From nobody Mon Jul 2 15:43:07 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 508AC130E60; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 15:42:49 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.934 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.934 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_SOFTFAIL=0.665, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4jXiHRgufzEB; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 15:42:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from d.mail.sonic.net (d.mail.sonic.net [64.142.111.50]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B38AE1311C0; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 15:42:47 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.10.33] (c8r38-1-78-197-168-57.fbx.proxad.net [78.197.168.57]) (authenticated bits=0) by d.mail.sonic.net (8.15.1/8.15.1) with ESMTPSA id w62MgW7i010211 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NOT); Mon, 2 Jul 2018 15:42:34 -0700 References: <153057085187.16368.17027473724315322445.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> To: 5GANGIP <5gangip@ietf.org>, "lisp@ietf.org list" , dmm@ietf.org, ila@ietf.org From: Erik Nordmark X-Forwarded-Message-Id: <153057085187.16368.17027473724315322445.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> Message-ID: <3c9865b6-5819-ab4c-7d0d-87d36949591a@acm.org> Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2018 15:42:31 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <153057085187.16368.17027473724315322445.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Sonic-CAuth: UmFuZG9tSVY1iNe6gkWLinv7Q6VYjHi47d9+sCFstg3x4j2TiABlzvWi8MAyoVZCUGc/hLuliQF0pKV9UCA4mBcMRaWIdXWB X-Sonic-ID: C;tNJaNUl+6BG7e6H3kFY0nw== M;6mlVNkl+6BG7e6H3kFY0nw== X-Sonic-Spam-Details: 0.0/5.0 by cerberusd Archived-At: Subject: [Ila] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt X-BeenThere: ila@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Identifier Locator Addressing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 22:42:50 -0000 This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more discussion around privacy considerations. -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700 From: internet-drafts@ietf.org To: Erik Nordmark A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy Revision: 00 Title: Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems Document date: 2018-07-02 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 6 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00 Htmlized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy Abstract: There exists several protocols and proposals for identifier/locator split which have some form of control plane by which participating nodes can use to share their current id to locator information with their peers. This document explores some of the privacy considerations for such a system. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat From nobody Mon Jul 2 22:01:59 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 323C5130E2D; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 22:01:46 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.4 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.4 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.25, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wXkRVcc7XDn4; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 22:01:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wr0-x242.google.com (mail-wr0-x242.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c0c::242]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3B9A9130E00; 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Mon, 02 Jul 2018 22:01:42 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: crowcroft@gmail.com Received: by 2002:a1c:ef11:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Mon, 2 Jul 2018 22:01:42 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <3c9865b6-5819-ab4c-7d0d-87d36949591a@acm.org> References: <153057085187.16368.17027473724315322445.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <3c9865b6-5819-ab4c-7d0d-87d36949591a@acm.org> From: Jon Crowcroft Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 06:01:42 +0100 X-Google-Sender-Auth: SCk-iy9uH3Y5I_JcFBlE4Cq8w7o Message-ID: To: Erik Nordmark Cc: 5GANGIP <5gangip@ietf.org>, "lisp@ietf.org list" , dmm@ietf.org, ila@ietf.