the survey in anonymous mode which means that we only see data that =
you explicitly provide.<br>
<br>
Thank you in advance for your help.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
Alissa Cooper, IETF Chair<br>
Jay Daley, IETF Executive Director<br>
Colin Perkins, IRTF Chair<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
IETF-Announce mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:IETF-Announce@ietf.org">IETF-Announce@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce">https://www=
.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-announce</a><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_SN6PR13MB233492A2BC787C1D46CE154885A70SN6PR13MB2334namp_--


From nobody Wed May  6 11:23:11 2020
Return-Path: <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C17F3A0A0F; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:23:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.089
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.089 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, T_SPF_PERMERROR=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=futurewei.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Z783Rf65k8SQ; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:23:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from NAM11-BN8-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bn8nam11on2112.outbound.protection.outlook.com [40.107.236.112]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 682D43A09C7; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:23:01 -0700 (PDT)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=X4hywWOmj+M/FaGAlWf2DWVwNw4qx0MYbBXh88DAmCuwUHJAYf+j+eVGWRD1OEUliSQ4Tw8/KLE7Y0fUhRM7+RtKz/w3gG6rCXNL6+/bc9r9NEawy2P05wJIC3w8W/cC+DSX1zm8DqdtHQ2W+3dSJYz7wyLkaOxdrn0egyC5qANvkVLgURzdTXF6+SipVbU0oDy2UMp22DX3OjZkQNL9zUAnfNHDAqkMnkia6VW7Q7MIfWeR/L9gnw1ZUIkWQaQDWFUkJUtSDVTkbiuw2eKf5bjU5K5VHJ8G4WSkxTwXiKgp4JRPzwkvQ6Wm/538Ld4pFBe869obV8aUaC0bKLOsLQ==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com;  s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=Oo8cHqgvUUA5qHaW9TeVuT6VwAYbYiHB0Aq1D5Jcdxg=; b=WiharyDvD4BJm89UCpN4RDP/HfxzutghdD/lN1iAqZmWk9/4OuwAfuR1aUcn68/XsltJdNERsGhTxHfqAWIC+fGYUhQcQDmzpcXOwY76ftqVgVsOh6FTlvM46cOaEXpRpWdWxwoYNpEvHSpxxBk0RTFWq0wjqEzmV0OMh4i7VyMGRIv0JWVuwoNFCAAmVNmyMNN59rVxdkdP1ZedKdApQXFZirKhvHGxnUPHV4v2FTFOZzk/MUlRqA+I9vVIJTQoGFJUBxl0k1Qnbh0snSEVdOBPGHsPPpO1OhHhYWf+xEPjpDiac2EwMnQxPKVnlsuWy2vVQanougibbQj4v8+TBA==
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=futurewei.com; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=futurewei.com; dkim=pass header.d=futurewei.com; arc=none
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=Futurewei.com; s=selector2; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=Oo8cHqgvUUA5qHaW9TeVuT6VwAYbYiHB0Aq1D5Jcdxg=; b=Zs1VdSQrc5Wr/vh+HJVboKhIyjeDyLdgNAGe3Vh9vsRojjl/uAvuJWrQHj5qL0sgPUhlckW8dsk+3SWofpAXv8PxxHZnFFTjyKGdVaoSfEJ9Zs0SEDTzYerqOaAusEJgIhkvahHnxVc6lxEbVnuxLnbIhZZRyp4Uc6RF+TtIt+s=
Received: from SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:55::16) by SN6PR13MB2479.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:57::24) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.2979.14; Wed, 6 May 2020 18:22:58 +0000
Received: from SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::5dac:54bb:275d:f2c5]) by SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::5dac:54bb:275d:f2c5%4]) with mapi id 15.20.2979.028; Wed, 6 May 2020 18:22:58 +0000
From: Linda Dunbar <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
To: "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability@ietf.org>, "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Please address the comments from AD and upload a revision for this draft to move forward
Thread-Index: AdWx4WWLg19bsltjREK+SkErbL3oUxx8d3aw
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 18:22:58 +0000
Message-ID: <SN6PR13MB23348A618D54273D2C56B4C885A40@SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
References: <BN8PR13MB26282A5FC9EED97C4366E29F85540@BN8PR13MB2628.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
In-Reply-To: <BN8PR13MB26282A5FC9EED97C4366E29F85540@BN8PR13MB2628.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
authentication-results: ietf.org; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;ietf.org; dmarc=none action=none header.from=futurewei.com;
x-originating-ip: [72.180.73.64]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 6735a118-952e-42c2-7d82-08d7f1ea8103
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: SN6PR13MB2479:
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <SN6PR13MB24791385BE549D579F31F45A85A40@SN6PR13MB2479.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
x-ms-oob-tlc-oobclassifiers: OLM:9508;
x-forefront-prvs: 03950F25EC
x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1
x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0;
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: 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
x-forefront-antispam-report: CIP:255.255.255.255; CTRY:; LANG:en; SCL:1; SRV:;  IPV:NLI; SFV:NSPM; H:SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com; PTR:; CAT:NONE;  SFTY:; SFS:(4636009)(346002)(366004)(376002)(39850400004)(396003)(136003)(33430700001)(166002)(66556008)(30864003)(450100002)(33440700001)(64756008)(66476007)(76116006)(66946007)(2906002)(33656002)(6506007)(186003)(66446008)(26005)(110136005)(316002)(8676002)(5660300002)(55016002)(86362001)(8936002)(52536014)(7696005)(9686003)(44832011)(966005)(71200400001)(53546011)(478600001)(579004)(559001); DIR:OUT; SFP:1102; 
x-ms-exchange-antispam-messagedata: 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
x-ms-exchange-transport-forked: True
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_SN6PR13MB23348A618D54273D2C56B4C885A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: Futurewei.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 6735a118-952e-42c2-7d82-08d7f1ea8103
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 06 May 2020 18:22:58.3746 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 0fee8ff2-a3b2-4018-9c75-3a1d5591fedc
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-mailboxtype: HOSTED
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-userprincipalname: ZhOMyHoSDMadrmh92waNx8SApnxOgolWSq+S5ZFQbhKj2fu97zqqfS4Y6c62xUgzDvilBDsUA/H8q4bYgG8ooQ==
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SN6PR13MB2479
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/2R6eeQDQYTze01DfEpwhqebI2Wc>
Subject: Re: [I2nsf] Please address the comments from AD and upload a revision for this draft to move forward
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 06 May 2020 18:23:09 -0000

--_000_SN6PR13MB23348A618D54273D2C56B4C885A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Ping the authors of the draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability:

Could you please address the comments from AD and upload a revision for thi=
s draft to move forward?

Thank you very much

Linda

From: Linda Dunbar
Sent: Friday, December 13, 2019 12:18 PM
To: draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability@ietf.org; i2nsf@ietf.org
Subject: Please address the comments from AD and upload a revision for this=
 draft to move forward

Authors of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability,

Could you please address the comments from AD and upload a revision for thi=
s draft to move forward?

Thank you very much

Linda

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
[I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05
Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org<mailto:rdd@cert.org>> Sat, 07 September 2019 03=
:25 UTCShow header<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/3zaF6lcQkHZd=
sajS-cRG3qEk9Zc>
Hi!

The following is my AD review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05:

=3D=3D [ Process feedback
(1) The I2NSF charter states "The working group will decide later whether t=
he information model needs to be published as an RFC".  The shepherd write-=
up does not capture WG deliberation on choosing to publish this document.  =
Can this please be added.

(2) What is the rational for this draft being standards track?  For a stand=
ards track information model, I would expected normative references to cont=
ent needed by the data models.  However, the data models that would be impl=
ement this IM only reference it as informational.

=3D=3D[ High level feedback
(More specific pointers to all of these are in the detailed feedback)

** The document discusses a lot different models -- CapIM, capability infor=
mation model, ECA policy model, capability model, meta-model, external info=
rmation model.  It would be helpful to define upfront the relationship betw=
een these components.

** The CapIM also appears to have multiple use cases.  The text seems to fl=
uidly move between the ideas of a Policy Rule and the capability being adve=
rtised by the NSF.  Being clear up front and organizing the text around the=
se uses would be helpful.

** At times it wasn't clear if what was being described is an element of th=
e CapIM or a properties of the system that would be consuming it.

** The mechanics of integrating external models wasn't clear to me

** Finally, explaining these models relative to the I2NSF architecture/term=
inology would be very helpful - i.e., the I2NSF reference architecture in F=
igure 1 of RFC8329, and the I2NSF Policy Rule.

=3D=3D[ Detailed feedback
(3)  Abstract.  Whatever markup generated this text oddly placed the Abstra=
ct after the Copyright notice and status of this memo statement.  The abstr=
act should be first.  Can you please rearrange the text.

(4) Please resolve these additional IDnits:

  ** The document seems to lack an Introduction section.
     (A line matching the expected section header was found, but with an
    unexpected indentation:
     '  1. Introduction' )

  ** The document seems to lack a Security Considerations section.
     (A line matching the expected section header was found, but with an
    unexpected indentation:
     '  5. Security Considerations' )

  ** The document seems to lack an IANA Considerations section.  (See Secti=
on
     2.2 of https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist for how to handle the ca=
se
     when there are no actions for IANA.)

  ** There are 4 instances of too long lines in the document, the longest o=
ne
     being 13 characters in excess of 72.

  ** The document seems to lack a both a reference to RFC 2119 and the
     recommended RFC 2119 boilerplate, even if it appears to use RFC 2119
     keywords.

(5) Section 1.  It struck me as unusual that Section 1 and early parts of 2=
, don't explain this information model (IM) in terms of the I2NSF architect=
ure.  Is there a reason for that?  IMO, it would make the text a lot cleare=
r to state that this IM is used for particular I2NSF interfaces and avoid t=
he defining what NSFs need. Without it, the text isn't clear on the link be=
tween "Security Capabilities" and the I2NSF architecture.

(6) Section 1.  Per the opening paragraph of "The rapid development of virt=
ualized systems .... Examples include ...":
-- Sentence #2 doesn't seem to support sentence #1.  What is the link betwe=
en IoT devices and virtualization?
-- what are residential access users?

(7) Section 1.  Expand NSF on first use.

(8) Section 1.  Editorial.  s/over the given network traffic/on the network=
 traffic/

(9) Section 1.  Editorial.
s/Security Capabilities describe the functions that Network Security Functi=
ons (NSFs) are available to provide for security policy enforcement purpose=
s./
Security Capabilities describe the functionality that Network Security Func=
tions (NSFs) are able to provide for security policy enforcement purposes./

(10) Section 1.  Per "Security Capabilities are independent of the actual s=
ecurity control mechanisms that will implement them":
-- this seems redundant to the content of the next paragraph.
-- in this context is a security control mechanism an NSF? Or something new=
?

(11) Section 1.  Per "Every NSF SHOULD be described with the set of capabil=
ities it offers", it seems odd for an IM document to place this required as=
 it doesn't actually specify the solution (as this would be a data model)

(12) Section 1.  Expand "ECA model" on first use.

(13) Section 3.  The first paragraph, "A Capability Information Model (CapI=
M), is a ..." and the fifth paragraph, "The CapIM is intended ...", appear =
to restate many of the same things.  Recommend their consolidation.

(14) Section 3.  Editorial.  s/This enables the precise/It enables the prec=
ise/

(15) Section 3.  How the paragraphs 2 - 4 of this section inform the model =
design isn't clear to me.  I don't think they are needed.

(16) Section 3.  Per paragraph 6, "This includes enabling ...", I don't fol=
low how this text informs the design.

(17) Section 3.1. Editorially splitting the Design Principles and the ECA P=
olicy Model into different section might helpful readability.

(18) Section 3.1. Abstraction.  This principal has already been mentioned t=
wice between in Section 1 ("Security Capabilities enable security functiona=
lity to be described in a vendor-neutral manner") and Section 3 ("Capabilit=
ies MUST be defined in a vendor- and technology-independent manner").  Perh=
aps it only needs to be said here?

(19) Section 3.1.  Advertisement and Execution.  How does the existence of =
a "dedicated, well-known interface" influence the design of the information=
 model?  Is it that certain meta-data is needed (or not)?  These seem like =
properties of the I2NSF architecture.

(20) Section 3.1.  Automation and Scalability. How this text informs the de=
sign of the IM isn't clear.  It seems to describe the properties of the end=
 system using the IM.  I would have expected the text to describe how this =
translates into the data fields in the IM.

(21) Section 3.1.  Per "Based on the above principles, this document define=
s a capability model ...", per the draft's title, I thought this document w=
as describing an information model?  What is the link between the capabilit=
y model and IM?

(22) Section 3.1., Per the paragraph that starts with "Furthermore, when an=
 unknown threat ...", I don't understand how this text informs the design o=
r specification of the IM?

(23) Section 3.1., "This document specifies a metadata model what MAY be us=
ed to further describe and/or prescribe ...", per the draft's title, I thou=
ght this document was describing an information model.  What is the relatio=
nship between the metadata model and the IM.

(24) Section 3.1, Per "The ECA policy model in [RFC8329] is used as the bas=
is for the design of the capability model..." - what is the relationship be=
tween an ECA policy model, a capability model, CapIM and an "I2NSF Policy R=
ule".

(25) Section 3.1.  Per "The "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model in =
[RFC8329] is used as the basis for the design of the capability model", see=
ms circular.  RFC8329 explicitly states that "The above concept [ECA] is de=
scribed in detail in I2NSF-CAPABILITIES".  However, the language here appea=
rs to be more specific and descriptive - it seems like the more specific de=
scriptions is normatively citing the more general text.

(26) Section 3.1. The text definition Event, Condition and Action is cut-an=
d-paste from the terminology document (draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology).  The =
subsequent paragraph of "An I2NSF Policy Rule ..." is also very similar to =
the terminology draft.  Why is it duplicated here again?

(27) Section 3.1.  What is the relationship between a policy model and a po=
licy rule?

(28) Section 3.1. Per the definition of the I2NSF Policy Rule of "I2NSF Pol=
icy Rule is made up of three Boolean clauses ...", this definition is incon=
sistent with draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology which suggests that it is "three =
clauses (Event, Condition, and Action). The Event and Condition clauses are=
 Boolean clauses, while the Action clause consists of a set of one or more =
I2NSF Actions."

(29) Section 3.1.  Where is the specification for the business logic?  What=
 is the "algebra" by which to combine the ECA clauses and related Boolean l=
ogic, with this metadata?

(30) Section 3.1. I found this example of meta-data confusing because it is=
n't explained until Section 3.3.  I'd recommending moving it or providing a=
 forward reference.

(31) Section 3.2.  Provide a citation for I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface when i=
t is used.

(32) Section 3.2, Per Step 2 - 4, how is the CapIM relevant here.  It seems=
 like these steps are describing internal processing that occurs on the I2N=
SF Network Operator Management Systems/Controller based on the information =
exchanged through the interfaces using the CapIM.

(33) Section 3.2., Per Step 4, What does it mean to "creates or uses one or=
 more data models from the CapIM to manage the NSFs" - the CapIM has data m=
odels?

(34) Section 3.2.  Where does the "external ECA information Model" come fro=
m?

(35) Section 3.3.  Per "Capabilities are typically used to represent NSF fu=
nctions", why "typically"?  Are there instances where capabilities are not =
NSF functions?

(36) Section 3.3, Per "Capabilities are objects, and hence, can be used ...=
", perhaps it might be clearer to say "Capabilities are modeled as objects =
..."

(37) Section 3.3.  Per "The I2NSF CapIM refines a predefined (and external)=
 metadata model; the application of I2NSF Capabilities is done by refining =
a predefined (and external) ECA Policy Rule information model that defines =
how to use, manage , or otherwise manipulate a set of capabilities."
-- where do the external models come from?
-- what does it mean to refine the model?  Does it add need elements to the=
 model, redefine semantics?
-- what does it mean to apply the I2NSF capability?

(38) Section 3.3., Per "When the I2NSF policy engine receives a set of even=
ts ...", what is the "I2NSF policy engine"?  From where does it get the eve=
nts?  It would be helpful to define it in terms of the I2NSF reference mode=
l per Figure 1 of RFC8329?  It isn't defined in the terminology draft eithe=
r.

(39) Section 3.3., Per "Condition clauses are logical formulas that combine=
 one or more conditions that evaluate to a Boolean ...", this seems like th=
e same definition as Section 3.1.  Does this need to be said again?

(40) Section 3.3. Per "The values in the condition clause are built on valu=
es received or owned by the NSF", what does it mean to "own" the value?

(41) Section 3.3, Per the discussion of resolution strategies, I recommend =
being more explicit that these are the "meta-data" elements (is that right?=
).  IMO, it would be clearer to define the I2NSF Policy Rule upfront as con=
sisting of the three clauses + meta data.

(42) Section 3.3.  Per "Resolution strategies may use ... 'external data'",=
 is this external data different than meta-data?  This isn't clear.

(43 Section 3.3.1.  I'm missing something basic because it isn't clear to m=
e how to use this section as normative guidance to implement this informati=
on model.
-- The applicability of the MEF Policy model was not clear to me (what was =
the guidance from this example)
-- The OO guidance isn't clear - first an example show how an I2NSFECAPolic=
yRule sub-classes MCMECAPolicyRule.  However slightly later, the text sugge=
st the CapIM uses the decorator pattern (which wouldn't be sub-classing).  =
I appreciate that these were different Figures, but what is  the relationsh=
ip?
-- I can't seem to find the I2NSF specific bits being added with the decora=
tor pattern.
-- Figure 2 lists a number of I2NSF specific classes, but the role and fiel=
ds/members of each isn't clear.

(44) Section 3.4.  How an implementer would use this section isn't clear

(45) Section 3.4.1.  What is the relationship between defining a "matched p=
olicy rule" (the first part of this section) and a list of properties that =
characterize the capabilities of the NSF (the other half of this section)? =
   Furthermore, what is the relationship (and significance of enumerating t=
his list) relative to the CapIM?

(46) Section 3.4.1.  Per "The concept of a 'matched' policy rule is defined=
 as ...", is a "policy rule" the same as an "I2NSF policy rule"?

(47) Section 3.4.1.  Typo.  s/that to characterize/that characterize/

(48) Section 3.4.2, Per "Conflicts theoretically compromise the correct fun=
ctioning of devices (as happened for routers several year ago).",
-- what does the parenthetical comment about an event several years ago mea=
n?
-- this conflict doesn't seem to compromise the device functionality (they =
are only doing what they were configured), rather is seems like there is a =
emergent undesirable behavior

(49) Section 3.4.2.  This section refers to "an additional processes that d=
ecides that action to be applied".
-- What is that process?
-- On what I2NSF architectural component does it get executed?

(50) Section 3.4.2   The text cites that a firewall might have a default be=
havior if there aren't specific rules.  Perhaps this is semantics, but isn'=
t a default behavior just a very general rule?  I don't understand the guid=
ance being provide relative to "default behavior" (as suggested by the sect=
ion title) with this example.

(51) Section 3.4.2.  Per the constructs RSc and Dc being "introduced [as] a=
nother security capability", what do these mean relative to the CapIM?  Are=
 they part of the CapIM or configuration items for the processing?

(52) Section 3.4.3.  What kind of regex (e.g., PCRE? POSIX?)

(53) Section 3.4.3.  What is a "high-level policy processing system" relati=
ve to the I2NSF Reference architecture?

(54) Section 3.4.4.  This section notes that the CapIM can describe both ge=
neric functions and specific products?  Is there any guidance to provide on=
 how to do that?

(55) Section 3.4.4. What is meant by "these will be described later in a re=
vision of this draft"?

(56) Section 3.4.6.  How does this section on capability algebra fit into t=
he CapIM?  Does CapIM encode the algebra or is this text intended to demons=
trate how an I2NSF node (which one?) would/could process the CapIM?

(57) Section 3.4.6.  Per "Assigning capabilities to a large number of NSFs =
can be a complex (and boring) operation) ...", the use of "boring" seems pe=
jorative and not germane to motivating the subsequent algebra.

(58) Section 4. What is the re-organization suggested by "Nevertheless, a p=
artial re-organization of the data models already produced by the WG is exp=
ected"?

(59)  Section 4.  Per "Currently (A survey on the existing data models in t=
he I2NSF world with a couple of lines about it and a list of things that ca=
n be inherited).", what does this parenthetic statement mean?

(60) Section 4.  Per "The CapIM can benefit ...", can this intent of this s=
entence be clarified.  It reads to me that its identifying deficiencies in =
the CapIM but it isn't clear how implementers would use this information.

(61) Section 4.  Could the intent of the last three paragraphs, "Knowing al=
l of the actions ..."/"On the other hand ..."/"Finally, Events are too ..."=
, be clarified.  It reads to me that they are saying actually enumerating a=
ll of the things that would appear in the data model would be a very long l=
ist so it won't be done.  However, "resolution strategies", "condition clau=
ses" and "evaluation methods" that will be used by the data models is a sho=
rter list, so they can be listed.  I'm not sure how this helps implementers=
 with the "practical use of the CapIM".  What would they do with this infor=
mation?  If anything, I would see this as a design approach covered earlier=
.

(62) Section 8.  IDNits is flagging all of these references in valid due to=
 a formatting issue.  Can you please look into what might be happening - if=
 it is a bug in idnits, let me know.

(63) Section 8.1. Normative References.  RFC3198, RFC8192 and RFC8329 are n=
ormative references to an informational document.  These downrefs is not no=
ted in the shepherd report.  Can this please be updated pending resolution =
of the following:
-- IMO, RFC8192 seems informative
-- RFC3198 is cited but doesn't appear to be used (it can be dropped)

(64) Section 8.2. Can you please provide a more detailed pointer for [MCM] =
and [PDO].  I got as far as the MEF website but couldn't find these referen=
ces.


  *   [I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capabilit...<https://mailarchiv=
e.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/3zaF6lcQkHZdsajS-cRG3qEk9Zc>  Roman Danyliw


