
From nobody Fri Jul  4 06:24:14 2014
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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>, Internet Area <int-area@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Conclusion of adoption call for draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Conclusion of adoption call for draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios
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Hi Suresh, all,

We updated the draft to take into account the comments raised during the ca=
ll for adoption. The new version is available at:

URL:            http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-boucadair-intarea=
-host-identifier-scenarios-06.txt=20
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-boucadair-intarea-ho=
st-identifier-scenarios/=20
Htmlized:       http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-intarea-host-ide=
ntifier-scenarios-06=20
Diff:           http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-boucadair-intarea-=
host-identifier-scenarios-06=20

The main changes are as follows:
* Add text to explain that the analysis in RFC6967 may not be accurate for =
some scenarios. That analysis was driven mainly for the CGN case.
* Clarify the context and the problem of identifying which policy to be enf=
orced for a host.
* Clarify the document does not assume only solutions revealing some inform=
ation in packets is in scope.
* Add some text on potential mis-uses.
* Add text for each scenario to clarify whether privacy considerations in R=
FC6967 are valid or not. =20
* other edits to enhance the readability of the document.

Comments are more than welcome.

We hope a second call for adoption can be initiated for this new version.

Thank you.

Cheers,
Med

>-----Message d'origine-----
>De=A0: Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org] De la part de Suresh
>Krishnan
>Envoy=E9=A0: mercredi 25 juin 2014 02:09
>=C0=A0: Internet Area
>Objet=A0: [Int-area] Conclusion of adoption call for draft-boucadair-intar=
ea-
>host-identifier-scenarios
>
>Hi all,
>
>  We have gone through all the messages and unfortunately we do not see
>wg consensus for adoption. There have been some issues that were brought
>forward during the adoption call. It would be great we can continue
>discussing the draft on the list and try to work on the issues.
>
>Thanks
>Suresh and Juan Carlos
>
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>Int-area mailing list
>Int-area@ietf.org
>https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area


From nobody Fri Jul  4 15:09:12 2014
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From: "Hosnieh Rafiee" <ietf@rozanak.com>
To: <DNSOP@ietf.org>, <Int-area@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Int-area] FW: I-D Action: draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig-09.txt
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Folks,

We removed a few editorial problems and applied the comments of some =
folks who sent their comments offlist.

I just briefly explain the purpose of this document.
- The name of this document is CGA-TSIG but it does not mean that it =
only supports iPv6 or it only uses CGA. The name was taken from the =
first versions of this draft and continued to appear on other version =
(it is a symbolic name)
So at the moment this draft supports IPv6 and IPv4 enabled network.=20
It uses two almost similar algorithms for two different purposes, one =
for only DNS secure authentication and automation of this process and =
the other for both DNS secure authentication and DNS privacy and data =
encryption.
- For DNS privacy we only use the public key cryptography to encrypt a =
16 byte secret key and exchange it to other nodes. After that the =
symmetric algorithm is used for the encryption of the whole DNS message.
It then adds a new header for the verifier node.

- In this version I also included a figure that shows the whole process =
for an example scenario (resolver to stub resolver DNS privacy and =
authentication)

We love to receive your comments to improve this document.
The purpose of this document is to address the problem exists with the =
current DNS mechanisms and also provide a solution for DNS privacy =
without chaning DNS protocol.

Thank you,
Best,
Hosnieh


-----Original Message-----
From: internet-drafts@ietf.org [mailto:internet-drafts@ietf.org]=20
Sent: Friday, July 04, 2014 8:53 PM
To: i-d-announce@ietf.org
Subject: I-D Action: draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig-09.txt


A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts =
directories.


        Title           : CGA-TSIG/e: Algorithms for Secure DNS =
Authentication and DNS Confidentiality
        Authors         : Hosnieh Rafiee
                          Martin von Loewis
                          Christoph Meinel
	Filename        : draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig-09.txt
	Pages           : 33
	Date            : 2014-07-04

Abstract:
   This document describes a new mechanism for secure DNS authentication
   and DNS data confidentiality. The purpose of this document is to
   reduce human interaction during different DNS scenarios such as the
   communications of resolvers to stub resolvers, recursive resolvers to
   Authoritative Name Server, Dynamic DNS updates, (especially updating
   PTR and FQDN records (RFC4703)) and zone transfers. This document
   supports both IPv4 and IPv6 enabled networks.




The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig/

There's also a htmlized version available at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig-09

A diff from the previous version is available at:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=3Ddraft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig-09


Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of =
submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at =
tools.ietf.org.

Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/




From nobody Fri Jul  4 20:04:05 2014
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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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Subject: [Int-area] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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i've now seen a number of proposals reaction to "the snowden
disclosures", seeking channel encryption for dns transactions. i have
some thoughts on the matter which are not in response to any specific
proposal, but rather, to the problem statement and the context of any
solution.

first, dns data itself is public -- the data is there for anybody to
query for it, if you know what to query for. only the question,
questioner, and time can be kept secret. answers are only worth keeping
secret because they identify the question, questioner, and time.

second, dns transactions are not secret to protocol agents. whether stub
resolver, full resolver, forwarder, proxy, or authority server -- the
full identity of the question must be knowable to the agent in order to
properly process that question. if the agent does logging, then the
question, questioner, and time will be stored and potentially shared or
analyzed.

by implication, then, the remainder of possible problem statement
material is "hide question from on-wire surveillance", there being no
way to hide the questioner or the time. to further narrow this, the
prospective on-wire surveillance has to be from third parties who are
not also operators of on-path dns protocol agents, because any second
party could be using on-wire surveillance as part of their logging
solution, and by (2) above there is no way to hide from them. so we're
left with "hide question from on-wire surveillance by third parties."

this is extremely narrow but i can envision activists and dissidents who
rightly fear for their safety based on this narrowly defined threat, so
i'm ready to agree that there should be some method in DNS of providing
this secrecy. and as we know from the history of secrecy, if you only
encrypt the things you care about, then they stand out. therefore,
secrecy of this kind must become ubiquitous.

datagram level channel secrecy (for example, DTLS or IPSEC) offers a
solution which matches the existing datagram level UDP transport used
primarily by DNS. however, the all-pervasive middleboxes (small plastic
CPE devices installed by the hundreds of millions by DSL and Cable and
other providers) have been shown to be more powerful than IPv6, DNSSEC,
and EDNS -- we could expect them to prevent any new datagram level
channel secrecy protocol we might otherwise wish to employ.

TCP/53 is less prone to middlebox data inspection, and may seem to be an
attractive solution here. i think "not" for two reasons. first, TCP/53
is often blocked outright, and second, because TCP/53 as defined in RFC
1035 has a connection management scheme that prohibits persistent TCP/53
connections at Internet scale, and we cannot afford the setup/teardown
costs of a non-persistent TCP-based channel secrecy protocol for DNS. to
those who suggest redefining TCP/53 and upgrading the entire physical
plant and all software and operating systems, i challenge you to first
show how this is less global effort than other proposals now on the
table, and then show how you would handle the long-tail problem, since
many agents will never be upgraded, or will only be upgraded on a scale
of half-decades. DNS works today because TCP/53 is a fallback for
UDP/53. its definition and deployment makes it unsuitable either
currently or as-would-be upgraded to become the primary transport.

i suggest that any channel secrecy protocol we wish to add to the DNS
system must be suitable as the primary transport, to which the existing
UDP/53 and TCP/53 protocols are fallbacks. i further suggest that any
new transport be operable at internet scale, which demands connection
persistence. finally i suggest that this be done using a protocol that
the internet's "middle boxes" (cheap CPE devices who think they know
what all valid traffic must look like) will allow to pass without comment.

one candidate for this would be RESTful JSON carried over HTTPS. because
of its extensive use in e-commerce and "web API" applications, HTTPS
works everywhere. because HTTPS currently depends on X.509 keys, other
groups in the IETF world are already working to make HTTPS proof against
on-path surveillance. (google for "perfect forward secrecy" to learn
more), and others are working to defend the internet user population
against wildcard or targeted SSL certificates issued by governments and
other anti-secrecy agents with on-path capabilities.

stephane bortzmeyer has already shown us that JSON representation of DNS
transactions is possible. i have heard from another protocol engineer
who is also working in this area (and who credits bortzmeyer for
informing his work).

the special advantage of TCP/443 as a primary transport for persistent
DNS with channel secrecy is that HTTPS's connection management permits
massive scale, as in, a single protocol agent with tens or hundreds of
thousands of open connections, even with local and global load balancing
and connection pinning.

in summary, i agree that we have a narrowly defined problem of on-path
surveillance of dns questions by third parties, but i do not think it
can be solved by further EDNS extensions to UDP/53, and i know it cannot
be handled by using or redefining TCP/53. i have identified a way
forward that relies on TCP/443, noting that other groups are already
repairing SSL to add perfect forward secrecy and to solve the
"government-controlled X.509 CA" problems, and that we can leverage that
work. i've suggested that we specifically focus on the bortzmeyer
solution involving RESTful queries and JSON responses, or perhaps
RESTful URI's using POST of JSON, and JSON responses.

thank you for your time spent reading this. note that i am not a member
of int-area@ but am allowed to post there, so, if you want me to see
your response, please cc me.

vixie


From nobody Sat Jul  5 10:47:45 2014
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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Matthäus Wander wrote:
> * Paul Vixie [7/5/2014 5:04 AM]:
>> datagram level channel secrecy (for example, DTLS or IPSEC) offers a
>> solution which matches the existing datagram level UDP transport used
>> primarily by DNS. however, the all-pervasive middleboxes (small plastic
>> CPE devices installed by the hundreds of millions by DSL and Cable and
>> other providers) have been shown to be more powerful than IPv6, DNSSEC,
>> and EDNS -- we could expect them to prevent any new datagram level
>> channel secrecy protocol we might otherwise wish to employ.
>
> DTLS works on top of UDP (among others) and thus can pass CPE devices.

no, it cannot. DTLS does not look something that the CPE was programmed
to accept; thus in many cases it is silently dropped.


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<br>
Matth&auml;us Wander wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:53B8333F.2070406@uni-due.de" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">* Paul Vixie [7/5/2014 5:04 AM]:
</pre>
  <blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">datagram level channel secrecy (for example, DTLS or IPSEC) offers a
solution which matches the existing datagram level UDP transport used
primarily by DNS. however, the all-pervasive middleboxes (small plastic
CPE devices installed by the hundreds of millions by DSL and Cable and
other providers) have been shown to be more powerful than IPv6, DNSSEC,
and EDNS -- we could expect them to prevent any new datagram level
channel secrecy protocol we might otherwise wish to employ.
</pre></blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
DTLS works on top of UDP (among others) and thus can pass CPE devices.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
no, it cannot. DTLS does not look something that the CPE was programmed 
to accept; thus in many cases it is silently dropped.<span 
style="font-family: monospace;"><br>
  <br>
</span>
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
</body></html>

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Matthäus Wander wrote:
> * Paul Vixie [7/5/2014 7:47 PM]:
>> Matthäus Wander wrote:
>>> DTLS works on top of UDP (among others) and thus can pass CPE devices.
>> no, it cannot. DTLS does not look something that the CPE was programmed
>> to accept; thus in many cases it is silently dropped.
>>
>
> DTLS can be used on top of UDP. CPE devices allow outgoing UDP sessions
> to arbitrary ports. If they didn't, many online games and VoIP
> applications would not work.

it's possible to find single counter examples to almost any assertion.
however, consider RFC 2671 (EDNS), published fifteen years ago. because
it changes the format of a UDP/53 datagram, there is silent loss across
most CPE boundaries. implementers of EDNS have had to investigate and
deploy about a dozen different fallback strategies since then, not to
make EDNS work, but to make it fail reliably enough so that normal
non-EDNS can be tried. since DNSSEC relies on EDNS0, this is a real
problem. to the extent that it's gotten any better it's because someone
changed this CPE logic:

    if (normal dns packet)
        intercept it and answer inappropriately, 30% of the time;
        let it get where it's going, 70% of the time;
    else
        drop;

to this:

    if (normal dns packet)
        intercept it and answer inappropriately, 30% of the time;
        let it get where it's going, 70% of the time;
    else if (normal edns packet)
        intercept it and answer inappropriately, 30% of the time;
        let it get where it's going, 70% of the time;
    else
        drop;

in other words what fixes have been made have been EDNS specific, where
the real fix is:

    if (packet addressed to you)
        handle it or send ICMP;
    else
        let it get where it's going;

that fix is not going into the O(10^9) CPE devices now in place, ever.

if we can't get this right for EDNS in 15 years, my bet is that another
15 (or 150) years of trying won't produce better results. in fact, by
jim gettys and dave taht i've been made to understand that the world's
CPE problem is much worse than i knew. we might be able to fix it for
the next billion devices some day, but the devices shipping today are
still crippled.

incentives are such that a CPE provider hopes to sell web access, not
internet access.

your counter-example of DNS gaming does not change the treatment now
accorded UDP/53 at the internet edge. if you seriously think that a DTLS
solution can be universally deployed, including in hotel rooms, home CPE
environments, coffee shops, and mobile, then you and i are having a
"same planet, different worlds" experience, and i wish you well on your
walk.

vixie


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Matth&auml;us Wander wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:53B94066.5000904@uni-due.de" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">* Paul Vixie [7/5/2014 7:47 PM]:
</pre>
  <blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">Matth&auml;us Wander wrote:
</pre><blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">DTLS works on top of UDP (among others) and thus can pass CPE devices.
</pre></blockquote><pre wrap="">no, it cannot. DTLS does not look something that the CPE was programmed
to accept; thus in many cases it is silently dropped.