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Ila] [5gangip] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt X-BeenThere: ila@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Identifier Locator Addressing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 05:01:47 -0000 what we need is compact onion routing - maybe we could call it garlic routing. in all seriousness, if people are worried about privacy with regards network operators, or state actors co-ercing network operators, at this level, that is what you want. otherwise forget about efficient mobile routing - the fact is that the signature of the set of locations you visit is enough to re-identify a node pretty quickly - its been done (see wetherall's work on this a few years back on simply looking at sequences of wifi AP associations, without bothing with end system mac addr, to uniquely matc individual (indeed, find their home) - you have to get the threat model appropriately...and proportioately On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 11:42 PM, Erik Nordmark wrote: > > This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more discussion around > privacy considerations. > > -------- Forwarded Message -------- > Subject: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt > Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700 > From: internet-drafts@ietf.org > To: Erik Nordmark > > > A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt > has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the > IETF repository. > > Name: draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy > Revision: 00 > Title: Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems > Document date: 2018-07-02 > Group: Individual Submission > Pages: 6 > URL: > https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt > Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy/ > Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00 > Htmlized: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy > > > Abstract: > There exists several protocols and proposals for identifier/locator > split which have some form of control plane by which participating > nodes can use to share their current id to locator information with > their peers. This document explores some of the privacy > considerations for such a system. > > > > > Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission > until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. > > The IETF Secretariat > > _______________________________________________ > 5gangip mailing list > 5gangip@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip From nobody Tue Jul 3 08:15:04 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AF46130E68 for ; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:15:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.91 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.91 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, T_DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=quantonium-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id xonHdsFPJn_U for ; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:15:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wr0-x22a.google.com (mail-wr0-x22a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c0c::22a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5864F1277CC for ; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:15:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-wr0-x22a.google.com with SMTP id f18-v6so2353881wre.10 for ; Tue, 03 Jul 2018 08:15:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=quantonium-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=1knYTn4Igy2DtGW+jwxLw9hhqA9pKeHHD2etcB6mm9Y=; b=I7aJKjXq3FZCPkt6YH//KB5d14gxTLXAD01CzqPE+FBm4DeArFsNW3WUKBOVev1jLS /rJYDUEiNTqf0/EcwY4v+eZ4HuVfs8OBghEVam4NGKZIq9tIFO6qbUIGMP7xExvb2p/I rqweISc9hG8E6kdGMuMQuvTp8QGUV9+M+w6yaQIE8LLceRO5Guj+5UyRulsaGNV9opFa VbL3AL1LhsI+33MaVxqtECaAvJsawI2MyhuSjzVFqKD/K3QjZVhiOdUAjbaEz0gjAfvT U2sIf2JEG2YVV9mUmAg+OHzi1ooIXOPKu7Ty/PNlPigqbjRwaQbnhYQztWwpZOhRqvfF 7kBg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=1knYTn4Igy2DtGW+jwxLw9hhqA9pKeHHD2etcB6mm9Y=; b=U72vwhtU6jtPelrwnUDPpR8R6jH96Uu0XuhHLZ+zBw/ux7C5zYHINtdlLaH/GypFep xzN8j1fSQmfF/CotUSakLy1wmf+KNctR1Uy4Ns+QUgHymjAq//IPIoYzQxrZr4ppyvDJ grQdxjOBJCHrdfxcMlpXQncY/ECKE4HFd6p3QFOEkM9XQbTeIwZFyI6NuypmQvb/Dd5n ar8JCaR6dH6N9LrPXbwa8+YSqHCbnF4E1gXfXZNvZjC2OpoeCP3S2bQOau+DyWju46H2 WdDGgReehkFRiQYHPuHll4vnOTPX27qXScJshYqy6EEwhtVhS8DQ7OY+MzniDzJhVUaS 2ZZw== X-Gm-Message-State: APt69E2ohP4HZc7aJufqEClB27Ldk5XdKU//V0tTG/h/0T56REUpgy8M Z5QC/CHNwJUBj9am1c+5jRYbEOuZ1qB3qMiBjc1iCQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpckblLdPtShOD9e2Vx9m4lU/mP7B7mmgoLYIFzYd+tjg8SphRlhpFqz8i3x4AsOr2t6MKbSpb+18Q5BTV1P44U= X-Received: by 2002:adf:ecc6:: with SMTP id s6-v6mr11026493wro.160.1530630898640; Tue, 03 Jul 2018 08:14:58 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 2002:adf:fa86:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:14:58 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <153057085187.16368.17027473724315322445.