--_000_SN6PR13MB23348A618D54273D2C56B4C885A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Microsoft Word 15 (filtered medium)">
<style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
	{font-family:Wingdings;
	panose-1:5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Consolas;
	panose-1:2 11 6 9 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:"Segoe UI";
	panose-1:2 11 5 2 4 2 4 2 2 3;}
@font-face
	{font-family:inherit;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0in;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:#0563C1;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:#954F72;
	text-decoration:underline;}
p.msonormal0, li.msonormal0, div.msonormal0
	{mso-style-name:msonormal;
	mso-margin-top-alt:auto;
	margin-right:0in;
	mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
	margin-left:0in;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}
span.EmailStyle18
	{mso-style-type:personal;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
	color:windowtext;}
span.EmailStyle20
	{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
/* List Definitions */
@list l0
	{mso-list-id:1215968022;
	mso-list-template-ids:316701826;}
@list l0:level1
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l0:level2
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:1.0in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l0:level3
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:1.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l0:level4
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:2.0in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l0:level5
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:2.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l0:level6
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:3.0in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l0:level7
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:3.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l0:level8
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:4.0in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l0:level9
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:4.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l1
	{mso-list-id:1500580317;
	mso-list-template-ids:640561748;}
@list l1:level1
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0B7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Symbol;}
@list l1:level2
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:o;
	mso-level-tab-stop:1.0in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:"Courier New";
	mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";}
@list l1:level3
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0A7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:1.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Wingdings;}
@list l1:level4
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0A7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:2.0in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Wingdings;}
@list l1:level5
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0A7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:2.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Wingdings;}
@list l1:level6
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0A7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:3.0in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Wingdings;}
@list l1:level7
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0A7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:3.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Wingdings;}
@list l1:level8
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0A7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:4.0in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Wingdings;}
@list l1:level9
	{mso-level-number-format:bullet;
	mso-level-text:\F0A7;
	mso-level-tab-stop:4.5in;
	mso-level-number-position:left;
	text-indent:-.25in;
	mso-ansi-font-size:10.0pt;
	font-family:Wingdings;}
ol
	{margin-bottom:0in;}
ul
	{margin-bottom:0in;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Ping the authors of the draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability:=
 <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Could you please address the comments from AD and up=
load a revision for this draft to move forward?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thank you very much<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Linda<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<div>
<div style=3D"border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in =
0in 0in">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Linda Dunbar <br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, December 13, 2019 12:18 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability@ietf.org; i2nsf@ietf.org<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Please address the comments from AD and upload a revision f=
or this draft to move forward<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Authors of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability, <o:p></o:p><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Could you please address the comments from AD and up=
load a revision for this draft to move forward?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thank you very much<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Linda<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">----------------------------------------------------=
----------------------<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"mso-margin-top-alt:1.5pt;margin-right:0in;m=
argin-bottom:1.5pt;margin-left:0in;background:white">
<span style=3D"font-size:13.5pt;font-family:inherit;color:#212529">[I2nsf] =
AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"margin-bottom:15.0pt;background:white"><spa=
n style=3D"font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Segoe UI&quot;,sans-serif;col=
or:gray">Roman Danyliw &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rdd@cert.org">rdd@cert.org</a>=
&gt;&nbsp;Sat, 07 September 2019 03:25 UTC<a href=3D"https://mailarchive.ie=
tf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/3zaF6lcQkHZdsajS-cRG3qEk9Zc"><span style=3D"color:#33=
7AB7">Show
 header</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">Hi!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">The following is my AD review of =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">=3D=3D [ Process feedback<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(1) The I2NSF charter states &quo=
t;The working group will decide later whether the information model needs t=
o be published as an RFC&quot;.&nbsp; The shepherd write-up
 does not capture WG deliberation on choosing to publish this document.&nbs=
p; Can this please be added.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(2) What is the rational for this=
 draft being standards track?&nbsp; For a standards track information model=
, I would expected normative references to
 content needed by the data models.&nbsp; However, the data models that wou=
ld be implement this IM only reference it as informational.<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">=3D=3D[ High level feedback<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(More specific pointers to all of=
 these are in the detailed feedback)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">** The document discusses a lot d=
ifferent models -- CapIM, capability information model, ECA policy model, c=
apability model, meta-model, external
 information model.&nbsp; It would be helpful to define upfront the relatio=
nship between these components.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">** The CapIM also appears to have=
 multiple use cases.&nbsp; The text seems to fluidly move between the ideas=
 of a Policy Rule and the capability being
 advertised by the NSF.&nbsp; Being clear up front and organizing the text =
around these uses would be helpful.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">** At times it wasn't clear if wh=
at was being described is an element of the CapIM or a properties of the sy=
stem that would be consuming it.&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">** The mechanics of integrating e=
xternal models wasn't clear to me<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">** Finally, explaining these mode=
ls relative to the I2NSF architecture/terminology would be very helpful - i=
.e., the I2NSF reference architecture
 in Figure 1 of RFC8329, and the I2NSF Policy Rule.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">=3D=3D[ Detailed feedback<o:p></o=
:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(3)&nbsp; Abstract.&nbsp; Whateve=
r markup generated this text oddly placed the Abstract after the Copyright =
notice and status of this memo statement.&nbsp; The abstract
 should be first.&nbsp; Can you please rearrange the text.<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(4) Please resolve these addition=
al IDnits:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp; ** The document seems to l=
ack an Introduction section.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (A line =
matching the expected section header was found, but with an<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; unexpected ind=
entation:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; '&nbsp; =
1. Introduction' )<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp; ** The document seems to l=
ack a Security Considerations section.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (A line =
matching the expected section header was found, but with an<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; unexpected ind=
entation:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; '&nbsp; =
5. Security Considerations' )<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp; ** The document seems to l=
ack an IANA Considerations section.&nbsp; (See Section<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2.2 of
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist"><span style=3D"color:#33=
7AB7">https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist</span></a> for how to handle t=
he case<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; when the=
re are no actions for IANA.)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp; ** There are 4 instances o=
f too long lines in the document, the longest one<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; being 13=
 characters in excess of 72.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp; ** The document seems to l=
ack a both a reference to RFC 2119 and the<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; recommen=
ded RFC 2119 boilerplate, even if it appears to use RFC 2119<o:p></o:p></sp=
an></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; keywords=
.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(5) Section 1.&nbsp; It struck me=
 as unusual that Section 1 and early parts of 2, don't explain this informa=
tion model (IM) in terms of the I2NSF architecture.&nbsp;
 Is there a reason for that?&nbsp; IMO, it would make the text a lot cleare=
r to state that this IM is used for particular I2NSF interfaces and avoid t=
he defining what NSFs need. Without it, the text isn't clear on the link be=
tween &quot;Security Capabilities&quot; and the
 I2NSF architecture.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(6) Section 1.&nbsp; Per the open=
ing paragraph of &quot;The rapid development of virtualized systems .... Ex=
amples include ...&quot;:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- Sentence #2 doesn't seem to su=
pport sentence #1.&nbsp; What is the link between IoT devices and virtualiz=
ation?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- what are residential access us=
ers?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(7) Section 1.&nbsp; Expand NSF o=
n first use.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(8) Section 1.&nbsp; Editorial.&n=
bsp; s/over the given network traffic/on the network traffic/<o:p></o:p></s=
pan></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(9) Section 1.&nbsp; Editorial.<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">s/Security Capabilities describe =
the functions that Network Security Functions (NSFs) are available to provi=
de for security policy enforcement purposes./<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">Security Capabilities describe th=
e functionality that Network Security Functions (NSFs) are able to provide =
for security policy enforcement purposes./<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(10) Section 1.&nbsp; Per &quot;S=
ecurity Capabilities are independent of the actual security control mechani=
sms that will implement them&quot;:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- this seems redundant to the co=
ntent of the next paragraph.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- in this context is a security =
control mechanism an NSF? Or something new?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(11) Section 1.&nbsp; Per &quot;E=
very NSF SHOULD be described with the set of capabilities it offers&quot;, =
it seems odd for an IM document to place this required
 as it doesn't actually specify the solution (as this would be a data model=
)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(12) Section 1.&nbsp; Expand &quo=
t;ECA model&quot; on first use.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(13) Section 3.&nbsp; The first p=
aragraph, &quot;A Capability Information Model (CapIM), is a ...&quot; and =
the fifth paragraph, &quot;The CapIM is intended ...&quot;, appear
 to restate many of the same things.&nbsp; Recommend their consolidation.<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(14) Section 3.&nbsp; Editorial.&=
nbsp; s/This enables the precise/It enables the precise/<o:p></o:p></span><=
/p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(15) Section 3.&nbsp; How the par=
agraphs 2 - 4 of this section inform the model design isn't clear to me.&nb=
sp; I don't think they are needed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(16) Section 3.&nbsp; Per paragra=
ph 6, &quot;This includes enabling ...&quot;, I don't follow how this text =
informs the design.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(17) Section 3.1. Editorially spl=
itting the Design Principles and the ECA Policy Model into different sectio=
n might helpful readability.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(18) Section 3.1. Abstraction.&nb=
sp; This principal has already been mentioned twice between in Section 1 (&=
quot;Security Capabilities enable security functionality
 to be described in a vendor-neutral manner&quot;) and Section 3 (&quot;Cap=
abilities MUST be defined in a vendor- and technology-independent manner&qu=
ot;).&nbsp; Perhaps it only needs to be said here?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(19) Section 3.1.&nbsp; Advertise=
ment and Execution.&nbsp; How does the existence of a &quot;dedicated, well=
-known interface&quot; influence the design of the information
 model?&nbsp; Is it that certain meta-data is needed (or not)?&nbsp; These =
seem like properties of the I2NSF architecture.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(20) Section 3.1.&nbsp; Automatio=
n and Scalability. How this text informs the design of the IM isn't clear.&=
nbsp; It seems to describe the properties of the
 end system using the IM.&nbsp; I would have expected the text to describe =
how this translates into the data fields in the IM.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(21) Section 3.1.&nbsp; Per &quot=
;Based on the above principles, this document defines a capability model ..=
.&quot;, per the draft's title, I thought this document
 was describing an information model?&nbsp; What is the link between the ca=
pability model and IM?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(22) Section 3.1., Per the paragr=
aph that starts with &quot;Furthermore, when an unknown threat ...&quot;, I=
 don't understand how this text informs the design
 or specification of the IM?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(23) Section 3.1., &quot;This doc=
ument specifies a metadata model what MAY be used to further describe and/o=
r prescribe ...&quot;, per the draft's title, I
 thought this document was describing an information model.&nbsp; What is t=
he relationship between the metadata model and the IM.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(24) Section 3.1, Per &quot;The E=
CA policy model in [RFC8329] is used as the basis for the design of the cap=
ability model...&quot; - what is the relationship
 between an ECA policy model, a capability model, CapIM and an &quot;I2NSF =
Policy Rule&quot;.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(25) Section 3.1.&nbsp; Per &quot=
;The &quot;Event-Condition-Action&quot; (ECA) policy model in [RFC8329] is =
used as the basis for the design of the capability model&quot;,
 seems circular.&nbsp; RFC8329 explicitly states that &quot;The above conce=
pt [ECA] is described in detail in I2NSF-CAPABILITIES&quot;.&nbsp; However,=
 the language here appears to be more specific and descriptive - it seems l=
ike the more specific descriptions is normatively citing
 the more general text.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(26) Section 3.1. The text defini=
tion Event, Condition and Action is cut-and-paste from the terminology docu=
ment (draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology).&nbsp;
 The subsequent paragraph of &quot;An I2NSF Policy Rule ...&quot; is also v=
ery similar to the terminology draft.&nbsp; Why is it duplicated here again=
?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(27) Section 3.1.&nbsp; What is t=
he relationship between a policy model and a policy rule?<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(28) Section 3.1. Per the definit=
ion of the I2NSF Policy Rule of &quot;I2NSF Policy Rule is made up of three=
 Boolean clauses ...&quot;, this definition is inconsistent
 with draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology which suggests that it is &quot;three cl=
auses (Event, Condition, and Action). The Event and Condition clauses are B=
oolean clauses, while the Action clause consists of a set of one or more I2=
NSF Actions.&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(29) Section 3.1.&nbsp; Where is =
the specification for the business logic?&nbsp; What is the &quot;algebra&q=
uot; by which to combine the ECA clauses and related Boolean
 logic, with this metadata?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(30) Section 3.1. I found this ex=
ample of meta-data confusing because it isn't explained until Section 3.3.&=
nbsp; I'd recommending moving it or providing
 a forward reference.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(31) Section 3.2.&nbsp; Provide a=
 citation for I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface when it is used.<o:p></o:p></span>=
</p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(32) Section 3.2, Per Step 2 - 4,=
 how is the CapIM relevant here.&nbsp; It seems like these steps are descri=
bing internal processing that occurs on the
 I2NSF Network Operator Management Systems/Controller based on the informat=
ion exchanged through the interfaces using the CapIM.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(33) Section 3.2., Per Step 4, Wh=
at does it mean to &quot;creates or uses one or more data models from the C=
apIM to manage the NSFs&quot; - the CapIM has data
 models?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(34) Section 3.2.&nbsp; Where doe=
s the &quot;external ECA information Model&quot; come from?<o:p></o:p></spa=
n></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(35) Section 3.3.&nbsp; Per &quot=
;Capabilities are typically used to represent NSF functions&quot;, why &quo=
t;typically&quot;?&nbsp; Are there instances where capabilities are
 not NSF functions?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(36) Section 3.3, Per &quot;Capab=
ilities are objects, and hence, can be used ...&quot;, perhaps it might be =
clearer to say &quot;Capabilities are modeled as objects
 ...&quot;<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(37) Section 3.3.&nbsp; Per &quot=
;The I2NSF CapIM refines a predefined (and external) metadata model; the ap=
plication of I2NSF Capabilities is done by refining
 a predefined (and external) ECA Policy Rule information model that defines=
 how to use, manage , or otherwise manipulate a set of capabilities.&quot;<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- where do the external models c=
ome from?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- what does it mean to refine th=
e model?&nbsp; Does it add need elements to the model, redefine semantics?<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- what does it mean to apply the=
 I2NSF capability?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(38) Section 3.3., Per &quot;When=
 the I2NSF policy engine receives a set of events ...&quot;, what is the &q=
uot;I2NSF policy engine&quot;?&nbsp; From where does it get the
 events?&nbsp; It would be helpful to define it in terms of the I2NSF refer=
ence model per Figure 1 of RFC8329?&nbsp; It isn't defined in the terminolo=
gy draft either.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(39) Section 3.3., Per &quot;Cond=
ition clauses are logical formulas that combine one or more conditions that=
 evaluate to a Boolean ...&quot;, this seems like
 the same definition as Section 3.1.&nbsp; Does this need to be said again?=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(40) Section 3.3. Per &quot;The v=
alues in the condition clause are built on values received or owned by the =
NSF&quot;, what does it mean to &quot;own&quot; the value?<o:p></o:p></span=
></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(41) Section 3.3, Per the discuss=
ion of resolution strategies, I recommend being more explicit that these ar=
e the &quot;meta-data&quot; elements (is that right?).&nbsp;
 IMO, it would be clearer to define the I2NSF Policy Rule upfront as consis=
ting of the three clauses &#43; meta data.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(42) Section 3.3.&nbsp; Per &quot=
;Resolution strategies may use ... 'external data'&quot;, is this external =
data different than meta-data?&nbsp; This isn't clear.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(43 Section 3.3.1.&nbsp; I'm miss=
ing something basic because it isn't clear to me how to use this section as=
 normative guidance to implement this information
 model.&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- The applicability of the MEF P=
olicy model was not clear to me (what was the guidance from this example)<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- The OO guidance isn't clear - =
first an example show how an I2NSFECAPolicyRule sub-classes MCMECAPolicyRul=
e.&nbsp; However slightly later, the text suggest
 the CapIM uses the decorator pattern (which wouldn't be sub-classing).&nbs=
p; I appreciate that these were different Figures, but what is&nbsp; the re=
lationship?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- I can't seem to find the I2NSF=
 specific bits being added with the decorator pattern.<o:p></o:p></span></p=
>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- Figure 2 lists a number of I2N=
SF specific classes, but the role and fields/members of each isn't clear.<o=
:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(44) Section 3.4.&nbsp; How an im=
plementer would use this section isn't clear<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(45) Section 3.4.1.&nbsp; What is=
 the relationship between defining a &quot;matched policy rule&quot; (the f=
irst part of this section) and a list of properties that
 characterize the capabilities of the NSF (the other half of this section)?=
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Furthermore, what is the relationship (and significance =
of enumerating this list) relative to the CapIM?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(46) Section 3.4.1.&nbsp; Per &qu=
ot;The concept of a 'matched' policy rule is defined as ...&quot;, is a &qu=
ot;policy rule&quot; the same as an &quot;I2NSF policy rule&quot;?<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(47) Section 3.4.1.&nbsp; Typo.&n=
bsp; s/that to characterize/that characterize/<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(48) Section 3.4.2, Per &quot;Con=
flicts theoretically compromise the correct functioning of devices (as happ=
ened for routers several year ago).&quot;,
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- what does the parenthetical co=
mment about an event several years ago mean?&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- this conflict doesn't seem to =
compromise the device functionality (they are only doing what they were con=
figured), rather is seems like there is
 a emergent undesirable behavior<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(49) Section 3.4.2.&nbsp; This se=
ction refers to &quot;an additional processes that decides that action to b=
e applied&quot;.&nbsp;
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- What is that process?<o:p></o:=
p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- On what I2NSF architectural co=
mponent does it get executed?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(50) Section 3.4.2&nbsp;&nbsp; Th=
e text cites that a firewall might have a default behavior if there aren't =
specific rules.&nbsp; Perhaps this is semantics, but
 isn't a default behavior just a very general rule?&nbsp; I don't understan=
d the guidance being provide relative to &quot;default behavior&quot; (as s=
uggested by the section title) with this example.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(51) Section 3.4.2.&nbsp; Per the=
 constructs RSc and Dc being &quot;introduced [as] another security capabil=
ity&quot;, what do these mean relative to the CapIM?&nbsp;
 Are they part of the CapIM or configuration items for the processing?<o:p>=
</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(52) Section 3.4.3.&nbsp; What ki=
nd of regex (e.g., PCRE? POSIX?)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(53) Section 3.4.3.&nbsp; What is=
 a &quot;high-level policy processing system&quot; relative to the I2NSF Re=
ference architecture?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(54) Section 3.4.4.&nbsp; This se=
ction notes that the CapIM can describe both generic functions and specific=
 products?&nbsp; Is there any guidance to provide
 on how to do that?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(55) Section 3.4.4. What is meant=
 by &quot;these will be described later in a revision of this draft&quot;?<=
o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(56) Section 3.4.6.&nbsp; How doe=
s this section on capability algebra fit into the CapIM?&nbsp; Does CapIM e=
ncode the algebra or is this text intended to demonstrate
 how an I2NSF node (which one?) would/could process the CapIM? <o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(57) Section 3.4.6.&nbsp; Per &qu=
ot;Assigning capabilities to a large number of NSFs can be a complex (and b=
oring) operation) ...&quot;, the use of &quot;boring&quot; seems
 pejorative and not germane to motivating the subsequent algebra.<o:p></o:p=
></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(58) Section 4. What is the re-or=
ganization suggested by &quot;Nevertheless, a partial re-organization of th=
e data models already produced by the WG is
 expected&quot;? <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(59)&nbsp; Section 4.&nbsp; Per &=
quot;Currently (A survey on the existing data models in the I2NSF world wit=
h a couple of lines about it and a list of things that
 can be inherited).&quot;, what does this parenthetic statement mean?<o:p><=
/o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(60) Section 4.&nbsp; Per &quot;T=
he CapIM can benefit ...&quot;, can this intent of this sentence be clarifi=
ed.&nbsp; It reads to me that its identifying deficiencies
 in the CapIM but it isn't clear how implementers would use this informatio=
n.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(61) Section 4.&nbsp; Could the i=
ntent of the last three paragraphs, &quot;Knowing all of the actions ...&qu=
ot;/&quot;On the other hand ...&quot;/&quot;Finally, Events are too
 ...&quot;, be clarified.&nbsp; It reads to me that they are saying actuall=
y enumerating all of the things that would appear in the data model would b=
e a very long list so it won't be done.&nbsp; However, &quot;resolution str=
ategies&quot;, &quot;condition clauses&quot; and &quot;evaluation methods&q=
uot;
 that will be used by the data models is a shorter list, so they can be lis=
ted.&nbsp; I'm not sure how this helps implementers with the &quot;practica=
l use of the CapIM&quot;.&nbsp; What would they do with this information?&n=
bsp; If anything, I would see this as a design approach covered
 earlier.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(62) Section 8.&nbsp; IDNits is f=
lagging all of these references in valid due to a formatting issue.&nbsp; C=
an you please look into what might be happening
 - if it is a bug in idnits, let me know.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(63) Section 8.1. Normative Refer=
ences.&nbsp; RFC3198, RFC8192 and RFC8329 are normative references to an in=
formational document.&nbsp; These downrefs is not
 noted in the shepherd report.&nbsp; Can this please be updated pending res=
olution of the following:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- IMO, RFC8192 seems informative=
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">-- RFC3198 is cited but doesn't a=
ppear to be used (it can be dropped)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529">(64) Section 8.2. Can you please =
provide a more detailed pointer for [MCM] and [PDO].&nbsp; I got as far as =
the MEF website but couldn't find these references.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"background:white"><span style=3D"font-size:=
9.0pt;font-family:Consolas;color:#212529"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<ul type=3D"disc">
<li class=3D"MsoNormal" style=3D"color:#212529;mso-margin-top-alt:auto;mso-=
margin-bottom-alt:auto;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo3;background:#F4F5F5">
<span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Consolas"><a href=3D"https://ma=
ilarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/3zaF6lcQkHZdsajS-cRG3qEk9Zc"><span style=
=3D"color:#337AB7">[I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capabilit...</span=
></a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Roman Danyliw<o:p></o:p></span></li></ul>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_SN6PR13MB23348A618D54273D2C56B4C885A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_--


From nobody Wed May  6 11:46:10 2020
Return-Path: <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B38213A0A94 for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:46:06 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.089
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.089 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, T_SPF_PERMERROR=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=futurewei.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Rsq60L10EjGk for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:46:03 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from NAM02-CY1-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-eopbgr760093.outbound.protection.outlook.com [40.107.76.93]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7AB153A0A92 for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:46:03 -0700 (PDT)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=YgETaiHHtc0f18QJ3UMVhPRRrN1x+59lgN4mGOhPmvl7Dc6wTAktuoQSKJcwEjn3SjuBxNAqS9Bdu0jyQiRuCBJDaF5b9EERm6zx7qRAMMk8nZwJq3izgVV/gf5Y3fNwN6XUIKhqcVIqZEMNtwwxELSQaLh6FvjXWfHQGQ+e0JOWj8x7Z+VAqbAhMkVxye9CHhxnsofpkuijmIeUfypHgcYHjsNuy+AWYZff796DMdHWyFLRBXrQt5R7NBmOXVa0+IwBvtaqo0rJqqOzoMhIsDpLJAkfRrJopO2gdcxIjKFbKMUWJZ5WQGfwCidFSnvGEjCaiQh0viMFUsLQZiBdNA==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com;  s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=Umnkez/W+2KKbT50r3CzKawl1vbP4E5ZHiBCN0snpXM=; b=n2bge0PSaPIn4OAff+4wkuFSmlR6y9nMtzTfyMkJOU/5o85r4xJfQ+0xePywEoSqswwt0axmOQ40RCV5XFMxykGxWRYoeDleyt79iyRoTyDZO9aRN6q9s/5+GqexspX7w+WR1s3jwS6ZgDJQRd/aozifkNQ90Q2S0cH1nnI9Z2SrOKy9EU2hfIdKE5d1Hmw6cFNl1smGB5oOYVKEqo9taXYbs+EFUApHNrw+PcZX/6mAiTXFe2rkw+1WxDpkfgY73061gtbrmZM3WBXbQGYxwtjdypGDd5RDybX5VaKzMdDE/RN7dGyH1yMrPhbV/WUgj5SInWHPt0Vy06Ne0ulwOQ==
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=futurewei.com; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=futurewei.com; dkim=pass header.d=futurewei.com; arc=none
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=Futurewei.com; s=selector2; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=Umnkez/W+2KKbT50r3CzKawl1vbP4E5ZHiBCN0snpXM=; b=thHpSuh3EU2O4jjSqGCR+w8LZnTYOeTvogrHNT66CXniTMNUuqTapGnYBwdsRjzwnyW7I91LAWHpK6M6ong8m/5gZdQvHv0WgH41Eg0wKZbkJMkueAx7Eo5TQO8YEy2t6lDiXnnDIgsQ5hXDZSXcjW8bulSS1RxLmTGYSAtzE2o=
Received: from SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:55::16) by SN6PR13MB2431.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:5b::13) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.2979.22; Wed, 6 May 2020 18:46:01 +0000
Received: from SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::5dac:54bb:275d:f2c5]) by SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::5dac:54bb:275d:f2c5%4]) with mapi id 15.20.2979.028; Wed, 6 May 2020 18:46:01 +0000
From: Linda Dunbar <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
CC: "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: What is the next step for draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05?
Thread-Index: AdYj1i9RzqF7PHC6QvWGwchWUizecg==
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 18:46:01 +0000
Message-ID: <SN6PR13MB233446797D81C7C9A6ACF12585A40@SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
authentication-results: cert.org; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;cert.org; dmarc=none action=none header.from=futurewei.com;
x-originating-ip: [72.180.73.64]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 67eaa850-d0ac-4a40-1af5-08d7f1edb973
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: SN6PR13MB2431:
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <SN6PR13MB24313174EA946FB24BFC699485A40@SN6PR13MB2431.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
x-ms-oob-tlc-oobclassifiers: OLM:8273;
x-forefront-prvs: 03950F25EC
x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1
x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0;
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: 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
x-forefront-antispam-report: CIP:255.255.255.255; CTRY:; LANG:en; SCL:1; SRV:;  IPV:NLI; SFV:NSPM; H:SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com; PTR:; CAT:NONE;  SFTY:; SFS:(4636009)(396003)(376002)(346002)(39840400004)(136003)(366004)(33430700001)(26005)(2906002)(86362001)(186003)(166002)(33656002)(66946007)(8676002)(71200400001)(66476007)(6506007)(52536014)(316002)(7696005)(33440700001)(5660300002)(4744005)(6916009)(64756008)(478600001)(66446008)(66556008)(9686003)(76116006)(55016002)(8936002)(966005)(44832011)(4326008); DIR:OUT; SFP:1102; 
x-ms-exchange-antispam-messagedata: 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
x-ms-exchange-transport-forked: True
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_SN6PR13MB233446797D81C7C9A6ACF12585A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: Futurewei.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 67eaa850-d0ac-4a40-1af5-08d7f1edb973
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 06 May 2020 18:46:01.5796 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 0fee8ff2-a3b2-4018-9c75-3a1d5591fedc
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-mailboxtype: HOSTED
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-userprincipalname: s3pPh9pzcqjk6Al0xB323pRQs2p0eWVPRTE/NAayIFH2F+XIDP0KhHfhTX/b26nSSf+B+cn11dCdw/xP2elsSQ==
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SN6PR13MB2431
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/hGR8dWc6pP1MWPQUtxRMaq0Jq8Q>
Subject: [I2nsf] What is the next step for draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05?
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 06 May 2020 18:46:07 -0000

--_000_SN6PR13MB233446797D81C7C9A6ACF12585A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Roman,

The status for draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05 is "Submitted to I=
ESG for Publication".

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model/

what is the next step? The IESG status is "Publication Requested".

Has IESG start to evaluate the draft? Is there anything WG needs to do to m=
ove it forward?

Thank you very much.