</pre></blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
DTLS can be used on top of UDP. CPE devices allow outgoing UDP sessions
to arbitrary ports. If they didn't, many online games and VoIP
applications would not work.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
it's possible to find single counter examples to almost any assertion. 
however, consider RFC 2671 (EDNS), published fifteen years ago. because 
it changes the format of a UDP/53 datagram, there is silent loss across 
most CPE boundaries. implementers of EDNS have had to investigate and 
deploy about a dozen different fallback strategies since then, not to 
make EDNS work, but to make it fail reliably enough so that normal 
non-EDNS can be tried. since DNSSEC relies on EDNS0, this is a real 
problem. to the extent that it's gotten any better it's because someone 
changed this CPE logic:<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; if (normal dns packet)<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; intercept it and answer inappropriately, 30% of the time;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; let it get where it's going, 70% of the time;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; else<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; drop;<br>
<br>
to this:<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; if (normal dns packet)<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; intercept it and answer inappropriately, 30% of the time;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; let it get where it's going, 70% of the time;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; else if (normal edns packet)<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; intercept it and answer inappropriately, 30% of the time;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; let it get where it's going, 70% of the time;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; else<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; drop;<br>
<br>
in other words what fixes have been made have been EDNS specific, where 
the real fix is:<br>
<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; if (packet addressed to you)<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; handle it or send ICMP;<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; else<br>
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; let it get where it's going;<br>
<br>
that fix is not going into the O(10^9) CPE devices now in place, ever.<br>
<br>
if we can't get this right for EDNS in 15 years, my bet is that another 
15 (or 150) years of trying won't produce better results. in fact, by 
jim gettys and dave taht i've been made to understand that the world's 
CPE problem is much worse than i knew. we might be able to fix it for 
the next billion devices some day, but the devices shipping today are 
still crippled.<br>
<br>
incentives are such that a CPE provider hopes to sell web access, not 
internet access.<br>
<br>
your counter-example of DNS gaming does not change the treatment now 
accorded UDP/53 at the internet edge. if you seriously think that a DTLS
 solution can be universally deployed, including in hotel rooms, home 
CPE environments, coffee shops, and mobile, then you and i are having a 
"same planet, different worlds" experience, and i wish you well on your 
walk.<span style="font-family: monospace;"><br>
  <br>
vixie<br>
</span>
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
</body></html>

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Subject: Re: [Int-area] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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Paul,

This seems like a fine and modular approach that doesn't boil the ocean.

Eliot

On 7/5/14, 5:04 AM, Paul Vixie wrote:
> i've now seen a number of proposals reaction to "the snowden
> disclosures", seeking channel encryption for dns transactions. i have
> some thoughts on the matter which are not in response to any specific
> proposal, but rather, to the problem statement and the context of any
> solution.
>
> first, dns data itself is public -- the data is there for anybody to
> query for it, if you know what to query for. only the question,
> questioner, and time can be kept secret. answers are only worth keeping
> secret because they identify the question, questioner, and time.
>
> second, dns transactions are not secret to protocol agents. whether stub
> resolver, full resolver, forwarder, proxy, or authority server -- the
> full identity of the question must be knowable to the agent in order to
> properly process that question. if the agent does logging, then the
> question, questioner, and time will be stored and potentially shared or
> analyzed.
>
> by implication, then, the remainder of possible problem statement
> material is "hide question from on-wire surveillance", there being no
> way to hide the questioner or the time. to further narrow this, the
> prospective on-wire surveillance has to be from third parties who are
> not also operators of on-path dns protocol agents, because any second
> party could be using on-wire surveillance as part of their logging
> solution, and by (2) above there is no way to hide from them. so we're
> left with "hide question from on-wire surveillance by third parties."
>
> this is extremely narrow but i can envision activists and dissidents who
> rightly fear for their safety based on this narrowly defined threat, so
> i'm ready to agree that there should be some method in DNS of providing
> this secrecy. and as we know from the history of secrecy, if you only
> encrypt the things you care about, then they stand out. therefore,
> secrecy of this kind must become ubiquitous.
>
> datagram level channel secrecy (for example, DTLS or IPSEC) offers a
> solution which matches the existing datagram level UDP transport used
> primarily by DNS. however, the all-pervasive middleboxes (small plastic
> CPE devices installed by the hundreds of millions by DSL and Cable and
> other providers) have been shown to be more powerful than IPv6, DNSSEC,
> and EDNS -- we could expect them to prevent any new datagram level
> channel secrecy protocol we might otherwise wish to employ.
>
> TCP/53 is less prone to middlebox data inspection, and may seem to be an
> attractive solution here. i think "not" for two reasons. first, TCP/53
> is often blocked outright, and second, because TCP/53 as defined in RFC
> 1035 has a connection management scheme that prohibits persistent TCP/53
> connections at Internet scale, and we cannot afford the setup/teardown
> costs of a non-persistent TCP-based channel secrecy protocol for DNS. to
> those who suggest redefining TCP/53 and upgrading the entire physical
> plant and all software and operating systems, i challenge you to first
> show how this is less global effort than other proposals now on the
> table, and then show how you would handle the long-tail problem, since
> many agents will never be upgraded, or will only be upgraded on a scale
> of half-decades. DNS works today because TCP/53 is a fallback for
> UDP/53. its definition and deployment makes it unsuitable either
> currently or as-would-be upgraded to become the primary transport.
>
> i suggest that any channel secrecy protocol we wish to add to the DNS
> system must be suitable as the primary transport, to which the existing
> UDP/53 and TCP/53 protocols are fallbacks. i further suggest that any
> new transport be operable at internet scale, which demands connection
> persistence. finally i suggest that this be done using a protocol that
> the internet's "middle boxes" (cheap CPE devices who think they know
> what all valid traffic must look like) will allow to pass without comment.
>
> one candidate for this would be RESTful JSON carried over HTTPS. because
> of its extensive use in e-commerce and "web API" applications, HTTPS
> works everywhere. because HTTPS currently depends on X.509 keys, other
> groups in the IETF world are already working to make HTTPS proof against
> on-path surveillance. (google for "perfect forward secrecy" to learn
> more), and others are working to defend the internet user population
> against wildcard or targeted SSL certificates issued by governments and
> other anti-secrecy agents with on-path capabilities.
>
> stephane bortzmeyer has already shown us that JSON representation of DNS
> transactions is possible. i have heard from another protocol engineer
> who is also working in this area (and who credits bortzmeyer for
> informing his work).
>
> the special advantage of TCP/443 as a primary transport for persistent
> DNS with channel secrecy is that HTTPS's connection management permits
> massive scale, as in, a single protocol agent with tens or hundreds of
> thousands of open connections, even with local and global load balancing
> and connection pinning.
>
> in summary, i agree that we have a narrowly defined problem of on-path
> surveillance of dns questions by third parties, but i do not think it
> can be solved by further EDNS extensions to UDP/53, and i know it cannot
> be handled by using or redefining TCP/53. i have identified a way
> forward that relies on TCP/443, noting that other groups are already
> repairing SSL to add perfect forward secrecy and to solve the
> "government-controlled X.509 CA" problems, and that we can leverage that
> work. i've suggested that we specifically focus on the bortzmeyer
> solution involving RESTful queries and JSON responses, or perhaps
> RESTful URI's using POST of JSON, and JSON responses.
>
> thank you for your time spent reading this. note that i am not a member
> of int-area@ but am allowed to post there, so, if you want me to see
> your response, please cc me.
>
> vixie
>
> _______________________________________________
> Int-area mailing list
> Int-area@ietf.org
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>
>


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Subject: Re: [Int-area] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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Just a minor note on this paragraph:

On 07/07/2014 06:48 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
> because HTTPS currently depends on X.509 keys, other
>> groups in the IETF world are already working to make HTTPS proof again=
st
>> on-path surveillance. (google for "perfect forward secrecy" to learn
>> more), and others are working to defend the internet user population
>> against wildcard or targeted SSL certificates issued by governments an=
d
>> other anti-secrecy agents with on-path capabilities.

TLS has this ciphersuite concept and allows you to more than just X.509
certificates. As such, you have more freedom than you think (if you know
what you want).

It would be funny if the precondition using using DANE would be to
require a PKI as currently used on the Web...

Ciao
Hannes

PS: I don't think that the solution for addressing government
surveillance is addressed by that proposal but it might solve other thing=
s.


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From nobody Mon Jul  7 00:14:56 2014
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Hi Hannes,


On 7/7/14, 8:23 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Just a minor note on this paragraph:
>
> On 07/07/2014 06:48 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>> because HTTPS currently depends on X.509 keys, other

I didn't write the above, Paul did.  But to your point below...
>>> groups in the IETF world are already working to make HTTPS proof against
>>> on-path surveillance. (google for "perfect forward secrecy" to learn
>>> more), and others are working to defend the internet user population
>>> against wildcard or targeted SSL certificates issued by governments and
>>> other anti-secrecy agents with on-path capabilities.
> TLS has this ciphersuite concept and allows you to more than just X.509
> certificates. As such, you have more freedom than you think (if you know
> what you want).

Yes.  This is something you might know something about ;-)
>
> It would be funny if the precondition using using DANE would be to
> require a PKI as currently used on the Web...
>

Unless what you're using ISN'T a PKI.  Any DNS mechanism must be free
and clear of dependency loops.  While that may be theoretically possible
with a PKI, I'd hazard a guess (perhaps worth a drink at a bar) that the
number of dependencies explodes, making such a loop more likely in an
operational environment.

Eliot


From nobody Mon Jul  7 04:09:16 2014
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>> this is extremely narrow but i can envision activists and dissidents who
>> rightly fear for their safety based on this narrowly defined threat

[BA] Presumably protection would only be from an attacker that can snoop on t=
he wire, but not have access to the logs? Is the assumption that the DNS ser=
ver is hosted out of country, and that measures are used to avoid identifica=
tion of DNS traffic?  I am trying to understand the scenario in which this a=
ctually would have a plausible chance of making a difference.




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On 07/07/2014 01:09 PM, Bernard Aboba wrote:
> [BA] Presumably protection would only be from an attacker that can
> snoop on the wire, but not have access to the logs? Is the assumption
> that the DNS server is hosted out of country, and that measures are
> used to avoid identification of DNS traffic?  I am trying to
> understand the scenario in which this actually would have a plausible
> chance of making a difference.

I also struggle to see the significant improvement for the cases that
had been discussed on the list. I would say that they go close to zero
when one uses DNS servers provided by the local network operator.


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Cc: "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
Subject: Re: [Int-area] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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On 7/7/14, 1:14 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>
> I also struggle to see the significant improvement for the cases that
> had been discussed on the list. I would say that they go close to zero
> when one uses DNS servers provided by the local network operator.
>

That's a matter of service selection and orthogonal to Paul's proposal.

Eliot


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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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* Paul Vixie [7/5/2014 5:04 AM]:
> datagram level channel secrecy (for example, DTLS or IPSEC) offers a
> solution which matches the existing datagram level UDP transport used
> primarily by DNS. however, the all-pervasive middleboxes (small plastic=

> CPE devices installed by the hundreds of millions by DSL and Cable and
> other providers) have been shown to be more powerful than IPv6, DNSSEC,=

> and EDNS -- we could expect them to prevent any new datagram level
> channel secrecy protocol we might otherwise wish to employ.

DTLS works on top of UDP (among others) and thus can pass CPE devices.

> TCP/53 is less prone to middlebox data inspection, and may seem to be a=
n
> attractive solution here. i think "not" for two reasons. first, TCP/53
> is often blocked outright, and second, because TCP/53 as defined in RFC=

> 1035 has a connection management scheme that prohibits persistent TCP/5=
3
> connections at Internet scale, and we cannot afford the setup/teardown
> costs of a non-persistent TCP-based channel secrecy protocol for DNS.

Could you elaborate on why RFC 1035 prohibits persistent connections?

My reading of Section 4.2.2 is that persistent connections are supported:=

- Servers should keep TCP connections open after transactions.
- Clients can keep connections open, if they want to.
- The minimum idle time before closing a persistent connection on
server-side is 2 minutes. There is no maximum.

> one candidate for this would be RESTful JSON carried over HTTPS. becaus=
e
> of its extensive use in e-commerce and "web API" applications, HTTPS
> works everywhere.

I don't see the need to use HTTP. Middleboxes cannot look into TLS
traffic, so they will pass DNS-over-TLS like they pass HTTP-over-TLS.

> stephane bortzmeyer has already shown us that JSON representation of DN=
S
> transactions is possible. i have heard from another protocol engineer
> who is also working in this area (and who credits bortzmeyer for
> informing his work).

Does JSON have an advantage over binary DNS?

> in summary, i agree that we have a narrowly defined problem of on-path
> surveillance of dns questions by third parties, but i do not think it
> can be solved by further EDNS extensions to UDP/53, and i know it canno=
t
> be handled by using or redefining TCP/53. i have identified a way
> forward that relies on TCP/443, noting that other groups are already
> repairing SSL to add perfect forward secrecy and to solve the
> "government-controlled X.509 CA" problems, and that we can leverage tha=
t
> work. i've suggested that we specifically focus on the bortzmeyer
> solution involving RESTful queries and JSON responses, or perhaps
> RESTful URI's using POST of JSON, and JSON responses.

Let's sum up the list of possible protocols:
- DNS over DTLS over UDP
- DNS over TLS over TCP
- JSON over HTTP over TLS over TCP

Also proposed elsewhere:
- DNS over DNSCrypt over UDP/TCP

So far I don't see the benefit of JSON and HTTP. Anyway, thanks for
framing the problem.

Regards,
Matt



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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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* Paul Vixie [7/5/2014 7:47 PM]:
> Matth=E4us Wander wrote:
>> DTLS works on top of UDP (among others) and thus can pass CPE devices.=

>=20
> no, it cannot. DTLS does not look something that the CPE was programmed=

> to accept; thus in many cases it is silently dropped.
>=20

DTLS can be used on top of UDP. CPE devices allow outgoing UDP sessions
to arbitrary ports. If they didn't, many online games and VoIP
applications would not work.

Here's an example DTLS session passing my DSL router at home:
> https://www.cloudshark.org/captures/7d2ae4cfe155

Source code found here:
> http://marc.info/?l=3Dopenssl-users&m=3D113009464321966&w=3D3

Regards,
Matt


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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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This is really a design question.

As far as I am concerned, DNS is and always will be a first class Internet
protocol. It is the foundation for everything else. The syntax etc can
change but it is a building block other stuff should build on, not
something that can leverage other facilities.

So the approach I would take to dealing with legacy infrastructure is a two
pronged approach:

1) A principled approach that does not make allowance for network
deployment constraints.

2) One or more mechanisms to ensure service is available in restricted
networks.


So a browser would need to implement (1) and (2) but an Internet connected
coffee pot might only support (1) plus legacy DNS because it isn't a device
that would require the connectability guarantees that (2) provide.

Having experimented with it seems that a UDP service plus a Web Service
over HTTP are the best choice. I have tried using DNS as a tunnelling
protocol (TXT lookups) but that does not seem to be worth the hassle.


DTLS looks like a good idea at first but it is a bolt on to TLS which is
already a thick stack. DTLS is really designed to secure protocols that are
essentially emulating TCP in UDP.

There are times to stick with the existing standards and time to make a
fresh start. I think DNS is a case where a fresh start is appropriate.