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <3c9865b6-5819-ab4c-7d0d-87d36949591a@acm.org> From: Tom Herbert Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:14:58 -0700 Message-ID: To: Jon Crowcroft Cc: Erik Nordmark , 5GANGIP <5gangip@ietf.org>, ila@ietf.org, "lisp@ietf.org list" , dmm Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Ila] [5gangip] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt X-BeenThere: ila@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Identifier Locator Addressing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 15:15:03 -0000 On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Crowcroft wrote: > what we need is compact onion routing - maybe we could call it garlic routing. > > in all seriousness, if people are worried about privacy with regards > network operators, or state actors co-ercing network operators, at > this level, that is what you want. otherwise forget about efficient > mobile routing - the fact is that the signature of the set of > locations you visit is enough to re-identify a node pretty quickly - > its been done (see wetherall's work on this a few years back on simply > looking at sequences of wifi AP associations, without bothing with end > system mac addr, to uniquely matc individual (indeed, find their home) > - you have to get the threat model appropriately...and proportioately Jon, The threat is not limited to coming from network operators, it is basically from the whole Internet. IP addresses must be sent as clear text, and when they encode personally identifiable information then that can be used by third parties to compromise privacy. In mobile addresses, the threat is both comprising identity and location of the user. Identity can be compromised when the same address (or device specific prefix in case of RFC4941 addresses) is reused for different flows, location is compromised when an address encodes a locator that can be used to determine specific location. There are publicized examples of third parties using IP addresses to expose identity and location (e.g. https://theintercept.com/2018/03/26/facebook-data-ice-immigration/). In order to provide privacy in addressing, IP addresses need to be purged of PII. This likely entails minimizing aggregation and a high frequency of address change in a host. On the surface, this does seem to be in conflict with "efficient mobile routing" as you mentioned, however I don't believe that efficient routing is an acceptable trade off for not providing adequate privacy to users. Alternatives that achieve both goals should be investigated. draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00 suggests "hidden aggregation" as one possibility. Tom > > On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 11:42 PM, Erik Nordmark wrote: >> >> This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more discussion around >> privacy considerations. >> >> -------- Forwarded Message -------- >> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >> Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700 >> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org >> To: Erik Nordmark >> >> >> A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >> has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the >> IETF repository. >> >> Name: draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy >> Revision: 00 >> Title: Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems >> Document date: 2018-07-02 >> Group: Individual Submission >> Pages: 6 >> URL: >> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy/ >> Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00 >> Htmlized: >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy >> >> >> Abstract: >> There exists several protocols and proposals for identifier/locator >> split which have some form of control plane by which participating >> nodes can use to share their current id to locator information with >> their peers. This document explores some of the privacy >> considerations for such a system. >> >> >> >> >> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission >> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. >> >> The IETF Secretariat >> >> _______________________________________________ >> 5gangip mailing list >> 5gangip@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip > > _______________________________________________ > 5gangip mailing list > 5gangip@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip From nobody Tue Jul 3 08:19:53 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 84028130E68; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:19:39 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.4 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.4 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=0.25, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); 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Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:19:34 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <153057085187.16368.17027473724315322445.