Linda

--_000_SN6PR13MB233446797D81C7C9A6ACF12585A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Microsoft Word 15 (filtered medium)">
<style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0in;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:#0563C1;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:#954F72;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}
@page WordSection1
	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Roman, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The status for draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-mode=
l-05 is &#8220;Submitted to IESG for Publication&#8221;.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ie=
tf-i2nsf-capability-data-model/"><span style=3D"color:blue">https://datatra=
cker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model/</span></a><o:p></=
o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">what is the next step? The IESG status is &#8220;<b>=
<span style=3D"font-size:11.5pt;font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,ser=
if;color:#222222;background:white">Publication Requested&#8221;.
<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span style=3D"font-size:11.5pt;font-family:&quot=
;Times New Roman&quot;,serif;color:#222222;background:white"><o:p>&nbsp;</o=
:p></span></b></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Has IESG start to evaluate the draft? Is there anyth=
ing WG needs to do to move it forward?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thank you very much. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Linda&nbsp; <o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_SN6PR13MB233446797D81C7C9A6ACF12585A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_--


From nobody Wed May  6 11:56:02 2020
Return-Path: <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48CAB3A0A9E for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:55:57 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.089
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.089 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, T_SPF_PERMERROR=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=futurewei.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id GeFoA-l6sxL8 for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:55:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from NAM04-SN1-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-eopbgr700138.outbound.protection.outlook.com [40.107.70.138]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 02D853A0A9A for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Wed,  6 May 2020 11:55:51 -0700 (PDT)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector9901; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=na9VctRpQ7s+wlB5KiL26bIoTqZMDYLZymyUSvT1YEqArvcyXtaAchVO+JrvqTLspN6hjHS2ad/Lku3QGkky7i72ctlnK5mPaWawmIUU2LNUYLing9NVbLRFoozT10V2/0nfsMwxN0rTUMKsG8zV2ACLhEOZRjE66YaEwbE/4H3ImAnrva9C09mvx2cWUCEeGUNV5GmB7rLk4WYkBO2k5ZYKnxqn2hBI1wK8bMKDPU/1SE6X3pELTI4VhndRWXKVRbfzDRYZuJWmT4qi/ht4Jx0LkBnPxneAtP6cxqepYqpu0a22sixo3RCf6sqhDe3wwAB/IMhRoAqXeiKmisNqcQ==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com;  s=arcselector9901; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=HCC6+aW8jg/smYm1rDKi3RBHKNTiS3s9/NA1jatEqOA=; b=lf3CYDLsR/cQ5CG2QFUfWFtOS2vr640CPqjQzNgbW4kbTflWKcR2XBDDvyGuxogfWC2ZrgNIFxn6vauP8OVRcKrzmWgzLW58iPGwY6rV5xIwqFXVJBtxMwsgcMroMm3N+lR6Q0i8/jQ9RvqE339A16Wjvsa8+Hs+XhdA9NZmy7DpN7T12laH+m3Kyue8GvJ78JSS6ud5k6rkPxAENMpduBHJgOWw+2ZOl5NsaCl+t8qY1O32oXu+wX+jB/+L2mo7gyCX+uSOa5WIGDNiMSd7qYORa1lTuAW2r6Wd/duwXH0yNm3f+vZ66WSJ378gVy+3R9THZojJiyPV565br+hh/g==
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=futurewei.com; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=futurewei.com; dkim=pass header.d=futurewei.com; arc=none
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=Futurewei.com; s=selector2; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck; bh=HCC6+aW8jg/smYm1rDKi3RBHKNTiS3s9/NA1jatEqOA=; b=iD+dNe8m2AZ03zM1hO0iPV2hVeDnqejDWfL/GRN+P733WKYbazf84Pjbc+C0/ko+t9zbR9rEY+NtPZhRgRw2HkuMmvT7d8zMtEZGd2GI3Oc+santxaKKmyqB88kdn5tJrr4KvuPOwQtqXsJergZPJAiouGbW3I/aSEUo8wh+3OQ=
Received: from SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:55::16) by SN6PR13MB2302.namprd13.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:805:62::23) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.2979.22; Wed, 6 May 2020 18:55:48 +0000
Received: from SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::5dac:54bb:275d:f2c5]) by SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::5dac:54bb:275d:f2c5%4]) with mapi id 15.20.2979.028; Wed, 6 May 2020 18:55:48 +0000
From: Linda Dunbar <linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
CC: "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: what is the next step for draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07?
Thread-Index: AdYj17YDEHrvrIl6RbGCCecZ1bi9tw==
Date: Wed, 6 May 2020 18:55:48 +0000
Message-ID: <SN6PR13MB2334D775C69DE70AFA07FC2E85A40@SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
authentication-results: cert.org; dkim=none (message not signed) header.d=none;cert.org; dmarc=none action=none header.from=futurewei.com;
x-originating-ip: [72.180.73.64]
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: 10f0cf63-3a68-4ebe-3c9a-08d7f1ef175d
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: SN6PR13MB2302:
x-microsoft-antispam-prvs: <SN6PR13MB23029B0EE6B1D67D4B72F46785A40@SN6PR13MB2302.namprd13.prod.outlook.com>
x-ms-oob-tlc-oobclassifiers: OLM:7691;
x-forefront-prvs: 03950F25EC
x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1
x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0;
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: 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
x-forefront-antispam-report: CIP:255.255.255.255; CTRY:; LANG:en; SCL:1; SRV:;  IPV:NLI; SFV:NSPM; H:SN6PR13MB2334.namprd13.prod.outlook.com; PTR:; CAT:NONE;  SFTY:; SFS:(4636009)(396003)(39850400004)(376002)(136003)(366004)(346002)(33430700001)(86362001)(966005)(6916009)(478600001)(66446008)(71200400001)(6506007)(8676002)(66476007)(64756008)(33656002)(66556008)(52536014)(44832011)(4326008)(55016002)(5660300002)(26005)(8936002)(186003)(2906002)(33440700001)(316002)(76116006)(9686003)(558084003)(66946007)(7696005)(166002); DIR:OUT; SFP:1102; 
x-ms-exchange-antispam-messagedata: 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
x-ms-exchange-transport-forked: True
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="_000_SN6PR13MB2334D775C69DE70AFA07FC2E85A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: Futurewei.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: 10f0cf63-3a68-4ebe-3c9a-08d7f1ef175d
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 06 May 2020 18:55:48.6049 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: 0fee8ff2-a3b2-4018-9c75-3a1d5591fedc
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-mailboxtype: HOSTED
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-userprincipalname: GT6t8Em4xWuJOBdyYWxfrkvd054AaLtFJOXKFuzrP+JAG/wZbpzYioBf0b/NCzozKBq4BjA1nGkd7AN0TYXJOQ==
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SN6PR13MB2302
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/DrK38wzYlRyfz0U96vGYrKVz9ZM>
Subject: [I2nsf] what is the next step for draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07?
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 06 May 2020 18:55:58 -0000

--_000_SN6PR13MB2334D775C69DE70AFA07FC2E85A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


Roman,

The status  for https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec=
-flow-protection/ is "AD Evaluation".

It has been on this state for 45 days. What is the next step?

Thank you very much.

Linda Dunbar



--_000_SN6PR13MB2334D775C69DE70AFA07FC2E85A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-micr=
osoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" =
xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns=3D"http:=
//www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"=
>
<meta name=3D"Generator" content=3D"Microsoft Word 15 (filtered medium)">
<style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
	{font-family:"Cambria Math";
	panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;}
@font-face
	{font-family:Calibri;
	panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
	{margin:0in;
	margin-bottom:.0001pt;
	font-size:11.0pt;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:#0563C1;
	text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
	{mso-style-priority:99;
	color:#954F72;
	text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle17
	{mso-style-type:personal-compose;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
	color:windowtext;}
.MsoChpDefault
	{mso-style-type:export-only;
	font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;}
@page WordSection1
	{size:8.5in 11.0in;
	margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
	{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext=3D"edit" spidmax=3D"1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext=3D"edit">
<o:idmap v:ext=3D"edit" data=3D"1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang=3D"EN-US" link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72">
<div class=3D"WordSection1">
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Roman, <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">The status &nbsp;for <a href=3D"https://datatracker.=
ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection/">
<span style=3D"color:blue">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2ns=
f-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection/</span></a> is &#8220;AD Evaluation&#8221;.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">It has been on this state for 45 days. What is the n=
ext step?
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Thank you very much. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal">Linda Dunbar<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_SN6PR13MB2334D775C69DE70AFA07FC2E85A40SN6PR13MB2334namp_--


From nobody Thu May  7 09:13:00 2020
Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietf.org
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0094E3A0AC4; Thu,  7 May 2020 09:12:58 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.129.1
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: i2nsf@ietf.org
Message-ID: <158886797794.29788.3534577707650973512@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 09:12:57 -0700
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/gwDYyT5WAtyVzlqDo-KCV1laAyE>
Subject: [I2nsf] I-D Action: draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-09.txt
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 16:12:58 -0000

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Interface to Network Security Functions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG Data Model
        Authors         : Jinyong Tim Kim
                          Jaehoon Paul Jeong
                          Jung-Soo Park
                          Susan Hares
                          Qiushi Lin
	Filename        : draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-09.txt
	Pages           : 101
	Date            : 2020-05-07

Abstract:
   This document defines a YANG data model for configuring security
   policy rules on Network Security Functions (NSF) in the Interface to
   Network Security Functions (I2NSF) framework.  The YANG data model in
   this document corresponds to the information model for NSF-Facing
   Interface in the I2NSF framework.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-09
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-09

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-09


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From nobody Thu May  7 09:49:34 2020
Return-Path: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietf.org
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from ietfa.amsl.com (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DD8CD3A0BEA; Thu,  7 May 2020 09:49:17 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
To: <i-d-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Test-IDTracker: no
X-IETF-IDTracker: 6.129.1
Auto-Submitted: auto-generated
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: i2nsf@ietf.org
Message-ID: <158887015780.30931.11364482652744810305@ietfa.amsl.com>
Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 09:49:17 -0700
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/CxMGiBTLBwevSiHVk89ireTMrBE>
Subject: [I2nsf] I-D Action: draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-03.txt
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 May 2020 16:49:22 -0000

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Interface to Network Security Functions WG of the IETF.

        Title           : I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model
        Authors         : Jaehoon Paul Jeong
                          Chaehong Chung
                          Susan Hares
                          Liang Xia (Frank)
                          Henk Birkholz
	Filename        : draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-03.txt
	Pages           : 78
	Date            : 2020-05-07

Abstract:
   This document proposes an information model and the corresponding
   YANG data model for monitoring Network Security Functions (NSFs) in
   the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) framework.  If
   the monitoring of NSFs is performed in a comprehensive way, it is
   possible to detect the indication of malicious activity, anomalous
   behavior or the potential sign of denial of service attacks in a
   timely manner.  This monitoring functionality is based on the
   monitoring information that is generated by NSFs.  Thus, this
   document describes not only an information model for monitoring NSFs
   along with a YANG data diagram, but also the corresponding YANG data
   model for monitoring NSFs.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

   Please update these statements within the document with the RFC
   number to be assigned to this document:

      "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 6087;"

      "RFC XXXX: I2NSF NSF Monitoring YANG Data Model"

      "reference: RFC 6087"

   Please update the "revision" date of the YANG module.


The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model/

There are also htmlized versions available at:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-03
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-03

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-03


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/



From nobody Mon May 11 14:53:16 2020
Return-Path: <rdd@cert.org>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 78B513A0D40 for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 11 May 2020 14:53:14 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.099
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cert.org
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6q3vNvRYzGwk for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 11 May 2020 14:53:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from taper.sei.cmu.edu (taper.sei.cmu.edu [147.72.252.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D835F3A0D3E for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Mon, 11 May 2020 14:53:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from delp.sei.cmu.edu (delp.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.21.31]) by taper.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id 04BLrAif018030 for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Mon, 11 May 2020 17:53:10 -0400
DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 taper.sei.cmu.edu 04BLrAif018030
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=cert.org; s=yc2bmwvrj62m; t=1589233990; bh=FUJoGQp7ITWw+Ojcidq/LxPFDLU+LReA+VrcmW2cMMw=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:From; b=tw5IM56GlruRypA4599XiOxu9HoN6vu+PgpwbLJNtfLU2rmifikxtiXy5h/qwM8pT 9HG5LYiksLtijnY0FfTkcGT+PbFm1WrRr4up41tTrI+43gBIIxF8MyMpHXIHZXyY5m hk+pkUFrKuYFVYsNbs4xz3ISKZr/Ykfzya7ORTcM=
Received: from CASCADE.ad.sei.cmu.edu (cascade.ad.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.28.248]) by delp.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id 04BLqtvp031737 for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Mon, 11 May 2020 17:52:55 -0400
Received: from MURIEL.ad.sei.cmu.edu (147.72.252.47) by CASCADE.ad.sei.cmu.edu (10.64.28.248) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.487.0; Mon, 11 May 2020 17:52:54 -0400
Received: from MORRIS.ad.sei.cmu.edu (147.72.252.46) by MURIEL.ad.sei.cmu.edu (147.72.252.47) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1847.3; Mon, 11 May 2020 17:52:54 -0400
Received: from MORRIS.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([fe80::555b:9498:552e:d1bb]) by MORRIS.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([fe80::555b:9498:552e:d1bb%22]) with mapi id 15.01.1847.007; Mon, 11 May 2020 17:52:54 -0400
From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07
Thread-Index: AdYn20FUSdftd9nvQWurjw3KRIqSvA==
Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 21:52:54 +0000
Message-ID: <57be4218bd9f48eababda4731ca92ab2@cert.org>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.64.202.241]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/xZmbYgNXGUERGj7XqqUA7dPshmw>
Subject: [I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 11 May 2020 21:53:14 -0000

Hi!

I performed an AD review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07 a=
nd my feedback is as follows:

(1) As written, it wasn't clear to me how this document fits into the I2NSF=
 architecture.  There were a number of places in the document that the unde=
rlying reference architecture does not appear to link to the one specified =
in I2NSF.  The text at times reads like I2NSF, an SDN architecture or a gen=
eric configuration of IPSec.  This document needs additional text to frame =
the work for I2NSF so that it fits into the charter -- if it generalizes to=
 other use cases, I don't see this as an issue.  The following is a non-exh=
austive list where I saw dissidence.

-- Section 1.  What is the relationship between the SDN controller referenc=
ed here and the I2NSF NOMS per Figure 1 of RFC8329?

-- Section 1 makes no reference to I2NSF.

-- Section 5.  Does the proposed architecture cited in Figure 1 and 2 confo=
rm to the "I2NSF Reference Architecture" depicted in Figure 1 of RFC8329.  =
It seems like it should.  However:

o this document doesn't cite it.  It does however cite RFC8192.  In Figure =
1 and 2 of this document, there is a "client facing interface"/"vendor faci=
ng interface"/"Security Controller", but RFC8329 has a "consumer facing int=
erface"/"registration interface"/"Network Operator Management System"
o In Figure 1 and 2 of this document there is an I2NSF agent in the NSF whi=
ch isn't described elsewhere.
o The Client-Facing Interface is cited as RFC8192.  What is the relationshi=
p between this interface and draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm?
o What is the relationship between the NSF Facing Interface in Figure 1 and=
 draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm?

-- Section 5.1.1.  How does the scenario of multiple Security Controllers a=
nd gateways relate to the I2NSF architecture?

-- Section 5.2.  Per "As shown in Figure 2, applications for flow protectio=
n run on top of the Security Controller", can you clarify what this means? =
 Is it that the functionality associated with translating the policy shared=
 by I2NSF client is built into the security controller?

-- Section 5.3.  Per "In principle, IKE case is easier to deploy than IKE-l=
ess case because current gateways ..." =20
o s/IKE case is/the IKE case is/
o s/than IKE-less case/than the IKE-less case/
o what gateway is being referenced here - it isn't in Figure 1, 2 or RFC832=
9.  RFC8192 defines a security gateway be subsequently doesn't use it again

-- Section 5.3.  Per "Moreover hosts can install easily an IKE implementati=
on":
o s/can install easily/can easily install/
o What are hosts in this context?  How are they related to the NSFs?

-- Section 5.3.1.  "However, when IKE is not used, we have followed a diffe=
rent approach to avoid any packet loss during rekey: the Security Controlle=
r installs first the new inbound SAs in both NSFs and then, the outbound IP=
sec SAs."  This text mentions multiple NSFs (i.e., "in both NSFs"), but the=
 I2NSF is scoped to the interface between the controller and NSFs (but not =
between NSFs).

-- Section 7.  How do these use cases relate to the I2NSF architecture?  Th=
ere appears to be a set of actions taken by an administrator that is at a d=
ifferent level of abstraction that specified by I2NSF
o Section 7.1 and 7.2 discuss communication between NSFs which isn't covere=
d in I2NSF
o Section 7.2 discusses communication though an "east-west" interface betwe=
en controllers which isn't covered in I2NSF
o I also couldn't find a reference to I2NSF interactions where there are mu=
ltiple controllers operated by different administrative entities.

(2) Abstract.  Editorial.  The sentence "This document describing ..." does=
 not parse for me and I recommend tying it to the I2NSF architecture:
OLD:=20
This document describes how providing IPsec-based flow protection by
   means of a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (aka.  Security
   Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this service.
NEW:
This document describes how to provide IPsec-based flow protection by means=
 of a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (I2NSF   Security Controlle=
r) and establishes the requirements to support this service.=20

(3) Abstract.  Per "The document focuses on the NSF Facing Interface ...", =
which NSF Facing Interface?  I2NSF or something more generic?

(4) Section 1.  Per "Recently, several network scenarios are considering a =
centralized way ...", this sentence notes that there are several network sc=
enarios motivating the work but only names one, SD-WAN.  Either enumerate t=
he others or note SD-WAN only.

(5) Section 1.  Editorial.
OLD:
SD-WAN is based on IPsec as underlying security
   protocol and aims to provide flexible, automated, fast deployment and
   on-demand security network services such as IPsec SA management from
   a centralized point.
NEW:
SD-WAN is based on IPsec as an underlying security protocol and aims to pro=
vide flexible, automated, and rapid deployment; and enable on-demand securi=
ty network services such as IPsec SA management from a centralized point.

(6) Section 1. "First, this document exposes the requirements to support th=
e protection of data flows using IPsec [RFC4301].", I had trouble identifyi=
ng the SDN-specific requirements in the text.  In what section is state sta=
ted?

(7) Section 1.  Editorial s/manage autonomously/autonomously manage/

(8) Section 1.  Per "The analysis of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scen=
ario is out of scope ...",=20
-- Consider using a different, less colloquial phrase than "roadwarrior"

-- EDITORIAL:
OLD:=20
The analysis of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of scope =
of this document

NEW:
Consideration for the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of scop=
e of this document

(9) Section 1.  Editorial. s/pays attention to the challenge/addresses the =
challenge of the/

(10) Section 3.  Per [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]:
-- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology] is expired.  Are you sure you want to use?

-- Is there a reason to redefine NSF here as it is defined in [I-D.ietf-i2n=
sf-terminology]

(11) Section 3.  Editorial. s/dst\/src/destination\/source/

(12) Section 3. Typo. s/outboud/outbound/

(13) Section 4.  This section was a helpful scoping.  I would have benefit =
from reading it earlier (Section 1)

(14) Section 4.  Per "... in order to protect specific data flows", between=
 what parts of the I2NSF infrastructure?

(15) Section 5.1.  Editorial
OLD
In this case the NSF ships an IKEv2 implementation besides the IPsec suppor=
t.  =20

NEW
In this case, the NSF ships an IPSec implementation with IKEv2 support.

(16) Section 5.1.1. Per Figure 1 (and applies to Figure 2)
-- What is the "application support"?
-- What is the "SPD entries Distr." Is that "distribution"?
-- What's "data protection and forwarding"?

(17) Per Section 5.1.1.  Per "In order to support this capability in IKE ca=
ses, the following interface requirements need to be met:"
-- To what interfaces is this referring?
-- Editorial: s/in IKE case/in the IKE case/

(18) Section 5.2.1.  The text references an SDN controller.  Is that the Se=
curity Controller per Figure 2?  I recommend consistent language.

(19) Section 5.3.  Per "As downside, the NSF needs more resources to hold I=
KEv2", what does "hold IKEv2" mean in this context?  Is it an observation t=
hat the NSF will need more memory? Storage? Compute?

(20) Section 5.3.  Per "Moreover, the IKEv2 implementation needs to impleme=
nt an internal interface" - what is an internal interface in this architect=
ure?

(21) Section 5.3.  Recommend something more precise than "lighter NSFs".

(22) Section 5.3.  Per "On the contrary, the overload of creating and manag=
ing ...", "overload", to me, implies that the demand for a resource is out =
stripping the supply.  Do you mean "the overhead of creating ..."? Also see=
 the last sentence of this paragraph, "In summary, this overload may ..."

(23) Section 5.3.2.  Per "Moreover, the Security Controller has a register =
about all the NSFs ...", what is "has a register"?  Is the intent to say th=
at the controller keeps a list of NSFs?

(24) Section 5.3.2.  "In IKE-less case, if the Security Controller detects =
that a NSF has lost the IPsec SAs it will delete the old IPsec SAs on the n=
on-failed nodes, established with the failed node (step 1).  This prevents =
the non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext."
-- Is there a reason why normative language isn't used to require this clea=
n up (i.e., deleting the old IPSec SAs)?
-- Are there constraints on how quickly this needs to happen?

(25) Section 5.3.2.  Per "Nevertheless other more optimized options can be =
considered", what is the guidance to implementors with this statement?

(26) Section 5.3.3.  Per "On the contrary, the IKE-less case does not have =
any protocol in the NSFs to detect whether they are located behind a NAT or=
 not.", it seems odd to make assumptions about the code in the NSFs.

(27) Section 5.3.3.  The normative behavior of the IKE-less NAT detection i=
sn't clear.  The paragraphs "On the contrary, ..." and "For example ..." do=
n't articulate what's to be done in the NAT case.

(28) Section 5.3.4.  Per "The assumption in this document is that, for both=
 cases, before a NSF can operate in this system, it MUST be registered in t=
he Security Controller.  In this way, when the NSF comes to live and establ=
ishes a connection to the Security Controller, it knows that the NSF is val=
id for joining the system."
-- how does this registration and validation occur?  I see the text later s=
ays "This discover process is out of scope ...", but registration seems dif=
ferent than discovery.
-- (editorially) I stumbled over "when the NSF comes to live", maybe "when =
the NSF starts"

(29) Section 6.2. Is the spd-entry having only a single traffic selector th=
e only simplification of RFC4301.  If not, list all of the divergences.  Ot=
herwise, I recommend explicitly saying only this edit was made.

(30) Section 6.2. Typo. s/instead a list/instead of  a list/

(31) Section 6.2.  Editorial. s/admit a traffic selector per IPsec policy/a=
dmit a single traffic selector per IPSec policy/

(32) Section 7.  Are the use cases normative text?  If not, please say so. =
 Consider moving them to an appendix outside of the normative flow of the t=
ext.  If the text is normative, then I'll have more feedback as they are un=
derspecified for standards track text.

(33) Section 7.1.  "Besides, fresh SAD entries will be also generated by th=
e Security Controller and enforced in the NSFs.  In this case, the Security=
 Controller does not run any IKEv2 implementation (neither the NSFs), and i=
t provides the cryptographic material for the IPsec SAs." =20

Editorially, what the "beside" is referencing and the double negative in th=
e second sentence created confusion for me.  Recommend:

NEW:=20
Fresh SAD entries will be also generated by the Security Controller and enf=
orced in the NSFs.  As the Security Controller is not running IKEv2, it pro=
vide the cryptographic materials for the IPSec SAs.

(34) Section 7.2.  Step 3.  What does "NOTE: This may require extensions in=
 the East/West interface." mean?

(35) Section 9.  s/MUST exit/MUST exist/

(36) Section 9.  Typo. s/to protect of the critical/to protect the critical=
/

(37) Section 9.0  Per "For example, when NETCONF is used as southbound prot=
ocol between the Security Controller and the NSFs, it is defined that TLS o=
r SSH security association MUST be established between both entities", what=
 is the difference between this normative language and Section 9.3's "The l=
owest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-imp=
lement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242].  The lowest RESTCO=
NF layer  is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS =
[RFC8446]."?

(38) Section 9.  Typo. s/This default policy MUST ... before the NSF contac=
ts with the Security Controller/This default policy MUST ... before the NSF=
 contacts the Security Controller/

(39) Section 9.  Per "Moreover, the startup configuration datastore MUST be=
 pre-configured ..."
-- where is the "startup configuration datastore" defined in the architectu=
re?
-- How is it provisioned (is this out of scope?)?

(40) Section 9.  Typo. s/always apply first/always first apply/

(41) Section 9. Per "In general, the Security Controller, as typically in t=
he SDN paradigm, is a target for different type of attacks .  Thus, the Sec=
urity Controller is a key entity in the infrastructure and MUST be protecte=
d accordingly ...", what are the details here?  Section 13 of [ITU-T.Y.3300=
]  says "Moreover, a logically centralized controller can be a single point=
 of failure, and can be a target of malicious attacks, thus special attenti=
on is required." and Section 7 of [8192] doesn't mention the security contr=
oller at all.

(42) Section 9.1. Should configurations adhere to the algorithm recommendat=
ions of RFC8247?

(43) Section 9.1 and 9.2.  Per "The general recommendation is that the Secu=
rity Controller MUST NOT store ...", is this a recommendation or a normativ=
e "MUST NOT".  To me, the use of the language "general recommendation" sugg=
ests it is optional.  I recommend:

OLD
The general recommendation is that the Security Controller MUST NOT store t=
he IKE credentials after distributing them.

NEW
The Security Controller MUST NOT store the IKE credentials after distributi=
ng them

(44) Section 9.1.  Editorial.  s/One option is to return always .../One opt=
ion is to always return .../

(45) Section 9.1.  Per "Moreover, the PSK MUST have a proper length (e.g.  =
minimum 128 bit length) and strength", what is the recommended guidance - i=
t is that PSKs need to have 128-bit strength?  The normative guidance in a =
parenthetic example is not clear.

(46) Section 9.1. "How the NSF generates these cryptographic material (publ=
ic key/private keys) and export the public key, or it is instructed to do s=
o , it is out of the scope of this document."
-- what is meant by "or it is instructed to do so"?
-- s/export/exports/
-- s/it is out of the scope/is out of scope/

Regards,
Roman


From nobody Tue May 12 15:11:13 2020
Return-Path: <rdd@cert.org>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6492B3A0C3B for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 12 May 2020 15:11:11 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.099
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=cert.org
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 37hNP6iUi8lp for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 12 May 2020 15:11:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from taper.sei.cmu.edu (taper.sei.cmu.edu [147.72.252.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BA2A73A0C38 for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Tue, 12 May 2020 15:11:08 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from delp.sei.cmu.edu (delp.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.21.31]) by taper.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id 04CMB6n2002558 for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:11:06 -0400
DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 taper.sei.cmu.edu 04CMB6n2002558
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=cert.org; s=yc2bmwvrj62m; t=1589321466; bh=MLj4ehqSO40PY5DTnvsfmRGCBBL4a/AQiF1j5jj6hTk=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:From; b=FCO5tKmZZpzn5vUMZc9o3ARL6zJ9F5rWoX3D+fF1RcgGy1fSJFoVBysf0YYPhGxJo ff/LjNO26NdQ/xjs/pvKEjf05qoNyTCKYQSHMc8cfga09Jq86Rwsc+MnRqjfEef5Yx wSEo6A0uyGdEviGlegt7fuUUzDC6vCs+mlSG/Fuk=
Received: from CASSINA.ad.sei.cmu.edu (cassina.ad.sei.cmu.edu [10.64.28.249]) by delp.sei.cmu.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id 04CMB1VV019878 for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:11:06 -0400
Received: from MURIEL.ad.sei.cmu.edu (147.72.252.47) by CASSINA.ad.sei.cmu.edu (10.64.28.249) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.3.487.0; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:11:01 -0400
Received: from MORRIS.ad.sei.cmu.edu (147.72.252.46) by MURIEL.ad.sei.cmu.edu (147.72.252.47) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.1847.3; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:11:00 -0400
Received: from MORRIS.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([fe80::555b:9498:552e:d1bb]) by MORRIS.ad.sei.cmu.edu ([fe80::555b:9498:552e:d1bb%22]) with mapi id 15.01.1847.007; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:11:00 -0400
From: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
To: "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05
Thread-Index: AdYoqSlDnyl9jo3tQyGyet7LOXvgHw==
Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 22:11:00 +0000
Message-ID: <475d6c2be4a7447dba48a4529451b72f@cert.org>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: 
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: 
x-originating-ip: [10.64.202.241]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/Qkup2tKpVyAcelxy3QooLf7P1KI>
Subject: [I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 May 2020 22:11:11 -0000

Hi!

I conducted an AD review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05.  Tha=
nks for the work in getting this document written.  My most significant ite=
ms are around aligning of the text in Section 4 with RFC8329 and the depend=
ency on draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config-01.  My detailed feedback is below. =20

(1)	IDNits returned the following valid comment about references (many of t=
he issue is noted were in the YANG module)
  =3D=3D Missing Reference: 'RFC3688' is mentioned on line 1764, but not de=
fined

(2)	Section 1.  Typo. s/[draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability]../ [draft-ietf-i2nsf-=
capability]./

(3)	Section 3.  Is there a reason to rely on two expired drafts for termino=
logy -- [draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology] and [draft-ietf-supa-generic-policy-=
info-model]?  In particular, couldn't RFC3444 provide the needed definition=
s of data and information models?