--047d7b86dea6ca08ae04fd8959fd
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div class=3D"gmail_extra">This is really a design questio=
n.</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">As =
far as I am concerned, DNS is and always will be a first class Internet pro=
tocol. It is the foundation for everything else. The syntax etc can change =
but it is a building block other stuff should build on, not something that =
can leverage other facilities.</div>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">So the appr=
oach I would take to dealing with legacy infrastructure is a two pronged ap=
proach:</div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra=
">1) A principled approach that does not make allowance for network deploym=
ent constraints.</div>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">2) One or m=
ore mechanisms to ensure service is available in restricted networks.</div>=
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">
So a browser would need to implement (1) and (2) but an Internet connected =
coffee pot might only support (1) plus legacy DNS because it isn&#39;t a de=
vice that would require the connectability guarantees that (2) provide.</di=
v>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">Having expe=
rimented with it seems that a UDP service plus a Web Service over HTTP are =
the best choice. I have tried using DNS as a tunnelling protocol (TXT looku=
ps) but that does not seem to be worth the hassle.</div>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><=
div class=3D"gmail_extra">DTLS looks like a good idea at first but it is a =
bolt on to TLS which is already a thick stack. DTLS is really designed to s=
ecure protocols that are essentially emulating TCP in UDP.=C2=A0</div>
<div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br></div><div class=3D"gmail_extra">There are t=
imes to stick with the existing standards and time to make a fresh start. I=
 think DNS is a case where a fresh start is appropriate.=C2=A0</div><div cl=
ass=3D"gmail_extra">
<br></div></div>

--047d7b86dea6ca08ae04fd8959fd--


From nobody Mon Jul  7 08:22:43 2014
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On 7/7/2014 12:14 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:

> Unless what you're using ISN'T a PKI.  Any DNS mechanism must be 
> free and clear of dependency loops.  While that may be 
> theoretically possible with a PKI, I'd hazard a guess (perhaps 
> worth a drink at a bar) that the number of dependencies explodes, 
> making such a loop more likely in an operational environment.

In fact, some sort of "PKI-free" framework might even be more
preferable for some folks. The problem with a PKI is not necessarily a
technical problem -- a trust anchor has to be established somewhere
with a PKI scheme, and politically that presents a lot of problems in
this day & age.

That is *not* to say that DANE is not a desirable thing to
deploy/accomplish.

Just sayin'.

$.02,

- - ferg


- -- 
Paul Ferguson
VP Threat Intelligence, IID
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From nobody Mon Jul  7 08:25:23 2014
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On Fri, 04 Jul 2014 20:04:02 -0700
Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:

> first, dns data itself is public -- the data is there for anybody to
> query for it, if you know what to query for. only the question,
> questioner, and time can be kept secret. answers are only worth
> keeping secret because they identify the question, questioner, and
> time.

Hi Paul,

This may traditionally be true and ideally in the coherent name space
world be true, but is not necessarily true.  Thanks to views and other
so-called DNS tricks, particularly those that in essence or a weak
form of authentication (or even stronger form such as when attaching
TSIG to them), answers that may never otherwise be seen by some subset
of clients, or perhaps more correctly synthesized for some clients, may
be candidates for enhanced secrecy.

I wouldn't necessarily optimize for or argue to support such uses, just
pointing out that they do exist in some corner cases.

> by implication, then, the remainder of possible problem statement
> material is "hide question from on-wire surveillance", there being no
> way to hide the questioner or the time. to further narrow this, the
> prospective on-wire surveillance has to be from third parties who are
> not also operators of on-path dns protocol agents, because any second
> party could be using on-wire surveillance as part of their logging
> solution, and by (2) above there is no way to hide from them. so we're
> left with "hide question from on-wire surveillance by third parties."

This sounds like DNSCurve's approach.

John


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Thread-Topic: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Matth=E4us
> Wander
> Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2014 5:56 PM
> To: Paul Vixie
> Cc: dnsop@ietf.org; Int-area@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
>=20
> * Paul Vixie [7/5/2014 7:47 PM]:
> > Matth=E4us Wander wrote:
> >> DTLS works on top of UDP (among others) and thus can pass CPE devices.
> >
> > no, it cannot. DTLS does not look something that the CPE was
> > programmed to accept; thus in many cases it is silently dropped.
> >
>=20
> DTLS can be used on top of UDP. CPE devices allow outgoing UDP sessions t=
o
> arbitrary ports. If they didn't, many online games and VoIP applications =
would
> not work.
>=20
> Here's an example DTLS session passing my DSL router at home:
> > https://www.cloudshark.org/captures/7d2ae4cfe155
>=20
> Source code found here:
> > http://marc.info/?l=3Dopenssl-users&m=3D113009464321966&w=3D3

WebRTC enabled browsers already use DTLS to secure media.

-Tiru

>=20
> Regards,
> Matt


From nobody Mon Jul  7 09:33:53 2014
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Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> Just a minor note on this paragraph:
>
>> because HTTPS currently depends on X.509 keys, other
>>> groups in the IETF world are already working to make HTTPS proof against
>>> on-path surveillance. (google for "perfect forward secrecy" to learn
>>> more), and others are working to defend the internet user population
>>> against wildcard or targeted SSL certificates issued by governments and
>>> other anti-secrecy agents with on-path capabilities.
>
> TLS has this ciphersuite concept and allows you to more than just X.509
> certificates. As such, you have more freedom than you think (if you know
> what you want).

you are right of course. we would use TLS PSK for this, avoiding the
X.509 system entirely.

vixie

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<br>
Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:53BA3CF8.9010808@gmx.net" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">Just a minor note on this paragraph:

</pre>
  <blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">because HTTPS currently depends on X.509 keys, other
</pre><blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">groups in the IETF world are already working to make HTTPS proof against
on-path surveillance. (google for "perfect forward secrecy" to learn
more), and others are working to defend the internet user population
against wildcard or targeted SSL certificates issued by governments and
other anti-secrecy agents with on-path capabilities.
</pre></blockquote></blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
TLS has this ciphersuite concept and allows you to more than just X.509
certificates. As such, you have more freedom than you think (if you know
what you want).</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
you are right of course. we would use TLS PSK for this, avoiding the 
X.509 system entirely.<br>
<br>
vixie<br>
</body></html>

--------------050707030804040007040305--


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Bernard Aboba wrote:
>>> this is extremely narrow but i can envision activists and dissidents who
>>> rightly fear for their safety based on this narrowly defined threat
>
> [BA] Presumably protection would only be from an attacker that can snoop on the wire, but not have access to the logs?

yes. which i said explicitly:

> by implication, then, the remainder of possible problem statement
> material is "hide question from on-wire surveillance", there being no
> way to hide the questioner or the time. to further narrow this, the
> prospective on-wire surveillance has to be from third parties who are
> not also operators of on-path dns protocol agents, because any second
> party could be using on-wire surveillance as part of their logging
> solution, and by (2) above there is no way to hide from them. so we're
> left with "hide question from on-wire surveillance by third parties."

so, to your question:

> Is the assumption that the DNS server is hosted out of country, and that measures are used to avoid identification of DNS traffic?  I am trying to understand the scenario in which this actually would have a plausible chance of making a difference.

there are two kinds of channel in dns queries. (i'm not going to account
for updates or zone transfers here.)

one channel is from the stub to the recursive. it's pointless to add
secrecy to that unless a stub wants to use a very distant name server,
like opendns or googledns, or as in your example, one in another
country. however, these long stub/recursive paths do exist and are
becoming more common, either to avoid poisoning by the local recursive
operator (typosquatting and so on) or to avoid surveillance by the local
recursive operator or to access poisoning by a distant local recursive
operator (opendns for example is actually a security company, and they
deliberately filter out dns results to known-dangerous locations, as a
service.)

the other channel is from the recursive to the authoritative. these
transactions contain very little PII, since the IP address of the
end-user is not present, and since cache re-use events are not present,
only cache-miss events. however, this channel is frequently intercepted
(see china's GFW) and frequently observed/logged. (my $DAYJOB does this
kind of observation/logging, but only with the explicit permission of
the recursive operator who must deliberately install our sensor
software, and only with the implicit permission of their stub
population, which we can't ourselves verify, but we require be attested.)

secrecy on either of these channels is only rarely important, but in
order to avoid exceptional appearance (standing out like a sore thumb)
it's going to be necessary to make secrecy on both of these channels
ubiquitous.

vixie


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<br>
Bernard Aboba wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:BLU406-EAS18174A34CF382691B9D54DF930D0@phx.gbl" 
type="cite">
  <blockquote type="cite"><blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">this is extremely narrow but i can envision activists and dissidents who
rightly fear for their safety based on this narrowly defined threat
</pre></blockquote></blockquote>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
[BA] Presumably protection would only be from an attacker that can snoop on the wire, but not have access to the logs?</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
yes. which i said explicitly:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span><pre wrap="">by implication, then, the remainder of possible problem statement
material is "hide question from on-wire surveillance", there being no
way to hide the questioner or the time. to further narrow this, the
prospective on-wire surveillance has to be from third parties who are
not also operators of on-path dns protocol agents, because any second
party could be using on-wire surveillance as part of their logging
solution, and by (2) above there is no way to hide from them. so we're
left with "hide question from on-wire surveillance by third parties."</pre></span></blockquote>
<br>
so, to your question:<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:BLU406-EAS18174A34CF382691B9D54DF930D0@phx.gbl" 
type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">Is the assumption that the DNS server is hosted out of country, and that measures are used to avoid identification of DNS traffic?  I am trying to understand the scenario in which this actually would have a plausible chance of making a difference.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
there are two kinds of channel in dns queries. (i'm not going to account
 for updates or zone transfers here.)<br>
<br>
one channel is from the stub to the recursive. it's pointless to add 
secrecy to that unless a stub wants to use a very distant name server, 
like opendns or googledns, or as in your example, one in another 
country. however, these long stub/recursive paths do exist and are 
becoming more common, either to avoid poisoning by the local recursive 
operator (typosquatting and so on) or to avoid surveillance by the local
 recursive operator or to access poisoning by a distant local recursive 
operator (opendns for example is actually a security company, and they 
deliberately filter out dns results to known-dangerous locations, as a 
service.)<br>
<br>
the other channel is from the recursive to the authoritative. these 
transactions contain very little PII, since the IP address of the 
end-user is not present, and since cache re-use events are not present, 
only cache-miss events. however, this channel is frequently intercepted 
(see china's GFW) and frequently observed/logged. (my $DAYJOB does this 
kind of observation/logging, but only with the explicit permission of 
the recursive operator who must deliberately install our sensor 
software, and only with the implicit permission of their stub 
population, which we can't ourselves verify, but we require be 
attested.)<br>
<br>
secrecy on either of these channels is only rarely important, but in 
order to avoid exceptional appearance (standing out like a sore thumb) 
it's going to be necessary to make secrecy on both of these channels 
ubiquitous.<br>
<br>
vixie<br>
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
</body></html>

--------------020705070902020903060607--


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Paul Ferguson wrote:
> ...
>  
> That is *not* to say that DANE is not a desirable thing to
> deploy/accomplish.

DANE relies on DNSSEC which relies on EDNS. the placement of a
DNS-over-HTTPS channel would have to be below EDNS in the stack, and
non-reliant. therefore my correction up-thread -- this HTTPS session
would rely on PSK for keying information, not X.509.

vixie


From nobody Mon Jul  7 09:52:29 2014
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Nicholas Weaver wrote:
> ...
>
> One important observation:  ONLY the path between the client and the recursive resolver in the classic model substantially benefits from channel security.

if i were proposing a secrecy scheme that was easy to do on
stub-to-recursive but hard to do on recursive-to-authority, then i'd be
looking very much harder at the benefits of recursive-to-authority.
however, what i'm proposing is no easier to do in one case than the
other, and so any purported difference in benefit is outweighed by the
lack of difference in the cost. pay once, benefit twice, is good
engineering economics as far as i'm concerned.

> ...
>
> Even if you wave a magic wand and all resolver<->authority communication becomes protected with 0-cost, 100% perfect data encryption, basic traffic analysis will largely be able to determine which domains are being looked up.  Individual names within the domain are protected, but that is relatively minor.
>
> The other problem is DNS is used to guide endpoint communication.  Between the resolver<->authority information leak, and the actual IP selected by the endpoint itself for communication, this allows a nation-state observer adversary to pretty much recover what the hostname was in question in many cases, and at least the domain in almost all cases.

i wish it noted that i am responding to the general post-snowden call
for channel secrecy, and that i don't myself see much need for it in the
case of DNS, but that the proposals i've seen come out of the security
community for how to add channel secrecy to DNS are alarming in their
lack of understanding of what DNS is, how large DNS is, and how DNS
works. therefore, i'm attempting to isolate the cases which might be
relevant to somebody, i am drumming up a definition of "dissident", and
crafting a proposal that would protect that mythical person's interests.

the fact that the QNAME can be recovered in many cases by a well
resourced nation-state actor is meaningless here, since that
surveillance would have to be targeted, and would be both inaccurate and
expensive; whereas the surveillance i'm solving for is the ubquitous
kind, which is presently very accurate and very cheap.

vixie

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<br>
Nicholas Weaver wrote:
<blockquote 
cite="mid:D13511F7-CAEE-4698-A213-0D3EF0C25DF2@icsi.berkeley.edu" 
type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">...
</pre>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
One important observation:  ONLY the path between the client and the recursive resolver in the classic model substantially benefits from channel security.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
if i were proposing a secrecy scheme that was easy to do on 
stub-to-recursive but hard to do on recursive-to-authority, then i'd be 
looking very much harder at the benefits of recursive-to-authority. 
however, what i'm proposing is no easier to do in one case than the 
other, and so any purported difference in benefit is outweighed by the 
lack of difference in the cost. pay once, benefit twice, is good 
engineering economics as far as i'm concerned.<br>
<br>
<blockquote 
cite="mid:D13511F7-CAEE-4698-A213-0D3EF0C25DF2@icsi.berkeley.edu" 
type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">...

Even if you wave a magic wand and all resolver&lt;-&gt;authority communication becomes protected with 0-cost, 100% perfect data encryption, basic traffic analysis will largely be able to determine which domains are being looked up.  Individual names within the domain are protected, but that is relatively minor.