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <3c9865b6-5819-ab4c-7d0d-87d36949591a@acm.org> From: Jon Crowcroft Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 17:19:34 +0200 X-Google-Sender-Auth: GB7Gi7DJj-LXKQShAp918tp7b_s Message-ID: To: Tom Herbert Cc: Erik Nordmark , ila@ietf.org, "lisp@ietf.org list" , dmm , 5GANGIP <5gangip@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Ila] [5gangip] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt X-BeenThere: ila@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Identifier Locator Addressing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 15:19:40 -0000 beware of sidechannel attacks - eg. a sequence of efficient routes can determine a sequence of locations just from latency/rtt estimation (observe outbound data and likely return path ack packets) - you want privacy, you're gonna pay On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Tom Herbert wrote: > On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Crowcroft > wrote: >> what we need is compact onion routing - maybe we could call it garlic routing. >> >> in all seriousness, if people are worried about privacy with regards >> network operators, or state actors co-ercing network operators, at >> this level, that is what you want. otherwise forget about efficient >> mobile routing - the fact is that the signature of the set of >> locations you visit is enough to re-identify a node pretty quickly - >> its been done (see wetherall's work on this a few years back on simply >> looking at sequences of wifi AP associations, without bothing with end >> system mac addr, to uniquely matc individual (indeed, find their home) >> - you have to get the threat model appropriately...and proportioately > > Jon, > > The threat is not limited to coming from network operators, it is > basically from the whole Internet. IP addresses must be sent as clear > text, and when they encode personally identifiable information then > that can be used by third parties to compromise privacy. In mobile > addresses, the threat is both comprising identity and location of the > user. Identity can be compromised when the same address (or device > specific prefix in case of RFC4941 addresses) is reused for different > flows, location is compromised when an address encodes a locator that > can be used to determine specific location. There are publicized > examples of third parties using IP addresses to expose identity and > location (e.g. https://theintercept.com/2018/03/26/facebook-data-ice-immigration/). > > In order to provide privacy in addressing, IP addresses need to be > purged of PII. This likely entails minimizing aggregation and a high > frequency of address change in a host. On the surface, this does seem > to be in conflict with "efficient mobile routing" as you mentioned, > however I don't believe that efficient routing is an acceptable trade > off for not providing adequate privacy to users. Alternatives that > achieve both goals should be investigated. > draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00 suggests "hidden > aggregation" as one possibility. > > Tom > >> >> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 11:42 PM, Erik Nordmark wrote: >>> >>> This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more discussion around >>> privacy considerations. >>> >>> -------- Forwarded Message -------- >>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>> Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700 >>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org >>> To: Erik Nordmark >>> >>> >>> A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>> has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the >>> IETF repository. >>> >>> Name: draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy >>> Revision: 00 >>> Title: Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems >>> Document date: 2018-07-02 >>> Group: Individual Submission >>> Pages: 6 >>> URL: >>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy/ >>> Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00 >>> Htmlized: >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy >>> >>> >>> Abstract: >>> There exists several protocols and proposals for identifier/locator >>> split which have some form of control plane by which participating >>> nodes can use to share their current id to locator information with >>> their peers. This document explores some of the privacy >>> considerations for such a system. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission >>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. >>> >>> The IETF Secretariat >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> 5gangip mailing list >>> 5gangip@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip >> >> _______________________________________________ >> 5gangip mailing list >> 5gangip@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip > > _______________________________________________ > 5gangip mailing list > 5gangip@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip From nobody Tue Jul 3 08:34:12 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4ED60130E09 for ; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:34:03 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.91 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.91 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, T_DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.01] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=quantonium-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 1_8OrQd0Cnyl for ; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:34:02 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wr0-x235.google.com (mail-wr0-x235.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c0c::235]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 811FD130E6D for ; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:33:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-wr0-x235.google.com with SMTP id a12-v6so2441846wro.1 for ; Tue, 03 Jul 2018 08:33:58 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=quantonium-net.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=xeMgB5yMuPi1Cjv1lu5FgXYHouIpe+QoOwAhrLzTXXM=; b=WFS8IwWbf3Rno8hGvaD7OiZoer8dsGeI7HCWhCDAKLZsel0kpZM3+Q8w+Mstf3TL1O EhO92gJ6iaKHqNHMqTYCkTtVhz9PQG0jriVefuIS3AiU4j6mxXH5uie5ckaKb07n9nBN DATEO6SDWHKFs/rtkbRNhQFhjPAso6rTMZE6yt0sz/hqkL95r9JHADhk/tDTNqUM7JIz h2P6btbgB/zUv9VDUfQQsysfbVUXWhIWjMMQMNaiEZ7Iw1ax8jQcO1SIhv0VbNPhUomr RCxr4pLaXfmZXpACDwx2GHX9ig3mCW+lLVnIXk0Dw9pL8lu6NjWE/Ise1lacA9AErb+x ON4w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=xeMgB5yMuPi1Cjv1lu5FgXYHouIpe+QoOwAhrLzTXXM=; b=SU6oJZF1i/MNg6nTo0+1rnFSkcZhoXHxK/JLcm+RKTRylF2VPxFuearnm0sqVYjUH9 M69LfikoF7EWKXM1OUDEftl8JUe98Nnw0R3APYX+Cq7aN4vhoBUoXAKflynf1O4bmpn4 rsRG2oORO8Q8I4nEz0P74u+Tzq+UezSEu+SBPqFBAjMfd+kNhTvFwY++E/b1G7s3XvgF 8eM6pthfZVATxnSuOOyfiBJd4eLTvY7Z651bLxgD0id+xPpmNkUPRxsjVMfA2Xvm8xBO vnyPHlW3lplOOGt1RnKE5TqKDCHgRci2hlU2DxEcdN2qljShsEUXFKHB0xn0fhkc+cKC HfZw== X-Gm-Message-State: APt69E2UjHDk4lH5tMQMKnWp/7WIURuXa1LFZ65dAxVuuWDmRDFKYzIA cYe1K6pG0Q5CejX3Mo/z7JgzxlRNngzYVRwI35mUxg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpe6WgxRN8O9Jk9HFVTjCff6Q0t+gkXwgJ+PdIfxmQbpdwqVVxi2OhpEtVergdjPpGMPDnnhPEF9/gZCbAXQpIU= X-Received: by 2002:adf:a056:: with SMTP id l22-v6mr2123756wrl.153.1530632036864; Tue, 03 Jul 2018 08:33:56 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 2002:adf:fa86:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:33:56 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <153057085187.16368.17027473724315322445.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <3c9865b6-5819-ab4c-7d0d-87d36949591a@acm.org> From: Tom Herbert Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:33:56 -0700 Message-ID: To: Jon Crowcroft Cc: Erik Nordmark , ila@ietf.org, "lisp@ietf.org list" , dmm , 5GANGIP <5gangip@ietf.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Ila] [5gangip] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt X-BeenThere: ila@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Identifier Locator Addressing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 15:34:04 -0000 On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:19 AM, Jon Crowcroft wrote: > beware of sidechannel attacks - eg. a sequence of efficient routes can > determine a sequence of locations just from latency/rtt estimation > (observe outbound data and likely return path ack packets) - you want > privacy, you're gonna pay > Yep, we also know there is a lot of effort being done to extract information from cipher text like apply machine learning to the data. As compute and data acquisition techniques advance, attacks on the Internet only get more sophisticated. Work will always be needed to mitigate new attacks and that will have cost. It's a never ending problem, but it's worth it to continually try to solve IMHO. Tom > On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Tom Herbert wrote: >> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Crowcroft >> wrote: >>> what we need is compact onion routing - maybe we could call it garlic routing. >>> >>> in all seriousness, if people are worried about privacy with regards >>> network operators, or state actors co-ercing network operators, at >>> this level, that is what you want. otherwise forget about efficient >>> mobile routing - the fact is that the signature of the set of >>> locations you visit is enough to re-identify a node pretty quickly - >>> its been done (see wetherall's work on this a few years back on simply >>> looking at sequences of wifi AP associations, without bothing with end >>> system mac addr, to uniquely matc individual (indeed, find their home) >>> - you have to get the threat model appropriately...and proportioately >> >> Jon, >> >> The threat is not limited to coming from network operators, it is >> basically from the whole Internet. IP addresses must be sent