(4)	Section 4.  I would have expected somewhere in this overview section an=
 explicit enumeration of which I2NSF interfaces use this YANG module.

(5)	Section 4.  Per "Figure 1 shows the capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF Frame=
work."
-- Thanks for reusing the diagram from RFC8329 and annotating it with more =
detail.  It helps connect the documents
-- It wasn't clear to me where the "capabilities" are on the diagram
-- Is all of the detail under the NSFs (i.e., E, C and A) needed in the dia=
gram?  Text doesn't explain it or reference it.  If kept, it should be expl=
ained and E, C and A should be defined (i.e., saying these correspond to Ev=
ent, Condition and Action)

(6)	Global.  Editorial. Is there a reason to abbreviate "Mgmt" in "Develope=
r's Mgmt System in the text?  Recommend s/Developer's Mgmt System/Developer=
's Management System/g

(7)	Section 4.  Per "To register NSFs in this way, the Developer's Mgmt Sys=
tem utilizes this standardized capabilities YANG data model through its reg=
istration interface.", this confused me a bit.  Doesn't the Developer Manag=
ement System use the model described in draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration-inter=
face-dm for registration?

(8)	Section 4.  Editorial. Per "... those security devices can be easily ma=
naged, ...", I might have used "more easily managed".

(9)	Section 4.  Per "The use cases are described below.", where are those u=
se cases described?  Is this text a reference to the "Configuration Example=
s" in Appendix A?

(10)	 Section 4.  Per "Note that the NSF-Facing Interface ... and the NSF M=
onitoring Interface is used to ...", does this text need additional precisi=
on based on the definitions in RFC8329.  Per RFC8329, the "NSF-Facing Inter=
faces" consists of the "NSF Operational and Administrative Interface" and a=
 "Monitoring Interface". If draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config is on the "Monitori=
ng Interface", on which "sub-interface" of the "NSF-Facing Interface" does =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm belong?

(11)	 Figure 1.  Editorial Nit.  Is there are reason that the Registration =
interface has a bidirectional arrow between the network operator management=
 system and the developer management system, but the there is no directiona=
lity on the consumer or NSF facing interface?

(12)	 Section 4.  The bulleted list under Figure 1 is helpful in describing=
 Figure 1.  However, I'd recommend explicitly saying this is an example.  E=
xplain the use case up front and then narrate the flow clearly delineating =
what is in and out of scope of I2NSF.  IMO, the text describes a number of =
internal processing functions which are in scope for standardization - plea=
se let me know if I'm reading it wrong.

(13)	Section 4.  Per "If network manager wants to block malicious users wit=
h IPv6, the network manager sends the security policy rules to block the us=
ers to the Network Operator Mgmt System using I2NSF user ....", can you ple=
ase clarify "malicious users with IPv6"; is the intent that the network man=
ager is concerned about malicious IPv6 traffic?

(14)	Section 4.  Bullet 1 under Figure 1.  Per "a web browser or a software=
", what's the difference between a browser and software? =20

(15)	Section 4.  Editorial.  Per the second bullet under Figure 1, "If NSFs=
 encounter the malicious packets, it is a tremendous burden for the network=
 manager to apply the rule to block the malicious packets to NSFs one-by-on=
e.  This problem can be resolved by managing the capabilities of NSFs.", de=
lete this text.  It is a duplicate of what was stated in the first bullet.

(16)	Section 4.  Per the paragraph, "If NSFs encounter the suspicious IPv4 =
packets, they can ask the Network Operator Mgmt System for information abou=
t the suspicious IPv4 packets in order to alter specific rules and/or confi=
gurations.  When the Network ...", how much of that signaling is in scope f=
or I2NSF?

(17)	Section 4.  Typo. s/suspiciou/suspicious/

(18)	Section 5.1. Editorial.  s/The model includes NSF capabilities/The mod=
el describes NSF capabilities/

(19)	Section 5.1. Editorial. "specify" is used twice in the sentence.
OLD
Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities to specify when to e=
xecute the I2NSF policy rule. =20
NEW
Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities which describe when =
to execute the I2NSF policy rule. =20

(20)	Section 5.1. Editorial.  This sentence didn't parse for me.  The secon=
d contains duplicate text.
OLD
Event capabilities are used to specify capabilities how to trigger the eval=
uation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule.  The defined event=
 capabilities are defined as system event and system alarm.
NEW
Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the e=
vent that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF=
 Policy Rule.  The defined event capabilities are system event and system a=
larm.

(21)	Section 5.1.  A number of capabilities note that they can be extended =
which is a helpful feature.  For example, "The condition capability can be =
extended according to specific vendor condition features."  However, where =
is the guidance on doing that?  Likewise, it might not be necessary to repe=
at this statement five times if the extension mechanism is the same.

(22)	Section 5.1.  A number of the described capability types state that th=
ey are described in detail in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.  For example, "T=
he condition capability is described in detail in [draft-ietf-i2nsf-capabil=
ity]."  I had difficulty locating which specific section to review.  Also, =
for the default action capabilities, no described of "pass, drop .. mirror"=
 was found in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.  Please provide a specific secti=
on number for the event, condition, action, resolution strategy and default=
 action in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.

(23)	Section 5.1.  Editorial.  These sentences didn't parse for me.
OLD
Action capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to control and =
monitor aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are=
 satisfied. =20
NEW
Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the =
control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condit=
ion clauses are satisfied. =20

OLD
Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to=
 resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different =
policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF. =20
NEW
Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that =
describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different =
policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF. =20

OLD
Default action capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to exec=
ute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet.
NEW
Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that descr=
ibe how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet.   =20

(24)	Section 6.1.  Update the copyright date and revision date to be in 202=
0.

(25)	Section 6.1.  Given that draft-ietf-i2nf-monitoring-data-model is refe=
renced in the YANG model for event and system alarm, please make it a norma=
tive reference.

(26)	Section 6.1. identity ingress/egress-action-capability.  I found draft=
-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 to be an unexpected reference.  There is no menti=
on of ingress or egress in that document.

(27)	Section 6.1. identity pass, drop, reject, alert, mirror.  I found draf=
t-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 to be an unexpected reference.  There is no ment=
ion of pass, drop, reject, alert or mirror in that document.

(28)	Section 6.1.  In the advanced-nsf-capability section, there are multip=
le normative references to draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config-01, an expired, indi=
vidual draft.  Additionally, Section 4 notes how it supports the advanced c=
apabilities. This draft is a substantial portion of the YANG module added i=
n -03.  What's the plan on resolving this dependency? =20

(29)	Section 6.1. Typo. s/Funtion/Function/

(30)	Section 6.1.  The list of references in generic-nsf-capabilities don't=
 line up with those in the child leaflist(s).  For example, RFC 792 is ment=
ioned in the top level reference list but not in any of the child leaflist =
(specifically not in leaf-list icmp-capability)

(31)	Section 6.1. Typo. s/smae/same/

(32)	Section 8.  A few clarifying updates to the template:
OLD
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network =
environments.  Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes wit=
hout proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations.
ietf-i2nsf-capability: The attacker may provide incorrect information of th=
e security capability of any target NSF by illegally modifying this.

NEW
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network =
environments.  Write operations to these data nodes could have a negative e=
ffect on network and security operations.
ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could alter the security capabilities as=
sociated with an NSF whereby disabling or enabling the evasion of security =
mitigations.=20

OLD
ietf-i2nsf-capability: The attacker may gather the security capability info=
rmation of any target NSF and misuse the information for subsequent attacks=
.
NEW
ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could gather the security capability inf=
ormation of any NSF and use this information to evade detection or filterin=
g.

Regards,
Roman


From nobody Tue May 12 18:14:52 2020
Return-Path: <jaehoon.paul@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 741523A0AE0 for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:14:49 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.087
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.087 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_HK_NAME_FM_MR_MRS=0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id oTJBLkhEzftb for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:14:46 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lj1-x22c.google.com (mail-lj1-x22c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::22c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 173763A0ADD for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:14:46 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lj1-x22c.google.com with SMTP id g1so9923419ljk.7 for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Tue, 12 May 2020 18:14:45 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025;  h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=oUB9GjVPRE+JuIEZY6cLDQaxVKrZSh1X+72z1D0BwMk=; b=g/DJJ+XRrsaEwH5YPzWzucHjcVd3Afj3ReyyLDPDU6jQC5tul/FcXb+CEerlGOpXoS djqmMbZFWJW1lUOL9rn49D+WgMaVYpvXIGPhLTUBG5UHHpkdGnD1amnufzhn6+NLjY9e qxvf1nW7l46E+m0UFZXF5iBOpp3UAKOPWvdvX/p85SL441VNXSWPfiDBZvDhH+28Hu9R a/IMz+6LbYth/hLRqlZjmjkuOTlOdIwvmsiR458MS4IBWPkvju8vtIDG8oWOb2SlnqHD pAb7Vq9C5Ki5NDjfW/xt+NTNmqgEwx6g9Q1ix5XajXDJy4itQK3Te3hO3PrzN9Vfd1mh QWOw==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=oUB9GjVPRE+JuIEZY6cLDQaxVKrZSh1X+72z1D0BwMk=; b=lhYT65Dn7GPOeVBa0ucaq2ZN3d5xHzUkkacHJ1j0lxsNcveRZcd2f3pywd0lU0LJhi c8aG9jvDe2zx617dEhTsLEg9M6G+rkLPPJJdVtgjQy/3n9sCoBK8S+8GLUMseFtak+8v S2AsGQOwBai0kuSl1paWClicvwb4fP3oxHCMhbGyxFuV/9tWSJF7MWIA+8ySS6zJUh4r mHEbHtnoAqlknfW5ep5EfsV9eEWdyd5RlGKLq/H1Y7cThV+YckH8mFITaQ/R3KJTjlrA XBsOAWApau4qvrALDdIxgneIxg3mucNWuJC9i9FVqBjJuDcsYDWz2mo8mzD8IfPkIO2v QRaw==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531VhcAst/VQn92K4sl6lRSmPRb5ek1CbqoZJ0pNSG5sD6Dl8rQu Qamly7D6KxYdxjREbt3F85q6GZRN7r34Wkxb/hc=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwY1ufLcbdktxsxTslUdcRktNsZjYRZgrc7DnGDxW9CeCu5nv62S4DUQ9oYnLPbcnBKtf6QnpP2CmyK9YBQ2cs=
X-Received: by 2002:a2e:8017:: with SMTP id j23mr14484328ljg.22.1589332484091;  Tue, 12 May 2020 18:14:44 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <475d6c2be4a7447dba48a4529451b72f@cert.org>
In-Reply-To: <475d6c2be4a7447dba48a4529451b72f@cert.org>
From: "Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong" <jaehoon.paul@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 10:14:23 +0900
Message-ID: <CAPK2DezGsNg3PWwLdJ97uKNFie7ri=_CncmY7Y2yVtFxgPKSZQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
Cc: "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>,  skku-iotlab-members <skku-iotlab-members@googlegroups.com>,  "Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong" <jaehoon.paul@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000024f45105a57d4e9f"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/8-LhHJ1XiWFEmrQZTDpbacL7JgI>
Subject: Re: [I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 01:14:50 -0000

--00000000000024f45105a57d4e9f
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"

Hi Roman,
I will reflect your comments on the revision.

Thanks.

Best Regards,
Paul

On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 7:11 AM Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> wrote:

> Hi!
>
> I conducted an AD review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05.
> Thanks for the work in getting this document written.  My most significant
> items are around aligning of the text in Section 4 with RFC8329 and the
> dependency on draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config-01.  My detailed feedback is
> below.
>
> (1)     IDNits returned the following valid comment about references (many
> of the issue is noted were in the YANG module)
>   == Missing Reference: 'RFC3688' is mentioned on line 1764, but not
> defined
>
> (2)     Section 1.  Typo. s/[draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability]../
> [draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability]./
>
> (3)     Section 3.  Is there a reason to rely on two expired drafts for
> terminology -- [draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology] and
> [draft-ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]?  In particular, couldn't
> RFC3444 provide the needed definitions of data and information models?
>
> (4)     Section 4.  I would have expected somewhere in this overview
> section an explicit enumeration of which I2NSF interfaces use this YANG
> module.
>
> (5)     Section 4.  Per "Figure 1 shows the capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF
> Framework."
> -- Thanks for reusing the diagram from RFC8329 and annotating it with more
> detail.  It helps connect the documents
> -- It wasn't clear to me where the "capabilities" are on the diagram
> -- Is all of the detail under the NSFs (i.e., E, C and A) needed in the
> diagram?  Text doesn't explain it or reference it.  If kept, it should be
> explained and E, C and A should be defined (i.e., saying these correspond
> to Event, Condition and Action)
>
> (6)     Global.  Editorial. Is there a reason to abbreviate "Mgmt" in
> "Developer's Mgmt System in the text?  Recommend s/Developer's Mgmt
> System/Developer's Management System/g
>
> (7)     Section 4.  Per "To register NSFs in this way, the Developer's
> Mgmt System utilizes this standardized capabilities YANG data model through
> its registration interface.", this confused me a bit.  Doesn't the
> Developer Management System use the model described in
> draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm for registration?
>
> (8)     Section 4.  Editorial. Per "... those security devices can be
> easily managed, ...", I might have used "more easily managed".
>
> (9)     Section 4.  Per "The use cases are described below.", where are
> those use cases described?  Is this text a reference to the "Configuration
> Examples" in Appendix A?
>
> (10)     Section 4.  Per "Note that the NSF-Facing Interface ... and the
> NSF Monitoring Interface is used to ...", does this text need additional
> precision based on the definitions in RFC8329.  Per RFC8329, the
> "NSF-Facing Interfaces" consists of the "NSF Operational and Administrative
> Interface" and a "Monitoring Interface". If draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config is
> on the "Monitoring Interface", on which "sub-interface" of the "NSF-Facing
> Interface" does draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm belong?
>
> (11)     Figure 1.  Editorial Nit.  Is there are reason that the
> Registration interface has a bidirectional arrow between the network
> operator management system and the developer management system, but the
> there is no directionality on the consumer or NSF facing interface?
>
> (12)     Section 4.  The bulleted list under Figure 1 is helpful in
> describing Figure 1.  However, I'd recommend explicitly saying this is an
> example.  Explain the use case up front and then narrate the flow clearly
> delineating what is in and out of scope of I2NSF.  IMO, the text describes
> a number of internal processing functions which are in scope for
> standardization - please let me know if I'm reading it wrong.
>
> (13)    Section 4.  Per "If network manager wants to block malicious users
> with IPv6, the network manager sends the security policy rules to block the
> users to the Network Operator Mgmt System using I2NSF user ....", can you
> please clarify "malicious users with IPv6"; is the intent that the network
> manager is concerned about malicious IPv6 traffic?
>
> (14)    Section 4.  Bullet 1 under Figure 1.  Per "a web browser or a
> software", what's the difference between a browser and software?
>
> (15)    Section 4.  Editorial.  Per the second bullet under Figure 1, "If
> NSFs encounter the malicious packets, it is a tremendous burden for the
> network manager to apply the rule to block the malicious packets to NSFs
> one-by-one.  This problem can be resolved by managing the capabilities of
> NSFs.", delete this text.  It is a duplicate of what was stated in the
> first bullet.
>
> (16)    Section 4.  Per the paragraph, "If NSFs encounter the suspicious
> IPv4 packets, they can ask the Network Operator Mgmt System for information
> about the suspicious IPv4 packets in order to alter specific rules and/or
> configurations.  When the Network ...", how much of that signaling is in
> scope for I2NSF?
>
> (17)    Section 4.  Typo. s/suspiciou/suspicious/
>
> (18)    Section 5.1. Editorial.  s/The model includes NSF capabilities/The
> model describes NSF capabilities/
>
> (19)    Section 5.1. Editorial. "specify" is used twice in the sentence.
> OLD
> Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities to specify when to
> execute the I2NSF policy rule.
> NEW
> Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities which describe when
> to execute the I2NSF policy rule.
>
> (20)    Section 5.1. Editorial.  This sentence didn't parse for me.  The
> second contains duplicate text.
> OLD
> Event capabilities are used to specify capabilities how to trigger the
> evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule.  The defined
> event capabilities are defined as system event and system alarm.
> NEW
> Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the
> event that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of the
> I2NSF Policy Rule.  The defined event capabilities are system event and
> system alarm.
>
> (21)    Section 5.1.  A number of capabilities note that they can be
> extended which is a helpful feature.  For example, "The condition
> capability can be extended according to specific vendor condition
> features."  However, where is the guidance on doing that?  Likewise, it
> might not be necessary to repeat this statement five times if the extension
> mechanism is the same.
>
> (22)    Section 5.1.  A number of the described capability types state
> that they are described in detail in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.  For
> example, "The condition capability is described in detail in
> [draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability]."  I had difficulty locating which specific
> section to review.  Also, for the default action capabilities, no described
> of "pass, drop .. mirror" was found in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.  Please
> provide a specific section number for the event, condition, action,
> resolution strategy and default action in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.
>
> (23)    Section 5.1.  Editorial.  These sentences didn't parse for me.
> OLD
> Action capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to control and
> monitor aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are
> satisfied.
> NEW
> Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the
> control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and
> condition clauses are satisfied.
>
> OLD
> Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how
> to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or
> different policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular
> NSF.
> NEW
> Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that
> describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different
> policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF.
>
> OLD
> Default action capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to
> execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet.
> NEW
> Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that
> describe how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet.
>
>
> (24)    Section 6.1.  Update the copyright date and revision date to be in
> 2020.
>
> (25)    Section 6.1.  Given that draft-ietf-i2nf-monitoring-data-model is
> referenced in the YANG model for event and system alarm, please make it a
> normative reference.
>
> (26)    Section 6.1. identity ingress/egress-action-capability.  I found
> draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 to be an unexpected reference.  There is no
> mention of ingress or egress in that document.
>
> (27)    Section 6.1. identity pass, drop, reject, alert, mirror.  I found
> draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 to be an unexpected reference.  There is no
> mention of pass, drop, reject, alert or mirror in that document.
>
> (28)    Section 6.1.  In the advanced-nsf-capability section, there are
> multiple normative references to draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config-01, an
> expired, individual draft.  Additionally, Section 4 notes how it supports
> the advanced capabilities. This draft is a substantial portion of the YANG
> module added in -03.  What's the plan on resolving this dependency?
>
> (29)    Section 6.1. Typo. s/Funtion/Function/
>
> (30)    Section 6.1.  The list of references in generic-nsf-capabilities
> don't line up with those in the child leaflist(s).  For example, RFC 792 is
> mentioned in the top level reference list but not in any of the child
> leaflist (specifically not in leaf-list icmp-capability)
>
> (31)    Section 6.1. Typo. s/smae/same/
>
> (32)    Section 8.  A few clarifying updates to the template:
> OLD
> These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
> environments.  Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes
> without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations.
> ietf-i2nsf-capability: The attacker may provide incorrect information of
> the security capability of any target NSF by illegally modifying this.
>
> NEW
> These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
> environments.  Write operations to these data nodes could have a negative
> effect on network and security operations.
> ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could alter the security capabilities
> associated with an NSF whereby disabling or enabling the evasion of
> security mitigations.
>
> OLD
> ietf-i2nsf-capability: The attacker may gather the security capability
> information of any target NSF and misuse the information for subsequent
> attacks.
> NEW
> ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could gather the security capability
> information of any NSF and use this information to evade detection or
> filtering.
>
> Regards,
> Roman
>
> _______________________________________________
> I2nsf mailing list
> I2nsf@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf
>


-- 
===========================
Mr. Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
Office: +82-31-299-4957
Email: jaehoon.paul@gmail.com, pauljeong@skku.edu
Personal Homepage: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
<http://cpslab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php>

--00000000000024f45105a57d4e9f
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr">Hi Roman,<div>I will reflect your comments on the revision=
.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks.</div><div><br></div><div>Best Regards,</=
div><div>Paul</div></div><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><div dir=3D"ltr" cl=
ass=3D"gmail_attr">On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 7:11 AM Roman Danyliw &lt;<a hre=
f=3D"mailto:rdd@cert.org">rdd@cert.org</a>&gt; wrote:<br></div><blockquote =
class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px sol=
id rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi!<br>
<br>
I conducted an AD review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05.=C2=
=A0 Thanks for the work in getting this document written.=C2=A0 My most sig=
nificant items are around aligning of the text in Section 4 with RFC8329 an=
d the dependency on draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config-01.=C2=A0 My detailed feedb=
ack is below.=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
(1)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0IDNits returned the following valid comment about re=
ferences (many of the issue is noted were in the YANG module)<br>
=C2=A0 =3D=3D Missing Reference: &#39;RFC3688&#39; is mentioned on line 176=
4, but not defined<br>
<br>
(2)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 1.=C2=A0 Typo. s/[draft-ietf-i2nsf-capabilit=
y]../ [draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability]./<br>
<br>
(3)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 3.=C2=A0 Is there a reason to rely on two ex=
pired drafts for terminology -- [draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology] and [draft-i=
etf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]?=C2=A0 In particular, couldn&#39;t RFC3=
444 provide the needed definitions of data and information models?<br>
<br>
(4)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.=C2=A0 I would have expected somewhere in =
this overview section an explicit enumeration of which I2NSF interfaces use=
 this YANG module.<br>
<br>
(5)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.=C2=A0 Per &quot;Figure 1 shows the capabi=
lities of NSFs in I2NSF Framework.&quot;<br>
-- Thanks for reusing the diagram from RFC8329 and annotating it with more =
detail.=C2=A0 It helps connect the documents<br>
-- It wasn&#39;t clear to me where the &quot;capabilities&quot; are on the =
diagram<br>
-- Is all of the detail under the NSFs (i.e., E, C and A) needed in the dia=
gram?=C2=A0 Text doesn&#39;t explain it or reference it.=C2=A0 If kept, it =
should be explained and E, C and A should be defined (i.e., saying these co=
rrespond to Event, Condition and Action)<br>
<br>
(6)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Global.=C2=A0 Editorial. Is there a reason to abbrev=
iate &quot;Mgmt&quot; in &quot;Developer&#39;s Mgmt System in the text?=C2=
=A0 Recommend s/Developer&#39;s Mgmt System/Developer&#39;s Management Syst=
em/g<br>
<br>
(7)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.=C2=A0 Per &quot;To register NSFs in this =
way, the Developer&#39;s Mgmt System utilizes this standardized capabilitie=
s YANG data model through its registration interface.&quot;, this confused =
me a bit.=C2=A0 Doesn&#39;t the Developer Management System use the model d=
escribed in draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm for registration?<br=
>
<br>
(8)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.=C2=A0 Editorial. Per &quot;... those secu=
rity devices can be easily managed, ...&quot;, I might have used &quot;more=
 easily managed&quot;.<br>
<br>
(9)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.=C2=A0 Per &quot;The use cases are describ=
ed below.&quot;, where are those use cases described?=C2=A0 Is this text a =
reference to the &quot;Configuration Examples&quot; in Appendix A?<br>
<br>
(10)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.=C2=A0 Per &quot;Note that the NSF-Facing=
 Interface ... and the NSF Monitoring Interface is used to ...&quot;, does =
this text need additional precision based on the definitions in RFC8329.=C2=
=A0 Per RFC8329, the &quot;NSF-Facing Interfaces&quot; consists of the &quo=
t;NSF Operational and Administrative Interface&quot; and a &quot;Monitoring=
 Interface&quot;. If draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config is on the &quot;Monitoring=
 Interface&quot;, on which &quot;sub-interface&quot; of the &quot;NSF-Facin=
g Interface&quot; does draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm belong?<br>
<br>
(11)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Figure 1.=C2=A0 Editorial Nit.=C2=A0 Is there are r=
eason that the Registration interface has a bidirectional arrow between the=
 network operator management system and the developer management system, bu=
t the there is no directionality on the consumer or NSF facing interface?<b=
r>
<br>
(12)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Section 4.=C2=A0 The bulleted list under Figure 1 i=
s helpful in describing Figure 1.=C2=A0 However, I&#39;d recommend explicit=
ly saying this is an example.=C2=A0 Explain the use case up front and then =
narrate the flow clearly delineating what is in and out of scope of I2NSF.=
=C2=A0 IMO, the text describes a number of internal processing functions wh=
ich are in scope for standardization - please let me know if I&#39;m readin=
g it wrong.<br>
<br>
(13)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.=C2=A0 Per &quot;If network manager wants to bl=
ock malicious users with IPv6, the network manager sends the security polic=
y rules to block the users to the Network Operator Mgmt System using I2NSF =
user ....&quot;, can you please clarify &quot;malicious users with IPv6&quo=
t;; is the intent that the network manager is concerned about malicious IPv=
6 traffic?<br>
<br>
(14)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.=C2=A0 Bullet 1 under Figure 1.=C2=A0 Per &quot=
;a web browser or a software&quot;, what&#39;s the difference between a bro=
wser and software?=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
(15)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.=C2=A0 Editorial.=C2=A0 Per the second bullet u=
nder Figure 1, &quot;If NSFs encounter the malicious packets, it is a treme=
ndous burden for the network manager to apply the rule to block the malicio=
us packets to NSFs one-by-one.=C2=A0 This problem can be resolved by managi=
ng the capabilities of NSFs.&quot;, delete this text.=C2=A0 It is a duplica=
te of what was stated in the first bullet.<br>
<br>
(16)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.=C2=A0 Per the paragraph, &quot;If NSFs encount=
er the suspicious IPv4 packets, they can ask the Network Operator Mgmt Syst=
em for information about the suspicious IPv4 packets in order to alter spec=
ific rules and/or configurations.=C2=A0 When the Network ...&quot;, how muc=
h of that signaling is in scope for I2NSF?<br>
<br>
(17)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 4.=C2=A0 Typo. s/suspiciou/suspicious/<br>
<br>
(18)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 5.1. Editorial.=C2=A0 s/The model includes NSF ca=
pabilities/The model describes NSF capabilities/<br>
<br>
(19)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 5.1. Editorial. &quot;specify&quot; is used twice=
 in the sentence.<br>
OLD<br>
Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities to specify when to e=
xecute the I2NSF policy rule.=C2=A0 <br>
NEW<br>
Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities which describe when =
to execute the I2NSF policy rule.=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
(20)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 5.1. Editorial.=C2=A0 This sentence didn&#39;t pa=
rse for me.=C2=A0 The second contains duplicate text.<br>
OLD<br>
Event capabilities are used to specify capabilities how to trigger the eval=
uation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule.=C2=A0 The defined =
event capabilities are defined as system event and system alarm.<br>
NEW<br>
Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the e=
vent that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF=
 Policy Rule.=C2=A0 The defined event capabilities are system event and sys=
tem alarm.<br>
<br>
(21)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 5.1.=C2=A0 A number of capabilities note that the=
y can be extended which is a helpful feature.=C2=A0 For example, &quot;The =
condition capability can be extended according to specific vendor condition=
 features.&quot;=C2=A0 However, where is the guidance on doing that?=C2=A0 =
Likewise, it might not be necessary to repeat this statement five times if =
the extension mechanism is the same.<br>
<br>
(22)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 5.1.=C2=A0 A number of the described capability t=
ypes state that they are described in detail in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability=
.=C2=A0 For example, &quot;The condition capability is described in detail =
in [draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability].&quot;=C2=A0 I had difficulty locating whi=
ch specific section to review.=C2=A0 Also, for the default action capabilit=
ies, no described of &quot;pass, drop .. mirror&quot; was found in draft-ie=
tf-i2nsf-capability.=C2=A0 Please provide a specific section number for the=
 event, condition, action, resolution strategy and default action in draft-=
ietf-i2nsf-capability.<br>
<br>
(23)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 5.1.=C2=A0 Editorial.=C2=A0 These sentences didn&=
#39;t parse for me.<br>
OLD<br>
Action capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to control and =
monitor aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are=
 satisfied.=C2=A0 <br>
NEW<br>
Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the =
control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condit=
ion clauses are satisfied.=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
OLD<br>
Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to=
 resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different =
policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF.=C2=A0 <=
br>
NEW<br>
Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that =
describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different =
policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF.=C2=A0 <=
br>
<br>
OLD<br>
Default action capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to exec=
ute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet.<br>
NEW<br>
Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that descr=
ibe how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet.=C2=A0 =
=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
(24)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 6.1.=C2=A0 Update the copyright date and revision=
 date to be in 2020.<br>
<br>
(25)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 6.1.=C2=A0 Given that draft-ietf-i2nf-monitoring-=
data-model is referenced in the YANG model for event and system alarm, plea=
se make it a normative reference.<br>
<br>
(26)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 6.1. identity ingress/egress-action-capability.=
=C2=A0 I found draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 to be an unexpected reference=
.=C2=A0 There is no mention of ingress or egress in that document.<br>
<br>
(27)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 6.1. identity pass, drop, reject, alert, mirror.=
=C2=A0 I found draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 to be an unexpected reference=
.=C2=A0 There is no mention of pass, drop, reject, alert or mirror in that =
document.<br>
<br>
(28)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 6.1.=C2=A0 In the advanced-nsf-capability section=
, there are multiple normative references to draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config-01=
, an expired, individual draft.=C2=A0 Additionally, Section 4 notes how it =
supports the advanced capabilities. This draft is a substantial portion of =
the YANG module added in -03.=C2=A0 What&#39;s the plan on resolving this d=
ependency?=C2=A0 <br>
<br>
(29)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 6.1. Typo. s/Funtion/Function/<br>
<br>
(30)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 6.1.=C2=A0 The list of references in generic-nsf-=
capabilities don&#39;t line up with those in the child leaflist(s).=C2=A0 F=
or example, RFC 792 is mentioned in the top level reference list but not in=
 any of the child leaflist (specifically not in leaf-list icmp-capability)<=
br>
<br>
(31)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 6.1. Typo. s/smae/same/<br>
<br>
(32)=C2=A0 =C2=A0 Section 8.=C2=A0 A few clarifying updates to the template=
:<br>
OLD<br>
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network =
environments.=C2=A0 Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data node=
s without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operation=
s.<br>
ietf-i2nsf-capability: The attacker may provide incorrect information of th=
e security capability of any target NSF by illegally modifying this.<br>
<br>
NEW<br>
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network =
environments.=C2=A0 Write operations to these data nodes could have a negat=
ive effect on network and security operations.<br>
ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could alter the security capabilities as=
sociated with an NSF whereby disabling or enabling the evasion of security =
mitigations. <br>
<br>
OLD<br>
ietf-i2nsf-capability: The attacker may gather the security capability info=
rmation of any target NSF and misuse the information for subsequent attacks=
.<br>
NEW<br>
ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could gather the security capability inf=
ormation of any NSF and use this information to evade detection or filterin=
g.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
Roman<br>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
I2nsf mailing list<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:I2nsf@ietf.org" target=3D"_blank">I2nsf@ietf.org</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf" rel=3D"noreferrer" =
target=3D"_blank">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf</a><br>
</blockquote></div><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir=3D"ltr"=
 class=3D"gmail_signature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr">=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D<br>Mr. Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong, Ph.=
D.<br>Associate Professor<br>Department of Software<br>Sungkyunkwan Univers=
ity<br>Office: +82-31-299-4957<br>Email: <a href=3D"mailto:jaehoon.paul@gma=
il.com" target=3D"_blank">jaehoon.paul@gmail.com</a>,=C2=A0<a href=3D"mailt=
o:pauljeong@skku.edu" style=3D"font-size:12.8px" target=3D"_blank">pauljeon=
g@skku.edu</a><br>Personal Homepage: <a href=3D"http://cpslab.skku.edu/peop=
le-jaehoon-jeong.php" target=3D"_blank">http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaeho=
on-jeong.php</a><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>