The other problem is DNS is used to guide endpoint communication.  Between the resolver&lt;-&gt;authority information leak, and the actual IP selected by the endpoint itself for communication, this allows a nation-state observer adversary to pretty much recover what the hostname was in question in many cases, and at least the domain in almost all cases.</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
</pre>
i wish it noted that i am responding to the general post-snowden call 
for channel secrecy, and that i don't myself see much need for it in the
 case of DNS, but that the proposals i've seen come out of the security 
community for how to add channel secrecy to DNS are alarming in their 
lack of understanding of what DNS is, how large DNS is, and how DNS 
works. therefore, i'm attempting to isolate the cases which might be 
relevant to somebody, i am drumming up a definition of "dissident", and 
crafting a proposal that would protect that mythical person's interests.<br>
<br>
the fact that the QNAME can be recovered in many cases by a well 
resourced nation-state actor is meaningless here, since that 
surveillance would have to be targeted, and would be both inaccurate and
 expensive; whereas the surveillance i'm solving for is the ubquitous 
kind, which is presently very accurate and very cheap.<br>
<br>
vixie<br>
</body></html>

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To: John Kristoff <jtk@cymru.com>
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Cc: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Int-area@ietf.org, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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On Jul 7, 2014, at 8:24 AM, John Kristoff <jtk@cymru.com> wrote:
>> by implication, then, the remainder of possible problem statement
>> material is "hide question from on-wire surveillance", there being no
>> way to hide the questioner or the time. to further narrow this, the
>> prospective on-wire surveillance has to be from third parties who are
>> not also operators of on-path dns protocol agents, because any second
>> party could be using on-wire surveillance as part of their logging
>> solution, and by (2) above there is no way to hide from them. so =
we're
>> left with "hide question from on-wire surveillance by third parties."
>=20
> This sounds like DNSCurve's approach.

One important observation:  ONLY the path between the client and the =
recursive resolver in the classic model substantially benefits from =
channel security.

Even if you wave a magic wand and all resolver<->authority communication =
becomes protected with 0-cost, 100% perfect data encryption, basic =
traffic analysis will largely be able to determine which domains are =
being looked up.  Individual names within the domain are protected, but =
that is relatively minor.

The other problem is DNS is used to guide endpoint communication.  =
Between the resolver<->authority information leak, and the actual IP =
selected by the endpoint itself for communication, this allows a =
nation-state observer adversary to pretty much recover what the hostname =
was in question in many cases, and at least the domain in almost all =
cases.

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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From nobody Mon Jul  7 10:59:33 2014
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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* Paul Vixie [2014-07-06 19:29]:
> Matth=E4us Wander wrote:
>> * Paul Vixie [7/5/2014 7:47 PM]:
>>> Matth=E4us Wander wrote:
>>>> DTLS works on top of UDP (among others) and thus can pass CPE device=
s.
>>> no, it cannot. DTLS does not look something that the CPE was programm=
ed
>>> to accept; thus in many cases it is silently dropped.
>>>
>>
>> DTLS can be used on top of UDP. CPE devices allow outgoing UDP session=
s
>> to arbitrary ports. If they didn't, many online games and VoIP
>> applications would not work.
>=20
> it's possible to find single counter examples to almost any assertion.

My point is that for a significant portion of Internet users, e.g.
residential, HTTPS tunneling is not necessary. HTTPS tunneling should
not be mandatory if it comes with disadvantages to a large user base who
don't need it.

The extra HTTPS layer suggests negative performance implications
compared to a tailored protocol (maybe negligible, maybe not). Requiring
TCP/443 is a dealbreaker when the port is already occupied by a small
business web server or by an administration interface on a plastic device=
=2E

> however, consider RFC 2671 (EDNS), published fifteen years ago. because=

> it changes the format of a UDP/53 datagram, there is silent loss across=

> most CPE boundaries.
>
> [...]
>=20
> that fix is not going into the O(10^9) CPE devices now in place, ever.
>=20
> if we can't get this right for EDNS in 15 years, my bet is that another=

> 15 (or 150) years of trying won't produce better results. in fact, by
> jim gettys and dave taht i've been made to understand that the world's
> CPE problem is much worse than i knew. we might be able to fix it for
> the next billion devices some day, but the devices shipping today are
> still crippled.

Agreed.

> incentives are such that a CPE provider hopes to sell web access, not
> internet access.
>=20
> your counter-example of DNS gaming does not change the treatment now
> accorded UDP/53 at the internet edge. if you seriously think that a DTL=
S
> solution can be universally deployed, including in hotel rooms, home CP=
E
> environments, coffee shops, and mobile, then you and i are having a
> "same planet, different worlds" experience, and i wish you well on your=

> walk.

I didn't mean to imply that a DTLS solution can be universally deployed.
I'm just not convinced that mandatory HTTPS tunneling built into a new
DNS protocol is the appropriate solution here. My experience is that
HTTPS tunneling is unnecessary in most (not all) networks. If I want to
use SSH or VoIP in one of those crippled networks, I need a generic
tunneling solution anyway. Admittedly, if I only need the web in a
crippled network then encrypted DNS over HTTPS is a plus. That use case
seems very narrow.

Regards,
Matt


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From nobody Mon Jul  7 11:05:05 2014
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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Matthäus Wander wrote:
> ...
>
> I didn't mean to imply that a DTLS solution can be universally deployed.

because the dns is a map to the territory known as the internet, and
because most internet packet flows begin with a dns transaction, i'm
dismissing out of hand anything that will almost universally not work
for some class of user, such as those in hotel room wireless networks,
or behind CPE that either can't pass new protocols or would require
above-average skill to configure for such.

in my own configuration i'd set EDNS to be the primary protocol, and add
HTTPS as the first fallback to be tried, so that the fallback to plain
DNS on UDP/53 can be as rare as possible. this may even be a reasonable
default.

but we can't spend any of our time pretending that the internet
architecture isn't a hostage to a billion poorly built CPE devices, no
matter how hopeful we are as to the future, and no matter how many
personal counter-examples we can cite.

vixie

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<html><head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head><body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><br>
<br>
Matth&auml;us Wander wrote:
<blockquote cite="mid:53BADFD2.6010309@uni-due.de" type="cite">
  <pre wrap="">...
</pre>
  <pre wrap=""><!---->
I didn't mean to imply that a DTLS solution can be universally deployed.</pre>
</blockquote>

<br>
because the dns is a map to the territory known as the internet, and 
because most internet packet flows begin with a dns transaction, i'm 
dismissing out of hand anything that will almost universally not work 
for some class of user, such as those in hotel room wireless networks, 
or behind CPE that either can't pass new protocols or would require 
above-average skill to configure for such.<br>
<br>
in my own configuration i'd set EDNS to be the primary protocol, and add
 HTTPS as the first fallback to be tried, so that the fallback to plain 
DNS on UDP/53 can be as rare as possible. this may even be a reasonable 
default.<br>
<br>
but we can't spend any of our time pretending that the internet 
architecture isn't a hostage to a billion poorly built CPE devices, no 
matter how hopeful we are as to the future, and no matter how many 
personal counter-examples we can cite.<br>
<br>
vixie<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:53BADFD2.6010309@uni-due.de" type="cite">

</blockquote>
</body></html>

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From nobody Mon Jul  7 12:54:39 2014
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On Jul 7, 2014, at 9:52 AM, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:
> i wish it noted that i am responding to the general post-snowden call =
for channel secrecy, and that i don't myself see much need for it in the =
case of DNS, but that the proposals i've seen come out of the security =
community for how to add channel secrecy to DNS are alarming in their =
lack of understanding of what DNS is, how large DNS is, and how DNS =
works. therefore, i'm attempting to isolate the cases which might be =
relevant to somebody, i am drumming up a definition of "dissident", and =
crafting a proposal that would protect that mythical person's interests.
>=20
> the fact that the QNAME can be recovered in many cases by a well =
resourced nation-state actor is meaningless here, since that =
surveillance would have to be targeted, and would be both inaccurate and =
expensive; whereas the surveillance i'm solving for is the ubquitous =
kind, which is presently very accurate and very cheap.

No, its ubiquitous and cheap, and reasonably accurate. =20

This type of traffic analysis correlation is bread and butter for a =
nation-state adversary running a pretty conventional real-time or even =
near real time IDS.  Doing it on the backbone is not hard, and overall, =
its no more complex than analysis we know they do like identify ALL =
users based on cookies and HTTP replies.

It is AMAZING the IDS analyses you can run on a 10 Gbps link when you =
are using a 20-system cluster.

--
Nicholas Weaver                  it is a tale, told by an idiot,
nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu                full of sound and fury,
510-666-2903                                 .signifying nothing
PGP: http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/data/nweaver_pub.asc


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From nobody Mon Jul  7 13:34:20 2014
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On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 12:42 PM, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:

>
> there are two kinds of channel in dns queries. (i'm not going to account
> for updates or zone transfers here.)
>
> one channel is from the stub to the recursive. it's pointless to add
> secrecy to that unless a stub wants to use a very distant name server,
>


Not at all. Trying to get any sort of privacy guarantee while sending your
DNS queries to any agent or service that you have not carefully selected
and decided to trust is the futile quest.

If we are going to have privacy then the DNS queries are going to be
directed at a trusted resolver and not the closest resolver on the network.



> the other channel is from the recursive to the authoritative. these
> transactions contain very little PII, since the IP address of the end-user
> is not present, and since cache re-use events are not present, only
> cache-miss events.
>

Agreed.

However that is based on a lot of assumptions on how the DNS works that are
currently true but need not be true in the future. If you have a DNS server
that is advertising names that are geolocation dependent then the caching
assumption breaks down and you start to leak privacy sensitive information.

It would be a mistake to accept a DNS privacy solution that unnecessarily
boxes the protocol in for future developments.


You might want to make use of a PKI to set up credentials for the
stub-resolver case. And you might well want to make use of the WebPKI etc.
to achieve that in a convenient way without falling into an infinite
regression trap of 'what is this anyway'. But that approach does not meet
every use case.

Once the credentials are set up you don't need that PKI any more because
the trust relationship is now a binding between the end user's client and
the service.

In sxs-connect the original design brief was to support omnibroker which
(among other things) allows the broker to advise on choice of WebPKI roots
rather than rely on the browser choice. So there are mechanisms that don't
rely on PKI to establish that binding which might well be preferred in an
enterprise. In fact the reason I split that part out was that I realized
that almost all the complexity in the problem was setting up that initial
relationship and that the problem was much more general.


The resolver to authoritative loop is very different. You probably do want
to ground that in DNSSEC or else what is it for?

Now you can't necessarily use DANE for that directly because the TLSA
record is specified for TLS and the authors decided (against advice) to
make it more than just a publication mechanism for keys. But you could
certainly adapt the spec without much trouble and you might just want to
publish raw keys.

--f46d0443066e6c753204fda046a4
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_extra"><br><br><div class=3D"gmail=
_quote">On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 12:42 PM, Paul Vixie <span dir=3D"ltr">&lt;<=
a href=3D"mailto:paul@redbarn.org" target=3D"_blank">paul@redbarn.org</a>&g=
t;</span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1p=
x #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">

<div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000"><div class=3D""><br></div>
there are two kinds of channel in dns queries. (i&#39;m not going to accoun=
t
 for updates or zone transfers here.)<br>
<br>
one channel is from the stub to the recursive. it&#39;s pointless to add=20
secrecy to that unless a stub wants to use a very distant name server, </di=
v></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Not at all. Trying to get=
 any sort of privacy guarantee while sending your DNS queries to any agent =
or service that you have not carefully selected and decided to trust is the=
 futile quest.</div>
<div><br></div><div>If we are going to have privacy then the DNS queries ar=
e going to be directed at a trusted resolver and not the closest resolver o=
n the network.=C2=A0</div><div><br></div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=
=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padd=
ing-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor=3D"#FFFFFF" text=3D"#000000">
the other channel is from the recursive to the authoritative. these=20
transactions contain very little PII, since the IP address of the=20
end-user is not present, and since cache re-use events are not present,=20
only cache-miss events. </div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Agreed.</div=
><div><br></div><div>However that is based on a lot of assumptions on how t=
he DNS works that are currently true but need not be true in the future. If=
 you have a DNS server that is advertising names that are geolocation depen=
dent then the caching assumption breaks down and you start to leak privacy =
sensitive information.</div>
<div><br></div><div>It would be a mistake to accept a DNS privacy solution =
that unnecessarily boxes the protocol in for future developments.</div><div=
><br></div><div><br></div><div>You might want to make use of a PKI to set u=
p credentials for the stub-resolver case. And you might well want to make u=
se of the WebPKI etc. to achieve that in a convenient way without falling i=
nto an infinite regression trap of &#39;what is this anyway&#39;. But that =
approach does not meet every use case.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Once the credentials are set up you don&#39;t need that=
 PKI any more because the trust relationship is now a binding between the e=
nd user&#39;s client and the service.</div><div><br></div><div>In sxs-conne=
ct the original design brief was to support omnibroker which (among other t=
hings) allows the broker to advise on choice of WebPKI roots rather than re=
ly on the browser choice. So there are mechanisms that don&#39;t rely on PK=
I to establish that binding which might well be preferred in an enterprise.=
 In fact the reason I split that part out was that I realized that almost a=
ll the complexity in the problem was setting up that initial relationship a=
nd that the problem was much more general.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The resolver to authoritative loop is ve=
ry different. You probably do want to ground that in DNSSEC or else what is=
 it for?</div><div><br></div><div>Now you can&#39;t necessarily use DANE fo=
r that directly because the TLSA record is specified for TLS and the author=
s decided (against advice) to make it more than just a publication mechanis=
m for keys. But you could certainly adapt the spec without much trouble and=
 you might just want to publish raw keys.</div>
<div><br></div></div></div></div>

--f46d0443066e6c753204fda046a4--


From nobody Mon Jul  7 17:59:17 2014
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To: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
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In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 07 Jul 2014 11:04:56 -0700." <53BAE148.5050006@redbarn.org>
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP] various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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Personally I would use a new opcode and fall back to query on NOTIMP.
The payload of the new OPCODE does not have to be decodable by
existing servers.  This is also how EDNS should have been done.

Since it is next to impossible to hide that you are talking to a
server use unencrypted DNS w/ DNSSEC to get a public key for
authoritative servers stored in its own type.  This signals support
for the new OPCODE.

Use that key to encrypt the payload the payload to the server using
the new OPCODE.  With a session key returned for followup transactions.

For recursive server add a DHCP and RA options which distribute the
public keys of the recursive nameservers.

This should work through pure DNS proxies.

Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org


From nobody Thu Jul 10 04:40:30 2014
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From: Hosnieh Rafiee <hosnieh.rafiee@huawei.com>
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Folks,

Does my updated document sufficiently addresses any technical concerns as w=
ell as comments/editorial nits?