as clear >> text, and when they encode personally identifiable information then >> that can be used by third parties to compromise privacy. In mobile >> addresses, the threat is both comprising identity and location of the >> user. Identity can be compromised when the same address (or device >> specific prefix in case of RFC4941 addresses) is reused for different >> flows, location is compromised when an address encodes a locator that >> can be used to determine specific location. There are publicized >> examples of third parties using IP addresses to expose identity and >> location (e.g. https://theintercept.com/2018/03/26/facebook-data-ice-immigration/). >> >> In order to provide privacy in addressing, IP addresses need to be >> purged of PII. This likely entails minimizing aggregation and a high >> frequency of address change in a host. On the surface, this does seem >> to be in conflict with "efficient mobile routing" as you mentioned, >> however I don't believe that efficient routing is an acceptable trade >> off for not providing adequate privacy to users. Alternatives that >> achieve both goals should be investigated. >> draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00 suggests "hidden >> aggregation" as one possibility. >> >> Tom >> >>> >>> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 11:42 PM, Erik Nordmark wrote: >>>> >>>> This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more discussion around >>>> privacy considerations. >>>> >>>> -------- Forwarded Message -------- >>>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>>> Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700 >>>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org >>>> To: Erik Nordmark >>>> >>>> >>>> A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>>> has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the >>>> IETF repository. >>>> >>>> Name: draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy >>>> Revision: 00 >>>> Title: Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems >>>> Document date: 2018-07-02 >>>> Group: Individual Submission >>>> Pages: 6 >>>> URL: >>>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt >>>> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy/ >>>> Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00 >>>> Htmlized: >>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy >>>> >>>> >>>> Abstract: >>>> There exists several protocols and proposals for identifier/locator >>>> split which have some form of control plane by which participating >>>> nodes can use to share their current id to locator information with >>>> their peers. This document explores some of the privacy >>>> considerations for such a system. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission >>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. >>>> >>>> The IETF Secretariat >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> 5gangip mailing list >>>> 5gangip@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> 5gangip mailing list >>> 5gangip@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip >> >> _______________________________________________ >> 5gangip mailing list >> 5gangip@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip From nobody Tue Jul 3 08:37:05 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B710130EBB; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:36:54 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.9 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id dZCYrHGkhZrH; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:36:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mta2.cl.cam.ac.uk (mta2.cl.cam.ac.uk [IPv6:2001:630:212:200::25:2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 93358130F67; Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:36:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ely.cl.cam.ac.uk ([2001:630:212:238:230:48ff:fefe:c314]) by mta2.cl.cam.ac.uk with esmtp (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from ) id 1faNME-0002QN-Lg; Tue, 03 Jul 2018 16:36:46 +0100 From: Jon Crowcroft To: Tom Herbert cc: Erik Nordmark , ila@ietf.org, "lisp@ietf.org list" , dmm , 5GANGIP <5gangip@ietf.org> In-reply-to: References: <153057085187.16368.17027473724315322445.