--00000000000024f45105a57d4e9f--


From nobody Sat May 16 02:46:06 2020
Return-Path: <rafa@um.es>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 391C73A09DC for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 16 May 2020 02:46:04 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.199
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=um.es
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6Co02hSacu0i for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 16 May 2020 02:46:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx01.puc.rediris.es (outbound1mad.lav.puc.rediris.es [130.206.19.138]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F320E3A09DB for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Sat, 16 May 2020 02:46:00 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from xenon44.um.es (xenon44.um.es [155.54.212.171]) by mx01.puc.rediris.es  with ESMTP id 04G9jj1f026523-04G9jj1g026523; Sat, 16 May 2020 11:45:45 +0200
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by xenon44.um.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5773720A71; Sat, 16 May 2020 11:45:45 +0200 (CEST)
X-Virus-Scanned: by antispam in UMU at xenon44.um.es
Received: from xenon44.um.es ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (xenon44.um.es [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with LMTP id CHCCHSV-U32E; Sat, 16 May 2020 11:45:45 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from [192.168.1.44] (47.red-2-138-85.dynamicip.rima-tde.net [2.138.85.47]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: rafa@um.es) by xenon44.um.es (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 47A5D209D8; Sat, 16 May 2020 11:45:41 +0200 (CEST)
From: Rafa Marin-Lopez <rafa@um.es>
Message-Id: <202B421A-24D5-411C-84D2-BFDAE1E3CE37@um.es>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_EA711349-E450-4420-8C76-1A415A384F2E"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\))
Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 11:45:41 +0200
In-Reply-To: <57be4218bd9f48eababda4731ca92ab2@cert.org>
Cc: Rafa Marin-Lopez <rafa@um.es>, "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>, Gabriel Lopez <vice_calidad.inf@um.es>, =?utf-8?B?RmVybmFuZG8gUGVyZcOxw61ndWV6IEdhcmPDrWE=?= <fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es>
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
References: <57be4218bd9f48eababda4731ca92ab2@cert.org>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11)
Authentication-Results: mx01.puc.rediris.es; spf=pass (rediris.es: domain of rafa@um.es designates 155.54.212.171 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=rafa@um.es
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; d=um.es; s=DKIM; c=relaxed/relaxed;  h=from:message-id:content-type:mime-version:subject:date:cc:to:references; bh=NKPE7+D77uVctidxENp5EEESzUs3D+WGIS+8apBsBXc=; b=RByflWTn+VFZSKfjCXZb7KhRCVVKfA2oe8sx63A2xkw9UfLqPP65AimAVSD1iwFJymkY4h60txXP b/sQ+9G6NA2Mifr0dEYs0vxNLsxN97nl9+aXdlBTkGeqMiN7O4tl12BIiCrsYCHabKNOvYkgZDYM 50mYpZfUSb4QHnWJ4SKzwZet4PzUOxTVkoePI8xC/wlpoizSW2ZJb5ItyEth/Y0Grl3EAj9UYcfg M5THdoUrDCGihrvbjlKPzF9PbJb/4ZAjl+j2i0mP/42ucbDOLcUBw6jNsyr8Xsw7vQcLkO31aSPt kUeBfPawmOylcGwa8ykk2SKG2EXvRFlwpm+GGQ==
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/aGFSFeXNjue3n04V5SHl5KbJano>
Subject: Re: [I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 09:46:04 -0000

--Apple-Mail=_EA711349-E450-4420-8C76-1A415A384F2E
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset=utf-8

Dear Roman:

I really hope this e-mail finds you well.

Thank you very much for this detailed revision. We really appreciate it.

We are preparing our answers to each of your comments/questions. We =
really hope we can have them by next week.

Best Regards.
=20

> El 11 may 2020, a las 23:52, Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> escribi=C3=B3:=

>=20
> Hi!
>=20
> I performed an AD review of =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07 and my feedback is as =
follows:
>=20
> (1) As written, it wasn't clear to me how this document fits into the =
I2NSF architecture.  There were a number of places in the document that =
the underlying reference architecture does not appear to link to the one =
specified in I2NSF.  The text at times reads like I2NSF, an SDN =
architecture or a generic configuration of IPSec.  This document needs =
additional text to frame the work for I2NSF so that it fits into the =
charter -- if it generalizes to other use cases, I don't see this as an =
issue.  The following is a non-exhaustive list where I saw dissidence.
>=20
> -- Section 1.  What is the relationship between the SDN controller =
referenced here and the I2NSF NOMS per Figure 1 of RFC8329?
>=20
> -- Section 1 makes no reference to I2NSF.
>=20
> -- Section 5.  Does the proposed architecture cited in Figure 1 and 2 =
conform to the "I2NSF Reference Architecture" depicted in Figure 1 of =
RFC8329.  It seems like it should.  However:
>=20
> o this document doesn't cite it.  It does however cite RFC8192.  In =
Figure 1 and 2 of this document, there is a "client facing =
interface"/"vendor facing interface"/"Security Controller", but RFC8329 =
has a "consumer facing interface"/"registration interface"/"Network =
Operator Management System"
> o In Figure 1 and 2 of this document there is an I2NSF agent in the =
NSF which isn't described elsewhere.
> o The Client-Facing Interface is cited as RFC8192.  What is the =
relationship between this interface and =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm?
> o What is the relationship between the NSF Facing Interface in Figure =
1 and draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm?
>=20
> -- Section 5.1.1.  How does the scenario of multiple Security =
Controllers and gateways relate to the I2NSF architecture?
>=20
> -- Section 5.2.  Per "As shown in Figure 2, applications for flow =
protection run on top of the Security Controller", can you clarify what =
this means?  Is it that the functionality associated with translating =
the policy shared by I2NSF client is built into the security controller?
>=20
> -- Section 5.3.  Per "In principle, IKE case is easier to deploy than =
IKE-less case because current gateways ..." =20
> o s/IKE case is/the IKE case is/
> o s/than IKE-less case/than the IKE-less case/
> o what gateway is being referenced here - it isn't in Figure 1, 2 or =
RFC8329.  RFC8192 defines a security gateway be subsequently doesn't use =
it again
>=20
> -- Section 5.3.  Per "Moreover hosts can install easily an IKE =
implementation":
> o s/can install easily/can easily install/
> o What are hosts in this context?  How are they related to the NSFs?
>=20
> -- Section 5.3.1.  "However, when IKE is not used, we have followed a =
different approach to avoid any packet loss during rekey: the Security =
Controller installs first the new inbound SAs in both NSFs and then, the =
outbound IPsec SAs."  This text mentions multiple NSFs (i.e., "in both =
NSFs"), but the I2NSF is scoped to the interface between the controller =
and NSFs (but not between NSFs).
>=20
> -- Section 7.  How do these use cases relate to the I2NSF =
architecture?  There appears to be a set of actions taken by an =
administrator that is at a different level of abstraction that specified =
by I2NSF
> o Section 7.1 and 7.2 discuss communication between NSFs which isn't =
covered in I2NSF
> o Section 7.2 discusses communication though an "east-west" interface =
between controllers which isn't covered in I2NSF
> o I also couldn't find a reference to I2NSF interactions where there =
are multiple controllers operated by different administrative entities.
>=20
> (2) Abstract.  Editorial.  The sentence "This document describing ..." =
does not parse for me and I recommend tying it to the I2NSF =
architecture:
> OLD:=20
> This document describes how providing IPsec-based flow protection by
>   means of a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (aka.  Security
>   Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this =
service.
> NEW:
> This document describes how to provide IPsec-based flow protection by =
means of a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (I2NSF   Security =
Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this service.=20
>=20
> (3) Abstract.  Per "The document focuses on the NSF Facing Interface =
...", which NSF Facing Interface?  I2NSF or something more generic?
>=20
> (4) Section 1.  Per "Recently, several network scenarios are =
considering a centralized way ...", this sentence notes that there are =
several network scenarios motivating the work but only names one, =
SD-WAN.  Either enumerate the others or note SD-WAN only.
>=20
> (5) Section 1.  Editorial.
> OLD:
> SD-WAN is based on IPsec as underlying security
>   protocol and aims to provide flexible, automated, fast deployment =
and
>   on-demand security network services such as IPsec SA management from
>   a centralized point.
> NEW:
> SD-WAN is based on IPsec as an underlying security protocol and aims =
to provide flexible, automated, and rapid deployment; and enable =
on-demand security network services such as IPsec SA management from a =
centralized point.
>=20
> (6) Section 1. "First, this document exposes the requirements to =
support the protection of data flows using IPsec [RFC4301].", I had =
trouble identifying the SDN-specific requirements in the text.  In what =
section is state stated?
>=20
> (7) Section 1.  Editorial s/manage autonomously/autonomously manage/
>=20
> (8) Section 1.  Per "The analysis of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) =
scenario is out of scope ...",=20
> -- Consider using a different, less colloquial phrase than =
"roadwarrior"
>=20
> -- EDITORIAL:
> OLD:=20
> The analysis of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of =
scope of this document
>=20
> NEW:
> Consideration for the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of =
scope of this document
>=20
> (9) Section 1.  Editorial. s/pays attention to the challenge/addresses =
the challenge of the/
>=20
> (10) Section 3.  Per [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]:
> -- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology] is expired.  Are you sure you want to =
use?
>=20
> -- Is there a reason to redefine NSF here as it is defined in =
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]
>=20
> (11) Section 3.  Editorial. s/dst\/src/destination\/source/
>=20
> (12) Section 3. Typo. s/outboud/outbound/
>=20
> (13) Section 4.  This section was a helpful scoping.  I would have =
benefit from reading it earlier (Section 1)
>=20
> (14) Section 4.  Per "... in order to protect specific data flows", =
between what parts of the I2NSF infrastructure?
>=20
> (15) Section 5.1.  Editorial
> OLD
> In this case the NSF ships an IKEv2 implementation besides the IPsec =
support.  =20
>=20
> NEW
> In this case, the NSF ships an IPSec implementation with IKEv2 =
support.
>=20
> (16) Section 5.1.1. Per Figure 1 (and applies to Figure 2)
> -- What is the "application support"?
> -- What is the "SPD entries Distr." Is that "distribution"?
> -- What's "data protection and forwarding"?
>=20
> (17) Per Section 5.1.1.  Per "In order to support this capability in =
IKE cases, the following interface requirements need to be met:"
> -- To what interfaces is this referring?
> -- Editorial: s/in IKE case/in the IKE case/
>=20
> (18) Section 5.2.1.  The text references an SDN controller.  Is that =
the Security Controller per Figure 2?  I recommend consistent language.
>=20
> (19) Section 5.3.  Per "As downside, the NSF needs more resources to =
hold IKEv2", what does "hold IKEv2" mean in this context?  Is it an =
observation that the NSF will need more memory? Storage? Compute?
>=20
> (20) Section 5.3.  Per "Moreover, the IKEv2 implementation needs to =
implement an internal interface" - what is an internal interface in this =
architecture?
>=20
> (21) Section 5.3.  Recommend something more precise than "lighter =
NSFs".
>=20
> (22) Section 5.3.  Per "On the contrary, the overload of creating and =
managing ...", "overload", to me, implies that the demand for a resource =
is out stripping the supply.  Do you mean "the overhead of creating =
..."? Also see the last sentence of this paragraph, "In summary, this =
overload may ..."
>=20
> (23) Section 5.3.2.  Per "Moreover, the Security Controller has a =
register about all the NSFs ...", what is "has a register"?  Is the =
intent to say that the controller keeps a list of NSFs?
>=20
> (24) Section 5.3.2.  "In IKE-less case, if the Security Controller =
detects that a NSF has lost the IPsec SAs it will delete the old IPsec =
SAs on the non-failed nodes, established with the failed node (step 1).  =
This prevents the non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext."
> -- Is there a reason why normative language isn't used to require this =
clean up (i.e., deleting the old IPSec SAs)?
> -- Are there constraints on how quickly this needs to happen?
>=20
> (25) Section 5.3.2.  Per "Nevertheless other more optimized options =
can be considered", what is the guidance to implementors with this =
statement?
>=20
> (26) Section 5.3.3.  Per "On the contrary, the IKE-less case does not =
have any protocol in the NSFs to detect whether they are located behind =
a NAT or not.", it seems odd to make assumptions about the code in the =
NSFs.
>=20
> (27) Section 5.3.3.  The normative behavior of the IKE-less NAT =
detection isn't clear.  The paragraphs "On the contrary, ..." and "For =
example ..." don't articulate what's to be done in the NAT case.
>=20
> (28) Section 5.3.4.  Per "The assumption in this document is that, for =
both cases, before a NSF can operate in this system, it MUST be =
registered in the Security Controller.  In this way, when the NSF comes =
to live and establishes a connection to the Security Controller, it =
knows that the NSF is valid for joining the system."
> -- how does this registration and validation occur?  I see the text =
later says "This discover process is out of scope ...", but registration =
seems different than discovery.
> -- (editorially) I stumbled over "when the NSF comes to live", maybe =
"when the NSF starts"
>=20
> (29) Section 6.2. Is the spd-entry having only a single traffic =
selector the only simplification of RFC4301.  If not, list all of the =
divergences.  Otherwise, I recommend explicitly saying only this edit =
was made.
>=20
> (30) Section 6.2. Typo. s/instead a list/instead of  a list/
>=20
> (31) Section 6.2.  Editorial. s/admit a traffic selector per IPsec =
policy/admit a single traffic selector per IPSec policy/
>=20
> (32) Section 7.  Are the use cases normative text?  If not, please say =
so.  Consider moving them to an appendix outside of the normative flow =
of the text.  If the text is normative, then I'll have more feedback as =
they are underspecified for standards track text.
>=20
> (33) Section 7.1.  "Besides, fresh SAD entries will be also generated =
by the Security Controller and enforced in the NSFs.  In this case, the =
Security Controller does not run any IKEv2 implementation (neither the =
NSFs), and it provides the cryptographic material for the IPsec SAs." =20=

>=20
> Editorially, what the "beside" is referencing and the double negative =
in the second sentence created confusion for me.  Recommend:
>=20
> NEW:=20
> Fresh SAD entries will be also generated by the Security Controller =
and enforced in the NSFs.  As the Security Controller is not running =
IKEv2, it provide the cryptographic materials for the IPSec SAs.
>=20
> (34) Section 7.2.  Step 3.  What does "NOTE: This may require =
extensions in the East/West interface." mean?
>=20
> (35) Section 9.  s/MUST exit/MUST exist/
>=20
> (36) Section 9.  Typo. s/to protect of the critical/to protect the =
critical/
>=20
> (37) Section 9.0  Per "For example, when NETCONF is used as southbound =
protocol between the Security Controller and the NSFs, it is defined =
that TLS or SSH security association MUST be established between both =
entities", what is the difference between this normative language and =
Section 9.3's "The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, =
and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) =
[RFC6242].  The lowest RESTCONF layer  is HTTPS, and the =
mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446]."?
>=20
> (38) Section 9.  Typo. s/This default policy MUST ... before the NSF =
contacts with the Security Controller/This default policy MUST ... =
before the NSF contacts the Security Controller/
>=20
> (39) Section 9.  Per "Moreover, the startup configuration datastore =
MUST be pre-configured ..."
> -- where is the "startup configuration datastore" defined in the =
architecture?
> -- How is it provisioned (is this out of scope?)?
>=20
> (40) Section 9.  Typo. s/always apply first/always first apply/
>=20
> (41) Section 9. Per "In general, the Security Controller, as typically =
in the SDN paradigm, is a target for different type of attacks .  Thus, =
the Security Controller is a key entity in the infrastructure and MUST =
be protected accordingly ...", what are the details here?  Section 13 of =
[ITU-T.Y.3300]  says "Moreover, a logically centralized controller can =
be a single point of failure, and can be a target of malicious attacks, =
thus special attention is required." and Section 7 of [8192] doesn't =
mention the security controller at all.
>=20
> (42) Section 9.1. Should configurations adhere to the algorithm =
recommendations of RFC8247?
>=20
> (43) Section 9.1 and 9.2.  Per "The general recommendation is that the =
Security Controller MUST NOT store ...", is this a recommendation or a =
normative "MUST NOT".  To me, the use of the language "general =
recommendation" suggests it is optional.  I recommend:
>=20
> OLD
> The general recommendation is that the Security Controller MUST NOT =
store the IKE credentials after distributing them.
>=20
> NEW
> The Security Controller MUST NOT store the IKE credentials after =
distributing them
>=20
> (44) Section 9.1.  Editorial.  s/One option is to return always =
.../One option is to always return .../
>=20
> (45) Section 9.1.  Per "Moreover, the PSK MUST have a proper length =
(e.g.  minimum 128 bit length) and strength", what is the recommended =
guidance - it is that PSKs need to have 128-bit strength?  The normative =
guidance in a parenthetic example is not clear.
>=20
> (46) Section 9.1. "How the NSF generates these cryptographic material =
(public key/private keys) and export the public key, or it is instructed =
to do so , it is out of the scope of this document."
> -- what is meant by "or it is instructed to do so"?
> -- s/export/exports/
> -- s/it is out of the scope/is out of scope/
>=20
> Regards,
> Roman
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I2nsf mailing list
> I2nsf@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf

-------------------------------------------------------
Rafa Marin-Lopez, PhD
Dept. Information and Communications Engineering (DIIC)
Faculty of Computer Science-University of Murcia
30100 Murcia - Spain
Telf: +34868888501 Fax: +34868884151 e-mail: rafa@um.es
-------------------------------------------------------