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig-09=20

Best,
Hosnieh


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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [DNSOP]  various approaches to dns channel secrecy
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Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:
>
> the other channel is from the recursive to the authoritative. these
> transactions contain very little PII, [..]

Two things might make this less true:

Firstly, some people advocate running full resolvers as close to the users
as possible, e.g. on the user's machine itself. The fewer users per
resolver the more PII in the rec -> auth channel.

Secondly, if DANE for OpenPGP starts being used at all then there will be
more interesting PII in this channel than at present.

> it's going to be necessary to make secrecy on both of these channels
> ubiquitous.

Yes.

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
Dogger: Northwest 6 to gale 8, veering north 4 or 5. Moderate or rough.
Thundery rain. Moderate, occasionally poor.


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Subject: [Int-area] [DNSOP] deployment requirements for dns channel privacy [was: various approaches to dns channel secrecy]
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[I added dns-privacy to the cc list, since that seems like a relevant
forum for this discussion.]

On Mon, 07 Jul 2014 11:04:56 -0700, Paul Vixie wrote:=20
>Matth=C3=A4us Wander wrote:
>
>    ...
>=20=20=20=20
>    I didn't mean to imply that a DTLS solution can be universally deploye=
d.
>
>
>because the dns is a map to the territory known as the internet, and
>because most internet packet flows begin with a dns transaction, i'm
>dismissing out of hand anything that will almost universally not work
>for some class of user, such as those in hotel room wireless networks,
>or behind CPE that either can't pass new protocols or would require
>above-average skill to configure for such.
>
>
>in my own configuration i'd set EDNS to be the primary protocol, and
>add HTTPS as the first fallback to be tried, so that the fallback to
>plain DNS on UDP/53 can be as rare as possible. this may even be a
>reasonable default.
>
>but we can't spend any of our time pretending that the internet
>architecture isn't a hostage to a billion poorly built CPE devices, no
>matter how hopeful we are as to the future, and no matter how many
>personal counter-examples we can cite.

These comments bring out a very important question that has been lurking,
somewhat unstated:

What IS the consensus about the completeness of deployment required to
declare "success" for DNS channel privacy?


Focusing on middleboxes for now (although deployability applies to
servers and users, too):

Paul "dismisses out of hand anything that is not almost universal,
including hotel rooms and behind broken CPE", because (A) there
widespread broken CPE devices and (B) we must protect the Internet
architecture from and the global DNS namespace.  (To paraphrase.)

With those assumptions, arrival at DNS-over-HTTPS [* footnote 1] makes
some sense, since HTTPS is the least protocol least-molested by CPE to
date [* footnote 2].


But I'm not sure those are the best assumptions to start with.  We're
talking about *adding privacy* to the existing DNS infrastructure.
What's important is that privacy is a *new feature*.

Thinking about things this way suggests two observations:

1. One can separate requiring privacy from providing a global namespace.
Since the Internet has survived without privacy DNS queries until now,
surely it won't melt if some queries continue to lack protection from
eavesdropping.

About the assumptions: if you accept fallback to current DNS, then new priv=
acy
methods that don't reach 99% deployment do NOT break global naming---we
can reject assertion (B) if we allow fallback.

2. Because privacy is a new feature, (a) users or companies interested
in that feature *can advocate* for it, (b) they *have motivation* to fix
it because privacy can be a potential differentiator of what is today
commodity service, and (c) some have the *ability* to fix it.

Some people will care about DNS privacy and some not.  But for those
that care, users can replace their CPE, or can request their ISP upgrade
their CPE, or switch ISPs.  While many users may not do this (many will
not care), they all can.  As proof, consider reaction to bufferbloat,
where publicity has raised awareness.  Some users have switched
hardware, and I hope new CPE is being more reasonably configured.

(Or consider DNSsec.  Yes, there have been a couple publicized failures,
but one can look for domain providers that advertise DNSsec or not
today.  And end-users can generally use it, or fall back if they don't
care.)

This approach can generalize to ISPs or governments, too.  If, say,
there were a mandate that all DNS users in a state must use DNS privacy,
then that state's government could identify local ISPs with broken CPE,
and either ask them to estimate the cost of hardware upgrade or software
reconfiguration, or estimate the lifecycle of natural CPE turnover.

About the assumptions: because users (or ISPs) that care often have some
control over CPE, we can sometimes reject assertion (A).

In fact, given enough time, all the hardware will turn over.  I believe
the Internet no longer has any active Fuzzball routers. :-) More
seriously, telecos seem to be agressively moving people off DSL now, so
perhaps 10 years is plausible EOL for 90% of hardware.  We can reject
assertion (A) for most hardware if we allow enough time to pass.



If you accept that some people will continue with current DNS while
others have improved privacy, then we can think about a 10 year rollout
and accept that some stragglers with old CPE will continue without
privacy for DNS.

For users who have strong privacy requirements and refuse to fallback to
current DNS---replace your CPE for US$50 OR walk down the block to an
open wifi that isn't broken.

Some users will stick with old stuff until it dies.  See (for example)
the lingering installs of Windows XP.  That's OK---they know what
they're not getting, and they make a choice about benefit vs. cost of
upgrading.


It seems to me that assumption that "must work for 99% of users, right
now, in spite of today's broken hardware, OR it's not acceptable" is a
false dichotomy.  I hope we consider the several possible designs (some
of which may not work for 10% of today's users), not discard them
out-of-hand.

It may be that fast deployment trumps alternative designs in the end,
but let's have that discussion and not cut it off.


Back to the question: "what completeness of deployment
required to declare success for DNS channel privacy?":

My assumptions and a suggested answer:  I assume software upgrades to
the (a) interested clients and (b) servers.  (c) I assume the servers
are reasonably current hardware.  I assume (c) most CPE doesn't
interference, and (d) some interfering CPE can be fixed with a software
upgrade.  I think success would be (e) 80% of users *can* use DNS
privacy (possibly with software installation) in 5 years, and (f) 60% of
people *do* use DNS privacy in 10 years.  Those are just guesses to put
a stake in the ground, and (f) is probably optimistic.  But to me
"immediate and near universal" is not a requirement for success.


Which perhaps raises the question: how often will CPE actually interfere
with whatever we try?  I don't know, but the closest data I know of is
from Netalyzr in 2011 (see "Implications of Netalyzr's DNS Measurements"
by Weaver et al, SATIN).  They say:  88% of their sessions are behind
NATs, and 73% of these hit a DNS proxy---so there's a lot of CPE in the
way by default.  BUT they estimate that about 1.4% of sessions are
"proxied or modified by the network" when they try to directly talk past
the CPE, so it may be that most CPE will get out of the way if one
choses to bypass it.  So sure, we can use DNS-over-HTTPS to bypass the
CPE.  But this data suggests we could also use DNS-over-TLS or -DTLS to
do the same.


I'll cut off this long note here, just focusing on deployment CPE.  But
similar questions come up around deployment in the client itself and in
the servers (recursive and authoritative).  It's been suggested that
solutions must work on old server hardware.  That too seems like an
overly strong constraint to me.  (And, by they way, a constraint that is
completely incompatible with standing up a bunch of new webservers to
run DNS-over-HTTPS.)  That's a related but hopefully separable
discussion.


[* footnote 1: DNS-over-HTTPS: the Bortzmeyer JSON encoding was
mentioned, and XML has been proposed and I-D'ed before.]

[* footnote 2: I'm not sure I believe the assumption is that HTTPS is
nppever interferened with.  Some companies put up TLS-intercepting
middleboxes to snoop TLS to "protect their employees", so even HTTPS is
no longer free from interference and assumptions.]


   -John


From nobody Thu Jul 10 13:44:18 2014
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On Jul 4, 2014, at 11:04 PM, Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> wrote:
> by implication, then, the remainder of possible problem statement
> material is "hide question from on-wire surveillance", there being no
> way to hide the questioner or the time.

This is only true if you leave out "from whom."   If in order to know =
who made a query, I have to be snooping in many places, much closer to =
the source of the query, that's better for avoiding pervasive monitoring =
than if I can very easily figure out who made the query by snooping at a =
relatively constrained set of places.

As an example using reductio ad absurdum, you can always know everything =
about any given network activity if you have supervisor access on the =
node on which the activity is originating, but of course we still care =
about securing the communication on the wire in many cases.


From nobody Fri Jul 11 01:24:41 2014
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To: Hosnieh Rafiee <hosnieh.rafiee@huawei.com>, "dnsop@ietf.com" <dnsop@ietf.com>, "Int-area@ietf.org" <Int-area@ietf.org>
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Dear Hosnieh et al,

This version is definitely better.

You have already compared DNSSEC and TSIG with your algorithms and explaine=
d the advantages and disadvantages of using them. You also explained differ=
ent use case scenario for your algorithms. I guess it would be useful if yo=
u add a section in introduction and compare the current DNS privacy approac=
hes by considering some criteria such as performance, etc. It will help to =
know advantages/disadvantages of this document in compare with the current =
privacy proposals.


Thank you,
Tina

-----Original Message-----
From: Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hosnieh Rafi=
ee
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:37 PM
To: dnsop@ietf.com; Int-area@ietf.org
Subject: [Int-area] Comment?

Folks,

Does my updated document sufficiently addresses any technical concerns as w=
ell as comments/editorial nits?

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig-09=20

Best,
Hosnieh

_______________________________________________
Int-area mailing list
Int-area@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area


From nobody Fri Jul 11 01:52:48 2014
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From: Hosnieh Rafiee <hosnieh.rafiee@huawei.com>
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Hi Tina,

Thanks for your comments, I will add a section in the next version.

Best,
Hosnieh

-----Original Message-----
From: Tina TSOU=20
Sent: Friday, July 11, 2014 10:23 AM
To: Hosnieh Rafiee; dnsop@ietf.com; Int-area@ietf.org
Subject: RE: Comment?

Dear Hosnieh et al,

This version is definitely better.

You have already compared DNSSEC and TSIG with your algorithms and explaine=
d the advantages and disadvantages of using them. You also explained differ=
ent use case scenario for your algorithms. I guess it would be useful if yo=
u add a section in introduction and compare the current DNS privacy approac=
hes by considering some criteria such as performance, etc. It will help to =
know advantages/disadvantages of this document in compare with the current =
privacy proposals.


Thank you,
Tina

-----Original Message-----
From: Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hosnieh Rafi=
ee
Sent: Thursday, July 10, 2014 1:37 PM
To: dnsop@ietf.com; Int-area@ietf.org
Subject: [Int-area] Comment?

Folks,

Does my updated document sufficiently addresses any technical concerns as w=
ell as comments/editorial nits?

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rafiee-intarea-cga-tsig-09=20

Best,
Hosnieh

_______________________________________________
Int-area mailing list
Int-area@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area


From nobody Wed Jul 16 10:10:15 2014
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Hi, all,

I'm including INTAREA in the discussion because this doc seems to be an 
end-run around intending to deprecate IPv6 HBH options, or at least to 
redefine the option behavior bits defined in RFC 2460. IMO, that ought 
to be addressed in INTAREA, not V6OPS.

IMO, the real DOS attack here is twofold:

	1) vendors who misrepresent their boxes as IPv6-capable
	at a given packet rate

	2) documents, such as this,
	that invert the Postel Principle into the Gont Principle:

	- Postel Principle:
		Be conservative in what you send
		and liberal in what you receive.

	- Gont Principle:
		Be paranoid in what you receive.

Just because you receive something you didn't expect, does NOT make it 
an attack.

I sincerely hope there are others who share this view, or we might as 
well just go straight to the conclusion that IPv6 routers that can't 
process 128-bit addresses really ought to be OK just forwarding based on 
the last 32.

Joe

On 7/15/2014 5:44 PM, Fernando Gont wrote:
> On 07/15/2014 09:36 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
>>
>> On 7/15/2014 5:08 PM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>>> The problem with both of these great inventions is that a single
>>> box on the path that takes the "drop" option breaks everything,
>>> whereas "ignore" at least provides best effort service and
>>> protects against any specific attack on the middlebox.
>>> As far as the destination host goes, HbH can't be any more
>>> dangerous than a destination option.
>>
>> IPv6 already indicates - inside the option type - what to do if an
>> option isn't supported.
>>
>> Why is honoring that set of flags not the only correct behavior?
>
> Because, with the world as we know it, that ends up killing performance
> -- with the corresponding implications (DoS) in extreme cases.
>
> Cheers,
>


From nobody Wed Jul 16 15:13:28 2014
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [OPSEC] [v6ops] I-D Action: draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-00.txt
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On Wed, 16 Jul 2014, Joe Touch wrote:
JT> I'm including INTAREA in the discussion because this doc seems to be an
JT> end-run around intending to deprecate IPv6 HBH options, or at least to
JT> redefine the option behavior bits defined in RFC 2460. IMO, that ought to be
JT> addressed in INTAREA, not V6OPS.

I think this would be within the purview, not of INTAREA, but of 6MAN, which, as 
noted by Brian Carpenter earlier in this thread, has recently spoken the subject:

On Mon, 14 Jul 2014, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
BEC> In fact, RFC [7045] changes that:
BEC> 
BEC> > 2.2.  Hop-by-Hop Options
BEC> > 
BEC> >    The IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Options header SHOULD be processed by
BEC> >    intermediate forwarding nodes as described in [RFC2460].  However, it
BEC> >    is to be expected that high-performance routers will either ignore it
BEC> >    or assign packets containing it to a slow processing path. 
BEC> 
BEC> You could s/must/should/.
BEC> 
BEC> More important:
BEC> 
BEC> > 2.3.1.5. Advice
BEC> > 
BEC> >    Intermediate systems should, by default, drop packets containing a
BEC> >    IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option Extension Header.
BEC> 
BEC> You can't say that! Firstly, RFC 7045 makes it permissible to
BEC> simply ignore them. That's the simplest DoS defence. Secondly,
BEC> well, dropping them is the wrong default because it breaks stuff.
BEC> You could discuss whether to inspect them for valid contents, and
BEC> you could discuss rate-limiting, which I understand some vendors
BEC> support already.


JT> IMO, the real DOS attack here is twofold:
JT> 
JT> 	1) vendors who misrepresent their boxes as IPv6-capable
JT> 	at a given packet rate
JT> 
JT> 	2) documents, such as this,
JT> 	that invert the Postel Principle into the Gont Principle:
JT> 
JT> 	- Postel Principle:
JT> 		Be conservative in what you send
JT> 		and liberal in what you receive.
JT> 
JT> 	- Gont Principle:
JT> 		Be paranoid in what you receive.
JT> 
JT> Just because you receive something you didn't expect, does NOT make it an
JT> attack.
JT> 
JT> I sincerely hope there are others who share this view, or we might as well
JT> just go straight to the conclusion that IPv6 routers that can't process
JT> 128-bit addresses really ought to be OK just forwarding based on the last 32.