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <3c9865b6-5819-ab4c-7d0d-87d36949591a@acm.org> Comments: In-reply-to Tom Herbert message dated "Tue, 03 Jul 2018 08:33:56 -0700." MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <20756.1530632206.1@ely.cl.cam.ac.uk> Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 16:36:46 +0100 Message-Id: Archived-At: Subject: Re: [Ila] [5gangip] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt X-BeenThere: ila@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Identifier Locator Addressing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 15:36:55 -0000 agree...of course... just we need to start adding security +cost+ considerations... to drafts > On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:19 AM, Jon Crowcroft > wrote: > > beware of sidechannel attacks - eg. a sequence of efficient routes can > > determine a sequence of locations just from latency/rtt estimation > > (observe outbound data and likely return path ack packets) - you want > > privacy, you're gonna pay > > > > Yep, we also know there is a lot of effort being done to extract > information from cipher text like apply machine learning to the data. > As compute and data acquisition techniques advance, attacks on the > Internet only get more sophisticated. Work will always be needed to > mitigate new attacks and that will have cost. It's a never ending > problem, but it's worth it to continually try to solve IMHO. > > Tom > > > > On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Tom Herbert wrote: > >> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Crowcroft > >> wrote: > >>> what we need is compact onion routing - maybe we could call it garlic > routing. > >>> > >>> in all seriousness, if people are worried about privacy with regards > >>> network operators, or state actors co-ercing network operators, at > >>> this level, that is what you want. otherwise forget about efficient > >>> mobile routing - the fact is that the signature of the set of > >>> locations you visit is enough to re-identify a node pretty quickly - > >>> its been done (see wetherall's work on this a few years back on simply > >>> looking at sequences of wifi AP associations, without bothing with end > >>> system mac addr, to uniquely matc individual (indeed, find their home) > >>> - you have to get the threat model appropriately...and proportioately > >> > >> Jon, > >> > >> The threat is not limited to coming from network operators, it is > >> basically from the whole Internet. IP addresses must be sent as clear > >> text, and when they encode personally identifiable information then > >> that can be used by third parties to compromise privacy. In mobile > >> addresses, the threat is both comprising identity and location of the > >> user. Identity can be compromised when the same address (or device > >> specific prefix in case of RFC4941 addresses) is reused for different > >> flows, location is compromised when an address encodes a locator that > >> can be used to determine specific location. There are publicized > >> examples of third parties using IP addresses to expose identity and > >> location (e.g. > https://theintercept.com/2018/03/26/facebook-data-ice-immigration/). > >> > >> In order to provide privacy in addressing, IP addresses need to be > >> purged of PII. This likely entails minimizing aggregation and a high > >> frequency of address change in a host. On the surface, this does seem > >> to be in conflict with "efficient mobile routing" as you mentioned, > >> however I don't believe that efficient routing is an acceptable trade > >> off for not providing adequate privacy to users. Alternatives that > >> achieve both goals should be investigated. > >> draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00 suggests "hidden > >> aggregation" as one possibility. > >> > >> Tom > >> > >>> > >>> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 11:42 PM, Erik Nordmark > wrote: > >>>> > >>>> This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more > discussion around > >>>> privacy considerations. > >>>> > >>>> -------- Forwarded Message -------- > >>>> Subject: New Version Notification for > draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt > >>>> Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700 > >>>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org > >>>> To: Erik Nordmark > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt > >>>> has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the > >>>> IETF repository. > >>>> > >>>> Name: draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy > >>>> Revision: 00 > >>>> Title: Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems > >>>> Document date: 2018-07-02 > >>>> Group: Individual Submission > >>>> Pages: 6 > >>>> URL: > >>>> > https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt > >>>> Status: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy/ > >>>> Htmlized: > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00 > >>>> Htmlized: > >>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Abstract: > >>>> There exists several protocols and proposals for > identifier/locator > >>>> split which have some form of control plane by which participating > >>>> nodes can use to share their current id to locator information > with > >>>> their peers. This document explores some of the privacy > >>>> considerations for such a system. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of > submission > >>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. > >>>> > >>>> The IETF Secretariat > >>>> > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> 5gangip mailing list > >>>> 5gangip@ietf.org > >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> 5gangip mailing list > >>> 5gangip@ietf.org > >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> 5gangip mailing list > >> 5gangip@ietf.org > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/5gangip > From nobody Fri Jul 27 12:45:48 2018 Return-Path: X-Original-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: ila@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A69E6130DCD; Fri, 27 Jul 2018 12:45:33 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.768 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.768 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_FONT_FACE_BAD=0.981, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4sKcHlpuxSxd; Fri, 27 Jul 2018 12:45:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail-wm0-x22a.google.com (mail-wm0-x22a.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:400c:c09::22a]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E6615130DCA; Fri, 27 Jul 2018 12:45:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-wm0-x22a.google.com with SMTP id o18-v6so6711233wmc.0; Fri, 27 Jul 2018 12:45:31 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=YU/en7owh81aieivR5b29psZ7v0c290n84w9nYunaWs=; b=n27YkrC+DTcEFp/66HcCugjz1S5sLqjVtj8AScxyJyUBWFtOoJREQyyWnh/40olPho 15bTXZscCVNyyAXeMkNGQyaJfjV40NbrlUTCk2sKntpHh3ghBUmSbWCrox/iamedHWCc WgSXh3tKkL+gI9c2OwKpEjG67aH53zsWrt32T4RiYnrkRJryBB1UDKRTbAiMyJDfFQXi bOW39J1etdokxAaCJajD0S/pShR9P4Fgq8hHkoIDweTC1SFJjzqE1CYmygwDyUSApdbU Qyw4LeiryGqYpC56/bNvttftLjSFBUvpv9l5EUaX/g4pLiFrXHZ7mPeP4jTx37pmvugG u04w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:reply-to:from:date:message-id :subject:to:cc; bh=YU/en7owh81aieivR5b29psZ7v0c290n84w9nYunaWs=; b=uR3bIFfXvlRak4zzsGztghtPwxTG7AZlauGYhackGDdsW4UrMjLH1CHyz4jRBjrbmy NcpnHgviRJWxM5q6VNSKW047UYHaKkzGttgS7B4cksGYYZ9Pa14McOcl30DLg4Zs2Y5h a15i9m5gh5y+PtEsKYosPKxyZ3WbcKmj+T8p/zsNiuG3mAkTJxT2xvbm05fqjqjNLyV1 gIVvx3RCdgACOA+6M/hnkWOuBbbFeDR8EtCITqmJQjz00u2U9FD9OXpOm7UQDBDJzePQ dIqQU1ytN7bY1j3cR/Pxr0W53/e8IQF2X37Mhx4zuHC4pZmVfTaHBGXdzvsAtVaFU5fz nD6g== X-Gm-Message-State: AOUpUlFJImasXDFtnpgGUq1X4Fp9TZXhHh7wQjEzZVmpP2ffHAWmZoPR 6M1sYmNJaQzEVgjnM4Qo4Pue24wDLoTfbm+RFvny+aSK X-Google-Smtp-Source: AAOMgpeOLocT8NWXim01gLUSg6OWf4gX0SazEUBYMQCrg2jHcdJff3edpgoYMTfXRyq3wuZKt7QGkURUAHQldsiJTdQ= X-Received: by 2002:a1c:1745:: with SMTP id 66-v6mr5292380wmx.38.1532720730213; Fri, 27 Jul 2018 12:45:30 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 2002:adf:ef8f:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Fri, 27 Jul 2018 12:45:29 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: sarikaya@ieee.org From: Behcet Sarikaya Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2018 14:45:29 -0500 Message-ID: To: 5GANGIP <5gangip@ietf.org> Cc: "lisp@ietf.org list" , dmm , ila@ietf.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000aa14370572005a65" Archived-At: Subject: [Ila] New Mailing List for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt X-BeenThere: ila@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.27 Precedence: list List-Id: Identifier Locator Addressing List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2018 19:45:34 -0000 --000000000000aa14370572005a65 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi all, A new mailing list to discuss Privacy and Security issues with Identifier/Locator (Id-Loc) separation protocols in the Internet called PIdLoc has been created. You can subscribe to the list at: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pidloc 5gangip list will continue to host the discussions on 5G issues such as deployment, operations and so on. For all Id-Loc discussions including the discussions on draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy, the new address is pidloc@ietf.org. Many thanks to Security Area ADs, Eric Rescorla and Ben Kaduk for their help and encouragements. So we are in security area! Regards, Behcet also for Dirk --000000000000aa14370572005a65 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi all,

A new mailing list to discu= ss Privacy and Security issues with Identifier/Locator (Id-Loc) separation = protocols in the Internet=C2=A0
called=C2=A0
PIdLoc

has bee= n created.

You=C2=A0can subscribe to the list at:

=

5gangip list will continue to host the discussions on 5G issues such= as deployment, operations and so on.
For all Id-Loc discussions including = =C2=A0the discussions on draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy, the new address is= =C2=A0

Many thanks to Security Area ADs, Eric Rescorla and Ben= Kaduk for their help and encouragements.
So we are in security area!=C2=A0

Regards,
Behcet also for Dirk<= /font>
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