--Apple-Mail=_EA711349-E450-4420-8C76-1A415A384F2E
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D"">Dear =
Roman:<div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">I really hope =
this e-mail finds you well.<br class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Thank you very much for this detailed =
revision. We really appreciate it.</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">We are preparing our answers to each of =
your comments/questions. We really hope we can have them by next =
week.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Best =
Regards.</div><div class=3D"">&nbsp;<br class=3D""><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">El 11 =
may 2020, a las 23:52, Roman Danyliw &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rdd@cert.org" =
class=3D"">rdd@cert.org</a>&gt; escribi=C3=B3:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">Hi!<br=
 class=3D""><br class=3D"">I performed an AD review of =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07 and my feedback is as =
follows:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(1) As written, it wasn't clear to =
me how this document fits into the I2NSF architecture. &nbsp;There were =
a number of places in the document that the underlying reference =
architecture does not appear to link to the one specified in I2NSF. =
&nbsp;The text at times reads like I2NSF, an SDN architecture or a =
generic configuration of IPSec. &nbsp;This document needs additional =
text to frame the work for I2NSF so that it fits into the charter -- if =
it generalizes to other use cases, I don't see this as an issue. =
&nbsp;The following is a non-exhaustive list where I saw dissidence.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 1. &nbsp;What is the relationship =
between the SDN controller referenced here and the I2NSF NOMS per Figure =
1 of RFC8329?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 1 makes no =
reference to I2NSF.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 5. =
&nbsp;Does the proposed architecture cited in Figure 1 and 2 conform to =
the "I2NSF Reference Architecture" depicted in Figure 1 of RFC8329. =
&nbsp;It seems like it should. &nbsp;However:<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">o this document doesn't cite it. &nbsp;It does however cite =
RFC8192. &nbsp;In Figure 1 and 2 of this document, there is a "client =
facing interface"/"vendor facing interface"/"Security Controller", but =
RFC8329 has a "consumer facing interface"/"registration =
interface"/"Network Operator Management System"<br class=3D"">o In =
Figure 1 and 2 of this document there is an I2NSF agent in the NSF which =
isn't described elsewhere.<br class=3D"">o The Client-Facing Interface =
is cited as RFC8192. &nbsp;What is the relationship between this =
interface and draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm?<br =
class=3D"">o What is the relationship between the NSF Facing Interface =
in Figure 1 and draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm?<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 5.1.1. &nbsp;How does the scenario =
of multiple Security Controllers and gateways relate to the I2NSF =
architecture?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 5.2. &nbsp;Per "As =
shown in Figure 2, applications for flow protection run on top of the =
Security Controller", can you clarify what this means? &nbsp;Is it that =
the functionality associated with translating the policy shared by I2NSF =
client is built into the security controller?<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">-- Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per "In principle, IKE case is easier =
to deploy than IKE-less case because current gateways ..." &nbsp;<br =
class=3D"">o s/IKE case is/the IKE case is/<br class=3D"">o s/than =
IKE-less case/than the IKE-less case/<br class=3D"">o what gateway is =
being referenced here - it isn't in Figure 1, 2 or RFC8329. =
&nbsp;RFC8192 defines a security gateway be subsequently doesn't use it =
again<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per "Moreover =
hosts can install easily an IKE implementation":<br class=3D"">o s/can =
install easily/can easily install/<br class=3D"">o What are hosts in =
this context? &nbsp;How are they related to the NSFs?<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">-- Section 5.3.1. &nbsp;"However, when IKE is not used, we =
have followed a different approach to avoid any packet loss during =
rekey: the Security Controller installs first the new inbound SAs in =
both NSFs and then, the outbound IPsec SAs." &nbsp;This text mentions =
multiple NSFs (i.e., "in both NSFs"), but the I2NSF is scoped to the =
interface between the controller and NSFs (but not between NSFs).<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 7. &nbsp;How do these use cases =
relate to the I2NSF architecture? &nbsp;There appears to be a set of =
actions taken by an administrator that is at a different level of =
abstraction that specified by I2NSF<br class=3D"">o Section 7.1 and 7.2 =
discuss communication between NSFs which isn't covered in I2NSF<br =
class=3D"">o Section 7.2 discusses communication though an "east-west" =
interface between controllers which isn't covered in I2NSF<br class=3D"">o=
 I also couldn't find a reference to I2NSF interactions where there are =
multiple controllers operated by different administrative entities.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(2) Abstract. &nbsp;Editorial. &nbsp;The =
sentence "This document describing ..." does not parse for me and I =
recommend tying it to the I2NSF architecture:<br class=3D"">OLD: <br =
class=3D"">This document describes how providing IPsec-based flow =
protection by<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;means of a Software-Defined =
Network (SDN) controller (aka. &nbsp;Security<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this =
service.<br class=3D"">NEW:<br class=3D"">This document describes how to =
provide IPsec-based flow protection by means of a Software-Defined =
Network (SDN) controller (I2NSF &nbsp;&nbsp;Security Controller) and =
establishes the requirements to support this service. <br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(3) Abstract. &nbsp;Per "The document focuses on the NSF =
Facing Interface ...", which NSF Facing Interface? &nbsp;I2NSF or =
something more generic?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(4) Section 1. =
&nbsp;Per "Recently, several network scenarios are considering a =
centralized way ...", this sentence notes that there are several network =
scenarios motivating the work but only names one, SD-WAN. &nbsp;Either =
enumerate the others or note SD-WAN only.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(5)=
 Section 1. &nbsp;Editorial.<br class=3D"">OLD:<br class=3D"">SD-WAN is =
based on IPsec as underlying security<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;protocol and aims to provide flexible, automated, fast =
deployment and<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;on-demand security network =
services such as IPsec SA management from<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;a =
centralized point.<br class=3D"">NEW:<br class=3D"">SD-WAN is based on =
IPsec as an underlying security protocol and aims to provide flexible, =
automated, and rapid deployment; and enable on-demand security network =
services such as IPsec SA management from a centralized point.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(6) Section 1. "First, this document exposes =
the requirements to support the protection of data flows using IPsec =
[RFC4301].", I had trouble identifying the SDN-specific requirements in =
the text. &nbsp;In what section is state stated?<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(7) Section 1. &nbsp;Editorial s/manage =
autonomously/autonomously manage/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(8) =
Section 1. &nbsp;Per "The analysis of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) =
scenario is out of scope ...", <br class=3D"">-- Consider using a =
different, less colloquial phrase than "roadwarrior"<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">-- EDITORIAL:<br class=3D"">OLD: <br class=3D"">The analysis =
of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of scope of this =
document<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">NEW:<br class=3D"">Consideration =
for the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of scope of this =
document<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(9) Section 1. &nbsp;Editorial. =
s/pays attention to the challenge/addresses the challenge of the/<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(10) Section 3. &nbsp;Per =
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]:<br class=3D"">-- =
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology] is expired. &nbsp;Are you sure you want to =
use?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Is there a reason to redefine NSF =
here as it is defined in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(11) Section 3. &nbsp;Editorial. =
s/dst\/src/destination\/source/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(12) =
Section 3. Typo. s/outboud/outbound/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(13) =
Section 4. &nbsp;This section was a helpful scoping. &nbsp;I would have =
benefit from reading it earlier (Section 1)<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(14) Section 4. &nbsp;Per "... in order to protect specific =
data flows", between what parts of the I2NSF infrastructure?<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(15) Section 5.1. &nbsp;Editorial<br =
class=3D"">OLD<br class=3D"">In this case the NSF ships an IKEv2 =
implementation besides the IPsec support. &nbsp;&nbsp;<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">NEW<br class=3D"">In this case, the NSF ships an IPSec =
implementation with IKEv2 support.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(16) =
Section 5.1.1. Per Figure 1 (and applies to Figure 2)<br class=3D"">-- =
What is the "application support"?<br class=3D"">-- What is the "SPD =
entries Distr." Is that "distribution"?<br class=3D"">-- What's "data =
protection and forwarding"?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(17) Per =
Section 5.1.1. &nbsp;Per "In order to support this capability in IKE =
cases, the following interface requirements need to be met:"<br =
class=3D"">-- To what interfaces is this referring?<br class=3D"">-- =
Editorial: s/in IKE case/in the IKE case/<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(18) Section 5.2.1. &nbsp;The text references an SDN =
controller. &nbsp;Is that the Security Controller per Figure 2? &nbsp;I =
recommend consistent language.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(19) Section =
5.3. &nbsp;Per "As downside, the NSF needs more resources to hold =
IKEv2", what does "hold IKEv2" mean in this context? &nbsp;Is it an =
observation that the NSF will need more memory? Storage? Compute?<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(20) Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per "Moreover, the =
IKEv2 implementation needs to implement an internal interface" - what is =
an internal interface in this architecture?<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(21) Section 5.3. &nbsp;Recommend something more precise than =
"lighter NSFs".<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(22) Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per =
"On the contrary, the overload of creating and managing ...", =
"overload", to me, implies that the demand for a resource is out =
stripping the supply. &nbsp;Do you mean "the overhead of creating ..."? =
Also see the last sentence of this paragraph, "In summary, this overload =
may ..."<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(23) Section 5.3.2. &nbsp;Per =
"Moreover, the Security Controller has a register about all the NSFs =
...", what is "has a register"? &nbsp;Is the intent to say that the =
controller keeps a list of NSFs?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(24) =
Section 5.3.2. &nbsp;"In IKE-less case, if the Security Controller =
detects that a NSF has lost the IPsec SAs it will delete the old IPsec =
SAs on the non-failed nodes, established with the failed node (step 1). =
&nbsp;This prevents the non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext."<br =
class=3D"">-- Is there a reason why normative language isn't used to =
require this clean up (i.e., deleting the old IPSec SAs)?<br class=3D"">--=
 Are there constraints on how quickly this needs to happen?<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(25) Section 5.3.2. &nbsp;Per "Nevertheless =
other more optimized options can be considered", what is the guidance to =
implementors with this statement?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(26) =
Section 5.3.3. &nbsp;Per "On the contrary, the IKE-less case does not =
have any protocol in the NSFs to detect whether they are located behind =
a NAT or not.", it seems odd to make assumptions about the code in the =
NSFs.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(27) Section 5.3.3. &nbsp;The =
normative behavior of the IKE-less NAT detection isn't clear. &nbsp;The =
paragraphs "On the contrary, ..." and "For example ..." don't articulate =
what's to be done in the NAT case.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(28) =
Section 5.3.4. &nbsp;Per "The assumption in this document is that, for =
both cases, before a NSF can operate in this system, it MUST be =
registered in the Security Controller. &nbsp;In this way, when the NSF =
comes to live and establishes a connection to the Security Controller, =
it knows that the NSF is valid for joining the system."<br class=3D"">-- =
how does this registration and validation occur? &nbsp;I see the text =
later says "This discover process is out of scope ...", but registration =
seems different than discovery.<br class=3D"">-- (editorially) I =
stumbled over "when the NSF comes to live", maybe "when the NSF =
starts"<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(29) Section 6.2. Is the spd-entry =
having only a single traffic selector the only simplification of =
RFC4301. &nbsp;If not, list all of the divergences. &nbsp;Otherwise, I =
recommend explicitly saying only this edit was made.<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(30) Section 6.2. Typo. s/instead a list/instead of &nbsp;a =
list/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(31) Section 6.2. &nbsp;Editorial. =
s/admit a traffic selector per IPsec policy/admit a single traffic =
selector per IPSec policy/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(32) Section 7. =
&nbsp;Are the use cases normative text? &nbsp;If not, please say so. =
&nbsp;Consider moving them to an appendix outside of the normative flow =
of the text. &nbsp;If the text is normative, then I'll have more =
feedback as they are underspecified for standards track text.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(33) Section 7.1. &nbsp;"Besides, fresh SAD =
entries will be also generated by the Security Controller and enforced =
in the NSFs. &nbsp;In this case, the Security Controller does not run =
any IKEv2 implementation (neither the NSFs), and it provides the =
cryptographic material for the IPsec SAs." &nbsp;<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Editorially, what the "beside" is referencing and the double =
negative in the second sentence created confusion for me. =
&nbsp;Recommend:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">NEW: <br class=3D"">Fresh =
SAD entries will be also generated by the Security Controller and =
enforced in the NSFs. &nbsp;As the Security Controller is not running =
IKEv2, it provide the cryptographic materials for the IPSec SAs.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(34) Section 7.2. &nbsp;Step 3. &nbsp;What =
does "NOTE: This may require extensions in the East/West interface." =
mean?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(35) Section 9. &nbsp;s/MUST =
exit/MUST exist/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(36) Section 9. =
&nbsp;Typo. s/to protect of the critical/to protect the critical/<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(37) Section 9.0 &nbsp;Per "For example, when =
NETCONF is used as southbound protocol between the Security Controller =
and the NSFs, it is defined that TLS or SSH security association MUST be =
established between both entities", what is the difference between this =
normative language and Section 9.3's "The lowest NETCONF layer is the =
secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport =
is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. &nbsp;The lowest RESTCONF layer =
&nbsp;is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS =
[RFC8446]."?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(38) Section 9. &nbsp;Typo. =
s/This default policy MUST ... before the NSF contacts with the Security =
Controller/This default policy MUST ... before the NSF contacts the =
Security Controller/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(39) Section 9. =
&nbsp;Per "Moreover, the startup configuration datastore MUST be =
pre-configured ..."<br class=3D"">-- where is the "startup configuration =
datastore" defined in the architecture?<br class=3D"">-- How is it =
provisioned (is this out of scope?)?<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(40) =
Section 9. &nbsp;Typo. s/always apply first/always first apply/<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(41) Section 9. Per "In general, the Security =
Controller, as typically in the SDN paradigm, is a target for different =
type of attacks . &nbsp;Thus, the Security Controller is a key entity in =
the infrastructure and MUST be protected accordingly ...", what are the =
details here? &nbsp;Section 13 of [ITU-T.Y.3300] &nbsp;says "Moreover, a =
logically centralized controller can be a single point of failure, and =
can be a target of malicious attacks, thus special attention is =
required." and Section 7 of [8192] doesn't mention the security =
controller at all.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(42) Section 9.1. Should =
configurations adhere to the algorithm recommendations of RFC8247?<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(43) Section 9.1 and 9.2. &nbsp;Per "The =
general recommendation is that the Security Controller MUST NOT store =
...", is this a recommendation or a normative "MUST NOT". &nbsp;To me, =
the use of the language "general recommendation" suggests it is =
optional. &nbsp;I recommend:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">OLD<br =
class=3D"">The general recommendation is that the Security Controller =
MUST NOT store the IKE credentials after distributing them.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">NEW<br class=3D"">The Security Controller MUST =
NOT store the IKE credentials after distributing them<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(44) Section 9.1. &nbsp;Editorial. &nbsp;s/One option is to =
return always .../One option is to always return .../<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(45) Section 9.1. &nbsp;Per "Moreover, the PSK MUST have a =
proper length (e.g. &nbsp;minimum 128 bit length) and strength", what is =
the recommended guidance - it is that PSKs need to have 128-bit =
strength? &nbsp;The normative guidance in a parenthetic example is not =
clear.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(46) Section 9.1. "How the NSF =
generates these cryptographic material (public key/private keys) and =
export the public key, or it is instructed to do so , it is out of the =
scope of this document."<br class=3D"">-- what is meant by "or it is =
instructed to do so"?<br class=3D"">-- s/export/exports/<br class=3D"">-- =
s/it is out of the scope/is out of scope/<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">Regards,<br class=3D"">Roman<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">I2nsf mailing list<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:I2nsf@ietf.org" class=3D"">I2nsf@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Courier; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;">-------------------------------------------------------<br =
class=3D"">Rafa Marin-Lopez, PhD<br class=3D"">Dept. Information =
and&nbsp;Communications&nbsp;Engineering (DIIC)<br class=3D"">Faculty of =
Computer&nbsp;Science-University of&nbsp;Murcia<br class=3D"">30100 =
Murcia - Spain<br class=3D"">Telf: +34868888501 Fax:&nbsp;+34868884151 =
<a href=3D"mailto:rafa@um.es" class=3D"">e-mail:&nbsp;rafa@um.es</a><br =
class=3D"">-------------------------------------------------------</div><d=
iv style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Courier; font-size: 16px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"></div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
</div>
<br class=3D""></div></div></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_EA711349-E450-4420-8C76-1A415A384F2E--


From nobody Mon May 25 05:30:56 2020
Return-Path: <rafa@um.es>
X-Original-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C77CB3A0ADE for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 25 May 2020 05:30:53 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.099
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=um.es
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ct96AXXYtaoZ for <i2nsf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 25 May 2020 05:30:47 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx01.puc.rediris.es (outbound1mad.lav.puc.rediris.es [130.206.19.137]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7CF393A0A8D for <i2nsf@ietf.org>; Mon, 25 May 2020 05:30:46 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from xenon43.um.es (xenon43.um.es [155.54.212.170]) by mx01.puc.rediris.es  with ESMTP id 04PCUSZw003617-04PCUSZx003617; Mon, 25 May 2020 14:30:28 +0200
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by xenon43.um.es (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5DAEB20322; Mon, 25 May 2020 14:30:28 +0200 (CEST)
X-Virus-Scanned: by antispam in UMU at xenon43.um.es
Received: from xenon43.um.es ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (xenon43.um.es [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with LMTP id 0z6Z5MKeYhkp; Mon, 25 May 2020 14:30:28 +0200 (CEST)
Received: from [192.168.1.38] (47.red-2-138-85.dynamicip.rima-tde.net [2.138.85.47]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: rafa@um.es) by xenon43.um.es (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AAB4E200CD; Mon, 25 May 2020 14:30:26 +0200 (CEST)
From: Rafa Marin-Lopez <rafa@um.es>
Message-Id: <904CB11D-FEF7-47DF-A58D-5C5E0FE325E1@um.es>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_4C2BF722-89BA-49E8-B74D-7039C16BA7B8"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 12.4 \(3445.104.11\))
Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 14:30:25 +0200
In-Reply-To: <57be4218bd9f48eababda4731ca92ab2@cert.org>
Cc: Rafa Marin-Lopez <rafa@um.es>, "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>, Gabriel Lopez <vice_calidad.inf@um.es>, =?utf-8?B?RmVybmFuZG8gUGVyZcOxw61ndWV6IEdhcmPDrWE=?= <fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es>
To: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
References: <57be4218bd9f48eababda4731ca92ab2@cert.org>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3445.104.11)
Authentication-Results: mx01.puc.rediris.es; spf=pass (rediris.es: domain of rafa@um.es designates 155.54.212.170 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=rafa@um.es
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; d=um.es; s=DKIM; c=relaxed/relaxed;  h=from:message-id:content-type:mime-version:subject:date:cc:to:references; bh=2ru6K1Hqi3tfHnza3TPV2UCHo6Jwza1F4yhbGDoqXzM=; b=dJohdqih1f3sMWlGKIseuwApiYPwHC4AAyInFh7HZJt2q3PBV0zlkFlJRHnuQZikz/1rAv+qzWal dXL4V9u+dbe7fYq8GMWC1eAh78GVLky/TvSlQcL9a1LE4WkG2Ry1E9aPRB+ddQEtPhC/rqEswTQG wC0A5MOhRtAobah1JJy7pl3LJiVWK/06n6DiGJp3DnF3pBNNaIPIp5X5DX57RU9ZKdswIclqayCB rkNOGqBs/ZUlQIQrNgtPdmAueZB4suuz3Fd9OpQXoeEg10wxsLWnkEatldslCpEsJKvE6l65zf8y aQ6Q3NrOZ58M7zPUGewaavzWaT9L4V2drGqoZg==
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/i2nsf/PT1Iw-ZUlN_jMfRS6DhTziFcmMw>
Subject: Re: [I2nsf] AD Review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07
X-BeenThere: i2nsf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "*I2NSF: Interface to Network Security Functions mailing list*" <i2nsf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/i2nsf/>
List-Post: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf>, <mailto:i2nsf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 25 May 2020 12:30:54 -0000

--Apple-Mail=_4C2BF722-89BA-49E8-B74D-7039C16BA7B8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset=utf-8

Dear Roman:

First of all, thank you so much for your extensive review. This is =
really appreciated.=20

Please see inline our comments. NOTE: We skip editorial comments in our =
answer.

> El 11 may 2020, a las 23:52, Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org> escribi=C3=B3:=

>=20
> Hi!
>=20
> I performed an AD review of =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07 and my feedback is as =
follows:
>=20
> (1) As written, it wasn't clear to me how this document fits into the =
I2NSF architecture.  There were a number of places in the document that =
the underlying reference architecture does not appear to link to the one =
specified in I2NSF.  The text at times reads like I2NSF, an SDN =
architecture or a generic configuration of IPSec.  This document needs =
additional text to frame the work for I2NSF so that it fits into the =
charter -- if it generalizes to other use cases, I don't see this as an =
issue.  The following is a non-exhaustive list where I saw dissidence.

[Authors] Before getting into the specific comments, a general comment =
is important. As we mention in the abstract, this document focuses in =
flow-based NSF Network Security Function (NSF) which protect data =
traffic with integrity and confidentiality between network resources by =
using IPsec.=20

This draft is related with the I2NSF architecture in the following ways:

- The beginning of I2NSF charter and Section 2 in RFC 8192 defines a NSF =
as "a function that is used to ensure integrity, confidentiality, or =
availability of network communication; to detect unwanted network =
activity; or to block, or at least mitigate, the effects of unwanted =
activity.". A flow-based NSF based on IPsec ensures integrity and =
confidentiality of network communications. Our document is useful for =
that type of NSFs.

- Section 3.1.1 in RFC 8192 identifies diverse types of Security =
Functions: "Security Gateways and VPN Concentrators:  Examples of these =
functions are IPsec gateways, secure VPN concentrators that handle =
bridging secure VPNs, and secure VPN controllers for data flows." and =
"Internal Data and Content Protection:  Examples of this function are =
encryption, authorization, and public/private key management for =
internal databases.". These functions are related to an IPsec-based NSF =
and this I-D provides the I2NSF NSF-facing interface required to deal =
with these functions.=20

- It covers one of the problems identified in RFC 8129 "3.1.9. Lack of =
Mechanism for Dynamic Key Distribution to NSFs".

- It is related to one of the use cases also identified in RFC 8129 =
"4.3.3 Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs" when the VPN is =
established with IPsec. Due to the importance this use case and others =
such as SD-WAN and data center scenarios
(https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-i2nsf-ipsec-dc-prof-00), this =
type of centralized IPsec management has raised significant interest in =
the industry.

- As such, the data model defined in this I-D fits in the definition =
given to  I2NFS NSF-Facing interface in Section 3.2 - RFC 8329.

"The I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface (NSF-Facing Interface for short) is
   used to specify and monitor flow-based security policies enforced by
   one or more NSFs."

In draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection the flow-based NSF allows =
to provide integrity and confidentiality to flows by using IPsec.

>=20
> -- Section 1.  What is the relationship between the SDN controller =
referenced here and the I2NSF NOMS per Figure 1 of RFC8329?

[Authors] Actually as such the SDN (Security) controller refers to I2NSF =
controller in RFC 8329. If we follow the Figure 1 the SDN controller is =
the NOMS. Considering the type of security service addressed in this =
draft, we believe the term "I2NSF Controller" is closer than NOMS. In =
fact, for example, this is also done in =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18 (see Figure 1).=20

We will change SDN controller or Security controller by the term I2NSF =
controller along the document.

>=20
> -- Section 1 makes no reference to I2NSF.

[Authors] We will rewrite this section to reference to I2NSF.

>=20
> -- Section 5.  Does the proposed architecture cited in Figure 1 and 2 =
conform to the "I2NSF Reference Architecture" depicted in Figure 1 of =
RFC8329.  It seems like it should.  However:
>=20
> o this document doesn't cite it.  It does however cite RFC8192.  In =
Figure 1 and 2 of this document, there is a "client facing =
interface"/"vendor facing interface"/"Security Controller", but RFC8329 =
has a "consumer facing interface"/"registration interface"/"Network =
Operator Management System=E2=80=9D

[Authors] Yes, the interface naming must be updated to be aligned with =
the one used in the I2NSF framework. Regarding the use of "Security =
Controller", other WG documents also use this term. However, considering =
you suggestion, since RFC 8392 also refers to NOMS as "I2NSF =
controller", we propose to use the term "I2NSF controller" along the =
document.=20

> o In Figure 1 and 2 of this document there is an I2NSF agent in the =
NSF which isn't described elsewhere.

[Authors] Correct. That was extracted from the old I-D =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-08, which we have removed now from the I-D. =
We have removed the term "I2NSF Agent=E2=80=9D.=20

> o The Client-Facing Interface is cited as RFC8192.  What is the =
relationship between this interface and =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm?

[Authors] Correct. Figure 1 and 2 should read Consumer-Facing Interface =
instead of Client-Facing interface.

> o What is the relationship between the NSF Facing Interface in Figure =
1 and draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm?

[Authors] This I-D (draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection) defines =
a data model to be used between the I2NSF Controller and the NSFs. It is =
important to note that this data model is complementary to the one =
described in the draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm. The =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm defines a data model for =
Firewall, IDS and IPS security policies. The =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection defines a data model for =
IPsec policy and security associations following the specification in =
RFC4301 and RFC7296. A NSF could play the role of IPsec host/gateway and =
or Firewall/IDS/IP by supporting one or both data models. =20
>=20
> -- Section 5.1.1.  How does the scenario of multiple Security =
Controllers and gateways relate to the I2NSF architecture?

[Authors] Certainly RFC 8329 does not seem to mention the possibility of =
having two I2NSF controllers cooperating. However, we think it is a =
realistic case for different reasons (for example load balancing). In =
any case, since RFC 8329 does not describe this case, to be aligned with =
it, we will remove it. The same for section 7.2.
>=20
> -- Section 5.2.  Per "As shown in Figure 2, applications for flow =
protection run on top of the Security Controller", can you clarify what =
this means?  Is it that the functionality associated with translating =
the policy shared by I2NSF client is built into the security controller?

[Authors] Basically we meant the I2NSF user (applications), which uses =
the consumer-facing interface to communicate with the I2NSF controller. =
Let us change that text to be aligned with that terminology.
>=20
> -- Section 5.3.  Per "In principle, IKE case is easier to deploy than =
IKE-less case because current gateways ..." =20
> o s/IKE case is/the IKE case is/
> o s/than IKE-less case/than the IKE-less case/
> o what gateway is being referenced here - it isn't in Figure 1, 2 or =
RFC8329.  RFC8192 defines a security gateway be subsequently doesn't use =
it again

[Authors] It is referring to "security gateways" such as defined in =
IPsec architecture RFC 4301. In I2NSF terminology, it translates to a =
flow-based NSF implementing IPsec. In line with previous comments, we =
can change it to NSF but clarifying its correspondence to IPsec =
architecture (RFC 4301) to facilitate the readability for those coming =
from the IPsec world.

>=20
> -- Section 5.3.  Per "Moreover hosts can install easily an IKE =
implementation":
> o s/can install easily/can easily install/
> o What are hosts in this context?  How are they related to the NSFs?

[Authors] Hosts are also defined in IPsec architecture. In fact there =
are different configurations: host-to-host, gateway-to-gateway and =
gateway-to-host (not covered in our I-D after a consensus in the I2NSF =
WG.). A host is still a flow-based NSF. The difference with the gateway =
is that the host does not forward traffic between different networks. =
The source of the IPsec traffic is the own NSF and the destination is =
another flow-based NSF which does not forward that traffic. =46rom RFC =
4301:

" IPsec can be used to protect one or more "paths"
   (a) between a pair of hosts, (b) between a pair of security gateways,
   or (c) between a security gateway and a host."

As mentioned in our previous answer, we will review this section to =
clarify the correspondence between I2NSF and IPsec entities.=20
>=20
> -- Section 5.3.1.  "However, when IKE is not used, we have followed a =
different approach to avoid any packet loss during rekey: the Security =
Controller installs first the new inbound SAs in both NSFs and then, the =
outbound IPsec SAs."  This text mentions multiple NSFs (i.e., "in both =
NSFs"), but the I2NSF is scoped to the interface between the controller =
and NSFs (but not between NSFs).

[Authors] In order to configure a IPsec flow between two NSFs, both NSFs =
have to be configured by the I2NSF controller. The interfaces involved =
here are: (1) the I2NSF NSF facing interface between the I2NSF =
controller and one NSF; and (2) the I2NSF NSF facing interface between =
the I2NSF controller and the other NSF. Therefore, there is no I2NSF =
interface between both NSFs.
>=20
> -- Section 7.  How do these use cases relate to the I2NSF =
architecture?  There appears to be a set of actions taken by an =
administrator that is at a different level of abstraction that specified =
by I2NSF

[Authors] The administrator provides high-level security policies (e.g. =
I want to protect data traffic with confidentiality and integrity =
between these two networks). Referring to I2NSF architecure, the =
administrator should be allowed to do that acting as I2NSF User. We can =
clarify this or simply state the I2NSF User in our text. In any case, =
the I2NSF User would be an IPsec management system.

> o Section 7.1 and 7.2 discuss communication between NSFs which isn't =
covered in I2NSF

[Authors] We included step 4 in Fig. 3 for completeness. Certainly that =
step 4 is out of scope of IN2SF. In fact it is only describing what =
finally happens after the configuration in steps 1-3. If it helps we can =
remove step 4 or stating that is out of scope of I2NSF. Same happens =
with Fig. 4.