I've complained before about "default deny" bias harming the internet, and so have 
many others.  It is a real problem.  And it appears that both of the factors you
mention are responsible for large-scale dropping of packets with IPv6 fragment 
headers in today's Internet.

That being said, it is a different and more hostile Internet than in Postel's day.  
Under the Postel Principle, something useless but harmless (w.g., the IPv4 stream 
ID option) would be ignored; nowadays, you will probably find consensus that it is 
OK, or even desirable, to block things like that.  In fairness to Mr. Gont, this 
draft is MUCH better that the initial versions of the corresponding IPv4 options 
filtering document.  Even it I don't agree with all of them, the filtering 
recommendations in this draft do seem to motivated by legitimate operational 
concerns, not blanket paranoia.

I think we should move further discussion back to OPSEC and V6OPS.

//cmh


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On 7/16/2014 3:13 PM, C. M. Heard wrote:
> Even it I don't agree with all of them, the filtering
> recommendations in this draft do seem to motivated by legitimate operational
> concerns, not blanket paranoia.

They need to be characterized as what they are:

	- an attempt to accommodate devices that are NOT IPv6-compliant

I agree that there are legitimate operational concerns, but redefining 
the behavior or the IPv6 flags is not the purview of operational or 
management groups in the IETF.

If these features cannot be supported, then deprecate them through 
standards-track updates, not by de-facto deprecation through operational 
neutering.

Joe


From nobody Thu Jul 17 14:34:26 2014
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Hi, Joe,

On 07/16/2014 11:09 AM, Joe Touch wrote:
> 
> I'm including INTAREA in the discussion because this doc seems to be an
> end-run around intending to deprecate IPv6 HBH options, or at least to
> redefine the option behavior bits defined in RFC 2460. IMO, that ought
> to be addressed in INTAREA, not V6OPS.

May I ask if you have read the I-D? Because this document is not trying
to do any of the above. It simply aims at providing operational advice
on how to filter packets with IPv6 EHs/options.



> IMO, the real DOS attack here is twofold:
> 
>     1) vendors who misrepresent their boxes as IPv6-capable
>     at a given packet rate
>     2) documents, such as this,
>     that invert the Postel Principle into the Gont Principle:
> 
>     - Postel Principle:
>         Be conservative in what you send
>         and liberal in what you receive.
> 
>     - Gont Principle:
>         Be paranoid in what you receive.

This document doesn't follow the "be paranoid principle" (if there's
such a thing): It recommends to pass lots of stuff that that, if you
were really paranoid, you wouldn't pass.

And while Postel principle's aims at interoperability, here we're
talking about avoiding some specific traffic from breaking your network.
SO I don't really follow your analysis.


> I sincerely hope there are others who share this view,

What's "this view"? Have you followed the thread with Brian Carpenter
regarding ignoring rather than dropping HBH?


>  or we might as
> well just go straight to the conclusion that IPv6 routers that can't
> process 128-bit addresses really ought to be OK just forwarding based on
> the last 32.

This document is an operations-related document, not a std track one. As
such, it provides advice to the folks *running* the routers not the
folks manufacturing them.

Just for the sake of reality check:

Packet drops rates for different traffic types (and, within parenthesis,
the percentage of such drops occurring in a different AS):

   +--------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
   |   Dataset    |       DO8       |       HBH8      |     FH512      |
   +--------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
   |     Web      |      11.88%     |      40.70%     |     30.51%     |
   |              | (17.60%-20.80%) | (31.43%-40.00%) | (5.08%-6.78%)  |
   +--------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
   | Mailservers  |      17.07%     |      48.86%     |     39.17%     |
   |              |  (6.35%-26.98%) | (40.50%-65.42%) | (2.91%-12.73%) |
   +--------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+
   | Namerservers |      15.37%     |      43.25%     |     38.55%     |
   |              | (14.29%-33.46%) | (42.49%-72.07%) | (3.90%-13.96%) |
   +--------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+

Yes: over 40% of packet drop rate for HBH, already. And quite a few
folks (e.g. Google) drop all packets that contain IPv6 EHs.

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
e-mail: fernando@gont.com.ar || fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1




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On 7/17/2014 1:59 PM, Fernando Gont wrote:
> On 07/16/2014 11:09 AM, Joe Touch wrote:
>> >
>> >I'm including INTAREA in the discussion because this doc seems to be an
>> >end-run around intending to deprecate IPv6 HBH options, or at least to
>> >redefine the option behavior bits defined in RFC 2460. IMO, that ought
>> >to be addressed in INTAREA, not V6OPS.
 >
> May I ask if you have read the I-D? Because this document is not trying
> to do any of the above. ...

 From draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-00.txt:

2.3.1.5. Advice

    Intermediate systems should, by default, drop packets containing a
    IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option Extension Header.

The currently required behavior of HBH option type "00" in RFC2460:

4.2 Options

    Two of the currently-defined extension headers -- the Hop-by-Hop
    Options header and the Destination Options header -- carry a variable
    number of type-length-value (TLV) encoded "options", of the following
    format:
...
    The Option Type identifiers are internally encoded such that their
    highest-order two bits specify the action that must be taken if the
    processing IPv6 node does not recognize the Option Type:

       00 - skip over this option and continue processing the header.

       ...


From nobody Thu Jul 17 15:04:10 2014
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] [v6ops] [OPSEC] I-D Action: draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-00.txt
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On 07/17/2014 02:11 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
> 
> 
> On 7/16/2014 3:13 PM, C. M. Heard wrote:
>> Even it I don't agree with all of them, the filtering
>> recommendations in this draft do seem to motivated by legitimate
>> operational
>> concerns, not blanket paranoia.
> 
> They need to be characterized as what they are:
> 
>     - an attempt to accommodate devices that are NOT IPv6-compliant

I'd have a hard time coming uup with a vendor/device that can process
IPv6 packets with HBH header with the same performance as regular
packets. So.. are you suggesting that we start claiming that "we
currently do not know of any ipv6-compliant routers", or what? (fwiw, I
expect you are not)



> I agree that there are legitimate operational concerns, but redefining
> the behavior or the IPv6 flags is not the purview of operational or
> management groups in the IETF.

We're not redefining anything. We're just saying "look, if you're
running an IPv6 network, this is probably the most sane thing to do".
Having that sane advice doesn't prevent you from doing something else if
you know better, if you want to allow everything withing your
organization, or if you just don't care if your network melts down.

Cheers,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492





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Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 16:05:52 -0600
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Hi, Mike,

On 07/16/2014 04:13 PM, C. M. Heard wrote:
> OK, or even desirable, to block things like that.  In fairness to Mr. Gont, this 
> draft is MUCH better that the initial versions of the corresponding IPv4 options 
> filtering document.

Thanks. And it's an individual -00 version. Nothing is set on stone.


  Even it I don't agree with all of them, the filtering
> recommendations in this draft do seem to motivated by legitimate operational 
> concerns, not blanket paranoia.
> 
> I think we should move further discussion back to OPSEC and V6OPS.

Agree.

Thanks!
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492





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On 7/17/2014 3:03 PM, Fernando Gont wrote:
> On 07/17/2014 02:11 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7/16/2014 3:13 PM, C. M. Heard wrote:
>>> Even it I don't agree with all of them, the filtering
>>> recommendations in this draft do seem to motivated by legitimate
>>> operational
>>> concerns, not blanket paranoia.
>>
>> They need to be characterized as what they are:
>>
>>      - an attempt to accommodate devices that are NOT IPv6-compliant
>
> I'd have a hard time coming uup with a vendor/device that can process
> IPv6 packets with HBH header with the same performance as regular
> packets. So.. are you suggesting that we start claiming that "we
> currently do not know of any ipv6-compliant routers", or what? (fwiw, I
> expect you are not)

If we are, then it's time to adjust RFC2460.

IMO, we ought to:

	- define the features/capabilities we think are necessary

	- require that anything that doesn't support what's necessary
	as non-compliant

Otherwise, you're just un-doing all the work that goes into the 
standards process in the first place. All because you think that 
anything you don't expect is an attack. It isn't. It just means you're 
not prepared.

Joe


From nobody Thu Jul 17 21:34:50 2014
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On 07/17/2014 04:38 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
>>>
>>> They need to be characterized as what they are:
>>>
>>>      - an attempt to accommodate devices that are NOT IPv6-compliant
>>
>> I'd have a hard time coming uup with a vendor/device that can process
>> IPv6 packets with HBH header with the same performance as regular
>> packets. So.. are you suggesting that we start claiming that "we
>> currently do not know of any ipv6-compliant routers", or what? (fwiw, I
>> expect you are not)
> 
> If we are, then it's time to adjust RFC2460.

I disagree. Operational policy != protocol specification. Actually, the
IETF can do whatever it wants with the protocol specs, but not that much
with the operational stuff (other than providing *advice* -- because ops
folks can do whatever they want with their networks).


> IMO, we ought to:
> 
>     - define the features/capabilities we think are necessary
> 
>     - require that anything that doesn't support what's necessary
>     as non-compliant
> 
> Otherwise, you're just un-doing all the work that goes into the
> standards process in the first place. All because you think that
> anything you don't expect is an attack. It isn't. It just means you're
> not prepared.

We seem to be in disagreement. If anything, anything that I don't want
is not an attack, but rather an unnecessary attack surface. But again,
please read the I-D... because it really doesn't follow that reasoning.

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492





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On Fri, Jul 18, 2014 at 12:21 AM, Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> wrote:
> On 07/17/2014 04:38 PM, Joe Touch wrote:
>>>>
>>>> They need to be characterized as what they are:
>>>>
>>>>      - an attempt to accommodate devices that are NOT IPv6-compliant
>>>
>>> I'd have a hard time coming uup with a vendor/device that can process
>>> IPv6 packets with HBH header with the same performance as regular
>>> packets. So.. are you suggesting that we start claiming that "we
>>> currently do not know of any ipv6-compliant routers", or what? (fwiw, I
>>> expect you are not)
>>
>> If we are, then it's time to adjust RFC2460.
>
> I disagree. Operational policy != protocol specification. Actually, the
> IETF can do whatever it wants with the protocol specs, but not that much
> with the operational stuff (other than providing *advice* -- because ops
> folks can do whatever they want with their networks).
>
>
>> IMO, we ought to:
>>
>>     - define the features/capabilities we think are necessary
>>
>>     - require that anything that doesn't support what's necessary
>>     as non-compliant
>>
>> Otherwise, you're just un-doing all the work that goes into the
>> standards process in the first place. All because you think that
>> anything you don't expect is an attack. It isn't. It just means you're
>> not prepared.
>
> We seem to be in disagreement. If anything, anything that I don't want
> is not an attack, but rather an unnecessary attack surface.

Related to this is
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-taylor-v6ops-fragdrop-02 -- Why
Operators Filter Fragments and What It Implies

This expired, but I suspect we may need to revive it...

W

> But again,
> please read the I-D... because it really doesn't follow that reasoning.
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Fernando Gont
> SI6 Networks
> e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
> PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> OPSEC mailing list
> OPSEC@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsec


From nobody Mon Jul 21 07:15:59 2014
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From: "Hosnieh Rafiee" <ietf@rozanak.com>
To: <Int-area@ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2014 16:15:08 +0200
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Subject: [Int-area] Waiting for your questions after my presentation :-)
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Folks, 

I am presenting cga-tsig in intarea. Here you can find the slides (probably
in IETF website you can also find the same version. )

There are supplementary slides which summarized the whole draft for those
who are busy with IETF sessions. I will not cover them during my
presentation unless there are questions regarding them. So, I would ask you
to skim on them before intarea session and if there are any questions or
problems with them, please ask after my presentation.
So, in my presentation I presume that you have reviewed at least these
slides so I only focus on the changes and comparison that I tried to made
with other DNS mechanisms (DNS privacy mechanisms with different criterias.
It was actually a very short time for this comparison but I did my best to
be fair in this regard. If I missed anything, I would also appreciate your
comments on them because I am going to update cga-tsig draft with a section
in introduction (as Tina and Dan asked)


<http://rozanak.com/cga-tsig.pdf > 

Waiting for your comments and questions. :-)
Thanks,
Best,
Hosnieh

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From nobody Wed Jul 23 04:57:35 2014
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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: Suresh Krishnan <suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com>, Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in>, "Ted Lemon (Ted.Lemon@nominum.com)" <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>
Thread-Topic: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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Hi Alissa, all,

Please see inline.

Cheers,
Med

>-----Message d'origine-----
>De=A0: Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org] De la part de Suresh
>Krishnan
>Envoy=E9=A0: vendredi 20 juin 2014 06:42
>=C0=A0: Alissa Cooper; Internet Area
>Objet=A0: Re: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host=
-
>identifier-scenarios-04
>
>Hi Alissa,
>
>On 06/19/2014 06:38 PM, Alissa Cooper wrote:
>> I guess it is a feature of area WGs that the sequence of work items is
>> not well-defined in advance of taking up any particular work items, nor
>> are those work items correlated to WG milestones (I looked at the
>> intarea milestones, dated to 2010, so I assume milestones are not used
>> in this group).
>
>Yes. This is correct. The intarea working group does not have any
>defined milestones. Most of the work we take up is one-off kind of items
>and these are not really anticipated ahead of time.
>
>
>> In the case of the host ID work, this seems particularly
>> unfortunate. I don't think it's often the case that a draft outlining
>> solutions is published in advance of a draft that describes use cases
>> for those solutions, but that seems to be the direction of the effort
>> here.
>
>Yes. It is unfortunate. When the draft that became RFC6967 was taken up
>in intarea, it was fairly controversial (as is all work in this space)
>and no further work was anticipated. The draft in question was
>originally going through an AD sponsored route (Joel Jaeggli - OPS).
>Joel posted in intarea to get some opinions on this draft since RFC6269
>and RFC6967 were produced here. Based on the ensuing discussion Joel
>felt that the draft was better pursued in intarea.

[Med] The initial scope of RFC6967 is limited to the CGN/A+P/proxies cases =
as a follow-up to RFC6269. The intent at that time was not to explore wheth=
er other deployment scenarios are suffering from the same issues as in RFC6=
967. The scenarios draft go one step further as it tries to draw a broad pi=
cture by listing deployment scenarios that share the same root problem.