> o Section 7.2 discusses communication though an "east-west" interface =
between controllers which isn't covered in I2NSF

[Authors] Yes, that's right. That is a common terminology in the SDN =
world (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7426). Since this may create =
confusion we will get rid of the text related with interactions between =
two I2NSF controllers, and keep the text for only one controller.

> o I also couldn't find a reference to I2NSF interactions where there =
are multiple controllers operated by different administrative entities.

[Authors] Correct. We will remove now the case for multiple controllers.

>=20
> (2) Abstract.  Editorial.  The sentence "This document describing ..." =
does not parse for me and I recommend tying it to the I2NSF =
architecture:
> OLD:=20
> This document describes how providing IPsec-based flow protection by
>   means of a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (aka.  Security
>   Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this =
service.
> NEW:
> This document describes how to provide IPsec-based flow protection by =
means of a Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (I2NSF   Security =
Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this service.=20

[Authors] Ok, done.

>=20
> (3) Abstract.  Per "The document focuses on the NSF Facing Interface =
...", which NSF Facing Interface?  I2NSF or something more generic?

[Authors] It defines a data model which is complementary to the defined =
in draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-09. As such, it defines a =
I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface for IPsec management.=20

>=20
> (4) Section 1.  Per "Recently, several network scenarios are =
considering a centralized way ...", this sentence notes that there are =
several network scenarios motivating the work but only names one, =
SD-WAN.  Either enumerate the others or note SD-WAN only.

[Authors] Ok. We will include a reference to RFC 8192 (Section 4.3.3) =
and the data center use case commented here =
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-i2nsf-ipsec-dc-prof-00

>=20
> (5) Section 1.  Editorial.
> OLD:
> SD-WAN is based on IPsec as underlying security
>   protocol and aims to provide flexible, automated, fast deployment =
and
>   on-demand security network services such as IPsec SA management from
>   a centralized point.
> NEW:
> SD-WAN is based on IPsec as an underlying security protocol and aims =
to provide flexible, automated, and rapid deployment; and enable =
on-demand security network services such as IPsec SA management from a =
centralized point.
>=20
> (6) Section 1. "First, this document exposes the requirements to =
support the protection of data flows using IPsec [RFC4301].", I had =
trouble identifying the SDN-specific requirements in the text.  In what =
section is state stated?

[Authors] They are in section 5.1.1 and 5.2.1.

>=20
> (7) Section 1.  Editorial s/manage autonomously/autonomously manage/
>=20
> (8) Section 1.  Per "The analysis of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) =
scenario is out of scope ...",=20
> -- Consider using a different, less colloquial phrase than =
=E2=80=9Croadwarrior"

[Authors] Ok, we will remove it since the term "host-to-gateway" =
clarifies enough the IPsec operation mode.

>=20
> -- EDITORIAL:
> OLD:=20
> The analysis of the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of =
scope of this document
>=20
> NEW:
> Consideration for the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of =
scope of this document
>=20
> (9) Section 1.  Editorial. s/pays attention to the challenge/addresses =
the challenge of the/
>=20
> (10) Section 3.  Per [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]:
> -- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology] is expired.  Are you sure you want to =
use?

[Authors] We use it because RFC 8329 also references it. But, certainly, =
it seems not advisable to refer an expired draft. So we will remove this =
reference.=20
>=20
> -- Is there a reason to redefine NSF here as it is defined in =
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]

[Authors] True. There is no need. We could refer to =
I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology, but as you suggest, it is expired. Should it =
be enough to refer RFC 8329.
>=20
> (11) Section 3.  Editorial. s/dst\/src/destination\/source/
>=20
> (12) Section 3. Typo. s/outboud/outbound/
>=20
> (13) Section 4.  This section was a helpful scoping.  I would have =
benefit from reading it earlier (Section 1)

[Authors] Ok. We can integrate this text in Section 1.

>=20
> (14) Section 4.  Per "... in order to protect specific data flows", =
between what parts of the I2NSF infrastructure?

[Authors] This text refers to the protection of data traffic exchanged =
between two flow-based NSFs implementing IPsec. We will clarify this.

>=20
> (15) Section 5.1.  Editorial
> OLD
> In this case the NSF ships an IKEv2 implementation besides the IPsec =
support.  =20
>=20
> NEW
> In this case, the NSF ships an IPSec implementation with IKEv2 =
support.
>=20
> (16) Section 5.1.1. Per Figure 1 (and applies to Figure 2)
> -- What is the "application support=E2=80=9D?

[Authors] It basically means the component in the Security Controller =
that handles the specificities of IPsec management. But we agree that it =
may create confusion. We can remove it from the Figure.=20

> -- What is the "SPD entries Distr." Is that "distribution=E2=80=9D?

[Authors] Yes, it is distribution. We will change Figure 1 to clarify =
this.

> -- What's "data protection and forwarding=E2=80=9D?

[Authors] Applying IPsec over data packets and, after that, forwarding =
of these protected packet.

>=20
> (17) Per Section 5.1.1.  Per "In order to support this capability in =
IKE cases, the following interface requirements need to be met:"
> -- To what interfaces is this referring?

[Authors] The interface between the NSF and the I2NSF Controller, i.e, =
the I2SNF NSF-facing interface.

> -- Editorial: s/in IKE case/in the IKE case/
>=20
> (18) Section 5.2.1.  The text references an SDN controller.  Is that =
the Security Controller per Figure 2?  I recommend consistent language.

[Authors] We agree. To be consistent we think it would be better to say =
"I2NSF controller" eveywhere, despite we have observed other WG =
documents also using the term "Security Controller=E2=80=9D.

>=20
> (19) Section 5.3.  Per "As downside, the NSF needs more resources to =
hold IKEv2", what does "hold IKEv2" mean in this context?  Is it an =
observation that the NSF will need more memory? Storage? Compute?

[Authors] Yes, the NSF will need more resources. On one hand, memory for =
the IKEv2 implementation. On the other computation since, each IPsec =
security association rekeying, may involve a Diffie-Hellman exchange. We =
will clarify this aspect.

>=20
> (20) Section 5.3.  Per "Moreover, the IKEv2 implementation needs to =
implement an internal interface" - what is an internal interface in this =
architecture?

[Authors] This is the interface that IKEv2 implementation needs to =
enforce the configuration sent by the Security Controller. However we =
understand that it might be confusing. It is a detail that can be =
omitted.

>=20
> (21) Section 5.3.  Recommend something more precise than "lighter =
NSFs=E2=80=9D.

[Authors] Yes. It is related to our answer in (19). We believe =
resource-constrained NSFs is the right description.

>=20
> (22) Section 5.3.  Per "On the contrary, the overload of creating and =
managing ...", "overload", to me, implies that the demand for a resource =
is out stripping the supply.  Do you mean "the overhead of creating =
..."? Also see the last sentence of this paragraph, "In summary, this =
overload may =E2=80=A6"

[Authors] The right word would be =E2=80=9Ccomplexity=E2=80=9D.=20

>=20
> (23) Section 5.3.2.  Per "Moreover, the Security Controller has a =
register about all the NSFs ...", what is "has a register"?  Is the =
intent to say that the controller keeps a list of NSFs?

[Authors] Yes. Your suggestion is better.=20

>=20
> (24) Section 5.3.2.  "In IKE-less case, if the Security Controller =
detects that a NSF has lost the IPsec SAs it will delete the old IPsec =
SAs on the non-failed nodes, established with the failed node (step 1).  =
This prevents the non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext."
> -- Is there a reason why normative language isn't used to require this =
clean up (i.e., deleting the old IPSec SAs)?

[Authors] Yes, it is a SHOULD:

"In the IKE-less case, if the I2NSF Controller detects that a NSF has =
lost the IPsec SAs it SHOULD delete the old IPsec SAs on the non-failed =
nodes, established with the failed node (step 1).  This prevents the =
non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext.

We include SHOULD since the IPsec SAs still has a lifetime that will =
make the IPsec SAs be removed automatically without the I2NSF controller =
involvement.


> -- Are there constraints on how quickly this needs to happen?

[Authors] There are not, as far as we know. As we mentioned the IPsec =
SAs still have a lifetime associated.

>=20
> (25) Section 5.3.2.  Per "Nevertheless other more optimized options =
can be considered", what is the guidance to implementors with this =
statement?

[Authors] We wanted to highlight that implementors may decide to add =
configuration permanent between NSFs reboots without compromising =
security. For example, if the IKEv2 configuration is in the =
startup-config , each time a NSF reboots it will use that configuration =
for each rebooting. It would imply avoiding to contact with the I2NSF =
controller. This =E2=80=9Coptimization=E2=80=9D would be for the =
IKEv2-case. Since this text is more related with IKEv2 we can move it =
and expand it with this explanation.

In the IKEv2-less case, the process described tries to avoid any packet =
loss. However, step 2 and step 3 can be performed at the same time at =
the cost of a potential packet loss. If this is not critic then it is an =
optimization since the number of exchanges is lower (in fact, we have =
implemented this behavior as well). We can add some text about this.=20


>=20
> (26) Section 5.3.3.  Per "On the contrary, the IKE-less case does not =
have any protocol in the NSFs to detect whether they are located behind =
a NAT or not.", it seems odd to make assumptions about the code in the =
NSFs.

[Authors] IKEv2 has a mechanism to detect if it is operating behind a =
NAT. With IKE-less, the NSF does not have IKE implementation since, =
under that standpoint, the NSF does not have any (IPsec-related) =
protocol to do it.  However, we agree that the NSF may have a protocol =
that allows it to detect it is behind a NAT. We can rephrase that =
sentence.=20

=E2=80=9CIn the IKE-less case, the NSF does not have the assistance of =
the IKEv2 implementation to detect if it is located behind a NAT."

>=20
> (27) Section 5.3.3.  The normative behavior of the IKE-less NAT =
detection isn't clear.  The paragraphs "On the contrary, ..." and "For =
example ..." don't articulate what's to be done in the NAT case.

[Authors]  We can rephrase this text as follows:=20

   In the IKE case, IKEv2 already provides a mechanism to detect whether
   some of the peers or both are located behind a NAT.  If there is a
   NAT network configured between two peers, it is required to activate =
the usage=20
   of UDP or TCP/TLS encapsulation for ESP packets =
([RFC3948],[RFC8229]). Note that the=20
   usage of IPsec transport mode when NAT is required MUST NOT be used =
in this specification.

   In the IKE-less case, the NSF does not have the assistance of the =
IKEv2 implementation=20
   to detect it is located behind a NAT. If the NSF does not have any =
other mechanism to=20
   detect if it is behind a NAT, the Security Controller SHOULD =
implement=20
   a mechanism to detect that case. The SDN paradigm generally assumes =
the Security Controller
   has a view of the network under its control. This view is built
   either requesting information to the NSFs under its control, or
   because these NSFs inform the Security Controller. Based on this =
information,=20
   the Security Controller MAY guess if there is a NAT
   configured between two hosts, and apply the required policies to both
   NSFs besides activating the usage of UDP or TCP/TLS encapsulation of
   ESP packets ([RFC3948], [RFC8229]). The interface for discovering if =
the NSF=20
   is behind a NAT is out of scope of this document.

   If the Security Controller does not have any mechanism to know =
whether a host is behind a NAT or not,=20
   then the IKE-case MUST be used and not the IKE-less case."


>=20
> (28) Section 5.3.4.  Per "The assumption in this document is that, for =
both cases, before a NSF can operate in this system, it MUST be =
registered in the Security Controller.  In this way, when the NSF comes =
to live and establishes a connection to the Security Controller, it =
knows that the NSF is valid for joining the system."
> -- how does this registration and validation occur?  I see the text =
later says "This discover process is out of scope ...", but registration =
seems different than discovery.

[Authors] Yes, both process are different. Registration refers to the =
process of facilitating the I2NSF controller information about a valid =
NSF such as certificate, IP address, etc. This information is =
incorporated to a list of NSFs under its control. On the contrary, =
discovery represents the process followed by the I2NSF controller to =
detect the capabilities supported by a concrete NSF (cryptographic =
algorithms, supported authentication methods, etc.). We believe both =
processes are independent of the content of document. We will make this =
clearer in this section. We will also mention that the registration =
process is out of scope.


> -- (editorially) I stumbled over "when the NSF comes to live", maybe =
"when the NSF starts"
>=20
> (29) Section 6.2. Is the spd-entry having only a single traffic =
selector the only simplification of RFC4301.  If not, list all of the =
divergences.  Otherwise, I recommend explicitly saying only this edit =
was made.

[Authors] Ok. We will list them.

>=20
> (30) Section 6.2. Typo. s/instead a list/instead of  a list/
>=20
> (31) Section 6.2.  Editorial. s/admit a traffic selector per IPsec =
policy/admit a single traffic selector per IPSec policy/
>=20
> (32) Section 7.  Are the use cases normative text?  If not, please say =
so.  Consider moving them to an appendix outside of the normative flow =
of the text.  If the text is normative, then I'll have more feedback as =
they are underspecified for standards track text.

[Authors] Yes, we think  moving them to an appendix should be ok. This =
is just describing examples about how it would operate.

>=20
> (33) Section 7.1.  "Besides, fresh SAD entries will be also generated =
by the Security Controller and enforced in the NSFs.  In this case, the =
Security Controller does not run any IKEv2 implementation (neither the =
NSFs), and it provides the cryptographic material for the IPsec SAs." =20=

>=20
> Editorially, what the "beside" is referencing and the double negative =
in the second sentence created confusion for me.  Recommend:
>=20
> NEW:=20
> Fresh SAD entries will be also generated by the Security Controller =
and enforced in the NSFs.  As the Security Controller is not running =
IKEv2, it provide the cryptographic materials for the IPSec SAs.

[Authors] Ok, perfect. Thank you.

>=20
> (34) Section 7.2.  Step 3.  What does "NOTE: This may require =
extensions in the East/West interface." mean?

[Authors] We understand this is not well explained. Assuming an =
east-west interface that interconnects two Security Controllers, this =
east-west must allow the negotiation with the other controller to agree =
on the IPsec SPD policies and IKEv2 credentials for their respective =
NSFs. We can remove that note. Moreover, we agreed before that this =
scenario with two controllers could be removed from the I-D.

>=20
> (35) Section 9.  s/MUST exit/MUST exist/
>=20
> (36) Section 9.  Typo. s/to protect of the critical/to protect the =
critical/
>=20
> (37) Section 9.0  Per "For example, when NETCONF is used as southbound =
protocol between the Security Controller and the NSFs, it is defined =
that TLS or SSH security association MUST be established between both =
entities", what is the difference between this normative language and =
Section 9.3's "The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, =
and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) =
[RFC6242].  The lowest RESTCONF layer  is HTTPS, and the =
mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].=E2=80=9D?

[Authors] The text included in Section 9.3 is extracted from RFC 8407 =
about "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG =
Data Models=E2=80=9D. The text in section 9 is to state that
"there MUST exit a security association between the Security Controller =
and the NSFs to
   protect of the critical information (cryptographic keys,
   configuration parameter, etc...) exchanged between these entities.=E2=80=
=9D

And then we give an example. Perhaps the MUST in "it is defined that TLS =
or SSH security association MUST be established between both entities=E2=80=
=9D is confusing since it comes from the NETCONF RFC 6242. We can remove =
that sentence to avoid any confusion.

>=20
> (38) Section 9.  Typo. s/This default policy MUST ... before the NSF =
contacts with the Security Controller/This default policy MUST ... =
before the NSF contacts the Security Controller/
>=20
> (39) Section 9.  Per "Moreover, the startup configuration datastore =
MUST be pre-configured ..."
> -- where is the "startup configuration datastore" defined in the =
architecture?

[Authors] The term "startup configuration datastore=E2=80=9D is defined =
in RFC 6241 (NETCONF) and used in RFC 8040  (RESTCONF). RFC 7950 (YANG =
1.1) mentions the startup since it is very related to NETCONF. We can =
include that term in section 3 and refer to RFC 6241.

> -- How is it provisioned (is this out of scope?)?

[Authors] Yes, that is out of scope. That would happen before the NSF is =
deployed. It is an initial pre-configuration.=20

>=20
> (40) Section 9.  Typo. s/always apply first/always first apply/
>=20
> (41) Section 9. Per "In general, the Security Controller, as typically =
in the SDN paradigm, is a target for different type of attacks .  Thus, =
the Security Controller is a key entity in the infrastructure and MUST =
be protected accordingly ...", what are the details here?  Section 13 of =
[ITU-T.Y.3300]  says "Moreover, a logically centralized controller can =
be a single point of failure, and can be a target of malicious attacks, =
thus special attention is required." and Section 7 of [8192] doesn't =
mention the security controller at all.

[Authors] The details about security in SDNs are in the literature, as =
you refer. As per your comment we can refer to [ITU-T.Y.3300] and remove =
[8192]. Moreover in RFC 7426, in the Security section part there is =
text:

"That said, security is paramount in networking; thus, it
should be given full consideration when designing a network
architecture or operational deployment.  Security in SDN is discussed
in the literature, for example, in [SDNSecurity], [SDNSecServ], and=20
[SDNSecOF]=E2=80=9D

We can also include some of these references.=20


>=20
> (42) Section 9.1. Should configurations adhere to the algorithm =
recommendations of RFC8247?

[Authors] Yes. We will add this reference.=20
>=20
> (43) Section 9.1 and 9.2.  Per "The general recommendation is that the =
Security Controller MUST NOT store ...", is this a recommendation or a =
normative "MUST NOT".  To me, the use of the language "general =
recommendation" suggests it is optional.  I recommend:
>=20
> OLD
> The general recommendation is that the Security Controller MUST NOT =
store the IKE credentials after distributing them.
>=20
> NEW
> The Security Controller MUST NOT store the IKE credentials after =
distributing them

[Authors] Thank you. Your text is better.
>=20
> (44) Section 9.1.  Editorial.  s/One option is to return always =
.../One option is to always return .../
>=20
> (45) Section 9.1.  Per "Moreover, the PSK MUST have a proper length =
(e.g.  minimum 128 bit length) and strength", what is the recommended =
guidance - it is that PSKs need to have 128-bit strength?  The normative =
guidance in a parenthetic example is not clear.

[Authors] True. This is related to comment 42.  Referring to RFC 8247 is =
proper here too. After all, the proper key length will depend on the PRF =
used for generating the AUTH payload in IKEv2.=20

>=20
> (46) Section 9.1. "How the NSF generates these cryptographic material =
(public key/private keys) and export the public key, or it is instructed =
to do so , it is out of the scope of this document."
> -- what is meant by "or it is instructed to do so=E2=80=9D?

[Authors] In our mind, the NSF can generate automatically the =
public/private keys and export the public when it starts up or only when =
the Security Controller instructs the NSF to generate public/private =
keys. In any case, after your comment we think we can simplify the text =
removing that part:

"How the NSF generates these cryptographic material (public key/private =
keys) and exports the public key is out of scope of this document.=E2=80=9D=


> -- s/export/exports/
> -- s/it is out of the scope/is out of scope/

Best Regards and thank you very much again,
authors.

>=20
> Regards,
> Roman
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> I2nsf mailing list
> I2nsf@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf

-------------------------------------------------------
Rafa Marin-Lopez, PhD
Dept. Information and Communications Engineering (DIIC)
Faculty of Computer Science-University of Murcia
30100 Murcia - Spain
Telf: +34868888501 Fax: +34868884151 e-mail: rafa@um.es
-------------------------------------------------------





--Apple-Mail=_4C2BF722-89BA-49E8-B74D-7039C16BA7B8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html;
	charset=utf-8