>
><snipped>
>
>> To me what would be useful here would be a document that points out new
>> problems beyond those identified in RFC 6269 that arise in
>> address-sharing or tunneled architectures not already contemplated in
>> that document. If there aren't new problems, then I'm not sure why 6269
>> is not considered a sufficient description of the problem space.

[Med] Some comments here:
* RFC6269 is cited in the scenarios drafts.=20
* RFC6269 and this scenarios I-D are not conflicting.=20
* Furthermore, there are new issues that are raised in the scenarios draft =
but are not discussed in RFC6269. We have taken into account this comment i=
n the new revision of the draft available (see the diff https://www.ietf.or=
g/rfcdiff?url1=3Ddraft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-05&difft=
ype=3D--html&submit=3DGo!&url2=3Ddraft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-sc=
enarios-07) and also in the slides presented in the intarea session (slides=
 5 and 6 of http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/90/slides/slides-90-intarea-1.p=
df).

 If
>> there are new problems, then between RFC 6269 and the new draft there
>> would be a fairly comprehensive list of them documented,

[Med] -06 of the draft included this text:

An exhaustive list of encountered issues for the Carrier
   Grade NAT, A+P, and Application Proxies scenarios are documented in
   [RFC6269].  In addition to those issues, some of the scenarios
   described in this document suffer from additional issues such as:

   o  Identify which policy to enforce for a subscriber/UE (e.g., limit
      access to the service based on some counters such as volume-based
      service offering); enforcing the policy will have impact on all
      hosts sharing the same IP address.
   o  Need to correlate between the internal address:port and external
      address:port to generate and therefore to enforce policies.
   o  Query a location server for the location of an emergency caller
      based on the source IP address.


In addition to this text we added also new text to explain why RFC6967 may =
not be appropriate for scenarios that are local to a single administrative =
domain:=20

   This document can be used as a tool to design solution(s) mitigating
   the encountered issues.  Describing the scenario allows to identify
   what is common between the scenarios and then would help during the
   solution design phase.  Note, [RFC6967] focuses only on the CGN, A+P,
   and application proxies cases.  The analysis in [RFC6967] may not be
   accurate for some of the scenarios that do not span multiple
   administrative domains (e.g., Section 10.1).

 and that could
>> provide a foundation for figuring out how to solve some or all of them,

[Med] The scenario draft does not ambition to define solutions but the sket=
ch the big picture of the problem space. We added this new text to the publ=
ished -06:

   This document does not include any solution-specific discussion. =20


>> whether some of them have existing solutions, and how potential new
>> solutions relate to embedding a unique host identifier at the network or
>> transport layer.

[Med] This draft does not assume injecting a host identifier is the only so=
lution to mitigate encountered problems for all scenarios. We added this ne=
w text to -06 to call out this point:

   In
   particular, the document does not elaborate whether explicit
   authentication is enabled or not.  Moreover, this document does not
   discuss whether specific information is needed to be leaked in
   packets, whether this is achieved out-of-band, etc.  Those
   considerations are out of scope.

>
>I think this is a good idea.


From nobody Wed Jul 23 05:12:07 2014
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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: "mohamed.boucadair@orange.com" <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
Thread-Topic: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 12:11:57 +0000
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References: <CFC8AC41.41E79%alissa@cooperw.in> <E87B771635882B4BA20096B589152EF6287695E1@eusaamb107.ericsson.se> <787AE7BB302AE849A7480A190F8B93300396C7@OPEXCLILM23.corporate.adroot.infra.ftgroup>
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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Hi,

I wanted to repeat my comment from the meeting. Given that at least in =
my read of RFC6967, there exist to sane mechanism to even exchange host =
IDs across the network, I don't really see why INTAREA should spend any =
more time on this space.=20

Lars

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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: "Internet Area (int-area@ietf.org)" <int-area@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
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Subject: [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
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Hi all,

Lars raised a point about draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios=
 that is basically to question whether it is worth continuing this effort i=
f no viable solutions can be designed to solve this problem.

I do agree this is a fair point. I have several comments to make here:


*         The lack of a recommendation in RFC6967 should not be interpreted=
 as there is no working solution.

*         The analysis in RFC6967 is specific to particular cases that span=
 many administrative domains (read CGN). So, the drawbacks of several solut=
ions discussed in RFC6967 are irrelevant for scenarios that are restricted =
to a single administrative domain (or where an administrative relationship =
is setup between involved parties).

*         The IETF recognizes there are solutions for specific applications=
: RFC7239 was published after RFC6967!

*         Some solutions such as the use of an IP option are viable ones wh=
en involved devices are under the control of the same administrative entity=
.

*         Some of the scenarios can be solved by protocol extensions (e.g.,=
 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal-01, querying the=
 MIB in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-nat-mib-11, announcing=
 port sets http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-ip-port-radius-ext-=
01, etc.) without requiring injecting an identifier in the packet.

*         I know Lars is not supportive to the use of a TCP option, but IMH=
O the use of a tcp option is superior to RFC7239. The TCP option is a worki=
ng solution for the TCP proxy, https and other scenarios.

*         Stephen (Farrel) mentioned in the list he has concerns with RFC72=
39 and a better solution that would preserve privacy should be considered.

The rationale in the scenarios draft is as follows: instead of advancing sp=
ecifications that are scoped to a specific scenario, it is worth having a m=
eans that will help linking all these scenarios to hopefully make common so=
lutions possible.

Cheers,
Med

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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"FR" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">Hi all,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"FR" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">Lars raised a point about draft-boucadair-intarea-host-ide=
ntifier-scenarios that is basically to question whether it is worth continu=
ing this effort if no viable solutions can be
 designed to solve this problem.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">I do agree this is a fair point. I have several comments t=
o make here:
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&middot;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &q=
uot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">The lack of a recommendation in RFC6967 should not=
 be interpreted as there is no working solution.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&middot;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &q=
uot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">The analysis in RFC6967 is specific to particular =
cases that span many administrative domains (read CGN). So, the drawbacks o=
f several solutions discussed in RFC6967 are
 irrelevant for scenarios that are restricted to a single administrative do=
main (or where an administrative relationship is setup between involved par=
ties).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&middot;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &q=
uot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">The IETF recognizes there are solutions for specif=
ic applications: RFC7239 was published after RFC6967!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&middot;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &q=
uot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">Some solutions such as the use of an IP option are=
 viable ones when involved devices are under the control of the same admini=
strative entity.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&middot;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &q=
uot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">Some of the scenarios can be solved by protocol ex=
tensions (e.g.,
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal-01">ht=
tp://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal-01</a>, querying th=
e MIB in
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-nat-mib-11">http://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-nat-mib-11</a>, announcing port sets
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-ip-port-radius-ext-=
01">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-ip-port-radius-ext-01</a>,=
 etc.) without requiring injecting an identifier in the packet.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&middot;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &q=
uot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">I know Lars is not supportive to the use of a TCP =
option, but IMHO the use of a tcp option is superior to RFC7239. The TCP op=
tion is a working solution for the TCP proxy,
 https and other scenarios. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo1"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">&middot;<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &q=
uot;Times New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">Stephen (Farrel) mentioned in the list he has conc=
erns with RFC7239 and a better solution that would preserve privacy should =
be considered.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">The rationale in the scenarios draft is as follows: instea=
d of advancing specifications that are scoped to a specific scenario, it is=
 worth having a means that will help linking all
 these scenarios to hopefully make common solutions possible. <o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: BOUCADAIR Mohamed IMT/OLN <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>, "Internet Area (int-area@ietf.org)" <int-area@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
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Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 12:42:23 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
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--_000_f245bf40d678432aab3116c5f354ae2cOPEXCLILH02corporateadr_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I figure out this text: "and a better solution that would preserve privacy =
should be considered." may not reflect exactly the point made by Stephen, s=
o I'm inserting his words:


"I'd be delighted if those who could get a better solution

implemented/deployed were to attempt to try to address the

privacy issues with XFF but it seems that at least in that

case relevant folks don't care (sufficiently;-) deeply about

our privacy to go do that."

Cheers,
Med

De : Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org] De la part de mohamed.bouc=
adair@orange.com
Envoy=E9 : mercredi 23 juillet 2014 14:33
=C0 : Internet Area (int-area@ietf.org)
Cc : draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios@tools.ietf.org
Objet : [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identi=
fier-scenarios)

Hi all,

Lars raised a point about draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios=
 that is basically to question whether it is worth continuing this effort i=
f no viable solutions can be designed to solve this problem.

I do agree this is a fair point. I have several comments to make here:


=B7         The lack of a recommendation in RFC6967 should not be interpret=
ed as there is no working solution.

=B7         The analysis in RFC6967 is specific to particular cases that sp=
an many administrative domains (read CGN). So, the drawbacks of several sol=
utions discussed in RFC6967 are irrelevant for scenarios that are restricte=
d to a single administrative domain (or where an administrative relationshi=
p is setup between involved parties).

=B7         The IETF recognizes there are solutions for specific applicatio=
ns: RFC7239 was published after RFC6967!

=B7         Some solutions such as the use of an IP option are viable ones =
when involved devices are under the control of the same administrative enti=
ty.

=B7         Some of the scenarios can be solved by protocol extensions (e.g=
., http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal-01, querying t=
he MIB in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-nat-mib-11, announci=
ng port sets http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-ip-port-radius-ex=
t-01, etc.) without requiring injecting an identifier in the packet.

=B7         I know Lars is not supportive to the use of a TCP option, but I=
MHO the use of a tcp option is superior to RFC7239. The TCP option is a wor=
king solution for the TCP proxy, https and other scenarios.

=B7         Stephen (Farrel) mentioned in the list he has concerns with RFC=
7239 and a better solution that would preserve privacy should be considered=
.

The rationale in the scenarios draft is as follows: instead of advancing sp=
ecifications that are scoped to a specific scenario, it is worth having a m=
eans that will help linking all these scenarios to hopefully make common so=
lutions possible.

Cheers,
Med

--_000_f245bf40d678432aab3116c5f354ae2cOPEXCLILH02corporateadr_
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:#1F497D">I figure out this text:
</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Courier New&quot;"=
>&#8220;and a better solution that would preserve privacy should be conside=
red.&#8221; may not reflect exactly the point made by Stephen, so I&#8217;m=
 inserting his words:
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">&#8220;I'd be delighted if those who could get a =
better solution<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">implemented/deployed were to attempt to try to ad=
dress the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">privacy issues with XFF but it seems that at leas=
t in that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">case relevant folks don't care (sufficiently;-) d=
eeply about<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoPlainText">our privacy to go do that.&#8221;<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">Med</span><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quo=
t;Courier New&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;;color:#1F497D"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
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<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><b><span lang=3D"FR" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-=
family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;">De&nbsp;:</span></b><span=
 lang=3D"FR" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot=
;sans-serif&quot;"> Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org]
<b>De la part de</b> mohamed.boucadair@orange.com<br>
<b>Envoy=E9&nbsp;:</b> mercredi 23 juillet 2014 14:33<br>
<b>=C0&nbsp;:</b> Internet Area (int-area@ietf.org)<br>
<b>Cc&nbsp;:</b> draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios@tools.ie=
tf.org<br>
<b>Objet&nbsp;:</b> [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea=
-host-identifier-scenarios)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"FR" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;">Hi all,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span lang=3D"FR" style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-fam=
ily:&quot;Courier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">Lars raised a point about draft-boucadair-intarea-host-ide=
ntifier-scenarios that is basically to question whether it is worth continu=
ing this effort if no viable solutions can be
 designed to solve this problem.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">I do agree this is a fair point. I have several comments t=
o make here:
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo2"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">=B7<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">The lack of a recommendation in RFC6967 should not=
 be interpreted as there is no working solution.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo2"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">=B7<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">The analysis in RFC6967 is specific to particular =
cases that span many administrative domains (read CGN). So, the drawbacks o=
f several solutions discussed in RFC6967 are
 irrelevant for scenarios that are restricted to a single administrative do=
main (or where an administrative relationship is setup between involved par=
ties).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo2"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">=B7<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">The IETF recognizes there are solutions for specif=
ic applications: RFC7239 was published after RFC6967!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo2"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">=B7<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">Some solutions such as the use of an IP option are=
 viable ones when involved devices are under the control of the same admini=
strative entity.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo2"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">=B7<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">Some of the scenarios can be solved by protocol ex=
tensions (e.g.,
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal-01">ht=
tp://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal-01</a>, querying th=
e MIB in
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-nat-mib-11">http://=
tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-nat-mib-11</a>, announcing port sets
<a href=3D"http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-ip-port-radius-ext-=
01">http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-ip-port-radius-ext-01</a>,=
 etc.) without requiring injecting an identifier in the packet.<o:p></o:p><=
/span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo2"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">=B7<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">I know Lars is not supportive to the use of a TCP =
option, but IMHO the use of a tcp option is superior to RFC7239. The TCP op=
tion is a working solution for the TCP proxy,
 https and other scenarios. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoListParagraph" style=3D"text-indent:-18.0pt;mso-list:l0 leve=
l1 lfo2"><![if !supportLists]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:S=
ymbol"><span style=3D"mso-list:Ignore">=B7<span style=3D"font:7.0pt &quot;T=
imes New Roman&quot;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
</span></span></span><![endif]><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:=
&quot;Courier New&quot;">Stephen (Farrel) mentioned in the list he has conc=
erns with RFC7239 and a better solution that would preserve privacy should =
be considered.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">The rationale in the scenarios draft is as follows: instea=
d of advancing specifications that are scoped to a specific scenario, it is=
 worth having a means that will help linking all
 these scenarios to hopefully make common solutions possible. <o:p></o:p></=
span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">Cheers,<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class=3D"MsoNormal"><span style=3D"font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Co=
urier New&quot;">Med<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>

--_000_f245bf40d678432aab3116c5f354ae2cOPEXCLILH02corporateadr_--


From nobody Wed Jul 23 06:01:06 2014
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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On Jul 23, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
> I wanted to repeat my comment from the meeting. Given that at least in =
my read of RFC6967, there exist to sane mechanism to even exchange host =
IDs across the network, I don't really see why INTAREA should spend any =
more time on this space.=20

Lars, the end user definitely has a trust relationship with the ISP from =
whom they purchase service.   Typically they have a password that works =
for authentication, but additionally it's common practice to use the =
fact that a device is connected over a particular circuit as proof that =
the person using the device is allowed to use the services the ISP =
provides.   So I am puzzled as to why this problem seems intractable to =
you.

As to which area ought to do this, that's obviously an open issue, since =
we don't even have a BoF yet.   This would certainly be a cross-area =
issue if the not-yet-existent working group finds that they cannot use =
existing technology to solve the problem.


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Hi Med,

On 24/07/2014 00:32, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
...
> *         The IETF recognizes there are solutions for specific applications: RFC7239 was published after RFC6967!

It isn't really a surprise that a specific application layer can add
any information about the path that it wants to application layer messages,
nor that these additions can nullify any privacy protection built into
lower layers. SMTP has done this very effectively for many years.
RFC 7239 is way for HTTP to do the same...

I don't see that as very informative about the issue of generic
Internet-layer host ID issues, but it is very informative about the
chances of globally enforcing privacy protection.

   Brian


From nobody Wed Jul 23 06:23:30 2014
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On 7/23/14, 8:42 AM, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> I figure out this text: =93and a better solution that would preserve
> privacy should be considered.=94 may not reflect exactly the point made=
 by
> Stephen, so I=92m inserting his words:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =93I'd be delighted if those who could get a better solution
>=20
> implemented/deployed were to attempt to try to address the
>=20
> privacy issues with XFF but it seems that at least in that
>=20
> case relevant folks don't care (sufficiently;-) deeply about
>=20
> our privacy to go do that.=94

The proposal for a HIAPS bof staked out a particular position with
respect to this

  "First it has to be ensured that the server on the receiver side is
well justified
  to receive the   information. Next it will be granted that the
communication is
  not visible to on-path observers using the most state-of-art ways of
securing
  the communication."

I found that acceptable, it is however incompatible with some of the
proposed solutions.

> Cheers,
>=20
> Med
>=20
> =20
>=20
> *De :*Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org] *De la part de*
> mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
> *Envoy=E9 :* mercredi 23 juillet 2014 14:33
> *=C0 :* Internet Area (int-area@ietf.org)
> *Cc :* draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios@tools.ietf.org=

> *Objet :* [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment
> (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Hi all,
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Lars raised a point about
> draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios that is basically to
> question whether it is worth continuing this effort if no viable
> solutions can be designed to solve this problem.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> I do agree this is a fair point. I have several comments to make here:
>=20
> =20
>=20
> =B7         The lack of a recommendation in RFC6967 should not be
> interpreted as there is no working solution.
>=20
> =B7         The analysis in RFC6967 is specific to particular cases tha=
t
> span many administrative domains (read CGN). So, the drawbacks of
> several solutions discussed in RFC6967 are irrelevant for scenarios tha=
t
> are restricted to a single administrative domain (or where an
> administrative relationship is setup between involved parties).
>=20
> =B7         The IETF recognizes there are solutions for specific
> applications: RFC7239 was published after RFC6967!
>=20
> =B7         Some solutions such as the use of an IP option are viable o=
nes
> when involved devices are under the control of the same administrative
> entity.
>=20
> =B7         Some of the scenarios can be solved by protocol extensions
> (e.g., http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal-01,
> querying the MIB in
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-nat-mib-11, announcing por=
t
> sets http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-ip-port-radius-ext-01=
,
> etc.) without requiring injecting an identifier in the packet.
>=20
> =B7         I know Lars is not supportive to the use of a TCP option, b=
ut
> IMHO the use of a tcp option is superior to RFC7239. The TCP option is =
a
> working solution for the TCP proxy, https and other scenarios.
>=20
> =B7         Stephen (Farrel) mentioned in the list he has concerns with=

> RFC7239 and a better solution that would preserve privacy should be
> considered.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> The rationale in the scenarios draft is as follows: instead of advancin=
g
> specifications that are scoped to a specific scenario, it is worth
> having a means that will help linking all these scenarios to hopefully
> make common solutions possible.
>=20
> =20
>=20
> Cheers,
>=20
> Med
>=20
>=20
>=20
> _______________________________________________
> Int-area mailing list
> Int-area@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area
>=20



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From nobody Wed Jul 23 06:25:54 2014
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From: Behcet Sarikaya <sarikaya2012@gmail.com>
To: Ted Lemon <ted.lemon@nominum.com>
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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Hi Ted,


On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Ted Lemon <ted.lemon@nominum.com> wrote:
> On Jul 23, 2014, at 8:11 AM, Eggert, Lars <lars@netapp.com> wrote:
>> I wanted to repeat my comment from the meeting. Given that at least in m=
y read of RFC6967, there exist to sane mechanism to even exchange host IDs =
across the network, I don't really see why INTAREA should spend any more ti=
me on this space.
>
> Lars, the end user definitely has a trust relationship with the ISP from =
whom they purchase service.   Typically they have a password that works for=
 authentication, but additionally it's common practice to use the fact that=
 a device is connected over a particular circuit as proof that the person u=
sing the device is allowed to use the services the ISP provides.   So I am =
puzzled as to why this problem seems intractable to you.
>
> As to which area ought to do this, that's obviously an open issue, since =
we don't even have a BoF yet.   This would certainly be a cross-area issue =
if the not-yet-existent working group finds that they cannot use existing t=
echnology to solve the problem.
>

Dirk (cc'ed) and I had a BoF proposal (called hiaps) for IETF 89 which
was on this issue but it was more concentrated on the emergency call
use case because of an Liaison Statement that was sent from ETSI to
IETF.I also cc'ed Bruno who was involved from ETSI side.

We had withdrawn that BoF request and since then the intention was
that Intarea would do this work.

Are you recommending on getting back to hiaps?

Regards,

Behcet
> _______________________________________________
> Int-area mailing list
> Int-area@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area


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From: <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
To: joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>, "Internet Area (int-area@ietf.org)" <int-area@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
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Hi Joel,

This is indeed acceptable, in particular, for scenarios that are specific t=
o a single administrative domain or that requires an agreement between the =
entity that owns the information and the one that will make use of that inf=
ormation.=20

Cheers,
Med

>-----Message d'origine-----
>De=A0: joel jaeggli [mailto:joelja@bogus.com]
>Envoy=E9=A0: mercredi 23 juillet 2014 15:23
>=C0=A0: BOUCADAIR Mohamed IMT/OLN; Internet Area (int-area@ietf.org)
>Cc=A0: draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios@tools.ietf.org
>Objet=A0: Re: [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host=
-
>identifier-scenarios)
>
>On 7/23/14, 8:42 AM, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
>> I figure out this text: "and a better solution that would preserve
>> privacy should be considered." may not reflect exactly the point made by
>> Stephen, so I'm inserting his words:
>>
>>
>>
>> "I'd be delighted if those who could get a better solution
>>
>> implemented/deployed were to attempt to try to address the
>>
>> privacy issues with XFF but it seems that at least in that
>>
>> case relevant folks don't care (sufficiently;-) deeply about
>>
>> our privacy to go do that."
>
>The proposal for a HIAPS bof staked out a particular position with
>respect to this
>
>  "First it has to be ensured that the server on the receiver side is
>well justified
>  to receive the   information. Next it will be granted that the
>communication is
>  not visible to on-path observers using the most state-of-art ways of
>securing
>  the communication."
>
>I found that acceptable, it is however incompatible with some of the
>proposed solutions.
>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Med
>>
>>
>>
>> *De :*Int-area [mailto:int-area-bounces@ietf.org] *De la part de*
>> mohamed.boucadair@orange.com
>> *Envoy=E9 :* mercredi 23 juillet 2014 14:33
>> *=C0 :* Internet Area (int-area@ietf.org)
>> *Cc :* draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios@tools.ietf.org
>> *Objet :* [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment
>> (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>>
>>
>> Lars raised a point about
>> draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios that is basically to
>> question whether it is worth continuing this effort if no viable
>> solutions can be designed to solve this problem.
>>
>>
>>
>> I do agree this is a fair point. I have several comments to make here:
>>
>>
>>
>> =B7         The lack of a recommendation in RFC6967 should not be
>> interpreted as there is no working solution.
>>
>> =B7         The analysis in RFC6967 is specific to particular cases that
>> span many administrative domains (read CGN). So, the drawbacks of
>> several solutions discussed in RFC6967 are irrelevant for scenarios that
>> are restricted to a single administrative domain (or where an
>> administrative relationship is setup between involved parties).
>>
>> =B7         The IETF recognizes there are solutions for specific
>> applications: RFC7239 was published after RFC6967!
>>
>> =B7         Some solutions such as the use of an IP option are viable on=
es
>> when involved devices are under the control of the same administrative
>> entity.
>>
>> =B7         Some of the scenarios can be solved by protocol extensions
>> (e.g., http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-boucadair-pcp-nat-reveal-01,
>> querying the MIB in
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-behave-nat-mib-11, announcing port
>> sets http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-radext-ip-port-radius-ext-01,
>> etc.) without requiring injecting an identifier in the packet.
>>
>> =B7         I know Lars is not supportive to the use of a TCP option, bu=
t
>> IMHO the use of a tcp option is superior to RFC7239. The TCP option is a
>> working solution for the TCP proxy, https and other scenarios.
>>
>> =B7         Stephen (Farrel) mentioned in the list he has concerns with
>> RFC7239 and a better solution that would preserve privacy should be
>> considered.
>>
>>
>>
>> The rationale in the scenarios draft is as follows: instead of advancing
>> specifications that are scoped to a specific scenario, it is worth
>> having a means that will help linking all these scenarios to hopefully
>> make common solutions possible.
>>
>>
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Med
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Int-area mailing list
>> Int-area@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/int-area
>>
>


From nobody Wed Jul 23 06:38:19 2014
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From: Ted Lemon <ted.lemon@nominum.com>
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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On Jul 23, 2014, at 9:00 AM, Ted Lemon <ted.lemon@nominum.com> wrote:
> Lars, the end user definitely has a trust relationship with the ISP =
from whom they purchase service.   Typically they have a password that =
works for authentication, but additionally it's common practice to use =
the fact that a device is connected over a particular circuit as proof =
that the person using the device is allowed to use the services the ISP =
provides.   So I am puzzled as to why this problem seems intractable to =
you.
>=20
> As to which area ought to do this, that's obviously an open issue, =
since we don't even have a BoF yet.   This would certainly be a =
cross-area issue if the not-yet-existent working group finds that they =
cannot use existing technology to solve the problem.

This was a lack-of-coffee error.   I was commenting about something Lars =
said in a completely different context about a completely different =
proposal.   Please disregard what I said above.   Sorry for the =
resulting confusion.


From nobody Wed Jul 23 10:10:07 2014
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] L. Eggert's comment (draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios)
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I'd like to add some context from my viewpoint:

On 7/23/2014 5:32 AM, mohamed.boucadair@orange.com wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Lars raised a point about
> draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios that is basically to
> question whether it is worth continuing this effort if no viable
> solutions can be designed to solve this problem.
>
> I do agree this is a fair point. I have several comments to make here:
>
> ·The lack of a recommendation in RFC6967 should not be interpreted as
> there is no working solution.

Agreed. The WG decided not to make a recommendation - but that also 
means that the analysis in that doc should not be taken as a 
recommendation either. This doc claims that RFC6967 says that a TCP 
solution may be possible, but that was based on only one candidate TCP 
approach *and* the TCP approach was considered roughly equivalent to 5 
of the other 7 approaches.

> ·The analysis in RFC6967 is specific to particular cases that span many
> administrative domains (read CGN). So, the drawbacks of several
> solutions discussed in RFC6967 are irrelevant for scenarios that are
> restricted to a single administrative domain (or where an administrative
> relationship is setup between involved parties).

Or behind home NATs.

Joe


From nobody Thu Jul 31 12:14:18 2014
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To: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>,  "mohamed.boucadair@orange.com" <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
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Subject: Re: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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Hi Lars,

Thanks for this clear reiteration of the concern you raised in the meeting.

Your reading of RFC6967 conflicts with mine, though I wasn't involved in 
the discussions related to adoption of that RFC. While I don't see that 
it recommends any particular one of the approaches analyzed in the 
draft, I also don't see that it rules out all of the proposals, either. 
Certainly, it indicates that some of them are problematic (e.g. any 
proposal with a high performance impact and/or low success ratio). 
However, it doesn't indicate (to me at least) that none of the solutions 
have any merit.

Has your read of RFC6967 been presented as the general int-area 
consensus in past discussions about the RFC? Or would there be some 
value in probing the list a bit more on the topic?

--Brandon

On 07/23/2014 08:11 AM, Eggert, Lars wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I wanted to repeat my comment from the meeting. Given that at least in my read of RFC6967, there exist to sane mechanism to even exchange host IDs across the network, I don't really see why INTAREA should spend any more time on this space.
>
> Lars
>

-- 
Brandon Williams; Senior Principal Software Engineer
Emerging Products Engineering; Akamai Technologies Inc.


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From: "Eggert, Lars" <lars@netapp.com>
To: Brandon Williams <brandon.williams@akamai.com>
Thread-Topic: [Int-area] Call for adoption of draft-boucadair-intarea-host-identifier-scenarios-04
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Hi Brandon,

On 2014-7-31, at 21:14, Brandon Williams <brandon.williams@akamai.com> =
wrote:
> Has your read of RFC6967 been presented as the general int-area =
consensus in past discussions about the RFC? Or would there be some =
value in probing the list a bit more on the topic?

my takeaway from the RFC as certainly has not been confirmed as the =
consensus of the WG, and I did't mean to imply so. Establishing any =
consensus would be up to the chairs.

Lars

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From nobody Thu Jul 31 14:02:05 2014
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Thanks Lars. That's what I thought; I just wanted to be sure that I 
hadn't missed something by joining the discussion a bit later than others.

I would be interested in hearing more broadly from the list on the 
subject of whether RFC6967 justifies further int-area work on host 
identification. I'm not asking about any specific solution candidate, 
but rather whether the solution set as a whole shows enough promise. The 
authors of the scenarios draft think that RFC6967 justifies the 
continued work effort, but Lars and some others do not. I'd like to get 
some sense of which direction consensus is leaning in that regard.

Of course, if people have the sense that this isn't a useful line of 
inquiry, I'm receptive to that feedback too.

Thanks,
--Brandon

On 07/31/2014 03:45 PM, Eggert, Lars wrote:
> Hi Brandon,
>
> On 2014-7-31, at 21:14, Brandon Williams <brandon.williams@akamai.com> wrote:
>> Has your read of RFC6967 been presented as the general int-area consensus in past discussions about the RFC? Or would there be some value in probing the list a bit more on the topic?
>
> my takeaway from the RFC as certainly has not been confirmed as the consensus of the WG, and I did't mean to imply so. Establishing any consensus would be up to the chairs.
>
> Lars
>

-- 
Brandon Williams; Senior Principal Software Engineer
Emerging Products Engineering; Akamai Technologies Inc.