<html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; =
charset=3Dutf-8"></head><body style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; =
-webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">Dear Roman:</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D"">First of all, thank you so much for your extensive review. =
This is really appreciated.&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D"">Please see inline our comments. NOTE: =
We skip editorial comments in our answer.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D"">El 11 =
may 2020, a las 23:52, Roman Danyliw &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:rdd@cert.org" =
class=3D"">rdd@cert.org</a>&gt; escribi=C3=B3:</div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">Hi!<br=
 class=3D""><br class=3D"">I performed an AD review of =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07 and my feedback is as =
follows:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(1) As written, it wasn't clear to =
me how this document fits into the I2NSF architecture. &nbsp;There were =
a number of places in the document that the underlying reference =
architecture does not appear to link to the one specified in I2NSF. =
&nbsp;The text at times reads like I2NSF, an SDN architecture or a =
generic configuration of IPSec. &nbsp;This document needs additional =
text to frame the work for I2NSF so that it fits into the charter -- if =
it generalizes to other use cases, I don't see this as an issue. =
&nbsp;The following is a non-exhaustive list where I saw dissidence.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
Before getting into the specific comments, a general comment is =
important. As we mention in the abstract, this document focuses in =
flow-based NSF Network Security Function (NSF) which protect data =
traffic with integrity and confidentiality between network resources by =
using IPsec.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div><div>This draft =
is related with the I2NSF architecture in the following =
ways:</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>- The beginning of I2NSF =
charter and Section 2 in RFC 8192 defines a NSF as "a function that is =
used to ensure integrity, confidentiality, or availability of network =
communication; to detect unwanted network activity; or to block, or at =
least mitigate, the effects of unwanted activity.". A flow-based NSF =
based on IPsec ensures integrity and confidentiality of network =
communications. Our document is useful for that type of =
NSFs.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>- Section 3.1.1 in RFC 8192 =
identifies diverse types of Security Functions: "Security Gateways and =
VPN Concentrators: &nbsp;Examples of these functions are IPsec gateways, =
secure VPN concentrators that handle bridging secure VPNs, and secure =
VPN controllers for data flows." and "Internal Data and Content =
Protection: &nbsp;Examples of this function are encryption, =
authorization, and public/private key management for internal =
databases.". These functions are related to an IPsec-based NSF and this =
I-D provides the I2NSF NSF-facing interface required to deal with these =
functions.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>- It covers one of =
the problems identified in RFC 8129 "3.1.9. Lack of Mechanism for =
Dynamic Key Distribution to NSFs".</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>- =
It is related to one of the use cases also identified in RFC 8129 "4.3.3 =
Client-Specific Security Policy in Cloud VPNs" when the VPN is =
established with IPsec. Due to the importance this use case and others =
such as SD-WAN and data center scenarios</div><div>(<a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-i2nsf-ipsec-dc-prof-00" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-i2nsf-ipsec-dc-prof-00</a=
>), this type of centralized IPsec management has raised significant =
interest in the industry.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>- As such, =
the data model defined in this I-D fits in the definition given to =
&nbsp;I2NFS NSF-Facing interface in Section 3.2 - RFC =
8329.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>"The I2NSF NSF-Facing =
Interface (NSF-Facing Interface for short) is</div><div>&nbsp; =
&nbsp;used to specify and monitor flow-based security policies enforced =
by</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;one or more NSFs."</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>In draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection the =
flow-based NSF allows to provide integrity and confidentiality to flows =
by using IPsec.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 1. =
&nbsp;What is the relationship between the SDN controller referenced =
here and the I2NSF NOMS per Figure 1 of RFC8329?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><div>[Authors] Actually as such the SDN (Security) =
controller refers to I2NSF controller in RFC 8329. If we follow the =
Figure 1 the SDN controller is the NOMS. Considering the type of =
security service addressed in this draft, we believe the term "I2NSF =
Controller" is closer than NOMS. In fact, for example, this is also done =
in draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18 (see Figure 1).&nbsp;</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>We will change SDN controller or Security =
controller by the term I2NSF controller along the =
document.</div></div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 1 =
makes no reference to I2NSF.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
We will rewrite this section to reference to I2NSF.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 5. &nbsp;Does the proposed =
architecture cited in Figure 1 and 2 conform to the "I2NSF Reference =
Architecture" depicted in Figure 1 of RFC8329. &nbsp;It seems like it =
should. &nbsp;However:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">o this document =
doesn't cite it. &nbsp;It does however cite RFC8192. &nbsp;In Figure 1 =
and 2 of this document, there is a "client facing interface"/"vendor =
facing interface"/"Security Controller", but RFC8329 has a "consumer =
facing interface"/"registration interface"/"Network Operator Management =
System=E2=80=9D</div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] Yes, the interface naming must be =
updated to be aligned with the one used in the I2NSF framework. =
Regarding the use of "Security Controller", other WG documents also use =
this term. However, considering you suggestion, since RFC 8392 also =
refers to NOMS as "I2NSF controller", we propose to use the term "I2NSF =
controller" along the document.&nbsp;</div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">o In Figure 1 =
and 2 of this document there is an I2NSF agent in the NSF which isn't =
described elsewhere.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Correct. That was extracted from the old I-D =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-08, which we have removed now from the I-D. =
We have removed the term "I2NSF Agent=E2=80=9D.&nbsp;</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">o The Client-Facing Interface is cited as RFC8192. &nbsp;What =
is the relationship between this interface and =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] Correct. Figure 1 and 2 should read =
Consumer-Facing Interface instead of Client-Facing interface.</div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">o What is the relationship between the NSF Facing Interface =
in Figure 1 and draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
This I-D (draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection) defines a data =
model to be used between the I2NSF Controller and the NSFs. It is =
important to note that this data model is complementary to the one =
described in the draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm. The =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm defines a data model for =
Firewall, IDS and IPS security policies. The =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection defines a data model for =
IPsec policy and security associations following the specification in =
RFC4301 and RFC7296. A NSF could play the role of IPsec host/gateway and =
or Firewall/IDS/IP by supporting one or both data models. &nbsp;<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 5.1.1. &nbsp;How does the scenario =
of multiple Security Controllers and gateways relate to the I2NSF =
architecture?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Certainly RFC 8329 does not seem to mention =
the possibility of having two I2NSF controllers cooperating. However, we =
think it is a realistic case for different reasons (for example load =
balancing). In any case, since RFC 8329 does not describe this case, to =
be aligned with it, we will remove it. The same for section 7.2.<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 5.2. &nbsp;Per "As shown in Figure =
2, applications for flow protection run on top of the Security =
Controller", can you clarify what this means? &nbsp;Is it that the =
functionality associated with translating the policy shared by I2NSF =
client is built into the security controller?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
Basically we meant the I2NSF user (applications), which uses the =
consumer-facing interface to communicate with the I2NSF controller. Let =
us change that text to be aligned with that terminology.<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per "In principle, IKE =
case is easier to deploy than IKE-less case because current gateways =
..." &nbsp;<br class=3D"">o s/IKE case is/the IKE case is/<br class=3D"">o=
 s/than IKE-less case/than the IKE-less case/<br class=3D"">o what =
gateway is being referenced here - it isn't in Figure 1, 2 or RFC8329. =
&nbsp;RFC8192 defines a security gateway be subsequently doesn't use it =
again<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] It is referring to "security gateways" such =
as defined in IPsec architecture RFC 4301. In I2NSF terminology, it =
translates to a flow-based NSF implementing IPsec. In line with previous =
comments, we can change it to NSF but clarifying its correspondence to =
IPsec architecture (RFC 4301) to facilitate the readability for those =
coming from the IPsec world.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">--=
 Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per "Moreover hosts can install easily an IKE =
implementation":<br class=3D"">o s/can install easily/can easily =
install/<br class=3D"">o What are hosts in this context? &nbsp;How are =
they related to the NSFs?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] Hosts are also defined in IPsec =
architecture. In fact there are different configurations: host-to-host, =
gateway-to-gateway and gateway-to-host (not covered in our I-D after a =
consensus in the I2NSF WG.). A host is still a flow-based NSF. The =
difference with the gateway is that the host does not forward traffic =
between different networks. The source of the IPsec traffic is the own =
NSF and the destination is another flow-based NSF which does not forward =
that traffic. =46rom RFC 4301:</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>" =
IPsec can be used to protect one or more "paths"</div><div>&nbsp; =
&nbsp;(a) between a pair of hosts, (b) between a pair of security =
gateways,</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;or (c) between a security gateway and a =
host."</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>As mentioned in our previous =
answer, we will review this section to clarify the correspondence =
between I2NSF and IPsec entities.&nbsp;</div><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section =
5.3.1. &nbsp;"However, when IKE is not used, we have followed a =
different approach to avoid any packet loss during rekey: the Security =
Controller installs first the new inbound SAs in both NSFs and then, the =
outbound IPsec SAs." &nbsp;This text mentions multiple NSFs (i.e., "in =
both NSFs"), but the I2NSF is scoped to the interface between the =
controller and NSFs (but not between NSFs).<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
In order to configure a IPsec flow between two NSFs, both NSFs have to =
be configured by the I2NSF controller. The interfaces involved here are: =
(1) the I2NSF NSF facing interface between the I2NSF controller and one =
NSF; and (2) the I2NSF NSF facing interface between the I2NSF controller =
and the other NSF. Therefore, there is no I2NSF interface between both =
NSFs.<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">-- Section 7. &nbsp;How do =
these use cases relate to the I2NSF architecture? &nbsp;There appears to =
be a set of actions taken by an administrator that is at a different =
level of abstraction that specified by I2NSF<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
The administrator provides high-level security policies (e.g. I want to =
protect data traffic with confidentiality and integrity between these =
two networks). Referring to I2NSF architecure, the administrator should =
be allowed to do that acting as I2NSF User. We can clarify this or =
simply state the I2NSF User in our text. In any case, the I2NSF User =
would be an IPsec management system.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">o Section 7.1 =
and 7.2 discuss communication between NSFs which isn't covered in =
I2NSF<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] We included step 4 in Fig. 3 for =
completeness. Certainly that step 4 is out of scope of IN2SF. In fact it =
is only describing what finally happens after the configuration in steps =
1-3. If it helps we can remove step 4 or stating that is out of scope of =
I2NSF. Same happens with Fig. 4.</div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">o Section 7.2 =
discusses communication though an "east-west" interface between =
controllers which isn't covered in I2NSF<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
Yes, that's right. That is a common terminology in the SDN world (see <a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7426" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7426</a>). Since this may =
create confusion we will get rid of the text related with interactions =
between two I2NSF controllers, and keep the text for only one =
controller.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">o I also couldn't find a =
reference to I2NSF interactions where there are multiple controllers =
operated by different administrative entities.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
Correct. We will remove now the case for multiple =
controllers.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(2) Abstract. =
&nbsp;Editorial. &nbsp;The sentence "This document describing ..." does =
not parse for me and I recommend tying it to the I2NSF architecture:<br =
class=3D"">OLD: <br class=3D"">This document describes how providing =
IPsec-based flow protection by<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;means of a =
Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (aka. &nbsp;Security<br =
class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;Controller) and establishes the requirements to =
support this service.<br class=3D"">NEW:<br class=3D"">This document =
describes how to provide IPsec-based flow protection by means of a =
Software-Defined Network (SDN) controller (I2NSF &nbsp;&nbsp;Security =
Controller) and establishes the requirements to support this service. =
<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] Ok, done.</div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(3) Abstract. &nbsp;Per "The document focuses on the NSF =
Facing Interface ...", which NSF Facing Interface? &nbsp;I2NSF or =
something more generic?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] It defines a data model which is =
complementary to the defined in =
draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-09. As such, it defines a I2NSF =
NSF-Facing Interface for IPsec management.&nbsp;</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(4) Section 1. &nbsp;Per "Recently, several =
network scenarios are considering a centralized way ...", this sentence =
notes that there are several network scenarios motivating the work but =
only names one, SD-WAN. &nbsp;Either enumerate the others or note SD-WAN =
only.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Ok. We will include a reference to RFC 8192 =
(Section 4.3.3) and the data center use case commented here <a =
href=3D"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-i2nsf-ipsec-dc-prof-00" =
class=3D"">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nir-i2nsf-ipsec-dc-prof-00</a=
></div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(5) Section 1. =
&nbsp;Editorial.<br class=3D"">OLD:<br class=3D"">SD-WAN is based on =
IPsec as underlying security<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;protocol and =
aims to provide flexible, automated, fast deployment and<br class=3D""> =
&nbsp;&nbsp;on-demand security network services such as IPsec SA =
management from<br class=3D""> &nbsp;&nbsp;a centralized point.<br =
class=3D"">NEW:<br class=3D"">SD-WAN is based on IPsec as an underlying =
security protocol and aims to provide flexible, automated, and rapid =
deployment; and enable on-demand security network services such as IPsec =
SA management from a centralized point.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(6) =
Section 1. "First, this document exposes the requirements to support the =
protection of data flows using IPsec [RFC4301].", I had trouble =
identifying the SDN-specific requirements in the text. &nbsp;In what =
section is state stated?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] They are in section 5.1.1 and =
5.2.1.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(7) Section 1. &nbsp;Editorial =
s/manage autonomously/autonomously manage/<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(8) Section 1. &nbsp;Per "The analysis of the host-to-gateway =
(roadwarrior) scenario is out of scope ...", <br class=3D"">-- Consider =
using a different, less colloquial phrase than =E2=80=9Croadwarrior"<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
Ok, we will remove it since the term "host-to-gateway" clarifies enough =
the IPsec operation mode.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">--=
 EDITORIAL:<br class=3D"">OLD: <br class=3D"">The analysis of the =
host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of scope of this =
document<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">NEW:<br class=3D"">Consideration =
for the host-to-gateway (roadwarrior) scenario is out of scope of this =
document<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(9) Section 1. &nbsp;Editorial. =
s/pays attention to the challenge/addresses the challenge of the/<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(10) Section 3. &nbsp;Per =
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]:<br class=3D"">-- =
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology] is expired. &nbsp;Are you sure you want to =
use?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] We use it because RFC 8329 also references =
it. But, certainly, it seems not advisable to refer an expired draft. So =
we will remove this reference.&nbsp;<br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">--=
 Is there a reason to redefine NSF here as it is defined in =
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology]<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
True. There is no need. We could refer to I-D.ietf-i2nsf-terminology, =
but as you suggest, it is expired. Should it be enough to refer RFC =
8329.<br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(11) Section 3. =
&nbsp;Editorial. s/dst\/src/destination\/source/<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(12) Section 3. Typo. s/outboud/outbound/<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(13) Section 4. &nbsp;This section was a helpful scoping. =
&nbsp;I would have benefit from reading it earlier (Section 1)<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
Ok. We can integrate this text in Section 1.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(14) Section 4. &nbsp;Per "... in order to =
protect specific data flows", between what parts of the I2NSF =
infrastructure?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] This text refers to the protection of data =
traffic exchanged between two flow-based NSFs implementing IPsec. We =
will clarify this.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(15) Section =
5.1. &nbsp;Editorial<br class=3D"">OLD<br class=3D"">In this case the =
NSF ships an IKEv2 implementation besides the IPsec support. =
&nbsp;&nbsp;<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">NEW<br class=3D"">In this =
case, the NSF ships an IPSec implementation with IKEv2 support.<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(16) Section 5.1.1. Per Figure 1 (and applies =
to Figure 2)<br class=3D"">-- What is the "application support=E2=80=9D?<b=
r class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
It basically means the component in the Security Controller that handles =
the specificities of IPsec management. But we agree that it may create =
confusion. We can remove it from the Figure.&nbsp;</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">-- What is the "SPD entries Distr." Is that =
"distribution=E2=80=9D?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><br =
class=3D"">[Authors] Yes, it is distribution. We will change Figure 1 to =
clarify this.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D"">-- What's "data protection =
and forwarding=E2=80=9D?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Applying IPsec over data packets and, after =
that, forwarding of these protected packet.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(17) Per Section 5.1.1. &nbsp;Per "In order to =
support this capability in IKE cases, the following interface =
requirements need to be met:"<br class=3D"">-- To what interfaces is =
this referring?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] The interface between the NSF and the I2NSF =
Controller, i.e, the I2SNF NSF-facing interface.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">-- Editorial: s/in IKE case/in the IKE case/<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(18) Section 5.2.1. &nbsp;The text references an SDN =
controller. &nbsp;Is that the Security Controller per Figure 2? &nbsp;I =
recommend consistent language.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
We agree. To be consistent we think it would be better to say "I2NSF =
controller" eveywhere, despite we have observed other WG documents also =
using the term "Security Controller=E2=80=9D.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(19) Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per "As downside, the =
NSF needs more resources to hold IKEv2", what does "hold IKEv2" mean in =
this context? &nbsp;Is it an observation that the NSF will need more =
memory? Storage? Compute?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Yes, the NSF will need more resources. On one =
hand, memory for the IKEv2 implementation. On the other computation =
since, each IPsec security association rekeying, may involve a =
Diffie-Hellman exchange. We will clarify this aspect.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(20) Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per "Moreover, the =
IKEv2 implementation needs to implement an internal interface" - what is =
an internal interface in this architecture?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
This is the interface that IKEv2 implementation needs to enforce the =
configuration sent by the Security Controller. However we understand =
that it might be confusing. It is a detail that can be =
omitted.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(21) Section =
5.3. &nbsp;Recommend something more precise than "lighter NSFs=E2=80=9D.<b=
r class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
Yes. It is related to our answer in (19). We believe =
resource-constrained NSFs is the right description.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(22) Section 5.3. &nbsp;Per "On the contrary, =
the overload of creating and managing ...", "overload", to me, implies =
that the demand for a resource is out stripping the supply. &nbsp;Do you =
mean "the overhead of creating ..."? Also see the last sentence of this =
paragraph, "In summary, this overload may =E2=80=A6"<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
The right word would be =E2=80=9Ccomplexity=E2=80=9D.&nbsp;</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(23) Section 5.3.2. &nbsp;Per "Moreover, the =
Security Controller has a register about all the NSFs ...", what is "has =
a register"? &nbsp;Is the intent to say that the controller keeps a list =
of NSFs?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Yes. Your suggestion is =
better.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(24) Section =
5.3.2. &nbsp;"In IKE-less case, if the Security Controller detects that =
a NSF has lost the IPsec SAs it will delete the old IPsec SAs on the =
non-failed nodes, established with the failed node (step 1). &nbsp;This =
prevents the non-failed nodes from leaking plaintext."<br class=3D"">-- =
Is there a reason why normative language isn't used to require this =
clean up (i.e., deleting the old IPSec SAs)?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><div>[Authors] Yes, it is a SHOULD:</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>"In the IKE-less case, if the I2NSF Controller =
detects that a NSF has lost the IPsec SAs it SHOULD delete the old IPsec =
SAs on the non-failed nodes, established with the failed node (step 1). =
&nbsp;This prevents the non-failed nodes from leaking =
plaintext.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>We include SHOULD since =
the IPsec SAs still has a lifetime that will make the IPsec SAs be =
removed automatically without the I2NSF controller =
involvement.</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div></div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">-- Are there constraints on how quickly this needs to =
happen?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] There are not, as far as we know. As we =
mentioned the IPsec SAs still have a lifetime associated.</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(25) Section 5.3.2. &nbsp;Per "Nevertheless =
other more optimized options can be considered", what is the guidance to =
implementors with this statement?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] We wanted to highlight that implementors =
may decide to add configuration permanent between NSFs reboots without =
compromising security. For example, if the IKEv2 configuration is in the =
startup-config , each time a NSF reboots it will use that configuration =
for each rebooting. It would imply avoiding to contact with the I2NSF =
controller. This =E2=80=9Coptimization=E2=80=9D would be for the =
IKEv2-case. Since this text is more related with IKEv2 we can move it =
and expand it with this explanation.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>In the IKEv2-less case, the process described =
tries to avoid any packet loss. However, step 2 and step 3 can be =
performed at the same time at the cost of a potential packet loss. If =
this is not critic then it is an optimization since the number of =
exchanges is lower (in fact, we have implemented this behavior as well). =
We can add some text about this.&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(26) Section 5.3.3. &nbsp;Per "On the contrary, the IKE-less =
case does not have any protocol in the NSFs to detect whether they are =
located behind a NAT or not.", it seems odd to make assumptions about =
the code in the NSFs.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] IKEv2 has a mechanism to detect if it is =
operating behind a NAT. With IKE-less, the NSF does not have IKE =
implementation since, under that standpoint, the NSF does not have any =
(IPsec-related) protocol to do it. &nbsp;However, we agree that the NSF =
may have a protocol that allows it to detect it is behind a NAT. We can =
rephrase that sentence.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>=E2=80=9C=
In the IKE-less case, the NSF does not have the assistance of the IKEv2 =
implementation to detect if it is located behind a NAT."</div><div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(27) Section 5.3.3. &nbsp;The normative =
behavior of the IKE-less NAT detection isn't clear. &nbsp;The paragraphs =
"On the contrary, ..." and "For example ..." don't articulate what's to =
be done in the NAT case.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div><div>[Authors] &nbsp;We can rephrase this text as =
follows:&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;In the =
IKE case, IKEv2 already provides a mechanism to detect =
whether</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;some of the peers or both are located =
behind a NAT. &nbsp;If there is a</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;NAT network =
configured between two peers, it is required to activate the =
usage&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;of UDP or TCP/TLS encapsulation for =
ESP packets ([RFC3948],[RFC8229]). Note that the&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; =
&nbsp;usage of IPsec transport mode when NAT is required MUST NOT be =
used in this specification.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>&nbsp; =
&nbsp;In the IKE-less case, the NSF does not have the assistance of the =
IKEv2 implementation&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;to detect it is =
located behind a NAT. If the NSF does not have any other mechanism =
to&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;detect if it is behind a NAT, the =
Security Controller SHOULD implement&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;a =
mechanism to detect that case. The SDN paradigm generally assumes the =
Security Controller</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;has a view of the network =
under its control. This view is built</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;either =
requesting information to the NSFs under its control, =
or</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;because these NSFs inform the Security =
Controller. Based on this information,&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;the =
Security Controller MAY guess if there is a NAT</div><div>&nbsp; =
&nbsp;configured between two hosts, and apply the required policies to =
both</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;NSFs besides activating the usage of UDP or =
TCP/TLS encapsulation of</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;ESP packets ([RFC3948], =
[RFC8229]). The interface for discovering if the =
NSF&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;is behind a NAT is out of scope of this =
document.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;If the =
Security Controller does not have any mechanism to know whether a host =
is behind a NAT or not,&nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;then the IKE-case =
MUST be used and not the IKE-less case."</div></div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(28) Section 5.3.4. &nbsp;Per =
"The assumption in this document is that, for both cases, before a NSF =
can operate in this system, it MUST be registered in the Security =
Controller. &nbsp;In this way, when the NSF comes to live and =
establishes a connection to the Security Controller, it knows that the =
NSF is valid for joining the system."<br class=3D"">-- how does this =
registration and validation occur? &nbsp;I see the text later says "This =
discover process is out of scope ...", but registration seems different =
than discovery.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] Yes, both process are different. =
Registration refers to the process of facilitating the I2NSF controller =
information about a valid NSF such as certificate, IP address, etc. This =
information is incorporated to a list of NSFs under its control. On the =
contrary, discovery represents the process followed by the I2NSF =
controller to detect the capabilities supported by a concrete NSF =
(cryptographic algorithms, supported authentication methods, etc.). We =
believe both processes are independent of the content of document. We =
will make this clearer in this section. We will also mention that the =
registration process is out of scope.</div><div><br class=3D""></div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D"">-- (editorially) I stumbled over "when the NSF comes to =
live", maybe "when the NSF starts"<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(29) =
Section 6.2. Is the spd-entry having only a single traffic selector the =
only simplification of RFC4301. &nbsp;If not, list all of the =
divergences. &nbsp;Otherwise, I recommend explicitly saying only this =
edit was made.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] Ok. We will list them.</div><br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(30) Section 6.2. Typo. s/instead a =
list/instead of &nbsp;a list/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(31) Section =
6.2. &nbsp;Editorial. s/admit a traffic selector per IPsec policy/admit =
a single traffic selector per IPSec policy/<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(32) Section 7. &nbsp;Are the use cases normative text? =
&nbsp;If not, please say so. &nbsp;Consider moving them to an appendix =
outside of the normative flow of the text. &nbsp;If the text is =
normative, then I'll have more feedback as they are underspecified for =
standards track text.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Yes, we think &nbsp;moving them to an =
appendix should be ok. This is just describing examples about how it =
would operate.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(33) Section =
7.1. &nbsp;"Besides, fresh SAD entries will be also generated by the =
Security Controller and enforced in the NSFs. &nbsp;In this case, the =
Security Controller does not run any IKEv2 implementation (neither the =
NSFs), and it provides the cryptographic material for the IPsec SAs." =
&nbsp;<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">Editorially, what the "beside" is =
referencing and the double negative in the second sentence created =
confusion for me. &nbsp;Recommend:<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">NEW: <br =
class=3D"">Fresh SAD entries will be also generated by the Security =
Controller and enforced in the NSFs. &nbsp;As the Security Controller is =
not running IKEv2, it provide the cryptographic materials for the IPSec =
SAs.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] Ok, perfect. Thank you.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div=
 class=3D""><br class=3D"">(34) Section 7.2. &nbsp;Step 3. &nbsp;What =
does "NOTE: This may require extensions in the East/West interface." =
mean?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] We understand this is not well explained. =
Assuming an east-west interface that interconnects two Security =
Controllers, this east-west must allow the negotiation with the other =
controller to agree on the IPsec SPD policies and IKEv2 credentials for =
their respective NSFs. We can remove that note. Moreover, we agreed =
before that this scenario with two controllers could be removed from the =
I-D.</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(35) Section 9. &nbsp;s/MUST =
exit/MUST exist/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(36) Section 9. =
&nbsp;Typo. s/to protect of the critical/to protect the critical/<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(37) Section 9.0 &nbsp;Per "For example, when =
NETCONF is used as southbound protocol between the Security Controller =
and the NSFs, it is defined that TLS or SSH security association MUST be =
established between both entities", what is the difference between this =
normative language and Section 9.3's "The lowest NETCONF layer is the =
secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport =
is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. &nbsp;The lowest RESTCONF layer =
&nbsp;is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS =
[RFC8446].=E2=80=9D?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] The text included in Section 9.3 is =
extracted from RFC 8407 about "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of =
Documents Containing YANG Data Models=E2=80=9D. The text in section 9 is =
to state that</div><div>"there MUST exit a security association between =
the Security Controller and the NSFs to</div><div>&nbsp; &nbsp;protect =
of the critical information (cryptographic keys,</div><div>&nbsp; =
&nbsp;configuration parameter, etc...) exchanged between these =
entities.=E2=80=9D</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>And then we give =
an example. Perhaps the MUST in "it is defined that TLS or SSH security =
association MUST be established between both entities=E2=80=9D is =
confusing since it comes from the NETCONF RFC 6242. We can remove that =
sentence to avoid any confusion.</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div=
 class=3D""><br class=3D"">(38) Section 9. &nbsp;Typo. s/This default =
policy MUST ... before the NSF contacts with the Security =
Controller/This default policy MUST ... before the NSF contacts the =
Security Controller/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(39) Section 9. =
&nbsp;Per "Moreover, the startup configuration datastore MUST be =
pre-configured ..."<br class=3D"">-- where is the "startup configuration =
datastore" defined in the architecture?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] The term "startup configuration =
datastore=E2=80=9D is defined in RFC 6241 (NETCONF) and used in RFC 8040 =
&nbsp;(RESTCONF). RFC 7950 (YANG 1.1) mentions the startup since it is =
very related to NETCONF. We can include that term in section 3 and refer =
to RFC 6241.</div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div=
 class=3D""><div class=3D"">-- How is it provisioned (is this out of =
scope?)?<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Yes, that is out of scope. That would happen =
before the NSF is deployed. It is an initial =
pre-configuration.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote =
type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">(40) Section 9. &nbsp;Typo. s/always apply first/always first =
apply/<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">(41) Section 9. Per "In general, the =
Security Controller, as typically in the SDN paradigm, is a target for =
different type of attacks . &nbsp;Thus, the Security Controller is a key =
entity in the infrastructure and MUST be protected accordingly ...", =
what are the details here? &nbsp;Section 13 of [ITU-T.Y.3300] &nbsp;says =
"Moreover, a logically centralized controller can be a single point of =
failure, and can be a target of malicious attacks, thus special =
attention is required." and Section 7 of [8192] doesn't mention the =
security controller at all.<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] The details about security in SDNs are =
in the literature, as you refer. As per your comment we can refer to =
[ITU-T.Y.3300] and remove [8192]. Moreover in RFC 7426, in the Security =
section part there is text:</div><div><br class=3D""></div><div>"That =
said, security is paramount in networking; thus, it</div><div>should be =
given full consideration when designing a network</div><div>architecture =
or operational deployment. &nbsp;Security in SDN is =
discussed</div><div>in the literature, for example, in [SDNSecurity], =
[SDNSecServ], and&nbsp;</div><div>[SDNSecOF]=E2=80=9D</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>We can also include some of these =
references.&nbsp;</div><div class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(42) Section 9.1. Should =
configurations adhere to the algorithm recommendations of RFC8247?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=3D""></div>[Authors] =
Yes. We will add this reference.&nbsp;</div><div><blockquote type=3D"cite"=
 class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(43) Section =
9.1 and 9.2. &nbsp;Per "The general recommendation is that the Security =
Controller MUST NOT store ...", is this a recommendation or a normative =
"MUST NOT". &nbsp;To me, the use of the language "general =
recommendation" suggests it is optional. &nbsp;I recommend:<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">OLD<br class=3D"">The general recommendation =
is that the Security Controller MUST NOT store the IKE credentials after =
distributing them.<br class=3D""><br class=3D"">NEW<br class=3D"">The =
Security Controller MUST NOT store the IKE credentials after =
distributing them<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] Thank you. Your text is better.<br =
class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(44) Section 9.1. &nbsp;Editorial. &nbsp;s/One =
option is to return always .../One option is to always return .../<br =
class=3D""><br class=3D"">(45) Section 9.1. &nbsp;Per "Moreover, the PSK =
MUST have a proper length (e.g. &nbsp;minimum 128 bit length) and =
strength", what is the recommended guidance - it is that PSKs need to =
have 128-bit strength? &nbsp;The normative guidance in a parenthetic =
example is not clear.<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div>[Authors] True. This is related to comment 42. =
&nbsp;Referring to RFC 8247 is proper here too. After all, the proper =
key length will depend on the PRF used for generating the AUTH payload =
in IKEv2.&nbsp;</div><div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">(46) Section =
9.1. "How the NSF generates these cryptographic material (public =
key/private keys) and export the public key, or it is instructed to do =
so , it is out of the scope of this document."<br class=3D"">-- what is =
meant by "or it is instructed to do so=E2=80=9D?<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>[Authors] In our mind, the NSF can generate =
automatically the public/private keys and export the public when it =
starts up or only when the Security Controller instructs the NSF to =
generate public/private keys. In any case, after your comment we think =
we can simplify the text removing that part:</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>"How the NSF generates these cryptographic =
material (public key/private keys) and exports the public key is out of =
scope of this document.=E2=80=9D</div><div><br =
class=3D""></div><blockquote type=3D"cite" class=3D""><div class=3D""><div=
 class=3D"">-- s/export/exports/<br class=3D"">-- s/it is out of the =
scope/is out of scope/<br class=3D""></div></div></blockquote><div><br =
class=3D""></div><div>Best Regards and thank you very much =
again,</div><div>authors.</div><br class=3D""><blockquote type=3D"cite" =
class=3D""><div class=3D""><div class=3D""><br class=3D"">Regards,<br =
class=3D"">Roman<br class=3D""><br =
class=3D"">_______________________________________________<br =
class=3D"">I2nsf mailing list<br class=3D""><a =
href=3D"mailto:I2nsf@ietf.org" class=3D"">I2nsf@ietf.org</a><br =
class=3D"">https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2nsf<br =
class=3D""></div></div></blockquote></div><br class=3D""><div class=3D"">
<div style=3D"word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; =
-webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=3D""><div style=3D"color: =
rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Courier; font-size: 16px; font-style: normal; =
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; =
orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: =
none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; =
-webkit-text-stroke-width: =
0px;">-------------------------------------------------------<br =
class=3D"">Rafa Marin-Lopez, PhD<br class=3D"">Dept. Information =
and&nbsp;Communications&nbsp;Engineering (DIIC)<br class=3D"">Faculty of =
Computer&nbsp;Science-University of&nbsp;Murcia<br class=3D"">30100 =
Murcia - Spain<br class=3D"">Telf: +34868888501 Fax:&nbsp;+34868884151 =
<a href=3D"mailto:rafa@um.es" class=3D"">e-mail:&nbsp;rafa@um.es</a><br =
class=3D"">-------------------------------------------------------</div><d=
iv style=3D"color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Courier; font-size: 16px; =
font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; =
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: =
0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; =
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;" class=3D""><br =
class=3D""></div><br class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline"></div><br =
class=3D"Apple-interchange-newline">
</div>
<br class=3D""></body></html>=

--Apple-Mail=_4C2BF722-89BA-49E8-B74D-7039C16BA7B8--

